“china syndrome”: new perceptions of globalization in europe

THE “CHINA SYNDROME”:
NEW PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION IN EUROPE
Sophie Meunier
Princeton University
Prepared for the Third Annual Princeton Workshop on European Integration
Princeton, May 4, 2011
Thanks to Christiane Lemke for comments on an earlier version and to Sabine Mair for research
assistance.
The relation between Europeans and economic globalization has long been ambiguous. In
Europe, perceptions of globalization are hard to disentangle from perceptions of European
integration because they have occurred in tandem. Europe has globalized itself and contributed to
globalization worldwide simultaneously. Yet perceptions of globalization in Europe have shifted,
sometimes dramatically, in recent years.
The reality is that Europe is one of the world’s biggest economic globalizers. Whether in
terms of extra-European trade or foreign direct investment, Europe is by many measures the
largest economic actor in the world. The European Union, acting as a single entity when it comes to
trade policy, is the world’s largest exporter of goods and services and is the biggest export market
for more than a hundred countries (European Union Commission, 2011). The combined GDP of the
EU 27 makes it the largest economy in the world. Taking this reality into account, Andrew
Moravcsik has argued that Europe is indeed one of the world’s superpowers, one that “exerts global
influence across the full spectrum from “hard” to “soft” power” (Moravcsik, 2010). Indeed, Europe
has been a central actor of globalization. The health of European economies, as well as their ability
to sustain their welfare benefits and standard of living, depend drastically on the opening and
existence of markets abroad for their goods and services, as well as on the investment of third
countries which provide needed employment at home. Globalization has also widely benefited
European consumers, who have enjoyed a wider array of choices and prices that have remained
stable or even decreased because of international competition.
Yet Europeans do not see it this way. In their majority, they tend to interpret globalization
as a passive, exogenous experience of which they are increasingly on the receiving end rather than
active participants. They see Europe as having missed the boat on globalization, a force now
controlled by exotic and threatening powers. The reality that Europe is the world’s other
superpower, able to shape the world in its image thanks to its regulatory and normative power,
does not accord with European perceptions of globalization. We can dismiss perceptions as not
worthy of study because they are not, after all, reality. But while perceptions may differ highly from
reality, they are important nonetheless because they can, in some circumstances, influence politics
and policies, as will be discussed later in the paper. Why Europeans are so self-deprecating when it
comes to globalization is a puzzle. Does it impact and constrain the way their leaders approach
policies involving economic globalization?
This paper focuses on what has changed in European perceptions of globalization in recent
years –in the post-Lehman era, post-outbreak of the debt crisis in the Eurozone, maybe even “post-
American” world. The paper emphasize four recent developments: the progressive demonization of
globalization; the disillusionment about the European Union’s capacity to manage globalization; the
“de-Americanization” of globalization; and the perceived domination of China as the main driver
and the main beneficiary of globalization today. The last section, still to be written, will explore
whether any of these new perceptions of globalization are likely to have an impact on policies.
1.
THE DEMONIZATION OF GLOBALIZATION
Globalization has moved from being an object of ambiguity, when not downright popularity
in some parts of Europe, to one of consternation, when not utter demonization.
Let’s backtrack a dozen years to the world of 1999. Globalization was a big buzzword then,
for better or for worse. Tom Friedman had just published his pro-globalization anthem, The Lexus
and the Olive Tree. Europeans, both public and politicians, were divided in their attitudes towards
globalization, as indicated on Table 1.
On one end of the spectrum were Greece (the only country where negative opinions
outweighed positive opinions of globalization), Austria, and France --the country most obsessed
about, and most negative towards globalization, for reasons which I have explained in my prior
work (Gordon, 2001). In France, popular perceptions and political rhetoric were cautious about,
when not outright hostile to, globalization. Globalization was portrayed mostly as a threat, even
though French companies were benefiting greatly from the globalization of markets. The rhetoric
was negative all across the political spectrum, with politicians on the right trying not to be outdone
by politicians on the left when it came to denouncing the evils of globalization –on jobs, on living
standards, on the environment, on culture, even on food.
On the other end of the spectrum, the countries most enthusiastic about globalization in the
early 2000s were Portugal, the Netherlands, and Ireland. Their citizens focused mostly on the
opportunities offered by globalization. Many of the Central and Eastern European countries which
joined the EU in 2004 were also fairly excited about globalization.
The rest of the European countries were more ambivalent, weighing the threats and
opportunities offered by globalization. Germany was an interesting case of such ambivalence, with
the second highest favorability towards globalization out of the 15 member states at 71% in 2003
but also the sixth highest opposition at 27% (European Commission, 2003). A similar story
unfolded in Scandinavia, with trust in the opportunities but also fear of the negative side-effects of
globalization. Surveys show that their citizens liked the main economic premises of globalization
(such as foreign investment and free enterprise), but they also had concerns about globalization
(such as growing inequalities, cultural threat, impact on the environment).
In all of Europe, the enthusiasm about globalization in the early 2000s progressively
morphed into a substantial amount of disillusionment with globalization, which is now viewed far
more negatively than it is viewed positively. The shift occurred before the financial crisis, which
only accelerated the preexisting trend.
According to the 2003 Eurobarometer, 63% of the EU 15 citizens surveyed saw
globalization in a positive light, while 29% saw it negatively on average. By the time the next
Eurobarometer questions on globalization were asked in 2006, the percentage of negative opinions
had outweighed the positive opinions, with 44% who had a negative connotation of globalization
versus 42% with a positive connotation. By that time, the only countries where the positive
opinions still outweighed the negative by more than ten points were Denmark, Spain, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. In Germany, 57% of respondents had a negative opinion
of globalization by 2006.
The same was true for the citizens of central and Eastern Europe who were very evenly
divided on globalization. For example, an Angus Reid Global Monitor Poll from summer 2006 – a
good time economically in CEE – found that 23% of CEE respondents thought globalization was a
“good thing for your country” vs. 21% who thought it a “bad thing.” 33% said neither, and 24%
were not sure. These figures were not strikingly different from numbers in Western Europe or
North America from the same poll, with the exception that CEE respondents were much more likely
to be unsure.
Still five years later, after the financial crisis in the US and the crisis of the Eurozone,
European perceptions of globalization had taken a negative turn. Many of the countries hardest hit
by the financial crisis and then the debt crises were those who had previously been very
enthusiastic about globalization: Ireland, Portugal, Spain. By that point the majority of Europeans,
Western and Eastern, Northern and Southern, believed that globalization benefits only large
companies and not citizens, that it represents a threat to employment, that it increases global
environmental problems, and that it does not protect citizens from inflation (European
Commission, 2010). Sure, they believed that globalization helped to lift developing countries out of
poverty, but it did nothing to protect them from the challenges posed by the emerging countries.
Globalization is no longer seen as a word full of promises on the European continent –its
threatening and destructive possibilities have now replaced its opportunities in the perceptions of
many Europeans.
2.
THE DISILLUSIONMENT ABOUT EUROPE’S CAPACITY TO MANAGE GLOBALIZATION
A second innovation is the disillusionment about Europe’s capacity to manage globalization.
For over a decade, European policymakers have argued that globalization could be
palatable if it could be managed (Jacoby & Meunier, 2010). They promised that globalization would
still deliver wonderful economic opportunities to Europeans, while its negative effects would be
kept under control by a series of specific policies. The European Union was presented as the
instrument of choice for managing globalization.
The phrase “managed globalization” originated in France as “mondialisation maitrisee” at
the height of the anti-globalization fever of the late 1990s (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010). It emerged
into the broader European debate thanks to Frenchman Pascal Lamy in 1999 when he was
European Trade Commissioner and has been perpetuated during his tenure as head of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
“Managing” means altering the existing course of things and reorganizing them for a
purpose. Political leaders often imply that citizens are safer in their hands than they would
otherwise be because they are “managing” globalization, instead of merely letting it happen. It
shows the voters that they are firmly in control, that they still have a margin of maneuver, that they
have not abdicated policy-making in the face of external forces, and especially the direct onslaught
of market forces.
Over the past two decades, the EU has developed several mechanisms to try to manage
globalization. Some seek to ensure that globalization happens on European terms, with other
countries conforming to Europe’s ways and standards. Other mechanisms ensure that external
challenges brought about by globalization have as little negative, disruptive effect on European
citizens as possible. Some mechanisms can be used for both purposes. Jacoby and Meunier (2010)
argued that the EU has attempted to implement policies designed to manage globalization by using
five main mechanisms: 1) expanding policy scope (designed to shelter the EU from the effects of
globalization by developing common EU policies); 2) exercising regulatory influence (to strengthen
EU regulatory power in order to affect global regulations –e.g. food safety, data privacy,
environmental standards, etc.); 3) empowering international institutions (write the “rules of the
game”, strengthen international institutions, and expand their membership); 4) enlarging the
territorial sphere of EU influence (by expanding its territory through enlargement, the EU
“subtracts” new countries from the unadulterated reach of globalization and expands its influence:
enlargement, but also neighborhood policy and regional trade agreements); and 5) redistributing
the costs of globalization ( with redistribution at the international level, e.g. through non-reciprocal
trade benefits, and redistribution within Europe, e.g. through the Globalization Adjustment Fund
started in 2007).
So, for years European citizens heard that the EU would be there to manage globalization so
they would enjoy its benefits while avoiding its costs. But a series of shocks, coupled with the
perceived failures of the European strategy, led to disillusionment that Europe could actually
manage globalization.
The main problem with the management of globalization was that it contains an inherent
tension and contradiction: in managing globalization, the EU has also accelerated globalization. To
be sure, the EU appears as the best bulwark against globalization, since its scale makes it more
effective and credible in the face of competitive practices and products that Europeans collectively
deem illegitimate. But European integration may also look like a “Trojan Horse” because it has
facilitated the penetration of globalization into Europe, notably by constructing the European single
market and opening up protected economies to substantial competition.
The failure to conclude the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO,
ongoing since 2001, has not helped either the perception that the EU could effectively manage
globalization. Enacting stringent rules and making sure they applied to the biggest number of
countries was at the heart of the managed globalization strategy. This was supposed to ensure fair
competition while opening up markets for European products and services abroad. But the EU,
once again, found itself facing inherent contradictions. With more countries in, its power to
influence the rules was diluted. Worse, it created a bigger coalition of countries opposed to
European practices, which led to the failure of the round –for now.
The disillusionment with European efforts to manage globalization was accelerated by two
shocks: the American financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone, neither of which
these efforts had been able to prevent or contain.
The Eurobarometer asks whether the European Union helps to protect from the negative
effects of globalization. In 2008 43% of those surveyed believed that the EU was having a protective
role against globalization, while 37% disagreed (European Commission, 2008). In 2010, 42%
believed that the EU could play this protective effect, while 38% did not (European Commission,
2010). On the surface, it does seem like minimal change. But the breakdown by country reveals that
the EU has lost its protective luster among several key actors: today only 39% of Germans trust the
EU’s protective role, against 49% that do not, 29% vs. 54% in France, 37 vs. 34 in the UK, 37% vs.
57% in Greece (in spite of the bailout efforts).
The disillusionment is setting in as Europeans realize that they cannot get their cake and eat
it too, as the promise of “managed globalization” was leading them to believe.
3.
THE “DE-AMERICANIZATION” OF GLOBALIZATION 1
The third innovation when it comes to Europe and globalization the “de-Americanization” of
globalization.
A decade ago, when globalization first emerged as a common buzzword, it was perceived in
Europe as a phenomenon that bore, for good or ill, the unmistakable imprint of the United States. A
common trope saw the rough growth of globalization measured in the number of Starbucks, GAP,
and McDonalds outlets that sprang up across the continent. European proponents of economic
liberalization, especially in Eastern Europe and the UK, focused on the opportunities provided by
globalization and many welcomed various forms of “Americanization” as a way to learn from best
practices. Meanwhile, opponents of globalization organized in vocal movements that sprang up in
many cities across Western Europe, with France at the epicenter. Their main criticisms focused on
globalization as an instrument of American imperialism and as a cultural steamroller. McDonald’s
was destroying French cuisine, and way of life by extension! So were the many English words like
“email” and “week-end” that were destroying the French language!
For both its proponents and opponents, however, globalization was widely equated with
Americanization.
The problem for the US was that while Europeans were then ambivalent or enthusiastic
about the opportunities offered by globalization, many people tended to blame the US for what they
This section is based partly on a draft paper with Wade Jacoby, “When Did Globalization become
De-Americanized in Europe?”, July 2010
1
did not like about globalization: increasing gap between the rich and the poor; being the world’s
worst polluter; and impacting negatively national culture (Kohut & Wike, 2008; Meunier, 2009).
There was no doubt that the US was the main driver and the main beneficiary of globalization then,
and therefore was responsible for the negative side effects of globalization.
Ten years later, the picture has changed radically. As skepticism of globalization has grown
and spread across Europe, the perceived “American imprint” on globalization has weakened. Today
the public face of globalization is more often the Indian software engineer to whom jobs have been
outsourced, the aggregate American debt claims of the Chinese Central Bank, and above all the
ubiquity of the “Made in China” label. The threat is more diffuse, more exotic and, as a result, more
salient because more difficult to identify.
What has changed in the last decade is that the US has moved from a position of culprit to a
position of victim when it comes to globalization. Globalization is no longer equated with
Americanization in most mainstream European perceptions. At least three kinds of changes have
contributed to the broad decoupling of globalization and Americanization.
First, there is an increasing European recognition that European ambivalence about
globalization is matched by American ambivalence. After the two most recent recessions, the older
sense of America as a “job machine” has been substantially discredited, even as Europe’s own
troubles with underemployment continue. Europeans increasingly see that many Americans are
also troubled and uncertain about global economic competition, and this likely contributes to
decoupling.
Second, the financial crisis of 2008 has weakened the international prestige and power of
the US, already bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and now mired in debt. It revealed American
vulnerabilities. This new sense of American weakness also precipitated the perceived demise of the
US as the holder of the keys of globalization.
Finally, the European debate about the rise of China and, though to a lesser extent, India,
has brought forward a new set of concerns that have little to do with American competition. When
globalization was perceived as American, the main reproaches were that it acted as a cultural
steamroller (the “coca-colonization”, “Disneyification”, “McDo-ization” of the world) and was
heightening the American values of individualism and competition to the detriment of the European
values of welfare and solidarity. Today, the concerns about globalization are markedly different.
They focus mostly on the lowering of all standards and the ineluctable loss of unemployment to
perceived unfair competition.
To many Europeans, the era of American domination of globalization is over and Europe
and the US are increasingly now in the same boat when it comes to globalization.
3. Mitigating factors
Are Europe and the US in the Same Boat?
Eurobarometer question: “The EU and the USA have the same
interests when dealing with globalization”
2008
Agree
7
2010
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
EU 27
37
41
41
38
Denmark
39
51
58
33
Germany
30
58
38
49
France
33
49
33
49
Italy
40
37
48
29
Netherlands 34
54
44
41
Spain
43
20
39
34
Sweden
33
51
42
43
UK
26
49
32
43
The “China Syndrome”: New European Perceptions of Globalization
According to successive Eurobarometer surveys, the percentage of Europeans believing that
the interests of Europe and the US coincide when it comes to globalization has increased
substantially. In 2008, 41% of EU citizens surveyed believed that American and European interests
were different when it came to dealing with globalization, while 37% believed they did coincide
(European Commission, 2008). In 2010, it was reversed: 41% agreed that American and European
interests were the same when dealing with globalization, while 38% disagreed (European
Commission, 2010).
Instead, European public opinion overwhelmingly sees China as the new global power in
the economic domain.
4.
THE DOMINATION OF CHINA
The final recent development when it comes to Europe and globalization is the perception
that, today, China has become the main driver and the main beneficiary of globalization. Remember
that I am talking about perceptions, not reality.
The last decade saw the “rise of the rest” as Brazil, China and India rose in international
economic prominence (Zakaria, 2008). The entry of China into the WTO in 2001 accelerated its
meteoric economic rise and contributed to flooding the world even further with its ubiquitous
goods. European perceptions about the nature of globalization changed accordingly.
For Europeans, it is now clear that China is already the world’s largest economic power –
even if these perceptions are a far cry from reality.
4. The Domination of China in European Perceptions
What is the World’s Largest Economy Today?
28
26
19
33
21
27
20
18
25
20
12
41
29
34
44
31
35
47
38
44
46
38
44
45
45
30
46
48
US
Britain
31
18 19
48 41 45
62
58
9
19
12
27
69
Turkey
8
30
43
20
25
55
21
37
42
33
31
36
Egypt
22
29
49
Jordan
28
20
India
Japan
50
30
43
22
35
51
18
39
32
29
Lebanon
34
31
26
33
24
22
34
15
42
47
40
35
36
29
52
Spain
74 80 77
South Korea
21
13
19
20
19
66
61
58
Kenya
23
14
18
68
43
18
39
29
56
12
44
32
30 30 26
15 17 20
18 26 21
53 50 49
52 44 53
Indonesia
Pakistan
18
34
32
33
27
13
27
24
55
53
41
43
The “China Syndrome”: New European Perceptions of Globalization
50
26
17
27
23
Russia
32 33 31
Nigeria
57
27
Poland
11 8 8
15 12 15
10
29 21
21 50
19
52 58 40
20
31
Germany
65 63 60
China
33
25
France
23 23 29
12 14 11
21 41 36
31
7
41
52
Argentina
24
17
29
25
31
16
22
18
59
55
53
51
Mexico
US
China
Brasil
RoW
As seen on Figure 1, a majority of citizens in France, Germany and Great Britain believe that,
today, China is already the world’s biggest economic power (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2010).
Germany is particularly touched by this “China syndrome”: 51% of Germans believed in 2010 that
China was the world’s largest economy, while an astonishingly low 18% only believed that it was
the United States.
What does this new reality, or these new perceptions of the reality, mean for Europe and
globalization going forward?
First, it will likely mean increasing concerns and even resistance to globalization, as the
Europeans perceive that their interests and those of the Chinese do not converge on globalization.
4. The Domination of China in European Perceptions
Are Europe and China in the Same Boat?
Eurobarometer question: “The EU and China have the same
interests when dealing with globalization”
CHINA 2010
Agree
EU 27
10
23
USA 2010
Disagree
52
Agree
41
Disagree
38
Denmark
19
71
58
33
Germany
20
64
38
49
France
14
67
33
49
Italy
29
44
48
29
Netherlands
26
58
44
41
Spain
19
50
39
34
Sweden
17
65
42
43
UK
19
54
32
43
The “China Syndrome”: New European Perceptions of Globalization
According to a 2010 Eurobarometer presented in Table 4, 23% of EU citizens surveyed
think that China and Europe have the same interests when dealing with globalization, while 52%
believe that their interests are different (European Commission, 2010). The regional breakdown of
answers reveals that the European countries where most citizens believe that Chinese and
European interests are different are in the big three –France, Germany, UK—and the Scandinavian
countries, which until recently were quite enthusiastic about globalization.
Second, the concerns about a China-dominated globalization will be greater in some
European countries than in others and may lead to some intra-European frictions. Two main views
are likely to dominate: China as a savior and China as a predator.
Some European countries have been hit very hard by the crisis, which in many cases was
facilitated and amplified by globalization. The crisis has increased Europe’s need for investment
coming from outside the EU. Greece was the first member state to undergo a massive sovereign
debt crisis. The other Eurozone countries organized a bailout, but it came late, with reluctance, and
was not enough. China used the opportunity provided by the Greek turmoil to invest massively in
the country, leasing for instance the port of the Piraeus for 35 years, as well as acquiring major
stakes in distribution, telecommunications and real estate, providing welcome relief to Greece in
the process (Faiola, 2010). Ireland, next in line of the euro countries in crisis, attracted massive
investment from China to create a manufacturing hub in Athlone (Inman, Macalister, & Wachman,
2010). When it was Spain’s turn to face its own debt crisis, China provided a lifeline by investing in
banking, tourism, and energy (Moya, 2011). China similarly came to the rescue of Portugal. For all
these countries, China’s role lately has been one of savior and its Vice Prime Minister, Li Keqiang,
was welcomed in great pomp by European kings and heads of state in Spain, Germany, and Great
Britain when he visited Europe in January (Cala, 2011).
Other European countries, by contrast, look very suspiciously at China, which they perceive
more as a predator than as a savior. Figure 2 shows that France, in particular, is extremely worried
about the growth of China. To be sure, China is a source of economic opportunity for European
countries. In many industries, China represents an increasing share of markets and European
companies have been investing massively in China. But in a way, China has replaced the US to
become the new economic bête noire of the French. In the economic sphere, the “post-American”
world is also becoming a “post-anti-American” world.
4. The Domination of China in European Perceptions
Rising Concerns about China’s Increasing Economic Power
BBC/PIPA Poll March 27, 2011
Negative views of China’s growing economic power 2005-2011
11
The “China Syndrome”: New European Perceptions of Globalization
The most recent poll on the subject, the BBC/World public opinion published last week,
reveals that negative views of China’s growing economic power have increased sharply between
2005 and 2011 (and not only in Europe). In France, in Germany, in Italy, it is now absolute
majorities that believe that China’s growing economic power is a negative.
Third, the new perceived economic domination of China has political implications. Yes,
Chinese markets represent economic opportunities for European companies, but it is a doubleedged sword: profits rise, but most of the employment is in China in the case of manufactured
goods. Moreover, it is no longer clear what “home” is for global corporations and whether the
citizens benefit when a company bearing their colors is successful abroad. This will likely trigger
some political backlash in Europe.
China is seen as offering a lifeline to many Europeans. But this, they increasingly believe,
comes at a price. Many Europeans are becoming suspicious of Chinese intentions and view Chinese
investments with growing concern and misgivings, which cannot happen without political
implications.
4. The Domination of China in European Perceptions
The Fear of China in Europe
February 4, 2010
August 23, 2010
9
November 11, 2010
January 3, 2011
The “China Syndrome”: New European Perceptions of Globalization
December 2, 2010,
February 2, 2011
4. The Domination of China in European Perceptions
The Fear of China in Europe
10
The “China Syndrome”: New European Perceptions of Globalization
The fears may be overblown for now compared to the reality of Chinese investment in
Europe, which until recently remained relatively modest as a ratio of GDP (Nicolas, 2009). Until
then, the UK and Germany were the first destinations for Chinese investment in Europe. However
the movement accelerated as a result of the crisis and there is now a clear upward trend.
I predict that the issue of Chinese acquisitions in Europe will become increasingly
politicized in the years to come and that political tensions between the EU and China will grow over
the issue of Chinese investment. In France the debate on so-called “economic patriotism” has
existed since the 2000s and served as the impetus for the EU’s takeover directive in 2005. In 2009
Germany adopted new legislation, which enables the government to examine the acquisition of a
stake in a German company by non-EU purchasers. The question is whether these investments are
innocuous in the long term. Do they entail security risks if they enable the leakage of sensitive
technologies to China or create situations of dependence in Europe?
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the trend towards demonization of and disillusionment with
globalization will likely continue in Europe in the years to come.
Like a decade ago, France finds itself at the vanguard of the anti-globalization contestation.
The far-right National Front in its new incarnation with its younger leader Marine Le Pen has put
the theme of anti-globalization (and anti-European integration) at the center of its electoral
platform. She portrays policy-makers from the left PS and the right UMP as having an identical
discourse when it comes to globalization and vows to resort to protectionism and withdraw France
from the Euro if elected. Even mainstream politicians, such as socialist Arnaud Montebourg, have
now familiarized the concept of “deglobalization” which some try to include in the socialist platform
for the 2012 presidential election (Landrin & Schmitt, 2010; Nathan, 2011).
Europeans seem to mistake trajectory for reality. They see China as growing at a much
faster pace than they do, as attracting all these manufacturing jobs that are deserting them, and as
starting to gobble up European companies one after the other. So of course they are justifiably
scared that their welfare state is unsustainable if emerging countries are engaged in a race to the
bottom. And of course they feel that their own identity has been eroded by globalization. The
Europeans are full of doubt and are unaware that they are, in fact, the world’s most important actor
of globalization.
But does it all matter? Can the fact that perceptions are so different from reality have an
actual impact? Couldn’t it be argued that public opinion does not constrain policy-makers, only
swing voters and small interest groups do? To be sure, European politicians have a point that
globalization has created winners and losers, and they could simply compensate the losers and not
care about public opinion when making decisions. But it may also be that perceptions do matter,
much more so when it comes to economic policy than when it comes to foreign policy. In electoral
contests, “It’s the economy, stupid”, and the perception that European identity has been challenged
and diluted by globalization might constrain policymakers in the years to come, leading to a
resurgence of calls for economic patriotism, when not downright protectionism.
Table 1: Support for Globalization in the EU in 2003
(European Commission, 2003)
Table 2
QD1-11: The EU helps to protect European citizens from the negative effects of globalization
(European Commission, 2010)
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