ufrgsmun 2012

Transcrição

ufrgsmun 2012

EXPLORING NEW POSSIBILITIES.
TREASURING THE PAST.
Iara Binta Lima Machado (coord.)
Cláudia Pfeifer Cruz (coord.)
Isadora Loreto da Silveira (coord.)
EXPLORING NEW
POSSIBILITIES. TREASURING
THE PAST.
First edition
Porto Alegre
November 2012.
UFRGS Model United Nations
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Pró-Reitoria de Pesquisa
Paulo Gama Avenue, 110, 7th floor
Bairro Farroupilha
Porto Alegre — RS, Brazil
ZIP Code: 90040-060
Instituto Sul-Americano de Política e Estratégia (ISAPE)
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Bairro Moinhos de Vento
Porto Alegre — RS, Brazil
ZIP Code: 90510-000
Phone: +5551 3084.6175
Sponsorship:
Printed by Gráfica da UFRGS
Cover: Santa Anna — Ideias em Movimento
© 2012 UFRGS Model United Nations
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced without the consent of at least
two of the organizers, except in the case of brief quotations in scholarly texts.
Machado, Iara Binta Lima, 1989
Exploring new possibilites: treasuring the past. / coordinated by Iara Binta Lima
Machado, Cláudia Pfeifer Cruz, and Isadora Loreto da Silveira. — Porto
Alegre, Instituto Sul-Americano de Política e Estratégia (ISAPE), 2012.
viii 330p. : il. ; 21cm.
ISBN: 978-85-65135-03-0 (printed)
ISBN: 978-85-65135-02-3 (eBook)
1. International relations — organizations 2. United Nations 3. Conflict and
conflict resolution I. Title
DDC 327.06
For UFRGSmuners here and abroad.
May we make this a better world for all.
CONTENTS
PRESENTATION 1
FOREWORD 2
Chapter 1
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME 3
TOPIC A: The Role of Environmental Resources in
Contemporary African Conflicts
4
Gabriela Antune , Marina Finger, Iara Binta Lima Machado,
Pedro Brites and Cláudia Pfeifer Cruz
TOPIC B: The Protection of Marine and Coastal 23
Ecosystems: Economic and Political Challenges.
Walter Lorenzo Zílio Motta de Souza and Jéssica da Silva Höring
Chapter 2
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
TOPIC A: Transitional Justice
40
41
Cláudia Pfeifer Cruz, Gabriela Jahn Verri and Renata Schmitt
Noronha
TOPIC B: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights
60
Anaís Medeiro Passos and Pedro Rigon
Chapter 3
79
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
TOPIC A: Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 80
Criminal Jurisdiction
Fernanda Graeff Machry and André da Rocha Ferreira
TOPIC B: Most-Favoured-Nation Clause
Mariana Bom and Jade Lopes
Chapter 4
93
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
106
TOPIC A: Non-Proliferation – The situation in Iran
107
Laura Quaglia, Luciana Brandão, Bruno Gomes Guimarães, Iara
Binta Lima Machado, and Willian Moraes Roberto
TOPIC B: The situation in Syria
Bruno Gomes Guimarães and Willian Moraes Roberto
130
Chapter 5
WORLD BANK
151
TOPIC: Extractive Industries in Africa
152
Isadora da Silveira Steffens, Alexandre Piffero Spohr, Diogo Ives,
Othon Veloso Schenatto, Marcelo de Mello Kanter, and Iara
Binta Lima Machado
Chapter 6
UNITED NATIONS WORLD SUMMIT ON UN
REFORM
TOPIC: UN Reform
194
195
Isadora Loreto da Silveira, Luíza Gimenez Cerioli, Matheus Machado
Hoscheidt , and Gustavo Henrique Feddersen
Chapter 7
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
REGIONAL FORUM
TOPIC A: ASEAN Vision 2015 and East Asian
integration
Bruno Magno and João Arthur Reis
TOPIC B: Maritime Sovereignty in East Asia
238
239
256
Marcelo de Mello Kanter, Erik Herejk Ribeiro and Gustavo
Feddersen
REFERENCES
275
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
330
Exploring new possibilities. Treasuring the past.
PRESENTATION
UFRGS Model United Nations 2012 is part of a tradition that has somehow
been part of this event since its beginning in 2003 and has been developing for
subsequent modeling generations. For the past ten years, UFRGSMUNers have come
to an agreement that we live in a world which has many flaws, currently evidenced in
the many raging conflicts that somehow affect all of us. The idea that we share is that
the shaping of a peaceful world is only attainable through the understanding of
possible solutions and of the plurality of views that are given to us by the international
community, so different and so numerous. The abovementioned harmony that is
sought by all that study and try to understand the world, in our view, passes by severe
criticism, high academic standards and unveiling of naïveté, associated with hope for
the best possible solutions.
This study guide and all the work of the 2012 staff is framed by the
conscience that idealism has to be pragmatic, at the stake that utopia will never come
to happen. Hence, in UFRGSMUN’s tenth edition, the seven committees and twelve
topics are permeated by one certainty: their solutions are interwoven with conflicting
interests and definitely carry heavy-weight political meanings. Hence, finding the best
solution means putting a lot of effort in disentangling different views of the world.
Bearing that in mind, it demonstrates that the spirit of UFRGSMUN consists of a
realistic view of the world, which is truly essential to the understanding of
International Relations, independent of personal judgments any of us may have on its
merits.
Regardless of what we want International Relations and International Law to
be, the truth is that exploring new possibilities in peace and development is a part of
our role. We have worked restlessly in trying to reach and reveal all reasons beneath
political positions, since you can only change what you truly understand. It becomes
essential to understand the past and treasure historical achievements. We believe that
wise decisions are made considering and reflecting about the past. Through that, we
try to recapture the spirit of the United Nations, and the environment in which
decisions are made so as to attain results that are as close to reality as possible. This
way, modeling can be an experience that is faithful to its meaning. All that said, we
wish all participants a magnificent event, replete with academic excellence, personal
growth and critical thinking. These study guides have carried our hopes of being the
best possible material for preparation and for the fidelity to high standards that we
hope you all take into your Committees, so as to make the best of this life-changing
experience and can treasure it in the future.
Warm regards,
UFRGSMUN 2012 Secretariat
1
UFRGSMUN 2012
FOREWORD
Esteemed participants,
On behalf of our Staff, I’d like to welcome you all to UFRGS Model United
Nations 2012.
Since its first edition in 2003, UFRGSMUN has become known as one of
Brazil’s greatest UN simulations for its academic and administrative qualities. If at
the beginning there were no more than 120 participants, nowadays UFRGSMUN
receives over 200 university students who are eager to understand the several
challenges facing our world these recent years.
In 2012, UFRGSMUN experiences further changes. For the first time, the
event is being hosted by the International Relations bachelor degree under the
supervision of the UFRGS Faculty of Economics. Such a big change comes as the
recognition of the hard work our students have put into organizing the event
throughout the years. Furthermore, it is a recognition of the excellence achieved by
our bachelor’s degree since its founding in 2004. This is not to undermine the work of
the several UFRGS law students who have been a part of UFRGSMUN since its first
edition. We deeply thank Prof. Dr. Cláudia Lima Marques for all the time and
expertise put into UFRGSMUN all these years.
In its 10th edition, UFRGSMUN seeks to address many pressing issues on
the international scene. The divergent opinions seen on topics such as Iran and Syria,
or even the situation on the Far East, point to a changing pattern of interaction
between traditional powers and emerging ones. Beyond that, the world is waking up to
treasure regions that were formerly marginalized, such as Africa. These are interesting
times…
Finally, I’d like to thank all members of the staff for their amazing work.
Whether your focus is on Law, International Relations, Engineering or Veterinarian
Medicine, it is your passion that makes it all possible.
I wish you all a great simulation and I hope to see you all again next year –
and for many years to come.
Sincerely,
Prof. Dr. Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini
UFGRSMUN’s Faculty Coordinator
2
Chapter 1
UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), created by the
General Assembly in 15 December 1972, is the main authority within the United
Nations responsible for environmental issues in global and local levels. Its role is to
manage the construction of an environmental policy consensus among United Nations
members and to bring the world’s attention to emerging risky situations. In 2010
UNEP has defined its six priorities for the 2010-2013 term. It will focus primarily on
climate change, resource efficiency, disasters and conflicts, environmental
governance, harmful substances and hazardous waste, and ecosystem management.
UNEP’s Governing Council reports to the General Assembly through the
Economic and Social Council and is composed of 58 Member States elected by the
General Assembly. Their term lasts four years and their election respects the principle
of equitable regional representation: 16 seats for African states, 13 seats for Asian
states, six seats for European states, 10 seats for Latin American and Caribbean states,
and 13 seats for Western Europe and other states.
The Programme acts through recommendations, and is also responsible for
monitoring national and international policies. It has an important role also in
contributing to scientific development, as well as reporting annually to the General
Assembly especially in regard to coordination issues and the environmental policy
inside the United Nations. It may not have any binding decision, but it has a strong
moral pressure over United Nations Member States.
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Topic A: The Role of Environmental Resources in Contemporary African
Conflicts
Gabriela Antunes, Marina Fnger,
Iara Binta Lima Machado, Pedro Brites and Cláudia Pfeifer Cruz
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is highly recognized nowadays that there is a very important link between
environment and violent conflicts. The United Nations Environment Programme
(hereinafter UNEP) estimates that natural resources fueled eighteen violent conflicts
since 1990, and around forty percent of all conflicts in the last sixty years (UNEP,
2009). Environment in those cases may not always be the main reason for conflict, but
it is usually an additional source of tension and a likely driver to violence (UNEP,
2009). Besides, it can be severely affected during the conflict and also act as a
fundamental factor during the peacebuilding process. For many of those conflicts
occur in developing countries, which are more natural resources dependent, it is likely
that they will keep happening and even increase their frequency, especially those
caused by environmental scarcity (HOMER-DIXON; DELIGIANNIS, 2009). Natural
resources have always been essential for all societies throughout history, either for
their own subsistence or for trading for other resources. In this sense they have always
been valuable, being for example one of the reasons for colonialism and imperialism
since the 15th century. As a country’s population grows its needs for natural resources
grows as well, at the same time that their amount might decline, especially the nonrenewable ones such as oil and minerals. In a global scale this perspective means that
environmentally rich countries will have economical advantages over the other ones,
which may pass through scarcity situations. These circumstances are in the roots of
several conflicts in the world history and will still be in an increasing path (HOMERDIXON, 1994).
Concerns about the linkage between environment and security in the
international community have grown notably over the last 30 years, although the first
ideas date back to the 1970s. At that moment the worries were mostly regarding the
threats unsustainable use of resources could cause to the world economy, which was
theorized in the Club of Rome’s The Limits of Growth1. The central idea was that
world development would be limited by its natural resources, and that was why
humanity needed to protect the environment (HULME, 2009). Only by the 1990s the
discussion evolved to encompass broader kinds of threats (HULME, 2009). The end
of the Cold War marks, in this sense, an important turning point in the whole idea of
security, which is no longer focused only in national and military security, and starts
taking into account issues such as economy and environment (HECKER, 2011).
Researches over the role environment plays in conflicts have pointed two contexts in
1 The Club of Rome is an organization founded in 1968 which aims to identify and analyze
issues that may affect the future of the world. In 1972 the Club publicized The Limits of
Growth report, which caused unprecedented controversy at that time (THE CLUB OF ROME,
2012).
4
which it can be a cause, either directly or indirectly, for disputes that can evolve to
violent conflict: scarcity and abundance (KHAGRAM; ALI, 2006).
Environmental scarcity can be caused by three factors: environmental
change, population growth and unequal distribution of resources (HOMER-DIXON,
1994). Those three sources of scarcity are deeply related to the main causes of various
violent conflicts throughout history. In some analysis they tend to be ignored because
their influence is usually not direct, but by “intermediate” social effects (HOMERDIXON; DELIGIANNIS, 2009). For instance, in the conflict in Peru in 1980, the
growing population in the south of the country faced a decrease in land availability
and quality, since the region was suffering with high levels of soil erosion. Alongside
those factors, the failure of the agrarian reform attempted by the government, thus
perpetrating the unequal distribution of lands, have led to a decline of the population
income and food intake, creating the social basis for the movement that ended up with
the Sandero Luminoso insurgency (SCHWARTZ; SINGH, 1999). Those were the
same aspects involved in the Zapatista rebellion in 1994 in Mexico, where
deforestation and soil erosion combined with unequal land distribution have met a
scenario of decreasing State capacity, therefore creating a state of social inquietude. It
is quite clear that environmental properties, in both cases, have been the primarily
causes of the rebellions, even though they are not always recognized as so
(HOWARD; HOMER-DIXON, 1995).
Conflicts generated by environmental scarcity are not restricted to States’
boundaries, though. In 1969 the conflict between Honduras and El Salvador has
caused the death of several thousands of people and has created around 100.000
refugees in both countries (SCHWARTZ; SINGH, 1999). The roots of the dispute lay
at the natural resource stress in El Salvador, where the usual population growth,
unequal distribution of resources and degradation of the available ones have forced a
wave of migration from this country to Honduras. Economic problems in the latest
were seen by the Hondurans as produced by the Salvadoran immigrants and tensions
between the two countries grew as both adopted politics anti-immigrants, which ended
up in a war in July 1969 (SCHWARTZ; SINGH, 1999). Besides land, another natural
resource that usually leads to international disputes is water. Water plays an important
role in the Israeli—Palestinian dispute in the Gaza strip, for instance. In addition to the
region’s natural low precipitation condition, Israel manipulates the distribution of the
available water resources, which raise difficulties to the Palestinian habitants in the
Gaza strip, leading the area to economic and human health levels decline
(SCHWARTZ; SINGH, 1999).
Not only scarcity plays an important role in instigating conflicts, but also
abundance. In such cases the main reason underlying the disputes is the control over
the abundant resources, usually high values ones, in order to finance militias
movements, for instance. Evidences show that countries where commodities represent
more than 35% of their GDP are much more likely to suffer from civil war, usually
because they have weaker institutions and their governments do not have a strong
accountability concerning the population, once their budget does not depend upon
taxes (COLLIER; HOEFFLER, 2007). A relatively common concretization of those
disputes is the emergence of secessionist movements in the resource rich region of the
country. For instance, a separatist movement emerged in Aceh, Indonesia, in 1976,
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right after the beginning of gas exploitation in the region. Just like in the scarcity
examples, here also the perceived unequal distribution of benefits has fueled the
rebellion (ROSS, 2002). The rebel financing use of natural resources is also usual.
During the Angola civil war, UNITA, one of the parties at the conflict, supported
itself with diamond sales in the 1990s; in the same decade, in Afghanistan, the
Northern Alliance financed itself selling lapis lazuli, a precious stone(ROSS, 2002).
Most of this natural resources based financing started after the end of the Cold War,
when rebel groups were no longer supported by one of the great powers—which does
not mean, on the other side, that foreign countries ceased their interference in such
conflicts (HUMPHREYS, 2005).
Supporting one side of an internal conflict according to their own interests is
usually the way international actors find to get involved in resource conflicts. For
instance, the interest in controlling diamond mines in Sierra Leone was the reason
why Mr. Charles Taylor, Liberian warlord and later president of Liberia, sponsored
the rebel group Revolutionary United Force in Sierra Leone, in 1991. He kept his
support even after becoming president by sending his own troops to the country
(UNEP, 2009). Another example of external interests getting involved in national
conflicts is the situation in Chad. The first successful coup d’état in the country
happened in 1975, at the same time that Mr. François Tombalbaye, then President,
was being accused of favoring United States’ oil extraction companies despite the
ones from France, military backer of Chad (HUMPHREYS, 2005).
The African continent plays an important role in this context. Africa is
widely recognized for its natural resources and has historically been a source of raw
materials for developed countries. During the colonial era some countries have had
unusual economical growth, due to their possession over natural resources essential
for European and American development. This process can be viewed in the same
terms Eduardo Galeano referred Latin America, as “the draining of a continent”
(GALEANO apud CUSTERS, 2009, p. 12). In the last decades, conflict over natural
resources has been a strong driver to violence in the African continent, caused either
by scarcity or abundance. This situation is of more concern considering that the
continent is among the greatest producers of some non-renewable resources, such as
cobalt, uranium, diamond, manganese, phosphate and gold. Besides, despite not being
now a major oil producer, Africa holds 10% of world oil reserves that are not fully
explored (CUSTERS; MATTHYSEN, 2009), which could put the continent in a
comfortable bargaining position in the future. On the other hand, it has severe
resources scarcities in some regions. Water stress reach more than 300 million people
on the continent (ECA, 2006, p. 2), and land scarcity has been considered one of the
causes of conflicts in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MARKAKIS, 2009). Considering environmental related conflicts in Africa, it is
important to stress out the issues related to ethnicity. Conflicts are usually perceived
as ethnic in the continent, but ethnicity is frequently only the relevant identity basis to
mobilization for a dispute over the political power. Control over political power
enables the group to manage natural resources in the country, whether they are scarce
or abundant (MARKAKIS, 2009).
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2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
2.1. How do Natural Resources Influence on the Beginning or Worsening of
Conflicts?
The link between the environment and conflicts is one that is every time
more discussed on studies trying to explain the fact that conflicts happen more in
some States than in others. The fact that climatic changes have been gaining more
importance on the international agendas has changed the focus of many other
discussions to the environment and how it can influence many aspects of the
contemporary life, including the onset or aggravation of disputes. However more
significant nowadays, the relation abovementioned is one that has been studied and
predicted since Malthus, or even before. Despite the fact that such linkage has been
long studied there is still no definite answer as to how the environment can influence
on conflicts. One thing is certain though, that natural resources do not cause conflicts
if there are no other aggravating factors present. One consensus seems to occur when
concerning the necessity of a weak State, or a low level of governmental organization.
As to the other factors, many can be mentioned, influencing on a larger or smaller
scale the onset and growth of conflicts, both need and greed can cause conflict. (LE
BILLON, 2000)
Even the position defended by some that the environment is a mere
coincidence and has no role when it comes to conflicts, is often raised. However this
point of view can be easily opposed to by a number of cases, in which the link
between violence and resources is clear and unquestionable. On the Democratic
Republic of Congo, for one, it is undeniable to realize the role of minerals, which
more often than not have served as financing material to armed militias (KONING,
2011); and, therefore, the control over these resources has become ever more pressing.
The situation that is laid in front of one observer is of one specific group in control of
one country’s probably most valuable resource and the animosity and competition
between these who control and those who seek to overcome the first ones. This
situation inevitably leads to a bad distribution of goods, the growth of rivalries, the
overexploitation of the resource in question (KONING, 2011), the destruction of the
environment, natural and urban, and sometimes the displacement of the loosing group.
This situation can be exemplified by a number of other cases, most of them
on the African continent. Most studies now have come to the common understanding
that natural resources can play a significant role in conflicts in Africa (ROELAND
VAN DE GEER, 2012). Even though there is no consensus on the way these resources
influence conflicts, there has been little doubt as to the truth of this affirmative.
In some countries, the shortage of natural resources –
aggravated by a large and growing population – fuels conflict.
Competition for land and water between sedentary farmers and
itinerant herdsmen was one of the causes of the dispute between
the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, and the Hemas
and Lendus in the eastern Congo.
The availability of natural resources traded on international
markets – notably oil – often fuels tensions and conflicts
between those with access to these resources and the revenue
they generate, and those who are denied such access. Rebel
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groups use the revenue from readily available resources to buy
arms. This was the case in Sierra Leone and Angola, with
diamonds and ivory. Revenue from the sale of timber (Liberia),
oil (Sudan) and coltran (eastern Congo) has also been used to
finance armed conflicts. (ROELAND VAN DE GEER, 2012,
p.5)
“But geology is not destiny” (PAGE, 2008, p. 1). Even though natural
resources play an important role on conflicts, it can also play a leading part on the
development and wealth of one State. In Latin America, Chile represents one of the
fastest developing countries, with one of the best social and economic numbers of the
continent, and its economy is largely based on the export of natural resources.
Botswana also has represented one of the countries with fast growth in the world, and
it bases its economy on the exportation of natural goods, the same happens with
Malaysia and Indonesia (PAGE, 2008).
The only thing certain is that the relation exists and that it is a multifaceted
one. It does not involve only natural characteristics of the State or the political
context, to understand these relations one must look to the economic and social
reality, the internal and international matters, all the factors that might be involved, the
only constant is the environment. (VARISCO, 2010)
2.1.1. Scarcity
One of the factors usually used to relate environmental factors to conflicts is
the resource scarcity. Although it does not represent the most accepted theory, it is
undeniable to recognize its importance and relevance. When considering the relation
between nature and disputes, one must remember that other factors are necessary in
order to turn this linkage effective, that is, taking into account only the resource
scarcity there is no base to conclude the consequently existence of conflicts, authors
often use the example of Japan for such demonstration. However, when one considers
other risk factors along with resource shortage the link is clear.
Dixon, the main researcher to defend the scarcity theory suggests three
situation in which the environment may play a definite role on the onset of a violent
conflict, which are: (i) the “decrease of supplies of physically controllable
environmental resources”, (ii) “large population movements caused by environmental
stress”, and (iii) the increase economic deprivation and disruption of key social
institutions (HOMER-DIXON, 1994, p. 6). When taking into account the first
hypothesis it is impossible not to remember the theory long defended by Malthus,
which stated that the population would grow in a geometric way, while resources
would do so in an arithmetic speed; in this hypothesis, however, it is defended that the
decrease of elements such as clean water and agricultural land would provoke the socalled “resource wars” (HOMER-DIXON, 1994, p. 5). This hypothesis has been
negated by the same author and a number of researchers after him, considering that
there was “little empirical support” for it. Furthermore, other authors found that the
lack or decrease of natural renewable resources such as it is stated often works as an
incentive to diversify economy necessities, import goods from other places, and
develop a more efficient way to explore these resources.
8
The second hypothesis finds more evidence to corroborate it; however one
must consider other present elements in this equation. The referred author sustains the
existence of a number of factors, which would increasingly and gradually lead the
people to move, differentiating the immigrants from refugees (HOMER-DIXON,
1994). The movement of large groups would then cause group-identity clashes, ethnic
disputes, which would eventually turn into a greater conflict (HOMER-DIXON,
1994).
The third and final hypothesis suggests that the social-economical and
political instability caused by environmental scarcity can influence “civil strife and
insurgency” (HOMER-DIXON, 1994, p. 5). Here it is argued that the environmental
scarcity affects the productivity of poor countries which leads to deprivation, and most
importantly, to the possible weakening of the State institutions, due to the increase in
demands that reveals itself to it and the lack of possibilities to solve such needs
(HOMER-DIXON, 1994). “A fall in the quality and quantity of renewable resources
can combine with population growth to encourage powerful groups within a society to
shift resource distribution in their favor” (HOMER-DIXON, 1994, p. 11). The
increase in the number of marginalized population increases as well the pressure on
State institutions to comply with this necessity.
Figure 1 – Some Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity
HOMER-DIXON, Thomas F., 1994, p. 37
It is, however, undeniable the fact that mostly resource scarcity causes socioeconomic innovation, since the leading classes seek a diversification of the economy,
in order to increase income, and that may even result in the more equitable
distribution of power. Other than that, it is impossible not to consider the influence of
international trade and how it can “counterbalance localized scarcities or motivate
renovations and shift in resources (LE BILLON, 2001, p.564).
Therefore, one is lead to the conclusion that in fact is the confluence of a
number of factors that related to resource scarcity may influence the rise of conflicts.
There are cases where this factor plays a more significant role in the creation of
instability and disputes, scarcity may be key to the misdistribution of resources and
population migration, but most authors still defend the abundance theory as a more
accurate and reliable one.
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2.1.2. Abundance
The most accepted theory to explain the link between conflicts and the
environment is the view that considers the abundance of one specific resource as a
facilitator of conflicts. The most defended vision is the one that understands that the
existence of a large amount of non-renewable resources creates, as well as increases,
greed over the domain of such resources; it is called the “greed-driven conflicts” (LE
BILLON, 2001, p.564). It is also undeniable to recognize the possibilities that the
exploitation of these resources bring as to the financing of armies or even the creation
of an “extensive and diversified support network, which integrates all people having
an economic stake in the exploitation of resources” (LE BILLON, 2000, p.30). These
natural resources that are at discussion here are usually minerals, gems, oil, etc, goods
that can be easily, in most cases, taxable, which can represent an even more attractive
reality to elites and other groups (LE BILLON, 2001).
Furthermore, the economy created by this reality, that is, based solely on the
exportation of natural resources is definitely an unstable one, since it depends on
international prices and fluctuations. In poor economies it can be very serious and
damaging, especially when one considers an already weakened economic growth due
to the neglect on non-resource sector, for they are not as rentable. It is a fact that on
resource-rich countries the development of the industry and all sectors that are not
related to the extraction and export of this resources is much neglected, and therefore,
economic growth is weakened. Most authors defend that, despite the initial boom,
resource-rich countries develop much slower than resource-poor ones; such situation
is due the event called the ‘Dutch disease’ “where the nonresource sector shrinks
because talent and investment is ploughed into the resource sector and into rent
seeking activities (most non-tradable) rather than into productive activities” (LE
BILLON, 2000, p.23).
In countries with these characteristics and reality, it is inevitable to notice the
concentration of wealth and consequently of power, which may often lead to the
creation and enlargement of marginalized groups, and further to the frustration of such
groups, who would eventually see in the political change the only possibility to
improve, or else, as the only way to become the ones who hold the domain over the
production of such resource. This can be explained by the fact that the “access to the
commodity value chain is often closely linked to social identities, articulating in
particular entitlements and horizontal inequalities along ethnicity, class, or religion
with the political economy of a resource”(LE BILLON, 2001, p.568).
However other factors must be considered in order to create the referred link.
One aspect that seems to be clear and unquestionable, for both scarcity and abundance
theories, is that “political instability and armed conflict” (LE BILLON, 2001, p. 563).
It is not possible though to create a complete and direct link between the abundance of
natural resources and the appearance of conflicts, that is, only the abundance of
resources cannot be understood as a decisive factor to the existence of violent
disputes. Historical facts as well as studies show that other characteristics should be
present, whether together or separately, in order for this link to be created. Some of
the factors that may contribute for the effective creation and aggravation of conflicts
due to natural resources are the lootablity, the diversification of economy, and the
distance and the distribution of the resource on the territory. A part from that,
10
underdeveloped countries are the most affected by this type of conflict; the reason to
what is no mystery, these countries do not usually have strong and present
governments.
When one talks about lootability, it refers to the extraction of the resource,
whether it is easy to be extracted or if it needs specific equipment to do so. The easiest
it is to get a hold on the resource, the more attractive it is for militias and rebel groups
to start using it. When a mineral has a low lootalibity, for instance, and needs special
machinery to be explored, it is most common for the State to have the monopoly of its
exploitation, or that private companies are responsible for this job (VARISCO, 2010).
As to distance, one refers to how distant it is from the capital, from the control of the
government. We can also talk about the resources being located in one specific spot or
spread around, that is, being point or diffuse; if a resource is point it is easier for the
State to have control over it than when it is spread all over the territory.
2.2. The Role of the International Community
Essential it is to remember that the referred conflicts do not influence only
the realities of the States in which they occur. Civil war, violent conflicts affect much
more than the territory of the State, but the surroundings, the environment, the
economy, especially when one talks about conflicts related to natural resources, which
are subject to exportation. Other than that disputes may create migratory movements
of large number of refugees, which for many times may cause conflicts over ethnic
matter in neighbor countries (COLLIER, 2003).
Furthermore and maybe even more important is to recognize the difference
that the existence of valuable resources may cause in conflicts. It was found that:
natural resources’ wealth may increase the danger that a foreign
[S]tate can intervene in a conflict supporting or “on behalf of a
nascent movement”, and both government and non-state groups
tend to sell futures booty, which are “future exploitation rights
to minerals they hope to capture” (VARISCO, 2010, p.47).
It is impossible not to notice the fact that markets for the substances that we
here mention (almost) always involve international companies and other countries
interests, the market of oil interests the international markets, the diamond markets
moves an enormous amount of money, it is even said to this point that diamonds are
not anymore just a “girl’s best friend” but a rebel’s best friend (LE BILLON, 2001, p.
565). Many companies around the world profit from this market, from the so called
conflict diamonds or, better yet, blood diamonds. During decades, not only
companies, but also governments that own shares of industries have profited from the
market of illegal diamonds and other minerals; and therefore the conflicts sometimes
may have seemed a necessary evil. No less important it is, however, to see that it was
also the international community that started the actions against the so-called blood
diamonds, the international community which sought ways to stop commercialization
of illegal minerals in order to stop conflicts concerning it. One of the most well known
and probably most efficient ways that was created is the Kimberly Process
Certification Scheme (KPCS).
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UFRGSMUN 2012
Currently some authors have been defending that the Kimberly process does
not work anymore, that blood diamonds rule the markets once more and are now
continuing to support rebels and blood revolutions in Africa. One of the researchers
that defend this point of view is one of the idealizers of the Kimberley Process, Ian
Smillie (HOWDEN, 2009). Mr. Smillie has withdrawn himself from the group that
works with the KPCS, since the massacre from a number of miners occurred in
Zimbabwe and some members of the Kimberley Process argued that this situation
should not characterize those diamonds as criminal diamonds, since they were
supporting the government and not the rebels. To this opinion, Mr. Smillie was
incisive when he said that the diamonds were “blood diamonds, they have blood all
over them” (SMILLIE, 2002 apud HOWDEN, 2009, p.2). Essential it is to reinforce
the warning given by him that illegal trade is returning everywhere, Ivory Coast,
Guinea, Lebanon and Venezuela, that in according to Global Witness 100% of the
diamonds in this last State are illegally smuggled, that the production of rough
diamonds has largely increased, and that none of the States that represent this new
situations have been suspended from the KPCS, which leads to the loss of trust in the
process.
2.3. Environmental Consequences of Conflicts
The environment is one of the damaged aspects of conflicts. Through all the
preparation, the duration and even after the dispute is over, the environment suffers
from the lack of care militias and the State show towards it. Apart from that, it is
essential to perceive that the extraction without restriction or any care may lead to the
decrease or even end of natural resources, of biodiversity and many other factors.
Furthermore, it is possible to perceive when considering history that the
environment is even used as a weapon to harm the opponent. “From the ancient tactics
of the Romans salting the fields of Carthage, to the destruction of dams in the Second
World War, the use of chemical defoliants in Vietnam, and the Iraqi oil-well fires, the
military war fighting machine is inherently an environmental security issue”
(HULME, 2009, p.15). From land use, to biological resources, water supply to
transportation infrastructure, the physical destruction of landscape is an almost
inevitable consequence from conflicts, as is the social disrupt that may generate
population displacement and the eventual onset of other social issues.
In this logic it is important to perceive numerous situations when the
environment may be affected during conflicts, through weapons testing and military
preparations, with the use of the environment as a weapon itself. Also previous war
zones and damaged areas can become a very suitable environment to militias as rebel
groups to cause further insecurity and tensions.
A [S]tate stripped of its natural resources or polluted with
weapons debris is likely to provide a fertile environment only
for further insecurities and conflict (so-called ‘reverse
causation’) and, hence, is unlikely to be able to maintain a
lasting peace (HULME, 2009, p.15).
2.4. The Environment and Peacebuilding
12
The environment plays a very important role as well on the reconstruction of
peace, after the conflict has ceased there is still a lot that needs to be done in order to
achieve once again political, economic and social stability, or something close to it, so
this State does not fall into conflict again. Historically the idea of peacebuilding has
changed, from a mere assistance on the negotiations of peace agreements, monitoring
of ceasefires, humanitarian aid, to a broader concept that concerns itself with
economic goals, development planning, democracy promotion and environmental
issues (ROSS, 2003). The last two aspects has began to grow on the concerns of the
international or national community once studies began to suggest that natural
resources could be possible aggravating factors for conflicts, especially in societies
which live a transition to peace (ROSS, 2003).
Addressing the consequences of the inter-relation between
natural resources and armed conflicts is important for all the
four parts of this comprehensive palette, since this inter-relation
is indeed reinforced when a country faces particular political,
economic and societal conditions, as shown in this article. Since
changing the natural and geographical aspects of the natural
resources is almost impossible, the foremost aspect a
peacebuilding policy should deal with is working on building a
combination of political, economic, and societal conditions that
can avoid a conflict being fostered again by natural resources
(VARISCO, 2010, p.52).
In peacebuilding it is essential to mitigate the consequences of conflicts on
the environment, and therefore, in natural resources, since these aspects are key to
maintaining and promoting stability and development. It is not reasonable to think that
development and improvement of post-conflict States could occur despite the
existence and guarantee of enough mean to sustain livelihoods. Studies have showed
that conflicts driven by natural resources have more chances of relapsing in the first
five years of post-conflict reality (UNEP, 2009).
3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION
The relation between the environment and conflicts has consolidated its spot
in international and internal agendas around the globe. However late, the realization
that conflicts over natural resources may cause great impact and damage to society,
economy and even the environment itself has come to guide discussions on many
forums around the world, from countries that have natural resources a plenty, to those
who need others treasures to maintain their own riches.
International standards and practices that take the environment into
consideration have been a result from the raising of awareness from States and
companies, as well and most importantly the pressure created by the civil societies
organizations; it was perceived that “good environmental practices as necessary for
their own profitability and sustainability” (LI, 2006, p.13).
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UFRGSMUN 2012
It was also stated by B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs, at the 5705th Meeting of the Security Council, that only the agreements
seeking cooperation were not sufficient, there had to be the “necessary capacity”, that
“[g]ood governance and transparency in managing resources were required, not only
of Governments in whose territory illegal exploitation was taking place, but also of all
those in a position to police exploitation and illicit trade” (UNSC, 2007).
Throughout history the international community has not given too much
attention to the association between environment and conflicts. In fact, until the end
of the Cold War security was seen in a much more restricted way and did not involved
environment as a risk or a threat. The first mention about these linkages in an official
United Nations document recognizes the environment in a passive way, only being
affected by conflicts. The General Assembly Resolution 3435 (XXX), of 1975,
discusses the situation of environmental degradation caused by colonial wars as
affecting the development of ex-colonies and it so demands the colonial Powers to act
in a way to minimize possible consequences and to compensate recently established
States. It then fits in a very specific context of decolonization and its costs.
The theme appears again in the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development. The Rio Declaration, as it is known, states 27
principles regarding the necessity to protect environment in order to allow
development. It requests the protection of environment during warfare situations,
considering it has no influence in the conflict. This idea is quite clear in article 24,
when the document recognizes warfare as being destructive to sustainable
development and call on States to respect international environmental laws (UN,
1992b). As a way to further this concept, in November 1992 the General Assembly
approved a resolution on the protection of the environment during armed conflicts. It
urges States once again to comply with international law concerning environmental
protection. In that moment the Gulf War played an important role, for in the preceding
year conflicts caused an oil spill in the Gulf Sea which has not until today been totally
rehabilitated (COUNTER SPILL, 2010).
This vision lasted throughout most of the 1990s, and it only started to change
in the end of that decade and beginning of the 2000s. In 1998 a Secretary-General’s
seminal report on the causes of the conflict and promotion of durable peace and
sustainable development in Africa was issued to the General Assembly and the
Security Council, and identified the illegal exploitation of natural resources as one of
the factors responsible for fuelling conflicts in the continent (UNGASC, 1998).
In 2003 the Security Council stated its first decision relating conflict and
environment. In its Resolution 1509 (2003) on the situation in Liberia, the Council
gave the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) the mandate to assist the
transitional government to manage the natural resources of the country, recognizing its
importance in the peacebuilding process. In the following years, the Security Council
has adopted several resolutions acknowledging the links between natural resources
and armed conflicts in specific situations, such as in the resolution 1565 (2004)
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In this resolution the
Security Council expanded the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and “urge[d] all States,
especially those in the region including the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself,
14
to take appropriate steps in order to end these illegal activities” (UN, 2004, p.6). In
the following year, the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan issued a progress report to
the 60th session of the General Assembly on the causes of conflict and promotion of
durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. The report reiterated the
exploitation of natural resources have persisted as a contributory causes of conflicts in
the continent, and stressed the need to address this issue. Mr. Annan stated the
examples of Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC.
In 2005, the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1635 acknowledged the link
between illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources and the trafficking of arms
as one of the elements fuelling conflicts in the African region of the Great Lakes,
particularly at the DRC (UNSC, 2005). Another UN Security Council’s adopted in the
following year (RES 1653) to address to the aforementioned situation urged
government in the Great Lakes region to enhance cooperation in order to provide a
more transparent exploitation of natural resources (UNSC, 2006). In 2007 the UN
Security Council issued a presidential statement broadening this vision, recognizing
the role of natural resources in all phases of a conflict, including the post conflict
situation. Despite assuring the right of every country to exploit its natural resources,
the Council acknowledged the necessity to improve international efforts regarding
illegal exploitation and management during and after conflicts (UNSC, 2007). The
Council has been frequently stating concern over the use of natural resources for
financing wars, especially in Africa. Another important step has been taken in the
Security Council Resolution 2053 (2012), when the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has
been given the mandate to cooperate with the Congolese government in order to
prevent illegal exploitation of natural resources. The Group of Eight (G8) countries
have showed intention to address the issue in Africa, and at it 31 st summit held in
2005 in Scotland, the Group made the compromise to act to fight the role resources
play in fuelling conflicts, especially in Africa (G8, 2005).
Following the efforts of the UN Security Council, in 2004 the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) issued a paper for the Session on
Natural Resource Governance and Conflict Prevention recognizing the importance of
the role of natural resources in motivating and fueling conflicts, and addressing to the
issue of transparent natural resource government and management. In order to fulfill
such purpose the DESA has the support of the Division for Sustainable Development
and the Secretariat of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNDESA, 2004).
Additionally, the UN organ releases regularly reports containing recommendations on
how to better address issues concerning transparent natural resource governance.
The United Nations Environment Programme has accompanied the evolution
of the international vision on this matter. In 1991, the Programme’s Governing
Council expressed worries about the damages warfare caused in the environment
during the Gulf War. In the Decision 16/11 of 1991, the UNEP Governing Council
called on States for more action, in a way to avoid further environmental damages and
to identify warfare technologies that harm the environment. Since 1999 the UNEP has
been committed with environmental assessment in post conflict regions. In 2003 the
Post-Conflict Assessment Unit has been created within the programme, becoming
responsible for assessing the consequences conflicts have in the environment, and
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UFRGSMUN 2012
possibilities for a sustainable peacebuilding process that assimilate natural resources
management in order to avoid conflict restoration. The Unit has since been present in
several countries after their requests, such as Afghanistan, Liberia and Occupied
Palestinian Territories (UNEP, 2009). In 2010 conflicts, alongside with disasters, have
been considered part of the six UNEP priorities 2. The sub programme has four goals:
disaster and conflict risk reduction, post-crisis assessment, post-crises recovery, and
cooperation for peacebuilding (UNEP, 2010). These have been the main acting lines
for UNEP since then.
In 2000 the Kimberley Process was launched. The initiative aims at
controlling diamonds sells in international markets. The General Assembly Resolution
on the Role of Diamonds in Fueling Conflicts, of 2000, demanded the creation of an
international scheme of origin certification for diamonds in order to prevent their use
as a financial mechanism for rebel movements. The resolution resulted in the creation
of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, in 2002, which establishes the
requirements for a “conflict-free” certificate for diamonds sells. In 2012 the scheme
has already been adopted by 76 countries that represent 99.8% of world rough
diamond production (KIMBERLEY PROCESS, 2012). Although the adoption of such
scheme represented recognition of the connections between conflict and natural
resources, it was limited to diamond related wars. In 2006 the General Assembly
recognized the need to address the consequences of natural resources’ illegal
exploitation in the peace and stability of the African continent, urging all the
organizations interested to dismiss efforts on the issue (UN, 2006).
In 2000 the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights were
established aiming at providing guidelines to strengthen human rights regarding
company’s activities and maintaining security of extractive operations. It was
followed by meetings between stakeholders by the United States’ and United
Kingdom’s governments and representatives of oil, mining, and energy companies,
human rights and labor organizations and groups designed to establish corporate
responsibility. Nevertheless, the initiative has been largely criticized by NGOs, since
it lacks transparency and monitoring mechanisms (FELDT, 2008).
4. BLOC POSITIONS
The European Union has played an important role in raising awareness to
the issue of illegally extracted minerals, and the damages caused to the environment
and society. The Union participates as a single member representing all its State
parties at the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Other than that, it is
important to state that all members of the KPCS have also endorsed the System of
Warranties created by the World Diamond Council. Furthermore, the president of the
European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, has indicated that the European Union
will be determined to create legislation that may at least mach the Dodd-Frank Wall
2 The other priorities are climate change, ecosystem management, environmental governance,
harmful substances and resource efficiency (UNEP, 2010).
16
Street Reform Act (MOYO, 2011), which seeks to install an accountability system for
companies by publicizing payments made on behalf of extractive sector deals.
With regards to specific European Union countries, Germany itself has
acknowledgment Africa’s importance as important energy producer and holder of
major mineral reserves (BUNDESREGIERUNG, 2011), an understandable move
given the country’s dependence on raw materials imports for its economic
development, especially technology industry. In that sense, Germany proposes a
partnership that will enhance Africa’s technological capacity through the
modernization of infrastructure while securing the resources Germany needs for its
development (BUNDESREGIERUNG, 2011). Furthermore, the German government
has also fully supported the use of sanctions to deal with conflicts caused by illegal
mineral exploitation, supporting embargos in those situations, but emphasizing that
initiatives that sought to improve “revenue transparency, such as the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative” (UNSC, 2007) should be encouraged.
France has been demonstrating full support to standard initiatives such as the
Kimberley Process, but stressed that the initiative “remained fragile, dependent on
improvements in keeping statistics and the implementation of more rigorous internal
controls” (UNSC, 2007). The country supported the need for the UN Security Council
“to strengthen the effectiveness of sanction mechanisms, with a view to greater
coherence and greater responsiveness” (UNSC, 2007). Furthermore, the country also
represents one of the stakeholder States at the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) and several of its companies are also part of it.
The United Kingdom has been one of the main supporters of transparency
initiatives, stressing that these are key for growth and development. The UK defends
that poor governance of natural resources contributes to the link between the
environment and conflicts (UNSC, 2007). “Political systems and structures of
governance must be reformed in order to address those challenges. Such efforts must
be targeted to specific situations, drawing on the expertise of all stakeholders and
concerned parties” (UNSC, 2007). As well as France, the United Kingdom is also one
of the States that oversees the processes of implementation of the EITI initiative as a
country stakeholder. UK companies also figure on the EITI initiative.
The United States, for one, has issued a piece of legislation entitled the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, which seeks to force all oil, gas and mining
companies listed in the country to publish all the payments they make to governments,
broken down to the level of individual projects; publicizing data on gas in Nigeria, oil
in Angola and mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Before this act came
into force, the United States was one of the countries that maintained investments in
conflict zones, ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco being examples of such behavior.
The maintenance of investments in those locations was, however, accompanied by
policies that sought to minimize human rights violations responsibilities, being the
“Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights” one of them (LI, 2006, p.15).
Besides emphasizing good governance and transparency, the US has worked on the
prevention of illegal resource trade through bilateral agreements, the G-8, and several
United Nations bodies (UNSC, 2007). The country is also a stakeholder for the EITI
and it also takes part on the Kimberley Process Certification Schemes.
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UFRGSMUN 2012
The Russian Federation has been a part of the Kimberley Process since
2003. It has also defended the need for sanctions, keeping in mind that those should
not compromise the well-being of populations (UNSC, 2007). Also, the State
demonstrated support for local initiatives such as the one made by the countries at the
Great Lakes Region, the Pact on Peace, Security and Development of the Great Lakes
Region and its provisions to curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources (UNSC,
2007).
China is one of the main countries to behold when the subject is mineral
resources extraction. Currently China represents “the prime driver of world mineral
prices and a number of Africa countries have (sic) become key beneficiaries of this
process” (IDE-JETRO, 2009, p.43). The reason for this fact is that China does not
meet its need for metals, “consuming more than 25% of the world’s support” (IDEJETRO, 2009, p.43). As such,
China is deeply reliant on Sub-Saharan Africa for
the import of minerals a necessity that has fostered investments on that continent.
However critical the Chinese need for African resources and the importance of these
minerals for the continuity of the Chinese economical growth, the percentage of the
investment that should be destined to environmental impact was of less than 1% (LI,
2006). Despite that, the Chinese government has stated the need to foster and
implement sanctions where needed, but never forgetting to end those when they were
no longer needed (UNSC, 2007). China has been a participant of the Kimberley
Process since 2003.
Japan demonstrated support to initiatives such as the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative – to which it is a stakeholder –, the Kimberley Process and the
efforts of the International Tropical Timber Organization on the prevention of
environmental conflicts (UNSC, 2007). For the Japanese government, the United
Nations – particularly the Security Council – should work to foster developmentoriented approaches to conflicts instead of focusing on sanctions as governments
express commitment to such an approach (UNSC, 2007).
India’s opinion on the prevention of conflicts was to “comprehensively
address inequality and economic deprivation” (UNSC, 2007, p.15). For the
representative of India at the 5705th Meeting of the UNSC, the merit of the regulation
processes for illegal exploitation was that it involved “the entire international
community, including civil society, and avoided the pitfall of treating the issue of
resource management purely as a matter of peace and security.” (UNSC, 2007). India
is also part of the Kimberley Process.
In recent times, Brazil has actively worked to strengthen its relations with the
African continent. As such, the presence of Brazilian companies in Africa has grown,
with major players like Petrobras and Vale at the frontline of the extractive sector
exploration on the continent. Both companies are stakeholders in the EITI. Brazil is a
participant of the Kimberley Process, directly related to the Working Group on
Artisanal and Alluvial Production (WGAAP). According to the Brazilian
representative at the 5705th Meeting of the Security Council, the General Assembly
should be in charge of discussions concerning natural resources; discussions under
UNEP and the Commission on Sustainable Development should then follow (UNSC,
2007).
18
Australia is one of the stakeholders of the EITI as well as a member of the
Kimberley Process. This State has also implemented in its governmental policies a
project to assist other countries on how to better manage their natural resources and
exploitation in order to prevent environmental impact, as well as guarantee
transparency, avoiding that the benefits of this type of activity become the fuel for
conflicts (AUSAID, 2012).
According to the African Group (UNSC, 2007), efforts to acknowledge the
linkage between natural resources and conflicts have been developing since the 1960s,
first with the Algiers Convention (1968), passing through the General Assembly and
the Security Council. For the group, is it of utmost importance to avoid the usage of
natural resources to finance military operations on the continent (UNSC, 2007).
Regional initiatives are also important on the prevention of conflicts. For instance, it is
important to comment on the southern African countries initiative to create the
Southern Africa Resource Watch, a network composed of Africa and non-African
institutions dedicated to improving the extractive industry sector in Africa
(SOUTHERN AFRICA RESOURCE WATCH, 2008). Also, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has worked to raise the awareness
of African countries that the management of resources has to become a pressing issue
in Africa’s agenda, since it is seen as a possible solution to the onset of conflicts in
resource-rich States and that conflicts over natural resources represent an important
part in Africa’s decrease of natural diversity and environmental integrity (ECOWAS,
2008).
Some of the members of ECOWAS have been taking measures to improve
the conditions under which their resources are used, as well as to promote
transparency in order to avoid profits going into the financing of militias or even
government officials in conflict within the State boarders or abroad. One of these
States is Nigeria. Since 1999, Nigeria has had a Minerals and Mining Decree which
takes on environmental conservation issues and it states unequivocally the
conservation methods which must be employed in mining and processing operations.
Beyond that, Nigeria is one of the States who has fully complied with the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), having internalized the requirements at a
legal act in the country and being up-to-date with its reports. Nigeria will be
reevaluated in 2016 (EITI, 2011). However, the 1999 decree has yet to create
sufficient provision of sanctions against those who fail to comply with the
environmental protection regulations (AIGBEDION, 2007). Furthermore, Nigeria has
been involved in several internal disputes related to the oil industry revenues,
especially between the central government and the Niger Delta region where
prospection facilities are located (KERR, 2007).
Togo, another member of the ECOWAS, possesses large phosphate reserves
in its territory and those encompass a considerable amount of the country’s export
revenues (WB, 2012). Improvements on this sector have been at the root of GDP
growth in 2011 and expected values for 2012 (WB, 2012). As of now, Togo is still not
a full member of the EITI since it has not fulfilled all the requirements to be
considered a compliant country. With regards to the Kimberley Process, Togo has
taken part in it since 2003 for it is a small alluvial diamond producer (KIMBERLEY
PROCESS, 2011). Back in 2000, a UN report accused former President Gnassingbe
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UFRGSMUN 2012
Eyadema, together with Burkina Faso’s president Balise Campaore, of supplying fuel
and arms to the UNITA group during Angola’s civil was in exchange for diamonds.
Such accusations were denied by both State leaders (TOGO, 2012).
In Kenya, gemstone mining has been the cause of conflict of interests,
especially when it comes to the preservation of national parks. The Commissioner of
Mines and Geology Department is the government body entitled of dealing with this
issues, in order to avoid “uncontrolled mining, loss of revenue, environmentally
unfriendly practices and non-rehabilitation programs after mineral exploitation”
(KARIUKI, 2002, p.12). The State has a piece of legislation to regulate mineral
exploitation; however it dates back to 1940. In 1993, the act began to be reviewed,
providing “for lesser discretionary powers to the licensing authorities and hence
provide for greater security of tenure. It is also to provide for greater environmental
protection from the undesirable effects of mining activities” (OPIYO-AKECH, 2000,
p.1). Despite the internal efforts, Kenya is not a member of the EITI, nor does it
participate at the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.
Short after independence in 1975, Mozambique fell into a civil war that
would only end in 1992. Since then, the country has enjoyed relative stability, but it
still lacks accountability and transparency. Even though extractive industry has had a
low contribution to the country’s GDP, the sector has evolved due to the discovery of
natural gas and the exploration of gold and precious stones (EITI, 2012).
Mozambique is one of the States that has been trying to become a participant of the
EITI; nevertheless its efforts so far have not been sufficient. In 2012 Mozambique has
launched its 2009 report, and according to the Board of Stakeholders it has made
significant progress. It still does not comply with some of the requirements of the
EITI, therefore remaining a Candidate Country.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been and still is one of the
States that suffers the most with resource exploitation leading to conflicts. For the
Congolese representative at the 5705th Meeting of the Security Council,
while “blood diamonds” might be the best known object of
illicit exploitation, his country also had “blood copper”, “blood
gold”, “blood coltan” -– a mineral extracted from the Congolese
jungles and essential to cell phone technology -- and “blood
cobalt”. To address such a serious and challenging situation, the
Council might consider backing the creation of global
cooperative schemes similar to the Kimberley Process -designed to certify the origin of diamonds from conflict-free
sources -- to deal with the exploitation of other natural resources
(UNSC, 2007).
The DRC has been at the root of the December 2006 Pact on Security,
Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, an effort to stop regional
conflicts which also laid out provisions regarding the illegal exploitation of natural
resources. Currently, the country stands as a candidate to the EITI; in order to become
a compliant country, the DRC was supposed to have met a number of requirements by
June 2011, but it did not succeed (EITI, 2011).
Gabon is a large producer of manganese and oil; nevertheless, its oil
production is threatened by the maturity of its oil fields. Furthermore, oil has been at
20
the center of a territorial dispute Gabon and Equatorial Guinea for islands in the
region. Currently, the country is a candidate to the EITI.
Colombia has great mineral reserves that includes coal, gold, crude oil and
nickel. In 2012, the country announced that will adopt the EITI standards. Law
266/2000 determinates that any activity related to resource exploitation must be
preceded by a study of the “indigenous” and “black” communities affected by the
project. Colombia also established the Sustainable Development Net whose concepts
are connected to the ideal of environmental protection established at Rio 92
Conference.
Mexico is a large exporter of mineral resources as celestite, silver, cadmium,
manganese ore and zinc. Since 1988 the country implemented a specific mining
control act as well as an environmental law. The standards of mining control are the
same established by NAFTA. Around 80% of its mining exports goes to USA and
Canada. The FAGEP (Federal Attorney Generalship of Environmental Protection) is
an organism, specifically, created to control, monitorate the mining activities and
punish environmental crimes as well.
Iran suffered with the depletion of its natural resources without, however,
any kind of ecological control. The Iranian government is trying to invert this
situation through some environmental programs in partnership with UNDP. These
programs include regional cooperation and technology transference. Besides that, Iran
is adhering to several treaties and environmental conventions as UNFCCC (United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).
Israel is a producer of dolomite, chalk and sand. After the creation of the
Ministry of Environmental Protection and the adoption of the National Master Plan for
Mining and Quarrying the concept of sustainability was incorporated into the mining
activities. Besides that, the new legislation aims to ensuring the country capability of
mining until 2040. Other “best mining practice” is the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) and the monitoring all phases of mining activities (NATIONAL
REPORT, 2009).
Ecuador has the same economic path that its Latin neighbors. Great producer
of gold, silver, copper and antimony has suffered with the unregulated exploitation of
its natural resources. In 2010, however the portion of GDP related to mining
commodities decreased substantially due to the mining moratorium established by the
parliament. The suspension of the mining exploitation would prevail until the new
Mining Act was approved by the national congress. The new mining code will change
the manner by which the mining industries exploit the natural resources, including
water. New agencies were formed as a result of mining reorganization, including the
Ministry of Nonrenewable Natural Resources (MRNR) and the Agency for Regulation
and Control of Mining (ARCOM).
5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER
1) How can the international community strengtht mechanisms designed to
regulate natural resources exploitation?
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UFRGSMUN 2012
2) How can the international community assist the sustainable development of
resource-dependent countries in order to avoid conflicts?
3) In the aftermath of a conflict rooted in resources’ exploitation, how can
international community and the State in question prevent the reemergence of
the dispute?
4) How the damages caused in the environment can be addressed during
peacebuilding?
22
TOPIC B: The Protection of Marine and Coastal Ecosystems: Economic and
Political Challenges
Walter Lorenzo Zilio Motta de Souza
and Jéssica da Silva Höring
Since the beginning of history, humanity has been closely related to oceans
and coastal areas, and until today the exploitation of these environments is apparent.
The exploitation of oceans and its biodiversity have been happening throughout time,
and the constant increase of food consumption, whether in terms of quantity or in
terms of diversity of species, represents only one of the impacts caused on the marine
ecosystem (JACKSON, 2010). Indeed, “oceans are crucial to life on Earth, support
livelihoods and are vital to the World Economy in numerous ways, including food as
fish, income to coastal communities from tourism, shipping and trade, and through
petroleum reserves, to mention a few” (FAO, 2006 apud NELLEMANN et al., 2008,
p. 14). Furthermore society may take advantage of coastal zones, which tend to exhibit
a greater diversity of species and alternative forms of sustenance, as well as the access
to communication means. However, this trend has led frequently to serious
consequences such as overexploitation, pollution, and rise of carbon dioxide, owing to
fossil fuels burning (JACKSON, 2010). Historically, maritime communities could
support relatively high human population densities in comparison to interior
populations, due to the larger availability of resources and lesser technology
requirements.
Whales, seals, fish, crustaceans, and algae have been fished for
human consumption, and seaweeds, salt, sponges, corals, and
pearls have been brought to consumers for diverse uses. Today,
important medicines, from anticoagulants to muscle relaxants,
are derived from marine snails (KRECH III et al., 2004, p. 959).
Coasts tend to be refuge of many species, therefore concentrating a wide
range of natural resources. Thus, it allowed many populations to build settlements on
coastal areas, with easy access to resources, and even when it did not,
the use of boats provide[d] a tremendous transportation
advantage for coastal peoples, allowing many widely dispersed
yet locally concentrated resources to be harvested and returned
to a central settlement. Coastal settlements, then, tend to be
optimally located to take advantage of several resources from a
single location (YESNER, 1980, p. 730).
A possible illustration to what has been said is the Roman Empire that, even
with the expansion of fishing grounds to Britain, due to the reduction of species in
Mediterranean, remained in the same location (JACKSON, 2010).
Jeremy Jackson (2010) states that due to the filling of the available niches
and the increase in population density, prehistoric societies needed to develop
innovations. “Trade with other groups would have been one such avenue, and
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intensive trade alone may have had important consequences for the development of
centralized elites to manage that trade” (YESNER, 1980, p. 735). Gradually, with the
emergence of the nation-States and the subsequent competition around global
resources and trade, the Central Powers began to identify the benefits which could be
taken from control of marine resources and skills. The sixteenth century was marked
by the shipping revolution, which allowed whaling and fishing in distant islands and
continents, and although extinguishing and dramatically impacting some species and
ecosystems, made possible the contact between different cultures (YESNER, 1980).
The referred situation illustrates the beginning of globalization phenomena, of the
movement of goods between continents and the progress in international relations.
The expansion of the great European maritime empires brought
new technologies and opened up the entire ocean to exploitation
with boom and bust cycles of fishing for shellfish, fish, turtles,
sea birds, seals, sea cows and whales (Roberts 2007). But the
real damage began when what had previously been a series of
local to regional problems became truly global in extent, driven
by the modern economic passion for growth and seemingly
endless supplies of cheap energy from fossil fuels (JACKSON,
2010, p. 3768).
Furthermore, both the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century and the
industrial transport revolution in the 19th century have allowed the fast growth of
cities, especially due to human displacement towards these areas. The progressive
development of transportation facilities has also “greatly enhanced long-distance and
even global travel, but it lessened the importance of regional transport economics.
Improved roads, railways, and steam shipping created a world market for many more
goods than before, and regional markets gave way to the global market” (KRECH III
et al., 2004, p. 960).
The referred context required not only the establishment of new port towns,
in order to reach the needs of maritime transport and long-trade, but also the
enhancement of the already available ones — since “the first port towns were well
developed in the Mediterranean three thousand years ago” (KRECH III et al., 2004, p.
960). Accordingly, that led to the development of industrialized societies and cities
along coasts, where oceans could provide access to communication, transportation and
trade. It was due to this progress, however, that one may perceive the increase in
pollution and sewage into the oceans.
Progressively, “diesel engines were being introduced, and by the 1950s coal
was all but given up” (KRECH III et al., 2004, p. 960), leading to the fast
development of private cars, long-distance trucking and jet travel connecting
continents (KRECH III et al., 2004), and setting a provocative stimulus on technical
innovations to oil exploration. Such progress led to innovations in oil extraction into
the ocean bed, which contains energy in a myriad of forms, such as oil and natural
gas. Regarding to the sea bed operations,
[k]ey technical innovations in drilling were the introduction of
the rolling cutter rock bit by U.S. industrialist Howard Hughes
in 1909, development of anchored and semisubmersible offshore
platforms after 1945, and a widespread adoption of directional
24
and horizontal drilling after 1980. Long-distance transfers and
exports of oil have been made possible by the introduction of
large-diameter seamless-steel pipelines and by reliance on
supertankers (carrying 250,000-500,000 metric tons) for
overseas shipments. After 1936 crude oil refining was
revolutionized by catalytic cracking, which makes it possible to
produce lighter, high-octane distillates (above all, gasoline and
jet fuel) from intermediate and heavy compounds (KRECH III et
al., 2004, p. 964).
It is also essential to emphasize that, towards the end of the 19th century,
there was a rapid development on the oil industry in the United States, Romania,
Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Mexico, Iran, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. Such path
was followed at the beginning of the 20th century by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, still
before 1940. In the second half of the 20th century, Middle East, Europe, Russia,
China, Nigeria and the North Sea emerged as major producers as well. In addition, the
recognition of oil importance was so patent, that oil production rose from 20 million
metric tonnes in 1900 to nearly 3.5 billion metric tonnes in 2000 (KRECH III et al.,
2004).
Offshore oil extraction is a widely used method of exploration; in accordance
to the Black Tides (2012a), it represents nearly a quarter of worldwide production. In
this regard, offshore exploitation may take some types of transport and refining
process, and oil spills may occur during drilling, transporting, refining, and the
extraction course, which includes tankers, pipes, worksites and terminals. One
important episode considering oil leaks is the one in a terminal during the first Gulf
War, in 1991, in which about 900.000 oil tonnes were spilled into the Persian Gulf
(KRECH III et al., 2004).
The primary method of transportation of oil is by oil tanker, and
traditional shipping lanes have developed between the oilproducing countries and the oil-importing countries. At present,
major oil routes go from Middle East to Japan, Europe, and the
United States. Oil is also transported through pipes over vast
distances to refineries. Oil spills occur mainly along these
oceanic and land routes and along the shores where oil transfers
take place. Small spills occur during the transfer of oil from
tanker to tanker, from tanker to refinery, from damaged
underground pipes, and around oil refineries and storage
facilities (KRECH III et al., 2004, p. 966).
Some of the largest oil spills in history may include Ixtoc-1 (Mexico, 529
million liters, 1979), Nowruz Field (Persian Gulf, 302 million liters, 1980), Fergana
Valley (Uzbekistan, 302 million liters, 1992) (KRECH III et al., 2004), as well as
many others. In order to understand this issue, it is interesting to mention further
incidents more thoroughly. In 1979 occurred the Atlantic Empress oil spill in West
Indies, which resulted in nearly 287.000 tonnes of oil spilled. The accident was due to
a collision between the crude carriers of Atlantic Empress and Aegean Captain; no
further studies were developed on this matter (ITOPF, 2012a). Another large oil spill
was the ABT Summer one, just off the coast of Angola, in 1991. It was result of an
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UFRGSMUN 2012
explosion followed by a fire under the tanker of ABT Summer, causing 260.000
tonnes of oil spilled into the sea. Since it took place near the off-shore, the
environment has not been largely damaged, because the oil was broken by high seas
(ITOPF, 2012a).
Some other major oil spills are worth mentioning, such as the one with
Torrey Canyon tanker (Sicily Isles in 1967). It grounded on Pollard Rock and caused
the spill of about 119.000 oil tonnes, damaging seabirds and even threatening local
populations near the coast. This case gained more visibility, for the oil became very
hard to dissipate, causing great environmental impact due to the indiscriminate use of
dispersants and detergents. The case led to searches of methods to be used in case of
persistent oils, that is, those oils difficult to dissipate (ITOPF, 2012b). Lastly, a well
known oil spill case was the Exxon Valdez one, which occurred in Alaska, 1989.
Although it is widely evoked, it is not one of the largest oil spills in history, although
it is the largest registered in the United States. Exxon tanker grounded in Prince
William Sound, in Alaska, and nearly 37.000 tonnes of oil were spilled, of which less
than 10% were recovered, largely affecting marine wildlife (ITOPF, 2012c).
In accordance to The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
Limited (ITOPF), “approximately 5.7 million tonnes of oil were lost as a result of
tanker incidents from 1970 to 2011” (ITOPF, 2012d). Notwithstanding, these numbers
have been changing: during the 2000s nearly 211.000 tonnes of oil were spilled into
the sea, which is considerably less than the amount registered during the 1970s
(3.166.000 tonnes) and in the 1990s (1.137.000 tonnes) (ITOPF, 2012d).
2.1. Current Status of Coastal and Marine Environments
Human activities depend on a complex life support system which consists of
services provided by Earth’s ecosystems. Services and goods, such as waste
assimilation and food supply, “represent the benefits human populations derive,
directly or indirectly, from ecosystem functions” (COSTANZA et al., 1997, p. 253).
An important report on the subject assessed that “non-market ecosystem services from
earth’s biosphere (climate, water, soil, nutrients, etc.) have been estimated at USD 33
trillion/year and of these, 63% derive from marine systems, one half each from coasts
and the open ocean" (COSTANZA et al., 1997 apud IOC/UNESCO et al., 2011, p.23).
Therefore, one shall perceive oceans and coastal ecosystems as main actors on
maintenance of life conditions.
Since “more than 40% of the world’s population (…) live within 100
kilometers of the coast” (IOC/UNESCO et al., 2011, p.13), human settlements rely on
marine and coastal resources and services. The nexus oceans-human society
comprehends many activities and issues, such as: urban and rural settlements,
fisheries, tourism, maritime transport and infrastructure, energy, biological services,
climate regulating services and cultural services. Such human activities are estimated
to value between 3 to 6 trillion dollars per year and depend directly on ecosystem
health, but in recent decades the economic growth related to oceans “has been
accomplished mainly through unsustainable exploitation of many marine resources”
26
(IOC/UNESCO et al., 2011, p. 8). Therefore, sustainable approaches that enable the
protection of marine and coastal ecosystems must be assessed.
In the recent decades, these ecosystems have faced increasing threats due to
direct or indirect human activities. According to Halpern (2008) apud Toropova et al.
(2010, p. 9), there is no area in the ocean that is unaffected by human influence, and
specifically “41% of the ocean is strongly affected by multiple drivers, with the
highest impacts concentrated closer to shores". Problems include marine pollution
from land-based sources (untreated sewage, urban litter, agriculture runoff, persistent
organic pollutants, heavy metals, radioactive substances and so on) and point sources
in the ocean (oil spills and ballast water of shipping), which are creating hypoxic
zones3 that undermine living conditions (NELLEMANN; CORCORAN, 2006).
Besides, overfishing and destructive fishing are pressuring down the global fish
stocks, compromising food security of most dependant populations; invasive species
are introduced by shipping, changing regional trophic webs; and, globally, ocean is
acidifying, posing risk to coral reefs and many other sensitive species (IOC/UNESCO
et al., 2011).
Respectively, land-based activities have large influence in ecosystem health.
Certain use of land and freshwater can alter sediment transport and hydrology of
watersheds. Run-off of urban sewage and agriculture products make coastal waters to
be excessively chemically altered. This problem can be assessed as a lack of
awareness, but also as conflict of uses, jurisdictions and cultures. While coastal
planners look at the land side of the zone, watershed managers are concerned
exclusively with the freshwater quality. While fisheries managers plan new
exploitation strategies, shipping authorities address ship traffic and safety rules.
Navies take responsibility for national security, while tourism managers want to
develop new resorts and leisure events. Finally, local communities demand services
and goods, while conservationists want to protect threatened species, reefs, and
wetlands. So, it is common different institutions get into a struggle to manage coastal
and marine environments (UNEP, 2011a).
On the other hand, mining activities within the ocean are also affecting
marine environments, through oil and gas lifecycle (OSPAR, 2010). According to the
United States National Academy of Science (2002) apud UNEP/GPA (2012), 37% of
the oil in the ocean comes from operational discharges and land-based sources, 12%
comes from accidental oil spills, 3% from extraction of oils and 46% from natural
seeps.
Therefore, international and national commitments must be made and
brought into action in order to avoid the depletion of biodiversity and natural
resources in marine and coastal ecosystems. Knowing the importance of many
activities that are held and impact in coasts and oceans, land-based sources and oil and
gas industry will be assessed as main vectors to marine pollution.
2.2. Dealing with Land-Based Sources of Pollution: Addressing Urbanization
3 Hypoxic zones or “dead coastal zones” are regions on coast with low concentration of oxygen
(hypoxic), undermining living conditions of the biota (NOAA, 2011).
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UFRGSMUN 2012
The world faces massive movement of the population migration from rural to
urban areas. Between 1970 and 2011, urban population increased from 36% to 52% of
the total world population. If this trend persists, taking into account the economic
growth of developing countries, projections show an amount of 67% of world
population living in cities by 2050 (UN DESA, 2012). The United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ (2012) projections also show an
increasing portion of people living in cities with more than a million inhabitants: from
39% in 2011 to 46% in 2025. Moreover, the urban population living in megacities
(cities with more than 10 million inhabitants) grew from 2.9% to 9.9% between 1970
and 2011. Regarding the ratio between urban and total population, despite having 52%
of world’s population, the Asian continent shows a lower level of urbanization (45%)
in comparison with Latin America and Caribbean (79%), but still higher than the
African continent (39.6%). Concerning coastal population, 73% of the cities with
more than 5 million inhabitants are localized near or on coast (UN DESA, 2012). All
in all, it is possible to state that “thirty-eight per cent of the world’s population live
within a narrow fringe of coastal land, only 7,6 per cent of the Earth’s total land area”
(UNEP/GPA, 2006, p. iv).
Since the population distribution is uneven, populous cities tend to have a
greater contribution to marine and coastal degradation, along with other land-based
sources. Therefore, it is estimated that 80% of marine and coastal degradations comes
from pressures of land-based activities (UNEP/GPA, 2006). On the other hand, “the
urban areas of the developing world, which contained some 30 percent of the total
population, contributed to nearly 60 percent of the total GDP [Gross Domestic
Product] at the turn of the century” (LUNDQVIST et al., 2006 apud
MAVROPOULOS, 2010, p. 3). Thus, although having more economical capacity to
develop in a sustainable way, big cities face serious environmental issues.
“Sewage is the most serious problem with the least progress, hampered by
financial constraints” (UNEP/GPA, 2006, p. 5). A common goal of every nation is to
provide adequate infrastructure to collect and treat wastewater, in order to avoid
adverse effects on human health, as well as on the biodiversity. Untreated wastewater
is the main vector to eutrophication of water bodies and contributes, along with
agriculture run-offs, to the increasing of dead coastal zones. Great improvements must
be made in African and Asian continent, as well in Latin America and the Caribbean,
where over 80% of wastewater is launched untreated in water bodies. It is the opposite
situation of European and North American countries that, with some exceptions (like
the ones that are on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea), launch less than 20% of their
wastewater untreated (UNEP/GPA, 2006). Economic constraints may keep the least
developed countries out of investing in improvements in this field. However, the
accelerating urbanization in these countries shall worsen the problem, if it is not found
a way of mobilizing financial resources to this issue.
Marine litter is also an important issue, since it poses risk to aquatic and
human life. It is believed that around “70 per cent of litter entering the oceans lands on
the seabed, 15 per cent on beaches and 15 per cent remains floating on the surface”
(UNEP/GPA, 2006, p. 26). Litter can enter in the sea through two different ways:
discards of sea-based activities (oils from offshore platforms, refuse of aquaculture
installations and discarded fishing equipment) and waste of land-based activities
28
(municipal waste, storm water, wastewater; discards of military activities; waste of
industrial installations; and waste originated from tourism and leisure activities).
Nationals and internationals efforts have been made but without success to control this
kind of pollution that increases each year (UNEP/GPA, 2006).
For its turn, physical alteration and destruction of coastal habitats has
increased, being directly influenced by population growth, economical development
and human settlement in coastal areas. Tourism activities and infrastructure
constructions also affects rich biodiversity ecosystems such as wetlands, mangroves
and coral reefs. Dredging in coastal areas, intensive aquaculture, draining wetlands
and hinterland activities such as damming or polluting rivers contribute to the
complexity of manage these areas. Taking into account that 50% of all mangrove and
wetlands have already disappeared, and 30% of coral reefs are seriously damaged,
efforts to address this issue have varied from region to region (UNEP/GPA, 2006).
Dramatic changes are being held on coast of Gulf countries, where the main
example is the creation of artificial islands in Qatar, for the purpose to develop
tourism industry. In South and East Asia, agriculture, deforestation and construction
of dams threaten the coastal ecosystems and their valuable services; with similar
situations occurring in other regions (UNEP/GPA, 2006).
In order to address land-based pollution on coasts and marine environment,
new institutional frameworks have been created, as well as cooperation in regional
and international level are being enhanced. The creation of the Global Programme of
Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities
(GPA) in 1995 was the first step to address properly the issue. However, due to
institutional and governance limitations, still there are challenges that have to be
overcome (POWERS, 2008). Possibilities of enhancing GPA are discussed on section
3.3.
2.3. Sea-Based Pollution: the case of Offshore Oil Exploitation
Petroleum, by definition, is a liquid mixture of hydrocarbons and impurity
compounds such as sulfur, nitrogen, metals etc. It is one of the most important raw
materials available currently, and it is used to produce synthetic fibers, plastics,
fertilizers, paints, synthetic rubber, many kinds of fuels (gasoline, kerosene, diesel
oil), and also electricity (SPEIGHT, 2011).
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008), petroleum is the
main source of energy and it will continue to be for, at least, the next two decades
(figure 1). Urbanization, improvement of living conditions, industrialization and
population growth are important variables that drive increasing demand for energy.
This is the case of non-Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Developments
(OECD) countries, which will account for 62% of the energy demand in 2030 (IEA,
2008).
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UFRGSMUN 2012
Figure 1 - Global energy demand by fuel. Observed data from 1980 to 2006 and projections from 2006 to
2030 (IEA, 2008, p. 80).
In spite of projected growth of consumption of energy, different fuel matrices
are used throughout the world. Concerning petroleum demand, “the industrialized
countries are the largest consumers of oil and the countries of OECD account for
almost more than 60% of worldwide daily oil consumption” (SPEIGHT, 2011, p.
200). IEA (2008) projects China, India and Middle East as responsible for more than
60% of the incremental global oil demand, during the period from 2006 to 2030; in
contrast, OECD countries will account for 46% of the global increase in the use of
renewable energy in the same period.
On the other hand, the reserves of crude oil are estimated in 1.3 trillion
barrels (BP, 2010 apud SPEIGHT, 2011). Approximately 75% of the available crude
oil is stocked in very large reservoirs called giants. There are about 300 of these big
fields and they belong to just a few countries, as Middle East being the main stocking
region. Although more than 200 nations rely on oil, “only approximately 40 countries,
most of which are oil exporters, produce significant amounts” (SPEIGHT, 2011, p.
52). As an example of the concentration of oil exporters, it is estimated that 40% of
the total daily production of oil is provided by 12 countries, which compose the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Apart from them, some of the
primary oil producers are also Russia, the United States, China, Norway, Mexico, and
Great Britain. For the small number of exporters and the volatile price of oil, importer
countries put first issues like energy security, energy trade, and alternative energies on
their political agenda (SPEIGHT, 2011).
Crude oil is the main kind of petroleum exploited due to its facility to be
drilled, transported (with pipelines and tankers) and refined with less energy
requirements. However, recently, “the average quality of crude oil has become worse”
(SPEIGHT, 2001, p. 31), due to an increasing content of sulfur and lower quality of
other important properties. Also, IEA (2008) projects conventional oil production to
level off by 2030, increasing importance of non-conventional sources, such as oil
sands and extra-heavy oil resources, whose exploitation is energy-intensive. Both
sources are placed mostly in Canada and Venezuela, with economic feasibility to
exploit between 1 and 2 trillion barrels (IEA, 2008).
30
With the rise of the oil price and the low rate of new onshore fields, offshore
resources are also being intensively explored. “Estimates of the recoverable
conventional oil located in deepwater (water depths between 400 meters and 1 500
meters) and ultra-deepwater (water depths greater than 1 500 meters) lie between 160
and 300 billion barrels” (IEA, 2005 apud IEA, 2008, p. 207). The United States was
the first to exploit oil in deepwater, within their fields in the Gulf of Mexico. This
region still produces most of the offshore oil by now, however important offshore
reservoirs are already being drilled in Angola, Brazil (which is a promising region
since the discovery of large quantities of oil under the pre-salt layer), Mexico, Nigeria,
Southeast Asia and Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the offshore production increased
from 200.000 barrels per day in 1995 to 5 million barrels per day in 2007; while the
ultra-deepwater exploitation just began in 2004, denoting a constant investment in
new technologies and ways to exploit petroleum in deep environments (IEA, 2008).
Also, many financial resources are focused in exploring the potential of Arctic region,
by nations such as Russia, Norway, Canada and the United States. However, the
ability of drill wells in ice-covered seas added to the complexity of operating in deep
sea environment turns the exploitation of oil in Arctic into a technological challenge
for the petroleum industry (IEA, 2008).
The complex technology employed in offshore wells generates concerns
regarding environmental issues, such as pollution control and impacts on marine
biodiversity. “These impacts depend upon the stage of the process, the size and
complexity of the project, the nature and sensitivity of the surrounding environment
and the effectiveness of planning, pollution prevention, mitigation and control
techniques” (E&P FORUM; UNEP, 1997, p .11).
Since the exploration surveying, seismic equipment provides disturbance
(noise and acoustic waves) to marine organisms. In order to confirm the existence of
oil, exploratory drilling is driven, that is, test wells are drilled. In this stage, important
operations are held on the seabed, that can be temporary (in case the quantity of
petroleum be under the economic feasibility to continue the operations) or permanent
(if the economic feasibility is assured and more wells are drilled to explore and exploit
the reservoir). At this point, important impacts take place, such as: discharges of
effluents (mixture of water and oil, oil-based mud, cuttings of the seabed); noise and
light; changes in sediment, air and water quality; disturbance to pelagic and benthic
organisms, as well as to marine birds. After confirmed the economic and technical
feasibility to exploit the reservoir, production wells are drilled. The number of wells
can achieve the order of a hundred, in case of giant fields; on the other hand, small
fields support the exploitation of about ten production wells. Then, permanent
structures called platforms are built, with capacity to gather and process oil from 40
wells; also, satellite-platforms may be needed in the case of larger reservoirs. During
the production, long-term impacts on environment are given by the large quantity of
water discharged, which is composed by inorganic salts, heavy metals, solids,
production chemicals, hydrocarbons, benzene and even normally occurring
radioactive material. Also, sediment and water quality decrease, noise and light take
place, causing chronic effects on local biota and changing the structure of regional
ecology (habitats, food and nutrient supply, migration routes and so on). However,
improvements like remotely assisted systems and horizontal drilling have the potential
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UFRGSMUN 2012
to optimize operations, reducing the number of platforms and wells, thus reducing the
environmental impacts of operations (E&P FORUM; UNEP, 1997).
Regarding potential emergencies, such as oil spills and explosions, Rochette
states that
(…) contrary to common thought, risks are actually similar
when drilling is made inland or in deep waters. Indeed, even if
offshore techniques slightly differ from onshore or shallow
waters operations, the type of risk is very similar. The real
difference comes from the remediation aspects: fixing a problem
in deep waters is obviously more complex, as has been
illustrated in many recent accidents on offshore platforms
(ROCHETTE, 2012, p. 5-6).
One remarkable accident occurred with Deepwater Horizon, an offshore oil
drilling rig (owned by Transocean and leased to British Petroleum), built to explore oil
in ultra-deepwater in Gulf of Mexico. The rig blowout and sank on April 2010,
releasing 5 million barrels of oil into the sea during three months. The oil spill ceased
on July 2010, when the well was capped. It is worth noting that “between 1996 and
2009 there were 79 reported losses of well control accidents in the United States Gulf
of Mexico” (ROCHETTE, 2012, p. 6).
In a similar situation, an oil spill, occurred at the Montana offshore oil
platform in 2009, located in the Australian economic exclusive zone (EEZ) of the
Timor Sea, motivated Indonesia to propose discussion in the Legal Committee of
International Maritime Organization (IMO) about the possibility of establishing an
international regime for liability and compensation for oil pollution damage resulting
from offshore oil exploration and exploitation activities, due to the impossibility of the
socio-economic damages caused to Indonesian coastal communities be repaired by the
owners of the oil field. The request has legal basis on United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which through its “Article 208-5 invites parties to establish
‘global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment’ from seabed
activities” (ROCHETTE 2012, p. 6). In response to this demand, the Legal Committee
of IMO, in its 99th meeting, recognized regional agreements as the best way to reach
solutions, based on experiences of some frameworks within North-East Atlantic
(OSPAR convention), Mediterranean (Offshore Protocol) and Western Africa
(Abidjan Convention) regional seas (ROCHETTE, 2012). Although stressing the
importance of regional cooperation, Rochette (2012) states that not every oil producer
country is covered by regional regulations, and many of them are not able to solve
incidents involving transboundary pollution damage from offshore platforms. Then,
ways of strengthening States capacity to respond to emergencies must be addressed in
order to enhance security of offshore oil exploitation and exploration.
Therefore, marine protection depends not only on security measures
(proportional to the size of the oil fields), but also on the ability to respond to
emergencies. The increasing depth of drilling and the interest to explore
environmental sensitive regions, such as the Arctic, put interesting issues such as
security and precautionary principles as critical factors. The Arctic case is therefore
emblematic, since a political, economic and environmental conflict takes place. While
32
the countries bordering the Arctic Sea study ways to extend the limits of their EEZs in
order to allow an increase in their oil exploration (CBC NEWS, 2010), environmental
organizations claim for the adoption of rules to turn sensitive environments into “nogo zones” for oil industry (WWF, 2012a).
3.1. International Marine and Coastal Conventions
When it comes to issues concerning global oceans and coasts, the most
important document adopted by the international community was the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, which is marked as an inflection moment to the establishment of an
international regime regarding shared water resources and all aspects of uses of
oceans. Most importantly, it deals with several issues, such as rights of civil and naval
navigation, protection of oceans and coasts, marine scientific research, and so on (UN
Global Issues, 2012). It establishes that “States have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment” (UN, 1982, Art. 192), which may include the
assistance to developing States in such matters4. It also sets down that “States have the
sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental
policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine
environment” (UN, 1982, Art. 193), and calls States to “establish global and regional
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment” (UN, 1982, Art. 208), regarding seabed
activities.
Then, it was the Torrey Canyon5 oil spill in 1967 that encouraged the
development of a regime of compensation for pollution damages from oil tankers
spills (IOPC, 2012), mainly due to the excessive damages the dispersants brought to
the environment. The regime built under this incident was based on two conventions:
the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969
CLC) and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971 Fund Convention). However,
because of the Amoco Cadiz (1978) and the Tanio (1980) oil spills, both of which
occurred in France, there was a need to amend both conventions, leading to the
creation of the 1992 Protocols, which provided higher levels of compensation and
widened the scope for application of both Conventions (IOPC, 2012). The
aforementioned amendments entered into force in 1996, as the 1992 Civil Liability
Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention (IOPC, 2012; ITOPF 2012e).
The 1969 CLC sets up the principle of strict liability6 for tanker owners, and
the 1971 Fund Convention establishes the payment of supplementary compensation
4 See: Section 3: Technical Assistance, on the Law of the Sea Convention.
5For further information, please see Case histories: Torrey Canyon on
http://www.itopf.com/information-services/data-and-statistics/casehistories/tlist.html#TORREY
6 Liability even in the absence of fault; See: http://www.itopf.com/spill-compensation/clc-fundconvention/
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from oil receivers in the countries parties to the 1992 Fund Convention, to those not
fully covered by the CLC system (ITOPF, 2012f). This is due to the system of
compulsory liability insurance provided by 1969 CLC, in which it is stated a limit to
the liability of the tanker, related to the tonnage of the same (ITOPF, 2012g).
Progressively, this “old regime” lost relevance to the 1992 Conventions,
culminating in the extinction of the 1971 Fund Convention in 2002 (ITOPF, 2012f).
However, it is worth mentioning that none of the aforementioned conventions
addressed oil spills of immoveable oil storage units, common in offshore oil
exploitations, thus providing limitations on the application of the law, as in accident at
the Montana offshore platform.
Other relevant document related to the control and minimization of release of
oil and other harmful substances into the oceans and seas is the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as modified by the Protocol of
1978 (MARPOL), and which holds six technical annexes. These annexes relate to the
prevention of oil pollution, by obligating new oil tankers to have double hulls (annex
I), sewage pollution from ships (annex IV), as well as the banishment of plastics
pollution from ships (IMO, 2012a). In order to complement MARPOL Convention,
the International Convention on oil pollution preparedness, response and cooperation
(OPRC) entered into force in 1995. This convention provides more satisfactory
awareness and response to oil pollution incidents, such as preparation of oil pollution
emergency plans and most importantly, the development and creation of national and
regional response preparedness systems to accidental oil pollution (ITOPF, 2012g;
BLACK TIDES, 2012b). The OPRC will assist developing countries to respond to the
incidents, once it aims to increase international cooperation to solve the problem in
question.
Finally, in a broader approach to marine protection, Brazil held in 2012 the
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (RIO+20), which sought to
define the agenda for sustainable development for the following decades. In this
forum, political commitments on sustainable development were renewed; and, also the
progress of some agreements — such as Johannesburg Plan of Implementation,
Agenda 21 and Durban Action Plan — were evaluated in relation to their proposed
targets (RIO+20, 2012). The outcome document The Future We Want, despite
including a section focused on oceans and seas, was highly criticized, especially
regarding biodiversity conservation, postponing concrete actions on preservation of
biodiversity to 2014:
[b]uilding on the work of the ad hoc working group and before
the end of the 69th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly we commit to address, on an urgent basis, the issue of
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction including by
taking a decision on the development of an international
instrument under UNCLOS (UN, 2012, par. 162).
At this same document, States have also recognized the risk of the ongoing
situation of marine pollution, urging countries which have not yet implemented the
international conventions of IMO on these issues to do so, and defining a deadline to
reduce pollution and damage to coastal and marine environment by 2025 (UN, 2012,
34
par. 163). Although the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon had stated
that the conference was successful, most global NGOs and the civil society expected a
larger commitment to concrete actions (ÉPOCA, 2012).
3.2. Regional Marine and Coastal Conventions
Regional agreements concerning protection of marine environment have been
signed in order to address local issues more efficiently. An important agreement is the
Convention for Cooperation in the Protection, Management and Development of the
Marine and Coastal Environment of the West, Central and Southern African Region
(Abidjan Convention, from 1981) that calls for cooperation between States in terms of
marine and coastal environments protection in the West, Central and Southern regions
of Africa. As a fundamental step to reaffirm the importance of the regional agreement,
the parties approved a protocol concerning co-operation in combating pollution in
case of emergency, in the last convention of the parties. Supported by United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), the Convention depends on technical and financial
assistance to develop actions (UNEP, 2011).
In Europe, three main conventions take place: the Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR
Convention, from 1992 but based on Oslo Convention from 1972), Convention for the
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona Convention, from
1976) and the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic
Sea Area (HELCOM, from 1992). These conventions were signed in response to the
decreasing quality of marine environments in respective regions; also, they aim at
promoting an integrated management considering different stakeholders, which
contribute with different sources of pollution (HELCOM, 1992).
With similar aims, some more conventions were signed, such as: Convention
on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution (Bucharest Convention, from
1992), Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of
the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention, from 1983), Regional
Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment
(Jeddah Convention, from 1982), Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution (ROPME, from 1978),
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the
South-East Pacific (CPPS, from 1986), Convention for the Protection, Management
and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African
Region (MCEA, from 1985) (CETACEAN HABITAT, 2012).
3.3. United Nations Programmes and Networks
Aiming to provide a wider understanding of the international regime
concerning the seas, oceans and coasts, and in order to improve maritime safety, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) was established in 1948, whose
Convention entered into force in 1958. The IMO is the specialized agency of the
United Nations dealing with maritime safety, shipping security and prevention of
ships pollution (UN-OCEANS, 2012) and has specially given a larger scope to
international regulations concerning pollution of oceans and coasts. Ever since, the
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IMO has promoted the development of several conventions on prevention,
compensation and rehabilitation of oceans and coasts (IMO, 2012b).
Other patent actions of the international community are UNEP 7 Regional
Seas Programme and UN-Oceans. The first was launched in 1974, with the mission to
address the degradation of world’s oceans and coastal areas, primarily through
sustainable regional environmental management by neighboring countries, in order to
protect and recover their shared marine resources. It works through the development
of regional Action Plans, and that currently UNEP presents 13 Regional Seas
programmes (UNEP REGIONAL SEAS, 2012).
On the other hand, the Oceans and Coastal Areas Network (UN-Oceans),
was established in 2004, as a replacement to the Sub-committee on Oceans and
Coastal Areas of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, which was created
to support activities regarding Chapter 17 of the Agenda 21, which dealt with
protection and uses of oceans (UN-OCEANS, 2012). Some of the UN-Oceans
functions are to coordinate activities and to establish interagency programmes
(UNESCO, 2012). In accordance to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN-Oceans faces some challenges: as oceans
issues are a multi-sectional and multi-national UN area, the responsibilities are too
much fragmented in several bodies, making the difficulties to coordination higher.
Thereby, it would be reasonable to review its structure and attempt to strengthen its
actions and the relationship between all related institutions dealing with oceans, as
well as to find means to increase UN-Oceans’ resources (UNESCO, 2012).
For its turn, the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-based Activities (GPA) was established in 1995, held by
UNEP, aiming to prevent “the degradation of the marine environment from land-based
activities by facilitating the duty of States to preserve and protect the marine
environment” (UNEP/GPA, 2001, p. 5). It seeks to cooperate with agencies and
governments, producing a framework capable to establish action plans and targets to
decrease land-based pollution (UNEP/GPA, 2001). There are, however, some critics
about the purpose of the Programme, as it does not include “clear and specific
international targets and environmental standards” (POWERS, 2008, p. 437) for landbased pollution. Also, Powers (2008) identified five kinds of limitations that must be
overcome: limited national participation and implementation of GPA guidelines;
limited national reporting of action plans (as submitting reports of implementation of
GPA strategies are voluntary, only a small amount of countries does it); limited
coverage of pollutant source categories (some pollutants such as pharmaceuticals and
carbon dioxide are not included — so that the latter absence does not integrate the
programme with climate change issues); limited financing (so that States does not
have access to any special fund to implement GPA actions); and finally, limits of a
non-legally binding approach, because GPA has only power of a “soft law”.
According to Powers (2008), to impose a legally binding regulation is one of the most
7 UNEP also coordinates the following activities in marine and coastal areas: Global
International Waters Assessment, Small Island Developing States Network, International Coral
Reef Action Network, World Conservation Monitoring Center and Earthwatch.
36
important challenges concerning the control of land-based pollutions. Hence an
agreement in this field should include, among others,
a process for developing detailed and enforceable pollution
standards, obligatory funding commitments to support capacitybuilding and technology transfers to developing countries,
encouragement of public participation and education, inclusion
of a compliance mechanism, and a specific dispute resolution
procedure for land-based marine pollution conflicts (POWERS,
2008, p. 441).
However, Powers points out that some countries “believe land-based marine
pollution can most effectively be addressed at national and regional levels”
(POWERS, 2008, p. 441), so that it would be difficult to reach an agreement.
4. BLOC POSITIONS
Within European Union framework, important agreements involving France,
Germany, United Kingdom, among others, are being held in order to assess the marine
and coastal pollution: the aforementioned OSPAR Convention, Barcelona Convention,
and also the European Union Directive 2008/56 that establishes targets of good
environmental quality in marine ecosystems by 2020 (EUROPEDIA, 2011). On an
OSPAR meeting, in 2010, Germany proposed to ban deepwater drilling in the
Atlantic Ocean, as a reaction to the Deepwater Horizon accident in the same year.
However, after pressure of oil producer States (United Kingdom, Norway and
Denmark) the project was withdrawn (ENERGY-PEDIA, 2010). Regarding marine
protection, Germany reached the target proposed by the International Union of
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) of protecting at least 10% of its exclusive economic
zone (TOROPOVA et al., 2010). For its turn, France, with the second largest EEZ in
the world, implemented strategies to protect its marine areas through the establishment
of a specialized national agency. At international level, France and United Kingdom
participated actively in the creation of particularly sensitive sea areas, an instrument
adopted by the IMO in 2005 (FRANCE, 2009).
Russian Federation has the 8th biggest oil reserves in the world, being one
of the main oil producers (CIA, 2012). Moreover, the country is an important actor in
the Arctic region, being involved in polemic issues concerning territory claims in the
Arctic Sea. The Arctic territory is strategic to Russian Federation, which plans to start
exploiting crude oil in the region by 2013 (GAZPROM’S, 2012).
The United States of America contributed actively to the implementation of
marine protection treaties in the “Wider Caribbean”, such as the Cartagena
Convention and protocols concerning land-based pollution (USEPA, 2012). In the last
GPA meeting, the United States of America stressed that physical threats and
destruction of marine habitat must be considered a priority, noting the population
growth poses danger to marine environments (IISD, 2012). On the other hand, deep
water wells in US Gulf of Mexico correspond to a great part of the global offshore oil
production, which tend to increase even after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
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(DEEPWATER, 2012). Also, the country faces a critical problem with a large deadzone in the mouth of Mississippi river, in Gulf of Mexico (2011 GULF, 2011).
Mexico plays an important role in Cartagena Convention and in the GPA. In
the last GPA meeting, its delegate criticize environmental protection approaches that
place values on environmental goods and services, “noting that these values are, in
some instances, only valid where environmental degradation is reversible and may
lead to questionable results overall” (IISD, 2012).
China and India highlight that developing countries need technical and
financial support — through international funds, programs or bilateral agreements —
in order to improve the quality of marine ecosystems (IISD, 2012). Also, both
countries face issues with the land-based marine pollution, as well as destruction of
coastal habitats, due to their great population and rapid urbanization. Therefore, there
is a need to create more marine protected areas (INDIA, 2012; NOAA, 1998).
Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia ratified Cartagena Convention and
created marine protected areas in their territories. For both countries tourism is a key
threat to coast protection, along with poor sanitation. However Colombia also holds
oil exploitation industry, which tends to expand towards offshore areas (WRI, 2012;
ALONSO, 2007). Moreover, in the first GPA meeting, the country placed “emphasis
on economic assessments of pollution impacts as a means of prioritizing investments
and proposed creating an information bank” (IISD, 2001, p. 1). Also in Latin America,
Ecuador has reached the IUCN target of protecting 10% of its marine territory
(TOROPOVA et al, 2010). In its foreign policy, Ecuador has stated its concern with
plastic pollution on oceans as a global issue (NRDC, 2012). Finally, Brazil holds a
great coastal biodiversity which is endangered mainly by urban development.
Furthermore, important issues arise with the increasing offshore oil exploitation in the
Southern coast (PRATES et al., 2007).
Mauritius, Kenya and Mozambique take part in the multilateral agreement
Nairobi Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine
and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region (Nairobi Convention), which
promotes the cooperation on marine protection. Apart from this, in the second meeting
of GPA, Mauritius underscored the vulnerability context of small island developing
States (SIDS) and “called for capacity building at all levels, and strengthened
international and regional cooperation” (IISD, 2006). Also, Gabon and some
countries of the Gulf of Guinea - Nigeria, Togo and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo - need to ensure the integrity of their coastal and marine ecosystems, while
dealing with an increasing offshore oil production and urban growth (AKOHOU,
2007). Concerning the urban development, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in
the last GPA meeting, highlighted the “challenges posed by the nutrients and waste
deposited in coastal areas by the Congo River (…) [and] requested UNEP assistance
in the subregion to assist countries in their struggle to preserve marine environments”
(IISD, 2012).
Fiji Islands and Malaysia are located in the Coral Triangle region, which is
considered by NGOs one of the most important marine regions in the world due to its
biodiversity. Governments of the region (except Fiji Islands) constitute the Coral
Triangle Initiative, in order to promote the sustainable development of the region
(WWF, 2012b).
38
Australia participates actively in Asian fora, providing technical and
financial support to improve marine conservation (AUSTRALIA, 2012). For its turn,
Japan economy depends on fishing and shipping, both activities that must be ruled in
other to achieve a sustainable development; thus, international agreements must be
held to enhance cooperation in this field (JAPAN, 2008).
Israel lies on the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, however it is only part of
the Barcelona Convention. Regarding coastal protection, the main potential source of
pollution is the transportation and industry of oil; however, the government also
addresses other issues, such as marine litter, land-based pollution and so on (ISRAEL,
2007). For its turn, Iran is part of some multilateral agreements on marine
conservation, such as the Kuwait Regional Convention (in the Persian Gulf) and the
Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian
Sea (along with Russian Federation) (CEP, 2012; ROPME, 2012).
1) Is it possible to establish marine "no-go zones" for oil industry? In which
conditions?
2) Should the international community launch a process to elaborate a global
agreement on offshore oil exploitation? Or should it be addressed regionally?
3) Does a new fund must be created to address the goals of the GPA?
4) How to decrease the global level of land-based pollution in the oceans? Is the
creation of a binding agreement the best way?
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Chapter 2
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was established by the
United Nations General Assembly through the Resolution 60/251 on 15 March 2006,
and replaced the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on its functions. The
Council is responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair
and equal manner. It is mandated to consider violations of human rights, including
gross and systemic violations, and to make recommendations. The Council is also
expected to promote the effective coordination and mainstreaming of human rights
within the UN system.
Among the Council’s elements is the Advisory Committee, which serves as
the ‘think thank’ of the Council to provide it with expertise and advice on thematic
human rights issues; and the Revised Complaint Procedure mechanism, which allows
individuals and organizations to bring complaints about human rights violations to the
attention of the Council. The Special Procedures are its independent expert
mechanisms, which have fact-finding and reporting mandates that provide global
coverage of major thematic human rights issues.
The UNHRC comprises 47 UN member States elected by the General
Assembly for staggered three-year terms. Membership is based on equitable
geographical distribution: 13 members are from Africa, 13 from Asia, six from
Eastern Europe, eight from Latin America and the Caribbean, and seven from Western
Europe and other states.
Although UNHRC’s resolutions are not binding, they carry great weight on
human rights issues, since the organ is one of the most prominent institutions
concerning them. This year, delegates attending to the United Nations Human Rights
Council at UFRGSMUN will be invited to debate on transitional justice and
transnational corporations and human rights abuses.
40
TOPIC A: Transitional Justice
Cláudia Pfeifer Cruz, Gabriela Jahn Verri,
and Renata Schmitt Noronha
We are unable to forgive what we cannot punish and we are unable to punish what
has turned out to be unforgivable. Hannah Arendt, 1958
Although it has gained more relevance in the last decades, the idea of
transitional justice (hereinafter TJ) is nothing new. Around 400 B.C. the Athenian
political system has witnessed transitions and elements of TJ, such as purges and trials
(ELSTER, 2004). In the late 19th century, after the French intervention in SyriaLebanon and the subsequent massacre of Druze and Christians, the foreign minister of
France proposed an international commission with the purpose to investigate causes of
the war and to compensate the victims of the conflict through reparations (BASS,
2009 apud FORSYTHE, 2011).
Nevertheless the series of prosecutions held after the World War II against
those responsible for the mass murders and other inconceivable violations of basic
human rights, otherwise known as the Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946), are often
regarded as the starting point of transitional justice in its current form. The Nuremberg
Tribunal not only fulfilled its main duty and purpose by judging each of the
perpetrators individually, but also took a step further in narrating the events from the
recent horrifying past in order to be able to overcome it (ANDRIEU, 2010). That
concept of grasping the ugly truth of the matters and freeing society from its
overshadowing ghost, only after fixing it in the popular memory as a subdued wrong,
is one of the fundamental purposes of transitional justice.
The International Tribunal for the Far East (1946-1948), also known as the
Tokyo Trials, followed the Nuremberg one, and faced some of the same critics of the
later: it is often considered biased and vindictive. With the adjournment of the Tokyo
Trials, international criminal prosecution fell into oblivion in the context of the Cold
War (ANDRIEU, 2010). In the bipolarized world, transitional justice “went on hiatus”
(ARTHUR, 2009, p.342) for almost half a century.
In the aftermath of the third wave of democratization (HUNTINGTON,
1991), which occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, transition to democracy
processes emerged in Latin America. Officials from the military regime were put on
trial in Argentina and Bolivia – although very few of them were in fact convicted –,
and reparation processes took place in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay
(ELSTER, 2006). Meanwhile in Africa, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia
(TGE) initiated its TJ process after seventeen years under a civil war in which gross
human rights violations were committed. The military regime in the country – known
as the Derg – fell in 1991, and the TGE made the decision to investigate and prosecute
members of the former government in order to provide accountability for past abuses.
The Ethiopian trials (established in 1994) constitute a landmark, since it was the first
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time such mechanism was implemented in the continent (TSADIK, 2007). A year
after the Ethiopian trials, and in a sharp contrast to those, was established in Cape
Town the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, a restorative justice
mechanism with the purpose to deal with human rights abuses committed during the
apartheid rule.
In the same context, a succession of conferences that addressed to transitional
justice aspects was established. In 1988, the Aspen Institute sponsored the conference
State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon. Four years later, in 1992, the Salzburg
Conference on Justice in Times of Transition took place in Austria, under the
sponsorship of the Charter 77 Foundation. In 1994, the Institute for Democracy in
South Africa promoted the conference Dealing with the Past (ARTHUR, 2009). All
these events had the purpose of debating on how to deal with past abuses and facilitate
transition to a new political order.
Notwithstanding, the greatest landmarks in the development of transitional
justice after the Nuremberg Trials was the creation by the United Nations of two ad
hoc tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 1,
in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 2, in 1994. These
were established in response to the two largest-scale genocide of the decade (CALL,
2004). The ICTY was created aiming at a series of purposes directed to attempt to
secure a thorough political, economical and social transition from a situation of drastic
contravention of human rights to one of peace and stability. However valuable the
ICTY's mission may be, there is much debate about how effective the trials actually
are outside the legal scope, perceiving that the effects of the tribunal as a transitional
justice instrument have limitations (HOARE, 2008). It is, however, argued that we
cannot expect immediate positive changes in the affected populations, since a time is
needed in order to build a conscience about past abuses and overcome the sense of
loss (FORSYTHE, 2011).
Less than a year after the Yugoslav Tribunal was established, genocide raged
through the African nation of Rwanda. In order to restore collective peace, security
and stability in the country, the United Nations Security Council authorized the
creation of the ICTR. The Tribunal should count with the co-operation of other States
to conduct the investigations and prosecutions of accused persons. The objective was
to expand the decisions to an international scope, since the national courts were unable
to reach effective results.
The trial of the president of the former Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic,
constituted the first time a political leader was prosecuted in an international
proceeding (TEITEL, 2005). The ICTR also constituted a historical landmark
regarding the implementation of the rule of law, since it was responsible for the first
conviction for genocide in history. In addition, the Tribunal accomplished the firstever successful conviction of a former prime-minister – the Rwandan Prime Minister
Jean Kambanda –, and the first conviction of rape as a crime against humanity
1 The ICTY was established by the United Nations Security Council resolution 827, adopted
unanimously on 25 May 1993 (UNSC, 1993).
2 The ICTR was established by the United Nations Security Council resolution 955, adopted on
08 November 1994 (UNSC, 1994).
42
(CALL, 2004). Such convictions shall strongly reflect in the jurisprudence of
International Humanitarian Law.
Since the end of the Cold War, the rule of the law has enhanced as a
peacebuilding and Nation-building instrument through the expansion of the
application of human rights law and International Humanitarian Law (TEITEL, 2002).
In addition there has been a growing implementation of transitional justice
mechanisms – both judicial and non-judicial.
2.1. Definition of transitional justice
The term transitional justice became popular as an academic concept in
debates on democratization and State reconstruction in the 1990s, following the
collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the new conjecture established
by the third wave of democratization (OHLIN, 2007). The concept of TJ derives from
the international human rights field (FISHER, 2010), and in its broadest sense refers
to how transitioning societies face abuses committed in the past, after a period of
repressive rule or armed conflict.
Despite the increasing importance the field has gained in the past decades,
there still no consensus about the definition of the concept of TJ. Ruty Teiltel, one of
the main authors on the subject, defines it as “a concept of justice, intervening in a
period of political change, characterized by a judicial answer to the wrongs of past
repressive regimes” (2003, p. 69 apud ANDRIEU, 2009, p. 2).
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a New York-based
organization created in 2001, which is an authority on the matter, defines transitional
justice as follows:
[t]ransitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial
measures that have been implemented by different countries in
order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses.
These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth
commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of
institutional reforms. Transitional justice is not a ‘special’ kind
of justice, but an approach to achieving justice in times of
transition from conflict and/or state repression. By trying to
achieve accountability and redressing victims, transitional
justice provides recognition of the rights of victims, promotes
civic trust and strengthens the democratic rule of law (ICTJ,
2012).
In a first moment, the term TJ was used to refer to the process of political
changes faced by dictatorial or repressive regimes in the path to a democratic
transition, mostly during the late 1980s and early 1990s in Latin America and Eastern
Europe. The concept became an essential component of democratization processes
(AVELLO, 2008). More recently the concept has being largely used to characterize
the process of dealing with war crimes and human rights abuses committed during
armed conflicts (FISHER, 2010). With the creation of the International Criminal
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda the international law was incorporated in the field of Transitional Justice
(AVELLO, 2008). Since then many ongoing peace processes have considered TJ
mechanisms as important elements of peacebuilding (AVELLO, 2008).
Notwithstanding it was not until 2004 that the United Nations acknowledged
the importance of issues related to transitional justice and the definition of the term. In
the occasion, the then United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, issued a report
on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,
stressing the importance of “articulating a common language of justice” (UNSC,
2004, p.4) for the organization in order to enhance human rights.:
[t]he notion of “transitional justice” (…) comprises the full
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and
achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international
involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions,
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and
dismissals, or a combination thereof (UNSC, 2004, para. 8).
2.2. Transitional justice mechanisms
In order to fulfill its aims at providing justice to transitioning societies,
transitional justice rely on a number of mechanisms, such as judicial proceedings,
truth commissions, reparations, public apologies, and development of a shared vision
of history. The use of these practices depends on the conjecture of the country, they
can be applied simultaneously, selectively or chronologically (HAZAN, 2006).
2.2.1. Judicial proceedings
The judicial proceedings can take different forms of punitive policy:
international tribunals, such as the ad hoc criminal tribunals form the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court; hybrid courts; and local
justice. It is undeniable that judicial proceedings have helped to strengthen
international humanitarian law. Nevertheless there are many issues that make it a
challenge in countries where such proceedings have been implemented. The
perception that trials “reflect victor’s justice” (CALL, 2004, p. 109) constitutes the
reality of many people in Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo and Iraq. In addition, there is a
structural problem of disparities regarding prosecutions: judicial proceedings depend
on where international donors (governments or organizations) are willing to dedicate
resources to mechanisms of TJ (CALL, 2004).
2.2.1.1. The international tribunals
In the last few decades there has been an increase in the number of
international tribunals with the purpose to process human rights violations committed
in the past. In addition to the International Criminal Court, the United Nations ad hoc
tribunals from the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the international tribunal for
Sierra Leone, there has been roughly eleven national trials to address issues regarding
transitional justice (HAFNER, 2007). These international tribunals created after the
44
end of the Cold War were largely based in the model established in the Tokyo and
Nuremberg trials.
The ICTY and the ICTR were responsible for collaring top-level officials
who have permitted massacres take place under their rule (CALL, 2004). Among the
affected populations, such international actions generated expectations that those
responsible for the war crimes would face justice. Slobodan Milosevic, president of
the former Yugoslavia was handled to the Hague and charged with war crimes and
crimes against the humanity alongside with Serb, Croat, and Bosniaks officials
(CALL, 2004).
Both tribunals constituted a great landmark in the progress of international
law and the International Humanitarian Law. In addition, as in Nuremberg, the trials
should fit a greater purpose: “documenting the history for future generations, acting as
a deterrent for the future, […], and strengthening the rule of law” (ANDRIEU, 2010,
p. 6). Notwithstanding, the tribunals are still subject of great controversy due to its
politic motivated character. Part of the population of some ethnic groups from the
countries from the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda see the tribunals as “tools for
ethnic prosecution rather than prosecution” (CALL, 2004, p. 105). The ICTR is most
criticized, considering a series of issues. The court was located in Tanzania, outside
Rwanda; consequentially, only a small percentage of the perpetrators would be tried,
and the role of the trial as an educational tool would be limited as well. Moreover,
after nine years, in 2003, the tribunal had accomplished only twelve convictions and
one acquittal (CALL, 2004). In addition, those tribunals have consumed a great deal
of United Nations annual budget, and considering its results, many start asking
whether the investment would not be more effective if directed to rebuild the judicial
system and the rule of law in the countries affected (HAZAN, 2006).
In spite of the critics, the international ad hoc tribunals constituted a prelude
to the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which came into force in
2002 through the Rome Statute. The Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over crimes
against the humanity3, war crimes, genocides and crimes of aggression. However, the
Court is conducted by the principle of nullem crimen sin lege, which prohibits
prosecution and punishment for acts that did not constitute a crime at the time of
commission. Furthermore, the ICC follows the principle of complementarity: it
considers a case inadmissible when it is “being investigated or prosecuted by a State
3 According to the Rome Statute, “crime against humanity means any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d)
Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health” (UN, 1998, Art. 17 para. 1).
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which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution” (UN, 1998, Art. 17 (a)).
Although until the present year 121 States have ratified or acceded the
Statute, influential States such as China, Russia and the United States are not part of
the Court (ICC, 2012). The failure of some countries to participate in the ICC raises
import questions about the partiality of the accountability system of transitional
justice, since it applies “to even the most powerful individuals of the world’s middle
powers and poor countries, but not to the lowest-ranking soldier of the United States,
Russia, or China” (CALL, 2004, p. 106). In addition, despite the relevance of such
international tribunals, it is undeniable that these mechanisms alone cannot provide
the demanded justice. Thus was raised the idea that criminal tribunals must be placed
alongside other TJ mechanisms in order to serve justice.
2.2.1.2. Hybrid Courts
Hybrid courts are constituted by both national and international elements of
justice, with variation of the levels of such elements (ANDRIEU, 2010). Most of
researches defend that the participation of local actors in the transition of a society is
an important factor to the maintenance of peace. In addition, hybrid courts usually
strengthen the rule of law in the country concerned, for the training of local personal
and granting more legitimacy to the process on the ground (ANDRIEU, 2010).
In the case of Timor Leste, the hybrid court was composed by a United
Nations-overseen Special Panel (with Timorese and international judges), a Serious
Crimes Unit (made of international prosecutors and investigators), and a Public
Defenders Office (composed mainly by Timorese staff) (CALL, 2004). The cases
under the Special Panels were processed faster and with much less expenses than the
ones under ICTY and ICTR. Nevertheless, the courts suffered from bad coordination,
issues of fairness, and failed to process most of the crimes committed before 1999
(CALL, 2004). The hybrid tribunal of Sierra Leone suffered from many of the same
problems of the one in Timor Leste. The Special Court of Sierra Leone was created in
2000 in order to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes
against humanity and war crimes. However, “[t]he court had difficulty meeting its
budget; high-ranking suspects either died (or in Charles Taylor’s case, fled to regional
power); and public education about the Special Court was ineffective as only fiftynine percent of the population supported its work” (CALL, 2004, p. 108).
The development of national courts is an important aspect of transitional
justice. The capacity to establish domestic trials evidences a functioning judiciary and
strengths the confidence in the new government (HAFNER, 2007). In addition,
national trials are more effective than international ones in a very important aspect:
international courts have limited mandate and their jurisdiction is usually restricted to
the gravest crimes. However the State in question not always have the capacity to
carry on prosecutions, especially when it has been devastated by an armed conflict. In
cases when the national courts cannot alone provide justice, they can share the
mandate over the cases on the ground with international courts. Nevertheless, if not
acting in coordination, international and national tribunals can destabilize the work of
each other (HAFNER, 2007). One of the greatest challenges of hybrid courts has been
the establishment of an independent and effective judiciary in national courts,
46
especially when the entering government does not replace the former biased judiciary
(HAFNER, 2007). Historically, hybrid courts were also established in Bosnia, Sierra
Leone and Iraq (ANDRIEU, 2010).
2.2.1.3. Local Justice
It is important to acknowledge that tribunals usually have a laudable purpose.
Nevertheless they are often culturally or geographically – such as in the case of
Rwanda – too distant from the people. Moreover they can be too remote from the
daily life of communities that faced widespread abuses (HAFNER, 2007).
Thus
traditional or indigenous justice mechanisms have been seen as an alternative to
international instruments of TJ, due to its direct engagement with local actors, and the
sense of achievement of justice that it can provide among local communities. It is
considered to have a great impact in empowering local people and capacity building
(ANDRIEU, 2010).
Indigenous courts usually incorporate mechanisms of punishment and
reparations (ANDRIEU, 2010). A well known example is the gacaca courts in
Rwanda, which were “part court, part truth commission, and part community council”
(HAFNER, 2007, p. 105). The traditional system was historically used to settle local
community disputes. The main ideas of these local system were restore communities
and provide victims with a sense of justice (HAFNER, 2007). Notwithstanding, the
use of such mechanism of transitional justice can raise issues of due process, since
these courts can be biased and have a patriarchal character. Therefore, traditional
justice must be carefully managed in order to assure fairness of the processes
considered (ANDRIEU, 2010).
2.2.2. Truth (and Reconciliation) Commissions
Truth commissions – also known as truth and reconciliation commissions
(hereinafter TRCs) – are traditionally oriented towards victims.
Dedicated to establishing a historical record of human rights
abuses over a defined time period, these bodies have contributed
to creating shared accounts of disputed and hidden events,
clarifying who committed abuses and how, eliciting
acknowledgment of [S]tate misconduct, and restoring some
degree of social reconciliation and moral order (CALL, 2004, p.
103).
Such commissions constitute an extrajudicial process which complements or
substitutes criminal proceedings (HAZAN, 2006). Considering they do not have to be
submitted to complex rules of procedure, such commissions “may be able to set their
work more swiftly than tribunals” (HAFNER, 2007, p.101). However, the same
reasons that make the work from truth commissions run more swiftly, also make it is
subject to complications, such as the lack of coordination.
A very common procedure regarding TRCs is the concession of amnesty to
perpetrators of violations in exchange for their testimony; the procedure was used in
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The idea of restorative
justice, based on social reconciliation, was largely developed by the South African
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TRC (CALL, 2004). Nevertheless, considering possible flaws such as insufficient
resources or political constraints, there is a great chance this procedure can be
misconduct; thus producing disappointment among victims (HAFNER, 2007).
Despite their innovative way of “extending the reach of human rights (…)
without creating a disincentive to peace negotiations, they have increasingly come
under pressure from international criminal accountability” (BELL, 2011, p.347).
Considering this matter, TRCs have been used as complements to judicial procedures.
It is worth mentioning that a very relevant work developed under truth commissions is
a report containing recommendations aiming at strengthening the rule of law under the
new government. However there has been disillusionment regarding TRCs, since their
recommendations on societal reform are usually not implemented (FISHER, 2010).
2.2.3. Reparations
As the truth commissions, the process of reparations is victim-oriented. It
aims at compensating victims or their legal successors for the suffering caused for
abuses committed in the past. They constitute traditionally in “voluntary payments by
a [S]tate for moral and political purposes to individual or groups” (HAZAN, 2006, p.
24). Nowadays, reparations can also be ordered though a judicial proceeding. The first
reparation as an instrument of transitional justice ocurreed in the Federal Republic of
Germany in the aftermath of the World War II, in 1952, when reparations were
granted to survivors of the Nazi concentration camps (HAZAN, 2006).
The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation to a Victim of Gross Violations of International Human Rights and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law 4 states that
[c]ompensation should be provided for any economically
assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the
gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case,
resulting from gross violations of international human rights law
and serious violations of international humanitarian law
(UNGA, 2005, para. 20).
Accordingly to the Principles, compensations should cover not only material
damage, but also moral damage. Although very laudable in theory, the idea of
reparations is not always realistic. The Guatemalan peace agreement (1994), for
instance, states that the government should return properties to their original owners,
or at least provide some form of compensation. However, "the process has not been
fully implemented" (BINNINGSBØ; ELSTER; GATES, 2005, p.14).
2.2.4. Public Apologies
A public apology is used stated by a head of State or high-ranking State
officials. The concept of public apologies is an old one. Nevertheless, in the last few
decades, the number of world leaders expressing public apologies has been increased.
Some of those apologies concerned abuses committed decades or even centuries ago,
4 The referred Principles were adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly resolution
60/147 of 16 December 2005.
48
as the apology of the former United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair for the
Irish famine in the 19th century, the former French President Jacques Chirac apology
for the France’s deportation of Jews, and the former Germany’s Chancellor Gerhardt
Schröder for the Nazi regime in the country (HAZAN, 2006).
2.2.5. Developing a Shared Vision of History
Developing a shared vision of history is not an independent mechanism. In
fact it is directly related to the instruments aforementioned. Judicial proceedings, truth
commissions, reparations and public apologies all play an important and unique role
in constructing history for future generations. This process is developed along with the
opening up of archives and the construction of memorials (HAZAN, 2006).
2.3. The concession of amnesties and the provision of accountability
All the mechanisms aforementioned have been developed as manner to
provide some form of accountability for past abuses. For many years, peace
negotiators have argued that pushing accountability mechanisms “may prevent a deal
from being signed, or undo a cease-fire and reignite conflict” (ICHRP, 2006, p. 78).
Amnesties were seen as a price to pay for peace. In order to proceed with negotiations,
blanket amnesties have been conceded to parts responsible for committing human
rights abuses. The 1999 Lomé Accord in Sierra Leone, which granted blanket
amnesty, permitted the rebel leader Foday Sankoh to have a position in the newestablished government (SRIRAM, MARTIN-ORTEGA; HERMAN, 2010).
The concession of amnesties was broadly accepted for a long period, and in
most cases they were established along with truth commissions, as it was the case of
many countries in Latin America. “By the end of 1980s, truth commissions in Latin
America became as commonplace as amnesty laws that compelled their conception”
(LAPLANTE, 2009, p.924). However, in 1998, the decision by the House of Lords to
trial the former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet for human rights abuses
constituted a landmark in international law regarding not only the ineffectiveness of
national amnesties under international judicial proceedings, but also the immunity of
State officials (LAPLANTE, 2009).
It was not until 1999 that the United Nations developed a policy regarding
blanket amnesties. After the Lomé Peace Agreement, the United Nations Special
representative wrote a reservation to the accord: “[t]he United Nations holds the
understanding that the amnesty provisions of the Agreement shall not apply to
international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law” (SCHABAS, 2004, p.148-149
apud HRW, 2009, p.16). Regarding the referred accord, the then UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan also stated that “[s]ome of the terms under which this peace has
been obtained, in particular the provisions on amnesty, are difficult to reconcile with
the goal of ending the culture of impunity” (SCHABAS, 2004, p.148-149 apud HRW,
2009, p.16).
Notwithstanding, a peace process which lays on impunity for serious crimes
committed under international law is not sustainable. The lack of accountability
creates a precedent of impunity, encouraging future violations (HRW, 2009). There is
a present idea that unaddressed past abuses fuel conflicts. “[T]here can be no just and
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lasting reconciliation unless the need for justice is effectively satisfied” (UNCHR,
2005), states the preamble of the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity. For instance, in
Sierra Leone,
three blanket amnesty provisions in different accords failed to
consolidate the hoped-for peace, and in Angola, six successive
amnesties did not lead to the called for ‘forgiving and
forgetting’. In both places, war and war crimes resumed within a
short period after peace agreements had been reached (HRW,
2009, p.4).
In fact, one of the main purposes of international justice is to prevent new
crimes to happen. The implementation of accountability mechanism is seen not only
as way to prevent future abuses, but also as a mean to strengthen peacebuilding
(FISHER, 2010).
It is worth mentioning that implicit – or de facto – amnesties can have the
same dangerous effect than blanket amnesties, fact that was well seen in Sudan,
through the use of ethnic militias against civilians by Khartoum following a
government strategy that remained long unpunished (HRW, 2009). An important
aspect concerning the lack of individual accountability is that “the notion of collective
responsibility for crimes has greater resonance, and it is easier for blame focused on a
group to be passed from one generation to the next” (HRW, 2009, p. 6). It is now clear
that blanket amnesties for serious crimes under international law are unaccepted
(ICHRP, 2006). Notwithstanding, the issue of whether and when amnesty can apply
remains a very complex and debated one.
2.4. The State responsibility to prosecute
The denial of amnesty for serious crimes under the international law is
directly related to the obligation of States to prosecute such crimes. As the Special
Court for Sierra Leone stated:
[w]here jurisdiction is universal, a State cannot deprive another
State of its jurisdiction to prosecute the offender by the grant of
amnesty. It is for this reason unrealistic to regard as universally
effective the grant of amnesty by a State in regard to grave
international crimes in which there exists universal jurisdiction.
A State cannot bring into oblivion and forgetfulness a crime,
such as a crime against international law, which other States are
entitled to keep alive and remember (SCSL, 2004, para. 67).
Since its first session, in 1946, the United Nations General Assembly has
reiterated the duty to investigate and prosecute those responsible for war crimes
(HRW, 2009). It is now generally accepted that States have the duty to prosecute those
responsible for serious crimes under international law. This principle, reflected in
customary law, is strengthened by the establishment of universal jurisdiction and
international tribunals (HRW, 2009). In a first moment the duty to prosecute serious
crimes was limited by the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, i.e. in
situations of international armed conflicts. Nevertheless decisions ruled by the
50
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia constituted a landmark
in extending such duties to non-international armed conflicts (HRW, 2009).
According to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide, persons who commit the referred crime must face punishment (UNGA,
1948, Art. 3). The 1984 Convention Against Torture, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment states that acts of torture shall be submitted to the
“competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution” (UNGA, 1984, Art. 7). The
1987 Inter-American Convention on Torture and the 1994 Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons also establish the duty of prosecution for the referred crimes
(ICHRP, 2006). In addition, the Geneva Conventions states the obligation to prosecute
persons who have committed grave breaches of International Humanitarian Law
(ICHRP, 2006). Notwithstanding, the Geneva Conventions only apply to situations of
international armed conflict. The 1968 Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity states that such crimes
cannot have their prosecutions disregarded with the passage of time (ICHRP, 2006).
In addition – and in consequence – to these judicial mechanisms, it is now accepted
that crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations constitute a violation
of the international customary law, i.e. they apply even in occasion the
aforementioned conventions have not been ratified (ICHRP, 2006).
Notwithstanding, according to the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions “[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed
conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict,
whether they are interned or detained” (APIIGC, 1977, Art. 6, para. 5). In addition the
Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through
Action to Combat Impunity also has provisions of permissibility of amnesties in
specific situations. Although these mechanisms constitute soft law, i.e. they are not
binding; it does not mean they do not represent obligations (MENDEZ, 1997).
Nevertheless even when a conflict does fall under the Geneva Conventions
parameters, States are “often reluctant to concede its application and (unlike with
human rights treaties) there is no supervisory body to enforce and interpret the treaties
(BELL, 2011, p. 338).
Notwithstanding, regional mechanism also developed the idea: according to
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, States have the duty to investigate and
prosecute violations committed under their jurisdiction. In addition, the referred State
must provide the victims of violations some form of compensation. In the case Barrios
Altos v. Peru5, the Inter American Court of Human Rights considered amnesty
provisions and the
establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility
(…) inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious
5 The dispute concerns the amnesty law promulgated in 1995 by the former Peruvian President
Alberto Fujimori, which granted amnesty to those who had been responsible for human rights
violations during the armed conflict that occurred in the country between 1980 and 2000
(LAPLANTE, 2009).
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human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of them
prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights recognized
by international human rights law (IACtHR, 2001).
2.5. The challenges in implementing transitional justice
Many authors view transitional justice as a selective justice process, imposed
by western powers, arguing that it constitutes an extension to the right to intervene at
the humanitarian and military level, since transitional justice mechanisms permit
intervening in the criminal-law field (GALLOIS, 2002 apud HAZAN, 2006). “At the
crossroads of moral standards, politics, law, history and psychology; transitional
justice has narrowly circumscribed the bounds of national sovereignty by limiting the
definition of diplomatic immunities and the permissible scope of amnesties”
(HAZAN, 2006, p. 21).
The prosecution of heads of States and other political leaders is still matter of
debate, since it is argued can hamper peace negotiation process. This issue is not only
controversy in theory: the former United Nations Administrator in Afghanistan,
Lakhdar Brahimi, argued against prosecuting suspects of committing war crimes in
the past which were members of the new government supported by the organization,
stating that taking the prosecutions further would undermine peace (HAZAN 2006).
On the other hand, at the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone, the Liberian president
Charles Taylor was indicted even though peace negotiations were already on the table.
Notwithstanding, Mr. Taylor’s prosecution is viewed as a very positive contribution to
the reestablishment of political order (HAZAN 2006). The dichotomy peace versus
justice is still very present and continues to challenge the international society.
Frequently, transitional justice mechanisms are forced by the international
community into countries, disregarding their particularities (HAZAN, 2006). In order
to be effective, transitional justice process must be adapted culturally and address the
local needs. Public awareness is an essential aspect in the process of transitional
justice, as it facilitates the involvement of the local and affected population, and gives
the process the sense of legitimacy and justice. Alienation of societies regarding TJ
procedures can generate skepticism and hostilities towards the tribunals (GSDRC,
2011). Unless transitional justice mechanisms are well introduced and coordinated,
they can undermine credibility of judicial proceedings, and the very purpose of it.
As the primary United Nations forum for discussion of human rights issues,
the Human Rights Council (hereinafter HRC) has acknowledged the importance of
transitional justice through important initiatives, such as resolutions on Human Rights
and Transitional Justice (UNHRC, 2008a) and Right to the Truth (UNHRC, 2008b),
both adopted at the 9th session of the Human Rights Council, in September 2008.
Although both resolutions were adopted by consensus, some issues raised intense
debate among the countries, such as the concession of amnesties and the scope of the
State’s obligations to investigate and prosecute those responsible for serious crimes
under international law (ICTJ, 2011). Despite the recently grow in the use of TJ
52
mechanisms, there are no clear alliance within the HRC committed to push forward
the issue of transitional societies (ICTJ, 2011).
As a succeeding committee to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
the Human Rights Council has inherited much of the CHR’s parallel organs. As one of
the most important ones, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) has been acting in several transitional societies not only providing reports,
but also with effective transitional justice mechanisms (ICTJ, 2011). Together with
other United Nations’ organs, the OHCHR has researching issues such as
accountability, healing processes, truth seeking and security in post-conflict nations.
Additionally to assisting other committees besides the Human Rights Council
(especially the General Assembly and the Security Council), the issued reports set
their own guidelines on how to deal with overcoming human rights abuses
(HANNUM, 2006).
As another widely recognized instrument of transitional justice, the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The creation of the Court followed the creation of
the United Nations’ ad tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which were
previously discussed. Despite ICC laudable purpose, it does not elude criticism. If not
for its allegedly political perspective, for other faults in its functioning many are
skeptical about its actual contribution to peacebuilding and peacekeeping (ABDULAI,
2010). In July 2009, African heads of State met in Libya to discuss its views on the
International Criminal Court as tool for accountability. What later would be called the
“Sirte decision” was the official position of the African Union of not cooperating with
the ICC, in acknowledgement of its perceived flaws as far as justice went.
Accompanying that general agreement, it was also decided that the organization
would refuse to extradite Sudanese president, Omar Al-Bashir, should he enter in their
territory (ABDULAI, 2010)6.This delicate situation has been frequently addressed by
the international community.
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has
played an important role supporting TJ programs aiming at rebuilding national justice
systems and enhancing States’ capacities in post-conflict situations (AVELLO, 2008).
Most of OECD funds have been directed to the creation of international and special
tribunals (AVELLO, 2008).
Although the Council of Europe has not an official definition of the term
transitional justice, the fact has not prevented it to act in the field. The Committee of
Legal Advisors on International Public Law, a body of the Council, has a whole array
of projects in the area of TJ, mainly concerning issues such as immunity of heads of
State and other governmental officials, and the duty of States to investigate and
6 In respect to a United Nations Security Council request, in 2005, the case of Sudanese
president Omar Al-Bashir was taken to the ICC and, from 2007 to 2010, arrest warrants and
summonses to appear have been issued against him (SUDAN, 2010). Concerning prosecutions
of those involved in the country’s issues with crimes against humanity and war crimes, the
United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UNICOI) in Darfur has presented its doubts. Although
the local population has criticized the ICC’s approach, the UNICOI defends the trials should be
carried out in international courts, since it fears the Sudanese criminal justice system lacks
legislation concerning human rights abuses and war crimes (UNICOI, 2005).
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prosecute those accused of serious crimes (AVELLO, 2008). Moreover, in 2008, the
European Commission established a transitional justice facility to enable speedy and
flexible funding to transitional justice measures, noting that:
[t]ransitional justice and ad hoc tribunals have emerged as a
critical issue for peacebuilding and postconflict resolution and
have been integrated into broader EU crisis management
approaches, reflecting the importance of addressing the question
of past human rights abuse in transitional and post-conflict
situation[s] for sustainable peace and stability (DAVIS, 2010, p.
11-12).
Besides, the EU and its Member States are the main contributors of
financial and technical assistance of the ICC (DAVIS, 2010).
In the field of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the creation of the
International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was a major evolution towards the
application of TJ mechanisms in a more appropriate way. The ICTJ works to assist
societies in transition to embrace the transitional justice and establish greater
confidence in the local institutions and in the rule of law. Their work consists in
presenting researches, analyses and reports on the matter in a vast number of countries
and organizations, such as the Human Rights Council. In addition, they work
alongside with victims’ groups, communities, activists and organizations, and advice
State institutions and policymakers (ICTJ, 2012).
4. BLOC POSITIONS
In 2002 the Bush administration withdrew the United States of America’s
signature of the Rome Statute. Following, the National Congress passed a law
prohibiting all kinds of cooperation with the ICC (CALL, 2004). However, the
country’s government formally strongly supports the instruments of transitional
justice, defending it constitute a mean to reach the democracy in the countries after
crises (ICTJ, 2009).
Mexico’s legislation is not favorable to transitional justice. There have been
attempts to establish a truth commission in the country in order to investigate the
crimes committed before the political transition of 2000; however, the idea has not
gain many enthusiasts (ICTJ, 2008). Presently these measures have been dismantled
and Mexico is being pressured by international actors to take new actions in this
regard. The main issue is the lack of political support in the country, which hampers
the development of a good transitional justice (ICTJ, 2008).
Costa Rica has passed through a dictatorial regime, similarly to other LatinAmerican countries, yet no measures were taken to implement investigations (GRAY,
2007) Guatemala has created a Truth Commission and has tried to provide justice to
its victims (GRAY, 2007). However, the local courts are believed to be biased,
blocking the actions of the Truth Commission, which shows that the instruments of
transitional justice are not so trustable in the country (CRANDALL, 2007). Bolivia
had some important prosecutions taken by the local courts, such as the case of the
54
former president General Luis Meza 7, which is viewed as a real landmark in the
justice system of the country (BLANK, 2007).
Peru accepted truth commissions as a compromised way of transition from
its military rule, supporting it politically and raising the expectations of achieving its
results. The strength of the commission relies on its good relation with the local
courts, which are very keen on the search for the truth and justice in the country. The
nationally televised hearings in Peru represent the first time in the Americas that a
truth commission has conducted its truth-seeking process so publicly (CRANDALL,
2004).
Following the steps of the Latin American countries, Brazil established a
truth commission to investigate human rights violations committed during its military
rule (1964-1985). The commission was created rather late in comparison to other
countries in the region. In addition, the current president, Mrs. Dilma Rousseff, has
signed a Freedom of Information law, which aims at allowing investigations of the
security archives of the dictatorial regime (ICTJ, 2012b).
Since the end of the military rule in Argentina, the country has pursued to
carry on the prosecutions for human rights violations committed during the period. In
1986 and 1987 Argentina implemented the full stop and due obedience laws, which
were highly compromised with prosecutions (ICTJ, 2005). Chile had also
implemented transitional justice measures. The one that had the most success was the
truth-commissions: the National Commission for Truth and Conciliation and the
National Commission on Prison and Torture Policy to investigate the issues from the
military period, which already provided the victims with lifelong pensions and better
life conditions (AGUILAR, 2007).
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Foreign’s
Office Human Right Strategy considers the improvement of criminal justice one of its
centerpieces. The office has an important role in supporting the rule of law
internationally, and has highlighted the work of its lawyers in countries such as Nepal
and Iraq (AVELLO, 2008). In Northern Ireland, the creation of the Historical
Enquiries Team, considered an alternative mechanism of transitional justice, had the
purpose of investigating the cases of deaths attributed to the security situation in the
region between 1968 and 1998 (BAGGOT, 2008).
For France, transitional justice is a priority measure to maintain regional
peace and a weapon to end impunity and support human rights. Since 2006, the
country has been participating in several cooperation projects related to transitional
justice, and has been trying to expand the knowledge of this process to the Frenchspeaking world. France has already used TJ instruments in security systems reform,
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes (FRANCE DIPLOMATIE,
2010).
7 The case of Meza consists of the trial of General Luis García Meza, former head of State of
Bolivia and initiator of the coup d‘etat in the country. Mr. Meza was convicted, although in
absentia, of 36 charges including murder, sedition, theft, fraud, genocide and violating the
constitution. In 1995 he was extradited from Brazil to Bolivia and still serving a 30 years prison
sentence (BLANK, 2007).
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The Netherlands bears a specific responsibility in the field of transitional
justice, not only as the host country to a large number of international legal
institutions, but also in view of its constitutional obligation to promote the
international legal order (AIV/CAVV, 2009). Despite the well-succeeded transition
process that occurred in Germany, starting with the Nuremberg Trials, the
mechanisms of transitional justice used for the restoration are still seen as controversy,
since they were mainly controlled by the victorious nations of the war (CALL, 2004).
The country is one of the main promoters of the Justice Rapid Response (JRR)
programme, which aims to develop the capacity to respond issues concerning justice
(AVELLO, 2008). The attempt to use instruments of transitional justice in Hungary
and Poland after the Soviets presence was not very successful, since both countries
have not concluded the investigations. The access to the files is very strict and the
political obstacle is strongly present (TUCKER-MOHL, 2005).
As a republic of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia has been dealing with
transitional justice since its independence. The attitude of Croatia has changed
regarding the ICTY since the country began negotiations with the European Union,
for the cooperation with the tribunal is required for the admittance in the group. In
addition, Croatia has organizations and programs that conduct researches and inform
the public about the major problems in transitional justice, such as the Youth Initiative
for Human Rights and the Regional Transitional Justice Programme, created alongside
with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (ICTJ, 2006).
Besides participating on the Regional Transitional Justice Programme to
strengthen cross-border cooperation on transitional justice issues, Bosnia and
Herzegovina also had the support of the ICTY in the judgments of war crimes.
However, most of the cases have not yet been judged, and will be passed to a new
court, the War Crimes Chamber. Bosnia and Herzegovina created as well the
Srebrenica Commission, to report all the actions taken in transitional justice issues
(ICTJ, 2004a).
Also a republic of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia TJ cases are under the
jurisdiction of the ICTY. Years after the implementation of the Tribunal, most of the
Serbians still view it with distrust, believing it is conducted by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) countries against the Serbs. Moreover, the country lacks
on independence and expertise regarding international humanitarian law issues. The
United States of America has assisted Serbia economically expecting some
cooperation with the ICTY (ICTJ, 2004b).
Having established one of the most well known TRCs, South Africa prides
itself of popular involvement in the processes of reconciliation, which is believed to
be the key element to such success (SOUTH AFRICA, 1998). South African
exemplary mechanisms for reconciliation have already been addressed by Zimbabwe,
which firstly intends to complete its political transition that has not yet become an
issue of its past (ICTJ, 2010). Having gone through widespread violence in 2007 due
to democratic disputes, Kenya has also been implementing in its territory modest TJ
mechanisms. In face of the ICC’s sent of warrants for Kenyans allegedly responsible
for crimes against humanity during the period of conflict, the country has shown,
however, its preference for nationally held prosecutions (HRW, 2009; MUSUNGU,
2009).
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On another end, both Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) have referred nationals accused of crimes against humanity to the International
Criminal Court (ERO, 2010). Child soldiers’ Congolese recruiter, Mr. Thomas
Lubanga, has gone into trial in the ICC, although his judgment has generated some
controversy (RAMKI-NOGALES, 2010). Another great concern in this post-conflict
society is its reform of abusive institutions, particularly army and police, commonly
known as security service reform. The European Union has effective relation with this
aspect of the DRC’s rebuilding. The organization has centered its efforts specifically
in defense and police, having invested millions of Euro in the establishment of
Congolese security (BAUSBACK, 2010).
International concrete support has been seen in cases such as that Rwanda.
The ethnical-based animosity between Tutsis and Hutus has left deep scars in both
Rwanda and Burundi. With abused societies, both have had encounters with
transitional justice tools; in one case, however, they have been more deeply applied
than in the other. It is arguable if whether for political reasons or for public pressure,
Rwanda has found accountability in an ad hoc tribunal while Burundi is still subject of
criticism concerning its efforts to achieve justice (SOTTAS, 2008). Still, Burundi’s
questioning regarding its own international aid has been left unanswered. It has been
suggested that crimes against Rwandese Tutsi victims has, for some reason, caught the
international community’s eye more than those committed against Burundian Hutus
(SOTTAS, 2008). Nigeria’s intentions of ending violence in Liberia presented serious
concerns to transitional justice. On one hand, the trial of resigned abusive president
Charles Taylor had to occur; on the other, Nigerian’s promise of asylum as payment
for his abdication could make the offering of exile an unreliable option for transitional
justice, having it not succeeded in Taylor’s case (KAUFMAN, 2005).
Contrarily to most cases in African history of internal conflict, in Angola
there was not a change of government with the settlement of peace. Civil war was
accounted for disputes between to political groups, one of which holds power to date.
Angola now wishes to “forgive and forget the offenses [...] and face future with
tolerance and trust” (LUSAKA PROTOCOL, 1994, annex 6 (I) para. 5). This
unwillingness to revisit painful memories along with the authority-suggested closure
in the matter does not offer much room for transitional justice to act. The question
now is whether to move forward once and for all or to focus efforts in rebuilding
Angolan society taking its recent past of abuse into account (SOUTH AFRICAN
REGIONAL ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT ON ANGOLA, 2008).
Conflict still clouds western Sudan’s region of Darfur. In order to fight local
rebel groups, the government has been acting through tribal militia, which is partially
perceived as source for such stability in the region (SRIRAM; PILLAY, 2009). With
the tragic results from the two civil wars in the country and its human rights
violations, the emerging of South Sudan as a new State and the ongoing conflicts in
Darfur, the international community has been trying to implement transitional justice
mechanisms in the region. The Sudanese authorities have stated its wish to reestablish
peace and resume pendant negotiations with its succeeding State (ICTJ, 2011).
The cases of Libya and Egypt recently settled governments also puts TJ in
discussion. Still in completion, revolution against Mubarak’s human rights-violating
regime in Egypt has sorted initial desired effects (MISTRY, 2012). Today, the country
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stands at a crossroads point, its newly settled transitional leadership which has had
considerable popular support, showing its will to repair and play close attention to
human rights violations acknowledged during the Egyptian lasting regime. The
present government has shown support for prosecutions in the ICC, but again, the
matter presents some controversy. It has been noted on more than one occasion that
the indictments concern mostly and solely crimes that happened at the end of the
revolution and those relatable directly to Mubarak and close ones (MISTRY, 2012).
Moreover, there is still polemic debate regarding other nations’ favoring of
circumstances of human rights violations in the country, with consent and in alliance
with the Mubarak government, that clearly contradicts jus cogens norms of
international law (MEYER, 2011).
As for cases which involve external actors, as those of Afghanistan and
Iraq, it is hard to set a line between repairing violence from before and during
interventions. Nonetheless, both countries, although unmentioned by the ICC, have
been offered foreign aid to rehabilitate its societies (BRANCH, 2010). During the
American occupation, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission has been
established, although little effective accountability or reconciliation has been achieved
(ZYL, 2005). As for Turkey, silence is the answer given to requests for truth
commissions to analyze and overcome past human rights violations in the country.
The country still refuse to recognize its genocide against the Armenians of the
Ottoman Empire (FORSYTHE, 2011).
Along with Azerbaijan, Pakistan, India, Vietnam and the People’s
Republic of China, the Russian Federation has not ratified the Rome Statute, which
accepts the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction (ICC, 2012) . Moreover, the
country has expressed its views about particular mechanisms of transitional justice
such as authority indictment and, on occasions, the establishment of ad hoc criminal
tribunals (HRW, 2009). Concerning the former, Russia feels that warrants sent to
high-ranking leaders during a period of conflict may work against expectations of
settling peace (HRW, 2009). The Chinese government does not stand too far from that
perspective either. In the questions of Sudan and Zimbabwe, the country has not
demonstrated intention of investigating or placing accountability for crimes on
government leadership (OOLA, 2008). China has also shown opposition to a joint
effort of the United Nations and Timor Leste to establish this country’s hybrid court,
as did Japan and Australia (NAGY, 2008; JAERVINEN, 2004).
Falling outside the jurisdiction of the ICC, crimes committed in Cambodia
over thirty years ago have found accountability in the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, an ad hoc tribunal negotiated between the Cambodian
government and the United Nations (GOLDSTON, 2006). In Timor Leste, the
Serious Crimes Panels of District Court of Dilli has been supported for investigative
as well as judicial purposes. There is, however, strong criticism concerning
accountability of external actors. Indonesia has acknowledged the abuses among
Timorese people, “promised that it would prosecute violators of human rights”
(SCHNEIDER, 2009, p. 301) and even set a court to judge its nationals who were
suspected to be involved in these crimes. Nevertheless, this dedication has brought
questioning about its true effectiveness, considering that the small number of members
58
of the Indonesian military that have actually been judged has been, in total, acquitted
(NAGY, 2008).
1) How can international community better empower the civil society to deal
with transitions?
2) How can international mechanisms of transitional justice better fit the
national dynamic of the affected countries?
3) To what extent can amnesties be permitted?
4) To what extent are transitional justice mechanisms achieving their preestablished goals?
5) What is the real effectiveness of mechanisms other than judicial
proceedings?
6) How can balance between a State sovereignty and the international
community interest in protecting international human rights norms can be
stricken?
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TOPIC B: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights
Anaís Medeiros Passos and Pedro Rigon
While international business activity involving direct investment can be
traced back to the Middle Ages in Europe (JONES, 1993), the appearance of the first
large transnational corporations (hereinafter TNCs) date from the early modern
period, with the beginning of the navigations and the colonization. Since then such
companies have developed and widespread for what we know today. From the British
East India Company to many of enterprises that act in the contemporary globalized
perspective, TNCs have entered in conflict with human rights in the fields of labor,
environment and health, for instance. However, the violations committed by such
companies have frequently evaded international law, since their actions are often
viewed as beyond the reach of any law (BRATSPIES, 2005).
With the advent of Mercantilism and the rise of the period of navigations,
demanding growth in expenses, States could no longer uphold the high expenses of
those quests, especially considering the risk of shipwrecks and loss of earnings behind
it. Consequently it aroused the necessity to assemble capital from different sources,
despite the risk of losing its investment. Within this scenario, emerged the largest
known TNCs of the 17th century— the Dutch East India Company and the British East
India Company—, and yet even at such early period those corporations already had
practices that violated international law. Among those practices piracy, smuggling,
drug traffic were well known and widespread.
Despite the existence of such companies centuries ago, the modern concept
of TNCs is largely a post-1945 phenomenon originating in the United States (JONES,
1993). Growing with an increasingly borderless economic order, globalization and the
influence of the liberalism at the time, those TNCs developed in way that its one and
only social responsibility would be to increase profits (FRIEDMAN, 1970). The Ford
Foundation is the very example of an American TNC that, rooted in the values of the
Marshall Plan, increased its influence and spread through a shattered Europe. Its main
project was related to the promotion overseas of the American managerial values and
know-how (mainly oriented to increase production) (CAREW, 1987). In a context of
the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1945, the signature of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) in 1947, the creation of the World
Bank in 1989, and further the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, it became
common ground the use of disparities between countries in order to gain advantages
and increase profit. This situation was aggravated by the policies of those institutions
which prioritized trade over all. Thus the inequalities increased, and the life of whole
swathes of the world population degraded (OZDEN, 2005).
The reflexes of the scientific advances and discoveries of the post-war period
were the boost in matter of production; particularly since a huge amount of the
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development of technology and research of that period 8. This conjecture, reinforced
by the process of globalization, generated a new phase for TNCs. Starting with the end
of the ancient regime of oligopolies and capital gain, and enjoying from the benefits
and subsidies offered by the outskirt countries for acting and settling in its territory,
TNCs started a dissemination of a net of company branches worldwide. The world
became one only sphere of investment, realization and capital formation. From that
moment on, TNCs developed a worldwide pattern regarding planning, human
resources, production and administrative norms related to across borders affiliate
companies (COSTA, 2008).
Throughout history many TNCs have used the premise that, considering they
operate across national borders, they elude national legal systems (BRATSPIES,
2005), and since most of international law rules aims at regulating the behavior of
States (CASSESE, 2005), their actions would be immune to any law. Only after the
recognition of individual responsibility for acts committed by a State that international
law developed mechanisms attributing responsibility to non-State actors such as
TNCs. The Nuremberg Trials, in the aftermath of World War II, represented a
significant development of that law, since they applied international law doctrines and
concepts to hold individuals accountable for crimes committed under the Nazi regime.
In the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials, one of particular significance is The United
States of America v. Carl Krauch et. al case - also known as the IG Farben trial - in
which the corporation was indicted for several human rights abuses, such as:
participation in enslavement and forced labor of the civilian
population of countries and territories occupied or controlled by
Germany, the enslavement of concentration-camp inmates
within Germany and the use of prisoners of war in operations
and illegal labor. It also charges the mistreatment, terrorization,
torture, and murder of enslaved person (US Military Tribunal
Nuremberg , p.5).
The corporation was also charged for the “participation, […], in a conspiracy
to commit crimes against peace” (US Military Tribunal Nuremberg , p.5). This and
other corporations at the time—Krupp Group, Flick Kommanditgesellschaft (Flick
KG) —were all condemned for crimes against humanity, and were individually held
responsible for their acts. As Nuremberg Tribunals prevented individuals to use the
abstraction of the State to avoid responsibility for their acts, those subsequent
prevented the individual to hide behind the abstraction of TNCs (CLAPHAM, 2000,
apud ENGSTRÖM, 2002).
Despite numerous efforts throughout history to protect human rights, TNCs
often have policies that historically violate international human rights norms. In this
sense, it is possible to mention the violations against the environment committed by
Monsanto chemical company and the damage it caused to the population of the United
Kingdom in circumstance of the dumping of toxic waste between 1965 and 1972. In
the occasion Monsanto paid contractors to illegally dump toxic waste in British
landfill sites (VIDAL, 2007). The company is also responsible for developing
8 Being in the field of computers, electronics or even deriving of the space and armaments race.
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controversial genetically modified organisms which were related to cause harm not
only to the environment but also to the population9. Chevron is another TNC involved
in serious violations of human rights during the same period. The company is
responsible for causing environmental damage in Ecuador during an operation from
1972 to 1993. The corporation allegedly made the residents ill and damaged national
forests and rivers by discharging water formation into the rainforest (FEIGE, 2008).
When brought before the Ecuadorian court, the corporation claimed that agreements
made with the Ecuadorian Government exempted the company from any liabilities at
the national level10.
Considering the cases afore mentioned and many others that continuously
happen trough the passage of time, they only reinforce the statement of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, that “there isn’t an
internationally recognized right that some company somewhere hasn’t violated”
(RUGGIE, 2009, p. 8). In this context, it is more than needed for international
community to come up with concrete solutions on how to deal with the issue of
human rights violations committed by transnational corporations.
2.1. Definition of Transnational Corporations
There is a lengthy discussion about the defining principles on transnational
corporations (TNCs). According to the United Nations Norms released in 2003, TNCs
refers to an economic entity operating in more than one country
or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more
countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home
country or country of activity and whether taken individually or
collectively (para. 20).
A transnational company distinguishes itself from national companies by its
capacity of locating production across borders, promoting trade and organizing its
managerial structures “in a way that affects the international allocation of resources”
(ENGSTRON, 2002, p.1). A TNC therefore also distinguishes itself from an
enterprise that engages in portfolio investment, which implies only a financial domain
in the foreign venture without any control on management.
Additionally the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines states that TNCs “usually comprise companies or other entities
whose ownership is private, state or mixed. The degree of autonomy of each entity in
relation to the other varies widely” (OECD, 2000, p.14). This notion stresses the fact
that a corporation carries a variety of relationships, including legal and natural
9 There is a controversy that arose out of the research of Arpad Pusztai with genetically
modified potatoes, in which he deemed that the stunted growth and suppression of the immune
system of the rats used in the experiments were a result of the transformation procedure
(RANDERSON, 2008).
10 Issue approached on the documentary Crude, premiered in 2009.
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persons, what makes more difficult determining legal liability issues. Concerning their
identity, corporations are business oriented, that is, work for the profit. This
characteristic has to be taken into account when discussing on settling social
parameters for their activities.
2.2. The Activities of Transnational Corporations Worldwide
The phenomenon of globalization has increased exponentially the role of
TNCs trough the expansion of world trade, growth in foreign direct investment, and
increased capital flows. The internationalization of production, for its turn, was
facilitated due to a deregulation of barriers to trade and a decrease in transport and
communications costs.
In 2010, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) reports concluded that foreign sales, employment and assets of TNCs
were continuously increasing. TNCs production both at home and worldwide
generated approximately US$16 trillion in 2010, about a quarter of the global GDP
(UNCTAD, 2011b). The 20 largest transnational companies have annual incomes
greater than those of 80 developing countries. Sales and value added of foreign
affiliates reached US$33 trillion and US$7 trillion, respectively, representing a growth
of 9.1% and 8.3% in 2010. Exportations reached more than US$6 trillion in the world,
about one-third of global exports (UNCTAD, 2011b). If we consider that in 2009 the
post-crisis environment represented a decrease of 16.8% of the total assets of foreign
affiliates, and a loss of 5.3% of TNCs’ GDP, the 2010 indicators shows that TNCs
have recovered their economic activities. That is why Kobrin writes about
transnational companies and their private authority, arguing that “TNCs have become
actors with significant power and authority in the international political system: they
can set standards, supply public goods and participate in negotiations” (2008, p.4).
The case of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
provision of the World Trade Organization in 1994 provides an example on how
TNCs can not only influence, but also determine the international context. After an
initiative of Pfizer and IBM, the United States-based twelve members of the
Intellectual Property Committee were responsible for putting the item on the agenda,
developing standards to be negotiated, and determining the best course of action
concerning the topic under discussion.
The search for optimize the geographical location of transnational
corporations value chain is an ongoing and multifaceted process. The fragmentation of
the production value chain and the desire of companies to be located closer to big
markets and scarce resources have contributed to the internationalization of economic
activities (UNCTAD, 2011b). This has spread awareness in countries about the need
to offer an attractive environment to companies seeking to develop their activities in
the most favorable scenario. Furthermore, location’s determinants vary according to
the nature of the activity developed. High quality resources such as skilled labor,
access to scientific capabilities and intellectual property right regime influence more
on high technology industry considerations, while costs related with labor and
resources are less important.
Concerning State-owned transnational companies, there are at least 650 of
them in the world, with 8.500 foreign affiliates distributed in several activities,
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especially the service sector. Even though they are less than 1% of TNCs, their
outward investment was responsible for 11% of foreign direct investment (FDI)
worldwide in 2010, representing 19 of the world 100 largest TNCs (UNCTAD,
2011b). Of these companies, 34.2% are located in European Union countries, and
52.8%, in developing countries, especially Asia (36%) and Africa (12.6%)
(UNCTAD, 2011b).
As these recent UNCTAD studies have shown, the attractiveness of
developed countries to receive high technology is being challenged by developing
countries due to an increase of local markets and technological capabilities. In 2011,
the UNCTAD World Investment Report showed that for the first time developing and
transitional countries have received more than half of global FDI. East and SouthEast Asia and Latin America have seen a deep increase of FDI inflows, while
developing and underdeveloped countries continue to receive less investment. “Flows
to Africa, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island
developing States all fell, as did flows to South Asia” (UNCTAD, 2011b, p.119).
2.3. Violation of Human Rights
Due to the non-enforceable character of the norms ruling corporate
obligations regarding human rights, the number of allegations of TNCs disrespecting
international human rights norms is vast. From the disregard to labor laws and
international guidelines in China to the illegal violence, forced labor, and support to
armed conflicts in pursuit of their corporate interests by oil giants like Enron,
UNOCAL and Shell, TNCs have been enjoying immunity of liability and an ever
increasing concentration of economic power (OZDEN, 2005; BRATSPIES, 2005).
Reports regarding human rights violations committed by transnational
companies especially in undeveloped and developing countries have been more
frequent, as these activities spread throughout countries (RUGGIE, 2007). The United
Nations Human Rights Council has expressed many times its concern regarding States
failure to prevent violations committed by corporations regarding labor conditions,
non-discrimination and indigenous people 11. The last draft of the United Nations Code
of Conduct for Transnational Corporations called upon the transnational companies to
not disrespect the sovereignty of the countries where they develop their activities. The
issue is that competition between corporations for comparative advantage, deepen by
globalization and integration between economies, can end up bringing negative
consequences:
such consequences of ‘outsourcing’ are captured e.g. in the
criticism of the ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon, i.e. use of low
cost services provides through poor environmental standards,
low wages, or poor working conditions. In a worst-case scenario
this leads to competition between states with social and
environmental standards in order to attract companies. As a
consequence large TCs can escape national regulatory control
trough relocating their production to countries offering more
favorable terms (ENGSTRON, 2002, p.5)
11 See for example A/HCR/4/35/Add.2
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The list of human rights that transnational corporations have been reported to
violate is long (DEVA, 2003): the right to enjoy life, freedom from torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment, freedom from forced or slave labor, freedom from
arbitrary detention or deprivation of security of person, freedom to enjoy property,
freedom from deprivation of or injury to health, enjoyment of a clean and healthy
environment, freedom from discrimination, free choice in work, fair wages a decent
living, equal remuneration for work of equal value, safe and healthy working
conditions, protection of children from economic exploitation, etc.
A company can be directly involved in human rights violation or indirectly
involved, which means even though it is not directly responsible, it does not take any
actions to prevent certain violations to occur, characterizing a “pervasive violation”
(DEVA, 2003, p. 22). In this second case, we may refer to two different situations.
One is when the company sells products to a third part (State, private entity,
individual), knowing that it will be used in activities related to human rights abuses.
This would be the case of the Nuremberg judgments and the involvement of
companies with the Nazi regime. A second situation of an indirect violation is when
companies get advantages from some kind of violation perpetrated by a third part, as
the ones committed by a military regime that is supported by a specific company. A
famous example of this situation would be the UNOCAL case, in which the American
company was charged by its relation with the Burmanese military and its culpability
in human rights violations. The UNOCAL case II (also known as Doe. v. Unocal
case), by its turn, fits in the “direct violation” label. It reported forced labor in the
construction of the Yadana pipeline, at the Andaman Sea, to the south of Myanmar.
The OECD has acknowledged that similar problems were found in oil and gas
developments owned by UNOCAL in Colombia, Congo-Brazzavile, Indonesia,
Nigeria and Sudan (OECD, 2002).
The case of Enron in India is well reported in the document “Human Rights
Watch: the Enron Corporation, Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations”, in
which the local entity of Enron in India, the Dabhol Power Corporation, took direct
advantage from the governmental conduct of suppressing dissent through the
circumvent of due process of law, harassment of anti-Enron protesters and
environmental activists, and arbitrary and brutal police practices. In the case
Rodrigues v. Drummond Co., 2003, allegations were made concerning corporate
involvement in the death of Colombian trade union leaders.
2.4. Asserting Responsibility for TNCs Human Rights Violations
Considering this scenario of increasing human rights violations and the lack
of accountability, it is necessary to assess the legal means available for assert
responsibility for transnational companies’ activities. There is no consensus on how
this should be done, whether focusing on States, individuals or corporations.
Although the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights entitles
individuals, States and “organs of society” the duty to promote and protect human
rights (p. 3), the term “organs of society” remains vague. Some scholars defend that
corporations should fit in the term, because it would obviously make a reference to
entities not falling under the category of individuals or States (BRATSPIE, 2005, p.
7).
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Others argue that only States and State agents are holders of obligations,
considering they are the only entities capable of possessing international legal
personality and having duties and rights under international law. Corporate duties are
therefore unprecedented and unjustified because corporations are interpreted as being
“derivative of, and enforceable only by states, who as ‘subjects’ conferred those rights
and duties upon them” (CUTLER, 2001, p. 13 apud KOBRIN, 2008, p.8). Following
this reasoning, asserting corporations obligations would jeopardize the State power
itself. As Vasquez claims, giving direct obligations to corporations “would result in a
significant disempowering of states” (2005, p. 150). Corporate direct accountability
would then not be in order with the human rights framework. In the Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy case, 2003, one find claims that corporations
could not violate international law, corroborating with this view.
Others point that transnational corporations have already recognized rights
through international treaties, multilateral trade agreements, and regional pacts.
Entitling them certain duties would be the natural consequence of this process.
Routinely transnational companies claim rights espoused by the Universal
Declaration, especially the right to own property and the right to freedom of opinion
and expression. Corporations should then be held accountable for violations of
international law, either directly or through national courts (ICHRP, 2002; RATNER,
2001).
States have already recognized many corporations’ duties trough soft law
instruments such as the International Labor Organization Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977/2006), the
UN Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2003), the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (1976/2000) and the UN Global Compact (1999/2000).
Additionally, one could argue that States have already indirectly recognized duties
entitled to corporations by prescribing international labor law, environmental law, and
economic sanctions.
If one accepts a corporate criminal liability approach, two theories may be
used to assert liability: identification and imputation. Under the identification theory,
the actions of a certain natural person are the actions of the corporation, being
restricted to the ones who actually represent the corporation, managers, chiefs,
coordinators. The imputation theory, for its turn, asserts that the corporation can be
held responsible for the acts of all its agents, when they are not performing in their
“individual capacity” (VASQUEZ, 2005a, p.1352).
2.5. International Law
There are several soft law instruments regarding the duties of transnational
corporations towards human rights. The United Nations Global Compact released in
1999 by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan affirms that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to corporate entities as well as to governments.
It lists ten principles that should be followed by socially responsible TNCs, such as
supporting and respecting the promotion of internationally proclaimed human rights,
not be in complicity with human rights abuses and uphold the freedom of negotiation
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and the right of collective bargaining. Besides these parameters, it acknowledges the
need to follow up with internal systems to report results (UN, 1999).
The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative that aims to promote
responsible corporate practices through the support for local networks, particularly
centered in developing countries. Since it is not a regulatory instrument, it basically
relies on public accountability and transparency to promote its principles. It is a
follow-up from the International Labor Organization Declaration, whose purpose is to
offer a dynamic global picture where abstract principles can be implemented indeed.
This way, it settles priorities and prescribes technical cooperation between companies
and countries. An important mechanism it has brought are the “Communication on
Progress” reports, which analyze corporations performances’ annually with regards to
the covenant principles. Despite its contributions, many critiques have come regarding
its real efficacy to change companies’ behavior. Additionally, some have said it has
too vague terms and do not cover some crucial areas like financial and non-financial
disclosure, consumer interests, science and technology competition and taxation.
The International Labor Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy of 1977 is an important
document concerning the matter, although one could point difficulties in regard to its
directory nature, the absence of any monitoring process and the lack of any
implementation mechanism prescribed by it. The ILO Principles were conceived as a
more positive approach to the social clause - i.e. trade sanctions for violation of
worker rights. They are a useful basis to distinguish the roles of governments and
companies concerning the prevention of human rights abuses, by settling fundamental
principles that each State should promote. According to the Declaration, States are
responsible for creating and maintaining minimum national standards for
corporations’ activities. That is the reason it has become a reference in the context of
corporate social responsibility and international framework agreements.
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 1976 is an important
contribution, in spite of lacking an enforcement system12 and being restricted to the 39
adhering countries, which are mainly developed ones. Its government-backed
mechanisms, that could be considered the Guidelines’ more important innovation,
include National Contact points, which are government offices located in each one of
the countries. These offices are responsible for making sure the OECD principles and
standards are being implemented, annually reporting the progress to the OECD
Investment Committee.
An interesting initiative is the United States Alien Tort Claim Act (ACTA),
which permits aliens to sue the United States and foreign corporations for human
rights violations committed abroad. In the case between the Presbyterian Church of
12 As Deva argues (2003, p. 5) “the efficacy of their implementation depends upon the National
Contact Points and the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
But these two institutions only perform advisory, consultative and clarificatory functions, and
thus lack any enforcements powers. The OECD’s usual practice of not revealing the identity of
an enterprise involved in the dispute makes the matter worse. In addition, the guidelines are
very general and vague, and the follow-up process is taken up only in member countries, not
throughout the world”.
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Sudan and the Talisman Energy company, it was rejected the claim that national law
cannot support corporate liability
In recent years the United Nations have issued important documents such as
the United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations (1998) - although
it was never fully adopted - and the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprise with Regard to Human
Rights (2003), that expressly recognizes that human rights violations have being
committed by transnational corporations. It is the first set of comprehensive
international human rights norms concerning specifically transnational corporations,
establishing the responsibilities such companies have with regard to human and labor
rights. The Norms have also settled important guidelines for activities of transnational
companies in conflict zones. Other documents also reflect the existing international
practice regarding the protection of human rights, such as framework agreements
between TNCs and workers organizations, self-imposed company codes of conduct
and NGOs’ guidelines13.
The Ruggie Report released in 2011 provides an updated vision of the UN
Norms, trying to tackle its main critiques and commentaries. UN Norms aimed to
impose to companies the same duties countries have assumed under international law
on the protection of human rights after signing some agreements. This proposal
generated a profound and polarized debate between companies and human rights
defenders’. Unfortunately, there was little support and participation of countries in the
discussions. In 2005, a Special Representative was indicated by the Secretary-General
to undertake a new process on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises. The work involved extensive and
multiple consultations with different countries, individuals and organizations. For
example, the efficacy of the Guiding Principles of human rights due diligence
provisions were tested by 10 different companies, and were discussed by corporate
law professionals from more than 20 countries. The final text rests on three
assumptions, aiming to balance States and business duties:
(a)States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfill
human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(b) The role of business enterprises as specialized organs of
society performing specialized functions, required to comply
with all applicable laws and to respect human rights;
(c) The need for rights and obligations to be matched to
appropriate and effective remedies when breached (RUGGIE
REPORT, p. 4).
The Guiding Principles are complemented by commentaries, this way
clarifying its meaning and preventing misinterpretations. There is no doubt that
13 Such as the European Commission Green Paper: promoting a European framework for
corporate social responsibility; Australian Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000; Declaration of
Human Duties and Responsibilities; Basic Code of Conduct covering Labor Practices adopted
by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; Workplace Code of Conduct initiated
by Fair Labor Association for the Apparel Industry Partnership; Shell International Petroleum
Company, Statement of General Business and Human Rights.
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establishing this global and common platform for action is a big step towards more
regulated corporation activities’. The overall positive acceptance the document
received from individual governments, business enterprises and associations, civil
society and workers’ organizations, national human rights institutions, and investors is
a sign of the well done process of writing it.
Civil society engagement with these issues has intensified, expanding and
assuming diverse forms. They are essential to make corporate activities’ more
accountable. A frequently used technique nowadays is known as ‘naming and
shaming’, which is basically identifying and publicizing corporate malpractice. Such
kind of activism has been undertaken by several organizations including: Corpwatch
(United States), Corporate Watch (United Kingdom), Greenpeace, Human Rights
Watch, International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN), Maquila Solidarity
Network, Minewatch, Norwatch (Norway), Oilwatch, Pesticide Action Network
(PAN), Project Underground, and PR Watch Consumer.
If one accepts to directly regulate transnational corporations for their
violations, some issues arise. Firstly, TNCs must intend a consequence or should they
just be aware of the particular consequence being enough to impose criminal liability?
Could liability be imposed for negligence in taking certain actions? In this context, it
has been proposed by some scholars a cooperation between the United Nations and
the World Trade Organization, to fill the vacuum created in the power of States to
regulate transnational corporations. In addition, there is a need to clarify who is
responsible and to what degree, what is the source of this responsibility, towards who
it develops and how such responsibility is asserted.
Presently, it is still prevalent a State-center context, in which States enjoy
most of the power and conditions to accomplish law. Entitling transnational
corporations a legal personality in international law equivalent to States could be an
unrealistic attempt. An alternative would be to treat TNCs as secondary limited
subjects of international law, considering their status derives from States despite their
independence. This concept would permit them to enter into international agreements
with other entities, make claims for violations of international law and be directly
liable for their actions.
2.6. State Responsibility
Appealing to corporate responsibility does not mean States do not need to
accomplish their duty to protect human rights. Despite the context of diffusion of
public authority, States still perform central functions in international relations.
Concerning their obligations under international human rights law, the 1997
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights concludes that
“[t]he obligation to protect includes the States responsibility to ensure that private
entities or individuals, including transnational corporations […] do not deprive
individuals of their economic, social and central rights” (Art. 18, sole paragraph).
Following the same reasoning, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination “prohibits and brings to an end […] racial discrimination by
any persons, group or organization” (Art. 2 (1)).
In the case of asserting State responsibility for TNCs actions the issue that
arises is if liability should be imputed to the home or the host State. According to the
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first approach, corporations are subjected to the national law under which they operate
and therefore the host State, for its territorial connection, would be liable if it fails to
protect its citizens from corporations’ acts. Alternatively, the home State
responsibility approach would be based on the presumption that States have not only
the duty to protect their citizens and organizations, but also the duty to prevent them
from violating human rights abroad14. There are some historic precedents for this
responsibility, such as the International Court of Justice statement regarding the
Nicaragua v. United States case (1984), pointing out the responsibility of State for acts
of persons unconnected with it, if it can exert control over them. Additionally, the
Basel Convention prohibits citizens and corporations to export hazardous waste to
other nations.
The due diligence concept is a mean of establishing whether human rights are
being violated or not. It acknowledges the fact there is a wide choice of means to be
used at the discretion of the State. A human right violation cannot be stated in
abstract, because it depends on the specific circumstances and the rights violated.
Foreseeability has then to be taken into account. Sometimes there is no real condition
of a State unconnected with TNCs to know their actions abroad. Also, an issue
remains whether due diligence questions should take into account the capabilities of
the State in specific or be ruled by international standards. The International Court of
Justice has employed the concept of “means at the disposal” 15 of the State in question,
Nicaragua, concerning the lack of resources it had to prevent traffic arms from
occurring inside its territory. In the situation, it was proved clandestine arms traffic
happened without any complicity from State (who even tried to stop it) and therefore
Nicaragua could not be held responsible for these activities.
Host State responsibility approach faces some difficulties. In many cases,
TNCs ends up being more powerful than the States in which they do business. Most
cases of violations occur in developing countries16, exactly because in these areas
14 Article 2 (2) of ICCPR, obliging states to adopt “necessary legislative and other measures”.
15 According to the excerpt ICJ decision, 1987, para. 157: “As the means at the disposal of the
governments in the region are roughly comparable, the geographical obstacles, and the intrinsic
character of any clandestine arms traffic, simply show that this traffic may be carried on
successfully without any complicity from governmental authorities, and even when they seek to
put a stop to it. Finally, if it is true that the exceptionally extensive resources deployed by the
United States have been powerless to prevent this traffic from keeping the Salvadorian armed
opposition supplied, this suggests even more clearly how powerless Nicaragua must be with the
much smaller resources at its disposal for subduing this traffic if it takes place on its territory
and the authorities endeavor to put a stop to it”.
16 An alternative would be to consider non-equity models (NEMs) of international production,
especially in developing countries, such as contract manufacturing, contract farming,
franchising, management contracts, and other types of contractual relationship that allows
TNCs to coordinate their activities in host-country firms “without owing a stake in those firms”
(UNCTAD, 2011b, p. 121). This kind of enterprise can support industrial development trough
capacity building, technology dissemination and giving access to global value chain. However
employment can be highly cyclical through contract manufacture and NEMs can be a way of
escape from labor and environmental legislation (UNCTAD, 2011b). Concerning industrial
development, should be taken into account the existent risk of developing countries becoming
too dependent on technologies and global value chain owned and coordinated by TNCs.
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TNCs resist more easily to domestic sanctions (ENGSTRON, 2002). Moreover, in
many cases governments do not have the financial and material resources to monitor
and regulate corporate operations.
Home State responsibility approach, for its turn, raises concerns of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Extraterritorial responsibility is well established in
international law. Some scholars even argue “that decisions against the extraterritorial
application of human rights law is anathema to the effective protection of individual
rights, the very purpose of human rights law” (HOWLAND, 2008, p. 403).
Notwithstanding it should be viewed carefully due to the excessive use of this
principle by some States to apply their laws abroad.
The present situation, one could argue, is of inadequacy of a regulatory
framework on transnational companies activities, considering there is no consensus on
standards, which in spite of the great amount of existent soft law documents rely on
quite vague terms. Additionally, they put excessive emphasis on dialogue and
cooperation with transnational corporations, without establishing sanctions in case
they are needed. However is it realistic to have a binding approach? Would States be
capable of achieving a consensus on well-defined standards? Monitoring and reporting
still face many difficulties with regards to finance and logistics. For all the reasons
stated above, until the present moment, States have been unwilling to take a step
further and to sanction parent corporations for human rights violations committed by
their subsidiaries (UNCTAD, 2007).
3.
PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION
When observing the evolution and development of capitalism and TNCs
activities, one can apprehend that there is a gradual evolution and development of
human rights and international law in order to regulate this process. Nonetheless there
is a delay in delivering a judicial response capable of adjusting these economic
activities to national legislation and internationally recognized good practices. In this
sense the fast growth that TNCs have experienced in the past—and, therefore, the
increase of practices that violate human rights— did not generate a similar response at
the international law level to inhibit and uphold these offenders. In this section, we
analyze some important international, regional and national initiatives done in the last
years towards more regulated transnational activities.
In recent years, international plaintiffs have resorted to the United States
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in attempt to hold corporations accountable for human
rights violations committed outside the country. Although mechanisms of earlier age
addressed to cases of piracy and slave trade, the ATCA appears nowadays as the only
available mean of redressing in cases concerning TNCs. The first plaintiffs to win, in
1997, were pleaded against UNOCAL, a transnational petroleum company accused of
complicity with forced labor, rape and murder (OZDEN, 2005). The case occurred in
Myanmar and involved the hiring of militaries to secure a pipeline construction in the
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south of the country. The company was accused of complicity with human rights
violations committed by militaries against local peasants17.
In a more recent tort brought before the ATCA, in July 2005 Nestlé was
accused of trafficking, torture and forced labor of Malian children in the cacao harvest
of the Ivory Coast. Another expression of the national struggle against abuses
committed by TNCs occurred in France, where the Totalfinaelf company and its
affiliate Totalfinaelf E & P Myanmar were brought to a Nanterre court in 2002 by
Burmese refugees. The company in question was accused of being involved with
illegal confinement. In 2005 the case ended with a decision obliging the company to
indemnify the plaintiffs. According to the final decision, Totalfinaef company also
had to set a fund for others who might prove to have suffered from these actions
(OZDEN, 2005).
Opinions hold by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
are also a contemporary example of strive against corporations at the regional level. In
October 2000 a decision regarding cases of human rights violations committed by
TNCs in Nigeria was adopted (ACHPR, 2001). The Commission understood that the
government of Nigeria was violating human rights:
the communication alleges that the military government of
Nigeria has been directly involved in oil production through the
State oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company
(NNPC), the majority shareholder in a consortium with Shell
Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), and that these
operations have caused environmental degradation and health
problems resulting from the contamination of the environment
among the Ogoni People (ACHPR, 2001, p.1).
Consequently, an appeal was made in order to stop all the attacks on Ogoni
communities and permit free access to the territory. An investigation started to
prosecute the parties involved, ensuring an adequate compensation for victims. Lastly,
the government was oriented in the judicial decision to provide an environmental and
social impact assessment report, as well as information and meaningful access to
regulatory and decision-making bodies to communities likely to be affected by the oil
operations.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights emitted a decision in
November 200418 regarding the Turkish government authorization for E.M. Eurogold
Madencilik company to prospect gold and to use cyanide for extraction purposes,
despite the claims of Bergama’s residents about the risks to health, water and
environment that these activities would generate. The European Court of Human
Rights concluded “that the respondent State did not fulfill its obligation to secure the
applicants right to respect for their private and family life” (ECHR, 2004, p. 92-93).
Therefore, it was violating several articles of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Turkey was condemned to indemnify each
of the applicants for non-pecuniary damage.
17 Cf. Doe v. UNOCAL and Roe v. UNOCAL.
18 Taskin et al. v. Turkey, No. 46117/99.
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Some international initiatives on this issue have an entirely voluntary
character, such as the Harkin-Engel Protocol19, a public-private agreement also
referred as the Cocoa Protocol. This initiative is an example of a voluntary document
aiming to promote the end of child forced labor. The main critics concerning these
initiatives are precisely their voluntary character. Another problem is the lack of any
legal fundament in the agreements and the absence of a mechanism to verify TNCs’
actual compliance with the commitments they claim to have made. Some
organizations even denounce that those documents are frauds, since they would only
serve to enhance the image of TNCs usually accused of human rights violations before
the public (OZDEN, 2005).
Another case to be mentioned would be the one involving the control of
diamonds and other natural resources. This issue has generated several conflicts in
Sudan, Congo and Sierra Leone. The term “blood diamonds” was created in reference
to the situation where diamonds are mined under condition of gross human rights
abuses while TNCs make substantial profits. A very clear example of that is the one
reported by Human Rights Watch20 involving one of the largest gold companies,
AngloGold Ashanti, and its relations with the Front des Nationalistes et
Intégrationnistes (FNI), a combatant group with a record of human rights abuses in
Congo (HRW, 2005). The company was proved to be clearly funding the continuance
of war and the group activities. Considering this alarming context, in 2002 the United
Nations Security Council has appointed a panel of experts to investigate the illegal
exploitation of these resources. The Council proposed to apply sanctions against
implicated legal entities that had violated OECD guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (UNSC, 2002), thus turning soft law into hard law.
Under these circumstances and inspired by the previously created Global
Compact, the United Nations proposed the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme 21,
aiming:
to discuss ways to stop the trade in ‘conflict diamonds' and
ensure that diamond purchases were not financing violence by
rebel movements and their allies seeking to undermine
legitimate governments (KIMBERLY PROCESS OFICIAL,
2012).
Notwithstanding, its effectiveness was questioned many times. In 2009 two of
the founder members were accused of failing to properly regulate the “issues of noncompliance, smuggling, money laundering and human rights abuses in the world's [...]
diamond fields" (IRIN, 2009, p.4). Other similar voluntary agreements emerged in the
19 Formally entitled "Protocol for the growing and processing of cocoa beans and their
derivative products in a manner that complies with ILO Convention 182 concerning the
prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor", it is an
initiative of the United States Senator Tom Harkin and Representative Eliot Engel (International
Cocoa Initiative, 2001).
20 See also Human Rights Watch , Congo: Bringing Justice to the Heart of Darkness, February
7, 2006,
21 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 55/56, A/RES/55/56
(2000). Lately suported by the Security Council in its Resolution 1459, S/RES/1459 (2003).
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last years. To mention one, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights22
has gathered several companies of the energy and extractive sector, as well as nongovernmental organizations, with the common objective of promoting and protecting
human rights, while recognizing the decisive role that business and civil society can
play in advancing these issues. This range of voluntary agreements, despite inherent
limitations due to their voluntary character and lack of any enforcement mechanisms,
represent an actual effort of international community towards a more solid recognition
of human rights by both State and non-State actors.
4. BLOC POSITIONS
The United States of America affirms to have strong business regulatory
environment, ensuring the promotion of human rights. The country has supported
efforts on bringing transnational activities into more transparent terms and will
continue with it. One of the major findings United States had during recently is that
corporate social responsibility requires a strong domestic legal and regulatory
framework (UN, 2009) to be effective. When dealing with human rights and
transnational corporations, a negative attitude towards national and international
businesses has to be avoided since they are a positive and substantial force capable of
promoting economic and social development.
Argentina acknowledges the contemporary complex world posed by
transnational companies and international organizations (KIRCHNER, 2011).
Considering this scenario the country’s government states that transnational
corporations may be either of valuable benefit to the countries where they operated, or
the cause of gross human rights violations.
Bolivia endorses any initiative aiming to settle a code of conduct for
companies in order to make them more accountable. It believes that in Latin American
countries should regulate economic activities directed to exploit natural resources
(TELESUR, 2012).
Chile stresses the problem of gender representation inside transnational
corporations (UN, 2009), a theme essential to be included in the debate.
Brazil supports national legal standards observance by transnational
corporations when operating abroad. Foreign investments and economic activities
have been an important source of growth for developing and under-developed
countries.
Notwithstanding, efforts concerning the issue should be adopted
multilaterally, respecting each country’s sovereignty and specificities (AMORIM,
2009).
Peru believes that foreign operations of transnational corporations in Latin
America are essential for developing nations. However, is it necessary to settle a
balance between the environment, human rights and economic activities.
Development “at all cost” is not a reasonable state strategy for growth and will not be
22 Proposed by the governments of United States and United Kingdom, and nowadays adopted
by 5 other countries: Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Netherlands and the Republic of Colombia.
74
supported by the Peruvian government, a country that has been historically committed
with the human rights defense and dissemination (PERU, 2012).
Guatemala has emphasized the need to come up with financial
indemnifications for those affected by human rights violations committed by
transnational corporations, especially those living in conflict zones. United Nations
should be able to coordinate a dialogue with both governments, companies and
international corporations. Lastly, the country believes that a gender perspective
should be adopted (PAREDES, 1994) when dealing with labor discrimination.
Mexico is especially concerned with issues related to child labor and migrant
workers’ rights (UNICEF, 2012). The country is committed with settling legal
patterns for economic activities, harmonizing social and economic growth.
Costa Rica believes that the World Trade Organization parameters should be
taken into account when regulating transnational corporations, especially those
concerning freedom of association and elimination of child and forced labor (COSTA
RICA, 2012).
The European Union acknowledges substantial gaps between TNCs
activities and human rights. EU has been a strong supporter of the United Nations
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, helping to implement effectively
their principles worldwide. In view of these arguments, European Union has renewed
its policy on corporate social responsibility sought to focus more on business and
human rights (EU, 2011). Regarding the State duty to protect human rights, more
attention should be given to how conciliate business-related activities and human
rights policy, especially when leading with countries that have difficulties to prevent
violation to occur in their own territory.
Germany defends that although securing the universal protection of human
rights is mainly a State obligation, individuals and every organ of society, including
the business community, must also play a part in this task. Companies have to strive
for the promotion and observance of human rights, environmental and social
standards. In view of these arguments, the German government has been supporting
multilateral cooperation (GERMANY, 2009) to enhance development and human
rights observance in several countries.
France is strongly concerned with human rights violations committed by
transnational companies. Failed states and conflict zones pose an even more alarming
problem (FRANCE, 2011). PNUD, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
should be consulted to acknowledge already exiting good practices concerning this
domain.
The United Kingdom is committed with a strategy on business and human
rights, having set aside a significant sum to implement the Guiding Principles around
the world. Disseminating those parameters and good practices should be a priority for
both governments and business (UK, 2011). States should also be aware on deepen
regulation on small and middle-sized companies that are initiating foreign operations,
since frequently they do not fit in the scope of international agreements.
The Netherlands highlights the role of transnational corporations in the
enjoyment of human rights. The country welcome business’s and State’ efforts to
harmonize economic activities and human rights principles, since promoting them is
one of the main aims of the Dutch foreign policy
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Poland and Hungary acknowledges their engagement with European Union
initiatives on implementing the UN Guiding Principles (EU, 2012).
Bosnia Herzegovina is committed with regional integration in Europe,
having signed in 2008 the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related issues (EU
website, 2012). The country believes this kind of dialogue can effectively help to
disseminate good practices and lessons learned when dealing with business and
human rights.
Serbia and Croatia are engaged alongside their European partners in
assuring effective mechanisms to conciliate economic policy and human rights
principles (EU website, 2012).
Russian Federation is directing efforts on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations. It believes States are the primarily responsible for drawing
up standards for the observance of human rights by transnational corporations, but
international community should act together with them to tackle the issue (RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, 2011).
Large parts of Asia provide significant manufacturing platforms within
global supply chain. The race among governments to attract business in spite of the
social cost implied ends up fueling the non-observance of human rights law.
The People’s Republic of China believes that claims regarding how to
protect human rights without putting companies at competitive disadvantages should
be taken in consideration. Nevertheless, it is willing to cooperate on advancing issues
such as corporate responsibility to respect human rights in the supply. In the last years,
China has expanded its presence abroad, fostering economic growth and development
in poor nations in accordance with human rights trough a win-win strategy (CHINA,
2012).
Japan believes that two areas should be given a high priority: the
implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the
United Nations framework Protect, Respect and Remedy (JAPAN, 2011). When
dealing with violations committed by transnational corporations, cooperation should
be established with international organizations such as ILO, OECD and the World
Bank.
Cambodia and Vietnam are especially aware on the issue of human rights
abuses and land rights (HRW, 2012). India, for its turn, is particularly concerned with
violations committed with land acquisitions and mining (SARDANA, 2012). The
country is committed with incentivize corporate responsibility programmes to provide
employment and development.
Indonesia has recently directed efforts to bring into more regulated terms
economic foreign activities, especially concerning the environment (EJLT, 2012). It
hopes to foster similar initiatives from both developing and developed countries.
Turkey, alongside its regional partners, upholds national initiatives in
assuring business compliance with internally recognized good practices and standards.
The country has been working in assuring healthy safety conditions for workers
(TURKEY, 2006), both in national and international companies.
Pakistan has worked in a National Policy of Home-Base Policy, helping to
assure rights for workers in global supply chains (ILO, 2010). The country is
committed with the workers’ rights when dealing with economic activities.
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Afghanistan is concentrated in combating forced and child labor in the
country (AREU, 2009) hoping to regulate more their own economic activities. Due to
its commitment with more accountable transnational activities, it is a candidate
country for the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative.
Iraq is particularly worried with abuses committed in conflict zones. Iraqi
companies have recently received training for Global Compact Principles (UN, 2012)
and the government is looking forward to support more activities like these.
Azerbaijan stresses the improved transparency in extractive industries
operating in the country (EITI, 2012), thanks to government actions on regulating
these operations.
Australia acknowledges the opportunities and challenges brought by
globalization (AUSTRALIA, 2001). Nevertheless, the country is committed with
protecting, respecting and remedying a framework on human rights and transnational
companies.
African countries have emphasized the links between development, security
and successful human rights protection and promotion, stressing the importance of the
role of business in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2006). One of
the major difficulties in assuring better practices for companies are the deficit of tools
for human rights impact assessments, as well as the lack of African States capacity to
regulate them.
South Africa is mainly concerned with violations committed during armed
conflicts and how to prevent them (UN, 2010).
Nigeria acknowledges the importance that transnational corporations have
for African countries development. The debate on regulating them should be done
considering the needs for more t ransparency, diversified economic growt h,
and improved fiscal management in t he region (CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK, 2012). The government is regulat ing pet roleum act ivit ies
in t he area.
Sudan is engaged in assuring respect for internationally recognized good
practices when dealing with transnational corporations, particularly regarding property
rights, food security and the environment. It has signed over the last years many
memorandums of understanding with investors and organizations in order to advance
corporate social responsibility in the country (BUSINESS&HUMAN RIGHTS, 2012).
The Democratic Republic of Congo is engaged in assuring certified origins
of products (GARREL; MITCHELL, 2009). It believes internationally community
should support this kind of initiative; otherwise it will be sustaining human rights
abuses.
1) How can international community better apply international human rights
norms to TNCs?
2) How can TNCs be held accountable for violations of international law and
international human rights norms?
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3) Considering there a corporate criminal liability approach, which theory
would better fit today’s international community’s needs: identification or
imputation?
4) Considering the mechanisms to deal with TNCs’ respect for international
human rights norms available today, what are their flaws? How can they be
remedied?
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Chapter 3
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
INTRODUCTION
The International Law Commission (ILC) was created in 1947 by the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 174 as a means of fulfilling the General
Assembly’s objective, stated in Article 13, paragraph 1.a, of the UN Charter, of
“encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification”.
Through, respectively, the preparation of draft conventions on matters that do not
possess regulation in international law and the more accurate formulation and
systematization of rules of international law in areas where there is significant State
practice, precedent and doctrine, the Commission seeks to attain its main objects –
that of developing international law and that of codifying it.
According to its Statute, the Commission is competent to analyze matters not
only in the field of public international law (though most of its activity has been
concentrated in this area) but also in that of private and international criminal law. The
main objective of the work of the ILC is to prepare a draft convention, however two
other possibilities are contemplated by the Statute: the simple publication of its report
or a resolution of the General Assembly taking note of or adopting the report (ILC
Statute, Article 23, paragraph 1).
The ILC is composed of 34 members, which “shall be persons of recognized
competence in international law” (ILC Statute, Article 2, paragraph 1). Candidates are
nominated by the Governments of Member States and are elected by the UN General
Assembly (ILC Statute, Article 3). Eligibility for membership is not restricted to
nationals of UN Member States, however no national of non-UN Member States has
ever been elected. Similarly to the judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the members of the Commission sit in their individual capacity, not representing the
interests of their respective governments. Nonetheless, two nationals of the same State
cannot be members of the ILC at the same time.
The Commission’s annual session is held in Geneva, Switzerland, for a
period of ten to twelve weeks, as approved by the General Assembly.
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TOPIC A: Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
Fernanda Graeff Machry
and André da Rocha Ferreira
The practice of granting immunity to certain persons for their actions on
behalf of a State dates back to cultural habits of the Ancient Greece, where
messengers, called heralds, and ambassadors enjoyed immunity, in order to enable the
establishment of a mutual dialogue between the cities during peace or wartime
(LANNI, 2008).
In international law, the principle that a State enjoys immunity from a foreign
State’s domestic courts is usually said to derive from the maxim par in parem non
habet imperium, however its origin is hard to discern. The topic of personal immunity
of the sovereigns themselves was little discussed among classical international law
writers, such as Hugo Grotius (SINCLAIR, 1980).
The judgment delivered by U.S. Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon case, in 1812, is usually referred to as the first judicial
expression of the doctrine of absolute immunity of the sovereign. According to his
reasoning, due to the equality and independence of sovereigns, it was improper for a
State to subject a foreign sovereign to its territorial jurisdiction (HARRIS, 2010).
The judgments of English courts in some mid-nineteenth century cases,
however, show that there was uncertainty as to the extent of a sovereign’s immunity
from jurisdiction. However, this uncertainty crystallized, in the beginning of the
twentieth century, into an acceptance of the doctrine of absolute immunity
(SINCLAIR, 1980).
Belgium, on the other hand, since the mid-nineteenth century, adopted the
restrictive immunity theory, distinguishing iure imperii acts and iure gestionis acts. In
the famous 1903 case of S.A. des Chemins de Fer liégeois-luxembourgeois c. l´État
néerlandais, the Belgian Cour de Cassation ruled that a foreign State could be sued
before Belgian courts, just like any private individual, when the proceedings related
only to a private law right (SINCLAIR, 1980).
Presently, the dissemination of the human rights doctrine and the wide
aversion of the international community to massive violations of those rights have
been stimulating the debate about narrowing the jurisdiction of such immunity. In
some documents, this principle is already present, such as in the Principles of
International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, in which, in its
Principle III, there is a clear limitation to the Immunity of Head of State1.
Furthermore, many cases have recently set human rights violations and
immunity of Heads of State on different sides. In the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) case, the International Court of
1 “The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international
law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from
responsibility under international law.” Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950.
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Justice developed a solid basis to the debate on the issue (CASSESE, 2002). The
judgment of the Court elucidates many points on the topic of immunities, by stating
that there is no evidence of a customary rule derogating the immunity of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs when they are accused of international crimes (ICJ, 2002).
The decision, as a matter of fact, provided the idea that high-ranking State
officials in the exercise of their functions shall be granted immunity from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts. Another similar case is the Ghaddafi case before the
French Cour de Cassation. Similarly to the previous case, the decision focuses on the
idea that the Head of State was exercising his function in the time of the charges, so he
had immunity from criminal jurisdiction (ZAPPALÀ, 2001).
Nevertheless, the idea of immunity of Heads of State has been narrowed by
municipal courts in many cases (BROWLIE, 2008). Perhaps the most prominent
example is the Pinochet case, in which the UK House of Lords argued that some
international crimes have the power to lay off the immunity of Heads of State. 2 It is
worthy to highlight, however, that the House of Lords was dealing with a former Head
of State, thus his arrest would not affect inter-State relations.
2.1. Introduction
At its 58th session, in 2006, the International Law Commission decided to
include the topic of immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction in its
programme of work, appointing Mr. Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin as Special
Rapporteur (ILC, 2007). Until the present day, three reports were submitted to the
Commission by the Special Rapporteur, as well as a Memorandum by the Secretariat.
2.2. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction and immunity are different concepts, independent from each
other (KOLODKIN, 2008). However, when considering the topic of immunity, it is
fundamental to understand the meaning of jurisdiction and its relation with immunity.
Shaw (2003, p. 572) describes jurisdiction as “the power of the state to affect
people, property and circumstances”, which “reflects the basic principles of state
sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs”. It can also be
described as the authority or competence of a State (BOWETT, 1982). According to
Brownlie (2008), jurisdiction is primarily territorial, meaning that it is usually
exercised with respect to facts occurred in the territory of the State exercising its
jurisdiction.
2 “As is well known, General Pinochet entered the United Kingdom in September 1997. Just
before his return to Chile, after undertaking surgery in London, he was arrested on the basis of
two provisional arrest warrants issued by UK magistrates, at the request of Spanish courts,
pursuant to the European Convention on Extradition. General Pinochet’s counsel immediately
moved to have the two arrest warrants quashed by the High Court.” (BIANCHI, 1999, p. 239).
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2.2.1. Types of jurisdiction
A State’s jurisdiction can be exercised by its legislative, judicial and
executive powers, in what we call, respectively, prescriptive, adjudicative and
executive jurisdiction (KOLODKIN, 2008).
Prescriptive jurisdiction concerns the law-making powers of the State,
consisting, basically, in the promulgation of laws by government authorities.
Adjudicative jurisdiction consists of the judicial activity, mainly in the consideration
of cases. Finally, executive jurisdiction concerns actions taken by the executive
authorities of the State in the enforcement of its laws (KOLODKIN, 2008). The
Special Rapporteur on the jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, S.
Sucharitkul (1980), included in his definition of jurisdiction 3 only its judicial and
executive aspect.
Furthermore, jurisdiction can be divided into civil, administrative and
criminal jurisdiction, depending on the substance of the laws and acts concerned
(KOLODKIN, 2008). For the purposes of the Commission’s work, the focus should
be on criminal jurisdiction.
2.2.2. Criminal jurisdiction
Criminal jurisdiction, according to Kolodkin (2008, para. 48), “involves the
adoption of laws and other orders that criminalize the acts of individuals and establish
and enforce their responsibility for those acts, and the activity of government bodies in
implementing the laws and orders”. This type of jurisdiction can be established on
various grounds: territoriality, active personality, passive personality, protection and
universality, the last four consisting in different basis on which extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction may be established.
2.2.2.1. Territorial criminal jurisdiction
As aforementioned, jurisdiction is primarily territorial, meaning that a State
will exercise jurisdiction over acts—in the case of criminal jurisdiction, offences—
committed in its territory. This is the most widely accepted legal ground for the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction. That is because, on one hand, it affirms the territorial
sovereignty of the State and, on the other hand, it is easier to collect evidence in the
territory where the crime has been committed. The Israeli Supreme Court, in the
Eichmann decision, considered the territorial State as the forum conveniens, i.e. the
adequate place to trial the offender (CASSESE, 2005).
3“Article 3. Interpretative provisions.1. In the context of the present articles, unless otherwise
provided, (…) (b) the expression ‘jurisdiction’, as defined in article 2, paragraph 1 (g), (…)
includes: (i) the power to adjudicate, (ii) the power to determine questions of law and of fact,
(iii) the power to administer justice and to take appropriate measures at all stages of legal
proceedings, and (iv) such other administrative and executive powers as are normally exercised
by the judicial or administrative and police authorities of the territorial State.”
(SUCHARITKUL, 1980, p. 206).
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2.2.2.2. Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: legal grounds
Nonetheless, criminal jurisdiction can also be exercised extraterritorially.
When a State extends its jurisdiction beyond its borders, it does so on the basis of one
or more of the following principles: active personality, passive personality4, protective
or universal. The first two are sometimes referred to as “personal jurisdiction”. It
applies to cases in which the act is committed abroad by a national of the State
exercising jurisdiction and is criminal under its law (active personality principle) and
when such a criminal act committed abroad injures one of its nationals (passive
personality principle) (KOLODKIN, 2008). Both of these principles are generally
accepted as grounds for the establishment of criminal jurisdiction. The protective
principle allows the State to exercise jurisdiction over offences committed by nonnationals when such an act is deemed to threat a fundamental national interest
(O’KEEFE, 2004).
Finally, when there is no other jurisdictional nexus, jurisdiction may be
claimed on the basis of the universal principle (O’KEEFE, 2004), usually when
international crimes are concerned. The rationale for universal jurisdiction is twofold:
on one hand, the gravity and magnitude of the crimes concerned is such that it allows
for universal prosecution and repression; on the other hand, the exercise of universal
jurisdiction does not violate the principle of sovereign equality of States, nor does it
amount to undue interference in the domestic affairs of the State where the crime has
been committed (CASSESE, 2005).
It is essential to point out that extraterritorial jurisdiction applies only to
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction (which sometimes are referred to in one
form, as prescriptive jurisdiction, comprising both of them), and not to enforcement
actions. A State is not allowed to enforce its laws in the territory of another State,
unless the latter gives its consent (O’KEEFE, 2004).
2.2.2.3. Civil and criminal jurisdiction: distinguishing features
Criminal jurisdiction must be distinguished from civil jurisdiction. Whereas
the latter may be exercised in relation to both individuals and States, the former can
only be exercised over individuals (KOLODKIN, 2008). However, it must be
acknowledged that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over an individual can, in
some situations, affect the interests of the State of which that person is a national—for
instance, when the individual concerned is a State official. As it was noted in the 2005
Adamov decision by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, under international law, “a domestic
criminal justice system should avoid intervening in the affairs of other states”.
Another different feature of criminal jurisdiction in relation to civil
jurisdiction is that it includes a pre-trial phase. This means that the criminal procedure
may begin a long time before the actual trial, with the preliminary investigations. This
4These are sometimes referred to as “active nationality” and “passive nationality” principles
(see CASSESE, 2005). Our choice of terms was based on the wording used by the Special
Rapporteur on the topic, Mr. Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, on its reports submitted to the
International Law Commission.
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is a key notion in the consideration of the topic at hand, since the question of
immunity may arise already in the pre-trial phase (KOLODKIN, 2008).
2.3. Immunity of State officials
2.3.1 Definition of immunity
According to Sinclair (1980, p. 198), “[i]mmunity, expressed in the maxim
par in parem non habet imperium, is in principle concerned with the status of
sovereign equality enjoyed by all independent States”. He goes on to define immunity
as “the correlative of a duty imposed upon the territorial State to refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction over a foreign State” (SINCLAIR, 1980, p. 199).
A State, however, cannot act but through natural persons, who do not
ordinarily enjoy immunity from legal process and have, in many occasions, been sued
by their actions on behalf of the State (TOMONORI, 2000). It is fundamental, thus, to
establish to what extent State immunity benefits a State’s officials.
2.3.2. Immunity ratione materiae
Two types of immunity to which State officials are entitled to are usually
distinguished: immunity ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae.
Immunity ratione materiae, also called “functional immunity”, covers acts
performed by State officials in an official capacity (CASSESE, 2005). Acts performed
in a private capacity are not included in this definition, meaning that such acts, even if
performed by officials of a State, may be subjected to foreign criminal jurisdiction.
2.3.2.1. Who is entitled to immunity ratione materiae?
There is a general agreement in the sense that all State officials are entitled to
immunity with respect to acts performed in their official capacity. Here, the status of
the official does not matter, since immunity is attached to the act and not to the
person. It applies to all those who have acted on behalf of the State in their official
capacity. As a consequence, immunity ratione materiae is enjoyed by both former and
serving State officials, and also by persons or bodies which, in spite of not being State
officials, have acted on behalf of the State (AKANDE & SHAH, 2011).
The rationale for functional immunity is in the sense that acts performed in
that capacity are attributable to the State itself, as it was agreed by both parties in the
ICJ case Certain Questions of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti
v. France) (ICJ, 2008). Furthermore, the ICJ stated, in its Advisory Opinion in
Differences Relating to the Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of
the Commission of Human Rights, that it is a rule of customary international law that
the conduct of any State organ must be considered as an act of that State (ICJ, 1999).
Therefore, the State stands behind the immunity of its officials, which derives from
the immunity of the State itself (KOLODKIN, 2010).
2.3.2.2. When is an act considered “official”?
In light of the aforementioned, we must establish when the conduct of a State
official will be regarded as performed in an official capacity. To cast light on this
subject, we refer to the commentary to article 4 of the draft articles on State
responsibility, included in the International Law Commission’s report on the work of
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its fifty-third session. According to the Commentary (2001, para. 13), “[w]here such a
person acts in an apparently official capacity, or under the colour of authority, the
actions in question will be attributable to the State”, regardless of the fact that the
person may have ulterior motives or may be abusing public power. The judgment of
whether a specific conduct may be regarded as official or private will depend on the
circumstances of each case (ILC, 2001).
2.3.2.2.1. Ultra vires acts
Immunity, as said, is ultimately a right of the State, rather than of the
individual serving it. In this context, the question arises of whether conduct which
exceeds or contravenes the instructions given by the State should be covered by
immunity.
Article 7 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that “[t]he conduct of an organ of a State or of
a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall
be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity
acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions”. From
that it is possible to conclude that functional immunity covers official acts, even when
exercised ultra vires (KOLODKIN, 2008).
2.3.2.3. Temporal scope of immunity ratione materiae
Another issue to be considered by the members of the Commission is
regarding the temporal scope of functional immunity. As it is attached to the act on
behalf of the State and not to the status of the State official, immunity ratione
materiae does not cease after he has left the post. Therefore, a State official must not
be criminally prosecuted by an act performed in official capacity, even if he no longer
holds that status (CASSESE, 2005).
With respect to acts performed before the State agent has taken its post, they
are usually not covered by immunity, because they were not performed in an official
capacity. The only exception would be in the case that the person, even if not holding
an official status, performed an act on behalf of the State.
2.3.3. Immunity ratione personae
Immunity ratione personae or “personal immunity” includes not only official
acts, but also acts performed in private capacity. It is conferred on certain State
officials, by both treaties and customary international law (AKANDE & SHAH,
2011).
In his vote in Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that
the “immunity enjoyed by a head of state in power and an ambassador in post is a
complete immunity attaching to the person of the head of state or ambassador and
rendering him immune from all actions or prosecutions whether or not they relate to
matters done for the benefit of the state”5.
5 Available at http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs5/2000AC147.html.
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The rationale for personal immunity is threefold. Firstly, it is based on a
functional necessity, meaning that immunity is needed to ensure the performance of
the State official’s functions. This was the main argument utilized by the ICJ in Arrest
Warrant, as it will be seen in the following sections. Secondly, it may be justified by
the representative character of these State officials, especially in the case of Heads of
State. Thirdly, it relies upon the principle of non-intervention in foreign States’
internal affairs (AKANDE & SHAH, 2001; CASSESE, 2002).
2.3.3.1. Who is entitled to immunity ratione personae?
2.3.3.1.1. Heads of State and Heads of Government
Traditionally, personal immunity is granted to the Head of State, because he
is considered to personify the State, thus “the immunity accorded to him or her is in
part due to the respect for the dignity of the office and of the state which that office
represents” (AKANDE & SHAH, 2011, p. 824). Furthermore, the immunity enjoyed
by Heads of State is necessary to the performance of the functions inherent to the post.
This immunity was affirmed by the UK House of Lords in its judgment in the Ex parte
Pinochet case, as well as by the French Cour de Cassation in the Ghadaffi case
(SHAW, 2003).
In addition, the immunity ratione personae to which Heads of State are
entitled to can be justified on the basis of the principle of non-intervention, which
derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States (ICJ, 1986), undoubtedly
one of the cornerstones of international law. To arrest the leader of a State would have
the effect of changing the government of that country, constituting a “particularly
extreme form of interference with the autonomy and independence of that foreign
state” (AKANDE & SHAH, 2011, p. 824).
Personal immunity is extended to the Head of Government, who is, in
numerous States, the country’s effective leader (AKANDE & SHAH, 2011), as it was
recognized in a number of cases6. The immunity of both the Head of State and the
Head of Government was acknowledged by the International Court of Justice in its
decision in the Arrest Warrant case.
2.3.3.1.2. Ministers of Foreign Affairs
The main source to assert the immunity of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is the
ICJ judgment in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium). The case concerns an arrest warrant issued by a Belgian court against the
then serving Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Mr. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, for the alleged commitment of crimes against
humanity and war crimes in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The DRC
claimed that, by issuing the arrest warrant, Belgium disrespected the immunity owed
to Mr. Yerodia because of his post. Belgium, in its turn, claimed that immunity did not
cover acts classified as international crimes (ICJ, 2002).
6 See BELGIAN COURT OF CASSATION. H.S.A. et al. v. S.A. et al., Decision related to the
indictment of Ariel Sharon, Amos Yaron and others, 12 February 2003; UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Saltan and others v. Reagan and others, 23
December 1988.
86
The Court ruled against Belgium, stating that it had violated the rule of
immunity by the issuing of the arrest warrant. According to the Court’s reasoning,
Ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy full personal immunity, thus they cannot be
prosecuted in foreign courts for acts either official or private, for as long as they are in
office. The Court based its conclusion on the functional justification of immunity
(CASSESE, 2002), by stating that “[i]n the performance of these functions, he or she
[the Minister of Foreign Affairs] is frequently required to travel internationally, and
thus must be in a position freely to do so whenever the need should arise” (ICJ, 2002,
para. 53).
The outcome of this case generated criticism among some scholars.
According to Akande & Shah (2011), the Court, by granting it to a Minister of
Foreign Affairs, excessively broadened the scope of personal immunity. That is
because, in their view, such immunity cannot be justified only on the grounds of
functional necessity, but must also be attached to an element of significance—such as
in the case of the Head of State, who symbolizes the sovereign State—and to the
principle of non-intervention. According to this view, the deposition of a Minister of
Foreign Affairs because of an arrest by a foreign State would not generate a change of
government, as would be the case if the Head of State was arrested, not amounting to
undue interference.
2.3.3.1.3. Other high-ranking State officials
In its judgment in Arrest Warrant, the ICJ made reference to the category of
persons enjoying immunity ratione personae as “holders of high-ranking office in a
State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign
Affairs” (ICJ, 2002, para. 51). This formulation made clear that the list of three was
not exhaustive, however it is not clear who are the other officials entitled to personal
immunity. To establish that, it is necessary to find out the criteria to be met by these
officials in order to enjoy this kind of immunity. These may be, for instance, the
importance of the functions carried out by high-ranking officials for ensuring the
State’s sovereignty and participation in international relations (KOLODKIN, 2008).
2.3.3.2. Temporal scope of immunity ratione personae
Differently from functional immunity, immunity ratione personae is attached
to the personal status of the official, and not to specific acts (AKANDE & SHAH,
2011). Consequently, while serving, his immunity covers not only official, but also
private acts, and extends also to acts performed before the entry into office
(CASSESE, 2005).
However, as previously stated, immunity is ultimately owed to the State he
serves and not to the person of the official. Hence, it ceases at the moment the official
leaves office. From that moment on, he can be prosecuted and tried for acts performed
in a private capacity while in office, although acts carried out in an official capacity
remain covered by the functional immunity enjoyed by all State officials (VAN
ALEBEEK, 2006; KOLODKIN, 2008).
This was affirmed by the UK House of Lords in the Ex Parte Pinochet case,
in a landmark decision on the matter of immunity of former Heads of State. The case
concerned a request by Spain for the extradition of former Chilean president General
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Augusto Pinochet, to be prosecuted and tried by Spanish courts for torture and other
heinous crimes. The House of Lords ruled that former Heads of State are to accorded
immunity ratione materiae, i.e. only with respect to official acts.
2.3.4. Diplomatic and consular immunities
According to the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Kolodkin (2008, para. 98),
“[d]iplomatic agents, consular officials, members of special missions and
representatives of States in and to international organizations are State officials”. Due
to their special status, a whole system of diplomatic law was developed, and it is
embodied, for the most part, in the 1961 Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations,
the 1963 Vienna Convention of Consular Relations and the 1969 Convention on
Special Missions. Customary law is also an essential source, even if the 1961 and
1963 are considered to have crystallized customary rules on the subject—a result of
the work of the International Law Commission.
There are special rules governing the immunity from criminal jurisdiction of
diplomats and consular officials, which are laid out in the aforementioned
conventions. The importance of this immunity was stressed by the International Court
of Justice in its decision in the U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United
States v. Iran) case (DENZA, 2008).
As Wirth (2002, p. 883) notes, however, diplomats and consular agents,
being State officials, “are protected not only by diplomatic immunity, but also by state
immunity (ratione materiae)”. The same conclusion was reached by the Special
Rapporteur, according to whom “State officials who are diplomatic agents, consular
officials, members of special missions or representatives of Stares to international
organizations can be said to enjoy both the immunities common to all officials and the
special immunities granted by international law to these special categories of
officials” (KOLODKIN, 2008, para. 99)
The basis for diplomatic and consular immunities is the sovereign equality
and independence of States, as well as the State’s need to consult and negotiate with
each other. For the exercise of these functions, and due to their representative
character, diplomatic and consular agents are granted immunity from foreign States’
criminal jurisdiction. The rationale for diplomatic immunity and immunity of State
officials in general is, thus, the same (KOLODKIN, 2008; SHAW, 2003).
2.4. Exceptions to the rule of immunity
An exception to the rule of immunity is considered to be “a situation where,
as a general rule, an official enjoys immunity, but due to certain circumstances does
not have immunity” (KOLODKIN, 2010, para. 54). It is important to differentiate this
from a situation where there not an exception, but an absence of immunity—for
instance, when a low-ranking State official is not protected by immunity with respect
to private acts, we have an absence of immunity, and not an exception, because
normally he would not be protected by immunity ratione personae.
With the growing importance of the protection of human rights in
international law and relations, the question of immunity became crucial—how to
balance the need to establish individual accountability for gross violations of human
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rights with the principle of sovereign equality of States and the stability and
predictability which are essential to inter-State relations? In this context, some authors
began to advocate for exceptions to the general rule of immunity when the prosecution
and punishment of international crimes is at stake. Exceptions to the rule of immunity
may be based on various grounds7. In this section, we will outline some of them.
2.4.1.1. Can international crimes be regarded as official acts?
One of the most widespread justifications for an exception to immunity is
that “grave crimes under international law cannot be considered as acts performed in
an official capacity, and immunity ratione materiae does not therefore protect from
foreign criminal jurisdiction exercised in connection with such crimes” (KOLODKIN,
2010, para. 57).
This view was upheld by Lords Steyn and Nicholls of Birkenhead in the Ex
parte Pinochet (No. 1) case and by Lords Hutton and Phillips of Worth Matravers in
the Ex Parte Pinochet (No. 3) case. In the words of Lord Hutton, the alleged acts of
torture by former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet “cannot be regarded as
functions of a head of state under international law when international law expressly
prohibits torture as a measure which a state can employ in any circumstances
whatsoever and has made it an international crime”8. The same position was taken by
Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert in her dissenting opinion in the Arrest Warrant case9.
Critics of this view argue that the lawfulness of a State official’s acts is not a
requirement for the granting of immunity. Lord Goff took this view in Ex Parte
Pinochet (No. 3), by stating that “the fact that the head of state performs an act, other
that a private act, which is criminal, does not deprive it of its governmental character.
This is true of a serious crime, such as murder or torture, as it is of a lesser crime” 10.
Furthermore, the question of immunity should always be considered in the
preliminary stage of a case’s consideration. This means that, when immunity is
considered, it has not yet been established that the act was in fact committed or that it
was an illegal act. Therefore, to lift immunity before even considering the merits of
the case would be in conflict with the principle of presumption of innocence
(AKANDE & SHAH, 2011).
2.4.1.2. The normative hierarchy theory: is there a conflict with peremptory norms
(jus cogens)?
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a
peremptory norm of international law, or a norm of jus cogens, “is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
7 See KOLODKIN, Roman Anatolevich. Second report on immunity of State officials from
foreign criminal jurisdiction. Sixty-second session of the International Law Commission. UN
Doc. A/CN.4/631. Geneva, 2010, para. 56.
8 Available at: http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs5/2000AC147.html.
9 See INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Belgium v.
Senegal), Judgment, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, para. 36.
10 Available at: http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs5/2000AC147.html.
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which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character”. According to the same
article, norms which conflict with jus cogens norms are considered void.
Therefore, the rule of immunity would be superseded when opposed to a
peremptory norm, because the latter has a higher hierarchy. This view was supported
by Judge Al-Khasawneh in his dissenting opinion in Arrest Warrant. According to
him, “[t]he effective combating of grave crimes has arguably assumed a jus cogens
character reflecting recognition by the international community of the vital
community interests and values it seeks to protect and enhance. Therefore when this
hierarchically higher norm comes into conflict with the rules of immunity, it should
prevail” (ICJ, 2002, para. 7). The same position was taken by the Italian Supreme
Court in the Ferrini case (DE SENA; DE VITTOR, 2005).
However, the existence of such a conflict of norms is doubtful. That is
because immunity is regarded as a procedural rule, to be considered in the preliminary
stage of proceedings, whereas jus cogens norms are of a substantive nature. The norm
of immunity does not affect the criminalization of acts, nor does it exclude criminal
liability or even criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, being placed in different areas of
law, peremptory norms and immunity could hardly conflict with one another
(KOLODKIN, 2010).
2.4.1.3. Has a customary rule derogating immunity in relation to international crimes
arisen?
There are, also, authors who defend the existence of a customary norm lifting
the immunity of State officials accused of international crimes. According to Cassese
(2002), the International Court of Justice failed to recognize this customary rule in its
judgment in Arrest Warrant. He states that Article 7 of the Charter of the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal, as well as all subsequent treaties—such as the statutes
of other international criminal tribunals—“clearly intended to remove the substantial
defence based on the official status of the accused with regard both to incumbent and
former state agents” (CASSESE, 2002, p. 865).
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia upheld this
view in Prosecutor v. Blaskic, by saying that exceptions to the rule of immunity “arise
from the norms of international criminal law prohibiting war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide. Under these norms, those responsible for such crimes cannot
invoke immunity from national or international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated
such crimes while acting in their official capacity” (ICTY, 1997, para. 41).
2.5. Some procedural aspects
2.5.1. Who can invoke immunity?
As previously stated, immunity does not belong to the State official himself,
but to the State which he serves or served. Therefore, the invocation of immunity will
only have legal consequences when it is done by the State. An invocation by the
official himself would be significant from a legal perspective, since that person is only
a beneficiary of immunity owed to the State. This view is supported by the ICJ’s
judgment in the Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal
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Matters (Djibouti v. France), in which the Court placed the burden of invoking
immunity with the State (KOLODKIN, 2011).
2.5.2. Waiver of immunity
In its judgment in the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ (2002, para. 61) stated
that State officials “will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State
which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity”. This is
based on the idea that immunity belongs to the State and not to the official himself.
According to the Special Rapporteur (2011, para. 32), “[a] State’s consent to
the exercise of jurisdiction over it by another State is the essence of a waiver of
immunity”. The Secretariat, in its Memorandum (2008, para. 249), further stated that
“[t]he rationale underlying waiver of immunity—like the rationale for immunity
itself—is based on the sovereign equality of States and the principle of par in parem
non habet imperium”.
The possibility of waiving diplomatic and consular immunities was laid out
in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Article 45 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, respectively. According to these
provisions, it is the State who has the power to waive immunity and, in the view of the
Special Rapporteur (2011), this applies to all State officials’ immunities.
Furthermore, waiver of immunity with regard to criminal proceedings—
which are the object of the Commission’s work in the present topic—must always be
express, taking the form of either a unilateral statement or notification by the sending
State or of an international agreement concluded between the two States concerned
(KOLODKIN, 2011).
When considering the topic proposed, the ILC members are recommended to
bear in mind the following questions.
1) What are the requirements for a person to be considered a State official
who is entitled to immunity? To what point does the immunity to which a
State is entitled to extends to its officials?
2) Which State officials are entitled to immunity ratione personae? Is the
“threesome” (Head of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign
Affairs) an exhaustive list? If not, what would be the requirements for a
State official to be considered high-ranked?
3) To what type of immunity are State officials entitled to in relation to acts
performed before they entered into office? And after they leave it?
4) What kind of act is covered by immunity? What are the requirements for
an act to be considered official? Can ultra vires acts be considered official
acts? Can acts amounting to international crimes or violations of norms
considered as jus cogens be considered official acts covered by
immunity?
5) Are there exceptions to the rule of immunity, as, for instance, in the case
of violations of norms considered as jus cogens? Is this concept relevant
to the discussion of the proposed topic? Is there a conflict of norms
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6)
between the rules of immunity and peremptory norms of international law
(jus cogens), in the terms of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties?
Can immunity be lifted by the State of which the concerned person is an
official? Who has the legitimacy to waive immunity?
The answer for these and other question that may arise in the course of the
debates shall be found in norms of customary international law. It is the role of the
Commission to crystallize such norms, the existence of which shall be determined by
observing the existence of State practice and opinio juris.
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TOPIC B: Most-Favoured-Nation Clause
Mariana Bom and Jade Lopes
The most-favoured-nation (hereinafter MFN) clause is one of (if not the
most) basic rule in international commerce (OECD, 2004). According to this rule, a
country must give any other country a treatment at least as good as that given to the
country it favors the most (UNCTAD, 1999). That is, each State must extend the
benefits it gives to a particular country to all the others in the same conditions. To
better understand the role played by this clause in the present, it is important to
understand in what contexts it gained importance and how it evolved through time.
The origins of the widespread of the utilization of most-favoured-nation
clauses in treaties can be traced back to the treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation (FCN) in the Modern Age (OECD, 2004; ILC, 2008). The 1654 treaty
between Sweden and Great Britain is an example. This treaty aimed at providing to
the nationals of each State, when in the territory of the other country, the same
treatment granted to the other foreigners. The main objective of said treaty was to
ensure the economic freedom to the nationals of those States abroad. At that time, the
principle of equality of States had not yet been formulated, and would only appear
centuries later (ILC, 2008).
In the 19th century, FCN treaties and unilateral most-favoured-nation clauses
were used as an instrument of domination of the European States over more fragile
nations, mostly colonized or newly independent ones (VESEL, 2007). Examples of
this situation can be found in the history of most Latin American and Asian countries.
These unequal treaties, as they would later be called, helped perpetuate the condition
of economic dependence of these regions in relation to developed industrialized
countries (VESEL, 2007).
In the years following the Second World War, the nations that were involved
in the conflict engaged in an effort of prevention of similar wars in the future, through
the normalization and improvement of the relations between them. In this process,
some institutions were created—one of which was the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) - whose main objective was the liberalization of world trade. One
of the main instruments by means of which liberalization would be achieved was the
principle of non-discrimination in world commerce (WTO, 1947), and, in this
framework, non-conditional and multilateral most-favoured-nation treatment became
one of the cornerstones of the GATT system (ILC, 2008).
Developing countries, however, were still in an unfavorable situation given
their economic conditions. As a consequence, for many years, they pressed for special
treatment under GATT and attempted, through the United Nations and related
organizations, to create new rules to embody their concept of how world economy
should operate (JACKSON, 2002). In the 1970s, the GATT created the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP), a permanent exemption to the most-favoured-nation
clause. Using this measure, developed countries could create systems of benefits
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(lower duties on imports, for example) to developing countries products, as long as
they were generalized, non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal (JACKSON, 2002).
Recently, most-favoured-nation standard has been incorporated in the vast
majority of international investment agreements, figuring among the grounds for a
growing number of dispute settlement cases in this area of law (ACCONCI, 2008).
The application of the MFN treatment in this case, however, is different and still
somewhat unclear (DOLZER; SCHREUER, 2008).
Ever since the widespread of MFN clauses in international investment law,
many issues regarding its interpretation and scope have arisen. The straightforward,
almost mechanical application of MFN clauses in international trade law has been
found to be inadequate to the needs of international investment arbitrations
(DOLZER; SCHREUER, 2008). After all, such mechanical application of MFN
could, in the context of investment agreements, lead to treaty shopping, as states
might be tempted to, through MFN clauses, replace the negotiated content of their
basis treaty with provisions negotiated by the host state with third parties.
Since the Maffezini case was arbitrated by the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputed (ICSID) in 2000, the issue of the scope of mostfavoured-nation clauses has engaged the interest of scholars (ACCONCI, 2008). The
uncertainty about which approach is most compatible with the field of investment
law's reality is reflected in the inconsistency of the interpretations made by investment
tribunals on the scope of MFN in investment agreements. While some precedents,
such as the Maffezini case, advocate the applicability of MFN to dispute settlement
clauses, others consider that MFN's scope is solely in regards to clauses with
substantive content in the treaty. In this section, a comprehensive analysis of the
modern issues concerning MFN clauses shall be provided, as well as some basic
concepts and definitions regarding the theme.
2.1 Definition of most-favoured-nation clause
According to the ILC's Draft Articles on most-favoured-nation clauses,11 the
most-favoured-nation clause consists in a treaty provision by means of which a certain
standard of treatment is granted to a beneficiary. Article 5 of the Draft Articles
provides a definition for the treatment thereby accorded:
Most-favoured-nation treatment is treatment accorded by the
granting State to the beneficiary State, or to persons or things in
a determined relationship with that State, not less favourable
than treatment extended by the granting State to a third State or
to persons or things in the same relationship with that third State
(ILC DRAFT ARTICLES, art. 5).
11 The ILC Draft Articles on most-favoured-nation clauses were never ratified and are, thus, a
non-binding, albeit comprehensive of the rules governing MFN, instrument of international law.
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Alongside the rule of national treatment, most-favoured-nation is one of the
typical non-discriminatory treatment standard generally included in all international
treaties in the area of international economic law (ACCONCI, 2008). As put GriersonWeiler and Laird (2008), such standards of treatment are not absolute, but rather of a
comparative nature. That is, in the case of application of a most-favoured-nation
clause, the claimant must be able to undergo a comparative test by identifying a
comparable counterpart from a third state that is receiving more favourable treatment
from the granting state. In other words, the benchmark in most-favoured-nation
treatment is the rights granted by the host state to a third state, or its nationals, whilst
national treatment qualifies one for the treatment given by the host state to its
nationals (ACCONCI, 2008).
The International Court of Justice has affirmed, in its ruling in the case Rights
of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, that a MFN clause's
objective is the establishment and maintenance at all times “of fundamental equality
without discrimination among all of the countries concerned.” Largely employed in
the areas of trade, investment and intellectual property, this provision seeks to prevent
discrimination against foreigner investors on the grounds of their nationality
(UNCTAD, 1999), as well as to ensure uniformity and equality in the treatment
bestowed by the host state to its foreign investors—thus balancing the competition in
that state's domestic market (ACCONCI, 2008; VESEL, 2007).
However, in order for MFN treatment to be successfully invoked, the
ejusdem generis principle requirement must be respected (OECD, 2004; ACCONCI,
2008). This principle, which establishes that MFN treatment is only due “in like
cases”, is further elucidated by the ILC (1978) in Articles 9 and 10 of its Draft
Articles on most-favoured-nation clauses, which provide that the rights acquired by
means of a MFN clause are “only those which fall within the limits of the subjectmatter of the clause”. In other words, the treaty containing the MFN clause—the basic
treaty—must concern the same subject as the treaty providing more favourable
treatment—the third party treaty. That is why, for example, a commercial treaty
containing an MFN clause between states A and B would not entitle A to require that
B grants it the same treatment it accorded C in the matter of extradition of criminals.
2.2 Types of MFN clauses
It has been said that the problem encountered in delimiting the scope of mostfavoured-nation clauses is that there is no such thing as one most-favoured-clause per
se, but there are rather as many such clauses as there are treaties that contain them
(ANZILOTTI, 2008). Therefore, the scope determined by the characteristics of each
MFN clause might vary from treaty to treaty. There are some traits that allow the
classification of MFN clauses according to their characteristics, namely being
conditional or unconditional, reciprocal or non-reciprocal and limited or unlimited.
In regards to reciprocality, early forms MFN clauses were mostly formulated
as unilateral clauses by means of which only one of the parties was granted MFN
treatment. These provisions usually benefited powerful European states at the expense
of their non-European counterparts, which received no reciprocal benefit (VESEL,
2007). Nowadays, the majority of clauses are reciprocal—that is, entitle both parties
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to the treaty to MFN treatment—, for unilateral clauses were found to be incompatible
with the principle of sovereign equality of states (VESEL, 2007).
Conditional MFN clauses were created as a response to the "free rider" issue
(UNCTAD, 1999). Since MFN treatment obliges a contracting party to extend to its
counterpart all benefits that it grants to any other country in any future treaty, such
clauses were thought to imbalance the contractual balance of the basic treaty
containing the MFN clause, because the contracting party might be able to claim for
itself additional rights to substitute those previously negotiated in the treaty (RADI,
2007)—becoming, thus, a “free rider”. Based on the principle of reciprocity,
conditional MFN were thought to contour that possibility by requiring that the country
benefiting from the operation of the MFN clause renegotiate the original agreement in
order to correct the potential contractual imbalance. In other words, “[t]he idea was
that each privilege or concession granted by, for example, the United States was
bargained for and paid for with a corresponding concession on the other side.”
(VESEL, 2007, p. 3). However, as this model, well-suited to the objectives of a
protectionist commercial policy, deprived MFN clauses of automatic effect and,
indeed, rendered them mostly ineffective, conditional MFN clauses were substituted
by unconditional ones as the general preference.
In their applicability—which may be either ratione mateirae, ratione
personae or ratione temporis— MFN clauses may be classified as limited or unlimited
(ACCONCI, 2008; UNCTAD, 1999). That is, MFN's scope of application may either
include the entire content of the treaty or be limited to only some of the matters
included in it (OECD, 2004).
2.3 Most-favoured nation in trade and investment law
Though the fields of international trade and international investment are
deeply connected—for one is the international flow of goods and services and the
other that of capital and other factors of production—international law handles both
topics differently and separately (DIMASCIO; PAUWELYN, 2008).
Despite their common origin in the protection and treatment of aliens
(DISMASCIO; PAUWELYN, 2008), today the regimes of international trade and
international investment differ in several points. The first one is that international
trade has been multilaterally regulated since 1947—with the signature of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is today the core of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) system. International investment law, on the other hand, is
governed by a web of almost 2600 separate bilateral investment treaties (BIT)
(DISMASCIO; PAUWELYN, 2008). Secondly, whilst trade, through the WTO
system, is addressed by a plethora of detailed rules, international investment law relies
only on a few principles, most of which derive from custom (DISMASCIO;
PAUWELYN, 2008). Thirdly, while the enforcement of trade agreements happens
exclusively between states; in the case of investment treaties, private companies
possess standing to request monetary compensation from host countries
(DISMASCIO; PAUWELYN, 2008). Furthermore, in international trade MFN is
applicable only to measures at the border—mostly tariffs—whereas in international
investment MFN is applied generally after the investment enters the territory (though
there are some MFN clauses that operate also in regards to treatment received in the
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pre-entry stage) (UNCTAD, 1999). Finally, these areas differ on their objectives
which concern, for trade, the liberalization of trade flows and, in the case of
investments, the protection and promotion of foreign investment (DISMASCIO;
PAUWELYN, 2008).
2.3.1 Most-favoured-nation in international trade
Historically one of the cornerstones of international trade policies, the mostfavoured-nation clause is set at the very core of the WTO system, which is the
organization currently regulating international trade. Indeed, Article I of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contains the provision:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed
on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed
on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports,
and with respect to the method of levying such duties and
charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties (WTO, 1947, Art.
I).
This obligation to accord MFN treatment “immediately and unconditionally”
at the border to goods of other GATT members, alongside the provision that
prescribes the obligation of national treatment, is the core of the non-discrimination
principle in the WTO system (ILC, 2008).
2.3.2 Most-favoured-nation clauses in the context of investment agreements
The most-favoured-nation clauses, a provision typical of the area of
international trade law, have been incorporated into the majority of investment
agreements. According to Acconci (2008), a possible explanation for this phenomenon
has to do with the fact that foreign investment has grown in importance to the process
of economic integration, as well as the growing need to provide predictability,
transparency and coherence in the legal framework regulating international
investments. However, as demonstrated above, international investment law differs
greatly from international trade law. Some particularities of international investment
law have presented some difficulties in the application of the MFN
According to Acconci (2008), two main types of treaties may be identified in
modern international investment law: multilateral agreements, which deal with the
liberalization and promotion of trade and investment, (such as NAFTA or
MERCOSUR); and bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which focus on the treatment
and protection of private foreign investments. However, differently from the situation
in international trade, in international investment law there is no broad multilateral
agreement and, therefore, “rather than convergence toward a single MFN clause
applicable to all, analogous to GATT Article 1, international investment law presents
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a multiplicity of differently worded MFN clauses embedded in different treaties, with
the result that the MFN clauses are subject to a broad range of interpretations”
(VESEL, 2007, p.1).
Regarding multilateral instruments, the NAFTA agreement contains an MFN
clause under Article 1103, which prescribes NAFTA contracting parties shall accord,
in like circumstances, most-favoured-nation treatment to both “investors of another
Party” and “investments of investors of another Party” in what concerns “the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
other disposition of investments.” This clause, which covers both the pre-entry and
post-entry stage of an investment,12 can be construed to be unconditional, reciprocal
and indeterminate (ACCONCI, 2008).
An unconditional, reciprocal and indeterminate MFN clause may also be
found in MERCOSUR’s Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments within MERCOSUR. However, this clause does not provide
for the protection of investments in the pre-entry.
In BITs, on the other hand, MFN clauses are usually reciprocal, since they
prescribe a mutual obligation; unconditional, since they automatically and
immediately applicable to investments of the Contracting Parties, without the
requirement of compensation or renegotiation; and unlimited, since they generally
contain no restriction ratione materiae, ratione personae or ratione temporis
(ACCONCI, 2008; UNCTAD, 2004). Except for American and some Canadian BITs,
this type of agreements usually do not grant MFN for the pre-entry phase, since “BITs
per se do not grant a general right to make foreign investments” (ACCONCI, 2008, p.
370).
Indeed, according to Acconci (2008) a typical MFN clause for BITs goes as
follows:
Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments in its
territory owned of controlled by nationals or companies of the
other Contracting Party to treatment less favourable than it
accords, in equivalent circumstances, to nationals or companies
of any third State (BARBADOS, GERMANY, 1994, Art. 3.1).
Though this model might be typical, a wide arrange of different constructions
and wording have been incorporated in the MFN clauses contained in each of the
almost 2600 BITs currently in existence. To illustrate this matter, while recent United
State’s BITs include a footnote precluding the application of MFN treatment to
dispute settlement mechanisms and the United Kingdom’s model BIT expressly
provide for the application of MFN to dispute settlement, most BITs include no
specific turn of phrase regarding the application or not of MFN to dispute settlement
12 The vast majority of investment agreements do not cover the admission phase of an
investment, prescribing the obligation to accord MFN treatment only once the investment is
indeed made. This model of MFN clause is known as post-entry, since the protection of the
clause will only operate after the entrance of the investment in the host country's territory.
Though a minority in international practice, the pre- and post-entry model of MFN clauses
extends MFN treatment to both the pre-establishment and the post-entry phases of an
investment (UNCTAD, 1999).
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provisions. The centrality of dispute settlement provisions to international investment
law transforms this into a most urgent issue. As highlights Vesel (2007), “the
relationships between these varied MFN clauses and dispute settlement mechanisms
have presented a unique set of problems”, since the plethora of provisions concerning
when, how and in which forum a investor is able to bring claims against the host state
appears to be in contradiction to the principle of MFN, which provides for the equal
treatment of all investors.
Indeed, on such matter, that is, in determining whether MFN clauses allow an
investor to claim dispute settlement provisions of third party's treaties, investment
tribunals have been highly divergent.
2.4 Previous Interpretations by International Tribunals
2.4.1 General Rules of Treaty Interpretation
As MFN clauses are treaty provisions, one must look first to the rules of
treaty interpretation in order to construe its meaning and scope (VESEL, 2007). The
general rule for the interpretation of treaties is laid down in Article 31 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which establishes that “a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” As the
ILC itself clarified in 1966 in its report to the General Assembly, this rule
“emphasizes the primacy of the text as the basis for the interpretation of a treaty, while
at the same time giving a certain place to extrinsic evidence of the intentions of the
parties and to the objects and purposes of the treaty as means of interpretation.”
Supplementary means of interpretation are provided for in Article 32 of the
mentioned Convention, and include reference to the travaux préparatoires—that is,
documents recording the negotiations occurred before the drafting of a treaty. As
Dolzer and Schreuer (2008) mention, the utilization of travaux préparatoires is not
common, but has been known to happen, namely in the Plama v. Bulgaria arbitration,
in which the it was ruled that direct negotiations between the two parties to a BIT
were relevant to enlighten the meaning of the original BIT.
In regards to MFN clauses which contain an exclusion from applicability in
certain areas (such as economic communities and free trade areas), two possible
interpretations are possible: one that takes into account the principle “expression unius
est exclusio alterius”—that is, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another—to the effect that all other areas not expressly excluded from applicability are
under the scope of the clause (DOLZER; SCHREUER, 2008); and one that considers
that certain matters, such as dispute settlement provisions, are excluded from the
scope of MFN by the application of the ejusdem generis principle (RADI, 2007)
As mentioned supra, the majority of MFN clauses do not explicit whether the
intention of parties to the BIT was that the clause apply to dispute settlement
mechanisms or not. Therefore, when confronted with such issue, tribunals have
utilized considerations of purpose, surrounding circumstances, and pragmatic
considerations to decide on cases (VESEL, 2007).
2.4.2 Cases regarding the application of MFN clauses to procedural matters
2.4.2.1 ICJ cases on MFN clauses and matters of jurisdiction
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In the cases Anglo-Iranian Oil and Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco, the
International Court of Justice, albeit indirectly, approached the subject of MFN
clauses in order to interpret their scope in regards to the jurisdiction of the ICJ or other
fora. The interpretative questions dealt with by the ICJ might possess especial
importance to investment disputes (VESEL, 2007).
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil case concerned the claim by United Kingdom that
the court had basis for jurisdiction through the application of the MFN clause
contained in its longstanding treaty with Persia to claim the for itself the same
treatment granted to Denmark in a later treaty, where the jurisdiction of the PCIJ was
provided for. The Persia-United Kingdom treaty, however, was previous to the
declaration in which Iran accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ). When deciding on the jurisdiction, the successor to the
PCIJ, the ICJ, held that treaty between United Kingdom and Persia could not provide
basis for jurisdiction, since it was entered before Iran's declaration. However, as put
Vesel (2007), the reasoning in order to reach this conclusion of the ICJ remains
unclear, since
The Court first states that it is not necessary to consider the
“meaning and the scope" of the MFN clause and that the Court
may "confine itself" to the dates in order to conclude that the
United Kingdom cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
Then [...] the Court appears to hold that the jurisdiction of the
Court is outside the scope of the MFN clause itself - stating that
the MFN clause "has no relation whatever to jurisdictional
matters” - but then immediately returns to the dates as if their
recitation were enough to resolve the matter (VESEL, 2007,
p.12).
In this case, the ICJ decided, by majority, that an MFN clause, alongside the
host country's consent to jurisdiction over disputes with a third state, was not
sufficient to constitute consent. On the other hand, in the case concerning the Rights
of U.S. Nationals in Morocco, the ICJ held that rights obtained through an MFN
clause depend on the continuing existence of the third-party treaty from which they
are derived. In this case, the United States, who had enjoyed the same consular rights
in Morocco as Spain and the UK through a MFN provision, wished to maintain those
rights even after the treaties with Spain and the UK were no longer in force. The ICJ
rejected both the claim that those provisions had been incorporated in the U.S. treaty
and the allegation that those rights were founded in custom, reaffirming the
dependence of rights attained through an MFN clause on the existence of the third
party treaty.
2.5.2.2 International Investment Tribunals cases on MFN and dispute settlement
provisions
Though the stare decisis principle is not applicable to the ICSID legal
framework, a very wide array of interpretations of one matter is bound to affect the
predictability and stability of the international investment law system. Thus, a certain
level of coherence between the decisions is desirable.
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The 2000 ICSID Decision on the Maffezini case initiated the polemics
surrounding the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions. In this
case, the investor, Mr. Emilio Agustín Maffezini, a national of Argentina, requested
arbitration against the Kingdom of Spain. The request concerned the application of the
MFN clause in the BIT between Argentina and Spain in order to avoid a “period of
eighteen months in domestic courts” (a procedural requirement of the aforementioned
BIT), on the grounds that that provisions was less favourable treatment than that
accorded in the Spain-Chile BIT, according to which the investor could bring a claim
before ICSID at once. In this case, the tribunal interpreted the most-favoured-nation
provision in the Argentina-Spain BIT as to allow the application of the dispute
settlement provision of the Spain-Chile BIT. The tribunal reasoned as follows:
Notwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty containing the
clause does not refer expressly to dispute settlement as covered
by the most favored nation clause, the Tribunal considers that
there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement
arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign
investors [...] [S]uch [dispute settlement] arrangements, even if
not strictly a part of the material aspect of the trade and
investment policy pursued by treaties of commerce and
navigation, were essential for the adequate protection of the
rights they sought to guarantee.[...] (ICSID, 2000, p. 54-55).
From the above considerations it can be concluded that if a third
party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes
that are more favorable to the protection of the investor’s rights
and interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may
be extended to the beneficiary of the most favored nation clause
as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis principle.
Of course, the third-party treaty has to relate to the same subject
matter as the basic treaty, be it the protection of foreign
investments or the promotion of trade, since the dispute
settlement provisions will operate in the context of these
matters; otherwise there would be a contravention of that
principle (ICSID, 2000, p. 56).
Though the tribunal, as stated, accepted that the MFN clause's application
might be legitimately extended to dispute settlement provisions, it also drew a
distinction between "the legitimate extension of rights and benefits by means of
operation of the clause" and "disruptive treaty-shopping that would play havoc with
the policy objectives of underlying specific treaty provisions" (ICSID, 2000, p. 63). In
order to illustrate this distinction, the tribunal affirmed a number of exceptions in
which the most-favoured-nation treatment would not be applicable to dispute
settlement provisions—namely:
(a) if one contracting party has stated, as a condition to its consent to arbitration, that
local remedies must be exhausted, this requirement cannot be bypassed through the
invocation of an MFN clause in relation to a third-party agreement that does not
contain this element, for this condition derives from a fundamental rule of
international law;
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(b) if the parties' agreed upon dispute settlement arrangement including an irreversible
and final choice between submission either to domestic courts or to international
arbitration, this stipulation cannot be bypassed by invoking the clause;
(c) if the agreement establishes a particular arbitration forum as competent, this option
cannot be changed by invoking the clause, in order to submit the dispute to a different
forum.
(d) if the parties have agreed to a highly institutionalized system of arbitration that
incorporates precise rules of procedure, which is the case, for example, with regard to
the North America Free Trade Agreement and similar arrangements, it is clear that
neither of these mechanisms could be altered by the operation of the clause because
these very specific provisions reflect the precise will of the contracting parties.
(e) other elements of public policy limiting the operation of the clause that might be
identified by the parties or tribunals. (ICSID, 2000, p.63)
In the Siemens case, the ICSID tribunal followed the same line of reasoning
of Maffezini. This case concerned whether, by means of a most-favoured-nation
provision included in the 1991 Germany-Argentina BIT (the basic treaty), the
claimant, a german national, might claim for himself dispute settlement provisions of
the 1991 Argentina-Chile BIT, which allowed for direct arbitration, without the prior
18 months of domestic courts required by the basic treaty. Interpreting the basic treaty
in accordance with Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that is,
in light of the objectives of the treaty, which were held to be "the promotion and
protection of foreign investments", the ICSID tribunal established that the MFN was
sufficiently broad to include dispute settlement. This conclusion was reached taking
into consideration that the MFN clause in question did not specify whether it was
applicable to dispute settlement provisions, and indeed explicitly included in its scope
only the term "treatment" and "activities related to the investment".
Likewise, in the Gas Natural ICSID case, in which the applicability of a
MFN clause in order to bypass the requirement of the 18 months in domestic courts
was also in question, the ICSID tribunal reached a similar conclusion. In this case, the
tribunal rejected Argentina's claim that the requirement of 18 months was equivalent
to the international law requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. The tribunal
noted the practice of Argentinean BITs, the majority of which did not include this
requirement of 18 months, in order to reach the conclusion that the granting, through
the MFN clause, of direct access to arbitration would not hurt any public policy
concern.
In the Suez case, another case which deals with the usage of a MFN clause in
order to bypass the requirement of the 18 months in domestic courts, the ICSID
tribunal interprets the ejusdem generis principle to the conclusion that it may not be
construed as to exclude dispute settlement matters from the scope of MFN clauses.
However, different conclusions were reached by the ICSID tribunal in the
Salini case. In this case, the claimant's request to, through the MFN clause on the 1999
Italy-Jordan BIT, base jurisdiction on the dispute settlement provisions contained in
the 1997 US-Jordan BIT was rejected by the tribunal. The tribunal expressed its
reservations with the Maffezini findings thusly:
The current Tribunal shares the concerns that have been
expressed in numerous quarters with regard to the solution
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adopted in the Maffezini case. Its fear is that the precautions
taken by authors of the award may in practice prove difficult to
apply, thereby adding more uncertainties to the risk of “treaty
shopping.” (ICSID, 2004, p. 115).
The tribunal, however, also underlined the many differences between the
factual situations of Salini and Maffezini, stating that, differently from what happened
in the latter, in Salini the most-favoured-clause of the basic treaty did not contain
reference to "all matters covered by this treaty".
In the same line, the Plama case, which regarded whether or not a MFN
clause might be used to extend consent to arbitration manifested in other investment
treaties, also criticized the tribunal's findings in Maffezini. In this case, the ICSID
tribunal declined jurisdiction over the case, which the claimant, a Cyprus national, had
attempted to establish through the MFN clause in the 1987 Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT (the
basic treaty). According to the claimant, the MFN clause in the basic treaty included
"all aspects of the treaty" and, therefore, also dispute settlement provisions. The
claimant wished to invoke the dispute settlement provisions of other Bulgarian BITs
in order to establish the jurisdiction of ICSID over the case. However, his claims
proved unsuccessful. The tribunal rejected the claimants teleological interpretation of
the clause, focused on the "objects and purposes" of the BIT (namely, to promote and
protect foreign investment), and upheld that the contracting states had no intention of
extending the MFN BIT clause to dispute settlement provisions in other BITs. As an
evidence of that the tribunal pointed out that, at the time of the signing of the 1987
BIT with Cyprus, Bulgaria was under a communist regime that preferred BITs
containing limited dispute resolution provision and limited protections for foreign
investors.
The ICSID tribunal underlined in Plama the great difference existent between
adding to the treatment provided for in one treaty provisions of other treaties that
accord more favourable treatment, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, replacing a
procedure specifically negotiated by parties with an alien mechanism. Indeed, the
tribunal considered in Plama that the conclusions reached in Maffezini led to "a
chaotic situation" which was actually harmful to harmonization and was completely
alien to the intention of the contracting parties.
3. PREVIOUS WORK BY THE COMMISSION
In 1964, acknowledging the importance of MFN clauses in international
trade, but not wishing, however, to limit itself to this area only, the ILC undertook the
project of creating a set of draft articles on MFN clauses. The result were the 1978
Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, which, though never ratified by the
United Nations General Assembly, provide a comprehensive analysis of the operation
of MFN clauses, including elucidation of the ejusdem generis principle.
The 1978 Draft Articles, by means of its Article 4, define MFN clause as a
treaty provision whereby the granting State undertakes the obligation to accord MFN
treatment to a beneficiary State in an agreed sphere of relations. Though Article 5
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defines MFN treatment as treatment “not less favourable than treatment extended by
the granting State to a third State or to persons or things in the same relationship with
that third State”, the Draft Articles provide that the content and extent of each specific
MFN obligation is to be determined by the text of the MFN clause in question. In this
sense, Article 29 states that “[t]he present articles are without prejudice to any
provision on which the granting State and the beneficiary State may otherwise agree”that is, the granting and beneficiary States might, for instance, choose to stipulate the
sphere of relations in which they undertake most-favoured-nation obligations or
restrict the extent of this obligation ratione materiae.
Article 8 sets forth the basic structure of the operation of the most-favourednation clause. It establishes that the MFN clause of the basic treaty, as the source of
the right of the beneficiary State to receive from the granting State, must be in force
for both the granting and beneficiary States. Furthermore, this provision also states
that the extent of the benefits which the beneficiary State may claim for is determined
by the treatment extended by the granting State to a third State. According to ILC
commentaries to Article 8, this “rule is important and its validity is not dependent on
whether the treatment extended by the granting State to a third State [...] is based upon
a treaty, another agreement or a unilateral, legislative, or other act, or mere practice.”
In other words, the operation of an MFN clause is triggered by the mere extension to a
third State of favours that constitute the MFN treatment according to the clause.
Finally, the ejusdem generis principle, contained in Article 9 of the Draft
Articles, lays down the rule that an MFN clause can only attract matters that fall
within the same subject matter or the same category of subject as that to which the
clause relates. Article 10 further indicates that if the beneficiary State claims rights in
respect of persons or things, it will acquire such rights only in the case that the persons
or things in question are either of the same category of persons or things as those
persons or things of a third State which benefit from the treatment extended to them
by the granting State, or related in the same way to beneficiary State as those persons
or things are related to that third State.
When deciding how to best deal with the issue of MFN clauses, be it issuing
draft report, a model clause or adopting draft recommendations, ILC Members are
asked to consider the following questions during the debates:
1) In which points are the existing norms and case law regarding MFN
clauses lacking in regards to their application in the field of international
investments?
2) When an BIT include no specific provision regarding the application or
not of MFN to dispute settlement provisions, may the principle
"expression unius est exclusio alterius"—that is, the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another— be interpreted to the effect that all
other areas not expressly excluded from applicability are under the scope
of the clause?
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3) C. May the ejusdem generis principle be interpreted as to exclude the
application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions within, for
instance, a bilateral investment treaty?
4) D. In the case that MFN clauses be deemed to apply to dispute
settlement provisions, would the use of this clause be sufficient to fulfill
the requirement of consent to jurisdiction, i.e. in the case of a MFN
clause used to extend consent to arbitration manifested by the granting
state in investment treaties with third States?
5) E. The ICSID tribunal underlined in Plama the great difference existent
between adding to the treatment provided for in one treaty provisions of
other treaties that accord more favourable treatment, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, replacing a procedure specifically negotiated by
parties with an alien mechanism.
The aforementioned topics, whose implications are central to the discussions,
must be carefully weighted by the ILC Members. The Members are, thus, asked to
prepare comments to contribute to the ILC's commitment of preventing fragmentation
in international law and assuring greater coherence in the interpretations delivered by
arbitral decisions in investment law.
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Chapter 4
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
INTRODUCTION
The UN Security Council is the primary body of the United Nations for
maintaining international peace and security. One of the main characteristics of the
UNSC, which contrasts with other UN organs, is that it is the only committee whose
resolutions are binding upon all Member States, regardless if they are current
members of the UNSC or not. Moreover, it is also in the Council’s mandate the right
to authorize the use of force through peacekeeping operations or military coalitions
and also to impose economic and military sanctions, but always as a last resort when
all negotiations have failed (especially in the case of military action). Therefore, the
UNSC’s first actions when a complaint related to a threat to international peace and
security is brought before it is to recommend to the parties to try and reach a peaceful
solution. It may also help ceasing of the dispute by investigating or mediating the
conflict.
The Council has also ordered ceasefires and imposed economic sanctions or
collective military embargoes on many occasions in which disputes have led to the use
of force. At last, the UNSC may recommend the suspension or expulsion, by the
General Assembly, of a Member State that recurrently violates the principles of the
UN Charter. This committee is, then, essential for maintaining international peace and
security and saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war—the main goal of
the United Nations—, while its relevance goes way beyond security and geopolitics,
because its decisions have effects on the populations directly involved in the conflicts
it strives to solve.
The UNSC is formed by fifteen members, of which five are permanent and
ten are selected by the General Assembly for two year terms. The five permanent
members of the Security Council are China, France, Russian Federation, United
Kingdom, and United States, and they hold what is commonly known as “veto
power”. That means that for any resolution to be approved it needs the concurring
vote of the five “great powers”, meaning that if they are against, it will automatically
fail. Since 2011 the first five temporary members of the UNSC are Colombia,
Germany, India, Portugal, and South Africa. In 2012, five new members were elected
by the General Assembly, namely Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan, and
Togo.
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TOPIC A: Non-Proliferation —The Situation in Iran
Laura Quaglia, Luciana Brandão, Bruno Gomes Guimarães,
Iara Binta Lima Machado, and Willian Moraes Roberto
1.1. The formation of Iran
To comprehend the formation of Iran as a major actor nowadays it is
necessary to consider the multiple factors that influenced the development of the
Middle East and, specially, of the ancient Persia (LEWIS, 2004). Since its formation,
Iran (or, how it was called before 1935, Persia) holds unique characteristics that
differentiate it from its neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa. One of these
differences is the fact that Iran is a country of Muslim majority and, in spite of that, it
is not an Arab one. The distinction between those two concepts, therefore, has to be
made: whereas Arabism regards ethnic and cultural features; Islamism concerns
religious aspects (VIZENTINI, 2002). The Arab-Islamic conquest that happened in
the 7th century was responsible for drastically changing the cultural patterns of the
societies in the region. In Iran, however, the millenary Persian culture remained
strong, merging with the Arab one (LEWIS, 2003).
A second particularity about Iran is its political structure, which also has its
roots in a past connected with the Arab expansion. The Shiite political orientation,
which is directly related with Iran nowadays, was brought by the Arabs to the country
around five centuries ago (KHALAJI, 2011). According to Lewis (2003) this was the
key moment for the consolidation of a centralized dynasty responsible for unifying the
different Iranian territories in a unique bloc. Unlike the other neighbours with Sunni
orientations, Iran was shaped with a mix of Persian culture and Shiite ideology.
A third factor that held a major influence over Iran’s formation as a State is
the fact that the territory where it is now established has always been a disputed place,
being occupied by different cultures and societies all along its History (LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, 2008). More recently—and until the first half of the 20th century1—the
reasons for this kind of disputes may be summed up to two aspects, namely strategic
location and natural resources.
The ancient Silk Road used to connect the West and the East through an
overland transport of goods and this route crossed Persia (KHANNA, 2008). With the
improvement in navigation techniques, after the 14th century, this route was
substituted by maritime ones, turning Egypt and the Red Sea into more important
places in the region (HOGAN, 2007). The decay of the Persian terrestrial trade routes,
however, did not put an end to the centrality of that region. On the contrary, Persia
would become even more pivotal to the world politics in the following centuries,
especially due to its natural resources. The use of oil as the main energy source in the
20th century and the discovery of several oil fields to the west of Tehran put Iran right
in the centre of attentions of the great powers. The British company Anglo Persian, for
1 Another reason will be added to these relations with the development of nuclear energy and
nuclear armaments in the second half of the 20th century.
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example, started the exploitation of the region’s sources in 1908. The Russian Empire
also had interests in Persia and also tried to extend and exert its influence over Central
Asia at that time. 2
Along the first two decades of the 20th century the attempts pursued by the
Iranian society for political reforms were restrained by the British and Russian
empires. They feared losing control over the region and its resources. With the
Russian Revolution in 1917 this country’s influence over Iran receded, thus, letting
the United Kingdom support politically and financially the establishment of a new
government headed by the commandant of the Persian Cossack Brigade, Reza Shah
Pahlavi. Pahlavi deposed the Qajar dynasty3 and started a series of modernizing
reforms. His government, however, ended up revealing more nationalistic and
authoritarian traces than the British administration had hoped for; Pahlavi did not
accomplish any substantial social improvement either. His growing relations with
fascist governments during the Second World War led to a military intervention by the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in 1941, known as Operation Countenance.
This operation deposed the Shah and formed a new coalition government under his
son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and the Allies (KINZER, 2003).
The government of Mohammad Reza was sustained with British and
American support in the subsequent decades. Thus, any contrary action or attempt to
promote a reform that threatened the interests of these two great powers would be
suppressed with relative success until 1979 4.
1.2. The Cold War period and the Iran-Iraq War
The emergence of the Cold War transformed Iran into an indispensable ally for
the United States and other Western countries. At that time, nationalistic and
revolutionary movements sprung up in the Middle East – for instance the Egyptian
Revolution of 1952 and they brought new concerns to the great powers with interests
in the region. The disruption of these revolutions led to the creation of the Baghdad
Pact in 1955, uniting the conservative governments of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan,
2 The supplies of Iranian oil provided the necessary means for modernizing the British Navy
and ensured the fuel necessary to that country during the First World War. As for Russia, since
the 19th century it was trying to expand its influence not only over Persia, but also in Central
Asia, in order to acquire a warm water port (YERGIN, 1992).
3 The Qajar dynasty used to be the bureaucratic elite that detained the governmental control
over Persia since 1785. It maintained the power inside the Qajar family, as in a monarchy.
When the dynasty started to manifest disagreements with the British, the UK supported its
deposition, which was already claimed by some sectors of society dissatisfied with the old
regime.
4 The most well known case took place in 1953 with Ajax Operation, staged by the Central
Intelligence Agency (RISEN, 2000). This was the operation responsible for taking out of the
Iranian political scene Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Mossadegh's autonomy was a
threat to the Sha's government and, therefore, to the western presence in Iran. The Operation led
to Mossadegh's deposition and exile.
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and the United Kingdom with the purpose of blocking these revolutions in the area
(VIZENTINI, 2002).5
At the same time, the production of nuclear technology by the great powers
rose, generating a new source of fear because of its military uses, but also creating
vast expectations around its peaceful applications. The idea of funding an international
agency for the control over atomic energy came from US President Dwight
Eisenhower, in his speech to the General Assembly called “Atoms for Peace” in 1953.
Eisenhower’s proposal was that governments of the main countries involved would
donate stockpiles of fissile material and natural uranium to a specialized agency
responsible for keeping and protecting this material. His idea would evolve into the
formulation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) statute signed by 81
countries in 1956. This document stated the responsibilities for the control and
development of nuclear energy, which should happen only for peaceful purposes
(FISCHER, 1997).
In this sense, the Iranian government of Mohammad Reza started a partnership
with the United States as a branch of the Atoms for Peace programme 6, which was
incorporated into United States legislation by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (USA,
2002). The cooperation program for the development of pacific nuclear energy in Iran
was established in 1957, and a research centre for nuclear energy at the Tehran
University was created (TIMELINE, 2009).
In 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was
created. Iran signed the Treaty in 1968 and ratified it two years later, together with
several other countries. The main goals of the NPT are the prevention of the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies, the promotion of
cooperation for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and complete nuclear
disarmament. One of the main provisions of the treaty is the establishment of a
safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Thereby, the signatories placed themselves at the disposal of the IAEA for
periodical inspections (UN, 1968).
In 1974 the U.S. government signed an agreement with Iran to provide the
country with two nuclear power plants and also a specific amount of enriched uranium
to be used as fuel. In addition to that, during the 1970s, the Iranian government sought
partnerships with other countries—such as Germany, France, and South Africa—to
construct additional nuclear power plants (BRUNO, 2010). It also established the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), responsible for the control over Iran’s
civil nuclear program (GHANNADI-MARAGHEH, 2002). This quest for partnerships
for technological development, energy diversification, and infrastructure-building has
to be understood in the surrounding context of Iranian politics for modernization
based on the Western model and aligned with American diplomacy (CURTIS;
5 After the Suez Crisis in 1956 the Eisenhower Doctrine was launched, with the goal of sending
American troops to the Middle East and stopping any riot attempts by communist uprisings.
6 The Atoms for Peace programme was incorporated into United States legislation by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (USA, 2002). The program would be extended to a series of
partnerships among United States and other emergent and allied countries. It reached a total of
more than 42 countries in 1959 (FISCHER, 1997).
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HOOGLUND, 2008; NASRI, 1983).7 The financing for these activities came mostly
from oil production and export income.
Despite the modern character of the Iranian project, in the political and social
scene the reality was pretty different. The inequalities among the population had been
growing deeper since the beginning of the century and, at the same time, a stronger
Islamic and nationalistic feeling was rising, and it was opposed to Western influence.
(ZONIS, 1983). Furthermore, once Iran’s economy was almost completely dependent
on oil, the 1973 crisis compromised the social and economic situation, creating a
power vacuum that allowed for internal fights between groups searching for a greater
influence in the State administration (VIZENTINI, 2002). The whole process would
reach its climax in 1979 with the Islamic Revolution, a movement characterized by a
strong anti-imperialist ideal which ended with the establishment of an Islamic
fundamentalist figure in the government of the country: Ayatollah Khomeini.
Right after the Revolution, the Iranian interest in nuclear research and
development diminished and the split with Western powers resulted in the reduction
of nuclear cooperation. Former agreements made with the United States, Germany,
and France, for example, were cancelled or reversed (NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, 2009). A couple of years later, however, Iranian administration would
restart the development of its nuclear program, but at that time with less consent from
the Western powers.8
The decade of 1980 was an extremely troubled period for the entire Middle
East. The political changes in Iran meant for the United States and for Israel the loss
of their major ally in that region (HAJI-YOUSEFI, 2003). The Arab-Israeli conflict
also escalated, incited by different political groups in both sides, with the Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO) being supported by the new Iranian government. This
clash led to an atmosphere of confrontation surrounding both countries; the Islamic
Republic of Iran, hence, gave its support for the Palestinian cause and refused to
recognize the legitimacy of the Israeli state (HAJI-YOUSEFI, 2003).
The development of nuclear armaments in the Middle East enhanced the
atmosphere of distrust that followed from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel, for
example, was suspicious that other countries were developing nuclear technology with
military goals. With this argument Israel took military action in June 1981, attacking
and destroying a nuclear reactor in Iraq. This incident is known as the first attack on a
civilian nuclear power plant under IAEA safeguards and has opened a substantial
precedent. The United Nations Security Council decision about the matter demanded
that Israel disassemble its nuclear arsenal. The U.S. opposed that resolution,
7 Starting in 1961, Iran began implementing a series of reforms supported by the United States
through the Kennedy administration that became known as the White Revolution. In this
context, Iran was modernized and its economy prospered. This exceptional growth was based
on Iran’s oil exportations (USA, 2012a). This is the background where nuclear energy
development took place.
8 Later on, in 2003, these activities would be a centre issue for the IAEA, which reported that
Iran nuclear development was hidden from the IAEA and, therefore, constituted numerous
breaches and failures of Iran's obligation to comply with its safeguards agreement
(CORDESMAN; AL-RODHAN, 2006).
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threatening to boycott any United Nations body that tried to suspend or reject Israeli
credentials (FISCHER, 1997).
This disagreement between Israel and Iraq would also spread its consequences
during the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that started in 1980 and finished with a ceasefire
promoted by the United Nations in 1988. This war cleaved and weakened the Muslim
world, with the nations of the Middle East dividing themselves between two opposing
sides. Israel would support Iran due to its belief that Iraq was maintaining or pursuing
a nuclear arsenal. Iraq, supported by Russia and with closer ties with Western nations,
presented itself as a possible tool for crushing the Islamic Iranian government and
guaranteeing, therefore, oil supply from the Gulf. After the war, some of its main
consequences were the strengthening of the modern Iranian armies as well as the
legitimization of Khomeini’s government in the internal scene (VIZENTINI, 2002).
1.3. Recent developments and regional conflicts
After Khomeini’s death, in 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took his place and
the conservative Rajsanjani was elected president for two mandates until 1997. The
new leader worked towards opening the Iranian economy to the world market and
attracting new international investments. The cooperation in nuclear matters between
Iran and other Asian nations, such as China and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, also intensified under his rule. The development of nuclear energy would also
grow at that time, which led the Clinton administration to impose unilateral sanctions
on Iran, forbidding American companies to negotiate with the country, including oil
and gas related affairs (TIMELINE, 2009). The election of Khatami, a reformist, in
1997 brought new hopes for the dialogue with the U.S., but these were undermined by
the election of American president George W. Bush in 2002, who branded Iran as one
of the nations in the “Axis of Evil”.
The election of the new president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005
demonstrated the will of the Iranian society to see their country transformed in an
internationally respected great power (VIZENTINI, 2009). He was elected in June
with several reformist proposals, amongst which were the development of an Iranian
nuclear program. The efforts for the creation of the program started in August of the
same year, when Iran notified the United Nations about plans to start the conversion
of raw uranium into its gaseous form for enrichment (MOUBAYED, 2006;
TRAYNOR, 2005). The possibility that there would be a connection between Iran and
the military Lebanese group Hezbollah, considered a terrorist organization by the
USA (PANETTA, 2011), explained a series of sanctions against Iran. 9 Therefore, the
9 It is stated by the American government that Iran has continuously supported some radical
political groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah since the Islamic Revolution. The connection
between Iran and Hezbollah would be not only financial, but also ideological and religious,
since both of them share the same Shiite orientation. The group Hezbollah, according to the
United States, receives an amount of 200 million U.S. dollars a year from Iran (TIMES, 2012).
Although there is not an absolute certainty about these relations, the United States government
reaffirms its validity (PANETTA, 2011). Therefore, in 2006, the existence of this connection
was used as one of the main arguments to impose financial sanctions on Iran, preventing its
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import and the export of nuclear material were suspended and the financial assets
connected with nuclear activities were frozen. In 2007 and 2008 the sanctions were
tightened and an arms embargo was included.
Another recently demonstrated challenge is the lack of certainty about Iran
related information, about its doctrine or who is actually in charge of its nuclear
planning. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released a report in 2007 attesting
that Iran would not be capable of producing a nuclear bomb until 2015 (NIE, 2007).
The Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, however, continue to grow and the advanced
missile called Sejil-2,15 was successfully tested in 2009. Some reports also defend the
idea that “Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are clearly connected” (RAND,
2012).
The relation between Iran and its neighbours is another aspect of the situation
that has become more pertinent while the political scenario in the Middle East
becomes even more complicated. The foreign minister of Egypt, for example, has
decided to re-establish diplomatic ties with Tehran after 30 years of distancing. Israel,
on the other hand, shows great concern over the lack of a second plan in case the
sanctions against Iran fail to prevent the country from advancing its nuclear program
(RAND, 2012). Furthermore, the control that Iran exerts over strategic straits and over
the oil trade bring a second issue to the table when discussing the sanctions and the
other attempts of stopping the proliferation (COLE, 2012), dividing other States
opinions and creating a bigger challenge when trying to reach a decision.
2.1. Nuclear Capacity in Iran
2.1.1. The Energy vs. Weapon Dilemma
Since the beginning of its nuclear program, the Iranian government has stated
that it would only use nuclear technology to attend peaceful ends, such as for the
development of medical equipment and energy generation. However, as commonly
known, much of the materials and technologies used to create nuclear energy can also
be used in the construction of nuclear weapons. It is, therefore, hard to determine if a
country is actually using nuclear energy for non-military ends, or whether nuclear
weapons are being secretly developed.
Iran has the 4th largest oil reserves and the 2nd natural gas reserves in the
world, and is one of the leading members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries and the Organization of Gas Exporting Countries. Almost half of Iran’s
revenues come from oil exports, and petroleum makes up for about 80% of the
country’s commodities exports. However, even though Iran is a net energy exporter,
an increase in domestic demand has caused shortage issues in peak hours in main
cities (OPEC, 2012).
Iranian energy sources are formed by four main elements: gas (53%), oil
(44%), hydroelectricity (2%) and coal (1%) (CIA, 2012). Therefore, it is noticeable
access to the U.S. financial system, which was being used to provide funds to Hezbollah,
according to the United States Administration (KATZMAN, 2012).
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that the country is heavily reliant on fossil fuels for its energy generation. Those are
the arguments used by Iran to justify its nuclear program, and it follows an
international trend of countries trying to gain more independence from petroleum and
natural gas, i.e. non-renewable energy sources. In this context, nuclear energy presents
itself as a valid option for many of those countries. As such, about 30 countries
already have nuclear power plants today, and at least 50 more are studying this option
with the assistance of the IAEA (WNA, 2012). The spread of nuclear power, however,
could generate conflicts with the prerogatives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and other similar institutions, for it can be used as camouflage for a nuclear arms
program (MILLER; SAGAN, 2009).
Throughput the years, international concern over the purposes of the Iranian
nuclear program have grown. As such, the international community puts into question
Iran’s intentions not only because of its refusal to allow proper inspection of its
nuclear facilities (SANGER; COWELLL, 2012l), but also because of its posture
towards Israel, which is believed to already possess atomic weapons. Furthermore, the
Iranian uranium enrichment program is believed—and the Iranian government
confirms—to go beyond the 20% of enrichment necessary to generate energy or to
develop medical equipment (IAEA, 2012a). The government has stated that it is
capable of creating highly enriched uranium (over 80%)10 at its facility in Natanz,
contributing to international concern.
2.1.2. Nuclear Program
The Iranian nuclear program was actually initiated in the 1950s with the
support of western countries, particularly the United States. As already explained in
the historical background, it was part of Eisenhower’s Cold War policy “Atoms for
Peace”, that aimed to spread technology, supplies, and information on nuclear energy
intended for peaceful ends. The practical results were the spread of nuclear fuel to
countries like Iran, Korea, Pakistan, Romania, amongst others, some of which ended
up developing their own atomic bombs (LINZER, 2005).
Iran’s first nuclear reactor was built by North American company American
Machine and Foundry and the country received not only help with nuclear matters, but
also military aircrafts from the United States up until the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Before then, the Iranian government of the Shah had repeatedly stated its commitment
to use nuclear technology only to generate energy by signing the Non Proliferation
Treaty in 1968; that commitment was reiterated in 1974 by the Shah’s statement that
already predicted an oil shortage and the need to find alternative energy sources:
“Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing,
as soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants.”
(WESTGARD, 2012). 1974 was also the year of the signing of the Iran-IAEA
10 Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) is used in commercial light water reactors, the most common
type of thermal power reactor; and in research reactors. Enriched uranium is considered LEU
when it has a concentration of 235U that is lower than 20%. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is
used as fissile material to fabricate nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium is considered HEU
when it has a concentration of 235U or 233U between 20% (weapon-usable) and 85% (weapongrade) or more.
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Safeguard Agreement which stipulates that Iran must provide information on materials
subject to safeguards, as well as the characteristics of their facilities (IAEA, 1974, art.
9); also, the government is required to provide information on materials being used in
activities not covered by the safeguard system, which are understood as nonproscribed military activities (IAEA, 1974, art. 14).
After the Revolution, western help came to a halt, leaving the construction of
nuclear enterprises unfinished, like the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Constructions
for the plant started back in 1975 by German companies, but stopped in 1979 and
were only resumed in 1995 after the Iranian government signed a contract with a
Russian contractor11. Additionally, when the United States cut the supply of highly
enriched uranium fuel to the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, the facility had to shut
down for nearly a decade, until 1988 when Argentina agreed to help Iran convert the
reactor to run from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium, and began
selling the low enriched fuel to Iran (JAHANPOUR, 2012).
As mentioned before, in recent years the Iranian nuclear program has
regained strength. One of the reasons is the availability of resources that allow for
further development. Even though the country’s uranium resources are not yet
completely known, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has conducted
exploration activities that have estimated the presence of around 25,000 tons of
triuranium octoxide (U3O8)12 – the first step to enriched uranium – throughout the
country, an amount considered to be enough to supply its own power plants
(GLOBAL SECURITY, 2012). For Iran, nuclear power is the most competitive fuel to
fossil energy sources, especially if the domestic prices of gas and oil keep increasing
(STERN, 2006).
The growing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program have led to the
beginning of investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2002, after
the public revelation by the National Council of Resistance of Iran of previously
undeclared sites and activities that allegedly go against NPT clauses and lead to the
belief that Iran might be on the path to creating atomic weapons (SMITH, 2006). Such
concerns have not been eased by the signing of the Additional Protocol13 in 2003,
which was ratified that same year. In fact, the signing of the protocol followed a
Board of Governors resolution condemning Iran over its hidden nuclear developments
The main issues were the discovery of a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a
heavy water facility in Arak. Since then, the government’s secrecy and refusal to
comply with IAEA requests to inspect its nuclear facilities have given space for
increased concerns over the possibility of the production of nuclear weapons. In its
latest reports, the IAEA has repeatedly denounced Iran’s unwillingness to let agents
inspect their nuclear sites and has urged Iran to stop its uranium enrichment program;
all the while Iran defends the activity’s legality for it is within the scope of the NPT,
thus being only used for peaceful purposes (IAEA, 2011a). However, not only
dissident groups inside Iran, but also innumerous countries and the IAEA itself have
11 Even so, the Bushehr Power Plant was only finished in 2011.
12 U3O8 is mined and milled to turn into yellowcake.
13 Additional Perotocols are an instrument used by the IAEA to expand its investigation
capacities in order to detect the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and materials.
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declared and produced evidence of possible military purposes in the Iranian nuclear
program. In its report of November/2011 (IAEA, 2011b), the IAEA published the
following list of activities in which Iran has allegedly engaged:
• Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment
and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections
C.1 and C.2);
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear
material (Annex, Section C.3);
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and
documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section
C.4); and
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon
including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).
2.1.3. Nuclear decision-making
The Iranian political system consists of a complex combination of
democratically elected officials and religious figures in high power positions.
Elections are held for President, the Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts. The
Assembly of Experts is formed by Islamic scholars who, among other duties, choose
the Supreme Leader into a lifetime position. The Supreme Leader is virtually the most
powerful person in the government, for it has the power to appoint the heads of the
media, mosque, justice and military, in addition to being the chief of all armed forces.
It is in the hands of the Supreme Leader, therefore, to lay decisions regarding the
nuclear program. He also controls the candidature for president, having the power to
veto candidates; after the election, the Supreme Leader confirms the president. The
laws made by the Parliament are also submitted for the Supreme Leader’s approval
(MALEKI, 2009).
In his official position as Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei has
condemned the use of nuclear weapons. He issued a fatwa – a type of Islamic law –
against the acquisition, development, and use of nuclear weapons in the Islamic
Republic, and other important religious figures have reiterated this position
(WEINBERG, 2005). To that regard, re-elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
defends the country’s right to develop its nuclear program, arguing that they will be
solely used for peaceful purposes. Besides the two leaders, the nuclear program is
guided by the Nuclear Energy Council, and regulated by the AEOI. The group
responsible for the key decisions, however, is the Supreme National Security Council,
nominally led by the President, but actually under the Supreme Leader’s authority
(NADER, 2012).
2.1.4. The Opposition
The opposition in Iran is heavily censored and repressed, so that many of the
opposition groups are in exile, and only few political parties are allowed to exist in the
country. In general, the opposition is considered to be less conservative than the
government, and defends political reforms that would benefit human rights and
democracy – at least rhetorically – and proposes a more open dialogue with the West
and a better relationship with Israel. Situation and opposition, however, generally
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converge in the opinion that Iran is entitled to develop its nuclear program.
Nevertheless, with regards to important groups in exile it is important to highlight
that, although there is a common understanding towards Iran’s right to develop a
nuclear program, such position does not undermine criticism to the way the
government is running the program. For instance, the National Council of Resistance
(NCR), a coalition of five opposition political organizations deemed to be westernfriendly, was one of the first groups to denounce Iran’s nuclear activities as illegal, for
the NCR is against nuclear proliferation (FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN, 2012). Moreover, Reza
Pahlavi, the son of the former Shah of Iran, defends the idea that before Iran became a
Islamic republic, the U.S., Germany and France were eager to help the Iranian people
obtain nuclear technology—which he considers an inalienable right—, but now they
fear its use for military reasons (PAHLAVI, 2006). The same can be said about the
Tudeh Party, of communist orientation. The party is against the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, but defends Iran’s right to develop a peaceful nuclear program.
Nevertheless, to its members, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s aggressive rhetoric serves
only the purposes of the United States’ imperialist policy towards the Middle East
(INTERNATIONAL, 2012).
Given that, former president of Iran, Mohammad Khatami believes that Iran’s
different factions will unite with the government if Israel were to attack the country
(DPA, 2011). On the other end of the spectrum, Israel’s former Mossad chief, Meir
Dagan, suggests that Israel should offer help to Iran’s opposition groups in order to
weaken the present government, considered to be extremely anti-Israel (THE
SPYMASTER, 2012).
2.2. Nuclear Proliferation: regional and transregional determinants of the Iranian crisis
2.2.1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the International
Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard System, and the Additional Protocol
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a process that
started in 1958 and was open for signature a decade later. Nowadays the Treaty is
widely accepted, with a total of 190 signatories. Its main objective is to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons worldwide, and it finds its roots in the fear of the policy of
deterrence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (TREATY,
2012).
The system lies on three pillars: non-proliferation; disarmament; and peaceful
use of nuclear technology. Non-proliferation, regarded by some as the only pillar,
consists of the agreement of the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWP) which are part of
the treaty (United States, Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom) to not
transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states, nor induce or encourage nonnuclear weapon states to acquire the technology to develop nuclear technology for
military ends (UN, 1968, art. I). As for the Non-nuclear Weapon States, article 2 of
the Treaty stipulates that they shall not receive or endeavor to manufacture nuclear
weapons (UN, 1968, art. II). Furthermore, they must accept and establish safeguards
in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to ensure the
maintenance of the peaceful nature of their nuclear programs (UN, 1968, art. III).
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The disarmament pillar is vaguely mentioned in the treaty, but it consists of
the building of enough trust in the international system as to make it possible to halt
the production of weapons and to liquidate all nuclear-related weaponry in countries’
arsenal. The NPT text on the matter reads as follows:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control
(UN, 1968, art. VI).
Finally, the peaceful use of nuclear technology refers to the right every
country has to use nuclear energy to generate electricity, for that falls under the
designation of peaceful usage of nuclear technology. Such right appears on the
Treaty’s fourth article, which states that
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the
inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles
I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have
the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to
the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in
contributing alone or together with other States or international
organizations to the further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories
of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due
consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world
(UN, 1968, art. IV).
Since the process to generate such energy stops mid-way to the development
on nuclear fuel required in nuclear weapons, it has become difficult to control such
right (IAEA, 1970). Consequently, the main principle that guides the NPT is basically
a trade-off between the Nuclear Weapon States and the non-nuclear states, where the
latter agree not to acquire a nuclear arsenal, and the former agree to cooperate by
sharing the technology for peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to adopt a disarmament
policy with the ultimate objective of eliminating their nuclear arsenals. Lately,
criticism has surfaced stating that the NWS ate not obliging with their part of the
bargain, and that the NPT is serving as a mean for these countries to keep their nuclear
power all the while keeping the other countries at bay.
In addition to safeguard agreements, the IAEA has established Additional
Protocols with numerous countries, Iran included. According to the Agency,
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA
complementary inspection authority to that provided in
underlying safeguards agreements. A principal aim is to enable
the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared
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and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA
is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites
(IAEA, 2012c).
The Additional Protocols were deemed a necessity after Iraq, a signatory of
the NPT, managed to hide several features of its nuclear program from the IAEA until
basically the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Thus, in 1993 the Agency started
formal procedures to enhance its investigation capabilities, culminating with the
Model Additional Protocol in 1997. As such, the Agency hoped to cover the loophole
on safeguard agreements concerning undeclared activities (HIRSCH, 2004;
KIMBALL; DAVENPORT, 2010).
2.2.2. Situation of Nuclear Countries
It is speculated that there are currently nine countries in the world that
possess atomic weapons. Five of them are part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: the
United States of America, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and
China. The other three, which have not signed the NPT, are India, Pakistan, and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Lastly, one of them, Israel, does not confirm
nor deny having nuclear weapons, although it is widely regarded as a nuclear State
(FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 2011)14. Thus, the international
community generally points to a risk of nuclear weapon usage in global or regional
scenarios.
Regarding the five permanent members of the UNSC, they have publically
declared a will to avoid proliferation worldwide and have called countries to honor
their responsibilities under the NPT through resolution 1887 (UNSC, 2009). As for
disarmament, those countries are also making private commitments. U.S. President
Barack Obama has said that “U.S. Nuclear Disarmament is a moral obligation”
(GEHRKE, 2012) and took practical actions towards it with the New START
agreement signed in 2010 with Russia. The United Kingdom and the US have also
signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation, the Mutual Defense Agreement (BASC).
In accordance with the U.S. deterrence policy, the UK has recently announced further
action to reduce its nuclear stockpile (PRIME MINISTER, 2010). France, for its part,
announced back in 2008 the reduction of the country’s nuclear weapons to less than
300 warheads; it is also the only permanent member of the UNSC that has shut down
its fissile material production facilities (TETRAIS, 2008). China itself has declared
that it possesses a fairly small nuclear arsenal, enough for its defense (MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHINA, 2004). The country also advocates for
disarmament. Despite these countries’ official commitments, analysts still question
their true will to eradicate, or even diminish, their nuclear weaponry capacity.
As for Israel, the country is believed to be Middle East’s first and only
country to possess the nuclear technology to create an atomic weapon. Its “nuclear
opacity” policy, the secrecy that envelops the country’s nuclear program, makes
access to hard evidence more difficult. Western countries in general, mainly
14
Information
on
total
inventory
can
be
<http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html>.
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found
at:
the United States, have shown great leniency towards Israel. France, for example, has
been a major partner since Israel began to develop nuclear technology. In 1969, Tel
Aviv and Washington made an agreement where the former would not declare itself as
a nuclear country nor it would use its weapons for diplomatic gains, earning in
exchange an ending of pressure to sign the NPT. Ever since, the U.S. accepted Israel’s
nuclear capacity making sure it would not defy American nonproliferation policies
(NTI, 2012c).
India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT as well, a move directly linked to
the fact that both countries share a relationship immersed in deep rivalry. India’s
nuclear program began shortly after its independence and it served not only to supply
the country with cheap electricity, but also to develop the capacity of producing
nuclear weapons. The project received internal support once it became
clear Pakistan was also developing a nuclear program. Pakistan was highly
encouraged to do so after India started developing its own nuclear capacities, being
the key moment 1972, after Islamabad lost an armed conflict against New Delhi. Even
though India refuses to join the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), it has formally articulated a “no-first-use doctrine”, with Pakistan also
adopting it. Islamabad claims that its disarmament depends on whether or
not India will do the same, since its nuclear capacities’ goal is to balance Indian
military power by the means of nuclear force. Pakistan has the support of China, who
agreed in 2010 to supply two reactors to the country’s power plants. This deal has
been criticized by the United States, which, in 2005, had unveiled an India-U.S.
agreement on nuclear cooperation (NTI, 2012a; NTI, 2012b)
Other than those, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, and Italy have
access to American nuclear weapons under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(NATO) nuclear sharing program, in its policy of nuclear deterrence. The concept is
under the assumption that if non nuclear countries have access to nuclear weapons
from their allies, they would not feel the need to create their own nuclear weapon
program (CHALMERS; LUNN, 2010)15. There are also countries that used to possess
nuclear weapons, but allegedly chose to dispose of them. South Africa disassembled
its nuclear arsenal in the early 1990s. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—former
Soviet countries that hosted plenty of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons—are said to
have transferred them back to Russia after the dissolution of the USSR, and the latter
did so with the assistance of the United States (NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARCHIVE,
2001).
2.3. Regional Positions in the Middle East
Even if at first one might perceive the Middle-East as a unified region under
Islam, with the only exception of Israel, a deeper look will prove this perception
wrong. There are many tensions inside the region, even among Islamic countries. In
15 The nuclear sharing practice involves military personnel from the non-nuclear countries to
handle, in this case, American nuclear weapons, but all the codes to activate them are held by
the U.S., and in peace times American soldiers guard the nuclear installations (CHALMERS;
LUNN, 2010).
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the case of Iran, these tensions have intensified since the Islamic Revolution of 1979
and the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988). The former brought the fear of a Shia Islam antimonarchy insurgency throughout the region, and the latter essentially put Arabs and
Persians in opposite sides of the conflict, making Iran stand out against the group of
unified Arab countries.
Furthermore, since the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s foreign policy has been
dubious and somewhat confusing, since it has oscillated between radical revolutionary
ideals and pragmatic economic advances. Even if Iran was able to turn some foes into
friends as years went by, recently published documents suggest Iran’s aggressive
foreign policy and its nuclear program have not only kept Israel at a distance, but have
also driven many Arab neighbors away. Such is the case of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain,
which were allegedly in favor of a military strike on the country’s nuclear plants
(MOHAMMED; COLVIN, 2010).
Israel is the most obviously hostile country to Iran in the region, for the
animosity between both countries is not veiled. The two countries fostered a good
relationship up until the Islamic Revolution, when the new Islamic regime cut official
ties with Israel. Iran does not recognize the State of Israel, instead referring to the area
as “occupied Palestinian State”. Tehran views that Tel Aviv may undermine its rising
influence in the region. In turn, Israel also feels threatened by the Islamic Republic’s
policies in the region, mainly by Iran’s willingness in developing nuclear capacities,
even though it has affirmed that its use would be for civilian purposes (KAYE et al,
2011). As such, some forces inside Israel have been claiming that a preemptive strike
targeting the Islamic Republic would be useful to dismiss Tehran’s aggressive moods
and to destroy its nuclear facilities. However, a large part of the Israeli civilian society
does not agree with such an attack, since it could destabilize the whole
region. Washington has also been asking Israel to act with prudence on this issue.
Besides Iran, Israel, and the Arab states, there are powers at play in the
Middle East that are not geographically limited to the region but contribute to the
geopolitical relationships within it. The economic relevance of the region, namely its
oil and gas reserves, not only fosters a local concern-interest trade off, but also attracts
the attention of the US, Russia, France, Britain, and even China. These powers seek to
secure and dominate their supply of oil, which leads to their meddling in the political
affairs of the region.
Iran’s long standing feud with the U.S. has pushed the Persian State towards
an alliance with Russia, which culminated with the entrance of Iran as an observer
member in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2005. Recently, however, the
relationship between both countries has been shaken by the sanctions passed by the
UNSC, when Russia suspended its supply of military resources to Iran (STROKAN,
2012). This situation has not had a deep impact in the economic ties between Iran and
Russia, who is one of Iran’s major partners in the energy sector (SHAHRIARI;
MASHAYEKHI, 2010).
As such, many alliances and animosities are fostered by proxy, following the
rule of thumb which states that “an enemy of my enemy is my friend; a friend of my
enemy is my enemy as well”. Such is the case of Iran’s relationship with Turkey. Both
countries maintained a good relationship, with Turkey, in co-ordinance with Brazil,
trying to forge an agreement of nuclear fuel swap in order to help Iran avoid sanctions
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in 2010 (IRAN, 2010). However, since Turkey’s deeper involvement with NATO and
its agreement to position a missile defense shield in its south-eastern border, the
relationship between both countries has suffered major changes. Iran feels that Turkey
has changed its traditionally neutral policy in the region in favor of a more aggressive
stand which aids U.S. interests in the region, protecting Israel in case of a counterattack attempt by Iran (POMEROY, 2011).
In contrast, Iran’s good relationship with Syria is based on their mutual
animosity towards the U.S. and Israel. Iran, alongside Russia and China (TRENIN,
2012), has supported President Assad’s regime throughout the civil uprisings that have
swept Syria since 2011. The political crisis in Syria has brought the Persian regime
and Syria closer together, since Tehran sees the Syrian uprising as a U.S. ploy to
remove the anti-Zionist government of al-Assad (ABDO, 2011). This situation has
also had its effects on Iran-Israel relations. For the Israeli leaders, the involvement
of Iran and its allies in handling the Syrian crisis has weakened the Western role
and Israel’s role to a greater extent in the Arab world (BARZEGAR, 2012).
In recent years, Iran has suffered pressures from different nations and
organizations that feared the use of its nuclear energy for military purposes. These
concerns have surfaced in the form of innumerous attempts to negotiate the terms of
nuclear energy use in Iran and ways in which the international community would
compensate Iran’s cooperation. However, most of these attempts failed because the
parties would not agree on all matters negotiated.
3.1. Negotiations
Since 2003, the Iranian government and the international community have
held negotiations to solve the issue of nuclear power in Iran. The first attempt came
from the government in Tehran, who reached out to Washington with a series of key
items concerning issues of interest to both. In exchange for a relief of sanctions and
access to nuclear technology, Iran offered transparency over its nuclear program, aid
against terrorist organizations and a more lenient stand on Israel. The United States,
under the George W. Bush administration, turned Iran down in favor of a more
aggressive approach, such as an increase in pressure (DAVENPORT, 2012b).
Following this failed proposal, the three most prominent members of the
European Union – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – started talks with Iran
on the condition that Iran would halt its uranium enrichment program. After a
temporary stop in the negotiations due to the non-compliance of the condition on
Iran’s part, the talks produced four proposals from Iran and one from the European
countries, in the course of over a year. In August of 2005 Iran rejected the proposal
from the European leaders, arguing that the proposal did not recognize the country’s
right to uranium enrichment.
The following year, Russia, China, and the United States joined France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom to renew the talks. This cycle of negotiations
comprising Iran and the so-called P5+1 (the five UNSC countries plus Germany)
started in 2006 and is still being discussed. It started with a proposal from the P5+1 in
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June 2006 which was rejected by Tehran. The two parts went back and forth with
proposals, but the key issue, Iran’s enrichment program, was never resolved.
In early 2010, Turkey and Brazil started diplomatic talks with Iran, in an
attempt to solve a fuel swap negotiation going on between Iran and the United States.
The terms being negotiated between Iran and the US stated that the latter would
exchange fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor for a high percentage of Iranian lowenriched uranium (LEU); however, Iran was unwilling to release an answer due to
mistrust and internal opposition. Thus, Brazil, Turkey, and Iran wrote a proposal
called the “Tehran Declaration”, where Turkey would house the Iranian LEU for a
month while the American enriched fuel would be tested and used (JOINT
DECLARATION, 2010). France, Russia, and the United States rejected the proposal
arguing that Iran was now enriching uranium at 20%, an issue that had not been
addressed in the declaration (DAVENPORT, 2012b).
In July 2011, the Russian government developed a proposal based on the
demands from the P5+1 and Iran. In this document, each side would get some of their
key demands in exchange of some giving in. Iran would have to stop its nuclear
enrichment program in exchange for the suspension of all sanctions against the
country. The changes would progress on the course of four steps, beginning with
Iranian limitation of uranium enrichment in Natanz and the suspension of some UN
sanctions, and ending with the suspension of all enrichment-related activities in Iran,
the lifting of all UN and bilateral sanctions, and implementation of the P5+1 proposed
incentives (DAVENPORT, 2012b).
Even though the Russian proposal was not fully accepted, the idea of
building a framework based on steps and gradual changes was adopted in the most
recent proposal developed. Talks on it started back in April 2012 and were followed
by three other negotiation rounds where both sides presented proposals and agreed to
negotiate in expert-level talks. However, the point of disagreement continues to be the
same. Iran is set on having its rights to nuclear enrichment recognized, whereas the
P5+1 wants Iran to halt all 20% enrichment activities (DAVENPORT, 2012b).
3.2. Treaties
Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has signed it
as a non-nuclear weapon state, and as such is required, under Article II of the treaty, to
[…] not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices (UN, 1968, art. 2).
Additionally, under Article III, the non-nuclear weapon states are required to
accept safeguards, which grant the IAEA agents access to the country’s nuclear
facilities in order to verify its compliance to the NPT .This is reinforced in the text of
the Iran-IAEA Safeguard Agreement itself (IAEA, 1974). Following repeated reports
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by the IAEA of non-compliance to the Safeguard Agreement’s conditions, Iran signed
an Additional Protocol with the IAEA in December 2003.
However, the latest reports by the IAEA keep denouncing Iran’s
unwillingness to permit full access of its nuclear facilities to the IAEA agents. The
May 2012 Report shows several situations in which Iran has either failed to provide
further information on suspect behavior or just plain refused access to the agents
(IAEA, 2012b). Furthermore, it was verified that Iran continues to enrich uranium at
20% and to work on Heavy Water related projects. As a consequence, the conclusion
of this last document reports that the IAEA cannot prove that Iran is only using its
nuclear facilities to peaceful ends:
While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs
declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not
providing the necessary cooperation, including by not
implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to
provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude
that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities (IAEA,
2012b).
3.3. UNSC Resolutions
The United Nations Security Council works closely with the IAEA Director
General and Board of Governors, and based on the agency’s reports and resolutions, it
has drawn its own resolutions. Since 2006, the UNSC has adopted six resolutions
regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the latest one being S/RES/1929 of 2010.
The UNSC Resolutions on Iran started relatively lenient. In July 2006,
Resolution 1696 was adopted, but its content was more of a warning, calling on Iran
to stop its enrichment program and fall into accordance with the IAEA. The resolution
asked for the rest of the Member States to take measures of vigilance towards Iran,
and warned the Islamic regime that failing to comply with the terms of the resolution
within 30 days would result in harsher measures (UNSC, 2006a).
In December 2006, upon Iran’s failure to comply with the previous
resolution, Resolution 1737, which repeated the previous demands of Resolution 1696
and added a request for Iran to suspend its work with heavy water related activities,
was approved by the UNSC. It also imposed sanctions against Iran and certain Iranian
individuals connected to the nuclear program, requesting that states refrain from
transferring certain nuclear and ballistic missile-related products to or from Iran, as
well as not assisting the country whatsoever in matters related to such goods (UNSC,
2006b).
Once again, Iran failed to comply with the demands of the previous
resolution, leading the UNSC to adopt yet another resolution on the matter. In March
2007, Resolution 1747 was adopted, again requesting that Iran falls in accordance
with the IAEA terms, as well as encouraging negotiations with the P5+1 group. The
resolution also raised the sanctions adopted previously, by enlarging the list of
individuals and entities that are related to the Iranian nuclear program, and asking
other member countries to take measures such as freezing the assets of said groups
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and reporting them. This resolution also increased the restrictions of trade with Iran,
broadening the sanctions to any arms or related material, instead of just nuclear and
ballistic missile-related goods (UNSC, 2007).
The next resolution, like its predecessors, was adopted because Iran decided
not to accept the provisions of the previous resolution. Resolution 1803 from March
2008 has a more direct and aggressive approach, reiterating the previous provisions
and adding to the growing list of sanctions against Iran. Once again the list of
individuals and entities that must be reported and have their finances frozen was
increased. The resolution also asks other Member states to prevent certain individuals
from entering and circulating in their territories. Member-States are discouraged of
making financial transactions with Iran, in case these funds are used to fuel the
nuclear program of the Islamic country (UNSC, 2008). In September 2008 resolution
1835 was adopted, this time only reaffirming the previous resolutions and keeping the
same sanctions as resolution 1803.
Lastly, resolution 1929 was adopted in June 2010. Twelve countries were in
favor, Lebanon abstained, and Brazil and Turkey voted against the resolution.
Through this resolution, the UNSC reiterates that Iran must stop its uranium
enrichment practices and its assumed nuclear weapon development activities. The
resolution highlights the importance of the IAEA and the obligation Iran has with the
Agency (UNSC, 2010).
Sanctions went further into isolating Iran and preventing it from any
operation remotely related to nuclear energy, including a complete arms embargo:
Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply,
sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by
their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or
using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not
originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured
combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft,
attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts,
or items as determined by the Security Council or the
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the
Committee”)[…] (UNSC, 2010, nº8).
The resolution also defines a vigilance regime to avoid smuggling of any
forbidden product to and from Iran, calling upon Member States to inspect any vessel
or aircraft of Iranian origin suspect of carrying such goods. Finally, the resolution
imposes financial sanctions on Iran, demanding that States freeze assets from major
Iranian organizations and asking Member States to control private business with Iran.
This ban also applies to Iran’s finance and banking institutions (UNSC, 2010).
As indicated in the last IAEA report (IAEA, 2012b), Iran is still not in
compliance with the agency’s terms, which implies Iran’s disregard for UNSC’s
resolutions.
4. BLOC POSITIONS
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Due to its strategic location, Azerbaijan plays an important role in the
Iranian nuclear issue. The country is located in Iran's north border and in the Caspian
Sea west coast. Thus, Azerbaijan has officially tried to prevent the use of its territory
as route of illicit traffic of materials related to nuclear proliferation. This country has a
successful experience in developing a national control system with the objective of
preventing nuclear traffic (UNSC, 2012b). The Azerbaijani security services already
arrested groups of Iranian agents that were suspicious of planning terrorist attacks
(COHEN, 2012). Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Azerbaijan remains officially
neutral. Iran, however, is skeptical of Azerbaijan's neutrality. The strengthening of ties
between Azerbaijan and Israel – signaled by a purchase of Israeli made-weapons in
the value of U$1.6 billion – and Iran's support of Armenia in the latter’s long running
territorial dispute with Azerbaijan are also causes of tension in Azerbaijani-Iranian
relations (HERSZENHORN, 2012).
For Chinese officials, it is extremely necessary to deal with the Iranian issue
in a comprehensive, flexible manner. The most proper measure to keep the
negotiations going would be through dialogue and respect, trying to avoid any kind of
higher confrontation in the Middle East (UNSC, 2012d). According to China, the
excessive pressure imposed on Iran through unilateral sanctions, especially those
taken by the USA, can intensify regional tensions and the possibility of outbreak of a
conflict. China is in accordance with the Security Council resolutions and believes
those should be implemented, but other unilateral measures and sanctions are only
jeopardizing the process of negotiation (DAVENPORT, 2012a). Besides that, Iran
and China are important partners, with commercial and financial ties. China's growing
demand for energy made the country become the biggest Iranian oil customer and a
major economic partner. Both countries also cooperate on the development of
infrastructure, military modernization, and implementation of technology and research
in several areas, including nuclear energy (HAROLD; NADER, 2012).
Colombia is a non-nuclear-weapon State and has historically attempted to
promote nuclear disarmament, since it considers nuclear weaponry the most
destructive kind. Colombia is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has
supported the universalization of it as an important instrument to foment disarmament.
Colombia has also adopted a Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA and signed the
Additional Protocol to it; the country is a member of the Conference on Disarmament
and believes that the existence of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile
materials would facilitate the task of disarmament. It is also greatly concerned with
the threat of non-state actors and terrorist groups possessing weapons of mass
destruction (UNSC, 2012b). Colombia is the current Chairman of the "1737
Committee" for the mandate that lasts until December 2012 and relies on the P5+1
negotiations with Iran to help solve the issue in question.
France, together with other European Union countries, strongly supports
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. Iran, however, must conduct its nuclear activities under the full control of
the IAEA. France made several diplomatic efforts regarding the matter from 2003 to
2008, in the light of a general approach defined by the European Council. This general
approach included proposals for helping Iran to develop its civil nuclear power
program as well as cooperation in the economic, political, and military fields. Since
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this negotiation process did not show the expected results, France now supports a
dual-track approach with regards to the Iranian situation (IRAN’S, 2012). France
endorses the restrictive measures determined by the Security Council resolutions, and
requests that Iran suspend all processes related with uranium enrichment. France also
believes that UNSC sanctions shall continue to be implemented, for they have shown
great efficacy in preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear and ballistic material that
could be used for military purposes (UNSC, 2012d). Included in the dual-track
approach, France has maintained its efforts on negotiating multilaterally with Iran,
through the meetings of the P5+1. This means that the dialogue channel between the
two nations remains open (FRANCE, 2012; FRANCE, 2011).
Germany is closely participating in the negotiations with Iran, since it is a
member of the ‘P5 + 1’’ negotiation group. Germany is determined to put pressure on
Iran in order to solve the nuclear issue, and it reaffirms the necessity of every country
to also implement the regime of sanctions. For Germany, a nuclear-armed Iran would
pose a threat to the entire region (PODOLSKY, 2012). Despite having the capacity to
produce nuclear armaments, Germany has compromised itself with the NonProliferation Treaty, remaining and non-nuclear-weapon State (WNA, 2012b).
Another great concern for Germany is the issue of Iran’s weapons export to Syria and
Hezbollah and how to find diplomatic solutions for these questions (UNSC, 2012d).
Guatemala is a great supporter of the three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.
Therefore the country believes that Iran should act in serious commitment with the
Treaty and, also, that its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be
respected. Guatemala is a strong supporter of the “two-channel focus”, corroborating
the Security Council sanctions and also hoping that a solution can be found through
the negotiation process. Guatemala is a non-nuclear state and has no technology to
produce nuclear power. It has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT), reaffirming its commitment to stop nuclear tests and to promote
nuclear disarmament worldwide (GUATEMALA, 2012).
India has played an important role regarding Iran's nuclear issue. These two
countries maintain cordial political and economic relations, due to their cultural
affinities and historical diplomatic relations. Iran is of major importance for India’s
energy security, since this country relies on Iran for 12% of its imports on crude oil. In
order to strengthen the country’s energy security, India decided that it would be
cutting its oil imports from Iran by 11% (BHADRAKUMAR, 2012). This country was
one of the main voices against the implementation of unilateral sanctions and military
threats against Iran. Despite that, the Indian government supports the resolutions taken
by the Security Council regarding the nuclear issue. It also urges that all efforts be
made in order to avoid penalizing any legitimate commercial activity with Iran. India
is also an important partner of the United States and of Israel and lately has intensified
its military cooperation with both countries (HEYDARIAN, 2012).
Morocco’s relations with Iran have been developed over a broad cultural and
religious background. The two countries share some similarities, like the Arab culture,
but their differences end up creating a certain amount of tension between them.
Morocco is a country of Sunni tradition and Iran is committed with the Shiite Islamic.
Tensions have escalated to the point where, in 2009, Morocco ended up cutting
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diplomatic ties with Iran (MOROCCO, 2009). The country is a signatory of all
international instruments on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (MOROCCO,
2011). It supports the work of the IAEA and urges all countries to cooperate with this
institution, since it believes that this is a matter of utmost importance for Middle East
security (IAEA).
Pakistan believes that the sanctions applied by the Security Council over
Iran are just one of the alternatives to solve the crisis, and other mechanisms based on
dialogue and cooperation should be encouraged. Pakistan’s great concern is to avoid
the uproar of any kind of conflict in the region, so it has put a major effort in trying to
find a solution through diplomacy. In this regard, the sanctions should not be seen as
an end in themselves. Whereas this country reaffirms that Iran, as a party of the NPT,
should fulfill its international obligations, it also calls attention to the fact that Iran has
the right to develop nuclear power for peaceful and civilian purposes, as stated in the
treaty (UNSC, 2012a).
Portugal’s position concerning the Iranian issue is in alignment with the
European Union foreign policy, which means that it supports the dual-track strategy
based on dialogue and also in the reinforcement of economic sanctions. When the
European Union, in the first half of 2012, raised its unilateral sanctions over Iran's
energy and bank sectors, Iran responded cutting oil exports to six European countries,
including Portugal (LABOTT, 2012). Portugal supports the meetings taken by the
P5+1 in the attempt to persuade Iran to stop its process of enriching uranium. Portugal
is a signatory of the NPT and of the CTBT.
The Russian Federation has taken a cautious approach in the Security
Council meetings. The country stands against any action that might artificially
increase tensions over Iran’s nuclear issue and defends the necessity of reaching a
comprehensive political agreement among the parties (UNSC, 2012a). Russia
maintains long-term relations with Iran, both in the economic and military grounds.
Besides having important cooperation agreements in the oil and gas sector, Russia has
also contributed to the development of the nuclear energy sector, investing in the
building of nuclear power plants (IRAN, 2011a). The two countries also had contracts
in the military field concerning Russian exports of armaments to Iran, which had to be
canceled in 2010 when the Security Council passed Resolution 1929 (RUSSIA, 2012).
Therefore, the Russian Federation has cooperated with all resolutions of the Security
Council regarding Iran's crisis while, on the other hand, it condemns the unilateral
sanctions as harming to the negotiations. The country highlights that Iran is dedicated
to cooperate in finding a reasonable solution and stands for evolving on the
negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran (BAKLITSKY, 2012).
South Africa, in accordance with the Non-Aligned Movement, praises for a
pacific resolution for the Iranian conflict (FINAL, 2012). South Africa perceives all
kinds of nuclear weaponry as inhuman, and defends the necessity of a nuclear
disarmament (UNSC, 2012b). The other nations who possess nuclear armaments
should also put a great effort in the banishment of nuclear weapons. On the other
hand, South Africa defends the right to use nuclear power for pacific purposes, in
accordance with the NPT. The confidence on Iranian intentions to make pacific use of
its nuclear program should then be restored (UNSC, 2012d).
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Togo is highly compromised with eliminating all nuclear weapon stockpiles.
This country urges all the other nations to do the same, collaborating with
disarmament and the NPT regime. The Togolese Republic also highlights the
importance of nuclear technology when used as a tool to promote development; the
country defends the use of nuclear energy in the fields of health, industry, and
agriculture in African developing countries as a way to overcome the obstacles and to
reach the Millennium Development Goals (UNSC, 2012b). Togo believes that Iran
must start acting in accordance with the NPT, complying with IAEA inspections to all
fields and access to all documents in order to solve the current crisis. It also shows
great concern with the possibility of non-state actors having access to nuclear
weapons, urging the Council to take measures to prevent this (UNSC, 2012a).
The United Kingdom is one of the leading actors in the negotiation process
with Iran. The country is part of the P5+1 and has based its decisions in the dual-track
approach. The United Kingdom has put great effort in trying to find a middle ground
with Iran: it has participated in several negotiations between 2003 and 2008 together
with other European nations. The United Kingdom reinforces the necessity for Iran to
start complying with international law, the NPT regime, and the IAEA surveillance
system (UNSC, 2012c). The country urges the Security Council to strengthen its
sanctions, since Tehran’s government has not shown the willingness to cooperate
(UNSC, 2012a).
The United States of America has played a major role in former measures
taken by the Security Council regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis. The US worries
about Iran’s nuclear technology development, especially processes linked to uranium
enrichment (USA, 2012b) since it believes this experience shows Iranian intentions to
produce nuclear armament. The country has been involved in diplomatic talks with
Iran together with the P5+1 group and it has offered an assured supply of fuel for
Iran's reactor to produce nuclear energy with civil and pacific purposes. Given Iran’s
refusal to abide by American terms, the United States of America has decided to
support the UNSC in taking all the necessary steps to ensure a better implementation
of the existing sanctions and to hold Iran responsible for the current crisis (UNSC,
2012a). Also, under Obama’s presidency, the U.S. has adopted a “Dual Track Policy”,
where it combines diplomatic talks through separate negotiations with increased
pressures through economic and political sanctions. So far this strategy has not been
successful, largely due to the lack of trust the added sanctions caused on the
diplomatic talks.
1) How can the Security Council guarantee that the economic sanctions
imposed over Iran are being effective and will lead to nuclear disarmament?
2) The Security Council has traditionally worked closely with the IAEA
surveillance system and, lately, has supported the attempt of negotiations
promoted by the P5+1. Is that the best approach to deal with Iran crisis, in
terms of diplomacy? Could the Security Council implement any other
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channel of communication in order to facilitate the negotiations with the
Iranian government?
3) How can the Security Council deal with the possibility of non-state actors
and terrorist groups inside Iran territory possessing weapons of mass
destruction?
4) What measures should the Council take if Iran non-compliance persists?
5) What lessons could be derived for the development of nuclear programs
elsewhere? How to separate pacific usage of nuclear energy from nuclear
weapon development?
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Topic B: The Situation in Syria
Bruno Gomes Guimarães and Willian Moraes Roberto
Born as a product of war and imperialism,
Syria’s fate remains inextricably tied to regional
and international struggles in good part outside
of its control.
Raymond Hinnebusch
1.1. The formation of the Syrian state
The Syrian Arab Republic is located in a key point of the Middle East, with
access to the Mediterranean Sea, making its territory a strategic ground for a great
number of civilizations throughout History. In ancient times, the actual Syria was in
the middle of a great number of empires and for this reason different people marched
upon those lands. The territory was conquered firstly by the Persians, but its control
later changed to other empires, like the Macedonians, and it eventually came under the
yoke of the Roman Empire.
In the Middle Ages the territory of Syria was conquered by the Muslims and it
became part of the great Umayyad Caliphate, the seventh largest contiguous empire
ever to exist. Practically all of the region’s inhabitants were then converted to Islam
and Arabic became the administrative language (BLANKINSHIP, 1994).
The territory was yet again conquered by other empires. The Byzantines
managed to get it under their control until the Turks arrived and right after them the
Mongols raided those lands. Traces of Muslim’s influence, however, remained even
when other empires conquered Syria’s current territory. Eventually, Syria became part
of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century, to whom it belonged to until the 20th
century.
Being part of one of Silk Road’s trading routes, Syria’s importance declined
when, in the 15th century, sea routes linking Europe to the Far East were discovered,
putting an end to the need of a land route through Syria (LIU, 2001). Its population
and wealth declined throughout these years, and it only managed to recover in mid20thcentury. Its territory also regained huge importance due to regional oil and gas
pipeline networks connecting Syria with neighbouring countries. 16
Some years before the First World War, the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution
began, directly affecting Syrian territory, changing the profile of its domination. In
1916, France and Britain signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which allowed for part of
the Middle East region to be divided between these two European countries; Syria
16 Syria has in its territory oil pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, with the last one
remaining closed since the 1970’s. It also has gas pipelines from Egypt and signed projects for
new gas pipelines from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran and Iraq (USA, 2011).
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would be under France’s dominion. 17 In 1920 the independent Arab Kingdom of Syria
was established, but it clashed with French forces, which occupied its territory. The
League of Nations then put Syria under the mandate of France in the same year.
The Syrian State, therefore, was “carved out from the defunct Ottoman empire
on the basis of foreign imperial interests and in the absence of any credible base of
authority upon which to erect new structures” (LUCIANI, 1990). Prior to this period,
there were no autonomous states in the region of the Fertile Crescent. The European
powers that carved the design of these States had no landmarks to guide their way,
leading eventually to a creation based upon traditional claims and zones of influence.
However, surrounded by the atmosphere of self-determination and
independence that emerged after the First World War, revolts began, uniting the
Syrian population in a struggle against the French, which more than once responded
with violent counter-insurgency. Finally, in 1943, Syria became independent from
France, as well as Lebanon, a fact that Syria hesitated to accept, since most Syrians
considered Lebanon as a part of their country. 18Nonetheless, the newly independent
Syria lacked political stability and experienced a series of military coups during the
first decades that followed its independence (CIA, 2012).
Besides all the internal problems of stabilizing a new State, Syria managed to
become a regional leader in the Middle East after its independence and has always
shown signs of political proactivity. The first regional action carried out by Syria was
founding the League of Arab States in 1945, along with other countries. 19
The historical conflict with Israel also began in the early years of the Syrian
state. As soon as the Israeli State was created, Syria positioned itself against it. “Israel
was perceived by the Arab countries as a kind of enclave or western colony, behind
which new imperialist interests would be penetrating in the region” (VIZENTINI,
2007).20 This led to the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948, in which Syria took part as a
member of the alliance of Arab States that intervened on the Palestinian side, ending
17 The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 was a secret agreement between the United Kingdom
and France that effectively divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire outside the
Arabian peninsula into areas of future British and French control or influence. “Britain was
allocated control of areas roughly comprising the coastal strip between the sea and River
Jordan, today’s Jordan, southern Iraq, and a small area including the ports of Haifa and Acre, to
allow access to the Mediterranean. France was allocated control of south-eastern Turkey,
northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon” (SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT, 1916).
18 During four centuries the Ottoman rule, Mount Lebanon was considered part of the larger
geographic entity of Syria. Ambiguous administrative divisions prompted persistent questions
over Lebanon’s autonomy as well as its boundaries. Competing claims were not resolved when
France gained a mandate over Syria and Lebanon in 1920. French designation of new
boundaries for each state favored Lebanon at Syria’s expense. The subsequent refusal by Syria
to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon reflected an enduring perception that Lebanon
was right-fully part of Syria (WEINBERGER, 1986).
19 Syria was one of the founders of the League of Arab States together with Egypt, Iraq,
Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
20 In the original: “A criação do Estado de Israel foi percebida pelos países árabes como uma
espécie de enclave ou colônia ocidental, atrás da qual novos interesses imperialistas estariam
penetrando na região” (VIZENTINI, 2007).
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in a war between sovereign states. The Arab countries were defeated by better trained
and equipped Israeli forces (VIZENTINI, 2007).
Fighting on the side of the Arabs together with Egypt made Syria emerge as a
de facto regional actor and that role was maintained throughout the years to come.
Facing this new conjuncture in the Middle East, Syria, following Nasser’s Egypt,
managed to achieve more efficient military capabilities, establishing cooperation
agreements with the Soviet Union. 21 During the 1950’s, Syria also tried to spread panArabism together with Egypt, what can be seen through the creation of the United
Arab Republic in 1958, uniting Syria and Egypt into a federation.
However, in a context of internal instability, in 1961, the Ba’ath Party took
over power in Syria and removed the country from the United Arab Republic. The
Ba’ath Party was a reformist, modernizing and pan-Arab movement, which considered
the existing States as parts of the same Arab nation, which should be unified. It had a
policy of state-building, which is really important to Syria given its state’s formation
and consolidation. Gradually, the Ba’ath overcame Nasserism as a more consistent
alternative not only in ideological but also in pragmatic terms, since the party
consisted only on a modernizing and socio-economic development strategy, without
Marxist connotation (VIZENTINI, 2007).
This new regime and its strong nationalism created even more tension with
Israel. In 1967, the Six Days War began as Israel’s answer to a crisis triggered by
Nasser through the interdiction of the Gulf of Akaba for Israel’s ships. Israel stroke
Egypt, Syria and Jordan by surprise. In the north front, against Syria, Israel conquered
the region of the Golan Height, entering fifteen kilometres inside Syria’s
territory.22The war was a tough strike against the Arabs, which decided to reject a
peace accord with Israel.
After the loss of the Golan Heights, Syria experienced two military coups. The
second one, in November 1970, put Hafiz al-Assad, a member of the Socialist Ba’ath
Party and of the minority Allawi sect, in the power through a bloodless coup which
brought political stability to the country (CIA, 2012).
1.2. Syria under the Ba’ath party
1.2.1. Hafiz al-Assad’s main goals and internal politics
During his time in power Hafiz had three main goals: continued rule by Assad
and the Alawite minority, to which he belonged; the desire for strategic parity with
Israel; and the achievement of the Greater Syria. This latter is related to the search for
the reunification of the original Syrian territories during the Ottoman Empire, which
consisted of the current territories of Syria, Lebanon and parts of Israel and Turkey
(PIPES, 1991).
21 “Nasserism was view as a system of ideas comprising components such as anti-imperialism,
pan-Arabism—or nationalism—, and Arab socialism” (PODEH, WINCKLER, 2004). Trying to
achieve more room to have independent maneuver in politics, Egypt was the first Arab country
to sign an arms-deal with the USSR in 1955.
22 Besides the Golan Heights, Israel also conquered the territories of Egypt, the Sinai
Peninsula, and from Jordan, the West Bank. The United Nations through resolution 242
demanded the exit of Israel from those areas, but Israel never complied with it.
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The Alawite minority composed at that point not more than 10% of Syria’s
population, and they continue to be a minority in power (GOLDSMITH, 2012). Hafiz
al-Assad was part of them, and during his time in power he turned this sector of
Syria’s society into the new elite. 23 Since then, for the Alawites to protect themselves,
they had to stay in power through Assad, a strategy that continues until this day.24
Still, the government always made good efforts to reach the Sunni majority, doing so
not only through a secular Constitution, which should appease the other Muslim’s
sects, but also by stressing issues of foreign policy instead of domestic contentious
issues. The greatest foreign policy issue was the subject of the Greater Syria, which
Hafiz al-Assad made his centerpiece goal since 1974, in an attempt to use Syrian
nationalism to avoid problems of a centralized party inside the country. Anti-Zionism,
directed to the great adversary of the Greater Syria, Israel, also managed to unite the
Syrians (PIPES, 1991).
Economic issues, however, were the worst of all Syrian internal problems. The
economy under Assad was stalled, compromised by corruption and huge military
expenditures. Inept government policies have resulted in annual inflation rate of some
50%, an overvalued Syrian lira and huge foreign debts, mainly to the Soviet Union.
Civil servants were making less than U$50 a month and cities routinely experienced
electricity shortfalls. Oil revenues, which were not so high comparing to other Arab
countries, were not being used to Syria’s modernization, but to temporary fixes which
harmed the economy in the long term, creating dependent attitudes (PIPES, 1991).
Despite these problems, Assad managed to keep Syria as a big leading player in the
Middle East, being one of the governments of the Middle East less influenced by
economic considerations at the time.
1.2.2. Hafiz al-Assad’s Syria and the international sphere
Regarding the actions of Hafiz al-Assad in the international arena, in the year
of 1973 it was Syria and Egypt who attacked Israel by surprise in the Yom Kippur
War, which had the main goal of restoring the lost territories of the Six Days War.
Israel was attacked in two simultaneous fronts, in the North and in the South. Both
countries managed to get back part of their original territories, but Israel
counterattacked and successfully expelled them (VIZENTINI, 2007).
Syria was directly affected by the consequences of the war. Firstly, because of
Egypt’s peace accord signed with Israel in Camp David, mediated by the United
23 The Allawism was in fact a wholly distinct religion from the mainstream Muslims, since it
rejects the sacred law of Islam and it maintains an elaborate but secret theology, and its rites are
alien to Islam (PIPES, 1991).
24 The rise of Alawites in Syrian society throughout the 1960s was assisted by political
infighting among the Sunnis and the Ba’ath Party coup of 1963, which united working-class
Alawites and Sunnis under one banner. When Hafiz al-Asad, proposed a new constitution that
mandated a secular state and allowed the presidency to be awarded to a non-Muslim, Sunnis
protested across the country. In February 1982, the struggle reached its climax in Sunnidominated Hama. Seeking to end the rebellion, Assad massacred the Sunni population of the
city. Since the Hama slaughter of 1982, the Alawites have consolidated their control of the
country (GOLDSMITH, 2012).
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States, which left the Arabs feeling betrayed by one of the most important Arab States,
granting Syria with an even more important position in the Middle East. The other
consequence was the beginning of a civil war in Lebanon in 1975, which would later
involve Syria.
The Syrian stake in Lebanon long precedes the independence of both countries
(WEINBERGER, 1986). Taking advantage of the fact that Lebanon was divided in a
civil war between Christians and Muslims, Syria tried to gain more influence in the
country. Syria, looking for a way to take advantage of the situation in Lebanon,
backed the Christians and made a ceasefire ordering the end of the violence
perpetrated against them by the leftist Muslims. Since they rejected it, Syria moved its
troops into Lebanon. The Arab League would later grant its approval. By 1978
Damascus had finally switched sides and began to support a leftist coalition of
Palestinians and Muslims. This support also led to the 1982 Lebanon War, when Israel
also got involved in the conflict. Syria would only withdraw from Lebanon in 2005,
after an agreement with the United Nations.
Still in Hafiz al-Assad regime, in 1991, during the First Gulf War, Syria
supported the US attempt against Iraq. This action is mainly because Syria saw in
Iraq, under Saddam Hussein’s rule, a regional rival. However, the conjuncture of those
years also mattered, since the Soviet Union was deteriorating and declining. This
balanced the relationship of Syria with not only the Arabs, but also with the West.
2.1. The local level of the Syrian crisis
2.1.1. Syria under Bashar al-Assad’s rule
In 2001, following the death of President Hafiz al-Assad, speculations on
whether instability would emerge from the situation of power transfer arose. As a
means to counter de disintegration of the regime, the Parliament amended the
constitution, reducing the minimum age for being president from 40 to 34 years old,
thus allowing Bashar al-Assad—son of Hafiz— to be appointed as the new
president.Following this, through a popular referendum, he was elected the new
president. Bashar was deemed a natural choice, because it seemed that he would not
betray his father’s Ba’athist legacy and yet he was very popular with the population
for his modernizing stances, particularly with the younger generations (LESCH, 2005;
LEVERETT, 2005).He pleased the Syrian elites and the populace, hence, Bashar
“represented both continuity and change” (HINNEBUSCH, 2008, p. 274). Indeed, as
Gerges (2012) points out, Bashar al-Assad’s rule was based on political hegemony,
co-option and balancing of various groups and their interests, not only on coercion and
hard domination.Accordingly, in May 2007 he was elected to his second term as
president.
During the time of Bashar’s ascent to power, there was a climate of social and
political fermentation known as “Damascus Spring”, which took place in Syria until
2001. It started as a private gathering of ideologically aligned intellectuals, but soon
informally spread by word of mouth across all of Damascus and other major cities of
Syria. Not only intellectuals and members of the opposition participated in the social
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and political debates which occurred, but also some members of the government and
of the reformist wing of the Ba’ath Party (HRW, 2007). Among the most prominent
claims of the “Damascus Spring” were the abolition of martial law, the end of the state
of emergency in the country, the return of political exiles and the right to form
political parties and other civil associations (HRW, 2007).
All across the Arab world, optimism ensued with the “Damascus Spring” and
Bashar’s accession to the presidency with promises of social, political and economic
reform. From the part of the Syrian regime, there was a brief political opening,through
which the government released several political prisoners and increased some civil
liberties. However, the Syriangovernment started to undo these reforms and to crack
downon dissent—sometimes violently—in August 2001. “Many who once viewed
Bashar as a potential partner, open-minded, and Western-oriented, now perceived him
as, if anything, more ideological than and just as tied to the Ba’athist regime as his
father” (ICG, 2004, p. i).
Despite this setback of the “Damascus Spring”, Bashar al-Assad carried on
with many reforms within the government and the regime. A few years after his
election, he had already established himself as the main decision maker and had
renovated the political elite of Syria, effectively transferring power to a new
generation where reformist tendencies were dominant (PERTHES, 2004). Bashar
recruited to ministerial offices many technocrats with Western education and who
favoured integration with the world economy. Yet, this partial abandonment of the
Ba’athist ideology—which no longer was the basis for governmental policies—did not
mean that the reforms would lead to an immediate socio-economic liberalization
(LESCH, 2005; LEVERETT, 2005). Syria would rather follow a middle way, a
“modernizing authoritarianism” in the words of Perthes (2004). 25Nonetheless,
Hinnebusch notes that these reformist surges were not very successful, because:
bureaucratic, legal, and political obstacles slowed down even
this modest reform program, while corruption, crony capitalists,
the lack of accountability, and continual regional conflict
remained major disincentives to getting the investment that
alone could make reform a success (HINNEBUSCH, 2008, p.
275).
The “modernizing authoritarianism” rendered some positive economic results:
The economy of the Syrian Arab Republic has improved under the rule of Bashar alAssad in comparison with the last decades of his father’s presidency. Until the global
economic crisis of 2008,Syria sustained rates of economic growth of approximately
5% per year; later, however, the pace slowed down with significant plunges in energy
consumption and gross domestic product (GDP) growth (WB, 2012; IMF, 2012).
ZubairIqbal(2012) notices that, in spite of this GDP growth in the last decade,inflation
rates have been steadily high (two digit variations being not uncommon) and that the
minimum wage has not accompanied the general economic growth. These economic
indicators point to a growing income inequality in Syria, raising dissatisfaction among
25 Hinnebusch (2008) affirms that Syria’s path towards reform would be similar to the East
Asian model of economic modernization before democratization.
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the population (IQBAL, 2012). Furthermore, the unemployment rate has been of
around 10% of the labour force, and youth unemployment has represented roughly
20% of the total in the past decade (WB, 2012). The growing inequality and high
unemployment, particularly among the youth, has led to a gradually increasing
discontent of the population with the government, since it has not enjoyed the results
of the economic growth of the past ten years. Therefore, “[t]hese developments, in the
absence of civil society institutions needed to absorb discontentment, point to
pressures for violent democratic transition [...]” (IQBAL, 2012).
2.1.2. The Syrian uprising
As a part of the so-called“Arab Spring”, a series of civilian protests that began
in February 2011 in Tunisia and rapidly spread to other Arab countries, the Syrian
counterpart started in March of the same year as people who were protesting against
political arrests were arrested themselves (AL JAZEERA, 2012). The triggering event
of the current situation occurred in Dar’a, southern Syria, when 15 schoolboys got
arrested for writing anti-government slogans on walls and their parents demanded
their release through demonstrations, which were violently repulsedby Syrian security
forces (ZIADEH, 2011). The rebuffing of these protests caused the death of six
protestors, what led to major manifestations in Dar’a and in other Syrian cities shortly
afterwards (ZIADEH, 2011).
The sudden escalation of these protests found its equivalent in government
response. Ziadeh (2011) affirms that the reaction of the Syrian security and
intelligence services was to use live ammunition, unlawful detentions and torture to
prevent and combat demonstrations. These violent actions at first were aimed at
peaceful protesters, who demanded more democracy and greater freedom in Syria, but
not the resignation of the president. As a result of such actions, though, protesters
began to demand regime change as well as an end to state repression, including
political detentions, extrajudicial killings and torture (BBC, 2012).
Although the protests were peaceful in the beginning of the Syrian revolt, this
opposition soonresorted to arms as well. 26 The violence used by the demonstrators
served as a legitimate justification for the government to keep on using force as well,
albeit in a larger scale. As Seale puts it: “No regime, whatever its political colouring,
can tolerate an armed uprising without responding with full force. Indeed, the rise of
an armed opposition has provided the Syrian regime with the justification it needed to
seek to crush it with ever bloodier repression” (SEALE, 2012, p. 1).Nevertheless, by
the end of 2011, witnessing an intensification of the clashes, Bashar al-Assad tried to
placate the protesters by acquiescing on some of their demands, such as the end of the
48-year long emergency law. In this context, Syria also approved—through a
referendum—a new constitution which provided for a multiparty system and imposed
a limit on the presidential mandateon February 2012. However, these concessions
26 At this point, there were at least two branches of the opposition, the military and the
political one. The military is known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was formed by
deserters of the Syrian military by the end of July, 2011. The political branch is the Syrian
National Council, a coalition of many political groups which was founded in August 2011 after
foreign pressure for a sole interlocutor from the opposition. For more information see section
2.1.3.
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were dismissed by the opposition. This was seen as anindication that the mounting
casualties had created great grudge amongst the population, especially the protesters,
reducing the chances of a negotiated solution (SEALE, 2012).
In the same month, the UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan launched his six
point peace plan for Syria. Its text was agreed upon by both the opposition and the
government and, therefore, endorsed by the Security Council. The plan stated that
there was a commitment to “an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the
legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people” and to a ceasefire
(HAMILTON, 2012). It also included humanitarian provisions and claimed for
freedom of movement for journalists, the end of unlawful arbitrary and political
detentions, freedom of association and peaceful demonstration. The ceasefire plan
brokered by Kofi Annan was supposed to be in place in on the April 10th, but Assad
only announced it four days later. Even though there were allegedly many ceasefire
violations by government troops, indeed the Syrian forces halted their assaults in
major theatres of war. Because of this situation of a fragile (or even incomplete)
ceasefire, the opposition did not acknowledge that the government was duly following
the plan and kept on with the hostilities.Thus, it may be noted that the ceasefire was
hardly being followed by both sides (GUTSCHKER, 2012; MacFARQUHAR, 2012;
UN, 2012).
The turning point for this whole situation came in late May, with the so-called
Houla Massacre. Shabbiha forces—militiamen of Alawite background backed by the
government—and even government soldiers attackedrebel-controlled villages of midwestern Syria reportedly killing 108 people, most of them civilians, in summary
executions (UNHRC, 2012). The government affirmed that it was acting against
terrorist forces linked to Al-Qaeda that wanted to draw international attention before a
meeting of the UNSC on Syria. However, an independent inquiry conducted by the
United Nations Human Rights Council found that there were no witnesses of the
official version and that most of the killers were indeed either government-backed or
part of Syrian forces themselves (UNHRC, 2012).27 The UN Security Council issued a
presidential statement condemning the use of heavy weapons in civilian
agglomerations and the government for firing them at civilians on this occasion
(UNSC, 2012c).As a response to this massacre, the Free Syrian Army (FSA)—
military branch of the Syrian opposition—resumed nation-wide military assaults on
government troops after issuing an ultimatum for Bashar al-Assad. Consequently, the
ceasefire was ultimately wrecked, leading to further intensification of hostilities. This
characterized an evolution of the situation, which was no longer an uprising, but rather
a civil war.
One of the main features of the conflict is its territorial inconstancy. Although
the opposition forces control many towns and villages, this control seems to be very
flimsy with troops loyal to the government re-conquering them and then losing them
again to the opposition. There are however many strongholds located mainly close to
border regions (especially Turkey, but also Lebanon and Jordan, and Iraq to a lesser
degree). Much fighting occurs close to the Turkish border where border control
27 This inquiry also noted that both sides of the conflict were committing a plethora of war
crimes.
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outposts change hands very frequently. This uncertainty facilitates the inflow of illegal
weapons and terrorists.Yet, the worst fighting rages in Aleppo, the economic centre of
Syria, and Homs. In addition to these warring parties, supposedly neutral Kurdish
groups have been in control of many cities next to the Turkish border, not without
belligerent acts against government forces, whence government troops were
withdrawn in order to be relocated to worse scenarios. According to the United
Nations, approximately 19,000 people have died since the beginning of the conflict,
many of them civilians, and 260,000 refugees have escaped Syria going towards
bordering countries, mainly Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (MAGNITUDE, 2012; UNARAB, 2012). This massive refugee flows have caused the conflict to spill into
neighbouring countries, for instance Syrian forces have bombed Lebanese territory
used by rebel forces as safe havens (AP, 2012).
2.1.3. Opposition groups
As the protests began in March 2011, the opposition movements were very
disorganized, especially due to their very popular and autonomous character. Any sort
of organized mobilization was hindered by Syrian security and intelligence forces,
therefore, these demonstrations were indeed very spontaneous and they happened
without prior planning (ZIADEH, 2011). They were also very urban and, in the cities
where they happened, the mosques served as gathering points, since the Alawite—
Bashar al Assad’s Muslim sect—tradition does not include frequenting mosques. In
this early stage, the chants varied from city to city, but their common denominators
were justice, dignity and freedom, and all of them carried more aspirations for change
of the poor socio-economic condition of the country than for attempts at overthrowing
the regime (PEREIRA, 2012).
In this context the Local Coordination Committees (LCC) emerged. The LCCs
were an array of protesters who provided online information on the status of the
demonstrations and government reactions. They shared and coordinated local data for
the whole country without any formal organizational structure. The LCCs were antigovernment but with no particular political leaning (JOHNSON, [2012]).
Soon, however, the LCCs joined a broader coalition of the opposition, namely
the Syrian National Council (SNC), which currently exercises the political leadership
of the rebels. Besides the LCCs, the SNC comprises the grouping of the Damascus
Declaration for Democratic Change (created in the “Damascus Spring”), the Muslim
Brotherhood of Syria, the Syrian Revolution General Commission (a coalition of 40
opposition grassroots groups) and some Kurdish factions, as well as tribal leaders
(GUIDE, 2012). It was created mainly due to the international community’s pressure
aimed at having a single interlocutor for the whole opposition. The SNC works to
legally overthrow the regime, maintaining national unity and protecting Syria’s
independence and sovereignty, thence rejecting calls for foreign military intervention.
It has also tried to keep the revolution peaceful, what created several disagreements
with the Free Syrian Army. Notwithstanding that, both groups have tried to work
more closely in order to coordinate their actions.
Another main opposition group is the National Coordination Committee
(NCC), which was formed in September 2011. It is composed of 13 left-wing political
parties, three Kurdish parties and independent political and youth activists (GUIDE,
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2012). It is the only group that still considers negotiations with the government as the
least costly settlement of the civil war. However, it affirms that such dialogue may
only happen provided that the government meets certain conditions. Thus, the NCC
has rejected several initiatives from the government that claimed for unrestricted
dialogue without preconditions. Just as the SNC, the group also rejects foreign
military intervention. However, the NCC is wary of the Islamists’ influence within the
SNC and therefore has rejected attempts at joining it and even challenged its primacy
(GUIDE, 2012).
The military branch of the opposition is the Free Syrian Army, which was
created in August 2011 by army deserters based in Turkey. 28 It serves as an umbrella
group for all sorts of armed combatants: army defectors, Islamist militants and armed
civilians. FSA combatants—allegedly 40.000, but probably closer to 10.000—have
only limited or no contact with the leadership in Turkey or with each other (GUIDE,
2012). In the beginning of the uprising, the FSA made only small-scale attacks on
military targets close to the border with Turkey. Nevertheless, it gradually spread its
operations to other parts of the country. Its tactics are those of guerilla warfare. At
first they had only light equipment (weapons included), but now they reportedly have
access to more sophisticated and heavier weaponry. After a major FSA setback in
early 2011, many Arab and Western countries started helping the Free Syrian Army:
The first vowed that they would supply weapons and the latter said they would give
the necessary funding and communication equipment. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
supposedly supplied them with automatic rifles, ammunition, rocket-propelled
grenades and anti-tank weapons, whilst American intelligence workers advise on
which groups should receive the military equipment so as to prevent it from falling in
the hands of terrorists (GUIDE, 2012). There have been many accusations and reports
of gross human rights violations made by the FSA (UNHRC, 2012). This organization
has had many divergences with the Syrian National Council and other opposition
groups on the terms for negotiating with the Syrian government, especially because it
represents the armed struggle that many of them oppose.
2.2. The international level of the Syrian crisis
2.2.1. Syria’s geopolitical importance
Located in the region of the Levant, Syria lies in a most strategic spot of the
Middle East. It lies at a hub for terrestrial and maritime routes, being vital for the socalled “New Silk Road” or “Modern Silk Road”. 29It is, thus, of primary importance
for regional integration processes and the world great powers. As Roberto (2012) puts
it, this fact makes Syria very susceptible to the whims of all great powers at the same
time.
28 The Syrian army is composed mainly by Sunni fighters, but the top ranking officials are of
Alawite background. Analysts say that it has approximately 200.000 soldiers (GUIDE, 2012).
29 It is nothing else but “the physical infrastructure of the globalized world: oil and gas
pipelines, optical fiber trunk cables, roadways and railways. Resorting to an image: the
connection of Tokyo to Rome, of the Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean, of Shanghai to the
Gulf of Guinea.”(REIS, 2012, p. 3, our translation).
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In this context, it is noticeable that many energy trade routes pass through
Syria. Even though oil revenues compose a great part of the Syrian balance of
payments, the country is not a major oil producer: it only has about 0.2% of the world
proved oil reserves (BP, 2011), 95% of which is traded with European countries
(USA, 2011). For that reason, the country heavily relies on oil and gas pipelines. On
top of that, there are many prospective transnational pipelineswhich could connect
Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt and Azerbaijan, allowing for greater shipment in the
Mediterranean (USA, 2011; ESCOBAR, 2012). The implementation of such projects
could minimize the reliance of oil importing countries on other transit routes such as
the Suez Canal and the Ormuz Strait by supplying oil and gas directly to the
Mediterranean. Although many agreements have been reached by Syria with
neighbouring oil-supplying countries (most importantly Iraq and Iran), the endpoints
of pipeline projects have been somewhat contentious, mainly with Turkey. Besides
theseterrestrial routes, the country’s location is also very strategic due to its capacity
to affect the whole East Mediterranean, where important maritime world trade routes
lay, namely the Suez Canal (PEREIRA, 2012).
Another factor of great importance for Syria has been its autonomist character.
The Syrian State under the Ba’ath Party has been a symbol of independence and
resistance in opposition to Western countries, especially the United States—which
characterized Syria as a “rogue state”—and former European colonial powers. Syria
became a bulwark of autonomous socio-economic development during the Cold War
and maintained this status even during its economic stagnation until 2011 (PEREIRA,
2012). Not only that, but Syria has also been very significant for Pan-Arabism and,
therefore, for integration processes in the Middle-East. Because of these resistance to
world powers, Western or not, the country has served as an example to developing
countries around the world (VIZENTINI, 2002; HINNEBUSCH, 2001).
2.2.2. The regional context
As previously stated, Syria has had a prominent role in the Middle East for it
has beena major supporter of Pan-Arabism, sometimes hostilely towards Israel, and an
example of resistance against the influence of world powers. Especially after the
Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, Syria has been the main bulwark of
such ideas together with Libya and Iran to some extent. Thus, Syrian regional
influence has been one of ideologies rather than military power.
Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War Syria found itself in the midst of a
great regional rivalry between the two major Muslim sects, namely the Sunnis and the
Shiites. There has been intense competition between Iran, main representative of the
latter, and Saudi Arabia, the advocate of the former (ROBERTO, 2012). Albeit the
majority of the Syrian population is Sunni, the governing elite is Alawite, a peculiar
Shiite sect deemed heretic by the Sunni. This has led to closer relations between Syria
and Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia. 30 In addition to those two regional powers,
30 Although the religious factor is very important for such alliances, it should not be forgotten
that Iran is also part of the resistance against the influence of western powers, especially the
United States of America, being logical that such proximity exists between the two countries.
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Turkey has also been trying to increase its influence in the region since the beginning
of the 21st century (ROBERTO, 2012).
The “Arab Spring” and its Syrian counterpart have incited the rivalries between
these three main regional players. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have realized that
the Syrian uprising could be turned in their favour to the detriment of Iranian
influence over the region. At first, Saudi Arabia had to cope with the Arab Spring in
its neighbouring countries, that is, Yemen and Bahrain. Once the situation was
stabilized in these countries, the Saudis could focus their attention on how to augment
their influence sphere in Syria, taking advantage of the situation as a means to
counterbalance Iran and the Shiites, effectively “exploiting the regional chaos”
(JACOBS, 2012). That is why Saudi Arabia along with other Gulf States was among
the first to condemn and castigate Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria already in
August 2011. Jacobs (2012) tells that these countries have tried to create an organized
and formalized payment structure for the FSA, besides supplying weapons to these
opposition groups—regardless of background—through smuggling routes in Jordan
and Iraq. The author also goes further and affirms that the Saudi government has
sanctioned a jihad against the heretic Alawite regime of Syria so as to enthrone a
Sunni aligned regime in the country, meaning that the country is working with
Islamist groups in Syria and in Saudi Arabia itself (JACOBS, 2012). Moreover, Bakr
(2012) reports that other Gulf countries, belonging to the Sunni-Saudi sphere of
influence, press for humanitarian military intervention in Syria.
As for Turkey, the country was at unease in the outset of the Syrian revolt in
2011. At first the country did not seem to wish for instability in Syria. However,
Escobar (2012) notes that Turkey has begun to foster opposition groups inside Syria
and in its own border regions with that country, hosting the leadership of the FSA. It
can be seen that Turkey has put aside its good-neighbourhood policy in order to
reinforce its presence and influence in the Middle East (ROBERTO, 2012).31
Particularly for the “Arab Spring”, Turkey has been an example aspired by protesters,
for it is largely religiously and politically free and has presented sustained economic
growth (YURIDITSKY, 2012).
From the beginning of the “Arab Spring”, Iran has been left aside from these
popular movements, being unable to claim any role in the developing of the events
(WITTES, 2012). Therefore, the country found itself regionally weaker and losing
ground in the Middle Eastern balance of power, according to Wittes (2012).
Nevertheless, ever since the events spread to Syria Iran has tried to uphold the alliance
of sorts with Syria for maintaining its ideological and geopolitical partner
(ROBERTO, 2012). The maintenance of the Alawite regime is of chief importance to
Iran and for that reason the country has reportedly sent military advisors of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard—although not for directly engaging in combat—and even
weapons to Syria, circumventing sanctions of the UNSC (CHARBONNEAU, 2012;
GORDON, 2012; DEHGHANPISHEH, 2012).
2.2.3. Sources of instability
31 For an analysis of the Turkish interests in the Syrian uprising concerning oil and gas
pipelines, read Escobar (2012).
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The prolongation of the armed uprising in Syria may engender dire instability
in the country and the region as a whole. Among the many dangers and risks of the
current continuation of the conflict are the huge flows of armaments, chemical and
biological weapons stockpiles, fundamentalist Islamist terrorism and sectarianism,
besides many other spillovers to neighbouring countries.
The inflow of weapons to Syria, either to the government or to the Free Syrian
Army, raises alarm, because once the fighting is over they may fall in the hands of
terrorists and keep the chances of violent armed actions very high in the country.
These weapons could also be diverted to other countries to instil insurgencies or
perpetrate terrorist attacks. Hence, the legal and illegal flows of weaponry could
destabilize the region not only in the short term, but also in the long one.
Syrian weapons of mass destruction (WMD) also raise great concern. Although
Syria supposedly had a military nuclear program carried out with the assistance of
Iran and North Korea, Israel bombed the alleged plutonium production reactor in
2007. Notwithstanding the fact that nuclear artefacts are not in the Syrian arsenal, the
main concern lies at the stockpiles of chemical and possibly biological weapons that
Syria has. Syria’s chemical WMDs were first supplied by Egypt during the conflict
with Israel, but after peace between those countries was reached the Iranians begun
assisting Syria to develop its capacities (NTI, 2012).32 On the other hand, data about
biological weapons has not been very credible, for some agencies report that Syria has
capacity to produce anthrax and botulism, while others found no evidence of that
(NTI, 2012). However, intelligence reports state that Syria has at least one biological
weapons storage and other five for chemical weapons, one of which in Homs, where
some intense fighting has raged during the uprising (WMD, 2012). Much
apprehension has emerged with the possibility that the Syrian government would use
its chemical weapons against protesters, but officials stated that this would never
happen; it could, however, be considered as a last resort provided that the scenario
changes with the intervention from foreign powers in the country (LANDLER,
2012).33 Nevertheless, there is also serious risk that these stockpiles fall in the hands
of the rebels, whose heterogeneity means that these weapons could be taken by
Islamist terrorists to be used elsewhere.
This has gradually become a greater threat in the region. The number of
jihadists fighting in Syria has risen enormously since the beginning of the uprising.
According to al-Shishani (2012), the Free Syrian Army scrutinizes the jihadists very
closely for they could represent a real threat after the regime changes. In spite of that,
there have been several reports of the growing role of fundamentalists in the rebellion.
Since the beginning of 2012 terrorist attacks have been made by groups related to alQaeda (HUSAIN, 2012). In the past months, however, Jabhat al-Nusra, a
fundamentalist terrorist group (also linked to al-Qaeda) has become prominent in the
fight against government troops (VELA; SLY, 2012). This group acts more frequently
32 Syria has stated that it will renounce its chemical weapons program once Israel does the
same with its military nuclear program (NTI, 2012).
33 Blomfield (2012) reports that the Syrian military has recently conducted drills of chemical
weapons usage with the help of Iranian advisors, further raising questions about the likelihood
that Syria will use such WMDs to counter the rebels.
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in urban regions, such as Damascus and Aleppo (AL-SHISHANI, 2012). The
aftermath of the conflict poses a serious concern when it comes to those terrorist
groups, for their members will probably scatter in the Middle East, endangering the
stability of the region as a whole.
Concerning sectarianism, this is a real threat because the Assad’s regime
branded itself as a protector of minorities and communities, successfully managing to
maintain the Syrian society very cohesive despite its many ethnic and religious groups
(GERGES, 2012). Gerges (2012) even says that it is this feature that determined the
durability of the Ba’ath regime, for Bashar and Hafiz promised those minorities many
rights and protection from the Sunni majority. Besides the Alawites, which comprise
12% of the Syrian population, the Christian minority in Syria—amounting to 10% of
the population—also officially backs the regime due to fear of an Islamist government
(SECRETIVE, 2012; JOHNSON, [2012]). Nonetheless, many Christians are active
members of the opposition, either in the LCC or the SNC, so as to guarantee the right
to religious liberty in a future new constitution (JOHNSON, [2012]). Taking into
account the fact that the majority of the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian
Army is composed of Sunnis, there have been many reports of sectarian violence by
the opposition against Alawite civilian neighbourhoods (GUIDE, 2012; SECRETIVE,
2012). Such clashes have oftentimes occurred in Lebanon as well in a spillover of the
conflict, raising concern that the religious sectarian fight spreads all over the region.
Another sectarian struggle that may come to happen inside Syria and perhaps
spill to neighbouring countries is the one involving the Kurd minority. Even though
the Kurds follow different religions and its sects such as the rest of Syria, they are the
country’s largest minority and have long been discriminated by the central
government (JOHNSON, [2012]). Escobar (2012) tells that they are mainly neutral in
the fighting, but it should nevertheless be noticed that clashes with government troops
have already occurred. Since Syrian troops were withdrawn from Kurdish areas, there
has been much pressure from Turkey against their own Kurdish populations. Milne
(2012) says that there is a rising chance that the country may strike Kurdish areas
within Syria in order to combat Kurdish sectarianism in the Middle East.
Finally, the continuation of the civil strife in Syria will increase the number of
refugees going to neighbouring countries. Byman and Pollack (2012) report that there
have been more than a million Syrian refugees flowing to Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey
and Iraq. These great refugee waves cause dire social and economic consequences to
the host countries, which further endangers the stability of the region. They could also
bring the conflict with themselves, spreading the fighting to other countries, such as it
has already started to happen in northern Iraq (ARANGO, 2012).
3.1. The United Nations and the Arab League
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After almost one year of conflict in Syria, the League of Arab States34 and the
United Nations choose a Special Envoy to deal with the issue. Mr. Kofi Annan soon
worked to create a peace proposal, aiming to achieve support from all external actors
involved in the resolution of Syria’s problems. His peace plan was composed of six
points and it was launched in February 2012. Mr. Annan’s main aim was the necessity
of imposing a cease-fire by both parties involved in the conflict, which then would
pave the way to build a way of communication between the government and the
opposition.
After the ceasefire agreement was reached, the United Nations Security
Council decided to establish the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to
monitor the cessation of the violence on April 21 st 2012 through Resolution 2043.
Initially mandated for 90 days, UNSMIS had to suspend its activities in mid-June
since armed hostilities worsened throughout Syria (UNSMIS, 2012).
In the same month a UN-backed Action Group met at a summit in Geneva in to
build a consensual peace plan for the Syrian conflict. The permanent members of the
UNSC and some members of the Arab League agreed on a transitional plan which
aimedat forging a government of national unity putting together members of the
present government and the opposition, basing itself on mutual consent. The summit
tried to focus on an alternative that would enable all segments of society to be
included in the national dialogue process (MEO, 2012). In spite of the consensual
nature of this agreement, which recalled Annan’s peace plan, many countries differ
over the interpretations of the final text. 35 Western countries affirm it implies that
Bashar al-Assad should step down, but Russia and China state that there was no such
message (GUTTERMAN; GROVE, 2012).
A month later UNSMIS resumed its duties and had its mandate renewed for
another 30 days. The UNSC stated that a further renewal would only be in order
provided that heavy weaponry stopped being used with a significant reduction on the
violence level. Because this was not accomplished, the mission ended in mid-August
2012 (UNSMIS, 2012). Because of this failure, Annan stepped down and Lakhdar
Brahimi, former Algerian Minister of foreign affairs, became the new UN-Arab
League envoy to Syria.
3.2. Friends of Syria
Outside the auspices of the United Nations, a diplomatic collective of countries
and bodies named Group of Friends of the Syrian People met to convene on the topic
of Syria. Initiated by the then-French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, the group has
already met three times and put together more than seventy countries, aiming to
support the Syrian opposition and to increase pressure on the Syrian government. The
Friends of Syria demand that Bashar steps down. The Syrian National Council
attended the summits, demanding serious actions in their favour. The Turkish Prime
Minister and the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, were some of the most
prominent actors which were supporting stronger measures against the Syrian regime.
34 The League of Arab States was one of the first international organizations to condemn the
Syrian regime for the violence perpetrated against civilians (PEREIRA, 2012).
35 Read the final text of the Geneva Accord at UNOG (2012).
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Syrian government denounced the collective as a conspiracy against Syria, especially
after some of the countries part of the group called for funding and arming the
opposition.
3.3. Teheran’s initiative
In the beginning of August 2012, Iran hosted the Tehran Consultative Meeting
on Syria. Approximately 30 countries attended the meeting, including Russia,
Pakistan, India and China. The final document of the meetingstated its firm support to
non-interference in Syria through direct military interventions. A very strong point of
the meeting was that there should be a political solution based on national dialogue
and that military assistance to armed groups should be ceased. Tehran’s initiative also
proposed the creation of a contact group of the participating countries with the Syrian
government and opposition in order to initiate an inclusive dialogue, thus defusing the
tension through political negotiations (ESTABLISHMENT, 2012). The UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-Moon, who was also present at the meeting, noted that for the
proposal to work there should be a first move by the government to show goodwill
towards the negotiation process (ESTABLISHMENT, 2012).
4.
BLOC POSITIONS
Since the beginning of the impasse, the Russian Federation has firmly and
consistently called for the non-use of force by all parties and has emphasized the need
for a political solution to the country’s problems (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). It also
strongly supports the necessity of implementing the six-point plan of the Joint Special
Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, as well as the transition
plan agreed by the Action Group for Syria in Geneva. Moscow insists that Syria’s
sovereignty must be respected, and more than once have cautioned about the dangers
that attempts of external influence can cause. Also, it have been stressing that it is
essential that all parties of the conflict, including the armed opposition, quickly refrain
from violence, according to Annan’s six-point peace plan, and enter in broad-based
talks to negotiate the settling of the crisis. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has
also emphasized that Russia opposes any military intervention in Syria, since it would
only lead to a greater catastrophe not only in the country but also in the region (RT,
2012). The Foreign Minister has also voiced concern about the reaction on the part of
some foreign players who, he said, support armed groups of the opposition and at the
same time demand that the international community take decisive steps to change the
regime in Syria (RT, 2012).
Russia has already vetoed, along with China, three UN Security Council
resolutions regarding the situation on Syria. Moscow does not want that any resolution
deviates for its original purposes and turns into an experience similar to the one that
happened in Libya, in 2011, where Russia accused the Western countries of
trespassing the resolution’s mandate, using the situation to topple an unfriendly
regime. However, Moscow have been one of the main supporters of the resolutions
that authorized the dispatching of the United Nations unarmed observer mission in
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Syria, calling to expand it after its mandate finished, being rejected by the other
Council members (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).
The United States of America strongly condemns all the violence perpetuated
by the Syrian government and supports the full implementation of the six-point plan
of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, as
well as the transition plan agreed by the Action Group for Syria in Geneva.
Washington sees Syrian government’s non-compliance as a proof that the regime is
not willing to honour its commitments, which makes the US sceptical about the
regime’s intentions (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012). Although having voted for the
authorization of dispatching an United Nations unarmed observer mission to Syria
through UNSC Resolution 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), the US did not agree upon
the extension of the mission, since it deems that the Security Council should be
imposing swift and meaningful consequences for Syria’s regime non-compliance in
implementing Annan and Geneva plans, also condemning Security Council members
that refuses to apply sanctions or other types of retaliation for Syrian government
(RICE, 2012).
The USA is also really concerned about the large stockpile of chemical
weapons which are under Syrian government’s control at the moment, making
themselves clear that those weapons must remain secure and that the regime would be
held accountable for their use (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012). President Obama himself has
also warned that if Syria were to deploy chemical or biological weapons, the United
States would follow through with its threat of launching an attack, since its
deployment is the red line they have posed to Al-Assad regime (RT, 2012). Hillary
Clinton, Secretary of State, has also recently said that Washington is working with its
external partners in planning ways to assist the rebels in their fight to topple President
Bashar Al-Assad, including implementing a no-fly zone. However, she also said that
this specific issue needed a greater in-depth analysis (RT, 2012).
The People’s Republic of China believes that Syria’s independence,
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as well as the choice and will of the Syrian
people, should be respected. All the parties of the conflict, including the Syrian
government and all opposition factions, should honour their commitments to cease all
acts of violence and create conditions for the launch of a Syrian-led inclusive political
process (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). Beijing also insists that the best solution to the end
of the Syrian crisis is the implementation of the six-point peace plan of the Joint
Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of the Arab States and the agreed
Geneva final communiqué made by the Action Group for Syria, initiated by the Joint
Special Envoy. China, as well as Russia, has vetoed the last attempt of passing a
resolution on Syria by the Security Council, since it believes that it was unbalanced,
pressing only one side of the conflict. Moreover, it deems that is necessary to extend
for more time the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), since it is
paving the way for the implementation of the already agreed international plans for
solving the issue. However, it does not agree with the idea of setting preconditions for
the expansion of the mission, like the implementation of sanctions against the Syrian
regime firstly. Beijing insists that the future and fate of Syria should be independently
decided by the Syrian people, rather than imposed by outside forces and that military
interference would achieve nothing.
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France also believes that the implementation of the six-point plan made by the
Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan,
is of utmost importance to settle the crisis in Syria. Paris urges that the Syrian
government fully and immediately fulfil all the commitments it has made to the Joint
Special Envoy, halting violence in every form. Furthermore, it also considers that the
Syrian regime has a criminal responsibility for all the violence it has already
committed against its own civilians (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). Beyond that, France
also considers that the goal in Syria is not only just ending the repression, but also
helping to pave the way to a political transition towards a democratic system.
Moreover, according to Paris, the provisions adopted by the Security Council have
been systematically violated by the Syrian regime, thus being necessary for the
Council to develop tools to exert pressure, such as the threat of sanctions, in order to
make the Syrian regime abide to its international obligations (UNSC S/PV.6810,
2012).
The United Kingdom believes that the six-point peace plan proposed by Mr.
Kofi Annan offers the last opportunity to finally put an end to the bloodshed in Syria,
insisting that the Syrian regime must have to fully implement the plan, as well as
follow the Geneva agreement. London deems that the opposition too must refrain
from violence and ensure that it gives the regime no excuse to renege on its
commitment. When all the violence is sustained, all parties must move quickly to
engage in a Syrian-led political transition, as the Geneva agreement and the six-point
pace plan proposes (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). Besides that, the United Kingdom also
thinks that sanctions are a pre-condition to make the Syrian government complies with
the adoption of the Annan plan, since, according to London, the regime has done little
to demonstrate that it has any intention of taking the steps necessary to end the crisis.
London has also declared that it could not support the expansion of USNMIS since it
was unable to operate in the proper way given the still not ended violence (UNSC
S/PV.6810, 2012).
Azerbaijan supports all efforts to end the violence in Syria, aiming to
overcome the crisis as well as to find a solution by peaceful means and through
dialogue. It also fully backs up the six-point peace plan proposed by the Joint Special
Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Mr. Kofi Annan, seeing
its implementation as the only wait to solve the current crisis in the country.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan deems necessary to end all violence and human rights
violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political process
leading to a democratic, pluralistic political system, always encouraging dialogue
between the parties (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012).
Colombia has been calling to the Syrian government to cease its violence and
also the unfettered repression of its people, which has jeopardized peace and security
in a region that has been experiencing an extremely fragile situation. Bogota deems
that the basis for dialogue is what has been established by the Joint Special Envoy of
the United Nations and the League of the Arab States, Mr. Kofi Annan, together with
the agreements reached in Geneva within the framework of the Action Group for
Syria (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). Moreover, it supports that all parties must cease
violence in all its forms, and that a United Nations mission to monitor the situation is
important, although being necessary that the Government of Syria firstly fulfill its
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commitments to the accorded plans, thus allowing the mission to correctly work.
Colombia also considers necessary that a clear message be sent to all parties in Syria
about the importance of complying with its commitments and obligations.
Germany stands entirely behind the efforts made by the Joint Special Envoy
Kofi Annan to achieve a sustainable cessation of violence and to facilitate a political
transition process in Syria. It believes that Damascus has to make a fundamental
change of course, as demanded by Kofi Annan, to enable a durable cessation of
violence in all its forms. However, Berlin deems that many commitments made by the
Syrian Government in the past have not been kept. Furthermore, it considers that a
United Nations mission in Syria cannot be deployed if all the necessary conditions are
not in place. The Syrian Government must ensure that the mission can freely and
effectively implement its mandate and that any impediments to that must make the
Council to implement consequences against the Syrian regime.
Always maintaining that the violence in Syria must cease immediately and that
the only way out of the impasse is through a political dialogue led by the Syrians
themselves, Guatemala supports the initiative of the Joint Special Envoy of the
United Nations and the League of Arab States, seeking a peaceful political outcome
for the situation (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). However, Guatemala shares the scepticism
expressed by various members of the Council regarding the commitment of the
Government of Syria in complying with all six points in the Special Envoy’s proposal.
It also believes that the potential application of sanctions on the grounds of noncompliance may be the least necessary tool to be tried, given the sequence of broken
commitments on the part of the Government of Syria (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).
Believing that the only way to influence events in Syria is through a united
voice of all members of the Security Council, Morocco has been working to
emphasize the need for complete and immediate implementation of the six-point
proposal presented by the Joint Special Envoy, accepted by all parties (UNSC
S/PV.6751, 2012). It is also strongly being in line with the recent resolutions of the
League of Arab States, which is convinced that the parties alone will not be able to
end the violence or to purse dialogue. The violence and the number of Syrian victims
have reached a level that prevents the parties from tackling the Syrian crisis through
existing mechanisms. For that reason, the Arab League has urged the Council to take
strict measures that would enable the Council to work within the framework of
Chapter VII of the Charter in order to put an end to the growing violence in Syria
(UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).
Portugal has been giving full support and appreciation for the efforts of the
Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of the Arab States. This
way, Lisbon deems that the Security Council is in urgent need for concerted action to
enforce the six-point plan, also calling on the Syrian Government to cooperate and to
immediately and visibly implement it in its entirety, as Damascus has committed to
do. In Lisbon’s view, the plan represents the last chance for a peaceful political
solution to the Syrian crisis. Portugal deems that the Syrian authorities must, once and
for all, demonstrate serious intent with stated commitments (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012).
Togo strongly supports the six-point plan proposed by the Special Joint Envoy
of the United Nations and the League of Arab States and believes that its full
implementation is of utmost importance for the settlement of the Syrian crisis.
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Furthermore, Togo remains convinced that the achievement of a peaceful and
prosperous Syria is first and foremost the responsibility of the Syrians themselves –
presidential and opposition supporters alike.
Consistently supporting all efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis through an
inclusive, Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of all
sections of Syrian society, India strongly backs the full implementation of the sixpoint plan of the Joint Special Envoy. Furthermore, it also believes that all parties
involved in the conflict must abide to their obligations, meaning that clear conditions
have to be met by not only the Government of Syria, but also by the armed opposition
groups. Both parties must cooperate to the full implementation of Annan’s plan and
the Action Group for Syria’s final communiqué (UNSC S/PV.6756, 2012). New Delhi
also deems that the issue in Syria must be resolved in a way to avoid spillover effects
in the countries of the region. Moreover, it also supports that is necessary to retain
UNSMIS on the ground, since it facilitates the implementation of the agreed plans,
which, according to India, are the only viable process for international community’s
engagement in the resolution of the Syrian crisis (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).
Pakistan strongly supports the efforts of the Joint Special Envoy of the United
Nations and the League of Arab States, which it has backed from the outset. It also
believes that a peaceful political solution to the situation in Syria must be promoted,
with full respect for that country’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, through
a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process. Islamabad also deems that all sides,
particularly the Syrian Government, must fulfil their responsibilities and commitments
(UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). However, Pakistan expressed its reservations about a
coercive approach, which in its view could further escalate tensions and be
counterproductive and unhelpful in the pursuit of the situation’s pacific settlement. It
does believe that a continued United Nations mission presence on the ground is
crucial to facilitate and support peace efforts, but Islamabad is of the view that linking
its mandate extension to Chapter VII of the United Nations charter and coercive
measures are not the right course of action (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).
Strongly supporting the efforts of the Joint Special Envoy, and emphasizing
that there is a need for all forms of violence in Syria to cease, South Africa has been
calling for all sides of the Syrian conflict to fully implement their commitments under
the six-point plan. It deems that the plan of the Joint Special Envoy is the only
credible mechanism that could deliver a positive and realistic outcome for the
situation, coupled with the final communiqué of the Action Group for Syria, adopted
in Geneva (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). In such way, keeping in mind the respect of
Syria’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, Pretoria deems that
the deployment of a United Nations mission is a calming influence to the Syrian issue.
Nonetheless, South Africa is concerned about unbalanced approaches to the situation,
and it supports that the threat of sanctions by the Security Council against the
Government of Syria without realistically allowing any action to be taken against the
armed opposition, would only permit that this side defies the six-point plan without
consequences. Thus, Pretoria calls for a continuation of the UNSMIS, as a critical part
of the effort to find a solution in Syria, which should therefore continue its work in
one form or another (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).
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5.
QUESTIONS TO PONDER
1) How can the Security Council help implement the Special Envoy six-point
peace plan and the Geneva Accords in the context of the current situation in
Syria?
2) Should the Council extend UNSMIS mandate in order to help Syria in the
implementation of the agreed international plans?
3) How can the Council deal with Syria’s stockpile of chemical and biological
weapons?
4) Should the Council impose sanctions or other consequences in case of
Syrian government’s non-compliance? What about the consequences for
the armed opposition non-compliance?
5) How can the Council deal with the flow of external influence entering into
Syria through bilateral parties?
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Chapter 5
BOARD OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF THE
WORLD BANK
INTRODUCTION
Created following the ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement, at the
end of World War II, the World Bank is an association of five development
institutions which seek to provide technical and financial assistance to member
countries. The two main ones are the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA); the
others are the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
The World Bank is composed of 187 shareholders who take part in two main
decision organs: the Board of Governors, which is the ultimate police maker and is
composed by all members, and the Board of Executive Directors, which has specific
duties delegated by the Board of Governors. As of November 2010, there are 25
representatives on the Board of Executive Directors. Each of the five largest
shareholders—France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
, appoints one executive director. The remainder 20 executive directors are elected to
represent each a determined group of countries.
From post-war reconstruction, which was the objective of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, its focus has evolved into assisting
middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries to diminish poverty levels and
engage in sustainable development strategies. To that end, the IBRD promotes loans
decided upon by the Board of Executive Directors. Beyond that, the Board is
responsible for creating the Bank’s general policies, stimulating a positive investment
climate, proposing country assistance strategies and financial decisions, as well as
providing support during crisis periods.
Within the World Bank structure, reconstruction is now seen as just a part of
the institution’s framework. Currently, poverty reduction, sustainable growth and
development stand out as the main issues being advanced by the Bank. As a
consequence, the World Bank has become deeply sensitive to matters related to the
aforementioned topics, particularly regarding the achievement of the Millennium
Goals.
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TOPIC: Extractive Industries in Africa
Isadora da Silveira Steffens, Alexandre Piffero Spohr,
Diogo Ives, Othon Veloso Schenatto, Marcelo de Mello Kanter,
and Iara Binta Lima Machado
1.1. From Ancient times to the Industrial Revolution
Metal exploration in Africa has been developed in accordance with the
civilizational process in that continent. It is estimated that the African peoples
abandoned the Stone Age and entered the Metal Age between the 5 th century BC, in
Western and Northern Africa, and the 7th century AD, in Sub-Saharan Africa. During
Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Times, the metal exploration caused—and it was
affected by—political, economic, and social changes within African societies.
Because of it, productivity gains in agriculture and commercial contacts between
different peoples were intensified. Several empires and city-states, as Egypt, Cartago,
Axum, Meroe, Ghana, Gao, Sofala, and Mombasa gained power due to their
knowledge of metalworking, which provided them with major wealth and military
strength (VERCOUTTER, 2010).
The African-European and the African-Asian trade have been occurring since
Ancient Times. Ghana had already gained its fame as the gold land in distant regions
such as Bagdad (WARMINGTON, 2010). During the Middle Ages, the kingdoms of
Western and Northern Africa focused in the gold trade with Arab and European
peoples, at the same time that the East African coast was being opened to international
trade, especially concerning metal sales to India and China (MASAO; MUTOYO,
2010; DEVISSE, 2010). In the 13th century, the gold coins coinage was spread in the
West. However, the amounts of gold that reached Europe were not sufficient to fulfill
the demands of a period of economic expansion. This thirst for gold became a
powerful factor that led the European nations to explore the world in the 15 th century.
When the Portuguese navigators landed on West Africa, they were amazed by the
region’s richness and prosperity (DEVISSE, 2010).
Portugal’s contact primarily with the Gold Coast and later with East Africa in
the 16th century caused many economic changes in Africa. The initial Portuguese
expansion over the West African coast allowed Portugal to control one of the ending
points of the Saharan trade routes and deviate part of the gold formerly sent to the
Muslim world. However, Portugal’s lack of means made the direct domination of the
discovered lands impossible. The Portuguese then inaugurated the trading post system
both in the West and East coasts. Such model was soon imitated by the other
European powers that fought against Portugal for the control of African cities. The
trading post system, until the moment the Spanish discovered mineral mines in
America, supplied the world with large amounts of gold and silver (DIAGNE, 2010).
Portugal kept the maritime and commercial supremacy in the West African coast,
from Arguin to Angola, until the second half of the 16th century, when it started
suffering the competition of its European rivals, namely France, England, and the
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Netherlands which had better material and financial conditions than Portugal for
trading (MALOWIST, 2010)1.
The impacts of European presence in West Africa are broad. From the 15 th
century on, economic production, once directed to the trans-Saharan trade and to the
Arab Empires, gradually converged to serve European interests. The disarticulation of
the old commercial interior routes and their transfer towards the Atlantic increased
incessantly. Even more significant in that moment was the growing European
disregard for the African metal trade—once metals abounded from America—and
their rising interest in the slave traffic which led to a decrease in African gold
production (BOAHEN, 2010; CHÉRIF, 2010; INIKORI, 2010).
In East Africa, the Portuguese relations with the autochthonous evolved in a
different way. Once reaching the Mutapa Empire region—currently the area of
Zimbabwe and Mozambique—the Portuguese tried to dominate the territory, so that
they could control the intense trade of gold, ivory, and other metals occurring among
the interior lands, the East African Coast, and India. To protect itself, the Mutapa
Empire forbade its subjects to indicate the location of mines in the region. Throughout
the 16th century, the region started to diminish its mineral production, leading the
interest in that region to decrease considerably (BHILA, 2010).
1.2. Industrial Revolution and Neocolonialism
In the late 18thcentury, the economic and social changes that spread from an
industrializing United Kingdom to the rest of Europe changed European interests in
the rest of the world and especially in Africa. Indeed, the economic demands arising
with the Industrial Revolution were based on the needs for raw material supplies – to
enable the usage of multiple technological innovations in production – and new
markets (INIKORI, 2002).2 The introduction of steam engines revolutionized
transports and producing patterns. Metals like iron, steel and lead became highly
demanded, as they were used to build railroads tracks, steam locomotives, steamships
and other diverse steam engines (HILLSTROM; HILLSTROM, 2005). Coal was the
main source of power to run steam engines, and it became a fundamental raw material
for the industrializing nations (KERR, 1977). In agriculture, the use of local organic
matter to fertilize the earth was being replaced by phosphorus material mined at
distant regions (CORDELL, DRANGERT, WHITE, 2009). Therefore, the control
over raw materials producing regions and mineral-rich areas became essential if
European countries were to develop their full productive potential and rise
1 European-African trade of fire weapons, forbidden by the Portuguese crown to its nationals,
granted at first to the French and later to the British and the Dutch great advantages in the trade
of gold and ivory. The introduction of fire weapons in Africa is a fact of major importance, for
it increased the conflicts between local kings, producing many war prisoners who were later
sold through the increasing slave traffic (MALOWIST, 2010; DIFFIE, WINIUS, 1977).
2 In consequence, from the beginning of the 19th century on, the slave traffic started to
collapse, greatly as the result of a British campaign against it.The United Kingdom, formerly
the greatest beneficiary of the slave trade, started a fierce campaign to demobilize slave trade
and even the slave mode of production. Such a move was deemed necessary as to broaden the
potential consuming markets made unavailable for slaves.
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economically (MOKYR, 1985). As such, if only the African coast was broadly
explored at the end of the 18th century, by the beginning of the 19th century this
situation would start to change deeply (MALOWIST, 2010; REED, 2001).
During the 19th century, European presence inside Africa increased. Several
Christian missions and naturalist trips put the interior lands on the map showing an
increased European interest over African territory. The Berlin Conference (18841885) institutionalized the African partition among the main European powers,
especially between France and England. Only Liberia and Ethiopia remained as free
states, as the rest of the continent had to deal with the implementation of the
neocolonialist domination model (AKPAN, 2010).
The arbitrarily divided territory now in the hands of European powers was
subjected to the local production of agricultural and mineral products strictly to supply
European demands. At the same time, each colony was conditioned to buy the
industrialized products from its colonizer country, once African societies were not
allowed to produce them locally. The colonial economy turned itself into an extension
of the European economy (RODNEY, 2010). The changes in the political and
economic systems that rose with the domination generated parallel changes in the
social and ethnic social composition3. In the majority of the cases, the immigrants
were able to impose their institutions and values to the local population (ISAACMAN,
2010).
The foreign companies installed in African land were the greatest
beneficiaries from the new political-economic model. The majority of the resources
from Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria passed to the foreigners’ hands, especially
French. The discoveries of great mines of lead, phosphate, cobalt, zinc, molybdenum,
manganese, and coal, already explored before the First World War, were incentives to
the rising production levels which would hit their full potential in the 20 th century
(COQUERY-VIDROVITCH, 2010).
In West Africa, after the abolition of the slave traffic, the trade of European
products for gold, ivory, palm oil, and rubber became the main economic activity. A
new African commercial class emerged, operating on permissions granted by
European companies, which it represented. The descendants of the great commercial
families of the region, who were schooled in Europe since the beginning of the
century, established themselves at the top of the local social hierarchy (ARHIN; KIZERBO, 2010).
The colonization process in South Africa deserves special attention, for it led
to the economic transformation that turned the country into the most developed one in
the continent. Between 1850 and 1880, “South Africa” was still a geographic
expression with no political meaning. The region encompassed British colonies, Boer
republics, and African states. By the end of the 19th century, when mineral
3 The colonial productive relations destroyed African self-sufficient economies. The ties that
kept them united before were cut off, as in the cases of the trans-Saharan and the Great Lakes
regional trade. Concomitantly, many local manufacture and industrial techniques were lost, as
the African societies were required to import European products and as the local population was
displaced to insalubrious services that required a minimum technical qualification (RODNEY,
2010).
154
resources—like gold and diamonds—were discovered in the interior of South Africa,
the United Kingdom began to execute an active policy in the region, seeking to unify
it and to explore exclusively its natural resources (BHEBE, 2010). The exploration of
mines by the British colonizers originated a huge capital flow to South Africa (the
biggest in Africa from 1880 to 1939), Western technicians moved to the region, and
an intense urbanization process occurred. The unceasing demand for labor force in the
mines caused huge waves of immigration from other African colonies, like
Mozambique and the Rhodesias, as well as from outside the continent, mainly from
China, where the British were also entering (CROWDER, 2010).
Besides South Africa, the United Kingdom colonized several other African
territories that helped it gain great economic power in the final period of the Pax
Britannica, when other countries were becoming competitors in the industrial field.
The British explored reserves of gold in South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe today),
Tanganyika, Sierra Leone, and Ghana; coal in Nigeria and South Rhodesia; diamonds
in Ghana and South Rhodesia; cooper in North Rhodesia (Zambia today); iron ore,
chromium, and platinum in Sierra Leone. The mineral reserves in those regions were
already known before the colonization and were indeed one of its main causes. The
real boom of production occurred at the beginning of the 20 th century, when minerals
quickly became the largest part of the British colonies’ exports (CROWDER, 2010).
The local administrations within the British Empire had autonomy to set the
characteristics of political and production systems in each colony. Economic growth
was seen in all of them due to the increase in outputs and the injection of capital.
However, the living conditions of the African populations did not improve; as they
were neither allowed to have rights over mineral exploration nor to specialize in a job.
In Sierra Leone and Ghana, for instance, the mining company Cast exercised a
monopoly over the entire mineral production. Furthermore, Western workers who had
the same job of an African worker received higher wages (KANIKI, 2010).
Following the United Kingdom’s and France’s empires in terms of size,
Portugal and Belgium also possessed large portions of African territories. Regarding
their colonies, Angola, Mozambique and the Belgian Congo were the ones that
attracted the largest investments in mining. In those areas, non-paid work was
common, as well as the obligation of compulsory work during some days of the year
(COQUERY-VIDROVITCH, 2010). Germany, Italy, and Spain completed the group
of seven European countries that owned colonies in Africa, a sensitive difference from
before 1884, when the United Kingdom, France and Portugal were the only powers
with presence in that continent (SHIH-TSUNG, 1998). Notwithstanding, Ibrahim
(2010) notes that imperialism in Africa was not an exclusive practice of European
countries. The lack of iron ore and coal in Egypt halted its industrialization, making it
one of the poorest provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In 1805, Muhammad Ali rose to
power and sought to explore the mineral resources of Sudan, specially its gold
(IBRAHIM, 2010).
1.3. Europe-Africa mineral trade in the first half of the 20th century
During the first half of the 20th century, the implementation of the
combustion engine caused a revolution in transports. The widespread adoption of
motorcars increased the demand of industrialized nations for raw materials such as
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copper, glass, iron, steel, lead, zinc, and oil (substituting coal as the main energy
source). The airplane industry also increased demand for metals. Construction became
one of the most dynamic activities in the central economies, as growing urbanization
and technological advances such as the elevator made it possible to build great height
buildings and skyscrapers, and the motorcar industry implied in the construction of
major highways and bridges, increasing significantly the demand for cement, sand,
gravel, stone and other construction materials. The great expansion of electric power
grids also increased dependence on oil (MORSE & GLOVER, 2000). Nonetheless,
African responses to such innovations varied according to European changes in
demand until the end of World War II.
The First World War caused a crisis in the colonial economy. An exodus of
the Europeans who worked in administrative and commercial functions paralyzed
many essential services. The war provoked a fall in the prices of basic exports and an
increase in the prices of imports, motivated by the reduction of supply from Europe.
There was also a shortage of labor force, since a large contingent of African people
became soldiers, carriers, and farmers of subsistence agriculture. It is estimated that
more than 2.5 million African natives participated in the war between 1914 and 1918
(CROWDER, 2010).
As Europe’s industrial production diminished during the war, the demand for
Africa’s minerals fell. As there were exclusive trade ties between colonial powers and
their colonies, Africa could not avoid the negative economic impacts of the conflict.
Unemployment and misery spread over the continent. The only mineral production
that benefited from the war was the gold mining, since the gold standard was used to
regulate the economy at that time. South Africa had the biggest gold reserves then and
the gains from their intense exploration led to the industrialization of the country
during that decade of crisis (CHENNTOUF, 2010). The deep bonds that were
established between Europe and Africa made the Great Depression of the 30s spread
itself aggressively from the former to the latter. In Tunisia, the exports of the main
mineral products were reduced by 220 million Francs from 1930 to 1932. In Morocco,
the sale of phosphate fell by half from 1930 to 1931, going from 1.7 to 0.9 million
tons. In Algeria, the iron production decreased by 75% from 1929 to 1932
(CHENNTOUF, 2010).
The Second World War put an end to the recession in Africa. The military
and economic destabilization in Europe and the occupation of the European colonies
in Asia by Japan caused a high demand for raw materials and minerals from the
African continent. Jobs were created and an important social change took place, as the
traditional rural elites were replaced by an industrial and urban bourgeoisie in many
societies (CHANAIWA, 2010). As an example, during the war, the fate of the United
Kingdom — and therefore that of the Allies — had intimately been connected to the
African colonies, which provided troops, agricultural products, and mineral resources
for the country. Moreover, the Belgian government exiled itself in London, making
85% of the exports from the Belgian Congo to be directed to the Allies since 1941.
The production of tin ore in that colony rose by 630% from 1939 to 1945, as well as
the output of zinc, cassiterite, coal and cooper increased by similar proportions. In a
special case, the manufacture of the atomic bomb by the United States depended on
the supply of uranium from the Belgian Congo’s mines (CROWDER, 2010). As the
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use of nuclear power started to spread over the world after the end of the Second
World War, the world start to see a greater demand for uranium (NUCLEAR
ENERGY AGENCY, 2006), which was available in Africa.
1.4. Africa’s extractive sector management after decolonization
After the Second World War, African decolonization processes began and
Western interests for minerals were intrinsically involved in the independence
trajectories of many countries, as the cases of Algeria and Angola clearly demonstrate.
With the discovery of oil and natural gas in Sahara in the 1950s, France had access to
those resources inside its own territory for the first time. The idea of being able to
practice an independent oil policy strongly influenced France’s decisions during the
violent war of Algeria’s independence from 1954 to 1962 (CHOWDER, 2010). In
Angola, a producer of diamonds in the prewar period, iron ore and oil were discovered
after 1945. Portugal tried to remain the sole beneficiary of those findings as long as it
could. The independence of Angola was only conceded in 1975, after a long and
violent conflict (M’BOKOLO, 2010).
Mining activities managed by foreigners continued to be a reality after the
independence processes, with the consent of the local governments from then on. In
1951, Libya gained independence, but the economic difficulties of the new State made
easier for several companies from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and
Italy to obtain concessions for oil extraction. Big reserves were discovered in 1959,
which rapidly transformed Libya into one of the richest countries in Africa.
Nevertheless, the national economy, based on only one product, became dependent on
external decisions and vulnerable to the fluctuations of the world market
(CHOWDER, 2010).
Liberia, which had not been colonized by the Europeans, began to attract
foreign investors by governmental initiative in the 1940s. As a result, the inflow of
external capital caused a diversification of its economic activities. Besides latex and
rubber, the country started producing iron ore, extracted by foreign companies, which
led to the country’s position as the largest producer of iron ore in Africa. In order to
allow for the viable economic exploitation of the nation’s richness, a highway network
was built to connect the parts of the territory. It represented a radical transformation in
the local tribes’ way of life, until then related to subsistence activities (SURETCANALE; BOAHEN, 2010). A similar policy was implemented by the government of
Madagascar, where exclusive rights of mineral exploration were granted to foreigners
so they could help the country move from a subsistence economy into a market one
(MUTIBWA, 2010).
By still dominating the economic systems, the Westerns also managed to
keep themselves as the social elite in the new African States. In South Africa and
South Rhodesia, the situation was extreme, as the European descendant inhabitants
implemented segregation laws—the Apartheid regime—after the independence
processes in order to maintain their privileges 4 (CHANAIWA, 2010). On the other
hand, a few countries managed to attain higher levels of development after becoming
4Such laws preserved the exclusive use of lands and mines for them, while a higher tax burden
charged the African peoples (CHANAIWA, 2010).
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independent. Botswana is the best example, since it experienced the highest rate of
economic growth in the world from 1966 (year of its independence) until 1999. Since
1966, infrastructure has been continuously improved, telecommunication has proven
to be efficient, literacy surpasses 80% of the population, girls were reintegrated in the
educational system, and public institutions have great assessments regarding
transparency (MARTIN, 2008). Nonetheless, Botswana’s growth was highly
dependent on the mineral sector, especially diamonds. In the past decade, it still
corresponded to over 30% of the country’s GDP, in spite of governmental efforts to
diversify the economy (MARTIN, 2008).
1.5. Conflicts and disputes over Africa’s minerals after independences
During the Cold War Era, the capitalist powers continued to try and maintain
economic advantages over Africa’s raw material supplies and buying markets. On the
other side, the Eastern Bloc gave technical and economic assistance to both colonized
and independent African countries, as means to stir them away from the capitalist
powers. The dispute over areas of political influence was intense. The Angolan War of
Independence was a paradigmatic case of proxy war under that conjuncture. The
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, in Portuguese), a Marxistoriented party, accepted the help offered by the USSR and Cuba in the dispute to
govern the country against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), both formed by proWestern guerrillas and supported by the capitalist nations. In addition to ideological
motivations, the foreign powers from both sides were especially interested in the
control of the uranium fields and the oil reserves of Angola. After fourteen years of
conflict, MPLA rose to power in 1975 (THIAM & MULIRA, 2010), but civil war
would only end decades later.
Several other African conflicts that happened during the Cold War had
motivations related to mineral resources and they generally received external
interference. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Katanga province tried to
constitute an independent State from 1960 to 1963, but it faced the resistance of the
central government, which did not accept the loss of the oil-rich region. Loose
Katanga received military support from Belgium, which wanted to continue mineral
exploitation activities in the former colony (SCARNECCHIA, 2011). A similar event
occurred in Nigeria, when the oil-rich Biafra province tried to be an independent
Republic from 1967 to 1970, a movement that was not accepted by the rest of the
country. The Igbo separatists received support from France, while the United
Kingdom acted in defense of a unified Nigeria. Both Western powers were protecting
the best interests for their oil companies, namely Elf Aquitaine and Shell (PFISTER,
2005; UCHE, 2008).
In the last three decades, Africa as a whole has rose as the second biggest oil
producer in the world, only behind Saudi Arabia. With the new reserves that have
been discovered since the 1980s, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, countries like
Angola and Nigeria experienced great economic growth based on the growing oil
exploration and in the rising oil prices since the oil crises of the 1970s. The Guinea
Gulf, principal producing region of the continent, is the one that receives the largest
amount of investments in comparison to other regions of the world (OLIVEIRA,
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2007). In the north of the continent, production is concentrated in Libya and Algeria,
and its oil exports are historically directed to Europe. In the Sub-Saharan portion,
competition between powers for the African oil, which is safer and cheaper than the
Middle East oil, is increasing, as the great powers like USA and China, and even
regional powers like India, have an increasing oil demand and a diminishing oil
production (OLIVEIRA, 2007).
Oil production in Africa is completely dominated by foreign companies,
which explore and pollute without offering real benefits for the local people.
Notwithstanding, as a way to put pressure in the oil market and to create an unified oil
policy, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created in
1960, and ever since, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, and Angola became members of the
organization, in 1962, 1969, 1971, and 2007, respectively. Throughout the civil wars
in Angola, Nigeria, Algeria, and recently in Sudan, oil was a fundamental question. In
Nigeria, where the income is concentrated in the north of the country, and production
regions are in the south, rebel groups constantly attack and boycott the production.
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe, and Nigeria and Cameroon also have territorial
disputes in their borders for oil rich regions (OLIVEIRA, 2007).
Mineral-related territorial expansion has not been an unusual practice inside
Africa as well. After Germany was defeated in the First World War, South Africa took
control of Namibia, one of Africa’s richest countries in minerals. The Namibians only
gained independence in 1990, after 24 years of war (KHON, 2007). In 1952, Eritrea
was annexed by Ethiopia, which wanted an access to the Red Sea and also to exploit
the natural resources of its neighbor. After decades of conflict, Eritrea became
independent in 1993. In the meantime, the war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 19771978 for the possession of the Ogaden region was influenced by mutual interest in the
region’s oil reserves. Conflicts between the two neighbors in Ogaden are recurrent
until present day (DE ROUEN; HEO, 2007). In 1973, Libyan occupation of Chad’s
Aouzou strip, a uranium-rich territory, initiated a long period of conflicts. The dispute
ended in 1994, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided in favor of
Chad’s rights over the region (MARK, 2002).
After the Cold War, conflicts over minerals have still been a part of the
African reality. Diamonds mined and sold by rebel groups provided revenues for them
that fueled civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola (GOREUX, 2001).
Similarly, there is a low-level separatism in the region of Casamance, in southern
Senegal, led by the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MDFC). Such
region gives access to an offshore oil reserve, which is shared with Guinea-Bissau
(EVANS, 2004). In Sudan, the Southern part of the country fought for autonomy in
the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) and in the Second Sudanese Civil War
(1983-2005). South Sudan finally gained independence in 2011. Nonetheless, conflicts
in the border with Sudan still persist in 2012, essentially because of a dispute over the
oil reserves in the Abyei region (VARMA, 2011). Recent conflicts involving interests
over minerals and the participation of non-African countries include the Second Civil
War in Côte-D’Ivoire (2010-2011), the Arab Revolution in Libya (2011) and the
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ongoing war in Darfur5.
2.1. Natural resource distribution in Africa
The term Extractive Industries concerns those processes of removing raw
materials from nature, namely fossil fuels and metals, that can be classified in three
categories: (1) Fuels; (2) Lootable minerals;6 and (3) Non-lootable minerals
(HILSON; MACONACHIE, 2009). The challenges facing these industries are diverse,
considering the different types of actors and resources in each one of them, but the
main challenge is common to all: to ensure that a long-term sustainable economy and
social development both arise from the usage of such materials. Since the extraction of
non-renewable natural resources7 is limited and can make countries highly dependent
on external factors, governmental planning to use profits into promoting economic
diversification is critical. That is the main objective of the World Bank in the
extractive sector: “to ensure that natural resources contribute positively to economic
development” (WORLD BANK, 2011a, viii).
Africa has a growing importance in the extractive sector, and how these industries
can promote development and help fight poverty has been a major challenge to the
continent. Of the US$679 million that the World Bank provided to extractive sector
projects, 32% were destined to Sub-Saharan Africa, making it the region with the
highest volume of financing received (WORLD BANK, 2011a). The explanation for
such actions comes from the fact that Africa has about 30% of the world’s mineral
reserves (SHARAKY, 2011) and produces about 10.4% and 6.2% of world’s oil and
gas, respectively (BP, 2012). The continent is especially important in the exploration
of platinum, chromium, tantalum, gold, diamond, cobalt, manganese, and phosphate
(SHARAKY, 2011). Also, the African oil industry becomes increasingly important
due to the growing demand of emerging countries and the depletion of resources in
other oil-producing regions, in addition to the discovery of major new oil reserves in
East Africa. Accordingly, about 60% of the FDI that comes into the continent goes to
resource-rich countries, the majority of it into the primary sector (AFRICAN BANK,
2007).
5With the advent of new technologies of the digital era, the second half of the 20th century saw
a huge increase in demand for the so called rare earth elements, which compose many
components of new products such as computer memory, DVD's, rechargeable batteries, cell
phones, car catalytic converters, magnets, fluorescent lighting and much more (GOONAN,
2011). This has spurred a race for minerals in Africa, prompting foreign companies to seek
deals in mineral extraction.
6 “Resources such as diamonds and gemstones that have a high value-to-weight ratio and can be
easily appropriated and transported by unskilled workers” (HILSON; MACONACHIE, 2009,
p.60).
7 Metals may be considered renewable resources in the sense that they can be recycled, but they
are not regenerative in nature, therefore they will not be considered renewable for the purpose
of discussing countries’ development strategies.
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The distribution of oil resources is uneven in the continent – 65% of the reserves
are located in only two countries, Libya and Nigeria, followed by Angola and Algeria
representing each one about 10% of the total8 (BP, 2012). Natural gas is found in
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria, with the main reserves located in the latter, while
coal is found mostly in South Africa and Zimbabwe (BP, 2012). As for mineral
resources, there is a clear concentration of reserves in South Africa, but they are
relatively more evenly distributed in Sub-Saharan Africa, as can be seen in the map
below.
Geographic distribution of strategic minerals in Africa. Source: SHARAKY, 2011.
2.2. The challenges facing Extractive Industries in Africa
The resources that could be a blessing to boost Africa’s economy are frequently
seeing as a curse. There is a strong relation between abundance of resources and
poverty, one that many scholars have been trying to explain. Despite the fact that, in
terms of gross internal product (GDP), resource-abundant countries in Africa are
richer than the resource-scarce ones, other indexes are worrying. Jeffrey Sachs and
8 Other significant oil reserves are located in Chad, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Sudan, South Sudan, and Tunisia (BP, 2012).
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Andrew Warner studied 97 countries between 1970 and 1989, and found that states
highly dependent on natural resources exports had slower growth rates, even when
controlling other variables (SACHS; ANDREW, 1997). More recently, a study
conducted by the African Bank (2007), analyzing data from 1891 through 2006, found
that the economic growth and the investment in human capital of resource-rich
countries was considerably lower when compared to other African countries, and the
inequality level was higher. The inequality is particularly worse in countries with fuels
and non-lootable minerals, because the exploration is done by huge enterprises –
mostly multinationals or state-owned companies – that are capital intensive and use
few unqualified labor, frequently hiring foreign employers and sending profits abroad.
According to the same African Bank study, the comparison shows that the degree
of economic diversification is also lower in resource-rich countries. That shows that a
great part of extraction profits is not invested on diversification or social projects, but
goes into the hands of the country’s elite, is absorbed by government corruption, or
goes to foreign countries through the process of repatriation of profits. Also, the lack
of diversification can be partially explained by the “Dutch Disease”, that is, the rise in
the export volume of natural resources leads to exchange rate valorization, which is
prejudicial to other economic sectors both because it undermines export efforts and
because it overstimulates imports in the internal market. The high dependence on
imports can be especially problematic with the deterioration of the terms of trade – the
value of the country’s exports, mainly natural resources, diminishes when compared
to the country’s imports. The terms of trade in resource-rich countries have dropped
since the 1980s, and some studies even show that the phenomenon has been
happening since “at least the beginning of the twentieth century” (ROSS, 1999, p.
303).
Dependence on extractive industries is particularly risky considering the volatility
of some commodity markets, specially the oil one, making a country’s economy
susceptible to price shocks. Governments may feel compelled to over-borrow in times
of high prices, compromising themselves with debts they will not be able to pay when
the prices go down again, many times stuck with “white elephant” projects 9. That is
the case with the high government borrowing during the euphoria of the oil booms,
caused mainly by the petroleum crises in 1973 and 1979, and the fiscal problems that
came as consequence when the prices came down in the 1980s (AFRICAN BANK,
2007, p. 102). Therefore, volatility is not only an economic issue but also a political
one, since the revenues of the high prices periods could be managed in order to protect
the countries in times of price shocks, and the indiscriminate borrowing could be
stopped both by the government or the credit banks.
The governments in resource-rich countries may turn into “rentier-states”,
meaning that their budgets are composed mainly by revenues instead of taxation,
which can lead to further distancing from civil society and its demands. The revenues
also give enough financial laxity for the ruling elite to continue in the government,
9 The “white elephants” are those projects that get a lot of attention but that do not address the
real necessities of the population – such as stadiums or huge hospitals built in the main cities
while the major necessities are in the countryside –, and are usually focused on political gains
other than addressing correctly the country’s main development needs.
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either by rent distribution between allies and to coopt enemies, or by affording police
and military maneuvers. That is the case mainly in countries with fuels or non-lootable
minerals that are explored by huge companies, either government-owned or
multinationals. In oil-producers such as Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Chad, the
high levels of corruption (TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2011) have not
stopped the investment in the extractive industries. The multinational companies are
willing to participate in the schemes of corrupt governments because they cannot
choose the location of the resources, and the high costs of setting up the endeavor
make companies unlikely to move once they are established in a country. In countries
rich in lootable resources, corruption happens in a lower level. Because the resources
are explored in a decentralized way, efficient regulation becomes harder, facilitating
the illegal trade; when there is some kind of regulation, it is frequently done not by the
central government but by small groups that control the resource-rich areas.
Africa’s vulnerability to the problems mentioned above have limited the
development of an internally conducted industrialization process, diminishing African
capacity to explore its natural resources and increase their selling price abroad. The
local techniques are still rudimentary, since developments were delayed by the
colonial teaching system. All the while, Western colonial companies did not transfer
science and technology, so countries are dependent on foreign machinery (MAZRUI,
2010). Political and economic conditions in Africa have also prevented the
development of the type of modern logistical systems that have fostered trade and
economic growth in the industrial world (GWILLIAM, 2011). Bad infrastructure
conditions keep all African economic sectors away from modernization and
competitiveness, including the one of extractive industries. Currently, roads dominate
the transport sector in most of the countries today, but their quality remains poor.
Railway lines are isolated, with little network interconnection. Most networks still
operate at the standards to which they were constructed: small-scale, undercapitalized,
and designed for relatively little load and low speeds. More recently, China’s
investment in railways has been motivated by that country’s need to secure supplies of
scarce minerals critical to its growth. Furthermore, Africa’s inland transport is poorly
aligned with port development, causing stuffing of containers in port areas and
creating congestions. African ports are usually small and badly equipped
(GWILLIAM, 2011).
2.3. Civil Conflicts and Extractive Industries
Civil wars have an extreme impact on poverty and development, leading to
an increased number of external and internal refugees, rampant unemployment,
environmental degradation, spreading of infectious diseases, and other major
problems. Moreover, conflicts are stages to constant human rights violations. They
also cause a long term destabilization of the country’s economic infrastructure, taking
it decades to recover and be back on the path to development. Thus, the search for the
causes and factors that influence civil conflict is an important matter in the progress of
Africa, a continent that has suffered under many armed disputes. In this context, it has
been pointed out by Ross (2003) that there is a relation between civil war and
extractive resource dependence, implying that natural resources can influence the
occurrence and development of conflicts in impoverished countries. The World Bank
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recognizes this link and the effect it has on poverty, and dedicates attention to
exploring its possible solutions, especially since 2002, when it started the Governance
of Natural Resources Research Project (BANNON; COLLIER, 2003). According to a
book published by the World Bank, “close to 50 armed conflicts active in 2001 had a
strong link to natural resource exploitation” (BANNON; COLLIER, 2003, p.7). Also,
since the 1990s the United Nations identified on several occasions the exploitation of
natural resources as one of the main economic factors financing conflict in Africa
(OSAA, 2006, p.7). There is an estimate, represented in the graphic below, that the
risk of civil conflict rises proportionally to the percentage of natural resources in the
GDP.
Source: BANNON; COLLIER, 2003, p.3.
Although that statement has been validated, it is not deterministic. As Ross
(2004b) points out, both civil war and resource dependence can be caused by a third
factor, such as a weak rule of law or poverty. Likewise, the relation can be considered
one of mutual causality. The distribution of resources can generate conflicts or
influence and sustain an existing one. Moreover, an internal conflict can harm the
economy, raising the reliance on one of the few sectors that cannot flee – Extractive
Industries –, while the manufacturing and service sectors are disrupted.
Also, when it comes to Africa, it is important to consider that the dependence
on the extractive sector is partly a heritage of the colonization pattern: the colonial
powers in resource-rich countries have established weak institutions and empowered a
small elite in order to set the conditions to maximize their profits (BASEDAU, 2005),
creating an economic environment focused on exports of natural resources, with little
space for diversification and to attend the population’s needs. This means that the
relation between natural resource dependence and civil conflict is influenced by the
countries’ history, and the singularities of each conflict have to be analyzed. With
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these considerations in mind, there are some similarities that can be considered as
trends in civil wars involving natural resources.
Since the end of the Cold War and the consequent decline in foreign
assistance, the importance of Extractive Industry revenues in financing conflicts has
grown (LE BILLON, 2000). In Angola’s civil war, the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels started to depend entirely on natural
resources since assistance from post-Apartheid South Africa and the United States
faded. Also, according to Ross (2004b), the war in Sudan became more serious in the
1990s for the same reason. Given that the rebels are usually the weakest side, the
availability of natural resources as sources of financing means that the conflict may
last longer than it would if they were deprived of means to continue their activities.
That is also true if the government is considered the weakest part: in 1997 and 1998,
during the First Congo War, the government was the weaker side in the DRC and was
being financed by the control of the oil – the same happened in 1993-1994 in Angola
(ROSS, 2003). If the resource is lootable, rebels can directly explore it, or charge
workers a fee to explore the regions they control. Lootable resources like diamonds,
that present a high value per weight, can be easily smuggled and sold illegally as
experience has shown.
If the resource is unlootable and demands high infrastructure to be explored
and transported, especially in the case of oil, it is almost impossible for the rebels to
control its production. However, if the petroleum is on shore, rebels can obstruct
pipelines and destroy equipment, harming government profit. Rebels can also make
profits through the kidnapping of workers and the charging of an “insurance” from
companies to prevent the destruction of their facilities. That happened in South Sudan,
where rebels frequently obstructed the pipeline that links the southern oil fields to the
northern refinery and harbor (ROSS, 2004a). These kinds of maneuvers also happen
currently in Nigeria, practiced by armed groups whose alleged goal is to fight the
socio-economic damage the oil exploitation is causing in the Niger Delta region.
Other important factors with regards to resource availability to rebels are the
distance from the country’s capital and if the resource is concentrated or spread in a
large area. When the resources are placed in areas far from the central power, it is
easier for the rebels to control it – that is the case of Sierra Leone and the DRC, where
diamonds are in remote areas. In Angola, the main diamond mines are in the Luanda
Norte region, but the alluvial diamonds are scattered and were controlled mainly by
the UNITA rebels. In Botswana and in Namibia, where the diamonds are respectively
concentrated in kimberlite pipes and along the shore, it is easier for the central power
to control them (LE BILLON, 2000). Both in Angola and in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) the same pattern was followed: the rebels controlled much of the
lootable resources, while the unlootable ones were under the government’s power
(ROSS, 2003).
When the natural resource at stake is unlootable and concentrated in a certain
region, particularly in the case of oil, historical events have shown that the region in
which the resource is located can start a separatist rebellion in order to better profit
from the revenues of the resource. That can be caused either by greed - that is, will to
dominate the exploration without sharing it with the rest of the country - or grievance
- in order to protest against the mismanagement of the central government, the lack of
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benefits felt by the population, and the negative consequences of the extractive
activities in the region (COLLIER, 1999). Separatist conflicts are more likely when
they are supported by an ethnic rhetoric, which helps the mobilization of rebels –
especially if a group feels that it is being harmed by another in power, as was the case
of the civil wars in Sudan and Nigeria. Although the two cases have many distinct
characteristics, both the oil-rich regions of Biafra, in Nigeria, and South Sudan sought
separatism through ethnic rhetoric, with only the latter achieving success 10.
Civil conflicts commonly have regional interests involved, and in the case of
resource-rich countries, economic interests may also have global implications –
resources needed by distant countries, and multinationals exploring far from home.
The rebel group UNITA, in Angola, besides being helped by the United States in the
Cold War context, received assistance from Burkina Faso and from Togo partly
because of economic interests (LE BILLON, 2000). Immediate economic gains are
not the only way countries can receive foreign assistance – even if a group does not
have the control over the resources, it can sell “booty futures”, that is, future rights
over resources they are currently fighting for. That has been done in the First Congo
War, when multinational mining companies – namely the American Mineral Fields
(AMFI) and the Canadian Tenke Mining – closed exploration deals with Laurent
Kabila even before the war was over (SILVA, 2011).
In fact, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a great example of foreign
intervention seeking the exploitation of resources. Considered to be the world’s richest
country in mineral resources, the DRC had its politics, since independence, closely
controlled by the United States through Mobutu Sese Seko’s government, both to
secure American companies economic interests and to maintain a strategically
important anti-communist regime. With the end of the Cold War, Mobutu lost its main
supporter, and was deposed by Laurent Kabila, who was helped by neighbor countries
and by multinational companies, in the First Congo War in 1997 (SILVA, 2011). In
the following year, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi turned against Kabila, starting the
Second Congo War. Ugandan and Rwandan troops, in both wars, allegedly benefited
from plundering DRC’s resources (SILVA, 2011). Kabila’s allies - namely Angola,
Namibia, Sudan, Chad, and mainly Zimbabwe – also had economic motives to get
involved in the war and benefited from the exploitation of the country’s resources as
well (SILVA, 2011). Hence, Congo’s importance as a strategically located and
resource-rich country engaged the continent in its internal affairs, to an extent that the
Second Congo War became known as “Africa’s World War”.
Recently, the North of the continent has witnessed a massive wave of civil
uprises – named “The Arab Spring” – which protested against poverty,
unemployment, human rights abuse, and sought to remove governments considered
corrupt and autocratic. The movement started in December 2010, in Tunisia, and
spread to other countries of the Arab world, including the African countries of Egypt
and Libya. Egypt and Lybia are significant oil exporters, a feature that renders their
internal political changes a subject of interest for the international community. In
10 The ethnic component can also explain why even when separatist rebellions run out of
financing they are prone to last longer – the support of the population to the rebel forces
undermines the government efforts to contain it.
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Libya, since Muammar al-Gaddafi refused to step back from power while the war
escalated, a United Nations resolution decided for military intervention in March
2011, with abstentions from China and Russia. NATO’s intervention was decisive to
give victory to the rebels, and it is clear that interest for oil was a major motivation for
foreign countries, especially France and England, to intervene.
The abundance of natural resources in Africa has made it a space of
imperialist dispute since colonization, passing through the Cold War, and arriving at
the competition that involves the emerging players. However, after the independence
of the African countries, the external influence on the political affairs of the continent
did not occur in a direct form, but mainly trough proxy wars and financial and military
support to allies. Therefore, the major security threat to African countries was not of
an external attack, but from its internal disputes for political and economic power,
always considering that these disputes frequently involve also foreign interests.
The World Bank’s scope does not allow it to interfere in the political
dynamics of civil conflicts, but, as analyzed, the conflicts involving extractive
industries frequently have common logics of inequality due to unfair distribution of
revenues, poor governance, and economic underdevelopment. A study published by
the World Bank asserts that “successful development is the best protection against
civil war” (BANNON; COLLIER, 2003, p. 7). Therefore, poverty alleviation and
economic growth are two major areas where the Bank seeks to work in order to
diminish the probabilities of civil conflict. Along with that, the Bank’s transparency
measures ideally lead to accountability and consequently to a government that meets
the needs of the population, also contributing to political stability.
2.4. Socioeconomic impacts
One of the World Bank Group’s main goals is to help the eradication or, at
least, the alleviation of poverty through sustainable development. To better understand
this goal, it is important to bear in mind the definitions of poverty and sustainable
development that guide the Group’s work. Therefore, poverty can be defined as
a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing inability to
satisfy basic needs, lack of control over resources, lack of
education and skills, poor health, malnutrition, lack of shelter,
access to water and sanitation, vulnerability to shocks, violence
and crime, lack of political freedom and voice (WORLD BANK
GROUP, 2003).
Meanwhile, sustainable development is the “development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs” (WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, 1987, p. 43).
Bearing these concepts in mind, it is not hard to believe that extractive
industries can bring some help to the cause of poverty eradication. The expansion of
the extractive sector can bring a variety of benefits to a country: greater flow of
capitals towards the country and a positive balance of payments; increase in the
governmental capacity to collect taxes without taking money from the people,
investing the revenues in infra-structure and other common goods; and positive
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externalities, such as the creation of new businesses to better serve all the newcomers
(UNCTAD, 2012). However, all these possible benefits must be thoroughly planned
by the State so as to avoid the other side of these opportunities, for example the rise of
the capital flow can, as described through the Dutch Disease concept, raise the prices
of African products through exchange rate, reducing exports. Besides, corruption and
lack of transparency are two great obstacles to a more comprehensive form of
development that the extractive industries might have made possible.
Despite the general belief that the employment rate will rise with the
introduction of this new economic sector, the new enterprises develop capital
intensive activities, needing, therefore, almost exclusively high-skilled professionals
that are hardly found in the regions of exploration. To promote the sustainable
development of the African economies through the extractive sector it would be
necessary that the resources obtained through rents be used to improve the educational
system and to build infra-structure. However, this is usually not the case in African
countries (UNCTAD, 2012), as the rents are generally used for other purposes.
The most important economic consequence of extractive activities is the great
dependence of the country's economy on foreign markets (BRYAN, HOFMAN,
2007). This represents an incredible danger: even though the benefits from an increase
on these products’ prices are huge, so are the losses provoked by crisis situations or
any decrease in international prices. Besides, the exploration of such resources will
necessarily extinguish them sometime in the future, since the reserves are not eternal
and the only way to increase the national reserves is by finding new exploration sites.
Furthermore, even though the extractive industries are responsible for a certain
increase of the GDP, the social consequences from this exploration can be harmful to
the common Africans. Throughout time, this kind of economic activity has not
fostered an equal development throughout the different social groups, intensifying
asymmetries of power, keeping, for example, women socially marginalized in most
cases. Firstly, populations can be affected by the very granting of licenses to
companies which receive the right to explore certain territories for their natural
resources. When the land is granted, the people living in that land become an issue to
the company, as they have to be evacuated for the beginning of the extraction process.
However, according to a UN report, the enforced or involuntary resettlement
Is considered a practice that does grave and disastrous harm to
the basic civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of
large numbers of people, both individual persons and
collectivities (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, p.10).
However, resettlement continues to occur and is usually not conducted in a
way that really compensates the population’s losses (ENTWICLUNGSPOLITIK
INFORMATION NORD-SÜD, 2007). There is not enough land to reallocate all the
evacuated people and, when available, the places these people are moved to do not
always allow them access to their primary needs, such as sources of income, arable
land, and drinkable water, creating very bad living conditions for the resettled people.
This problem is even worse when we examine the cases of indigenous people. There
are some opinions that consider this change of habit in local people, who inhabited
these areas for many years, a form of ethnocide (WORLD BANK, 2003).
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Another important human consequence of extractive industries is the migration
of many foreigners and people from other regions of the country interested in the
opportunities the emergence of new activities creates. The increase in population
numbers can originate tensions among the people, since the old and new inhabitants
compete for scarce resources, and the infra-structure and social services are overexplored and prove no to be prepared for such a high demand, decreasing incredibly
the quality of the service at the local citizens’ disposal (SOCIETY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2009).
Even though GDP increases, it does not necessarily induce better wages, as
much of the work is made by machines and specialized working force is brought from
other countries. This not only implies a stagnation of wages, but it is also responsible
for rising unemployment rates, as the local artisanal methods of extracting minerals
are
substituted
by
extractive
industries’
large-scale
methods
(ENTWICLUNGSPOLITIK INFORMATION NORD-SÜD, 2007). Beyond that,
these industries do not always follow the countries’ work legislation and sometimes
produce slave-like conditions of work for local people. The stronger development of
resource regions in the country also promotes inequality among the countries’ regions,
creating asymmetrical, and sometimes conflicting, relations among them.
The conditions of work in the extractive activities are often pretty bad for the
workers' health and safety, being the mining sector the one that kills the most workers
(WORLD BANK GROUP, 2003, pg. 35). Therefore, better worker rights’ regulations
have to be passed in each country, so that these workers can receive their salaries
without having to threaten or harm their own health. The government is, therefore, the
main responsible for ensuring that the companies are complying with the new
regulations. Meanwhile, many transnational companies develop health and safety
programs so as to show their interest for such causes and try to reduce the general
criticism towards extractive companies, reversing accusations that they generate most
of the problems related to natural and social issues in the African countries (WORLD
BANK GROUP, 2003).
In many cases the problems caused might be said to surpass the economic
growth and the opportunities created:
Even with the increase in the number of mining companies in
Tanzania, the rate of employment has not increased. There have
been falling standards in labor rights and welfare as workers are
denied freedom to participate in unions. […] Inequality in society is
further exacerbated by large-scale corporate mining operations. In
most cases, people from the local communities around the mining
area remain unemployed (SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 2009, p. 55).
Countries that have recently experienced some kind of political turbulence are
usually good examples of human problems caused or catalyzed by the extractive
industry. In Sierra Leone, extremely low wages, disrespect for labor law, and
conditions of work similar to slavery are some of the problems faced by the country,
caused by or related to the exploration of the countries' natural resources, mainly
diamonds. In some countries, local initiatives have been formed to try and solve the
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problems major transnational mining companies have caused to the local population,
like the WACAM11. This association tries to disseminate information on poorly
conducted cases of reimbursement to dislocated people, and to help these people
search for their rights through the legal framework. However, most companies end up
settling the cases outside the courtroom, avoiding public records of such irregularities.
Similarly, in order to help attract more foreign investment, Ghana, following the
recommendation of many experts – including World Bank ones –, has passed a law
that, besides reducing taxes, weakens the ecological and social burdens to mining
companies (ENTWICLUNGSPOLITIK INFORMATION NORD-SÜD, 2007).
2.5. Environmental consequences
The damages inflicted by the presence of extractive industries upon the African
nature are as great as the political and economic phenomena usually described as
resource curse. The processes adopted to extract minerals, oil, and gas incur in terrible
consequences to the local environment, and, therefore, the indigenous population. To
better understand the impacts that this extraction has over the African environment, it
is important to analyze the different resources that are explored and the different
forms this extraction is conduced. An important element that has to be considered in
the analysis of the mining sector is the presence of both small- and large-scale mining,
because of the distinct ways they damage the nature that surrounds them.
First of all, the exploration of mineral resources implies the modification of the
local natural structures: forests are invaded and stone formations are destroyed in
order to create better ways to access the mining sites and to facilitate the
transportation of the minerals extracted to their destinations (WWF, 2011). So, roads
are built, changing the soil characteristics and an increased flow of people towards the
mining region can be observed, incurring in the natural consequences that fast
urbanization provokes. The construction of roads, besides promoting noise and
material pollution, reduces the area the wildlife has to inhabit and can make it easier
for hunters to develop their activities by reducing the natural defenses of the animals.
An example of that is the Western Congo Basin that is located in the territory of three
different states, Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon. The exploration of iron in this region
led to construction of roads and other structures that enter the rainforest, making it
easier for hunters to have access to the elephant and apes that inhabit the area (WWF,
2011).
Another common feature in the exploration of mineral resources in Africa is
the high demands for water and the following contamination of water and air. During
the exploration of most mineral resources, dust and other emissions are produced
which are usually not constrained by their producers, spreading throughout the
regions. The exploration sites are usually “plagued by poor sanitation, lack of clear
and safe drinking water, high congestion, and poor hygiene” (SOCIETY FOR
11 WACAM is the Wassa (Ghana’s Western region) association of communities affected by
mining. It records the problems caused by the exploration of minerals in that region and
organizes the activities developed in order to reduce the human rights violations perpetrated by
the mining companies (ENTWICLUNGSPOLITIK INFORMATION NORD-SÜD, 2007).
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2009, p. 53). Often water bodies have their
flow changed in order to facilitate the extraction of alluvial deposit minerals.
The mineral’s nature and location are very important to evaluate the impacts its
extraction might have on the surrounding environment. One of the less damaging
forms of extraction is the underground mining, which can be summarized as the use of
tunnels to have access to explored resources. Even though it does not occupy a large
surface area and does not interfere directly in the wildlife, it does have negative
impacts, such as the great consumption of energy and water, and the creation of mine
tailings. Meanwhile, open-pit sites create greater disturbances, since they require
important structural changes to the occupied surface, like the removal of rocks and
sediments from the mining sites. The deep impact this form of mineral extraction
causes can also reach underground layers, contaminating the water table (BATS,
2008).
The extraction of some mineral resources occurs in a simpler way, without the
utilization of chemical products that can detach the desired mineral from other
elements. The exploration of those resources, like sand, clay, and rock, is marked by
the removal of great quantities, promoting changes in the natural relief and soil
composition. Other minerals, like gold, after their extraction from nature, have to
undergo chemical processes before being introduced into the market (BATS, 2008).
These chemical processes include products that damage the nature intensely and are
commonly conducted without the minimal care required to avoid environmental
impacts; for example, the obtainment of gold requires the utilization of cyanide, which
is highly toxic. After the gold is obtained, the cyanide is usually disposed with no care
in water bodies, provoking serious damages to water resources.
Even though small-scale mining, developed by locals, might promote a better
level of life in the countries, by allowing its citizens to find work and increasing the
national income, we cannot undermine the potential large-scale mining has to use
methods of extraction that are less harmful to the nature, because of the high level of
technology it has access to and to the level of accountability the big enterprises might
be forced to have, forcing them sometimes to use less harmful products and methods.
The small-scale mining produces sometimes very bad results because of the inferior
level of information that are at the miners’ disposal. These cases usually risk not only
the miner’s lives, but also the lives of the people that inhabit the region and use the
same hydro resources (SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2009)
or rely on the same forests.
The impacts of oil and gas extraction are also harmful to the African
environment. The process of drilling in the oil extraction can in many ways promote
pollution. This can happen as the drills made might reach table water or other sensible
underground layers, or by creating disturbance to the natural life surrounding the
exploration sites. The construction of infra-structure that precedes the drilling
promotes similar effects to the local biodiversity as the ones experienced in the mining
processes.
Another harmful consequence is deeply related to an inappropriate structure for
the transportation of the oil and gas to their destinations. The great advantages of the
African oil for external markets, such as the facility to refine it, the better location of
the reserves in terms of subsequent transportation and the small involvement of the oil
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UFRGSMUN 2012
producing regions in conflicts, all in comparison to the Middle East (KELLERMAN;
DOVE, 2010), produce a high demand for this resource and therefore higher pressure
on the commonly old and outdated extractive infra-structure. The bad conservation of
the oil pipelines in many African oil producing countries causes frequent spills of this
resource on the environment crossed by such pipelines. Oil spills are responsible for
great damages to the local fauna and flora, contaminating water and soil (BATS,
2008). The only solution to this problem is the constant upgrading of infra-structure
and surveillance over the oil pipelines so that spills can be prevented; however, this
requires an increased investment that is usually not available for such causes.
A third problem that is often caused by oil and gas exploration is what
specialists commonly refer to as produced water. This outcome of the extraction of
these resources is created when the water present in the offshore oil and gas reserves
is brought out of the sea mixed with oil and grease. This water is highly
contaminating, because of the presence of toxic substances from petroleum. At first,
the produced water would be reintroduced into the nature without any regard for the
implications of such a decision, provoking incredible environmental damages.
Nowadays, this byproduct of the oil exploration ought to be extracted from the toxic
mixture it is involved in through very long procedures. The obtainment of produced
water is deeply related to the time the extraction unit has been used: as the time
passes, more and more produced water is obtained as a byproduct of the oil
exploration (BATS, 2008).
2.6. Actors involved in the Extractive Industry
2.6.1. Traditional Actors
As mentioned before, the beginning of the extraction of African natural
resources was primarily conducted by the continent’s indigenous people and trade
routes were established with the Arabs and the Ottomans. However, these processes
started to take new dimensions with the arrival of European countries, which started to
dominate various African regions since the 16th century, and reached a higher level
after the Industrial Revolution and the colonial period. In the 20th century the forms of
domination were gradually changed as movements for independence got stronger,
finally resulting in the decolonization of the continent (CROWDER, 2010). However,
the European powers, mainly France and the UK, maintained their influence over their
former colonies in the post-colonial period, spreading it to the former territories of
other European countries. Nevertheless, European interests in Africa and their
capabilities to sustain their intensive intervention grew weaker and they were
gradually substituted in many sectors by the US and the new actors, which started to
act with more strength in the continent by the end of the 20 th century. The United
States and its companies were very successful in taking over much of the strong trade
relations once conducted by Europeans.
The largest colonialist empire in Africa was owned by the United Kingdom12.
Initially, English interests towards the region were not of territorial domination, but
12 Its African possessions went from South Africa to Egypt and from Somaliland to Sierra
Leone. The British imperialism towards the African continent started around the end of the 18th
century, with the occupation of the formerly Dutch Cape colony.
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the increase in trade; such goal was gradually enlarged because of the traders’ lobby
and the fear towards the French empire (SHIH-TSUNG, 1998). The British obtained a
lot from extracting natural resources from their colonies, even after the end of the
British formal rule over its African territories. During the post-colonial period, the UK
used the Commonwealth of Nations to maintain its influence over the continent.
However, British interest in Africa gradually faded, as its power declined and it had to
concentrate on other elements to keep its status as a world power.
The main British company in Africa, which was an important element in UK’s
foreign policy formulation, was the mining sector Lonrho 13. Additionally, two of the
world’s “supermajor” oil exploration companies are British: the BP plc (formerly
British Petroleum) and the Royal Dutch Shell plc (also Dutch). These companies
profited a lot from the British possessions in Africa, as some of these colonies
detained and still detain some of the largest oil reserves in the continent, such as
Nigeria and Sudan (and recently South Sudan). Nowadays, the United Kingdom
imports around 25.9% of its precious stones from African mines (or 17.8% of African
exports of these products), and 8.7% of its oil from African reserves
(INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE). Its main African trade partners are, besides
Algeria, the former colonies of South Africa, Botswana, Nigeria, and Egypt.
The French imperialism was also really strong in Africa, having conquered a
huge part of Western Africa and islands in the Indic Ocean. The African French
colonies were the main colonial system for France, as its territories in Indochina were
gradually lost14. Therefore, the French deployed a very intense strategy for the
continent, so as to ensure control over the territory and the exploration of natural
resources by French companies, competing intensively with the United Kingdom. The
last African country to obtain independence from French rule was Comoros in 1975 –
the French still control the Mayotte Island. The Francophonie was the French postcolonial way of maintaining its ties to the African continent, this being the most
comprehensive Western initiative in that direction (CLAPHAM, 1996). Through the
Francophonie, France managed to include former Belgian colony DR Congo into its
area of influence. The French oil company Elf, which later merged into the French oil
“supermajor” Total, got very good conditions for the exploration of oil in African
territory. Currently, France imports around 18.2% of its oil imports from Africa,
having as main commercial partners Algeria, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Morocco
(INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE).
Portugal was the first Western European national State to establish a stronger
contact with the African continent during the Age of Great Navigations, as
aforementioned. The decline of the Portuguese power, however, did not allow it to
conquer a greater portion of the African continent. Despite that, Portuguese colonies
in Africa cannot be disregard, as two of them, Angola and Mozambique, were the
stage of some of the most violent conflicts in the post-colonial period. Almost all
Portuguese colonies became independent from the metropole in 1975. However, this
13 London and Rhodesian Mining and Land Corporation Limited, nowadays Lonmin plc,
producer platinum group metals.
14 France first started spreading its influence and creating trade relations with Africa in 1624,
establishing trading posts in Senegal.
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independence came only through armed conflict, as Portugal did not detain the tools to
deploy a neocolonialist strategy towards its former colonies (CLAPHAM, 1996). Even
after the armed fight with the former metropole, the Portuguese colonies still have
some level of contact with Portugal. Portugal kept the intense trade with Angola,
which, together with Algeria and Nigeria, is one of the main Portuguese commercial
partners in Africa. This trade is intensively based on the import of oil, which
represents approximately 35.5% of all Portuguese oil imports (INTERNATIONAL
TRADE CENTRE).
The German participation in the dispute for African colonies was delayed by
the formation of its national State. Together with the French, the Germans summoned
the Berlin Conference in order to consolidate some of its conquests and try to expand
its colonies (SHIH-TSUNG, 1998). The first German colonies were conquered by the
Prussians in the Ghana, Benin region in the end of the 17th century. Later, the current
territories of Namibia, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Cameroon, and Togo came under
German rule. Nonetheless, all colonies were lost after the German defeat in the First
World War. However, Germany still trades with Africa, mainly South Africa and
Nigeria, with greater importance for the import of oil, accounting for 8.2% of German
oil imports, and precious stones, representing 9.2% of the country’s import from the
sector (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE).
Other European countries also conquered African regions and developed some
extractive activities, and still contribute to this sector, either through the national
extractive companies they installed during the colonial period or by buying the
products originated from these activities. Through French encouragement, the
European Commission signed agreements – like the Lomé Convention – with former
African colonies in order to create special conditions for the import of natural
resources and other products from one continent to the other (CLAPHAM, 1996).
The Dutch had some possessions in West Africa, in what is now Ghana and
Mauritania, but ended losing or selling them to either the British or the French.
Besides, they were the first to occupy the territory of current South Africa, but were
also expelled from there by the British. The bi-national “supermajor” oil company
Royal Dutch Shell plc has its headquarters in The Hague. The Netherlands still
imports a great deal of oil from Africa, approximately 8.9% of its total oil imports,
mainly from Nigeria and Algeria (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE). Belgium,
for its part, colonized the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 19 th century, later
taking Burundi and Rwanda from Germany during the First World War. The
colonization process was based on the exploration of ivory and rubber (VISENTINI,
2012). The Congolese independence came in 1960, while Rwanda and Burundi
became independent in 1962. Since then, Belgium lost a lot of its influence over these
countries and was gradually replaced by France and the United States. The Belgian
trade with Africa was sensitively reduced; still, 7.7% of Belgium’s precious stones
imports come from Africa (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE).
Spain and Italy also had some colonies in the African continent: Spain
dominated the territories of Equatorial Guinea and Western Sahara, keeping them until
the independence of the first in 1968 and the conquest of the second by Morocco in
1975; Italy conquered Libya, Eritrea, and part of Somalia, losing all of them after its
defeat in World War II. Both countries still maintain a great deal of trade relations
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with the continent, mainly of oil. Their oil purchases from Africa represent a great
deal from their total oil purchases, Spain – 29.7% –, and Italy – 24.7% –, and from the
African total oil sales, Spain – 7.2% –, and, Italy – 8.5%. Italy maintains strong trade
relations with former colony Libya and Algeria; while Spain trades mostly with
Morocco, Algeria, and Nigeria (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE).
Additionally, during the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire conquered the Northern
part of Africa, but gradually lost it to European powers. The pattern of domination,
however, was different from the European, as the extractive sector was not the main
goal of the Ottomans.
The dynamics through which the world superpowers started their intervention
in the African continent were not based in the extractive sector. Being concerned with
the global dynamics, they did not pay much attention to this continent, as its location
was not strategic to any of them. The United States used to see Africa as secured by
the maintenance of European influence and intervention through the post-colonialist
practices. In that sense, the fast increase in American intervention is closely related to
the Soviet challenge to the status of the continent, helping movements that wanted to
undermine some regimes supported by European powers (CLAPHAM, 1996).
The United States had almost unrestrained access to Africa – facing only some
resistance from the French –, but few US companies maintained strong interests in the
African extractive sector in the mid 20th century, not pushing the American
government towards a stronger economic policy for the continent. However, the oil
sector already showed some level of American initiative, as the Gulf Oil – later
merged into Chevron Corporation – was already involved in the Angolan civil war.
Gradually, many other US companies started getting involved with the extractive
sector in Africa. In the oil industry, the other two US oil and gas “supermajors”,
ExxonMobil Corporation and ConocoPhillips Company, also started exploring
petroleum in the continent. The increasing private interest led to a greater US insertion
in Africa in order to ensure the accomplishment of the companies’ goals (GARY;
KARL, 2003). The portion of US oil imports sold by African countries has been
growing recently; in 2011 it represented 16.6% of the total, while representing 23.9%
of the total oil exports from the continent to the world. Meanwhile, the African
precious stones sector exported 6.5% of US total imports of these products,
accounting for 12.2% of the African total precious stones’ exports
(INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE). US main African trade partners are Nigeria,
Algeria, Angola, and South Africa.
2.6.2. Emerging actors
The African continent has been experimenting a new period of international
competition. Especially after the turn of the millennium, the high growth rates of a
group of developing countries has propelled them to seek new markets and sources of
natural resources to fuel that growth. Africa is rich in natural resources, has a growing
middle class, and many investment opportunities, all incentives to greater cooperation.
Emerging countries also seek a place in world politics compatible with their growing
economic strength, pushing for changes towards a multilateral world, such as the
implementation of a new economic order and the reform of the United Nations
Security Council. As Visentini (2010) points out, it is desirable for emerging countries
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that their allies in Africa be strong, since status is more important than quantity in the
strategy of establishing a strong bloc of developing countries to push for changes in
the international order.
Although emerging countries frequently deal with limited resources and
internal development problems of their own, they have been seeking to provide
African states with aid within their capacities. The amount of aid donated by emerging
economies is hard to measure, since it is decentralized and much of it does not fit in
the traditional description of developmental assistance, being associated with
economic agreements – such as export credits, natural-resource backed lines of credit,
and hybrid credits (HUGON, 2010; AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011). In the
extractive industries, it is important to point out that the resources for infrastructure
deals are very beneficial to African countries, especially if one considers the high
levels of corruption frequently found in this sector. The resource revenues paid from
the foreign investor to the government go directly into improving the country’s
infrastructure, avoiding embezzlement – as it is clear in a popular saying in Congo:
“you can't put a highway in your Swiss bank account” (LEE, 2010). China is leading
these mixed forms of aid and investments, and the other Asian emerging countries
also adopted similar models, while Brazil presents a more conventional method
(AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011). Despite the difficulties in measurement, it is
clear that the bulk of emerging countries’ assistance to Africa is rising fast and is
directed mainly to infrastructure construction, agriculture, and human
resources. According to the African Economic Outlook, developed countries focus in
institution building and governance, while emerging economies concentrate their aid
in human resources, infrastructure and “other structural bottlenecks” (AfDB, OECD,
UNDP, UNECA, 2011, p.108).
The economic results of this phenomenon are seen when trade and
investment figures over the last years are analyzed. According to 2009 data, the
traditional partners still have the largest share of African trade, 63.5%, while the
emerging countries have a 6.5% participation. However, the difference is rapidly
diminishing: in 2000, the percentage of African trade corresponding to each group of
countries was 77% and 23%, respectively. As seen in the figure below, China is
Africa’s main trade partner among the emerging countries, followed by India, Korea,
Brazil, and Turkey. Regarding foreign direct investment (FDI), traditional partners
were the source of 83.3% of the total received by Africa in the period between 2005
and 2010, while emerging partners invested 10.2%. But again, if compared with data
from five years before, it is clear the presence of developing countries is growing
(AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011). The African Economic Outlook (AfDB,
OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011) also stresses that focusing only on FDI can be
misleading, since investment from emerging countries has generally other forms. In
terms of destination of the investments, in the first ten years of this century about three
quarters of incoming FDI in Africa were directed to oil exporting countries. It is
important to observe that if only OECD countries are considered the number rises to
85%, showing that, despite also focusing on resource-rich countries, developing
countries have a more diversified investment pattern.
With regards to extractive industries, the progress of these developing
economies has affected the global commodities market in a way beneficial to Africa.
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The sharp increase in the demand of minerals, oil and gas - mainly due to China’s and
India’s growth - has risen world prices, increasing natural resources revenues and
enabling the exploration of more technically difficult locations (WB, 2011a). World
Bank’s predictions point out that the
global metals demand will grow faster than global GDP through
2015, and energy demand is likely to rise by 55 percent until
2030. 80 percent of this increase will be in fast-growing
developing countries like China and India (WB, 2011a, p.14).
According to the World Bank (2011a), the extractive industries have gone
from a buyers market to a sellers market, leading to the review of contracts in several
countries, including the DRC, Tanzania, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone,
Madagascar, and Guinea. It also raises African economic stability, since the 2008
global crisis could have affected more harshly the resource-exporting countries if it
were not for the growing demand of emerging markets. In the oil sector, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries
have reduced their demand growth rate, while the total demand raised mostly due Asia
Pacific imports (BP, 2012). The emerging markets kept with the high medium growth
of 6%, while developed countries’ growth is around 2%; without better conjectures in
the future, the high prices in commodity markets will continue to be maintained due to
developing economies’ growing demand (WB, 2011a). Oil demand from emerging
countries used to represent 25% of the global demand back in 1970, while in the last
years it represented about 50% (WB, 2011a).
The presence of the emerging countries also undermines Western efforts to
exclude countries named “pariah states” from the global economy. Having to face
well established Western competition in the continent, it is clear to understand why
Africa’s new partners see in those countries left aside by the traditional powers a great
opportunity to engage in business negotiations (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA,
2011). It is the case of Sudan and Zimbabwe: both turned to the East when faced with
Western sanctions, and these relations – especially with China – were essential to
maintain the governments of Omar al-Bashir and Robert Mugabe in power. This has
led to much criticism that the developing countries were undermining Western efforts
to oblige these African regimes to comply with human rights, a position which can be
considered hypocritical due to the traditional powers past of supporting undemocratic
governments in the continent and elsewhere.
China is by far the most prominent emerging partner in Africa. In 2009,
China became Africa’s biggest trade partner, a position previously occupied by the
United States (KERMELIOTIS, 2009). China-Africa relations date back to the 1950s
and, with the end of the Cold War, China’s growth accelerated and economic relations
with Africa had a sharp rise. China is still a developing country, but with deep
pockets, willing to take even projects that the West refused to. Its emergence as a
global political power is strongly supported by cooperation among developing
countries, and its close links to Africa are a main part of that strategy. The strategic
reasoning of China’s presence in Africa affects its economic dynamic since the
majority of the Chinese companies are state-owned or closely assisted by the
government, allowing them to operate with very low profit rates and increasing
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competitiveness.
Oil is the second most important energy source to the country, and the high
dependence on imports leads China to seek diversification from the Middle East to
new petroleum producing countries, especially in Africa – in 2009, 76% of the
country’s direct investment in Africa were directed to the 19 countries rich in oil or
mineral resources (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011). The continent provides
24% of Chinese oil imports, mainly from Angola (EIA, 2012). Regarding mineral
exploration, China’s main base metals consumption climbed 16% each year since
2000 (WB, 2011a). Over the years, it also became the largest consumer of bauxite,
iron ore, coal, cooper, nickel, and others. The fast rise in demand has boosted China
presence into Africa to assure the necessary resources to sustain its growth are
provided.
African-Indian relations have historical roots; however, a special Indian policy
towards the African continent was only established after the subcontinent’s
independence in 1947. This policy was based on the fight against colonialism and
racism through the UN and other international bodies. It was through the cooperation
of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and two African chiefs of state,
Egypt’s and Ghana’s presidents, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah, together
with Tito (Yugoslavia) and Sukarno (Indonesia), that the Non-Alignment Movement
was created. However, as India faced some regional and internal problems in the
beginning of its independent period, creating a stronger policy towards Africa was not
an option. It is only during Indira Gandhi’s mandate15 that India reinitiated stronger
relations with Africa, creating development projects in the continent and looking for
natural resources, mainly oil, to fuel its economic growth (VIEIRA, SPOHR, 2011).
In 2010, 70.5% of India’s imports from Africa were composed by oil, which
accounted for 20% of its total oil imports from the world. The second most imported
goods from Africa were precious stones, representing 6.4% of India’s total precious
stones imports. India’s main African trade partners are Nigeria, South Africa, Angola,
and Algeria (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE).
The connections between Brazil and Africa date back to when the slave trade
created permanent bonds between the two regions. Nevertheless, throughout time, this
relationship has seen phases of proximity and distancing according to government
projects and changes on the international scene. A phase of greater proximity started
during the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), when the
number of Brazilian embassies in the continent more than doubled. According to an
article written by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, this
strengthening of relations is a “political, moral and historical obligation”, being Brazil
the second largest black nation in the world (AMORIM, 2003). The Brazilian interest
in Africa is focused on Angola and other Portuguese-speaking countries, where the
language facilitates doing business, and in South Africa. Also, Brazilian companies
have important investments in Northern Africa countries (IGLESIAS; COSTA, 2011)
and Nigeria. Brazilian investments are mostly directed to extractive industries and the
construction sector, besides several diversified small and medium enterprises
established in the country. Even as an oil producer and having recently discovered
15 Indira Gandhi was India’s Prime-Minister between 1966-1977 and 1980-1984.
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major petroleum reserves, Brazilian refining capacity is focused on light oils when it
produces heavy ones, meaning there is always the need to import the first type
(IGLESIAS; COSTA, 2011). The state-owned oil company Petrobras has been
increasing its presence in Africa – in Angola, although it was present in the country
even during the civil war, Petrobras increased substantially its participation since
2006, when it started to participate in oil exploration and production (VILAS-BÔAS,
2011). Moreover, the mining company Vale S.A. has also been investing heavily in
Africa, especially in South Africa and Angola, and with prospects of new projects
coming soon in Guinea, Zambia, and RDC. Vale’s most important investment in the
continent, the Moatize coal mine in Mozambique, has started full production last year
(IGLESIAS; COSTA, 2011). The joint venture of construction companies Odebrecht
and Camargo Corrêa formed a partnership with Vale to the construction of Moatize,
not only limited to the mine and processing plant but also including road infrastructure
and building of a village to the expropriated families (VILAS-BÔAS, 2011).
Turkey has traditionally been a partner to North African States, due to
cultural and religious ties that date back to the Ottoman Empire, while keeping distant
relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1998, though, with the Opening up to Africa
Plan, this scenario has changed and Turkey has been seeking to improve relations with
the whole continent (ÖZKAN, 2011). The “Year of Africa” (2005) was a mark in this
new phase of Turkish-African relations due to the visit of Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan to Africa, “the first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister below the
equatorial line in the country’s history” (ÖZKAN, 2011, p. 121). Last Year, Turkey’s
Prime Minister and a businessmen delegation visited Egypt, Tunisia, and Lybia to
reaffirm cooperation and to close new investment deals that can be highly beneficial
to help the economic reconstruction of these countries after the “Arab Spring” (THE
NATIONAL, 2011). Turkey targets Africa as a market for its products – between
2003 and 2011, the imports from Africa grew 163%, while Turkish exports were
increased by 390%. The main trade partners in the continent are still northern
countries, added to South Africa and Nigeria. Extractive sector products are among
the most imported ones (TURKEY’S MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, 2012).
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union occupied a primary role in the
continent’s foreign relations. These close ties were severely damaged with the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991, and in the following years there were cuts in diplomatic
personnel and closing of nine embassies and three consulates in the continent
(FIDAN; ARAS, 2010). After a period of introspection, Russia is recovering both
economic and politically, a move which is expressed through greater involvement in
global affairs and a revival of interest in Africa. There is a need for the country to
relocate within the new power system and to face new problems, such as the
competition with a rising China (HUGON, 2010). Despite having important mineral
reserves, Russia has the need to import some minerals to supply its internal demand,
and even some products that do exist in Russian territory – aluminum, copper, nickel,
uranium, and others – are shrinking and will not be enough to fulfill the country’s
processing capacity (FIDAN; ARAS, 2010). Also, beyond internal needs, Russian
companies seek to enjoy the investment opportunities in African extractive industries.
To name examples, the companies Gazprom, Abrosa, and Rusoil are, respectively,
involved in gas exploration in Nigeria, diamond extraction in Angola, and aluminium
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exploration in Nigeria and Guinea (HUGON, 2010).
Other significant economic partners to Africa are intra-continental investors
and the Asian countries of Thailand, Indonesia, and especially South Korea. South
Korea has been an important aid donor to Africa, and it has a great interest in the
continent’s extractive industries - the majority of Korean investment is directed to the
sector, and natural resources compose most of African exports to the Asian country
(KANG, 2011). Given intra-continental investment, South Africa is by far the biggest
player, and companies take the expertise acquired in internal extractive industries to
explore resources in other countries in Africa and in the world. Following South
Africa, the biggest African investors are located in the North – Libya, Egypt, Tunisia,
and Morocco – but the recent political turbulences in the first three countries have
caused a shrinking in investment that will be felt in the rest of the continent (AfDB,
OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011). Even though there are clear imbalances of
capabilities between developing countries and besides the inevitable competition for
natural resources, Africa is a place of numerous opportunities and there is space for all
of these emerging countries to engage with the continent.
3.1. African Development Bank (AfDB)
The African Development Bank (AfDB) was created in 1963 with the main
task of supporting the social and economic development of African countries through
financing and policy advice. Its resources come currently from 53 regional member
countries and 24 non-African countries. Among several areas of action, the AfDB
finances mineral exploration operations. Lately, the Bank has become highly active in
mainstreaming extractive industry governance by supporting institutional reforms in
the sector. While the AfDB shares the idea that revenues from the extractive industries
are an important source of economic growth and social development, it recognizes
that the lack of transparency in the management of these resources has often led to
conflict, corruption and poverty in Africa (AfDB, 2012).
According to the African Development Report 2007, elaborated by the AfDB,
few countries in Africa have managed their natural resources in ways that have
beneﬁted the majority of their populations, with the exception of mainly Botswana,
Namibia and South Africa. In most of the other countries, natural resource wealth
ended up in the hands of a few, causing state fragility—Sierra Leone, Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola are examples (AfDB, 2007). As a way to alter
this unequal scenario and improve the extractive sector governance, the funding
decisions of the AfDB, among other criteria, are based on expectations that the
supported projects are development oriented. The fairness (mainly regarding the
distribution of resource rents) of the concession signed between the private investors
and governments is one of the criteria used in deciding in favor of a loan (AfDB,
2012b).
In 2006, the AfDB became an endorser of the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). Since then, the Bank has encouraged resource rich
countries to adhere to the initiative. To those that lack the human, financial and
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institutional capacities for its implementation, the Bank provides technical and
financial assistance. To date, the Bank has contributed to the achievement of EITI
candidacy status of three countries—namely the Central African Republic, Liberia and
Madagascar—and it is assisting others in implementing the initiative. These include
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo, Guinea Conakry and Madagascar. With the Bank’s
support, Liberia became the first African country and the second country in the world
to be classified as EITI compliant (AfDB, 2012).
In 2009, the AfDB launched the Africa Legal Support Facility, a technical
advisory agency that assists member countries to negotiate complex extractive
resource contracts. By providing legal assistance services, the Bank aims to create an
environment with modern regulatory frameworks for the extractive resource sector
(AfDB, 2012c). Nevertheless, countries still have a long way to go. According to a
2012 AfDB’s report, governments have provided overly generous concessions to
foreign mining companies, mainly through taxes exemptions, and they have also
failed to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of resource rents,
violating their own mineral codes (AfDB, 2012b).
3.2. World Bank (WB)
The World Bank recognizes the existence of the “resource curse” patterns in
most resource rich African countries, and believes that the main challenge is to
guarantee that the extractive industry revenues generate economic growth leading to
diversification, and ultimately to poverty alleviation. Since the resources are finite, it
is necessary to transform the natural capital into human capital and infrastructure. The
key is to achieve sustainable development, not only in an environmental sense but in
also to maximize extractive industries’ profits by creating a chain effect that boosts
the growth of other economic sectors. That is, “[i]n terms of extractive industries, the
point is not ‘sustainable mining’ or a ‘sustainable oil industry’: the objective is
sustainable development of human societies, communities, and environments”
(SALIM, 2003, p.4). In order to achieve that, the WB works with governments,
private enterprises, and civil society.
In the 1990’s, the WB started to base its policies on stimulating private
investment by providing a secure environment to mitigate the high risks involved in
most developing countries’ extractive sectors. The Bank assisted governments to
implement investment-friendly reforms, including privatizing state enterprises
(SALIM, 2003). But, as the first Extractive Industries Review Report (SALIM, 2003)
pointed out, these policies alone were not guaranteeing significant results on poverty
alleviation and environmental preservation. Since then, the Bank has enhanced its
social and environmental projects. Another significant change since the 2003’s report
is the regional focus. Between 1994 and 2001, World Bank’s lending on the
extractive industries sector was mainly directed to the Former Soviet Union countries
and to Eastern Europe, while Africa only received 16% of the investments (SALIM,
2003). Nowadays, this pattern has changed, and Sub-Saharan Africa is the main
benefited area, receiving 32% of extractive industry financing, while the Middle East
(including North Africa) is the third region in volume of lending, with 23% of the total
(WORLD BANK 2011a). The WB has provided lending to extractive industry
projects of more than 20 African countries.
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The extractive industry sector of the WB is managed by the Oil, Gas, and
Mining Policy and Operations Unit (SEGOM). SEGOM provides loans, technical
assistance, policy expertise, and other mechanisms to more than 70 countries, most of
them from Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2009, SEGOM created the Extractive Industries
Technical Advisory Facility (EI-TAF), to provide urgent assistance to transactions in
the extractive industries sector (WORLD BANK, 2011a). A government can ask for
EI-TAF assistance when negotiating an exploration contract, for example. Another
interesting field of work of SEGOM is on the relation between Extractive Industries
and Gender, since impacts provoked by natural resource exploration affect men and
women differently.
The WB believes that one of the main causes of the resource curse is poor
governance, and consequently it became the largest donor to projects that address this
problem in the extractive industries. Accordingly to an African Development Bank’s
survey, the WB’s donations to the sector represent 70% of the total (AFDB, 2009).
The Governance for Extractive Industries (GEI), a program of the World Bank
Institute, was formed to address that issue, by connecting stakeholders to monitor
agreements in oil, gas and mining, resulting in more transparent and responsible
contracts – in Ghana, thanks to the efforts of GEI, oil contracts have already been
made public (WB, 2012). To improve governance in resource-rich countries, the WB
also engages in international partnerships, such as the Petroleum Governance
Initiative (PGI), created in collaboration with the Norwegian government (WORLD
BANK, 2011a); the “GOXI” platform, a space in which those involved in extractive
industries can exchange experience; and the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, that will be discussed on another topic.
The WB also works with small and medium size enterprises engaged directly
in the extractive sector or that may be included on the supplier chain to these
industries. The main goal is to maximize the positive effects of resource exploration
for the regional communities. The Communities and Artisanal & Small-Scale Mining
(CASM) initiative is an important part of this strategy. Another of the WB’s concerns
is the social and the environmental damages that the exploration can cause. The Bank
provides advising and assistance both to private companies and to governments to
assess previously the possible impacts of the enterprise and develop plans to mitigate
them (SALIM, 2003). Also, the World Bank is part of the international program
Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR), which seeks to reduce this highly
polluting practice.
Recently, the WB launched the Extractives for Development initiative (E4D),
that aims to be a platform between government, civil society and non-governmental
organizations to share knowledge regarding the four “D’s” of the extractive industry
process: discovery, development, depletion and distribution (WB, 2012b). The sharing
of expertise aims to make resource management more effective and directed towards
the main goal of the WB, poverty reduction.
3.3. Publish What You Pay Campaign (PWYP)
“A Crude Awakening”, Global Witness’ report about the plundering of oil in
Angola published in 1999, called on companies to “publish what you pay”. Three
years later, the Publish What You Pay Campaign was launched internationally by joint
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efforts of Global Witness and other five non-governmental organizations. Today, over
650 organizations in more than 30 countries have joined the initiative (PWYP, 2011).
These organizations pressure governments and companies to participate on the
initiative, besides promoting discussions within the society about turning extractive
industries’ revenues into development. To companies, the disclosure of what they pay
is a way to escape liability from complicity of governments’ bad revenue
management.
The PWYP’s goal is to increase transparency in the extractive sector, in order
to empower civil society and improve its participation in a country’s decision making,
by holding governments accountable on how natural resources revenues are spent.
That is, PWYP initiative is made by and to civil society, based on the idea that a
country’s natural wealth belongs to the population, and not to a small elite. Initially,
the campaign started to call for companies to publish what they pay and for
governments to publish what they earn in revenues. These goals were later expanded
to the disclosure of contracts. Also, the PWYP highlights the importance on
international financial institutions – such as the World Bank – to demand transparency
when lending to extractive industries projects.
PWYP’s main office is established in London, but the bulk of its activities are
focused in Africa, where countries’ development seems to have suffered the most due
to lack of governments’ accountability in the extractive sector. The initiative is present
in 27 African countries, and the continent has its only full-time regional coordinator
located in Accra, Ghana. As for the publication of extractive industries’ contracts,
already six African governments – Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea,
Liberia, Niger and Sierra Leone – have accomplished it so far (PWYP, 2011).
3.4. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
In 2002, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the creation of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), at the World Summit for
Sustainable Development, and in the next year the project was launched. Having as its
ultimate goal the fight against corruption, seen as a main obstacle to development, the
EITI has been created to promote transparency and to stimulate the debate between
governments, companies, and civil society. The Publish What You Pay Campaign
(PWYP) has strongly supported the EITI initiative – PWYP has representatives on the
EITI International Board, where it helps shaping the global standards of EITI’s rules
and policies (PWYP, 2011).
The World Bank formally supports the EITI since December 2003, mainly by
administering a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF), which assists those countries in the
process of implementing the EITI trough grants and technical assistance (WORLD
BANK, 2011b). The World Bank has provided technical assistance to the
implementation of the EITI in several countries. It also contributes to the enhancement
of civil society participation and to the improvement of the International EITI
Secretariat, where the Bank is an observer on the Board. There are seven African
countries already compliant with the initiative, with the most advance program being
in Nigeria, and other 14 candidate African countries in the process of compliance.
However, there are many obstacles that the program still has to overcome,
especially those of compliance by both governments and companies and the
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participation of civil society. Being the EITI a voluntary initiative, there are no
mechanisms to punish non-compliant governments, and there is a strong necessity of
legislation to enforce the collaboration of companies in releasing information. Also,
the EITI website is the primary mean for the disclosure of the information, which is
not efficient in many African countries where the majority of the population does not
have access to the Internet. Most of all, transparency does not necessarily mean
accountability, since there were no measures to search for missing oil and funds in
Nigeria (OCHEJE, 2006), and since it does not guarantee a true participation of the
society in countries where there are restrictions to the freedom of expression. These
are the challenges the World Bank must address to improve the effectiveness of the
EITI.
3.5. Kimberley Process (KP)
The Kimberley Process (KP) is a 2002 initiative to fight the trade of illegal
diamonds that finances conflict. It was a result of years of negotiation following the
United Nations General Assembly resolution of 2000 that endorsed the creation of
such a program (KP, 2012a) as a response to the critical African problem of “blood
diamonds” - an issue that has mainly harmed Angola, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The KP works by a Certification Scheme: after the
completion of several requirements, including commitment to transparency, the rough
diamonds receive the certification needed to enter the legal international diamond
trade (KP, 2012a). That assures buyers that they are not helping to finance rebels
groups. Currently, there are 51 members (77 countries) of the KP - 19 of which are
African countries - representing 99.8% of world’s rough diamonds production (KP,
2012a). Furthermore, the initiative also includes the participation of the diamond
industry, trough the World Diamond Council, and of civil society organizations.
Accordingly to KP’s website, there are estimates that conflict diamonds
currently represent 1% of total world trade, a large advance from the 15% of the
1990’s (KP, 2012a). But, although it exempted diamond companies from liability on
civil conflicts – saving their reputation - and cleared buyers’ consciences, the KP as it
is now is not enough to solve the many problems caused by decades of conflict over
diamonds. Bad work conditions, environmental problems, and violence still are
present in diamond mines in countries like Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. Besides the
illegal trade still existing, these persistent problems are partially caused by what’s
pointed by many as the main flaw of KP: it only recognizes as conflict diamonds the
gemstones that finance rebel groups, excluding from the definition those that finance
corrupt and authoritarian governments involved in civil conflict (BIERI &
WADDELL, 2012). The KP is generally recognized as a very successful program, but
in order to address the still existing problems and improve the initiative’s
effectiveness, it will be necessary to monitor social and environmental problems and
to approach human rights in a broader sense, considering not only violations made by
rebels but also those practiced by some governments.
3.6. United Nations (UN)
The United Nations is a multilateral cooperation organization founded in
1945 after World War II by 51 states, and currently has 193 members. The
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organization has within its scope a wide range of subjects to be addressed and
coordinated on a global basis as a way to promote friendly relations among nations,
comprising areas such as peace and security, human rights, sustainable development,
to name a few. The United Nations acts more in a global basis than in regional ones,
and yet one can see initiatives from regional organs and groups of nations within the
UN structure to coordinate policies and strategies toward issues of their interest.
Related to extractive industries in the African regional sphere, in 2002 the
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg (South
Africa), debated about benefits that can derive from mining activities to sustainable
development. The Summit introduced a paragraph in the Johannesburg Political
Declaration and Plan of Implementation (JPOI) about extractive industries, ensuring
the importance that the mineral exploitation has on modern living patterns, as for the
economic and social developments of many countries. The paragraph states the
importance of analyzing the mutual impact of decisions taken in each part of the cycle
from mining to mineral processing and obtaining of pure metals, and the importance
of enhancing the benefits that derive from mining to the workers’ health and safety, of
diminishing environmental impacts, of promoting the participation of indigenous
people and women in mining activities, and integrating a wide range of different
actors (both public and private ones) in the sector. The document states that providing
financial, technical and capacity-building support to developing countries is essential
to foster sustainable mining practices (UNITED NATIONS, 2004).
Deriving from the discussions initiated in the World Summit for Sustainable
Development, a “Big Table”, composed of ministers and senior officials from 11
mineral-rich African countries and representatives of the African Union, under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the
African Mining Partnership, along with representatives of the African Development
Bank, the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), met in February
2007 to address the theme “Managing Africa’s Natural Resources for Growth and
Poverty Reduction”.
In 2008, as a result of the 2007 meeting, the African Union Conference of
Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources Development was held in Addis Ababa,
where the Addis Ababa Declaration on the Development and Management of Africa’s
Mineral Resources was adopted. This declaration reaffirmed the countries’
“commitment to prudent, transparent and efficient development and management of
Africa’s mineral resources to meet the Millennium Development Goals, eradicate
poverty and achieve rapid and broad-based sustainable socio-economic development”.
To provide for these goals, the African Mining Vision was created in August 2008, as
a coordinated program between UNECA and the African Development Bank
(AFRICAN UNION, 2009). It aims to integrate the initiatives and efforts made at
local, regional, continental and global levels to coordinate and foster the development
of policy and regulatory frameworks related to mineral exploitation, willing to
maximize its outcomes, and to increase its transparency. The Vision’s main objective
is to provide information that promotes measures to spread the benefits and incomes
from extractive industries to other spheres of the African economies, developing
sustainable, modern and efficient mineral management systems and institutions, and
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providing for partnerships to come up (ECONOMIC COMISSION FOR AFRICA,
2011).
3.7. African Union (AU)
The African Union is a continental organization launched in 2002 with the
main purpose of promoting cooperation among the African countries. In 2008,
ministers responsible for mineral resources gathered for the first time in Ethiopia.
Their conference resulted in the African Mining Vision (AMV), which was later
adopted by the AU during the 2009 summit of Heads of State. The AMV’s aim is to
stimulate a “transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources”, in
order “to underpin sustainable growth and socio-economic development” (AFRICAN
UNION, 2009). It is considered that transforming the degrading situation of African
resources exploration into a well-governed mining sector will improve the lives of
workers and communities. Strengthened governance would enable nations to negotiate
contracts with mining multinationals in better terms, foster a transparent and
accountable extractive sector, and facilitate the integration of mining to industrial and
trade policies. A better management of African resources would ultimately address the
continent’s poverty (AFRICAN UNION, 2009).
The African Mining Vision tries to stand out from previous initiatives. The
idea that mineral resources could be used to catapult Africa towards modernization
has been articulated in many strategies at national and regional levels, as in the Lagos
Plan of Action, the SADC Mineral Sector Programme, the Mining Chapter of
NEPAD, the Africa Mining Partnership, the ECOWAS Directive on the Mining
Sector and the WAEMU Common Mining Policy. However, most of those plans were
centered in building ambitious and grandiose projects, which were very capital
intensive and dependent on foreign inputs (AFRICAN UNION, 2009). What the
AMV proposes is a broad rethinking of the mining industry, one that includes
educational skills, infrastructure needs, business environment conditions, local
enterprises and regional integration.
On December 2011, the second AU conference of ministers responsible for
mineral resources took place in Ethiopia. At the time, the ministers established an
action plan to implement the African Mining Vision. More than one hundred measures
were proposed to be put in practice at national and regional levels, in a way to
establish common standards on extractive industries. Following the idea of tackling
several areas together, the action plan includes: renegotiating contracts to optimize
revenues; developing systems to evaluate tax avoidance and evasion; developing the
capacity of local communities to negotiate partnership agreements; enhancing the
capacity of national geological institutions; strengthening continuing professional
development; regularizing and upgrading artisanal and small-scale mining; facilitating
technology transfer at sub regional level; resorting to the legislature to provide
effective oversight over the mineral sector; ratifying and domesticating human rights
conventions relevant to the mineral sector; developing mineral (and tax) law and
policies that will encourage R&D; developing value addition strategies; and
facilitating cross-border infrastructure investments. Indicators were also established to
monitor the implementation of every suggested measure. The ambitious plan is
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supported by many partners, including the European Investment Bank, the World
Bank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations, ONGs, national
governments and private companies (AFRICAN UNION, 2011).
4. BLOC POSITIONS
The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria has the 3rd largest oil reserves
(around 2% of the world’s reserves) and crude oil production in Africa and the 2nd
largest natural gas reserves in the continent. The country is the largest natural gas
producer in the continent (OPEC, 2012). In 2008, the oil industry made up more than
30% of its gross domestic product. The government and international companies
dominate the oil sector. Aside from hydrocarbons, Algeria produces iron, steel, gold,
silver, and other industrial minerals. Metal and mineral industries are growing at a
large pace (in 2008 they grew 9,8%). Recently, the government is negotiating joint
ventures with international mining companies to explore its metals, in an attempt to
diversify the economy (TAIB, 2009).
Brazil has a more diversified extractive industry, with both fossil fuels
production and an important mining sector. That has allowed Brazilian companies to
use their expertise abroad. As such, Petrobras and Vale have expanded their business
in Africa recently and both companies are stakeholders to the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative. Although, the country also has abundant natural resources to
fulfill a great part of its needs, differences in refining capacity and oil quality still
require Brazil to import such product.
Canada is one of the world’s most active countries in the extractive field. It is
among the top five countries in the production of uranium, aluminum, sulfur, cobalt
ore, nickel ore, gem-quality diamond and platinum-group metals (PGM) ore.
Canadian companies that explore in other countries account for a significant
percentage of the world’s solid mineral exploration budgets (USGS, 2011). In the area
of fossil fuels, Canada is a large producer and exporter of oil and natural gas. In 2011,
the government created the Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries
and Development, with the main purpose of giving assistance to the extractive sectors
of developing countries (CANADA, 2012).
Chile also has one of the most notable extractive industries of the world,
especially on the mining sector. All copper mines and companies were nationalized in
the decade of 1970, but a growing private sector has been allowed in the last decades.
Frequent tensions between labor unions and companies (including the state-owned
CODELCO) have led to massive strikes due to alleged bad working conditions
(SINGH, 2010). Nevertheless, Chile is considered a good investment opportunity by
the Fraser Institute and could be pointed out as an example to African countries.
According to the Fraser Institute, transparency and governmental policy are majors
factors contributing to this evaluation (FRASER INSTITUTE, 2011). Furthermore,
there are efforts to implement social responsibility on the mining sector (CONSEJO
MINERO DE CHILE, 2004).
The high growth of Asian economies has motivated their search for natural
resources. This growth is being led by China, currently the largest energy consumer
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in the world (EIA, 2012b), which seeks to diversify its oil sources and to guarantee it
has the minerals necessary for its industrial development, mainly by mining
investments in Africa. But, despite being indeed a net importer of resources, China is
also rich in many of them, and has an important internal extractive industry. The
country is the largest coal producer and consumer and it also has oil and natural gas
fields that supply part of the domestic demand – the intense exploration of these goods
makes the production/reserves relation very high in comparison to other countries
(EIA, 2012b). China is also rich in metallic and non-metallic minerals – the country
has 171 varieties of mineral resources, of which 154 are explored (CHINA MINING,
2006). Even with an abundance of total resources, China has relatively scarce
resources if compared to the size of the population, and is facing rising demand due to
sharp economic growth – these issues demand a cautious mineral sector development
strategy and a search for sources of supply in other parts of the world.
The Democratic Republic of Congo has large reserves of gold, diamonds and
major non-ferrous metals. The mining sector responds for about 12,1% of the gross
domestic product, and is entirely directed for foreign markets (AFRICAN
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, 2012a). In ten years, the mining sector is expected to
respond for about 20%-25% of the gross domestic product. About 90% of the mineral
production in DRC is made with artisanal and small scale processes, a segment that
employs more than 10 million people in the country, and presents many problems,
such as the lack of health, safety, and environment protection, the exploitation of
vulnerable populations, and conflicting relations between artisans and large-scale
mines. Previously, the mineral production was dominated by state-owned companies,
which are now bankrupt. Besides the attempt of restructuring these companies, the
government faces many challenges. Over the past ten years, after a war that involved
many States and groups in the region, the government has tried to rebuild political and
administrative systems, and has to fight the many dysfunctions it presents, basically
related to a culture of corruption and impunity involving officials and politics
(WORLD BANK, 2008).
France has a historical participation in the extractive sector in Africa. With a
very low oil and gas production, the French depend on foreign markets to supply their
energetic needs (EIA, 2012e). One of the world’s oil “supermajors” is French, Total
SA, exploring some important African oil reserves. French oil imports from Africa
account for 18.3% of its total imports from the world (INTERNATIONAL TRADE
CENTRE). The French government recognizes the problem the lack of transparency
and good governance might create when natural resources extraction reaches higher
levels. Civil conflicts and reduced living conditions for local citizens are just some of
these problems. The French Republic defends the urgent need of construction of
infrastructure and of transparency policies for the African continent (FRANCE
DIPLOMATIE, 2012).
The very limited oil production in Germany does not meet the national oil
demand, making it necessary for the country to find energetic resources elsewhere.
The trade of extractive industry products between Germany and African countries is
intense, both of oil and precious stones (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE).
Germany is concerned about the social and political impacts the extraction of mineral
resources from African countries has been promoting. The Germans are seized on the
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matter of promoting transparency and ending illegal extraction and trade in order to
help to bring peace to conflictive regions, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia
(FEDERAL FOREIGN OFFICE, 2011).
India has experienced an accelerated growth recently. The extraction of natural
resources from its own soil does not suffice this growth’s needs. Therefore, it requires
that India import them from other regions in the world. The historical cooperation
between the African continent and India has, thus, recently been broadened so as to
include an increase in the trade between the two. India’s oil imports from Africa
represent 20% of its total (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE). India has always
been a strong defender of African social and economic development and of the use of
its natural resources to achieve such goals. In that sense, the Indian government has
already promoted important programs, exporting its development model and its
technology to Africa in order to improve the conditions in the continent for their
development (VIEIRA; SPOHR, 2011).
Although Israel is significantly dependent on foreign oil and coal as sources of
energy, most of its energetic imports come from ex-Soviet republics. Its most
significant relations with extractive industries in Africa are related to its large
diamond industry, as Israel is one of the major global hubs for the cutting and
polishing of diamonds, done in the so called “Diamond District” in Tel Aviv. Israel is
a member of the Kimberley Process, having been its vice-chair in 2009, and its chair
in 2010 (AMI, 2010).
Japan’s extractive industry is characterized by small-scale mining operations
and high-value-added mineral and metal processing activities (USGS, 2012). The
country depends on trade to fulfill most of its needs for fossil fuels and minerals. It is
the world's largest importer of LNG, second largest importer of coal and the third
largest net importer of oil (EIA, 2012f). Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National
Corporation, a state-owned company responsible for ensuring stable supplies of
mineral resources, finances overseas activities performed by national companies,
gives technical assistance and seeks technology development with foreign
partnerships (JOGMEC, 2012).
The Republic of Korea has sought to expand its presence in Africa, seeking
new markets to which to export, based on the Korean export oriented development
model, but also increasing its imports of African natural resources. However, the ROK
has also stimulated development based on natural resources to promote sustainable
and stable development, for instance, being a member of the Kimberley Process.
Furthermore, the ROK has developed the Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation
(KOAFEC) Action Plan. Of particular note was the 2009-2010 Action Plan, which
established as its goals the development of infrastructure and the usage of natural
resources to achieve sustainable and environmentally responsible economic
development, with extensive consultations with African countries in order to provide
financing to projects in an effective manner (LAGERKVIST; JONSSON, 2011).
Libya’s civil war in 2011, which took the dictatorial government of Muammar
Gaddafi out of power and replaced it with a National Transitional Council, mainly
disrupted the economy, and represented a great opportunity for social and economic
reforms. Libya’s gross domestic product contracted 41.8% in 2011 with the cuts in oil
and gas production and the freezing of the country’s assets by the international
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community. Nevertheless, it is expected to grow 20.1% in 2012 and 9.3% in 2013, as
the country resumes its oil and gas production. In 2010 the mining sector (essentially
composed of gas and oil production) represented 64% of real gross domestic product
(AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, 2012b). In 2009 Libya had the 4th biggest oil
production in Africa and the largest oil reserves in the continent (OPEC, 2012).
The oil sector has been crucial for Norway’s economy for more than forty
years. In 2010, it represented 21% of the national GDP. The country is also among the
top producers and exporters of natural gas (EITI, 2011). Norwegian environmental
regulation on oil and gas activities could serve as an example to African countries. In
order to diminish environmental damages, the Climate and Pollution Agency has
limited the amount of pollutants the sector is allowed to produce, at the same time
stimulating technological development. During the 1990s, the country established the
zero-discharge-goal to new installations to avoid the discharge of oil on the sea – the
same measure was adopted a few years later for older exploration sites (OIL, 2012).
Norway is a leading country in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI). It was involved in the formulation of the program and it was the first Western
nation to fully implement its principles, releasing its first EITI report in 2010. The
EITI International Secretariat is based in Oslo.
Poland has relatively little contact with African extractive industries. It is
noteworthy, however, that it has a growing extractive sector, and focuses on
sustainable practices and modernization of its mining, besides having recently
approved legislation focusing on increasing health and safety conditions for miners, in
addition to enhancing management and focusing on greater environmental protection
(NORTON ROSE, 2011). Therefore, Poland can propose itself as a model for
sustainable growth of extractive sectors, taking into consideration that Poland has
maintained fairly elevated growth rates despite the economic crisis (PALARSKI,
2007). Poland is also represented in the Kimberley Process through the European
Union representative.
Because of its lack of oil reserves, Portugal must import a lot of oil from other
countries, since it consumes around 259,760 barrels/day (EIA, 2012g). 35.6% of this
imported oil comes from African countries (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE).
The Portuguese have historical ties with oil producing Angola, among other former
colonies. Being part of the European Union, Portugal also defends measures to
eradicate poverty and giving the resource-rich countries the tools to turn these natural
resources into sources of sustainable development, promoting social justice
(EUROPEAN UNION, 2012).
Russia’s economic comeback has propelled the country to look for extractive
resources abroad. Despite being rich in oil, gas, and minerals, Russia still has the need
to import natural resources to fuel its refining and industrial capacity. Africa is an
important element in that strategy. As such, African gas could be used by Russia to
supply Europe, an alternative to internally produced gas (HUGON, 2010).
Commercial relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Africa have
never been very intense, with the proportion Saudi imports from Africa among overall
Saudi imports usually not being over 2% (SABB, 2001). Saudi Arabia’s connection to
African extractive industries is mostly related to its links with OPEC’s African
members (Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Angola). Saudi Arabia also tends to increase its
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influence in Africa through its connection to Muslim African States, both financing
religious institutions and promoting development through institutions such as the
Islamic Development Bank (HUGON, 2010).
South Africa is one of the leading countries in the world in terms of extractive
industries. The country has the largest reserves of manganese and platinum group
metals in the world, and large reserves of gold, diamonds, chromite ore, coal,
vanadium and rare earths (BAARTJES, 2011). In 2010, the mineral industry
accounted for 8,6% of the gross domestic product, and mineral products accounted for
48% of the country’s exports. Historically, the gold and diamond mines - South
Africa’s most important mineral products - are dominated by large-scale producers.
Therefore, the government is creating programs so that historically disadvantaged
South Africans can join in mining ventures, an initiative inserted in its Broad-Based
Black Economic Empowerment Plan (KEARNEY, 2012).
The Republic of the Sudan was one of the biggest states in Africa, but in 2011
its southern region became independent, after decades of civil war. Suddenly, with the
secession, oil revenues, which responded for half of the government revenues,
decreased abruptly, as around 75% of the productive fields became part of the new
state. Although most of the productive fields are now part of South Sudan, the entire
pipeline, refining, and export infrastructure is in Sudan, so even if both countries are
politically independent, economically they remain greatly interdependent. With
contentions over the fees for the use of the pipelines and for export transit, South
Sudan is now trying to make agreements with Kenya and Ethiopia to build pipelines
through both countries, and therefore reduce its dependence on the Sudanese
infrastructure. Sudan and South Sudan still dispute over the Abyei area, an oil rich
region which still belongs to Sudan. Chinese, Indian and Malaysian companies
dominate Sudan’s oil sector (EIA, 2012c). Recently, to fight some of the fiscal
problems caused by the secession, Sudan began trying to diversify the economy,
investing in new sources of revenues such as gold mining, and implementing an
austerity program (CIA, 2012). Aside from oil and gold, Sudan has large and
unexploited reserves of silver, zinc, chromium, uranium, gypsum, mica, and other
metals (MINERAL AND MINING SECTOR INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS
GUIDE, 2011).
Turkey is a country that links Asia with Europe and is very rich in minerals,
mainly industrial. Nevertheless, the country is poor on oil and gas reserves, making
imports a necessity. As such, Turkey’s main imports from Africa are related to the
extractive industries sector. After initial approaches in 2005, the Turkey-Africa
Cooperation Summit (2008) opened way to further developments on relations between
the country and the African continent (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
TURKEY, 2012).
The production of oil in the United Kingdom is not enough to meet its needs,
making it, therefore, necessary to obtain additional supplies of oil elsewhere.
Historically the UK has been present in the African continent, having interest in the
extractive industry both for minerals and oil. In 2011, its imports from African
precious stones accounted for 25.9% of its total imports from these products from the
whole world (INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE). The UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office is extremely concerned with social and political consequences
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that the illegal extraction and non-transparent use of the resource revenues create in
African countries. Illegal extraction and commercialization finance armed groups,
bringing social instability and civil conflict. It bids British companies to follow many
acts in order to ensure the compliance to international norms of respect to human
rights and sustainable development principles (UK FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, 2012).
The highly diversified economy of the United States has made minerals a
fundamental part of its industrial system. The country is a top producer and importer
of core metals and fossil fuels. It has one of the largest outputs of oil, natural gas, coal,
gold and copper of the world. It also has a significant production of iron ore, zinc,
lead, molybdenum and silver (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 2012).
American companies of the extractive sector are among the richest in the world.
Recent governmental actions aim to enhance transparency in the industry, in order to
hold companies and governments more accountable for their actions. In 2011, the
United States committed to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative. Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law in 2010, includes sections
relating to “Conflict Minerals”, “Mine Safety Disclosures” and “Payments to
Governments by Resource Extraction Issuers”. Every company directly involved in
exploration, extraction, processing and exporting activities must comply with the new
legislation (KPMG, 2012).
Venezuela has a prominent extractive industry, focused in the area of fossil
fuels which accounted for 30% of its GDP in 2010. Back in 2006, the Venezuelan
government announced its will to enhance its relations with Africa, being the oil
sector a major point to be explored (MORSBACH, 2006). Through the state-owned
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), the government managed to establish a joint
venture with PetroSA, a state-owned oil company from South Africa, which included
the development of refineries in South Africa.
Vietnam is fairly self reliant in several minerals, reducing its interests in the
extraction of African resources. However, despite having significant oil reserves,
Vietnam is dependent on the import of oil products, being incapable of refining all the
oil it needs. In all, Africa corresponds to about 1.2% of Vietnamese imports, with the
most important products of extractive industries imported being liquefied natural gas
(mostly from Nigeria), copper, precious stones and metals, and wood (VIETNAM
TRADE PROMOTION AGENCY, 2012). Vietnam is also a member of the
Kimberley Process.
1) Which actions can the World Bank take to help resource rich countries to
diversify their economies, avoiding the resource course? How can the profits
of these industries be translated in promotion of development and poverty
mitigation?
2) Considering the relations between conflict and natural resources, and
considering that “successful development is the best protection against civil
war” (BANNON; COLLIER, 2003, p. 7), what can we learn from previous
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3)
4)
5)
6)
civil wars to prevent new conflicts and to mitigate their negative effects
trough improvements in the extractive industries?
In which way can the World Bank help to improve the efficiency of EITI and
other transparency initiatives in order to fight corruption in the extractive
industries? Can the issue of governance be addressed by voluntary means,
without interference in internal politics?
What measures can be taken to mitigate the social and environmental impacts
of the extractive industries? What are the gender issues related to the
extractive industries in Africa and how can they be addressed?
How can the World Bank help countries to plan environmental-friendly
infrastructure building to boost extractive industries growth and improve the
population’s life quality?
What are the international interests, both of companies and governments, in
the extractive industries in Africa? Should these actors take responsibility in
the consequences of their involvement in the sector?
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Chapter 6
UNITED NATIONS WORLD
SUMMIT ON UN REFORM
INTRODUCTION
Established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations, the General
Assembly occupies a central position as the chief deliberative, policymaking and
representative organ of the United Nations. Comprising all 193 Members of the
United Nations, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the full
spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. It also plays a significant role
in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law. The
Assembly meets in regular sessions intensively from September to December each
year, and thereafter as required.
General Assembly’s resolutions are not binding and, therefore, considered
recommendations, appointing and suggesting actions to be taken individually or in
cooperation by member states and the United Nations. The regular flow of debate of
high level plenary meetings is the General Speakers’ List and debate is moderated by
the chair. All countries have one vote, either in procedural matters or substantive
matters. There is no “veto power”, what means that, no matter which countries vote
against, once a qualified majority (2/3 of countries in favor) is achieved in voting a
resolution, it is approved. All member States take part in the sessions. However, in
UFRGSMUN, the Secretariat and the Directors of the committee established a number
of countries to be represented during the conference.
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Topic: UN Reform
Isadora Loreto da Silveira,
Luíza Gimenez Cerioli,
Matheus Machado Hoscheidt
and Gustavo Henrique Feddersen
1.1 The Post-World War I and the Flaws of the League of Nations
The League of Nations (LON) was an international organization created in
1919, right after the end of the First World War. By that time, the horrors of the
conflict made nations engage in the idea of a global institution that could avoid any
other possibility of war. Even though it represented a groundbreaking initiative in the
field of international cooperation, it faced serious contradictions from its very
beginning, which culminated with its disastrous failure to prevent the Second World
War.
1.1.1 The League’s Innovations
The LON is considered as an innovative mechanism for promoting peace in
the international system. It brought about for the first time the notion of “intergovernmentalism” through which“which states cooperate without surrendering
significant parts of their national sovereignty” (MACQUEEN, 2011). Member States
participate directly in the construction of resolutions and have, therefore, greater
incentives to engage in collective decision-making processes.
Multilateralism, “the commitment to collective, institutional responses to
international changes” (MACQUEEN, 2011: p. 4), was another important principle of
the organization. It reassured the need to deal with transnational problems through
collective and consensual means. The Locarno Treaties (1925) 1, for example,
evidences concerns with practical problems related to collective security under the
aegis of the League (PEDERSEN, 2007).
Another innovation of the League was its administrative structure, which was
later taken as a model for the UN and several other international organizations. The
League had three main organs: the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat. The
Assembly was composed by representatives of all member states, while the Council
had representatives of great powers (initially the United Kingdom, Italy, France and
Japan). Finally, the Secretariat was formed by a Secretary-General and his staff
(PEDERSEN, 2007, p. 4-5).
1.1.2 The Reasons for the League’s Failure
Three main flaws are usually considered to be the causes of the failure of the
League and its consequent ending in 1946: 1) its lack of coercive power, 2) its
revanchist approach and, above all, 3) the absence of the Unites States of America.
Regarding the first flaw, economic sanctions were the strongest mean of enforcement
1The Locarno Treaties were an attempt made by WWI European Allies and new states of
Central and Eastern Europe to settle post-war territories.
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possible inside the League. But even when economic sanctions were adopted, some
members chose not to support them. As a result, the League lost much of its
credibility. In this context, both Italy’s attack to Abyssinia in 1935 and Japan’s
aggression against China in 1931 are examples of unpunished actions taken by its
members (PEDERSEN, 2007). As for the second flaw, the revanchist approach, it is
important to remark that the Treaty of Versailles, the main peace treaty of the WWI,
was created during the Paris Peace Conference along with the negotiations to
engender the League. In this regard, the League’s role as an international organization
may have been influenced by the will of the winning Allies to favor their own
interests. Consequently, the League of Nations was often seen as a source of unrest by
Germany. For instance, the Publicity Section of the League, which was designed to be
an instrument for expression of public opinion, was a place marked by nationalist and
anti-pacifist opinions by the French side (PEDERSEN, 2007).
At last, the US Congress refusal to accept American participation in the
League left a huge gap in the organization. Firstly, because the United States were
already one of the greatest powers after the WWI, and secondly because European
nations, acquainted with a more conservative diplomacy, ended up heading the
organization (MACQUEEN, 2011: p. 6). In fact, the League failed by not having
created attractive internal mechanisms for Great Powers to pursue their interests and,
therefore, participate. In this regard, the United States, barely affected by World War
I, had few incentives to join a consensus-based institution that would limit their
power.
1.2. Post-World War II, the creation of the United Nations and its main purposes
1.2.1 The Founding of the UN
The United Nations came into existence on October 24 th , 1945, in San
Francisco. Once the League failed to prevent another world war, the United Nations
was founded as the second international organization committed with the preservation
of peace among States. During its initial creative process, although the United Nations
borrowed many characteristics from the League, the organization also created
innovative mechanisms, which made the UN scope far wider than that of the LON in
terms of results. Many of the negotiations for the UN foundation arose during World
War II, as the frights of war led Allied Powers to recognize the necessity of an
effective organization in the field of international cooperation and security. The
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held in Washington D.C. in 1944, for example,
formulated the most important decisions and settlements prior to the creation of the
UN. At this Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and China
agreed on the aims, structure and functioning of a world organization. Furthermore,
the Moscow (1943), Teheran (1943), and Yalta (1945) Conferences also conducted
relevant negotiations about the UN2. Regarding the innovations of the UN, its
2The origin of the name “United Nations” is related to its use in the course of the World War II.
By that time, the expression was used to indicate the Allied Nations, in opposition to the Axis
Powers. It was US President Franklin Roosevelt, during the Moscow and Teheran Conferences,
who first suggested the expression to be the name for an international organization (UNITED
NATIONS WEBSITE).
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institutional structure represented an important progress when compared to the League
of Nations. For example, the veto power was devised to be an effective instrument to
convince Great Powers, specially the United States and the USSR, to join the
organization, providing them an exceptional hierarchical position inside one of the
principal organs of the UN, the Security Council (UNSC)(PEDERSEN, 2007). 3 The
concession of such a power, however, has been a source of controversies and criticism
to the UN, either concerning this mechanism as a differential and unfair treatment, or
pointing out the necessity of extending the veto power to other nations.
1.2.2. The Purposes of the UN
Throughout World War II, many agreements and declarations pointed out the
necessity of an international organization that could truly engage in the promotion of
peace and in solving global problems that the League of Nations did not manage to
deal with. The Inter-Allied Declaration (1941), the Atlantic Charter (1941), and the
Declaration by United Nations (1942) are just a few examples (UNITED NATIONS).
All of these documents already paved the way to UN’s pursuit of its long-run goals.
Actually, many of the United Nations official objectives are the same as those of the
League. Besides, the fact that they are all listed right in the First Article of the UN
Charter evidences the organization’s strong commitment with its purposes. The UN
purposes are listed as follows:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to
that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures
to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of these common ends.(UNITED
NATIONS)4.
The obligation to the establishment of peace, the multilateral approach,
the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the defense of human rights are
3 The veto power is the power of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to
obstacle the approval of any substantive draft Council resolution.
4 Full access to the Charter is available at
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>
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substantive heritages from the League to the UN. On April 18 th , 1946, the League of
Nations transferred all its assets to the United Nations through an agreement signed by
WlodzimierzModerow, representative of the United Nations, and Sean Lester, the last
Secretary-General of the League of Nations (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT
GENEVA WEBSITE).
1.3 The United Nations during the Cold War
1.3.1 Bipolarity and the immobilization of the UN
Since the beginning of the Cold War up to the Détente5, UN actions were
damaged by the increasing tensions between the USA and the URRS. Both Great
Powers tried either to use the UN as a basis for pursuing selfish benefits or to block
one another’s interference in the global sphere, what resulted in the period with the
highest rates of veto usage in the UNSC. Still, the United Nations’ role until the
Détente may be divided, for analytical purposes, into two main axes of action: the first
one regarding collective security issues and the second one concerning human rights
and decolonization matters (SANTOS, 2012; HARDWICK, 2011).
In 1950 the UN Security Council released a Resolution allowing Member
States to assist the southern part of Korea to defend herself from an invasion from the
north. This decision was possible due to the Soviet Union’s boycott to the UNSC
meeting, claiming for the recognition of the People’s Republic of China’s in the
UNSC – by that time, Taiwan owned the Chinese seat (KISSINGER, 2011: p.138).
Therefore, UN troops engaged in the Korean War, which came into a halt in 1953 and
did not succeed in bringing peace to the region in a reasonable period of time. The
underlying Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union and the USA hampered the
adoption of an effective peaceful solution for the conflict (HARDWICK, 2011).
1.3.2 UN achievements prior to the Détente
When it comes to pointing successful actions regarding the promotion of
human rights and decolonization matters in the aforementioned period, the UN has
more accomplishments than it had on collective security subjects (HARDWICK,
2011). In 1948 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Likewise, in 1969, the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination came into force.6
Since its very beginning, the UN showed a big support to the decolonization
processes. In 1960 alone 17 newly independent States joined the organization. It also
worked as a platform for developing countries to struggle for participation in global
politics. Williams (apudHARDWICK, 2011) says that the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was created by developing countries in 1964,
as a means to further their plea for economic justice with a different vision from that
of the Bretton Woods institutions.
1.3.3 The Détente: undermining brinkmanship
5Détente was the easing of relations between the USA and the URRS during the 1970s.
6 Both documents are available at:
<http://www.un.org/documents/instruments/docs_en.asp?year=1969>
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The logic of the Cold War changed in the beginning of the 1970’s. The United
States and the USSR adopted a new policy, which was named Détente. Unlike the
previous form of relationship embodied in the Truman Doctrine—i.e., open
diplomatic and ideological conflict—this new phase of the Cold War saw an easing of
the tensions between the superpowers (BOWKERL & WILLIAMS, 1988). The
previous “paralysis” of the United Nations, caused by the political struggle between
the superpowers was then momentarily relieved.
This turn of events marked a reinvigoration of international law and,
consequently, of the United Nations. The highlights of this phase were the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks and the Helsinki Accords. Both of them helped undermine the
tension between the superpowers: while the first was an effort of bilateral talks to
reduce the atomic terror by limiting the construction of new ballistic missiles
(GARTHOFF, 1977), the second established a common ground in the territorial issues
of the European continent (CSCE, 1975). Although international politics at the time of
the Détente continued to be polarized between two opposing superpowers, it was
evidently less harsh then the initial and final phases of the Cold War, and the
perception of the efficacy of the United Nations grew while the use of veto
prerogatives in the Security Council diminished.
1.3.4 The Reagan Doctrine and the Perestroika
The end of the Détente came with the Reagan Doctrine, which found grounds
to establish itself after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the end of the 1970s. The
doctrine composed the core of the rollback policy implemented by the US in the
closing years of the Cold War (GARTHOFF, 1994). It marked an escalation of
tensions between the superpowers and the previous institutional approximation
observed in the past decade was put on hold. The Reagan Doctrine enabled a much
more assertive policy against the USSR which had not been possible in the previous
years due to fear of nuclear confrontation (LAGON, 1994). These fears were put aside
together with the advances being made in institutional compromising of the parties.
In the 1980s the USSR was struggling to maintain its centrally planned
economy and communist political regime in a world where West European countries,
Japan, and the “Asian Tigers” were benefiting from the results of the economic
investments made by the US in the decades that followed the end of World War II.
Hence, the Soviets ended up opening their economy to the global market. Soviet
president Mikhail Gorbachev issued two major reforms of the USSR system, the
Perestroika and the Glasnost. Their role would be to adapt the communist regime to
the new phase of the global economy (GORBACHEV, 1988). The result, however,
was an unprepared opening of a centrally regulated system to a competitive and liberal
market. The end of the USSR would occur in a peaceful way due to these reforms
(VISENTINI, 2006).
1.4 The United Nations, the Post-Cold War period, and the new configuration of
world power
The end of the Cold War inaugurated a new reality for international politics,
and, of course, for the United Nations as well. The main feature of this new reality
was the absence of bipolarity. It was uncertain, however, how the division of power
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would now be arranged: would the world find itself under the rule of a sole hegemonic
superpower, or would a bunch of new actors emerge, filling the vacuum left by the
USSR, creating then a multipolar order? It was this uncertainty that the world tried to
solve in the 1990s, and the UN was the stage in which many of the defining events of
this decade took place. If the world had changed—and there was little doubt about
that—was it not time for United Nations reforms?
1.4.1 Operation Desert Storm: a chance for multilateral cooperation?
On August 2nd, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded its neighboring country, Kuwait.
Orders for immediate cease of hostilities and Iraqi withdrawal were issued by the
United Nations Security Council almost instantaneously (UNSC, 1990a), followed by
economic sanctions (UNSC, 1990b), and naval blockade (UNSC, 1990c). After Iraq
refused to leave Kuwait as long as other issues had not been resolved, UNSC passed a
resolution, on November 29th, giving Hussein the deadline of January 15th, 1991, to
leave Kuwait, allowing the use of force if Iraq did not comply (UNSC, 1990d). When
the time was up, a coalition of forces, led by the United States, entered Kuwait and
pushed back the Iraqi forces. This episode marked a reinvigoration of the public belief
in the efficacy of the United Nations in resolving security matters that was not seen
since the end of the Suez Crisis, in 1956, mainly because of the political impediments
caused by the bipolar order.
1.4.2 Agendas for Reform: Peace and Development, the legacy of Boutros Ghali
In 1992 the first Heads of State meeting of the countries composing the United
Nations Security Council discussed the imperatives needed to build a UN that would
suit the new world order. In their statement, they agreed that
[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does
not in itself ensure international peace and security. The nonmilitary sources of instability in the economic, social,
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace
and security. The United Nations membership as a whole,
working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the
highest priority to the solution of these matters (UNSC, 1992).
Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was invited to prepare, the
“analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient
within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations
for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping” (UNSC, 1992).
The report was released a few months later, entitled ‘An Agenda for Peace’. The main
contribution of this report was the reshaping of the concept of peace-keeping, making
it more complex and more suitable to the different realities that the world would face
from then on (UNGA, 1992a).
Later, following the steps of the Security Council, the General Assembly
requested from the Secretary-General the elaboration of an Agenda for Development
to enhance the role of the UN in promoting prosperity and cooperation (UNGA,
1992b). In 1994 the report came out, entitled “Development and International
Economic Cooperation: An Agenda for Development”. Regarding the reform of the
UN system, the most important section of this agenda is entitled “Enhancing the role,
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capacity, effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations system in development”,
that laid out the flaws of UN organs, programs, and committees, and presented means
to improve them (UNGA, 1994).
1.4.3 UNAMIR and Ghali’s “step down”
In the course of a hundred days in 1994 the Hutu government of
Rwanda and its extremist allies very nearly succeeded in
exterminating the country's Tutsi minority. Using firearms,
machetes, and a variety of garden implements, Hutu militiamen,
soldiers, and ordinary citizens murdered some 800,000 Tutsi and
politically moderate Hutu. It was the fastest, most efficient
killing spree of the twentieth century. (POWER, 2001)
A number of reasons were appointed to explain why the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed to produce meaningful results. The
most accepted explanation is the lack of compliance and engagement in the mission
itself, in practical terms, by the member-states of the UN. The logic underlying this
lack of compliance is simple: the memory of an American soldier being dragged to
death, tied to the back of a car on the streets of Mogadishu, broadcasted worldwide, in
the last peacekeeping operation that the United States participated in Africa, just a few
months prior to the Civil War in Rwanda, were still fresh. “Having lost much of its
early enthusiasm for peacekeeping and for the United Nations itself, Washington was
nervous that the Rwanda mission would sour like so many others” (POWER, 2001).
The Rwandan conflict was a harsh blow to Boutros Ghali and his plan for UN
Reforms; the United States vetoed Ghali’s reelection in 1996 (CLARKE, 2004).
1.4.4 Kofi Annan’s first efforts to reform
Boutros Ghali, the first Secretary-General that did not serve a second term, was
replaced by Kofi Annan. In its first months in charge, Annan already started to
propose new methods to reform the UN system. He appointed Maurice Strong as
Under Secretary-General for Reform and merged several units into a new Department
for Economic and Social Affairs (UN POST, 2009). He also made a report with more
than 90 pages assessing ongoing reform methods, proposing new ones or new ways of
approaching the existing efforts (UNGA, 1997). The main points approached by
Annan’s report regarded reforming the leadership and management structure, and
proposing a new way to think the United Nations’ “Core Activities”, such as security,
economy, and human rights.
In 2000, having in mind the past issues regarding UN funding problems, Kofi
Annan launched the Global Compact initiative, which allowed for partnership policies
between the UN and the private sector (UN, 2001). The initiative, however, received
heavy criticism from the international society and NGOs, with claims that it would
provide private companies with an international platform for public relations and
publicity (UN POST, 2009). In the same year the Millennium Summit occurred and
discussed the role of the United Nations in this new century, establishing, among other
things, the “Millennium Development Goals” in the Millennium Declaration (UNGA,
2000).
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1.5 The United Nations and the War on Terror
For a number of reasons, the international scenario after the turning of the
century was a lot different from the one observed in the early years after the end of the
Cold War. Regional powers had more freedom to emerge and consolidate their
influence in their adjacent areas; meanwhile, the United States, instead of adapting its
policies to a more multilateral approach of international relations, assumed a growing
unilateral position given its capability to intervene in any point of the planet within a
short period of time. Any glimpse of certainty in world politics was erased with the
images of two planes literally crashing on the World Trade Center.
1.5.1 America’s Unilateralism…
In the early years of the 21st century, the United States of America invaded the
Middle East twice. The first incursion happened shortly after the September 11
terrorist attacks (WINTOUR et al, 2001), initiating the American global fight against
terrorism (CARFANO, 2003). With the approval of the United Nations Security
Council, American troops invaded Afghanistan, claiming that the country was housing
Al-Qaeda terrorists, the same group that perpetrated the World Trade Center attacks.
Even with the approval of the UNSC, the international community questioned the real
interests of the United States and the lack of results of the operation in finding the Al
Qaeda members (RICHISSIN, 2004).
In 2003 a new intervention in the Middle East was carried out by the United
States. Claiming that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction
(USA, 2003), the US tried to arrange a UNSC sanctioned intervention in the country.
The Security Council, however, did not approve the intervention; even so, a coalition
led by the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq on May 19 th, 2003. The
public opinion was much more vehement in the condemnation of the unilateral actions
carried out by the US government at that time than it had been in 2001. The episode
marked the rising of renewed uncertainties on the perspective of UN effectiveness in
maintaining peace and security (UN POST, 2009).
1.5.2 … and the emerging countries’ endeavors for multilateralism.
Kofi Annan, in 2005, published a report entitled “In Larger Freedom”. This
report is founded on the notion that the main goals of the United Nations could only
be achieved if three basic aspects of international relations in the new century were
respected: development, security, and human rights (namely, Freedom from Want,
Freedom from Fear and Freedom to live in Dignity) (UNGA, 2005a). After laying
down the methods to ensure those principles, he states that
[c]learly our Organization, as an organization, was built for a
different era. Equally clearly, not all our current practices are
adapted to the needs of today. That is why Heads of State and
Government, in the Millennium Declaration, recognized the
need to strengthen the United Nations to make it a more
effective instrument for pursuing their priorities (UN, 2005a,
p.39).
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The rest of the report is dedicated to establishing ways of reforming the main
organs, the Secretariat, the system as a whole, the regional organizations, and to
updating the United Nations Charter.
The same year also marked the most profound discussion regarding the reform
of the composition of the United Nations Security Council, following Kofi Annan’s
efforts to initiate an organizational reform of the UN. The 2005 World Summit: Highlevel Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly was held and
much of the discussion regarding that topic happened at the occasion. Nevertheless,
practical actions were limited at the time. For starters, the G4 – the group of countries
composed by Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India – which joined efforts to induce
change in the UNSC, found great opposition to its objectives (UN POST, 2009). There
was also no consensus on the countries that would represent the African continent.
The outcome of the meeting was a vague declaration that did not define any concrete
way to reform the UNSC (UNGA, 2005c). Moreover, other punctual alterations on the
organizational composition of the United Nations were made, like more substantial
approaches to development, terrorism, and peacekeeping, the adoption of the concept
of “Responsibility to Protect”, and minimal updates to the UN Charter (UNGA,
2005c).
1.5.3 The International Criminal Court and the Human Rights Council
In discussion for several years, the International Criminal Court came to
existence in 2002, with the Rome Statute being sanctioned by sixty countries, the
minimum required to bring it to force (UN CONF, 1998). For the first time, an
international institution could prosecute individuals and hold them accountable for
human rights violations. Other innovations came about in 2006, when the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was extinct and the UN Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) took its place (UNGA, 2006b). The main flaw pointed by
the international community in the UNCHR was the fact that many countries that
internally did not respect Human Rights were members of the Commission (UN
POST, 2009).
2.1 Different Interpretations of the UN Charter Dispositions
The essential characteristic of the effectiveness of the UN juridical
personality is its independence of action in relation to States in order to achieve the
purposes set forth in the Charter, acting as a distinct member of international society.
However, such an understanding does not exclude the necessity to analyze the
different interpretations regarding its competencies. The more traditional line of
thought advocates a literal interpretation of the UN Charter, with strict fidelity to the
express provisions of the Charter. It was founded by Russian jurist Grigory Tunkin
(LIMA; ÁVILA; NADER, 2005).
The second line of thought – that of implied powers – presents a softer
approach and it is based in the Reparations for Injuries case. According to the
interpretation of that case by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1949:
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[It] is tantamount to [ask] whether the Organization has
international personality. In answering this question
which is not settled by the actual terms of the Charter,
the Court goes on to consider what characteristics the
Charter was intended to give to the Organization. In this
connection, the Court states that the Charter conferred
upon the Organization rights and obligations which are
different from those of its Members (ICJ, 1949).
This doctrine claims that the UN can act with implicit powers in order to
achieve aimed goals, and may for that end, create bodies that were not anticipated by
the original Member States of the Conference of San Francisco, or even conclude
treaties with other States or international organizations. Therefore, from the
perspective of international law, the UN ought to be considered as possessing powers
that, even if not expressed in the Charter, are attributed to it by because they are
considered fundamental to the performance of its obligations and purposes (ibidem).
The third line of thought, the most radical perspective, is based on the
inherent powers of the UN. According to such perspective, the UN would have an
inherent legal capacity to perform any international act that it is able to perform. For
Norwegian jurist Finn Seyersted, the ability of the UN as a juridical personality is
inherent to its existence. Thus, it is important to understand the principles of the three
doctrines because the matter of UN reform is directly linked to the type of
interpretation that one makes of the UN competencies as laid out in the UN Charter
(ibidem).
2.2 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Reform
When the issue under discussion is the United Nations reform, the first topic
that comes to mind is the remodeling of the UN Security Council. . Indeed, the UNSC
is the major organ in the organization to provide and maintain international security
and peace. With the end of the Cold War and the turning of the century, a more
flexible scenario for international leadership emerged and along came optimistic
opinions about the greater possibilities for UN actions in this new global order.
However, UNSC structures have barely seen any substantive changes since the
Dumbarton Oaks draft of the UN Charter in 1944 which established the five
permanent members (the P-5): China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France,
and the United States of America. Thus, it is clear that the organ reflects a bygone era;
the geopolitics have changed drastically since then, important international actors are
not properly represented and others - especially those which arose in the
decolonization process—have their interests hardly represented at all. The UNSC
needs to reflect the current reality, according to former Secretary General Kofi Annan:
By adhering to the Charter of the United Nations, all Member
States recognize that the Security Council has the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security and agree to be bound by its decisions. It is therefore of
vital importance, not only to the Organization, but to the world,
that the Council should be equipped to carry out this
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responsibility and that its decisions should command worldwide
respect. (UNGA, 2005a)
The discussion of UNSC’s reform goes beyond the matter of membership. In
2007 the President of the General Assembly determined five main points of reform:
membership, regional representation, enlargement of the Council, veto power, and the
relationship of the Council with the General Assembly. The discussions on reforms
date back to the 1990s, in the General Assembly, when a broad number of members
agreed that the UNSC was not fit for the world’s current needs, being unrepresentative
and lacking democracy. At the 2005 World Summit leaders agreed to reform the
UNSC in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient, and transparent and
to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its
decisions (UNGA, 2005c). However, until this day, Member States could not reach an
agreement on how the reform should be established.
2.2.1 Consideration About the Number of Members
All Security Council members hold a specific kind of position of power: the
member is simultaneously co-author of the decisions in the fundamental matters of
international peace and security and it is also the co-author of the global security
agenda (SIMÃO, 2008). It is, thus, clear why the question of being or not a member of
the Council is very important to the foreign policy of the major countries: the ones
that already have a seat want to maintain their power and influence; the emerging
countries desire to reflect their growing international importance in the configuration
of the Council; and the Third World countries want to turn the Council into an
international platform to assist their main needs. The number of UN members has
grown 211% since its foundation in 1945, and countries as Brazil, India, Japan, South
Africa, Nigeria, and Germany are vehement supporters of including strategic countries
in the main decisions of global security. This awareness is driven by
broad considerations relating to the role (and responsibility) of
the major actors in international relations with regard to the
maintenance of international peace and security. (…) those who
contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily and
diplomatically should participate more in Council decisionmaking. The Security Council needs greater credibility,
legitimacy and representation to do all that we demand of it
(BLUM, 2005, p. 633).
Therefore, in the last decade, many UNSC reform projects were elaborated in
order to reach consensus, many of them focusing on the issues of contribution and
representativeness that should be taken into consideration. Countries as Japan and
Germany are among the biggest contributors to the UN budget, and others like Brazil
and India are not only important growing economies with a vast population, but also
important contributors to UN peacekeeping operations around the world. Those four
countries are known as the G-4, which, since 2004, began to defend a reform that
should include as permanent-members countries that are capable and willing to
assume greater responsibilities in the safeguarding of peace and security (SIMÃO,
2008).
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However, the G-4 has not found enough support in their cause and other
blocs of States have created their own reform proposals. The Uniting for Consensus
group, also known as Coffee Club, has today more than ten members, including G-4’s
regional rivals, such as Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, Italy, and Pakistan. This
group contests the G-4’s request for permanent seats, proposing, instead, that the
members should be elected on a regional basis to create a more equal representation.
Another well-known group is the Small Five (Costa Rica, Jordan, Lichtenstein,
Singapore, and Switzerland) that also displayed a series of proposals for the reform,
advocating for more transparency and coordination with the non-members countries,
and also proposes that the veto power should not be used in humanitarian emergencies
and genocide or war crimes, and that the P-5 countries should explain every veto to
the General Assembly. More radically, the African Union, since 1997, sustains that
the Council should be fully expanded, giving permanent seats and veto power to
Africa and to Latin America.
In December 2004 then Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed two models
of reform. According to Model A, there would be nine additional seats, in which six
would be permanent without veto power. Even if it is not explicit, it is easy to
conclude that from those six new permanent seats, “one would go to Europe, two to
Asia-Pacific, one to the Americas and two to Africa” (BLUM, 2005, p. 641). In Model
B, the permanent membership would remain unchanged; a new category would be
created (with eight seats) for a four-year term and renewable (instead of the current
two years without direct re-election) that would be equally distributed among regions
and one more two-year not-renewable seat would also be created (BLUM, 2005). In
both models, we can see that Annan was certain that, if the veto power remained a P5’s privilege, crafting, therefore, a hierarchical distribution of power, the P-5 would be
more inclined to accept changes in the Council. The following year Annan would
endorse his statement in the aforementioned report “In Larger Freedom: towards
security, development and human rights for all”, in which he stresses the necessity of
changes in the Council in order to maintain its credibility and capacity of action in the
main issues of global peace and security. However, neither of the proposals was even
voted by the organization.
Even though almost all Member States agree on the necessity of a more
inclusive and democratic reform, more than a decade has passed and nations are still
debating its linings and no actual negotiation is in order. Endorsing and adding new
permanent members will likely only “fuel political rivalries” (WORKSHOP ON SC
REFORM, 2011) and increase the P-5’s concern with any change that might dilute or
challenge their power. Moreover, in order to change the membership it would be
necessary to modify the UN Charter, a move deemed extremely difficult given the
required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, followed by an equivalent
number of ratifications and the endorsement of all the P-5 (PAUL; NAHORY, 2005,
p.03).
At the same time, “one cannot be sure that the enlargement of the Security
Council will necessarily enhance its effectiveness” (BLUM, 2005, p.644). Questions
may arise on how related is the concept of enlargement to the efficiency and
democracy of the Council. States in favor of the enlargement often argue that new
members will bring “more representativeness”, however, opponents reply that adding
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members only adds more States that have their own national interests, and therefore
do not necessarily make the organ more democratic. “To many, the reform of the
Security Council is a question of its continuing legitimacy. Expansion of the
membership could help enhance its authority (…) to others, reforming the Security
Council is mainly about increasing their own power” (FREIESLEBEN, 2004). On the
issue of effectiveness, incredulous observers ask themselves if a larger number of
members would not increase the length of the decision-making process of the
Council;there are others that insist on a regional basis form of representation, instead
of only expanding the number of Member States, proposing, for example, a seat to
European Union(FREIESLEBEN, 2004). The discussion of enlargement is far from
closuring and a great number of important international actors seem to differ about
this major question that should define the distribution of global power.
2.2.2 The Veto Power
Together with the enlargement of membership comes the very complicated
issue of the veto power. This debate is intense and controversial since the beginning of
the UN. As explained before, during the Cold War, the veto was a tool used by the
USA and the USSR to block each other’s actions, turning the Security Council into an
ineffective organ, preventing it to take action in important situations. From 1946 to
1989, the permanent members have casted 199 vetoes. Since the end of the Cold War,
the formal use of veto has diminished drastically, about one veto per year.
Nevertheless, the P-5 countries still use this device as a coercion mechanism to reach
their self-interests. Those countries frequently threaten to use the veto in order to
obstruct actions they oppose or to manipulate the Council’s agenda; this exercise is
call “hidden” or “silent” veto (NAHORY, 2004).
The hidden veto is mainly used in closed-door informal consultations, where
the P-5 benefits from the absence of any records or public. Consequently, this created
a situation in which the non-permanent member learns the issues that cannot be raised
without the risk of a threat, being, hence, a sort of self-censorship mechanism that
paralyzes the work in the Council.
The Council never discusses crises that a P-5 member considers to
be within its own exclusive sphere of interest. Chechnya, Tibet,
Xinjiang, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Uganda and Colombia figure
among the forgotten conflicts that the Council ignores. Even in
earlier days, when the formal veto was used much more
frequently, hidden vetoes kept key issues such as colonial wars
and Cold War conflicts off the agenda (NAHORY, 2004, p. 2).
The main criticism towards the UNSC veto power is that it should not be
used in humanitarian crises, genocide or mass atrocities. Indeed, the Security Council
“failed to act during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 due to the hidden vetoes of France
and the US. Paris and Washington not only blocked UN action, but also used their
hidden veto to weaken the definition of the crisis under international law” (NAHORY,
2004, p. 3). Many actors in the international system are urging the UN for more robust
diplomatic efforts in the agreements between the P-5 so none of them use the veto
power to block or weaken resolutions on genocide or mass atrocities.
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As already stressed, the different groups that advocate for reforms in the
Council have different positions about the veto power. The G-4, in a realistic decision,
abandoned their request for a permanent seat with veto and adopted another strategy.
The Uniting for Consensus insists that any expansion of the veto power would only
make the organ more undemocratic. The African Union maintained their terms of two
permanent seats to Africa with veto power, as their continent is not represented in the
P-5. The Non-Aligned Movement strongly opposes the veto, affirming that it
guarantees an exclusive and dominant role to the Permanent Members of the Council
and that it would be contrary to the aim of democratizing the UN (PAUL, 1996). A
great number of the reformers seem to agree that granting more veto rights would only
stanch the Council even more, rather than make it more efficient (NAHORY, 2004).
2.2.3 The UNSC Working Methods, Transparency, and Interactions
Apart from the intricate discussion about the Council’s membership, many
reformers are interested in changing the way the Council works within its procedures
and how it interacts with other organs of the UN, mainly the General Assembly. Many
delegates argue that the lack of transparency and information in closed-doors
meetings—which do not provide any record to non-members—are compromising its
credibility and such practices must soon be reinvigorated and restructured (UNSC,
2006). Consultations and negotiations on the released Council’s texts were defined as
“sedate” and “underproductive” (WORKSHOP ON SC REFORM, 2011) and some
suggested that the rules of procedure should be more dynamic and less formal, in
order to bring efficiency to the flow of debate. Non-permanent members complain
about the bureaucracy and the lack of information inside the Council, resulting in a
clear division between them and the permanent members. Moreover, in a period of
two years it is almost impossible to fully comprehend the working methods, forcing
the elected delegates to avoid a more proactive position during their mandate.
Furthermore, delegates urge for a more democratic interaction between the UNSC and
subsidiaries bodies, such as the Peacebuilding Commission, and non-members, such
as regional organizations and NGOs (WORKSHOP ON SC REFORM, 2011).
The Security Council has taken, in recent years, several measures in order
to increase its transparency and efficiency. Such actions were deemed possible since
reforming the working methods does not require a two-third majority approval, neither
demands an amendment to the Charter; also they probably present a minor danger to
the interests of the many delegations (FREIESLEBEN, 2008). Indeed, probably due
to the ten elected members’ pressure, the Council is slowly reforming itself7, aiming
to hold more public meetings, to extend the access to the Council’s documentation and
decisions (through a website), and to improve consultations with non-Council actors,
7 “Initiatives included: publicizing the daily work program (S/26015); publishing tentative
monthly work schedule (S/26176); making almost final (‘in blue’) draft resolutions available
(S/ 1999/165); providing greater transparency on procedures of the sanctions committee
(S/1995/234, S/ 1995/438, S/1996/54), on peacekeeping operations (S/PRST/1994/22);
initiating meetings between Council and troop-contributing countries (S/PRST/ 1994/22); and
launching ‘Arria-style meetings,’ in which a member of the Council could invite experts or
representatives of civil society.” (FREIESLEBEN, 2008)
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experts and speakers of the civil society. Several Working Groups emerge to be the
arena of such reforms, such as the “Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council
and Other Matters related to Security Council” and the “Security Council Informal
Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions”.
The interaction between the Council and the subsidiary committees is directly
related to its accountability. Being the UN’s most powerful organ in maintenance of
global peace and security, it should be able to rapidly communicate with the other
specialized branches of the organization. The organ seems to be committed with its
principle, according to UNSC Notes: “The Security Council agrees to cooperate with
other organs of the United Nations in synchronizing reporting obligations of the
Secretariat on the same subject, if appropriate, while putting priority on the effective
work of the Council” (UNSC, 2006). However, this issue is still sensitive between
reformers, especially the Peacebuilding Commission and the Sanctions Committee, as
shown below:
The recent trend of host countries requesting the pullout of UN
forces led some speakers to call for improved relations; others
desired greater communications with the countries providing
forces. Several members lamented the dire consequences of
inadequate mission reviews (…) the Council severely lacks
military expertise and procedures in general, one member
observed, especially in contrast to an organization such as
NATO”(WORKSHOP ON SC REFORM, 2011).
In 2005, the Security Council, together with General Assembly, adopted
resolutions 1645 and 60/80 that established a new Peacebuilding Commission in
response to the growing criticism over the Council’s difficulty to provide a
coordinated, integrated, and coherent approach to uptight post-war situations.
However, criticism continued after this resolution; the biggest financial contributors
or troop contributing countries to the Peacekeeping Commission are continuously
demanding for more consultation and participation in Security Council decisions, such
as India or Brazil.
The Council has the right to establish sanctions as an enforcement tool when
global security is threatened. “The range of sanctions has included comprehensive
economic and trade sanctions and/or more target measures such as arms embargoes,
travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions” (UNSC, 2012). Yet, many
international actors, governmental or not, have expressed their concerns with the
effects of this sanctions over the economy and the negative impacts over society. The
political motivations of the sanctions are also questioned, since many of the countries
that received sanctions had some sort of previous tension with some of the P-5
countries. Hence, reforms in this issue should find ways to improve the approach,
design, and application of sanctions to impact only specific targets and avoid
collateral-effects. In 2000 the UNSC established the “Informal Working Group on
General Issue of Sanctions” in order to improve the effectiveness of those measures.
Apart from its relations with subsidiary committees, throughout the 1990s,
the Council increased its relations with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
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After the end of the Cold War, many NGOs, already active in the General Assembly,
started a greater involvement with the Council as they assumed a larger role in
international affairs. The Council itself needed to deliberate in diverse situations in
which some NGO and agencies were specialized and active. It is easy to understand
why NGOs became a provider of knowledge and information to the Council:
In every crisis, NGOs were present, struggling to feed the
hungry, care for the sick, shelter the homeless and protect the
vulnerable. If the Council was to end such conflicts, it obviously
had to seek more than formal peace agreements between
belligerents. Rather, Council-built peace depended on economic
and social development, respect for human rights, disarmament,
and other areas of NGO expertise (PAUL, 2004, p.3).
NGOs are, nowadays, an important tool to the information and analyses
available to the Council. Furthermore, NGOs can work as an instrument to push the
Council to greater transparency and accountability, since most of them have organized
a comprehensive media system that provides reports and news to the public (PAUL,
2004).
In 1995 the “NGO Working Group on the Security Council Reform” was
created to be a body having regular interaction with Council members and the reform
proposals. This Working Group brought a new level of openness to the Council, since
the meetings are rather informal and less secretive. “The Working Group today
organizes dialogue meetings between a group of about thirty major NGOs and
individual Council ambassadors, as well as top-level UN officials and other key
players in the international security world” (PAUL, 2010, p.1). Nonetheless, NGO
actions are closely monitored by Council members, mainly the P-5, which, when the
NGOs goals do not match with their interests, use their veto power (cast it or threaten
to do it) to paralyze them. According to Paul (2004, p. 13), “[o]n sanctions reform,
Chechnya, the Middle East, Iraq, and many other important issues, even the most
vigorous NGO advocacy runs into the ‘brick wall’ of P-5 opposition”. Another issue
that must be addressed is the UNSC’s relation with the General Assembly.
Throughout the Cold War, while the Council was stagnated, the General Assembly
was growing, with the admission of many recently independent States, many of which
have begun to request more power to the organ, since it is the largest one in the UN.
“In 1963, in response to the ongoing pressure from the newly enlarged Assembly, a
more meaningful constitutional reform was put in place: four nonpermanent seats
were added to the six already on the Security Council” (REISMAN, 1993, p. 84).
Given the Council’s situation at that time, the General Assembly extended its range of
activity, even dealing with issues of peace and security. In 1950 resolution “Uniting
for Peace” was adopted; “Uniting for Peace, stated that when the Security Council—
because of the veto power of each of its five permanent members—cannot come to
agreement, the General Assembly can take up the matter” (SWART, 2008, p.24).
However, with the end of the Cold War, the Council found itself suddenly
more effective, with its functions renewed and also with many other activities to
undertake. Perceptibly, this new revival of the Council generated tension on the issue
of the two organs’ jurisdictions. Delegations in the General Assembly strongly
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complain about the recent attempts of the Council to take on issues that are not
directly dealing with peace and security, such as climate change, diseases, arguing that
they encroach the GA jurisdiction. Moreover, it has been suggested that the General
Assembly should address more of security issues, since the Charter does not prohibit it
and the “Uniting for Peace” resolution allows it. However, even if the GA did take up
subjects such as the situation in the Middle East and Afghanistan, it is unlikely that the
General Assembly as a whole would be keen to take on some of the Security
Council’s unresolved issues and complaints from the Security Council could also be
expected (SWART, 2008).
Even if the Presidents of both organs usually meet once a month, the gap
between the UNGA and the UNSC is an imperative matter that should be addressed.
Furthermore, UNGA’s international image is distorted, labeled by the opposing
priorities between the North and the South, and known to have an agenda that does not
necessarily respond to the world’s urgent needs. On the other hand, the Security
Council is known by its over-all power, with an obscure decision-making process,
especially regarding the non-documented meetings between the P-5. Delegates in the
UNGA argue that “the composition is not sufficiently representative of the UN’s
current membership, undermining its legitimacy” (SWART, 2008, p. 22). In their
defense, the P-5 (with support of many Council members) responds that countries
from the South organize lobby against their measures and decisions, making the
UNGA indirectly undemocratic. This disparity of power between the UNGA and the
Security Council may be one of the main instigators of the UNGA revitalization
debate now in order.
2.3 The Revitalization of the General Assembly
The General Assembly is the “chief deliberative, policy-making and
representative organ of the United Nations” (UN CHARTER, 1945) according to the
most used definition in the revitalization debate, that of the UN Charter. The fact that
each Member State carries equal weight in the General Assembly makes it a much
more representative organ than the Security Council. Although its recommendations
are not binding, it has a central role in setting standards and in the codification of
international law. It possesses an incipient legislative function when informal
consultations on critical issues lead to new treaty bodies and it also has the power to
establish new UN entities (SWART, 2008).
The proposal of some sort of restructuring of the General Assembly dates
back to 1975. In that year it was one of the six topics to be discussed as a part of the
restructuring of the United Nations in a special session of the General Assembly. A
small group of high-level experts appointed by the Secretary-General then issued a
report, after having prepared proposals for the discussion of structural reform within
the UN. The “A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation”
report consisted of two main areas of reform proposals: 1) how the General Assembly
and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should conduct their deliberative
and policy-making efforts; and 2) how the organization and operation of UN programs
should be structured to achieve effective implementation of goals.
The group conceived important and strong roles for the General Assembly
and the ECOSOC, but the report did not have a positive political outcome, excluding
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its use from further deliberations. However, the group’s proposals composed the
substantive basis for eventual discussions within the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations System,
created in 1975 as a result of the seventh special session to work on questions of UN
restructuring. The newly-formed Ad Hoc Committee then established the most
important unit in its deliberative process, an informal working group. The Committee
later agreed upon an agenda that framed UN restructuring considerations into eight
problem areas8, with the improvement of the over-all effectiveness of the General
Assembly in fulfilling its role under the UN Charter as one of them (MELTZNER,
1978).
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Member States have resumed discussions
and deliberations on the revitalization of the General Assembly in order to turn it into
a more relevant and effective organ. The main concerns are the improvement of its
working methods and the enhancement of its role and authority (SWART, 2008).The
revitalization debate is treated as a political rather than a procedural matter by most
Member States from the South. Hence, an essential motivating factor in the debate has
certainly been the disparity of power and authority between the General Assembly and
the UNSC. The former’s work should, for many Member States, mainly from the
South, ideally become as important as that of the UNSC, or maybe even more
important, as it is often stressed that the drafters of the UN Charter had envisioned
separate but equally important roles for the UNGA and the UNSC.
It is the understanding of some Member States that the General Assembly
should evaluate the work of the UNSC, allowing for more checks and balances in the
United Nations. In this sense, there have been resolutions that asked for better UNSC
annual reports and their further consideration in the UNGA and for the periodical
issuance of special subject-oriented reports to the General Assembly for its
consideration on issues of current international concern (ibidem).
Over time the General Assembly has attempted to be heard on questions
related to the use of force. This represents a changing role of the UNGA by
demonstrating interest and acting in the peace and security area, normally covered by
the UNSC. The General Assembly is determined to express its opinion on those
matters, but its power and that of the International Court of Justice – a result of
UNGA deliberations –, has often been constrained by the UNSC and its resolutions.
This power struggle has influenced the role of the General Assembly, forcing it to
keep the UNSC accountable to the standards and rules of international law. In 2005
the General Assembly stated that they take the responsibility to help prevent genocide
and human rights abuses according to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principles
(MEYER, 2011).
81) Improving the overall effectiveness of the General Assembly in fulfilling its role under the
Charter; 2)the role and functions of the Economic and Social Council in fulfilling its
responsibilities under the Charter; 3) other United Nations forums for negotiations, programs,
specialized agencies and ad hoc world conferences; 4) structures for regional and interregional
cooperation; 5) operational activities of the United Nations system; 6) planning, programming,
budgeting, and evaluation; 7) inter-agency coordination; and 8)secretariat support services.
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The image and the reputation of the UNGA are forged by a wide range of
often opposite priorities among Member States and by suspicion between the North
and the South. Moreover, some other problems can be named. For instance its agenda
does not necessarily deal with the most urgent issues on a priority basis, its debates are
repetitive and lengthy –and therefore its decision-making processes are slow –, its
resolutions are often uncreative and unproductive, only reproducing preexisting ones,
and they are not equipped with mechanisms to ensure or assess their implementation.
According to the ambassadors of some Member States, the one body in the General
Assembly that provides some sort of counterweight to the power of the Security
Council is its Fifth Committee, which manages budgetary and administrative issues.
Political will is fundamental for the implementation of UNGA resolutions as
they are non-binding; furthermore, there is no comprehensive mechanism in place to
assess the status of their implementation. Thus, Member States periodically request
the Secretariat to provide informal notes or reports on the implementation of UNGA
resolutions. Concerning the revitalization debate, the Secretary-General was asked,
through a series of resolutions, to provide an implementation status report, the first
being issued in 2006.
Concerning the election of the Secretary-General, in practice, he is selected
by the Security Council, normally based on a regional rotation, given that the five
permanent members can veto any candidate and can even present their own
candidates. The UNGA receives the UNSC’s recommendation for one candidate and
then appoints the Secretary-General by acclamation. However resolutions from the
51st session of the General Assembly on have made a number of recommendations
concerning the selection of the Secretary-General. Such resolutions show that Member
States are not satisfied with the current Secretary-General selection method. The
UNGA has stressed the need for improved transparency, inclusiveness, interaction
with official candidates, regional rotation and gender equality, the identification of
potential candidates by UNGA’s President in consultation with Member States (only
when such candidates are endorsed by their own Member State) and has even made
suggestions regarding the candidates’ qualifications.
Finally, also since the 51 st session of the General Assembly, a great number
of resolutions have been issued in regard to the improvement of its working methods.
The main questions consisted of streamlining and rationalizing the agenda; reducing
and consolidating documentation; improving proceedings, especially concerning
dates, promptness, rules of procedure and voting; reporting from the SecretaryGeneral to Member States; and improving coordination among Main Committees and
their working methods. The manner in which those questions are and will be dealt
with is central to the revitalization of the General Assembly (SWART, 2008).
2.4. The Reform of the ECOSOC and of the Social and Economic Policy Process at
the UN
There have been initiatives to reform the ECOSOC or to create a new global
decision-making body for social and economic matters for the past 50 years. In 1995
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the Commission on Global Governance 9 presented in a report a proposal for an
“emerging system of economic governance” (CGG, 1995) and the retirement of the
ECOSOC. In the years that followed a series of similar initiatives was presented under
different names, such as World Economic Council, Council for Sustainable
Development, Global Governance Group, Economic Security Council, among others.
Such projects aimed at creating a global economic decision-making body that would
be more assertive than ECOSOC and more representative than the G-8. In 2002, then
French president Jacques Chirac called for the creation of an Economic and Social
Security Council. Former German Minister for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, has also repeatedly advocated the creation
of a Global Council.
To many it did not seem practical to create a new global economic council
when the ECOSOC already existed, because such UN organ could take over global
economic coordinating functions if it were appropriately upgraded. Such a reform
would not require an amendment to the Charter, but a change in the political will of
Members States (MARTENS, 2006). Throughout time, ECOSOC has been constantly
overshadowed by other institutions, most notably the IMF, the World Bank and the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Its formal oversight role towards UN specialized
agencies - the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health
Organization (WHO), for instance – and in relation to its subsidiary bodies –such as
the Commission on Sustainable Development – has not given it any real power.
In his 2005 report ‘In Larger Freedom’, former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan defended pragmatic changes such as streamlining ECOSOC debates,
concentrating its agenda on selected issues and establishing an executive board. He
also advocated that it should become the global forum for development and the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (FUES, COOPER, 2005). In the outcome
document of the 2005 World Summit, Member States endorsed the idea of ECOSOC
as the main UN body dealing with economic and social matters. In order to strengthen
its political significance, it was claimed that the Council shall meet once a year on a
ministerial level. Its task should first and foremost consist of monitoring the
implementation of the internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs.
Every two years it shall serve as a high-ranking Forum for Development Cooperation
with the objective of analyzing trends in international development policies and
facilitating coherence between the development goals and policies in other sectors
(MARTENS, 2006).
9 The Commission on Global Governance was an organization established in 1992 “in the
belief that international developments had created a unique opportunity for strengthening global
co-operation to meet the challenge of securing peace, achieving sustainable development, and
universalizing democracy”. Former West German Chancellor Willy Brand organized the
international commission in order to “explore the opportunities created by the end of the cold
war to build a more effective system of world security and governance”. At the time UN
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali commended the initiative and assured the organization of his
support.
Available
at:
<http://web.archive.org/web/20020204001556/http://www.cgg.ch/TheCommission.htm.>
214
The General Assembly has been holding two simultaneous processes of
consultation on development and Economic and Social Council reform (ECOSOC)
based on commitments defined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. In
2006 the UNGA adopted a resolution on follow-up to the development outcome of the
World Summit, restating development commitments including the MDGs. Of the
many resolutions agreed upon during the Summit, the first to become operational were
the Annual Ministerial Review, a yearly convention of national and regional leaders,
policymakers and scholars in which opportunities for coordination among participants
towards the achievement and assessment of MDG progress are facilitated – which was
held for the first time at the 2007 High-level Segment –, and the Development
Cooperation Forum, which was launched the same year.
Concerning the other commitments made at the 2005 World Summit,
progress has been relative. On humanitarian issues, from ECOSOC 2009
Humanitarian Affairs Segment resulted a resolution on strengthening of the
coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the UN, calling upon all States
and parties to comply fully with the provisions of international humanitarian law,
while also urging Member States to continue to prevent, investigate, and prosecute
acts of gender-based violence, including sexual violence in humanitarian emergencies
(ECOSOC Resolution 2009/3). On the 2005 Summit’s commitment to enhance
coordination between ECOSOC and the Bretton Woods Institutions, there has not
been much advancement. With the development of the G20 as the main forum for
global economic policy definition, as well as the informal integration of the IMF and
World Bank into the Group’s governance structure that followed, ECOSOC has found
its position as a global economic policy-making body even more weakened
(REFORM THE UN.ORG, 2010).
2.5 Human Rights Related Reforms
2.5.1 The Peacekeeping Reforms and the Concepts of ‘Human Security’ and
‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’
The development of a renewed conceptual framework to address grave
human rights violations and mass atrocities in the past ten years carries great
importance, for the provision of a theoretical foundation is a useful mechanism in the
prevention of those violations. The term ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (also known as
R2P) focuses on the rights of the populations to be protected from physical harm and
not so much on the right of the states to carry out humanitarian intervention. The
concept refrains from the discussion on whether humanitarian interventions are
legitimate and addresses the fact that certain states at certain times are incapable or do
not possess the political will to offer protection to their populations, therefore,
humanitarian measures must be adopted (NOTARAS; POPOVSKI, 2011).
In a 2001 report, the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) used R2P as a substitute for the term humanitarian intervention,
what generated fierce debates on the topic. In 2005, however, due to its employment
in the World Summit Outcome document, R2P became a well-established term
(ibidem). According to such document, “responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” implies that:
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Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility
and will act in accordance with it. The international community
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an
early warning capability.(UNGA, 2005c).
The concept of ‘Human Security’ is central for the comprehension of the
local government capacity-building facet of UN peacekeeping missions
(TADJBAKHSH, 2005). Its goal, according to Sabrina Alkire (2003), is “[…]
fundamentally to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive
threats, without impeding long-term human fulfillment”. Globalization has prompted
profound changes in the forms of post-Cold War human security threats and it is,
therefore, necessary to build new tools that are more responsive to such threats, such
as fostering government capacities (ALKIRE, 2003).
UN peacekeeping has contributed to the prevention of violent intra and
interstate conflicts and has supported domestic actors in post-conflict peacebuilding
since 1948 (DPO & DFS, 2009). In Boutros Ghali 1992 ‘An agenda for Peace’, some
important concepts were defined: 1) Preventive diplomacy , the “action to prevent
disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into
conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”; 2) Peacemaking, the
“action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means
as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations”; 3)
Peacekeeping, the “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto
with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations
military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well”; 4) Post-conflict
peace-building , the “action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UNGA,
1992a).
A new vision for UN peacekeeping was exposed in the 2000 Brahimi report,
reinforcing its role, helping improve its effectiveness and reducing its costs. The
elements pertaining to this new vision enabled a 500% growth in operations over the
past ten years. The contemporary dimension and complexity of peacekeeping are,
nevertheless, straining UN’s resources, management and staff, endangering the
cohesion of such renewed vision (DPO & DFS, 2009).
The post-Cold War period, especially after the 9/11 events, is witnessing a
growing demands for UN peacekeeping forces to put an end to hostilities in violent
environments across the globe. The nature and range of these demands have,
nevertheless, strained UN’s ability to respond. UN's tasks have also increased in scope
and number. It is, therefore, of paramount importance to differentiate traditional UN
peacekeeping missions from new peacekeeping operations (SHAW, 1995).
Common characteristics, such as the need of consent of the main parties to
the conflict before the deployment of troops and the conduction of negotiations must
216
not be overlooked. However, one important change is the expansion of the scope of
new operations. While traditional operations were designed to maintain the rule of
law, to monitor ceasefire agreements, and to form buffer zones between disputants,
new missions must undertake humanitarian assistance, mine clearing, preventive
deployment, electoral monitoring, etc (SHAW, 1995).
Furthermore, in the new missions, a growing international demand to protect
human rights has lifted the limitation of the UN’s interventions in civil wars due to
matters of state sovereignty. Finally, in traditional missions, peacekeepers were armed
only with light armaments, but following the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping
troops started entering regions where there is no ceasefire and, therefore, are now
more heavily armed and may use military force for peace enforcement (SHAW,
1995).
The fundamental differences between the terms ‘enforcement’ and
‘peacekeeping’ must be made clear. While peacekeeping relies on the consent of the
contenders and on the principle of impartiality, those two conditions are difficult to
achieve in enforcement situations. Moreover, the use of military strength by
peacekeepers may bring about unpredictable results in the military, political and
diplomatic spheres. Force may just as well end a conflict, by convincing the parties to
take part in a negotiated settlement or exacerbate it, by compromising negotiation
efforts (SHAW, 1995).
2.5.2. The Creation of the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission
In 2005 former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan advocated for the idea that
human rights constitute one of the three pillars that account for the basis of all UN’s
work, along with peace and security and economic and social development. As a
result from the 2005 World Summit in the sphere of human rights, the Human Rights
Council and the Peacebuilding Commission were created. As a result from the 2005
World Summit in the sphere of human rights, the Human Rights Council and the
Peacebuilding Commission were created.
The Commission on Human Rights, that preceded the Council, was created in
1946. It drafted major international human rights standards, including the two
international human rights covenants, which along with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948) form the International Bill of Human Rights.
Through a work with more substantive thematic and case specific
characteristics, the commission promoted important advances in human rights
protection field. Thus, creating a unique system of special procedures composed of a
body of independent experts of the area and working groups that included Special
Rapporteurs. Performing the function of the commission’s and now the council’s
“watchmen” for human rights violations matters, they must monitor and respond to
reported human rights violations across the globe. Part of their work includes visiting
countries, developing studies, intervening on behalf of victims, and reporting back
with recommendations for UN action (TERLINGEN, 2007).
Even though Annan expected the Human Rights Council to be eventually
elevated to the status of a UN main organ, it was created as a subsidiary organ of the
General Assembly. The council’s mandate foresaw addressing situations of human
rights violations and providing prompt responses to humanitarian emergencies. A
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2006 General Assembly resolution stresses the need for ‘‘objectivity and nonselectivity’’ in on the issue and defended the elimination of ‘‘double standards and
politicization’’, in order to highlight the fact that political interests must never be
placed above human rights (TERLINGEN, 2007).
With regards to the Peacebuilding Commission, it is essential to note that
here is no consensus on the definition of the concept of peace-building. Therefore, it is
extremely difficult to agree on practices for achieving it. In his 1992 ‘Agenda for
Peace’ former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali defined peace-building as “action
to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in
order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Nevertheless, its operational meaning varies
according to the agency that uses it (BIERSTEKER, 2007). Hence, it is possible that
successes in one context will be imported into another, without considering widely
varying contextual, historical or situational differences between different conflict
zones. The measures that seem to have worked in one region might have some
relevance for another, but the demographic and resource disparities between them may
render those same measures of limited utility.
Biersteker (2007) considers that the Peacebuilding Commission remains
today one of the most promising areas of substantive UN reform, contrasting with the
“disappointing performance” of another new institutional outcome of the 2005 World
Summit, the Human Rights Council, which has received heavy criticism outside and
inside the UN. The UN Peacebuilding Commission reflects the UN acquired
knowledge on the challenges that punctuate conflict resolution, peacemaking,
peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding and development. The frequency with
which negotiated settlements turn back into armed conflict is a source of distress for
UN experts. Moreover, it has been observed that in 50% of cases countries return to
violent conflict within five years of the peace settlement.
2.6 The Enhancement of Cooperation between the UN and Regional Arrangements or
Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security
In his ‘An Agenda for Peace’,former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed
the greater inclusion of regional organizations in solving conflicts involving their
Member States (SHAW, 1995). In the period inaugurated with the end of the Cold
War it became clear that the multilateral structures, due the great demands placed
upon them, from an operational standpoint, would need strengthening, especially
concerning the resolution of conflicts. Regionalism then became a necessary feature of
conflict resolution, with the objective of burden sharing. During the early post-Cold
War years, the UN did not possess enough resources or commitment of major states to
provide security globally, what created vacuums that could be filled by regional
powers and institutions. Furthermore, such system contributed to the development of a
self-help mechanism for weaker states to address new security threats (FAWCETT,
2008).
The UN may encourage rather than take on the roles of regional organizations in
the short term, according to what was stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome
document. Strong states will, then, keep on considering legitimizing roles for regional
institutions useful, and weaker states will benefit from the security umbrella they
provide. Moreover, the ‘R2P’ concept relates closely to this topic once it defends
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strong regional alliances, acknowledging the importance of security regionalism
(ibidem).
Although the manner through which the UN should relate to regional
arrangements is defined in the UN Charter, coordinating efforts remains a difficult
task from an operational standpoint. During the Ivorian crisis, for example,
connections between the UN and its regional and subregional counterparts were
weakened, leading to suboptimal outcomes. Contenders frequently try splitting
international consensus, making coordination even more complicated. Coordination
challenges’ origins, nonetheless, vary greatly from region to region. The UN-AU
relations are influenced by the highly developed nature of African Union structures,
while the more undefined nature of Asian-Pacific arrangements, for example,
generates diverse effects on the UN-ASEAN relations (CONFERENCE REPORT,
2011).
It is, therefore, essential to increase the reinforcing political legitimacy that
can be achieved through the cooperation between UN and regional structures, and
ensure that different levels of multilateral engagement are acting in a coordinate
manner both normatively and operationally. Furthermore, the United Nations and
regional structures might help foster the establishment of national R2P focal points,
contributing to the formation of an integrated regional and international network for
response and prevention systems (CONFERENCE REPORT, 2011).
2.7 The Advancement of Environmental Governance
Among the 21th century international challenges, the environmental issue
definitely stands out. The Earth’s climate, biodiversity, water, forests, food, and
energy supplies are threatened daily by unsustainable human practices. Emission of
greenhouse gases, destruction of the ozone layer, overconsumption of critical
resources, high water and food prices, pollution and climate change are frequent topics
in global conferences, intergovernmental bodies and the media. Developing countries
are, by far, those who suffer the most from the ecological consequences of the
unsustainable exploitation of the Earth’s limited natural resources and they are
determined to make the United Nations their platform to pressure for more
coordinated international environmental governance. They are supported by many
developed countries, especially in the European Union; as said by an EU
commissioner for climate action,
the 21st century must have a more intelligent growth model, or
else it’s really difficult to see how we feed 7 billion people now
and 9 billion people [by 2050], resources were cheap before, but
it seems we are in for a period where resources become more
and more expensive. Oil is coming up in price, so many other
commodities are coming up in price. Food prices are rising. We
need to deal with this (HARVEY, 2012).
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However, many argue that the European Union position is contradictory,
associating it to the “Kicking away the Ladder Theory10”, because the majority of the
developed countries that are today insisting in a sustained development are the same
that polluted and degraded the environment the most in the past century, during their
industrial expansion.
The current system of international environmental governance is a network of
multilateral agreements. This governance is orchestrated by every kind of actor,
governmental or not, public or private, OIs and others, major groups of the
international civil society (UNEP, 2012a). Regional organizations provide forums for
policy development and implementation in regions and the scientific community has a
specific role in providing a basis for decision-making in a scientifically sound and
informed manner (UNEP, 2012b). The United Nations longs to play a leading role in
the global environment governance, and fulfill that goal it created the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) to be the principal body to work on this matter.
Among its tasks and coordinated mechanisms, it must set the international
environmental agenda and promote sustainable development (UNEP, 2012c).
However, the vast majority of experts believe that the current environmental
governance is unsuitable to current needs and ill-equipped to correspond to
expectations. Critics say that this governance lacks necessary representation from
poorer countries and accountability, especially from those countries that are the main
polluters and those that oppose rules and regulations in the name of free markets and
economic growth (SWART, 2008). Among the changes that are requested by the
international community in order to provide more effectiveness in this governance,
there are: a wide-ranging education system to create a workforce with skills and
knowledge of Green Economy; an approximation of the Green sector to profiting
market; the update of educational institutions in order to encourage research in
sustainability; the implementation of renewable energy sources and the increase of the
security of the world’s food supply. It is, thus, necessary to create an institutional
framework that provides, to governments and civil society, the coordinates for
sustainable development (NAJAM; MUÑOZ, 2008,).
The UNEP, together with the General Assembly and others organs, noted the
need for better coordination, treaty compliance, scientific knowledge, policy guidance,
and system-wide coherence of environmental activities. Many informal consultations
on environmental governance were undertaken by UNEP since early 2006 (GLOBAL
POLICY FORUM, 2012) and it was expected that in 2012 the Rio+20 Convention
would endorse the need for nations to dedicate themselves to environmental protection
and a more cohesive collaboration towards sustained development. This need is not
only to reduce the symptoms of the environmental crisis, but also to underline greater
policies to long term changes. According to UNEP, to strengthened environmental
governance, the actions required are:
[S]upport coherent international decision-making processes for
environmental governance; catalyze international efforts to
10 This theory was presented in Ha-Joon Chang’s work “Kicking away the ladder:
Development Strategy in Historical Perspective”. This book won the EAEPE (European
Association for Evolutionary Political Economy) award for best publication in 2002.
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pursue the implementation of internationally agreed objectives;
support regional, sub-regional and national environmental
governance processes and institutions; promote and support the
environmental basis for sustainable development at the national
level (UNEP, 2012d).
2.8 The Problem of Financing and UN’s relations with the Private Sector
To fulfill its duties with the international community, answering to global
problems and crises, the United Nations needs a certain amount of money to cover its
expenditures. UN’s lack of adequate financing is a serious constraint to the
organization, preventing it to respond to some current demands. The United Nations
and all its agencies and funds spend about 30 billion dollars each year or about 4
dollars for each of the world’s inhabitants (GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2012). This
budget, compared to the biggest economies’ GDPs or even to the world’s military
spending, is a very small sum and does not correspond to all that is required from each
branch of the UN System. According to the Global Policy Forum (2012), for nearly
two decades, the UN is facing financial difficulties, cutting the funding of many
programs and choosing one aid program over another; some observers even say that
the organization is going through a financial crisis 11.
The UN financing system is divided in two categories: the mandatory and the
voluntary contributions. The mandatory contributions are applied to all 192 Members
States and the individual amount to pay is determined by the General Assembly and
its Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the GA) every three
years. The calculus made is based on
[T]he country’s gross national income average of the last three
to six years and is calculated according to particular national
debt, per capita income and currency fluctuation. The ceiling
rate is fixed at 22%, which is met only by the United States as
the biggest donor to the UN budget. The floor rate and minimum
due is 0.001% on the UN budget, which applies to the poorest
countries (WEISSER, 2009, p. 2).
The mandatory budget covers the UN headquarters’ activities, staff and
infrastructure, as also the expenditures of the General Assembly, the Security Council,
the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the
Secretariat. The mandatory budget also covers the peacekeeping operations, which
have, by far, the highest budget of the organization (US$7.06 billion annual budget for
the period from July 2011 to June 201212) since the UN is taking on more and more
regional conflicts to settle and this operations are more complex than they were in the
past, with the observation of elections, the distribution of supplies, the management
the refugees, among others. The voluntary contributions are sent to different UN funds
and programs and those contributions do not have guidelines or limits. The majority of
11 Global Policy Forum is an independent organization that closely monitors the work of the
United
Nations
and
scrutinizes
global
policymaking.
See
also:
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/about-gpf-mm/introduction.html>
12 Data From the Global Political Forum. Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org
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UN aid programs, as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World
Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are
nourished by this voluntary budget.
This financial architecture is criticized and many members urge for reforms,
especially in terms of accountability. Many Member States do not respect their
obligation towards the UN and are late in their payments or even have not paid their
full dues at all.
In December 2008, 59 member states still owed US$ 3.4 billion
to the UN for the current year, which includes unpaid
assessments for the Regular Budget, the Peacekeeping
Operations, the International Tribunals and the Capital Master
Plan. The biggest debtor is the United States, which accounts for
94% of the debt on the regular budget and more than 40% of the
total debt (WEISSER, 2009).
Reformers insist on a stricter managing funding system with a higher
accountability and bigger consequences to those members that rescind their donations,
blaming them for the ‘widespread inefficiency and discrepancies in enacting UN
agendas (JAGEL, 2012). Some observers say that, while many countries do not pay
because they have their own financial problems, there are many other countries that
choose not to pay due to political reasons, such as mistrust between Member States
and within the work of certain committees. Since much of the budget of programs,
funds, and specialized agencies is based on voluntary contributions, countries use their
financial contributions to these institutions as a political tool to reach their goals. A
greater donor can pressure the UN to act on a specific matter over another, since he is
in an important position of influence. He can, also, threaten to stop financing such
institution if he is in disagreement with the adopted policies. As such, “The individual
programs, funds and agencies have to deal with insecurities in their financial planning.
The short-term funding contradicts the long-term approach for development”
(WEISSER, 2009, p. 1).
Delegates are looking for ways to improve the UN financial architecture, but
in a General Assembly session proposals on the matter were numerous, indicating
difficulties towards an agreement (JAGEL, 2012). The majority of members agreed
that the general fund for UN operations must be one of the focuses of this reform, as
well as finding ways to increase the organization’s efficiency, strategic planning, and
lessen the costs of its operations. In the 63 rd Session of the UNGA, members directly
quoted Ban Ki Moon’s concept that summarized the weaknesses of the actual funding
architecture:“Volatility of resource flows, long-term decline in the share of core
resources of overall contributions, fragmentation of non-core funding, and uneven
burden-sharing among donors” (BAN KI MOON, 2009 apud JAGEL, 2012).
The reform of the financial system of the organization is imminent; the first
15 donors of UN correspond to more than 80% of the system’s budget and, in 2009,
only five members financed more than 50% of the whole UN inflow (WEISSER,
2009, p. 2). A group of reformers proposed lowering the ceiling rate from 22% to
10%, in order to limit the political influence of those bigger donors and increase the
leverage of the smaller ones. Other proposals recommend a global tax, as a penalty,
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applicable to the consumers of energy fuel in large scale that aim to be an “additional
instrument for shaping policy, for instance, on climate change and global financial
structures” (WEISSER, 2009, p. 2). As States are contributing less and less to UN
agencies and funds, alternative sources of funding, especially non-governmental ones,
are increasing their participation in the organization. The private sector is actively
working with the United Nations, especially in issues concerning human rights, peace
and security, economic and social development, and humanitarian assistance. Though
the UN end-goal may differ from the profit-goals of businessmen, the organization
sustains that there are many objectives in common, such as building a strong market,
combating corruption, safeguarding the environment, increasing food security, and
ensuring social inclusion. Thus, the private sector is becoming an important donor to
UN’s activities, and almost all funds, agencies, and programs have already received
deeper collaboration. The United Nations sustains that, to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, a greater engagement with the private sector is necessary.
Nonetheless, there is a major concern about the role of the private sector
inside the UN; delegates questioned how altruistic can a private company be on issues
of development and international aid. One may ask if private companies form an
alliance with UN not by their willing to cooperate in achieving the Millennium
Development Goals, but because they may have particular interest in market fragilities
of some determined region (GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2012) since most UN
missions are in countries that have fragile markets, with excessive deregulation, cheap
labor force, and flexible labor rights.. Thus, to avoid those problems, many delegates
are asking for a more rigid control towards private sector aid. Among specific topics
of concern it is possible to name the decreasing UN’s capacity regarding humanitarian
intervention: the UN is increasingly turning to mercenary armies in its missions
abroad. Since UN is lacking personnel and the prices are rising, there is a trend to
contract private armies to protect the organization personnel and facilities, since they
seem to be cheaper (GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2012). Many States are also
worried that this trend could perceive the UN field operations’ neutrality, undermining
even more the organization’s credibility.
2.9 The Increase of UN’s System-Wide Coherence
The Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB) is a coordination body
comprised of all heads of UN organs. It developed into a common UN voice that made
itself heard on climate change, food security, and the global financial and economic
crisis. It is difficult to develop such a common voice in a highly decentralized system,
with incentives for each agency to be visible as an individual organization and where
Member States do not necessarily behave in a coherent manner across the different
bodies. The emergence of the CEB as an actor relates to the latest round of reform of
the UN’s development cooperation system. This process initially gained momentum in
the 2005 World Summit and the subsequent high-level panel on system-wide
coherence in development, humanitarian assistance, and environment areas.
The process main focus was the strengthening of coherence and coordination
of UN operational activities. The greatest products of the system-wide coherence
reform initiative so far are the General Assembly’s decision in June 2010 to merge
four entities working on gender-related issues into a new organization, UN Women, as
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well as to improve the governance, financing, and country-level work of the UN
development system by a number of reforms (WEINLICH, 2011).
Furthermore, the Delivering as One (DaO) program seeks to enhance
coordination between normative UN organizations, specialized organizations and civil
societies, and the country level UN programs. The creation of the DaO dates back to
the 2005 World Summit and the establishment the 2006 High Panel on System-wide
Coherence, which recommended the initiative. At the end of 2006, eight countries
volunteered to launch pilot programs of the DaO initiative. Those countries were:
Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and
Vietnam. The programs were launched in early 2007 and transferred to UNDG
leadership in 2010. The main goal was to make the UN system work in a more direct
fashion with pilot country governments in order to enhance UN presence, achieve
sustained results, and reduce transaction costs (JAGEL, 2012). Since 2007, in pilot
countries, the UN system operates with one program, one budgetary framework, and
under the authority of one leader, providing a way of building coherence from the
local bodies up via the DaO initiative (WEINLICH, 2011).
3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS
3.1 The United Nations 2005 World Summit
The 2005 World Summit of the United Nations was held in New York City
from September 14th to 16th, in 2005. Representatives of all the then 191 Member
States met in the UN Headquarters. They debated some points outlined in the
Millennium Declaration13 and in the Millennium Development Goals 14. The Summit
settled four main branches of UN actions to make decisions and recommendations on:
development, peace and collective security, human rights and the rule of law, and the
strengthening of the UN (UNGA, 2005c). The last point comprises a group of internal
practices and policies that the UN should try to implement in order to best fit itself in
the international arena. After all, “Strengthening the UN” 15 is a designation for many
suggestions of internal improvements that shall guarantee more efficiency and
effectiveness to the organization (UN, 2012b).
In the High-Level Plenary Meeting, the most relevant topic about changes in
the United Nations was the one concerned with human rights and the rule of law and,
later, the strengthening of the UN. The former's importance relies on the first official
recognition of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
3.1.1 The Responsibility to Protect
Since the beginning of its use, the R2P turned out to be a fundamental
guideline for international actions in conflicting zones. Despite being recent, it has
quickly developed since 2005. In 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a
13 Full text at <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.>
14 More information at <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals>.
15More
information
on
Strengthening
the
UN
is
<http://www.un.org/en/strengtheningtheun/.>
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available
at
speech in Berlin to better clarify what exactly is the R2P. One year after, Ban Kimoon released a report entitled "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" based on
paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. The report called for a three
aspects strategy for implementing the R2P, namely 1) the protection responsibilities of
the state, 2) international assistance and capacity building, and 3) timely and decisive
response (ICRtoP, 2012; UNGA, 2009a).
On 7 October 2009, the General Assembly passed the Resolution 63/308,
which reaffirmed the States' commitment with the R2P in the 2005 World Summit
(UNGA, 2009b). After that, two more reports of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
were made on this issue: the 2010 Report on Early Warning, Assessment, and the
Responsibility to Protect and the 2011 Report on The Role of Regional and Subregional arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (UNGA 2010b;
UNGA, 2011).
3.1.2 Strengthening the United Nations in the 2005 World Summit
During the 2005 World Summit, Strengthening the UN decisions regarded
many different and relevant improvements in the organization. They could be divided
as follows: 1) changes related to the main organs, like the General Assembly, the
Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat; 2) changes
related to coherence of the UN System and its relations with other entities and 3)
changes in the Charter of the UN (UNGA, 2005c). Each of these aspects shall be
analyzed hereafter.
3.1.2.1 Decisions related to the main organs of the United Nations
Firstly, concerning the General Assembly, the 2005 World Summit Outcome
called for the improvement of the relationship between the General Assembly and the
other principal organs of the UN. On the other hand, the proposals for the Security
Council once again reaffirmed the need to make the Council more broadly
representative, efficient and transparent. Furthermore, the Outcome demands the
UNSC to adapt its working method so as to increase the involvement of States not
members of the Council (UNGA, 2005c).
Still regarding changes in the main organs, there was a great effort to
revitalize the ECOSOC as the main body for coordination, policy review, policy
dialogue, and recommendations related to economic and social issues. Bearing this in
mind, this council should a) promote global dialogue and partnerships regarding its
matters along with international financial institutions, private sector and civil society,
b) hold a biannual high-level Development Cooperation Forum, c) follow the
outcomes of the conferences of the UN and d) foster and complement international
efforts related to humanitarian emergencies, including natural disasters. (UNGA,
2005c). Moreover, the Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United
Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization stressed “the
desirability of finding practical ways and means” to reinforce the International Court
of Justice (UNGA, 2006a).
In relation to the Secretariat, the member states present in the Summit
reaffirmed the importance of accountability, transparency, and integrity. In addition to
that, efforts were made in order to implement a gender equality perspective in the
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policies and decisions taken inside the UN. There was an overall agreement with the
policy of zero tolerance adopted by the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding
sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations personnel (UNGA, 2005c).
It was during the 2005 World Summit of the UN that member States took the
first steps towards the creation of the Human Rights Council 16. This Council was
designed to have mainly three functions: to promote protection of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms, to address human rights violations and to make
recommendations related to its subjects (UNGA, 2005c; UNGA, 2006b). The creation
of the Peacebuilding Commission is also a result of the High-Level Plenary, further
detailed by the Resolution 60/180 on the Peacebuilding Commission (UNGA, 2005d).
3.1.2.2 The coherence of the UN System and its relations with other entities
The second topics division of the Strengthening the UN in the 2005 World
Summit Outcome regards changes related to coherence of the UN System and its
external relations. The signatories claimed to strengthen the linkage between
normative work and the operational activities of the United Nations. They also created
consensus on the need to consider more tightly managed entities in the fields of
development, humanitarian assistance, and environment (UNGA, 2005c). This
compromise was particularly well-established and supported the decision to create the
Human Rights Council.
The Summit’s Outcome proposed a reinforcement of the relationship
between the UN and regional organizations by making the United Nations a platform
of cooperation and consultancy for regional blocs. Beyond that, the members of the
Plenary Meeting highlighted the importance of improving relations with national
parliaments through the Inter-Parliamentary Union. These were endeavors to fortify
the UN-System by adapting itself to new global phenomena, as regionalism and
growing interdependence (UNGA, 2005c)
3.1.2.3 Changes in the Charter
Finally, there were a few proposals concerned with modifications in the
Charter. The first one suggested the elimination of Chapter XIII, the one which
regulates the Trusteeship System, and other references to the Trusteeship Council in
Chapter XII. The Trusteeship Council suspended its operations on November 1 st after
the independence of Palau, the last Trust Territory of the UN. Furthermore, member
States resolved to delete references to “enemy States” in Articles 53, 77, and 107,
understanding the outdated character of this expression. At last, Resolution XX asked
the Security Council to consider some aspects of the Military Staff Committee (UN,
2005a; UNGA, 2005c). These changes reflect UN awareness of the importance of
renewing institutions in order to adapt to contemporary international processes and to
keep historical coherence and harmony with the Charter’s principles.
3.2 Boutros Boutros-Ghalli’s Agendas
16Further attributions related to the Council were pointed out in General Assembly Resolution
60/251 on the Human Rights Council of April3rd, 2006.
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The process of reforming the United Nations started its main advances with the
arrival of a new Secretary-General in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghalli, and the
acknowledgment of the need to adapt the organization to post-Cold War reality. Two
different, yet complementary, agendas were issued by him in order to set guidance to
the efforts of reforming the United Nations: the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for
Development.
Answering the request made by the UNSC Summit of 1992, Boutros-Ghalli
created the Agenda for Peace, laying out the new strategy that the UN should strive
for when dealing with security concerns (UNGA, 1992a). There were five
interconnected principles expressed in this document, which should guide UN's role in
establishing peace in the world: preventive diplomacy, peace-enforcement,
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building (DOYLE; OTUNNU,
1998).
Another underlying logic, that guided international politics after the World
War II, had disappeared with the end of the Cold War: the practice, by the
superpowers, of using investment and cooperation to create spheres of influence
(ADVEMEG, 2012). The majority of the developing countries feared the end of the
funding development projects. In this context, the Secretary-General was called by the
47th General Assembly of 1992 to establish an Agenda for Development to guide
nations in promoting social and economic development in the new era (UNGA,
1992b).
The main ideas that Boutros-Ghalli addressed in the report can be summarized
in seven points (ADVEMEG, 2012). Firstly, although the Nation-State should
continue to have the main role when striving for development, the UN should utilize
its vast experience to act as a facilitator in such pursuit. However, the second point
stresses that the national government should not be regarded as a paramount economic
agent, given the internationalization of trade flows. It should, notwithstanding, provide
a framework for ensuring social safety and a competitive market system. The third
point states that economic growth should not be an end in itself, but rather a mean for
poverty reduction and promotion of full employment.
The fourth point is a critic that there is no mechanism to ensure that major
economies could be induced to promote economic structural changes to benefit
international economy. The fifth point argues that sustainability is paramount for
development. The sixth point defends social integration as an underlining logic for
development. The seven and last point accounts for the parallel processes of
development and democracy, since social participation in decision-making is linked to
the legitimacy of governmental development programs. The Secretary-General ends
its report noting that these should be the principles that would enable United Nations
engagement in social and economic development.
3.3 Kofi Annan: Further Changes and Larger Freedom
Upon taking office, in 1997, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, together with
Maurice Strong, started his efforts to reform the United Nations by issuing a report
entitled Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (UNGA, 1997). The
main objective of such Programme was to establish a practical guide for achieving the
guidelines exposed in the 1995 Commission on Global Governance report, entitled
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Our Global Neighborhood (ECO, 1997). The main new feature introduced in this
1995 report was a reassessment of national sovereignty. The world was facing new
security concerns, which, since then, started to encompass not only the traditional
“external threat” notion, but also the hazards brought by hunger, disease, repression
and the like. Although developed countries focused mainly in the efforts of reducing
the “bloated world-wide bureaucracy”, these reports also strived to tackle the new
security menaces. An adaptation of the concept of sovereignty was proposed in the
first report, affirming that a state’s right of autonomy should not be weighed against
human’s right for security (CGO, 1995). The Pregramme for Reform focused mainly
on management, administration, and coherence in UN activities around the world.
The turning of the century brought the Millenium Development Goals, which
were outlined by the Millenium Assembly. As a follow-up to this declaration, Kofi
Annan, two years later, issued the report Strengthening of the United Nations: an
Agenda for Further Change, intending to highlight ways for the United Nations to
help nation-states achieve the Millenium Goals. As stated in the introduction of such
report:
The present report suggests a number of improvements aimed at
ensuring that the Organization devotes its attention to the
priorities fixed by the Member States, and that the Secretariat
gives better service. However, the intergovernmental organs
must also change. The General Assembly and the Economic and
Social Council both need to adapt in order to realize their
potential, while the stalled process of Security Council reform
needs new impetus. The work programme of the Organization as
a whole should be better focused, with fewer but more
productive meetings and fewer but more useful documents
(UNGA, 2002, p.2).
In its first section, the report asseses what has been done in terms of a
comprehensive reform of the United Nations and what should lie ahead, such as
strenghtening the General Assembly, enhancing the role of the Economic and Social
Council, resuming the process of reforming the Security Council and reducing the
number of unnecessary meetings. The following sections propose ways to do so, by
aligning the activities of the Organization with its priorities; serving the member states
better; promoting institutional coordination and partnerships; reforming the planning
and buget process to better allocate resources; and investing in the excellence of the
United Nations staff (UNGA, 2002).
In 2005 another major report was issued by Kofi Annan, as a five-year
assessment of the progress made under the Millenium Declaration, entitled In larger
freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, which focuses
mainly on progress that should be made in assuring freedom through the end of want,
the end of fear, and the end of human rights violations (UNGA, 2005a). For the
United Nations to achieve a main role in promoting this new world, the system as a
role should be updated. In the report, after adressing the three main concerns in
promoting freedom, the Secretary-General issued the guidelines in reforming the
General Assembly, the Councils, the Secretariat, the System Coherence, the regional
organizations, and the United Nations Charter (UNGA, 2005a).
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4. BLOC POSITIONS
Japan defends the UN reform, but usually focuses on the reform of the
Security Council. The Japanese government argues that such a change would increase
UN’s efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy, and representativeness, once there is a lack
of proportionality between the amount of present seats in the UNSC and the huge
enlargement of United Nations membership during the last decades. Besides, Japan
demands changes in the regional composition of membership, since Asia holds more
than a half of global population, but has only one permanent member and two nonpermanent members in the UNSC (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN,
2011).
Japan’s defense of its addition as a permanent member is based mainly on 3
points: a) Japan is the second-largest contributor to the UN budgets among the
Member States, bearing 12.5% of the total budget; b) Japan is one of the major
contributors to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, having already sent 10
dispatches of self-defense forces and civilian police personnel. Japan additionally has
established 14 peacebuilding actions in Africa; c) Japan is the biggest supporter of
disarmament and non-proliferation policies and, for instance, has putted forward a
resolution on nuclear disarmament to the UN General Assembly every year since 1994
(MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, 2011). Apart from the reforms in
the UNSC, Japan addresses further demands. Among them, the country asks for the
rationalization of the agenda in the General Assembly, conducting a more timely
debate on the highest priorities problems. (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
JAPAN, 2006).
South Africa’s claims for changes in the membership of the United Nations
Security Council usually come along under the IBSA forum. India, Brazil, and South
Africa stress the need to expand both permanent and non-permanent seats in the
UNSC, granting larger emphasis to an increasing participation of developing countries
(IBSA, 2010). Regarding the UN as a whole, South Africa has expressed the will of
creating new and improved relations between the UN and regional organizations. This
concern is related to its leading role in the African Union. (IRCD, 2012). South Africa
argues that developing and underdeveloped countries are the most damaged by
economic and financial global crises. The internal costs of their contributions are
much heavier and, therefore, United Nations must always try to improve its efficiency,
raising accountability standards.
Brazil has strongly supported the adaptation of UN institution to the new
international context, so as to, according to the Brazilian argument, make the UN a
more efficient and legitimate organization. Regarding the reforms in the Security
Council, Brazil has striven to increase its representativeness and transparency, through
the enlargement of both permanent and non-permanent seats. Moreover, Brazil wishes
to own one of these permanent seats. She is a really active member of the G4, having
upheld the L. 64, a Draft Resolution that proposed an extended Security Council with
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up to 25 members17. . Until now, 89 out of 192 member States of the United Nations
support Brazilian pretensions to a permanent seat, including France and United
Kingdom. (MREa; MREb). Considering reforms not only of the Security Council,
Brazil supported the creation of the Human Rights Council during the 2005 World
Summit. At this same Summit, Brazilian representatives also defended the creation of
the Peacebuilding Commission, pondering that the Brazilian position was essential for
its creation. Additionally, Brazil has assisted the Development Cooperation Forum in
order to properly strengthen the functions of the Economic and Social Council.
(MREa).
India strongly stresses the necessity of reforms in the structure of
membership of the United Nations Security Council. As the other G4 nations, its
demands range from permanent to non-permanent seats. Inside the UN, India showed
great support to the creation of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment
of Women (UN Women) (MEA, 2010). Besides reforms of the UNSC, the Indian
government actively discusses “the revitalization of the UN General Assembly and the
strengthening of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the UN’s
development-related efforts” (MEA, 2011: p. 12). As the top three troop contributing
country of the UN, India endorses many sorts of peacekeeping operations. (MEA,
2011). Recently, India has decided to join the L69 Group, a bloc composed by 41
countries that seek to achieve the lasting reform of the UN (GLOBAL POLICY
FORUM, 2012).
Mexico supports many projects of reform in the United Nations. In 2004, its
officials struggled for the creation of the Group of Friends for the United Nations
Reform, a bloc that points demands for specific topics for the reform of the
organization. Mexico has declared the will to cooperate with projects of reform in the
Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC, Secretariat, and other organs. In this
regard, the country proposed many procedural changes that could fasten the
negotiation process in the fora of discussion of the UN (MEXICO, 2005). Mexico is
also known for its participation in the “Uniting for Consensus”, also called Coffee
Club, a movement created in 1995, which stands against the enlargement of
permanent seats in the Security Council. Basically, the Coffee Club members defend
the extension of non-permanent seats up to 20 members, but they claim for no changes
in the structure of membership of permanent members (UNGA, 2005b).
The Russian Federation states its position as a supporter of greater synergy
among UN bodies, especially between the Security Council and regional organizations
(RUSSIA, 2009). Regarding the topic of the Security Council reform, this country
defends that, given the importance of this body in assuring global stability, any reform
has to be made patiently, taking in account the harmonization of all the positions
concerning this topic (RUSSIA, 2005). Given that no results made by
intergovernmental negotiation have received wide support, Russia believes that setting
artificial deadlines and forcing a specific model to vote prior to this harmonization
would polarize the countries, leading to a nefarious deadlock in the talks. The country
17 According to the proposal, six more permanent members would make part of the UNSC, two
of them from Africa, another two from Asia, a single one from Western Europe and the last one
from Latin America and Caribbean.
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defends also that the size of the council should continue to be compact, no greater than
twenty and a few, to assure its effectiveness, and that the veto power should not be
changed (RUSSIA, 2010).
The People’s Republic of China, stressing the importance of the General
Assembly and the Security Council as the two main bodies of the United Nations,
calls for the revitalization of the former and the reform of the later as top goals of the
institution reform, focusing on consensus and deliberation as a way of achieving it
(CHINA, 2008). The UN Security Council should be enlarged, according to this
country, and a greater number of developing countries, especially African ones,
should be present in the Council (CHINA, 2012). Still regarding UNSC, China also
calls for the improvement of its working method, in order to enhance its efficiency
and transparency. Just as Russia, the PRC does not believe in imposing time
boundaries for the reform (CHINA, 2006b). On the topic of UN funding, China
advocates attaining to the principle of “capacity to pay” (CHINA, 2006a).
The Argentine Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Italian Republic and
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan are part of the group “Uniting for Consensus”,
formerly known as Coffee Club. The group defends that, on the topic of the United
Nations Security Council reform, the changes should only be done unanimously
(UNGA, 2005b). The objective is to delay the process so that regional powers, such as
the G4, do not arise to a permanent spot with veto power in the Council. The practical
proposal of the group is to increase non-permanent seats in the Council to twenty
(UNGA, 2005b). Pakistan itself, together with Viet Nam and six other countries are
the pilots of the endeavor known as the “Delivering as One” project (UNDG, 2010).
This project aims to combine comparative advantages of Member States and more
coherent programs of the institution in order to increase the impact of UN efforts and
reduce its costs.
Turkey is also a member of the Uniting for Consensus faction, which
opposes to the addition of new permanent members to the Security Council (SWART,
2009). Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated that the United
Nations Security Council must be reformed, since it is impossible for the UNSC to
deliver justice to the world with its current structure. He also stated that “the world is
running under the hegemony of five countries and only what permanent members say
is done” (AKPARTI, 2012).
The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam sees that a comprehensive United Nations
reform goes through the revitalization of the General Assembly. In order to raise the
position of this body, the country defends its responsibility of being a policy making
agency and main representative of the institution, as well as any reform should
increase its role in the process of setting up standards, compiling international law,
and selecting and appointing senior UN officials (BAO, 2011). The country defends
that the reform should benefit all Member States, advocating mutual consultations to
achieve a better system-wide coherence (VNA, 2009). The country hosts a pilot of the
“Delivering as One” project, as stated in the previous paragraph (UNDG, 2010).
Regarding the UN Security Council reform, Viet Nam believes not only in expanding
the numbers of permanent and non-permanent seats, but also that the reform should
make the Council more transparent and accountable for its actions (VNA, 2009).
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The Arab Republic of Egypt strives for a permanent seat in the United
Nations Security Council and it defends the right of African countries to have two
permanent and five non-permanent seats in this committee (EGYPT, 2010). Also, the
country is in favor of granting more powers to the General Assembly (EGYPT, 2009).
Regarding operational activities, Egypt believes that they should be enhanced by the
reform process, and that the Economic and Social Council should have the role of
supervising them, as well as coordinating and highlighting its orientations and policies
(EGYPT, 2011).
Nigeria is in favor of the reform of the UN Security Council and aims at
becoming a permanent member as an African representative. On the initiative of the
former Nigerian President and then African Union Chairman, Olusegun Obasanjo,
African leaders at the African Union summit worked towards two-consensus
candidates - the Ezulwin consensus - in Swaziland, February 2005, supporting
Nigeria’s pledge. This event followed the growth of US interest in Egypt and South
Africa. This consensus building was threatened at the AU Sirte Summit in July 2005,
when the countries competing for the seats rose from the four original countries
(Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa) to eight, the four new ones being Gambia,
Kenya, Senegal, and Libya (AKPOTOR, AGBEBAKU, 2010). At the 66th Session of
the United Nations General Assembly, Nigerian President Goodluck E. Jonathan
restated the Nigerian position on UNSC reform (NIGERIA, 2011).
Germany welcomes the fact that it was possible for a few additional
proposals for reform of the United Nations to be implemented in recent years: with the
establishment of the intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission by the Security
Council and the General Assembly in December 2005, the implementation of the
“One UN” initiative and it has welcomed the creation of UN Women (GERMANY,
2012). Germany still supports a European seat officially, according to the
government’s coalition agreement signed after the September 2009 general election.
The coalition agreement also states that as the UK and France would probably not
agree with such proposal, “in the interim, Germany remains prepared to assume
greater international responsibility with a permanent seat on the Security Council.”
Germany is the EU’s most populous country and the UN’s third-largest financial
contributor. Moreover, German soldiers are part of UN contingents in Afghanistan, in
Kosovo, and off the coast of Lebanon (NEUKIRCH, 2010).
Although France admits the need for the adaptation of the Security Council
to the realities of this century, the French position is that the Council must remain
capable of performing its attributions effectively. France is in favor of an expanded
number of permanent and non-permanent seats in the Council, so that its composition
reflects the emergence of new powers willing and able to assume great
responsibilities. France supports the accession of Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan to
permanent member status and an increased presence of African countries within the
Council, in particular among its permanent members. France, along with the UK,
advocates for an intermediate reform proposal, which could include a new category of
seats, with a longer term than that of the currently elected members. At the end of this
intermediate period, a review should take place to convert these new seats into
permanent seats (FRANCE, 2012).
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The United States of America supported the creation of the UN
Peacebuilding Commission in 2005. Nevertheless, American Ambassador Bolton
stated that management and budget reform are more of a priority for the United States
than the Commission (US MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2005). The
country generally supported the establishment of a Human Rights Council to replace
the Commission on Human Rights. The previous Commission was criticized by the
United States and other countries over the composition of its membership when
countries perceived by many to have poor human rights standards were elected as
members. However, in March 2006, when the UN General Assembly agreed to a
resolution creating the new Council, the United States was one of four countries to
vote against it, on the grounds that the new Council was not equipped with stronger
mechanisms to maintain credible membership. The US also expressed disappointment
with the Council’s work during its initial sessions, which focused primarily on alleged
Israel’s human rights abuses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in Lebanon.
The US also identifies economic development as a UN reform priority
(BLANCHFIELD, 2011).
The US agrees with a Security Council reform, but only if an increase in its
effectiveness accompanied such change. Furthermore, the country supports Japan as a
permanent Security Council member due to its “democratic and human rights record”,
and its role as the second largest contributor to the United Nations. The US
government believes that developing countries deserve representation in the Council,
but maintains that any new potential permanent member should meet specific criteria
i.e. dimension of economy and population, military capacity, contributions to
peacekeeping operations, commitment to democracy, respect for human rights,
financial contributions to the UN, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism records and
equitable geographic balance (ibidem). The United States agrees in principle with a
minor expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members and defends that any
consideration of an expansion of permanent members must be focused on a specific
country. Furthermore, the United States is not open to an enlargement of the Council
that changes the current veto structure (DICARLO, 2010).
In January 2009 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and France launched an initiative aiming at improving the way in which the
UN Security Council mandates and reviews UN peacekeeping operations. The
initiative includes the enhancement of coordination with countries that contribute with
civilians, police, and troops to UN peacekeeping operations (UK, 2010). As for the
Security Council reform, the UK continues to support permanent membership for
Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India, as well as permanent African representation. Any
increase in the size of the Council, however, should be followed by the expansion of
the non-permanent category also. Moreover, according to the British government, an
intermediate model could provide a means of advancement towards permanent
reform, stressing that such reform must not reduce the Council’s capacity to perform
its functions (UK, 2012).
Concerning the reform of the UNSC, the Republic of Korea’s government
addresses the need for more transparent periodic elections of Council Members in
order to achieve a more legitimate representation. Moreover, the veto should be
exercised with restraint and the reason for its use should be explained. During the
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Annual Debate on Security Council Reform, South Korean delegation “believed the
‘Intermediary approach’ with the establishment of longer-term seats would help break
the ‘deadlock’” (UNGA, 2010c). Besides, it called for improving transparency,
effectiveness and inclusiveness of the Council (UNGA, 2010c). South Korean
representatives usually state that the reforms must be achieved through a two-thirds
majority voting process and also that dialogue ought to be especially intensified
among the Permanent Members of the UNSC (DONG-IK, 2012).
The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly urges for reforms in the Security
Council, calling for an increase in its permanent seats. It suggests that collective
action is the best way to defeat the unfair structure of the UNSC and that the General
Assembly is the real symbol of the United Nations. Iranian representatives reiterate
that the more than one billion Muslim population around the world should own a
permanent seat at the Security Council (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
IRAN 2011).
The United Nations has played a crucial role in Bosnia and Herzegovina
state-building after the Dayton Agreement, in 1995, which formalized the ending of
the Bosnian War (GUIMARÃES, 2012). After the conclusion of the UN mandate in
the country, it fell upon the European Union to conduct state building operations
there. These factors, allied with the will of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a part both
of the EU and NATO, set the main guidelines regarding the foreign policy of the
country. Regarding the Security Council reform, the country defends the position
adopted by neighboring states, namely to create a new permanent seat in the Council
for Eastern Europe members (LUND, 2009).
For Canada, strengthening the United Nations System is fundamental for the
maintenance of the organization’s efficiency and capacity to deliver results to the
international community. Canada affirms the need to better manage the organization’s
funds, focusing in accountability, integrity, and value for money, creating a true
international civil service that is flexible, mobile, and has the specialized skills and
training to respond to the demands of UN’s global operations (CANADA
PERMANENT MISSION, 2012). In the topic of Security Council’s reform, Canada
belongs to the United for Consensus group, which proposes an adding of nonpermanent seats reflecting regional distribution of power. However, this group does
not believe that by the addition of new permanent members the problem would be
solved, because it would only insert more differences between nations. Canada also
belongs to the Utstein Group of donor countries and to the Geneva Group (the top 14
contributors to UN budgets) (CANADA PERMANENT MISSION, 2012). One of the
major concerns of the international community is the question of development and, for
that, Canada strongly urges the creation of a UN Sustainable Development Security
Council, a high-level decision-making organ with coordination powers over
specialized agencies (CANADA PERMANENT MISSION, 2011). Moreover, Canada
sustains that organizations like ECOSOC should be more efficient in order to achieve
the Millennium Goals.
Australia affirms that UN reform must focus on two main questions: the lack
of funds for the organization and the necessity of readapt the structures of the Security
Council (PARLAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, 2001). For Australia, nations should focus
on how UN’s internal financial instability can be controlled and reorganized, and the
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country strongly supports the intergovernmental meetings to debate such matter.
Australia is not bound to any of the groups for the Security Council reform, and, for
them, the reform must include new permanents and non-permanent seats and focus on
eliminating – or just putting on oblivion – the veto power. The Australian delegation
supports reforms in the administrations, including stronger mandates, better planning
of missions and operations, efficient financial management, and transparent
accountable systems in all organs(PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, 2001).
Colombia belongs to the United for Consensus group for reform of the
Security Council. .. For Colombia, any reform in the Council should aim broader
regional representation, restrictions on the use of the veto, and greater transparency in
the decision-making process (BLUM, 2009). According to Colombia, there must be a
reform aiming to reorganize the relationship among the organization’s organs. All
organs, including – and primarily – the Security Council must be accountable to the
General Assembly, since this is the main organ that gathers all Member States.
Periodical meetings between the Presidents of the General Assembly, the ECOSOC,
and the Security Council for the presentation of analytical reports by the Council to
the Assembly are essential to Colombian delegates. For Colombia, the greatest threat
to the international community is the question of development and poverty and, for
that, United Nations and the multilateral financial institutions must develop a new
framework to prevent and respond to economic crises and instabilities (SOTO, 2000).
Also, UN’s system reform should also focus on the new treats of the 21 st century, such
as illicit drug and arms traffic and terrorism (BLUM, 2009).
According to the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chaves, in a speech at the
General Assembly in 2005, the United Nation has exhausted its model and the 21 st
century claims for deep changes in the organization. For him, there are four
indispensable points that must guide any reform in the organization: the question of
expanding Security Council seats – both permanent and non-permanent ones –, the
improvement of the work methods of all organs in order to increase transparency, the
elimination of the veto power, and the strengthening of the role of the SecretaryGeneral.. In order to make the organization more democratic, Venezuela believes that
the veto power must be abolished and that the election for Secretary General must be
open and transparent. Venezuela also demands a reform of international financial
institutions to secure true representation of developing countries (CHAVEZ, 2005),
strengthening the regional financial architecture and reviewing the Bretton Woods
institutions.
To Saudi Arabia, there must be a real reform in UN structures, mainly in the
Security Council, which needs to be more representative, corresponding to the
nowadays balance of power among countries. Therefore, it urges the UN Security
Council to improve geographical representation, promote transparency, avoid the
application of double standards, and ensure the adoption of measures to enhance the
credibility of its work and guarantee respect for, and compliance with its resolutions
(MADANI, 2004). According to Saudi Arabia, the veto power is one of the major
obstacles to transparence and democracy in the Council, and for that this power should
be rationalized. It is also imperative to reorganize the balance between the General
Assembly and the Security Council, and also enhance the role of the ECOSOC and its
coordination with UN funds and programs (MADANI, 2004). Being part of a region
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that is so unstable as the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is clearly worried with terrorism
proliferation, the illicit arms traffic, and poverty; for that, this country urges greater
cooperation in the international community for fight those humanitarian threats
(ibidem).
Israel supports the increase of membership in the UNSC with as much
consensus as possible. The main concern of Israeli representatives in this matter
regards the revision of priorities in the General Assembly, arguing that bodies like the
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the
Division for Palestinian Rights in the DPA, the Special Information Programme on the
Question of Palestine in the DPI, and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices aim only to disseminate a partisan view of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Furthermore, according to its representatives, many of the UNGA resolutions related
to Israel are antiquated and redundant (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
ISRAEL, 2005).
Together with Japan, Serbia wishes to achieve a meaningful result on
Security Council reform so as to make the Security Council more representative,
effective, and responsive to the necessities of the international community (JAPAN,
2011). Serbia supports the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),
but admits that “(n)either the armed KFOR contingent, nor the […] (UNMIK) has
managed a solution to the Serbian-Albanian conflict which has dogged the province
for centuries.” (SERBIA MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS). Recently, the
Serbian government expressed its concerns with what it considers a violation of its
rights under the UN Charter, namely the independence of Kosovo (SERBIA, 2012).
Rwanda in one of the ‘One UN’ pilot countries for UN reform. The
Rwandan government is committed to fulfilling international development objectives
such as the Millennium Development Goals for poverty eradication and sustainable
development. In October 2010, however, the Draft UN Mapping Report in the DRC
was published by the UN, after being leaked earlier the same year. The report about
the Congo wars caused the Rwandan government to threaten to withdraw its troops
from UN missions and to issue the “Official Government of Rwanda Comments on
the Draft UN Mapping Report on the DRC” (RWANDA, 2010).
6.
QUESTIONS TO PONDER:
1) How could the UNSC reform be achieved and what form should it take?
2) Could the UN debates become more horizontal through the revitalization
of the General Assembly?
3) Would economic and developmental issues receive a better treatment
through a reform of the ECOSOC and Social and Economic Policy
Process at the UN?
4) Will the Human Rights Council generate better results than its
predecessor? Could peacekeeping reforms and the influence of concepts
such as “Human Security” and “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” promote
the increase of respect for human rights and protection of civilians?
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6) Could the enhancement of cooperation between the UN and regional
arrangements or agencies in the maintenance of international peace and
security be achieved and be carried out effectively?
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Chapter 7
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST
ASIAN NATIONS REGIONAL
FORUM
INTRODUCTION
The ARF is the most comprehensive forum for international debate and the
fostering of multilateral understanding that focuses on Asian matters. It is an
institution that facilitates dialogue and promotes confidence building measures,
lacking the power of approving binding resolutions. Instead, it focuses on being quite
simply a forum where common grounds can be reached, facilitating cooperation and
avoiding conflict, especially where there might be a threat of usage of force. On this
particular summit, the ARF will debate a crossroads in which Asia finds itself:
cooperation or conflict. In this sense, two topics make this crossroads exceedingly
clear.
On one hand, the various integration processes and multilateral institutions
that coexist shall be under a discussion triggered by the ASEAN Vision 2015,
focusing on the future of Asian integration. But different projects and visions exist
simultaneously, and many have competing means and ends, and the fulfillment of all
projects is not necessarily viable, or desirable to all parties involved in the ARF.
Therefore, within the very symbol of international cooperation, competition can be
gleaned, and all member States must promote cooperation, while keeping their
national interests and sovereignty in mind.
On the other hand, the most persistent disputes in East Asia, those over small
archipelagoes and the important resources and territorial waters they command, seem
to become more intense every year. This point epitomizes the dynamics for conflict in
Asia, with the rise of powerful actors seeking to solidify their position in the region
creating rifts and skirmishes that risk escalation. And yet, amid these disputes,
projects for mutual exploration of resources exist, offering a prospect of cooperation
in the heart of Asian conflict. Furthermore, traditional alliances seem weakened, and
local rivalries are often put aside, when these archipelagoes come into play, showing
that these disputes are dynamic, and opportunities for closer articulation between ARF
members do exist.
Hence, the Asian dilemma: cooperation or conflict. Conflict over how to lead
integration, and cooperation in order to ensure key territories against regional
opponents. In this conjuncture, the paradigm of the ASEAN Way of conducting
diplomacy, and the structure of the ARF, seeking to foster dialogue and mutual
understanding, is of paramount importance for the avoidance of hostilities. In this
context, Ministers will seek to find viable solutions to their grievances, reaching
compromises in order to avoid conflicts, while keeping their national interest and
foreign policy at the heart of their negotiations.
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Topic A: ASEAN Vision 2015 and East Asian Integration
Bruno Magno and João Arthur Reis
1.1. The colonial past and the rise of the Japanese Empire
The history of the processes of regional integration in East Asia has a deep
relation with the history of colonialism in the region. In fact, the first attempts to do
something similar to a regional organization date from before World War II, and are
related to some kind of struggle against imperialism. Right after the War, the main
ideals of uniting the region or creating some kind of international organization were
influenced by the decadent European empires trying to maintain their rule in East Asia
and the fight of nationalist or communist movements against that. Along the
subsequent decades, when some of the regional integration processes had succeeded,
the consequences of that recent colonial past were still very alive.
Before World War II, great part of East Asia was under the rule of European
Empires. Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand, was divided mainly between
France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The French ruled over great part of
Indochina, namely Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; Great Britain possessed Malaysia,
Burma, Singapore and some colonies in Borneo; and the Dutch had Indonesia. After
the war against Spain, the United States had conquered the Philippines and Guam,
becoming this way another power in Asia.
Southeast Asia was not the only region suffering from foreign rule at that
time. The Chinese Empire, since the Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860), was
being dismembered and exploited by European Empires and Japan, which held
possessions in Chinese territory. This process of dividing China assured the
commercial interests of these powers and crushed the country, economically and
politically (REIS FILHO, 1982).
The situation in Japan differed from the rest of the region and would later
have a huge influence in decolonization and regional integrationdynamics. After the
Meiji Restoration, in 1868, the Japanese were pursuing a policy of stimulating
industrialization and modernization, while preserving the Japanese culture and identity
at the same time. It was considered a process of combining “Western advances” with
“Eastern values”. The result was that by the end of the XIX century Japan had a
modern army and a powerful navy. This, combined with an aggressive foreign policy
resulted in the attainment of an empire in East Asia. After the war against China, in
1894-1895, Japan conquered Formosa and secured the indirect rule over the Korean
peninsula. In 1904, Japan started a war against Russia and won.
The Japanese victory in 1905 made it the first non-Western nation to defeat
an European one, launched it in the front rank of the modern world powers and ended
an era of European assumption of racial superiority (DAVID, 2009). From this
moment on, Japan played a decisive role in East Asian politics and regional dynamics.
In 1910 it formally annexed Korea and in 1931 it launched an attack over Manchuria,
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a strategic region to Japanese plans of control of the whole region. In this project,
conquering China became central, so as expanding to Southeast Asia and strongly
opposing to European and North-American presence in Asia (KERSHAW, 2009).
1.2 Early attempts of regional integration: Before the Cold War
By the end of the XIX century, the idea that Asian peoples should unite and
make front to Western aggressions arose both in China and in Japan. These ideas were
called Pan-Asianism. As consequence, many government-supported organizations
were created in Japan, in order to promote Pan-Asian ideals.Such organizations
imagined Japan and China leading East Asia, united in equal positions (HOTTA,
2007). It has guided Japanese foreign policy by the end of the XIX century, also
contributing to the nationalist revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911, in China,
which counted with inestimable Japanese assistance (SATO, 2007). In this moment, a
considerable fraction of Chinese and Korean elites saw favorably the Japanese
strengthening. This Pan-Asian ideology prevailed in Japan until the Second SinoJapanese War, in 1937. However, due to the rise of militarism, the Pan-Asian ideal
was distorted and reduced to a pretext for colonial policies that Japan put in practice
by the mid-1920s (HOTTA, 2007; MAGNO et al, 2011).
With the rise of Japan, came the proposal of the Japanese Greater East Asia
Co-prosperity Sphere. Publicly announced in 1940, the proposal for a bloc of Asian
nations headed by Japan was designed to free Asia from Western domination and to
promote Nipponese supremacy through East Asia. It was based on the thesis of the
superiority of the Japanese race, and in Japan’s mission to lead Asia against Western
powers (GORDON, 2010). Such discourse was used to legitimize the military and
territorial expansion promoted by Japan, and there were obvious economic
motivations, important to sustain the growth of the Japanese industry and its war
efforts. In this scheme, the oil, the rubber, and the other raw materials of the European
colonies in Southeast Asia were determinant to the invasion of this region by the
Japanese (DAVID, 2009).
The invasion of China started in 1937 and in 1941 Japan launched a
synchronized attack against Southeast Asia and the North-American Pacific Fleet.
Following the Japanese raid against the Hawaiian base of Pearl Harbor, the United
States entered definitively in World War II. After the defeat of Germany, US efforts
were directed to fighting Japan, which would surrender in 1945 after the launch of the
atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Manchuria’s invasion by soviet
troops.
After the War, the Japanese take over demonstrated having a vital role in
disrupting the colonial regimes in Southeast Asia, since it destroyed the patterns and
the structure of the system imposed by the imperialist powers. Part of the Japanese
strategy was supporting nationalist movements against Western rule, and indeed, in
many colonies, the nationalist movements that fought for freedom saw in the Japanese
occupation a way out of European domination and Japanese troops were hailed as
liberators (DAVID, 2009). In spite of the colonial features of the Japanese occupation,
in many cases it contributed to the establishment of the occupied state’s armies and
bureaucracies, especially in Indonesia, paving the way for the future independence
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process (PITT, 2011). Indeed, the Japanese invasion resulted to be more of a political
firebreak than a promoter of regional cohesion (TURNBULL, 1992).
In the last stages of occupation in Southeast Asia, the Japanese made efforts
to promote dialogue between nationalist movements of different countries and gave
nominal independence to Burma, Philippines, Indochina and Indonesia. After the war,
the ancient colonial powers tried to return, but it was not possible anymore. The
rupture of the rule of such powers, and the costs of war made their return impossible
(FRIEDRICH, 2011). Besides that, the creation of the United Nations and its Charter
gave legitimacy to the independences, as well as the anti-colonial bias of the United
States.
The Dutch and the French tried to retake their territories, respectively
Indonesia and Indochina, which caused violent reactions, and the attempt to reimpose
themselves did not succeed. Great Britain returned in a more pacific way, and granted
independence to its colonies without violence, generally. This way, it remained a great
influence to its former colonies; such factor would latter cause conflicts among the
countries in the region. The United States did something similar in Philippines,
assuring political independence but keeping close economic and defense links, which
would ensure a wider role for this country in the region. In the following years, the
main challenges for the regions’ countries were to create a national identity, in order
to keep their countries united within their boundaries (TURNBULL, 1992). The USA
also occupied Japan after their victory, and under the rule of General Douglas
MacArthur this occupation sought to establish American control and dismantle the
apparatus of the Japanese society, considered by the Truman’s administration the
originator of the will of military expansion (PIKE, 2010).
China was still divided between the communist and the nationalist
movements, a division present in a large number of countries in the region in that
time. The consequences of the victory of the communists would bring even more
complexity to the situation of East Asia during the Cold War, which was just starting
in the end of the 1940’s. The bipolarity and the division of the world between the
capitalist and the communist blocks made many rivalries and political struggles arise
in East Asia, turning the region into one of the most important zones in the world.
1.3. The Cold War
The fact was that after the War, there was no obvious leader in the region
(TURNBULL, 1992), since no country was strong enough to take this position.
Basically, every country in East Asia was dealing with such internal troubles that
searching to establish a regional order or unity was secondary. In many cases, the
governments changed constantly, making the establishment of continuous external
policy lines impossible. China was immersed in a Civil War, divided between the
communist, led by Mao Zedong, and the nationalist Kuomintang party, led by Chiang
Kai-shek. Japan was still occupied and with great part of it infrastructure destroyed.
The Korean Peninsula was free from Japanese rule, but was now divided: the soviet
troops occupied it north of the 38ºN parallel and American troops made the same in
the south.
There have been some attempts to promote regional cooperation by Great
Britain and India. The first one tried to use the Commonwealth, focusing on its former
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colonies. For its plans to work, the participation of India was indispensable, but the
Indian government adopted another approach. Jawarhal Nehru, Prime Minister of
India, preferred to see India as the champion of the struggle against imperialism, and
tried to adopt the role of natural leader and focal point of regional cooperation against
the colonial features, but it did not work. Southeast Asian countries were afraid of
coming under the rule of such a big neighbor, and avoided being placed under the
umbrella of neither India nor China (TURNBULL, 1992).
During that period, practically every country in Southeast Asia was facing
rebellions, civil wars and unrest. In this region, the main transnational ideological or
religious influences, namely nationalism, communism and pan-Islamism, have
demonstrated to be more disruptive and divisive than a stimulus for unity (ibidem).
Besides that, there were still strong influences of Great Britain and the United States,
what gave rise to disputes and conflicts between countries in the region.
In 1949 the Communist troops in China marched over Nanjing, the
nationalist capital, and later in the same year Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s
Republic of China, putting an end to a civil war that started even before the Japanese
invasion. Mao’s success would inspire communist movements throughout the region,
mainly in Southeast Asia and Korea. In the following year, a war started in the Korean
Peninsula, when the soviet-backed North Korean government invaded South Korea.
United States, backed by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, engaged
and pushed the North Koreans back, until the Chinese border. In that moment, China
entered in the war and pushed the American and UN forces back to the 38ºN parallel,
where the war continued until 1953, and ended in a stalemate.
The fact is that the emergence of a communist giant such as China
preoccupied the United States (and this was materialized with the Chinese
intervention in the Korea War). At that moment, emerged the thesis that stated that if
one country was to fall to communism, it would provoke destabilization in its
neighbors. This way, the entire region would fall to communism. This would later be
called the “domino theory” (TURNBULL, 1992). Like MacArthur said in 1951, “If
we lose to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable” (DAVID, 2009). This
kind of fear led the United States and Great Britain to pursue a more assertive policy
in East Asia, by building bilateral treaties and creating organizations in order to deter
the expansion of Communism.
In 1951, as part of the deterrence policies, the United States signed bilateral
defense treaties with Japan and Philippines, and a tripartite pact with New Zealand
and Australia, the ANZUS. In 1954 the Geneva Conference was held in order to
discuss the matter of The First Indochina War. This conflict started when the
nationalist and communist movements in Vietnam opposed to the return of the French
colonial regime. In this conference, the division of Vietnam in two zones was
approved, with the North governed by the pro-soviet Viet Minh and the south by the
State of Vietnam, backed by the United States.
Subsequent to this conference in 1954 the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO) was created. This Collective Defense Treaty was signed by
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Britain and the
United States. This last two were the pillars of such organization, but their different
projects for it created a division that jeopardized the initiative. The USA had the idea
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of establishing a military alliance, and Great Britain saw it as an organization with a
broad acceptance of members, that could embrace the concept of non-aggression.
Besides that, controversy arose due to the fact that it was a foreign dominated
institution, and that it could be more dangerous than the communist subversion it was
supposed to fight (TURNBULL, 1992). These controversies and the critics it received
from communist and non-communist countries made the organization not so durable
and useful as it intended to be.
At that moment, East Asia was divided between SEATO members and the
Sino-Soviet backed countries. This way, there was a clear political economic and
political division, the capitalist and the communist blocs. But in reality, the situation
was not that simple. Some of the Western-aligned countries had some reservations in
their relations with the capitalist powers, and the same occurred in the other side,
where the differences between China and the USSR became increasingly visible.
The Bandung Conference, held by Indonesia in 1955, questioned this
simplistic division, presenting non-alignment as a way for recent independent
countries to act in the international system. Strongly supported by Jawarhal Nehru, the
Indian Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier and Sukarno, the Indonesian
President, the non-alignment policy was based not in neutrality, but in an active and
independent actuation of developing countries, by aligning neither with the USA nor
the USSR bloc. In one hand, the conference failed in creating a permanent Afro-Asian
organization, due to the exclusion of China, decline of Indian relevance and inclusion
of European members (TURNBULL, 1992). But in the other hand, it gave birth to the
non-alignment movement, and its ideals of autonomy, sovereignty, non-intervention
and equality among peoples and races were crystallized, becoming some sort of
guidance for some nations.
In 1961 the idea of “Great Malaysia” became public. This country became
independent in 1957, peacefully, and received help of the British to fight communist
rebel groups, thus maintaining strong relations with its former metropolis. The plans
of “Great Malaysia” intended to unite Malaysia, Singapore, the Sultanate of Brunei
and the colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo in a federation (VELOSA-PORRAS,
2009). The “Great Malaysia” concept consisted in a loose union of several small
Islamic sultanates and was proposed by the British with the purpose of maintaining its
presence and avoiding the spreading of nationalist movements.
In response to that, the Indonesian government started the policy known as
Konfrontasi,supporting communist subversion inside Malaysia, since it saw the
initiative as British imposed and neocolonialist. This strong opposition also put an end
to Maphilindo, an attempt of creating a nonpolitical confederation made by
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Such forum was basically a strategy of Manila
and Jakarta to delay the formation of the Great Malaysia Federation. Malaysia and
Great Britain succeeded to contain the attacks, and the Indonesian government, led by
Sukarno, demonstrated this way the economic weakness of its policies. This resulted
in a coup led by the military in 1965, in which Suharto takes power and make
profound changes in the Indonesian foreign policy (VELOSA-PORRAS, 2009).
In 1961 Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand formed the Association of
Southeast Asia (ASA), a cooperation organization focused mainly in the economic
and cultural fields. Only in 1967 the first promising regional organization arose:
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ASEAN was created by the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand and Singapore, when they signed the Bangkok Declaration. This
organization differed from all the previous attempts due to the fact that it arose from a
local initiative, and suited the interests of the countries involved (TURNBULL, 1992).
Since ASEAN was created right after the Konfrontasi, it was a means of
reconciliation among neighbors. And due to the fact that Indonesia, by its size and
population, was a key state in the establishment of the organization, it formed a kind
of political defense that constrained new confrontation policies and hegemonic
pretentions. This organization also provided some basis for its members to fight
secessionist and communist movements inside its territory, supporting nationbuilding. This way, ASEAN focused in the common problems and in the idea that the
solution should be free of external interference (BEUKEL, 2008). Indeed, for many
years the organization concentrated in this non-interventionist and equitable basis.
Such context paved the way for the success of the Japanese outsourcing
process, as defined by Giovanni Arrighi (1997). Henceforth, the technologies of little
aggregate value and intensive in manpower were transferred to the Asian Tigers 18,
while the Japanese dynamic pole specialized in development of cutting edge
technologies. In the next decade, it would be the Tigers turn to transfer such
technologies to other countries, mainly ASEAN and China. The aim was to focus in
more advanced producing techniques, as well as in the services sector. The Fukuda
Doctrine represented the consolidation of the economic diplomacy towards Asia,
demonstrating publicly, by the first time since World War II, the importance of
Southeast Asia to Japan.
This Doctrine, launched in 1977, advocated Japan’s process of maintaining
closer relations to East Asia once again, and especially with ASEAN countries, to be
made through “heart-to-heart understanding” (HOOK et al, 2005).This meant
convergence of visions regarding economics and political issues. Such policy
promoted interdependence between region’s countries, consolidating the economic
integration between East and Southeast Asian states. It has granted privileged
Japanese access to Southeast Asian markets and trading routes, essential to the
supplying of energy and raw materials to the Japanese industries. The “Japanese
outsourcing process” was also responsible for the spreading of the Japanese Economic
Miracle, which resulted in the Asian Tigers and the Chinese Economic Miracle itself.
(MAGNO et al, 2011).
ASEAN members had most of the time authoritarian regimes, but open
market policies; foreign investment was a way of achieving growth and development
(TURNBULL, 1992). The assurance of such kind of system was important in a region
full of what was seen as Communist menaces. Despite all that, the organization had a
slow development, with not too much being done until 1971, when was signed the
declaration of the Zone of Freedom, Peace and Neutrality (ZOFPAN), stating the
desire of the members states to maintain the area free from external influence
(ASEAN, 1971).
In the middle of the 1970 decade, Asia was facing new challenges and
transformations. The United States had just withdrawn from Vietnam, where the
18Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.
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Communist Viet Minh was victorious. Not only there, but also in Laos and Cambodia
Communist parties and regimes had just triumphed. Besides that, the Nixon Doctrine
was in effect, with USA using a new strategy for the region, gradually approaching of
China. This new context demanded a renewal in the organization, which led to the
Bali Summit of ASEAN, in 1976.
In this conference, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was signed.It stated
some of the main features of ASEAN, such as non-interference, non-intervention,
pacific settlement of disputes and renunciation of the use of force. It was also
designed the High Council, a dispute settlement mechanism. The adoption of such
treaty reiterated ASEAN’s normative framework (BEUKEL, 2008). It also invoked
the Bandung Conference principles, the United Nations Charter and the Bangkok
Declaration, of 1967 (TURNBULL, 1992). More than that, such characteristics
formed what would be called the ASEAN Way, an ethic basis adopted by the
organization, based in quiet diplomacy, consensus, dialogue-focused and minimum
institutionalization. Such concept guides the ASEAN process of integration and its
relations to its bigger and powerful neighbors until today.
Brunei joined the organization in 1984, and after the end of Cold War, with
the dismantle of Soviet Union and the end of the Communism related tensions,
ASEAN passed by a phase of expansion, incorporating the other nations in the region.
Vietnam entered in 1995, and was followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997. In 1999,
Cambodia also became a member.
The history of the Asia-Pacific rim shows the Strong interdependence
between East and Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War shows us that it’s not
possible to analyze these regions in a separated manner. The end of the bipolar system
and the ascension of new powers in Asia raise new questions about the old problem
concerning the influence of external powers in the region. Nowadays, Asia must face
a dilemma: to seek sovereignty through the development of integration processes or to
leave competition increase confrontation and subsequent interference from other great
powers.
2.1. The Asian Affirmation
The rapid economic development witnessed in Asia since the 1970’s has
moved the center of the global economy and the core of the international politics to
the Asia-Pacific region. This process symbolized the return of Asia as a main player
of the world politics after more than a century of occidental domination and also can
represent the beginning of process of hegemonic transition between the West and the
East. At least that is how this phenomenon was interpreted by most Asian countries
(HUNTINGTON, 1997).
As ambassador Tommy Koh registered in 1993 “a cultural renaissance is
sweeping all Asia” (HUNTINGTON, 1997). This new Asian momentum represented
not only the resurgence of a new Asian nationalist movement, but also a new moment
for relations between Asian countries. This is what Samuel Huntington (1997) called
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the “Asian Affirmation”. This “affirmation” is result of the economic growth
experienced by these countries, especially China and Japan, and is composed by the
following characteristics: (1) the Asians believe that the rapid economic development
will allow their countries to deal with the West, especially the USA, in an equal
manner, and even surpass them as the main pole in the International System; (2) this
economic success can be attributed to the Asian cultural values; (3) although the
differences between Asian civilizations are recognized there are also important aspects
in common, so it is necessary to promote new forms of dialogue and cooperation
between these countries, in order to protect their common interests; and (4) Asians
sustain that their model of development should be followed by other non-western
countries, in an effort to universalize their concept (HUNTINGTON, 1997).
Aside the merit of Huntigton’s analysis the truth is that we are currently
witnessing a new phase of cooperation and dialogue in the Asian continent. Mainly it
is the effort to institutionalize the economic integration process, described on the last
session, which was dictated mostly by private enterprises. Such institutionalization is
necessary to maintain the economic growth easing the competition and avoiding the
escalation of tensions between these countries. The enhancing of cooperation between
Asian countries is also needed to maintain a common dialogue with the extra regional
powers to maintain the good governance of the region without interference. This
process will be translated in the expansion of the ASEAN, the creation of new
dialogue forums, such as ARF, the creation of new cooperation blocs and the
development of a new ethical content to the integration process, the ASEAN Way.
The success of this new Asiatic cooperation drive can possibly determine the future of
the current hegemonic transition to a multipolar International System in the same way
that its failure can lead to the escalation of competition and conflict with effects not
only East Asia but possibly in all world.
Hence, three paths unfolds on the Asia horizon: to choose the path of
competition and further escalation to a possible War, as Aaron Friedberg (1994) put it;
or to seek cooperation through the dialogue and interdependence as Amitav Acharya
(2003) describes it; or to accept the moral leadership of a new hegemon, as Yan
Xuetong (2011) proposes on his model of “Human Authority” based in pre-Qin
theorists.
2.2 TheAsean Way and the 2015 Vision
We can say that the main contribution of ASEAN to the current process of
integration and cooperation in Asia was the Asean Way. This concept is known as a
series of six principles adopted by the ASEAN countries on the signing of the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976, the cornerstone of
ASEAN. The six principles are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality,
territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations;
The right of every State to lead its national existence free
from external interference, subversion or coercion;
Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner;
Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
Effective cooperation among themselves. (TAC, 1976)
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Thereby, the promotion of dialogue and non-interference, embodied in the
Asean Way, conformed the ethical content of international regimes adopted by the
ASEAN, and later by other countries in Asia (REIS, 2012). This ethical content will
try to establish a new kind of governance in Asia in the post American hegemony
period, or as Huntington puts it the Asiatic Affirmation period. And it will be with
these principles in mind that the ASEAN will reach a new level of cooperation
internally and externally.
Internally the ASEAN countries will seek the construction of the ASEAN
Community, in other words, an integrated bloc with legal personality and common
security, economic and socio-cultural policies. This path was confirmed in 2007 with
the adoption of the ASEAN Charter that entered in force in 2008. The Charter finally
granted legal personality to the bloc and serves as a Constitution to the ASEAN
Community. The ASEAN Countries decided to create the Community in 2003 at 9 th
ASEAN Summit. The ASEAN Community will be constructed under three pillars: the
ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community, and they are all comprised in the Roadmap for an
ASEAN Community 2009-2015, that is expected to be fully implemented until 2015.
But there are still some challenges ahead. The Asian Development Bank estimates that
an amount of US$ 600 billion would be necessary to materialize the Master Plan of
Asean Connectivity (MPAC), the infrastructure building plan, approved by ASEAN
members in 2010. It means something like US$ 60 billion annually, a very high and
faraway of being achieved sum (CHONGKITTAVORN, 2012).
Externally, ASEAN exports its model of governance based on the Asean
Way through a series of dialogue forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus
Three Meeting (ASEAN+3). They were all designed to solve political and security
issues through multilateral dialogue and cooperation and to the construction of new
international regimes.
This institutional architecture aims, through the ASEAN way, to establish
some basis of regional and extra-regional consensus about Asian political, security,
and economic issues. This way, the Asean Regional Forum is the broader dialogue
forum, aiming to achieve a regional security regime, by promoting dialogue and
confidence building between every single influent player in the Asia-Pacific,
encompassing members of several other regional organizations. By accommodating
external players, such as China, United States and the European Union to discuss
internal regional issues, the ARF is achieving to reassure the ASEAN members
sovereignty in the region, inserting such powers in a series of common norms and
principles (BEUKEL, 2008).
2.3. The Export of ASEAN model
This model serve as an example to the integration processes in East Asia,
namely to China, Korea and Japan. As it was explained in the Historical Background,
the integration in region was mainly economical, explained by the “flying geese”
model, without the protection of legal frameworks nor international regimes or
organizations. Taking the initial drive of the ASEAN+3 as an example, China, Japan
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and Korea started to institutionalize its integration process that began to overflow the
economic sphere and started to cover political and legal issues as well.
The ASEAN+3 Meeting was designed initially to deal with the issues of the
1997 Asian Economic Crisis and resulted in a series of new agreements and the
establishment of novel international regimes. The first one was the Chiang Mai
Initiative (CMI), which establishes a network of multilateral currency swap between
the central banks of ASEAN and the Central Banks of China, Japan and Korea
(VISENTINI, 2012). The next step was the creation of three free trade areas (FTAs)
between these countries and ASEAN. Subsequently in 2008 China, Japan and Korea
created their own summit, the Trilateral Summit, to solve their own political,
economic and security issues and to consult about their foreign policies as well.
In 2009 the three countries announced the intention to form their own
community, the East Asian Community (VISENTINI 2012). Since then, the Trilateral
Cooperation Secretariat was created in 2011, in order to form a common bureaucracy
to deal with cooperation issues among the three countries. The Trilateral Summit was
expanded to the ministerial level with the objective to coordinate policies between the
three countries, in the area of foreign affairs, transport, health, environment and other
issues. And, in 2012, the three countries agreed on a framework to incentive mutual
investment and to protect intellectual rights and also agreed to start the negotiations to
create a FTA among China, Japan and Korea (MAGNO, 2012).
2.4. The New Silk Road Challenge
But what is at stake in this process of Asian Affirmation? Why do we need a
model such as Asean Way to reach consensus on regional issues? Why the old
bilateral relations are not enough to maintain peace, prosperity and stability in the
region? The answer can be found on the challenge imposed by the conventionally
called the “New Silk Road”.
The New Silk Road is a term used to describe the connection between
railroads, highways, maritime routes, communication lines and pipelines throughout
the Eurasian continent. It is the ideal of connect Europe and the Western hemisphere
to the Asia-Pacific Rim through a corridor of goods and services. The objective is to
supply with energy and raw materials the new center of world economy, the Pacific, at
same time that good can be exported throughout the continent and the world. Today
the flow of good in the region depends mainly of maritime routes with critical
bottlenecks, such as the Mallaca and Ormuz Straits.
There are a lot of explicit and implicit plans to construct a New Silk Road.
The United States Congress have issued and updated The Silk Road Strategic Act,
which is basically a plan to revive the ancient silk road by building highways,
railroads and pipelines in Central Asia to prepare Afghanistan for the post-war
(HORMATS, 2011; LIN, 2011). A stabilized Afghanistan would be the center of
access to the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia (STARR et al, 2010). China’s
concept of the New Silk Road, made public in 2004, of a Eurasian Land Bridge
connecting Asia to Europe through the Eurasian continent (LIN, 2011). There are also
declared Russian intentions to transform the country into a transports and energy
artery, to link the Asia-Pacific Rim to Europe. This way, the main corridor of the New
Silk Road would be into Russian territory (RT, 2012).
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Even the United Nations has its own projects, embodied in the UNESCAP’s
Asian Highways and Railroads project (UNESCAP, 2003). Alongside with UN and
ASEAN we have other regional organizations with their own view about the New Silk
Road. The South Asian Association For Regional Cooperation (SAARC), with an
Indian hegemony seeks to increase their influence over the ASEAN region, the
Eurasian Community, with a Russian Hegemony, wishes that the Transiberian
Railroad and Highway became the core of the Silk Road.
There are other relevant organizations with opposite points of view about the
Asian future. Among them we can cite the new proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), the agreement between United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam that seeks to improve the
American competiveness and to grant the American Pacific Century (CLINTON,
2012).The TPP seeks to maintain the security and economic partnership with old allies
in order to secure the Asian maritime routes and maintain them dependent of the
security framework of the US Navy.
Other organization that cannot be put aside is the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). The APEC is mainly an economic forum aimed to promote Free
Trade and economic liberalization. Besides being one of the greatest forums of the
Asia-Pacific region, the APEC is frequently criticized by some of its members for its
economy-oriented profile, neglecting the promotion of development of its country
members, which could represent a vantage for the bigger economies in the economic
competition in Asia.
Thus, the main obstacle that lays ahead the construction of a New Silk Road
it is not the infrastructure, as it may seem at first glance, but to create international
regimes that may permit the efficient flow of goods, to solve security issues and
historical conflicts and to reach a consensus on how to implement such international
regimes without harming national policies and interests (STARR et al, 2010). In other
words it is necessary to reach a consensus between the three major powers in the
International System, EUA, China and Russia and all the other countries in the region.
Therefore, the Asean Way model emerges as a solution to promote dialogue,
confidence-building and consensus among these divergent projects. In such scenario,
the ARF arise as the main forum to debate about these challenges since its
interregional nature brings together countries of almost all Eurasia to debate about
Asian political and security issues.
2.5. Conclusion
With the end of the Cold War, the Asian continent saw unprecedented
economic growth, at the same time witnessing a power vacuum in the region, caused
by the gradual process of American military withdrawal and the dismantle of the
Soviet Union. In such scenario, a fast growing China and Japan, raised Asia-Pacific
instability. Asian countries, especially ASEAN members, have responded to such
changes with the creation of its own institutional architecture, mainly by the export of
the ASEAN Way.
During the last years, such system remained stable and did not face any great
challenge. But the raising economic and military Chinese power –seen as a menace by
many countries- and the United States assertive declaration of return to the region
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(CLINTON, 2012), have made the ASEAN countries to enhance their governance
capabilities with the promotion of the ASEAN Vision 2015 and with the enlargement
of the ASEAN way Architecture represented by new dialogue forums, such as the
EAC, the ASEM, the ASEAN+3 and mainly the ARF.
The overlap of interests of the many countries and organizations in the region
can be represented by the different broad projects of the New Silk Road that has
placed the Asian countries in a dilemma: choosing the path of competition and further
escalation to a possible War, seeking cooperation through the dialogue and
interdependence, or even accepting the moral leadership of a new hegemon.
Neither way, in an optimistic view, is expected that the ARF based in the
Asean Way can deal with all these challenges and spur the shadow of the war out of
Asia. The ARF represents the most relevant instrument to converge such different
interests in a base of consensus.
The creation of ARF in 1994 itself was a great step towards the further
integration of the ASEAN bloc. This forum was celebrated as the first meeting
between high representatives of the participant countries and as a first step to promote
peace, cooperation, and the establishment of a consensual basis between the many
countries and organizations with interests in Southeast and East Asia regions (ASEAN
2006).
Another great mark for integration and cooperation in Southeast Asia was the
adoption of the ASEAN Vision 2020 in 2003 at the 9 th ASEAN Summit. The Vision
called for the establishment of The ASEAN Community based on a three pillar
system: a Political-Security Community, an Economic Community, and a SocioCultural Community (ASEAN, 2006). The first step taken toward this goal was the
adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 at the 12th ASEAN Summit which serves as a
Constitution for the future ASEAN Community. Along with the Charter, the countries
present decided to accelerate the implementation of the Community, therefore
announcing at the same meeting ASEAN Vision 2015 (ASEAN, 2010) and promoting
the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN
Community by 2015.
Concomitantly, the bonds between East Asian countries also have tightened.
The beginning of the Trilateral Summits and the proposition of the East Asian
Community between China, Japan, and Korea in 2008-2009 marked such moment
(VISENTINI, 2012). This cooperation has continued with the establishment of the
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, the signing of the protocol for the incentive and
protection of investment between China, Japan, and Korea and the decision to form a
Free Trade Area among these three countries (MAGNO, 2012).
There was also a deepening of the cooperation between these two regions,
East and Southeast Asia. Among these initiatives, it is possible to quote the formation
of Free Trade Areas between ASEAN and China, ASEAN and Japan, and ASEAN
and Korea – agreed in 2007, 2008 and 2005, respectively –, the ASEAN+3, forum
and the Chiang Mai Initiative.
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At the same time, ASEAN is expanding its economic agreements, negotiating
FTA’s with Australia, New Zealand, India, and the European Union. It is also
expanding its dialogue forums through the creation of other interregional forums, such
as ASEM, and the expansion of others, such as EAS, which includes the USA and
Russia since 2011. Beyond that, there is a large number of agreements, protocols, and
declarations which were signed with other Asian and non-Asian countries and
organizations. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether these initiatives are
sufficient to mitigate competition and promote cooperation or whether they are only
expedients for the creation of new zones of influence in the region.
4. BLOC POSITIONS
The United States of America sees the Asia-Pacific as the “key driver of
global politics” in this century (CLINTON, 2011). This way, it is directing huge
diplomatic, military and economic efforts to such region. For President Obama,
participating more actively in its crescent economic growth and dynamism is a top
priority in the country’s Foreign Policy. Promoting free market, free navigation in the
South China Sea and seeking military transparency of the region countries are some of
the core strategic objectives seen as vital for the United States. Such interests must be
pursued mainly through the establishment of a wide military presence, the deepening
of bilateral relationships with emerging countries and the engagement in regional
multilateral institutions, which are seen as supplementary to the bilateral ties. The
main objective is to “build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific”
(CLINTON, 2011).
In this context, playing an active role in ASEAN and APEC is fundamental.
United States is a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN since 1977, and in 2009 has signed the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The country has also a
mission to ASEAN in Jakarta (US, 2012). In its turn, APEC is considered by
Washington the “premier regional economic institution”, fundamental to the process
of guaranteeing open and free markets, facilitating economic growth and cooperation
(CLINTON 2011, US 2012). Also of much importance are the efforts of the US to
create more small forums, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative and the Pacific Islands
Forum.
There is a growing progress in developing the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), a organization that may serve as a platform to more profound regional
agreements and even a Free-Trade Area (CLINTON, 2011). A deep engagement with
the Asia-Pacific and its old and new institutions is the right way to promote
democracy, free market, respect to human rights and other values seen as universal by
the United States.
Canada was a founding member of APEC and has a strong commitment with
such organization. It has strong links with ASEAN and has an active role in the
region’s issues (CANADA, 2012), an importance reflected by its own participation in
the ASEAN Regional Forum.
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In many aspects, Australia and New Zealand share many propositions
regarding regional cooperation with the United States, due to its friendship and
security alliance with the country. Due to their geographic positions, these countries
have an important role in the regional institutions and multilateral forums of the AsiaPacific Rim. They are both ASEAN dialogue partners, TAC signatories, and founding
members of ARF, having an active participation since its beginning. They are also
APEC founding members, believing in its potential to promote free trade and
investment, and participants of East Asia Summits as well. Australia is now
negotiating its entry in the Trans Pacific Partnership (AUSTRALIA, 2012), and New
Zealand was one of its founding countries (NEW ZEALAND, 2012).
One of the most important ASEAN-related organizations in East Asia is
ASEAN+3, which comprises all ASEAN members, China, Republic of Korea and
Japan. These three countries are considered the major economies in the region, and the
relations among them and other players in the region is fundamental for determining
the future of any East or Southeast Asian integration process.
Japan had a key role in promoting integration in East and Southeast Asia,
mainly through the Fukuda Doctrine, exporting capitals to promote integration, and by
proposing the creation of the East Asia Community. The country is also a major
player of APEC, supporting its development and deploying efforts in order to deepen
its ties with the other members (JAPAN, 2012). Japan has a strong relation with the
United States, being one of its most important allies in the region. In 2011, Japan has
expressed its aspirations to become a member of the Trans Pacific Partnership
(OKADA and NAKAYAMA, 2011), and negotiations are already in course (JAPAN,
2012). At the same time, Tokyo has a strategic partnership with China, having
proposed the East Asia Community along with Beijing, besides the prospects for the
creation of a free trade agreement. In 2011, it has created the Secretariat for Trilateral
Cooperation, along with South Korea and China.
The Republic of Korea is part of a wide number of regional organizations
around the Asia-Pacific Rim. It also has strong economic and military ties with the
United States, due to its shared values and strategic importance for South Korea. Such
alliance serves as a pillar for deterring North Korea and laying the basis for the
unification. It has also expressed interest in being part of Trans-Pacific Partnership
(REUTERS, 2010) and was invited by the Unites States to do so (DONGA, 2010).
Seoul also realizes that there are significant changes in the international security and
economic environment. This way, the Republic of Korea aims to develop the ROKUS Alliance into a multi-dimensional strategic alliance, but at the same time
developing its cooperation with China (SUNG-HWAN, 2012). Seoul has also an
important role in the Trilateral Cooperation.
Being the second economy in the world, and one of the top players in the
Asia-Pacific, People’s Republic of China has a very important role in determining if
the future of Asia is going to be one of integration or conflict. China pursues what it
calls an “independent foreign policy of peace”, preserving China’s independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity, in order to pave the way for China’s reform and
modernization (PRC, 2012). Beijing supports regional cooperation and
multilateralism, as it is attested by its participation in a wide number of regional
institutions, such as ASEAN+3, SCO and APEC. But it is of extreme importance for
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this country that such engagement does not affect its internal affairs. One example of
such approach is the question of the territories in South China Sea, seen as integral
part of China.
Timor-Leste has already declared its intentions to become a full member of
ASEAN (ARF, 2009). For this small and young country, becoming part of a broader
regional institution is a way of gaining relevance. It also has strong ties with Australia,
which approximates the views of these two countries.
As well as Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea seeks full membership of
ASEAN (GMANEWS, 2009), although it is already an observer member. The country
already belongs to a series of regional institutions, such as APEC, the Pacific Islands
Forum, the South Pacific Commission, the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the ARF
itself.
Together with India, Sri Lanka has been giving great importance to regional
integration and to developing ties with its neighbors. It has fostered the development
of regional cooperation, through SAARC and its bonding with other regional
institutions, like ASEAN.
The European Union sees the Asia-Pacific as a region with many emerging
economic powers, therefore recognizing its great importance. It supports regional
integration processes in Asia, as can be seen by the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). It
has also improved ties with ASEAN and the SAARC, and participates actively of the
ARF, due to the shared commitment with regional integration. Such processes are
seen as means to achieve regional stability, economic prosperity and as a way to deal
with global challenges (EU, 2012). It has major relations with ASEAN, and these two
regional institutions have developed a Plan of Action in order to promote a closer
cooperation in political, economic and cultural issues (EU, 2012).
The Russian Federation is pursuing a strategy of looking east and enhancing
its position in the Asia-Pacific. The country sees APEC as an example of the benefits
of regional economic cooperation, and it’s willing to deep its relations with it, by, for
example, hosting the APEC summit in Vladivostok in 2012. Moscow aims to become,
through the involvement in regional organizations as APEC and the Eurasian
Economic Union, a bridge between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific. It would
consolidate Russia’s role of transportation artery between these regions and develop
infrastructure of transports and communications (RT, 2012). In this sense, Russia is
playing an active role in regional multilateral arrangements in Central and East Asia.
One example of this is the central place Russia occupies in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
Deeply committed with the ideals of independence, friendship and peace in
Asia and the rest of the world, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea strives
for the development of South-South relations, assuring the principle of collective selfreliance. This way, friendship and cooperation are seen as fundamental to the
establishment of a new and peaceful order in Asia and the rest of the world, free from
external domination (DPRK, 2012).
Bangladesh was a leading country in establishing the South Asia Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and in maintaining an active policy of fostering
its development (BANGLADESH, 2012). Such support to regional institutions made
it a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum.
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Consistent with its “Look East Policy”, India has been engaging with the
Asia-Pacific region through a crescent involvement in regional organizations. New
Delhi’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum is a clear feature of such
determination to direct its foreign policy to other Asian countries and regional
institutions (INDIA, 2012). Of course it is not only to Asia that India aims. It has a
significant partnership with the United States, exemplified by its nuclear agreement
signed in 2006. It is unnecessary to talk about India’s importance, since it is an
emerging power not only in Asia, but in the entire world.
As well as the other South Asian countries, Pakistan is a member of SAARC
and has a strategic role in the process of stabilization of Afghanistan and this way, the
entire Central Asia (ARF, 2011). According to such role, and by strongly supporting
regional initiatives such as ASEAN and the ARF itself, it is a member of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (PAKISTAN, 2012). It is also a member of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC), having ties with other Muslim countries in Southeast
Asia.
Mongolia follows pacific and cordial guidelines of foreign policy in general.
It has the status of a nuclear-weapon-free country and its engaged in the promotion of
a Nucler-Weapon-Free-Zone (ARF, 2011). It engages with regional organizations, in
order to develop bonds with the region countries. It is an observer member of SCO
and a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum.
Vietnam is a very strong supporter of the enhancement of the ASEAN
Community, and especially of the politics-security pillar. This way, the establishment
of a security community, by a closer defense cooperation, is seen as essential. An
approach and cooperation deepening with the United States are also seen as a
contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region (VIET NAM,
2012). Philippines shares many of these views, affirming that maritime security in
South China Sea is an imperative, and must be achieved through a multilateral
approach (PHILIPPINES, 2012). These two countries share the view that ASEAN
should enhance its role in defending the member’s interests, acting as one and
providing a multilateral space to resolve such disputes.
Singapore is strongly committed with the implementation of the ASEAN
Community, and has been the largest contributor to the Working Plans that aim to
develop such initiative. Is of extreme importance Singapore’s robust economic
cooperation with China; they have signed a Free-Trade-Agreement in 2009, and also
share strong cultural ties (SINGAPORE, 2012).
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Cambodia share
the fact of being very recent members of ASEAN, and of having very important
economic partnerships with China. All of the three are developing economies, and
thus believe in the importance of ASEAN to promote mutual development, specially
Myanmar, that faces the problem of economic sanctions by western countries. This
way, all of them are supporters of ASEAN Community (LAOS, 2012; MYANMAR,
2012).
Thailand, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia are strong promoters of
ASEAN Community. For both of them, ASEAN is the cornerstone of its foreign
policies, so enhancing ASEAN cooperation and internal trade will bring enormous
benefits. These three countries are also active members of the Organization of Islamic
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Cooperation, developing greater dialogue and partnership with other Islamic countries
(THAILAND, 2012; MALASYA, 2012; BRUNEI, 2012).
Indonesia, by its population and size, had always a leading role in ASEAN.
Due to its economic and population growth, it is being seen by the US as an important
partner (CLINTON, 2011). Jakarta maintains important economic ties with the
European Union and the United States, but it has also a strong leadership role in
ASEAN, and sees the ARF as the main forum for such influence to be exerted
(INDONESIA, 2012).
1) The Asean Way and its regional architecture is capable to surpass the
national interests of the countries involved and lay a basis for a consensus?
2) How to promote regional sovereignty by bringing to the table extra
regional parties?
3) It is possible to make the Asean Way an universal value in order to
promote dialogue and confidence-building?
4) How do ASEAN principles of sovereignty and non-intervention apply in
the process of deepening regional integration among its members?
5) How to converge such different projects about the New Silk Road and
bring peace and stability to the region?
6) How to overcome the challenges imposed to the ASEAN countries and
build an ASEAN Community until 2015?
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Topic B: Maritime Sovereignty in East Asia
Marcelo de Mello Kanter, Erik Herejk Ribeiro and Gustavo Feddersen
1.1. From ancient times to modern history
Since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.- 220 A.D.), China alternated moments of
great unity and development with decades of collapse or invasions, for instance the
Mongol’s establishment of the Yuan Dynasty in 1279. After the defeat of the
Mongols, the Ming Dynasty was founded in 1368, starting another golden age with
great discoveries and improvements in naval power, agriculture, arts and economy.
Over the centuries, China established a hierarchical order over East Asia, being the
great center of a tributary system, reaching from East Asia to Central and Southeast
Asia (KANG, 2010).
China was the first empire to arrive at the Spratly Islands back in the East
Han Dynasty (23-220 A.D.), also being the first to develop economic activities and
jurisdiction over the Islands during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368 A.D.) according to
its official documents (FMPRC, 2000). The Paracel Islands were also part of the Yuan
domain, as recorded in “The History of Yuan”, including China’s navy regular patrols
in the region (SHEN, 1998). Vietnam also claims the exercise of sovereignty over the
Spratly and Paracels Islands starting from the 15 th century.
The maritime sovereignty in East Asia from the 16 th until the 19th century
began to be disputed between China and the European imperialist countries based in
the south Pacific (France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Due
to Japanese and European Expansionism as well as internal collapse, China’s maritime
domains were affected and started to be occupied by the French Indochina, the
German Empire and the English colonial domains in the South China Sea. On the
other hand, China ceded, in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Taiwan and the Pinnacle
Islands19 (also known as Senkaku, or Diaoyu) in the East China Sea to Japan after the
First Sino-Japanese war in 1895 (SUGANUMA, 2000).
1.2. Clashes of Empires: from Russo-Japanese War to World War II
The contemporary history of Asia-Pacific is marked by a series of clashes
between empires. Regarding the major regional powers in the beginning of the 20 th
century, one can notice the Imperial Russia struggling to maintain a permanent
maritime access in the Pacific Northwest, while Japan promoted its expansionism and
the Western powers were still a colonialist force ruling, formally or informally,
several countries in the region. The territorial disputes until 1945 remained a
permanent source of tension in Asia-Pacific relations, leading to at least three more
imperial wars: The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the World War I (1914-18) and
the World War II (1938-45).
19 It did not specified by name in the Treaty, but said island belonged to Taiwan, although this
is still disputed by Chinese and Japanese nationalistic scholars (SUGANUMA, 2000).
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The Russo-Japanese War resulted from Imperial Russia’s intention to restore
its sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which were given in exchange of the Sakhalin
Island in the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1875). Japan was also troubled by the
Chinese concessions to Russia in inner Manchuria, especially Port Arthur. The
Japanese victory established a new framework for East Asian relations and gave it a
new great power status, halting Russian expansionism. With World War I causing the
German retreat from East Asia, the first decades of 20 th century reassured the French
and English dominance in Southeast Asia and the Japanese Imperialist Expansion in
Manchuria and Korea (annexed in 1910).
Meanwhile, in the first half of the century, China started to concede contracts
that allowed merchants to exploit extractive activities such as mining guano,
phosphorus and other minerals. Also, the government began to restructure the
administrative regions, placing the Paracels Islands under Hainan Prefecture’s
jurisdiction in 1911 (SHEN, 1998), while the Spratly Islands remained under central
government control. At that time, China was already mapping and renaming all its
islands, dividing the South China Sea Islands into four groups: Xisha (Paracel),
Nansha (now Zhongsha, or Macclefield Bank), Dongsha (Pratas), Tuansha (now
Nansha, or Spratly).
Despite its recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the Paracel Islands,
France tried to invade them in December 1931, based on alleged constructed
monuments and temples in the region dating from 1835, from the emperor of An’nan
(Vietnam). Thus, China sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese Embassy in Paris,
affirming that there was no record of the An’nan vassal State invading China’s
territories, and the sovereignty had been exercised by China for centuries. In 1933,
France declared the occupation and sovereignty over nine islands in the South China
Sea, and later it was discovered that these islands where in the Spratly region. Since
the Republic of China was in civil war against Chinese communists, it was unable to
take actions. France occupied these islands and also the Paracel (starting from 1938)
until the Japanese invasion in 1939 (SHEN, 1998).
The Japanese played a crucial role not only in Northeast Asia, but also in the
southeast during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which after 1941
became a part of the broader Pacific Theatre in World War II. Japan refused foreign
presence in the South China Sea and took control of the Paracel and Spratly islands
until the war ended (SHEN, 1998).
World War II led to deeper restructuration in Pacific Asian relations.
Japanese troops deployed over Southeast Asia aided many nationalist independence
movements against colonial rule (notably in Indonesia, Burma, French Indochina and
Malaysia), while, on the other hand, the United States helped the Philippines in its
independence struggle against Japan. As results of these combined movements, many
Southeast Asian countries negotiated their independence, beginning in 1945:
Indonesia in 1945 (recognized in 1949 by the Netherlands), the Philippines in 1946,
Burma and Ceylon in 1948, Laos in 1949, Cambodia in 1953, Vietnam in 1954,
Malaysia in 1957, Singapore in 1965 and Brunei in 1984.
1.3. The end of World War II and disputes in Northeast Asia
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With the surrender of Japan in 1945, the end of the Pacific War was signed
through the Potsdam Declaration in August. The declaration established that Japan
would never have expansionist intentions again, disarming the country and occupying
some points in its territory. Besides the military retaliation, Japan was punished by
losing all its territories with the exception of its four main islands (Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushu and Shikoku) and other territories determined by the Allies following the
Cairo Declaration (1943) signed by the Great Britain, the United States of America
and the Republic of China. Those three countries agreed that Japan should give back
Manchuria, Taiwan and Penghu to China, also leaving Korea free and independent.
The Soviet-Japanese theatre of the Second World War was apart from these
agreements between Japan and the Allies. In the Yalta agreement, Churchill,
Roosevelt and Stalin stated that former rights of Russia violated in 1904 should be
restored together with its North Pacific possessions (Sakhalin and Kurils). The Soviet
Union was not a signatory of the San Francisco Treaty (1951), the treaty that formally
established peace between Japan and the Allies. The Soviet Union claimed as its
reasons for not signing the San Francisco Treaty that its terms were in violation of the
Yalta Agreements, that the People’s Republic of China had not been invited to the
negotiations, and that the United States occupation of Japanese territories constituted
an anti-Soviet measure. Still, China’s government was concerned about the Treaty,
which did not state provisions about the Spratly or Paracel islands (GROMYKO,
1951; TEXTS, 1951).
Finally, the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 was signed, resuming
diplomatic relations between the countries, although leaving the territorial dispute for
future negotiations. Although, Article 9 stated that:
“[h]ereby, the U.S.S.R., in response to the desires of Japan and
taking into consideration the interest of the Japanese [S]tate,
agrees to hand over to Japan the Habomai and the Shikotan
Islands, provided that the actual changing over to Japan of these
islands will be carried out after the conclusion of a peace treaty”
(TEXTS, 1956, p.2).
After Korea was liberated from Japanese occupation, the two parts of the
country, North and South, fell into a civil war in 1950. During the conflict, known as
the Korean War, South Korea (or the Republic of Korea - henceforth ROK) was
negotiating its boundaries with Japan, after the signing of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty in September 8, 1951. In January 1952, the then ROK president Syngman Rhee
declared a Peace Line (also known as Syngman Rhee Line) which included the
Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo for ROK or Takeshima for Japan) in its boundaries
(COULSON, 1998). The United States had already shown support for South Korea’s
claims, as stated in SCAPIN No. 677 (Supreme Command for Allied Powers
Instruction), handling Liancourt Rocks to Korea. Since the final version of San
Francisco Treaty left the sovereignty over these islands undefined, both countries
started to claim rights over the Liancourts.
Notwithstanding the Japan-Korea dispute is not limited to the Liancourt
Rocks; it also includes the Tsushima Islands (also known as Daemado), and later
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claims about the name of the Sea shared by both countries 20. The arguments of each
party rely on historical exercise of sovereignty over Tsushima and Liancourt Rocks in
different periods of ancient and modern history.
Over the centuries Tsushima was a key point for merchants heading to Korea
and Japan. It has institutional and cultural influences from both countries and, in
modern history, it has been ruled by Japan. Historically, Tokyo used the islands as a
base to launch attacks against Russia, Korea and China. Since 1872, Tsushima is part
of Nagasaki Prefecture. Nevertheless, recent developments in Japan-Korea relations
have raised the dispute over Tsushima once again. On the other hand, Liancourt Rocks
remain under ROK’s jurisdiction since 1954, despites attempts of Japan to solve the
issue in the International Court of Justice in 1954, 1962, and more recently, 2012.
Nevertheless, the ROK avoided international mediation, stating their undeniable
sovereignty (COULSON, 1998). It is essential to assert that Japan-Korea relations are
much more complex than an issue of sovereignty; it originates from centuries of
Imperial clashes. The Japanese colonial rule in the 20th century played a especial part
in the development of the complex relation between the countries, since it involved
several repressive policies (such as prohibition of Korean language, forced
assimilation of Japanese culture, social and political repression), despite its
modernization measures during the period (SETH, 2011).
Since the Korean War and the consequential separation of North Korea
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and South Korea (Republic of Korea), the
two countries engaged in border disputes, including maritime sovereignty. The main
focuses on dispute are Yeonpyeong, Baengnyeong and Daecheong Islands in the
Yellow Sea, currently under ROK jurisdiction. These islands came under ROK’s
sovereignty since 1953 as a result of Korea Armistice Agreement.
After the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan also had undefined maritime
boundaries with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The region in dispute was the
Diaoyu-Senkaku (Pinnacle Islands), which had been ceded to Japan in the First SinoJapanese War. However until 1969 none of the countries had shown interest in
establishing their rule over the islands. In November 1968, countries such as the ROK
and the Philippines conducted a research, under the sponsorship of ECAFE (United
Nations Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East), on the East China Sea and
Yellow Sea. According to the results of the survey the area between Japan and Taiwan
“might contain one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world, possibly
comparing favorably with the Persian Gulf area” (SUGANUMA, 2000, p.129).
In the subsequent months of the discovery, thousands of applications for
drilling rights were submitted to Okinawa prefecture in Japan, which conducted two
more researches in the area, confirming the initial ECAFE’s expectative. In 1970, the
Executive Yuan in Taiwan responded by giving exploration rights in China’s
territorial waters, including the Diaoyu Islands region. Furthermore, the state-owned
China Petroleum Corporation signed agreements with United States’ companies to
develop the extraction of oil and gas. An incident occurred in September after some
20 Historically the sea was named Sea of Japan. However the denomination started to be
contested in 1992 by the Republic of Korea, which defends the East Sea denomination.
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civilians led a group of reporters from the China Times to plant a Taiwanese flag,
provoking the action of Japanese officers (SUGANUMA, 2000).
After the creation of a “Liaison Committee” for conjunct exploration of
resources without the participation of People’s Republic of China, a Remin Ribao’s
(PRC newspaper) commentator stated that those areas were China’s sacred territories,
and they would not permit any foreign presence. The PRC sent strict warnings
regarding the activities of Japan and the United States, which led the countries to
suspend their drilling activities in March 1970, especially because of the
Washington’s interest in a détente with the PRC (SUGANUMA, 2000). However, in
the Reversion Treaty (1972), President Nixon granted full sovereignty to Japan over
Okinawa, including Diaoyu-Senkaku. Once again the PRC made a complaint and the
United States assumed a neutral position, which has been kept since then. Japan has
continually refused Chinese proposals for joint development (SUGANUMA, 2000).
1.4. Decolonization and new China-Southeast Asia relations
Since the 19th century, relations between China and the former vassal States
or members of its hierarchical order in Southeast Asia were restricted by European
influence. In the aftermath of World War II and the beginning of decolonization, a
new framework of relations was arranged. With the end of the War, China restored its
sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands, despite the uncertainty regarding the
jurisdiction over the island.
During the drafts for the San Francisco Treaty’s final text, Vietnam,
supported by France, made a statement reassuring its sovereignty over the Paracel and
Spratly: “[a]s we must frankly profit from all the opportunities offered to us to stifle
the germs of discord, we affirm our rights to the Spratly and Paracel islands, which
have always belonged to Vietnam.” (VIETNAM, 1981, p. 16). China did not attend
the meetings and the Philippines did not state any claim, believing that Japanese
renunciation of the islands would make it res nullius21 and consequently available for
acquisition (DZUREK, 1996).
Later in 1956 Thomas Cloma, a Filipino citizen, asserted ownership over 33
Spratly islands and gained support from the government, naming the territories as
Kalayaand (Freedom Land). At this time, Taiwan had frequent patrols in the region
and apprehended Cloma’s brother’s ship, leading him to recognize Chinese ownership
of the islands. South Vietnam also sent a patrol to the islands in 1956 (DZUREK, 16,
1996).
The dispute remained cold until the 1970s, when Southeast Asia saw a major
regional shift. In 1971, the People’s Republic of China was recognized by the United
Nations; followed by the visit of the United States president Richard Nixon to Mao
Zedong; and the end of the Vietnam War. Washington approached the People’s
Republic of China, leaving communist Vietnam relying solely on the Soviet Union
and antagonizing the PRC. After a great turmoil in the 1960s (Cultural Revolution,
War against India, clash with the Soviet Union), the PRC started to build defenses in
the Paracel, which remained calm until 1974.
21 “No person’s property.”
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In 1974, South Vietnam conducted an inspection over the Paracel Islands,
finding People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) troops from the PRC stationed. Thus,
South Vietnam decided to fight against China for the Paracel, but lost the air and sea
battles, and, consequentially, the control over these territories. Later PRC started the
oil exploitation in the region. Only in the 1980s the PRC started to conduct scientific
researches regarding the region in order to effectively occupy the Spratly Islands. In
March 1988, occurred the “Johnson South Reef Skirmish” episode: a naval battle
originated from the China’s ambition to build a marine observation station in the
Spratly which lead to confrontation with Vietnam. The result of this battle was the
capturing of 6 islets by the PLA’s Navy. Both countries decided to enforce their
military presence in each side’s occupied islands (DZUREK, 22, 1996).
Starting in 1974, the Philippines occupied islands in the Spratly region,
searching for oil. In 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos signed the Philippine
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) decree and proclaimed sovereignty over Kalayaand,
arguing that it was not part of the Spratly Islands and were conquered by effective
occupation and control and geographic proximity. Malaysia also claims part of Spratly
Islands, starting military visits in 1978, arguing it is part of its surrounding continental
shelf (ignoring that sovereignty over the islands invalidates these claims). Malaysia
maintains a base in Swallow Reef since 1983 and proclaimed its EEZ in 1980,
although without specifying which areas are covered. Brunei is the last claimer of the
Spratly, beginning in 1983-1984 with its independence and demarcation of continental
shelf covering an area a little farther than Malaysia’s. However, Brunei does not
contest the islands’ sovereignty, just the rights to explore economic activities in the
South China Sea (DZUREK, 19-21, 1996).
There was also attrition between Australia and Indonesia over Timor Island
(considering the natural resources present in the territory) starting with the Indonesian
annexation of Timor Leste in 1975 until 1999, when the country gained its
independence.
2.1. Contemporary Background
The 1990s were relatively stable regarding the maritime disputes in East
Asia. The apparent global dominance of the United States, after the end of the Cold
War, served as a strong deterrent to countries that had disputes with its allies. Japan,
Taiwan and South Korea were going through a period of cooperation, due to the
paradigm of the New Industrial Countries (NICs). The main focus of the government
of the People’s Republic of China, at the time, was reclaiming Macau and Hong
Kong, and effectively incorporating these areas under its sovereignty. On the other
hand, the incorporation of these territories had a significant symbolic value to China,
showing that the country had managed to overcome its past at the hands of Western
powers. Thus, the People’s Republic of China, propelled by its economic growth,
could begin to assert its dominance in the region, especially as, over the course of the
first decade of the 21st century, the United States concentrated the vast majority of its
military and diplomatic resources on the Middle East, and Central Asia.
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This period saw the occurrence of the first summit of the Asean Regional
Forum (hereinafter, ARF), in 1994, in which Beijing affirmed that it would not use
force in the resolution of the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. However, in
the following year, 1995, a notable incident took place: the discovery by the
Philippine government that a Chinese military structure was under construction in the
Mischief Reef, in the Spratly Islands. The Philippine government claimed this to be
part of a Chinese strategy of occupying territory that was not frequently patrolled: the
Chinese military would build progressively larger “temporary” structures, and if these
were not demolished by other countries’ patrols, they would be expanded into
permanent military forts. This incident raised tensions significantly, leading several
countries to increase their patrols of the disputed area. However, in order to avoid
escalation, the Philippine government refrained from dismantling the Chinese
structure, merely lodging diplomatic complaints (MEYER, 1996). In the aftermath of
the Mischief Reef Incident, the Philippines sought greater multilateral support, and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began taking action as a bloc,
further restricting Chinese action on the South China Sea. Beijing, preferring bilateral
negotiations, reacted by moderating its stance, and refraining from further occupation
of disputed areas, even making concessions before the second ARF summit to
internationalize the subject, accepting some forms of multilateral negotiation
(EMMERS, 2005).
However, disputes continued to happen in the South China Sea, even with
less Chinese participation. The apparent paradox of the ASEAN members joining to
avoid Chinese expansion in the region, but continuing to have skirmishes with each
other, led to the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (ASEAN, 2002), ratified by all members of ASEAN and Beijing. The
Declaration, however, was only a political statement, rather than a binding document
creating mechanisms to avoid confrontations – perhaps underlining the degree to
which China managed to maintain its freedom of action, avoiding multilateral
negotiations. At the same time, Beijing proposed the course of joint economic
development, through which sovereignty disputes could be temporarily shelved, and
the economic resources of the islands could be jointly explored. The Philippines were
the first to accept the proposition, with the Philippine and Chinese State-owned oil
companies developing pre-exploratory oil surveys in the South China Sea in 2005,
with Vietnam following suit in the same year. On the other hand, the argument could
be made that this exploratory model would be overwhelmingly favorable to China,
being a form of bilateral negotiation (EMMERS, 2005; WAIN, 2008).
The rising tendency of shelving sovereignty disputes in favor of economic
development was not always successful, leading to cases of heightened tensions. In
2004, for instance, Japan felt its interests in the Senkaku islands threatened by Chinese
development of an oil platform nearby, and announced plans to begin surveying for oil
in the area of the islands, eliciting strong responses from Beijing, and increasing
tensions regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyou islands (GLOBAL SECURITY, 2012). Japan
also turned to surveying for oil in the areas around the Liancourt Rocks. This led to a
heightening of tensions with the ROK, whose President, Mr. Roh Moo-hyun, claimed
that the recovery of the Dokdo Islands – Liancourt Rocks – was a symbol for the
Korean recovery against Japanese colonialism. On the same year, the ROK sent a
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naval current research vessel to the surroundings of the islands, accompanied by
military vessels, claiming to be merely exercising its sovereignty to conduct research
in the area (NAKAJIMA, 2007).
The increased effort by Japan to assert itself in disputed areas also led to
heightening tensions with Russia over the Kuril islands. As late as 2006, certain
concessions by Russia allowed Japanese citizens to travel without a visa to the Kurils,
and for Japanese fishing vessels to fish in the waters of the islands, until rising
tensions led to Japanese fishing vessels being fired upon by Russian patrol boats. At
that time Putin’s government was offering Japan the Shikotan and Habomais islands
(approximately 6% of the disputed area) in exchange for the cessation of Japanese
claims over the rest of the archipelago. It used as its basis the Joint Declaration of
1956, according to which Japan would receive these islands once a peace treaty was
signed. Japan, however continued to refuse this proposition, preferring to offer
economic incentives to stimulate the population of the Kurils to favor being integrated
into Japanese sovereignty. However, starting in 2007, a growing fishing industry and
economic developments in the islands seemed to make these offers less effective at
attracting the islanders (ISLANDS, 2007).
In 2008, tensions raised significantly in the Spratly islands, with the visit of
the Taiwanese leader, Mr. Chen Shui-bian, sparking criticism from the other claimant
parts. In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, claiming jurisdiction over an extended area,
eliciting criticism from the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines (CLCS,
2011). The situation over the islands truly flared in 2011, with an attack by Chinese
patrol boats on Vietnamese oil exploration ships, indicating that the rationale for
economic exploration of resources is being abandoned amid more intense efforts for
reaffirming sovereignty. These were underlined by Chinese military drills in the area.
The situation has become tense as, after Filipino forces apprehended Chinese
fishermen around the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, China has used economic
retaliations such as banning fishing in certain areas of the South China Seas, limiting
the imports of certain goods from the Philippines, and limiting the number of Chinese
citizens allowed to go to the Philippines. The Chinese Naval forces have also
maintained a presence in the Shoal, erecting barriers to block access by Filipino
vessels in the area (AP, 2012). At the same time, maneuvers of a more political nature
were being employed regarding the South China Sea, with both Vietnam and the PRC
creating administrative divisions that covered the Paracel and Spratly islands, which,
in turn, elicited the lodging of diplomatic protests from the other parties (SINA, 2012).
Regarding the Kurils, by 2010, tensions had become sufficiently high that
negotiated alternatives were being essentially abandoned in favor of political
maneuvers to demonstrate sovereignty. That year was marked by the visit of the then
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to the South Kurils, possibly in an implicit
demonstration of support to China in relation to the disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
(RUSSIA, 2010). In 2011, Mr. Medvedev announced plans to increase the defense of
the Kuril islands, by increasing the deployment of military personnel and equipment
(RUSSIA, 2011). In 2012, Prime Minister Medvedev also signed a resolution focusing
on the social and economic development of the Kurils, apparently seeking to cement
their link to the Russian Federation (CCTV, 2012).
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The Senkaku/Diaoyu have been the stage of a shifting of alignments.
Whereas Japan and Taiwan were firmly aligned in the 1990s, by the late 2000s,
significant friction has occurred concerning these disputed islands, and this, in turn,
has brought Taiwan and the PRC closer together. One incident marking this
transformation took place in 2008, when a Taiwanese fishing vessel sunk after a
collision with a Japanese patrol boat. Japan released most of the crew of the ship,
however, detaining the captain for a few more days, and seeking reparations. After
anti-Japanese activists circumnavigated the Senkaku in a demonstration, accompanied
by Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels, Japan instead apologized for the incident and
offered reparations (VLADIMIROVA, 2012). A similar incident took place in 2010,
however, with a fishing trawler originating from the PRC colliding with two Japanese
patrol boats. The subsequent arrest of the Chinese captain caused widespread
indignation in China, with the country temporarily restricting the exports of rare earth
materials to Japan. After Japan released the Chinese captain, China demanded an
apology and compensations, which Japan refused to do. The Beijing demands caused
strong reactions from the Japanese population, with large anti-Chinese demonstrations
taking place (WSJ, 2010). The matter of the Senkakus became critical when, in 2012,
the Japanese government nationalized a few of the disputed islands, which previously
belonged to private individuals. The PRC and the ROK have expressed intense
opposition to this action, and several large anti-Japanese protests have broken out in
Chinese urban areas, with Japanese businesses being vandalized amid cries for war
against Japan (NPR, 2012). In September 2012, several Taiwanese patrol boats
entered the Senkakus’ territorial waters, and engaged in a skirmish with water cannons
against Japanese patrol vessels. Reportedly, PRC patrol vessels were also present,
although at a distance, and refrained from taking part in the episode.
With respect to the Liancourt Rocks/Dokdo/Takeshima, after 2008, when Mr.
Lee Myung-bak became South Korean President, his government began showing
signs of attempting to enforce its claim over the islands in a more forceful manner,
including plans for the building of infrastructure and their development as a resort
area. Japan, in response, offered the opportunity for a bilateral meeting, parallel to a
assembly of security ministers, which was refused by the ROK (SOUTH, 2008).
Interestingly, the DPRK, despite its frictions with Mr. Lee Myung-bak’s government,
has shown support for the ROK in the dispute for the Liancourt Rocks against Japan
(CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, 2012). In 2012, Mr. Lee Myung-bak continued this
policy by being the first head of State to visit the Liancourt Rocks, in a demonstration
of the ROK’s claim to the islands. Japan reacted forcefully, withdrawing its
ambassador from South Korea, summoning the Korean ambassador to Tokyo to file a
complaint, and threatening to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
This was later officially proposed to the ROK, which refused (SOUTH, 2012).
2.2. Relevance of the Issue
The maritime disputes for sovereignty over certain islands and archipelagos
in East Asia may seem counterintuitive, due to the relatively small areas being sought
by various parties. However, the territorial waters that surround these islands add
certain layers that make their possession far more important than it would seem at
first. The most obvious advantages brought by sovereignty over these islands are
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economic. Control over the South China Sea archipelagoes, in particular, allows a
nation to control one of the most transited sea lanes in the world, with over half the
world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passing through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda
and Lombok, the majority of which goes on to pass through the South China Sea. A
large part of the transit through the area is composed of raw materials, especially oil
and liquefied gas, meaning that, geopolitically, controlling the area allows for control
of energy supplies for all East Asia. Furthermore, several of the islands themselves
have proven natural resources, such as significant reserves of oil (for instance, in the
South China Sea alone, estimated to reach 28 billion barrels) and gas. Furthermore,
the islands also possess large biodiversity, and economically exploitable fish
populations, with many incidents of clashes often involving fishing trawlers, due to
the high profitability of fishing in the waters surrounding the islands (CORBETT,
2012; WESLEY, 2012).
Therefore, the country that controls the islands has the capacity not only to
exploit its economic resources, but will also have the ability to severely hamper the
supply of raw materials, especially energy, to States in the region. Thus the islands
acquire great strategic importance, amid rising tensions. Other important dimension
that the islands have is in furthering the capacity to project naval power to greater
distances. China, for instance, has great reluctance in installing military bases in
foreign soil. So, it is only reasonable to believe that it seeks to establish its sovereignty
over nearby islands, in order to be able to install naval bases, solidifying its status as a
regional power. The Kuril islands also fit in a dynamic of power projection, since
having them – and their territorial waters – gives Russia access to seas further to the
South that rarely freeze. In other words, for the Russian naval forces in East Asia to
have undeterred year-long access to the seas, they depend on the possession of the
Kurils. Should Japan instead possess this archipelago, defensive installations could
effectively halt Russian access to the Pacific Ocean.
These strategic and economic factors that lend importance turn them into
important objectives in foreign policy, with much political capital being put to ensure
a claim over them. Therefore, sovereignty over the islands becomes a matter of
national pride, with great symbolic value being attached to them. Therefore, the public
opinion in several countries becomes intensely focused on these islands, with massive
popular protests breaking out whenever a threat to a nation’s claim to an archipelago
is perceived. Hence the even greater efforts to project aggressive stances in this topic,
since showing signs of weakness on the subject can threaten the perception of
legitimacy that a government holds.
2.3. Specific Aspects of the Archipelagoes
Solving the maritime disputes on the Western Pacific is one of the top goals
of the East Asian countries’ diplomacy. The arguments on which the countries support
their claims are diversified, going from historical evidences to present days treaties.
On the following paragraphs the main issues and interests regarding sovereignty are
presented.
2.3.1. The Diaoyu/Senkaku/Tiaoyutai Islands
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These islands are located between mainland China and Japan, northwest of
Taiwan. Its sovereignty is claimed by all these parties, and it is one of the most
controversial maritime disputes in the area.
The disputes started mainly in the 1970s, when a group of Japanese, together
with two goats, were sent to these inhabited rocks to claim its ownership (JINGOIST,
2012). Since then, it was considered, at least by the Japanese government, as private
property of a Japanese family, called Kurihara. Nowadays, the Prime-Minister of
Japan, Mr. Yoshihiko Noda, signals a more assertive stance of its government
regarding this issue, as it prepares to nationalize the islets chain. Shortly after the
Prime Minister’s announcement, Chinese vessels were spotted near the islands, which
led to harsh diplomatic exchanges.
On the Chinese side, the main argument is that the islands were part of China
until the end of the 19th century, and were taken by Japan as spoils of the SinoJapanese war. After the post-World War II occupation of Japan by the United States,
Washington would have given the ownership of the Islands to Japan, after
withdrawing the bulk of its forces from Okinawa, in 1972. The last time tensions
escalated because of this issue, prior to Mr. Noda’s announcement, in 2010, when
thousands rallied in China to condemn the establishment by Japan of the “Senkaku
Islands Colonization Day” (MCCORMACK, 2011). At the time, Taiwan allied with
China in its stance against Japan, which led to more synergic efforts between both
parties regarding maritime sovereignty, even on the South China Sea. (FEDDERSEN,
2012).
2.3.2. Liancourt Rocks (The Dokdo/Takeshima Islands)
The Liancourt Rocks are a group of islets in the Sea of Japan, which are
disputed by Japan, North Korea (DPRK) and South Korea (ROK). Both Japan and the
former Korea have historically ruled the region alternately, but in the 20 th Century,
Korea was brought into Japan’s sphere of influence and progressively colonized by
Japanese, including the Dokdo Islands. This scenario changed dramatically after the
World War II, when Korea regained independence and entered in a civil war between
North and South. Meanwhile, Japan lost all of its territories, except for its four main
groups of islands and surrounding area.
In spite of this, there are different views on this issue because the San
Francisco Peace Treaty did not make a clear statement about the “surrounding area”,
although the Allies had made clear, in 1946, for Japan to keep its ships 12 miles away
from these islands, later reverting the control over the islands to South Korea’s
government (SCAPIN Nº 677 and Nº 1033). Since then, South Korea has exercised
sovereignty over the islands, despite Japanese claims, and has made regular tourist
visits to them, together with a small group of administrative personnel (CYBER
DOKDO, 2012). These regular visits started right after a local Japanese prefecture
created the “Takeshima Day” in 2005 to make people aware of the issue in Japan
(BOSTON, 2009).
In 2006, Japan announced an economic survey around the islands and South
Korea responded aggressively by sending gunboats to prevent Japanese coast-guard
vessels from mapping the region (WHY, 2012). More recently, in August 10, 2012,
ROK’s president Mr. Lee Myung-Bak visited the Dokdo Islands, becoming the first
266
president to do so and provoking a temporary withdrawal of Japan’s Embassy. Japan
reacted threatening of lodging the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
proposing such solution in August 21, which South Korea rejected ten days later
(SOUTH, 2012).
In spite of some rumors about natural resources in the Liancourt Rocks, the
real interests are beyond the islands. Both countries still resent Japanese imperialism,
and for Korea the sovereignty over these islands could mean that their country and the
Korean people are sovereign and free from foreign influence. Resonating this issue,
DPRK supported its southern neighbor, in spite of still being “technically” at war
against ROK, declaring its support for South Korea on the Dokdo issue (CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK, 2012). The Korea-Japan dispute is not only about territories, but also
about war reparations and Korean claims for Japanese crime apologies (e. g. including
the “comfort women” issue 22). Like Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands, this dispute may impede
ways for deeper economic and political integration in East Asia, including plans for
uniting currencies (the Chiang Mai initiative) and multilateral cooperation in a broader
frame (ASEAN+3).
2.3.3. The Kuril/Chishima Islands
The Kurils, part of the Russian Sakhalin Oblast, form a chain of islands
ranging from near the Russian Kamchatka Territory, on the far northeast, to
Hokkaido, a main high populated Japanese island. It has an area of about 15 km and
there are 19.000 inhabitants living in the region (mostly Russian) (RUSSIA IC, 2007).
The Kurils were divided in 1855 by Imperial Russia and Japan, but 20 years later
Russia exchanged them for the control of Sakhalin (which lies in the Russian
southeastern coast). In the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the first clash between a
growing Eurasian empire and the newly imperialist Japan led the czar to lose
Sakhalin. The whole region was returned back to Russia after the Allied victory in
1945 and since then Japan claims former sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, which
they call Chishima.
In fact, Japan wants a restoration of former agreements that were made in
1855 (Treaty of Shimoda), dividing North and South Kurils, and because of that issue
both countries have not signed yet a formal peace agreement after the World War II
(JAPAN, 2010). The European Parliament in 2005 brought back the dispute by issuing
a declaration supporting Japan’s claim for its “northern territories”. A year later, Mr.
Vladimir Putin admitted for the first time a negotiation and maybe an agreement to
settle the dispute, seceding some of Russia’s territory (in Russia’s officials view,
Japan should firstly recognize their sovereignty over Kurils to later negotiate for some
22 The issue of the so called “comfort women” refers to the “forcible recruitment of women
who were held in so-called "comfort stations" and subjected to rape and other forms of sexual
abuse at the hands of the Japanese military”, during Japanese occupation of territories during
World War II, similarly to the “Joy Divisions” of Jewish women described in certain Nazi
concentration camps. It must be noted that the Japanese “comfort stations” existed even in
Japan, with Japanese women. The issue remains taboo in Japanese society, and the Japanese
government has failed to provide official apologies and significant compensation for this issue
(MORRIS-SUZUKI, 2007)
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UFRGSMUN 2012
islands) (GORENBURG, 2012). Mr. Putin declared that Russia could give Japan two
of its four claimed islands to end the dispute, but Japan was not willing to negotiate
and responded with its Parliament in 2009, adopting a law that stated Japanese
sovereignty over Kuril Islands and Russia’s illegality in occupying them
(GORENBURG, 2012).
After rising to power, President Medvedev took a more aggressive position
and visited the region in 2010, provoking a temporary recall from the Japanese
ambassador in Moscow. After a personal call of Mr. Medvedev to improve the Kuril’s
defenses, Russia started to build capabilities in its Pacific Fleet, deploying amphibious
assault ships recently bought from France in the region (MYSTRAL-CLASS, 2011).
The main interest in dispute is Russia’s free access to the Pacific Ocean in all
seasons; since the region and Russia’s naval bases are far north, therefore suffering the
threat of being stuck in the Sea of Okhotsk or in the frozen waters during winter. The
dispute also has an economic side which is about to be explored by Russia and maybe
Japan, that admitted the joint exploration has no role in sovereignty disputes
(GORENBURG, 2012). The region is rich in mineral resources (such as hydrocarbon
deposits, gold, silver, iron, titanium and rhenium), geothermal energy and fish, while
tourism could be also explored. Japan, instead, needs Russia’s energy resources
especially from Siberia and fears that freezing relations with Russia and South Korea
could lead them to supply China, which also has growing needs for natural resources
(GORENBURG, 2012).
2.3.4. The South China Sea Archipelagoes (Spratly and Paracel Islands)
The South China Sea is a part of Pacific Ocean, ranging from the Strait of
Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan. This area comprises more than one third of world’s
shipping transit and is believed to have huge natural resources as oil and natural gas
(PHNOM PENH POST, 2012). There are two main groups of disputed islands in the
region, the Paracel Islands in the north, equidistant from Vietnam and China coastlines
and Spratly Islands, in the south, laying off the Malaysia, Brunei and Philippines
coasts, and a half of the distance to Vietnam coast.
The Paracel Islands are claimed by People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and
Vietnam. China retook their control in 1946, after Japan’s surrender and occupied
Woody Island and Macclesfield Bank, while the other islands were still occupied by
South Vietnam. After the battle of Paracels in 1974, China gained control over the
whole archipelago. In 1982, Vietnam officially established the Hoang Sa District,
covering the Paracel Islands (SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 1988). Since
then, China and Vietnam have been most active in occupying and protecting the
region.
For their part, Spratly Islands are disputed and occupied (with the exception
of Brunei) by six countries: Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and
Vietnam. Differently from Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan does not support China’s point of
view in the South China Sea (TAIWAN CNA, 2012). While China and Vietnam both
claim the whole archipelago based on historical documents; Brunei, Malaysia and
Philippines claim only part of the region as their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
regarding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which
became active in 1994. For that purpose, the least countries state the islands were res
268
nullius, i. e. the territories were not effectively occupied until their claim for
enjoyment of the islands. Philippines has a special and contradictory claim different
from the others, based on the Thomas Cloma occupation in 1956 and later annexed de
jure by Philippines in 1978, calling the new land Kalayaan (this is specially
contradictory, because according to their claims the islands were res nullius, but they
were actually under Filipino rule).
The current situation in both regions is far from solution. Notably there is one
(re)rising great power (China), struggling to show the world its weight in the 21 st
Century and avid to prove it can fill the vacuum of power after the end of the Cold
War. Formerly, China was the most powerful country in East Asia and dominated the
South China Sea, so it is not hard to perceive an attempt to regain this respect and
sovereignty over this sea which could be solidified by achieving international
recognition of China’s rule in Spratly and Paracel Islands. Besides the economic
advantage in annexing the islands (some estimates reach one trillion dollars), the
strategic importance of the region is vital to China’s maritime defense and projection,
since the Armed Forces doctrine is opposite to stationing troops abroad (STOREY,
2010). However, there are still three important challenges to achieve these objectives:
the United States, ASEAN and Taiwan.
The United States was the great “winner” of the Cold War, after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and has been the great power of the Pacific Ocean
since the end of the World War II. The Western superpower became a close ally of
defeated Japan, reconstructing the country and leading it to an economic miracle in the
1960s and 1970s. The United States also was responsible for maintaining Republic of
China (Taiwan) engaged against mainland China, which population, over the times,
became increasingly pro-unification (especially after the end of Cold War and
People’s Republic of China’s policy of “one country, two systems”). In Southeast
Asia, the United States was the most important ally of anti-communist regimes that
challenged not only Soviet’s power, but China’s dominance too, like Suharto in
Indonesia, also Philippines and Thailand. More recently, Washington has a policy of
bilateral security engagement specifically with the key actors in the region. It has
developed strategic ties with Vietnam and Philippines, promoting military exercises in
the South China Sea (CS MONITOR, 2010).
The ASEAN countries have varied positions and behaviors regarding the
South China Sea issue. Cambodia was the host of the ASEAN summit in 2012 and
made continuous efforts to divert the spotlight from the South China Sea recent
developments, stating that the forum could not make any final document expressing
its opinion about the issue. Cambodia is not the only country in ASEAN which
implicitly supports China; Myanmar, Laos and Thailand are also interested in closer
cooperation, since these countries have growing investments from China and Hong
Kong, while Singapore nowadays is more a Chinese trading hub than ever
(KHANNA, 2008). In spite of that, Philippines and Vietnam are calling on their
neighbors to take more aggressive and supportive attitudes, converging for a
multilateral and common view of the issue. Indonesia and Malaysia (which share this
view with Brunei), as founding members of ASEAN, always call for a multilateral and
unbiased negotiation, strengthening ASEAN ties not only between the 10 members,
but also among East Asia.
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It is important to make it clear that the South China Sea issue is a structural
one, belonging to national interests within the long term and not in momentary
situations. That means that military alliances are transient, but the national interest is
difficult to change, so even ASEAN countries allied with China, United States or even
India might not want to get too involved in balancing against great powers, instead
making a complex game of “Balance of Influence” (a mix between balancing and
bandwagoning) (CIORCIARI, 2009). By playing with the great powers in an
institutional frame, it becomes easier for smaller countries to have a more prominent
role in regional affairs. So it is not clear what role ASEAN countries will have in the
long term, especially those not interested in maritime claims, because they can stand
for both sides depending on the situation and on the advantages they can take, but also
regarding the structural consequences.
The disputes concerning sovereignty over the archipelagoes in East Asia have
been comparably lacking in the development of international efforts to solve them.
The majority of disputes involve only two parties, and there have been very few
incidents of arguable spillover, and escalation has mostly been avoided. Therefore, the
bilateral disputes have not produced concerted international action. The disputes on
the South China Sea, on the other hand, perhaps due to the large number of parties
involved, have been more successfully internationalized, and have generated some
international resolutions. However, these have been limited, and not very successful at
solving controversies. The first document worthy of note was the 1992 ASEAN
Declaration on the South China Sea. This document, however, defined itself as a
declaration of principles, providing guidelines on behavior on the South China Sea,
such as exhorting restraint, and stimulating all parts to cooperate in certain areas such
as environmental protection, search and rescue operations, safety of navigation, and so
on (ASEAN, 1992). Besides, this document was only signed by the members of
ASEAN at the time (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and
Brunei), not having sufficient scope.
Ten years later, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea was signed by the current ASEAN members and China. This document reinforced
the need for restraint in the disputed areas, repudiating the use of force, and
established which activities could be carried out by the signatories in the South China
Sea (ASEAN, 2002). This document was not effectively binding, although it was
originally intended as a preliminary step towards the solution of disputes in the area.
However, no document expanding and building upon the Declaration on the Conduct
of Parties has been successfully elaborated, and all documents since have generally
repudiated the use of force in disputes in the South China Sea, promoting initiatives of
joint economic development of the area (ARF, 2012).
4. BLOC POSITIONS
270
The People’s Republic of China has strategic interests in both the
Diaoyu/Senkaku/Tiaoyutai and South China Sea issues. Because of its model of
government fostered industrialization, the country demands higher and higher
volumes of oil to maintain its growth pattern. Both areas, besides containing oil
reserves, are strategic positioned on the verge of the Sea Lines of Communication that
supplies the country with fossil energy. Many North-American military analysts have
suggested the idea of strangling, in a given contingency, those lines of communication
and denying to the Chinese those supplies. That is why China is very assertive
regarding sovereignty in those areas, as they are a matter of national security. They
support their maritime claims on the basis that, historically, the islands chains located
in those areas always belonged to China. In the context of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, that would give China the majority of the South
China Sea as their Exclusive Economic Zone, as well as a vast portion of the East
China Sea. China also prefers to avoid multilateral negotiations regarding the status of
the islands, preferring a bilateral, case by case approach.
Due to their close relations with China and the fear of an arising powerful
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are not inclined to support ASEAN countries claims,
rather insisting that South China Sea issues should not be discussed in multilateral
forums and supporting China’s view in the other disputes (INTER AKSYON, 2012).
Mongolia, for its part, is becoming increasingly influenced by China, especially
because of its economic dependence on China and granted access to Pacific Ocean
(WEI-FANG, 2005), thus also supporting their view on maritime issues. The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea generally aligns automatically with Beijing
in foreign relations, but it is essential to state that they have a special interest in
Dokdo/Takeshima islands and should support Republic of Korea’s claims in this
specific maritime dispute.
Myanmar is an internationally isolated country which is opening gradually
its political and economical systems, but in the last 20 years has been backed and
covered from criticism by China; since it is not a vital issue for Myanmar or its
immediate neighbors, it should stick together with China, but trying to avoid a
confrontational profile. As well as Myanmar, Thailand enjoys special strategic
relations with Beijing and is willing to provide military assistance to their partners
whenever they want; however, this is the Thai Armed Forces view and does not reflect
its diplomacy of non-confrontation within ASEAN, so the national interest comprises
both points-of-view (THE NATION, 2012).
Australia, in spite of allowing the United States to base troops in Darwin in
2011, does not want to see a major conflict that would move Asia’s economies
backwards. Nowadays, China is Australia’s biggest partner in foreign trade, however
the most part of direct investments come from Western countries (AUSTRALIA,
2012). For Australia, stability in the South China Sea is essential to the country’s
development, but they also have a moral compromise of being linked to the
Commonwealth and to Western Powers; the country also has serious ambitions of
being a mediator of the sovereignty disputes. New Zealand, which also has strategic
ties with United States (O’BRIEN, 2012), Sri Lanka and Singapore share this view
of neutrality and need for stability, preferring to avoid confrontation and to maintain
the economic trade flowing through East Asia (AUSTRALIA, 2012). Papua New
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Guinea and Timor Leste have applied to join ASEAN and thus will support
multilateral negotiations and should enforce the role of the organization in conducting
peaceful talks.
Indonesia is the most active player for stability in Southeast Asia, circulating
among ASEAN nations a draft code of conduct for the South China Sea
(INDONESIA, 2012). The country is pursuing unity of views within ASEAN to
enforce the organization that it helped to create and to institutionalize. Therefore,
Indonesia is seeking an influential place in Southeast Asia, which would be capable,
in the framework of institutionalization, to attract its members to closer cooperation in
security, economy and culture. To achieve this objective, Indonesia must keep an open
multilateral dialogue between ASEAN and Great Powers, including territorial issues.
Malaysia and Brunei, despite their claims for res nullius territory and EEZ, are
looking, as well as Indonesia, for a multilateral and peaceful solution for disputes that
could unite ASEAN countries and promote stability in the region (MALAYSIA,
2012).
The most threatening and assertive positions in Southeast Asia, besides
China, are from Vietnam and Philippines. Both countries show publically their
intentions to take every measure possible to guarantee their sovereignty rights in
South China Sea. While Vietnam states that it has been historically exercising
sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands, its demands include the totality of both
archipelagos; the Philippines claim just a part of Spratly Islands, called Kalayaan, but
are not less bold in their actions. In 2012, for example, several incidents marked the
relations between them and China, joining together against their common enemy and
calling the support of all ASEAN members. Their economic relations with China have
been strained and suffering from sanctions and boycotts from both sides, at the same
time they build up military capabilities. The most important incident was in the
Scarborough Shoal, where surveillance ships from Philippines and China clashed over
illegal activities from Chinese fishermen. Since then, China kept its ships stationed
there to avoid foreign presence and tensions are still high. As stated in other
paragraphs, Vietnam maintains strategic relations with both Russia and United States,
which are developing quickly Vietnamese armed forces in equipment and military
exercises respectively. Vietnam is also pushing for a Sino-Indian dispute over
influence in Southeast Asia complex, as it calls for India a more active role beyond the
Malacca Strait and extends contracts in hydrocarbon conjunct exploration
(VIETNAM, 2012).
The United States of America constitutes a great power in the Pacific and,
as such, seeks to maintain its position of dominance in East Asia. The main United
States’ goals in maritime disputes are contain China and to regular intervene in the
region as a major provider of security, still to keep the SLOCs (Sea Lines of
Communication) under control. To do so, it must keep its allies engaged with these
goals and to show China it is still the greatest power of Pacific. There is a lot of
discussion whether United States would be willing to intervene directly and it is not
clear what would be their position in an escalating conflict. At the same time they urge
Philippines to avoid a confrontational position; The United States blame China for
hostilities in South China Sea (US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2012). The role of
Washington in diplomacy is to enforce the multilateral role of ASEAN and its
272
members and to support Japan’s claims over China. The country also has promoted
other frameworks of integration in the region and has strengthened the role of
international organizations, the rule of law and former political little-active Pacific
countries as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Washington also values its long
standing alliance with Japan and Republic of Korea, although it does not express
preferences on disputes (CAMPBELL, 2012).
The main objective of Japan is to contain China’s rising in East Asia (also in
the South China Sea) and to regain some of the prestige lost after World War II, when
the country lost a lot of its possessions in the Pacific Ocean. Japan claims the
ownership of Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands against China, but until now the perspectives
are bringing them, especially in 2012, to a “Trade War”. After Japan “purchased” the
islands in September, Chinese people started a series of clashes in many regions of the
country to destroy Japanese branded products (e.g. cars, electronics) and the trade is
about to drop due to unofficial intentions from China to put an embargo on some vital
Chinese exports to Japan (THE DANGERS, 2012). Also it has contentions with
Republic of Korea about Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima) and it seems the Islands are
responsible to keep some of the pre-World War II spirit into these two countries. The
ownership of these islands and also Kurils to Japan mean that they still have a
dominant position in East Asia.
For the same purposes, Republic of Korea has claimed the sovereignty over
Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo), ruling this territory since the end of Korean War. For ROK
and also for DPRK, which supports South Korea’s claim, exercising sovereignty over
Dokdo Islands mean the country is finally free from Japanese colonialism and it has a
key role in defining East Asia’s relations among Great Powers. The last claimant in
maritime disputes is Russia, which currently rules Kuril Islands and also has been
involved in polemics over these territories. Russia needs Kurils to have a clear way in
the Pacific Ocean and still wants the natural resources present in this region.
Defending Kurils means for Russia that it is a great power of the Pacific and not only
an influential country in Europe, compounded by the fact that Japan before the World
War II had subjugated Russia in the far east during the Russo-Japanese War. In the
South China Sea, Russia has developed over the years close ties with Vietnam and is
currently supplying Vietnamese armed forces to balance China (RUSSIA
LAUNCHES, 2012). Russia, for its part, is developing economic ties with South
Korea and has interest in joining efforts to socialize North Korea for further
cooperation; regarding Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands, Russia is in favor of China’s claims,
with highly public support (RUSSIA: DIAOYU, 2012).
The European Union relies on the South China Sea trade, which comprises
almost 20% of its exports and 30% of its imports. The Union also has an alliance with
Japan and South Korea, besides economic ties, and seeks for regional stability and
peaceful negotiations in all maritime disputes that would involve its partners
(MYKAL, 2011). Like stated in another section, European Union supports Japanese
claims for Kuril Islands.
Canada is shifting its foreign policy to a more active role in East Asia
relations and there are three main questions in its new form of engagement: regional
tensions challenge Canada’s economic approach (thus developing pragmatic relations
instead of moral ones); Canada’s allies are increasingly involved in South China Sea
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tensions and its partners may consider that Canada is more worried about restricting
the North West Passage (NWP), a Sea Lane in North Canada, which could be against
the argument of its allies claims (MANICOM, 2012).
India is investing in South China Sea natural resources, as its needs grow
quickly. Also, after its Look East policy started in 1993, India became increasingly
aware of Southeast Asia relations, however it did not have much effect in the first
decade (PANDYA; MALONE, 2010). The country is still trying to find partnerships
in the region and to participate in East Asia’s issues, but strategically, India does not
have yet neither the strength, nor the immediate intention to take a more assertive
position in South China Sea dispute, for example (INDIA TODAY, 2012). Regarding
these arguments, it is more likely India will try to explore the region’s natural
resources (with China’s complaints about the illegality of these activities in disputed
areas) and make itself more relevant strategically by enforcing its alliances with
Japan, South Korea (NDIA-SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN, 2012) and United States, but
preferring to have a softer approach of cooperation and peaceful settlement of
disputes. For their part, Bangladesh and Pakistan would be more likely to keep a low
profile because of their fundamental relations with China and United States, trying to
avoid controversial positions that would upset Great Powers, without having a
practical interest in East Asia’s maritime disputes.
1) How to safeguard national interests while avoiding conflict with other
nations?
2) How can extraregional actors participate in reaching a solution, while
keeping their interests in mind?
3) To what extent should convergent positions regarding maritime disputes
shape the foreign policy of traditional rivals?
4) To what degree should issues be internationalized, and discussed
multilaterally, in bloc, or kept between the parties directly involved?
5) Is joint economic development of disputed territories feasible? Does it
intensify conflict, promote stability, or does it simply favor the most
economically capable side, harming less developed nations in the process?
274
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Chapter 2 – UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Topic A: Transitional Justice
Books and Articles
ABDULAI, Emmanuel Saffa. The Standoff between the ICC and African Leaders: The Debate
Revisited. 2010. Oxford Transitional Justice Research. Debating International Justice in
Africa. 2008 – 2010.
AGUILAR, P. Transitional Justice in the Spanish, Argentinian and Chilean case, 2007.
Available
at:
<http://www.peace-justiceconference.info/download/WS%2010%20Aguilar%20report.pdf>. Last access in 22 Aug. 2012.
AIV/CAVV. Transitional Justice: Justice and Peace in Situations of Transition, 2009.
Available
at:
<http://www.aiv-advies.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/AIV_6519_webversie.pdf>. Last access: 25Aug. 2012.
282
ANDRIEU, Kora. Transitional Justice: A New Discipline in Human Rights. In Online
Encyclopedia of Mass Violence (SAMELIN, Jacques), SciencePo., 2010, available at: <
http://www.massviolence.org/Transitional-Justice-A-New-Discipline-in-Human-Rights> Last
accessed: 12 May 2012
ARENDT, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958.
ARTHUR, Paige. How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of
Transitional Justice. Human Rights Quaterly, v. 31, pp. 321-367, 2009.
AVELLO, María. European efforts in Transitional Justice. Working Paper, Madrid: Fundación
para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), n.58, 2008.
BAGGOT, M. Historical Enquiries Team: Policing the Past, 2008. Available at:
<http://www.psni.police.uk/historical-enquiries-team/het-introduction.htm> Last access: 27
Aug. 2012.
BINNINGSBØ, Helga Malnim; ELSTER, Jon; GATES, Scott. Civil War and Transitional
Justice, 1946-2003: A Dataset. In TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND CIVIL WAR
SETTLEMENTS, 2005, Bogotá, Colombia. Paper prepared for presentation at the ‘Transitional
Justice and Civil War Settlements’ workshop in Bogotá, Colombia 18-19 October 2005.
Available
at:
<
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/622582331/Binningsboe,%20Elster,%20Gates%20Presentation%20
-%20Civil%20War%20and%20Transitional%20Justice,%201946-2003.pdf>. Last access: 12
July 2012
BLANK, T. Measuring Transitional Justice in Latin America, 2007. Available at:
<http://www3.carleton.ca/csds/docs/working_papers/BlankWP06.pdf> Last access: 24 Aug.
2012.
CALL, Charles T. Is Transitional Justice Really Just? Brown Journal of World Affairs, v. 11,
pp. 101-113, 2004.
CRANDALL, J. Truth Commissions in Guatemala and Peru: Perpetual Impunity and
Transitional
Justice
Compared,
2004.
Available
at:
<http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/perpetualimpunity.PDF> Last access: 23 Aug. 2012.
DAVIS, L. The European Union and Transitional Justice. 2010. Available at:
<http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-IFP-EU-Justice-2010-English.pdf>. Last Access: 08
Sep. 2012.
ELSTER, Jon. Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
ELSTER, Jon. Trasitional Justice in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
FISCHER, Martina. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice in Advancing
Conflict Transformation. The Berghof Handbook (AUSTIN, B.), Framington Hills: Barbara
Budrish Publishers, pp. 405-430, 2011.
FORSYTHE, David P. Human Rights and Mass Atrocities: Revisiting Transitional Justice.
International Studies Review, v.13, pp. 85-95, 2011
FRANCE
DIPLOMATIE.
Transitional
Justice,
2010.
Available
at:
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/global-issues/human-rights/democratic-governance-andhuman/article/support-for-transitional-justice>. Last access: 25 Aug. 2012.
GRAY, D. Devilry, Complicity and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debts. Law and
Contemporary Problems, v. 70, pp. 137-164, 2007.
GSDRC (Governance and Social Development Resource Centre). Helpdesk Research Report:
Factors Contributing to Transitional Justice Effectiveness, 2011. Available at:<
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/justice/transitional-justice>. Last access: 15 Sep. 2012.
HAFNER, Donald L.; KING, Elizabeth B.L., Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional
Justice: How Trials, Truth Commissions, and Other Tools for Accountability Can and Should
283
UFRGSMUN 2012
Work Together, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, v.30, pp.91109, 2007.
HANNUM, Hurst. Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. Human Rights
Quaterly, v. 28, n. 1, pp.1-85, 2006.
HAZAN, Pierre. Measuring the impact of punishing and forgiveness: a framework for
evaluating transitional justice. International Review of the Red Cross, v. 88, n. 861, March
2006.
HRW (Human Rights Watch). Selling Justice Short. Why Accountability Matters for Peace.
United States of America: Human Rights Watch, 2009.
HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century,
United States: University of Oklahoma Press: 1991.
ICHRP (International Council on Human Rights Policy). Negotiating Justice? Human Rights
and Peace Agreements. Versoix: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2006.
ICTJ (International Centre for Transitional Justice). Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected
Developments
in
Transitional
Justice,
2004a.
Available
at:
<http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Bosnia-Developments-2004English.pdf>. Last access: 20 Aug. 2012.
_____. Serbia and Montenegro: Selected Developments in Transitional Justice. 2004b.
Available at: <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Serbia-Developments2004-English.pdf>. Last Access: 21 Aug. 2012.
_____. Accountability in Argentina: 20 Years Later, Transitional Justice Maintains
Momentum,
2005.
Available
at:
<http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-ArgentinaAccountability-Case-2005-English.pdf>. Last access: 22 Aug. 2012.
_____. Croatia: Selected Developments in Transitional Justice, 2006. Available at:
<http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Croatia-Developments-2006English_0.pdf> Last Access in 20/8/12.
_____.
Mexico.
2008.
Available
at:
<http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session4/MX/ICTJ_MEX_UPR_S4_2009_Int
ernationalCenterforTransitionalJustice_ENG.pdf> Last access: 24 Aug. 2012.
_____. U.S. Accountability: The Difficult but Necessary Task, 2009. Available at:
<http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-USA-Accountability-Necessary-2009-English.pdf> Last
access: 23 Aug. 2012.
LAPLANTE, Lisa J. Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional
Justice Schemes. Virgina Journal of International Law, v. 49, n. 4, pp.915-984, 2009.
MÉNDEZ, Juan E. Accountability for Past Abuses. Human Rights Quaterly, v. 19, n.2, pp.
255-282, 1997.
OHLIN, Jens D. On the Very Idea of Transitional Justice. The Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations, pp.51-68, 2007.
SARKIN, Jeremy. Transitional justice and the prosecution model: The experience of Ethiopia.
Law, Democracy and Development, v. 3 pp. 253-266, 1999.
SRIRAM, Chandra; PILLAY, Sulem. Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional
Justice in Africa. South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009.
STAN, L. Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. New York:
Routledge, 2009.
SUDAN: ICC Warrant for Al-Bashir on Genocide. Human Rights Watch News, 13 Jul. 2010.
Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/13/sudan-icc-warrant-al-bashir-genocide>.
TEITEL, Ruti. The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice. Cornell
International Law Journal, v. 38, 2005.
284
TEITEL, Ruti. Transitional Justice in a New Era. Fordham International Law Journal, v. 26,
pp.893-906, 2002.
TEITEL, Ruti. Transitional Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BRAZIL. Truth Commission, 2012. Available at:
<http://transitionaljusticeinbrazil.com/truth-commission-brazil/> Last access: 23 Aug. 2012.
TSADIK, Hannah. A Sida Minor Field Study of the Ethiopian Transitional Justice Trials.
Uppsala: Department of Peace- and Conflict Research, 2007
TUCKER-MOHL, J. Property Rights and Transitional Justice: Restitution in Hungary and
East Germany, 2005. Available at: <http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/urban-studies-andplanning/11-467j-property-rights-in-transition-spring-2005/projects/jtuckermohlfinal.pdf> Last
Access: 21 Aug. 2012.
UN Documents
UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). Resolution 260 (III) A (1948) on Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, adopted on 9 December 1948. UN document A/RES/9/260(III) A
(1948).
_____. Resolution 46 (1984) on Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted on 10 December 1984. UN document
A/RES/39/46
_____. Resolution 147 (2005) on Basic Principles and on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted on 16 December 2005. UN
document A/RES/60/147 (2005).
UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Council). Resolution 10 (2008) on Human rights and
transitional justice, adopted on 24 September 2008 . UN document HRC/RES/9/10 (2008).
_______. Resolution 11(2008) on Right to the Truth, adopted on 24 September 2008. UN
document HRC/RES/9/11 (2008).
UN (United Nations). Rome Statute, 1998. UN document A/CONF.183/9*(1998).
UNSC (United Nations Security Council). Resolution 827 (1993) on The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted on 25 May 1993. UN document
S/RES/827 (1993).
_____. Resolution 955 (1994) on The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted
on 8 November 1994. Un document S/RES/955 (1994).
_____. Report of the Secretary-General on The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict
and post-conflict societies, issued on 23 August 2004. UN document S/2004/616* (2004).
UNICOI (United Nations International Commission of Inquiry). Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, issued on 25
January 2005. Available at: <http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf>. Last
Documents from other Organizations
IACtHR (Inter-American Court of Human Rights). Barrios Altos Case, Judgment of November
30, 2001. Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 87 (2001).
SCSL (Special Court of Sierra Leone). Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord
Amnesty,
13
March
2004.
Available
at:
<http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Ft%2FR0iLzl3U%3D&tabid=197>. Last access: 4 Sep. 2012.
Websites
ICC
(International
Criminal
Court).Available
at:
<http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/>. Last accessed: 17 Sep. 2012.
ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice). Available at: <http://www.ictj.org/ >. Last
accessed: 17 Sep. 2012
285
UFRGSMUN 2012
Topic B: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights Violations
Books and Articles
ACHPR . The Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights
v. Nigeria. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 2001. Available at: <
http://www.achpr.org/communications/decisions/155.96/>. Last access: 19 Sep. 2012.
AMORIM, Celso. O Brasil e os direitos humanos: em busca de uma agenda positive. Revista
Política Externa, v. 18, nº2, 2009.
AREU (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit). Confronting Child Labour in
Afghanistan, May 2009. Available at:
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a26585e2.html>. Last access: 14 Sep. 2012.
AUSTRALIA. Speech by the Hon Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Adelaide, 13 November 2001.
BRATSPIES, Rebecca. Organs of Society: a Plea for Human Rights. Michigan. Journal of
International Law, 2005.
CAREW, Anthony. Labor Under the Marshall Plan: the politics of productivity and
marketing. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987.
CASSESE, Antonio. International Criminal Justice: Is it Really so Needed in the Present
World Community? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
CHEVRON Fined for Amazon Pollution by Equator Court. London, BBC news, February 15,
2011. Available at: < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12460333>. Last access:
12 Aug. 2012.
CHINA. Work Together to Achieve Common Security and Development. Statement by H.E.
Yang Jiechi. New York, 27 September 2012
CLAPHAM, Andrew. The World Trade Organization. In Human Rights Obligations of NonState Actors (CLAPHAM, Andrew). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
COSTA RICA. Submission paper of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica in Geneva. 2011.
Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Submissions.aspx>. Last
access: 03 Oct. 2012.
COSTA, Edmilson. A globalização e o capitalismo contemporâneo. São Paulo: Expressão
Popular, 2008.
EITI (Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative). Azerbaijan, 2012. Available at:
<http://eiti.org/Azerbaijan>. Last access: 03 Sep. 2012.
EJLT (Enviromental Justice Organizations, Liability and Trade). Victory in lawsuit appealon,
2012.
ENGSTRÖM, Viljam. Who is responsible for Corporate Human Rights Violations? Abo
Akademi University, 2002. Available at: <http://web.abo.fi/instut/imr/norfa/ville.pdf>. Last
access: 03 Oct. 2012.
EUROPEAN UNION. Submission paper of the Permanent Mission of European Union in
Geneva. 2012. Available at:
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Submissions.aspx>. Last access: 02 Oct.
2012.
FEIGE, David. Pursuing the Polluters. Los Angeles Times: April 20, 2008. Available at:
<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/20/opinion/op-feige20>. Last access: 15 Sep. 2012.
FRANCE. Submission paper of the Permanent Mission of France in Geneva. 2011.
Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Submissions.aspx>. Last
access: 012012.
FRIEDMAN, Milton. The Social Responsibility of Companies is to increase its profit. New
York: The New York Times, 1970.
GARRET, Nicholas; MITCHELL, Harrison. Trading Conflict for Development. Utilizing the
Trade in Minerals from Easter DR Congo for Development, 2009. Available at:
286
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/CrisisStates/trade-conflict-development.pdf>. Last
GERMANY. Multilateral development cooperation policy. Available at:
<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>. Last accessed: 03/10/2012.
HRW (Human Rights Watch). Congo: Bringing Justice to the Heart of Darkness, 2006.
Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/02/06/congo-bringing-justice-heart-darkness>.
Last accessed: 01 Oct. 2012
HRW (Human Rights Watch). The Curse of Gold. June 2, 2005. Available at:
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/06/01/curse-gold-0>. Last access: 03 Oct. 2012.
HRW (Human Rights Watch). The Enron Corporation – corporate complicity with human
rights violation, 1999. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/>. Last access:
01 Mai 2012.
HRW (Human Rights Watch). World Report 2012, 2012. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org>.
Last access: 01 Oct. 2012
ICJ. US Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V.
United States Of America). June 27, 1986.
ILO. Office for Pakistan-Islamabad: Recognizing and supporting home-based workers.
Islamabad, 2010.
ILO. Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy. Geneva: ILO Office, 1991.
IRIN. The credibility of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Johannesburg.
22 June 2009. Available at: <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/84949/GLOBAL-Credibility-ofKimberley-Process-on-the-line-say-NGOs>. Last access: 01 Oct. 2012
JAPAN. Answers concerning the Working Group on the issues of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 2011. Available at:
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Submissions.aspx>. Last access: 03 Oct.
2012.
JONES, Geofrey (ed.). Transnational Corporations: Historic Precedents. New York:
Routledge, 1993
KOBRIN, Stephen. Sovereignty Bay: Globalization, Multinational Enterprise and the
International Political System. In BREWER, T.; RUGMAN A. (Eds.). Oxford Handbook of
International Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. pp.181-205.
NETHERLANDS. Human rights in Dutch foreign policy, 2012 Available at:
<http://www.government.nl>. Last access: 03 Oct. 2012
OECD. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Paris: OECD Publications, 2000.
OECD. Multinational Enterprises in situations of violent conflict and widespread human
rights abuses. Paris: OECD Publications, 2002.
OZDEN, Melik. Transnational Corporations and Human Rights. Human Rights Program of
the Europe-Third World Centre (CETIM), 2005.
PAREDES, Sandra. Public Policies with a Gender Perspective in Central America.
Guatemala. UNIFEM-UNICEF, 1994.
PERU. Promoción de la Democracia y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos. Available at:
<http://www.rree.gob.pe/>. Last access: 03 Oct. 2012.
RANDERSON, JAMES & PUSZTAI, Arpad. Biological Divide. London: The Guardian,
January 15, 2008.
RATNER, Steven. Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility. Yale
Law Journal, v. 111, pp. 443-545, 2001.
RUGGIE, John. Business and human rights – the evolving international agenda. Harvard:
Harvard University, 2007.
287
UFRGSMUN 2012
RUGGIE, John. Press Conference by Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises. New
York: United Nation, 22 October 2009.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION. The suggestions of the Russian Federation for the first session
of the Working Group. . Available at:
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Submissions.aspx>. Last access: 03 Out.
2012.
SARDANA, M.K. Land Acquisition Issues. sd. Available at:
<http://isid.org.in/pdf/DN1001.pdf>. Last access: 03 Out. 2012.
TURKEY. Occupational Health and Safety in Turkey. 2006. Available at:
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/>. Last access: 01 Mai 2012.
UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Council). Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, 2003.
UNITED KINGDOM. Submission on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and northern Ireland. December 2011. Available at:
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Submissions.aspx>. Last access: 03 Out.
2012.
US (United States). Military Tribunal Nuremberg. Judgment of 30 July 1948.
____Estate of Rodrigues v Drummond Co Inc 256 Supp 2d 1250, 2003
VAZQUEZ, Carlos. Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law,
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, v. 43, pp. 927-940, 2005.
VIDAL, John. The Wasted Land: How Years of Secret Chemical Dumping Left a Toxic
Legacy. London: The Guardian, February 12, 2007.
UN Documents
UN GLOBAL COMPACT. Iraqi Companies Trained on Global Compact Principles. 2012.
Available at: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/218-05-03-2012>. Last access: 03 Out.
2012.
UN. Global Compact. New York, 1999/2000.
UN. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. New York, 1966.
UN. Regional consultation by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations. Johannesburg, March 2006.
UN. Summary record of the 25th meeting of the Third Committee. New York, 22 October
2009
UN. Summary record of the 31st meeting of the Third Committee. New York, 26 October
2010.
UNCTAD. Transnational Corporations. UNCTAD Publications, vol. 20, no. 2, August
2011b. Available at: <www.unctad.org/tnc>. Last access: 01 Mai 2012.
UNCTAD. World Investment Report. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2007.
UNICEF. Unicef México Saluda la Decisión de la Cámara de Diputados de Crear una
Comisión Ordinaria para los Derechos de la Niñez. Available at:
<http://www.unicef.org/mexico/>. Last access: 03 Out. 2012.
UNSC. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2002.
Websites:
Global Policy: www.globalpolicy.com
Earth Rights: www.earthrights.org
Kimberly Process Official: www.kimberleyprocess.com
Business and Human Rights: www.businesshumanrights.org
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: www.ohchr.org/
European Union: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm
288
Chapter 3- INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
TOPIC A: Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
AKANDE, D.; SHAH, S. Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes and Foreign
Domestic Courts. European Journal of International Law, v. 21, n. 4, p. 815-852, 2011.
BIANCHI, A. Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case. European Journal of
International Law, v. 10, p. 237, 1999.
BOWETT, D. W. Jurisdiction: changing patterns of authority over activities and resources.
British Yearbook of International Law, v. 53, n. 1, 1982.
BROWNLIE, I. Principles of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008.
CASSESE, A. International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
CASSESE, A. When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case. European Journal of International Law, v. 13, n.
4, p. 853, 2002.
DE SENA, P.; DE VITTOR, F. State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court
Decision on the Ferrini Case. European Journal of International Law, v. 16, n. 1, p. 89-112,
2005.
DENZA, E. Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic
Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
HARRIS, D. Cases and Materials on International Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium). Judgment. ICJ Reports, 2002.
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium). Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh. ICJ Reports,
2002.
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium). Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert.
ICJ Reports, 2002.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Certain Questions Concerning Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France). Judgment. ICJ Reports, 2008.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal
Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion.
ICJ Reports, 1999.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Judgment. ICJ Reports, 1986.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (United States of America v. Iran). Judgment. ICJ Reports, 1980.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic. Appeals Chamber Decision, 1997.
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION. Immunity of State officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction. Memorandum by the Secretariat. UN Doc. A/CN.4/596, 2008.
KOLODKIN, R. A. Preliminary report on immunity of State officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction. UN Doc. A/CN.4/601, 2008.
KOLODKIN, R. A. Second report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction. UN Doc. A/CN.4/631, 2010.
KOLODKIN, R. A. Third report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction. UN Doc. A/CN.4/646, 2011.
LANNI, A. The Laws of War in Ancient Greece. Law and History Review, v. 26, p. 469,
September, 2008
289
UFRGSMUN 2012
O’KEEFE, R. Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept. Journal of International
Criminal Justice, v. 2, p. 735-760, 2004.
SHAW, M. International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
SINCLAIR, I. The Law of Sovereign Immunity. Recent Developments. Hague Recueil des
Cours, 1980.
SUCHARITKUL, S. Second report on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property.
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980, v. II(1).
TOMONORI, M. The Individual as a Beneficiary of State Immunity: Problems of the
Attribution of Ultra Vires Conduct. Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, v. 29,
2000-2001.
UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF LORDS. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate And Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1). Judgment. 1998.
UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF LORDS. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate And Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3). Judgment. 2000.
VAN ALEBEEK, R. The Immunity of States and Their Officials in the Light of
International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law. Leiden: E. M. Meijers
Instituut, 2006.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. United Nations, Treaty Series, vo1. 596, p. 261,
1963.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95,
1961.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331,
1969.
WIRTH, S. Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in the Congo v. Belgium Case.
European Journal of International Law, v. 13, n. 4, p. 877-893, 2002.
ZAPALLÀ, S. Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International
Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation. European Journal of
International Law, v. 12, n. 3, p. 595, 2001.
Topic B: Most-Favoured-Nation Clause
ACCONCI, P. Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment. In: MUCHLINSKI, Peter, ORTINO,
Federico and SCHREUER, Christoph. The Oxford Handbook of International Investment
Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 363-406.
ANZILOTTI, D. apud ACCONCI, P. Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment. In: MUCHLINSKI,
Peter, ORTINO, Federico and SCHREUER, Christoph. The Oxford Handbook of
International Investment Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 363-406.
BARBADOS; THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. Bilateral Investment
Agreement.
1994.
Available
at:
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_barbados.pdf
DIMASCIO, N.; PAUWELYN, J. Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds
Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin? 102 American Journal of International Law 48
(2008).]
DOLZER, R; SCHREUER, C. Principles of International Investment Law. Oxford: Oxford
GRIERSON-WEILER, T. J.; LAIRD, I. A. Standards of Treatment. In: MUCHLINSKI, Peter,
ORTINO, Federico and SCHREUER, Christoph. The Oxford Handbook of International
Investment Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 259-304.
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTED
(ICSID). Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain. Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction of January 25, 2000, 16 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 212 (2001); 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002);
124 I.L.R. 9 (2003). ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7. (2000).
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