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The
P RESIDEN T I A L
R ECORDI N G S
J O H N F. K E N N E DY
THE GREAT CRISES, VOLUME ONE JULY 30–AUGUST 1962
Timothy Naftali
Editor, Volume One
George Eliades
Francis Gavin
Erin Mahan
Jonathan Rosenberg
David Shreve
Associate Editors, Volume One
Patricia Dunn
Assistant Editor
Philip Zelikow and Ernest May
General Editors
B
W. W. NORTON & COMPANY • NEW YORK • LONDON
Copyright © 2001 by The Miller Center of Public Affairs
Portions of this three-volume set were previously published by Harvard University Press in The
Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
by Philip D. Zelikow and Ernest R. May.
Copyright © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
First Edition
For information about permission to reproduce selections from this book, write to Permissions,
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110
The text of this book is composed in Bell, with the display set in Bell and Bell Semi-Bold
Composition by Tom Ernst
Manufacturing by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group
Book design by Dana Sloan
Production manager: Andrew Marasia
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
John F. Kennedy : the great crises.
p. cm. (The presidential recordings)
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. July 30–August 1962 / Timothy Naftali, editor—v. 2. September 4–October 20,
1962 / Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, editors—v. 3. October 22–28, 1962 / Philip Zelikow
and Ernest May, editors.
ISBN 0-393-04954-X
1. United States—Politics and government—1961–1963—Sources. 2. United States—
Foreign relations—1961–1963—Sources. 3. Crisis management—United States—History—
20th century—Sources. 4. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917–1963—Archives. I. Naftali,
Timothy J. II. Zelikow, Philip, 1954– III. May, Ernest R. IV. Series.
E841.J58 2001
973.922—dc21
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110
www.wwnorton.com
W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
2001030053
MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
The Presidential Recordings Project
Philip Zelikow
Director of the Center
Timothy Naftali
Director of the Project
Editorial Advisory Board
Michael Beschloss
Taylor Branch
Robert Dallek
Walter Isaacson
Allen Matusow
Richard Neustadt
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Robert Schulzinger
Contents
xi
Preface to John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3
xvii
Editors’ Acknowledgments
xxv
Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars
xxvii
A Note on Sources
xxix
Meeting Participants and Other Frequently Mentioned Persons
xxxi
Introduction: Five Hundred Days
Timothy Naftali
WEEKEND OF JULY 28–29, 1962
Prologue: Taping System Installed
MONDAY, JULY 30, 1962
11:52 A.M.–12:20 P.M. Meeting on Brazil
12:25–12:57 P.M. Meeting on Peruvian Recognition
12:58–1:10 P.M. Meeting on Europe and General
Diplomatic Matters
4:00–4:55 P.M. Meeting on the Economy and the Budget
5:00–6:48 P.M. Meeting on Nuclear Test Ban
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1962
11:30 A.M.–12:43 P.M. Meeting on Nuclear Test Ban
4:45–5:32 P.M. Meeting on Nuclear Test Ban
5:35–6:25 P.M. Meeting with the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
xli
3
3
4
5
26
43
52
80
130
132
167
186
viii
CONTENTS
FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 1962
10:33–11:12 A.M. Meeting on Berlin
11:14 –11:20 A.M. Meeting with Lyman Lemnitzer
MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1962
6:00–6:42 P.M. Meeting with Wilbur Mills on
the Tax Cut Proposal
10:36–11:12 A.M. Meeting with Llewellyn Thompson
on Khrushchev
5:30–6:12 P.M. Meeting on China and the Congo
THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1962
10:00–10:55 A.M. Meeting on Peru and Haiti
10:55 A.M.–12:15 P.M. Meeting on Berlin
4:30–5:47 P.M. Meeting with Business Leaders
on the Tax Cut Proposal
FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1962
10:10–11:10 A.M. Meeting on the Tax Cut Proposal
11:20 A.M.–12:30 P.M. Meeting on the Gold
and Dollar Crisis
4:10–4:45 P.M. Meeting on Laos
6:35–6:53 P.M. Meeting with John McCone
10:50–11:46 A.M. Meeting with Douglas MacArthur
5:50–6:32 P.M. Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis
11:48 A.M.–12:06 P.M. Meeting on Intelligence Matters
4:00–5:30 P.M. Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis
TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1962
9:30 A.M. Conversation with Orville Freeman
10:00 A.M. Conversation with Dean Rusk
202
203
227
233
234
260
261
272
287
287
311
335
361
362
385
418
419
439
443
445
462
480
482
489
526
527
534
CONTENTS
10:14 A.M. Conversation with Robert McNamara
10:20 A.M. Conversation with Eugene Zuckert
10:25 A.M. Conversation with Lyndon B. Johnson
10:30 A.M. Conversation with James Eastland
5:05–5:15 P.M. Meeting on U.N. Strategy
5:15–5:55 P.M. Meeting with Adlai Stevenson
6:00–7:05 P.M. Meeting on Trade and Textile Policy
6:10–6:37 P.M. Meeting on Intelligence Matters
9:36 A.M. Conversation with Philip Hart
TIME UNKNOWN. Dictated Memo to Eugene Zuckert
5:00–6:06 P.M. Meeting on Arab-Israeli Questions
11:06 A.M. Conversation with David McDonald
5:46–6:35 P.M. Meeting on Berlin
6:35–6:46 P.M. Meeting on the Congo
9:30 A.M. Conversation with Walter Reuther
11:26 A.M. Conversation with Willard Wirtz
11:30 A.M. Conversation with a White House Operator
11:33 A.M. Conversation with George Harrison
11:35 A.M. Conversation with Walter Reuther
Index
ix
536
540
541
545
546
552
566
592
593
603
604
608
608
610
623
624
627
641
651
651
654
655
656
657
659
BY
PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY
B
etween 1940 and 1973, presidents of the United States secretly
recorded hundreds of their meetings and conversations in the
White House. Though some recorded a lot and others just a little,
they created a unique and irreplaceable source for understanding not
only their presidencies and times but the presidency as an institution
and, indeed, the essential process of high-level decision making.
These recordings of course do not displace more traditional sources
such as official documents, private diaries and letters, memoirs, and contemporaneous journalism. They augment these sources much as photographs, films, and recordings augment printed records of presidents’
public appearances. But they do much more than that.
Because the recordings capture an entire meeting or conversation,
not just highlights caught by a minute-taker or recalled afterward in a
memorandum or memoir, they have or can have two distinctive qualities.
In the first place, they can catch the whole complex of considerations
that weigh on a president’s action choice. Most of those present at a
meeting with a president know chiefly the subject of that meeting. Even
key staff advisers have compartmented responsibilities. Tapes or transcripts of successive meetings or conversations can reveal interlocked
concerns of which only the president was aware. They can provide hard
evidence, not just bases for inference, about presidential motivations.
Desk diaries, public and private papers of presidents, and memoirs
and oral histories by aides, family, and friends all show how varied and
difficult were the presidents’ responsibilities and how little time they had
for meeting those responsibilities. But only the tapes provide a clear picture of how these responsibilities constantly converged—how a president could be simultaneously, not consecutively, a commander in chief
worrying about war, a policymaker conscious that his missteps in economic policy could bring on a market collapse, a chief mediator among
interest groups, a chief administrator for a myriad of public programs, a
spokesperson for the interests and aspirations of the nation, a head of a
sprawling political party, and more.
The tapes reveal not only what presidents said but what they heard.
For everyone, there is some difference between learning by ear and by
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T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
eye. Action-focused individuals ordinarily take in more of what is said to
them than of what they read, especially when they can directly question
a speaker. A document read aloud to a president had a much better
chance of registering than the same document simply placed in the inbox. Though hearing and reading can both be selective, tapes probably
show, better than any other records, the information and advice guiding
presidential choices.
Perhaps most usefully, the secret tapes record, as do no other sources,
the processes that produce decisions. Presidential advisers can be heard
debating with one another. They adapt to the arguments of the others.
They sometimes change their minds. The common positions at the end
of a meeting are not necessarily those taken by any person at the outset.
The president’s own views have often been reshaped. Sometimes there
has been a basic shift in definition of an issue or of the stakes involved.
Hardly anyone ever has a clear memory of such changes. Yet, with the
tape, a listener now can hear those changes taking place—can follow, as
nowhere else, the logic of high-stakes decision making.
Casting about for analogies, we have thought often of Pompeii. As the
ruins uncovered there have given students of Greco-Roman civilization
knowledge not to be found anywhere else, in any form, so the presidential
recordings give students of the presidency, of U.S. and world history, and
of decision making knowledge simply without parallel or counterpart.
They are a kind of time machine, allowing us to go back and be in the
room as history was being made. And, unlike even the finest archaeological site, what we uncover are the words and deliberations of the people
themselves in the moment of action, not just the accounts, summary
notes, or after-the-fact reconstructions they left behind.
Of the six presidents who used secret recording devices, three did so
extensively. Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower
recorded to a limited extent. John Kennedy, however, after installing an
elaborate taping system in July 1962, used it frequently during the 16
months before his murder in November 1963. Using a different system,
Lyndon Johnson made recordings throughout his presidency, especially in
1968, his last, tumultuous year in office. Richard Nixon, after two years
without using any recording devices, installed a system which, because
voice activated, captured every conversation in a room with a microphone.
The existence of Nixon’s system came to light in July 1973 during
congressional hearings on administration involvement in the 1972
Watergate burglary. Segments of tape obtained by Congress provided a
major basis for the impeachment proceedings that led to Nixon’s later
resignation.
xiii
The Watergate hearings brought an end to secret taping. Afterward,
it became unlawful to record conversations without knowledge and consent. As the ruins of Pompeii reveal details of Greco-Roman life only up
to August of 79 A.D., when lava from Vesuvius buried the city, so secret
recordings reveal the inner workings of the U.S. presidency only from
1940—and especially 1962—down to mid-1973.
On the premise that these recordings will remain important historical sources for centuries to come, the University of Virginia’s Miller
Center of Public Affairs plans to produce transcripts and aids for using
all accessible recordings for all six presidencies. We started with the
methods and style we used in 1996–97 to produce a then-unprecedented
volume of its kind, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
Though that volume improved on the then-available transcripts of a few
Kennedy administration meetings, we kept trying to find ways to make
the transcripts still better. This was a process of trial and error.
Our initial hope was that professional transcribers, like court reporters,
could do much of the primary transcription. That did not work out
well. For those untrained in the history of the period, transcribing
presidential tapes can be a bit like assembling a jigsaw puzzle without
being able to see the picture on the puzzle box, and this is especially
true when the audio quality is bad. Tapes of telephone conversations
tend to be much easier, both because the speakers are using a machine
that was linked to the original recording system (usually a Dictaphone
in this case) and because there are generally only two participants in
the telephone conversation. Recordings of meetings are much harder to
transcribe. Most Kennedy recordings are of meetings; most Johnson
recordings (and all those publicly released so far) are of telephone conversations.
Originally short of funds and audio expertise, we initially worked
almost entirely with ordinary cassette copies of the tapes. We later began
relying on more expensive Digital Audio Tape (DAT) technology. We tried
out other technical fixes, starting in 1996 with a standard noise reduction
technique (called NONOISE in the trade). The results were disappointing.
We have since tried out other, much more sophisticated techniques suggested by some sound studios. Though we have learned these techniques
can sometimes be vital for especially murky material suffering from unusual
interference, there is an offsetting risk of additional distortion and loss of
data, including the subtle changes in tone that can affect accurate speaker
identification. Two of our scholars, Timothy Naftali and George Eliades,
were especially critical experimenters in this learning process.
xiv
The same two scholars helped the growing team stumble on a more
useful bit of hardware. Looking for a way for two scholars to listen
simultaneously to the same DAT copies, Eliades suggested use of a multiple outlet headphone amplifier (Rane’s Mojo amplifier). Eliades and
Naftali also discovered that this hardware dramatically improved our
ability to boost the audio signal from the tapes. We are continuing to tinker with the hardware, including more use of CD-ROM technology. We
welcome suggestions for further improvement.
The most fundamental improvements in transcription so far, though,
have not come from machines. They came from people. Introduction of a
team method for reviewing transcripts, an innovation developed and
managed mainly by Naftali, has helped reduce the most intractable source
of error—the cognitive expectations and limitations of an individual listener. For instance, when you expect to hear a word in an ambiguous bit
of sound, you often hear it. Even without particular expectations, different listeners hear different things. So we have utilized a special kind of
“peer review” in this new realm of basic historical research.
The talents required from our scholars are demanding. They must be
excellent historians, knowledgeable about the events and people of the
period. They must also have a particular temperament. Anthropologists
and archaeologists used to taking infinite pains at a dig, teaspoon or
toothbrush in hand, might call this a talent for “field work.” So we are
especially grateful to the historians, listed on the title page of the volumes, who have displayed the knowledge, the patience, and the discipline
this work requires, rewarded by a constant sense of discovery.
In consultation with our editorial advisory board and our scholars, we
developed a number of methodological principles for the Miller Center’s
work. Among the most important are:
First, the work is done by trained professional historians who have
done deep research on the period covered by the tapes and on some of
the central themes of the meetings and conversations. They are listed on
the title page as associate and volume editors. The historians not only
delve into documentary sources but sometimes interview living participants who can help us comprehend the taped discussions. Our voice
identifications are based on sample clips we have compiled and on our
research. On occasion our list of participants in a meeting differs from
the log of President Kennedy’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln. We list only
the names of participants whose voices we can identify. Our research has
also turned up a few minor cataloguing errors made at the time or later.
Second, each volume uses the team method. Since few people always
speak in complete grammatical sentences, the transcriber has to infer
xv
and create paragraphs, commas, semicolons, periods, and such. Usually
one or two scholars painstakingly produce a primary draft, including the
introductory scene setters and explanatory annotations. Two or more
scholars then carefully go over that transcript, individually or sometimes
two listening at the same time, with their suggestions usually going
back to the primary transcriber. In the case of often-difficult meeting
tapes, like the Kennedy recordings, every transcript has benefited from at
least four listeners. The volume editors remain accountable for checking
the quality and accuracy of all the work in their volume, knitting
together the whole. All of this work is then reviewed by the general editors, with the regular advice of members of the project’s editorial advisory board.
Third, we use the best technology that the project can afford. As of
2001, we work from DAT copies of the recordings (not the less expensive
analog cassettes ordinarily sold to the public by presidential libraries).
Our transcribers are now moving toward transferring this digital data
onto CD-ROMs. Each transcriber at least uses a professional quality
DAT machine and AKG K240 headphones with the signal boosted by a
headphone amplifier. Each listens to a DAT copy of the library master,
checking with a DAT from which sound engineers have attempted to
remove extraneous background noise.
Fourth, we aim at completeness. Over time, others using the transcripts and listening to the tapes may be able to fill in passages marked
[unclear]. Although the Miller Center volumes are intended to be authoritative reference works, they will always be subject to minor amendments.
Editors of these volumes will endeavor to issue periodic updates. We use
ellipses in our transcripts in order to indicate that the speaker paused or
trailed off, not to indicate that material has been omitted.
Fifth, we strive to make the transcripts accessible to and readable by
anyone interested in history, including students. As the U.S. government’s National Archives has pointed out, the actual records are the
tapes themselves and all transcripts are subjective interpretations. For
instance, our team omits verbal debris such as the “uh”s that dot almost
anyone’s speech. Listeners unconsciously filter out such debris as they
understand what someone is saying. Judgments must be made. Someone
says, for example, “sixteen . . . uh, sixty. . . . ” The transcriber has to
decide whether the slip was significant or not. But the judgment calls are
usually no more difficult than those involved in deciding where to insert
punctuation or paragraphing. In the effort to be exhaustive, sometimes
there is a temptation to overtranscribe, catching every fragmentary
utterance, however unclear or peripheral. But the result on the page can
xvi
add too much intrusive static, making the substance less understandable
now than it was to listeners at the time. Obviously, what to include and
omit, balancing coherence and comprehension against the completeness
of the record, also requires subjective judgment. The object is to give the
reader or user the truest possible sense of the actual dialogue as the participants themselves could have understood it (had they been paying
attention).
Sixth, we go one step further by including in each volume explanations and annotations intended to enable readers or users to understand
the background and circumstances of a particular conversation or meeting. With rare exceptions, we do not add information that participants
would not have known. Nor do we comment often on the significance of
items of information, except as it might have been recognized by the participants. As with other great historical sources, interpretations will
have to accumulate over future decades and centuries.
Preface to John F. Kennedy:
The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3
BY
PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY
T
hese three volumes in the Miller Center Presidential Recordings
series cover the three months after Kennedy first began to taperecord meetings.
Before and after becoming president, Kennedy had made use of a
recording device called a Dictaphone, mostly for dictating letters or
notes. In the summer of 1962 he asked Secret Service Agent Robert
Bouck to conceal recording devices in the Cabinet Room, the Oval Office,
and a study/library in the Mansion. Without explaining why, Bouck
obtained Tandberg reel-to-reel tape recorders, high-quality machines for
the period, from the U.S. Army Signal Corps. He placed two of these
machines in the basement of the West Wing of the White House in a
room reserved for storing private presidential files. He placed another in
the basement of the Executive Mansion.
The West Wing machines were connected by wire to two microphones in the Cabinet Room and two in the Oval Office. Those in the
Cabinet Room were on the outside wall, placed in two spots covered by
drapes where once there had been wall fixtures. They were activated by
a switch at the President’s place at the Cabinet table, easily mistaken for
a buzzer press. Of the microphones in the Oval Office, one was in the
kneehole of the President’s desk, the other concealed in a coffee table
across the room. Each could be turned on or off with a single push on an
inconspicuous button.
We do not know where the microphone in the study of the Mansion
was located. In any case, Bouck, who had chief responsibility for the system, said in 1976, in an oral history interview, that President Kennedy
“did almost no recording in the Mansion.” Of the machine in the basement of the Mansion, he said: “Except for one or two short recordings, I
don’t think it was ever used.” So far, except possibly for one short
recording included in these volumes, no tape from the Mansion machine
has turned up.
President Kennedy also had a Dictaphone hooked up to a telephone
in the Oval Office and possibly also to a telephone in his bedroom. He
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P R E FA C E
could activate it, and so could his private secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, who
knew of the secret microphones, often made sure that they were turned
off if the President had forgotten to do so, and took charge of finished
reels of tape when they were brought to her by Bouck or Bouck’s assistant, Agent Chester Miller.
Though Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and
Robert Kennedy’s secretary, Angie Novello, certainly knew of the tapes and
dictabelts by some point in 1963, it is not clear that they had this knowledge earlier. Anecdotes suggest that the President’s close aide and scheduler, Kenneth O’Donnell, might have known about the system and might
have told another aide, Dave Powers, but the anecdotes are unsupported.
Most White House insiders, including counsel Theodore Sorensen, who
had been Kennedy’s closest aide in the Senate, were astonished when they
learned later that their words had been secretly captured on tape.
After Kennedy’s assassination, Evelyn Lincoln was quickly displaced
by President Johnson’s secretaries. She arranged, however, for the Secret
Service agents to pull out all the microphones, wires, and recorders and
took the tapes and dictabelts to her newly assigned offices in the
Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House. Though Robert
Kennedy had charge of these and all other records from the Kennedy
White House, Lincoln retained physical custody.
During Kennedy’s presidency, only a small number of conversations
were transcribed. Though Lincoln attempted to make some other transcripts, she never had much time for doing so. George Dalton, a former
Navy Petty Officer and general chore man for the Kennedy family, took
on the job. “Dalton transcripts” have not been released, but everyone
who has seen them uses terms like fragmentary, terrible to unreliable, awful,
or garbage.
The tapes and dictabelts migrated with President Kennedy’s papers.
First they moved to the main National Archives building in downtown
Washington, D.C. Herman Kahn (an archivist, not the strategic analyst)
was responsible for them within the National Archives system; Robert
Kennedy was the custodian for materials belonging to the family, including all the tapes. Robert Kennedy disclosed the existence of the tapes in
1965 to Burke Marshall, a legal scholar and former Justice Department
colleague. Lincoln and Dalton were looking after the materials, and
Dalton was attempting some transcripts. The papers and the tapes then
were moved to a federal records depository in Waltham, Massachusetts.
In the summer and fall of 1967, when Robert Kennedy drafted his
famous memoir of the Cuban missile crisis, Thirteen Days, he used what-
P R E FA C E
xix
ever transcripts existed and almost certainly listened to tapes. Passages
in the book which refer to “diaries” seem nearly all to be based on the
secret recordings.1
After Robert Kennedy was assassinated in 1968, custody of President
Kennedy’s private papers became the primary responsibility of Senator
Edward Kennedy (Burke Marshall represented Jacqueline Kennedy’s
interests). Dalton was employed by Senator Kennedy, and either some
tapes or some of Dalton’s transcripts or both may have been moved into
Senator Kennedy’s own files. Despite occasional rumors, none of the custodians publicly acknowledged that the tapes existed.
When Nixon’s taping system was revealed in 1973 and Congress was
seeking access to those tapes, Senator Kennedy was a member of the
inquiring Judiciary Committee. With rumors by then rife, he and the family quickly confirmed that President Kennedy had, indeed, also secretly
taped meetings and conversations in the White House. They publicly
promised to turn the tapes over to the National Archives. During the next
two years they negotiated a deed of gift that put in the hands of archivists
at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts, all
tapes except those dealing with private family affairs.
According to Richard Burke, a longtime member of Senator Kennedy’s
staff, Dalton was instructed by the late Steven Smith, Senator Kennedy’s brother-in-law, to remove sensitive documents from the Kennedy
papers and to cull the tapes in order to protect the family’s reputation.
Burke also claims that he read transcripts by Dalton from Oval Office
dictabelts of conversations with Marilyn Monroe and Judith Exner and
that Dalton had erased potentially embarrassing passages.2 But Burke is
an undependable source. A book he wrote about his years with the senator is full not only of errors but of outright inventions. Yet there are
others, including at least one Kennedy Library archivist who received
the tapes, who suspected that between 1973 and 1975, Dalton — possibly assisted by Kennedy aide Dave Powers and retired archivist and
Kennedy family employee Frank Harrington —looked at the tapes to see
what should be removed without leaving any record or documentation
1. See Timothy Naftali, “The Origins of ‘Thirteen Days,’”Miller Center Report 15, no. 2
(Summer 1999): 23–24.
2. Philip Bennett, “Mystery Surrounds Role of JFK Tapes Transcriber,” Boston Globe, 31
March 1993, p. 1; Seymour M. Hersh, The Dark Side of Camelot (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997),
pp. 454–55.
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of their work. Dalton has refused to discuss what he did. Senator
Kennedy’s then–chief of staff, when interviewed in 1993 by the Boston
Globe reporter Philip Bennett, denied that Dalton had worked on the
tapes at the direction of Senator Kennedy, but Burke Marshall told
Philip Zelikow in February 2000 that he thought Dalton had been
working on the tapes for the Senator, at least in general.
In 1975, tapes recording about 248 hours of meetings and 12 hours
of telephone conversations became part of the President’s Office Files at
the library. While a treasure trove for history, this handover did not
include all the recordings that President Kennedy had made, nor were all
the recordings complete.
Fortunately perhaps, the Secret Service agents had originally numbered and catalogued the reels of meeting tapes in a simple way, so
removals and anomalies are easily noticed. There are a few. Three tapes
were received by the library with reels containing “separate tape segments.” It is possible that they had been cut and spliced, for two of these
tapes, including the one made on August 22, 1962, concerned intelligence issues and may have involved discussion of covert efforts to assassinate Castro. The Kennedy Library archivist Alan Goodrich says,
however, that the “separate tape segments” may exist simply because the
Secret Service agents were winding some partial reels of tape together
to fill out the reels of blank tape being fed into the machine.
Another tape from August 1962 is simply blank. Several more numbered tape boxes, for tapes made in June 1963, had no tapes inside,
though the library has “Dalton transcripts” for at least four of these
missing tapes. The fact that still other tapes received by the library had
been miswound suggests at least that they had been clumsily handled.
Since the library has not yet issued its own forensic reports about the
“separate tape fragments” or blank tape or made the original tape reels
available for outside examination or released the existing “Dalton transcripts” for missing tapes, we cannot draw conclusive judgments about
just what happened.
The dictabelt recordings never had any order. Lincoln seems to have
filed them randomly. Some seem to have been partially overwritten. The
Kennedy Library’s numbers merely distinguish one item from another.
They provide no guidance to chronological sequence or content. As with
the meeting tapes, the Kennedy Library has attempted to date and identify the tapes, and the editors of these volumes have confirmed and, in
various cases, amended this information as a result of further research. A
number of dictabelts were taken by Lincoln without authorization for a
private collection of Kennedy memorabilia. Some of these went to the
P R E FA C E
xxi
Kennedy Library after her death in 1995; others turned up in the hands
of a collector who had befriended her. In 1998 the Kennedy Library was
able to recover these dictabelts too, but there is no way of knowing
whether there were others and, if so, what their fate was.
Once in the jurisdiction of the Archivist of the United States, the
recordings were handled with thoroughgoing professionalism. The library
remastered the tapes on a Magnecord 1022 for preservation. The dictabelts were copied onto new masters. All copies of the tapes, including
those used for these books, derive from these new preservation masters.
Some minor anomalies were introduced as a result of the remastering.
Listeners will occasionally hear a tape stop and the recording start up,
replaying a sentence or two. That is an artifact of the remastering process,
not the original White House taping. The original tapes were also recorded
at relatively high density (1 78 inches per second). The remastered tapes
necessarily have different running speeds that produce subtle audio distortion. The new masters, for example, seem to have people talking slightly
faster than they did at the time.
The library was initially at a loss as to how to make tapes available to
the public. Many contain material still covered by security classification.
Because of the poor sound quality of most of the tapes, it was not easy to
identify sensitive passages. The library initially attempted to prepare its
own transcripts and submit these for classification review. But the task
was hard, the library staff was small, and funds were meager. Moreover,
some archivists believed as a matter of principle that the library should
not give official standing to transcripts that might contain transcribers’
errors. In the view of the National Archives and Records Administration,
only the tapes themselves are archival records. All transcripts are works of
subjective interpretation. The effort at transcription came to an end in
1983, and almost all the tapes remained under lock and key.
In 1993 the library acquired new equipment and began putting the
recordings onto Digital Audio Tape (DAT). These could be reviewed in
Washington and digitally marked without transcripts. Changes in procedures, along with determined efforts by two archivists, Stephanie
Fawcett and Mary Kennefick, accelerated the pace of declassification.
Between 1996 and 2000 about half of the recordings in the Kennedy
Library became available for public release; the rest await declassification review.
While the Kennedy Library has been careful to make no deletions or
erasures from tapes and dictabelts in its possession, the copies publicly
released, and used for these volumes, do have carefully annotated excisions of passages still security classified. These passages were excised
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P R E FA C E
digitally, not literally, and remain intact on the library’s preservation
masters. It is to be hoped that future, more tolerant declassification
reviews may someday release some of the material that currently is
excised. But even for the sanitized tapes, the library issues no transcripts.
Our work on these tapes commenced in 1995. We obtained analog
cassettes of tapes relating to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis as soon as they
were released. Painstakingly, we listened to and transcribed those tapes.
Each of us spent many hours listening to each hour of tape. Even so, our
transcripts contained large numbers of notations for words or passages
that were unclear or speakers that could not be identified. The resultant
transcripts were published by Harvard University Press in 1997 as The
Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Because of support from the Governing Council of the University of
Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs, and W. W. Norton, the transcripts of meetings on the missile crisis in volumes 2 and 3 of this series
are more complete and accurate than were our original products. We
were able to decipher in those tapes large numbers of words and passages previously incomprehensible and to identify speakers with greater
certainty. We were also able to draw on the assistance of other historians
employed in the Miller Center’s Presidential Recordings Project,
employing and benefiting from the team method we describe in our general preface on the project.
Some questions nevertheless linger because of uncertainties, already
described, concerning the completeness and integrity of the tapes now
available. Why were they made? Did Kennedy use the on/off switch with a
view to controlling, even distorting the historical record? Did others, after
his murder, tamper with the tapes in order artificially to shape the record
of events? In view of the possibility that a small fraction of the meeting
tapes were removed or mangled after the fact, can they really be regarded
as better sources than self-serving memoirs or oral histories? To the
extent that they are valid, undoctored records of conversations and meetings, do they tell us much that could not be learned from other sources?
Our judgment is that any tampering with the tapes was so crude and
ham handed that it extended only to removals. The extent of such
removals may have been constrained by the original Secret Service cataloguing system. Since missing tapes would be noticed, too many missing
tapes might cause an outcry and lead to unwelcome inquiries. So the
removals of meeting tapes, if that is the explanation for the anomalies,
were relatively limited. The situation of the dictabelts is different. Since
they were not catalogued at the time they were made, we cannot know
how many—if any—are missing.
P R E FA C E
xxiii
The most plausible explanation for Kennedy’s making secret tape
recordings is that he wanted material to be used later in writing a memoir. Since he seems neither to have had transcripts made (with two minor
exceptions in 1963) nor to have listened to any of the tapes, it is unlikely
that he wanted them for current business. He had himself written histories and was by most accounts prone to asking historians’ questions:
How did this situation develop? What had previous administrations
done? He knew how hard it was to answer such questions from surviving documentary records. And he faced the apparent likelihood that,
even if reelected in 1964, he would be an out-of-work ex-president when
not quite 51 years old.
Did Kennedy tape just to have material putting himself in a favorable
light? On some occasions, he must have refrained from pushing an “on”
button because he wanted no record of a meeting or conversation.
Especially on early tapes, there are pauses at moments when the President
was speaking of tactics for dealing with legislative leaders. Almost certainly, he made recordings only when he thought the occasions important.
As a result, the tapes record relatively little humdrum White House business such as meetings with citizen delegations or conferences with congressmen and others about patronage.
Those who have spent much time with the tapes and those who have
compared the tapes to their own experience working with Kennedy find
no evidence that he taped only self-flattering moments. He often made
statements or discussed ideas that would have greatly damaged him had
they become public. Early in the missile crisis, for example, he mused
about his own possible responsibility for having brought it on. “Last
month I said we weren’t going to [allow it],” he said. “Last month I
should have said that we don’t care.” He never seemed to make speeches
during a meeting for the benefit of future listeners. His occasional taped
monologues were private dictation about something that had happened
or what he was thinking, obviously for his own later reference.
Two other points apply. First, he had no reason to suppose that the
tapes would ever be heard by anyone other than himself unless he chose
to make them available. They were completely secret. Second, he could
hardly have known just what statements or positions would look good to
posterity, for neither he nor his colleagues could know how the stories
would turn out.
The tapes of missile crisis debates establish far more clearly than any
other records the reasons why Kennedy thought Soviet missiles in Cuba
so dangerous and important. They make abundantly clear that his preoccupation was not with Cuba or the immediate threat to the United
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P R E FA C E
States. He feared that, if he did not insist on removal of the missiles,
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would be emboldened to try to take
over West Berlin, in which case he—Kennedy—would have only two
choices. He would either have to abandon the two and a half million
West Berliners theretofore protected by the United States, or he would
have to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, for there was no
imaginable way of defending West Berlin with conventional military
forces. The Soviet missiles in Cuba would then be a “knife in our guts”
constraining the U.S. nuclear threats to save Berlin.
The tapes also explain as do no other sources Kennedy’s approach to
the Mississippi civil rights crisis. They show him worrying about international economics, specifically the drain on U.S. gold reserves, to such
an extent that he questions whether the United States can or should
continue to keep troops in Europe. The tapes in some instances disclose
facts still hidden by walls of security classification, as, for example, that
the Kennedy administration had plans to create an illegal CIA unit to
investigate U.S. journalists and officials.
But the greatest value of these recordings does not reside in specific
revelations. It comes, as is said in the general preface to the project, from
giving a listener or reader unique insight into the presidency and presidential decision making. We are proud to be able to put this extraordinary source into the hands of students of history and politics.
Editors’ Acknowledgments
These initial volumes of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Recordings
Series represent the work of a team of dedicated people. Besides the
scholars listed on the title page, the editors are grateful to Lorraine
Settimo, the executive assistant of the Miller Center’s Presidential Recordings Project, and to Andrew P. N. Erdmann, the scholar who assisted
with the Eisenhower conversations. At the John F. Kennedy Library, Jim
Cedrone, Alan Goodrich, William Johnson, and Mary Kennefick were
especially helpful. And at the National Archives, Nancy Keegan Smith
was of special assistance. Lastly, we are deeply grateful to our editors at
Norton, Drake McFeely and Sarah Stewart, who exhibit such a rare
combination of qualities: attention to detail, patience, and vision.
Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars
RESEARCH SCHOLARS
David Coleman
Cuba, Nuclear Test Ban
George Eliades
Vietnam, Laos, Nuclear Test Ban
Francis Gavin
Berlin Crisis, International Monetary Policy
Max Holland
Domestic Politics
Jill Colley Kastner
U. S.-German Relations
Erin Mahan
Berlin Crisis, U.S.-European Relations, Congo, Middle East,
United Nations, China
Timothy Naftali
U.S.-Soviet Relations, Cuba, General Latin America,
Intelligence Policy, Nuclear Test Ban
Paul Pitman
U.S.-European Relations
Jonathan Rosenberg
Civil Rights
David Shreve
Congressional Relations, Tax and Budgetary Policy,
International Monetary Policy
CD-ROM DEVELOPER AND MULTIMEDIA COORDINATOR
Kristin Gavin
RESEARCH ASSISTANTS
Brett Avery Bush
W. Taylor Fain
Laura Moranchek
A Note on Sources
In addition to the various memoirs and other writings cited as sources in
our footnotes, we have relied upon the relevant archival holdings for the
White House and the various agencies of the U.S. government, held
mainly in the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston and the National
Archives, Washington, D.C. We have also relied on the less formal holdings of that useful private institute, the National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C.
Each footnote appearing for the first time in a chapter is fully cited
on first reference. The one exception made was for the many footnotes
citing the U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States
1961–63 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office). Footnotes
that include references to Foreign Relations of the United States are abbreviated as FRUS and include the volume number and page numbers. For
FRUS references other than those from 1961 to 1963, the appropriate
years are included.
Meeting Participants and Other
Frequently Mentioned Persons
T
he following is a concise guide to individuals who participated in
taped conversations. We have supplemented these brief descriptions, when possible, with the thumbnail sketches made by former presidential special consultant Richard E. Neustadt in his book
Report to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999). Neustadt met the people he has written about.
We feel that his vivid brush strokes add some additional color that we, at
this distant remove, do not feel qualified to provide. We also include figures mentioned frequently in the conversations, such as foreign heads of
government, who were not present at the meetings.
Abrams, Creighton W., Colonel, U.S. Army; Assistant Deputy Chief of
Staff and Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, 1962–1963
Ackley, H. Gardner, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1962–1968
(Chairman, 1964–1968)
Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
1949–1963
Alexander, Henry, Chairman, Morgan Guaranty Trust in 1962
Allen, Ward P., Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Political
Affairs, Department of State
Anderson, George W., Admiral, U.S. Navy; U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,
1961–1963
Ausland, John C., State Department Representative to the Berlin Task
Force, 1961–1964
Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State, 1961–1966
A Washington lawyer with an international practice, wartime associate of
Jean Monnet (the advocate of European Union), adviser to Adlai Stevenson
in 1952, ’56 and ’60, Ball had come into the Kennedy Administration as
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M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; his focused energy, intelligence, and
application already had won him a promotion.
Barbour, Walworth, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, 1961–1973
Barnett, Ross R., Democratic Governor of Mississippi, 1960–1964
Bell, David E., Director of the Budget, 1961–1962; Director, U.S.
Agency for International Development after December 1962
An economist, former Secretary of Harvard’s Graduate School of Public
Administration, as it then was, and before that Administrative Assistant to
President Truman, Bell was personable, thoughtful, analytic, and experienced.
Billings, LeMoyne, Personal friend of President Kennedy; a roommate of
the young JFK at Choate and, briefly, Princeton
Blough, Roger, Chairman, U.S. Steel Corporation, 1955–1969
Boeschenstein, Harold, Senior Executive, Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corporation in 1962
Boggs, Thomas Hale, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Louisiana,
1941–1943, 1947–1972; House Majority Whip, 1961–1971
Bohlen, Charles E., Special Adviser to the President, 1961–1962; U.S.
Ambassador to France, October 1962–1968
One of the two top Russian specialists in the State Department, recently
appointed Ambassador to France. More a thoroughly skilled operator than a
deep analyst, Bohlen was bored in Paris, feeling out of things.
Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, 1961–1966
Formerly Dean of Arts and Sciences at Harvard at a young age, co-author of
Henry Stimson’s memoirs, “Mac” was bright, quick, confident, determined,
striving to be the perfect staff man, juggling many balls at once.
Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant of Defense for International
Carter, Marshall S., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, 1962–1965
Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of Cuba, 1959–
Celebrezze, Anthony J., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
1962–1965
Charyk, Joseph V., Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1960–1963
Clark, Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General of the United States,
1961–1965
Clay, Lucius D., President’s Special Representative in Berlin, 1961–1962;
Special Consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962–1963
Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs, 1961–1965
Clifford, Clark, Personal Attorney to the President; Member, President’s
xxxiii
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 (Chairman from May
1963)
Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1966
Cox, Archibald, Solicitor General of the United States, 1961–1965
Day, J. Edward, Postmaster General of the United States, 1961–1963
Dean, Arthur H., Chairman, U.S. delegation, Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Geneva, 1961–1962; Chairman, U.S.
delegation, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva, 1962
de Gaulle, Charles, President of France, 1958–1969
Dennison, Robert S., Admiral, U.S. Navy; Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, 1960–1963
Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury, 1961–1965
Dillon was engagingly direct, practical, experienced, disinclined to reach beyond
his own (broad) departmental boundaries, except on Kennedy’s invitation.
Dirksen, Everett M., U.S. Senator, Republican, from Illinois, 1950–1969;
Senate Minority Leader, 1959–1969
Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1962–1985
Dowling, Walter C., U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1959–1963
Duncan, John P., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, 1961–1963
Duvalier, François, President of Haiti, 1957–1971
Eastland, James O., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Mississippi, 1943–1978
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 34th President of the United States, 1953–1961
Feldman, Myer, Deputy Special Counsel to the President, 1961–1964
Fisher, Adrian, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1961–1969
FitzGerald, Desmond, Chief, Far Eastern Division, Deputy Directorate
for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, 1958–1963
Forrestal, Michael V., Senior Staff Member, National Security Council,
1962–1965
Foster, William, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
1961–1969
Fowler, Henry H., Under Secretary of the Treasury, 1961–1964
Fowler, James R., Deputy Administrator, Far East, U.S. Agency for
International Development
Freeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture, 1961–1969
Fulbright, J. William, U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Arkansas, 1945–1974;
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959–1974
Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1961–1964
Wall Street lawyer, skilled, sophisticated, broad-gauged, loyal to McNamara.
xxxiv
Goldberg, Arthur J., Secretary of Labor, 1961–1962; Associate Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court, 1962–1965
Goodwin, Richard N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, 1961–1963
Gordon, A. Lincoln, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 1961–1966
Gordon, Kermit, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1962;
Director, Bureau of the Budget after December 1962
Gore, Albert, Sr., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Tennessee, 1959–1971
Goulart, João, President of Brazil,1961–1964
Graham, William Franklin (Billy), Baptist minister and evangelist
Graybeal, Sydney N., Division Chief, Foreign Missile and Space
Activities, Central Intelligence Agency, 1950–1964
Greenewalt, Crawford H., Chairman, E. I. DuPont de Nemours and
Company, 1962–1967
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister, 1957–1985
Halaby, Najeeb E., Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
1961–1965
Halleck, Charles A., U.S. Representative, Republican, from Indiana,
1935–1969; House Minority Leader, 1959–1965
Harriman, W. Averell, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern and
Pacific Affairs, 1961–1963
Hart, Philip A., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Michigan, 1959–1976
Haworth, Leland, Member, Atomic Energy Commission from 1961
Heller, Walter W., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1964
Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1965
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., U.S. Senator, Republican, from Iowa, 1945–1969;
Chairman, Republican Policy Committee, 1961–1969
Hillenbrand, Martin J., Director, Berlin Task Force and the Office of
German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State,
1961–1963
Hilsman, Roger, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research, 1961–1963
Hodges, Luther H., Secretary of Commerce, 1961–1965
Hoover, Herbert H., 31st President of the United States, 1929–1933
Humphrey, Hubert H., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Minnesota,
1948–1964; Senate Majority Whip, 1961–1964
Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States, 1961–1963
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, 1961–1964
xxxv
A senior career Foreign Service officer, most recently Ambassador to Thailand;
successful in the Service in all senses of the phrase.
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, 1962–1966
Kaysen, Carl, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National
A professor of economics on leave from Harvard, Kaysen worked up expertise in defense policy and weaponry, among other things; brilliant, subtle,
confident, analytic but also a looker-around-corners.
Keeny, Spurgeon, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology
A physicist with training in international relations, associated from the
start with the President’s Science Adviser’s Office, Keeny was personable,
sophisticated, discreet, and a great gatherer of bureaucratic intelligence.
Kennedy, John F., 35th President of the United States, 1961–1963
Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States, 1961–1964
Keogh, Eugene J., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from New York,
1937–1967
Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist Party and Soviet Premier, 1953–1964
Killian, James R., Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, 1957–1959
King, J. C., Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans,
Central Intelligence Agency
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., Executive Director, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1965
Kirwan, Michael, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Ohio, 1937–1970;
Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, House
Appropriations Committee in 1962; Chairman, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
Kohler, Foy, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs, 1959–September 1962; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
September 1962–1966
Kreer, Robert G., Director of the Diplomatic Communication Services,
Department of State
Kuchel, Thomas H., U.S. Senator, Republican, from California,
1953–1969; Senate Minority Whip, 1959–1969
Land, Edwin, physicist and inventor; member, President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board in 1962
Leddy, John M., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until
xxxvi
April 1961; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, April 1961–June
1962; U.S. Representative to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development after October 1962
LeMay, Curtis E., General, U.S. Air Force; U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff,
1961–1965
Lemnitzer, Lyman, General, U.S. Army; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1960–1962; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command,
1962–1969
Lincoln, Evelyn, Personal Secretary to President Kennedy, 1952–1963
Loeb, James, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, 1961–1962
Long, Franklin, Assistant Director for Science and Technology, U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962–1963
Lovett, Robert A., Special Counselor to the President, 1961–1963; member, Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October
1962
Lundahl, Arthur C., Assistant Director of Photographic Interpretation,
Central Intelligence Agency, from 1953
MacArthur, Douglas, General of the Army, 1944–1964
MacDonald, Torbert, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Massachusetts,
1955–1976
Macmillan, M. Harold, Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1957–1963
A one-nation Tory in Parliament from the 1930s, close to Eisenhower since
North Africa in the ’40s, complex, shrewd, detached and tough behind a
bland, Edwardian exterior. Macmillan’s private humor and wry outlook on
life endeared him to Kennedy, despite their age difference.
Mansfield, Michael J., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Montana; Senate
Majority Leader, 1961–1977
Marshall, Burke, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
1961–1965
Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, 1962–1964
Martin, William McChesney, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 1951–1970
McCloy, John J., Special Adviser to the President on Disarmament
Matters, 1961–1963
McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965
McCormack, John, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Massachusetts,
1928–1971; Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1961–1971
McDonald, David, President, United Steel Workers of America,
1952–1965
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense, 1961–1968
xxxvii
Recruited from the presidency of the Ford Motor Company, a driving, managing, no-nonsense—and also no-pomposity—rationalist; his adherence to
reason and duty was so passionate as to hint at emotion hidden beneath.
Meany, George, President of the AFL-CIO, 1955–1979
Meredith, James H., First African American student admitted to the
University of Mississippi, 1962–1963
Mills, Wilbur D., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Arkansas, 1939–1976;
Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee, 1957–1976
Morgan, Thomas E., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Pennsylvania,
1945–1977; Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1962;
member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1962
Moscoso, Teodoro, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International
Development; U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
Murrow, Edward R., Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1961–1964
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, Prime Minister of Egypt, 1954–1956; President of
Egypt, 1956–1958; President of the United Arab Republic, 1958–1970
Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, 1961–1963
Experienced in defense and diplomacy since 1940, sophisticated, competent,
cool, public cold warrior and private philanthropist, Nitze had all the skills
and some of the limitations of the driving young banker he had once been.
Norstad, Lauris, General, U.S. Air Force; NATO Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, 1956–1963
O’Brien, Lawrence F., Special Assistant to the President for Congressional
Affairs, 1961–1963
O’Donnell, Kenneth, Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1963
Okun, Arthur, Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisers,
1961–1964
Ormsby-Gore, Sir David, British Ambassador to the United States,
1961–1965
Former Tory MP, intelligent, sensitive, quick on the uptake and well connected: related both to Macmillan’s wife and to Kennedy’s late lamented
brother-in-law, the Marquis of Hartington, killed in World War II.
Pérez Godoy, General Ricardo Pío, leader of Peruvian military coup of
July 1962; leader of the military junta, 1962–1963
Pittman, Steuart, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense,
1961–1964
Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, President of Peru, 1956–1962
Reuther, Walter, President of the United Auto Workers,1946–1970
Roosa, Robert V., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary
Affairs, 1961–1964
xxxviii
Rosenthal, Jacob, Executive Assistant to the U.S. Under Secretary of
State, 1961–1966
Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman
of the Policy Planning Council, 1961–1966
MIT economist, a driving enthusiast and conceptualizer with a tendency to
listen to himself.
Rusk, Dean, U.S. Secretary of State, 1961–1969
Experienced, thoughtful, conventional, perhaps essentially shy, temperamentally at odds with his presumed model and undoubted mentor, General
Marshall, Rusk may never have felt at ease with JFK, to say nothing of
articulate aides like Kaysen.
Russell, Richard B., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Georgia, 1933–1971;
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
Salinger, Pierre E. G., White House Press Secretary 1961–1964
Saltonstall, Leverett, U.S. Senator, Republican, from Massachusetts,
1945–1967; ranking minority member, Senate Armed Services
Committee, in 1962
Samuelson, Paul A., Economist; member, Council of Economic Advisers,
1960–1968
Schaetzel, J. Robert, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, February 1961–March 1962; Special Assistant to
the Under Secretary of State, March 1962–September 1962; Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after September 1962
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President,
1961–1964
Schroeder, Gerhard, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany,
1961–1966
Schultze, Charles L., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1961–1965
Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
1961–1971
Shoup, David M., General, U.S. Marine Corps; Commandant of the U.S.
Marine Corps, 1960–1963
Sloan, Frank K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs in 1962
Smathers, George A., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Florida, 1951–1969
Solow, Robert M., Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1962–1968
Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1964
Sproul, Alan, President of the New York Reserve Bank, 1941–1956;
Chairman, Task Force on the International Balance of Payments,
November 1960–January 1961
Staats, Elmer B., Deputy Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1958–1966
xxxix
Stevenson, Adlai E., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, 1961–1964
Strong, Robert C., Director, Office of Near East Affairs, Department of
State, 1961–1963
Sullivan, William H., U.N. Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State until April 1963
Sweeney, Walter C., General, U.S. Air Force; Commanding General,
Tactical Air Command, 1961–1965
Taber, John, U.S. Representative, Republican, from New York,
1923–1963; ranking minority member, House Appropriations
Committee in 1962
Talbot, Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, 1961–1965
Taylor, Maxwell D., General, U.S. Army; Military Representative of the
President, 1961–1962, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1962–1964
[H]e had come out of retirement after a distinguished career to support JFK
in 1960: one person at the Pentagon the President knew well enough to trust.
Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1961–1971
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., Ambassador-at-Large, U.S. Department of
State, 1962–1966
Tobin, James, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1962
Tretick, Stanley, Staff photographer for Look magazine in Washington,
1961–1971
Troutman, Robert, Member, President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 1961–1962
Tshombe, Moise Kapenda, Leader of the secessionist Katanga Province,
the Congo, 1960–1963
Turner, Robert C., Assistant Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget,
1961–1962
Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
September 1962–1965
Vance, Cyrus R., U.S. Secretary of the Army, 1962–1963
Vinson, Carl, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Georgia, 1914–1966;
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, in 1962
Wagner, Aubrey, Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, 1962–1978
Webb, James E., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 1961–1968
Wehrley, Roy, Director, U.S. Agency for International Development
mission in Vientiane, Laos
Wheeler, Earle G., General, U.S. Army; Army Chief of Staff, 1962–1964
xl
White, Lincoln, Spokesman, U. S. Department of State, 1961–1963
Wiesner, Jerome B., Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, 1961–1964
Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
1961–1966
Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1961–1965
Wirtz, W. Willard, Secretary of Labor, 1962–1969
Zorin, Valerian A., Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee, Geneva, 1962–1964
Zuckert, Eugene M., Secretary of the Air Force, 1961–1965
Introduction: Five Hundred Days
BY
TIMOTHY NAFTALI
I
t was July 1962, just past his five-hundredth day in office, and John
F. Kennedy was becoming concerned about the fate of his presidency.
He had set the bar high. A friend, the writer Gore Vidal, noted in an
early portrait of the President that Kennedy “intends to be great.”1 At
stake was not simply personal glory. Having been elected at 43, Kennedy
symbolized the coming of age of a new generation of Americans. On a
cold day in January 1961 the junior officers of World War II had trooped
to Washington, D.C., to replace the aging generals of the Eisenhower
administration. Kennedy challenged these young leaders, as he did himself, to seek a New Frontier, whether that frontier lay in the inner cities
or in outer space. Like the men assembled by Frank Sinatra’s Danny Ocean
in the 1960 Rat Pack film, Ocean’s Eleven, the New Frontiersmen were
united by a code of honor earned through the hardship of the Depression
and the experience of fighting in World War II. Kennedy himself had not
experienced the Depression. His father had made his money during
Prohibition, leaving the family well fortified during the difficulties of the
1930s. But he understood combat. In 1943, a PT boat he commanded was
rammed and sunk by a Japanese destroyer. Kennedy had saved his crew.
Too ironic by nature to cast himself in the role of political savior,
Kennedy nevertheless took seriously that as president, he carried the
hopes of his generation. And he worried that it might seem he was letting
his peers down.
In mid-1962 Kennedy could be excused if he doubted he would ever
have a lasting effect on the American consciousness. That summer his
presidency was not going terribly well. Kennedy had just suffered a
telling legislative failure. In what the Los Angeles Times described as
“Kennedy’s Blackest Week with Congress,” his plan for medical assistance for the elderly had been defeated on July 21, 1962, by a slim mar-
1. Gore Vidal, United States: Essays 1952–1992 (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 803.
xlii
I N T RO D U C T I O N
gin in the Senate, despite a overwhelming Democratic majority in that
body.2 The outcome had stung Kennedy, who reacted by holding a press
conference the night of the Senate vote to decry this “most serious defeat
for every American family.”3
That legislative failure was the latest in a series of signs that the
Kennedy magic was not having the effect that many had hoped and he
had expected. The key areas of his presidency were marked by frustration and mistakes, high promise but middling result. The U.S. economy,
for example, was in the doldrums. The hoped for expansion after the
recessions of the late Eisenhower years had not happened. Despite
Kennedy’s promise to “get the country moving again,” unemployment
hovered at 51/2 percent, much lower than what the United States would
experience in the 1970s and 1980s, but for this period unacceptably high.
Business investment was also falling short of administration projections,
though corporate earnings were strong and rising. And there were signs
that the U.S. economy might even get weaker. New orders for durable
goods—a bellwether for the industrial economy of the 1950s and
1960s—had been falling since January 1962. The stock market had taken
a 25 percent tumble in the spring and had not recovered. Finally, due to
outflows in foreign aid, overseas investment, and the cost of military
operations and installations around the world, the U.S. balance of payments situation was difficult. The gold supply was down to its lowest
level since the Depression.4
The state of the U.S. economy that summer seemed to confirm some
of the early criticisms of the young President. Conservative businessmen
had always been wary of Kennedy, who seemed too liberal despite the
views of his businessman father, Joseph P. Kennedy. As president-elect
Kennedy had averted a run on the U.S. dollar by assuring Wall Street
that the liberal economist and Kennedy adviser John Kenneth Galbraith
would not be designated secretary of the Treasury. Nominating instead
Republican C. Douglas Dillon (who brought with him the talented financier Robert Roosa to handle foreign economic policy), Kennedy purchased an uneasy truce with Big Business, but by the summer of 1962
that truce seemed increasingly untenable. In April Kennedy had used his
2. Los Angeles Times, 22 July 1962.
3. New York Times, 22 July 1962.
4. The United States covered 30 percent of the infrastructural cost of NATO; this meant an
annual outflow to Europe of $1.5 billion. In the Kennedy era, exchange rates, the relationship
between national currencies, were fixed and imbalances in the accounts of the major Western
economies were redeemable in gold.
xliii
power to talk down the U.S. steel industry, which had announced a price
hike. Steel prices returned to their pre-showdown level—a victory for
the administration. But the defeat of Big Steel spread fears of more government intervention and the Dow Jones industrials plummeted. “Not
since the days of FDR and the New Deal,” intoned the magazine
Newsweek, “had the level of attack on a President, his family, and his policies seemed quite so heated.”5 Becoming popular with some businessmen
were buttons emblazoned with “I Miss Ike.”
The condition of the economy also inspired some criticism from the
Left.6 Keynesian economists were pushing the President to ward off a
recession by stimulating the economy. In a reversal of the politics of the
1980s and 1990s, the Left advocated a tax cut, while the Right argued
that tax cuts were unacceptable because they were inflationary. Liberals
were impatiently waiting for Kennedy to act on a tax plan.
Criticism of the President was not simply directed at the economic
performance of his administration. A little less than two hundred years
earlier, the country had rid itself of George III and the Hanoverian
dynasty. The Kennedys now seemed to some to be acting as if they were
the country’s newest royal line. Just after the election, John Kennedy had
appointed his brother Robert to his cabinet as Attorney General. The
younger Kennedy had run the campaign for John F. Kennedy but lacked
extensive judicial experience. More than a year later, Bobby Kennedy
seemed to be working out in his job, though newspaper accounts of the
horseplay around the Kennedy pool in Virginia were confirming an image
of the Kennedys as spoiled and immature. But the most recent challenge
to the President’s reputation was a storm of protest over the attempt to
extend presidential coattails to an even younger member of the clan. That
summer Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy announced that he would be running
for the U.S. Senate from Massachusetts. “We could take Jack and Jackie
and Bobby and Caroline,” said one wag, “but Teddy was too much.”7
In foreign affairs, the Kennedy record was also not flattering.
Kennedy had criticized Eisenhower for his unimaginative foreign policy,
accusing him both of having missed opportunities to reduce the chance
of nuclear war with the Soviet Union and of having undermined U.S.
interests in the Third World. In the initial months of his term, Kennedy
had initiated more dialogue with the Soviets, at times involving his
5. “Kennedy and His Critics,” Newsweek, 16 July 1962.
6. New Republic, 16 July 1962.
7. “Kennedy and His Critics,” Newsweek, 16 July 1962.
xliv
brother as a secret back channel to Moscow. Yet relations with Moscow
seemed to be worse now than they had been in January 1961. A summit
conference with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in June 1961 had
turned out badly, with the two leaders’ disagreeing over the preconditions for peace and stability in the world. As a result, there was little
movement on controlling the nuclear arms race or even on getting a
superpower ban on testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or underground. The latter goal was of special interest to the President, who saw
a nuclear test ban as essential to preventing the diffusion of nuclear technology to nonnuclear states.
The results were no better in the Third World. Efforts to remove
Cuban strongman Fidel Castro in early 1961 had led to the fiasco at the
Bay of Pigs, where a 1,200-man Cuban emigré army was stopped at the
beach and captured. A presidential promise to provide some air cover to
the force was rescinded at the eleventh hour, and the United States, for
all Kennedy’s efforts to limit his public exposure to the failure, received
the brunt of criticism for the affair from Bogotá to Berlin. Meanwhile
carrots seemed to be as unproductive as sticks in pushing the administration’s goals. Having announced the Alliance for Progress in March
1961 as a long-term crusade to combat Communism and shore up Latin
America’s fledgling democracies through trade and economic assistance,
Kennedy found these goals seemingly incompatible in the short run. By
mid-1962, military leaders had removed friendly elected governments in
Argentina and Peru and were threatening to do the same in Brazil, the
largest country in Latin America. These coups posed a threat to the
cherished concepts of constitutionalism and democracy in the region and
a challenge to the spirit of the Alliance for Progress. Yet the dilemma for
Kennedy was that the political generals in Latin America shared his
assessment of the threat to regional stability from Fidel Castro and the
Soviet Union to a greater extent than did the democrats they overthrew.
Should the United States work with these generals or not? The only
possible exception to this dismal picture of U.S. policy in the Third
World was in Southeast Asia, where a cease-fire had been negotiated in
landlocked Laos. But even there the policy had flaws: Kennedy knew that
the North Vietnamese were not fully respecting their promise to let Laos
be neutral in the Cold War. Moreover, further south in the region there was
no cease-fire of any kind. Kennedy had made very little headway in helping
the South Vietnamese defend themselves.
By the standards of the presidents who succeeded him, John F.
Kennedy was extremely popular as he neared the midterm elections of
1962. Yet Kennedy had reason not to be pleased with the polls that sum-
xlv
mer. The recent defeats in Congress, uncertainty over the future course
of the U.S. economy, and the bashing by his critics had taken their toll.
Kennedy’s public approval rating had dipped below 70 percent. For all
the glamor of the Kennedy White House and all the freshness of spirit
brought by this handsome young leader with the photogenic family,
Kennedy was now less popular than Dwight Eisenhower had been.
It was in this moment of disappointment that Kennedy decided to
create an unprecedented record of his actions as president. He had long
believed that few if any outsiders could understand the burdens of
office.8 A few months earlier Kennedy had gotten into a spirited debate
with Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the Harvard historian who served as
one of his special assistants in the White House, about how historians
evaluated presidential performance. Schlesinger had provoked the
exchange by asking Kennedy’s opinion of a system to rank U.S. presidents. “Only the President himself can know,” Kennedy replied, “what his
real pressures and his real alternatives are.”9 A less self-conscious leader
might well have shrugged off the inevitable chasm between the way he
saw his leadership and how it was perceived by others. But Kennedy was
an atypical politician in that he was also an historian at heart. In his senior year at Harvard he had written an analysis of British foreign policy
before World War II. The thesis, published as Why England Slept, was
the work of a young man who believed that democracies needed strong,
vital leadership to fight dictatorships. That belief and the need to chronicle the struggles of the powerful never left Kennedy.
In mid-July 1962, Kennedy directed his Secret Service staff to install
a recording system to tape his conversations in the Oval Office, the
Cabinet Room, and the residential portion of the White House. This was
not unheard of for a U.S. president. To varying degrees, three of
Kennedy’s predecessors had made secret tapes. But these had been smallscale operations, limited to the Oval Office and, at least in the case of
Roosevelt and Truman, rarely used. Kennedy had in mind something
bigger.10 By the time of Dallas, 16 months later, he had recorded over
270 hours of high-level deliberations in the White House.
8. Author’s Interview with Theodore Sorensen, April 2000.
9. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Greenwich,
CT: Fawcett Crest, 1965), p. 619. On 29 July 1962 the New York Times published the first presidential ranking since 1948, which was done by Schlesinger’s father, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr.
10. Franklin Roosevelt had a system installed in a closet of the Oval Office in the summer of
1940. Although it appears that Roosevelt lost interest in this system after he was elected to an
unprecedented third term in 1940, he never ordered its removal. Harry Truman inherited the
xlvi
Robert Kennedy once joked that among the things their father had
taught the brothers was “never write it down.”11 John F. Kennedy, despite
a love for language and history, had followed his father’s advice for over a
year in the White House. But now he wanted a fuller record. The difficulties of his presidency had set the stage for this decision to install a
taping system. Kennedy assumed that historians would not get his presidency right and secret recordings would give him fodder for a future
memoir. But the precise timing of Kennedy’s decision to tape and the
enthusiasm with which he used the machine once the decision was made
were more likely the result of his desire to be sure to chronicle one particular challenge of the many swirling about him that summer.
Amidst the many difficulties at home, Kennedy concluded that the
United States faced its greatest foreign danger since the early 1940s.
The President sensed that events were pushing the United States and
the Soviet Union closer to war than they had been for some time. Earlier
in the year, Kennedy had read Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August, a
well-written history of the coming of World War I. Kennedy, who read
widely, would on occasion come across something that profoundly influenced him. Tuchman’s work was important to him in that the narrative
demonstrated how none of the major players in Europe at the time—
German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the Russian czar
Nicholas II, or British foreign minister Edward Grey—had wanted war.12
Yet war was the sum total of all of their actions.
Kennedy saw a disturbing parallel between 1914 and 1962. Instead of
the Balkans, the tinderbox this time would be Adolf Hitler’s former capital, Berlin. As partners in the Grand Alliance against fascism, the United
States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union had in 1945 each
earned the right to occupy the city. Since November 1958, however, the
Soviets had intermittently threatened unilateral action to change the
postwar status quo and end the Allied occupation of the western sectors
of Berlin. In the late spring of 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev
had resumed pressure on the West to quit Berlin, insisting that otherwise
system and used it intermittently. He left just over ten hours of tapes from 1945 and 1948.
Dwight Eisenhower used a different system and taped quite a few meetings from 1954 to 1956,
though only about a dozen hours have been found by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.
11. Quoted in Evan Thomas, Robert Kennedy, His Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000),
p.172. Robert Kennedy made this comment in a note to the director of central intelligence
John McCone on 2 May 1962.
12. Robert Kennedy recounted this in Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New
York: Norton, 1969), p. 62.
xlvii
peace would be impossible in Central Europe. Kennedy, for his part, was
very clear that the United States would never abandon West Berlin. “It is
a vital interest of the United States,” Kennedy told the Soviet ambassador,
Anatoly Dobrynin, on July 17.13 Nevertheless, Khrushchev would not let
up. In the third week of July, when negotiations between the United
States and the Soviet Union ground to a halt over the future of a Western
presence in the German city, Khrushchev warned U.S. ambassador
Llewellyn Thompson that “he would have no choice but to proceed with a
signature of [a peace] treaty [with East Germany] after which our
rights there, including right of access, would end.”14 Khrushchev made no
secret about expecting a major crisis in the fall. He even asked Thompson
whether Kennedy wanted the Berlin question “brought to a head” before
or after the midterm elections in the United States.15
What made the Berlin issue so difficult was that the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) could not defend West Berlin if
Khrushchev lost patience and sought a forceful solution. West Berlin
was about 100 miles inside the territory of East Germany and could easily be swallowed up by the Soviet force stationed in East Germany. Even
if Khrushchev decided not to invade, this NATO enclave was in a perilous position. The Soviets could starve West Berlin into submission by
closing down all access routes, including those by air, between West
Germany and the city. Weighing down file cabinets in the White House
were contingency plans listing responses to various Soviet actions
against the city. What would the West do if the Kremlin announced that
the East Germans were in charge of all access routes to West Berlin and
then the East German government closed them? How would NATO
respond if the Soviets prevented the use of Allied airfields? Conversely,
would the Soviets react with force to a NATO move to defend West
Berlin? Would this chain of events lead to nuclear war?
In Kennedy’s eyes, the danger posed by the geography of Berlin was
magnified by the personality of his adversary. A year earlier in Vienna, at
their only meeting, Kennedy had tried to engage Khrushchev on the
problem of misunderstanding and miscalculation in international politics. The effort was a painful failure. Every time the U.S. president raised
13. Memorandum of Conversation, 17 July 1962, FRUS, 15: 223–24.
14. Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 26 July
1962, FRUS, 15: 253.
15. Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 25 July
1962, FRUS, 15: 252–53.
xlviii
his concern over the disastrous consequences of a misunderstanding
between the two superpowers, the Soviet leader responded as if it was
only Moscow that was ever misunderstood.
Kennedy did not want a war, and despite his suspicions of Khrushchev,
he assumed that the Soviets were equally disinclined. Yet the superpower
conflict was intensifying over Berlin, making a miscalculation more likely
and potentially catastrophic in its result. The Soviet Union and the United
States had nuclear weapons in Europe that might figure in any struggle
there. In these circumstances, a detailed record of the steps the United
States was taking to defend its position in Central Europe could be of
great historical importance. Rather than starting a journal on July 30,
1962, however, John F. Kennedy opted to begin a program of taping key
conversations with his advisers.
Kennedy was no stranger to the tape recorder. The Dictaphone, a
machine the size of a suitcase that sat on an credenza, was standard issue in
U.S. offices in the mid-1950s. President Eisenhower used one. When he was
a senator, Kennedy had used his Dictaphone as an administrative convenience. Kennedy dictated first drafts of his speeches into the machine, which
a secretary would transcribe and his aide, Theodore Sorensen, would then
polish. By the standards of the twenty-first century, this was an unusual
system for a political leader. Ordinarily the speech writer produces the first
draft, which the leader then edits and improves. But Senator Kennedy
understood the issues he was writing about, and when the subject was foreign policy, he knew more than his staff. Moreover his staff was very small,
and it was a polished literary style that he needed, not ideas.16 On occasion,
Kennedy used the machine to dictate notes after an important meeting, but
in those days he did not intentionally tape the meetings themselves.17
The most lasting use of taping in Kennedy’s Senate period came as a
16. The earliest surviving Kennedy senatorial tapes were made in mid-January 1954. One has
Kennedy preparing a speech attacking President Eisenhower’s new foreign policy strategy for
relying too heavily on the threat of nuclear war to deter Soviet aggression. While dictating
this speech, Kennedy called Sorensen in and mused with him over some of the phrasing.
Forgetting to turn off his dictating machine, the resulting conversation was recorded.
Kennedy ultimately delivered this speech on 21 January 1954 to the Cathedral Club in
Brooklyn, New York. See Dictabelt MR 77-18:2, John F. Kennedy Library.
17. In June 1954, during the Geneva conference over the future of Indochina, Vice President
Richard Nixon dropped by to discuss with Kennedy the situation in Southeast Asia. Despite
their political differences, the two men were friendly. Nixon’s office was actually across the
hall from Kennedy’s and the Vice President often popped his head in. Kennedy did not record
this conversation, but after the meeting he dictated his recollections (see Dictabelt MR 77
18:10, John F. Kennedy Library).
xlix
result of his decision to author a book on congressional leaders who had
championed unpopular causes. Kennedy first conceived the idea for what
would become Profiles in Courage in the fall of 1954.18 Originally the goal
was to produce a long article for a national magazine, but a series of
health setbacks in 1954–55—his back was operated on twice in six
months—left Kennedy with time on his hands.19 So he began to think of
writing a book. In February 1955, Kennedy had his Dictaphone machine
brought south to Palm Beach, where he was convalescing. Over the next
three months, the tape recorder served as the young Senator’s lifeline to
the activity of his Senate office. Part of the time he used it to keep up
with his official correspondence, but the rest of the time he used it to dictate at least 100 pages of notes for his amanuensis, Theodore Sorensen,
who stayed in Washington. Kennedy’s notes consisted of quotations and
observations—his own and those of the historians whom he had read—
which Sorensen apparently wove into a narrative.20
In his first year as president, Kennedy continued this practice of using
tape recorders primarily as management tools. On the one Dictaphone
tape (or dictabelt) that survives from 1961, Kennedy is dictating some of
the earliest National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) of his administration.21 Earlier, during the campaign, Kennedy had used a tape
recorder to dictate a piece on why he had entered politics.22 Otherwise
Kennedy taped neither telephone calls nor meetings in his office until
mid-1962.
In July 1962 Kennedy let only a few people know of his decision to
18. Theodore C. Sorensen to Senator John Kennedy, 23 November 1954, Personal Papers, Box 31,
John F. Kennedy Library; Senator John Kennedy to Cass Canfield, 28 January 1955, Personal
Papers, Box 31, John F. Kennedy Library; author’s Interview with Theodore Sorensen, April 2000.
19. Kennedy hurt his back playing pickup football at Harvard and reinjured it when the PT
boat he was commanding collided with a Japanese ship in the Pacific. His back started hurting
again in 1954.
20. See Dictabelts MR77-18:25A, MR77-18:25B, MR77-18:26, and MR77-18:27A, John F.
Kennedy Library. In these recordings, Kennedy is dictating notes for his chapter on Thomas
Hart Benton. These notes were typed in Washington and then served as the basis for a chapter
on Benton, a senator from Missouri in the mid–nineteenth century. The draft for that chapter,
based in part on the notes from Senator Kennedy, was typed on Theodore Sorensen’s typewriter
in Washington. There is no draft in Kennedy’s hand of the chapter. For a typescript of Kennedy’s
dictated notes on Benton, see Personal Papers, Box 35; for the Sorensen redraft, see Personal
Papers, Box 28, Item 4, John F. Kennedy Library.
21. Dictabelt 45, Cassette L, Presidential Recordings Collection, John F. Kennedy Library.
The NSAMs were instructions to the Cabinet or the White House staff from the President.
This dictabelt contains NSAM 9–12, all issued 6 February 1961.
22. Dictabelt 39, Cassette K, continued on Dictabelt 40, Cassette L, Presidential Recordings
Collection, John F. Kennedy Library.
l
initiate a program of secret taping in the White House. Besides the
Secret Service team that installed the system and his secretary, Evelyn
Lincoln, who would on occasion shut the system off for the President,
Kennedy apparently told only his brother and, possibly, Kenneth
O’Donnell.23 He also kept to himself what criteria, if any, he would apply
to what he recorded.24
The taping system went in over the weekend of July 28–29, while
the President was at Hyannis Port.25 Returning that Monday, Kennedy
wasted no time in making full use of it. On that first day he would log
four hours of taped conversation. The system had been set up so that
Kennedy could initiate secret taping himself by inconspicuously pressing
a button under his desk or by the coffee table in the Oval Office or by his
leather chair at the long table in the Cabinet Room. Only once in the
remaining 16 months of his life did Kennedy tire of taping his White
House meetings. This lapse occurred in the heat of midterm campaigning in September 1962. Thereafter, especially when the focus of his concerns shifted from Berlin to Cuba, Kennedy recommitted himself to
retaining an audio diary of his policymaking.
With these tapes, Kennedy preserved a striking portrait of a government in motion. The Kennedy administration is best understood as a
league of factions that owed their allegiance to one man. The first faction
was the Adlai Stevenson men, some of whom had switched their loyalty to
Kennedy as late as 1960, once it became clear that their man, the two-time
unsuccessful Democratic standard-bearer of the 1950s, could not win.
These men—the most important being John Kenneth Galbraith, Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr., George Ball, and Stevenson himself—shared a belief
23. In conversations with the author, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, former
Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, former Counsel to the
President Theodore Sorensen, and Arthur Schlesinger have all denied knowing about the taping system when Kennedy was alive.
24. The opening segments of Richard Nixon’s taping in February 1971 involves a discussion
between him and his aide-de-camp H. R. Haldeman about the nature and purposes of the taping system. Kennedy left no such explanation. The Secret Service agent who installed the system, Robert Bouck, later recalled Kennedy telling him that he wanted a taping system because
of his concerns about an impending major clash with the Soviet Union (Robert Bouck Oral
History, John F. Kennedy Library). The pattern of his taping, however, suggests that though
the Berlin crisis was a likely catalyst, Kennedy wanted to preserve more than a record of his
foreign policymaking. Midsummer concerns over Berlin pushed him to begin a practice he had
probably been contemplating for a while.
25. Approximately a month later, Kennedy had a Dictaphone system attached to his and
Evelyn Lincoln’s telephones, so that he could secretly record telephone calls. He taped telephone calls until early November 1963.
li
that the United States faced a mortal enemy in Moscow. Nevertheless,
with the transition from Stalin to Khrushchev in the early 1950s opportunities had opened to improve relations.26 These men blamed the former
secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, a Cold War hawk who doubted the
possibility of a détente with the Soviet Union, for making U.S. foreign policy so rigid that Eisenhower could not exploit those opportunities. These
men were also committed to domestic reform. They advocated to varying
degrees an active role for government in achieving general economic
growth and more widespread prosperity.
A second circle around Kennedy came from among the ranks of
Republican internationalists. C. Douglas Dillon had been under secretary
of state for John Foster Dulles. In January 1961, he became secretary of
the Treasury for John Fitzgerald Kennedy. As managing partner of a
major investment banking firm, Dillon was well respected on Wall Street
and his economic views were generally conservative. He sought to keep
government intervention in the economy to a minimum. Kennedy also
gave most of his key national security posts to Republicans. He asked J.
Edgar Hoover and Allen Dulles to stay at the helms of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, respectively.27 He
recruited McGeorge Bundy, the dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
at Harvard, to be his special assistant for national security affairs and
Robert McNamara, the president of Ford Motor Company, to be his secretary of defense.
Although young people figured prominently on Kennedy’s foreign
policy team, the President always had time for those Washington veterans who had shaped the U.S. postwar policy of containing the Soviet
Union. In his first year as president, Kennedy had called on the former
Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy to formulate the administration’s arms control strategy and similarly enlisted former Secretary of
State Dean Acheson to sort out the Berlin tangle. Others Kennedy tapped
informally. Robert Lovett, a former secretary of defense in the Truman
administration who had refused a position in Kennedy’s cabinet on
26. W. Averell Harriman expressed this view in Peace with Russia? (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1959). Harriman, Franklin Roosevelt’s ambassador in Moscow in World War II,
served in the Kennedy administration first as ambassador at large, then assistant secretary of
state for Far Eastern affairs, and finally under secretary of state for political affairs. Thanks to
his friendship with Robert Kennedy, Harriman would eventually move much closer to the center of the administration.
27. He would ask another Republican, John A. McCone, to replace Allen Dulles at the CIA
after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
lii
account of health, was regularly asked for his foreign policy wisdom, and
Clark Clifford, Truman’s special assistant, served “of counsel” on all matters, personal and public. After the failure at the Bay of Pigs in April
1961, Clifford received a formal appointment to the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
Finally there were the Kennedy loyalists. These were energetic young
men who owed their principal allegiance not to any set of ideas but to the
President himself. Sometimes called the Irish mafia because of its overwhelming Irish-American makeup, the group included Kenneth P.
O’Donnell, who as the President’s appointments secretary was Kennedy’s
principal doorkeeper; David Powers, a Mr. Fix-it and court jester who had
been a loyal aide since Kennedy’s first political campaign in 1946; and
Lawrence O’Brien, an experienced Massachusetts political operative who
kept track of congressional politics for the President. Even more important an adviser was Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy’s principal speech writer
since 1954 and an unofficial domestic affairs coordinator in the White
House. Another loyalist was Richard Goodwin at the State Department,
who had worked with Robert Kennedy, when the younger Kennedy was
with the Labor Rackets Subcommittee on the Hill. But the strongest and
most powerful of the loyalists was Robert F. Kennedy himself, attorney
general and still the most influential presidential brother in U.S. history.
Looking back at the Kennedy administration, McGeorge Bundy, who
was in many ways an insider, believed there was a place where even he
could not go, a circle within the inner circle. The President and the
Attorney General kept some things to themselves, which Bundy later
described as the “unsharables.” As head of the Kennedy loyalists, Robert
sometimes acted as a parliamentary whip for his brother, moving along
these factions in the administration, making sure that when the time came,
they voted with the President. His job was also to provoke the President’s
advisers, to stir the policy pot, so as to ensure that the President got to
hear all sides of an argument, especially his own.28 Robert Kennedy was
strong willed and more impatient than his older brother.
At the center was John F. Kennedy. Kennedy disliked elaborate organizational charts and instead moved among his advisers, seeking what he
needed from each of them. Captured on tape are the essential elements of
Kennedy’s management style. Self-confident and knowledgeable, Kennedy
listened to briefings and then dominated meetings by questioning those
around him. Whereas he expected clarity of thought and speech from
28. Author’s Interview with McGeorge Bundy, 16 November 1995.
liii
these advisers, Kennedy could himself be quite elliptical and often spoke in
a rapid-fire shorthand. And whenever he forgot he was being taped, which
happened a lot, Kennedy would slip into coarser phrases expressed in a
distinctive Bostonian twang. Occasionally Kennedy left the recording
machine on so long that he captured on tape the rhythm of a entire presidential day. Surprisingly, the young President seems not to have been in
the habit of working long hours in the Oval Office. He came to the office
late, took a long lunch, and usually left before 7:30 P.M. Perhaps much of
the reason for the short day was Kennedy’s ever-present physical ailments.
He needed long naps and frequent therapeutic swims to loosen his back.
He also liked to take his work upstairs to the Executive Mansion, where he
could read in bed.
The tapes confirm that Kennedy was not the only power center in the
Washington of 1962. Although Democrats controlled the House and
Senate by wide margins, Kennedy lacked a working majority in the U.S.
Congress.29 British commentators in the nineteenth century had criticized
the U.S. Constitution for being “all sail and no anchor.” Kennedy was finding that in 1962 it was the other way around.30 Southern Democrats
formed a powerful bloc in Congress—controlling half of all committees in
the House and 9 out of 16 in the Senate—and they generally opposed the
administration’s legislative agenda. In the past year they had joined with
Republicans to defeat or delay Kennedy initiatives on Medicare, the farm
bill, and floating a bond to fund the United Nations. Besides northern and
midwestern Democrats, Kennedy could count only on the liberal wing of
the Republican Party, senators like Jacob Javits of New York and Leverett
Saltonstall of Massachusetts, to support him and then really only on foreign policy questions. The prospects for legislative action were so grim
that by July 1962, there was some talk of Congress’s just shutting down
for the remainder of the session.
Finally, not all of the voices captured on tape were those of federal officials or legislators. To govern effectively, the President needed to create
consensus outside Washington. As he considered tax reform, for example,
Kennedy reached out to business leaders and economists to gauge where
Washington could help Wall Street and Main Street. Local voices were
even more significant in shaping John F. Kennedy’s approach to civil rights.
Kennedy’s decision to tape coincided with a dramatic and violent turn in
29. House: Democrats 262, GOP 174 (1 vacancy); Senate: Democrats 64, GOP 35 (1 vacancy).
30. James Reston, “Kennedy and Capitol Hill: An Institutional Crisis,” New York Times, 25 July
1962. Reston quoted the British historian Lord Macaulay.
liv
the struggle for civil rights for African Americans. In the deep south,
African Americans were pushing to do those things that most Americans
had long taken for granted: to enroll in public universities, to eat at public
lunch counters, to pray in houses of worship without fear of violence. Their
appeals reached the Oval Office and Kennedy responded. Meanwhile, the
opponents of change were not mute. Southern state leaders cautioned the
young northern President not to push too fast to implement federal court
decisions or to try to erase certain southern ways. As the tapes document
dramatically, nearly every action by the Kennedy administration in support
of the exercise by African Americans of their civil rights was to meet with a
stubborn southern reaction. The civil rights struggle was not like those
foreign crises for which Kennedy had calmly prepared himself, but it would
mark his presidency just as profoundly.
This was John F. Kennedy’s world when he started recording his official meetings. Although he would never know it, his presidency had hit a
bottom of sorts in July 1962. The months ahead would bring his administration’s greatest achievements and some of its greatest controversies.
But all Kennedy could know as he left Cape Cod early on the morning of
July 30, 1962, was that he faced enormous challenges. He sensed the
very real possibility of a war with Russia. And there was always the
chance of something unexpected and bad happening at home.
Kennedy’s taping system was ready, and it was about to record the
transformation of his presidency.
The
P R E SIDE NTIA L
R E CO R DIN GS
J OHN F . K ENNEDY
Prologue
Weekend of July 28–29, 1962
Sometime That Weekend
I am now at the President’s desk and I’m waiting . . .
Taping System Installed1
Robert I. Bouck of the Secret Service installed the taping system over
the weekend of July 28–29, 1962, while President John F. Kennedy and
his family were in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. Although Bouck later
explained that he installed the system himself, the first sounds are probably of Bouck and someone else testing the system before the Kennedys’
return.
Unidentified: Is this a Coast Guard boat? Or do you want it up there?
Unidentified: No, this—
The machine is turned off abruptly. After a short silence, a lone voice is
heard.
Unidentified: I am now at the President’s desk and I’m waiting . . .
1. Tape 1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
3
4
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Monday, July 30, 1962
The President awoke this morning at the Kennedy home in Hyannis
Port, Massachusetts. Boarding Air Force One at a little after 9:00 A.M.,
he flew to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland, where Marine One, the
presidential helicopter, was waiting to ferry him to the White House.
President Kennedy entered the White House from the South Lawn at
10:25 A.M.
He went straight to work. Turning left in the hall that bisects the
ground floor, President Kennedy walked through a short lobby to the
Colonnade connecting, along the fabled Rose Garden, the Executive
Mansion to the President’s working office, the West Wing. On the right
of the Colonnade, he passed the swimming pool, the french doors of the
Cabinet Room, and then those belonging to the office of Evelyn Lincoln,
his secretary. Walking through Lincoln’s office, or perhaps opening his
own Rose Garden door, he entered the Oval Office.
The taping system had been installed over the weekend. The
President had had a switch placed under his desk in the Oval Office and
another under the portion of the long conference table nearest his chair
in the Cabinet Room.
Kenneth O’Donnell, the President’s appointments secretary, had not
scheduled any meetings for the first 90 minutes of this otherwise busy
day. The President had time to acquaint himself with the new taping
system before catching up on his mail and telephone calls.
Meeting on Brazil
5
11:52 A.M.–12:20 P.M.
[W]e may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to
take over at the end of the year, if they can.
Meeting on Brazil1
President Kennedy used his taping system for the first time to capture
his conversation with the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon.2
Gordon was in Washington to discuss the most recent political crisis in
Brazil.3 The largest country in South America, Brazil was considered by
U.S. officials as a major test of the Alliance for Progress, the centerpiece
of the Kennedy’s administration’s efforts to encourage economic development and political stability in Latin America.
In Brazil the Alliance for Progress took the form of a $274 million
joint U.S.-Brazilian development project, for which the United States
pledged $131 million in grants and loans to develop the droughtstricken and impoverished northeast region.4 Kennedy had taken a personal interest in Brazil, especially the activities of João “Jango” Goulart,
Brazil’s charismatic president. Goulart was a puzzle to Washington.
Since coming to power in August 1961, Goulart had adopted a selfdescribed “independent foreign policy” that involved maintaining good
relations with Fidel Castro. At the January OAS foreign ministers’ meeting at Punta del Este, the Brazilian foreign minister Francisco San Taigo
1. With President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Richard Goodwin, and Lincoln Gordon. Tape 1,
John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
2. Lincoln Gordon was ambassador to Brazil, August 1961 to January 1966. An economist at
Harvard and Oxford before and after World War II, Gordon helped develop the Marshall
Plan, advised NATO in the 1950s, and soon after the 1960 election was appointed a member of
a Latin American Task Force organized by president-elect Kennedy. After playing a prominent role in the organization of the administration’s Alliance for Progress, announced to the
world in a White House speech by President Kennedy to the Latin American diplomatic corps
on 13 March 1961, Gordon was appointed ambassador to Brazil. From January 1966 to
January 1967, Gordon served as assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, resigning that post to become president of John Hopkins University.
3. Gordon was in Washington from 26 July through 1 August. William H. Brubeck,
Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 25 July 1962, “Brazil” folder, National Security Files,
Box 13, John F. Kennedy Library.
4. “Northeast Agreement,” Cable to Brazilian Government, 9 April 1962, “Brazil” folder,
National Security Files, Box 12A, John F. Kennedy Library.
6
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Dantas had led the opposition to sanctions against Cuba. Besides the
confrontation over foreign policy, relations with Goulart were strained
because of a series of high-profile expropriations of U.S.-owned Brazilian
subsidiaries. Yet when Goulart visited the United States in April 1962 he
had made a good impression on President Kennedy. The Brazilian president had two private sessions with Kennedy, gave a speech to a joint session of Congress, and visited New York, Chicago, and the North
American Air Defense Command in Colorado. A high point of the tour
was Goulart’s offer to buy out foreign-owned public utility companies on
negotiated terms, a reference to the dispute with U.S. giant IT&T, whose
telephone company had been taken over by the state of Rio Grande do
Sul. Both leaders appeared pleased with the visit and President Kennedy
promised to go to Brazil in July or August.
Kennedy never made that visit. By the summer of 1962, Brazil was
in the grip of a constitutional crisis born of the strange circumstances
surrounding Goulart’s rise to the presidency. In 1960, Goulart, a
Labor Party leader, had been elected to the vice presidency. Under the
Brazilian constitution of 1946, separate elections were held for presidents and vice presidents. The elected president, Jânio Quadros, stunned
the nation a year later by resigning in what appears in retrospect to
have been a monumentally unsuccessful play for more power. Assuming that the military would never support Goulart, who would succeed to the presidency if Quadros’s resignation were accepted, the
president expected the Brazilian Congress to agree to a broad delegation of powers as a way of persuading him to revoke his resignation.
Instead the resignation was accepted at face value with Goulart the
beneficiary.
As Quadros had predicted, the leadership of the Brazilian military was
not happy, and a civil war was averted only by a congressional compromise
that limited presidential powers even further. The Brazilian constitution
was amended to transform the government into more of a parliamentary
regime, modeled after the West German constitution. A disciple of the legendary Brazilian leader Getúlio Vargas, Goulart dreamed of revoking this
parliamentary democracy to return to the strong presidential state of the
1930s and 1940s. Vowing to recapture those powers, Goulart once quipped
to Gordon, “I do not intend to be the Queen of England.”5 By the terms of
the new constitution, a plebiscite on restoring presidential powers was to
5. Timothy Naftali Interview with Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, 3 August 2000.
Meeting on Brazil
7
be held in 1965 just before the next presidential election. Goulart did not
wish to wait that long.
The U.S. government watched warily in June 1962 as Goulart
launched what the U.S. diplomats thought was an attack on the Brazilian
parliamentary system in June 1962. Congressional elections were scheduled for October, and the constitution provided that anyone in public
executive office who wanted to run for congress had to resign his office
four months before election day. Goulart used the fact that the Brazilian
cabinet had to resign to maneuver the congress into advancing the date
of the referendum on presidential powers. He also forced out a centerright prime minister in favor of a little-known left-leaning candidate,
Francisco Brochado da Rocha. Brochado da Rocha was no stranger to
the U.S. Embassy. As secretary of justice in the state of Rio Grande do
Sul, he had played a very active role in the IT&T telephone expropriation, which despite Goulart’s promises in April had not come any closer
to resolution.
Goulart’s political gambit worried Washington and President
Kennedy’s visit was postponed.6 Brazilians friendly to the United States
warned that the political crisis of July was a “Garincha” play, named after a
celebrated Brazilian soccer player “whose style is to take great risks in the
hopes of great gains.”7 This manufactured crisis would allow Goulart to
make a successful bid for dictatorial powers. Brochado was a close associate of Leonel de Moura Brizola, the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, who
was considered to be a man of the far Left. Brizola was also Goulart’s
brother-in-law. Brizola and the federal foreign minister Dantas were considered by some Americans as dangerous influences on the Brazilian president. The rise of Brochado was just the latest in a series of developments
that portended an anti-U.S. turn by Goulart. That summer the Congress
had passed a remission of profits bill which taxed foreign subsidiaries
heavily and seemed to discourage any further direct investment by the
6. “Background on Current Situation in Brazil,” attached to State Department memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, 28 July 1962, John F. Kennedy Library. Written on the top of the
document is the note, “Send to O’Donnell Mon. A.M.” For the CIA’s views see two reports
that predated the Goulart visit to Washington: “Brazilian President João Goulart,” Office of
Current Intelligence, CIA, 30 March 1962, and “The Situation in Brazil,” Office of Current
Intelligence, CIA, 2 April 1962, “Brazil” folder, National Security Files, Box 13, John F.
Kennedy Library.
7. Philip Raine, counselor of embassy for political affairs, U.S. Embassy, Brasília to State,
“Goulart Plan to Change Parliamentary System in Brazil,” 20 July 1962, “Brazil” folder,
National Security Files, Box 13, John F. Kennedy Library.
8
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
United States. In July Gordon spoke by telephone with President Kennedy
to outline his concerns and the White House asked for more detailed
information about the political situation in Brazil.8
Even before Gordon’s return to the United States, the Kennedy administration decided to act. The CIA station in Brazil, with the support of
Ambassador Gordon, drew up a plan to influence the congressional elections, scheduled for October 7.9 It was feared that the Left, which controlled between 80 and 100 seats in the 326-seat legislature, would make
significant gains. The policymaking body for covert action in the Kennedy
years, the Special Group (Augmented) of the National Security Council,10
apparently approved the plan by late July, though the details, including the
amount of covert funding to be funneled into the election, had still to be
worked out.11 This would occur while Gordon was in Washington.
Among the factors in this political crisis, the Brazilian military was
known to be friendly to the United States. Any effort by the Brazilian
army, the strongest and most politically significant of the services, to
oust Goulart would require a response from Washington. The Kennedy
administration had an inconsistent policy toward military coups in Latin
America. In April the United States had recognized the government of
José María Guido of Argentina, a civilian who had been installed by the
Argentine military. Yet three months later, Kennedy had made a public
stand against the new military junta in Peru, breaking diplomatic relations with Lima when its constitutionally elected president was overthrown. The inconsistency of the Kennedy administration’s approach
reflected a deep ambivalence about the nature of the threat to U.S. interests in the hemisphere. Washington’s dilemma was how to navigate
between a desire to neutralize Castroist or Communist influence in Latin
America while remaining true to its preference for constitutional liberalism in the Americas. Already dissident members of the Brazilian military
were sending feelers out to the United States to determine whether a
Brazilian coup would be accepted like the coup in Argentina or
denounced like the junta in Peru.12
8. Naftali Interview with Gordon, 3 August 2000.
9. Ibid.
10. The Special Group (Augmented) comprised the under secretary of state, U. Alexis Johnson;
the attorney general, Robert Kennedy; the deputy secretary of defense, Roswell Gilpatric; the
director of central intelligence, John McCone; and the special assistant to the President for
national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy.
11. As it appears from the transcript of this July 30 conversation.
12. Sometime in the late spring, Gordon had a meeting with Admiral Sylvio Heck, a former
Meeting on Brazil
9
Kennedy started taping as Ambassador Gordon described his meeting on July 23 with President Goulart.
Lincoln Gordon: . . . [unclear] we’re still on very good terms personally, which is a good thing and I think he’s very candid. We had a long
talk on Monday about his political organization.13 I said I would have to
explain to various people, including you, how it is that his new foreign
minister14 says that the Alliance for Progress is a wonderful thing, but his
political party’s strategy is being planned now by his brother-in-law,
[Leonel] Brizola,15 a young, very far left-wing Labor Party fellow; and
[Francisco] San Tiago Dantas, who’s moved far to the left since you saw
him, with anti-Americanism and anti–Alliance for Progress as a major
plank in their platform—
President Kennedy: Did they announce it as anti? Or is this just by
indirection?
Gordon: [Unclear] Brizola’s speeches essentially are very bad. One
after another on television . . . lots of money. It started as being just
anti–American business. Now it’s become anti–American government on
the theory that you are in the pocket of American business. I haven’t yet
been attacked personally, but I expect that one of these days. But it’s sure.
[They said things like:] The United States is draining the country;
American business is draining the country. We are responsible for all the
delays in Brazilian development. They’re an economic colony of the United
States. We are responsible for infant mortality, every damn thing under the
sun.” Such . . . completely irrational and highly emotional [unclear].
Now Goulart’s answer to this was that that left-wing group in the
Labor Party is 30 percent of the party:16 “I really sympathize with the 70
minister of the navy who had opposed the Goulart succession in 1961. Heck had requested the
meeting to ask whether the United States would support the military overthrow of Goulart.
Gordon recalled that he was not authorized to give a response. Washington only expected an
assessment of the seriousness of Heck and his group. The embassy’s political experts doubted
Heck could organize a successful coup (Naftali Interview with Gordon, 3 August 2000).
13. Monday, 23 July 1962. Highlights of that talk were cabled to the State Department, which
passed the report along to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. See Gordon to SecState, 24
July 1962, in “Brazil” folder, National Security Files, Box 13, John F. Kennedy Library. There
is a check by “Bundy-P” indicating perhaps this was shown to the President.
14. The new foreign minister Afonso Arinos, whom Gordon met on 21 July, promised that he
would abandon the term independent foreign policy (Gordon to SecState, 24 July 1962, “Brazil”
folder, National Security Files, Box 13, John F. Kennedy Library).
15. Leonel Brizola, Goulart’s brother-in-law and governor of Rio Grande do Sul.
16. The left-wing group was known as the Compact Group in the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB).
10
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
percent, which is very much more moderate, that is my personal position; but I stand at the moment between these two because the conservatives in the country are all against me and I need this left wing as my
shock forces against the parliament[ary] majority.”17
That is Goulart’s position up to election time. I don’t know what the
hell he’d do if he got more power. He wants more power desperately . In
this hour and a half, he was like a Victrola record: he came back twenty
times to say that the [parliamentary] regime is no good. It’s fallen
[unclear]. I don’t have any equal power to get at the [unclear].
President Kennedy: I suppose that’s true, isn’t it? He doesn’t have
anything to do with [a] party.
Gordon: He has a helluva lot of influence.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Gordon: If he wanted to work with a cabinet, it would work. But he
doesn’t want to work that way, I don’t think. This is clear, this is distinctive. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Do you think he knows what he wants himself ?
Or is it just, sort of, he floats with the waves? Or has he really got an
objective, a long-range objective?
Gordon: I don’t think he has any long-range objectives. No, I think,
he wants more power.
President Kennedy: Is Salasman—is he the finance minister?18
Gordon: He accepted. He accepted—
President Kennedy: Well, [will] he come up here to see us at all?
Gordon: I don’t know.
President Kennedy: Have we got any new financial deals that we’re
supposed to . . .
Gordon: We have been discussing this in the last couple of days. I
saw Salles on Sunday, while he was still trying to make up his mind—19
President Kennedy: Did you tell him all these things that you have
said to me?
17. Gordon is repeating here the gist of his memorandum on his meeting with Goulart that he
cabled on 24 July 1962. “On own political orientation Goulart placed himself in middle
between left-wing compact group and moderate right-wing, whose present strength he
appraised as 30 to 70 [percent]. Said large moderate parties irreconcilable [sic] opposed to
him, supported by conservative press and business interests, and he intended to fight them.
PTB compact group were his shock forces in this fight. Sees need for non-Communist but radical new political force for drastic social changes. . . .”
18. Kennedy means Walter Moreira Salles, the former Brazilian ambassador to the United
States who was known to be pro–United States.
19. Sunday, 22 July 1962.
Meeting on Brazil
11
Gordon: Oh, indeed, oh yes. There is no problem about where he
stands. He stands—
President Kennedy: Yes, but I mean the fact that we can’t—you
know, they send up these fellows to see us who are very reasonable and
of course we go ahead with them and then it just goes down the—
Gordon: Well, he asked—
President Kennedy: —drain.
Gordon: Well, he said he was making a condition of his acceptance, a
very vigorous anti-inflationary program. And he said that, “if I really do
that and get the condition accepted, do you think that there would be
any chance of American support?” And I said, “In light of what happened in the last two months, I think he [President Kennedy] would
appreciate it; but this time there really must be some performance.” And
he said, “A promise is just—isn’t going to convince anybody.”
My own feeling is that what we should do is probably go easy on stabilization assistance and probably do nothing to stall it off. But to push
on certain types of projects, which could be advertised, which could be
made into concrete manifestations of the Alliance for Progress.
The only trouble with stabilization assistance, you know, [is] we get
no credit for it—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Gordon: —except with a handful of bankers and economists—
President Kennedy: That’s right. I agree I think we ought to forget
that.
Gordon: —and—
President Kennedy: Have we got any stabilization assistance still
to go?
Gordon: We’ve got left over about 90 million dollars from the package negotiated here.
President Kennedy: And how much have we given them in the last
12 months?
Gordon: Well, we’ve released—the whole thing was 328. So, we’ve
released—what’s the difference of that?
President Kennedy: Two hundred million. Just vanished isn’t it?
Gordon: That’s right. Absolutely. And at the moment either balance
of payments support or budgetary support is like just pouring water into
a sieve. I mean they’ve got more or less—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] have we just frozen it? I mean are we
not going to give it now? Should we take any steps to prevent any more
from running—
Gordon: Oh yes, oh sure. Just before the president came in April, we
12
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
released 30 million roughly and we said that the rest, the remaining 90,
would depend on performance or the performances of factories, and so
on.20 It’s been highly negative.
One of the projects, [in] the northeast, for example, I think we should
push ahead. There are certain governors: Governor Rio Grande del
Norte . . . I don’t think he saw you, Aluisío Alves, but he saw everybody
else in town. He was up here about three weeks ago. This is a hell of a
good fellow. . . .
President Kennedy: This is Vicento—this not Rio, is it?
Gordon: Rio Grande del Norte.
President Kennedy: This is Rio.
Gordon: It is a little state in the northeast.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. No, I didn’t see him.
Gordon: This is a little state in the northeast. This is a 40-year-old
fellow, energetic as can be, not a demagogue, honest. He’s—
President Kennedy: How strong are the Communists there?
Gordon: As such, the party is weak.
President Kennedy: But it is just they’ve got them out—
Gordon: [Unclear] we like.
President Kennedy: But now they’ve just taken over a lot of the Left?
Gordon: They have taken over a lot of the Left. And they are in some
key spots and they have been organizing . . .
President Kennedy: Goulart gives them shelter?
Gordon: He gives them shelter both in the government and in the
trade unions.
Richard Goodwin: And they haven’t—
Gordon: [Unclear] on the trade unions guise at the moment, but perhaps even more.
Goodwin: And they’re allied with the nationalists in a lot of key
areas, who are not Communists themselves but who have mutual objectives at this point in time.
President Kennedy: I just read some of the stuff in the Washington
Post this morning with these visiting students up there—
Goodwin: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —about . . . the reason was . . . in other words . . .
Gordon: Well, there’s [mumbles].
President Kennedy: What?
Gordon: There is a visiting student group here.
20. President João Goulart visited the United States 3 to 7 April 1962.
Meeting on Brazil
13
Goodwin: That’s the one.
Gordon: Is that the one? [Mumbled agreement.] I didn’t see the Post
story. They’re making a tour of the White House tomorrow morning
between 9:15 and 9:50. And I would hope very much that you would be
willing to give them five minutes just to shake [hands]—
President Kennedy: Who are they?
Gordon: They are seventy students from four different states.21 They
were recruited by an extremely energetic American lady, Mildred Sage,
a Bostonian, a girl who’d been married to an American businessman
or some fellow. She raised 90 percent of the money from mostly the
American business community down there, the other 10 percent came
from the State Department. They have been up at Harvard for two
weeks. They run all the way from strongly democratic, pro-American to
almost Communist, highly nationalist but anti-American. Sage got them
all together.
I was with them at lunchtime on Saturday talking about [unclear] for
an hour or so, asked them how things went at Harvard. They said, “Very
well. We learned a lot, and we were not being propagandized.”
I think it’s good. I think we made some headway with them. They’re
going to meet with Ted [Moscoso] this afternoon for an hour and a half
and with regional aid people. They are meeting with HEW this morning
and meeting with the State Department tomorrow afternoon. And then
decided we’d [unclear] at two [P.M.]. But I think if you could step out
into the Rose Garden . . .
President Kennedy: OK. If you can arrange that.
Tell me, what is their complaint about American business. Is there
any legitimate complaints?
Gordon: No. Not significant. The myth has developed that the remissions of profits are draining the Brazilian economy. This is almost pure
myth.22 There is Brazilian documentation as well as our own.
President Kennedy: How much do we take out a year?
Gordon: We take out officially something like 40 million dollars and
21. This group of 76 Brazilian university student leaders was sponsored by the InterAmerican University Association of São Paulo.
22. The Joint Committee of the Brazilian Congress on the profits remittance bill reported that
between 1954 and 1961 the net inflow of private direct investment was $721 million as compared with an outflow of profits and dividends of $269 million (Memorandum for the National
Security Council Executive Committee, Meeting of 11 December 1962, 10:00 A.M., “Proposed
Speaking Paper,” Robert F. Kennedy Confidential File, Box 7, Cuban Crisis 1962, Executive
Committee, NSC-62, John F. Kennedy Library).
14
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
there may be disguised profits, with a maximum of another 20. The total
of 60 is not just American, but all foreign investors. We have perhaps 60
percent of it.
President Kennedy: So, in other words, we are taking out about 30
million dollars a year?
Gordon: [Unclear.] No, it’s actually—
President Kennedy: And actually we have been putting in?
Gordon: It’s actually peanuts, you see.
President Kennedy: And we have been putting in?
Goodwin: Even private investment is putting in that much.
Gordon: Now, they have—somebody handed me this morning, these
figures.
President Kennedy: Well, what happens when those figures are
pointed out? Nobody points them out?
Gordon: Yes, people point them out—
President Kennedy: You mean, private investors are putting in
almost that much; in addition we are putting it in aid and all these other
things, and in addition we are buying their coffee.
Gordon: Many of these people either don’t believe the figures or they
haven’t been pointed out sufficiently or effectively. This is something we’re
going to try to take care of in briefings during this week, with—to tackle
this one head on [unclear].
President Kennedy: With who—briefing with who?
Gordon: Well, this would be with AID and State.
President Kennedy: But I mean, can’t we get everybody—?
Gordon: With these students, I mean, these students—
President Kennedy: Oh, yeah, but hell they’re just—
Gordon: I know.
President Kennedy: —they’re just a fraction. But I mean is there
anybody down there that can bother to point out these figures?
Gordon: Well—
President Kennedy: [What] the United States has given in aid in the
last two years; the profits that have been taken out are so much; the
amount of purchases from the United States . . .
Gordon: This was done extremely effectively by the reporter for the
Joint Senate and House Brazilian Committee on this remissions of profits bill and they [unclear]. But these fellows will say, “Oh well, you know,
he’s a tool of the trusts. He’s a reactionary. He’s . . .” There is a senator
from Rio Grande do Sul . . . Brizola and . . .
President Kennedy: What’s Brizola’s job now?
Meeting on Brazil
15
Gordon: He is still governor.23 He will be governor until January. He
is running for the Congress from Guanabara.24
President Kennedy: Now, we’ve, of course, indicated that if they want
to buy up [the American utility companies] . . . What percentage of
American investment [located] there is [in] the [unclear interjection by
Gordon] utilities?
Gordon: Not that [unclear].
President Kennedy: They haven’t done anything about buying those
up, have they?
Gordon: No, I talked with them about this last week when the new
government got started on meetings [unclear] with the American Foreign
Power group, [unclear] the biggest, who have a new proposition [unclear]
discussing.
Goulart feels a strong personal commitment to you about this. And
he says he is going to push it. And I think there is a chance that he can
get this thing. All they did was to establish this commission, which is
supposed to negotiate an effective treaty but they never really got it
going. There’s been little action on it, at least from [unclear] since the
April talks. This is—
President Kennedy: Is there big discouragement in Brazil [among]
all the moderates?
Gordon: Ah, they’re not discouraged to the point of giving up.
They’re very unhappy. The way this political crisis was handled was
extremely bad.
No, a fellow like Aluisío Alves wants to organize a strong center, a
strong slightly left-of-center. And, I think, we ought to support this
absolutely to the hilt.
Six seconds excised as classified information.
Gordon: We reviewed this at length just before I left. I think he’s
become more rather than less important. There was a little period when
we were getting a bit complacent. We have passed through that. We can’t
afford to be complacent. I think we have to do more and I think we probably have to do more with a little bit less concern about possible wastage
and control. The boys have a little bit of a GAO [General Accounting
Office] philosophy. You know they want to be awful careful about making
23. Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, which is the southernmost state of Brazil, on the BrazilianUruguayan border.
24. Guanabara was a state in the southeast. In 1974 it was fused with the state of Rio de Janeiro.
16
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
sure that their money is rightly spent. Well, that’s a good prejudice to
have, but we’ve only got two months left.25 We have this organization
called IPES, for example, which is a progressive [unclear] organization
which needs some financial help; it’s got [unclear] support and I think we
should help them.26 We won’t be able to get a detailed account of withdrawals and how every withdrawal in particular will be spent. I just don’t
think we can afford to take risks.
Unidentified: I agree with the substance . . .
Gordon: We’ve got—
Goodwin: I think the elections really could be a turning point. Linc
is analogizing to the Italian elections of ’48.27
President Kennedy: I know. Well, how much are we going to put in?28
Gordon: Oh, this is a matter of a few million dollars, say.
Seven seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: That’s a lot of money. Because, you know, after
all, for a presidential campaign here you spend about 12. And our
costs—so that I don’t think—that’s 8 million dollars, would be an awful
lot of money in an election.29
Gordon: That’s right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Gordon: It’s an incredibly complicated political scene—
President Kennedy: Well, now, is it really being spent now? Are you
going ahead with it?30
25. Until the October election.
26. The IPES was the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais. Established in late 1961 by a
group of business and civic leaders to lobby on behalf of liberal democracy and private enterprise
in Brazil. It became the principal channel through which U.S. money flowed into the Brazilian
elections of 1962. Naftali Interview with Gordon, 3 August 2000; and Ruth Leacock, Requiem for
Revolution: The United States and Brazil (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990), pp. 111–13.
27. Fear of a Communist victory in the 1948 Italian elections led to the first massive political
covert action by the U.S. government. The brainchild of George Kennan at the State Department
and Frank Wisner of the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency, this operation involved providing
financial and strategic assistance to pro-Western personalities, primarily A. de Gasperi and other
representatives of the Christian Democratic Party [see Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who
Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 28–29]. Deemed a success, it apparently became the model for similar political action in other countries.
28. What is interesting here is that President Kennedy’s question implies that this covert
action has already been approved without his direct involvement.
29. In a published interview in March 1977, Lincoln Gordon estimated that the U.S. government spent $5 million to influence the Brazilian elections of 1962 (see Leacock, Requiem for
Revolution, p. 120 and p. 277, note 54).
30. Again, it seems that though the Special Group has apparently approved an operation without his knowledge, the President is not perturbed.
Meeting on Brazil
17
Thirty-nine seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: Well, now there’s nothing I can do about, with
Goulart is there? There’s nothing—
Gordon: Well, I think there is. This is the point of strategy in general, I think, is this. One thing I wanted to alert you to is the, is the possibility of military action. This is, this is quite possibly in the cards.
President Kennedy: Well, now let me ask—we have of course been
very critical of Peru’s military action—31
Gordon: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: —which is entirely different. We might not be
quite as—The military did a pretty good job a year ago.32 It all depends
on the circumstances of the military action.
Gordon: I think, I think—
President Kennedy: In other words, we were against military action
in the Dominican Republic. We have been reserved about the military
after they arrested Prado, and so on.33 But we are going to go back and
recognize them next week, or this week; but the question really is, how
we . . . what our attitude towards it would be.34
Gordon: Well, I think that what we should do . . . This is a very delicate business and we have to protect ourselves very carefully about this.
I don’t think we want to try to encourage a coup.
What we really want to do with Goulart, I think, is two things: we
want to make use of the fact that he does have a tremendous regard for
you. And he is really very proud that this relationship with the U.S.
[unclear] has been established. And there are certain things . . . I think
we’ll get this IT&T case settled and soon and finally [unclear interjection by
President Kennedy]. We got your letter to Goulart. I talked with him again
Monday. I think you’ll get that fixed. I hope we can avoid other expropriations this time. I think we can make some headway on the utility thing. It’s
mostly negative, but I think we’ve got to use as much as we can.
The main thing is at the same time, to organize forces which are both
political and military to, either to reduce his power . . . in an extreme case
perhaps to push him out, if it comes to that. And this would depend on
some overt action on his part. He’s playing, he’s quite prepared to [unclear].
31. The United States has not yet recognized the military junta in Lima, Peru, which took
power 18 July 1962.
32. Kennedy is referring to the Brazilian military’s role in easing the transition to Goulart
after Jânio Quadros’s surprise resignation in August 1961.
33. Manuel Prado y Ugarteche was the president of Peru until the 18 July coup.
34. Toward a military coup in Brazil.
18
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Goodwin: Has he changed a lot of commanders, military commanders in the garrisons?
Gordon: He’s changed a number and he’s threatening to change others. How far he goes on those changes depends a little bit on the resistance of the military.
I think one of our important jobs is to strengthen the spine of the
military. To make it clear, discreetly, that we are not necessarily hostile
to any kind of military action whatsoever if it’s clear that the reason for
the military action is—
President Kennedy: Against the Left.
Gordon: —he’s giving the damn country away to the—
President Kennedy: Communists.
Gordon: Exactly. And there is a lot of evidence that Goulart, willingly or unwillingly, has been [unclear] that.
A few weeks ago just after Dantas was defeated in Congress,35 he
[Goulart] had a specific plan, which he told Kubitschek.36 Kubitschek told
me this firsthand. A plan to nominate a cabinet of his own without a prime
minister. He told the Congress that he wouldn’t expect this Congress to
ratify [it], but he hoped the next Congress would, which is going to be
elected in October. And to call for a plebiscite now for a return to a presidential regime in October.
Kubitschek took this to thirty high military officers and they told him
unanimously that this was obviously unconstitutional and if Goulart tries
it, they would oppose him. He asked whether he could tell Goulart that.
They all said yes, and some said, “Well, it would be better to sign our names
to a statement.” And he went back to Goulart and Goulart withdrew.
You see the kind of thing that’s in his mind. This is . . . he’s thinking
actively about a kind of white coup, as they call it. And if the military are
too frightened . . . if they feel that there is no support anywhere, inside
or outside, especially outside—which means us—if they take action,
then they . . . They were, I am told . . . I was unfortunately sick in bed
the week before last, just gradually getting on my feet—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Gordon: —this last week before I came up on Wednesday. I did man-
35. In June, the Brazilian Congress had refused to accept Francisco San Tiago Dantas as prime
minister.
36. Former president Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, arguably Brazil’s most popular politician,
could not succeed himself in 1960 but remained a strong future contender for the presidency.
Meeting on Brazil
19
age to see Goulart, and the new foreign minister and the prime minister
Tuesday night, and Walter Moreira Salles on Sunday.
Eleven seconds excised as classified information.
Gordon: The military, I can see that they are very friendly to us: very
anti-Communist, very suspicious of Goulart. And they expressed great
dismay at our position on Peru.
Well, I can explain to them what the political circumstances are. I
think it’s important that we should make it clear, to these friendly people, the ones we really know are friendly—
President Kennedy: But by the—
Gordon: That the Peruvian case is not necessarily—
President Kennedy: Yeah. But by this week we’ll be right back recognizing the Peruvian government.
Goodwin: Well, I think it—as long as they understand that a military action to save constitutionality—
President Kennedy: [Grunts.]
Goodwin: —is fine. Then I think that that’s why we can’t have the
OAS meeting because this would really discourage the military.37 If you
start getting all these countries together and—
Goodwin: —passing resolutions against—
President Kennedy: That’s what I want to say today at this [unclear].
Goodwin: Because we may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to take over at the end of the year, if they can.
Gordon: We have that military front. And as I see it their function is
first to keep Goulart on the rails—
President Kennedy: What kind of liaison do we have with the military?
Gordon: Well, it’s pretty good.
The military’s not united. This is one of the things that make it complicated. There are a few officers who are strong left-wingers themselves, including a couple in quite high positions: commander of the first
army, which is in the city Rio de Janeiro . . . a very dangerous fellow.
Goulart toyed with the notion of making him minister of war and then
withdrew because there was a hell of a lot of [unclear].
President Kennedy: Do you think if Goulart had power—
You know you get into these fights with Congress and just about use
anything to get your way.
37. The abbreviation OAS stands for Organization of American States.
20
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Do you think if he had the power, would he relent? Or is this just a
tactic?
Gordon: I’m afraid that—I doubt whether he’s, I don’t believe the
man is a Communist. I think what he would probably do is something
like . . . more like [former Argentine dictator Juan] Perón. A kind of, a
kind of—
President Kennedy: Personal dictator.
Gordon: —a kind of populist personal dictator.
Goodwin: Well, I don’t . . . I think that you gotta remember that he may
not have a purpose but Dantas has a purpose. And Brizola has a purpose
and that purpose is not Peronist, it may be Nasserist or Titoist, eventually.
And I think that their presence, that they [have], and the intellectual domination that they might have would move him. Because there’s no . . . if
you’re going to play a part on the world scene, you know, today you can’t be
a Perón. You have to go further and that’s what they want.
Goodwin: No doubt about—
Gordon: They want it. Goulart doesn’t give a damn about foreign
policy, actually, he’s—
Goodwin: Well—
Gordon: —he’s interested in [unclear]—
President Kennedy: Vanity.
Goodwin: —well, you know, he is a man of great vanity and of desire
for power.
Goodwin: No, I think the chances are 80 percent that he would push
pretty far to the left with these two fellows.
Gordon: Well, I don’t believe that [unclear]—
Goodwin: He would not be a local dictator, not be satisfied with
[unclear].
Gordon: There’s a good chance that they would push him out—
President Kennedy: Dantas?
Gordon: No, that they would try to push Goulart out in certain circumstances.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but Dantas is . . . Now, what is it we ought
to do? I think that we’ve got this problem of how much we do against
Goulart and how much we try to do with him.
Gordon: I think we have to try—
President Kennedy: How about what we ought to do about getting
the word to the military that—
Meeting on Brazil
21
Goodwin: I think, strengthen our relations with the military; we’re
making our position fairly clear to them. Maybe McNamara ought to
review the people he has there and see if he can [unclear].38
Gordon: Well, we need, we need a new Army attaché badly.
Goodwin: You see, is there anything else—
Gordon: The Army is much . . . that’s the . . . most important [of the
three Brazilian services]. This is the key fellow in the relationship.
President Kennedy: Our fellow, is he good?
Gordon: Our present fellow is . . . he’s nice but fairly stupid.39 I talked
with General [unclear] about it.
President Kennedy: But, of course, we don’t have many fellows who
can speak Portuguese, do we?
Gordon: Well, there are a few around, not many, not many. But I
think that McNamara—
President Kennedy: All right. Now let’s have a—When are you
going back there?
Ten seconds excised as classified material.
Gordon: Yes.
President Kennedy: When do we get a look at it now before we—so
we know where we are going?
Goodwin: Well, you have the last—
President Kennedy: Like this Army—Who are you talking to about
changing the Army attaché?
Gordon: I talked to General [unclear].40
President Kennedy: Well now, is there any use in changing a fellow,
when within three months you may be able—to have to—can he establish his links within three months?
Gordon: Uh, yes.
President Kennedy: Is there anybody that’s ever been there before,
that’s had good relations we could send back?
Goodwin: What about this Eisenhower [unclear]?
Gordon: Dick Walters?41
38. Robert S. McNamara was U.S. secretary of defense.
39. Colonel Stanley N. Lonning was U.S. Army attaché in Brazil.
40. In an interview with Timothy Naftali on 3 August 2000, Ambassador Gordon recalled that
before returning to Washington in July 1962, he had spoken with General Andrew P. O’Meara,
the commander in chief, Caribbean, about changing the U.S. Army attaché in Brazil.
41. Colonel Vernon Walters. A linguist, fluent in seven languages, Walters had served in Italy
during World War II as the U.S. Army’s combat liaison officer to the Brazilian Expeditionary
Force. He went to Brazil for three years after the war as assistant military attaché in Rio de
22
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Goodwin: Dick Walters.
Gordon: He is in Rome.
President Kennedy: Does he know anything about Portugal?
Goodwin: He knows Portuguese fluently.
Gordon: Oh, he speaks Portuguese fluently. He’s a hell of a good fellow; he’s got a good political sense, too.
Goodwin: He was Eisenhower’s interpreter down there, wasn’t he?
Gordon: Oh yeah, oh yeah. He would be marvelous. He was—
President Kennedy: Now, what are you going to do about that? I
mean, who are we going to get? We gotta get somebody down there who
can establish liaison quickly . . . you got to speak Portuguese.
Goodwin: Why don’t we talk to Ros Gilpatric or somebody.42
President Kennedy: OK, well that ought to be done today.
Fifteen seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: You say there’s no need my writing Goulart
again, to ask him to do anything?
Gordon: No. No.
Goodwin: You know, your brother sat in on the initial meeting that
set up this political program. It was basically from his push that it got
going anyways.
Gordon: Now.
President Kennedy: Is he going to be at the meeting tomorrow?43
Goodwin: Might be a good idea.
President Kennedy: Would you, would you tell him? Yeah.
Gordon: There’s one—there are two other little problems I have
here on my plate.
Kubitschek has written you a letter, which I have here.44
President Kennedy: Well, is he supporting Goulart?
Gordon: No, no.
President Kennedy: Is he disturbed?
Janiero. A stint with the Marshall Plan in Paris followed, where Walters met Lincoln Gordon
for the first time. Joining General Dwight Eisenhower’s staff at NATO headquarters in 1951,
Walters later served as interpreter to President Eisenhower and Vice President Richard
Nixon. In July 1962, Walters was Army attaché in Italy.
42. Roswell L. Gilpatric was deputy secretary of defense.
43. Special Group (Counterinsurgency) meeting.
44. Gordon brought the original with him. Meanwhile the U.S. Embassy cabled to the State
Department an informal translation of Kubitschek’s letter to President Kennedy. “Informal
Translation of Letter from Ex-President Kubitschek to President Kennedy,” 25 July 1962,
“Brazil” folder, National Security Files, Box 13, John F. Kennedy Library.
Meeting on Brazil
23
Gordon: He is supporting—he is disturbed as hell. He is supporting
Goulart only on the idea of returning to the presidential [unclear]. He
wants it in ’65.45 He would like to do something about loosening the
Alliance for Progress politically all over Latin America. I think we
should encourage him.
This letter says very little. [A piece of paper is flipped.] That’s the
translation. What we have worked out with Ed Martin is,46 he’s going to
see Lleras Camargo in Bogotá,47 and then we’ll come and see Kubitschek
in Rio . . . an idea for trying to pick up this initiative. It was written by
Schmidt, of course, who always writes these letters.48
Goodwin: Yeah.
Gordon: It practically says nothing, except that this can’t just be a
technical program, it needs to have some political emphasis and he’s
right. But he doesn’t say how to do it.
I think we must take advantage of the Kubitschek—
Goodwin: You know . . . with the Monnet Action Committee idea.49
Gordon: Yeah.
Goodwin: I think he might accept that.
Gordon: Right. I tried this out on Schmidt last week and he was
down on it. Schmidt has a great prejudice against Ted Moscoso because
he thinks—he’s prejudiced against all Puerto Ricans, by definition.50
Quite unjustified, actually, but . . .
President Kennedy: What does he want us to do, I wonder?
Gordon: Well, what he would really like is for us to set up under the
OAS some sort of general political coordinator for the Alliance for
Progress and put Kubitschek in that job.
That can’t be done this year, I think. I think it might be good idea,
but I don’t know whether Kubitschek would be the man or not. But I
think we have to work up to this by stages and some sort of action committee maybe with some blessing—
President Kennedy: What way are we going to change it again? Tell
me. What is it they want us to do?
45. The 1946 Constitution forbade immediate reelection but permitted a second, nonconsecutive term.
46. Edwin M. Martin was assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs since May 1962.
47. Alberto Lleras Camargo, president of Colombia 1945– 46 and 1958–62, had recently left
office.
48. A. F. Schmidt was aide to former Brazilian president Kubitschek.
49. Jean Monnet. Kubitschek’s idea was inspired by the Marshall Plan for Europe.
50. Teodoro Moscoso was U.S. coordinator of the Alliance for Progress.
24
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Gordon: What they would—at the moment, the formal structure of
the Alliance for Progress is the OAS council—
Gordon: —and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council,
meeting at the ministerial level once a year, on a lot of technical issues.
What they would like is, something like what was done with the Marshall
Plan at a given point. We’ve got [Dirk] Stikker, the former Dutch foreign
minister, to be a sort of political coordinator for the Marshall Plan and he
got a formal job; he was the permanent chairman of the Council, and
what they would like is something like that—51
President Kennedy: Well, would Kubitschek be good for that?
Gordon: I think he would be good but he wouldn’t have complete
receptivity in the Spanish-speaking countries.
Gordon: And there’s always a certain—
President Kennedy: So what is it you suggest I do about this letter?
Gordon: Well, let’s work on an answer for it. I think you ought to do
nothing until Ed is out of these preliminary talks with about 25—
Goodwin: We thought that something like the Monnet Action
Committee.
Gordon: What it would actually do—
Goodwin: Lleras Camargo, heading it might be good. Or something
that is not official or not sponsored by us or—
President Kennedy: By private citizens.
Goodwin: Yeah . . . by private citizens, industrial groups, political
people. . . .
Gordon: What might get some kind of . . . I think, to tie it in somehow informally to—
Goodwin: To the OAS.
Gordon: —the OAS. . . . I think this would be good, [unclear] we can
get it.
President Kennedy: I think that’s a good idea about getting a private
group talking about the—
Goodwin: There is no equivalent of a Monnet subgroup at all. This
would be—the only people with real stature—only about a half a dozen
that you can name would be Galo Plaza, Lleras Camargo, Kubitschek.52
51. Dirk Stikker was NATO secretary-general.
52. Galo Plaza Lasso was the former president of Ecuador, 1948 to 1952. He lost the election
of 1960 to José María Velasco Ibarra.
Meeting on Brazil
25
And they’re about the only—You don’t have any nonpolitical person of
the Monnet type; but one of these fellows . . . I’d like to tie Kubitschek in
with Lleras Camargo because Kubitschek’s running for president of
Brazil and Lleras Camargo is running for nothing.
President Kennedy: That’s right. Well, can somebody come back to
me with this?
Goodwin: Yes.
McGeorge Bundy: [referring to the letter] That’s the original.
Gordon: One other thing, Mr. President. My northeast program
needs a new director.
Gordon: The one we tried was a failure. The best-qualified man for
this job is a man called Warren Wiggins, who works for [Peace Corps
director] Sarge Shriver.
President Kennedy: Why not get him? You want to tell him?
Goodwin: OK.
President Kennedy: Does he speak Portuguese?
Gordon: No, but he speaks Spanish and [unclear exchange].
President Kennedy: What’s he do for Sarge?
Goodwin: He’s one of the associate directors; job’s pretty important.
President Kennedy: OK. Well, let’s get him. Yeah. Just tell Sarge we
need him and we’ll figure out . . . If there’s any question, let me know.
Goodwin: All right.
President Kennedy: Will I see you? I won’t see you before you go?
Would you let me know, if I should . . . Call me on the phone before you go.
Gordon: Yeah.
President Kennedy: [Unclear].
The meeting ends. Gordon and Goodwin are heard talking in the hall.
Then Kennedy shuts off the machine.
Gordon arranged for the visit of the Brazilian students. The next
morning, the President would spent 22 minutes with them.
Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin did not leave the White
House. Kennedy had a brief meeting scheduled with representatives of
the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.; then Gordon’s and Goodwin’s
Latin American expertise would be needed again.
26
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
12:25–12:57 P.M.
It looks like we’re being more Peruvian than the Peruvians,
more democratic than they are, and we’ve now got to think
about how we are going to protect our own prestige.
Meeting on Peruvian Recognition53
Brazil was not the only Latin American country in crisis in late July
1962. On July 18 the Peruvian military drove a Sherman tank into the
presidential palace in Lima and arrested President Manuel Prado y
Ugarteche. Ambassador James Loeb of the United States had tried to
forestall this military coup, which had been rumored for months. In
March, following a meeting with President Kennedy, Loeb warned the
Peruvian military that were it to stage a coup to erase the results of a
presidential election scheduled for June, it could not count on U.S. recognition. The Peruvian military openly stated that it would not accept the
election of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the leader of the liberal
American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (APRA), who was the favorite
to win. Haya’s anti-Communist credentials were well established, but the
army hated APRA for a bloody attack on a military barracks in 1932.
Peru’s troubles worsened in the summer. The results of the June election
were inconclusive. None of the candidates won the required 33 percent
of the share of the popular vote to be elected. As the military began making noises that it would nullify these results and restore order, Loeb
asked again for permission to warn the Peruvian army that the United
States would view dimly any intervention in Peruvian politics. This time
Washington said no. Dean Rusk cabled back, “Flexibility is necessary to
U.S. policy interests.”54
In this case flexibility was a code word for indecision. Once the coup
happened and Washington observed the arrest of Prado and the establishment of a 12-person junta under General Ricardo Pío Pérez Godoy,
Kennedy returned to his earlier policy of defending democracy in Peru
53. Including President Kennedy, Ward Allen, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Richard
Goodwin, Lincoln Gordon, James Loeb, Edwin Martin, and Dean Rusk. Tape 1, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
54. Department of State (Rusk) to American Embassy Lima, 16 July 1962, “Peru” folder,
National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library.
Meeting on Per uvian Recognition
27
by containing the army. The United States suspended diplomatic relations with Peru on July 18, keeping its embassy open in Lima. And the
next day, Kennedy publicly condemned the Peruvian coup, describing it
as a “setback” for the entire region and denouncing the junta for violating “the purposes inherent in the inter-American system.”55 The State
Department then suspended all U.S. aid.
The President apparently was not comfortable for long with this policy. While receiving support from the liberal constitutionalists of the
region, Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela and José María Figueres Ferrer
of Costa Rica, Kennedy’s nonrecognition policy proved unpopular with
the United States’s European allies and some Latin American states,
which viewed it as a form of intervention in domestic affairs. Even in
Peru, there appeared to be little opposition to the junta. An attempt at a
general strike fizzled. Soon some officials at State and the President himself began to worry about the long-term consequences of alienating the
Peruvian military, which appeared to be in control of the country.
Caught between seemingly conflicting goals in Peru, the administration employed two channels to try to communicate to the Peruvian
junta its willingness to restore diplomatic relations in return for the
establishment of some sort of constitutional regime with free elections
and civil rights for the Peruvians. Ambassador Loeb was empowered to
present this case in Lima (and in his absence, Chargé Douglas
Henderson); while in Washington, the President turned to his old
friend, Charles Bartlett, the Washington correspondent for the New
York Times–affiliated Chattanooga Times, to make the pitch to the
Peruvian ambassador, Fernando Berckemeyer.56 Over the weekend this
policy seemed to bring its first results. The junta restored some civil
rights, indicated it would soon release former president Prado, and
promised elections by June 1963. It was now time for President
Kennedy to reconsider his diplomatic boycott of Peru.
55. Press Conference, 19 July 1962, “Peru” folder, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy
Library.
56. On Loeb’s efforts in Lima see Department of State (Ball) to American Embassy Lima, 23
July 1962, “Peru” folder, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library, as cited in “Idealism
in Crisis: John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and Military Coups in Latin America,
1961–1962,” Laura Moranchek, unpublished paper, 1999. For information on the Bartlett
channel, see Handwritten Notes [early August 1962], “Peru” folder, National Security Files,
Box 151; Interview with James Loeb, 12 November 1967, John F. Kennedy Library; Timothy
Naftali Interview with Charles Bartlett, October 1999.
28
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
The President began taping as he asked the assistant secretary of
state for inter-American affairs, Edwin M. Martin, to brief the group on
the status of U.S. policy toward Peru.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Shifts in his chair.] How are we now?
Edwin Martin: Mr. Secretary—
Dean Rusk: Well, Mr. President, I think that there are three different
things that we might remind ourselves about.
One is the effect of whatever we have done so far in Peru and I think
we have nothing to be ashamed of or nothing to worry about as far as the
situation up to this point is concerned because this junta has taken over;
there are civil liberties. They have worked out some working relationships with heads of the parties. They arrested the President, but didn’t
try him and execute him, and there’s a little restraint there which I think
has been a dividend from the attitude of the hemisphere up to this point.
The most immediate thing is the meeting of the OAS this afternoon,
primarily insisted upon by the Venezuelans.57 We had thought on
Saturday that we had the Venezuelans in a position to let the OAS
[unclear] committee to consider the Venezuelan motion, and they’d pull
it back. But apparently the Venezuelan [representative] over the weekend, [unclear], had a talk with Betancourt, [and] is going to propose
that a committee be established simply to set a date for a foreign ministers’ meeting.58 And the plan is that the OAS chairman, the Colombian,
would ask them to—
Rusk: The OAS chairman, who is a Colombian—
Rusk: Simply would ask that now it be put over for a week to ten
days in order to give delegates a chance to get instructions. And get
that—
57. The Venezuelans wanted to convene a meeting of foreign ministers to condemn the junta.
The OAS in 1962 had 21 members and 11 votes were needed to call this meeting. This initiative was a problem for the United States. If Venezuela failed to get the 11 votes, then the junta
might have interpreted this as a weakening in hemispheric opposition and reneged on its
promises. On the other hand, if the meeting occurred and a resolution passed, the United
States would not be able to recognize the regime without severe criticism in Latin America.
58. Rómulo Betancourt had been the president of Venezuela since 1959.
29
President Kennedy: What is it they’re going to ask, the Venezuelans,
to do?
Rusk: They are going to ask for a meeting of the foreign ministers,
primarily. But, procedurally ask for a committee to meet to actually set a
date, or recommend a date. Now, this is not something we can support. If
we have a vote on that, we have to vote against it.
President Kennedy: On what grounds?
Rusk: On the grounds that we don’t think this is an appropriate
action.
President Kennedy: Who will represent us at the OAS—
Martin: Chep Morrison is on three weeks’ military leave.59
President Kennedy: I see.
Ward Allen (?):60 On the grounds, sir, that the point of setting such a
date, prior to a decision favorable to convening the foreign ministers—
which has not yet been made—we think therefore such action would be
premature.
President Kennedy: So that will be defeated, will it?
Allen (?): I think, yes sir, and I think that in any event we can talk the
Venezuelans out of it, beforehand.
President Kennedy: OK, so what will be the next hurdle that . . . ?
Rusk: That would be all for the day.
Allen (?): Right. They would table their proposal to call a meeting of
foreign ministers. They would speak to it. Then—our hope is, I would
speak, and simply say here: It is the objective of the [unclear] that this is
an important matter which requires consultation of government. We
propose therefore that this meeting be suspended and another meeting
be called in a week to ten days to consider the matter further.
And we would hope then that that would end it. We are trying to get
some of the others who are opposed to a meeting not to get so involved
with the wrong group.
President Kennedy: Now, what about the Wednesday meeting?
Martin: This is in place of the Wednesday meeting. [Someone else says,
“This is it.”]
59. DeLesseps “Chep” S. Morrison was U.S. permanent representative to the OAS.
60. Ward Allen’s voice could not be identified. He is listed in the President’s Daily
Appointments Diary as having attended this meeting. Allen headed the Office of InterAmerican Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in the State
Department. Not only is this the only voice at this meeting that could not be identified, but
the substance of his comments is consistent with what could be expected from a person in
Ward’s position. Therefore the editor has made a tentative identification.
30
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Martin: The Venezuelans jumped the gun on us [unclear] go ahead.
President Kennedy: Well, that will take care of that.
Now, then, what is our general attitude about resuming relations
with this junta? Will we expect some Latins as well as others to resume
relations this week?
Rusk: [to Martin] Would you run over the situation and . . . [unclear].
Martin: As of today, Haiti has resumed. Paraguay has indicated that
she would have in a day or so, but we think this was probably because
she expected Argentina to do [it], which at one time was also interested
in going on Saturday.
We have conveyed your request that you gave to me after you saw
Alsogaray.61 The Argentines have responded and said, “Please tell the
President that we will not resume immediately, but will hold off for a considerable period of time, if necessary.” We think at least—the Chileans have
said, and I talked to Bill Cole this morning who is back, that they would
probably be third or fourth or fifth, but they would wait on some others.62
On this basis, unless something now unforeseen should happen, we do not
anticipate that anybody except Paraguay is possible or probable this week.
And Paraguay will not set much of the ten pins in motion, I think.
Rusk: Mexico said they would be one of the last.
President Kennedy: [under his breath] Good.
And what does it look [like] . . . How would you sum up after this
week, on the restoration of relations?
Martin: I think the British will restore, probably today, and it may
well be that the French, Germans, and Italians will follow suit before the
end of the week. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Any other Latins this week?
Martin: No Latins this week, as far as we can know.
President Kennedy: What is the advantage of waiting?
Martin: Except Paraguay.
President Kennedy: What is the advantage of waiting this week?
What is it we are trying to get from them, that we have a chance of getting but we haven’t gotten?
Martin: This leads into the other major question. Do you want us to
go ahead, Mr. Secretary?
61. The President met with Argentina’s minister of economy, Alvaro Alsogaray, on
Wednesday, 27 July 1962.
62. Charles W. “Bill” Cole was the U.S. ambassador to Chile.
31
Rusk: Go ahead.
Martin: Well, I think that, as far as we’re concerned, we ought to
wait until a number of other countries are ready to go with us. And that
we ought to use this period to see whether or not we can get anything
additional. I think from the reactions we have had from our chargé, one
can’t be overly optimistic.63 There are some private channels that are
somewhat more optimistic. But it’s clear the current junta still feels
some pressure on them. I think what we want as a minimum is a real
guarantee that they will hold elections and abide by the results.
President Kennedy: Even if the date is as originally set?
Martin: Even if the date as originally set. I think we should continue
to see if we can move up the date. But I don’t think that is as important
as being sure that they are held and the results accepted.
President Kennedy: Have they indicated they would hold—they have
indicated of course they would hold the elections?
Martin: On June 9th, and that they would accept the result. They’ve
said this.
President Kennedy: Now what kind of . . . more guarantee would you
get?
Martin: Well, I would like to have them say that again to us after discussions in some fashion; but more importantly we feel that it would be
desirable to try hard to see if they would be willing to have an OAS election observer team or some multilateral hemisphere operation in connection with this, as an assurance of their good faith in the matter and that
this is something we should see. I think these are the important things. I
think we ought to privately—
George Ball: Plus [unclear] absolute assurance of the maintenance of
civil liberties.
Martin: Well, the maintenance of civil liberties—They have, as you
may know, restored civil liberties fully over the weekend. First they had
a 30-day suspension, which they have now pulled back.
President Kennedy: You might get me a memorandum, Ed, before my
press conference Wednesday on the things which the junta has done in the
civil liberty areas to which we can partly claim some responsibility—64
Martin: Yes. I can do that.
Rusk: These three points, the maintenance of civil liberties is much
better now—
63. Douglas Henderson was chargé d’affaires, Lima, since 26 July 1962.
64. Wednesday was 1 August 1962.
32
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
President Kennedy: They’ve got the maintenance of civil liberties,
they have set the [election] date for June, we don’t expect they’ll change
the date for June, they have said they will abide [unclear]; now if they say
it again, [unclear] more power to it.
Martin: If they could say [that] to some kind of an OAS body and
then welcome some kind of OAS team watching the situation, et cetera. I
think this would give us more assurance.
We would also like to talk to them about the Communist fact—particularly the Communist trade union leaders and the effect on APRA and
make sure that they don’t get fooled by this one.65 This is certainly where
the Communists [unclear]—
President Kennedy: Well . . . what do you see as our schedule for
resuming relations?
Martin: My own thinking is that probably sometime early next week,
we would probably, we would need to make a decision and the decision
should probably be affirmative. We have done what we can do.
President Kennedy: But you expect probably that—you don’t expect
this week other Latin American countries to go ahead.
Martin: No. No.
President Kennedy: Then what will you do—send out a notice to our
. . . saying that we’d like to notify [unclear] everybody [in the hemisphere] that we are planning on going ahead and recognize?
Martin: [Unclear] in the Argentine, which worked rather well, was
that he suggested a couple of days’ notice. And we’ll probably want to do
it on Wednesday. We’d be quite agreeable if a few other Latin Americans
did [it] between now and then, and we have suggested to one or two of
them [unclear] with the same goal, to do it themselves.
McGeorge Bundy: Did we formally suspend relations with the
Argentinians?66
Martin: Yes.
Bundy: In the same fashion?
65. The American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana,
APRA) was led by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre.
66. On 29 March 1962, the Argentine military removed democratically elected President
Arturo Frondizi. The president of the Senate, José María Guido, took the presidential oath of
office that day. The coup caused a sharp debate in the Kennedy administration. Secretary
Rusk, the Argentine team at State, and the U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aires, Robert
McClintock, all favored recognizing the Guido government. Assistant Secretary Martin and
Special Assistant to the President Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., were against recognition.
President Kennedy waited until some large Latin American countries had recognized the new
regime and then did so in mid-April 1962.
33
Martin: In exactly the same fashion.
President Kennedy: Will you give me also in this memorandum, Ed,
what we did with the Argentine; because I understand the difference, the
only difference so far, is my statement.67 Or is there any other difference?
Martin: Your statement and the suspension of aid.
President Kennedy: That wasn’t done in—?
Martin: That was not done in the Argentine case. We proposed that
and you and the secretary decided against it.68
President Kennedy: OK, I see. Is that the reason we’ve gone ahead in
this case because we said we were going to? Is that correct? Is that why
we’re doing this?
Martin: Partly, we said we were going to; and partly because there
was no observance of the constitutional norms or protection of civilian
government as there was in the Argentine case.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, this is what we want to get down
now for this press conference . . . this point here.
Unidentified: There was a Supreme Court decision in Argentina.
[Unclear.]69
Rusk: Also when we acted we did not know what the conduct of the
junta was going to be.
Martin: No, that’s true.
Bundy: All we had to go on was the tanks banging through the presidential gate.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but they also had seized and imprisoned
the—
Martin: And they had imprisoned the president and—
President Kennedy: They are going to say, “Well, you mentioned the
imprisonment of Prado and everything.” [Unclear] Prado and Frondizi
are in prison. I’m going to have to say what they’ve done.
Now, as I say, the only thing that’s [unclear] about—
Martin: Frondizi would be allowed to get out of prison in Argentina
the minute he agrees not to live in Argentina. The problem is that he
doesn’t want to leave the country. . . .
Bundy: [aside] Pretty thin difference.
67. The fact that on 19 July President Kennedy took a public stance against the Peruvian coup.
68. Martin and Rusk were on different sides in the recognition of Argentina debate.
69. The Argentine Supreme Court cloaked the March coup in constitutional legality by ruling
that Guido’s succession was constitutional because Frondizi had been out of the capital. In
fact, Frondizi had been under arrest.
34
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Richard Goodwin (?): In effect, to me, this is a double coup: the coup
against [unclear] in order to prevent the result of free elections and
[unclear] it really [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s right.
Rusk: Mr. President, another thing in the picture here, as to how we
do that—this business of [unclear]. We don’t want to lose, if we can
avoid it, the very definite “plus” opinion we’ve had around the hemisphere on our attitude toward the junta. And secondly, we’ve got to find
some way to give [Rómulo] Betancourt a chance to pull back out
[unclear], to give him some of these points that he can—
President Kennedy: Yeah, but on the other hand, we have got to be
concerned about our own—we can’t look like we’ve embarked on a road
[unclear]. Better not [unclear] in the hemisphere either.
Rusk: Right. That’s right.
President Kennedy: And that’s what I am most concerned about
right now: Is to get out of this in a—we are going to have to resume
relations and it’s going to look like the United States has encountered a
stronger man and they weren’t able to implement it and then had to back
down. Now these things that Prado agrees [with]: to the gradual points
of a civilian restoration that we are sort of [unclear], I am not even
aware of much of them and no one else is.70 So we are going to have, we
are going to have quite a time trying to make it look as if we haven’t gotten the air kicked out of us.
Ball: Well, Mr. President, [this is] consistent with the junta’s claim
that what they were doing was moving into a situation where there had
been dishonest elections in order to preserve the kind of caretaker so
they can hold new elections. And if they were to do these three things
you’ve said: the maintenance of civil liberties, the bringing in of somebody to observe, some third party to observe the elections—
President Kennedy: When they take place? When they take place?
Ball: When they take place. Plus the assurance that they will support
any government that comes out of those elections. This is consistent
with their thesis. Now if we can get them to make this very clear in a
way which makes it also appear that this is the result of the kind of pressure we’ve been doing. I think this gives us . . .
President Kennedy: That’s right. Now how do we get . . . Two of
70. The President meant the head of the military junta, General Ricardo Pío Pérez Godoy, not
Prado. Prado was the ousted president.
35
those they have already said and we have to get them to say again the
third—about bringing the OAS group in.
Rusk: Well, I think the fact that the Venezuelan motion will be
before the OAS gives us the chance to say to the junta, “Now look,
you’ve got to have some way to manage this problem in the OAS; now
here’s a way to do it.”
President Kennedy: But is [there] any new word in from Lima?
Martin: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Now how are we going to be in touch with the
junta? Is this the most effective way, [via] our chargé? Or should we be
in touch with one of the Peruvian embassies of another state?
Allen (?): I think, Mr. President, that if they can do it in Lima, I think
there might be circumstances in which, for example, if the British recognize today that the British [unclear] very effectively.
Martin: If we had difficulty.
Allen (?): If we had difficulty. But I think there’s a broader spectrum
of contacts in Lima than there would be here, which is just through
Ambassador [Fernando] Berckemeyer.
President Kennedy: Now will we send another message through our
chargé, sort of restating how we felt about [unclear] these things? You
know, in other words, what we want to do is sort of restate them, two of
these three things—
Allen (?): Right.
President Kennedy: —which you’ve already got again. And we put it
in one package and the third thing we would [unclear] on their own—
not as the result of compulsion—is the OAS to observe the election. Is
there any information for us to believe that they will do that?
Martin: Well, we also had an indication through the Sears channel—71
Unidentified: Sears? No, I haven’t heard from him [unclear].
Unidentified: This was in the press.
President Kennedy: As I say, I think we’ve got to be putting our
minds now that this Peruvian thing has taken place, there is no evidence
of public disorder. . . . It looks like we’re being more Peruvian than the
Peruvians, more democratic than they are, and we’ve now got to think
about how we are going to protect our own prestige. [Martin agrees.]
That’s what I’m most concerned about.
Martin: That’s right. Well, I think the message that went out on
71. Unidentified.
36
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Saturday is pretty clear on this, what we were anxious to do. And I think
Jim [Loeb] and my press conference . . . we got this across and the press
stories over the weekend both here and in Lima, on the U.S. side, were
good on this score. But I agree, this is the key—
President Kennedy: That’s the problem now.
Martin: —problem in the lineup.
James Loeb: I’d like to, on this score, I haven’t said anything, but we
did gain a major victory both in Peru and in the continent. I think the
problem is, without being evicted . . .
President Kennedy: How did we gain a victory in Peru, though, Jim?
There doesn’t seem to be—at least the stories I read coming out of there
indicates a rather [unclear] attitude toward our action.
Loeb: I think they’re wrong, Mr. President. I think that we . . . when
we took the stand, we never had any slight idea that we were going to
overturn the junta—the junta was the entire armed forces and the navy.
President Kennedy: What did we think we were going to do, then?
Loeb: We—Prado has been released, civil liberties have been
restored, I think the secretary . . . they have made more concessions than
they ever would have made if we hadn’t taken that stand.
President Kennedy: Why—how do we get that over?
Loeb: Well, we’re trying to get it over. I think Ed and I partially did.
I think we ought to—
Martin: Sir, we also put out a Voice piece on Saturday on this whole . . .
of our Latin American [unclear].72 [Unclear interjection.] [Unclear] he canceled this morning because he’s tied up with [unclear].
Unidentified: We should see if can get somebody up on the Hill to
make a speech about some of these things.
President Kennedy: We have [unclear]?
Unidentified: No. No.
Rusk: Manny might [unclear],73 or Mansfield.74
President Kennedy: I think either one of them would be fine, Wayne
is chairman of the committee, if he would—Doc [Martin], why don’t
you get ahold of him—75
Martin: The committee’s scheduled tomorrow after [unclear].
72. Likely the Voice of America.
73. Congressman Emmanuel Cellar.
74. Mike Mansfield was the Senate majority leader from Montana.
75. Wayne Morse was the chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin America of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
37
President Kennedy: He shouldn’t attack the junta; he should just say
that the result of our policy has been the following and so we begin to
lay this groundwork. And I can do something about it on Wednesday.
Now the other thing is that I talked to Linc Gordon this morning,
and he is very alarmed about events, as you know, in Brazil.76 And he
thinks the army may be an important factor there to prevent a real Communist takeover there. He says the army is very discouraged now
because of our stand against the army takeover in Peru. How would we
prevent the army from becoming completely demoralized if they become
the only [unclear]? He made the point to some of them that we opposed
the army takeover in Peru because it was against constitutional government, against a free election.
Bundy: And in fact it is at least [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah. Of course. It has that clear difference.
That is a factor in Peru; but in Brazil the army may be all that we’re
going to have left three months from now, the way it’s going.
Martin: We got a question Saturday, “Does this mean we would
never want the army to intervene in a [unclear] situation?” And I said
there are no rules and regulation in the future as our policy is flexible.
[Unclear] are really two or three democratic, constitutional governments.
President Kennedy: Well, now, you might speak again to Linc about
this—
Martin: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —to figure out what the line’s going to be. And
then probably what we ought to do . . . another thing, Ed, he wants to
change the Army attaché down there, which he is going to check on; but
I think, he may . . . you ought to tell him to let his army people and the
military attachés sort of have this line because, you know—
Martin: Yeah.
President Kennedy: You don’t want to have them . . . That is one
country where the army may be important.
Twenty-seven seconds excised as classified information.
Loeb: Well, I think, one difference, Mr. President, is that the
Communists in Peru had one objective which they have never been able
to accomplish, which is to break this anti-Communist force. The military, in effect, is trying to accomplish what the Communists had not succeeded in accomplishing. This is an entirely different situation in Peru. It
76. Lincoln Gordon was the U.S. ambassador to Brazil. See “Meeting on Brazil,” 11:52 A.M.
38
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
was fuzzy a little bit in Argentina; but in Peru it was clear on one side. It
might be clear on the other side in Brazil.
Martin: My sense [unclear] I think we’ve got to have an even better probable basis in distinguishing because first of all, [unclear] yesterday. Goulart will not be able to accomplish what he may be trying
to do, [unclear] he thinks is satisfactory, without some constitutional
break—
Martin: —which he has been rather [unclear]; but he will have to take
a [unclear] which is really unconstitutional, [unclear] to get back powers
which the Congress won’t give him or to dispense with the Congress,
which is still essentially conservative. And this would give us a—
President Kennedy: Well, I—
Martin: —a different framework in which to act.
President Kennedy: That’s right. Well, I think Linc has a major job
doing this. Especially [unclear] I talked to him again about giving the
army a little bit without getting caught. And so, I think we’ve got to—
Martin: Well, I’m—I rather expect to be down there next week for
this conference on world tensions also, and I’ll talk to some [unclear].
Rusk: Can we have a meeting this afternoon or tomorrow morning
before . . . on Brazil about—?
Martin: We’ll be seeing [him] at two tomorrow afternoon, now I—
President Kennedy: Let me just say now as I understand it, then, we
are going to try to get the Venezuelans to withdraw this or else to get it
tabled—
Rusk: Get them to withdraw their proposal.
President Kennedy: All right, then our chargé, we’ll have to send
him another clear—
Martin: We will.
President Kennedy: —instruction saying what we would like now is,
number one, a restatement of the package; number two, [unclear] these
things that are done, you see, done in a way that hasn’t been dramatic. It
seems to me [unclear], perhaps we ought to say, one, that civil liberties
[have] been restored [unclear] maintained. Number two, whatever it is
they’ve done that is useful, let them say they have done it in one [unclear].
And then . . . Not looking like they’ve done, with the impression [unclear]
civil liberties restored, number two, they’ve set this date, which they will
abide by for a free election. Then, if possible [unclear] to try to get this in
[unclear] and inviting the committee in. So, they may not be willing to do
that because they may be doing [unclear]. [Unclear] because the British go
39
ahead. Our friends the British, are they worried about that dam up there or
something?77
Martin: That’s been a factor.
President Kennedy: [cynically] The British . . . ask us to do something
good. [General laughter, followed by an unclear comment by the President.]
Martin: [Unclear.] They have a recognition policy as evidenced by
Communist China, which is fairly inflexible.
President Kennedy: I think we’re all going to recognize them
[unclear] them.
Martin: That’s right.
President Kennedy: All we ask is that they [unclear].
Unidentified: It took us three weeks in Argentina, sir.
Martin: We’ll get that thing done. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] As I say now, even if we get [unclear] I
think our central problem is to protect our prestige, which is involved in
this struggle, because if we don’t, whatever goodwill we’ve gotten in Latin
America . . . we don’t [want it to] look like we have gotten a licking from
[unclear].
Bundy: [Unclear] say we get out of Latin America [unclear]. We can
do that right away at [unclear] time. I am not myself aware of it; but an
awful lot of other people are [convinced] that our diplomatic action . . .
it would seem to me, the aid suspension is precisely the same as in
Argentina and the Argentine suspension lasted three weeks [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well now, my brother Teddy who was down
there, said to me last night, “How do you explain the contrast between
the ambiguity about your policy in Argentina and in Peru?”78 Well, I
started to try to explain it to him. The point is, he watches it carefully
and as a candidate therefore wants to go over his answers, and he doesn’t
know. And, now, if he doesn’t know, and I must say that I only know
when I think about it for a while. [Laughter.]
We’re going to have a chance to get it at the press conference
Wednesday. But that indicates that we are in some trouble, I think, on
this one.
Martin: I think, Max Frankel had some of this in his story yesterday,
which we gave him on Saturday.79
77. Unidentified.
78. Teddy is Edward M. Kennedy, Democratic nominee for the U.S. Senate from Massachusetts.
79. New York Times, 29 July 1962.
40
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Loeb: One of the problems is the interaction here. The last time,
when I came up, Mr. President, to talk to you in early March, before
I could get back to talk to the generals to give them the answer,
Argentina’s taken place, and [unclear] looked awful thin on it. So, I
think, the Argentine thing did affect them, they didn’t believe it. As a
matter of fact our Army attaché went to see General [Rijos],80 the head
of the military school, one of the plotters. And he looked at the paper
and said, “Don’t tell me you’re not going to help us; look what you’re
doing for Argentina. Of course you will.”
Rusk: We did make a pretty strong effort here to prevent this from
happening [murmur of agreement] and in that circumstance when it happens despite your efforts to prevent it, then you expect a response, for
prestige. [Unclear.]
Loeb: That’s right. I mean, you can’t [unclear].
President Kennedy: What happened, of course, what really adversely
affected them was the closeness of the election, the junta. If it had been a
clean victory, we would have had a somewhat—
Loeb: Are you sure?
President Kennedy: What? [Unclear exchange.] Well, they would have
seized it; but the point is, then, our protest would have been [on] much
sounder ground.
Unidentified: The resistance would have—
President Kennedy: Would have been sounder.
Unidentified: There wasn’t any resistance, of the real kind. There
wasn’t any real resistance. . . .
Loeb: The military really prevented a solution to the problem.
Belaunde81 would have been president with APRA’s support had the military not told him, “Don’t take it.”
Bundy: You don’t mean Belaunde, do you?
Loeb: Yes, they would [unclear] actually completed negotiations,
[unclear] the military—
President Kennedy: I think the problem is here that the stories out of
there looked like the Peruvians and the . . . hypothetically [unclear].
Three seconds excised as classified information.
Martin: One hundred forty-four Peruvian—
President Kennedy: Well now, I didn’t even see that.
80. Unidentified Peruvian general.
81. Fernando Belaunde Terry was the presidential candidate and leader of Acción Popular.
41
Martin: I’m rather optimistic.
President Kennedy: I didn’t even see that—as I say, I think we got, let
me . . . I’m very concerned about our problem now because I think that it
affects us not just the United States but [unclear] all through the hemisphere. People say it’s good, America is noble but not very effective anymore. That’s what I think. In fact there was an article to that effect by
Warren Ulmers or something that the United States no longer can . . .
and this has proven it and that’s not very good.
Loeb: I would say just a word in defense of the Peruvians and their
resistance. The army—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] to resist it.
Loeb: The army has created a circumstance where these Peruvian
workers were asked to go out and fight and die for the former dictator
because they had eliminated Haya. So, this was the issue. You [unclear]
past Thursday, then you have to—
President Kennedy: Where is Haya now? Who’s there? The Scotty
Reston article.82
Loeb (?): No.
President Kennedy: But the point is, Jim, as I say, the story in the New
York Times as well as in other papers. Was it Saturday or was it yesterday?
Loeb: There was a Friday one.
President Kennedy: That’s what I’m concerned about, that it’s going to
be interpreted as a licking. I think, as I say—where I think we went wrong
was my statement. I should have kept out of it unless we were sure of a success. That was a mistake; but that’s in the past now. Now the problem is
how to see about getting these fellows to do this in a way that we want
them [to]. And I think that we can just say to them, we’ve got to go ahead
on recognition. Because [unclear] about everybody’s going to recognize
them and we’re going to have to. On economic aid and so on, then we’re not
going to be cooperative. But even that, we don’t play too many cards with
because they can give us a screwing that way—American profits and so on.
Unidentified: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: We’re holding up American aid, aren’t we?
Martin: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Let’s not go ahead on that for awhile. Well, now
82. James Reston, “JFK’s Sudden Diplomacy in Latin America,” New York Times, 27 July 1962.
Having ascribed to Kennedy “the habit of talking and acting in a hurry when things go wrong
in Latin America,” Reston predicted that the President would soon regret his policy of nonrecognition in Peru.
42
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
two of the three things we wanted, they have already done. It shouldn’t
be very difficult to ask them to redo their package. The other thing they
may or may not do.
Martin: Do we have to restore all the aid when we renew [unclear]?
President Kennedy: No, I think we just . . . we’ll have to talk about that.
Unidentified: What is the—
President Kennedy: We’ll have to take a look at it and see how we
sort of dragged it. It shouldn’t look like we just sort of dragged it out.
Meeting breaks up. The President huddles with a smaller group.
Martin: [Unclear] press conference. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw that.
Unidentified: The red one?
Unidentified: Yeah. Red one?
President Kennedy: I just want to keep that chargé. I saw his answer
back and it kind of gives them the flavor of what we’re thinking about, to
a certain extent.
Martin: We’ll send a memo just to make sure he’s seen it.
President Kennedy: Right. I think the only thing that he may not
realize is this problem [unclear] explaining to [unclear].
Bundy: [engaged in a separate conversation with George Ball about the
British and European trade negotiations] You can’t do anything about it.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] that’s critical of the United States
[unclear] understand [unclear] want a restatement of the [unclear] elections and these other things which have sort of slipped out, which have
not been particularly dramatic. And they [unclear] try to get that which
they already [unclear] dress it up as a pretty good package and give us
the key, then we’re moving in.
Bundy and Ball continue their side conversation as the others file out.
Bundy: [Unclear] on trade [unclear] I’m not sure that the [unclear]
Agriculture Department [unclear].
Ball: I think this [unclear] other there.
Then they ask the President if he could turn his attention to European
matters for a moment.
The Peruvian policy group left. Following the President’s instruction,
Edwin Martin and Ambassador Loeb headed off to draft a cable to the
chargé d’affaires in Lima, Douglas Henderson. The cable laid out the
administration’s desire for three concessions by the junta as the price for
Meeting on Europe and General Diplomatic Matters
43
recognition: a guarantee of continued civil liberties; a guarantee of free
and fair elections before June 9, if possible, but not later; and an invitation to the OAS to send an observer team to monitor the election. The
first two points had already been agreed to by the junta, but President
Kennedy needed them restated more forcefully to influence world opinion. The third might pose a problem. Fearful of the loss of prestige in the
region, however, Martin and Loeb stressed that Washington “wished to
expedite solution in such [a] way as not to leave the United States isolated or to give the appearance of U.S. capitulation.”83
As the Latin American specialists were filing out of the meeting,
Bundy pulled Rusk and Ball to one side to discuss some foreign economic matters with the President.
12:58–1:10 P.M.
I just see an awful lot of fellows . . . who don’t seem to have
cojones.
Meeting on Europe and General Diplomatic Matters84
From time to time, President Kennedy dropped his cool demeanor and slid
into more colorful language. What started out as a quick strategy session
to determine the U.S. line on the then-current Common Market negotiations in Europe deteriorated into something else entirely. Kennedy had a
lot on his mind. The struggle over Berlin worried him. But in this brief
conversation, Kennedy spent most of his time giving an unvarnished critique of the U.S. foreign service. As a young man, Kennedy experienced
embassy life firsthand when his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was ambassador
to the Court of St. James. Evidently the ambassador was not the only
Kennedy to have left that London experience with some sour memories.
Behind the withering characterizations of U.S. diplomats there was also,
no doubt, some presidential frustration over then-current dealings with
dictators in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the determined junta in Peru.
83. Rusk to Henderson, 30 July 1962, 9:17 P.M., FRUS, 12: 869–70.
84. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk. Tape 1,
44
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Before the end of this conversation, the Harvard faculty, especially one
economist, would also be the target of some presidential ire.
McGeorge Bundy: Well, do you want to take a minute?
Door closes. Dean Rusk and George Ball have remained behind with
Bundy and Kennedy in the Oval Office.
Bundy: This is this question.
George Ball: This question—
Bundy: Whether you go in in writing on our view of the Common
Market negotiations.85
[to the President] I don’t know whether you have had a chance to—
President Kennedy: I haven’t read that paper. I’ll do it by lunchtime
and I’ll call you this afternoon.
Ball: All right, it’s . . . My own recommendation would be that we
don’t give them an aide-mémoire, but that we instruct the ambassador
simply to go call on the governments tomorrow morning. Tomorrow is
a crucial day because they go back for the—
Bundy: —final round.
President Kennedy: What do you want to say in it?
Ball: Well, it simply defines what, with more precision in the light of
the developments of the agreement, exactly [Bundy tries to interject]
what the American trade position is, particularly with regard to common
agriculture products. Now this is really—the only reason for doing
this—we are not going to change the result at all; but we want to be
able to assure the American agricultural interests that there was no
ambiguity about our position with the Europeans—
President Kennedy: I’ll read this now.
Bundy: I think it best to do it this way, Mr. President. If George
could get a draft ongoing in a final form, that’s the easiest way to get the
President’s mind on it.
Ball: Well, actually this is—
Bundy: It can be just the same as the one you had over the weekend.
Ball: No. I’ll get it over to him—
Bundy: Might do that.
Dean Rusk: There ought to be some strong introduction there so
that no one on the inside can use this move as a—
85. The six original members of the European Economic Community were negotiating with
Great Britain to admit it into the Common Market.
45
Bundy: Excuse.
Rusk: —for responsibility or failure.
Bundy: What we really want is a copy of the outgoing cable to show
people back here. Nobody in the chancelleries has any doubt what our
view is.
Ball: That’s right. Yeah.
President Kennedy: We’ll get that out before we—
Bundy: Yeah.
Ball: Right. I’ll get it over to you.
Nine seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: There’s nothing else we have to do in Berlin.
Looks to me, like all that stuff that—my weekend—that Sunday intelligence thing about what they’re doing to the Wall, doing to the autobahn
and the shipment of fighters and all the rest sounds to me like they’re
ready to do something [unclear].86
Bundy: [to Rusk] We have, as I told the President this morning, an
understanding that the Berlin task force is working hard on the whole
business of “after an announcement of a peace treaty.” On the other hand,
I am inclined to think that Thompson’s—when does Tommy get back?87
Rusk: On the sixth of August.
Bundy: That his assessment from Copenhagen—did you see that in
the brief ?—that on the whole Khrushchev doesn’t want a grand caesura.88
President Kennedy: I saw that. Yeah. Now, Ed89 said something to
me on Sunday about sending Jim Loeb back there [to Peru].90 And I
said, “Well, he’s persona non grata,” and he said, “It’s much better to
have them declare him persona non grata.” I don’t think that’s so, then
we would have to withdraw him. I don’t think we ought to send Loeb
back there. We ought to get his family out of there. Put the chargé [d’affaires] there, then send an ambassador down—
Bundy: [to Rusk] Why don’t we live with a chargé for a while? There’s
a lot of advantage in that.
86. Every weekend, McGeorge Bundy prepared a collection of classified materials for the
President to read. This intelligence report was not found.
87. Llewellyn E. “Tommy” Thompson, Jr., retired as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union
on 27 July 1962. See “Meeting with Llewellyn Thompson on Khrushchev,” 8 August 1962.
Thompson had served in Moscow since 1957.
88. On the way home from Russia, Thompson sent a cable to Dean Rusk arguing that
Khrushchev “did not intend [to] push Berlin question to point of real risk of war” (Thompson
to Rusk, 28 July 1962, FRUS, 15: 255).
89. Edwin Martin was assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs.
90. James I. Loeb was U.S. ambassador to Peru, 31 May 1961 to 26 July 1962.
46
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Rusk: Well, I think we ought to—
President Kennedy: The question really ought to be whether we . . . I
can send Jim anyplace else or whether he retires from the foreign service. I think probably we ought to offer him something: maybe Honduras
or something [unclear].
Rusk: Let me take a look at that business. I don’t know enough about
it. . . .
Bundy: Did Bill Art get a chance to speak to you about Canada this
morning?91
Rusk: No, I asked Robin.92
President Kennedy: It follows [unclear] we are going to have one
more request before the . . . to see whether, what’s his name?
Bundy: Irwin [Prescott].
President Kennedy: . . . of Harvard Law School wants to go. If he
doesn’t want to go, then—
Bundy: [Unclear.] You might want him checked out. I’m going to ask
Bill to check that.
President Kennedy: He’d wanted to go to Australia, which we didn’t
do. Otherwise you might as well send a career man.
Rusk: He probably wanted to go. But I would think that since he had
a special interest in Australia and was lukewarm about that—
Bundy: Was he?
Rusk: Yes, and regrets he was faced with that.
President Kennedy: Well, Mac can check [that] today; otherwise it
can actually go to a career [unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: That Iranian did not overly impress me, that fellow we had from Iran. He came in to see me . . . right out of that school.
Rusk: Iranian?
President Kennedy: Mustache . . . No, our ambassador to Iran.
Ball: Did Calvin go home? [Mixed voices.]
President Kennedy: I mean Iraq.
Bundy: Jernegan?93
Rusk: Oh, Jernegan? Well, it depends on how you look at it, Mr.
President. He’s a pretty crack officer.
91. Unidentified.
92. Unidentified.
93. John D. Jernegan was U.S. ambassador to Iraq, 12 January 1959 to 11 June 1962. He visited
Kennedy in July 1962 after having been declared persona non grata by the Iraqi government.
47
President Kennedy: Is he?
Bundy: He did one thing, Mr. President. He never got into a lather
over the fact that these relations were going sour and he never became
their man in a rather difficult period.
President Kennedy: I agree. I mean, I understand that I can’t judge
these things.
Rusk: I have known Jernegan, Mr. President, quite a long time and in
the situation where there is real trouble I would rather have him there
than many.
Bundy: If the Foreign Service knew how much you plead their case
over here, Mr. Secretary, you’d be in like Flynn.
President Kennedy: I’d just like to have—who is on the selection
board now, this year, that is our man?
Rusk: Well you mean, for selecting our chiefs of mission?
President Kennedy: No, the new ones.
Bundy: The promotions.
Rusk: Oh, the promotions.
President Kennedy: And the new recruits to the missions.
Rusk: Oh, they have got a whole series of boards, for different grades,
and each one of them have a couple of people on them.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but [unclear] take a look as long as [unclear]
new people coming in—I just see an awful lot of fellows who, I think—
Bundy: You mean the cream of the crop?
Rusk: The class A people?
President Kennedy: [dropping his voice] No, I don’t think so . . . people . . . who don’t seem to have cojones.
Bundy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Really what I think [unclear] as a group. If I had
to generalize—you never want to generalize—I think surely the
Defense Department looks as if that’s all they’ve got. They haven’t any
brains. [Laughter.] But I mean, can’t we get a spine to [unclear]? Huh?
That’s where your problem is. They all come in here . . . even though
we’ve replaced the fellow we sent to the Sudan.94
Bundy: That’s not [unclear], the other fellow.
Rusk: Rountree.
Bundy: That’s Rountree.
President Kennedy: Now Rountree just doesn’t present a very virile
94. William M. Rountree was the newly nominated U.S. ambassador to the Sudan.
48
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
figure, that’s all. Maybe that service doesn’t—maybe that work doesn’t
require it.
Bundy: It doesn’t attract.
President Kennedy: Albrecht, Rountree.95 I mean what . . . even that
very nice fellow, Woodward, they all look sort of—and he’s one of the
best.96 They don’t have very many, sort of—what is it?
Bundy: Charming . . .
President Kennedy: You don’t agree with that?
Rusk: I don’t agree with the—
President Kennedy: McClintock in the Argentine.97
Rusk: —with the assessment of the overall makeup of qualifications
and I think that the—
President Kennedy: Why is it that that particular—I think, my judgment is because these are all fellows who went in, in the 1930s and ’20s,
when this was a very very specialized, rather precious career. And that
isn’t what you are getting in now. I don’t [unclear] joining the Peace
Corps. They all look kind of . . . the same type of fellow who you’d want
to have later in the Foreign Service. They all look very rugged, an
American type, who seem to be both bright and physically with some
vitality and force. But when you’re talking to, these days . . . when you’re
talking to so many people who are dictators, who sort of come off in a
hard and tough way, I don’t think it makes much of an impression on
them if some rather languid figure—Again that’s my generalization and
I’m sure it’s grossly . . . [unclear].
Rusk: Well, I think it is true, Mr. President, that—
President Kennedy: Well, I mean you couldn’t get a better man, in
my opinion, than Freeman, for example.98 He isn’t that way at all.
[Unclear] Colombia [unclear]. He’s first class. Hell, I’d send him anywhere.
Bundy: Tom Mann or [Llewellyn E.] Thompson.99
President Kennedy: Or what’s his name—the fellow we had in
Canada?100
Bundy: [Unclear.]
95. Albrecht is unidentified.
96. Robert F. Woodward was U.S. ambassador to Spain, since 10 May 1962.
97. Robert M. McClintock was U.S. ambassador to Argentina, since 14 February 1962.
98. Fulton Freeman was U.S. ambassador to Colombia, since 16 June 1961.
99. Thomas C. Mann was U.S. ambassador to Mexico, since 5 August 1961.
100. Livingston T. Merchant was U.S. ambassador to Canada, 15 March 1961 to 26 May 1962.
He had been U.S. ambassador to Canada for the first time in the Eisenhower administration.
49
Rusk: Livingston Merchant.
President Kennedy: I mean . . .
Rusk: Well, it is true, Mr. President, that you, if you said two years
ago—
President Kennedy: Or the fellow in Italy is very [unclear].101
Rusk: Two years ago if you started at the top of the foreign service
list and looked at the people that take on the top jobs, you’d have to eliminate about 60 percent of those in career ministerial ranks: you just
couldn’t do it. Now this has been pared down enormously, now I think
we are far—
President Kennedy: Now the fact of the matter is that when we
[unclear] however [unclear] more people, career people, in Europe, in my
opinion, than [ever] in this century. I thought there was [unclear] . . .
Rusk: At no time in history would an important post be filled by so
many nonpolitical people.
President Kennedy: That’s right. And now we ought to [unclear]
there. Therefore having done that it seems to me we’ve got a right to be
rather tough about where they all . . . You know, I think it, [unclear]—like
Dobrynin makes an impression, because you think there is a very—102
Bundy: [He laughs.] Aircraft engineer.
President Kennedy: —self-assured and very competent, bright fellow
and that makes an impression the Russians are some sort of . . . A fellow
walked in like McClintock, you’d think, “Guys, is this the United States?”
Bundy: McClintock was a good soldier in the Lebanon, you know.103
The appearance is somewhat deceptive there.
President Kennedy: Remember, all their appearances are deceptive.
Let’s get some guy [laughter].
Rusk: Despite [unclear. There appears to be a short break in the tape.] I
would guess the appearances don’t produce necessarily the results.
President Kennedy: That’s correct. But I don’t think you can generalize, I agree, I know that. I understand that a lot of fellows who look very
deceptive out there and [unclear] long experience helps. And I know that
you get all this sort of virility over at the Pentagon and you get a lot of
Arleigh Burkes: admirable, nice figure, without any brains.104 We all know
101. G. Frederick Reinhardt was U.S. ambassador to Italy, since 17 May 1961.
102. Anatoly Dobrynin was the Soviet ambassador to the United States, since March 1962.
103. Robert M. McClintock was U.S. ambassador to Lebanon during the crisis of 1958, when
Eisenhower sent U.S. Marines into Beirut.
104. Admiral Arleigh Burke served as Chief of Naval Operations, 1955 to 1961.
50
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
that. But that, we don’t want that. But the problem is, there must be somebody . . . you can’t separate it, so much. I just think there is too much of
that thread running through.
Bundy: Well, Mr. President, I really think the problem is—
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I don’t think they have to be that way.
But there’s an awful lot of them. [Unclear.]
Rusk: Yeah. Well, I must say that in saying goodbye to the lot that
are retiring [unclear].
Bundy: You ought to see the ones that got away! [Laughter.]
Rusk: We’ve retired an awful lot of good prospects for retirement all
right. [More laughter.]
President Kennedy: I remember Herschel Johnson.105 You remember
Herschel Johnson?
Rusk: Yes.
President Kennedy: He was with my father. He used to call my father
Jeeves, which drove my father mad. Herschel was an Old Lady if you
ever saw one.
Rusk: Sir, I [unclear].
President Kennedy: But he was celebrated a lot.
Bundy: I think we have got a real problem with our DCMs in Western Europe, because they’re trained by our chiefs of mission.106
President Kennedy: The second people?
Bundy: Yeah.
Rusk: Well, I think that—
President Kennedy: Cecil, you’re getting Cecil home, aren’t you?
Rusk: We’re going to get him somewhere else.
Bundy: You can’t fire him without a letter from Joe Grew in the
papers.107
Rusk: Well, we got Leoville Patterson. [Unclear.] He does not have
the strength of Joe in [unclear].
Bundy: Thank God.
Ball: By the way, who is the very distinguished Harvard economics
professor who just made a speech to the German bankers, saying that
the dollar is 10 percent overvalued?
105. Herschel Johnson was counselor at the U.S. Embassy in London, from 8 July 1937 to 11
February 1941, then minister counselor until becoming U.S. ambassador to Sweden in
October 1941.
106. The abbreviation DCM stands for Deputy Chief of Mission.
107. Cecil is unidentified. Joseph Grew was the former U.S. ambassador to Japan.
51
President Kennedy: Who said this?
Ball: It is in the Journal of Commerce this morning.
President Kennedy: A distinguished economics professor?
Bundy: Hockelick?108
Ball: It may be Hoteler; he just two days . . .
Bundy: Was there a name in this?
Ball: No, it was Wallich’s piece.109
Bundy: I am no longer able to account for a lot of the professors in
the economics [department.]
President Kennedy: He made this, he made this in Germany?
Ball: In Germany, to the group of—
President Kennedy: Well, that’s just Harvard. I’d take his passport. I
mean, imagine the son of a bitch doing that.
Bundy: [sarcastically] You get his name, [unclear].
Ball: Well, it continues some serious—
President Kennedy: That’s the nearest thing to treason.
Bundy: That’s right.
Ball: Of course, bankers today [unclear] money because they thought
he would be brought here to spend [unclear].
President Kennedy: He’s talking like in a classroom: it is 10 percent
overvalued. [Bundy agrees.] That would be great to devalue by 10 percent, that would do us a lot of good. What would that do? Based on
other currencies, it may be 10 percent overvalued. . . .
Bundy: In the end, it doesn’t work that way.
President Kennedy: George, you’re working hard on this thing in
spite of the Treasury opposition.110
Ball: We’re not . . .
Bundy: The Treasury’s not going to—
Ball: The other day we had a meeting; it was the most constructive
meeting we’ve ever had on this thing. And Bob Roosa was there and he
was full of ideas.111 He seemed to me enthusiastic toward going right
down this program.
Unidentified: We all are.
President Kennedy: Right. Good. I’m very interested.
108. Hendrik Houthakker, later on Richard Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisers.
109. Henry Wallich, chairman of Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisers and former Yale
professor, was then writing for Newsweek.
110. The President is referring to the Treasury’s opposition to a State Department plan to
stabilize the U.S. dollar by negotiating an end to European purchases of gold.
111. Robert Roosa was assistant secretary of the Treasury.
52
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Ball: We’re working very closely together, very hard on this thing.
Discussion ends. All leave through the door. The President is on his way
to the swimming pool.
President Kennedy’s official day was usually less than eight hours. At
lunchtime the President would often go to the pool for a half hour of
swimming. Then he would retire to the family quarters for two hours,
including lunch. Today he returned to the Oval Office just before 4:00
P.M. for a meeting on the federal budget.
4:00 –4:55 P.M.
. . . you got anything to do about the Small Business
Administration getting more money in there?
Meeting on the Economy and the Budget112
The President’s frustrations this day were not solely in the area of foreign
policy. Current news magazines were full of criticisms of the administration’s handling of the economy. Growth rates were flat and unemployment
was rising. President Kennedy needed to meet with his budget director,
David Bell, and others to discuss the administration’s budget proposals for
fiscal year 1964. Working from a joint Treasury–Council of Economic
Advisors (CEA)–Bureau of the Budget monthly review document, Kennedy
aimed to produce a budget proposal that served three major purposes. It
had to appear, on the surface, to be a product of surpassing frugality. It had
to include new outlays for programs that genuinely interested the
President and his chief economic advisers. And, in what was fast becoming
President Kennedy’s theoretical outlook, the budget had to also possess a
critical mass large enough to propel the economy in at least a modest
upward trajectory, despite its relatively trim appearance.113 Banking on
112. Including President Kennedy, David Bell, Henry Fowler, Walter Heller, Arthur Okun,
Theodore Sorensen, and Robert Turner. Tape 2.1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
113. Memorandum for the President from C. Douglas Dillon, Walter W. Heller, and David E.
Bell, 27 July 1962, Departments and Agencies: Bureau of the Budget, July 1962–November
1963, President’s Office Files, Box 71, John F. Kennedy Library.
Meeting on the Econom y and the Budg et
53
a general tax cut at some undetermined point in the near future and on
relaxed political and economic budgetary limits beyond that point,
President Kennedy hoped that these budgetary changes would take
place amid economic growth rather than decline.
The most recent economic indicators were not encouraging. Having
missed their forecast for the first two quarters of the year by predicting
more growth than actually occurred, Kennedy’s Council of Economic
Advisers, represented here by Chairman Walter Heller and staff economist Arthur Okun, had just issued a much gloomier report, forecasting
an increase in the unemployment rate and the distinct possibility of a
recession before the end of the year.114 The Republican opposition girded
to attack on two grounds: that the economy was faltering somewhat
after an all too brief period of renewed growth and that, at the very least,
the Kennedy performance had fallen considerably short of the lofty goals
set by the President himself in the campaign and throughout 1961. And
while the Treasury, represented here by Under Secretary Henry Fowler,
offered a much more sanguine view of the near term, they forecast little
more than modest growth and a stable unemployment rate. At approximately 5.5 percent, the unemployment rate stood well above the 4 percent goal Kennedy and his advisers hoped to reach sometime in 1963.115
With plans for a tax cut—either immediate and temporary, or delayed
but permanent—as the backdrop to these discussions, caution and deliberate formulation prevailed. Much of the President’s reluctance,
explained Walter Heller, “was simply a political sensitivity to the sting
of Republican charges of fiscal irresponsibility and a consciousness that
tax cuts did not fit his call for sacrifice.”116 “The Republicans would kick
us in the balls on that one,” Kennedy reminded Paul Samuelson.117
Political opposition notwithstanding, Kennedy had by this time settled
on the economics of the Keynesian tax cut proposed by nearly all of his
economic advisers. Only uncertainty in the prevailing economic fore-
114. Though officially recognized as a staff economist, Okun, along with fellow staff economist (and future Nobel laureate) Robert Solow, became, according to CEA member James
Tobin, additional members of the council in all but name [see James Tobin and Murray
Weidenbaum, eds., Two Revolutions in Economic Policy: The First Economic Reports of Presidents
Kennedy and Reagan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), p. 4].
115. A goal reached by Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, in December 1965.
116. Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1966), p. 30.
117. Quoted in Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1993), p. 319.
54
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
casts forced the President to consider a temporary “quickie” tax cut
designed to stave off an immediate recession.
Plans for tax cuts, in general, otherwise focused on permanent tax
code revision, the eradication of the “fiscal drag” blamed for the economy’s underperformance, increasing demand as a catalyst for new
investment, and a full-employment goal of no more than 4 percent
unemployment.118 Despite conspicuous hesitation regarding the timing
of a tax cut and the associated political difficulties related to deliberate
deficit financing, the President and his advisers were unwavering in
their preference for these goals, even if the more pessimistic forecasts
were to be proved wrong and a recession deemed unlikely or impossible.
As a result of these concerns, the President and his advisers devoted
much of this meeting to a survey of the budget numbers and their economic impact. What should be counted and when it should be counted
became questions of paramount significance. Kennedy understood that
the answers would tell him much about the economic impact of the
budget and the outlook for the economy at large. And perceptions also
mattered. How the budget was perceived—by the public, by the political
opposition, and by the press—was just as important to the President
and his economic advisers.
Recording begins with a broadcast of the major league baseball AllStar game heard in the background and on the left channel.119 The conversation between President Kennedy and his advisers begins soon after
this broadcast is cut off and is recorded on the right channel.
[Broadcaster] Vin Scully: . . . Bill Mazeroski of Pittsburgh at second, Dick Groat of Pittsburgh at short, and Ken Boyer of the St. Louis
Cardinals at third. Tommy Davis of the Los Angeles Dodgers—
David Bell: [Unclear] differently or you’re going to get caught that
118. Fiscal drag is a phenomenon produced when government (mostly federal, but also state
and local) fiscal policies take in, either in the form of excessive tax withdrawals or insufficient
spending (or a combination of both), more than they send out.
119. This All-Star game, played at Chicago’s Wrigley Field, was actually the second of two
played in 1962. Two All-Star games were played annually from 1959 to 1962, with proceeds
from the second contest earmarked for the recently established major league pension fund.
The American League defeated the National League 9 to 4 in this game on the strength of
Rocky Colavito’s three-run home run in the seventh inning, and $216,908 was raised for the
league’s pension fund.
55
same way. These are very small percentages of the total, and that you . . .
I don’t know whether we can count on doing much better . . .
Henry Fowler: We’ve been basing it all on contract letting, from
Defense and other large contract-letting departments in—
Bell: [Unclear.]
Fowler: —May and June.
Unidentified: But you can still count on—[Recording goes off and comes
on again.]
Unidentified: We’ve done that and while we have a little—
Unidentified: This pattern of—
Bell: The accuracy of the [unclear].
Walter Heller: There are some fairly good ones . . . [Unclear background conversation.]
Fowler: These figures on goals, that is, are generally . . . are not in
favor of, say . . . The things that are associated with large defense contracts and all the good goals show a drop-off in June, whereas normally
you expect a rise such as [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: You do the same thing—
Bell: Prices go up.
Unidentified: Unless you—
Bell: [Unclear.] Contract letting or [unclear].
President Kennedy: But they should proceed here?
Bell: That there it is, related to the three-party monthly reviews, and . . .
We sent you a copy on Friday. I don’t know whether you had a chance to
look at it or not. This one, has the key element in it that, looking forward
into fiscal ’63 we get a split verdict from Treasury and from the council.120
And that they make . . . they have different assumptions about the . . . what
the economy is going to do in the early part of calendar 1963.
Thirty-two-second pause.
President Kennedy: It’s a big difference. The CEA projection for the
second quarter of ’63 is 559 billion.121
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: While the Treasury projection for the same is 581?
Bell: Yes, sir.
120. Council of Economic Advisers.
121. Figures drawn from Memorandum for the President from C. Douglas Dillon, Walter W.
Heller, and David E. Bell, 27 July 1962, Departments and Agencies: Bureau of the Budget,
July 1962–November 1963, President’s Office Files, Box 71, John F. Kennedy Library.
56
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
President Kennedy: It’s a major—
Bell: It is. Actually, the difference of view as to what’s going to happen to the economy after the first of the year—
Fowler: The detail of that is indicated on page 2 in the economic outlook under “Housing,” “Plant and Equipment,” and “Inventories.”122 We
will summarize—
Bell: All the Council is saying [is] that the economy is going to start
sliding downward after January, and the Treasury’s saying it’s going to
continue slightly upward after January.
Twenty-nine-second pause.
President Kennedy: How many copies of this have you made, Dave?
Bell: Well, they’re all here in the room, sir, except, for about three more
that are in our . . . in Bob Turner’s office.123 This was handled the way—
Bell: —each of these things has been handled over the last number of
years.
President Kennedy: The estimated budget deficit . . . under the
Treasury is 7.4, and 8.3 under the CEA model.
Bell: Yeah. You see there isn’t much difference. Those two figures are
not really far apart.
President Kennedy: Increased expenditures 1.2. That would be
what? Agriculture? And it’s Postal? Is that where we’re seeing it?
Bell: It’s an increase since the last . . . yes, since the January budget.
President Kennedy: That would be the . . . primarily on page 4, these
increased expenditures?
Bell: Those are about 600 million, resulting from the modifications
that we have made since the public works bill and the breaks entered
under unemployment compensation . . . recommendations from some of
the [unclear].124 Now, that’s only a net 450, but it shows here 600 million,
the difference between the payment and the receipts side. The other 600
million dollars . . . we anticipate a farm bill that will not cut expenditures
122. On housing starts, for example, the joint memorandum reads: “The Treasury foresees
some decline in housing starts from the high levels reached in the second quarter of calendar
1962, but feels that a ready availability of mortgage funds, some upward trend in family formation and increases in additions and alterations will help sustain total housing expenditures.
CEA expects that the slackening of income gains will lead to a decline in housing activity during the first half of 1963.”
123. Bob Turner was assistant director, Bureau of the Budget.
124. The public works bill was the Public Works Acceleration Bill, signed by President
Kennedy six weeks later on 14 September 1962.
57
the way yours would have. A delay in postal rates going into effect, probably next January rather than July 1st so that we get some in the budget.125
And the U.N. bond legislation hitting ’63 instead of ’62.126 Possible larger
pay raises.127 And this public welfare bill you signed a couple of days ago
has a hundred million dollars plus in it that was over and above what you
recommended.128 That’s where the billion-two comes from. I don’t think
any of it, we can do much about it at this stage, with the exception of what
Congress is doing with your various recommendations.
Theodore Sorensen: At least, Mr. President, in our [unclear] to you,
we found an outstanding—
President Kennedy: Does this go . . . We assume that you are going
to take a billion dollars off foreign aid. They’ve taken 500 million off of
the shelters, that’s a billion and a half. That’s not—129
Sorensen: Let’s put it in there—
Bell: We have assumed that there will be about a 500 million dollar
net cut in expenditures in, stemming from the Congress’s actions on
appropriations. If they cut foreign aid, the effect of the cut will be felt
only partly in fiscal ’63 and partly in fiscal ’64 because they enacted
obligational authority to make loans. Much of the expenditures in ’63
will stem from loans that are already being made or have been made, so
that, the Congress’s action on foreign aid will have a minimal . . . a
smaller effect in ’63 than the gross amount that they cut. And along with
the rest of the budget, as you know, they move up a lot of things, as well
as moving some down.
125. Postal rate increases were attached to the Pay Bill (H.R. 7927) signed by President Kennedy
on 11 October 1962. This legislation increased the first-class postage rate from 4¢ to 5¢.
126. Legislation to authorize the U.S. purchase of $200 million worth of 2 percent interest
U.N. bonds, designed to help the United Nations out of its precarious financial situation. This
legislation was delayed because of strident opposition in Congress and was eventually altered
to authorize only $100 million in bond purchases.
127. Potential federal pay raises attached to the Pay Bill, note 126. It increased salaries of nonpostal employees by approximately 10 percent and those of postal employees by approximately
11 percent. The administration proposal was replaced by a substitute bill, introduced by James
Morrison (D-Louisiana), that substantially increased the costs of the Pay Bill relative to the
administration’s first projections.
128. The amount authorized in the new Welfare Bill was $2.8 billion, a $300 million increase
from the previous year and $100 million more than requested by President Kennedy.
Attracted to its self-help provisions and to the imposition of new penalties for parental misuse
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children funds, conservatives supported the bill openly
and contributed substantially to the drive for additional funds.
129. This was federal aid for the construction of radioactive fallout shelters. President Kennedy
had proposed a $568 million fallout shelter program; Congress scrapped the proposal, appropriating only $10 million to undertake a study of the potential need for such a program.
58
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
President Kennedy: Let’s see, [reading] “On a consolidated cash
basis, the estimated excess of payments over receipts is $8.2 billion.”130
It’s 6.9.131 That doesn’t seem to me very much different from the . . .
Bell: Not very much different. That’s right . . . this particular year.
President Kennedy: I wonder why that is?
Heller: Well, because the most of the impact of . . . on revenues is
delayed for some time, and our divergence in the GNP developments is
really only after the close of this calendar year.
Unidentified: Most of the revenues—
Heller: Most of the revenue impact will come in fiscal ’64. That’ll be
a much bigger divergence if [unclear] those plans with those figures.
Our set of figures is essentially a sort of a high-level plateau in GNP, but
with unemployment rising, with the gap between what we could do and
what we are doing widening. I think yours is more of a plateau of unemployment. Your . . . you keep, what, 51/2 percent unemployment right
straight through, and your gap between the actual and the potential
[output] would be about steady.132 We see—
Fowler: We feel it will begin to come out and move up in the fourth
quarter of this calendar year and the first quarter of statistical . . . but at
a slightly higher rate in the movement from the first to the second quarter of the second year.
President Kennedy: Well Dave, are we going to do anything about
our budget? Changing the budget form? Are we going to put it in different forms, like the consolidated cash?133
Bell: Well, we’ve got, as you know, we have a study underway on this.
130. A consolidated cash basis is a method of computing the budget by which Social Security
and other trust fund receipts and disbursements are included in the total. Total trust fund
activity in 1962, which included Social Security, highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation, and a few others, amounted to approximately $25 billion.
131. The $8.2 billion was the CEA deficit estimate and the $6.9 billion was the Treasury estimate, both on a consolidated cash basis. See note 134 on the consolidated cash basis and other
methods of government budgeting.
132. You refers to the Department of the Treasury.
133. Four different methods of computing the federal budget were in use at this time and were
given active consideration as the official method. The conventionally accepted method, known
as the administrative or bookkeeping budget, excluded trust fund receipts and disbursements
and classified all investments as expenditures. The consolidated cash budget differed from the
administrative method by including trust fund receipts and disbursements. The national
income budget also included trust fund transactions but did not classify some investments as
expenditures. It also recorded transactions when liabilities were incurred (accrual basis) but
not when cash changed hands (cash basis), and it omitted transactions in financial assets and
already existing assets (government loans, for example). The capital budget, like the adminis-
59
Just . . . I guess, I’m going to have to put it to these fellows within the
next week or two because I think we have a different suggestion. I think
they would like us to go to a capital budget, and we’re going to come
down against it. We’ll be bringing this to you, fairly soon.
President Kennedy: What would be, in short, your reasons against it?
Bell: Well, there are two or three points involved. Now, the first is
that the . . . it seems to me it tends to create a bias in favor of physical
public works and against actions which are maybe more important and
necessary, like increases in expenditures for education and research. It
looks as though you are saying, “Don’t worry about how much you
spend on public works, worry only about how much you are spending
on your current outlays.” Some of the current outlays are more important than the public works in terms of their contribution to the growth
of the country.
The second principal problem is that it looks as though you’re saying
. . . the . . . we should plan typically to budget for borrowing to cover
capital expenditures, whereas the decision whether or not we should
have a budget deficit and therefore a net borrowing, in an economic
sense, really has nothing to do with that whatever. That’s strictly an
irrelevant fact. The economics of the situation depend on the entire drift
of the . . . The criteria for decision in economic terms are the impact of
the federal fiscal actions on the economy. In some years you want to
budget for a deficit and for borrowing that is much larger than the
amount of capital you happen to have in that year’s budget. Other years
you don’t want to borrow, you want to budget for no borrowing whatever, even though you do have some capital outlays.
Heller: May I interrupt to say I agree a hundred percent with that
point, and that, that doesn’t need to be dictated by the size of the capital
budget . . . but that’s getting into—
Bell: Yeah.
Heller: On this we’d have a 100 percent agreement . . . this second
point.
Bell: Well, it doesn’t really affect the question here, but we will indicate why—
President Kennedy: But how can we get a budget that will not put in
more, extract more without really having any effect upon the . . . Now, as
trative budget, excluded trust fund transactions but placed capital outlays into a separate
account. All but the capital budget were produced in the 1962 Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).
60
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
I understand it, for the last, what, four or five months we’ve been taking
more out than putting into the economy by how much? How does it run
for a year, the 12 months, from July to July, isn’t it? [Unclear exchange.]
Bell: My economists . . .
Fowler: Mike can tell us about [unclear] . . . he said that’s gone up.
Robert Turner: That’s on the national income account basis, though.
Fowler: That’s on an income and product account basis, we have not
been—[Unclear exchange.]
Bell: On the income and product account basis, we have not been
drawing out more than we’ve been putting in. We’ve been drawing a
small deficit each quarter.134
Arthur Okun: It’s not seasonally adjusted.
Turner: [Unclear] and on a cash basis it’s extremely hard to put
together . . . roughly it is close to 2 billion dollars in the second quarter
in surplus, but—
Bell: Yeah.
Turner: —we’ve been trying to put a precise figure together . . .
hoped to have it here today, and it probably—
President Kennedy: This is on the [consolidated] cash [basis], is it?
Turner: This—
Fowler: This is income and product account that you have there.
Okun: Those probably aren’t seasonally adjusted. They are—
Bell: The cash—
Okun: Those are—
Bell: The cash figure, Mr. President, would show a surplus in the
spring and a deficit in the fall . . . seasonal.
Okun: Right.
Bell: The question is whether that has any economic meaning.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well . . .
Fowler: We usually attribute the economic meaning to the incoming
tax year.
Bell: To these figures here. The reason being that the swing, the tem-
134. It was the contention of Kennedy’s economic advisers that this method (national income) of
budgeting produced figures that most accurately reflected the economic impact of federal government operations. Use of the accrual method and the inclusion of the trust fund transactions,
for example, reflected transactions with clear impact on private spending decisions. Since corporate income taxes were normally paid more than six months after the liabilities were incurred,
actual payments could run well below accruals in times of rising economic activity, yet the sum
of the accrued liabilities tended to determine corporate cash flow and spending practices. This
difference for fiscal year 1962 was estimated at approximately $3 billion.
61
porary . . . the seasonal surplus in the spring, the deficit in the fall, I
think—
Unidentified: Sure.
Bell: —has to do with when you collect your corporation tax receipts.
In the fall, even though you’re not collecting them, the corporations know
that they are accruing them, and they are setting aside cash funds. They
could be buying Treasury bills, or some other handy device to keep the
money liquid, you see. Therefore, since they are putting the money aside,
taking it out of the normal stream of their private business activities, it has
roughly the same effect on the economy as if we were getting it in taxes.
So that even though there is a seasonal swing, it’s questionable whether it
has any very large economic significance. These figures, which most of the
economists look to as the real indicators of the government’s effect on the
economy, do not show the same kind of a swing. They are normally—
Fowler: On a cash basis, for example, this fall we’ll have a very substantial—
Bell: Deficit.
Fowler: —deficit.
Turner: Ten billion dollars.
Fowler: Ten billion dollars.
President Kennedy: You don’t think that’s any help to the economy?
Turner: A little.
Bell: Yes, a little. But not that much.
Fowler: But not as much significance as what these figures would
show.
Bell: Our private income and product [unclear] figures will show
deficits in the fall of probably, oh . . . 21/2 percent.
Heller: The quarter’s changing so that’s right.
Bell: Now, 21/2, during the fall actually . . . roughly. Though it should
be—
President Kennedy: Well, this says here, it might be 5.1, isn’t it?
Turner: That’s an annual rate.
Fowler: These are annual rates, Mr. President, they’re projected on
an annual rate basis. Fifty-three point . . .
Bell: Now, the main . . . the third question on the capital budget, sir,
and again, I’m not going to argue the case now, but, this is what we will be
talking about, is that if you would propose a capital budget, it seems to me
you’re very likely to be in a logical position of having to defend the point
of view that the federal debt can rise indefinitely. This is purely a political
point. The economics of that doesn’t bother me in the slightest. I think
that’s correct, as an economist. The federal debt should rise indefinitely.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
But politically it’s a rather difficult position. And yet that’s the implication
of a capital budget against which you would . . . you would regularly cover
your capital expenditures by borrowing. Now as, as Walter says, that isn’t
the only kind of a capital budget [unclear.]
Heller: No, well, you could run a surplus on the current account.135
Then fiscal policies, hopefully, offset whatever excess you have in the
deficit on the capital account.
Bell: But these are the considerations being—
Fowler: Mr. Stans has devoted his last two weekly articles to this
capital budget question.136
Bell: Oh, has he?
Unidentified: Yesterday, in your—
Bell: I stopped reading them months ago. [Quiet laughter.]
Fowler: The last time I think it came up for any brief consideration
on the Hill, that was when Ruml proposed it.137 I think, there was the
usual blast from Senator Byrd, and then it kind of evaporated.138 But that
was a very brief encounter, though. It wasn’t a well-developed, welldesigned push through.
Bell: We had some small approach to the capital budget in the
income and product account figures, because they do leave out federal
lending activity, and, I think, there’s questions we’ll have to consider
when we come to these bills, and we may have to bring judgments on
them as to whether or not it’s a sufficient basis of change, to enable you
to present the budget figures from that . . .
135. Expenditures category in a capital budget for operations and not investments.
136. Maurice Stans was budget director in the Eisenhower administration and later secretary of
commerce and finance chairman of the Committee to Re-elect the President in the Nixon administration. Stans had been hired by the Los Angeles Times-Mirror syndicate to write a weekly column on economics and economic policy. Syndicated in 46 newspapers by this time in 1962,
Stans’s column had surveyed issues such as the rising tide of personal bankruptcies, the ongoing
corporate profit squeeze, the loss of U.S. gold reserves, and other similarly gloomy topics.
137. Beardsley Ruml was a Carnegie Corporation executive, director of the Laura Spelman
Rockefeller Memorial (which he transformed from a modest social work program into a major
research agency), dean of social sciences at the University of Chicago, Macy’s Corporation
treasurer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York director, and unofficial adviser to Franklin
Roosevelt (particularly during the late 1930s period, often termed the Second New Deal). In
concert with Harry Hopkins, Leon Henderson, and Aubrey Williams, it was Ruml, along with
Marriner Eccles, who convinced Franklin Roosevelt in the midst of the 1937–1938 “Roosevelt
recession” to ignore Treasury Secretary Morgenthau’s urging of a balanced budget and to
create additional purchasing power through government deficit spending instead.
138. Harry F. Byrd, Sr., was a Democratic senator from Virginia, 1933 to 1965, and chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, 1955 to 1965.
63
Fowler: We haven’t considered this at any length, Mr. President, over
in the Treasury. I have discussed it informally with Secretary Dillon, and
I have the feeling that some consideration ought to be given to, if you are
going to move forward on that, on having some kind of outside economist . . . organizational analysis before you jump.139
Bell: You mean as, as window dressing or for a real purpose?
Fowler: Well, a little bit of both.
Bell: But, the . . . we’re already moving . . . the President has asked
the chamber of commerce to give us some advice, or to consider these
questions which are—
Fowler: That’s right. I think we might—
Bell: That’s under way.
Fowler: We . . . we probably have to anticipate—
Bell: If we think the prospect of getting—
Fowler: —yours would be one way or the chamber’s would be
another in some kind of amalgam in between.
Bell: We also have to consider the related question: whether the
whole budget should be put on an accrual basis rather than a cash basis.
President Kennedy: That’s what I . . . I had a bill to that effect. It
passed the Congress, and the appropriations committees objected.
Bell: We didn’t realize that.
President Kennedy: That was . . . that was the one the Hoover
Commission made public—140
Bell: No, that’s the accrual accounting—
Bell: —accrual accounting. The accrual accounting part of it was all
right, but what the Hoover Commission recommended was what they
call accrued expenditure limitations.
Bell: Which would mean that the Congress would vote limits on the
expenditures that any agency could make in a given year. The trouble
with that is that the expenditures simply flow on out from the commitments that have already been made and made earlier. And, therefore, you
can say—to the defense of the department—that we’ve got an accrued
expenditure limitation of so much in this fiscal year. If that is less than
139. C. Douglas Dillon was secretary of the Treasury.
140. See Budgeting and Accounting, Letter from the Chairman, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949).
64
M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
the bills that will be coming due, under the contracts that they have . . .
that they have been authorized to make, then you have got to consider
how to make some private contractors wait for their money. It doesn’t
have any real effect on their making the volume of commitment, which is
the point of effective control.
So, that in particular, that’s a lesser . . . a separate . . . a separate point.
But we have been . . . the government in the budget, with that bill, which
you introduced, the government has been going out on an accrual
accounting basis. And nearly all the departments now can provide accrued
cost figures for our use. In fact we understand that their [unclear] will
remain. The main impact of it, though, would be on the receipts side.
Unidentified: Yeah.
President Kennedy: What do we have to decide today? No, this is
just really—
Bell: This is the best . . . this is the information. . . . Having noted
that there’s a difference between the council and the Treasury at this
point, I—
President Kennedy: It’s rather large, isn’t it? Now, tell me again,
what is the reason for a difference of almost 30 billion dollars for . . .141
Fowler: Well, in each of the three sectors that are discussed on page
2 and 3—housing, plant and equipment, and inventory planning—there
is some substantial difference of view. I think the differences are somewhat marginal on housing, but on plant and equipment we stick, more or
less, to the premise of the budget last January that given the depreciation
changes, given the investment credit, there will be a push forward in the
plant and equipment field.142 We see no reason to back away from that
judgment, which was made then collectively, insofar as the first six
months of 1963 are concerned. I think it’s too early to anticipate very
much in 1962, and I wouldn’t on that score, but we do think given the
enactment of the investment credit, that the combination of the two
things will be of some significance in the first six months—
141. Gross national product (GNP) projections.
142. Earlier that year, by executive order, President Kennedy had enacted accelerated depreciation schedules for plant and equipment, which allowed businesses to write off the cost of these
investments at a faster pace than before. The Kennedy administration had also submitted legislation introducing a 7 percent investment tax credit for the purchase of new plant and equipment. The investment tax credit would be signed into law on 16 October 1962 and, together
with the new Treasury Bulletin F depreciation schedules, would increase corporate cash flow
over the first year by approximately $3 billion.
65
President Kennedy: Well, we’ll have three budget deficits . . . aren’t
we? But there’s nothing we can do about that [unclear] as far as I can tell
[unclear].
Fowler: Well, I think it’s worth noting, however, that the amount of
the deficit already cranked into the situation ought to provide some, at
least, retarding effect on any, on any fall back, you see, so . . .
Heller: Yeah, there’s some cushioning. Well, we went back to check
what we said on that and that’s exactly what we said.
Fowler: There is a cushion there, but—
Heller: Cushioning, but not, not that it’ll [unclear] push it back up.
Fowler: You get about the same amount of cushioning for . . . on our
projections now as the Eisenhower deficit provided in 1958 or ’59.
President Kennedy: Six point three this year . . . an estimated, what,
seven billion next year? Nothing . . .
Unidentified: Yes.
Heller: That’s seven billion.
Unidentified: Seven to eight.
Unidentified: Right.
Heller: Seven to eight.
President Kennedy: Well, all right, say eight. . . . Let’s just [unclear].
Fowler: The last element, Mr. President, is on inventories, and, there,
we take the view that, inventory accumulations which have dipped some,
and will dip a little bit more for the remainder of the year, will probably
increase moderately in 1963. We think inventory levels are quite low now
compared to sales. We don’t have any picture of excessive inventories having built up. They’ve been really held back, whether it’s due to judgment or
due to new techniques of measuring inventories and using better calculating methods for procurement. . . . But, anyway, there is a lot of room there
for continued inventory accumulation in early ’63. On the other hand, the
council’s judgment is that very conservative inventory policies are likely to
be maintained even though there is an advance. And I think—
President Kennedy: Can I . . . can I just ask, what was our deficit for
last year?
Bell: Three point nine, sir. You mean fiscal ’62?
Bell: —’62?
Bell: I mean ’61.
Unidentified: Fiscal ’61.
President Kennedy: Oh, yeah.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Bell: That, of course, you count that as an Eisenhower year.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, it’s . . . I was going to say, in the year,
how much did we . . . added to . . . How much did his . . . based on the
amount of increases in the program, how much did we add to that
deficit? [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: It depends on how much [unclear] in the [unclear].
Unidentified: Sounds incredible.
President Kennedy: OK, that’s a drop in . . . his estimates were
wrong on income and his programs were wrong. But we added something to it in agriculture, didn’t we, and something in defense?
Unidentified: I’ll tell you [unclear].
Bell: We would have added, you know. . . . They can . . . it’s right up
to a billion dollars, to 3.9. Could have been—
President Kennedy: Ours?
Bell: —logically argued at the time . . .
President Kennedy: Well, all right. I want to thank you for these figures.
Bell: Mr. President, there is in this difference, in the anticipation of
what happens in . . . in January. Beyond January it appears, in some
[unclear] they’re probably waiting on, deciding on the tax cut.
Sorensen: The best I can say, Mr. President, our arguments may be
able to show the difference in the Treasury and the CEA aggregate
unemployment numbers. It’s the largest—
Unidentified: The CEA—
Sorensen: The CEA predicts unemployment’s going to go up to 7
percent.
Bell: Look up to C-1.143
Sorensen: The statement . . . table and statement at C-1 . . . 7 percent
compared to 5.5 percent. And the difference is—
President Kennedy: By what date do they think it’s 7 percent?
Unidentified: That’s 7 percent in August.
Unidentified: Seven percent in [unclear].
Unidentified: So that’s the middle of May [unclear].
Unidentified: —in the second quarter.
Heller: [to himself, quietly] [Unclear] 1963, again [unclear].
143. Attached statement in which the Treasury projected the GNP for the second quarter of
calendar year 1963.
67
President Kennedy: These figures are [unclear]? OK.
Heller: Also, possibly, we should go over, but aren’t prepared to
today, is the relationship of the deficits of fiscal ’63 and fiscal ’64 on our
tax cuts and no tax cuts. That we’re ready to say whether the deficits for
the two years are now going to be getting larger or smaller with the
stimulus of the tax cut. And I think that’s an open question.
Bell: The memo I just handed to you, sir, has been pending since July
12.144 It was prepared originally for . . . that one.
President Kennedy: This one?
Bell: Yeah. For the meeting with Wilbur—
President Kennedy: OK.
Bell: —but, [unclear] with Mills.145 Now, that recommends some
action on expenditures, for the second half. You already know about and
have approved the Veterans Administration’s dividends.146
President Kennedy: Right.
Bell: It’s being looked into.
Bell: Now, on page 3 . . . two other . . . recommendations that we propose to you, make to you, one is to accelerate Defense Department procurement of general and medical supplies which they would be buying
any way, but which they could buy a little earlier.
President Kennedy: For this fall?
Bell: Right . . . well, it’d be, yeah, for this coming fiscal year. Place the
orders as soon as they can.
President Kennedy: And that’s, what, 50 million dollars?
Bell: Well, it may add as much as 50 million, I don’t know.
President Kennedy: Are you checking into that, then?
Bell: Yes, sir. We will if—
144. The memo was Bell to President Kennedy, “Possibilities for Increasing Government
Outlays in the Short Run,” 12 July 1962, Departments and Agencies: Bureau of the Budget,
President’s Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library.
145. Wilbur Mills was the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, with whom
President Kennedy would meet one week later, on 6 August 1962. See “Meeting on the Tax
Cut Proposal with Wilbur Mills,” 6 August 1962.
146. This was an acceleration of life insurance dividend payments. Officially announced on 22
November 1962, it advanced payments of $222 million on National Service Life Insurance policies (to be paid in January 1963, rather than throughout the 1963 calendar year) and $15.6 million—disbursed also in January—to holders of U.S. Government Life Insurance policies. As
Budget Director Bell noted in his memorandum, this infusion, being a trust fund item, would
not affect the administrative budget but would nonetheless provide a small stimulus, a suitable
initiative, then, for the political environment in which the President and his advisers operated.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
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Bell: —you agree. Then point three, there are certain speedups in contracting and procurement in other agencies. There isn’t much money
involved, but this again can help a little bit . . . if you’d like us to pursue
that. We could also speed up the food stamp plan. I don’t, personally, think
that’s a good idea. I think Ted may . . . may be for that. I’m not sure.
Sorensen: Well, we’re about to announce an expansion of the food
stamp plan into more communities, but that was decided upon earlier.147
Bell: But that’s part of the normal program. This would be an additional expansion. They, in effect, can, you know, can enlarge this quite
rapidly.148
President Kennedy: Where are we putting it now? We have it in how
many communities now?
Sorensen: Well, we have 8 until—
Bell: That’s right.
Sorensen: —last year and we’re about to announce at your next press
conference, Mr. President that they’re—
Bell: Going up to—
Unidentified: To 20?
Bell: —[unclear] 20.
Sorensen: Well, no [unclear] what an addition of 20 . . . At any
rate—
Bell: Yeah.
Sorensen: —it’s a very popular program, both on the Hill and in the
communities where it’s taken—
President Kennedy: What are you . . . you got anything to do about
the Small Business Administration getting more money in there?
Bell: Well, that’s the other thing we have in here for current decision.
It’s on page . . . page 6.
147. Instituted in 1939 and discontinued in 1943, the federal Food Stamp Program was reinstituted in 1961 as a pilot program in selected counties and municipalities. Changed fundamentally at this point from a program that was designed to distribute farm surpluses to one
that focused more on improved nutrition, it grew markedly as it expanded to cover more people and a greater variety of foodstuffs. On 2 August 1962, only three days after this meeting,
President Kennedy issued a statement calling on the Department of Agriculture to expand
the Food Stamp Program to an additional 25 areas in 18 states [see “Statement by the
President on the Food Stamp Program,” Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 599].
148. Many counties and municipalities had requested new pilot programs. The Food Stamp
Program would continue to function as a pilot program and would continue to operate as a
subsidy, rather than a grant, program until late in the Johnson administration.
69
President Kennedy: Well, now let’s see, there’s some more here.
Well, let’s let the Food Stamp go, then . . . not accelerate; increase this, or
. . . Ted, this is number four: “Expand Food Stamp.”
Sorensen: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [reading] “Using Section 32 funds . . . of doubtful desirability once expanded, it would be difficult to retract. Would
have no . . . virtually no stimulating impact on private investment,” but
they would on private . . . on production.149
Bell: Well, it’s essentially simply a matter of using up some of the
agricultural surpluses. There’s no net stimulating effect, and you don’t
want to have any stimulating effect on agriculture output. [Quiet laughter.] OK, fine.
President Kennedy: OK, well, now, the other one . . . the next one I
think we ought to . . . ‘‘Accelerate placing contracts.”
Bell: But to this point it is, that Bob . . . in that case would go into a
new set of circumstances, when the appropriation bills are enacted—
President Kennedy: [reading] “Accelerate in the first quarter . . . repay
VA [Veterans Administration] insurance dividend normally payable in the
full year.”
Bell: That’s one that would be coming up, as of January 1st, isn’t it?
Sorensen: Yes.
Bell: That’s right.
Unidentified: OK.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] new authority to request it—
Bell: Now, then you get to some things if you want to ask Congress
for more money. But I’m assuming that you do not want to make that
decision today.
President Kennedy: There’s one like this already.
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: Right. Now, this is the . . . “that will increase rate
of extension of credit, considerable authorities, in the case of variable
rates, have been granted which can be used . . . which [unclear] have very
little economic effect. . . . Small business loans . . . from all of . . .”
They’re financed by appropriations, aren’t they?
Bell: Yes, sir, and revolving funds. And here, they have, in effect, a
limitation, on the size of the loan. Their statutory maximum has been
350,000 dollars per loan. They have been operating administratively at
200,000 dollars as part of the cutback exercise which we put in last fall.
149. The reference here is to the proposed expansion of the Food Stamp Program.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
They recommend, and we concur, that it’s time to lift that back to
350,000 dollars, if you agree. You should be aware, however, that if you
do that you’re committing yourself to—
Sorensen: If you’re—
Bell: —sending up a $60 million supplemental along about in
January. Now it may not turn out to be exactly 60, but we’ve got to look
at it, at that time. It may well be 60.5.150
President Kennedy: Now, first off, who can get something from the
Small Business Administration that they can’t get from their local bank?
What . . . what . . . how much of a difference is there?
Bell: The theory is that nobody gets anything from the Small
Business Administration unless they can’t get it from their local bank.
It’s supposed to be a lender of last resort. Now, in practice there’s some
skepticism, and what entitles some skepticism is that whether the bank
in every case is, you know, just doesn’t get interested in this particular
fellow and his project, and therefore, says, “Well, you can go ahead to the
Small Business [Administration], and I’ll say that I wouldn’t make the
loan.” The . . . nevertheless, I suppose a reasonable assumption is that 50
percent of them—
President Kennedy: How have we been doing this? The credit rating’s been good?
Bell: Well, it’s been fine in recent years, you see, but that’s because
the economy’s been, by and large, been moving pretty well.
Sorensen: [Unclear] Wall Street, to about 41/2 percent.
Bell: But, if we were in a time of real difficulties, their loss ratio
would jump sky high.
President Kennedy: What’s the loss ratio of a regular bank?
Unidentified: And this is 41/2 percent.
Bell: In pretty good time. But that’s, you see . . . that’s the theory, I
think. You’re supposed to make loans that are—
President Kennedy: Anybody got any thought about this?
Sorensen: I think it’s . . . it will add some . . . enough stimulus to the
rest of the economy and it’s worth going ahead on, Mr. President. You
know that the 60 million sent up in January is not going to improve
[unclear].
Unidentified: Let’s go on.
150. President Kennedy approved raising the cap for small business loans and sent up a $40
million supplemental appropriation to pay for the prospectively increased outlays.
71
President Kennedy: OK. Let’s go with that.
Bell: [Unclear] and I think the prospect [unclear] how its going to end.
President Kennedy: All right, then, the other is financed biannually . . .
that you borrow from the Treasury, from the Farmers Home Administration.151
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Only 275 million dollars.152
Bell: Now—
President Kennedy: Leaves us with 600 million left.
Bell: Well, this is—
Unidentified: You could easily opt—
President Kennedy: They think big over there.153
Bell: [Unclear] yeah, at this stage . . . yeah.
President Kennedy: That would be . . . We would . . . I’d have . . .
there’s a supplemental request for 325 million dollars.
Bell: Well, we back them up on that, at the present time. There are
two different programs. The one you’re looking at is the operating loans
program, the other is housing. We’re going to come back to that. We
recommend no action to you on either one at the present time. Now—
President Kennedy: VA. I see . . . yeah.
Bell: VA housing also we recommend no action at the present time.
But you should be aware that they are . . . they are there to be used at
any stage you want to.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but your point is that in both of these, it
looks like you’re substituting public loans for private loans.
Bell: Yeah . . . right.
President Kennedy: What would be the other one?
Fowler: You’ve got aid—
Sorensen: I hope the Treasury’s right.154 [Unclear exchange.]
Fowler: So do we. [Laughter.]
Heller: I must say, we do, too.
Bell: But, let’s get to the last page, then, Mr. President. This is on the
public works . . . the standby public works.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] now, you designate it as—the . . .
151. Post–World War II successor to the New Deal Era Farm Security Administration which
administered farm ownership and production and subsistence loans.
152. Farmer’s Home Administration operating loans were limited at this point to $275 million; the Department of Agriculture proposed raising the limit to $600 million.
153. They refers to the Department of Agriculture.
154. In their projection for GNP.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
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Bell: The Secretary of Commerce . . . But the question here is how you
would want the standby public works bill operated, if it’s enacted. We’re
all . . . everybody’s in agreement, now, that this isn’t the way to do it. The
House bill has a public works coordinator who would be established—
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s what we were talking about this
morning with Lee White.155
Bell: Some of us are anxious to see that, I guess.
President Kennedy: You can probably take that out, I think . . . if
Bobby wants it in, but . . .156
Bell: Yes, he does.
President Kennedy: Is that the public works coordinator in the
Department of Commerce, isn’t it?
Bell: Not the way they write it. They want it in your office.
Turner: But they . . . you know, the bill doesn’t put it anyplace.
Unidentified: It then creates—
President Kennedy: And, well, I suppose you got a half billion—
Turner: Because they are assuming that it would be in the Executive
Office of the President.
President Kennedy: You might want to get this sort of instruction,
in any case, to Hodges.157
Bell: Yeah . . . right. The assumption that—
President Kennedy: The main response, so you can get a coordinator,
now, to work with whoever—
Bell: Somebody’s going to have to be ready to go right up there with
them on appropriating more—
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . well, now, Dave, what do you want to
do about this?
Bell: If you’ll agree with this—
Bell: We’ll . . . we’ll tell him that—
155. Lee White was deputy special counsel in the Kennedy administration who advised the
President on civil rights and urban affairs. White later served as chairman of the Federal
Power Commission from 1966 to 1969.
156. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.
157. Luther Hodges, former governor of North Carolina (1954–1961), was appointed secretary of commerce by President Kennedy in large measure to assuage business fears of the
incoming administration. An active promoter of increased exports and increased trade with
the Soviet Union, Hodges remained secretary of commerce under Lyndon Johnson until retiring to the directorship of the Financial Consultants Mutual Fund in December 1964.
73
Bell: —you know, we’ll go around and . . . a letter will be prepared.
Of course, it’s a hell of a—
President Kennedy: Now, what about the dunes?158 Does it have anything to do with what we’ve been talking about?
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: Well, I think . . . I don’t know what . . . Did Lee report to you on
that session that he and I both attended in Senator Douglas’s office?159
Bell: I think there’s no question but what—
President Kennedy: I must say, I come down on the side of jobs, now,
rather than recreation at this point.
Bell: Well, the question is whether any jobs are in it, Mr. President.
The Indiana folks think so, but, there are jobs there only if the steel companies are going to expand their facilities. And, it’s really . . . there’s
room for plenty of skepticism that the steel companies will do that.
President Kennedy: Well, if they don’t, then what happens?
Bell: Then we’re building a harbor, and—
President Kennedy: Well, don’t we have any commitments? Isn’t there
any way to get a commitment out of steel before we build the harbor?
Bell: Oh, yes. That’s in there. The . . . yes, the arrangements that the
engineers propose is that they wouldn’t start work on the harbor until
the steel companies had formally and firmly committed themselves to
build their part of the harbor, which is the piers, along both sides.160 We
would build the breakwater and do the main dredging, and they would
build the dock facilities. They on the sides, and the state of Indiana on
the . . . on the south end of the harbor.
Everybody would have to have his money ready to put into the kitty,
before any work were undertaken. And, therefore, if the steel companies
backed off what it would mean is you’d have a harbor authorized for
quite some time, but it wouldn’t be constructed. The likelihood, I sup-
158. There was a legislative battle involving Senator Paul Douglas, who championed the
preservation of Lake Michigan’s Indiana sand dunes; Bethlehem and National Steel companies, who hoped to build steel mills at that point on the lakeshore; and Indiana state officials,
who favored, at the same site, a new lake port and expanded industrial development in general. After years of struggling for it, Douglas secured, in November 1966, the passage of legislation creating the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore.
159. Lee is Lee White.
160. The engineers are the Army Corps of Engineers.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
pose, is, you know, anybody’s guess. . . . It doesn’t seem, to me, likely that
there would be substantial expansion in new steel works over the next
two or three years, but—161
President Kennedy: Of course, if we . . . if we knock it down, it will
look like we’re the ones that—
Bell: I agree entirely. I agree entirely.
President Kennedy: If they don’t build it, then you’ve still got your
recreation, haven’t you?
Bell: You’ve got the status quo. I don’t think there’d be any actions
undertaken. I don’t know what would happen. There might be some of
that land that could begin to . . . to be put into other kinds of industrial
facilities, but not very much, I should think, because there’s many
involved—
President Kennedy: When are you going to come forward with your
. . . As I say, I’m great on recreation and all the rest, but I do think if
we’re talking about the number of jobs which they’re talking about that I
won’t be sympathetic to . . . that number of jobs in that place, that’s all.
Bell: Well . . .
President Kennedy: These days.
Bell: I think the problem is essentially political. I don’t think there’s
any doubt that, what the—
President Kennedy: Well, politically, if we could get that back, you’d
say, you would go ahead, because it’s Indiana versus Senator Douglas.
Bell: No, I think that the merits of the case strongly argue that if
you’re putting the whole thing into recreation, in 25 years there isn’t any
question that the value to the nation will be far superior on that side.
Heller: There’s no doubt about it.
Bell: In the short run, this case about jobs is not too clear. If the steel
companies were ready to go ahead and invest, then there would be jobs.
President Kennedy: Now, don’t we get . . . what kinds of assurances
can we get out of the steel companies before we set it aside for productive use?
Bell: The steel companies are so badly caught between the two
opposing political sides of this thing, I don’t think we can get anything
out of them that tells us anything we don’t now know—as to the likelihood that they will, in fact, be ready to invest at any given date. They
161. This meeting followed the widely publicized administration showdown with the steel
companies in April 1962 regarding steel company pricing. In that event it became clear that
most steel companies were operating well below their productive capacities.
75
have said, to the state of Indiana, “Yes, we do plan to use these sites for
steel works.” They have not said, “We are prepared to commit ourselves
to take action as of 1 January 1963,” or something like that. And I don’t
think we could get any such commitment. Nor, I think, we’re . . . are we
likely to get the opposite, because then the state of Indiana would be all
[unclear], saying, but they’ve said, “No, we don’t plan to do anything
with that land for the next four years.” So I just think they’re gonna
stand right where they are in saying, “We bought the land to build steel
plants. If you want the harbor, go ahead. One of these days, we’ll build
the steel plants.”
President Kennedy: Now, can’t we say that we’ll go ahead with the
harbor if we could only get some indication that you’ll build the steel
plant? Otherwise, why are we going to build the . . . How much are they
sticking in the harbor? The steel companies?
Bell: About 5 million dollars.
President Kennedy: And we’re putting in how much?
Bell: Twenty-three, I think.
President Kennedy: Fine, and how much is the state putting in?
Bell: Well, the state puts in about 35, eventually. I’m not quite sure
how much—
President Kennedy: Well, they’re not putting much in, so—162
Bell: No, they’re not.
President Kennedy: —the companies, but . . . I mean, they can probably afford to put in 5 million to get this. It adds to the value of their land,
anyway, doesn’t it? Do they use some land there?
Bell: Yes, they do, and I suppose it does, in the sense that it would be
valuable industrial land.
President Kennedy: So it—
Bell: I don’t . . . I’m not sure they would put up that $5 million.
They’re pretty . . . you know, steel companies are pretty funny folk.
President Kennedy: Well, I’m all for that. But anyway, so we [go] in
for that figure. The United States government and the state of Indiana
go in for a combination of 55, 60 million . . .
Bell: There is another . . . another big question mark here. Douglas is
saying . . . his engineers say the state of Indiana will never be able to
float the 30 million dollars of revenue bonds. The state of Indiana has a
constitutional prohibition against general purpose bonds, or whatever
you call them. Is that right?
162. They are the Bethlehem and National Steel companies.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
30, 1962
Unidentified: Yeah.
Heller: General obligation . . .
Okun: General obligation bonds.163
President Kennedy: How do we get into . . . as I say, I haven’t followed it closely. Can’t we get an understanding from everybody—the
steel companies, the state of Indiana, et cetera—and then say, “If you . . .
if these understandings are any good, we can go ahead. If they’re not,
then . . .”
At least, then, we’re not going to have everybody saying that it’s
because the administration failed to provide dollars for—
Bell: Now, that’s the position of Indiana. The state of Indiana says,
“We do want to go ahead.” And we say, “We can float the revenue bonds.
The steel companies say, “Yes, we do plan to use this.”
President Kennedy: Were we given that in writing and so on?
Bell: It’s in writing. They plan to use it for—
President Kennedy: Do they say when?
Bell: No, they do not.
President Kennedy: Well, couldn’t we find that out and ask them
when they plan to go ahead?
Bell: We can try. I don’t know.
President Kennedy: I mean, I think we ought to put the . . . If we’re
not going to . . . we ought to put it on the . . . If there’s a legitimate question here, we ought to put it on their backs.
Bell: This is precisely what I meant by saying that the problem is
essentially political.
President Kennedy: Well, we ought to say, “We’re prepared to go
ahead with the land . . . with the thing, and if this is what sounds reasonable, and the thing, but we’re not going to go ahead unless we have the
assurances from the companies, now.” If the companies are not going to
give us any assurances, then it’s back on them.
Bell: Well, let me talk to Lee about this.164
Fowler: [Unclear] the article [unclear] after that or the next day. I
don’t know whether it’s good or bad, or whether you saw it or not . . . in
the New York Times.165
163. General obligation debt is secured by the full faith and credit of the state’s taxing authority, whereas revenue bonds, the other major type of state debt instruments, are secured by revenues from the projects financed by their proceeds.
164. Lee White.
165. Probably James Reston, “Kennedy Takes His Battle to the Nation,” New York Times, 29
July 1962, p. 8E; or Joseph A. Loftus, “Economic Indicators Hold Key to Tax Decision,” New
77
Bell: Can’t we do that? We can’t send them that one budget item.
Twenty-eight-second pause.
Unidentified: Yeah, I think that [unclear].
At this point, the meeting ended and the President began speaking with
Robert Roosa, Henry Fowler, and an unidentified adviser about recent
newspaper stories. His brief conversation with Roosa appears to be a discussion of reported developments in the steel industry. “Beth Steel Profits
Off, Spending Up,” read one headline; “Lag in Profits,” read another.166
After their attempts at an industrywide, across-the-board price increase
in April 1962, eliciting the famous showdown with the Kennedy administration and the eventual rollback of the increases, U.S. steel companies
appeared to be initiating a new public relations blitz designed to tell a
tale of woe and to garner support for prospective price relief. And it was
a portrayal that seemed to be garnering sympathy despite the reality
that poor U.S. performance actually reflected vigorous foreign competition and relatively high U.S. producer prices.
Reflecting on several issues and several articles at once, Kennedy also
referred, briefly, to a separate article on the U.S. balance of payments
problem and the potential weakness of the U.S. dollar.
Roosa: [Unclear.] You asked me to contact Clark Clifford [unclear].167
I have an appointment with him for Friday. I’ve got the whole dossier
here, if you have a—
York Times, 29 July 1962, p. 5E. Reston noted that much of Kennedy’s legislative difficulties
stemmed from the complicated and abstruse character of many of the issues and proposals he
championed. Loftus summarized by writing, “The information here is that the report Mr.
Kennedy is waiting for to decide on the tax cut is the report that only Chairman Wilbur Mills
of the Ways and Means Committee can give.” Curiously, one relatively trivial point raised here
by Loftus, that July’s economic indicators tell you little about current trends—due to vacation
absences—is one repeated by Wilbur Mills in a meeting with President Kennedy on 6 August
1962 (see “Meeting with Wilbur Mills on the Tax Cut Proposal,” 6 August 1962).
166. Christina Kirk, “Beth Steel Prices Off, Spending Up: The Homer Plan to Ease Squeeze,”
New York Herald Tribune, 27 July 1962, p. 20; Christina Kirk, “Lag in Profits,” New York Herald
Tribune, 29 July 1962, 5:7.
167. Clark Clifford was former special counsel to President Truman, who, since 1950, had
become a partner in a Washington, D.C.–based law firm that specialized in corporate tax and
legal problems. A member of Kennedy’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (and its chairman after April 1963), Clifford was, at the time of this meeting, employed as an adviser to several large U.S. steel companies.
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President Kennedy: There’s another one in there this morning, you
know.
Roosa: I saw it. That one’s not quite so bad.
President Kennedy: No?
Roosa: But, I think, maybe they’re . . . they’re starting to relent. The
only way you’re going to see any or all of this is broken down into
groups and . . . I’ll leave it with you. I had intended to, do a little—
President Kennedy: Obviously, the dollar, in Sunday’s paper, is hopeless.
Roosa: Yeah.
President Kennedy: [reading] “The dollar under fire in Britain.”
Roosa: That’s . . . that was the essence of it.
President Kennedy: Did we ever find out whether he’s got any conflict
of interest in this, the price we’re paying at this time is what? [Unclear.]
Roosa: They really do that.
President Kennedy: Beautiful job. Hopeless is the word here. Because
they are—
Roosa: Yeah, he is.
President Kennedy: Is there any . . . did you tell me there was someone—
Unidentified: Douglass Cater’s looking into it.168
President Kennedy: Who is?
Unidentified: [Unclear], Cater. Douglass Cater’s looking into it with
The Reporter.
Fowler: [Unclear] report in the Journal calm you down today?169
President Kennedy: Paul Boyd’s article today—
Unidentified: Yes.
President Kennedy: —in the Tribune, was quite an article about their
troubles.170
Fowler: Yes. The economics [unclear].
President Kennedy: Their market has gone down 40 percent in two
years, isn’t it?
168. Douglass Cater was Washington editor and then national affairs editor of The Reporter. Dean
Rusk hoped to name Cater as assistant secretary of state for public affairs but lost out to Press
Secretary Pierre Salinger who selected Roger Tubby for the post. In May 1964, Cater became a
special assistant to President Johnson. Hired chiefly as a speech writer, he was soon drafted to
help frame education policy in particular and health and education proposals in general.
169. Perhaps a reference to “U.S. Chamber Urges Higher Interest Rates to Restrict Flow of Gold
to Other Nations,” Wall Street Journal, 30 July 1962, p. 5, especially if Fowler was being facetious.
170. The steel companies.
79
Roosa: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Forty percent, isn’t it?
Bell: It’s forty?
Sorensen: That’s fantastic.
President Kennedy: Why are they so bad off [unclear]?
Roosa: Well, they’ve tried to play it both ways, and now they’re planning a lot of the expansion.171 And to get prices to increase, they’re trying to clamp down on it, and the events being as crude in its effect as the
original increase.172
President Kennedy: As what?
Roosa: It’s as crude in its effect as the original increase. They’re trying to tighten up without having the instruments for doing it gradually
and effectively.
President Kennedy: Add some [unclear], boy, are they getting cocky.
Sixty-two outward . . . an upturn in business. [Unclear.]
Roosa: Well, we’ve got a separate section on some of them. They’re
indicating that, in general, we’ve been—
President Kennedy: Ninety-eight point four.
Roosa: —primarily, we’ve handled them one at a time.
President Kennedy: [Unclear], you say Dave Cater’s looking at it in
the . . . ?
Unidentified: Yeah. Yeah. He’s looking at the one in the national
[unclear].
Unidentified: I’ll be back in [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] It’s what?
Unidentified: It’s really—
The President’s careful discussion of federal budgetary accounting practices was excellent preparation for his next meeting. As the economists
left the Oval Office, Kennedy walked over to the Cabinet Room to set the
negotiating strategy for the next round of talks in Geneva on a nuclear
test ban.
171. As the Bethlehem story, above, explained, most U.S. steel companies professed a need for
increased capital spending as a way to break out of their sales and profit slumps. Accompanying
this profession was a parallel call for greater corporate cash flow, ostensibly the only way to
finance the modernization the industry required.
172. The original increase was most likely the rescinded mid-April round of price increases
led by U.S. Steel.
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5:00 –6:48 P.M.
If we put in a number n, the Congress will say it should be 2n
and the neutrals will say it should be 1/2n, and we will have a
hell of a war over something that doesn’t do us any good at all
if the Soviets stick with zero.
Meeting on Nuclear Test Ban173
In 1962, nuclear testing was the issue on which people focused their
fears and concerns about the global nuclear arms race. Advocates of a
test ban made various arguments: a test ban might hinder the development of yet more nuclear weapons and relax superpower tension; a ban
at least on above-ground tests might do away with their hazardous
radioactive fallout; and a test ban might keep even more countries from
joining the nuclear club which already included the United States, the
Soviet Union, Britain, and France.
John F. Kennedy wanted a comprehensive test ban treaty. He emphasized the last argument—the risks of nuclear proliferation. A test ban was,
however, very difficult to negotiate. Although nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space could be detected by devices under U.S.
control, it was not possible to monitor effectively underground tests without an intrusive verification system. Since March 1962, the Kremlin had
opposed any verification that involved inspections on Soviet territory.
Within his administration, Kennedy faced strong opposition to a comprehensive test ban. Some opponents believed that a test ban treaty was
unenforceable. Others believed that the outlawing of testing would cause
harm by discouraging scientists from staying in government laboratories
and foreclosing the development of possible new weapons perhaps producing little or no fallout or producing intense radiation without the accompanying blast and firestorm effects of existing weapons. Confusingly, some of
these projected new weapons were sometimes labeled fusion bombs even
though existing thermonuclear weapons were fusion weapons, and some
173. Including President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, Arthur Dean,
Adrian Fisher, William Foster, Leland Haworth, Carl Kaysen, Lyman Lemnitzer, Franklin
Long, John McCone, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, Glenn Seaborg, and Jerome
Wiesner. Tapes 2 and 3, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. For a copy of a memorandum on this meeting, see Memorandum of
Meeting with President Kennedy, 30 July 1962, FRUS, 7: 520.
Meeting on Nuclear Test Ban
81
were called neutron bombs even though considerably different from the neutron bombs or enhanced radiation weapons developed later in the 1960s.
Since the spring of 1961, when John Kennedy first employed the
Attorney General to explore with Soviet representatives the possibility
for a test ban agreement, the President was active in seeking ways to
break the diplomatic stalemate in Geneva and the political logjam at
home. He resorted to both orthodox diplomatic contacts and special back
channels to find common ground with Moscow. For these efforts the
President had but 15 months of failure, not in the least because he faced
a reluctant partner in the Kremlin. But President Kennedy’s foreign
frustration was not simply because of Khrushchev. He found it hard to
maintain a united front with his allies, especially the British, who were, if
anything, more willing to take risks to achieve a comprehensive test ban
than he. World opinion was also shifting against the President. Despite
the fact that John Kennedy himself was a strong advocate for a test ban
and the Soviets had shown no flexibility in their unwillingness to allow
foreign inspections, the United States was viewed by many neutral
nations as the greatest obstacle to achieving a test ban.
Scientific innovation in the summer of 1962 complicated the politics of
the test ban even further. Over the weekend of June 28–30, two Air Force
experts determined through a reassessment of data from the Soviet blast of
February and the French tests in the Sahara in May that the United States
could detect underground blasts with a system that was less than 20 percent the size of the huge verification system proposed at Geneva and would
require far fewer on-site inspections.174 Not only could underground
tremors be detected more easily, but scientists could more reliably distinguish between the seismic and the nuclear test–related explosions.175 These
new criteria, which were referred to as the VELA test results, called into
question the U.S. negotiating position and put downward pressure on both
174. Dr. Doyle Northrup and Dr. Carl Romney worked at the Air Force Technical
Applications Center. Their assessment of seismic capabilities was part of the VELA Program,
overseen by the Pentagon’s Advanced Research Projects Agency and designed for the “evaluation and development of methods of monitoring a treaty of test cessation.” “Nuclear Test
Program,” (undated 1961), FRUS, 7: 178. The Geneva system, first elaborated in 1958, comprised 180 land-based control posts, of which at least 110 were to be on continents.
175. This was the result of two new assessments. The first was the new confidence in the
achievement of a long-range seismic detection capability which would make it possible to
detect events in the Soviet Union from stations outside the country. The second was the determination that the number of earthquakes that might produce unidentified events comparable
to an underground nuclear test of a given magnitude had been substantially reduced since the
previous estimate—by a factor between 4 and 5.
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the number of monitoring stations and number of on-site inspections that
would be required to maintain a watch on all underground explosions
above a certain magnitude. Not all underground tests could be detected,
given available technology; but most of them could.
The Kennedy administration initially mishandled this new scientific
data. The Pentagon released it on July 3 without any diplomatic or political
preparation, placing the White House in the worst possible position with
critics at home and abroad. On the one hand, the Pentagon was now saying
that it did not need as much help to verify an agreement. On the other, the
State Department was still pushing the pre-VELA diplomatic package at
the talks in Geneva. The State Department then succeeded in making the
situation worse. The U.S. negotiator in Geneva, Ambassador Arthur Dean,
misspoke on July 14, telling a group of reporters that the new data probably implied that the United States might not require any monitoring stations on Soviet soil anymore. Although the secretary of state would quickly
correct the ambassador, the impression was out that the U.S. position at
Geneva was soft. At home press criticisms rose among opponents of a comprehensive test ban; while congressional opinion—especially among the
members of the Joint House-Senate Committee on Atomic Energy—reflected
the lack of any political preparation by the executive branch and moved
decidedly against changing the U.S. negotiating position. On July 25,
Senators Chet Holifield and Henry Jackson of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy made clear their opposition to any new concessions to the
Soviets based on the Pentagon’s new analysis: “There could be nothing
more dangerous than to make a hasty change in the fundamental principle
of arms control because of a preliminary scientific finding.”176
Now three weeks after the release of the new data, the administration
was finally getting around to a full-fledged test ban policy review. Kennedy’s
decision to start secret White House taping coincided with the final
stages of the process. The first two phases of the review, a meeting of the
U.S. government’s top nuclear test ban experts—the Committee of
Principals—on July 26 and this committee’s meeting with the President
on July 27, were not taped. But when President Kennedy reconvened this
group on July 30 to discuss the rough consensus reached the week before,
recording machines were whirling in the basement.
The test ban issue would challenge the President’s grasp of technical
detail. Not only would he need to understand the bases of his advisers’
disagreements over the detectable versus the nondetectable; but the
176. Chet Holifield, joint committee chairman, and Henry M. Jackson, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Military Applications to President Kennedy, 25 July 1962, FRUS, 7: Supplement.
83
President was called on to assess the possible future effects of a test ban
on U.S. weapons development. In this vein, there was more bad news for
President Kennedy. Problems were cropping up with the DOMINIC
atmospheric test series, which the United States had launched in April
1962. On July 25, a nuclear test of a Thor missile from Johnston Island,
known as the BLUEGILL shot, experienced a catastrophic failure. The
missile exploded shortly after ignition and caused major damage to the
launch pad and radioactive contamination of the surrounding area.177
President Kennedy brought his nuclear test ban experts to the
White House, including Arthur Dean who was flown in from Geneva on
the weekend, to formulate a coordinated response to these missteps and
challenges. The President wanted modifications in the U.S. negotiating
position, and this meeting was designed to formalize the preliminary
conclusions reached at the two earlier meetings. The basis for conversation was a summary drafted by William C. Foster, director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
Foster’s recommendations contained new proposals. The administration would accept the principle of control stations that were manned by
nationals of the country in which they were located so long as they could
be supervised and their data analyzed by some kind of international
commission. Knowing how politically delicate verification was, the State
Department and ACDA recommended putting forward a test ban agreement that did not require verification—a partial or atmospheric test ban.
Finally, Foster’s paper suggested that the number of these internationally supervised nationally manned control sites could be reduced from
the Geneva number of 180 (with 19 on Soviet soil) to about 25 (with 5 in
the Soviet Union). For the time being, this was to be an internal U.S.
number to be brought out only when the Soviets would accept the concept of some foreign inspection.178
The President’s special assistant for national security affairs
McGeorge Bundy tried to orchestrate this meeting so that Arthur
Dean would emerge with his instructions for Geneva. Before the meeting the President received William Foster’s paper and was told by
Bundy what to expect from the rest of the group.179 At first the
177. FRUS, 7: 520, note 1.
178. Memorandum from the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to
President Kennedy, “U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests and
Other Disarmament Proposals” (as Revised), 30 July 1962, FRUS, 7: 517–19.
179. Bundy to the President, “Agenda for 5 P.M. Meeting Today,” 30 July 1962, “Nuclear Weapons”
folder, National Security Files: Box 100a, John F. Kennedy Library. This document and the transcript that follows provide a wonderful case study of how high-level meetings can go awry.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
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Department of Defense would make the argument for a comprehensive
test ban. A scientific representative from the Atomic Energy Commission would then explain the effect of a test ban on U.S. technical
development. Then Foster would run through his recommendations,
which Bundy assumed the President would accept. Next week the
United States would offer a partial test ban to the Soviets while sending signals that a comprehensive test ban might be possible, with a
lower number of required inspections and even nationally manned
monitoring stations, so long as Khrushchev returned to his pre-1962
position of supporting the concept of foreign inspectors in the Soviet
Union. However, the meeting would not go as planned.
President Kennedy started taping before formally calling the meeting
to order. He is overheard asking Glenn Seaborg, the chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, for information about how long it would take
the United States to complete the DOMINIC test series in view of the loss
of the launch pad on Johnston Island. President Kennedy was evidently
concerned that the U.S. series should be completed as quickly as possible
and certainly before the current Soviet tests ended. He did not want to be
negotiating a test ban while the United States was the only superpower
exploding atomic weapons into the atmosphere.
The tape quality is poor.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] I think [unclear] to repair that pad
out there?180
Glenn Seaborg: Yes.
President Kennedy: Let me say again, the only problem that we’re
going to have is if their tests are over; so they can tell people that their
tests are over . . . ready to go in a few months, is that correct?
Seaborg: That’s right, the 27th.
President Kennedy: Seven to eight weeks, yeah?
Seaborg: Yes.
President Kennedy: Yes, and then we get [unclear] and then as we,
we’re also saying, [unclear] won’t be finished until October 25th, the following day.
Unidentified: [Mumbles.]
Unidentified: What’s that?
Franklin Long: There’s only one.
180. The pad on Johnston Island destroyed by test failure on 25 July.
85
William Foster: There is only one pad. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Can I fire it from any other pad you’ve got?
Unidentified: The only way [unclear] there’s no other way of doing it.
President Kennedy: Well, the only problem that I see is when we
start firing that thing after they get finished [unclear].
The conversation gets choppy. Kennedy and Wiesner may have been distracted as the rest of the group settles into their seats.
President Kennedy: . . . probably, because [unclear] that went over.
Jerome Wiesner: I want to get rid of—
Paul Nitze: They’ve said—
Unidentified: They’re waiting . . . They want to launch September
1st or November 4th might be as long—
President Kennedy: August 5th, September 5th, October 5th. The
earliest, the closest thing, isn’t it. [Unclear] only three tests we’re talking about?181
Unidentified: Three tests, yes.
McGeorge Bundy: Mr. President, we thought that we might actually
sit down and wrestle with that problem for a few minutes after this
meeting today because it is a tough one.
Wiesner: Have you seen the amendment?182 They’re trying to get us
in a box and keep us from getting the information.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but we’re not right . . . The fact that . . . OK.
A short indistinct conversation follows on this point. The Secretary of
State interjects, “Suppose they take our absolute advantage? Maybe
that means we’d offer . . .”
Foster: [in response to an unclear comment] October 20th, we might
agree, is still in that area.183
Dean Rusk: As I think about it, it’s a fairly remote—
Unidentified: Yes, I think. [An unclear exchange follows.]
McGeorge Bundy, the President’s special assistant for national security
affairs, signals the formal start of the meeting.
Bundy: Mr. President, we thought we’d begin this afternoon by
reviewing some of the studies that you asked to have done over the
181. The President has walked into a minefield. There is a dispute among his national security
advisers as to how many U.S. nuclear tests remain in this series. The Defense Department, for
example, would like to add new airdrop tests.
182. Unidentified amendment.
183. On 20 October the Soviets were expected to complete their then-current atmospheric
test series.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
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weekend. Two were done by the Defense Department and two were
done between the Defense Department and the AEC.184
Then, Secretary McNamara, if you would speak right at the beginning, if you would, and then Commissioner Haworth might certainly follow him.185
Unidentified: Which statement are you on?
Robert McNamara: Mr. Nitze will comment on the work we did for
the President.
Nitze: Mr. President, you asked us to look at what the world would
look like if there was a longer [unclear], if there were no test ban.186 We
looked . . . One of the problems we looked at was the problem of diffusion, what would happen with diffusion of nuclear weapons, and first of
all as to what the technical capabilities of various countries were, and we
found there were 16 countries that had the technical capability to produce at least a few nuclear weapons within the next ten years. These are
16 in addition to the 4 present nuclear countries.187
And the cost of getting into the nuclear business for them might be on
the order of [unclear] typically 175 million dollars each. The cost of a
delivery system would be much more, but they might have just a rudimentary delivery system that could deliver these small number of weapons
over a [unclear]. And the time from initiation of an advanced program to
completion might be three to seven years, something on that order.
We also looked at the motivation that these [unclear] have to get into
the business, and the restraints on their getting in. The restraints against
their going into the business, if, in general, if they haven’t got a clear military need—for instance, Canada doesn’t need nuclear weapons—but
there are pressures today in the international community against their
going in.
184. “The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Military Balance with and without a Test Ban Agreement,” “The
Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with and without a Test Ban Agreement,” “Maintaining Readiness
to Test During a Test Ban,” “Relative Technical and Military Advantages of Testing or NonTesting Under Various Testing Constraints,” Departments and Agencies: ACDA, Disarmament,
General 7/29–31/62, National Security Files, Box 256, John F. Kennedy Library.
185. Leland Haworth was commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission.
186. “The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Military Balance with and without a Test Ban Agreement,” and “The
Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with and without a Test Ban Agreement.” As of August 2000
both reports remain classified. As of August 2000 the only two reports that had been declassified were the memorandum on maintaining readiness and the memorandum on relative technical and military advantages of testing or not testing under various testing constraints.
187. The United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1948), Great Britain (1952), and most
recently France (1960).
87
The pressures for their going in are: the prestige of [the] military—a
seeming military requirement, in the face of [unclear] their own people.
But after looking at the capabilities and the restraints, we came to the
conclusion that the ones that would most likely develop a nuclear capability in this sphere were China,188 and perhaps Sweden and India,189 and
that might lead also the Australians and the Japanese to try to get into
the business, and one couldn’t exclude the Union of South Africa,190 from
perhaps wanting to get into this business in a ten-year time frame. I’m
not sure that Egypt [unclear] get in in this ten-year time frame.
The pressures on both Germany and Italy to either get a capability
of their own or to acquire weapons or to share the control of nuclear
weapons would be very great. But if they go forward with some kind of a
multilateral form or if the Europeans do, this might take that pressure off.
But if you look at the period beyond 10 years, up to an additional 15
years, then the possibility becomes much higher, and obviously less predictable. The important point is that if both we and the U.S.S.R. continue
testing, then it is possible that the cost of producing weapons will go
down substantially. It might go down by a factor as large as ten or a hundred, so that it will cost really very little to produce nuclear weapons, if
both tested to perfection a nonfission trigger, which you can do with
cheap materials therefore. And furthermore, the diffusion of nuclear
technology is to be anticipated if both of us test this knowledge, the
technological knowledge exists in our and the Russian technological
communities. This does seep out.
Also, the proliferation of peaceful reactors will cause people to have
more knowledge about nuclear matters. They will probably have nuclear
power plants to convert plutonium from those power plants. So the ease
of getting into the business in the period beyond 10 years, up to 25 years,
would be far greater.
Furthermore, if some of the smaller countries begin to get them,
then this induces other countries to get them, so that looking forward to
a 25-year period, we would consider, in the absence of a test ban, the risk
of diffusion to be very great indeed.
Of course, the question arises as just the degree to which a comprehensive test ban would, in fact, limit that diffusion. If it’s our idea that
a comprehensive test ban is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
188. China tested its first atomic device in 1964.
189. India tested its first atomic device in 1974.
190. The Union of South Africa developed atomic weapons in the 1980s.
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to inhibiting, and slowing, the dispersal of nuclear knowledge and the
problem of nuclear testing, I think it would probably require a degree
of collaboration between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to really inhibit the
further spread of nuclear weapons, even if you had a comprehensive
test ban.
If this were merely an atmospheric test ban, it was our conclusion
that there wouldn’t be much inhibition to the further spread of weapons
because testing underground would be legal and most countries could
probably develop underground tests if they were strongly motivated to
getting into this business.
President Kennedy: Does that increase the—By what factor does
that increase the difficulty, if the fellow could go underground?
Nitze: I think Glenn [Seaborg] could speak to that . . .
Long: Against the total development costs, Mr. President, very little.
President Kennedy: So, in other words, even if the country had not
done any atmospheric testing they could test underground. . . .
Seaborg: Oh yes, it would slow them down a few years, I suppose.
Bundy: Not that long.
Seaborg: Not that long.
Bundy: If you make your preparations ahead of time—the French, for
example, [unclear interjection] were in their primitive stage of doing
underground testing recently, and . . .
Seaborg: Well, it depends on how long a program and [unclear]
about how sophisticated, and how far they’re going, and so forth.
McNamara: For most of these cases, we are estimating five or six
years of development and [the need to test] underground might add a
year to it.
Wiesner: They knew they had to do it from the start because while
they were doing all their other things, they’d be learning how to do
underground certainly, too.
A fragmentary side conversation arises over how to determine when a
country goes nuclear.
Leland Haworth: Well, we had some limitations and we totaled the
results, et cetera.
Unidentified: This total is true.
Bundy: Yes, but if all you want to know is: Did it go? Is what you
want to know . . . in 1945?
Haworth: Yeah, but you don’t need to go back so very far. That’s not
what we’re talking about here.
Bundy: You’re talking about the first nuclear weapons.
89
President Kennedy: [The President restores order so that Secretary Nitze
can finish his presentation.] Right. OK. Fine.
Nitze: We also did a study on what the effect of continuing testing
would be upon the relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and
there, I think, in the summary, we said that continued testing should lead
to growing equality between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Today, they’re
probably as far, if not further, along in high-yield, efficient weight-toyield ratios. Below the high yield, we have a decided advantage today, and
what our advantage today rests . . . not only upon a more efficient, smaller
set of warheads but also upon the more sophisticated general technology:
hardened, accurate, sophisticated weapons. If they continued testing,
there would be a trend toward their knowing whatever it is we know.
There would also be greater knowledge of effects of weapons, and there
would be a risk of the unforeseeable, things that you can’t today foresee.
President Kennedy: What about the fusion . . . If you had a test ban,
where you would . . . your chance of getting a fusion bomb would be?191
[Unclear] not the [unclear] [bomb].192 In any case . . .
Unidentified: Oh, if there was a complete test ban, including a ban
on underground, yes, that could be.
Bundy: You could do it by cheating.
Unidentified: Well, I think this is an important point, if you want
them to take one [unclear] against cheating.
McNamara: At the threshold proposed, it would allow development
of the fusion bomb if one was to cheat under that threshold.193
President Kennedy: Under the threshold of what [unclear]?
Bundy: It depends, Mr. President, with any [system], it depends
what you test in.194 We’ve talked about approximately up to 10 kilotons
in alluvium—the estimates are that, especially as systems of testing
become more sophisticated, you could learn all you need to know for an
all-fusion weapon, assuming that you didn’t get caught [testing devices
having an explosive force of less than 10 kilotons]. Now, statistically, if
191. The President is possibly referring to the development of a fusion bomb with a fusion
trigger, which might create very little fallout.
192. The President probably is making clear he is interested in discussing the development of
new kinds of fusion bombs and not the existing hydrogen bomb, which is also a fusion bomb.
193. The Secretary of Defense is warning the President that even under a comprehensive test
ban, states could develop more-advanced kinds of fusion bombs. The manufacture of a fusion
bomb requires very low yield nuclear tests, which would not be detected by the various monitoring systems proposed by the United States and Great Britain to verify a comprehensive test ban.
194. It refers to the ability of control stations to detect the blast.
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you run a big series through time, there are lots of reasons that might . . .
that will open a bigger field of debate as to whether you could or couldn’t get away with it. Different people will take different views.195
President Kennedy: Would the [unclear] consider the development
of the fusion bomb . . . Would that [unclear]?196
Nitze: Yes, it might reduce the cost of weapons by a very large factor,
and would reduce the cost in terms of plutonium or other fissionable
material . . .
Unidentified: Not according to—
President Kennedy: Once you have the weapons, does it really, is it . . .
and all these things that have to go into that equation, but once you have
the weapons, and you’ve paid the costs, and you have the material, is it . . .
Starting over again would be a big saving. But if you’ve got to . . . given
our position, the stockpile of the Soviet Union, the stockpile of the nuclear
club, [is it] worthwhile enough for us not to have a test ban?197
McNamara: Mr. President, it’s very difficult for me to put down on
paper the military advantage associated with one side having a fusion bomb
and the other side not. I know that [unclear] but I haven’t been able to put
down on paper, a clear analysis of why the fusion bomb, possession of it
exclusively, provides one with a substantial military advantage, assuming
that the other side has a large stock of nuclear weapons. [Unclear exchange.]
Wiesner: One of the great dangers here is that this is a specific
example of general [unclear] a continued research and development
[unclear] on our part makes the diffusion easier. If we learn how to make
these weapons, [initially] by fission triggers, presumably it will be easier
to make and cheaper to make, and both easier and cheaper for other people, too. So that if you won’t accept Bob McNamara’s statement that it is
essentially hard to see the real advantage of a fusion weapon once you
have the enormous stockpiles that the world has, it seems to me a kind
of a disadvantage to development.198 [Unclear] technical and other
[unclear] to development. I think that [unclear] there’s probably a
195. Apparently even if a single blast were undetectable by a control station, a long series of
these small tests might be detectable.
196. According to Seaborg’s notes, “The President inquired as to the value of the fusion (neutron) bomb, which might be developed in underground testing” [Glenn T. Seaborg, with
Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1981), p. 166].
197. Kennedy wants to know whether the advantages of the neutron bomb, whose development would be illegal under a comprehensive test ban, outweigh the strategic advantages of a
comprehensive test ban.
198. It refers to a comprehensive test ban.
91
tremendous incentive on the other side to cheat on this particular prototype.199 And even if they did, it’s hard to see that it could imbalance the
military situation.
President Kennedy: General, do you want to say something about
this?
Lyman Lemnitzer: Based on the characteristics of fusion weapons,
there’s some difference of opinion on the characteristics. We believe
there’s [an] advantage to having it.
Wiesner: Can I add something, for just a moment? There was a couple
of years ago a general belief that the fusion weapon was a special kind of
battlefield weapon [unclear], because the nuclear fusion weapon would be
used to kill troops without doing blast damage and without leaving
radioactivity behind. There was a smaller, detailed study of it made last
year that turned around this, to give you more light, showed that this was
a mixed blessing. Because while it killed a few people close in rapidly, it
was really a time bomb in the sense that most of the people who got the
neutron blast that were not killed instantaneously, were, in the fact of the
matter, in bad health, but were going to die in a period from 12 hours to 2
weeks. So that what you would be creating on the battlefield was essentially a kamikaze situation with troops, and it would have to be . . . So
we’re not going to do that. I think the [unclear] many of these people who
were saying that this is a very unique close battlefield weapon withdraw
from that position. And I think the designers are likely to feel very
strongly [unclear] that this is an important role for the . . .
President Kennedy: Well, let’s proceed on [unclear].
Before Commissioner Haworth starts, there is an indistinct exchange
over something that the AEC might summarize for the President.
Kennedy also asks McNamara whether he has any papers that would
summarize this matter. McNamara says that he does. Just as Haworth
begins to speak, someone asks for a brief adjournment. Perhaps in
response to the previous unclear exchange, Haworth is heard discussing
estimates of the amount of time it would take the United States to
resume nuclear testing in the event that the Soviets or anyone else suddenly broke a test ban. The issue of keeping some U.S. testing capability,
even under a test ban, leads Haworth to raise the question of using
Britain’s Christmas Island testing facility.
Haworth: [Unclear—almost inaudible.] There are four facets. Before we
. . . the most important of these is Christmas Island. Because we are not
sure they would release their [island] for any weapons tests. We believe
199. A fusion (neutron) bomb.
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that if at all possible, we should try to procure it with very few limitations
of the [unclear] should be restrictive. But other than that, we ought to try
to be part of a long-term agreement in which we are both free to do the
things we want to do, and not be committed to [unclear] British.
We believe that with this maintained state of readiness, that as far as the
field is concerned we can then have about a two- to three-month response
time in any case of an abrogation of a treaty. If we spent several million dollars to improve it, we might reduce that down to 60 to 90 days. In the—
President Kennedy: Sixty to 90 days?
Haworth: Yes. I’m sorry, just 30 to 60 days. We believe, though, at the
same time in working on developing an airborne, all airborne [unclear]
for [unclear] tests we’ve done some of that in the current series, and
believe therefore the whole purpose might well [unclear] to get it, and
even though we [unclear] on this issue, he was working on the instrumentation and so on.200 [Unclear.] If we should have another atmospheric
series [unclear].
President Kennedy: We’ll talk about that this afternoon.
Haworth: Then we should fix up and maintain Johnston Island for the
special effects tests that it’s being used for now. We should [make ready]
the pad, and still another for the same technique [unclear], that sort of
test [unclear] the other, but probably [unclear] do [unclear], and find this
sort of the analogs of the airborne capability for weapons development.
The Navy is studying our shipborne capability for the launch pads’ effects.
And this kind of limiting factor [unclear] Johnston Island. One of the
things that impresses about the airborne and shipborne capabilities is
that you can make yourself more independent of weather and other considerations [unclear]. Well, so much for the [unclear] as I say, we—
President Kennedy: But we are in touch now with the . . . We are
[unclear] to [unclear] an alternate land site where we could duplicate the
Christmas tests. In other words, [unclear].201
Haworth: Yes. Just maintain that we have any jurisdiction over or
[unclear] jurisdiction over the island.
Bundy: It’s an island which is no good for anything else, Mr.
President. That’s all I’m saying.
Haworth: Except for scientific tests.
200. Nuclear tests that do not require a launch pad, such as airdrop tests, would not need as
much startup time in the event that a test ban were suddenly broken.
201. In case the British decided not to allow the United States to maintain a workable launch
site on Christmas Island as insurance against a future Soviet treaty violation.
93
President Kennedy: Well, we’ll see what they say. If they refuse to
give us this long-term agreement, then we’ll [unclear].
Haworth: Now turning to the other paper, it had to do with—where is
that?—possible technical developments in these areas, so long as there is a
[test ban] treaty or [there is] not to be all-out testing, or testing development and so forth. A lot of it has been said already around the table, so I’ll
try to be very brief.
We considered the case of a total test ban, by that I mean a really
effective total test ban, and I think that our conclusions are the same
as Mr. Nitze’s with respect to different [unclear]. So we then looked,
Mr. President, at a comprehensive test ban with cheating. We considered two levels of cheating, one below 10 kt. and one below 3 kt. I
think that one can summarize it very quickly by saying that, at either
of these levels, one can study most of the phenomena of the basic
underlying physical things.
He can, of course, develop devices depending on the level at which he
[unclear] tests.202 He can develop devices, small weapons, a combination
of larger weapons. He can make tests that he can later extrapolate to still
larger weapons. And it depends then on just how far he dare go. It’s an
important thing, I think, though, that at 10 kilotons—for example, one
can probably, by the scheme known as the [Choctaw] test, you could get
the trigger of the secondary of a thermonuclear weapon—he can probably be pretty sure of having designs that he could trust up to several
hundred kilotons, even though he’d only [have] done a 10-kiloton test.
That’s typical [unclear]. Then there’s the all-fusion thing that’s been
already mentioned. I believe that the most important aspect of that is the
fact that it might unbalance the unbalance that now exists between the
Soviets and ourselves on quantities of that material [unclear] values that
we can measure.
President Kennedy: What we need—
Haworth: Well, we have much more fissionable material than anybody.
It seems to me that these improvements in efficiency, all the way
down to the all-fusion weapons, are, from this point on, probably more
important, from that standpoint, than even from the standpoint of lightweight and the other military-type device.
President Kennedy: I don’t see the . . . I see the advantage for them
to cheat, but I don’t see that that makes for much of an advantage for us,
does it?
202. Referring to a cheater country.
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Haworth: No. Well, but we have been considering how the Russians
see this.
President Kennedy: But in other words, though, whether you have
an agreement or not have an agreement—[Unclear exchange.]
Haworth: Yes, I see. Right. I think it’s an additional reason to be very
careful with the recommendations [unclear].
Then we considered the case of no restrictions on underground testing, and there, of course, you can do more of the same, plus the fact that
you can then begin to do what are called reduced-yield tests for very
large weapons, and in all probability in a year or two one can do tests up
to a few hundred kilotons, and those could incorporate, then, these
reduced-yield tests which would enable you to design weapons up to several megatons, or a few megatons, entirely underground.
Now, with respect to the underground, the total comprehensive ban,
and the possibility of cheating, I actually believe the most important
thing is the point that Dr. Seaborg made in our last meeting, namely,
that the fact that the cheater would keep his laboratories going, doing
tests and experiments.203 There’d be a core of ideas that would keep the
whole subject alive, would make the field more attractive to good,
aggressive people. I think that is the most important thing.
And of course it has a big impact on the thing I personally am most
worried about, and that is the effect of a later abrogation, that it seems to
me that our greatest danger—and I’m not saying the most likely danger,
but the one that would have the biggest effect—would be if we would go
downhill in our capability, the Russians would then after three or four or
whatever years, bring a surprise abrogation. They would have two advantages: one, if they had wanted to cheat in the meantime and keep going,
they could have some technical advance, plus this liveliness that I spoke of
a moment ago, plus, of course, the fact that they would have planned it for
a particular time and so forth. So I think that the one that—
President Kennedy: What might they find out, though? Let’s . . .
Given the kind of possibilities of cheating under this agreement [unclear]
more reasonable. Obviously, they’re not going to take unreasonable risks,
[unclear] people will test, but they’re [unclear] and abrogate in five years.
What does it take to find out [unclear]?
Haworth: Well, from the point that I spoke about earlier [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah, but they might . . . But I don’t see that any
of the ones that you talked about, are really decisive.
203. The President last met with this group on Friday, 27 July 1962.
95
Haworth: They’re probably not decisive. I don’t believe that underground cheating would be decisive. That’s one of the reasons why I say
that I think these indirect effects, this effectiveness and morale of the
laboratories and so forth, is more important than any technical advances
that they would find out. And then I think that was, in turn, most important if it is leading up to an abrogation.
Wiesner: Technically, people know that even if this situation developed and there was an abrogation, and we lost a year or two, that this
doesn’t mean we’ve lost a military advantage. Now, [there are] so many
other dimensions that this nation has an option on, if you want to, to
move in.204 For example, we can increase the number of missiles. There
are so many responses we have which you could do quickly. The problem
is to make it obvious to them that increasing their arsenal would
[unclear] respond [unclear] if they do abrogate the treaty. I think you
have to have [unclear].
Rusk: [to Wiesner] Are you and Dr. Haworth [saying] the same
thing . . . that it would be difficult to maintain a central core of men who
give this their full intellectual attention [unclear] . . . ?205
Haworth: For a long period of time, actually. I think irrespective of
magnitude . . . I think a formal treaty [unclear]. If it were a real treaty I
think people would be rather willing to take [unclear].
President Kennedy: I think. . . . Let’s see now . . . [Unclear.]
Sounds of papers being shuffled. Participants look at Foster’s memorandum.
Foster: We have read them and [unclear] generally agree with these
[Defense and joint Atomic Energy Commission–Defense] reports. I
think the first [unclear] basic report which was expressed [unclear] in
general terms last week, and following these studies, we would recommend in effect that you do a [unclear] we’re going to [unclear] in order
to get the advantage in timing, we recommend that we table an atmospheric, outer space, underwater test ban treaty.206
204. Wiesner was talking about ways the United States could blunt the strategic consequences of a Soviet test ban violation.
205. Rusk is referring to the problem of maintaining nuclear weapons research under conditions of a total test ban.
206. In his formal paper, William Foster laid out seven recommendations:
a. Atmospheric test ban. The United States should table an atmospheric–outer space–underwater
test ban treaty.
b. Comprehensive test ban. At the time of tabling an atmospheric–outer space–underwater test
ban treaty, the United States should declare its willingness to accept a comprehensive test
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President Kennedy: Have we ever tabled the one before [unclear].
Foster: Well, our ambassador [unclear] said the other day . . .
Bundy: We have never tabled a treaty, we have made proposals . . .207
Foster: Right. [Unclear interjection by Wiesner.] [Unclear] was turned
down and see which way this one is turned down. It would at least put
us in a good position. And an atmospheric treaty does not have the
domestic political difficulties which you would expect with the comprehensive [unclear]. At the time—
Rusk: And, as well, it has very large international appeal.
Foster: Oh, it has a great deal of appeal, really emotionally, and
whether it is proper or not, it has a great emotional appeal, in terms of
fallout. We would at the same time, express our willingness to discuss a
comprehensive test ban treaty, without numbers, but involving a possible
reduction in the number of on-site inspections, and involving a slightly
different type of control post than had been in the Geneva treaty. We
would not discuss numbers, of either control posts or the on-site inspections, unless the Soviets expressed a willingness to get away from their
zero on-site inspections.
President Kennedy: Have they ever indicated a willingness to go
ban treaty involving internationally monitored national control posts on Soviet soil and
involving a possible reduction in the number of on-site inspections. We should be prepared
to provide the conference with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location,
and identification capabilities of internationally monitored and coordinated national systems while making the point that this data did not eliminate the need for on-site inspections.
We should avoid proposing specific numbers either of stations or of on-site inspections on
the ground that we saw no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the
Soviet Union accepted the principle of on-site inspections.
c. Soviet testing. In the event the Soviets commence an atmospheric series, we should continue
to indicate willingness to negotiate in both areas a and b but should indicate that we might
wish to conduct further tests ourselves if the Soviet series produced extraordinary results.
d. Domestic political preparation. The decision to table a revised comprehensive treaty should
await the developments both at Geneva and in this country. A major campaign of domestic
information and political preparation should be begun as to the new data and its significance.
e. No-transfer agreement. The United States should press for a worldwide agreement banning
the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology. This course of action
would be related practically but not organically to the other courses of action.
f. Underground testing. We should continue our underground testing program until a comprehensive treaty had been achieved.
g. Readiness to test in the atmosphere. We should, to the extent feasible, maintain readiness to test
in the atmosphere. This would involve discussions with the United Kingdom as to the continuing readiness of Christmas Island as a test site.
207. The United States proposed a partial test ban in September 1961. The Soviets rejected
this proposal.
97
ahead with control posts? And now, of course, it’s got to be a question of
what “internationally coordinated nationally controlled” control posts,
what those words mean. [Unclear.] How do we interpret that phrase, in
other words?
Foster: Well, I thought, again, that we should go in, with the internationally monitored and coordinated control posts, so that the data from
control posts on the Soviet soil would feed into the international system
and that there would be the opportunity of having some representatives,
other than all Soviet citizens, who will take a look at this situation.
Now, the scientists, I believe it is fair to state, think that the value of
that data is, from a scientific viewpoint, not particularly great. From a
political viewpoint at home, however, it has a political significance, which
without some such request for an outside look at the Soviet data, I think
their political friends have made it quite clear to us that they would feel
that this is a tremendous concession for the Soviet Union [unclear]. It
would take a lot of education before we can accept such a—
President Kennedy: But our whole scientific opinion is that we can
do without that information from the Soviet Union as far as these control posts are concerned?
Rusk: As far as detection is concerned.
President Kennedy: [Someone coughs.] Gesundheit. This is really in a
sense a political decision that there are increasingly [unclear] treaty.
Unidentified: I think we ought to accept it myself. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: That could be the start. [Unclear] could be
[unclear].
Arthur Dean: Well, I think that we could approach the Soviets and,
under general [unclear] and comprehensive treaty, not mentioning the
number of control posts and number of on-site inspections. Of course,
they’re pretty smart. They would immediately start playing a numbers
game with us, and say, “Well, you had 180 [control posts] before, and
you’re talking about 19. . . .”208
President Kennedy: We were talking 180 around the world, were
we?209
Dean: We were talking 180 around the world, and 19 on Soviet
territory.
208. Arthur Dean was the chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee at Geneva until 27 December 1962.
209. The President is referring to the verification system proposed at the Geneva conference
in 1958.
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President Kennedy: And now we’re talking about [unclear]?
Dean: We’re talking about 20 on an international [basis] outside the
Soviet Union and 5 on Soviet territory.210
Long: That is not a fair comparison, though, because although it’s
180 that one had before, where you covered all testing and all media, and
with the 20 that you mentioned, you’re only [verifying] with respect to
seismic [areas], so that, if you would . . . the numbers wouldn’t be quite
that different.
Foster: It might be 170, wouldn’t it?
Wiesner: But we did want 17 seismic control posts in the Soviet
Union and we’re now talking about 5. I think that’s a relatively—
Bundy: We’re not talking about 5, I think that’s really the point.
[Bundy chuckles.]
President Kennedy: We’re now talking about 5 in the international
system. [Unclear] understand [unclear]. Before this, we were talking
about 180, is that correct?
Long: Yes, that’s right. And those 180 had . . . All of them, or essentially
all of them, had seismic equipment on site, but they also, all of them had
various types of equipment to monitor tests at high altitude in outer space.
President Kennedy: But will we still need that, won’t we?
Long: There’s quite a good case to be made for letting the monitoring of high altitude and outer space be done by unilateral systems, so
that simply [unclear].
President Kennedy: Why is that? What is that case?
Long: Well, the case is threefold. One of them is that outer space is
ideally the sort of situation where we can do fully as well by ourselves as
we can with the [unclear]. [Unclear] as to the numbers of pieces of
equipment, things that we go into that if we have to do—
President Kennedy: In other words the United States alone can monitor that around the world?
Wiesner: If we want to.
President Kennedy: If we want to. So there’s 180, now we reduce
that to 20? We could reduce it to 20, these . . .
The conversation becomes confused. Evidently Dr. Long of ACDA envisions deploying new types of monitoring stations that were not prescribed
in the old Geneva system of 180 stations. Meanwhile Jerome Wiesner has
210. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had suggested that the new technical information permitted a scaling back of the verification system to 25 national control posts that
would be internationally monitored.
99
just assured the President that some of the monitoring can be done by systems controlled by the United States within its own territory.
Long: If one did the very tentative kind of technical proposal which
we have been working on, one would include seismic and atmospheric in
this international [system], and then the number of separate stations
might be nearer to 50, of which [unclear].
President Kennedy: We’re at 50. . . . What about 20?
Wiesner: Twenty at seismic only, you see. And these things are not
supposed to be co-located [unclear].
President Kennedy: All right. [Unclear.] So 20 is the seismic . . . ?
Long: Twenty of these would be seismic, some of which would have
other facilities like electromagnetic pulse. And as I say, the total number
would cover atmospheric and . . .
President Kennedy: Some of these, 30, and the 20 seismics, and 30
makes 50. Would they all be located in the United States? [Several people
simultaneously answer “No,” and someone adds “All around the world.”] So
where do we get the 80–20? [Unclear] seismic. Where did we get . . . ?
Long: Twenty is the number of seismic stations which by themselves,
if no stations inside Russia, do quite a good job of monitoring seismic
events.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] do quite a good job. [General laughter,
perhaps in reaction to this confusion over the number of control posts.]
Wiesner: At the last meeting, Mr. President, last Friday—
Unidentified: Mr. President, this is why we decided not to have precise numbers!
Unidentified: Let’s not.
Wiesner: Last Friday, you were given a chart which compared the
performance of the system that Dr. Long is talking about with basic
[unclear] with the performance of the system that we attributed to a
[unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: I know that they’re comparing in some way
[unclear] with 180 [unclear] I know . . . testing the equipment in outer
space, the atmosphere, seismic, and electromagnetic. Now we’re only talking about 20 that would be just seismic? Or 50 that would be just seismic?
Long: No, they . . . If the . . . The 20 figure comes up over and over
again, because if one focuses only on the underground problem, 20 stations outside Russia, 20 seismic stations, is a system that has been
assessed in detail and whose characteristics are known rather well, and
we are reasonably confident—
President Kennedy: Is this 20 based on the new information, last
month’s data, or is this based on the [unclear]?
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Long: Well, it’s based on a consideration of last month’s data.
Particularly the capability of those [unclear].
President Kennedy: All right. So now we’ve got 20 that are seismic.
Now we’re talking about 50. So where did we get the other 30?
Long: One would have—this is going to be cumbersome but I think
[unclear] a lot, one would have about 15, around the world. Fifteen pieces
of equipment which were acoustic, [unclear] then we’d have about 25
pieces of equipment around the world for electromagnetic pulse, but some
of these various things would be co-located, so that the total number
would be 45 or 50.
President Kennedy: Now, tell me your judgment on the 20. As I
understand it, the other 30 would be for above ground, is that correct?
Then either [unclear]. With 20 seismic, if the Russians were cheating, so
far as testing, we’re in [unclear] of this great data from the control posts
within the Soviet Union. We didn’t have any [unclear]. What kind of . . .
What are the chances of picking up [unclear] . . . ?
Long: The detection threshold for, on a sort of comparable test basis
would be . . . The detection threshold for the Geneva system for this particular standard [unclear] tuff would have been about 1 kiloton.211 The
threshold for these 20 will be just about twice that, about 2 kilotons. The
identification capability is reasonably close to the same.
President Kennedy: Now that’s for tuff; and for the other material?
[Several people answer simultaneously: “Alluvium.”]
Long: The same factor of two would hold.
President Kennedy: Was that five before? Now it’s up to ten?
Unidentified: It’s actually up to 22.
Unidentified: Twenty-two. Six and 12. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: In other words, you couldn’t really do without
any inspection in this time period, could you?
Unidentified: You could not.
President Kennedy: You could do without controls [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s correct.
President Kennedy: What is your judgment, let’s say you have two
conditions of . . . You don’t have reliance upon their national control stations, how many inspections, scientifically . . . How many incidences
could you pick up on one of these [unclear] machines, whether it would
211. Tuff is hard rock in which a nuclear explosion can be tested. It is a mixture of volcanic
ashes and igneous rock. A low-yield test (1 kiloton) would be easier to detect in this hard
material than in the softer alluvium.
101
be seismic, that you think it would require inspection in the Soviet Union
[unclear] based on that latent data?
Long: One would end up seeing something like very roughly 50 to
75 small earthquakes, small events, small seismic events, which were on
land, which were sort of not obviously in the shallow coastal waters—so
that there’s some reasonable chance to think they were on land [unclear]
reasonable chance. But it should be said that that’s a number that does
fluctuate from year to year, so that one year it might be 50 or another
year it might be a hundred.
President Kennedy: And in a previous year, this new information . . .
how many do we think it would add? If [unclear] tell about . . . ?
Long: Oh, the number would have been . . . well, with what previously,
[before the] very new, it would have been very high, something like a
thousand.
President Kennedy: So now you figure that you can tell, by pointing
these machines, you could pick up, distinguish, between an earthquake
and an atomic explosion except in 50 to 75 cases, is that about it?
Long: Yes. That’s in some ways an unfair, but actually a correct, statement. It doesn’t quite put the thing in the picture in the sense that a better station would detect more of those smaller events and of course leave
somewhat more undetected, so that in a sense we would have a better station and it would see more events, at least maybe a hundred [unclear].
Wiesner: If we improved the system, so that the threshold goes
down, we’ll see more and more events, so that [unclear] a very poor system wouldn’t see anything, needing inspection. But this is the dilemma
[unclear].
President Kennedy: For example, if you move the threshold up . . .
[unclear] talk about cheating
Wiesner: Yup. You could. [Unclear.]
Bundy: We’d be consistent then.
Wiesner: But we’d be very happy if under all conditions we could see
a clear implosion; but if we could, then these number of events might be
four times as many.
President Kennedy: Now, let’s say the 50 to 75, if you test . . . Does
that include the 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 kilotons in alluvial?
Unidentified: Yes. Yes.
President Kennedy: Would that include, say, 2 kilotons in alluvial?
Long: No, it would go to 5 to 10 kilotons.
President Kennedy: Five to 10. And anything below 5 to 10 kilotons
in alluvial would not show in that, would not go into the 50 to 75?
Unclear exchange between Long and the President.
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Long: Two kilotons associated with 10 to 20 in alluvial. I said 5 to
10. [Unclear exchange.] In tuff.
President Kennedy: Two kilotons in tuff is equivalent to [unclear]?
Several say, “10 to 20.”
President Kennedy: Now, if you drop the . . . that’s the threshold is it?
Long: Yes.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] On the alluvial, then, say, you had 5 to
10 in alluvium, could you pick that up at all?
Wiesner: No.
Long: Well, on this system, a single 5- to 10-kiloton test, a single 5kiloton test in alluvium probably would not be seen.
Bundy: What’s not clear to me is whether that’s true of all tests, or
whether this depends on circumstances and conditions—
Long: It does depend on circumstances. There’s a very significant
amount of fluctuation in the behavior of these stations depending on precisely where the station is and where the test is, so that . . .
Bundy: There’s a risk factor involved . . .
Long: It shouldn’t be taken quite that. . . . There is a risk factor involved.
Wiesner: As a matter of fact, if we all calculated that the threshold is
5 kilotons, I doubt whether anyone would have the courage to test
[unclear] kilotons just because of the uncertainty in someone being able
to [unclear].
President Kennedy: It occurred to me, there are certainties in regard
to testing as well as . . .
Bundy: Detection. Detection.
Long: The fluctuation [unclear] in signals that are generated from
various sites . . .
Bundy: The same earthquake doesn’t give the same signal to different places.
Rusk: Well, you couldn’t be comfortable testing up to these . . .
President Kennedy: It . . . wouldn’t it help you very much to have
additional detection? [Unclear] reduce the number from 180 to just 20 of
the seismic—I don’t know all these figures. Wouldn’t it help you to
improve, to increase the number, not reduce the seismic so much?
Another 20 machines around the Soviet perimeter?
Wiesner: If it’s right within the Soviet Union, you probably can’t
help yourself a great deal . . .212
212. Referring to an explosion.
103
Wiesner: That’s right. Those few might help some, but I doubt we
can find a marked improvement.
Foster: It would help. It would help on this fluctuations—especially
since we defined it as having to have four stations.
Long: We had to have made provision, for example, [unclear] wanting
to improve a quite substantial number of rather ordinary [stations], one
would almost say, relative to these inferior, university-type seismic stations around the world: Japan, Russia, Iran, Iraq. . . . Those stations . . .
each one is not very good, relative to these rather good ones proposed
here, but every now and then one of them does pick up an event, and the
fact that they are occasionally false in their [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, it doesn’t seem to me that there’s so much
objection to the number of control posts as there is objection [unclear] . . .
Rusk: Unless they have . . . Unless they man them internationally. I
think the Russians have objected to international—
Tape cuts out for 13 seconds.
Wiesner: Incidentally, I think that we’re talking about the core of the
two proposed systems when we talk about the level of 22 kilotons in alluvium. It’s either accepting the set of figures that say 6 to 12, and this just
involves being willing to spend more money and have better equipment,
and have a more complicated system. So, an alternative to your proposal
that would have more stations which also could be looked at in detail is
that, including the best possible stations [unclear] limitations.
President Kennedy: Yes. And as I say, I don’t . . . now, even if they . . .
I gather from what you said, Doctor, that there isn’t very much that we
would anticipate the Soviet Union, given its sophistication, that they
would be able to develop with these tests.
Haworth: There’s certainly a lot they would be able to develop,
[unclear]; in my personal opinion, it would be unlikely to be decisive.
President Kennedy: They could—
Tape cuts out again for 45 seconds. During this period the conversation
shifted to the status of negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. special envoy to
the General Disarmament and Nuclear Test Ban talks, Arthur Dean, is
speaking as the recording resumes.
Dean: [ fades in] . . . then today are being turned down on the
grounds that we now spend some 43-odd underground and know how to
do it. I think they have also learned how to do underground better, and I
think they’ve assumed that we were, in effect, offering them something
which didn’t need any inspection, or any control system, [unclear] we
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would be perfectly free to continue to do it underground.213 Now my
general judgment is that they wouldn’t accept it. I also feel that, all of
the Eight feel,214 that when we put out our Department of Defense memorandum of the 7th of July, that that was sort of a diplomatic signal that
we planned to make some fairly important concessions on the comprehensive treaty.215 That’s the way they all interpreted it.
The Swedes, Madame [Alva] Myrdal, their ambassador, has told
me that if we don’t table a comprehensive treaty in about two to three
weeks, she is under instructions from Bernd Lundgren, their foreign
minister, to come in with a fairly important proposal for a comprehensive treaty. And the Swedish scientists are very suspicious of our data.
They can’t understand how we picked up the Soviet tests, underground signals and, second, in the French test by distant instrumentation. And yet we say that we can’t always detect and identify by
distant instrumentation. They are very . . . She tells me that she hopes
we will come in with a comprehensive treaty, but that if we don’t
within that period, she is under instructions to do something fairly
comprehensive —
President Kennedy: Now what is our answer to those two points
about picking that up?
Haworth: Well, the French test, for example, was above 40 or 50 kilotons and it was in rock, hard rock, which is ten times as good a signal as
alluvium.216
Dean: But you see, that’s top secret, I can’t mention it.
President Kennedy: Why can’t you mention it now?
Long: The yield in magnitude, the magnitude is top secret.217 . . . [fade
in] magnitude, which, by the standard thing, is . . . would be equivalent to
90 to 100 kilotons in tuff, or 15 kilotons in granite. [Unclear interjection.]
That could [unclear]—
President Kennedy: What was it in granite? [Unclear exchange.]
Bundy: Well, that we don’t have to say.
213. The Soviets began to test underground in October 1961. The United States had started
in September 1957.
214. The eight neutral members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.
215. The memorandum of 7 July alerted the world to the Department of Defense’s upward
revision of current detection capabilities.
216. In other words, an explosion in hard rock is ten times easier to detect than one in alluvium soil, which is much softer and can muffle sound waves.
217. At this point in the conversation the White House recording machine switched from
Tape 2 to Tape 3.
105
President Kennedy: In other words, we’re now relying on the figure
received in our machines and not on the special intelligence, so that’s a
rather easy line. So, I think let’s go ahead. And we have some . . .
Wiesner: But this is interesting because the rest of them probably
will say it’s 20 or 30, but there’s still a disagreement between them by a
factor of two, so—
Unidentified: Anyway, they’re saying—
Bundy: Well, that’s a whole lot more than nothing.
Wiesner: Yup.
President Kennedy: Anyway, could we detect it on our machine close
by or would they go all the way around?
Long: All the way around. A very long distance.
President Kennedy: OK. Well, that’s one point. Now, the other one
would be . . . What’s the other thing we talked about? The . . .
Bundy: Semipalatinsk underground shot, which we also detected a
little while ago.
Long: Also big, very much the same size, detected by many many
stations, both ordinary university types and—
President Kennedy: How much did we figure that was in stone?
Unidentified: Size 10?
Long: A little bit smaller.
President Kennedy: Is that in stone?
Long: Yes sir. The rock in that area is, again, hard rock.
Wiesner: These are both aseismic areas to which . . . [Unclear] happened in the seismic areas you might not have paid notice.
Bundy: Well, not only aseismic areas, but testing areas.
Wiesner: Testing area and very large explosions.
Unidentified: Well, I think that that seems to me [unclear] answers.
Dean: So far, that’s been regarded as top secret.
Foster: Mr. Dean—
Bundy: Every newspaper’s—
Foster: The point for consideration here is we have declassified the
use of several Nevada shots and told in what medium they are, what the
yields were, and people around the world, of course, had their seismic
counters at our facility.
Bundy: [aside, under his breath] This is just nuts.
Foster: So if that information has . . . should be dispensed if it hadn’t
been—it’s been given out—
Unidentified: Ahead of time.
Foster: Well, it should because that would straighten a lot of this out.
[Unclear interjection.]
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Long: Wait a minute. Which hasn’t been . . . You were referring to
the French shot?
Foster: Yup. French and Russian. [Unclear] our information—
Unidentified: From which then people can infer these things and
straighten all this out.
Wiesner: Yeah, but they’re always carrying the extrapolation too far,
because these are under ideal conditions for detection with no attempt
made to disguise or hide the thing. We’re worrying about poor conditions
with people trying to hide, and we’ve got to keep saying this to them.
Dean: I know—
President Kennedy: I think Arthur Dean ought to maybe go ahead
and say what he, these two points anyway. It doesn’t seem to me that this
is very secret.
Dean: Yeah. That’s fine; can I just finish my [unclear]?
Dean: I believe, and I’m in no position to judge the law; maybe our secretary and Mr. Foster would know, but the political situation is precarious—but I think the Indians have now come to the conclusion that, since
we will not accept the 100 percent destruction of nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicles and the abolition of all foreign bases in the first stages,
that there’s no possibility of bringing the Russians and ourselves together
and disarming. I think they’re very discouraged and very disillusioned.
I think, therefore, they’re determined in the fact that they must get
something before the UNGA [U.N. General Assembly] on nuclear testing. I think they are determined that they are going to introduce something, and most of them are much more interested in the arms race, at
least at Geneva, than they are in the fallout.
I think if, because of the political situation, we cannot table sometime
before the committee adjourns on the first of September, if we can’t table
something even with blanks in it—even if we put blanks in it, I think we
would get a very good position in the UNGA—but if we can’t table something along the comprehensive line after we tried the atmospheric . . . I
may be wrong, they might expect the atmospheric, but I think the Soviets
will not, and I think most of the Eight there will be somewhat disappointed if we don’t come along with an atmospheric.218
I’m very much afraid that we might go into the UNGA, and that the
Swedes, joined, I believe, by the Arabs, can themselves propose [unclear]
218. Dean was referring to a draft comprehensive treaty that would leave unspecified the
number of monitoring stations and annual on-site inspections.
107
something which might be far more difficult for us to combat in the
UNGA if we ourselves don’t come forward with our own treaty before
the first of September, and [unclear] largely without.
Now as I said, I quite agree with the theory here that we ought not
to just go in and table a comprehensive treaty with, let’s say for the sake
of argument, five control posts inside the Soviet Union and say, 12 onsite inspections per annum, because I think immediately the Soviets
would start driving on numbers, and I think India would start driving
on numbers. And I think you’d end up with a number that you wouldn’t
be able to sell domestically. And maybe the thing that they’ll do is to still
continue to build these [unclear]. The Soviets, of course, are pretty
shrewd and—
President Kennedy: I’m not going to . . . I don’t see . . . That’s what I
don’t understand, how we can do it in blanks.
Dean: Well, I think they’re pretty shrewd. What [unclear] to say,
whether you’re talking about a greater number of control posts or a
lesser number. You’re talking, between 10 to 15 or 5 and 10. I think that
they’re playing the game.
President Kennedy: And you keep saying, “Well, will you accept
any?” and they’ll say what?
Dean: Well that’s . . . I’ll have to try. I think I’ll have to try it at least for
two days with [Valerian] Zorin to see whether, as a matter of principle,
that they would accept any control posts on the Soviet Union, on a . . .219
President Kennedy: What is our argument for not having a definite
number proposed?
Rusk: So long as the Soviets stand with zero, whatever number we
put in, whether it’s 12, 8, or 2, would be subject to erosion. We both do
our best to put in a reasonable number adequate to our needs. In the
process of mutual opinion and discussion, this number will come down
under pressure for no purpose. So what we can say is that, whatever
number it is, you can be very sure that it’s more than zero.
Bundy: To put it another way, Mr. President, sure we’re parlous with
two groups of people, whatever number. If we put in a number n, the
Congress will say it should be 2n and the neutrals will say it should be
1
/2n, and we will have a hell of a war over something that doesn’t do us
any good at all if the Soviets stick with zero.
Rusk: The main prerequisite is to get some agreement with the
219. Valerian A. Zorin was the Soviet representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee, 1962.
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Russians. And if we put in numbers without getting a breakthrough on
the principle from the Russian side, then we’re negotiating with the neutrals about something that doesn’t have any relevance to them at all.
President Kennedy: If we’re talking, though, about 50 to 75 events, it
seems to me that actually you don’t need 12 inspections.
The President’s comment sparks an unclear exchange. His eagerness to
bring down the number of required annual on-site inspections is controversial around the table. McGeorge Bundy is one of the President’s challengers.
President Kennedy: You can prove this though, Mac. We were talking about 12 to 20 based on the number of events, and now we’ve cut the
number of events into . . . what? A fifth or a tenth?
Bundy: You’re saying exactly what the Swedes will say, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: Well, that’s it. That’s, you see, the logic of it
takes us there. By what do we cut our events?
Unidentified: Well, then we’d have to add [unclear]. [Unclear interjection by the President.]
Bundy: Probably about 10 [unclear]. [Wiesner is speaking in the background.] Depending, but you’re using different detection systems. But
what you have to bear in mind as you improve the detection system, the
number of events goes up again.220 [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: The problem with that, I think it would probably go up
by four Mac not by ten.
Bundy: It depends where you look at it, to inspect it.
Rusk: [Unclear.] When we first went in, we had one inspection for
every five events, so we had a threshold. But when we revised the threshold, the ratio of inspections to suspicious events jumped from 1 to 40, so
we thought that from 12 to 20 inspections, there was an overhang of the
possibility of inspections which would give us some security. Now, you
get below a certain number, and that overhang of inspections is not
viewed as a threat. When you got down to three, for example, it doesn’t
provide enough of a threat of inspection to apply real brakes on a place
as large as the Soviet Union.
Unidentified: What’s that, a lot of control posts? [Unclear.]
Rusk: A lot of international control posts on Soviet territory.
220. Bundy is deflecting the President’s argument by making the point that as verification
technology improves, more rather than fewer suspicious underground events will be detected.
These, in turn, will necessitate more on-site inspections.
109
The President appears impatient with this opposition to reducing the
number of on-site inspections. He turns to other areas where the U.S.
position can change in Geneva: on the number of required control posts,
how they are manned, and the number of on-site inspections.
President Kennedy: I think according to Arthur Dean, we’ll just have
to go through with the changes we’ve made. This first place is international, we’re now talking about it as specifically manned [control posts].
We’re talking . . . well now, we’re not talking about internationally
manned, we’re talking about internationally controlled. We haven’t
defined what the difference is, have we, between internationally manned
and internationally controlled?
Dean: As I understand it, [as opposed] to having this [as] one-third
are Western, one-third Soviet, one-third neutral on the control posts, we
now are prepared to have these control posts manned 100 percent by
Soviet nationals, except that we would like to have some right of supervision of the equipment and the calibration and the training of the personnel by [unclear] on the committee. It’s not [unclear] right of on-site
inspection.
President Kennedy: Well, it seems to me . . . Can’t we drop . . . What
did we originally say was our number for control posts along the Soviet
[unclear]? [Some unclear responses.]
Dean: Ninety-two.
President Kennedy: Now we’re talking about . . . It seems to me in
this area, we could drop it. I mean, they were counting on this very
much. There’s got to be some change in our position, otherwise we’re
going to look [unclear] last month and that would look pretty bad.
Wiesner: Well, the President’s proposal is that in addition to the
[unclear] outside the Soviet Union—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] 5 to 19 in.
Wiesner: Will be 5 here—
Rusk: That drops from 19 to 5 . . .
Wiesner: Manned by the Soviets, which is a critical Soviet [unclear].
President Kennedy: That’s if we count the category before that.
Foster: No sir. We’ve never mentioned it.
President Kennedy: How long will that last when we don’t have any
confidence in it anyway? The fact that we don’t regard it as essential.
Why? Why can’t we say we’re dropping it from 19 to 5 because of our
new information [unclear]?
Bundy: Well one reason, Mr. President, one reason for the question is
that the 5 is associated with a total net worldwide system of 25, of which
5 of these would be [unclear], 20 would be outside.
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As you said yourself 20 minutes ago, there’s a real question of
whether that’s the thing to do or whether we want 50 stations which
would detect a lot more closely.221 I don’t think what we . . . This happens to be one system which we’ve looked through, but it’s not the only
possible system, and I don’t think we’re in a position now to say that it’s
the one to which we would sign on. We could put it forward as a sample,
but I don’t think you ought to get pinned to it.
President Kennedy: Say [unclear]. When did it . . . Did we ever put
forward the drop of 180 to 20?
Dean: No, sir. [Unclear]—
President Kennedy: With no bombing data? That’s an American proposal?
Bundy: It’s not a proposal; it’s only a study program.
President Kennedy: I understand, but that’s an American—
Unidentified: It could be co-opted.
Haworth: This is a suggestion within the executive branch.
President Kennedy: Well, why is it we can’t drop this 180 down to . . .
drop it to 50? It really depends on what kind of controls, inspection, I
mean, quotas we’re talking about. Whether they’re major or [unclear]
circumstances, less sophisticated.
Unidentified: Yes.
President Kennedy: And that’s if we dropped the 20 to the 5. I mean,
if we . . . What was the figure again?
Unidentified: Nineteen.
President Kennedy: Nineteen down to 5, then say on the question of
inspections, we’ve got to first find out whether we’re going to get any
action. If that’s the weakest part we’re going to be in. The fact of the
matter is, if we said from 12 to 20, if we said 9 now, at least it would look
like we could change, and 9, I would think, would be . . . the Soviets
probably could take it [unclear] anyway.222
The question we have to decide is, if we said from 12 to 20 [unclear],
are we better off to have a slightly different figure—as a result of new
material—9, than we are with Arthur Dean over there saying, “Well, I
can’t give you what our figure would be,” because [unclear] to be safe. I
221. The President did not say this. He never quite understood how the number of control
posts rose from 20 to 50 in the course of Dr. Franklin Long’s speech.
222. The President is referring to on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. The U.S. position
was that it required between 12 and 20 annual inspections of suspicious underground events
to verify a comprehensive test ban.
111
would think they would say, “Well, let’s get your figure and then we’ll
make the Soviets come up.” I would think that one way [the onus] is
going to be on him all the time for the next three months, and in the
United States; the other way is going to be for the Soviet Union to break
the [unclear].
Bundy: You could have the best of both worlds, maybe, by saying we
could go at least to 12, and we hope lower, but the data aren’t yet completely examined. Then you’d know you’d get pulled further, but—
Wiesner: I think it better if you don’t specify numbers, because if you
have 12, people start saying well, you know, 12.
Bundy: That’s true, but we know—
Wiesner: We’ll say we’re willing to talk about a new number once we
understand that there’s going to be some inspection. [Then] we’re in
much better shape.
Bundy: And that the number will be lower.
Wiesner: The number will be—[Unclear exchange.]
Foster: [Unclear] lead us to believe that it will be a lower number
than we previously thought.
President Kennedy: What will be Arthur Dean’s answer to why we
can’t come forward with a new number?
Bundy: It’s actually damned complicated, as we found out this afternoon.
Dean: [Unclear.] I think I could explore with Zorin for a couple of days
alone, but he and I alone, whether or not they in principle would accept a
comprehensive treaty, if they would be willing to accept a lower number of
control posts and a lower number of on-site inspections than we’ve been
talking about before. And I think I can explore that with him. . . . If he’s too
vague, I don’t believe I can spar with him much beyond two days, but supposing he said to me at the end of the two days, “No, we absolutely, flatly
refuse to accept any control posts, and we flatly refuse to accept the on-site
inspections [unclear].”
Bundy is heard whispering in the background.
President Kennedy: [to Bundy] I don’t agree with [unclear].
I think, well, I think we ought to, well why don’t we . . .
Foster: I ought to mention one other technical factor that has not
been mentioned, that relates to the inspections, and that is the defined
area over which you can look, and that originally the Geneva system was
supposed to be so that you had a 50 percent chance that it was actually
inside the area where you were allowed to look.
This is one thing that has been clearly done on a professional basis,
whether by having fewer stations farther away, and so forth. And our
position would be better if we could get that area enlarged, and that
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would give us more breathing room on inspections, so that should, I
think, be factored into the plan as well as the other two.
Dean: Somewhere, around 200 to 500?
Foster: Well, maybe [unclear]. [Foster continues to whisper in the background.]
Wiesner: Actually, as it’s set up now, I think you will get the pattern
that we have a 200 and a 500, and the 500 occurs if you don’t have a signal surround. And I think this would be the case in almost all the signals
we’re talking about, so we’re talking automatically with the 500, wouldn’t you agree?
Unidentified: I would think so, and [unclear].
Foster: I just can’t see why this . . . increasing that would be nearly
so objectionable to the Russians as more inspections.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] Maybe we ought to change that
restriction.
Dean: I don’t [unclear].
Wiesner: On a related point . . . in the list of things that’s been proposed here, as you know, issuing from the State Department is also a
pretty [unclear], and after the Secretary of State proposed this the other
day, it appeared to me that this might be the mechanism that would give
Premier Khrushchev some flexibility if he needs it. After all, he’s in a
very funny spot vis-à-vis inspections. He’s made the statement so many
times that he isn’t going to have any inspection in the Soviet Union, that
he has to have some way to get out of it. If they’re seriously interested in
these kinds of thing, then they would [unclear] to, but he was in a position to say, “Well, I am really not interested.”
President Kennedy: Well now, you know, Arthur, what about now,
given the mood of the place? Are we suggesting that Arthur Dean can
go back to them and say, “We’ll drop the number of control posts on
the Soviet Union’s [unclear]”? Do we have agreement that that’s our
position?
Foster: Not right away, Mr. President. I think you can take a sampling tomorrow morning with the congressional leaders, and I can
assure you all our mail and our discussions with the two committees that
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, I agree the stories this weekend are unfortunate—they keep using the word soft and so on, which is very absurd.
But the only thing is we do have, as I understand it, new information,
and we don’t want to just dissipate . . . for political reasons, we don’t
want to miss a chance, particularly if we are, which seems to be the general consensus, with a general agreement that we’re better off . . . and we
113
don’t want to let the uninformed, in a sense, to use that term, hold us
back and bring us into a worse situation.
Haworth: Well, I’m appalled that they don’t believe it, sir.223
Bundy: Well, this isn’t partly because the job isn’t finished. It’s just—
Haworth: Make up our own mind.
Bundy: They’ve always been told that this data is very tentative. The
data is really rather less tentative than [unclear].
Rusk: But Mr. Dean will only say that we dropped 180 posts to the
range of 50. Well, that automatically, proportionally drops the 19 to the
range of 5. That’s 5 being the total number of posts you’re talking about.
I think we could go ahead on that, on a discussion basis. We’re not
[going to] put it in the form of a formal treaty text. But I wouldn’t say
[unclear] about that.
President Kennedy: What is the . . . now I know that the . . . Has this
been sort of explored in detail with the joint committee yet?
Foster: Yes, sir. There was a technical presentation by Defense
[unclear] for three or four hours, and then I was up for three or four hours,
and was not . . .
President Kennedy: Because they don’t . . . that joint committee
doesn’t want a test ban, I mean, isn’t that their—
Foster: Well, they want . . . They were expecting an atmospheric test
ban. At this point in time, they’re against concessions, as they call them.
The Foreign Relations Committee, before which I went after those two
appearances, is almost . . . Well, [Senator] Clint[on] Anderson moved
strongly for an atmospheric test ban. [Unclear], [Senator Stuart]
Symington, [Senator Wayne] Morse . . . it looks like [Senator] George
Aiken will be [unclear], as I say—but I talked to him a little bit—are all
against this at this point in time.224 They say it’s too tentative . . .
President Kennedy: Atmospheric?
Foster: No, atmospheric is all right, that’s if it’s by itself.
Nitze: [Unclear.] Has it occurred to them that we were not talking about
a situation in which there was no inspection, because Stuart Symington
223. Some congressional leaders had questioned the implications of the technical reassessment announced by the Defense Department on 7 July.
224. Clinton P. Anderson, a Democratic senator from New Mexico, and George D. Aiken of
Vermont were on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Stuart Symington of Missouri and
Wayne Morse of Oregon were on the Foreign Relations Committee with Aiken. Symington
was also on the Armed Services Committee.
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called me very upset and said, “I hope to hell that you’re not going to go
through with this.” [Unclear interjection.] He seemed vaguely lost [unclear].
Foster: [Unclear] insisted on on-site inspections, both committees.
President Kennedy: He did not [unclear].
Bundy: Is it not clear to them? I think the ones I talked to—
The tape cuts off for 1 minute and 24 seconds. Evidently some of the
missing conversation involves discussion of how to persuade the members of the Joint Committee about the significance of the new data.
Long: [fades in] But you would take one large underground test as a
calibration to explosions.
President Kennedy: What about our own test? Has that told us
much? Our own underground test? Doesn’t that tell us?
Long: Yes, our own underground tests confirm all this, but you see,
this is so [unclear] to see Russia, you have a neutral fellow seeing some
of ours, for example, it did respectively but not nearly so well seeing
these French Sahara tests. But all these confirm for us that it’s just that
the very best numbers, the ones that are particularly interesting . . . I
think this is just—[Unclear exchange between Long and Bundy.]
Adrian Fisher: Mr. President, with [Senator] Hubert Humphrey as
probably the strongest supporter that we’ve got.225 He takes—who wants
this treaty really badly—he takes the position that he wishes that you do a
two-stage operation. He said if you put any major, “the things we’ll call
concessions,” now or table a comprehensive treaty based on “national systems,” the animals will go loose and people will take positions on this, so it
will make it very hard to get a treaty ratified if we ever get one in debate.
We originally, as you know, felt rather the other way. If you sound all
excited about it [unclear] and he said, “If you really want a treaty, don’t do
anything too fast, because if you do, you’ll have people like Jackson . . . “
Tape cuts off again for 51 seconds. According to Seaborg’s account of
the meeting, several others reiterated Fisher’s view. They reported that
“the proponents of a test ban in the Senate such as Humphrey feel that it
should be taken in two steps: first, exploration without actual numbers
and then a treaty.”
President Kennedy: The Senate and the [unclear] consider the job
[unclear]. On the other hand, maybe by the fall, the Soviets finish their
tests, we make the determination that their tests are not a danger to us,
that we might be able to really do something on a treaty. We will have
two or three months, and they won’t be [unclear] to feel that they’re
225. Hubert H. Humphrey, senator from Minnesota, was on the Foreign Relations Committee.
115
being rushed.226 Now, how can we . . . on the other hand, those people
over in the [unclear] Senate.
Rusk: Mr. President, the effect of what we’re saying here to Arthur
Dean would be to go over there and talk about a comprehensive treaty.
There would be two blank spots in it, and that’s the numbers, so long as
the Soviets are sitting on zero. But in any event, we would like to go
ahead with that in spirit, since we can go ahead on that now—
Bundy: [whispering an aside to a separate conversation] I agree with
that. This is so stupid as to—
Rusk: —without reference to all this inspection issue.
President Kennedy: Well, now can’t we—?
Rusk: [Unclear] is enough activity for Arthur Dean for some time
to come.
President Kennedy is not persuaded that the administration should be so
cautious.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] trying to go from 180? So that there’s
no point—
Bundy: Well, he can certainly indicate that he’s ready to move, Mr.
President—
Rusk: Yes.
Bundy: —and maybe we can give numbers in the control posts area if
we avoid the numbers, but if you’re going to feel Zorin out as to whether
there’s any give, if you get give, then we’ve got a clear course.
Bundy: If you don’t get any give, then we have to look again. Isn’t
this going to be true all summer long?
Rusk: Sure.
Bundy: If you go back and talk two days—
Dean: Yeah [unclear]. [Dean tries to interject.]
Bundy: —then you have to ask again. Meanwhile, we’re at war on the
Hill, and maybe we’ve got resources we haven’t mobilized for talking to
these fellows.
Rusk: See, we don’t really have a case to argue on Capitol Hill or for
the public so long as the Soviets are saying zero inspections.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but the only problem is how Arthur Dean . . .
this thing could build into sort of a struggle and all the rest, and he’s got no
data. And then he goes back there and, says . . . Well, he’s got to look like
he’s got something more.
226. They refers to the senators.
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Bundy: He can tell a lot, Mr. President. Now, there’s this very simple
thing. If people don’t even know the difference between a 50-kiloton shot
in granite and a 5-kiloton shot in alluvium, there’s quite a lot to be said
at Geneva [laughs], it seems to me.
Unidentified: Yeah. And we’ve got [unclear]—
Bundy: We’ve got to look around and do a lot of declassifying.
Dean: I don’t want to overexaggerate what might happen if the
Swedes come into this thing, but I think the Swedes feel that we’ve had
this information a lot longer than three weeks ago.
Bundy: Well, that’s another thing we could say—with straight honesty.
Dean: And . . . I think the Swedes may come in, and I think the
Russians would also come back on this thing. Our data now in effect
goes back to the occurrence of their [unclear] back in 1959.
Foster: By good luck not by good knowledge of their [unclear].
President Kennedy makes an unclear response to Foster.
Dean: I’m really sorry, but I think, and I don’t want to exaggerate
this thing, but I think that if we don’t use, if we don’t do . . . I don’t want
to get you in trouble on the political situation here, but you may find that
if we don’t come up with something very good within two to three weeks,
that the Swedes and the Indians and the Arabs may come in and table
their treaty and bring their scientists in to prove that we can do a lot
more than we’re prepared to say that we can do as of the present time.
Then you’ve ruined—according to the UNGA—[unclear], and you’ve
got their plan plus their data which I think puts us in a very difficult
position for the UNGA this fall. I don’t want to overexaggerate that
speculation, but Madame Myrdal has told me that she’s under instruction [unclear] to move within two weeks in a major way if we don’t do
something within two weeks.
Wiesner: That could be. That could be.
Bundy: From what I heard, Art, with all the dope that we’ve got in
front of us that we’re pretty sure they don’t know, you could make three
6-hour speeches. And if she doesn’t have to go back and tell them
[unclear]—[Unclear exchange.]
Dean: No, she doesn’t. But I think the Swedes are onto something,
because this fellow [unclear] keeps coming around everyday, asking,
probing, probing, probing, asking for more information. And I think that
they think that we’ve had this data that we are now saying [since] the
seventh of July, for over a year.
President Kennedy: For over a year?
Dean: Yes.
President Kennedy: What do they base that on?
117
Dean: Well, I think we have.
President Kennedy: We have had this data?
Long: Couldn’t have got it from the Russian test or the French test
until the last year . . .
Dean: Well, I think this data’s been available to AFTAC for well over
a year.227
Dean’s comment provokes a loud outburst from a few participants who
speak over each other.
Bundy: It’s nuts to even say that! [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Oh, I agree.
President Kennedy: I’ll tell you . . . I sent a memorandum to the
Secretaries of State and Defense about this, because, as I say, I don’t
know anything that we’ve done that is more confused and spread havoc
that this thing . . . as far as the government’s going [unclear]. So we’ve
looked into this question—I sent a memorandum with exactly that question, how long have we had this, and why, if we had it for any length of
time, wasn’t it made available to the disarmament agency? So I sent that
over to the Secretary, so perhaps you could tell us . . .
Bundy: He’s answered.
McNamara: Well, I would be happy to. The information is based on
analysis, further analysis of the Russian and French tests. The French
tests occurred on approximately May 5, if I remember the date correctly.
It normally takes 60 days to transmit the information from the collection
stations to the analytical groups in Washington, which would mean that
they received it on July 5.
In this particular instance, however, they became so interested in the
possibilities that this information allowed them to, in effect, recalibrate
their scales, they expedited the transmission and received it, I believe, on
June 15. Now I’m quoting these dates from memory, but I can check my
memo here.
They began to analyze it on June 15, and on the weekend of June 29,
which I believe was a Saturday, Dr. [Doyle] Northrup, [who was] at
home, had a new idea of the way in which this could be interpreted, and
either went to the office or took the material home with him on Sunday,
reanalyzed it, and concluded that the estimate should be changed. Now
that would have made the date approximately June 30 or July 1. The
Disarmament Commission had called a meeting for July 3.
The question was, then, since he had this new information that had
227. The acronym AFTAC stands for Air Force Technical Application Center.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
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developed between June 29 and July 3, should he present it to this meeting. He discussed the matter with his superiors in the Air Force. They
said, “Expose them.” He went to the meeting. [Someone begins to tap on
the table.] There were 25 people in the room; he exposed the information
to them. Now I am told—although I wasn’t present at the time—that
later, it was considered that since 25 people knew it, particularly because
of the character of the people, this was likely to leak to the press, and it
was subsequently proposed that it be distributed to the press. I think
that’s a fair approximation of the timetable.
McNamara: Since Mac was involved in the process—
Bundy: I was deeply involved in this last part and would still . . . if
they’re suspicious of us for having put it out, what they would think of
us if it had leaked out beggars description.
McNamara: But I think, Mac, it’s fair to say that this was a weekend
analysis.
Bundy: Look, now, this is what happened and now it’s also fair to say,
in a wider sense, that if we’d all looked harder at the data and had a different system for spying it out, we might have known a lot a lot sooner.
But it is not true that anybody sat on the knowledge of this stuff, and
anyone who says that ought to have . . . really [ought] to be hit over the
head. [Unclear exchange.]
Rusk: There’s a major reinterpretation here, because somebody had
some ideas they discovered [unclear] under credence, and not under
national interest.
Kaysen: But I think the important point is when the questions were
asked, I think, because the fact that certain numbers existed doesn’t in
itself make you change your ideas. [There is a whispered side conversation.]
You have to ask the question, “Do these numbers mean something different than what we thought they meant?”
Bundy: That’s right. Maybe we were dumb, but we weren’t corrupt.
President Kennedy: Now we’re going to get Arthur . . .
President Kennedy: Given the problem at home, given the fact that
we’re really rather indecisive about the significance of these matters
because it’s all new, where do we go and deal with Zorin . . . ? Zorin will
say to you that he won’t allow anybody to be on the national control sites
except Soviets. He will also say that there’s no inspections, and we will,
after you and Zorin meet, go before the neutrals and you say, “Zorin says
this,” and they’ll say, “Well, all right with Zorin, but what about you?”
That’s where it seems to me his problem is going to come [unclear].
119
Dean: Well, I bet I . . .
President Kennedy: For instance, if we could say a change that will not
be particularly controversial, but I say, well I say, we could change the
number, though we daren’t put it into distribution, the number of . . .
[Bundy whispers] control sites. That’s where all the difficulty is. It all
depends what kind you have and where you locate it. At least he can say
he’s gone from 180 down to 50, can’t they? That certainly isn’t . . . What?
Unidentified: Does Arthur have to respond to the neutral nation
proposal which is on the table?
Wiesner: Because there is already a specific proposal.
President Kennedy: What about?
Wiesner: Which says that essentially the national type of detection
system and inspection which is rather ambiguous as we read it here, you
can’t tell whether it’s invitational inspection or permissive, unless—
Rusk: Mr. President, the Eight only, with the possible exception of
India, appear to walk the fence that some control, some international
inspection, is necessary. It seems to me that so long as the Russians are
saying zero, we can get the neutral nations over there to put their heat
on the Russians, rather than on ourselves. But we don’t have to come
out, we can intimate that these figures are lower than we thought they
had to be at the beginning. But just so long as the Russian figure is zero,
the neutral problem is with the Russians, not with us. . . .
The tape cuts off again, this time for 51 seconds.
President Kennedy: . . . if we went to the previous data, this kind of
inspection system, with the progress that they can make underground, is
still a terrific gamble for the Russians.228 [The President continues to speak
softly.]
Haworth: Well, I agree. And I . . . well, I think, Mr. President—
President Kennedy: In the first place, we tried to put in a separate
category what they could get by cheating underground. And that . . .
they know that they could get some things, but when we talk together
what we could ask them . . . what they’ve got.
As I understand it, the scientists tell us they don’t think they could
make decisive breakthroughs. So they have to have a reason for cheating,
and if you’ve got the chance to inspect them, even ten times, you’ve got a
pretty good—even with the previous data—you’ve got a chance that I
wouldn’t think they’d, that anybody’d want to take.
228. The President was returning to his earlier argument that even scaled down, the proposed
verification system would deter Soviet cheating.
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They’re not gonna let us do it anyway. They’re not going to let us go
tracking around the Soviet Union ten times in a year anyway, are they?
Dean: Now, as I understand it [unclear].
President Kennedy: You don’t think they’ll let us go any time?
Dean: As I understand this data—I’d like to have the scientists correct me—I’ve been troubled for 18 months about the fact that this system we’ve set up is really a Frankenstein. The one that we originally had
set up, with 180 control posts and that type of thing, I . . . the cost and
the whole thing, I’d always thought that it would never work, and that if
we could do these things on a national basis, and where we could build
our own equipment and have our own personnel in to supervise it, plus
this tied in to some kind of an international commission with an obligatory right in the commission to determine when you make the on-site
and to make it obligatory and not invitational [that then it might work].
And all the Eight have told me that when I say it must be obligatory,
“We agree with you.” Now, I’d always thought that instead of making a
concession to the Soviets, or making this a softer system, I think you
really have got a harder system, a better system.
Wiesner: You’d get it quicker.
Dean: Now if we could . . . and you don’t have to wait this three years
while you install these 180 control posts when you really have an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium. If we really could satisfy the congressional committees that the scientists are correct on this data, and that
we’ve even got a better system, perhaps we could get in on the public
and all of the newspaper accounts who used the word soft on Monday
[morning], or concession, or it looks as though you’re giving something
away to the Soviets. I actually [unclear].
President Kennedy: I’d prefer that word soft. . . .
Dean: —you’re improving it; you’re improving the situation.
Foster: Mr. President, it seems to me that this is a good system, it
can be put in sooner, it is salable to the Congress. It just needs a little
more time, and a little more . . . than just me selling it to them over the
[unclear]. It seems to me also, however, perfectly negotiable to go to the
neutrals and the nonaligned and say, “We have come back, and our data
allows us to accept a good many of the philosophies within your proposal—national control posts, augmented by an international commission and international monitoring and coordinating.” It also allows us to
claim in advance that we will be able to substantially reduce the number
of control posts—
Bundy: And on-site inspections.
121
Foster: —on Soviet territory and of inspections, over our previous
plans. Now, if you don’t have to give numbers at that point. I think you’d
say, “But before any of this can take place, we have got to get acceptance
of the principle of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union.”
The President realized that no one in the room supported his view that
it was in the interests of the United States at that time to authorize
Arthur Dean to present precise changes in the U.S. position.
President Kennedy: I generally agree [unclear], so that’s all right
with me.
Now the question is, what about the scientific briefing? Get all of this
clear, the real essence of all this, [unclear] limitations as well as the possibilities, can be presented to all of them, so that some Swede isn’t up there . . .
Wiesner: You mean in Geneva?
President Kennedy: Yeah. How exactly . . . Who’s going to do that?
Foster: Oh, we’re gonna send Dr. Long, hopefully Dr. Wiesner, a distinguished seismologist, either Dr. [Frank] Press or Dr. Oliver or Dr.
[unclear], from AFTAC.
Wiesner: Up to [unclear].
Foster: —from AEC. And invite the other nations to do this, giving
them a time, a week’s notice. The Soviets, I understand, are . . . have said
that they would be willing to discuss this thing—
Dean: [Unclear.] That’s right.
Foster: —with competent people. Now this gives us, again, a week or
so in which we can do some verbal arrangement on the Hill . . .
The tape cuts out for eight minutes and four seconds. According to
Seaborg’s diary account, “Foster reiterated that he would like to table the
atmospheric test ban treaty, and Bundy reiterated that Congress would
be troubled if a comprehensive treaty were tabled at this stage depending solely on national detection posts. . . . Vice President Johnson said
that many senators have talked to him about their concern about opposition to such a treaty.”
According to an unsigned memorandum on this discussion, the participants made the following recommendations and suggestions:
Mr. Foster summarized his view. We should table a treaty banning
only atmospheric tests now. We should tell the neutrals that our new
data means we can accept a national detection system, fewer detection
stations, and fewer on-site inspections, but we must first get acceptance from the Russians of the principle of on-site inspection.
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M O N DAY, J U LY
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Ambassador Dean repeated his view that we should table a comprehensive test ban treaty even though all its details could only be
spelled out later.
Mr. Bundy pointed out that tabling a comprehensive treaty would
upset the senators.
The Vice President acknowledged that many senators were upset.
They are concerned about what we are now doing and they need
additional information. Possibly the President will have to talk to certain key senators.
Ambassador Dean restated his view that we should introduce a
revised comprehensive treaty now.
Mr. McCone said that the congressmen are worrying [about ?]
the test sites in the Soviet Union.229
Foster: What we propose in the comprehensive treaty. The commission should take appropriate measures, including arrangements for permanent observers at, or periodic visits to, elements of the system, in
order to ensure that established procedures for the rapid, coordinated,
and reliable collection of data are being followed.
President Kennedy: Well, now isn’t it a fact that we don’t . . . that our
new scientific data, if we believe it, will tell us that national control of
these systems on the Soviet Union are not necessary [unidentified speaker
agrees with President Kennedy] [unclear] make some progress?
Haworth: They would jump on this localization.
President Kennedy: Tell exactly where it is?
Haworth: Yes.
Wiesner: Well, as a matter of fact, if the Soviet Union did [unclear
interjection], it would help on detection, too. But—
Bundy: All right. Well, now we can’t count on it.
The President had a new strategy. He would adjourn this meeting and try
again later to achieve consensus on a new negotiating posture in Geneva.
President Kennedy: That’s our proposal, there. Well, now, we’re still
back . . . We’d better . . . We’ve been at this problem for over an hour, and I
don’t think that . . . it seems what we’ve got to do is come back tomorrow.
When are you going, Arthur?
Dean: I have no plans [unintelligible because Dean and the President are
speaking at the same time].
229. Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy, 30 July 1962, FRUS, 7: 520–24.
123
President Kennedy: You probably ought to go up and talk on the Hill
a little before you go, just to . . . I mean, Wednesday morning, we could
arrange to have you go up on the Hill, and then we’ve got to have a meeting again tomorrow in which we go at this matter of exactly how he
should word the three matters: How we should describe the control posts,
and how we should, how many of these control posts he could save.
Because it’s got to look like there’s some difference, otherwise we’re sending him back there to lose the case. Then we can’t have put out all this
publicity and then make it look like we just didn’t do anything in effect.
I think what we’ve got is political, Arthur, because I don’t think the
Soviet Union is going to probably accept, certainly before their tests are
over, and we’ve looked at them, and they’ve looked at them, and neither
one of us is going to accept any inspection, a [unclear] observer, accept
an inspection. The problem is to have it on their back and not on our
back for the next five or six months. And . . .
Dean: On this question of—
President Kennedy: I’d just like the Secretary to go over there and
have something to protect himself with, and us with, and not have it look
like he’s just kind of shooting off. But Arthur Dean has all his information based on the Soviet interpretations, given to you [unclear] arrival.
They’ll say, “Arthur Dean knows it’s better than this, but he’s been
forced by the Pentagon and the warmongers to just come up with nothing.” Now they tend to . . .
I know that the Congress is [unclear], also the broader constituencies of the Congress in this matter, particularly when none of us think
they’re going to get a test [ban] anyway at this time. But now the question is, what is our posture, arguing this matter, our position over the
next five or six months? We don’t want to have the Soviets and the main
neutrals all together, and two-thirds of the General Assembly all beating
our brains out.230
I don’t think anybody’s going to be very . . . particularly if we know
an awful lot of people up there, on political grounds would be charging
us with selling out no matter what we do anyway. So I think we’ve got to
think of what his case is going to be when he gets over there.
Dean: I might—
President Kennedy: Why don’t you think about that overnight.
230. The President was anticipating a difficult time over Berlin at the U.N. General Assembly in
the fall. Nikita Khrushchev was expected to come over in November, and Kennedy did not want
to hand him another issue in the form of apparent U.S. intransigence on a nuclear test ban.
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30, 1962
Dean: Yes.
President Kennedy: Let’s get back tomorrow and talk about it.
Dean: I mean, just [this] last discussion I had with Zorin, he was
very relaxed the other afternoon and we were together for three or four
hours, but he said to me, “Are you going to try to stop us from doing this
next series of tests?” And I said “Well, what do you mean?” And he said,
“Well, are you going to make some kind of a proposition that’s going to
make us look badly because we go through with the next series of tests.”
And [unclear], “Well, we could do it of course.” And I said, “What do
you have in mind?” [Laughter.]
He said, “Well, what do you think of this Padilla Nervo’s thing?”231
And I said, “Well . . .”
President Kennedy: This what?
Rusk: . . . Padilla Nervo’s proposal, [unclear].
Dean: Padilla Nervo’s proposal.
Rusk: [Unclear] stops January 1st . . . , sir.
Dean: That you stop your testing in some stated period of time.
Kennedy asks about the details of Padilla Nervo’s proposal and Rusk
responds indistinctly.
Dean: And I said, “Well, of course you’re also [going to] have to
[Rusk continues to mumble in the background ] . . . you’re always going to
have to be sure that the period of time is long enough, and you’re
always going to have to be sure that you or ourselves don’t test last,
and maybe we could work it out so we have some stated period of time.
I don’t know what it should be. I think June 30th, ’63, is probably too
early; but I said, “Even if we signed the treaty, and we both agreed to
it, there’d be some period of time before it’d be ratified by our Senate,
in which it wouldn’t be a binding agreement, but probably we could, if
we did get together, we probably could agree on some period of time in
which each of us could test.”
And he completely tried to raise this three or four times as to
whether we were going to try to stop them from testing, and I said,
“Well, we certainly are open minded on that; we certainly would be prepared to work out some kind of a formula with it.” But he is very much
interested in this Padilla Nervo formula.
President Kennedy: That’s all just . . . it’s just in the atmosphere, is it?
231. Luis Padilla Nervo, the Mexican representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee, suggested on 14 June that the nuclear powers agree to stop atmospheric testing
by 1 January 1963.
125
Dean: They’re going to start—no sir—they’re . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I meant [unclear]—
Dean: Padilla Nervo is against all testing. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: But he’s got inspection in there, ideally.
Unidentified: January 1st was his date, wasn’t it?
Dean: It is, but Padilla Nervo is—
President Kennedy: It’s the date . . . It’s just the date the agreements
begin, I think.
Well, I think we’ve got to come back tomorrow. Let me just say again
that in view of the publicity we’ve had [unclear] to date, in view of Mr.
Dean’s own position over there, then I think there is the impression on
our part that this new data should bring new hopes within the limits of
our own concern for safety here, and also the Congress, and we’ve just
got to figure out what we can give him to go back and sustain him for
two or three months.232 And we’re going to be debating this, and we’re
clearly not going to get any place with the Russians on this matter until
they get through their tests and we’ve analyzed them.
We’ve got to get something for Arthur. We’ve got to think about the
little things. Now what are we going to do about the French? [Unclear.]
Bundy: After this meeting, I think that we’re going to have further
discussions. We’ve already said that this was your initial meeting with
Mr. Dean. We simply say that again. If we could all do as well as we did
over the weekend, we’d get a medal for good behavior. . . . It seems to me,
if we could just—[Laughs.]
President Kennedy: Anyways I might say coercion was [unclear] idea.
Bundy: I tried to bat that down. Softness and concession has nothing
to do with it. It’s what the facts indicate that we need to have that we’re
talking about. We might all go after that one understandably.
Wiesner: The trouble is the data is soft.
Foster: Perhaps due to the frustration of the leadership [unclear] on
this, with the Vice President might be helpful.
Rusk: I think this [unclear] today.
The meeting begins to break up. Wiesner mentions the timing of raising
this matter with the congressional leadership. While the men stand and
move their chairs, there are some unintelligible exchanges. After a door
closes an argument begins between Arthur Dean and Robert McNamara
232. On 14 July, Arthur Dean had said to reporters that the new data might make it possible
for the United States to withdraw its insistence on having any monitoring posts in the Soviet
Union. He was quickly corrected by Dean Rusk.
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over when the new data on detection capabilities was available. The
President is overheard saying, “Why don’t we do this tomorrow?”
Bundy: But really, nobody’s hiding anything. They may not. . . .
Dean: A year ago, I had the chance, and I cross-examined this fellow
[unclear]. But the [unclear] was disciplined for giving me information
about [unclear] at all. I know perfectly well this son of a bitch is furious.
President Kennedy: But some of this suggests [unclear].
Bundy: . . . dislike this information?
McNamara: Mr. President, I’ll absolutely guarantee you that
Romney . . . I said [Dr. Doyle] Northrup but it was [Dr. Carl] Romney
that was the [unclear], that did this over the weekend of the 29th. . . .233
Dean: Well, I can show you charts dated a year ago where—
Bundy: Oh, well three years ago [unclear].
Unidentified: Is that going to go outside of this room?
President Kennedy: Well, you’ve got to do that, but I’ve got to say, I . . .
You know, Romney’s . . . of course . . . couldn’t . . . Do you feel that this [is]
information they had?
Dean: I don’t think they realized it. But I, when I kept cross-examining
them about it, cross-examining them about it, cross-examining them about
it, they finally disciplined Doyle for giving me too much information!234
McNamara: Well, that may be. I don’t dispute that at all, although that
isn’t going to happen. It isn’t happening now. And, of course, definitely . . .
But Romney didn’t have these ideas, he didn’t have the data [unclear].
Dean: Well, I got suspicious myself over this thing, not that anyone
was hiding anything, but I just kind of put all of the little stuff together,
and I kept cross-examining all of these fellows, and finally they . . . I got
silence. And I went after them all again and that’s . . .
Bundy: That’s what’s been changed. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: What I’m talking about is talking about bringing down tomorrow John McCloy and Bob Lovett as a . . . sort of independent outside people who might be able to help out with the joint
committee . . . that wanted [unclear].235
233. Northrup and Romney worked at the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC).
234. Dean is referring to the Air Force.
235. Robert A. Lovett and John J. McCloy were two of the most experienced national security
specialists in the United States in 1962. Secretary of defense during the Korean War, Lovett
had been offered his pick of senior positions in a Kennedy administration, only to turn them
all down on account of his health. McCloy, assistant secretary of war during World War II
and later the U.S. high commissioner in Germany, served under Kennedy as the President’s
adviser on disarmament until October 1961.
127
Unclear exchange involving Dean.
President Kennedy: Particularly, Scoop [Senator Henry Jackson] is
very responsive to Bob Lovett, and [unclear].
Dean: I think Lovett will be fine.
Bundy: Are you going to be OK on this, on the data, at the meeting?
Dean: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Well, now first—
Dean: You sure about it? Was he fine with this?
President Kennedy: Well, yes, he hasn’t [unclear] very close to—
Unidentified: No, he is not.
Dean: Let me tell you what happened. He got very sore, because he
said that we didn’t bring this thing up in either [unclear], but we did bring
it up before [unclear], and he got up and walked out to another meeting,
and the whole thing was [unclear]. [Bundy makes an amusing aside.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] has this information?
Foster: Oh, Mr. McCloy has it, the chairman of it has it, and he’s
talked a lot of [unclear] over the telephone [unclear].
President Kennedy: All right. Now what about this? What I’d like to
see, is it possible to get Mr. McCloy and Mr. Lovett down in the morning to get it together . . . get all the data. . . .
Bundy: Get a briefing—
President Kennedy: . . . all the data, and have a meeting in the afternoon like we had today and discuss these three points?
Unidentified: Sure.
President Kennedy: Then Arthur Dean ought to think overnight
[someone mumbling in the background] [about] what he thinks he needs to
go back there, given the limitations in our position. And I just . . . Really,
because you know, the Hill, we don’t want to find ourselves historically . . .
and then we miss the chance [unclear]. Obviously, what will happen, as
well, [unclear] series. But I think we’ve got to give him something to do.
Otherwise it’s going to look like we got him back and didn’t really pursue [unclear]. . . .
Bundy: I think you [unclear] if we do a hard job with the Committee
and we get the thing calibrated so that we can—
President Kennedy: If we can get McCloy and Lovett going, it is
much easier for him to do this.
Dean: I’m sure.
President Kennedy: We’ll try to get them. Mac, you want to talk
with—?
Dean: I’ll call. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Mac, [unclear] if you can get them to come
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M O N DAY, J U LY
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down in the morning for the data and in the afternoon for our meeting.
Have you got all the . . . ? [Unclear exchange.]
Bundy: The only way to get [unclear].
President Kennedy: I think if we can get . . . I’ll tell you what, Mac . . .
Could we make sure that . . . ?
Bundy: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: I’d like to have Mr. McCone get all this, because
they’re going to be talking to him, a lot of these people.
Bundy: All of the technical data?
President Kennedy: Well, have him listen to it, because a lot of the
Joint Committee know him and then he would be in a position to do us a
[unclear]. So let’s get that tomorrow morning, too. If we can get
Lovett, McCloy, and Mr. McCone there at the same time; otherwise it
just [unclear].
Bundy: Well, if we could get as many as we can get. That’s the easiest
[unclear].
McNamara: Mac, who do you want to have do this?
Bundy: Well, I would think that there are several people that ought
to do it, and the question is who really can pull it together and harden it
up. And my . . . in some ways I wish you would do it. You’ve heard all the
data; you’ve got an analytical mind. You can present it to a layman better
[unclear].
McNamara: I haven’t heard this. This is just what I was going to do
tomorrow morning assuming that there’d been no [unclear]?
Bundy: That’s just what has to be done.
McNamara: You have to pour this through a layman’s mind, and
[unclear] some [unclear] fashion, but I can—
Bundy: Well, I myself haven’t listened to it enough.
McNamara: Well I have; but I would [never] do it. . . . If they can’t
come down, I will definitely [unclear].
Bundy: Bob, we can probably hold the whole thing 24 hours.
[Unclear] to have a meeting without getting this done, so let me find out
what their availability is and . . .
President Kennedy: Will you let me know, too?
Bundy: Yeah, sure. When I know—
McNamara: [Unclear] which requires you to process it through somebody. Might talk the same language as the uninitiated, which [unclear].
Bundy: This is plain. But also, you see . . . what did happen, and this
is why people worry about, had worried about the earlier organization, is
that when these fellows go up, they’re under instructions from General
129
LeMay to make it very plain that all this data is tentative and implies no
breakthrough.236 So these two create [unclear] . . .
McNamara: Well, it’s a little more than that, Mac. Harold Brown
feels that this is tentative.237
President Kennedy: Does he?
McNamara: I wouldn’t say tentative. He feels there are many uncertainties, and of course there are. There is a tremendous amount of interpretation that’s—
When the President is out of earshot, Bundy outlines his concerns about
the President’s eagerness for new numbers.
Bundy: The basic reason for not putting in figures is that there are . . .
it isn’t just [unclear] events. I mean that the President keeps going back
to that, but the moment you get a sophisticated understanding of the
interlock between detection and inspection and threshold, and risk, you
know that the number is a political number; it’s never a technical number.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Kaysen: This, I think, is an important point. I think the big thing
about the new data that hasn’t been clearly said, Bob, is that all the
uncertainties we have [unclear] a different direction. People are uncertain, and they are mostly uncertain about how much better this is.
Dean: No, no, no. I don’t know about that, [unclear]. [Unclear
exchange.]
McNamara: I definitely don’t agree.
Kaysen: I can’t believe we spent two and a half days on this—
McNamara: Some people may be that, but Harold is not just as
uncertain that they aren’t much better. . . . Harold is uncertain as to the
range, and the point within that range which might turn out to be the
most probable point, and the range is wide.
Bundy: Yes, but it’s all in one direction.
McNamara: No, no. I think the, except the—
Bundy: Except that problem with alluvial testing; I thought it was a
[unclear].
McNamara: That was a [unclear] problem.
Kaysen: . . . But the alluvial testing [unclear interjection] is at least
half a red herring. [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] made a pressing case the other way.
236. General Curtis LeMay was Air Force Chief of Staff.
237. Brown, later secretary of defense in the Carter administration (1977–1981), was director,
Defense Research and Engineering of the Department of Defense in 1962.
130
W E D N E S DAY, AU G U S T
1, 1962
Dean: What do you fear? That’s what I want to know. [Unclear
exchange.]
Kaysen: Mac, Taz wanted you to know that he’s collecting [unclear]
for you or for somebody’s customer. [Unclear.]238
Bundy: Yeah, I have a customer. [Unclear exchange.]
Door closes. The President forgot to turn off the machine and the tape
spooled out. There is some indistinct corridor discussion and then someone, probably Evelyn Lincoln, turned off the machine.
As Bundy had suggested, the matter could wait 24 hours. Lovett and
McCloy could not come down together on July 31, so the next meeting on
the test ban would be held over to August 1. In the meantime, the White
House Press Office announced that the President would be giving a press
conference Wednesday afternoon. The President already intended to discuss Peru at that time; but he would also be expected to have something to
say on Arthur Dean’s instructions by then.
The President had one more meeting before going for his second
swim of the day. An old friend from Kennedy’s time on the Senate Labor
Rackets Committee, Clark Mollenhoff, was in for an unrecorded 20minute chat. Finally, at 7:25 P.M., the President could call this well-taped
day over.
Wednesday, August 1, 1962
After taping nearly four hours of conversation on Monday, the President
left no tapes from the next day.1 Tuesday, July 31 was largely taken up
with ceremonial duties. In the morning, President Kennedy met with the
Brazilian student leaders as suggested by Lincoln Gordon. Later he
attended the swearing in of the new secretary of health, education and
welfare, Anthony Celebrezze. However that evening, Kennedy held a very
interesting meeting with Georgi Bolshakov that would have provided
238. Tazewell Shepherd was the President’s naval aide.
1. The Secret Service numbering system suggests that no meeting tapes were made on 31 July
1962.
1, 1962
131
some insight into his back-channel relations with the Soviet Union had he
taped it. Ostensibly a journalist, Bolshakov was actually a Soviet military
intelligence officer. Since May 1961, he had had regular meetings with
Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Although used by the Kennedy brothers to send feelers to Moscow, Bolshakov was not the Kremlin’s special
envoy, though his reports on the Kennedys were sent directly to Nikita
Khrushchev. At the end of July, however, Khrushchev had decided to use
Bolshakov to request that the United States stop overhead reconnaissance
of Soviet ships plying to Havana. The Oval Office meeting was arranged
for July 31 so that President Kennedy could respond directly. The Soviet
record of this conversation (no U.S. record has been found) indicates that
Kennedy agreed to suspend overhead reconnaissance of Soviet merchant
ships but wanted a promise that Khrushchev would put the Berlin question “on ice” until after the fall congressional elections.2 Nothing came of
President Kennedy’s Berlin condition and so the President’s own promise
to suspend overhead reconnaissance was not kept. Unfortunately, it would
not be until mid-October that President Kennedy understood the reason
for Khrushchev’s acute sensitivity to the security of Soviet cargoes heading for Cuba.
The President resumed taping the next day, August 1. He had breakfast with the Vice President and his domestic policy advisers and then
went into a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia and Averell
Harriman, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs. A large
ceremony followed, at which the President signed the Foreign Aid Bill.
The Secretary of State took a few minutes of the President’s time as did
the daughter of the state committee chairman for New York, Catherine
Pendergast. None of this was taped.
Then the President turned to the stubborn problem of the U.S. position at the nuclear test ban talks in Geneva. The White House had
already scheduled a press conference for 4:00 P.M. that afternoon, where
the President intended to announce this new position. The President
would tape their meeting.
2. The meeting with Georgi Bolshakov is listed in the Presidential Appointments Diary. See
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and
Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), pp. 193–95, for details of the meeting.
132
1, 1962
11:30 A.M.–12:43 P.M.
Now, the question will really be whether for the next six
months the United States ought to look like there is new information, and we haven’t changed our position at all, and the
cat really therefore will be on our backs. Or whether we say,
“Well, based on the new information, here’s where we’ll go,
and go no further” and the cat then is on the Russians’ backs.
After the test ban meeting on Monday, July 30, had adjourned, Kennedy
asked John McCloy, who had served as the President’s adviser on disarmament until the formation of ACDA in 1962, and Robert Lovett, a former under secretary of state and secretary of defense, to travel from
New York to Washington in order to study the VELA seismic results.
Kennedy also asked the director of central intelligence, John McCone, to
review the seismic results and to join with McCloy and Lovett to serve
as an advisory group.
On Tuesday, July 31, Secretary McNamara and Director of Central
Intelligence McCone spent roughly three hours reviewing the results of
the VELA seismic improvement program with a group including Dr.
Doyle Northrup, technical director of the Air Force Technical Application
Center (AFTAC); Dr. Carl Romney, also of AFTAC; and Department of
Defense general counsel Norton.4 The group developed a table showing
the changes in basic detection capability and the analysis of natural events
by the number which would remain unidentified under three detection
systems: (1) the system as it currently existed or was known in March
3. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Arthur Dean, Adrian Fisher, William Foster,
Roswell Gilpatric, Vice President Johnson, Robert Lovett, John McCloy, John McCone, Edward
R. Murrow, and Dean Rusk. Note that the official presidential log for August 1 does not list
McCloy, Lovett, or Murrow as participants of this meeting, but both McCone’s August 2 memorandum and Glenn Seaborg’s account indicate that they were indeed present. Seaborg’s account
also implies that Seaborg himself was present, as well as Dr. Franklin Long of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. [Glenn T. Seaborg, with Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, Khrushchev and
the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) pp. 167–68]. Tape 4, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
4. Northrup was harshly criticized by his superiors in the Air Force for his handling of
AFTAC’s new information on seismic detection (see Memorandum of July 27 discussion,
drafted by McCone, Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 4/7/62–8/21/62;
see Supplement).
133
1962, (2) the March 1962 system with the most recent technology and
knowledge, and (3) the so-called national system. Probabilities of success
and deficiencies were also noted in the table.5
On Tuesday evening, Lovett visited McCone at his home. The two
talked, and Lovett remained at McCone’s home for dinner (although
McCone himself was out for the evening), reading the transcripts of the
joint committee hearings of July 19 and 23, as well as additional material from the White House and McCone. Lovett gave McCloy and a
select group of scientists a briefing on these documents the next morning at 10:00 A.M.
Kennedy convened the meeting at 11:30 to continue the discussion of
negotiating strategies at Geneva, as well as his statement for that afternoon’s press conference.6
The President turned on the machine as Dean Rusk suggested the
President hear from William Foster, the director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, who that morning took some soundings on
Capitol Hill.
Dean Rusk: . . . including our security interests in trying to bring
some end to this arms race, and then secondly, having decided what
would be right for us to do, to consider what Arthur Dean’s negotiating
problems are, to see how we can best give effect to that position.
I think though that, since you [unclear] material already that it might
be well for Mr. Foster to bring you up to date on his discussions with the
[congressional] leadership, and you might want to get comments from
Mr. Lovett and Mr. McCloy as to how this appears to them, after their
rather extensive briefing, [unclear] first [unclear], summarized.
William Foster: Well, we had a very interesting breakfast this morning, Mr. President. Senator [Richard] Russell, Senator [Henry “Scoop”]
Jackson, Senator [John] Pastore, and Senator [Stuart] Symington were
there, and we put before them what we considered to be the improvements
in [detection] capabilities, and then I think I can simplify the discussion,
which was quite extensive, by saying that, at the end, Senator Russell said
5. Table not attached to McCone’s Memorandum for the File, 2 August 1962, FRUS,
7: 531–33.
6. For the text of the statement which Kennedy read at the press conference, see Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), p. 591.
134
1, 1962
that he recognized that these scientific achievements probably were sufficient to lead to some modification in the number of our on-site inspections.
The point at which he felt he would have to differ very strongly with
any change, was in changing the control posts from internationally
manned to nationally manned. We informed him we felt that we had sufficient ability from outside to detect, without any Soviet contributions
from their control posts, to detect better than we could before, and we
still insisted on on-site inspection.
We felt therefore, if we had international supervision of the control
posts on Soviet territory, that this would give us enough of a handle so
those stations would at least make some contribution.
Well, he said, “Maybe so.” He said, “I shall have to tell you that I
would have to vigorously fight any proposal of a treaty which gave up
this international supervision.” Now . . .
McGeorge Bundy: Gave up the supervision?
Foster: The international supervision of these control posts.
Arthur Dean: Well, do you mean the international supervision or
international manning?7
Foster: Well, [unclear].
John McCone: Well I [unclear] the proposal he makes, and he was
talking about international supervision with national manning, but
they’d be interested in the supervision being on the job all the time. He’s
not in favor of a roving team that would spot-check them occasionally.
Bundy: [Unclear] internationally when some things get crossed—
McCone: That’s right, that’s right—[Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: He will not raise those issues.
McCone: He will [not] what?
Unidentified: He will not raise those issues.
McCone: On the basis . . . on an international operation, . . . national . . .
Rusk: Mr. President, you will recall it is our proposal we have an outside scientist stationed at these stations to ensure against tinkering.
Foster: Now, he further said on the way up to the Hill—Adrian
7. This was an important distinction. The existing U.S. position, as it was presented in the
April 1961 U.S.-U.K. draft treaty, was that these control posts—19 on Soviet territory according to the Geneva system of 180 stations worldwide—would have international staff. The
Soviets rejected this proposal. During the White House meeting on 30 July a consensus had
formed that in light of the new scientific guidance it would be acceptable to allow the Soviets
to staff their own control stations so long as they agreed to international supervision. This
new position was proposed informally to the Soviets a few days later, on 6 August, in a private
note to the Soviet delegation in Geneva.
135
Fisher rode up with him, pursued this conversation—he said that if we
simply, in the discussion, said that we were willing to discuss a change in
the relationship of these control posts to the international system, without identifying what “supervision” meant, that he would not give us too
much trouble.8 I think this is being appraised. So that I think this, I think
some education—
Bundy: Well, obviously it’s been modified [unclear] as John McCone
[unclear] in his more recent . . .
Foster: Well, I think that, while you’d have difficulties, this is not
impossible on the basis of putting forward a willingness to modify our
existing treaty, which is on the table, in the direction of lesser on-site
inspections, on the basis of fewer control posts, and on the basis of a
willingness to discuss the relationship of these control posts to an international commission.9 Is that a fair statement?
Adrian Fisher: I would think so, [unclear]. His own feeling, right
now, is simply, they have not crossed the bridge in on-site inspections,
and we’re still just . . . As he said, [unclear] we’re still . . .
Fisher: They haven’t given us the signal that they’re willing to talk,
and then they’re, under these circumstances I think, you know, you’re
maybe just going to a lot of effort . . .10
Foster: He said I don’t trust them at all, [and] I don’t think they’re
going to do anything, but if you did it this way, this probably is a risk we
could assume.11 It’d be a—
President Kennedy: And have the Soviets ever . . . do they ever make
a very sharp distinction between their willingness to accept a degree of
international manning of the control posts and manned inspections?
Actually, the control posts [unclear] doesn’t seem to me to present any
espionage hazards comparable to free inspection. Have they made that
distinction or do they—?
Dean: Well, they say as of the present time that they will not permit
any stationing of anybody, neutrals or anyone else, at control posts on
their territory, nor will they permit any on-site inspections by anybody
outside the [unclear].
8. Fisher was deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1961.
9. This would be in order to accommodate the proposal made by the eight neutral delegations
to the Geneva talks on 16 April that an international commission of scientists be established
to supervise the detection process.
10. The Soviets had not accepted the principle of on-site inspections.
11. Referring to the Soviets.
136
1, 1962
President Kennedy: They don’t make any distinction between one
being [unclear].
Dean: No.
President Kennedy: Fine, good, well, perhaps, Mr. McCloy?
The congressional reaction to the concept of “international supervision”
for the control posts introduced a new twist into the policy review. The
President, however, decided to move the meeting along. He was keen to
focus on the advice of McCloy and Lovett regarding Arthur Dean’s
negotiating instructions.
John McCloy: Well, I’ve listened to this briefing this morning and
have given it some thought. I learned that by . . . coming to the conclusion that we’ve got to make a very clear statement, and I think we ought
to make it beforehand rather than in [unclear] composite treaty, of our
insistence upon the on-site inspections.
[Soviet foreign minister Andrei] Gromyko, as you confirmed, has
said that this is an undebatable point. I think we ought to be just as
undebatable on the other side, and I believe that the offer can’t be
divorced entirely from the test ban, can’t be isolated from the test ban.
I believe it has a big implication on other aspects of our disarmament. I think, unless we get this embedded in the whole disarmament
process, that we’re not going to get anywhere, and I feel that if we gave
way on this, if we accepted, ignored the statements which they have so
explicitly made at this point, this would be an encouragement to further obstruction. I think the sooner we meet that head-on, the better
off we are.
Bundy: Can I ask you one question on that?
McCloy: Yeah.
Bundy: Would you . . . Supposing, which is not currently the case, but
supposing we had a really major advance and could tell without inspection, no matter what they may say—12
McCloy: What I’m putting my accent on is verification rather than
various independent controls.
Bundy: It isn’t that you want to go there in order to go there; it’s that
you’ve got to know.
McCloy: That’s it. I’ve got to know whether they are cheating, I’ve
12. Bundy questioned the need to make Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection the sine qua
non for all arms control or arms reduction deals. An atmospheric or partial test ban, for example, could be verified by the United States without a presence on Soviet territory.
137
got to know. I’ve got to come down and test this event, if it’s a suspicious
event. And I’ve got to do it, and I don’t mean in regard to a test ban, but
I’ve got to do it all the way along the line, in disarmament, or else we’re
not going . . . it isn’t in the interest of the United States to disarm.
Rusk: The answer to Mac is that the object of inspections is to provide assurance.
Unidentified: —Feedback.
Rusk: If you can clearly provide assurance—
Rusk: [Unclear] day you look at it.
Bundy: There are people who say the object of inspections is to
establish the principle. I didn’t think that . . .
McCloy: Well, that’s not what I mean, no. I mean, for the principle is
what—
Unidentified: We need to know.
McCloy: —we need to know. We can’t equivocate on what we need to
know. And, therefore, I would say to them that, you’ve made the statement that you are prepared [to accept on-site inspections] . . . We are
not going to concede in any sense that we can’t have on-site inspections.
It’s demanded . . . it’s an element that’s going to run through all the disarmament discussions. If you’re ready to give way on that, then we’re
ready to sit down with you and discuss these modifications that we feel
the advance of the art has enabled us to do.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think Mr. Dean would agree that Lord Home
and I both laid a very strong basis for this point at the last meeting,
where we had—13
Dean: That’s right. Even the Pole.14
Rusk: —several people who came up after it and said that we had
made a very fine statement. Emphasizing the very point that you made
that inspection has to come about. This secrecy is incompatible with—
McCloy: It’s incompatible with constructive disarmament.
President Kennedy: Well, we . . . I understood that the Secretary of
Defense, after examining this new scientific information, came to the
conclusion that based on this new information, instead of insisting on 12
to 20, we could protect our national interests by having only six on-site
13. Alec Douglas Home, Lord Home, was the British foreign secretary.
14. Presumably Professor Manfield Lachs, Polish deputy representative to the EighteenNation Disarmament Committee.
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1, 1962
[inspections]. That is not our governmental position, but that may or
may not be Secretary McNamara’s position.15 But there isn’t any doubt
that if they would accept the principle that we would be able to change
our required number of—
McCloy: On-site.
President Kennedy: . . . on-site inspections. Now . . .
Unidentified: That’s correct.
President Kennedy: This may be just academic unless they change it.
The question would be whether we would indicate, with what words we
would indicate our willingness to change, providing the principle is
accepted. Or do we, when Mr. Dean goes over there, and they say . . . He
says that he doesn’t have the principle accepted, and they say to him,
“well, assuming the principle were accepted, what would this new scientific information permit you, require you to insist upon?”
Does he then say, “Well we can’t even discuss that until we first get
the principle accepted?” Or does he say, “Well, we could reduce it, and
then perhaps negotiate a reduction.” How does he handle that?
McCloy: We would . . . Is the chief accent, and if I could just . . . is the
chief accent on the number of control stations, the reduction of control
stations, rather than the reduction of the on-site inspections? I do believe
as a concomitant of this better detection system, we probably won’t have
as great a necessity for on-site inspections, as you would have had, but I—
President Kennedy: I understood that this new information could
really . . . that the nationally manned, internationally monitored control
stations would permit you to check information outside and inside in such
a way that it really wouldn’t be very worthwhile for them to try to cheat
on the . . . There would be quite a risk in their cheating with the kind of
information they send out from the nationally manned control station.
Bundy: It’s true, Mr. President, but remember they can always lower
the threshold way down, and enlarge their level of safety.16 I mean,
change—
President Kennedy: Yeah, but that’s why I think that’s why we have to
insist on the international inspection. Now, if you have six international
inspections combined with any kind of effective international monitoring
15. John McCone had stepped out of the meeting by this point. He would become very concerned later when it was reported to him that Robert McNamara’s position was that the
United States could live with as few as six on-site inspections.
16. Bundy is referring to the fact that the Soviets could resort to testing very low yield
devices, which would be very difficult to detect.
139
system of the nationally manned control posts, combined with an adequate
number of stations outside the Soviet Union, the rewards for the Soviets
scientifically of cheating is really, based on what we heard the other day, is
rather limited. They’re not going to gain anything, given the way the art is
now developing. They’re not going to be able to make much progress, with
these rather limited tests underground, and the gamble, to have six or eight
international inspections . . . I don’t see that it’s worth it to the Soviet
Union to take that chance to cheat, because they’re not going to gain much.
If they were testing in the atmosphere, they can make great progress,
but they’re not going to be able to make that kind of progress underground. What is the return to that? Why should they cheat under those
conditions?
McCloy: Well, anybody that’s experimenting, underground or in the
air or where[ever], as against the fellow that isn’t experimenting, is
gaining. You’ve got to operate—
President Kennedy: Yeah, but even . . . but our scientists tell us that
the amount of gain they can make is very low with these tests, if they
cheated. Compared to what they now have as a result of their last atmospheric test, and will have as a result of their [Soviet code-named TYCHI]
one, is quite limited.
McCloy: Well, I think that’s probably so, although this morning, Dr.
[Leland] Haworth was a little bit hesitant—
Bundy: I’ll tell you what is real clear, and I think this is the more logical one if history is on our side. What they would do is stuff that would
not be cheating, up to the point when they abrogated. Then they would
abrogate massively. This would keep their laboratories alive; they could
plan against a date. That’s the more serious [unclear].
President Kennedy: But that’s an argument against any test ban.
Bundy: That’s correct. Yeah.
Unidentified: That’s right. That’s right.
President Kennedy: Now, against that we have to put the studies of
the Department of Defense about the problem of diffusion—17
Foster: The risk—
President Kennedy: And other countries testing and making these
things so cheap that everybody will have them in great quantities. So
that it’s not a single scale.
McCloy: Mr. President, although it may be true, that you don’t get in
17. Kennedy was reminding the group that he believed a strong argument in favor of a test
ban was that it would curb nuclear proliferation.
140
1, 1962
bulk, once, a great advantage, if you have a steady accumulation from
year to year of underground testing, and we not being able to test—and
by assumption we can’t test because we’re an open society; they can—
maybe that accumulation in the end is pretty substantial.
I’m not saying that this isn’t a risk that we ought to take. I’m very
much in favor of a test ban, as you know. I think it’s symbolic. It has
great significance for our security. To achieve it, I’m ready to make some
sacrifices for it.
I don’t think that you can treat this [as] entirely de minima, however:
a constant series of underground, undetected testing on their part, as
against no testing on ours.
President Kennedy: No, that’s right. That’s why we’re insisting on
inspection, as I say the Secretary said that . . . 18 I wonder . . . We’ve got
two problems: One is what I might say this afternoon, because I think
these stories that have come out have caused an unnecessary concern
and alarm, because they’re always using the words soft and concessions
and all the rest, and the scientific information is not regarded as hard
enough to make concessions or to soften.
So I’d like . . . It seems to me I ought to really get it as clearly as we
can today what our position is going to be, and also what we ought to,
what Arthur Dean ought to say. What’s your thought, Mr. Lovett, on
what we ought to do on this?
Robert Lovett: Well, I agree, Mr. President, with the comments of
McCloy. I’m a member of the once-burnt, twice-shy club down here. I’ve
been through this Hans Bethe affair, and the Committee of Experts, and
I’m aware of the fact that in this particular instance you have no scientific breakthrough.19 The scientists themselves confirmed that this
morning, as they have in the recent past.
We have some improvement. There’s no reason to believe preliminary
figures can’t be materially changed, changed in the important elements at
least, and there’s no reason to think that additional improvement won’t
occur over a period of time, but at the moment, there is no scientific
breakthrough. There is some slight improvement in detection means outside the country.
18. The President may have been referring to McNamara’s apparent belief that the number of
required on-site inspections could be reduced without any additional risks to national security.
19. Lovett appears to have been expressing frustration at the contradictory recommendations
made over previous years by the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group chaired by Cornell
University physics professor Hans A. Bethe.
141
Secondly, I have a feeling that we are making this decision unnecessarily complicated for ourselves by regarding this as a negotiation. I
don’t think this is a negotiation, Mr. President. I think this is a phase of
the Cold War, and I think it ties in with a lot of other things, as, for
example, the GNC form of the draft of the treaty.20
We are told by Gromyko and [Soviet negotiator Valerian] Zorin
within the last few weeks that they will “not permit verification of
amounts of weapons and forces at any stage of a disarmament plan, not
even in the [unclear] zone.”21
In those circumstances, it seems to me that we have to pay far less
attention to the posture of this country, than we do to our own security.
The posture internationally is nice, but the security is the thing that
keeps us alive in the future.
My own feeling about it is that, in the present circumstances, we
ought to go for a comprehensive treaty, say nothing at this time about
atmospheric, not say in our discussions with them that we might accept a
reduced number of things, because I don’t see why we should. What we
need to do is to talk about discuss instead of accept. The language in one
of these reports, in the book that Mac [Bundy] was good enough to give
us a chance to study last night, uses that language.
Edward R. Murrow: What language?
Lovett: Accept.
Murrow: Oh. There’s been a change.
Lovett: Well, it changed overnight because it was given it to me last
night.
Bundy: I’m not sure I have the latest figures. I can’t tell [unclear].
[Unclear exchange. McCloy is heard saying “On Monday” perhaps in
reference to the date of the figures he consulted. ]
Lovett: [Unclear] . . . would probably help the position of the United
States. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: We’re trying to . . .
Lovett: I think it’s perfectly clear, to be realistic about this, that we
are not going to get agreement from the Soviets for on-site inspection
for verification purposes.
An interesting sideline to that, which probably Dean [Rusk] knows,
is that Mr. Khrushchev has been very outspoken recently. He says that
20. The abbreviation GNC stands for Group of Nonaligned Countries.
21. The United States’s spring 1962 proposal for general and complete disarmament made to the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva included a provision for zonal inspection.
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1, 1962
there’s no self-respecting country [that] can accept such control. He’s
speaking now of retained arms. He will let us inspect the arms which are
going to be destroyed, but not the arms that are being retained. In other
words, we can go into the morgue and count the bodies, but we can’t go
into the maternity ward and count what’s coming.22
And, he says this in spite of the fact, and he’d be far more persuasive
if he remembered this, that he proposed just precisely this form of verification by inspection under the Rapacki Plan . . . Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia.23
So the net of my feeling is that we ought to approach this entirely
realistically. We ought to put it forward in such a way that we make it
clear that unless they are prepared to abandon their complete refusal to
agree to any form of obligatorily accepted verification by inspection . . . if
they will do that, then you are prepared to discuss the application of any
modernization program of these techniques to the problem of internationally . . . of formal control systems. The number, I should think, we
would want to avoid, Mr. President, discussing. We don’t know, and I
think it’s far too early in any negotiation, to get into it.
President Kennedy: Mr. Dean, do you want to make any comment?
Dean: Well, I agree a hundred percent that we ought to discuss first,
primarily whether it’s in the security interests of this country. And I
don’t think that we ought to get into this question of numbers first. I can
go back and discuss with Zorin with respect to whether or not, as a matter of principle, they would take any on-site inspections. [Unclear] it
may mean that we can get them to accept some, although Gromyko told
the Secretary [Rusk] very clearly they would not. Mr. Zorin has said
the same thing to me.
You then get down to the question of what do we want to accomplish.
We probably are now going to have another month’s [worth] of discussion
at Geneva before we adjourn for the UNGA.24 Madame [Alva] Myrdal,
who is in London. . . . Her last act as foreign minister of Sweden . . . [she is]
22. Kennedy liked this turn of phrase. He would use it in a response to a reporter’s question at
his afternoon press conference.
23. In October 1957, Polish foreign minister Adam Rapacki proposed a denuclearized zone in
Central Europe to extend through Poland, Czechoslovakia, and both Germanies. His proposal
also included limitations on conventional arms in the region and a nonaggression pact
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In December 1957, chairman of the Soviet Council of
Ministers, Nikolai Bulganin, publicly endorsed the plan, but the Eisenhower administration
rejected it on the basis that the limitations it would place on NATO’s deployments would be
detrimental to Western security interests, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany.
24. U.N. General Assembly.
143
terribly interested personally in this question of a test ban treaty, and that
they want to wait to see if we’re not going to come forward and make some
proposals on the basis of this supposed new technical knowledge.25 And if
we don’t, that they’re going to come through and probably put some kind
of a proposal of a treaty based, I guess, almost entirely on the eight-nation
memorandum, which they initiated.26
And, what concerns me then is we might lose control of the negotiations at about the time that we went into the UNGA. Now as Senator
[Stuart] Symington said this morning, “Well what of it? What do we
care? If the UNGA is against us, that’s so much the better, and we don’t
care who has the majority in the UNGA.”
Well, I would hate, and I’d hesitate to see us lose control of [the]
negotiations, [unclear] the fact that we now have 106 against us, Burundi
and Algeria numbered in there, with . . . We started with 52, two-thirds
of 70. You’ll have the Africans in there, playing a pretty important position. I think we’re going to be negotiating on this for a long time.
I would like, if we can, and I don’t want to give away anything on
security, and I don’t want to be making any promises that on the basis of
science that we can’t perform, but it does seem to all of us, even Jack
[McCloy] knows, from the time I got into this thing27 that this 180
[stations] proposal, 3 billion dollar investment figure, taking four years
to install, is just not working.28 We’ve always wanted to get a more
workable system. Not any concession to the Russians, but just a workable, efficient, and effective system. I would like to be in the position, and
even though Zorin says flatly they won’t take any on-site [inspections],
to be able to outline that we believe—without going into too much of
actual detail—but we do believe that this Geneva system could be
replaced by a system which would not only, except in certain respects,
would be more efficient than the Geneva system, [but] would go into
effect immediately. I think it would be workable, and I think we at least
have to come out of these Geneva negotiations with some forward movement on the part of the United States, so that we don’t go into the
UNGA with, in effect, saying, “Yes, we know there’s some technical
improvement, but we won’t discuss it.” I think that would put us in a
very bad light at Geneva and in [unclear] world opinion.
25. Alva Myrdal was the head of Swedish delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee in Geneva.
26. Proposed at Geneva, April 1962.
27. Dean had been the U.S. disarmament negotiator since February 1961.
28. Dean said nations here but clearly meant stations.
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1, 1962
Rusk: Well I think with Geneva—
Fisher: We could reduce, materially reduce our control stations, don’t
you think?
Dean: Now when you say “materially reduce,” I would [unclear interjection] I want to be clear that what we’re really talking about is going to
about 80 instead of 180.
Unidentified: Going to what?
Dean: We’re going to [talk] about 80 instead of 180. The 25 is seismic stations. You’re still going to have your acoustic—29
Unidentified: Acoustic and electronic.
Dean: Your acoustic over in the air, your electromagnetic pulse. You
won’t have all three—acoustic, electromagnetic, and seismic—at every
one, but you’d be working these technical—
Bundy: At 80 locations.
Dean: At 80 locations, and you’d be working in collaboration with
these universities around the world. They’ll all tie in together. So
you’ll probably have about a total of about 25 of what they call these
[unclear]—
Unidentified: Seismic active relays.
Dean: Huh?
President Kennedy: If we get [unclear], can we not say that this is,
that these 80 would be . . . in addition to the advantage of speed or
immediacy, they ought to be more effective?
Dean: Be more effective. Yes.
Bundy: It wouldn’t be more effective than the old system would be,
but they’re more effective than the initial designed effectiveness of the
old system.
Dean: Well, you can put it into effect almost immediately. You don’t
have to wait—
Dean: —for four years. It’s on operating—
McCloy: Oh, I’m greatly relieved that we’re off the hook.
Dean: What?
29. Here the conversation picked up on the difference between the number of control stations
of any type and those designed simply to detect seismic (earthquake) waves. At the 30 July
meeting Kennedy became confused as some of his advisers argued for reducing the number to
25 and others to 50, without making clear that the smaller number included only seismic control stations and the larger included all detection formats. No one mentioned the number 80 at
the earlier meeting.
145
McCloy: I’m greatly relieved that we’re off the hook on that 180.
That was a cumbersome number of . . . unworkable . . .30
Fisher: We’re not off the hook, yet. It still sits there at the moment.
McCloy: Well, if we can get off, [unclear] if we can get off.
Fisher: Well, this is what we’re recommending.
President Kennedy: Can we describe this phase of it as making,
rather than the word concessions and softening and so on, that it will make
this part of the system more effective? And why is it we’re going to be
able to do this immediately and have to wait four years for the other?
How would you describe this?
Dean: Well, we’ve got the, we’ve got the working stations, sir. We’ve
got this equipment under the Geneva program which was already given
to them, if we can get these . . .
Bundy: But we need at least six months to a year. [Unclear exchange.]
Dean: Well, maybe six months to a year as against roughly four
years, I believe.
President Kennedy: And they’re clearly expensive [unclear].
Dean: Oh, nowhere near as expensive as—
President Kennedy: What will it cost [unclear]?
Dean: ACDA costs on the 180 stations was estimated at 3 billion and
operating costs half a billion and 35,000 men. It always seemed to me
fantastic.
President Kennedy: And now what is . . . Your cost is what?
Bundy: Well, those figures have never been very hard.31
Dean: No, no.
Unidentified: I’d be careful about . . .
Unidentified: I’d be careful . . .
Unidentified: We don’t have many, we don’t have many soft figures.
[Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Well, now, that’s . . . What else have we . . .
As the President tried to refocus the discussion, there was a side conversation about the cost of the Geneva system. Bundy can be heard saying
“more economical than” and someone else added, perhaps as a way of
explaining the savings, “men, money, and durables.”
President Kennedy: Now I think that . . . I’d quite agree with Senator
30. McCloy was referring to the number of control stations.
31. Perhaps evidence of how little confidence there was that the Geneva system would ever be
accepted and implemented.
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1, 1962
Symington, if we finally get down to where we are about to sign something, we’re not that interested in giving them something to go away, as
far as we’re concerned. It’s just a question of [unclear] at this point and
which one is going to be the future of the Soviet position. There’s no reason for us to make it more difficult if we can make it easier for ourselves.
Dean: That’s right.
President Kennedy: It’s just a question of what our posture is compared to theirs. If we sign, and then it becomes a . . . if there’s any doubt
about our positional piece,32 then we ought to try to figure out why we
will look like we are the opponent when it clearly is the Soviet Union.33
Bundy: Let me give you one more fact which is in active consideration both on the policy and on how to handle it today. We have signals
that the Soviet low-yield tests in the atmosphere [unclear] first indications of higher altitude [unclear].
Lovett: Right on schedule. [Unclear exchange.]
Bundy: We have announced that we will release—
Eleven seconds excised as classified information.
McCloy: Mr. President, you wouldn’t use the word eighty this afternoon in the press conference, would you?34
President Kennedy: No.
Fisher: Did I understand, Mr. McCloy, that the word material reduction . . .35
McCloy: Well, that’s what I would say, yes. It seems to me that it’s
bound to be [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: Unusually significant reduction? Or [unclear]?
Dean: I think you could use the word or term significant reduction in
your . . .
Bundy: “In the structure of the detection system.”
Dean: Yes. But at the same time . . .
President Kennedy: . . . you make a more effective [unclear]—36
Bundy: Cheaper, more quicker . . .
32. President Kennedy meant “negotiating position.”
33. Sensitive to the role of public diplomacy on this issue, the President made a point of inviting veteran broadcaster, the chief of the U.S. Information Agency, Edward R. Murrow, to
these test ban meetings.
34. Lovett was referring to the number that Dean mentioned earlier in the meeting for all
control stations in a proposed new verification system.
35. In the number of control stations.
36. Concerned that even this language might be viewed as a concession, Kennedy is eager to
remind the public that the new, slimmer version of the Geneva system would be equally as, or
more effective than, the originally proposed version.
147
Dean: Doing it more quickly, and I think, in most instances, equally
as effective. [Unclear exchange.]
Bundy: That’s a way of producing the same effectiveness, [as] the
initial assigned effectiveness?
Lovett: That’s all right, no it’s all right.
Dean: It gives us the same effectiveness as the initially designed
means available.
Bundy: The same effectiveness we first hoped to get of our new system. You see the point. [Unclear exchange.]
Dean: There is a slight . . . there is one detraction from that. There is
a slight degradation of this new system in identification.
Lovett: That’s right.
Dean: If you don’t . . . slight degradation in your ability to identify
nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union if you don’t have the number of
control posts inside the Soviet Union as was originally contemplated by
the ’58 system.
Foster: You can’t fix the locations effectively, either. [Several people
speak up at once.]
Bundy: —locations very close together. [Unclear] probably need a
larger area for inspection.
McCone has apparently reentered the room at some point.
Lovett: Yeah.
McCone: I’d be careful about references to the capabilities of the
original system, for this reason, that the original system, we knew had a
threshold. We laid out the VELA program with the purpose of finding
out whether we could improve technology and thereby reduce or eliminate that threshold. Now, we’ve eliminated the threshold first. Now
we’re using the technology to reduce the system. This might cause some
questions and problems.37 [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: [to Arthur Dean] OK, well, now the second . . .
what is the . . . what do you think . . . do you have an opinion of what you
see as your problem in presenting this, and what you think would be the
alternative ways of doing it?
Dean: I guess that I would hope that we would not start out with
37. The test proved that the same level of detection could be accomplished with fewer total
control stations, of which fewer needed to be on Soviet soil. This information, however, did
nothing to alter criticisms of the original Geneva system. There was a threshold for the 1958
Geneva system below which no tests could be detected. McCone was making the point that
the VELA tests did nothing to alter that threshold.
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1, 1962
this atmospheric [unclear] treaty—underground and outer space—
because on November 28 [1961] the Soviets proposed a ban in the
atmosphere, plus a moratorium on underground. I would be very worried that they would maneuver us somehow, through India or [international] pressure, to take this atmospheric and then, instead of our being
free to continue to test underground, I would be afraid that terrific opinion would be building up to make us agree to an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on underground [testing]. Now I know you’re
saying we won’t,38 but I simply say I think you’ve then given away your
biggest asset. And that is, our ability to agree on bans in the atmosphere.
That’s basically [unclear].
I would be inclined to try this out on Zorin and make sure he’ll say
no on the on-site, then I could go before the plenary and say that we’ve
tried to work this thing out, but we are prepared to lay out—without
going into too much detail—we are prepared to discuss an internationally supervised system. So that gets away from the eight-nation memorandum, which relies entirely on nationally manned plus some additional
systems by agreement.
I’d lay out that we do believe that we are prepared to sit down with
the Soviets and try to make this a more effective system. And try to outline, without going into too much detail, just some of the things that we
have discovered, but which I think we’ve got to be awfully careful about,
as Mr. Lovett says, not to announce this as a scientific breakthrough. In
that way, I think we could keep this discussion going and I think that we
could prevent the Eight there from agreeing on some Swedish program
that they might bring in.39
President Kennedy: What are you going to do about the British?
Because they’re going to be a bit more . . .40
Dean: Well, they’re going to be quite a problem, because they’re . . .
Lord Home has been making some statements that in effect have called
this a scientific breakthrough, and in answers . . . not in answers to questions, in statements in England. And the British told me before I just
came over here, Godber, their minister, was there, that they are really in
38. Stop underground testing.
39. The Eight are the eight nonaligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee—Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab
Republic.
40. The British, who were eager for a test ban agreement, would want to hear sweeter music
from U.S. negotiators.
149
a very tough way, as far as the conservative party is concerned, and
they’re really looking for us to come back there with some sort of major
thing that’s going to help them out with their difficulties.41 I think
they’re in so much difficulty that this isn’t going to help them, but
Godber, who’s a very good fellow, told me that they really expected us to
come back with some really major changes. [Unclear background whispering.] I think that these are . . . I think in all probability that you will have
to, as soon as we agree on this, that you will have to explain this to Mr.
[Harold] Macmillan personally, if—42
President Kennedy: Well, I’d like to ask Mr. Lovett if he believes,
which I think we all would accept as solid, that the Soviets will not agree
to on-site inspection, and if there is new information which reduces the
number of events to a fourth, and when you have the British who have
always wanted to go much further even before we understood the information, plus the neutrals . . .
What is wrong with us attempting, saying, putting forward these
reduced figures at this time of the number of on-site inspections? By
doing this, we would have demonstrated that we were bringing our position up to our technology. I don’t think anybody . . . most people would
think, whether we say six or seven or eight [on-site inspections], that it
would be certainly sufficient restraint on the Soviet Union. They wouldn’t really want to take this chance.43 Why would we be in a better position to do that? Then the Soviet Union would then be sticking with its
original position, and we at least would be in a much more protected
negotiating position with the British who’ll be out trying to gut us . . . as
well as everyone else . . . without really losing anything. What is the reason not to do that [unclear]?
Lovett: I think there’s one basic reason, and that is that the Soviets
have consistently said they will permit no inspection, no verification of
any sort. I read the quotation from Khrushchev which was two weeks
ago. And [Andrei] Gromyko and Zorin have consistently taken his position. Now, if they say, “none at all” and then we go over there and then
say, “Well, will you consider 10, 13, 20, 6?” . . . whatever it may be, it
seems to me that they will continue to say no while we have given rather
41. Joseph Godber was the British minister of state for foreign affairs (June 1961 to June 1963)
and representative to the Geneva Conference.
42. British prime minister Harold Macmillan.
43. Probably take the chance that their cheating would be detected.
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1, 1962
important evidence, in fact, that we are prepared even to abandon the
verification and inspection, which at once runs into the problems of our
phased general disarmament program, runs into the entire structure of
our—
President Kennedy: If I may, no, excuse me, we would reduce the
number, but we wouldn’t give up the—
Lovett: Well, we would reduce the number. Then we’ve opened up a
whole new area of problems, which is: What is the minimum number of
verifications which would be appropriate?
President Kennedy: Well, up to now, we’ve said based on previous
information which, as I understand the report, is four times as many
events. We have said that we would go between 12 and 20. Now, let’s say
that the secretary, after looking at it, says that, based on the development
of the art and so on, that we could detect our, that it would be too much
of a risk to the Russians if we had six or seven or eight, let’s say, whatever the figure might be, but at least then we have come forward with a
new position based on new information, which isn’t a breakthrough, but
it’s more sophisticated [unclear].
Lovett: Well, basically Mr. President, I think that’s one man’s position, one man’s opinion, in an area in which there can be no exactitude at
all. I don’t think 12 or 20 carries any magic; but fundamentally, every
time we withdraw from a position of an unquestioned principle, I think
we weaken the principle itself.
President Kennedy: That’s our own principle! After all, we did
change from 20, to—
Bundy: Twelve.
Lovett: Twelve at this point, as I understand.
Dean: That’s right sir. Yes, that’s right.
President Kennedy: But at any rate, there’s nothing sacred about 20
or 12, it really depends on how many events and what you consider constitutes a reasonable hazard to cheating.
Lovett: Well, I—
President Kennedy: Now let’s say this new information tells us, without regard to negotiation, within this room, that six [inspections] presents the Russians with a [unclear] hazard and we are convinced they
won’t take any. Now, the question will really be whether for the next six
months the United States ought to look like there is new information,
and we haven’t changed our position at all, and the cat really therefore
will be on our backs. Or whether we say, “Well, based on the new information, here’s where we’ll go, and go no further” and the cat then is on
the Russians’ backs.
151
Lovett: Well, sir, I don’t think we can shift the cat as easily as that. It
seems to me that if we say to the Russians—this is an element of negotiations, Mr. President, that I’m talking about, not the generic problem. If
they say we will consider no inspections, none at all, and we say, “Well,
has the number got anything to do with it?”
Lovett: And they’d say, “Yes, the number’s got something to do with
it,” then you’d have a reasonable opportunity to talk about it. But if they
say, “No inspections at all,” and they have consistently taken that, they
say no self-respecting country would permit this, this seems to me it’s an
exercise in futility, and it becomes something of a gimmick in the public
mind. And in the world.
President Kennedy: Well, let me put it a different way. Do you see
any objection . . . We’ve talked about the question of reducing from 180
to this sort of—now, do you see any objection to Mr. Dean saying that,
if the Russians were willing to negotiate this question seriously based
on this new information we now have for the number of inspections,
we’d be prepared to discuss it with them, and if there is a [unclear], to
reduce the number of tests.44 But until we know whether they’re going
to persist on . . . our getting into detailed discussions about the number
if we are running [unclear]. Do you see anything wrong, in short, with
him indicating that we would, once the Soviets had accepted the principle of international inspection, we would be prepared perhaps to change
our [unclear]?
Lovett: I would think there would be nothing wrong with saying
that we would discuss it, once they had agreed to the principle of inspection, because I don’t know what the magic figure is, Mr. President.
Dean: Can I make a suggestion on our . . . ?
Dean: They’ve always said that there are never more than 50 unidentified events in Soviet territory. Our formula—12 to 25—when we said
there was a hundred. So we said, here’s how [unclear] correct, then, on
the basis of one to five, are . . . that we’ll have.45 If your signs are incorrect, then it’s a maximum of 100, and we go up to 20. Now we might be
able to say, “We’re quite prepared, on the basis of these new calculations,
44. On-site inspections.
45. The U.S. position was that it wished to investigate by on-site inspection one out of every
five unexplained underground events in the Soviet Union.
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1, 1962
to relate the number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union to what
we agree upon is the number of unidentified events on Soviet territory.”
Now, as I understand, under this new data, it’s roughly 75, and so on
the basis of one in five, that would be 15. Now this is really a political
judgment. 12 is one a month. So I think—as all of the Eight keep saying
to us all of the time, “you want to always have some give in your position”—I would think that we might put it into a formula relating it to
the number of unidentified events, and then, perhaps, if we need to,
depending upon your instruction, we might get down to somewhere
around 10. But in the first instance, I should think it would make a very
good impression if we were prepared to say that we would relate these
on-site inspections to whatever the new data showed with respect to
your number of unidentified events.46
Rusk: Mr. President, the—
Bundy: [aside] Do you agree with that? [Unclear response.]
Rusk: This problem runs into what Chip Bohlen is always talking
about, of [unclear]. So long as the Soviets sit at zero, any figure that we
could put in will be clipped sharply by the others [someone agrees] in an
effort to get us to move nearer the Soviet position. Our move has got to
be, and I think we can succeed in this, to get other people talking at the
Russians about zero, rather than talking about a figure of whatever—
President Kennedy: But can we get them to do that though, Mr.
Secretary, unless we have indicated some change in our . . .
Rusk: Well I think that that’s probably incumbent upon us [unclear].
Unclear exchange. Rusk is apparently asked a question to which he
responded, “The last time we used this is . . .”
President Kennedy: But I must say that if we say there are only
70—I’m not saying that that’s all there are —but if there’s only 70 and
you’re going to inspect one out of every five, I don’t see that . . . The
fact of the matter is that if you’re inspecting one out of every ten, it isn’t
worth it to cheat.47
46. What the group did not understand was that Kennedy had always understood this to be a
political number, and there is evidence that the President was not concerned about the ratio
between inspections and unexplained events. In May 1961, the President had Robert Kennedy
offer Khrushchev a secret deal through Soviet intelligence officer Georgi Bolshakov for ten
on-site inspections. This was long before the VELA tests reduced estimates of the number of
unexplainable underground events each year in the Soviet Union (see Fursenko and Naftali,
“One Hell of a Gamble,” p.113).
47. Number of unexplained underground events.
153
Bundy: Given the fact that 70 is [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: I would hate to be doing something illegitimate
and figure every tenth time there’s going to be an inspection, because
you wouldn’t do it, it’s too much of a risk, just by mathematical—
Dean: We could divide [unclear]. We could divide it one step further, if
you wanted to, and that is to divide the number of inspections between
your seismic areas and your off-seismic areas in the Soviet Union. Or your
seismic areas entirely in Kamchatka, Kurile Islands, and this Kashmir
region northeast of Afghanistan, the very heartland of Russia. As I understand it, that’s a fairly hot seismic area.48
President Kennedy: There aren’t that many . . . [Unclear exchange.]
Bundy: You could say that [unclear].
Dean: It might be nice to have a further degree of flexibility in dividing up your 12, or whatever your number is [unclear] between your seismic and your—
President Kennedy: We’re not in disagreement here that if the
Soviets actually said they’d come forward and start discussions, then we
would take another look and figure what is the . . . gives us protection.
All right, now we’re only talking therefore, if they do change, how is it
that we can keep the, as the Secretary suggests, the major heat on them,
and not on our refusal—and with . . . the British, I know, are going to be
at us—our refusal to equate our new information with a new position?
What phrases can Arthur Dean use that would indicate that we’re
prepared to take a new position without getting us into a lot of trouble
before the time comes? I wouldn’t mind having a fight with the
Congress if it looked like you could really get an agreement, and get a
treaty . . . Make that the initiative that would be worth a fight. But if
we’re not going to ever get that, there’s no sense in having six months of
being attacked by [Senator Henry “Scoop”] Jackson and others for giving away our position rather late in the game.
Now how can . . . it seems to me, therefore, it’s just a question of how
Arthur Dean can put this, so that the next six months it’s more on the
Russians than it is on us, and that we don’t look like our position remains
unchanged with the information which is changed. I just don’t know
what the phrase is that he’s going to use. He’s the one who has to carry
the case. What can we say to him that he can say? Yeah.
48. In earthquake zones the odds that an underground nuclear test might be mistaken for a
seismic event are high.
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1, 1962
Vice President Johnson: Could I read a couple of paragraphs here
and make a limited comment? [Unclear.] [The Vice President begins to
read from draft language for the President’s 4:00 P.M. press conference statement.49]
Our new assessments give real promise that we can now work
towards a system of detection and verification which would be substantially less large and cumbersome than the system which was contained in the treaty which we tabled in Geneva in April. Meanwhile,
on the defense side, our new assessments do not affect the requirement that any system include adequate provision for on-site inspection of unidentified underground events. It is probable that if we can
agree on an improved system, in the light of our very best assessment of the technical capabilities, there is no justification whatever
for accepting the comprehensive treaty on the basis of present Soviet
insistence that any inspection whatever [unclear].
Bundy: No inspection.
Vice President Johnson: [continuing reading]
We have been conducting a most careful and intensive review of
our position with the object of bringing it squarely in line with technical realities. I must express the hope that the Soviet government,
too, will reexamine its position on this matter of inspections. In the
past it accepted the principle, and if it would return to its earlier
position, we, for our part, will be able to engage in a more serious
attempt to reach agreement on the relatively small number of on-site
inspections which is essential.
Isn’t that what you’re saying?
Dean: Yes, sir.
Vice President Johnson: Now isn’t that what you’re saying? That
keeps the [unclear] on-site inspections . . .
Lovett: . . . keeps the initiative with us.
Vice President Johnson: And, that’s just a bare modification of the
last page of your statement [unclear].
Rusk: See, the two essential points here for the President today:
49. For the transcript of the President’s news conference later that afternoon, including his
statement regarding the test ban treaty, see Public Papers of the Presidents, pp. 560–98.
155
Recent tests have resulted in an improved capability to provide assurance through a simpler and less expensive arrangement. Secondly, we
see no way to provide assurance without an adequate number of on-site
inspections. So long as the Soviets say “No on-site inspections,” we cannot be encouraged about the prospects of a test ban treaty. That’s
exactly what they’re going to say. [Voices of agreement.]
President Kennedy: What is Arthur Dean going to do?
Bundy: [Unclear] on numbers until we get them on the [unclear].
President Kennedy: On what grounds?
Bundy: On the grounds—
President Kennedy: When they say to him, “Well is this . . . what do
you believe this new data will permit you to agree upon?” What does he
say in answer to that?
Lovett: That these are preliminary figures, Mr. President.
Lovett: We’ve got to explore this and find out what is the proper
number.
Vice President Johnson: And we’re going to sit down and discuss it.
Once again the discussion of firm numbers for a new Geneva verification system sets off an unclear exchange.
Bundy: [Unclear] answer is if we [unclear] lower number, we couldn’t agree around this table, whether it’s three or—
Rusk: Mr. President, [unclear] accept, [unclear] India . . . Arthur
Lall50 [unclear]. I think we get Mr. Dean to go to them directly, in private and say, “Well now, on that question, there’s no point in my negotiating that number with you, Mr. Ambassador. This is a problem between
the United States and the Soviet Union. And so far, as the Soviets are
saying zero, we’re not in business. Now, if you can help us get the Soviets
to talk about this, then all of us are in business here. But there’s no point
in my talking to you about a specific number—it’ll be lower, I can tell
you it’ll be lower—but let’s don’t get into specific numbers, until the
Russians—”51 [Rusk is cut off.]
President Kennedy: If he can decide . . . Now, as long as . . . I just
wanted to get the . . . He can say that it’s going to be lower. It’s going to
. . . My judgment is, that’s what he has to say. It’s going to be lower.
Dean: I say lower. The 12 is related to the number of unidentified
events. [Unclear exchange.] I’d like to be able to relate it so that [unclear].
50. Arthur Lall was the Indian ambassador to the Geneva talks.
51. A strategy to use the Indians to help move the Soviets to accept some, any on-site inspections.
156
1, 1962
[Unclear exchange.] I don’t want it to pass lower than 12 [on-site inspections], that’s my problem.
Rusk: “Lower, in the light of improved capabilities.”
President Kennedy: Well, it may be lower than 12.52
Dean: Lower than 12, I’m sure its going to be, but in the first
instance I would like to have the negotiating [room] because I don’t—
[unclear exchange].
President Kennedy: I want to make sure that we’re not sending you out
without even a shirt on. [Laughter.] Do you feel that you’ve got enough to?
I don’t think that we ought to . . . I think the heat ought to be on them.
Dean: I think [unclear].
President Kennedy: We ought to give you as much as we can [unclear].
Dean: If you’d allow me to relate it to the scientific data on it, I think
I’ve got the negotiating ability to [unclear], but I need—
McCloy: One thing that I don’t like about the Vice President’s and
yours, Mr. Dean, is the fact that we don’t see how we can give up the . . .
I think we ought to be more aggressive, be more crystallized in [unclear]
on-site inspections, because I think, as I say, it’s not only related to the
test ban and the probability of getting a test ban, but it relates to
the whole probability of getting off this [unclear] . . .
Bundy: Well, you can make that argument if you want . . .
President Kennedy: I think we ought to restate at the beginning
what this information is. I mean everybody’s got a . . . at least generally
what it has indicated, based on the early July, or whatever it is . . . but
indicate the somewhat tentative nature, but it does encourage us.53
Bundy: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Whatever the phrase, at least restate what the
data is, because everybody’s got entirely different ideas of what it is,
the data. The fact of the matter is even with the most optimistic view
of the new data, there is still a great . . . this threshold is different than
. . . the number of events is still substantial.
Bundy: The basic point is—
President Kennedy: And then go on to say along the lines of what
Mr. Vice President read there, and let’s give him [Dean] the general
American position this afternoon rather than continuing to have his
[unclear] [unclear interjections] about international inspection, about
52. Kennedy once again showed he is not stuck on any particular set of numbers. He wanted a
treaty.
53. “Early July” was the 7 July 1962 Pentagon statement about the results of the VELA tests.
157
nationally manned [control stations], about using the phrase we used
before about internationally—
Bundy: . . . internationally supervised . . .
President Kennedy: —and whatever, supervised, and that would just
have to be a negotiating matter as to what . . . Senator Russell would be
satisfied as long as we use that phrase. [Unclear.]
Lovett: Don’t we want to deal, Mr. President, also, to try to strike
down this big scientific breakthrough—
President Kennedy: Yeah. [Unclear background discussion.]
Lovett: Saying that there is no scientific breakthrough. We had
[unclear], Romney, Norton, the whole thing.54
Bundy: [Unclear] very important point.
President Kennedy: How do they describe it, then? [Unclear exchange.]
Lovett: Well, this . . . the sort of language that . . . in answer to a question on the Hill, was that Dr. [Jerome] Wiesner says, “There is no clear
way of identifying a nuclear explosion without looking at the spot itself.”
Then Senator [John O.] Pastore says, “Then there has to be on-the-spot
inspections.” Then Arthur Dean said, “Yes, that is right.” This morning
under questioning he confirmed, as did the others . . . to my question, “Do
you regard this as a scientific breakthrough,” they all said no, they did not.
Bundy: It’s only a word. I don’t myself think we ought to get into
this word, what is and isn’t a breakthrough. Anything that reduces by a
factor of three the requirements of the system is a very substantial
change. [Chuckles.]
President Kennedy: [to Lovett] Did they say that to you?
Lovett: [Unclear.] Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: They [unclear] . . .
Lovett: [Unclear.] We were all there. They said that there is no scientific breakthrough.
President Kennedy: But that there is a factor of . . . did they . . .
Lovett: No sir, they didn’t say anything about that.
President Kennedy: What did they say to you as far as the improvement of this system, of their detecting?
Lovett: They said that they would substantially reduce the number
of—
Unidentified: Suspicious events.
54. Dr. Carl Romney was a member of the Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC);
Norton was general counsel of the Department of Defense.
158
1, 1962
Lovett: Suspicious events.
Rusk: [Unclear.] You said at the beginning, Mr. President, that the
results of the VELA tests have in essence done two things: One, they
make it possible to reduce the number of so-called suspicious events. And
secondly, to increase advantageously the range of estimates taken.
[Unclear exchange between Rusk and Lovett.]
McCloy: The point is then, they have not changed the bottom-line
identification. . . .
Unidentified: That’s right, that’s right.
McCone: Well, the point here is that they’ve discovered an error in
the transposition in the Richter scale. [Unclear] factor of 3 or 21/2, in
reduction of the number of [unexplained] events, of course, is not due to
the improvement of—
Lovett: This is no scientific breakthrough.
McCone: —technology, it’s just that they found that a conversion
factor was [unclear]—
Bundy: Well, I don’t think you really ought to say, [unclear interjection
by Lovett] “no scientific breakthrough.” That’s a word game. To understand your figures better by this amount is very, very important.
Lovett: Well, the figures on the thermometer are no longer the same.
Bundy: Yeah, that’s right.
Lovett: We agreed this morning that the patient hasn’t got a fever of
106. It’s the same patient. He’s just as sick as he was before, but it’s only
reading 102. And that’s all that’s happened.
Unclear exchange. Bundy can be heard saying, “The reason it’s very
different.”
President Kennedy: Tell me that value again.
Lovett: The Richter system, as it was worked out in 1935 based on a
list of earthquakes, has now been proved by advanced techniques,
improved science, and that sort of thing, as I understand it, to be incorrect. So they’ve got to revise the yardstick by which things are measured. That is one of the problems that produces this [unclear].
Bundy: That’s the primary reason. I agree.
Lovett: This is not a scientific breakthrough, in my opinion. It is a
correction of a scientific mistake.
Rusk: I wouldn’t attach the word breakthrough, because most breakthroughs are—
Bundy: Are like that. [Unclear exchange and laughter.]
McCloy: [Unclear] saying it’s a breakthrough abroad.
Unidentified: There you are.
159
Foster: They extrapolated from large events to indicate that there
would be a lot more events. When they actually checked the events,
there weren’t so many. Now, this is a difference, Bob, because you’re
measuring against fewer events. Now, this is literally a true change
because if the thermometer says 106 [unclear comment by Bundy], you feel
badly. Actually it isn’t the thermometer being up there. . . . The thermometer was down where it says “you’re at 94 and you feel pretty good.”
Lovett: But you still feel badly.
Fisher: We just [unclear] a number of earthquakes.
Foster: Because you’ve counted these earthquakes, and this is the
basis of the present number.
President Kennedy: May I ask you, what are the British drawing
from the same information as we’ve got? Why do they draw a different
conclusion?
Foster: They draw the conclusion that we can detect a lot better than
we could. And this is true to some extent. And they also draw the same
conclusion that detecting against a less fuzzy background, you can identify better. Now, this is not true, you can’t identify better—[Unclear background discussion.]
Bundy: Mr. President, they wanted you to go with a nationally controlled system beforehand. Their desire for this is obviously reinforced
by this new assessment.
President Kennedy: But they still claim that national inspection is
necessary?
Bundy: They still agree that on-site inspection is necessary.
President Kennedy: Well, I think we’ve got to get this statement going.
What is our schedule now, as far as, are we going to meet this afternoon?55
Bundy: We had a meeting scheduled for quarter to five, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: I’m not sure at this point—
Bundy: It’s on the record, and it’ll be a little difficult to cancel it now.
President Kennedy: Well, it’s just a question of when do you go back
to New York?
McCloy: Nine.
President Kennedy: Do you want to come? Can you come at a quarter to five? And number two, I wonder if there’s some way we could read
you this statement when we get it done.
55. The President had planned to meet later with his full test-ban team to formalize the
instructions for Dean.
160
1, 1962
Bundy: We can . . . [to Lovett] Unless you’re all tied up this afternoon,
we’ll hunt you up or you can come and join us when we have a draft.
Lovett: I have an appointment [unclear].
Dean: Could I make just one comment on your draft. I hope in relation to this scientific data, [unclear] when we reported this decoupling
event in ’59, the Soviets said we were wrong.56 Because they said that the
number of earthquakes in the Soviet Union was somewhere around 50 to
60. I hope we don’t . . . I know that I’m going to be faced with the matter
of debating with the Soviets that they’re now going to say, “Well, you’ve
held up this nuclear test ban since ’59, [unclear].” You want to be a little
bit careful about the way we word this.
Bundy: Got any advice?
Dean: Huh? Huh?
Bundy: How do we . . . What do we say? Arthur Dean was crazy? Or is
there some better way out?
Dean: Oh, I was crazy, but I wasn’t there in ’59. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: Well, if they were right, [unclear] right for the
wrong reason, why is that?
Foster: Well, they didn’t mention their own earthquakes [unclear]
because they were mere [unclear]. We were doing it by calculating the
curve, and we estimated that we had this many. The reason for this is we
now have a better detection procedure. This is the real reason.
Lovett: Bill, isn’t that a beautiful argument, to say they could measure it because they were on the spot for the test [unclear]?
Bundy: Yeah.
Foster: I believe this is, again, the problem of secrecy. If they open up
their society, these misapprehensions will not develop.
Lovett: Mr. President, you expressed some concern as to why the
Russians might be stupid enough—I don’t think you used that word—to
take a chance on it being caught, with their foot off base.
Lovett: I don’t know the reason, but I think the element that makes it
less abhorrent to them is a complete absence of conscience, and of
embarrassment. They’re not embarrassed by being caught off base. In
56. Decoupling is a technique employed to drastically reduce the strength of the shockwaves
emitted by a nuclear explosion, and thereby the chances of detection, by conducting the test in
a large underground chamber.
161
fact, they regard that as an accomplishment. I think the feeling which
you have on that score shouldn’t weigh too much into trying to measure
“why would they do a stupid thing like this and get caught?” They don’t
mind getting caught at all, sir.
President Kennedy: Well, let me say that I, what I, you have to put so
many things into the equation, or into the machine, the computer. You
have to put what they could hope to accomplish scientifically by cheating, how much embarrassment they would suffer from being caught,
what the chances are of your catching them, what the risk would be to us
if both of us continue with the present system of testing, those dangers
they would bring, help keep their . . . make these weapons and so on. So I
think you’d have to put all that into the machine, and then you’d get an
answer which everybody would interpret differently, but which I would
interpret as a . . .
Depending on how much significant progress they could make by
cheating. Let’s just assume they would cheat—I’m ready to accept
that—let’s assume they would cheat and take the chance of getting
caught. In the first place, I think one in five, they’re going to give you a
factor mathematically.57
Bundy: Well, Mr. President, bear in mind that their cheating would
go on underneath the threshold, and you wouldn’t have an inspection, so
you won’t see a suspicious event . . .
Lovett: Yes sir, that’s the point. That’s the point.
President Kennedy: That’s right. So that you’d have no suspicious
event, and you’d have to make a judgment as to how much ground, compared to what we’ve been through in our laboratories, how much
ground they could gain by cheating, assuming they had [tested illegally], below the threshold, over a period of years, compared to the
danger to us of a constant testing and an increase in weapon technology of other countries who do not now possess it. I think that would be
the formula.
I think one trouble is that we and the joint committee look too much
at the Soviet gains and less at the danger to us of other national
[nuclear] deterrents arising.58 Now what do you . . . what is your view of
that?59 That doesn’t bother you?
57. One on-site inspection for every five suspicious underground events.
58. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
59. The President rephrased his basic argument for a test-ban treaty.
162
1, 1962
Lovett: I don’t have that feeling, Mr. President. I think we . . . it may
be a fact that we look too much at the Soviet gains, but we’ve consistently underestimated their competence over a period of years.60 And the
ones which led the underestimates were the scientists, who said it would
take them ten years to catch us. I think that the only measure we have of
our own position here is our potential enemy. And this would not really
bother me, sir.
President Kennedy: If other countries have possession of this . . .
Lovett: Oh yes, I wouldn’t want to see [nuclear] proliferation. But I
think that’s a separate problem which would not be controlled by this
test ban.
President Kennedy: Test ban.
Rusk: Well, we should work on that simultaneously as a separate
matter.
Lovett: I think it’s a separate matter, sir.
By fundamentally rejecting the President’s motivations for a test ban,
Robert Lovett put the President on the defensive.
President Kennedy: Well I think that, well I would . . . it would seem
to me that the test ban might lessen the chance of proliferation. If that
weren’t so, then I agree. I don’t know what good the test ban really is,
except [an] atmospheric test ban might be in some day useful to
[unclear] radioactive.61 [Unclear interjection.]
Roswell Gilpatric: I think a ban, an agreement between the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A., would have a very strong deterrent effect on them.
Lovett: I think it would have a certain deterrent effect, Ros. I don’t
think it’s in the order of magnitude that the Army paper, the military
paper shows, which rather offers it as an inducement for the ban.62 I don’t
think it is. I think it’s a potential benefit to get a ban [unclear] perhaps,
but I don’t think you can say that if you get this test ban, you’re not going
60. The United States underestimated the speed with which the Soviets would develop a
nuclear bomb. In the mid- to late 1950s, however, the United States exaggerated the growth
of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.
61. The President was referring to public concerns that nuclear testing releases strontium 90
and other harmful radioactive elements into the atmosphere.
62. This is probably a reference to “The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Military Balance with and without a
Test Ban Agreement,” a document introduced by Paul Nitze at the 30 July test-ban meeting.
Given to the President by McGeorge Bundy on 30 July 1962 to prepare for the earlier meeting, it has not been declassified as of August 2000. See Bundy, “Agenda for 5 P.M. Meeting
Today,” 30 July 1962, “ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/29/62–7/31/62” folder, Departments
and Agencies Files, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library.
163
to have proliferation. I don’t think the Chicoms [Chinese Communists]
or any [unclear]. I’m not sure it follows.
Theodore Sorensen: . . . work simultaneously toward the . . .
Lovett: You have to deal with it as a separate problem but simultaneously handle it.
President Kennedy: I think the one question which we’re now in
[unclear] is the question of whether we want the atmospheric test ban
itself. [Unclear exchange.]
Bundy: I don’t think you need it.63 It’s not relevant to your press conference.
President Kennedy: No, I meant, it seems to me at 4:45 we ought to
come back to that.
Unidentified: You need a fallback, I think, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Good. Well now, where could we establish to
have this paper reviewed?64
Bundy: Well, Ted will be working on the paper. I’ll give him all the
data, and then, when he has a draft, we can have a discussion of it.
President Kennedy: Except they’ll want . . .
Bundy: Well, I think we should all come back . . . 2:30?
President Kennedy: How about 2:30?
Bundy: Three o’ clock? Or 2:30, what do you think?
Unidentified: Three o’clock.
Sorensen: What time is the press conference? Four?
Several Voices: Four.
Sorensen: Well, in that case then, we’d better make it 2:30.
President Kennedy: 2:30.
Bundy: Sounds good.
Meeting adjourned. Small unintelligible side conversations began. Dean
said, “I’ve been trying to get him, but he’s traveling up in the
country somewhere, but . . .” After five minutes of indistinct banter,
the President is overheard preparing for his press conference. He asked
for information about the status of the Satellite Bill that was being filibustered in Congress.
63. Need to have that answered now.
64. The President’s 4:00 P.M. statement.
164
1, 1962
President Kennedy: Pierre, what about that satellite thing? Do you
want to give me a brief, and I’ll read it before? [Unclear] . . .
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: I’ll tell you why.
The President said, “Dean would be good,” and then was pulled to
one side for a small chat.
Dean: Have you got just a second?
President Kennedy: Yeah, sure.
Their conversation is unintelligible.
McCone: [Unclear.]
Bundy: Well, I think we’re getting there.
McCone: [Unclear.]
Bundy: That’s going to be quite different when we get to it. I know
the Vice President has been working on it and [unclear].
Murrow: This is the key issue. Are you going to use the word internationally operated, or are you just going to use—
Bundy: No, we are not. I think we say internationally supervised.
Unidentified: Internationally is not the word I want for operated.
Bundy: So it’s [unclear].
Murrow: All right. That’s fine.
Bundy: I don’t think.
Murrow: Well—
Bundy: We were going to decide that at 2:30 . . . make it clear that
internationally—
Murrow: Right, well I shouldn’t . . . well I can say it may be clear it’s
going to be internationally supervised [unclear].
Bundy: [Unclear] to discuss.
Murrow: Right.
Bundy: And all under [unclear].
Unidentified: Pardon?
Bundy: All under the [unclear]. They move for zero inspections.
Unidentified: Yes.
Unidentified: [Unclear] I was . . . Senator [unclear] how come the
thing blew up so badly in the island?65 That seemed to be in his mind.
McCone: Oh yeah, he asked all about it. And I don’t know what the
hell happened to this last one, do you?
Unidentified: No.
65. On 25 July 1962 a Thor missile carrying a nuclear device as part of the DOMINIC test
series exploded on Johnston Island, destroying one of the launch pads.
165
McCone: Huh?
Unidentified: Looks like—
McCone: [Unclear.] The first two . . . the scientists [unclear] to get
their [unclear] gadgets on them.
Unidentified: This is through them all.
McCone: Through them all. What happened with this last one, I
don’t know.
President Kennedy: Let’s get that clear. Now . . .
Rusk: [Unclear.]
Dean: Well, the first one was scrubbed because the Navy ship didn’t
get a fix on it. I think it was successful, but then the Navy ship worried
that they hadn’t got a fix on it. So they scrubbed it.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Rusk can be heard in the background mentioning Russia.]
Dean: [Unclear] the first one. The second one was lopsided. The first
one was a success.
Unidentified: [Unclear] had nothing to do with it.
Unidentified: First [one] was a success.
Dean: I think we need more elevation of morale among the scientists.
Of course, they had to [unclear] because one ship hadn’t got a fix.
Unidentified: Yeah.
McCone wanted to make a telephone call.
Unidentified: Well I think if the Secretary goes . . .
McCone: Have you got a line for me?
Unidentified: Yes, I [will] go out. . . . I think I’m going to try to
make a date with the Attorney General. This was 2:30 wasn’t it?
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: I’ll keep my eye on it.
Unidentified: I’ll know just exactly who took them. [Unclear exchange.]
As McCone waited for his line, Rusk was organizing the preparation of
the President’s statement for the press conference at the State Department.
Unidentified: Mr. Secretary, can I get you a ride?
Rusk: Yeah. Let’s work on the statement now, we’re coming back at
2:30; Thompson’s got it [unclear].66
Unidentified: We’re coming back.
The Secretary of State is ready to leave. Unclear exchange.
66. Llewellyn Thompson was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union.
166
1, 1962
Unidentified: Can I give you a lift?
Dean: Yeah, thank you.
Some salutations are heard. Two speakers were talking about Douglas
Dillon and Robert McNamara: “Secretary of the Treasury, that’s
understandable; Yeah, that’s interesting. This is the Secretary of
Defense’s view.”
McCone: [on the telephone] Yeah. All right, get him there. Hello?
Hello? Hello? [Pause.] Walter, I’m going out to the house for lunch with
Mr. Lovett and Mr. McCloy.67 I asked Sherman Kent68 to round up some
people that could to talk to Mr. McCloy on this Russian oil problem.69
Have you found out what he’s got prepared and give me a call up at the
house? I’ll be there in a few minutes. OK, anything new? Yeah, yeah,
yeah. And, we’ll be in contact [unclear]. OK. [Unclear.]
McCone hung up. There was some closing banter with McCloy and
Lovett before their car arrived. Someone mentioned work the previous
night that took three and a half hours. “It gave it a little advance.” To
which either Lovett or McCloy responded, “Gave it the whole works.”
After they left, an unidentified speaker decided he needed a little food,
“Maybe I’ll get myself a little piece of candy,” and chuckled.
Unidentified: Did somebody say about the, got to keep the [unclear]
business up?
McCloy: Well, like I said, it’s in Mac Bundy’s [office].
Unidentified: No it isn’t. He took it with him. I think I told you
[unclear]. Come on let’s go.
The remaining people left the room. After a little over a minute of
silence, the recorder picked up the sounds of someone, probably Evelyn
Lincoln, switching off the machine.
President Kennedy went for his prelunch swim, then returned to his private quarters. At 2:30 P.M. his advisers gathered to rework the Vice
President’s draft of the test ban statement for the 4:00 P.M. press conference. The phrase “internationally supervised,” which Kennedy believed
Senator Richard Russell and the other arms control skeptics on the Hill
might be willing to swallow, was added to describe an acceptable verification system to police a test ban. There was nothing added to reflect
67. Probably Walter Elder, John McCone’s assistant.
68. Sherman Kent was head of the Office of National Estimates, 1951 to 1968.
69. McCloy had long been an intermediary between large oil companies and the government.
167
the President’s readiness to reduce the number of control posts from 180
to something less than a hundred or to reveal his flexibility on the number of mandatory on-site inspections.
At 3:47 P.M. President Kennedy left for the State Department auditorium, the venue for the press conference. Minutes later he delivered the
written statement but in response to a question about what “internationally supervised” meant in the context of the proposed Geneva verification
system, he went further than his advisers expected. He spoke of “national
control posts . . . internationally monitored or supervised.”70 The United
States had never accepted national control posts. The official position was
that these monitoring stations should be manned by an international scientific team. Whether he intended to or not at that particular moment,
President Kennedy had suggested some new flexibility.
When his test ban policy group reconvened at the White House after
the press conference, the President would be somewhat on the defensive.
Former defense secretary Robert Lovett had cautioned him in the morning that the test ban talks were not a negotiation but “a phase of the cold
war.” There would be others around the table who expressed a concern
that the United States not appear too willing to get an agreement.
President Kennedy’s challenge was to mollify the unpersuaded while
still providing his negotiator, Ambassador Arthur Dean, with something
useful to say in Geneva.
4:45–5:32 P.M.
What is the statement we made in the statement itself ?
At 4:45 P.M., the test ban meeting begun in the morning was reconvened,
this time with a larger group in attendance. This would be the last meeting to establish Ambassador Arthur Dean’s negotiating instructions
before he returned to Geneva.
70. The Kennedy Presidential Press Conferences (New York: Coleman, 1978), pp. 356–57.
71. Including President Kennedy, Arthur Dean, William Foster, Leland Haworth, Carl Kaysen,
Lyman Lemnitzer, Franklin Long, Robert Lovett, John McCloy, John McCone, Robert
McNamara, Edward Murrow, Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, Glenn Seaborg, and Jerome Wiesner.
Tape 5, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
168
1, 1962
The first part of the meeting was not recorded. President Kennedy
began taping as he read aloud British prime minister Harold Macmillan’s
reply to his cable on U.S. strategy in the test ban negotiations. He had
stressed to the British leader that, though he wanted a comprehensive test
ban, he would accept an atmospheric test ban as a first step. The President
also requested the right to use Christmas Island for U.S. nuclear tests.
This request was very much a part of Kennedy’s efforts to prepare seriously for the possibility of a test ban agreement. Administration experts
on nuclear testing had cautioned the President that one of the dangers of
an atmospheric test ban would be that the United States would make
itself vulnerable to a sudden Soviet abrogation of the agreement by
allowing U.S. nuclear facilities and laboratories to erode during the
period the treaty was observed. The British facility on Christmas Island,
in their view, was insurance against a Soviet violation of the ban.72
Macmillan wrote to say the British would allow the United States to use
Christmas Island now and, in the event a test ban treaty were signed,
would keep the facility in good working order, just in case it were later
needed. Macmillan also cautioned that the British preferred to push for a
comprehensive ban, though President Kennedy’s proposed first step
would be acceptable.73
The sound quality in the first ten minutes of this tape is especially
poor.
President Kennedy: [reading from Macmillan’s letter, received by the
White House]
. . . tests if they tried to cheat. However, I quite realize that you do
not entirely share this view. And anyway, Congress would not accept
it, at least at the moment. So I agree that there would now be advantage in offering both the atmospheric ban, as you suggest and also a
comprehensive treaty which at this stage would not need to specify
the exact number of inspections.
I am looking into the question of Christmas Island, but I should
72. Gerald W. Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) and Leland J.
Haworth, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission, “Memorandum on Maintaining
Readiness To Test During a Test Ban,” 29 July 1962, National Security Files, Departments and
Agencies: ACDA, Disarmament, General, 7/29/62–7/31/62, Box 256, John F. Kennedy Library.
73. Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M–K, 1961–1962,
National Archives II.
169
think that we would not find it too difficult to keep the installations
on a care and maintenance basis, as indeed we have been doing in
recent years. I am looking into this further and if the treaties were
tabled, we would certainly consider doing as you suggest. Of course,
the question of reactivating Christmas Island in the event of the
Russians cheating, would have to be discussed between the United
States and British Governments of the day.
I have not discussed your letter with anyone (except David Gore
who is here on leave and with Alec Home.) So these are just my personal thoughts.
Well, I think the main point is . . . if we just could get Christmas
Island for just the time being, I think he thinks we are going to table it.
He’s talking about our tabling the comprehensive, so, if we’re not going
ahead with the [unclear exchange].
McGeorge Bundy: [Unclear] would be, Mr. President [unclear].
President Kennedy: Now, in the first place, let’s say, what we would . . .
what is going to be our response on this [unclear] concept of an atmospheric test ban as of a certain date?
Bundy: Could I interrupt for one second, Mr. President.
Bundy: Pierre [Salinger] is getting pressure from the press already
as to whether we are now, whether your statement at the press conference means that we are . . . a sign that your position is that we would
accept “internationally supervised, national control posts.”
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] What did I say?
Bundy: That’s what we agreed on in the text [of the statement].
Dean Rusk: I believe we did say “internationally supervised, national
control posts.”
Unidentified: “Internationally supervised, national control posts.”
President Kennedy: Well, does that mean the international corps of
supervisors [unclear]? These are the things that Mr. [Arthur] Dean is
going to discuss.
Bundy: The details are not . . . you don’t need to give them to Pierre
in the next hour. You have to work out the full background on that to
get the [unclear].
President Kennedy: What is the statement we made in the statement
itself ?
Bundy: In the written statement, there was nothing on this except
170
1, 1962
that [unclear] said that an internationally monitored system of control
would be [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, I’ve always thought [unclear] was meaningless.
Unidentified: [Unclear] very closely.
Robert McNamara: Well, exactly. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: And therefore in a paradoxical . . . So that I . . . It
seems to me the important point is that [unclear] internationally monitored. So, in effect, that’s what Mr. Dean has had to set out. But I think
that. . . . Now, what we have to go into is how does this differ from our
previous . . . what is the phrase we used before in the treaty in the
[unclear] about the monitoring stations?
Arthur Dean: “Under effective international controls.”
President Kennedy: This is “under effective international control.” Is
that the phrase, was it? Now, do you want somebody else with a
[unclear]? Did somebody ask you about [unclear]?
Bundy: If we can wait till six. We can stick on this point.
President Kennedy: I believe the important point for Pierre is just to
say in the present language—Repeat that language, would you?
Dean: “Under effective international controls.”
President Kennedy: We’re talking about restraint, not controls.
Bundy: That’s exactly that because in the end we may want to negotiate a separate statement on controls.
President Kennedy: I think that . . . can’t he say that what we want
are control posts, which are effectively—
Bundy: Under effective international supervision.
President Kennedy: Now, if he starts to ask you about how this compares with our treaty, just say, “This is a matter Mr. Dean is discussing”;
[background whispering] but the important point is, we have not accepted
the concept of national control posts, solely. We’re talking about internationally supervised for the national control posts. [Laughter.] All right?
Rusk: The paragraph A on page 3 gives a summary of terms under a
comprehensive test ban and [unclear] give Mr. Dean a chance to find out
whether there’s any possibility of us moving on a comprehensive treaty.
It would mean that we would not get into detailed numbers, [unclear] a
real response from the Soviet Union, although we would have to indicate
informally and privately to a number of delegations that the numbers
would be smaller than those we talked about in the [draft] treaties that
have been tabled.
We had an understanding among ourselves of the approximate num-
171
bers we would be willing to discuss, at such time as the Soviet position
made it possible to discuss it. There would be five national stations on
the Soviet Union with a neutral observer present, in the range in which
we talk about on-site inspections.
But I think the key question we think . . . we really ought to think
about this afternoon is what we do if there is a sentiment in Geneva to
move on the atmospheric [test ban]. And my own personal belief, subject to Mr. Dean’s negotiating needs, would be that we’re prepared to
move on that rapidly, subject to the point at the bottom of the page, that
if the Soviets continue an extended series, and we find it necessary for
security reasons to conduct an additional series, we would not then enter
into an arrangement with [unclear].
President Kennedy: Couldn’t we put it in a . . . Either we would
accept it immediately—
Rusk: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —the atmospheric test ban, and therefore we
wouldn’t do any more of our tests and they would call off theirs, which
obviously they won’t do. But otherwise, that we should agree on a date,
to give us time to test again, if we decided that we needed to after this
series of tests. So it would either be September 1, for example, or June 1.
By then we would be able to test again if we wanted to, but we would
still have agreed to a cutoff date.
Rusk: I think this. . . . From a political point of view, that would be . . .
[unclear] dramatic about it on the part of . . . from the point of view of our
test people, and at Defense they would [unclear].
Glenn Seaborg: It would . . . should be quite acceptable from the
[unclear] AEC standpoint and I think Mr. McNamara should speak to
the [unclear].
McNamara: It would be quite acceptable from our position also.
William Foster: This has been suggested by Padilla Nervo, in fact.74
President Kennedy: He accepted a different . . . He has different
dates, doesn’t he?
Foster: Yeah, he was flexible on the dates. He wanted a date that
would be acceptable [unclear].
74. Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee, proposed in June 1962 that there be a time-lapse between the signing and the
coming into force of a treaty. He suggested an end date for atmospheric testing of January
1963. London supported the proposal.
172
1, 1962
Bundy: Is he fixing a date now? Or do we know?
Foster: No, we’re working on that because we discussed [unclear].
Rusk: The earlier the date, the better from a political point of view, in
terms of negotiation. June 1 sounds a little distant. I gather that they
expect to finish their series by the end of October. We hesitate to accept
a much earlier date than June 1 . . .
Bundy: Well, we prefer not to decide that now, Mr. Secretary. What
we really ought to do is to see what they’re doing.
President Kennedy: Well, but you don’t need to have . . . If we get a
chance to get an atmospheric test ban, don’t we . . . providing we have
sufficient time to . . . We don’t want to have it [unclear] a chance lost . . .
Bundy: But we don’t today have to say what [unclear] would be.
Robert Lovett: My guess would be that if their series calls for a specific response on our part, it would be in the length of the test period
rather than the length of the—
Jerome Wiesner: Yes, the high-altitude area.
McNamara: I think that’s right.
Foster: [Unclear.]
McNamara: Certainly today we wouldn’t want to decide on a date
earlier than June.
Bundy: Yeah, that’s right.
Foster: Today we wouldn’t want to set—
McNamara: We would not.
President Kennedy: Now does Mr. Dean . . . should he . . . should his
response be when he arrives there be favorable to this?
Dean: I personally think we’re getting into a Soviet trap on this
atmospheric test ban, and I don’t like to differ with the Secretary, but last
November they said that they wanted an atmospheric test ban plus a
moratorium on all further underground testing. I think they’re going to
try to wangle the Eight to make this proposal on atmospheric testing,
and I think they’ll play around with that in an effort to try to put the
heat on us, after we’ve made the atmospheric proposal; then I think we’ve
lost our most important weapon.
I don’t believe you’re going to be able to get a continuation of underground testing even though you make your atmospheric test ban. I think
you’ve given up your most important negotiating position. And then I
think world opinion would put terrific pressure upon us to agree not to
do any further underground tests. You’ve got a moratorium pending the
working out of your controls. Then, I think you’ve given away all your
negotiating position if you offered an atmospheric test ban, I think.
173
President Kennedy: Let me just say that I don’t find any [unclear] to
a reasonably [unclear] responsibility [unclear]. I don’t find the slightest
pressure to desist from underground testing, as a moratorium or on a
unilateral basis without inspection. I think that everybody in the world
says we should. We should either . . . in fact, I think there isn’t the slightest inclination, and I don’t even feel that they could ever put any real
pressure on us. That’s number one.
Number two, for us to put a hold on an atmospheric test ban, providing we have sufficient time to test again if we need it, I think does put up
in the air our whole capacity on this issue. Then we really look like we’re
just wild about this. And I think that militarily, though we may wait,
providing we have a chance at another go, until you make it necessary,
everybody is better off together, if that’s all we’re going to get.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think that the thing Mr. Dean will need to get
a little comfort on this is for him to know that we see that trap lying
there, and we just are determined not to step in it. But if he is told that
we are not going to be pressured into a moratorium on underground
testing—
Lovett: Why can’t we say no?
Rusk: Then let’s cancel the trap so we won’t put our foot in it.
John McCloy: As a precondition, why don’t you say that “you know
that we’re ready to accept an atmospheric test ban, but we want you to
be aware that we’re not going to go into this moratorium dance”?
[Unclear exchange.]
Dean: I think we ought to make it very clear, if we do decide to
accept the atmospheric test ban, that they’re not under any circumstances going to get in any further unpoliced moratorium underground.
[Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: So, in other words, then, Mr. Dean will see that
the response to this thing, for the reasons they . . . I think that it’s possible then, if . . . they may try to pull away by opposing what they [unclear]
before. Anyway [unclear]. Then there’s the question to come on the date.
Do we have to say, “Oh, if it’s done immediately,” because they want
nuclear tests, otherwise we have to make sure we’ve got enough room at
the other end?
Dean: Padilla Nervo suggested January 1, ’63. And his proposal, at
least that’s what we have [unclear] right straight through to December
31, ’62. I told him at the time I thought that was entirely too early, that
we would have to go at least to the middle of ’63 and then I didn’t know
how much further than that you would want.
President Kennedy: Actually, you know what tests, what tests you’d
174
1, 1962
want to run now anyway, right, even if you get . . . [unclear]. Say you had
nine months in which you could test, you know what tests . . . ?
Seaborg: In the weapons area. I’m not sure that we would know so
well on the effects of—
Wiesner: But then this doesn’t depend as much on the Russian tests
as getting our own out of the way so that we know what our uncertainties are, so that . . .
McNamara: It doesn’t depend exclusively on the Russian tests, but
the Russian tests may influence our nuclear testing—
Wiesner: [Unclear.]
McNamara: —so that we do wish to have Russian test information
available before we state finally and unequivocally that we would accept,
could accept that, a certain test ban, without further testing. And I think,
therefore, that the date suggested by the President is just about the right
date, September 1 or June 1. Now, we might be able to shave the June 1
later, but we certainly won’t know for some time.
Foster (?): We still control the comprehensive, if we retreat to this. If
we can’t get the other, then we want to move on the other.
Wiesner: Now, within this discussion on the comprehensive on page
3, and I’d like to comment, as I did last time, that I think there are some
inconsistencies with the proposal. I don’t believe we can go to Geneva
without talking about the means, the way . . . about capabilities of the
system without talking about the specific system. I just don’t understand
how we’re going to do this.
Foster: I agree with you.
Dean: [Unclear] within one day, I . . . sure, that I can easily walk this
tightrope, but I know within one day I’ll have to begin the—
Wiesner: [aside to someone] Page 3 in the . . .
Dean: —with the various specifics. I don’t believe you can carry on
any meaningful conversations beyond a certain point, without getting
into ranges or if you’re going to have numbers, you will say 10 percent
or 25 percent, I mean that if taken down . . . a very very effective impact.
I don’t, myself, think it’s quite realistic to say that you’re going to say
“substantial reduction” and then say, “but I won’t tell you how much.”
McCloy: Can’t you ask the Soviets to commit themselves to an onsite inspection before you go in and talk specifics?
Dean: I can do that with them, but I mean . . . and our allies will
immediately come to me and start saying, “What are you talking about
here? I mean, how many control posts are you going to—”
Bundy: I think that’s different with control posts than what it is with
inspections. You can avoid talking about a specific number of inspections.
175
Dean: I can relate the on-site—
Bundy: I believe we can be insistent on the control posts—[Unclear
background exchanges.]
Wiesner: I think you’d have to be prepared to discuss some configuration. You can get around this by talking about several—very elaborate
ones and very simple ones—but otherwise you can’t do what we suggest.
Bundy: We’re not in any trouble on numbers of control [posts]—
Wiesner: Why?
Bundy: We talked this morning about a system of control posts that
might be as much as 80, taking in all of the different kinds of [unclear]
which is technically how [unclear]. This is embarrassing. The number of
inspections that they want us to be having, to be honest [unclear].
President Kennedy: That question should be . . .
Wiesner: I understand that now, but I just want to make sure we
understood . . . that this document says what we mean.
Rusk: Well, we’re talking about proposing specific numbers. That
doesn’t mean that we can’t, in the case of control posts, talk about orders
of magnitude and approximations, and . . .
Bundy: What’s really happened . . . [Unclear exchange.]
Wiesner: We’ve got to be able to say, “Here is a system configuration
and we think this will have defined detective capability.”
Paul Nitze: But you can use that as an illustration.
Wiesner: Well, that can be an illustration.
Nitze: It doesn’t have to be a proposal.
Wiesner: That’s right. I understand that.
Foster: And you don’t have to specify details of how this is [unclear].
You don’t have to go into all the details precisely, [unclear]. The number
and the location are variable.
For the next three minutes of recording, the sound quality deteriorates.
Rusk: Of course, I realize this would be a little difficult for Mr. Dean,
but I do think it’s important that we find ourselves negotiating with the
Soviets, and not with the neutrals on these questions.
Dean: I’m not going to negotiate with the neutrals for that matter.
[Unclear.] The President’s going to have to telephone Mr. Macmillan,
because the day that I land, all four of your allies are going to want to
know pretty specifically what I’m going to discuss with the Russians.
Always before we have had a Four Western meeting before the meeting
began, and we’ve kept them very closely posted. Now, some of them are
more discreet than others. Canada today is a very slippery ally on this
point.
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1, 1962
Foster: Is there any objection to saying that the control posts . . . if
it’s possible that after consideration we might be able to do reduce it
somewhere in a range of up to 50 percent?
Wiesner: Bill, if you want to do what this says, which says we should
be prepared to provide the conference with as much recent data as we
can relating to detection, location, and identification capabilities of internationally supervised systems, national systems, you have to be specific
about locations. I mean, just giving numbers like that permits a discussion that doesn’t really agree with what this paper is saying [unclear].
This is the point I am trying to make.
Foster: You can’t do it all at once, and the point is you move into this
gradually—
Unidentified: All right.
Foster: And it seems to me if you have a range, it’s perfectly possible
to carry on negotiations.
Wiesner: You may take this system that’s more elaborate than the
one you [unclear] get.
Foster: That’s right.
Wiesner: My point is, if you’re going to have any serious technical
discussion, you have to specify what you’re talking about.
Nitze: Well, let’s not have the serious technical discussion in the first
few days.
Wiesner: All right, [unclear].
Dean: Actually the [unclear] scientists don’t like it.
Wiesner: Uh-huh.
McCloy: Can’t you protect your on-site inspections by hinting much
more elaborately what you’re going to do with the control system? Isn’t
that enough for you to start off with at least, and then . . .
See the other thing we’re not going to talk about until we get some
missive from the Soviet Union that they’re . . .
Dean: The on-site inspections doesn’t bother me as much as the
number of the controls. I think you’re going to have to be . . . we just
might discuss this with the Four or [the] Russians.
Fifty-six seconds excised as classified information.
Dean: Well, I’d like to get some here.
Wiesner: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Well, I think the British are more the problem
now because with this letter from the prime minister in which he says, “I
believe there is a technique for [unclear] determining testing” [unclear]
Ambassador. What he’s saying is [unclear].
177
And I rather expect that that’s going to be their position.
Foster: I think you can talk about ranges without drawing the full
range [unclear]—
President Kennedy: What would we say scientifically on this question about the number of controls? What do we say . . . I know it would
depend on the kind of station we talked about, but what is our range,
depending on the kind of station? Just the 80?
Franklin Long: If I could talk just about the seismics. The couple of
things that we have done in our recent [unclear] is, we have in the first
place, focused on the Northern Hemisphere—Cuba, Russia, China, United
States, Canada, and so on. And for those with a quite well controlled
organization of 25 seismic stations, including, now, stations in the U.S.S.R.,
one gets really a system, with the U.S.S.R. stations, one gets a system
whose capability is, I would say, indistinguishable from [unclear]. It’s
really a very satisfactory system.
Even the point that we made at the previous meeting was even if you
didn’t include the U.S.S.R. stations, it’s a pretty respectable system. Now,
one could push that number to 30, but 25, I think, would be a pretty satisfactory number.
Rusk: [Unclear.]
Dean: That’s [unclear] seismic [unclear]?
Long: [repeating Dean’s phrase] This is [unclear] seismic [unclear].
Leland Haworth: Mr. President, I think it’s important that if we do
mention any numbers of this sort, that we make the point that this is the
Northern Hemisphere, so that it won’t be in their minds that this is
spread all over the world, because they might grant control with respect
to almost a smaller fraction under the, coming under—
Dean: Now, we are talking about Asia, as I understand it?
Unidentified: Yeah, but [unclear] controls . . .
Dean: [Unclear.]
Wiesner: In the atmosphere of the United States. . . .
President Kennedy: Now, if they ask you, in regard to on-site inspections, you will not give even the Four [allies], before we’ve talked
[unclear] . . .
Dean: I plan, at present, Mr. President, the Soviets, with respect to onsite inspections, that we were quite prepared to relate the number of onsite inspections to the number of unidentified events in the Soviet Union.
Foster: Are you prepared to talk about that?
Dean: Talk about the number of unidentified events?
Foster: [Unclear.]
178
1, 1962
Dean: Then I think I can handle myself on that.
President Kennedy: You won’t give them any . . .
Dean: I won’t give them any specific numbers.
President Kennedy: Can you make it very clear, which we would . . .
the fact that the information that we have does not permit . . .
Dean: We’ve got to have on-site inspections.
Bundy: Your government has not authorized you to discuss any concrete numbers until the principle of on-site inspections—
Bundy: —is agreed upon.
President Kennedy: Now, when you first get there, the first question
really will be this atmospheric test ban.
What do you think of Arthur Dean saying that he’d be prepared to
sign that tomorrow, if it would go into effect tomorrow?
With that . . . then they would say, the Russians would suggest,
“Well, we can’t do it tomorrow.”
And we say, “Unless you’re prepared to move right now.” And then
we’d have to pick another date, move back to our June date.
Then there’s no hesitancy about our embracing it.
Rusk: If it isn’t signed immediately then there is a problem of finding
the right date. [Mumbling in the background.] So we have to be pretty
careful not to accept in any way the Soviet alleged right to test now.
Carl Kaysen: Mr. President, if we get into the position of saying,
after we’ve said we’re prepared to sign it tomorrow, and we get a no to
that, then we get into a discussion of the atmospheric test ban, don’t we
somewhat undercut our own position of trying to get discussion on the
comprehensive [test ban]?
Wouldn’t it be tactically better if, as you suggest, that if Arthur says,
“Sure, we’re prepared to sign one tomorrow” and we get the no answer
on that, then let’s say, “Let’s talk about the comprehensive.” I feel if we
indicate a willingness to talk about the time at which in the future we’re
prepared to sign the atmospheric, we undercut our position for arguing
that the comprehensive is quite important today.
Dean: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Well, I just . . . Well now, let’s see, there’s some
certain adjustments [unclear] in our position on the general disarmament treaties.
Unidentified: [Unclear] their statements.
Foster: Let’s start on page 4, Mr. President. [reading] “Stage I
179
Production.” It has been agreed to by the interested agencies and the
Committee of Principals, and briefly: “The production of armaments
during Stage I should be limited to replacement and repair of existing
armaments. Replacement would be ‘in kind.’ The amount of production
will be reduced at least as much as the reduction of armaments. Production of new types of weapons, of prototypes, and of new armament production facilities would be prohibited.”
This developed from the fact that any limitations by percentage, we
talked about before, developed a variation in the percentages, developed a
complication in definition to such an extent that, in view of the fact that
we are [unclear] on the scope with this restriction, the announcement is
late and in phase two [unclear] appear to be the simplest [unclear]
between the agencies, and it doesn’t matter [unclear] frustration with
this language [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yes, I see how this makes [unclear] position harder.
Bundy: Is there trouble in the Joint Chiefs concerning weapons?
Lyman Lemnitzer: We see problems, and we’re not sure what in kind
means. We have questions about this particular area, and we feel it’s
indefinite and not precise. But that’s our problem. We don’t know what in
kind means.
Foster: By types, essentially.
Lemnitzer: Well, by types, categories . . .
Wiesner: It could be 2a or f.
Bundy: No, we’ll have to tie it down [unclear].
Unidentified: A B-52? [Unclear.]
Lemnitzer: That is a question of a strategic delivery type, whether
it’s a missile . . . Are missiles and aircraft interchangeable?
Foster: No, it’s by types.
For the next few minutes, the sound quality of the recording deteriorates.
Rusk: [Unclear] this would be about the same.
Lemnitzer: Whether it’s a B-52, or a Minuteman, or an Atlas . . .
Unidentified: We’ll have to replace it.
Bundy: A B-52 [unclear].
Unidentified: Right. That’s a possibility. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: You can’t so redefine a B-52 that it turns into a
Minuteman.
Lemnitzer: All right, take an Atlas and a Minuteman. Isn’t an Atlas
replaceable by a Minuteman, because of obsolescence?
Foster: No.
Unidentified: No.
180
1, 1962
Wiesner: That’s what was possible when it was categories
Lemnitzer: That’s what got us into—
Unidentified: Correct.
Lemnitzer: —troubles.
Lemnitzer: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: In other words, your narrowing of the definition is in
the interest of preserving—
Bundy: It’s quite apparent that that definition would be exactly how
much energy to exert [unclear] State Department. Minutemen [unclear].
Wiesner: That will have to be pinned down in the negotiations. The
principle is to narrow—
Lemnitzer: That’s the point we want to be so sure of: that this will be
defined precisely in the ongoing negotiations.
Wiesner: It will have to be, yeah. . . .
Foster: We’ll have an annex that would so define it.
Unidentified: You’ll spend ten years negotiating this thing.
Rusk: [Unclear.] We may in fact wind up with one if we make any
headway in this direction.
Foster: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Can we do number two now?
Foster: Well two has to do, Mr. President, with the reduction of military bases in Stage I, at least the willingness to discuss the reduction of
military bases in Stage I without in any way giving way to the Soviet
emphasis on foreign bases. It will only be discussed if substantial
progress had been made in the reduction of armaments in the early parts
of Stage I. It is felt that if we actually make progress in Stage I on those
reductions then it would be logical to assume, that certain bases would
be eliminated too, and therefore we’d be willing to discuss it with the
Soviet Union.
This, again, is recommended as a method of, really, negotiating to
disarm the attack of the Soviets in this regard, since they have made a lot
of progress with all of the other members of the conference, on the basis
that they know we’re going to give up some bases, therefore why are we
unwilling to discuss it. We’re willing to discuss it after we’ve seen some
signs of actual progress.
Rusk: As long as we’re sure . . . but then how are you going to avoid
discussing the available systems, [unclear] then?
Lemnitzer: We do see a problem in this area of bases vis-à-vis installations or facilities, the right interpretation of what bases happen to
181
mean. And it’s just going to have to be very carefully looked at. It affects
our whole NATO deployment, particularly, in which I have a particular
interest right at the moment, but I speculate [unclear].75
We do believe this is an unfair contest on bases, insofar as giving up a
base on our part, on [the] one hand, and the Soviets moving out. They
can move into Europe very quickly, across the ground. If we pull out of
Europe or our positions in the Far East, our reentry is an entirely different type of problem. We are at a distinct disadvantage, a military disadvantage in this field.
Wiesner: But there are limitations on this, though. . . .
Lemnitzer: Well, obviously, the way it’s worded I’m just calling
attention to some of the problems. Be prepared to discuss, if there is substantial progress. That’s the way I understand it, Mr. President.
Rusk: The third point is that [unclear] this decision will be taken
immediately from phase one to phase two. It seems a little hypothetical
at this point given the general state of discussions. But the proposal
here would be that we move it away from the Security Council, we make
it by a two-thirds vote of the Control Council of the disarmament
organization, and that the United States and the Soviet Union would
have a veto. This would require nationalist China to be there, in the
Security Council.
Bundy: [Unclear] NATO [unclear].
Rusk: Well, it says . . . we’re clearly inferring those of at least the
United States and the Soviet Union. Maybe one or two others who
would insist on a veto.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] is this the general [unclear] for the
public record.
Dean: Yes, sir, we would put this on the table.
President Kennedy: At least the United States and the Soviet Union . . .
Dean: Yes.
Unidentified: I would predict that the British and the French will
object.
Lovett: No, as a matter of fact, they’ve recommended it.
Dean: The British . . . not the French, but the British have recommended it.
President Kennedy: Do you have any suggestions?
Unidentified: If it ever gets to that.
75. Lemnitzer’s appointment as supreme commander of NATO forces had been announced in
July. He took up the post on 1 November.
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1, 1962
Foster: Well, there are just a few more items.
President Kennedy: As for the ambassador’s general plan of action,
how are you going to . . . what are you doing about the technical briefing?
Dean: I thought I could handle immediate negotiations with
[Valerian] Zorin and to the extent necessary with the Western Four,
and then I thought I would gradually expand this number about . . .
expand it [unclear] by the weekend of the . . .
President Kennedy: Does anybody really need . . . for your preliminary discussions with the Four as regards . . .
Foster: They’ve pretty well got all the facts.
Dean: Oh, they’re all pretty well versed on this.
I would prefer that we keep this on a political basis until about a
week . . . whatever they say . . . they’re apt to pick up a chance remark of
anybody that’s most favorable to them and then quote it in the summary
saying “I’m quoting an American scientist who says this,” and that’s . . .
they’re generally very [unclear]. I think it would be better if we could
get [unclear] discussions for about a week.
President Kennedy: OK, well now, on the guidelines to the background [unclear].
Dean: Can I add just one fact in?
Dean: The Soviets have already agreed to go from 1.7 to 1.9, are we
still not . . . does [unclear].
Foster: Further study is being undertaken on this, Mr. President, by
the Joint Chiefs.
Rusk: This is a general [unclear] I assume. [Unclear] 3.1, the Soviets’
1.7. [unclear] 1.9. The Defense Department announced [unclear].
President Kennedy: How long would it be before we get an answer
to it?
Lemnitzer: Recently there have been some real problems in this area
of determining our forces, and one of the principal difficulties of identifying a military . . . civilian and military employee vis-à-vis a man in uniform. There’s all sorts of possibilities. The Soviet Union has many of the
things that we do in our services performed by civilians.
President Kennedy: What are our force levels now?
Lemnitzer: About 2.8 million.
McNamara: It’s 31/2 million, including civilians.
Lemnitzer: It is.
McNamara: This is one of our problems, Mr. President. To answer
your question directly, I believe we have scheduled the completion of the
183
study for about the 20th of August. We can work on the disarmament
dates to that date.
Unidentified: We have a meeting on August 20 [unclear].
President Kennedy: That meeting on August 20th [unclear]. Now,
on the guidelines and background [unclear] of this meeting in August.
[Unclear.]
Rusk: Mr. President, I do think that it’s important, it’s also important for the four Western powers and as at least a preliminary point for
Zorin, that we ought to give very little more than you gave in your press
conference today.
President Kennedy: Any use having Mr. Dean go up to the joint
committee [on Atomic Energy].
Dean: I’d be very happy to go to the joint committee tomorrow.
President Kennedy: Bill, what’s your judgment of their state of mind
[unclear]?
Foster: Well we spent about two and a half hours with Senator
[Chet] Holifield yesterday.76 I think he’s all right. We talked to Senator
[Henry] Scoop Jackson and Senator [John] Pastore at breakfast this
morning,77 so they’re pretty well up to this.
President Kennedy: It seems to me, unless there’s some disadvantage
or some use to have them . . .
Rusk: Well I think it would be important for the committee to know
what Ambassador Dean is not going to do in Geneva. [Unclear]—
President Kennedy: All right. Why don’t we see if we can get an
appointment for tomorrow morning with the committee and let them
[unclear].
Bundy: I suggest we have two committees hear it, not just one.
[Unclear.]
Foster: I think Senator [unclear]?
President Kennedy: Well, when do you wish to go back? Didn’t you
say tomorrow? [Unclear background discussion.]
Dean: No sir. I’ve been trying to check on planes, but I think the earliest one I could get out is 9:15, 10:00 or 8:15, 10:00 on Friday morning.
76. Senator Chet Holifield was the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
77. Henry “Scoop” Jackson was the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Applications,
and Senator John Pastore was the vice chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
184
1, 1962
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we see if the committees could
meet . . . the joint committee, with the Senate Foreign Relations, and
they could invite . . .
Unidentified: How about Armed Services?
President Kennedy: Armed Services. Why don’t they . . . Why don’t we
get the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to invite Senator [Richard]
Russell and Senator [Leverett] Saltonstall to the Foreign Relations
[unclear].78
Foster: Senator Russell, of course, is on the Joint Committee.
President Kennedy: I know that.
Unidentified: He never shows up.
Rusk: But you had breakfast with him.
Foster: [Unclear.] We had breakfast, and I called on him individually.
President Kennedy: Perhaps if somebody could call [Adrian] Fisher
[unclear] and say that Mr. Dean could go around and see Senator Russell
first about this.
McCone: I think that might be a good idea. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: We can say that. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: OK, I think that ought to be . . . if we need background, we’re going to say that Mr. Dean is going up to Hill [unclear].
Now, do you want to make any suggestions about [unclear]?
Rusk: Mr. President, there’s been a good deal of [unclear]. [Pauses.]
I think we ought to safeguard against such a thing. One is that
there’s a great row going on within the administration. This is a matter
on which we have had consultation with any administration. We are all
in agreement on the nine we’ve picked. We’ve consulted with the congressional leadership in sending Ambassador Dean to Geneva to find
out what the possibilities are for a comprehensive test ban.
I think on the technical side that we need to indicate that we . . . what
might be called the simple plan, is the minimum results of these technical developments with respect to the reduction in the number of suspicious events, some improvement in the range of detection, but nothing
which indicates that we can eliminate on-site inspections.
I think that we should background that so far as we know, the Soviets
have not changed their position.79 They oppose all on-site inspections,
78. Russell was chairman of the Armed Services Committee; Saltonstall was a member of that
committee.
79. “Background that” means brief the press on a background basis.
185
which would preclude any optimism on that point. They have reaffirmed it
very recently. And very much leave it at that. I wouldn’t get into the question of exactly what these so-called internationally supervised national
control posts are, because that’ll take some negotiation in Geneva.
Bundy: It has to be [unclear]. That’s where the heat will be. It’s really
imperative for us to try to spell that out.
Edward Murrow: Mr. President, do I understand that Ambassador
Dean is going to accept the atmospheric test ban forthwith when he gets
back to Geneva?
Dean: Well, not quite that way because their proposal on November
the 28th is that we accept the atmospheric test ban and the [unclear].
[Unclear exchange.]
Bundy: [Unclear] see it [unclear] papers.
Dean: I want to look at . . . I want to examine Madame Myrdal’s proposal, and see what she says before I say I’m going to accept an atmospheric test ban right off the bat.
Rusk: Can’t you possibly get a commitment from that there won’t be
any pressures on a moratorium?
Dean: Right. I want to interview Madame Myrdal before I make any
statement.
Rusk: And study the record.
Dean: What?
Rusk: And study the record.
Dean: Oh, and study the record.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] this says “name of observer from
Moscow”? Where they said [unclear] . . . we make the point that our
information makes it . . . we now conclude incontrovertibly that any
nuclear test may be detected by national means. So that the scientific
testing is going to be important to demonstrate and not [unclear] choice
. . . and that, therefore, the scientific estimate ought not to be of extreme
importance.
For the next two minutes of the recording, the sound quality deteriorates.
Dean: We also [unclear] their actual records [unclear] series. It’s
possible we could eliminate all on-site inspections.
President Kennedy: Where did you get that?
Nitze: Did Macmillan say that last night?80
Dean: Well, Macmillan, in an answer to the question in the House,
said possibly all on-site inspections might be eliminated.
80. British prime minister Harold Macmillan.
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1, 1962
Unidentified: This is just the opposite of what he said about nine
weeks ago.
Dean: Well, he’s under terrific pressure.
Unidentified: We ought to keep our relations with [unclear].
The meeting dissolved into muffled discussion. Rusk can be heard referring to “political hope” with Bundy’s adding that Dean might say, “Your
scientists don’t agree with ours.” The President then said that it was
time “to break this up,” and the men are heard leaving. For the next ten
minutes there is chatter in and around the room. Only the occasional
word is intelligible.
5:35–6:25 P.M.
Times have changed. You can’t do this anymore on a hit-andmiss basis like we’ve done in the past because now incidents of
this kind are infinitely more important and more damaging
than they’ve ever been before. . . . And the FBI . . . has never
been effective.
Meeting with the President’s Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB)81
There would be no let up in President Kennedy’s schedule this day.
From the test ban meeting he immediately went into a meeting with his
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. President Kennedy gathered the
board to discuss a serious press leak. A front-page story in the New York
Times by Hanson Baldwin, which appeared on July 26, revealed detailed
U.S. intelligence information on the size and strength of the Soviet
intercontinental ballistic missile force.82 The source of the article was
apparently a National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet military forces
that was distributed in the government in early July. For Kennedy this
leak was the latest in a series of unauthorized disclosures of sensitive
81. Including President Kennedy, Clark Clifford, Robert Kennedy, Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Dr.
Edwin H. Land, and Maxwell Taylor. Tape 5A, Presidential Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection, John F. Kennedy Library.
82. Hanson Baldwin, “Soviet Missiles Protected in ‘Hardened’ Position,” New York Times, 26
July 1962.
Meeting with the PFIAB
187
information.83 He wanted to make an example out of Baldwin, the
Times’s longtime military affairs correspondent, and whoever leaked
this information to him as a way of deterring similar leaks in the future.
Baldwin’s piece not only described in detail the probable size of the
U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union in numbers of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines—a fact that had been common
knowledge since late in 1961—but also gave evidence of Soviet efforts to
strengthen, or “harden,” the installations holding their ICBMs, which
could only have come from the supersecret CORONA satellite program.
Baldwin reported the assessment of U.S. military experts that these
defenses would be of little help against a U.S. nuclear first strike. It was
an important leak. There had been some talk in the Pentagon that summer of 1962 of the importance of coming up with a plan to wipe out all
Soviet missiles before Russia could use them against the United States.
Apparently someone at the highest level decided to affect the debate by
leaking to the New York Times. And President Kennedy was furious. The
very day he read the article the President had the Attorney General initiate an FBI investigation.84
The Bureau worked quickly. At 9:30 A.M., July 30, 1962, the FBI held
a very high level briefing at the Pentagon for Robert McNamara, the
secretaries of the armed forces, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and other high officials of the Department of Defense.85 The FBI representative advised the group that the Bureau was investigating the source
of the leak and needed help in determining Baldwin’s contacts during his
visit to Washington in mid-July. McNamara pledged his assistance and
that of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency informed the Bureau that McNamara himself had met with Baldwin on July 19; but McNamara denied being the
leaker. None of the other officials in attendance volunteered that they
had seen Baldwin, though the Bureau suspected that Baldwin had met
with several high-level Pentagon officials. That evening, two FBI agents
83. In July 1961, the FBI investigated a Newsweek article by Lloyd Norman on contingency
planning in the Berlin crisis (see director, FBI, to the Attorney General, “Article by Hanson
W. Baldwin in the New York Times, July 26, 1962,” 31 July 1962, Hanson Baldwin Collection,
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University).
84. The attorney general, Robert Kennedy, instructed the FBI to begin an investigation of the
Baldwin leak on 26 July (FBI report, “Article by Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times, 26
July 1962, Espionage-X,” Hanson Baldwin Collection, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale
University).
85. D. E. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 30 July 1962, Hanson Baldwin Collection, Sterling Memorial
Library, Yale University. Moore was the FBI officer who led the briefing at the Pentagon.
188
1, 1962
approached Baldwin at his home in Chappaqua, New York. Just back
from work and rattled by this unexpected intrusion, Baldwin asked the
G-men to leave and make an appointment to see him the next day at the
Times.86 The FBI demurred and instead put a tap on his home telephone.
That night the FBI heard Baldwin tell a colleague: “I think the real
answer to this is Bobby Kennedy and the President himself, but Bobby
Kennedy particularly putting pressure on [J. Edgar] Hoover.”87 As of
late afternoon August 1, FBI agents were preparing to visit Baldwin’s
appointments secretary to ask for a list of everyone the journalist had
seen during his four-day Washington visit in July.88
President Kennedy was not satisfied with leaving the investigation to
the FBI. He asked his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to evaluate
the seriousness of the leak and in light of their assessment to suggest
additional steps to deter leaks like this one. When he was first elected,
John Kennedy thought he would have little use for these intelligence
consultants. The President’s father, Joseph P. Kennedy, had served on the
President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, as
PFIAB was called in the Eisenhower period, and apparently thought little of the organization. President Kennedy abolished the board of consultants and might have done without it but for the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
Stunned by the role of the CIA in the failure of the paramilitary operation in Cuba, Kennedy reconstituted the board under a new chairman,
Dr. James Killian of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He
named an old family friend, Washington lawyer Clark Clifford, to the
board, which numbered eight members including Harvard international
historian William Langer and the President’s military adviser, General
Maxwell Taylor.
The President turned on the tape at the start of the discussion of
Baldwin.
President Kennedy: I’d just like to say before I . . . I want to get it so
it’s independent . . . nonagency evaluation of the significance of this
Baldwin article because, you know, there is so much braying down here
86. Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, 31 July 1962, Hanson Baldwin Collection, Sterling
Memorial Library, Yale University.
87. Ibid.
88. Mossien to Hanson Baldwin, Memorandum for the Record, 4 September 1962, Hanson
Baldwin Collection, Sterling Memorial Library. Mossien worked for the New York Times.
189
about a lot of these things that appear in the press and it’s hard to separate what is really a bad leak from other kinds of leaks, which we see
every day.
Secondly, whether, if this leak is serious, whether we . . . there is any
action that we could take with . . .
I had a talk a year ago with some of the publishers about this matter
without much success and maybe there is nothing that can be done.89 But
if this is a serious leak then, it seems to me, that we ought to do something about bringing it to the attention of the responsible people, who
are, presently, you know, the publishers’ associations and see whether
they feel stimulated to take some action of their own.
James Killian: [Unclear.] It is the judgment of your board today that
this is one of the most damaging unauthorized disclosures and leaks that
we have any knowledge of in our experience. There is no doubt. And we
made a detailed analysis here that we have tried to make available to you
as to what this means in terms of the coordinated intelligence operations
we’ve been carrying on. And, in our judgment, this is going ultimately to
result in the diminution of the intelligence that we have available to us
because the Soviets will now be prompted to engage in concealment and
deception. There are many technical ways that they can do this. We
think it inevitable, this is going to reduce the intelligence take on very
vital kinds of intelligence now which has to do with the whole balance of
power, and our military planning, the problem of [unclear] and the SIOP
and our own missile program.90
We would say to you unequivocally that this has been a tragically
serious breach of security.
President Kennedy: What I find is incomprehensible . . . that someone of [Hanson] Baldwin’s experience and stature and the status of the
[New York] Times would do it in a story which was not of particular
interest to anyone but the Soviet Union.
Killian: We certainly share this feeling, in fact. And given his presumed military knowledge and background, we just think it incomprehensible that he should do this.
President Kennedy: Can I get a memorandum or a letter from you
which is a statement of what you’ve just told me?
89. Presidential Statement to the American Publishers’ Association, 1961.
90. The Single-Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) was the U.S. nuclear strike plan.
190
1, 1962
Killian: Yes. We have a brief statement here.91 Perhaps I might just
read this quickly. [Begins to read paper.]
Three minutes and 28 seconds excised as classified information.
Killian: Does this answer your question?
Unidentified: Yeah, it does. It definitely does. It does. Yes.
President Kennedy: What is your judgment as to how many people
might have had—well, of course it is hard for you to make that judgment. How many people might have had the capacity to have given this
kind of information to this [unclear]?
Killian: Such information as we have available and we’re . . . After
you had reduced the list of the distribution of the estimates, about 33
people, who got the list.92 In addition to that, there were some hundred
people at least who were engaged in the preparation of the estimate. And
it was this group, perhaps enlarged by some factor—we think the secretaries who get this and transmit it to the people that work for them and
various other people—probably the number is substantially greater than
a hundred, engaged in the preparation process.
We have some comments to make on this because we think in dealing
with this highly sensitive material that if we change procedures to
reduce the number of people involved in handling this kind of material in
the estimating process—
Robert Kennedy: I might say, Mr. President, that’s the same conclusion as we reached from our investigation that there must have been several hundred people who had this information.93
Killian: It’s a lot of people.
Edwin Land: There are a lot of loyal people. There are about seven
thousand people now who have access to this general information and our
impression is that the operating people, the people who work at it and
gather the information, are responsible because they’re involved in it.
Our general concern is what happens to the information when it gets
to high levels.
President Kennedy: [to Killian] Jimmy, what is your guess as to the
effect on the Soviet Union if it became known that we regarded this as a
91. Document not found.
92. The estimates are National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), which were produced by the
Office of National Estimates in a process supervised by the U.S. Intelligence Board. The NIEs
drew on the full range of intelligence resources available to the several intelligence organizations serving the government. The sensitivity of the information contained in the estimates
necessitated that distribution be as limited as practicable.
93. The Attorney General oversees the FBI.
191
very dangerous—we feel—as a dangerous leak? In other words, this
was enough of a red light to them that . . . Would this have been enough
of a red light that any publicity about our feeling that this was a very
damaging leak would not add to our security loss at the moment?
Killian: It’s highly doubtful. [I would] answer that this way: that
they may well consider that this kind of article written in this newspaper
by this man [is] probably with authority. This is one of the things that
makes [unclear] leaks a particular kind of problem; but we would also
have to add to that, that public discussion of this particular situation will
undoubtedly tend to authenticate still further, the article. [Unclear.] And
I think it would be necessary to weigh the possible authentication effects
for the Soviets against remedial measures that may be essential to—
President Kennedy: There wasn’t enough authentication in the article for them, given the information they have and therefore judging how
much information we had, that they probably are able to authenticate it
sufficiently that way?
Killian: That’s the kind of thing that Dr. Land has just mentioned—
Killian: They can relate this directly to specific events that this
reveals of our observing. This is an authenticating kind of aspect to the
article that makes it even worse than you might think.
Land: That’s right Mr. President, [we spent] a great deal of the day
discussing this point and I suppose that what we feel is so much is
revealed that it’s unlikely that much damage would be done. But we’re a
little [unclear] directing the plan; yet we are a little reluctant to take the
chance of having to discipline someone directly for doing it . . . that
would authenticate it. I suppose by not [unclear] the discipline that Dr.
Killian will discuss [unclear] vital . . . and disciplinary steps should be
taken but with some effort to separate the disciplinary action from that
particular article.
Killian: Public [unclear] action. Well, we have ventured to put down
some suggestions here. Whether they are practical from your point of
view or not, you will have to judge. Realizing how difficult and impractical
this area is, we nevertheless feel that we ought to try to grapple with it.
We would make this kind of comment, first of all: Given the damaging nature of this, it justifies you in taking very drastic and unprecedented procedures to prevent it in the future. I might make the observation
that having observed our responses to security breaks over a period of
years, having observed a certain ultimate timidity in trying to do something about them that we have seen a situation evolve wherein those who
engage in security leaks probably have no real fear that any punitive
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1, 1962
action will be taken. And this is a part of the problem that we face at the
present time. This is one of the reasons why we feel so strongly that if
you could find the ways and the means appropriately to take drastic
action, even though this drastic action might result in adverse criticism
temporarily, after a period, that the national interest would be well
served by your doing it, and taking the adverse reactions as they might
come. It’s been, I think, the fear of adverse reaction that prevented any
kind of, this remedial action being taken in the past.
It is easy for us to say these things to you and you will have to evaluate the risk of approving this. But it is our considered judgment that you
will be justified even against the possibility of reactions by the press or
reactions within your own official family to do some things that obviously are of an unprecedented and drastic nature.
We would suggest that the first and most basic response which obviously ought to be taken here is to be a very clear indication on your part
of the seriousness with which you consider this particular security break,
and the [unclear] that you were asking at the beginning. And to the
extent that we can be helpful in providing you with a backup statement
as to how serious we deem this to be, we will give you such documentation as you might find useful.
President Kennedy: I wonder if I, in other words, if I can get a letter
from you—
Killian: Yes. We thought that if this would be useful to you we’d fight
[unclear]. Now, we suggest, for example, that you might call a special meeting of the National Security Council and make a very strong statement at
such a meeting to make clear to all of the cabinet officers involved that you
have a cumbersome staff problem, in deadly [unclear], how serious you feel
this to be and how important it is that we prevent it in the future.
It may be the force of your concern will strengthen the hands of each
of the people who are involved, as for example the Secretary of Defense
and all the members of his staff, in dealing with the problem, the petty
things, which have been very difficult.
We know, of course, that you have initiated an FBI investigation of
this particular situation. We recommend that should the offenders be
identified that you authorize drastic discipline, individual discipline.
That such discipline be taken in a way that leaves no doubts in the minds
of the offenders’ associates about how disastrous their actions have been
and the punishment that has been meted out.
And I think all of us feel very strongly that provided the man can be
identified, that the men can be identified, that really drastic action is
indicated. And that this will be the best way to prevent future occur-
193
rences of this sort. And that in very few instances, the facts that we
know anything about, where punitive action hasn’t worked—
President Kennedy: Well, you remember the . . . the one case back
that I talked to Secretary McNamara and the other generals . . . they got
a call that they thought they probably had the—
Killian: This was the letter from Secretary Rusk.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Indeed, they’re sort of [unclear]. They’re
rather pessimistic about their chances but they need to make [mumbles]. . . .
Killian: We make a further suggestion that in the event that the
investigation reveals—and this comes about as a result of a discussion
that we had with General Taylor, in particular—offices or groups that
might have been involved in this thing, that the situation would justify
taking some kind of disciplinary action against the whole of that particular office group, even though he personally might have not been directly
involved in this [security]. But, this would, again, do much to alert people and indicate the seriousness and the determination to stamp out this
kind of thing.
We recommend another kind of thing, that consideration be given to
the establishment and distribution of new policies in the Department of
Defense and the other agencies involved in handling classified intelligence material, about procedures to be followed by personnel when talking to the press.
We suggest consideration be given to a requirement in such a policy
that officers, both civilian and military, be required to prepare memoranda reporting each conversation they have had with representatives of
the press and that such memoranda be filed with the head of the department or agency in which they are involved.
President Kennedy: Do you think that anybody who talks to a newspaperman at the Pentagon should first clear it with the press officer or
that he should have a third person present to . . . ?
Killian: Well, we have some skepticism about the third person for a
variety of reasons. We think, first of all, that the press will not accept
this. There will be a quite powerful reaction to this as an overall policy.
We think that this suggestion of having them understand that they are
expected to prepare a memorandum of their discussions, and that this
memorandum must be filed with the head of their particular branch or
agency, would help to make them more careful, more reticent and would,
in the event that they don’t prepare the memorandum, leave the man in a
much more vulnerable position to that punitive action in the event that it
is necessary. This is one of the problems [unclear].
Land: I can’t; I tend to—
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1, 1962
Killian: We have not discussed the question of whether a man should
check in with the central office before he has a meeting with the press.
This might be a very—
Unidentified: Well, this gives an immediate record of everyone the
press representative might see.
President Kennedy: All right, so the burden would be on the government rather than on the newspaperman—
Killian: Yes.
President Kennedy: So it might be more polite to accept it. Right.
The press might not want to go to clear it. [Unclear.]
Killian: We don’t see that the press could have any adverse reaction
to this, at all. Because this is none of their business.
Maxwell Taylor: I might say others have—
Killian: You are not interfering with their access to personnel.
Taylor: We’re not talking about a lot of people either in the
Pentagon.
Killian: No.
Taylor: I would say that the people who should be allowed to talk
regularly to the press are very few and in the past have been very few.
Killian: Still another suggestion is that there ought to be a sharper
identification, a listing of those particular areas that have a high degree
of sensitivity, more than we have done so far.
And then the procedures should be adopted, even more stringent
than those we now have. [Unclear] access [unclear] of the kind that
we’re talking about involving this, too.
This board has undertaken to prepare its list of such areas and we
think that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
Intelligence Agency of the DOD ought to make an analysis of this
[unclear], too.94 Then it can be made clear, clearer than it is now that
there are these certain areas that must be handled in very special ways
and that people must take extreme precautions.
We next suggest as I mentioned earlier that we ought to try to
reduce the number of people involved in the estimating process, when
the estimates involve this kind of high[ly] sensitive materials. [Someone
says “That’s right.”] Having a list of these areas of high sensitivity, the
National Estimates Board ought to limit the accessibility to this information when they deal with these particular kinds of topics, cutback on
94. The abbreviation DOD stands for Department of Defense.
195
this 200 as we were talking about, keep it very very small. It may well be
that there are certain kinds of information that is [sic] so sensitive and
obviously so valuable as ought not to be handled in any way except by
hand-carrying [unclear] locked, like a courier, certainly.
We make another observation here with some hesitancy, but nevertheless I think it was the clear opinion of the board that the FBI may not
be the best agency to conduct investigations of leaks of this kind. The
history has shown that they have never been either enthusiastic or successful in dealing with serious security breaches. As I am sure you are
fully aware, Mr. Hoover apparently doesn’t like to get into this field.95 He
feels it is an administrative responsibility rather than an FBI type of
responsibility. We’re unsure how enthusiastic the FBI is when it undertakes to make an investigation.
We say this not wanting to be unfair to the agency. But for, I think, a
more fundamental reason: that is, we believe that there ought to be
within the defense, within the intelligence community itself, the means
to conduct this kind of search and investigation. The act gives the
Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting the
sources of our intelligence information.96 He really has no mechanism to
do this at the present time. The only committee of USIB that has at least
the designation of being a committee to deal with security problems . . .
We would suggest, therefore, that the Director of Central Intelligence
be encouraged to develop an expert group that would be available at all
times to follow up on security leaks.
When the FBI gets into this problem, they are not cleared in the first
place as we discovered in this particular situation.97 They start from
behind the starting line. It takes them a long time to get the necessary
background to begin to be effective. We ought to have a trained, experienced and knowledgeable team available to deal with this problem whenever and wherever it arises. And perhaps, maybe, this could be approached
in two ways: One, we say ask the Director of Central Intelligence to make
sure that he has such a team available to him operating under his direction.
And next that the director of the intelligence agency of the DOD
95. J. Edgar Hoover had been the director of the Bureau of Investigation and its successor, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, since 1924.
96. The act is the National Security Act of 1947. Clark Clifford, a member of PFIAB, participated in the drafting of that act.
97. They did not have security clearance for matters of national security.
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1, 1962
have a similar group that can work in the Department of Defense.
Because under the new directive establishing the intelligence agency in
Defense, the director of that clearly has the responsibility for security,
but he is just getting started and so far doubtless does not have any real
reasons to discharge this responsibility.
Here are two ways that we think it would be better and would have
an important effect, a deterrent effect, on leaks in the future, if we had
such groups available to respond to it.
Clark Clifford: I think, Mr. President—
Killian: This would be better than the FBI.
Clifford: I think this is the most effective recommendation that the
group makes: that there be a full-time, small group, devoting themselves
to this all the time. I believe that that group could become knowledgeable about the pieces that these various men write, like Baldwin and
Alsop and so forth.98 They can after awhile become pretty knowledgeable about who these men are seeing, these columnists, where these leaks
occur. It can be done quietly, unobtrusively [so] that they have a wealth
of background from which to select the information. They’re at it on a
full-time basis.
Times have changed. You can’t do this anymore on a hit-and-miss
basis like we’ve done in the past because now incidents of this kind are infinitely more important and more damaging than they’ve ever been before.
Killian: That’s right.
Clifford: And the FBI, as Jim says, has never been effective. I remember in 1946, they had a bad leak in the State Department that 16 years
ago they gave the same kind of report and I bet I’ve seen plenty of them.
They never found out who it was. They were really valueless. But a fulltime group that is working on it all the time and has some background
so that when one of these leaks occurs, they don’t start from scratch.
They’re already very well oriented in the field.
Taylor: I think if this can be combined with a thorough system of
keeping memo for record . . . if this kind of group—
Unidentified: Yes.
Taylor: —went around and looked at the memo of record all through
the Pentagon, they’d see the pattern of behavior simply.
Unidentified: Sure. They would.
Killian: There are many things that such a sensitized group could do
that . . . They could follow the press and see evidence of . . .
98. Clifford could be referring to Joseph Alsop or to Stewart Alsop.
197
Taylor: We’d know the trends, where their contacts . . .
President Kennedy: That’s a very good idea. We’ll do that.
What about this particular case in regard to the Times itself ? We’ve
had two or three bad leaks from the Times: one was the Finney story of
several years ago which caused the Russians to change their own method
of sending communications on the telephone.99
Killian: We were briefed at our last meeting on the fact that you had
protected firing of a Polaris-type of missile on a Russian submarine out
of fear that the New York Times, in a Finney story a couple of days later,
[would] essentially [say] the information that the Russians have on the
Polaris type is bogus. This supports what you say. . . .
President Kennedy: You think there is any . . . You would describe
this as, what, one of the worst that you have seen?
President Kennedy: Which one is worse?
Killian: I don’t know of any one that is worse.
Thirteen seconds excised as classified information.
Killian: But that wasn’t the first kind of a leak to the press. It was
another . . .
President Kennedy: Do you suggest that . . . this is, of course, a . . .
the New York Times would be . . . I am not sure how effective a question
[unclear] here. Clark Clifford might suggest some recommendations at
the moment.
The nature of the press, as I say, I had a very . . . I found their conversation very . . . I made a speech up there in which I suggested that they
examine the matter after Cuba.100 And they were very unreceptive to it and
they came down, five or six of them when they were here to [unclear]. And
I was just wondering whether there was anything to do with them. They
are the most privileged group.
Killian: And they’re all sitting on their asses.
President Kennedy: And they regard any action in this area as a limi-
99. John Finney was the New York Times science correspondent.
100. Kennedy was referring to the role of the press in the Bay of Pigs affair. Days before the
start of the operation, Kennedy had asked Orvil Dryfoos, the president and publisher of the New
York Times, to withhold information about the Bay of Pigs operation. The New York Times complied. On 27 April 1961, in a speech delivered in New York City to the American Newspaper
Publishers Association, Kennedy called on the press to “heed the duty of self-restraint which
that danger [the present danger] imposes upon us all.” Public Papers of the Presidents, John F.
Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 337.
198
1, 1962
tation on their civil rights. And they are not very used to it. On the other
hand, I wouldn’t think that [Orvil] Dryfoos would be very happy using
his paper for a very unimportant story about our estimating function
[unclear] the effect that you describe. What is your opinion, Clark,
whether we ought to try going to the publishers or not . . . or the publishers?
Clifford: My feeling in this particular instance is that the transgression is such a tragic one that it would be a mistake on the part of the
President or this committee to let it go without bringing it to the attention of Dryfoos. I’m sure he doesn’t recognize all the implications. I’m
assuming he’s a loyal American. If he knew what this did to our national
security, then I believe there might be less likelihood of this happening in
the future. If, however, nothing is done with reference to Dryfoos, then I
think they proceed on the assumption that “I guess this isn’t doing any
damage, let’s encourage our boys to get more of the same.”
It is my opinion that some contact should be made with Dryfoos, and it
should be brought to his attention that this is perhaps the most serious
transgression of its kind that’s occurred since you’ve been President and
that the damage is so severe it’s probably incalculable and that the purpose
of bringing it to his attention is on the basis that if he knew the amount of
damage done then there is much less likelihood of it occurring again.
Killian: We’ve had quite a lot of discussion about this.
Clifford: And there may be some different feeling on the part of
other members of the board.
President Kennedy: What about the publishers’ group that came to
meet me last year?101 Six or seven of them, who were more or less . . .
[unclear]. I guess they were the board of publishers. I had trouble with a
speech in which I had suggested at that time the necessary procedures to
prevent this thing. I’m wondering whether we should—Time [magazine] is actually one of the worst offenders of this kind over the years.
Its contacts are the best. What do you think?
Of course, as this thing becomes rumored around, which it will, then I
wonder whether we ought to attempt . . . what’s your judgment of our
bringing to other publishers’ attention that this atmosphere is disastrous?
Clifford: I doubt that there is much usefulness in that. You get a
101. On 9 May 1961, President Kennedy met with officials from the American Newspaper
Publishers Association, the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Associated Press, and
the United Press International (David R. Davies, “Kennedy and the Press, 1960–1963,” in the
Presidential Recordings Project Archive, Miller Center of Public Affairs).
199
group of publishers together and each seems to sustain the other in his
position that the government should not interfere with their business.
Also, it’s much more likely to be spread around when there is a group of
them called in to discuss it.
My present notion is that probably the best approach is to make individual contacts with publishers as this type of incident occurs. And there
probably are not more than 6 or 8 or 10 or 12 in the country who have
papers of such substantial influence that it would be necessary.
I hope that no more of them occur. I think we all know that they will
occur. These occur every so often, and if there were some procedure by
which that publisher when such an incident occurs, and it can be pinpointed and he can be shown the damage that has occurred, then I would
hope ultimately there’d be a greater feeling of responsibility on their
part in the future. It may not work, but I think it ought to be tried
because I think that in some way there is an avoiding of responsibility
unless it’s brought to the attention of a publisher when such an amount
of damage has been done.
Killian: There’ll never be a better case than that to justify certain
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Do you have a . . . can you then draft for me a
letter which I can use as the source? I also have a statement from Mr.
McCone and Secretary McNamara as to the seriousness—
Killian: Yes.
President Kennedy: —and I would use that as the basis of my letter
to Dryfoos.
Killian: Very [unclear].
President Kennedy: But I think . . . And I agree with you about the
establishment of a group over there because there isn’t any doubt that
they can follow this very closely, a lot of this stuff goes out. You only just
described about the submarine. We had that coming in and in addition,
the press were aware and the Pentagon, and the State Department, and
the CIA were aware that there was this group. That would . . . might
have a very very useful effect.
Killian: Yes.
Clifford: We saw a report after you saw it today, too, that—
Two seconds excised as classified information.
Clifford: —told about Hanson Baldwin coming to Washington on
the day before this report was disseminated. And they say he was there
that day, he was there the next day. It is known that on the day that the
report was disseminated, he spent that day at the Pentagon. Well, now
that’s apparently all they know.
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1, 1962
I say that this group can know who it is who he’s seeing at the
Pentagon. They can find that out, I think, within a period of a few short
months. They can find out who are Hanson Baldwin’s contacts. When he
goes over to the Pentagon, who does he see? Nobody knows now. The
FBI doesn’t know. But I think it would be mighty interesting to know
when he drops [in] over there whom he sees. And I think it would be
mighty interesting to know who Alsop sees and who Chalmers Roberts
sees and the rest of these fellows.102 Let’s then begin to get up a file on
these different men because if they begin to know where to go. . . . To my
knowledge it’s never been done before and it is long overdue.
Killian: All right, sir, we will prepare and give to you that statement.
President Kennedy: I think everyone who has clearance for this particular type of a sensitive . . . We ought to establish the procedure
whether they see them at their home or any place that we get the memorandum on their conversation and it should be from anybody from the
White House or anyplace else. And that we get that established and failure to do so would be regarded as a breach. [Unclear.]
Killian: The knowledge among all the people who are seeking this
material that you are deeply concerned about this and prepared to take
action on the matter [unclear].
Clifford: Mr. President, you made one comment, I think maybe we
might want to refer to. I would wonder about the advisability of writing
Dryfoos a letter [Killian is heard muttering in the background] and sending
copies of a letter that Dr. Killian might get out for McNamara—
President Kennedy: I thought if it was delivered by hand and then
brought back by hand but—
Clifford: That would concern me a good deal. In the first place you
have gone on record in such a manner that it would indicate that perhaps that the article is based upon fact which would concern me some.
Who would see it besides Dryfoos, I don’t know. We can’t be absolutely
certain —
Killian: He suggests that we would send it—
Clifford: Well, I know that, but—[Killian speaks indistinctly.]
President Kennedy: How else would we get it to Dryfoos’s attention?
Clifford: If you intended to get it to Dryfoos’s attention directly, it
would seem to me that the most effective way would be for you to talk to
Dryfoos. I doubt that a letter from the President would have much effect
102. Chalmers M. Roberts wrote for the Washington Post.
201
upon him. I believe if I were a newspaper publisher and the President of
the United States told me what damage this had done to my country, I
think it would make a hell of an impression on me.
Now, you can’t do that with all of them, but there’s only one New
York Times. It’s considered generally to be the most influential. Every
newspaper in the country takes the New York Times. And this would be
an interesting test to see if this could be effective insofar as the New York
Times is concerned.
Killian: Again, appealing to them because of their great prestige and
influence to exercise [their] responsibility.
President Kennedy: Good. Well, as I say . . . let’s work on the best
way to establish the contact. What I need, of course is [unclear]—
Killian: Well, I understand how you feel about putting anything in
writing.
President Kennedy: Is the judgment from you as to its seriousness
because they will tend to dismiss anything we in government say as just
an attempt to . . .
Killian: All right.
Taylor: Would you see any disadvantage in the President showing
the kind of letter you’re going to write?
Killian: No, I see no disadvantage.
President Kennedy: I think that . . . it would be necessary to have
just two. One would be a report to me; and the other would be a letter
which I could show to Dryfoos to demonstrate that this is not a—
Killian: Yes.
President Kennedy: —overly sensitive administration. [Everyone
laughs.]
Unidentified: Thank you very much.
Killian: I bet you’ve had a heavy day.
President Kennedy: Yes, I did. You will put in writing all the things
that—?
Killian: Yes, we will. [Meeting ends.]
Evelyn Lincoln: Is Dr. Killian with you?
The President, or possibly Evelyn Lincoln, turned off the machine.
The last meeting of the day was with Representative Wright Patman,
Walter Heller of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Larry O’Brien,
the President’s congressional liaison. The President did not tape it.
Then it was on to the pool and dinner.
202
F R I DAY, AU G U S T
3, 1962
Friday, August 3, 1962
The President arrived in the office a little earlier than usual. Ordinarily
he had a working breakfast until about 10:00 A.M. But this Friday he
came in just after 9:00 A.M. This had been a busy week for the President
as he faced decisions on Latin American policy, the U.S. position at the
Geneva disarmament talks, and the very public debate on a tax cut. But
throughout the week, another issue had never strayed far from the
President’s mind. Berlin was arguably the reason Kennedy decided to
install an elaborate taping system in the White House. It was certainly
the area where he most expected a major crisis with the Soviets. As he
said Monday to Dean Rusk, “Looks to me . . . like they’re ready to do
something there.” The Soviets did not misbehave particularly this week.
But the President believed the United States had to be prepared to act if
they did and the unwieldy North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
had to be ready to act fast, if need be. In the New York Times that morning were two stories related to Berlin that caught the President’s attention. The Soviets were protesting the flight of a U.S. helicopter over East
Germany the previous day. Meanwhile the U.S. reservists who had been
called up to meet the Berlin emergency in 1961 were now complaining
about the length of their service. Just as the Soviets began making
threatening noises again, it appeared that there would be obstacles at
home to maintaining a united front in response.
After quarter-hour discussions with a representative from Indiana1
and the U.S. ambassador to Chile,2 President Kennedy welcomed his
Berlin task force in for their first discussion with him since Nikita
Khrushchev told the departing U.S. ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in
late July that he was prepared to sign a peace treaty with East Germany
sooner rather than later, and thereby bring the crisis to a head.
1. Vance Hartke.
2. Charles W. Cole.
Meeting on Berlin
203
10:33–11:12 A.M.
You know, the damndest details come into this business.
Meeting on Berlin3
Berlin seemed a dangerous place to be in the summer of 1962. The building of the Berlin Wall the previous August, followed by a tense standoff
between Soviet and U.S. tanks in October, had exacerbated the sense of
imminent violence in the city. Since November 1958, the Soviets had used
the threat of signing a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic
Republic (G.D.R.) to force the Western powers out of West Berlin.
Initially, Nikita Khrushchev had set a six-month ultimatum to reach an
agreement with the West, and then let it pass in 1959 when the
Eisenhower administration refused to give up the U.S. position in Hitler’s
former capital. In the wake of John F. Kennedy’s failure at the Bay of Pigs,
Khrushchev revived the threats of 1958 at the Vienna summit in June
1961. But the mobilization of U.S. Reserves convinced Khrushchev that
this U.S. President was as committed as his predecessor to a West Berlin
linked to the Western alliance. Although the Berlin crisis of 1961 had subsided by October, once again Khrushchev was threatening to sign a peace
treaty that would force U.S., British, and French troops out of West Berlin.
The U.S.-Soviet negotiations to settle the issue peacefully had reached a
public stalemate in April 1962. In discussions with U.S. ambassador
Llewellyn Thompson at the end of July, Khrushchev had not set a time
limit; but his actions portended some kind of declaration that fall, when he
was expected to visit the U.N. General Assembly.
The signing of a peace treaty with the G.D.R. would not by itself mean
world war. The U.S. feared that once the Soviets renounced their World
War II occupation rights, the East Germans would demand the removal of
the Western powers from Berlin. The Kremlin would denounce the hardwon understandings that permitted the West to reach West Berlin, an
enclave 110 miles inside of East Germany, by air, rail, or road. It was East
German interference with allied access to Berlin, backed by Soviet power,
which could possibly spark a war. Even without a separate peace treaty, the
3. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Martin Hillenbrand, Foy Kohler, Paul
Nitze, Dean Rusk, and William Tyler. Tape 6, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
204
3, 1962
Soviets had started a campaign of harassing both civilian and military aircraft in the air corridors established between West Germany and West
Berlin. Most recently, on July 30, a Soviet controller at the Berlin Air Safety
Center protested a U.S. helicopter flight over Karlshorst, which was in the
East sector but within the 20-mile Berlin control zone, and warned that it
would be shot down if it returned. Major General Watson, U.S. commandant for Berlin, fired off a note protesting the threat. Meanwhile, U.S. officials began reviewing flight procedures, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
temporarily suspended flights over Soviet installations in East Berlin.
Western officials in Berlin and Bonn agreed that the Soviet threat constituted a new form of intimidation in the conflict over Berlin.
Kennedy had called for the creation of a task force to deal with the
Berlin situation after the stormy meeting with Khrushchev in June 1961.
When the Wall went up in August 1961, the Berlin Task Force began
meeting daily, coordinating opinions and information from the White
House, the Department of State, and the Pentagon. An ambassadorial
group from the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany
also met regularly to deal with the Berlin issue. President Kennedy had
been deeply dissatisfied with allied contingency planning to deal with a
Soviet or East German move against Western access to Berlin. The various NATO military contingency plans, known as BERCON and MARCON, would take days to implement, and there seemed no good way to
deal firmly with aggression from the East without resorting to nuclear
weapons, which could unleash a general nuclear war.4
The President was most familiar with National Security Action
Memorandum 109, incongruously code-named Poodle Blanket, which he
approved in October 1961.5 Poodle Blanket seemed unworkable to the
President in a crisis. The plan envisaged a 60-day negotiation and mobilization period before the allies could act. McGeorge Bundy attempted to
dispel the President’s impression, stressing that the pause would coincide
with an intensive period of diplomatic activity to avoid military action.
Yet it seemed that the more Kennedy learned of planning for problems in
Berlin, the less he had to be pleased about. In June, the President was
informed that months would still be required before any of the plans
under consideration could be made operational. On August 2, Dean Rusk
4. The BERCON plans dealt with Berlin itself while the MARCON plans were NATO plans
for Marine countermeasures.
5. National Security Action Memorandum 109, 23 October 1961, National Security Files,
Meetings and Memoranda, Box 332, John F. Kennedy Library.
Meeting on Berlin
205
sent him a memorandum on contingency planning for a Soviet-G.D.R.
peace treaty.6
Kennedy also learned that despite the current tensions, some of the
West European allies were dragging their feet in fulfilling their obligations to NATO. The West Germans and French, for instance, thought
Berlin should be protected with firm, nuclear threats. Rumors were
reaching Washington that the West Germans, who had made a commitment to NATO of 700,000 soldiers, were considering holding their number to 500,000, a move which would constitute a blow to Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara’s latest ideas for a forward defense based on
increased conventional forces. Kennedy, who had campaigned on a platform of personal sacrifice, had extended his call for “burden sharing”
beyond the nation’s borders to ask not what the United States could do
for Western Europe but what the Western European nations could do for
the defense of their own continent.
Finally, equally fresh in Kennedy’s mind were the extensive talks
between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet foreign minister Andrei
Gromyko in Geneva in mid-July, where both had been present for the signing of the Laos accords. Whereas the talks brought relief to the tensions
in Southeast Asia, they had the opposite effect on the situation in Central
Europe. Like Khrushchev in the Kremlin, Gromyko had sounded the tocsin of an impending German peace treaty. There was some discussion of a
nuclear nonproliferation agreement. But even this was overshadowed by
Berlin. Gromyko had stressed Soviet concerns that West Germany might
acquire nuclear weapons. As part of President Kennedy’s efforts to share
the burden of NATO defense more equitably, he had approved discussion
of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF)—possibly a jointly manned nuclear
submarine—that would both discourage European countries from
acquiring nuclear weapons of their own and provide tangible proof that
in the event of a Soviet attack, the Europeans would have nuclear
weapons nearby. Gromyko and Rusk had discussed their shared interest
in nonproliferation but had parted company on the significance of the
MLF idea. The Soviets stressed its incompatibility with nonproliferation. The State Department had prepared a draft statement for Gromyko
that awaited the President’s approval.7
6. Rusk to President Kennedy, “Contingency Planning for Soviet-G.D.R. Peace Treaty,” 2
August 1962, FRUS, 15: 257–62.
7. This draft has not been found. For the final version of the statement, see Memcon, 8 August
1962, FRUS, 7: 541–47.
206
3, 1962
The President began to record this meeting with his Berlin advisers
as Dean Rusk described his recent discussions with Gromyko.
Dean Rusk: [voice fades in] He volunteered that their deputy foreign
minister would be either [Vladimir] Semenov, or—8
William Tyler: [Vasili] Kuznetsov or—9
Rusk: Kuznetsov or—
Tyler: Or somebody else.
Rusk: And asked if Tyler would be out there. My thought—
McGeorge Bundy: Lucky Tyler! [Laughter.]
Rusk: Actually, we used [U.S. ambassador-at-large] Tommy
Thompson’s idea.
Rusk: This could be a career. It could go on for months and months.
And he would be very much up to that kind of job.
So, the second point on which [Andrei] Gromyko went through on
this [was the] nondiffusion of nuclear weapons point, and I have here. I
haven’t had a chance to talk to Bob McNamara about it, but I have here,
something I drafted as a letter to Gromyko.10 I think it would put us in a
position of saying to our allies that we haven’t passed over the pieces of
paper to the press. I would give this carefully to [Soviet ambassador to
the United States, Anatoly] Dobrynin orally, letting his men then stay
behind and take accurate notes so they have an exact copy, but not actually pass a piece of paper. You might just take a moment . . .
President Kennedy: When would you send this?
Rusk: I would do this as soon as possible today, or you talk to
McNamara or Bundy, or tomorrow . . . as soon as possible.
Tyler: Is that the only copy we have with us?
Rusk: What?
Martin Hillenbrand: [mumbles] I’ll promise that . . .
The group proceeds to read the draft.
Rusk: Stick to this one; it’s really important [unclear] thing on Berlin.
President Kennedy: Hmm, hmm.
More time passes. There are sounds of papers turning and of writing.
8. Vladimir S. Semenov was Soviet deputy foreign minister and an expert on Germany.
9. Vasili V. Kuznetsov was Soviet first deputy foreign minister.
10. The draft of the letter that the Secretary of State read to Ambassador Dobrynin on 8
August.
Meeting on Berlin
207
President Kennedy: Now, what would be the advantage, what would
be the purpose of taking this out as a separate matter?
Rusk: Well, we would like to get going on something in which they
have a real interest. I’m sure they have a tremendous interest in this
nuclear weapons for Germany problem, and if we [can] get it worked on
so that we can throw this into the Geneva framework, that is, the general
worldwide arrangement, then you avoid the specific discrimination against
Germany, which of course is an enormous problem in Germany.11 Now,
this could cause us trouble in, both in France and in Germany.12
Bundy: Yes, but this could cause us some, but it’s—
Rusk: Yes, but if we push this problem out of the strictly European
framework, and really tee off on our European allies that China is our
problem, 650 million people out there, and we’ve got allies right around
the rim of China, and that we are intensely interested in getting Peiping
[Beijing] on the line with this kind of thing, as well as the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy: But Peiping, though, wouldn’t agree.
Rusk: Well, if Peiping didn’t agree, then we’d have to take a look and
see whether we would go ahead without them.
President Kennedy: So at least it . . . Now how does this tie into the
Berlin treaty, I mean the Berlin . . . ?
Rusk: Well, I think that if we got going on something that is as serious to them as this problem, this would—this could—take some of the
heat off the Berlin question, because I think this is something where they
could see some pretty great gains in, as would we. . . .
Foy Kohler: Are you sure this shouldn’t be geared to a test ban of
some kind?
Rusk: Well, we’re working on the test ban simultaneously . . .
Kohler: I’m just thinking—
Bundy: This ought to be a sentence here relating it to the test ban so
that it doesn’t look wholly as—
11. The Soviets wanted the problem of nuclear diffusion to the Germanys to be mentioned in
any nonproliferation treaty. The U.S. position was that if Germany were mentioned, why not
China or Israel, as other states that should not become nuclear powers. This would be discussed by Rusk and Dobrynin on 8 August. Memcon, 8 August 1962, FRUS, 7: 541–47.
12. The Kennedy administration anticipated West German and French opposition to any
nuclear nondiffusion agreement because it would restrain the development of national nuclear
capabilities. The West German government further believed that any agreement that precluded the transfer of nuclear weapons to NATO represented a reduction of U.S. commitment
to Europe. The French government had consistently opposed test ban talks, nondiffusion
agreements, and a NATO multilateral nuclear force as attempts to stymie the development of
a French nuclear arsenal.
208
3, 1962
Rusk: There was a reference in here to disarmament, we could build
that up a little if you like, but I don’t think we need to hook it to the test
ban, and if the present atomic powers continue to be atomic powers, continue testing, there’s still no reason why we can’t say that we won’t give
these to anybody else, and ask everybody else not to have them.
President Kennedy: Didn’t we always attempt to keep this out of the
Geneva talks because we thought this was something the Soviets
wanted?
Unidentified: We didn’t—
President Kennedy: Now we’re relating it to Germany aren’t we . . .
Rusk: In our principles paper, we included a paragraph on nuclear
nondiffusion, and we talked about it either in the deputy foreign minister’s or some other appropriate forum, so that we indicated to the Soviets
that Geneva might be the right place for it. But I think we’ve got almost
as much mileage out of this with respect to Berlin as we can get. [Sounds
of agreement from others around the room.]
President Kennedy: I agree that’s true . . .
Rusk: Without tying it organically to Berlin, which is the principle
the Germans would never accept.
President Kennedy: Well, okay, let’s go ahead with this, then.
Rusk: All right.
President Kennedy: Well, what about the . . . ?
Rusk: Now, the other point that I would like to mention pertains to
this . . . dealing with these various contingencies.
At the present time, if they propose a peace conference for an East
German, for a German peace treaty, our plan is to play that down, to
minimize the effect of that, and get other countries outside the bloc not
to attend, and to nevertheless play on the wicket that if they simply substitute East Germans for Russians, our [unclear] would otherwise continue. At least we would go right ahead, don’t worry too much.
We think what is missing there is an immediate counterinitiative on
our part, and the point that is not in the paper is that we would suggest
that we get racked up with our allies now, that we would make within
hours a counterproposal of a deputy foreign ministers’ discussion to consider whether there’s any prospect of reaching an agreement. In other
words, if they propose a phony conference, we go back to the deputy foreign ministers, straight away.
This would also tie in to the possibility of U.N. action, because if this
gets into the U.N., what we would not want from the U.N. is a U.N.-proposed settlement with all sorts of U.N. forces and that sort of thing in
the first stage. We wouldn’t want the U.N. to try to get into the settle-
Meeting on Berlin
209
ment, but we don’t shoot, but talk, a resolution out of the U.N., and talking would be the deputy foreign ministers, as we see [it]. So that, for us
to go right back and propose a deputy foreign ministers [meeting], if
they come up with a peace conference call, it would put us in a good
position to deal with the U.N. conference.
So I think that if we could get that laid on in advance, so that we
would—literally within hours, hopefully within an hour—have something going right back to the Soviet Union, we not only would be prepared for that move on their part but we would look prepared, which is
almost as important.
Kohler: You haven’t mentioned the French angle.
Tyler: Uh-um.
Rusk: Yes, the French on both these points. The nondiffusion point
and on the deputy foreign ministers we could have trouble with the
French.
I think that if the Russians made these proposals without any sense
of threat, without any ultimatum, the French might come along.
[Foreign minister] Couve [de Murville] seems a little more open to
rejoining the party when I talked to him yesterday. And I think that the
French idea, that these are matters which ought to be settled by the Big
Four—Russia and the three Western powers—would fit this, but even
so, [President Charles] de Gaulle might stick a bit on the question of
there being no basis for discussion.
But I think that the deputy foreign ministers level has to transfer to
either the foreign ministers or chiefs of government. This is not as much of
a problem because the purpose of the deputies would be to find out whether
there is any [unclear] debate at this point in time [unclear]. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: Do you think that that’s much of a counter. . . .
There’s no sense . . . We talked one time about whether, if they
announced they were going to sign this peace treaty, whether we would
have a meeting with [British prime minister Harold] Macmillan and de
Gaulle and so on; but you decided the timing or whatever that that
would not be appropriate.
Bundy: Too big a signal.
Kohler: That goes contrary to the philosophy we’re following—
[Unclear exchange.]
Rusk: And I also, I think under those circumstances, it might create a
sense of panic. It might be better for you to work in such a meeting
[unclear] trip because [unclear] get into this, but to have them propose a
conference, and have the Western heads of government suddenly meet, I
think would look like a crisis and uncertainty [unclear].
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3, 1962
President Kennedy: What about this coming into the U.N., and
Congressman Hale Boggs’s cable saying they thought they were going
to take it to the U.N.?13
Rusk: Yes, Bill [Tyler], did we have one or two other hints about
that?
Tyler: [German ambassador Hans] Kroll, came up with . . . The
German ambassador came up with that estimate on speculation some
weeks ago. . . .14
Rusk: Gromyko, as well as Dobrynin I think . . . Didn’t Dobrynin
mention this at lunch yesterday?
Tyler: He didn’t mention the U.N. specifically, but he said . . . I asked
him whether Khrushchev would be coming in, and recommending . . .
Rusk: Yes, Gromyko is very careful [to] leave this open, so we just
don’t know . . .
Tyler: Dobrynin said . . . nothing official has been decided. It was too
early to tell yet, but he left the implication that it was in the wind.
Rusk: Well, now, we’ve got masses of papers here, Mr. President. I
don’t know which particular points are . . .
President Kennedy: Well, let’s see. [reading] “If at any time it seems
that withdrawal by the Soviets from their functions with respect to the
allied access is imminent, the three governments would presumably act
in accordance with agreed contingency plans. The assumption underlying these plans is that the Western Powers are prepared to accept execution of existing procedures on ground access. . . .”15
Is that the question about the passports, or what the procedure is?
Bundy: That’s a slightly separate problem.
Kohler: That’s a compromise.
Bundy: That’s after they’ve begun to . . . If they put in new requirements, the passports and visas question would arise. The question which
is reviewed here, on which we will get some heat, I think, in this next
month, [the] Department thinks, I think, from the French and
13. Thomas Hale Boggs, Sr. (D-Louisiana), served as majority whip in the House of
Representatives. In 1962, he was serving on the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Joint Economic Committee. A copy of that cable has not been found. Apparently, Boggs reinforced administration fears that Khrushchev intended to attend the opening session of the
17th U.N. General Assembly and possibly call for a U.N. resolution to the Berlin question.
14. Hans Kroll was West German ambassador to the Soviet Union.
15. President Kennedy was reading from the memorandum on peace treaty contingencies
prepared for him by Rusk. The rest of the sentence reads, “. . . to Berlin by East German personnel substituting for Soviet personnel” (see Rusk to Kennedy, 2 August 1962, FRUS,
15: 257–62).
Meeting on Berlin
211
Germans, [unclear] with Germany is whether we accept without protest
the no-trouble change from Soviet to East German controls on existing
access procedures.
Tyler: On the ground?
Bundy: On the ground.
Rusk: But I think that we continue to insist that the Soviets would be
responsible to us. If they choose to use these people to carry out their
responsibilities, that’s their business, but we expect from these people
exactly the same rights [unclear].
Bundy: This decision was made just about a year ago, and we’ve stuck
to it since.
President Kennedy: Now, what is the French . . . Anything new?
Anything we’re aware of ?
Bundy: No, everybody’s agreed.
President Kennedy: What kind of paper might the East Germans
insist on looking at—in terms of kinds of paper? What is it they stamp
today?
Kohler: Movement orders. It’s just—
President Kennedy: On the West Germans going into West Berlin?
Kohler: No, on the West Germans, there’s a regular procedure. They
have to have an identity card and it’s stamped, and they check that they
have a customs . . .
President Kennedy: That they have a passport, and so on. . . .
Kohler: The West have no passports . . .
Rusk: The West Germans have no objections for West Germans
going east, on these.
Kohler: No, they’ve accepted that.
Hillenbrand: This is all addressed to allied access. The German
access question is . . .
Kohler: That’s a separate question. . . . However, this does not permit
the East Germans—the agreed planning does not permit the East
Germans to do anything different than is done by the Soviets today.
That would be a sticking point if they changed the procedures.
President Kennedy: They asked for different kinds of documentation?
Kohler: Yeah.
Tyler: Or inspection of vehicles.
Kohler: That’s right.
President Kennedy: Inspection? What is this document?
Bundy: What we would do, Mr. President, is to go on with them in
the same way that we’ve responded to Soviet harassments and Soviet
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3, 1962
attempted encroachments, of which there have probably been 100 in the
last two years.
Rusk: You know, the damndest details come into this business.
Apparently, the British military trucks, Mr. President, don’t have tailgates. Ours do. So that these fellows can look into the British military
trucks without any trouble, so that no inspection point arises. With ours,
you have to get up on a box and then you have a look at the . . . I don’t
know why we can’t leave our tailgates down in order to . . .
President Kennedy: Let me just ask you about that [unclear] topic.
[Unclear] given any thought to lowering . . . I saw that . . .
Bundy: But not over the . . .
Rusk: They’re flying simply symbolic flights. The one that flew
again was at 1,000 feet. I don’t think we want to give up helicopter
flights throughout the 20-mile zone, but we want to stop this business
of low-flying, picture-taking flights, and flights around the Russian
headquarters.
President Kennedy: Well now have we set a . . . what we’ve told them
that they can’t go below a thousand feet? Have there been any instructions?
Hillenbrand: There’s the instructions.
Probably points to a document near the President.
That’s the . . .
President Kennedy: [reads some of it aloud] “increases pressures to
expand over, encroachments over Soviets [unclear] . . .”
Now, did that flight yesterday meet this—?
Unidentified: Suggestion.
Hillenbrand: It did not go over Karlshorst.
Bundy: That was a straight local reaction, Mr. President, on which
we have intercepted a telephone from the fellow who was being flown
over to the Soviet man with the BASC saying, “Tell your man opposite
the table that he is in some danger if he flies right over us this way.”16 In
other words, it was an immediate local response to a direct, very low
overflight of a specific building, is what it amounts to.
Hillenbrand: Yes.
Bundy: The language was in fact quite guarded not telling him he
would be shot down, telling him that someone would be shot down . . .
[Laughter.]
President Kennedy: [reading] “Average daily U.S. [unclear].”
16. The Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) was the U.S., British, French, and Soviet organization for exchanging information regarding aircraft in air corridors to Berlin.
Meeting on Berlin
213
Rusk: I must say on that one, I don’t know the Soviets will object.
President Kennedy: “Average daily helicopter flights over the Soviets’
sector” . . . We’ve been doing that, is that it?
Hillenbrand: Oh yes, it’s been going on for—
President Kennedy: What are we giving as the reasons why?
Hillenbrand: Well, mainly intelligence flights.
Bundy: Well, there’s also a kind of flying the flag. This is within an
area in which it is legitimate to fly.
Rusk: I think we want to do just enough of them to keep the right
alive and not stir up the West Berlin–Soviet conflict—I think just as a
demonstration.
President Kennedy: We asked for these reports . . .
Hillenbrand: We’re instituting a general review of the situation.
Meanwhile, the kind of flight that caused this particular incident has
been suspended, but there will continue to be normal operational flights
until the review comes to some conclusion.
President Kennedy: They’ll be above 1,000 feet. It that right?
Hillenbrand: Well, there’s no height limitation. What they’re to
avoid: flying over or in the vicinity of Soviet military installations in
East Berlin. That’s the territory that’s now being reserved because that’s
the kind of thing the Soviets—
President Kennedy: Are you going to tell them to do it at reasonable
heights? Or do you think you ought to be adopting this?
Hillenbrand: Well, I think they’re hypersensitized now in Berlin to
this. Our mission knows that . . .
Bundy: Do they know more generally, Marty [Hillenbrand], that
we’re obviously playing into their hands if we have fencing incidents in
the next couple of months?
Hillenbrand: I think they’re aware of this. We’ve been in touch with
them by KY-9 phone as well as by this message. And they know that this
is a subject on which we are sensitized.
President Kennedy: I agree, but the only thing is I saw in this morning’s papers it sounded to me that . . .17
Hillenbrand: Now, actually, you see, our people have issued a press
release on this indicating that the flight did not penetrate the sector at all.
17. On 3 August, the New York Times carried an article entitled, “U.S. ’Copter Flies Over
East Berlin,” which reported that “a United States Army helicopter flew over East Berlin
yesterday without incident although there had been a Soviet threat earlier that the craft
might be shot down.”
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3, 1962
Paul Nitze: This is the actual press release that was issued.18
Rusk: About the flight that was talked about this morning?
Nitze: That’s right.
Hillenbrand: The papers then claimed there were eyewitnesses who
said that the flights actually had penetrated East Berlin.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. OK.
Hillenbrand: So, they’re very much on top of this story, and I think
they will avoid any flights that are likely to expose—
Bundy: Things like this—three Soviets arresting [unclear] one guy?
President Kennedy: Let’s just read this now, where it says a bunch of
things: “However, as the result of Macmillan’s visit to Washington . . .
[Kennedy jumps ahead in the document.] . . . the French and Germans . . .
[He jumps ahead again.] . . . somewhat unenthusiastically agreed . . .”19
[He returns to the part of the paragraph he jumped over.] “Persistent
physical interference with access to Berlin was chosen as the point at
which the West would have to demonstrate its determination.” [Then he
rereads the key allied response.] “The French and Germans subsequently—
and somewhat unenthusiastically—agreed.”
Why were they unenthusiastic about this?
Hillenbrand: Well, because it does in fact represent a larger measure
of acceptance of the G.D.R . . .
President Kennedy: . . . than they wanted. [He continues reading.]
The essential argument in favor of this position was that the earlier plans did not draw the line at a point which would receive public
understanding and support in that they would involve a procedural
18. The press release reads, “We noted press reports that there were U.S. army helicopter
flights over the Soviet sector today. As a matter of fact, there were no such flights today. Some
helicopters did fly over West Berlin today. As we have previously stated, there has been
absolutely no change in regard to normal routine flights of U.S. planes within the Berlin
Control Zone.” See Telegram, Bonn to Rusk, 2 August 1962, Germany, “Berlin Cables” folder,
National Security Files, Box 97, John F. Kennedy Library.
19. Referring to Rusk’s memorandum, Kennedy read a passage under the section “Assumption
Underlying Plans for Withdrawal of Soviets from Check Points.” The passage reads:
“However, as the result of Macmillan’s visit to Washington in the spring of 1961, and after
informal U.S. discussion during the following months, the United States and United Kingdom
revised their positions to permit implementation of existing procedures by East German personnel. Persistent physical interference with access to Berlin was chosen as the point at which
the West would have to demonstrate its determination. The French and Germans subsequently—and somewhat unenthusiastically—agreed.”
Meeting on Berlin
215
innovation likely to give rise to criticism that the West was making
an issue over who stamped a document.
It was argued that a Western position of leaving well enough
alone and not being the one to demand a change in its favor would
appear reasonable and unprovocative, and that U.S. allies would move
to this position in any event. There would possibly be some questioning in the U.S. press, public, and Congress as to whether the most
suitable breaking point had been chosen. There would also be grave
difficulties in making the U.S. position plausible. . . . [Kennedy jumps
ahead.] All this would be apparent to the Soviets. . . . [He jumps ahead
again.] In the face of Bloc pressures . . . it seems likely that the U.S.,
U.K., and France would eventually accept the same paper-stamping
from the East Germans that . . .
[He jumps to new paragraph.] Since the decision to accept East
German stamping was made, both the U.S. Embassy in Bonn and the
U.S. Mission in Berlin have questioned it. Their essential argument is
that although who stamps a document is not a good issue over which
to use force if necessary, the issue is actually much more than that and
really boils down to whether or not the U.S., the U.K., and France are
determined to maintain their right of free and unrestricted groundaccess to Berlin. They argue: (1) that the question of “persistent physical interference with access to Berlin” will never arise; (2) that
substitution of East German personnel will be the most visible and
objectionable single act; . . . [He jumps to point 3.] thereafter the East
Germans will take one infinitesimal step after another . . . [each much
less] salable a breaking point than substitution—until, over . . . time,
by gradual erosion Western . . . [ground access] is completely at the
mercy [of the Ulbricht regime]. . . . [He jumps ahead.] [T]his is more
or less what he had in mind, i.e., that action in the period after the
peace treaty will be so slow and circumspect that the West will never
be provided with a point . . . Those who object to East German
stamping argue that it will lead at best to self-blockade on the ground
and at the worst to de jure acceptance. . . .
Self-blockade, of course, is what they can do. . . . The easiest
answer . . .
Rusk: It makes our retaliation and certain of our moves—
President Kennedy: How do we . . . What do we do about this if they
change the personnel authority, at least the [East] Germans do, the
Russians announce it, then what if they change the documents so that
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3, 1962
the kind of document which we have to do acknowledges the sovereignty
of the G.D.R.? What do we do then?
Kohler: We go into regular contingency planning, then. Start a probe
through that refuses to follow their many . . .
President Kennedy: Okay, an economic cut-off before we do the first
probe? There isn’t a Western cutting off of trade?
Kohler: No, sir.
Rusk: Well, one of the troubles there, that’s where the self-blockade
comes in. If they stop only our military convoys, and then we break trade
with the Soviet bloc, this blockades the civilian population of West
Berlin. So it’s this kind of a pinch that we get into.
Kohler: I might mention in this connection, Mr. President, Mr.
Secretary, that we are planning just a briefing session for you next week
sometime that goes into the whole range of these contingencies—
Rusk: The sequence of events, that’s how we’re looking at it this time.
Kohler: —and that knits together not only the military but the economic and political and other contingency planning. I think it would be
helpful to get the general picture.
President Kennedy: Yeah, good. What about this debate now going
on in Germany now. This announcement of the increase in the force levels has caused the Germans to decide we’re not going to use . . . Is that
the reason for the nuclear . . . for this debate . . . the stories coming out of
Europe that we’ve changed our strategy? What is sort of the reason
they’ve started up now? Is it the German parliamentary debate?20
Nitze: I think there are two things involved. One of them is, when
[West German defense minister Franz Joseph] Strauss was over here,
he talked about the fact that he couldn’t meet a budget above 16.6 billion
marks [unclear]. And McNamara went through with him what would
really be required for them to meet their MC/26 goals, which would be
closer to 680,000 men than 500,000.21
20. At his 1 August press conference, President Kennedy was asked to comment on European
press speculation that U.S. command changes indicated “a complete change in American strategy going as far as to a nuclear disengagement.” He responded that the speculation was
“wholly unfounded, wholly untrue, and the slightest check by those who transmit them
through Europe would demonstrate that they are unfounded.” In late July, SACEUR General
Lauris Norstad announced his resignation, effective 1 November 1962. His intended replacement was the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman Lemnitzer. The
Europeans favored Norstad’s conception of NATO as a fourth nuclear power. The European
press speculated that his departure signaled a shift in U.S. defense strategy.
21. Strauss visited Washington from June 7 to 8, 1962. During discussions with Kennedy and
McNamara, Strauss explained that it would require an armed force of 750,000 in West
Meeting on Berlin
217
And Strauss said that he would have to take it back and talk it over
with [West German chancellor Konrad] Adenauer, and Adenauer would
have to decide whether the level would be the 500,000-man level or
higher. It seems clear, from what is coming out of the German press now
that Adenauer has decided for the 500,000-man level and not a higher
level. I think the Germans are trying to justify that and that is why
Strauss isn’t making speeches why he’s starting [unclear] annoying.
They are laying a defense against the arguments that McNamara made
to them.
President Kennedy: What will this do to their divisions? I mean, are
they pretty much the 30—
Nitze: Well, I hope it would mean that rather than having the 12
divisions which they were supposed to have, they’ll probably end up with
about 11 divisions and not up to the full standard that they hoped it
would get to. So that it will be somewhat short of the goals.
President Kennedy: And they’re saying that this is because the
United States is changing its strategy?
Nitze: No, they say this is just because of budgetary limitations on
themselves and that they can’t afford to do any more.
Rusk: You see, from their point of view, this is not so closely linked
into the nuclear strike as it is to the forward strategy. What we’re trying
to do is to get the buildup to get the kind of forward strategy that the
Germans themselves want.
President Kennedy: Well, now that they—
Nitze: This is linked to the strategy point, because if they don’t go
beyond the 11 divisions in the [unclear], then it becomes doubtful as to
whether we really can do the forward strategy and then hope for a nonnuclear [unclear] at length. And then we’ve got to rely more on a quick
introduction of nuclear weapons than usually related to the strategic.
President Kennedy: And they’re suggesting that the [General
Maxwell] Taylor appointment indicates that we are not going to introduce nuclear [unclear]?22
Germany to meet the commitment of 12 divisions under 1962 NATO policy proposal MC
26/4. He declared that West Germany might need to reduce the size of its divisions.
22. West German uneasiness about a shift in U.S. nuclear strategy toward greater reliance on
conventional weapons was increased by Kennedy’s nomination of General Maxwell Taylor to
succeed General Lyman Lemnitzer as Chairman of the JCS. Taylor’s 1959 book, The Uncertain
Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1960), criticized Eisenhower’s “overemphasis” on nuclear “massive retaliation” for leaving the United States unprepared to fight limited wars. Many of his
views had been adopted by the Kennedy administration.
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3, 1962
Nitze: That’s right.
President Kennedy: Now when do we take . . . Do we say anything
about this? Or do we . . . ?
Bundy: We’re doing something about it already, Mr. President. Taylor
is doing some backgrounding, and you struck a firm blow. He may have
been anti-French, but he hit the Germans [unclear].23 [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: I know he said that while I was talking to him.
[Inaudible exchange amidst the laughter.]
President Kennedy: But the thing is that this sort of, their refusal to
go ahead, and their acquiescence really in the French refusal to go ahead,
I think . . . and then, sort of, blaming it on us . . . is curious. So, what are
we going to do about it?24
Bundy: The internal German political situation is conducive to the
worst possible discussions on this at the moment. The old man
[Adenauer] is old. Strauss is under a cloud; they’re all looking around
for someone to hit [unclear].
President Kennedy: What about that fellow who was quoted as having been over here talking to some of our people, some fellow from the
Christian Democratic camp?
Hillenbrand: [Georg] Kliesing.25
President Kennedy: Yeah, who did he see over here? Did he see anybody in Washington?
Hillenbrand: We didn’t have much to do with it . . .
[in response to a question] . . . [unclear]. He is a member of this—
Unidentified: He came over . . . he was part of that group with
George Brown.26
Bundy: The WEU defense committee.27
23. As commander of the 101st Airborne in World War II, General Taylor had hit the
Germans hard in Normandy.
24. President Kennedy was frustrated that the West Germans would not pressure de Gaulle to
meet the French commitment of four divisions under the MC 26/4 goals.
25. Bundestag deputy Georg Kliesing was a leading West German defense expert. On his
return from a recent trip to the United States, he declared that General Taylor intended to use
nuclear weapons only in the event of a direct attack on the United States or a major nuclear
offensive against Europe.
26. George Brown was a deputy leader of the British Labour party and shadow foreign secretary.
27. The Western European Union (WEU) was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom at Brussels in March 1947, and modified and completed at Paris in October 1954. Its main feature was the commitment to mutual defense
should any of the signatories be the victim of attack in Europe. In September 1954, the WEU
was amended to permit the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to join.
Meeting on Berlin
219
President Kennedy: Oh, I see.
Nitze: George Brown came in to see you.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see.
Nitze: Kliesing was the chairman of that group.
President Kennedy: He’s quoting Washington as what? Saying about
the . . . Oh, he quoted us as having atomic withdrawal, didn’t he?
Hillenbrand: Well, no, he actually said was we would not . . . What
he really said was that the general view that was now accepted here was
that which General Taylor had put forth in his book, and that is that
there would be no use of our nuclear deterrent, except in defense of the
American homeland.28
Bundy: But Taylor didn’t even say that.
Hillenbrand: But he’s quoted as having said this, that’s the way . . .
President Kennedy: Of course, that’s wholly . . .
Bundy: Taylor was talking to [General Adolf] Heusinger and it’s
not . . .29
Rusk: He couldn’t have heard any American say that during his trip.
Nitze: To the contrary.
President Kennedy: What are we going to . . . When will this debate
be over and when will they reach their decision on the funds? [Mixed
voices with Nitze’s adding, “Already in the budget.”]
President Kennedy: That’s their budget figure so the budget . . .
Nitze: And after that [unclear] equivalent of the decisions before
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Well now, what is it we . . . Are we planning to
do anything about that?
Bundy: We’re having difficulty. Their argument with us, Mr.
President, is that they shouldn’t be required to do more until the French
do more. It’s a very hard proposition to beat.
Kohler: I think we shouldn’t get engaged in a public debate with
them. A backgrounder will straighten it out, as some of this is fairly
good. But we will continue to pursue this in the NATO Council and
through SHAPE itself,30 and I’m not sure that this debate isn’t going to
come out well—isn’t going to do some good—because Strauss was
already, when he was here, coming to the realization as to what a grave
28. Reference was to General Taylor’s The Uncertain Trumpet.
29. Heusinger was general inspector of the German armed forces.
30. The acronym SHAPE stands for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.
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3, 1962
deficiency it is that the French not only have just two divisions there and
are only committed to four, but that this, in itself, is an imbalance and
that they should [unclear] be committed to six if we’re going to have a
forward strategy. And if this is debated long enough, I think the
Germans will turn toward pressing the French for more conventional
strength on the central front, don’t you Paul? I think this would . . .
Nitze: Well, Strauss would like to do that—
Kohler: Yeah.
Nitze: But what I highly doubt is whether Adenauer feels that his
relations with de Gaulle are such that—
Bundy: Adenauer won’t.
Kohler: In due course, though, it might, because this was a visceral
[unclear] problem to them . . .
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] In due course, around September—
we don’t want to get this in on account of the election—but I would
think in the fall we would make some proposals to them about goals and
so on, then we’ll also make some proposals about their increasing their
acceptance of the burden of defense.
And then about increasing the manpower, we’ll suggest that if they
don’t want to do any of these things, then we’re going to take some of
ours out. We’re not going to be up for six divisions while the Germans
don’t do what they should do in their own country, and the French do
nothing, and I think at that time, we don’t want to do it now because we
want to use that argument perhaps for our monetary problem, but I
would think we would pull out. . . . We would indicate either that . . . thin
out . . . We can’t be the ones, while no one else . . .
Kohler: Well.
President Kennedy: It’s [unclear]. Every time that an American
speaks to Adenauer about it, he doesn’t want to put any pressure on de
Gaulle. What’s he saving de Gaulle for? He’s only saving him because he
doesn’t want to put pressure on de Gaulle because he wants to use de
Gaulle against us, on the political field. He doesn’t want to have a fight
with de Gaulle in this area because he figures de Gaulle will sustain him
against us in case we’re going to compromise in Berlin. I’m sure that’s
the extent of it. We carried him. . . .
Rusk: I’d like to send over a long memorandum that [permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council Thomas K.] Finletter wrote.31
His conversation with—
31. Finletter’s memorandum remains classified.
Meeting on Berlin
221
Bundy: We have it, Mr. Secretary. I put it in the President’s weekend
reading.32
Rusk: Oh you have that? That’s good, because that will throw some
light on it. We’ve got a real tussle with de Gaulle on the whole European
NATO structure and everything else. We’ve got to work to get the rest
of it solid and leave de Gaulle in a minority of one, if possible.
President Kennedy: Hell, we don’t even need the French on this
monetary matter.
Bundy: We’ll keep Bill Tyler in charge of de Gaulle.33
Tyler: I don’t think that’s it. De Gaulle rather likes being in a minority of one. [Laughter.]
Rusk: Well, let’s accommodate him, then. [Laughter.]
Well, we will go ahead on getting this deputy foreign ministers proposal cleared away for immediate response if they call a conference.
Bundy: We’ll take that up with the other three now.
Rusk: That’s right, we would.
Nitze: I take it, for us, that we would play everything on a low key
during this whole thing. [Sounds of dishes being cleared.]
Unidentified: I think it very important that—
Bundy: That’s signed down on the [unclear] unsigned [unclear] would
be [unclear] a little bit . . . That’s one of the open questions in the memo.
President Kennedy: You mean whether we move any troops, and so
on . . .
Bundy: Whether [unclear] on the peace treaty basis.
Nitze: Mr. Thompson has suggested that it would quiet things that
[unclear], but that there’s no publicity for, which is hard for us to do. All
the thinking . . .
Nitze: It would really help us to prepare for that . . .
Bundy: You could move a quartermaster company without getting
any publicity.
32. President Kennedy was leaving that afternoon for Hyannis Port. In a cover memorandum
for the President’s weekend reading, Bundy wrote, “Ambassador Finletter’s memorandum on
the state of minds in the North Atlantic Council. This is the one the Secretary mentioned
Friday morning in the Berlin meeting. The most interesting views are those at the beginning
of Boon of the Netherlands and von Walther of Germany, and at the end those of Stikker.
Nobody loves de Gaulle” (see Bundy to Kennedy, 3 August 1962, “Index to President’s
Weekend Reading” folder, National Security Files, Box 318, John F. Kennedy Library).
33. Tyler was one of the few Kennedy administration officials who had a good rapport with de
Gaulle. Tyler frequently served as Kennedy’s translator during phone calls with de Gaulle.
222
3, 1962
Rusk: But I think we ought to keep a daily eye on what our intelligence picks up on Soviet military moves. If they begin to make military
moves then we’ve got to make some.
Bundy: I agree.
President Kennedy: I spoke to the Secretary [of Defense] the other day
about whether we ought to get a renewal of this power to call up reserves
without having a national emergency. He said that he felt we should and he
was going to look into it. We haven’t got too much more time.
Nitze: We looked into it yesterday, and I haven’t yet reported to Bob
[McNamara]. The outcome of Norman Paul and my investigation is
negative on this.34 If we go to the Congress now for a renewal of this
reserves authority, it would meet with serious opposition on the Hill.
You’d have to really give forceful arguments as to why you wanted it.
This would be played up in the press.35 It would be contrary to what we
understood, at least to be the State Department’s—
President Kennedy: The only thing is, even if we put a great . . .
What is it they want to do then? That would mean that from the end of
the first part of September until January we couldn’t call up air—
Bundy: Not without a national emergency.
Nitze: We’d have to call up the National Guard to [unclear].
President Kennedy: Even if we wanted to call up 30,000? I mean
most likely—
Bundy: If you’re going to do that, I suggest you ask the Vice
President. Has anybody talked to Dick Russell about it?36
Nitze: Norman Paul has taken extensive soundings on this.
Bundy: If the President said to Russell that he simply, we weren’t
through with Berlin, that it’s just in a quiet phase, and we’d like this
same . . .
34. Norman Paul was assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. He was participating in a Department of Defense legislative proposal to reorganize the Army National
Guard and Army Reserve. The plan would provide greater civilian authority over functions
formerly reserved for the armed services.
35. Congress had provided more funds than requested for the National Guard and Army
Reserve from 1958 through 1961, but a 1962 Department of Defense plan to reorganize them
generated a major controversy. The Kennedy administration expected congressional opposition to increased Reserves authority. President Kennedy was also disturbed by a story on the
cover of the morning’s New York Times, which reported that Army reservists were bitter
about their ten months of duty in Europe where they had been sent after the Berlin crisis
flared. A spokesman for the Army unit had accused Kennedy of contriving the crisis for political reasons and had considered their stint in Europe a waste of time.
36. Senator Richard Russell (D-Georgia) was the chairman of the Senate Armed Forces
Committee.
Meeting on Berlin
223
President Kennedy: How much . . . What was the number we were
allowed to call up?
Kohler and Bundy: 250,000.
Rusk: If we got about a dozen—and you’re talking about the briefing
of the President on this sequence of events—if we got about a dozen of
the key leaders down here, like Russell, and [unclear] given that same
briefing, about the way this thing could develop . . .
Bundy: Mr. President you need some middle-ground authority short
of a national emergency.
Rusk: We could then explain to them why it is necessary that the
President have this authority without kicking up a big fuss about it. Try
to handle it as a routine, low-key . . .
Bundy: Extension—
Rusk: Extension of something that wouldn’t last long . . .
Nitze: Our congressional people have a very sketchy [unclear].
Rusk: Yeah.
Bundy: It’s a question really of how high a level they’re asked to do it
at, at least in part, it seems to me
Nitze: What they say is we’re just releasing the Reserve divisions
now. The publicity that comes out of this isn’t too good, which is a problem. Before a congressional election, people focus on just this point.
Rusk: Maybe it’s easy for these fellows coming back from these
reserves, saying well, it turned out not to be necessary, what the hell.
But in fact, it would seem—
Bundy: They’re going . . .
President Kennedy: They’re not mad at the Congress. They’re mad
at us. And me, and so on, so why should any congressman . . . I’m sure
we can do it if we get these fellows in to do the preparatory work, and
I’m sure that if . . . Why don’t we plan to have, after this briefing that I
get, then get the Hill people down, with you and the secretary, Secretary
McNamara, and have them say, at times say, have McNamara say we
need some authority because we may have to call up our air units?
They’re the ones who’ll probably [unclear]. We’ve got to stop calling
ground units if we’d say there’s a national emergency . . . but I can see
how calling back these air people for two or three months . . .
So I think we ought to have that power, because otherwise we’ll have
to call 20,000 people, and in order to do that we’d have to have a national
emergency, and that would really be crazy. Even if they only give us the
power to call up 100,000 this time, and have that thing run out in
March—not for a year, like they did before—but have it run out in
March. . . . We asked for a year before, didn’t we, Paul?
224
3, 1962
Nitze: I don’t remember.
President Kennedy: Well, now this time we could change the amount
to 100,000 or whatever, if necessary, and we could change the time to six
months. Then, at least it would be on our back, not theirs, and I’m sure
we can get that. But it’s gotta be done by us, not—
Rusk: It may even be that the leadership would think that the . . . the
quietest and quickest way to do it would be just a one-line bill extending
the earlier package. You don’t have to get into the changes, particulars.
Just extend it.
President Kennedy: For five, for six months [unclear].
Bundy: We’d better get it for a year at a time.
President Kennedy: Well, in any case, we could . . .
Bundy: Could I see [you] for one minute, Mr. Secretary? There’s a
very important dispatch from Geneva showing that we’re in danger of
having a rift with our British friends [unclear]. It’s likely . . . You’re not
terribly worried about [unclear].
All of the Berlin group left the Oval Office, except for Bundy and Rusk
who remained behind with the President.
President Kennedy: There should be a memo [unclear]. [Unclear]?
Who’s Godber?37
Bundy: Godber is—
President Kennedy: I know. But, I mean, who told the . . . said his
understanding from [the] U.S. was the Soviet post could now be excluded
from systems?
Bundy: Mr. Secretary, Mr. President, there was a technical discussion
of the possibilities of national control stations. There’s been no agreement on this. He knows it perfectly well, but the British are very tight
and tied on to desiring [unclear] on this point. . . .38
37. Joseph Godber was British minister of state for foreign affairs and chair of the British delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. A telegram from the U.S. delegation explained that Godber’s “particular concern is with what they understand is provision
that there should be a minimum of one foreigner per eight-hour shift at control posts in
U.S.S.R. Godber said such a provision would vitiate whole political value of acceptance
‘national stations’ concept. Also said his understanding from U.S.-U.K. technical talks was that
Soviet posts could be excluded from system and system could still have satisfactory detection
capabilities” (see FRUS, 7: 533).
38. See nuclear test ban meetings on July 30 and August 1 for British impatience with the U.S.
negotiating strategy at the Geneva disarmament talks. Harold Macmillan’s government
believed the United States sought an impossible level of verification, including extensive international inspections which were plainly unacceptable to the Soviets, as a precondition for a
comprehensive nuclear test ban. Here the question is what the United States meant by “inter-
Meeting on Berlin
225
Rusk: This came out of the [President’s special assistant for science
and technology Jerome] Wiesner [unclear]. . . .
Bundy: But Wiesner had no authority, and I’m sure did not try to say
that this was now technically possible. They were talking about the manageabilities. I think what’s indicated here is a very strong message from
you to the prime minister that we’re just not in business with the
Congress, unless we stick to this line.39
President Kennedy: In the first place, we ought to find out whether
the Russians . . . Before we have a split between the United States and the
U.K. . . .40
Bundy: Exactly. It’s like the international access authority.41 Why
fight over it? . . .
President Kennedy: . . . until we find out we’re gonna get anyplace,
then if we’re really gonna get someplace, if this happens to be the issue
which prevents the signing of the [comprehensive nuclear test ban]
treaty then we can either come together or have a fight, but not to have a
fight before we even hear from the Russians. So, Godber better . . . All
right, how will we get this [unclear]?
Bundy: My theory . . . We owe the prime minister an answer anyway—
Bundy: —we would say to him that it was perfectly obvious to us that
we would have a first-class political row in this country which would . . .
There’s no point in having either a split with the Congress or a split with
the British on a hypothetical issue, just what you’ve just been saying.
President Kennedy: Okay.
Bundy: And would he please tell his people to stick to technical discussions on this point until . . .
President Kennedy: . . . until we find out about this question of international . . .
nationally supervised national control posts” on Soviet territory to monitor compliance. As a
result of an intensive policy review, the United States had shifted from requiring international
control posts to showing a willingness to accept these hybrid posts that would be run by
Soviet nationals but somehow supervised by non-Soviets.
39. President Kennedy faced congressional opposition, centered in the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, to any perceived concessions that weakened verification. He knew that whatever agreement he reached in Geneva would ultimately have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate.
Members of the joint committee opposed national control posts.
40. Probably a reference to a critical question in test ban negotiations: Would the Soviets
agree to international inspection of any kind?
41. A November 1961 U.S. proposal to end uncertainty regarding Western access to West
Berlin, rejected by the Soviets.
226
3, 1962
Bundy: . . . and we see whether there’s any give.
President Kennedy: But, I mean, there isn’t any doubt we’re gonna
have a fight with the British if we ever . . . because they, he thinks . . .
Bundy: Sure.
President Kennedy: We know what he thinks. So that . . .
Bundy: I’ll draft something now. [Bundy leaves.]
Rusk: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] You’re not going yet are you?
Rusk: No.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] with you [unclear].
Rusk: I’m leaving now. On the separation [unclear] arms embargo
[unclear].42
President Kennedy: Yeah. We hope to get the Saudis out, as you
know, unless we put it off till [unclear] people to talk to . . .
Rusk: Aside from that [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Laughs.] What about the . . . But I think that if
you talked to [special assistant to the secretary of state Charles] Chip
[Bohlen] that he’d probably want [unclear]. [Voices fade. Rusk leaves.]
Kennedy went to see his secretary, Evelyn Lincoln. The two of them
came back into the Oval Office and shut the door. The President was
concerned that the recording device was not working properly.
Evelyn Lincoln: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, but then I can’t still tell whether it’s on or
off. I don’t know, I turned . . . I just pushed, pulled that thing across.
Lincoln: Yes.
President Kennedy: But I can’t tell you now whether it’s on or off
though; can you?
Lincoln: Oh.
President Kennedy: I think what they’ve got to do is work out some
thing . . . I don’t know, there . . . I don’t [know] whether it’s on now or not,
you’d better turn yours off. [Garbled exchange. The tape machine stayed on.]
The President’s next visitor entered the Oval Office a few minutes later.
The President had more questions about the military aspects of preparing for any Soviet move on West Berlin.
42. The Kennedy administration was seeking an arms limitation arrangement for the Middle East.
Meeting with Lyman Lemnitzer
227
11:14–11:20 A.M.
I think they [the West Germans] can do a great deal more.
Meeting with Lyman Lemnitzer43
On August 1, President Kennedy announced that General Lyman
Lemnitzer, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be
replacing General Lauris Norstad as supreme allied commander in
Europe. Lemnitzer’s appointment was controversial because the allied
leaders favored Norstad’s conception of Europe as a nuclear third force.
The President’s selection of Maxwell Taylor to replace Lemnitzer had
caused even greater concern in Europe because Taylor advocated measures short of nuclear attack that NATO could adopt to defend its interests in Europe. Some European leaders saw Taylor’s appointment as a
shift away from the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe. Lemnitzer
would have as one of his responsibilities as SACEUR making sure that
the Europeans did not believe this. He would also need to explain the
Kennedy administration’s concerns about defense burden sharing.
Before leaving for Europe, Lemnitzer wished to clear up a few misconceptions he felt the President had about Berlin contingency planning. A
meeting in mid-July of a high-level group of Berlin experts from the
Pentagon, State, and the National Security Council with the President had
not gone well.44 Kennedy dominated the meeting, asking so many questions that Lemnitzer felt the President had not received an adequate military briefing. Worse, Lemnitzer feared the President left the meeting
convinced that the Pentagon had insufficiently prepared for a Berlin crisis.
Lemnitzer asked for this meeting with the President to assure him that the
necessary operational plans existed and the only problem that remained
was getting allied support for joint military action. Unfortunately for
Lemnitzer, the President had no time for a long military briefing.
President Kennedy: Good morning. How are you? Glad to see you.
Lyman Lemnitzer: Now that we’ve had our briefing on Berlin contin-
43. President Kennedy and General Lyman Lemnitzer. Tape 6, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
44. See Lemnitzer, Memorandum for the Record, 19 July 1962, FRUS, 15: 230–32.
228
3, 1962
gency plans,45 I rather got the impression that we had not put things
quite in the right perspective,46 and there could be some concern about
the plans and the sequence of events, and so on, on the military side.
There are similar ones on the political and economic side. So I am back
[unclear] and I thought I would try to put our sequences together in a
paper of this type. And this is illustrated, but I’ll make this clear.
In accordance with the way the plans are now drawn, I have started
with the very first indication of Soviet intentions to call a peace conference, that’s on the inactive side going right to almost to general war
here on the far side. Now what we were talking about that day was way
over here just before we get to general war.
President Kennedy: Right, right.
Lemnitzer: And before that there are a great many sections of planning . . .
President Kennedy: [reading47] Let’s see now, “Intensified planning,
initiate quiet procedures . . .” What could those be?
Lemnitzer: Well, they would be to put troops on the alert along the
front. A surveillance type, it could be graduated from efforts to collect
additional information to moving troops up into their assigned areas.
Any one of these things.
President Kennedy: What I think we ought to do is to . . . the first
troops that we would call out, if we got into this thing of course is the
air. We would have to call those poor bastards back in again.48
Lemnitzer: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: But we ought to agree to get that planned.
Lemnitzer: Well.
President Kennedy: If we have to, about who we’d call back, and so
on, and where we’d put them, these reserves.
Lemnitzer: I’m sure that both departments, the Army and the Air
Force, are now looking at that particular one as to, if we do get into one . . .
because this is in accordance with the requisites that the Secretary has
given us to take a look now and see . . . if we do get into another hassle
this summer or fall, we’ll know who to call.
45. General Lemnitzer was probably referring to the joint State-DOD-JCS and White House
Staff meeting on July 19 with President Kennedy about Berlin planning.
46. See Lemnitzer, Memorandum for the Record, 19 July 1962, FRUS, 15: 230–32. At that
meeting Lemnitzer concluded that the President did not understand the relationship between
BERCON/MARCON and Poodle Blanket.
47. Memorandum from Lemnitzer, not found.
48. There was a lot of grumbling by Air Force Reserve pilots called up in 1961.
229
President Kennedy: You notice how all those reservists bellyaching
this morning in New York and when asked, they answered they were all
in dance orchestras and these . . .49 [Laughter.]
Lemnitzer: My goodness. Well, I thought that this might be helpful
for you. I have abbreviated it quite a bit; but one of the other things that
I just wanted to just say that, if we started from the time he calls a peace
conference or indicates his intention to, we have things graduated all the
way up. This is really a catalogue of the plans as they exist to date, and
they’re pretty complete. Unfortunate comments that were made in that
particular briefing was the time to get plans approved for the military
action that we refer [to] over here all the way on page 3.50
President Kennedy: So let me take this to the Cape.51
Lemnitzer: Well, that’s why I wanted to get it over to you today. I
thought if we could just sit down, that this would reassure you that
there are parts, there are other aspects, however were I to see
President de Gaulle, I’d talk this over with Norstad. And right down at
the end, you’ll find that NATO emergency defense plans are thoroughly SHAPE emergency defense plans. If something happened right
today, he would put his emergency plans in, and they’ve been developed under President [Dwight] Eisenhower, and then later [General
Alfred] Gruenther and right on down through.52 And it would only
take a long time to get these plans approved through the international
chain of command. This is where the pileup will take [unclear]. To
pinch off that Kassel salient, if we wanted to take drastic action over
here this far, which I think is quite unlikely, a corps group commander
could put that plan together from an outlying map overnight, and it
wouldn’t have to be checked through in detail all the way on up to the
national authorities.
President Kennedy: What about this decision of the Germans of not
increasing their forces as we had hoped? Are they? Say one division . . .
Lemnitzer: Well, no, I haven’t heard that they’ve made any change. . . .
49. Still fresh on the President’s mind is the article from the cover of that day’s New York
Times about the bitterness of Army reservists recently returned from a ten-month duty in
Germany because of the Berlin crisis.
50. At the 19 July meeting the President was given the vague answer that it would take
months for any serious operational plans to be approved. See Lemnitzer, Memorandum for the
Record, 19 July 1962, FRUS, 15: 230–32.
51. His weekend retreat at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts.
52. General Alfred M. Gruenther was supreme allied commander in Europe from 11 July 1953
until 11 November 1956.
230
3, 1962
President Kennedy: But are they only going to keep it at 500,000
instead of the 700,000?
Lemnitzer: That’s the rumor. I personally think that they have to
change, after they reach their 12 divisions, they’ve got then to move into
the area of support forces. They haven’t got the kind of support forces . . .
President Kennedy: They won’t have 12 now, though will they with
this figure? Won’t they only have 11?
Lemnitzer: Well, I don’t think that they have officially changed their
commitment to NATO yet, and I think it ought to be resisted. I think they
[the West Germans] can do a great deal more. When they get their 12
divisions, which I think that they should get, I think then they should
build up the logistical backup, the way our forces are backed up, so that
they can carry on sustained action. This, in my opinion, is one of the jobs
that I have to do over there, to press, as we are pressuring them now, as a
national government, to press our allies to look to their . . . First build up
their units to the required strength. They’re below strength, most of
them. They did come up in the last year a lot as a result of the Berlin
emergency, but they still have some things to do in the logistical field, so
that they don’t have to live off of our lines of communications, and out of
our depots, and that they get into this area themselves. I personally think
also this is de Gaulle’s whole problem, because if they do this, they’re
going to have to get a lot of equipment and material from us.
Kennedy: Well, the Germans have been [unclear] with the French.
Lemnitzer: Well, I think this may be reassuring to you. I rather was
unhappy, that day when I left, that maybe we left you with the belief that
maybe the planning had not proceeded as far as it should have in the last
year. I agree that it could have proceeded farther . . .
President Kennedy: What does [Major General David] Gray do?53
Lemnitzer: What’s that?
President Kennedy: What’s Gray’s—
Lemnitzer: Well, he’s working with Nitze, Paul Nitze, in the ambassador’s group, and there’s where they run into the problems of every little thing, that the German doesn’t like it, or the British doesn’t like it.
You’ve got to go back to the national capitals. To get something
approved through the whole chain of command really takes a terribly
long period of time. This is where the tie-up occurs. It don’t take long to
develop a military plan to do some of these things on the American side.
53. Gray was the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on the Berlin Task Force.
231
We have plans to do these things. It’s just a question of going through
the long harangue of discussions as to whether we ought to do this or
couldn’t it be done a different way. And whenever you get more than two
people involved, then it goes up, the time required goes up in geometric
progression. When you get three, it’s 9 times as much, when you get
four, it’s 16 times as long. And that’s the way it goes. Whether, it’s in the
Defense Department or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
President Kennedy: Well, I’ll get this; I’ll take this one.
Lemnitzer: This is just one copy. Now, there’s no copy of this. I was
supposed to give one to Secretary McNamara; I’ve made only seven
copies. I’m using them for my own edification.
I just want to explain one thing, though, before I leave. We have
started off, as this has illustrated, that the first activity of bloc denying
access to us is on the ground. This is an assumption. We put in phase II,
under the National Security Action Memorandum, the air blockage.54
Now these could be interchanged. They might do it in the air first. But
nevertheless, these are the sequence of events in the military field, and
where the political side and economic side is pretty well defined, now
I’ve indicated them. I understand that State is using this as a model to
try to list the political actions and economic actions that might parallel
some of these . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah we’ve gotta get something from them, but
I [unclear] a good way to put it. We better get something on the political
and economic.
Lemnitzer: Yes.
President Kennedy: Have you shown this to . . . ?
Lemnitzer: They know that I’ve prepared this, on the military side . . .
President Kennedy: I’ll send it to Bundy and ask Bundy to get something like this from the State Department.
Lemnitzer: I think it would be helpful . . .
President Kennedy: All right.
Lemnitzer left; President Kennedy escorted him to the door.
President Kennedy: Pierre [Salinger] come here would you?55 [Door
closes.]
54. This is a reference to NSAM 109, commonly called Poodle Blanket, approved on 23
October 1961 (see NSAM 109, 23 October 1961, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security
Files, Box 332, John F. Kennedy Library).
55. Pierre Salinger was Kennedy’s press secretary.
232
3, 1962
President Kennedy: Now you’re going to talk to them about working
out a device for getting it off ?56
Evelyn Lincoln: Yes.
President Kennedy: What? Now there’s—
Lincoln: There, see it’s on.
Lincoln: Now. Push that.
President Kennedy finally shut off the machine.
Pierre Salinger ushered in Sandra Clardy, a representative of Girls Nation,
for a ten-minute photo opportunity with the President. Kennedy would
have a somewhat tight schedule before leaving for the Cape. General
Maxwell Taylor visited just before noon for a brief unrecorded talk. The
President then had only 12 minutes for his daily swim before a luncheon
with a group of California publishers and editors. This was another in a
series of publishers’ luncheons with Kennedy, intended to drum up wider
understanding of the administration’s goals and achievements in advance
of the November midterm elections. After the luncheon and some free
time in the Executive Mansion, the President ended his official day by
meeting with Michael V. DiSalle, the governor of Ohio.57
At 4:45 P.M. President Kennedy left the South Grounds aboard
Marine One. Ahead of him were two days of sailing and motorboating
with Mrs. Kennedy and Caroline and John, Jr. As usual, he brought some
weekend reading. Berlin was not to be left far away. Included in the
packet prepared by McGeorge Bundy were some cables showing West
German nervousness about NATO defense policies and possible U.S.
responses to Soviet aggression in Central Europe.
56. The President continued to experience problems with the recording system.
57. Kennedy did not tape his meeting with DiSalle. However, after the President had left the
Oval Office, the tape recorder was accidentally turned on, with DiSalle and a few aides still in
the room. Captured on tape are about ten minutes on Ohio politics. It is likely that Evelyn
Lincoln, who knew of her boss’s difficulties with the tape machine, had inadvertently turned
the machine on, when she was trying to turn it off. The transcript of these ten minutes has
not been included because the President did not participate in this brief discussion of Ohio
politics.
Monda y, August 6, 1962
233
Monday, August 6, 1962
“Marilyn Monroe Dead, Pills Near:” The President’s copy of this morning’s
New York Times highlighted the event. Below the news of the movie star’s
death was another front-page story, “Kennedy Presses For Safer Drugs.” In
light of the Thalidomide scare, where an antinausea drug tested on pregnant women had left some babies with deformed limbs, the President was
championing rigorous drug approval procedures by the Food and Drug
Administration. The juxtaposition of the two stories seemed bizarre.
There was more bad news for the President. As expected, the Soviets
had resumed atmospheric nuclear testing. They set off a huge 45-megaton
blast over Novaya Zemlya on Sunday. The news from Geneva was no better. The Soviets were not even waiting for the formal presentation of the
new U.S. and British nuclear test ban proposals to knock them down.
The President arrived in the office in time to greet a group of young
musicians from Interlochen, Michigan, before their concert on the South
Lawn. The morning was then taken up with meetings with McGeorge
Bundy; the President’s military aide, Brigadier General Chester V. Clifton;
August Heckscher; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.; and the departing Yugoslav
ambassador, Marko Nikesic. After the President’s customary midday break,
he met with Najeeb Halaby, the administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration.
The only meeting taped that day was the last, with the chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills of Arkansas. The
President needed to sound him out on a tax cut. As the newspapers were
making clear, the White House was on the verge of making a choice
between a “quickie” tax cut in 1962 to stave off a recession that some were
beginning to forecast and a permanent tax cut in 1963 designed less to prevent a recession than to achieve full employment, stimulate increased productivity and investment, and produce lasting economic growth. Without
Mills on his side, the President knew that either option would be impossible,
whatever the merits of the tax cut stimulus his advisers had proposed. As he
once said to Theodore Sorensen, “Wilbur Mills knows that he was chairman
of Ways and Means before I got here and that he’ll still be chairman after
I’ve gone—and he knows I know it. I don’t have any hold on him.”1
1. Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 426.
234
M O N DAY, AU G U S T
6, 1962
6:00 –6:42 P.M.
Even if you hold defense down, space is going up, and there
are enough other programs that are bound to be increased by
law . . . but I don’t see any problem with having a deficit
because it at least keeps the . . . It’s much better to have the
employment and the economy going, even if you have some
deficits, provided it’s not excessive and inflationary.
Meeting with Wilbur Mills on the Tax Cut Proposal 2
Not yet sold on the economic or political propriety of his recent tax cut
and tax reform proposals, President Kennedy was anxious to gauge the
sentiments of Wilbur Mills, chairman of the most important tax-writing
committee in the U.S. Congress, the House Ways and Means Committee,
since 1957. Mills had already earned a reputation as a tax expert and as
the imperious chairman of the one House committee that lacked a subcommittee to dilute its responsibility or influence. Known by many colleagues as “Ol’ Never Miss Wilbur,” Mills had also developed a reputation
for sinking legislation he deemed difficult to pass. Time magazine once
described his predilection for this behavior by suggesting that he “is not
just a mule who blocks innovations but a leader who hates to lose.”3
Because legislation emanating from the Mills Ways and Means Committee always emerged under a “closed rule” permitting one or no floor
amendments, Mills was especially wary of legislative proposals or provisions that might engender contentious floor debate or worse, an embarrassing defeat of the recommended legislation in the House. Though it
would have been natural for the President to consult any chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee at this point in his deliberations, it is
likely that he had Mills’s reputation for caution in mind as he invited him
to the White House in the summer of 1962.4
2. President Kennedy and Wilbur Mills. Tape 7.1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
3. Time, 9 February 1968, p. 18.
4. Ultimately, Mills would back a tax cut proposal and even helped Ted Sorensen prepare
President Kennedy’s speech on behalf of the tax cut delivered later that year to the Economic
Club of New York on 14 December 1962, the response to which seems to have convinced the
President that the proposal might well succeed. “Oh, I was very strong for it,” Mills remarked
in a 1971 interview, “ . . . had been long before it was even born. This resulted from several
meetings with President Kennedy in 1962” (Transcript, Wilbur Mills Oral History Interview
Meeting with Wilbur Mills on the Tax Cut Proposal
235
President Kennedy spoke privately to Wilbur Mills with apparently
two goals in mind: He hoped to uncover the nature of Mills’s economic
thinking on the subject of the current economy and the tax cut proposal;
and he hoped to draw Mills toward his own way of thinking on these
matters, in both economic and political terms. Preparing an intelligence
report for, and securing Mills a place at, the White House meeting to be
held four days later with the President’s chief economic advisers may
well have been, indeed, the overriding rationale for this meeting.
Unrelated and undated fragment precedes main conversation; Evelyn
Lincoln and unidentified male.
Evelyn Lincoln: And it’s very different [unclear] . . . yeah.
Unidentified: Well, I think anyone, not knowing the difference . . .
Lincoln: Um-huh.
Unidentified: Walking up, would—
Lincoln: Think that was . . .
Unidentified: Would not really know of it once you . . .
Meeting with Mills begins in midconversation.
Wilbur Mills: . . . seems to be sluggish. We haven’t gone as high or
as far up as any of us would like to have had, perhaps as much as we
should have; certainly we’re not using full resources, either physical or
manpower. All of that . . . but still, the committee is not convinced that
we can make a case yet, that we are not making if we do this, susceptible
to the charge of being fiscally irresponsible in the process.
President Kennedy: What about Arthur Burns . . . I thought . . . how
was his testimony?5 Does he think we ought to have a tax cut now, or . . . ?
Mills: No . . . no. As I recall—
President Kennedy: He says prosperity bubbles but recovery may be
over.
I, 11/2/71, interviewed by Joe Frantz, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, p. 9). While the tax
cut bill cleared Mills’s Ways and Means Committee and the House of Representatives just
before President Kennedy’s assassination, it would not be signed into law until February 1964,
under President Lyndon Johnson.
5. Arthur F. Burns was director of the National Bureau of Economic Research at Columbia from
1945 to 1953, a member of “Democrats for Eisenhower” and Eisenhower CEA chairman from
1953 to 1956, professor of economics at Rutgers University (where he taught Milton Friedman
and Geoffrey Moore), counselor to the President in the Nixon administration for a brief period
in 1969 and early 1970, and then Federal Reserve chairman from 1970 to 1978. Though he
switched parties just before being appointed to the Eisenhower CEA, Burns remained sympathetic to some of the ideas and practices of Kennedy’s economic advisers. He abhorred the wage-
236
6, 1962
Mills: Well, he takes a position, more or less, that, we’re sluggish . . . I
guess. That’d be the better description than that. But he didn’t think . . .
now here, if you’ll notice . . . [sound of pages turning] he didn’t think in
terms of . . . of . . . I guess . . . tax cut, prorate, you see. [Unclear] there’s no
reason why we couldn’t go to that first year. Now we have Saulnier.6 And
Saulnier is somewhat of a disappointment to me. He was Eisenhower’s
man, right after Burns. He came after Burns. It’s [sound of pages turning]
over here on this page.
President Kennedy: For a minute I thought maybe . . .
Mills: Now, there he is . . .
President Kennedy: [reading] “Full recovery. . . . Not really . . .”
Mills: That’s right. And he wasn’t really for a tax cut . . . wants to
reduce the burden of profits, cut expenditures . . . They—
President Kennedy: Like to cut, they all want to cut expenditures.
Mills: Well, that’s what I’m saying. . . . They . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah, but they don’t ever say what they want to
cut do they? Anybody ever ask them what they want to cut?
Mills: Yes. Now with Burns, he was very specific. He was. I was
amazed at that. I believe it was Burns, he gave us some high . . . He gave
us some priorities.
President Kennedy: Okay.
Mills: He was very much in favor of what was already taking place in
this area of cutting the military spending overseas. Buy here rather than
over there.7
President Kennedy: That’s right. That makes more spending, or it’s
more expensive.
Mills: Now . . . Yes, I know it does. But, one, I was thinking it was
price guideposts (though he would later urge guidepostlike activities in the Nixon administration) and believed that the administration Keynesians had adopted a simplistic worldview; yet he
considered their modeling and forecasting to be excellent and generally believed that their confidence in their ability to tame the business cycle was not misplaced.
6. Raymond J. Saulnier succeeded Arthur Burns as chairman of the Eisenhower Council of
Economic Advisers (1956 to 1961). Though he viewed the construction of the interstate highway system, launched under the Eisenhower administration, as a way to stimulate the economy during recession, Saulnier favored balanced budgets and did not support the call for a tax
cut in the early 1960s. Most of his reluctance to support a tax cut rose out of his fear that the
Democratically controlled Congress would enact tax cuts that would forgo too much revenue
[see Raymond Saulnier, The Constructive Years: The U.S. Economy Under Eisenhower (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1991), pp. 74, 126].
7. Part of the overall program to limit the number of dollars paid to entities in foreign countries and to ameliorate the potential balance of payments problem.
237
Burns that had this idea, but one of them, of this more conservative
group—with respect to the balance of payments—gave us an idea I
hadn’t really thought of.8 Our aid ought to be somewhat limited to the
difference between our imports and exports. Let them know if we’ve got
five billion dollars of surplus, if we’ve got four billion dollars, that’s the
extent to which we can go at the moment because of our problem of balance of payments.
President Kennedy: Well, you know, we have been tying aid more and
more.9 We now . . . we had it at a billion-three last year.
Mills: Right.
President Kennedy: I think it’s 800 million this year. The difficulty is
. . . I have the ambassador from Brazil up here, and . . . Linc Gordon, and
he says, of course, the few ties which we now try to do—50 percent—
that means you have to cut out all schools, hospitals, and so on because
they are mostly local cost.10 And he said Brazil could go Communist
within the next year, without any trouble.11
Mills: Maybe in spite of it.
President Kennedy: So that [unclear] is pretty tough. And then you
try to . . .
President Kennedy: But, in any case, your judgment is—
Mills: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, they all want to get that tax down in front
of . . .
8. The balance of payments is an ongoing record of the credit and debit transactions of a
country with all other countries and foreign institutions. These transactions are divided into
two groups, the current account—made up of visible trade (merchandise imports and exports)
and invisible trade (services and foreign profits and interest earnings)—and the capital
account—made up of net foreign investment. The balance of payments “problem” had come to
President Kennedy’s attention largely because of fears that a liberal Democrat like himself
would abandon sound monetary practices and that the U.S. pledge to redeem foreign dollar
holdings for gold at $35 per ounce might lead to a run on the U.S. gold supply (if too many
dollars accumulated abroad). A transition economic policy task force, led by New York Federal
Reserve Bank director Alan Sproul, also recommended that Kennedy pay specific attention to
balance of payments effects as he framed his domestic economic policy.
9. This refers to the practice of tying U.S. foreign aid, often on a specified percentage basis, to
the recipient country’s promise to use a portion of that aid to purchase exported U.S. products.
10. Lincoln Gordon was ambassador to Brazil.
11. See “Meeting on Brazil,” 30 July 1962. Ambassador Gordon did not say to the President
that Brazil was on the verge of Communism. Richard N. Goodwin, deputy assistant secretary
of state for inter-American affairs, the other participant in that conversation with the
President, held the more pessimistic view of Brazil’s political future, though even he did not
make this prediction.
238
6, 1962
Mills: Sure. Because they’re saying this . . . actually what they’re saying, and they didn’t put it this way . . . I asked some questions about it.
But what they’re saying is this. To give the economy this temporary
injection, it may have some effect, but the minute that injection wears off,
it’s just like medicine.12
President Kennedy: Uh-huh.
Mills: Then the basic problem you’ve got is still this business of the tax
law itself taking more out of the economy than it ought to at levels of full
employment, therefore defeating our purposes of ever getting to the level.13
President Kennedy: What I think, what I see is . . . is I think that, you
know the Treasury thinks . . . The Council is more gloomy. Now, the reason I think they’re more gloomy if I wanted to psychoanalyze the council
would be that they participated in a judgment that was high—five-seventy,
and therefore, now they’re going the lower, and they feel that the only way
to prevent this premature recession is to have a tax cut.14 Now they’re . . .
Let’s say we got the . . . Leon Keyserling had that article—15
Mills: Yes . . . I read that . . .
12. Though there was an ongoing debate between those who favored a temporary versus a permanent reduction of tax rates, many political opponents of a tax cut in particular professed the belief
that even a permanent tax cut would not have much of a stimulative effect after the first season.
13. The Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers suggested that should this kind of surplus
prevail (via rapidly increasing revenues), it would prove to be a boon to credit markets in the
short run and should open up medium- or long-term opportunities for additional tax cuts or
new public expenditures.
14. President Kennedy is referring here to the Council of Economic Advisers and their most
recent prediction for the nation’s gross national product, promulgated in the 1962 Annual
Report of the Council of Economic Advisers and transmitted to the President on 12 January 1962.
The CEA had predicted a GNP of $570 billion at the end of the second quarter, 1962; the
actual GNP at that point stood somewhere between $552 billion and $557 billion. Having witnessed a rise in GNP from $501 billion to $542 billion in 1961, as the nation moved out of the
1960:2 to 1960:4 recession, the Kennedy CEA based their optimistic forecast for early 1962 on
the continuation of this trend, renewed strength in private markets, and “current and proposed government actions” that would reduce unemployment to 4 percent by mid-1963.
Though personal consumption increases generally conformed to their forecasts, the CEA was
surprised somewhat by the slower than expected increase in government expenditures and by
the reluctance of businesses to continue the buildup of their inventories at the fairly rapid
rates that had begun to prevail in 1961.
15. Keyserling was a graduate of Harvard Law School and was appointed by President Harry
Truman as a member of the first Council of Economic Advisers in 1946. He became chair of
the CEA in 1950 and served in that capacity until Truman left office in 1953. As an adviser to
Senator Robert Wagner (D-New York), Keyserling was instrumental in writing the FullEmployment Act of 1946 (signed into law as the Employment Act) which created the Council of
Economic Advisers. Keyserling also advised Senators Allen Ellender of Louisiana and Robert
Taft of Indiana. He became a prominent liberal critic of the Kennedy administration and characterized its economic proposals, throughout 1961 and 1962, as too timid and conservative
239
President Kennedy: —in the Sunday Times . . . about what he thinks
ought to be done.16 Now, what do we do to . . . let’s say we’re going to get
through this year. We’ll have an upturn in the fall of automobiles and so
on, so let’s say we’re going to be all right this fall, or reasonably all right,
but that the recession will come on . . . everybody even says it’ll either be
late this fall—this recession—or it’ll be in the winter or the spring of ’63.
Doesn’t everybody admit . . . pretty much? Isn’t that all your dope?
Mills: Some of them are as optimistic as the Treasury people were in
here the other day.
Mills: That it could come, up in ’63 . . .
Mills: Now, they’re . . . Most of the economists think that we ought
not wait until there’s a recession.
President Kennedy: That’s correct.17
Mills: We ought not look to see the signs of a recession.
President Kennedy: That’s correct.
Mills: What they’re concerned about is that the economy’s not moving upward [unclear]. That we do this to get the economy to move a little bit more. Now the difficulty in the House and Senate, I think you
would know better, you know the Senate better than I would, but certainly I think it’s true, in view of the committee. You might be able to get
the Congress to do this if we were in a depression, if we’re starting
downhill, and everybody could see we’re starting downhill. And you
could say that you thought that it was better to do this through tax
reduction than to get busy with a whole lot of billions of dollars in additional public works, or something, or anything else of that sort you’d
want to say. Now, at that particular time, the Congress would go with
you, I think. But, I . . . I don’t believe that they will support, because I
don’t think they’re sufficiently aware . . .
with undue emphasis on balanced budgets and the balance of payments. “Tax reduction never
cleared a slum, and tax reduction never increased a teacher’s salary,” he declared in 1969.
16. Leon Keyserling, “One Prescription for Unemployment,” New York Times, 5 August 1962,
Magazine section, pp. 10G, 56G–57G. Suggesting that the real unemployment rate was
approximately 7 percent—after accounting for the full-time equivalent of the existing and
widespread part-time employment—Keyserling pleaded with the administration to enact an
immediate personal income tax cut and to make it retroactive to 1 July 1962.
17. Kennedy’s firm response here came most likely from an earlier discussion of Senator
Paul Douglas’s opposition to the tax cut proposal. Paraphrasing William Prescott at Bunker
Hill, Douglas beseeched the administration “not to fire until we see the whites of the eyes of
the recession.”
240
6, 1962
President Kennedy: Did this . . . did they, did the members of the
Ways and Means Committee get shaken at all about the prospect for the
economy?
Mills: No, because, most of these people say, we’re not qualified to
say when a depression is coming, or a recession. We’re calling your
attention to the fact that there is this much unused capacity within the
United States, both physical and manpower. In the place of having a
gross national product of 552 billion, it ought to be 30 billion more, in
order to have unemployment down to 4 percent, or to have full plant
capacity . . . and things like that.18 Now that’s the way they’re talking to
us. But they would not tell us, and that was one of the points that one of
the staff members made, that maybe this—
President Kennedy: [aside] Could you get that Economist magazine?
[Door closes.]
Mills: Maybe this is a little bit, too brief in the economic outlook
where they say downturn soon, or—
President Kennedy: Well, I’ve got them all summarized.
Mills: I know you have. I sent that record down here, hoping that—
President Kennedy: I’ve got—
Mills: There are several parts of it that you might take time to read . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I’ve got them to summarize it all.
Lincoln: [delivering The Economist magazine requested by the
President] Here are the pages to read.
Mills: To get at . . . Well, I don’t believe you get [unclear]. I know
you haven’t got time to read all that.
President Kennedy: No, but they did about a five- or six-page summary of each of them.
Mills: Oh, well. It was . . . The main thing I was thinking about was
that you get a feel, through the questions of the members of the committee.
Mills: And—
President Kennedy: I looked at those—
Mills: [Unclear] what bothers them, you see.
18. CEA models suggested that were the unemployment rate at 4 percent, as opposed to the
current 5.7 percent (August 1962), national output would have been approximately $30 billion
higher. The CEA estimate of the gap between actual gross national product and the output
obtainable at full employment had narrowed from $51 billion in the first quarter of 1961 to
$28 billion by the end of that year. The unemployment rate would not drop to 4 percent until
December 1965.
241
Mills: And I’ve got on . . . I went into this with . . . And let me make
this point with you, which I think is most important. Let us assume that
half the people in the United States were sophisticated and fully
informed and they took the economists’ point of view. They wanted tax
reduction, but the other half says, no that isn’t the thing to do. And that’s
about the way I think it was, at the moment, frankly, [unclear] things get
moving—instead . . . in spite of the Gallup Poll.19 You have 50 percent
that say, “Yes this is a good thing.” But then you’ve got a marked division
in that 50 percent as to how it’s to be done.
Mills: And I asked, Ruttenberg today,20 after we’d had George Meany
and had him today,21 I said, “Now, Mr. Ruttenberg, just . . . most of the
people appearing before the committee who’ve talked in terms of tax
reduction have suggested tax reduction, as you’re suggesting it. I think
that probably we ought to take 3 percentage points off of each bracket as
we go up and maybe 3 percentage points off of the corporate tax. Now,
that is Walter’s thinking.22 And I knew that, you know, from the hearing.
“Maybe four even would be better, depending upon the circumstances.
Seven and a half billion in one instance, ten in the other.” I said, “Would
the . . . would your organization support that?” He said, “No, we would
be emphatically opposed to that. The only way to spur this economy is to
put your tax loss, your reduction, in the first bracket.”23 Well, you see
now, what you’ve got is . . . You’ve got business on the one hand, if they
want a tax cut, wanting one type of a tax cut. You’ve got the labor groups
on the other hand wanting a tax cut, but a different type of a tax cut. So
you got a division within the people that want a tax cut. And we were talk-
19. A Gallup poll released only a few days before this meeting revealed that 72 percent of
those queried said they would oppose a tax cut “if a cut meant that the federal government
would go further in debt” (see “Gallup Poll,” New York Times, 5 August 1962, p. 2E). President
Kennedy downplayed the results at the press conference following its release and suggested
that the results would have been far different if the poll had asked the respondents, instead, to
consider a tax cut as a way to prevent a recession.
20. Stanley Ruttenberg was an AFL-CIO economist. See Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most
Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor (New York: Basic Books,
1995), p. 366, for a brief summary of how the George Meany–Walter Reuther rivalry affected
Ruttenberg’s ability to consult with the Kennedy administration on plans for a tax cut.
21. First president of the AFL-CIO, formed in 1955 out of the American Federation of Labor
(dominated by craft unions) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (dominated by
unions organized principally on an industrywide basis).
22. Walter W. Heller was a former University of Minnesota economist and chairman of the
Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers (CEA).
23. The first bracket is lowest income bracket.
242
6, 1962
ing today, Ullman24 and Cecil King25 and I were, as we broke up. They said,
“Now you see where we are?” That’s after I’d asked Ruttenberg these
questions. “See where we are? Even if we made up our minds that we
wanted a tax cut, we can’t win, because we can’t write one that either one
of these groups are going to say, or both of these groups are going to say
they want.” So three-fourths of the people, finally, are going to say this tax
bill is not what we want, and that is a danger. And you turn around and
ask a businessman, and I’ve done that, if we want to increase consumption,
we do it in the first bracket There’s no doubt about that. That’s where the
people spend their money.
President Kennedy: Um . . .
Mills: If that’s what we want, to create additional market, purchasing
power, it’s there. And Walter would tell you and you know it yourself.26
But, the businessman would say that’s not the kind of tax cut we need.
What we need is a tax cut that engenders greater incentive.27
President Kennedy: Of course, they are—
Mills: Inducement for—
President Kennedy: As I say, you know where they are [unclear].
Mills: Certainly.
President Kennedy: You know what this—
Mills: Give them an inch and they want a mile.
President Kennedy: This fellow now, [reading] “Dr. Otmar Emminger,”
this is from The Economist magazine, “director of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
wrote a hard-hitting article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung pointing
out that the marked shift in cost, and the failure of the United States to
notably reduce the overvaluation of the dollar . . . ” This is The Economist.
24. Al Ullman was a Democratic congressman from Oregon and member of the Ways and
Means Committee. He was first elected to Congress in 1956.
25. A Democratic congressman from California who became the second-ranking Democrat on
the Ways and Means Committee in 1961. King was first elected to Congress in 1942 from a
predominantly working-class Los Angeles district.
26. Walter Heller.
27. See President Kennedy’s speech to the Economic Club of New York on 14 December 1962 in
which he attempted to bridge the political gap between those who sought a tax cut to increase
purchasing power and those who sought it as a spur to new investment [“Address and Question
and Answer Period at the Economic Club of New York,” 14 December 1962, Public Papers of the
Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp.
875–81]. To the President and to his economic advisers, the ultimate goal was increased risk
taking and increased investment in the private sector; increased purchasing power, rather than a
supply-side tax cut, was, however, the proposed means to this end.
243
“Above all, Dr. Emminger speaks out against the widespread belief that
present stresses on the dollar force the United States to take risks with its
domestic economy.” In other words, we’re too restrained. “Nothing would
harm the world economy and confidence in the dollar more than a premature slide of the American economy into a recession. As for the danger that
official countermeasures may be inflationary, some experts indeed maintain
the present circumstances of the United States are very difficult to bring
any inflation about. A [misreads, momentarily] reactionary policy . . . a reflationary policy of the right kind, he points out could actually help the balance of payments, through its crucial effect in attracting private capital.”28
Well, now, the problem that I see . . . here’s what I see. I think we’ve
got . . . let’s just halve these in Committee, but let’s just say we’re going
to be through. . . . Paul Samuelson says the downturn will take place in
the fourth quarter, but let’s assume that he’s wrong, and that we’re all
right this year on the plateau when the unemployment figures stay
below 6 percent.29 Then we get the winter of 1963, and the thing runs
out of gas. Meanwhile we’ve sent up a tax bill, which has some reform in
it.30 You know that reform’s going to have tough sledding, because . . .
especially [unclear] the depletion or one of those things and it’s never
going to . . . it’ll never happen.31 So, but in any case we do have a reduc-
28. See “The Business World: Reappraisal for the Dollar,” The Economist, 4 August 1962, pp.
457–58. The Emminger quotation is on p. 458.
29. Samuelson was an economics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
unofficial economic adviser to the Kennedy administration. Before declining President-elect
Kennedy’s offer to join the administration as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,
Samuelson chaired its transition-based economic policy task force.
30. As it was then considered, any plan for a tax rate decrease was to be accompanied by tax
code reform. Though CEA chairman Heller was urging the President to consider one change
at a time (tax cut first) and though general reform was eventually dropped in favor of a few
specific changes (travel and entertainment expense deduction changes), reform proposals
were, at this time, at the forefront of most tax policy discussions.
31. The reference was to the Oil Depletion Allowance. Created in the mid-1920s under the
Coolidge administration, it allowed oil producers to exempt 27.5 percent of their income from
taxation. The 27.5 percent figure had been adopted, according to Texas senator Tom
Connally, simply because it sounded “scientifically determined,” and was a provision designed
to help oil producers offset exploration costs. Though Vice President Johnson believed that
the Oil Depletion Allowance was an appropriate target for tax reform, he was also one of the
first to remind President Kennedy that its removal might well jeopardize both other tax
reforms and the tax cut since quite a few members of the tax-writing committees hailed from
oil producing states. Afterward, Kennedy told Johnson and others to remind their “oil friends”
that 10 percent of his trust fund was in oil, and that he would never preside over the destruction of his own wealth (see Bobby Baker, “Wheeling and Dealing,” Playboy, June 1978).
244
6, 1962
tion. Our budget is going to be unbalanced, because our costs are just
going up, and then you know every . . . You can see the way they add to
everything and re-add. It’s just built into the structure. Even if you hold
defense down, space is going up, and, there are enough other programs
that are bound to be increased by law so that we . . . but I don’t see any
problem with having a deficit, because it’s . . . at least keeps the . . . It’s
much better to have the employment and the economy going, even if you
have some deficits, provided it’s not excessive and inflationary.
But . . . so we send the bill up, and you start hearings on it. You get
through with the hearings at the end of March or April. We get it
through the House in May, and Harry Byrd starts it in June and gets the
bill from the floor in late August,32 like he does for, after all this tax bill,
look how long he’s taken with it.33 We put this thing through in what,
March or at the end of February? This thing . . .
Mills: He had it by the 15th of March, I thought.
President Kennedy: Started on the 15th of March . . . We put the
trade bill through to what? April?34
Mills: No, that didn’t go until June, because—
Mills: —we held it up.
President Kennedy: Now he’s still at it. He won’t even finish the
hearings until the beginning of September and then we take it to the
floor. So we won’t get a tax bill through, even if we send it up, until
September, and by then we’ll be in the midst of a major recession. Then
how do we look? What do you and I look like then?
Mills: Let me make this suggestion now. And this is a difficult, it’s a
political evaluation. I know that. We’re faced with this very fact, that if
you should request a tax reduction now, you might well not get it, and it
would engender a terrific amount of criticism within the House at the
idea of a tax cut. That, I think, we walk into with our eyes open. Now,
you’ve got to evaluate, on the other hand, whether or not you as the
32. Harry F. Byrd, Sr., conservative Democratic senator from Virginia and chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee from 1955 until his retirement in 1965.
33. It is the investment tax credit legislation. This credit, eventually signed into law later in
1962, was equal to 8 percent of investment in eligible machinery and equipment and was estimated to have improved overall corporate cash flow at the outset by approximately $1.5 billion
per year. It was proposed originally alongside a reform by which the federal government
would begin to withhold taxes on interest and dividends, and, as a result, was designed to be
revenue neutral.
34. The trade bill is the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
245
President of the United States can be stopped even—when you know
that—from doing what you think you ought to do, when you make up
your mind what you ought to do.
Now, you’ve got to be able, I think, to evaluate the situation: Are we
going to be in such a thing as a recession by the first of the year?
Frankly, I don’t know and I don’t think our evidence before the committee would lead us one way or the other in that conclusion. Some of
them, you could take one position and say to one fellow and say no,
another yes.
President Kennedy: Yeah, and I don’t have any confidence in these
fellows either.
Mills: I don’t either.
President Kennedy: Because, you know, we thought we were going
to have a 570 . . .35
Mills: I know.
President Kennedy: They can’t tell. They can’t tell.
Mills: They can’t tell.
President Kennedy: But at least they can tell, I suppose, when it’s
starting to run out of gas, but they can’t tell when the real downturn
will—
Mills: Well, they’re looking at . . . I think, frankly, that it’s a mistake
and I’ve had them admit it in the committee to take June or July statistics. I wouldn’t believe either one of them as indicative of which way the
economy was going, if they showed up or if they showed down. I’m not
too encouraged by what I see from the July figures, frankly.
President Kennedy: Uh-huh.
Mills: I don’t think you can tell too much by just one month or two
months. I don’t think you can tell particularly by the summer months.
I’ve tried to keep up with these indicators myself.
President Kennedy: What is your guess as to what, you would, if you
had to make a guess based on what you’ve heard and your knowledge
[unclear]?
Mills: If I had to make a guess, based upon what I’ve heard, I would
say that the situation at the moment is such: That some time within the
next six months there will be a downturn.36 I think that downturn may
35. A reference, once again, to the January 1962 CEA forecast for GNP.
36. A recession would not again plague the U.S. economy until the fourth quarter of 1969, 106
months into the Kennedy-Johnson expansion.
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6, 1962
well be unless we have another stock market thing or something like
that. It may well be the mildest we’ve had yet of any of these downturns.
It may not come back too fast on the basis of what they’re saying, but I
do believe that there’s no real reason for it to be serious, that is, to the
extent of the ’57 one even. I think it would be more like, this one that we
were in in ’60, and not get very low, be a plaguing thing, knock some
unemployment up perhaps, but this whole thing could shift.37 This whole
thing could shift, and they all admit it. Every one of them. Businesses
haven’t got any real inventories. Well, now, if they had heavy inventories
coming into this thing I’d be scared to death. They haven’t—
President Kennedy: Well, now what is your bet—
Mills: Actually, this Keezer . . . this fellow Keezer . . .38 He’s a conservative, but he’s . . . he works for Elliot Bell.39 He and Elliot Bell take different views on these things a lot, but he’s about the best-informed man
I’ve ever known, too, on the intentions and plans of business with
respect to plant and equipment. And he says . . . if I can find the page reference in here [thumbs through record of Ways and Means Committee testimony] . . . but I’d have them brief this, if I were you, pretty carefully,
because . . . see, only with a reform . . . He thinks that it makes no difference whether we do it now or a little later.
President Kennedy: I’ve got it here.
Mills: That he doesn’t see anything with respect to a shift in plant
and equipment expansion of business to indicate it. Now that’s his field.
He hadn’t gone into consumer indices and things like that, but I see they
didn’t pay much attention to what he said. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: Now this is a boy who is pretty—
Mills: He’s a little bit more conservative than some of the others,
frankly.
President Kennedy: What about . . . what’s your, well, now what will
happen to, let’s say I don’t make . . . send up any recommendation now,
and then, come next winter we begin to slide into this recession?
Meanwhile you’re beginning your hearings on this tax bill. We don’t get
a tax bill in September . . . we go into a recession—
37. Even though the official 1957 recession (1957:4 to 1958:1) was of shorter duration than
the official 1960 recession (1960:2 to 1960:4), it was followed by six months of unemployment in 1958 (April to September) that exceeded the peak unemployment rate of the 1960
recession.
38. Dexter Merriam Keezer was an economist and the author of New Forces in American
Business; An Analysis of the Economic Outlook for the ’60s (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).
39. Elliot V. Bell was economics editor and editor of Business Week magazine.
247
Mills: No, you’ll get it much quicker than that. You’ll get one quicker
than that. If you would go with us on the . . . on some simple idea . . . and
it’s got to be simple now. We could enact, I think, in the House, without
too much trouble, if we’re going in or if we are, and everybody sees now
that we’re in a downturn.
President Kennedy: Let me say something to you, now, just between
us. This is . . . supposing we call them back, and if the Congress doesn’t
change much, and we call them back in November.
Mills: If you’re in a depression, you’ll get it.
President Kennedy: Well, let’s just say that the signs are . . . I’m just
thinking that for . . . if we, you and I, guess that the . . . Let’s just say we
assume that we guess that we’re about to have a recession in the winter
of 1963, and, as I say, most of our economist friends may . . . would probably say it’s going to be sooner than that, but let’s say that. Wouldn’t we
be better off, and . . . But on the other hand, if I go up and ask for a tax
cut now, and Congress isn’t going to give it to us, it’s going to complicate the running for office of a lot of fellows who have to defend that the
president’s asked for a tax cut. It shows the economy’s desperate; and, it
shows the Democrats have failed to bring the economy back; and it
shows that they’re fiscally irresponsible. And a lot of bastards then come
out and say they’re not for a tax cut, and that . . . well, some will break
with me. And in other words, it will make our problem almost impossible
come November. That’s . . . so that’s, I think—
Mills: Your judgment is right about that.
President Kennedy: Ah, but let’s say that we also know that come
next winter we wouldn’t get the bill and Harry Byrd would screw us
even if you put it through the House. And by the time you get a rule out
of Judge Smith snow would be on the ground.40 But, let’s say we come
back, that the Congress doesn’t change much, so that they couldn’t say,
“Well, this is a lame duck Congress.” Let’s say we can hold our strength
reasonably well, then we could, if necessary, and if we saw this thing
coming in a more immediate fashion, we could always go back, I suppose,
in November, couldn’t we?41 And then at least if the Congress didn’t act,
it would be . . . the responsibility would be . . . wouldn’t be ours.
Mills: I had thought that probably that this might be a way out of it,
40. Howard W. Smith was a conservative Democratic congressman from Virginia who served
as chairman of the House Rules Committee from 1955 to 1967.
41. Kennedy is talking about Democratic strength in Congress after the midterm election.
Presidents have come to expect that their party will lose seats in a midterm election.
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6, 1962
and, I know, there’s been too much talk about your position, really. . . .
And that might be indicated, as I see it, your position, there certainly has
been too much talk, generally, about what we ought to do. I had thought
this—
President Kennedy: I think it’s unfortunate that Patman’s having his
open hearing.42
Mills: I do too. But I think it’s . . . I’ve been trying to figure out just
what we would say, in the committee, that could be helpful and what you
could say that would be helpful. Now, people want to have confidence.
You know that, first of all. They want to have confidence in this whole
system that we’ve got. They want to look on the bright side always. We
can say that our concerns primarily stem from the fact, that there were
some indications that our economy was not moving forward, uphill, at as
fast a pace as we thought we were capable of moving. And we’ve looked
into it. There are those who think that we’ve got some troubles ahead, at
some time. We don’t know when. Everybody is convinced that we are
capable of greater economic activity than we’re presently enjoying. But
when it comes to reducing taxes, creating additional deficits, that is also
a very serious matter. And it has to be . . . it has to be considered in the
light of many factors. We’re all for full employment. We want full
employment. We want to do something about our balance of payments.
We want to retain the confidence of the American people in our desires
to run the government on a fiscally responsible basis. There are many
factors that have to be considered. And I can’t breeze to the conclusion,
at the moment, that the situation is such that we need to further enlarge
our deficit at the moment. Now, I’m watching the situation and I’m
going to keep abreast of this thing, because I know that the American
people would rather have some additional deficit in federal financing to a
downturn in economic activities or a full-blown recession or depression
that can cost us so much more.
42. Wright Patman was a populist Democratic congressman from northeast Texas who
served in the U.S. House from 1929 to 1976. Patman, who once shared a desk with Sam Ealy
Johnson (father of Vice President Lyndon Johnson) in the Texas legislature, was a frequent
opponent of large banks and Federal Reserve policy (and their adherence, in his view, to a
regime of high interest rates and tight money). Beginning in 1961, as chair of the Small
Business Committee, Patman held hearings which over a period of several years detailed the
tax avoidance techniques of large philanthropic foundations. Patman also served as chair of
the Joint Economic Committee, then undertaking a series of hearings on the Kennedy tax
proposals.
249
President Kennedy: Um . . .
Mills: And I shall keep abreast of this thing, and when I become convinced that I’ve got a choice to make between tax reduction and an
increased deficit, and a recession, I’m going to take the tax reduction
route. And I shall advise the Congress.43 Now, there are many good
things that we can look to in this situation. We’ve . . . we’ve got a very
high level of consumer purchasing. There’s been some shift with our
employment. It’s not as good as we want . . . the fall months sometimes
are better than the summer months. Businessmen will admit that readily.
Business still seems to have the . . . the desire to go forward with its
plant and equipment changes . . . plans. And we’ve given them incentives
to do that. We’ve given them incentives to do that.44
Now, we’ll watch this thing, and if . . . if it’s necessary, I wouldn’t
hesitate to ask the Congress to come back. If it can . . . If it isn’t necessary, we’ll submit a plan of tax reform the first of the year, and then
because of the time taken in connection with tax reform to enact it, if
the situation requires it, I’ll ask the Congress to do something about
the rate of taxation while there’s time to complete a program of tax
reform. Now, there are a lot of people that would support the idea, I
think, that you’re watching this thing; you’re not going to let it go
down. And of course, politically, we can’t let it go down. We all know
that. And I’m going to make that choice. If I have to do something, if I
have to recommend to the Congress tax reduction to keep us from
going downhill, you can count on me doing it. But I’m not going to ask
the Congress to create additional deficits and tax reduction until I
know that I’m faced with that choice. Now, maybe, your people would
say, “No, don’t do that now because you might want to reduce taxes to
boost an economy that’s already going up the hill, just . . . at a little
faster pace. That is the problem in the Congress, of getting the
Congress to do that very thing.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . .
Mills: It’s not with respect to tax reduction to prevent us from going
downhill when we know we’re going downhill.
43. A scenario nearly tantamount to passage in the House, for as Ways and Means member
Phil Landrum of Georgia, noted in 1970, Mills’s alert mind, experience, and ability to communicate with other members caused committee members “not to study so hard” [quoted in
Mark Silbergard, Phil M. Landrum, Ralph Nader Congressional Project (Washington, DC:
Grossman, 1972), p. 8].
44. Principally the accelerated depreciation allowance introduced earlier that year.
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6, 1962
President Kennedy: Now, the problem . . . well the other problem is
the question . . . the time that you—
Mills: You may have . . . and I was going to say that now, Mr. President
. . . you may have to pay a little bit more price, and, that is, it may have to
be more of a cut. We may have to lose more revenue, at a given time,
because of the reluctance of Congress to act until it’s maybe too late.
President Kennedy: Yeah—
Mills: It’s a little later than it should be in your opinion or mine.
President Kennedy: Umm . . .
Mills: In the place of seven billion, it may have to be ten billion
because the Congress has waited a little too long to accept the idea.
President Kennedy: How long . . . What is your view, Wilbur, of the
problem of . . . let’s say that we see signs that we’re going to have the
downturn in March, or April, or May or something of 1963. Or . . . how
do we . . . ? What way is it that we . . . we get into the problem if that’s
going to tell you that it’ll take seven or eight months for the Congress to
act? By then you’d be in the middle of a recession.
Mills: Here’s what I was thinking. We do something simple like this.
We could say to the Congress . . . ask the Congress to pass legislation
which will permit us to withhold from everybody this much less, you see.
President Kennedy: For a period of what?
Mills: Well, whatever time we think. The rest of the year, while the
Congress is . . . And to write this change into whatever changes that the
Congress makes on a permanent basis.
President Kennedy: We could actually do that if we had to. If we
really were serious, as I say . . . if the Congress were not changed in complexion, we could always come back if we needed to in December to do
that much, certainly.
Mills: Certainly. But that can easily be done. The Internal Revenue
Service people . . . I know Mortimer Caplin can make changes within
their withholding tables very quickly to accommodate that.45
45. Caplin was the Internal Revenue Service commissioner from January 1961 to July 1964.
He had taught Bobby and Ted Kennedy at the University of Virginia School of Law and now
spearheaded the Kennedy administration’s effort to pinpoint needed tax reforms, particularly
proposals to eliminate business travel and entertainment expense abuses. When the so-called
Kennedy tax cut was finally signed into law in February 1964 under President Johnson,
reduced withholding rates were utilized, in the same fashion described here by Mills, to jumpstart the economy. In March 1964 the withholding rate declined from 18 to 14 percent, reducing overall withholding by approximately $8 billion while the tax cut itself reduced personal
income tax liability for 1964 by $6.7 billion.
251
President Kennedy: So, it would just be a question of having the
advice of Harry Byrd?
Mills: That’s right. You’d say . . . say you think it ought to be, that we
ought to withhold just 10 percent less, or maybe a hundred dollars a
month, or [unclear] ten dollars a month. Whatever the figure is, they tell
me they can work that out pretty quick. Now that doesn’t affect your
permanent rates at all, but for a temporary period you just disregard
your permanent rate and take this much less. Now, that, I think is simple
enough that we could do that pretty quick. And I don’t know that we’d
have to do much of a hearing on it. But if you get into what Walter’s
talking about, this adjustment of rates, you know and I know that they
can’t be temporary.46 If once that’s done . . .
Mills: The Congress and you and I can get by letting it go back up.
But now you can forgo this little old 10 percent or 15 percent, whatever,
40 percent, whatever you want to make it. We’re just reducing this withholding for that period of time. And if you—
President Kennedy: Well, I think that makes sense. Well, why don’t
we . . . If we can just give . . . keep this to ourselves, because, we . . . I’ve
got the problem of taking a look at this thing, as I kept saying, August
10th, and then, getting some statement. It may be that you and . . . if you
could come down on that Friday, that August 10th, then we’ll . . .47 In the
meanwhile, I’ll be working on some satisfactory way of putting our case,
and if we can just keep this to ourselves so we don’t get the press, and
have them—
At this point Mills began to offer brief summaries of a number of individuals who testified (on the economy and on the merits of various tax
reform and tax cut proposals under consideration) at a recent House
Ways and Means Committee meeting.
Mills: This . . . Here’s another . . . there’s another excellent statement
that I wish you would ask them to let you just check. This man right
here is a very, a very qualified person that . . . a public statement like that
is well worth reading. Now this man, practically said that we were
already in one [a recession]. He wants a permanent cut, not a temporary
cut, you see, and he wants it into effect now. It’s an across the board type
46. Walter is Walter W. Heller.
47. Mills joins President Kennedy and his chief economic advisers at the White House on this
date for an additional discussion of the administration’s plans for a tax cut (see “Meeting on
the Tax Cut Proposal,” 10 August 1962).
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6, 1962
of a cut. Sporn is 20 . . . he’s been in government and out of government,
but he’s not a president of this group that’s . . . He’s recognized as a very
able fellow.48 But there’s, oh . . . this one’s a disappointment for me.
President Kennedy: Really?
Mills: I expected great things out of him. He’s born and raised in
Bonham, Texas, . . . graduate of the University with me and he’s in New
York. I was a little bit . . . This man is from Boston. You know this one.
Mills: I’ve known of him for years. He used to be down here in the
government service. He was one of Fred Vinson’s economic advisers
back in—49
President Kennedy: They, of course, all want these corporate tax cuts.
Mills: Oh, yes, yes. He says it’ll be—
President Kennedy: Greenewalt any good?50
Mills: Greenewalt was outstandingly good, very good, and he sticks
to the idea of a tax cut for the individual, not for the corporation. But . . .
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] Oh, he got the wire?
Telephone call for the President.
Lincoln: Yes. He’s on.
President Kennedy: Oh that’s fine.
Begins speaking with someone on the telephone and begins writing in
middle of conversation.
Hello? Hello, Colonel? Oh, well, listen, I’m awfully sorry to hear
that. I hadn’t realized that the situation was that way. [Eight-second
pause.] I’ve . . . well . . . [Fifteen-second pause.] I know, well, my goodness,
I didn’t realize that she was as sick as that. I’m terribly sorry about that.
[Seven-second pause.] Yeah . . . Yeah . . . [Nine-second pause.] Well, listen,
she’s—[Eleven-second pause.] Well, listen, you’ve both have been terrific
to us. [Ten-second pause.] Well, you’re very nice, Colonel, and I’m just
awfully sorry. As I say, and until I heard today I had no idea that the sit-
48. Possibly a reference to Philip Sporn.
49. Fred Vinson was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1924 to 1929 and
1931 to 1938 and a member of the House Ways and Means Committee from 1931 to 1938.
Vinson was widely acknowledged as one of the leading authorities on matters of taxation in
the U.S. House. Following Henry Morgenthau’s resignation at the end of World War II,
Vinson served as Harry S. Truman’s secretary of the Treasury. He left that post in March
1946 to become the first chairman of the boards of directors of the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank.
50. Crawford Greenewalt was retired president and current chairman of the board of E. I.
DuPont de Nemours and Co. President Kennedy would meet with him on 9 August 1962 (see
“Meeting with Business Leaders on the Tax Cut Proposal,” 9 August 1962).
253
uation was like you—[Thirteen-second pause.] Yeah . . . Yeah . . . Yeah
[Twenty-six-second pause.] Well, you’re . . . well, you’re terrific, Colonel,
and I’ll . . . I hope to get a chance to see you this fall, anyway. Well, okay,
Colonel. I’m awfully sorry. Good-bye. [Sound of phone being hung up.]
Mills: [Unclear.]
Mills: He’s a very fine economist. He’s with this, Allied . . . machine
tools . . .
Mills: Machine tool [unclear].
President Kennedy: But the committee did not come out with an
impression of what . . . any single impression?
Mills: Not that we need to do anything at the moment—
Mills: —at least because of an impending recession.
President Kennedy: When do you figure . . . when are you going to
finish your hearings?
Mills: Thursday.
President Kennedy: And when do you think that . . . What will you
do or state as far as the committee goes?
Mills: Well, I’m not intending to release this right now. And I don’t
know what to say. I’ve got to say something, I guess.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we do this? Why don’t . . . let’s see,
Friday is the 10th, isn’t it? That we were supposed to meet—
Mills: Yes.
President Kennedy: We’re going to have . . . Why don’t you come
down to that meeting?51
Mills: [Unclear.] All right.
President Kennedy: [President Kennedy’s voice fades a bit as if he were
walking away from Mills as he speaks.] Then I will . . . let’s say that I
would put out some statement, appropriate, about . . . along the lines
perhaps you suggest. I’ll work on it this week. Then, you might put out a
statement saying that you agree with that judgment, that based on your
hearings . . . and then we’ll be moving in concert.
Mills: If I release this thing, though, the Republicans are where they
can pick this up right quick on the idea that we needed to do something.
That’s the trouble. [Nervous laughter.] It’s—
51. Additional reference to the meeting proposed for 10 August 1962 with the President’s
chief economic advisers. Though Mills spoke very little at this meeting, he did attend.
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6, 1962
President Kennedy: Well, I . . . yeah [unclear] what I would . . . you
wouldn’t have enough time to release yours, though . . .
Mills: Oh, yeah.
President Kennedy: It seems to me . . . I mean there’s enough in
there to say we ought to do it right now.
Mills: Well, if we rely on some of these people, there are conditions
they effect. I mean Greenewalt and fellows like that. Now, this is a little
bit of a misstatement, I think, about what he said on the expenditures. . . .
I mean, he didn’t say—
President Kennedy: Well, you know those guys, they . . . but they
love to say reduce taxes in each proposal, [but] they aren’t going to tell
you that.
Mills: But he didn’t—
President Kennedy: What they do, they get the government out of
the agriculture business or some other foolish thing.
Mills: —tax cut should be accompanied by significant expenditure
cuts, but he didn’t say that.
President Kennedy: He said the ones we think were easier . . .
Mills: He told me that it would be helpful—
Mills: —if you would make a statement [unclear] that you intended
to sort of freeze spending at this level, if it could be done.
Mills: And that you didn’t have to cut out—
President Kennedy: You know how difficult it is, though. Because so
many of this stuff is built in.52 Do you have a pen? I don’t know if I’ve got
one here . . .
Mills: Here’s one.
President Kennedy: This is all right.
Mills: And it won’t . . . and this one I had mentioned to you, and I’d
read Joe Pechman because Joe . . . I think he’s a very able—53
President Kennedy: Let’s see this one.
Mills: Pechman’s not only—
52. Referring to budget increases.
53. Joseph A. Pechman was an economist and tax policy specialist with the Brookings
Institution. Though, at this point, Kennedy seems unaware, Pechman had already been called
on frequently to advise members and staff economists of his Council of Economic Advisers
[see James Tobin and Murray Weidenbaum, eds., Two Revolutions in Economic Policy: The First
Economic Reports of Presidents Kennedy and Reagan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), p. 4].
255
President Kennedy: He’s a—
Mills: I wanted you to read that one because it’s . . . it’s very conservative.
President Kennedy: [writing as he speaks] Joe Pechman?
Mills: Joe Pechman, now, that came today. And I [unclear]—
President Kennedy: Well, and then I’m going to find out what
Doug’s going to say. I haven’t seen his testimony.54 He’s been away.
Mills: I would read . . . well, now, he called me just a few minutes ago.
I would read George Meany. George Meany I’m just fond of.
Mills: This, this was a good statement.
President Kennedy: Right . . . Right.
Mills: I’d read that. You know who he is.
Mills: But George Meany, I’m very fond of him.
Mills: Get his idea. He wanted to—
President Kennedy: He sent me over that . . . a lot of that stuff. He’s
ready for a tax cut right now.
Mills: Oh, well, he is [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Laughter.] And Keyserling is always there . . .55
Mills: Oh, yes.
President Kennedy: I keep wondering why Keyserling ever got in
that ’49 recession if he knows all these answers.
Mills: You know, I was in law school with Leon Keyserling. This is
interesting—
President Kennedy: He can talk like a bastard, can’t he? He’s the
most articulate fellow.
Mills: —really a very outstanding record in law school. He never
studied economics in his life, I don’t suppose—in school—any more
than you and I did.
Mills: May have had to take a course in college.
Mills: And then when I found him, when I came to government
54. C. Douglas Dillon was secretary of the Treasury, January 1961 to March 1965.
55. Leon Keyserling was chairman of the Truman Council of Economic Advisers during the
1949:1 to 1949:4 recession.
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6, 1962
down here . . . It was the old Senator Wagner in New York State had had
him as his administrative assistant,56 and he’d given him to Roosevelt,
President Roosevelt, to put over in the slum clearance.57 You remember
Straus that was out here running it.58 He was his general counsel. I was
on the Banking and Currency Committee. So we was thrown together
that way, and we renewed our friendship. We were friends in school. A
very smart guy who we’d like to talk to and get the answers to prospective questions, you know. [Chuckles.]
President Kennedy: Oh, yeah.
Mills: Well, when Straus left, I came down here and talked to
President Roosevelt, and suggested that he give him that job as the head
of the slum clearance and he did for a while. Then he got to be an economic adviser to Truman. Well, now, his wife is a brilliant economist.
President Kennedy: Umm . . .
Mills: I’ve been in their home and had dinner with them. I think
maybe she’s got her doctor’s degree in economics.
President Kennedy: Oh, yes. She taught at Sarah Lawrence.
Mills: Yes. She’s a brilliant economist. Now I . . . I assume he’s
learned what he knows from her . . . because he was a lawyer.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.
Mills: A graduate of Harvard Law School.
President Kennedy: So, I read that article yester[day] . . . Now what,
Wilbur, I think that . . . that as I see it, your judgment would be that we . . .
that we go ahead now, that we take a look . . . If it looks . . . begins to look
really ominous in November or so, we can always come back.
Mills: Certainly.
President Kennedy: If you think it looks really lousy and, as I say in
January, if the Congress is all chewed up and the Republicans win a lot
and we go up in January and recommend it, that we state that . . . some
of the plus and minuses signs now, and then . . . And I will issue a statement, and then you will say, based on your hearings . . . Probably, but I
think, probably, our statement ought to come out ahead of you because if
you issue a statement on Thursday—
Mills: No, I—
President Kennedy: —saying we shouldn’t have one, then on Friday.
56. Senator Robert F. Wagner.
57. President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
58. Robert Straus, son of Jesse Straus, head of Macy’s department store, was an NRA official
under President Franklin Roosevelt.
257
Mills: No.
President Kennedy: Makes it look like—
Mills: No. I’d want you to have it first.
President Kennedy: Then if you—
Mills: But I would minimize, to the extent you can, the minuses.
Mills: Because I think we’re—
President Kennedy: We don’t want to talk ourselves into it. If we’re
not going to do anything we’d better not—
Mills: That’s the point. I think, I think if we hew to the line, that—
President Kennedy: —with unemployment down to 5.3 and so on.
Mills: That’s right. That’s it precisely.
President Kennedy: Now, the only thing is, to make sure that Leon . . .
that Patman’s hearings I’ve told . . . I went over Heller’s testimony today,
and, you know, he’s saying a little of this and that, this and that, and so
on. He isn’t saying very much. I think it’s unfortunate that they’re having a public hearing. Because you see, when this talk about a tax cut
started, which was way back in early July when we had this meeting
with Samuelson. Except at that point this was the market that was in
much more desperate trouble.59
Mills: Right.
President Kennedy: You know the thing was looking like it might go
through, the . . . through the floor this summer. Well, then that picked up
some. Then I think we, of course, with the depreciation,60 and then if we
can finally get some sort of tax credit by,61 that would do quite a lot to
help improve things.
Mills: The one thing that Keezer says, in addition to this other evaluation I was talking about, that was significant. I don’t think I’d ever
59. Beginning with the fallout from President Kennedy’s confrontation with the steel companies in April 1962, all stock market indices began to register significant declines, declines
which persisted until midsummer and which were blamed on the President’s antibusiness attitude. On 30 May 1962, for example, former Vice President Richard Nixon blamed the decline
on the administration’s “hostile climate toward business.”
60. Accelerated Treasury Bulletin F depreciation guidelines, introduced by executive order in
1962. Viewing depreciation as a function of both “wear and tear” and technological obsolescence, the Kennedy CEA justified the new depreciation guidelines on the basis of updated
replacement practices peculiar to the new era of technological progress and on data that
revealed a small reversal of this trend in the late 1950s. These new guidelines allowed for a
much more rapid writing off of capital investment costs than the previous existing guidelines
[see the 1962 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 132–33].
61. The investment tax credit.
258
6, 1962
heard it before. In 1929, when the stock markets went down, the total
loss in values of stocks at that time was equal to 120 percent of our then
gross national product.
President Kennedy: Yeah?
Mills: And that’s why it makes such a major contribution to our wellbeing economically.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . .
Mills: But, this last reduction was less than 20 percent.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . Yeah.
Mills: The total loss in that was less than 20 percent of our then
gross national product, showing what has happened over the years. It’s
protection, of course . . . Securities and Exchange.62 These marginal
operations and all that, that I don’t know much about. But something
has happened to where we can take [it] in stride. And he pointed out
that the remarkable thing about it all was that it didn’t have any more
effect. You didn’t find any dropping in real estate values to amount to
anything. Not much change—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] paper loss in purchasing power . . .
Mills: When we take something there that was as damaging, perhaps
. . . if it had happened in 1929, we’d have had a major recession.
President Kennedy: But I think the problem is . . . just looking at it tactically now, this week, is to keep the members of your committee—at least
the ones who are our friends—in doubt so that . . . What we don’t want to
do is have Loftus and these others who are saying that we’re not now going
to definitely have it, that the President and the chairman thinks he can save
it.63 What . . . what we want to do is put out whatever decision we announce
with sufficient, with impact, so we get all the benefit, so we don’t have the
Republicans saying, “Oh, well, the administration is . . . the economy’s in
trouble and they won’t do anything about it.” So, I think, if we can keep it
vague this week, and if you say, “Well, I think, the President’s waiting until
he sees these August figures until we meet,” and then you just say you’re
not going to make up in your mind until you’ve looked at the August figures and finished the hearings. Then we sort of put it to bed until we’re
ready to come out and do it, and then maybe I’d say—
Mills: I haven’t said a word. I’ve told everybody that the only thing
you can say about my position is that I’m always—
62. Securities and Exchange Commission, created in 1934.
63. Joseph A. Loftus was a business reporter for the New York Times.
259
Mills: —a little amused at a suggestion of this sort. But, I’m certainly open minded, to having this borne of necessity.
President Kennedy: And I’ll send you up . . . This is a pretty good
article that was in The Economist this week. I’ll send it over to you.
Voices begin to fade; President Kennedy and Congressman Mills sound
as if they are standing and walking away.
Mills: All right.
President Kennedy: About the problem of the dollar. I’m more
encouraged about that.
Mills: Well, everything before our committee was . . . you ought to
read the record of it, plus the criticism by the Republican members, of
course. But these witnesses, here’s Burns, Saulnier and all of them practically praising—
Mills: —how these things have turned out . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah, I think, we’re doing . . . much better shape
on that.
Mills: They all say that.
President Kennedy: Well, [unclear] think which way we can—
Mills: Well, [unclear] you decide to go. [Unclear] go to lunch with
[unclear] Friday. Whatever it is, you’re going to have to talk with Al
Ullman. I don’t much about [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Laughter.]
Voices trail off as President Kennedy and Congressman Mills departed;
tape runs for an additional 1 minute, 37 seconds.
The President and the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee seemed to have reached an understanding. There would be
no tax cut proposed this summer. Mills was reluctant to use Congress to
take preventive economic measures. However if the economy started to
sink in the fall, Mills agreed that there could be a special session in
November or December to rush a cut through. Meanwhile, the President
seemed to like Mills’s suggestion of an invisible tax cut achieved by having the IRS issue a temporary reduction in payroll withholding rates.
Following this meeting with Mills, Kennedy had his domestic policy
adviser, Ted Sorensen, begin work on a White House statement explaining why it was a no-go on a quickie tax cut.
The President finished his official day with a relaxing swim.
260
8, 1962
Wednesday, August 8, 1962
On August 8, President Kennedy devoted the bulk of the morning to the
problems of organized labor. George Meany, the president of the AFLCIO, came to the White House for half the day. In the morning, the
President spoke in the Rose Garden to a group of labor leaders from the
Caribbean, Central America, and Surinam, assembled by the AFL-CIO.
Later the President was to meet with his labor secretary, Arthur
Goldberg; the new HEW secretary Anthony Celebrezze, who had
replaced Abraham Ribicoff the week before; and Lee White to discuss, in
part, the possible creation of a presidential emergency board to avert a
nationwide rail strike. Finally, there was a luncheon planned with the
AFL-CIO’s Executive Council.
Sandwiched in the morning’s program was a 36-minute conversation
with Llewelyn Thompson who had just returned to Washington after
leaving his post as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. A holdover
from the last administration, Thompson had gained the respect of the
President through his measured cables. Thompson seemed to understand the mercurial Nikita Khrushchev better than any of the administration’s Kremlin hands. Thompson and another veteran diplomat,
Charles “Chip” Bohlen, were the men President Kennedy would rely on
for appraisals of the Soviet leadership. Thompson’s cables in late July
alerted the President to the fact that Khrushchev was once again gearing
up for a showdown over allied rights in West Berlin.
Meeting with Llew ell yn Thompson on Khr ushchev
261
10:36–11:12 A.M.
Do you think that the Cuba thing and the fact that we hadn’t
gone into Laos might have given him the impression that we
were going to give way in Berlin?
Meeting with Llewellyn Thompson on Khrushchev1
Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson had served two presidents as U.S.
ambassador to Moscow. In that time, he had become a recognized student of Nikita Khrushchev, having witnessed Khrushchev’s emergence
as the undisputed head of the Soviet government in 1957. Thompson
spoke Russian and traveled around the United States with Khrushchev
when the Soviet leader made his unprecedented 23-day visit in the late
summer of 1959. He resigned his post in late July to return to the State
Department.
At his last meeting with Khrushchev, on July 25, Thompson detected
the start of a new Berlin crisis. In the course of cabling Washington
three times over the next few days, Thompson stressed that he did not
think Khrushchev was prepared to go to war over Berlin, but he cautioned that the wily Soviet leader was about to launch a new campaign
for world opinion before signing a peace treaty.2
President Kennedy did not know Thompson personally. He kept him
on as ambassador because of his reputation. Recently returned from
Moscow, Thompson was in a position to give Kennedy the briefings he
would need to make sense out of his adversary in the Kremlin and the
latest Soviet bid for Berlin. It is likely that Thompson knew little if anything about the President’s use of a back channel to assess Khrushchev’s
intentions regarding Berlin. He certainly did not know of the President’s
meeting a week earlier with Soviet intelligence officer Georgi Bolshakov.
At that meeting Kennedy had asked for a Soviet commitment to put the
Berlin issue on ice for a while in return for a U.S. promise to suspend
overhead reconnaissance of Soviet shipping to Cuba by U.S. pilots.3
1. President Kennedy and Llewellyn Thompson. Tape 8, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
2. See Thompson cables of 25, 26, and 28 July 1962, FRUS, 15: 252–55.
3. See Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro,
and Kennedy, 1958 –1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), pp. 193–94, for an account of this Oval
Office meeting (which included Attorney General Robert Kennedy) based on Russian sources.
262
8, 1962
The meeting opened with Thompson’s reviewing briefly Khrushchev’s
meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David in 1959 and the abortive 1960
summit in Paris, which broke up when Khrushchev demanded that the
United States apologize for the violations of Soviet airspace by U.S. U-2
spy planes.
Llewellyn Thompson: . . . [unclear] to see whether or not, if he could
have, withdraw it and [unclear]?
President Kennedy: The Germans?
Thompson: Yeah. And [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower had said
no. He said, “This shows that he was, that he had some knightly qualities,” he said—
President Kennedy: Khrushchev said that?
Thompson: Yeah.
Thompson: I told this to Eisenhower, and he said, “Well,” he said,
“when you write him, which you will have to do to thank him for his
farewell gifts and so on, why,” he said, “couldn’t you?—You might put in
something about, that I had spoken of him, and the great impression he’d
made on me or something like that.” I don’t know if that’s useful to do or
not. But he . . . you can think about it.
President Kennedy: No, I think that—
Thompson: I think he . . . See, he was so let down by this build up.
He kept saying this business: “Eisenhower called me friend,” and he kept
saying that publicly. Here was this Russian peasant who—[He chuckles.]
Thompson: —in a country that had always been a pariah and then,
you see this, this idea, well, I think this might be useful to encourage this
idea that this is—
Thompson: —still a genuine feeling that we, both parties, have for
the Russians: we are prepared to be friends with them in order to solve
the problems.
President Kennedy: What is your judgment about the U-2? Did he
want Eisenhower to just . . . did he want to get out of it, or was he really
attempting to sort of bait a trap?4
4. On 1 May 1960, a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot
down over the Soviet Union. Denials by the United States that the plane was on a spy mission
263
Thompson: I’ve always been convinced that he didn’t want an
excuse. I think they had a meeting of the Presidium,5 just before he went
there and said “Look, this German thing is too dangerous. If you don’t
get an agreement on it, you bring it to a head, you’ve got to move. This
we can’t do now and you’ve got to break it up.6
Because before he saw Eisenhower, he saw de Gaulle, and gave him in
writing this rather offensive demand for an apology and if Eisenhower
had gone ahead and apologized—a Frenchman had this thing leaked
out—he must have known this. I mean, the way he handled it, I’m sure
he wanted to break it up. I felt so sure of this that—you know, [you]
remember he left there and went to Berlin, East Berlin—
Thompson: And everybody thought he was going to announce the
signature of the treaty.7 And I was so afraid we’d make some statement
that would make it necessary for him to do that, that I sent a telegram to
Paris saying I was convinced he would not do this in which . . . simply on
the basis that I was sure that the whole play was to prevent the issue
coming to a head.8
President Kennedy: Well, what would they have done if there hadn’t
been a U-2, do you think? They just would have had the meeting and
wouldn’t have gotten an agreement?
Thompson: Yeah. But in those circumstances, I think that he might
have worked out a modus vivendi of some sort.
The thing that I never could understand was why he surfaced the U-2.9
They knew about it before, and maybe they were afraid now that Russia’s
collapsed when Khrushchev revealed that the pilot had survived and could tell his story.
Khrushchev, who had been invited to a meeting in Paris with Western heads of state—
Eisenhower, Harold Macmillan of Great Britain, and Charles de Gaulle of France—used the
U-2 affair to break up the summit on 16 May 1960. Thompson, the longtime U.S. ambassador
to the Soviet Union, was in Paris at the time and Kennedy, the historian, was asking for his
insights into why Khrushchev sacrificed the summit.
5. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was the main decisionmaking body of the Soviet Union. Under Stalin and again after Khrushchev’s dismissal, it was
known as the Politburo.
6. Thompson is referring to the Berlin Crisis started by Khrushchev in November 1958 when
he threatened to sign a peace treaty with East Germany in six months if the Western powers
did not accede to his demand for a demilitarized West Berlin. Although Khrushchev allowed
the first deadline to lapse by early 1960, he was agitating again for a resolution, something
which, according to Thompson, his colleagues in the Kremlin thought highly unlikely.
7. A peace treaty with East Germany that would terminate the Allied occupation rights in all
territory claimed by East Germany, that is, all of Berlin.
8. Thompson remained in Moscow during the Paris summit.
9. To surface in this case means to “reveal something that is secret.”
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8, 1962
become so open that it would become known. There were too many military [officers] who knew it, [and] there were too many civilians, but he
could have sat on that just as the way he sat on [the President murmurs agreement] this business of these fireguards who never, ever appeared.
President Kennedy: We got any explanation of that? You think it
was just that they were shot?
Thompson: Hmm.
President Kennedy: Or they were imprisoned, or what, shot or . . . ?
Thompson: I think they were probably shot. But . . . maybe the local
boys covered [unclear]. That’s very possible.
Thompson: It seemed that they were very excited [unclear] times.
Thompson: It’s quite possible.10
President Kennedy: But, why would he have become so—Do you think
that the whole Camp David business was a propaganda from his point of
view, the “spirit of Camp David,” or do you think he really felt this?
Thompson: Well, I—I think he felt a lot of this. Of course, I think
the Chinese angle was very prominent in his mind.
I remember when he came back, the Swedish ambassador, who was the
oldest fellow there—he’s been there about 13 years. He said to me this,
“There’s something strange about the way Khrushchev is playing this
Camp David business, putting up posters around on the streets, advertising in a film about it.” He said, “They are playing this up for some reason.”
And he said, “I think it must be the Chinese.” Well, I think it was a large
part of that. This was showing that there was some mileage in his—
Thompson: —in his policy of trying to build relations with America.
President Kennedy: Why?
Thompson: Because at this time in their own councils the Chinese
were saying this was for the birds—[unclear]. [Chuckles.]
Thompson: [Unclear.]
Thompson: That made the U-2 all the more difficult for him. But . . .
He kept, it was always on his mind, he brought it up about three times
[unclear] . . . talking about the secrecy of this thing. He kept saying,
“Well, here [unclear] the U-2 and your people just insist on knowing
10. It is not clear what “fireguards” Thompson and Kennedy were discussing.
265
everything; you’d never be satisfied.” But I also think that, for this reason, that they won’t agree to any on-site inspection.11
President Kennedy: Right. True.
Thompson: It’s slightly possible that they think now, we’ve got more
of a chance of a breakthrough than they do. Because we can make a much
bigger effort than they can afford to make now and for that reason they
might want to do it for that. They are just simply against . . . they figure
our military is spotting these missile sites.
President Kennedy: I think that we might get the atmospheric, don’t
you think?12 If they don’t make any significant breakthrough on this
thing, then we can put that forward.13
Thompson: Yeah, I think that could go, and I think very possibly this
nondiffusion might go, because that doesn’t involve inspection.14
President Kennedy: Has that . . . the conversation which the
Secretary is going to have with Ambassador [Anatoly] Dobrynin on
that,15 is that to be gone through with the British and the Germans and
the French on that?16
11. Thompson was referring to the negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Due to the number of
hard-to-explain seismic events in the Soviet Union, the United States had insisted on a certain
number of inspections per year to ensure Soviet compliance with a test ban.
12. Get the atmospheric test ban. It would not require on-site inspection because atmospheric
testing creates air particles that can be detected from outside the Soviet Union.
13. Here breakthrough likely refers to a change in the Soviet position on on-site inspections.
14. An agreement on the nondiffusion, or nonproliferation, of nuclear weapons. Gromyko and
Rusk had discussed this at a private dinner in Geneva on July 22. Both foreign ministers
expressed their country’s interest in a nonproliferation agreement. They disagreed, however,
over the most likely causes of nuclear proliferation. Apparently Gromyko stressed his concern
that the U.S. plan for a European multilateral force (MLF) was a ploy to give a national arsenal to West Germany. The Soviet Union wanted any nonproliferation agreement to outlaw
multilateral nuclear sharing. A record of this conversation has not been found. However, its
substance was discussed at a subsequent meeting of Rusk and Soviet ambassador Dobrynin
(see Memcon, 8 August 1962, FRUS, 7: 541–47).
15. Rusk met Dobrynin that day at the State Department. He had invited Dobrynin to call in
order to discuss the possibility of an agreement on the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons (see
Memcon, 8 August 1962, FRUS, 7: 541–47). This discussion hit a snag. Whereas Rusk spoke
in favor of a general nonproliferation agreement, Dobrynin made clear that his government
was most concerned about the acquisition of nuclear weapons by either of the Germanies.
Moscow either wanted a specific agreement prohibiting nuclear sharing with Germany or, at
least, Germany was to be named in a general nondiffusion agreement. Dobrynin emphasized
that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany was his government’s “problem
number one.” Rusk assured Dobrynin that Germany had forsworn acquiring nuclear weapons
in 1955 and this was a binding agreement. The United States, on the other hand, was concerned that China and Israel would get the bomb.
16. The President wanted to know whether Rusk would be clearing his statement on the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons with the Europeans before meeting Dobrynin.
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8, 1962
Thompson: I don’t know, the secretary—I think it’s not because the
Secretary showed me yesterday the draft of his statement, and it’s basically saying “I will have to consult with the allies on this one.”17
President Kennedy: Yeah. When you got to do that?
Thompson: Well, I didn’t ask him any. . . .
President Kennedy: What is your judgment as to the purpose of the
Vienna meeting that we had and also why he took such a tough tone
there and then why they called it [the threatened move against West
Berlin] off ?18
Thompson: I think again this Chinese thing was at a touchy, crucial
stage with them that . . . very difficult. I think there must have been a lot
of people in the Presidium who said, “This is getting . . . This split is too
dangerous for us, and we’ve got to heal it.”19
And the way the thing came out, it was on the very issue that they
are fighting the Chinese about: this is whether or not they should go
ahead vigorously to try to exploit every opportunity regardless of the
risks, almost regardless of the risks and . . . Or whether it’s better to
have a more or less status quo and try to deal with their domestic problems and mark time.
And so, the situation with China, his relationship with China being
what it was, to have done that could have caused very great internal
pressure that [unclear], I think.
But personally I’m still glad you had the meeting. I think you—
President Kennedy: Oh, it was educational for me; but I don’t know
whether—it seemed . . . the fact of his, he was so sort of tough about
Berlin . . .
Thompson: Ah, but he also was very impressed—
President Kennedy: Hmm.
Thompson: —with your determination—
17. Rusk read the statement on the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons at the August 8 meeting
with Dobrynin. He suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union move with Britain
and France to propose a two-point agreement: (1) A commitment by existing nuclear powers
not to transfer nuclear weapons to other nations and (2) A commitment by nonnuclear powers
not to develop nuclear weapons. On the issue of the proposed MLF, the statement stressed
that it was intended as “a means for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons on a
national basis.” Rusk reminded the Soviets that under existing U.S. law and allied military
arrangements, “United States nuclear warheads remain under all circumstances under United
States custody and control” (see Memcon, 8 August 1962, FRUS, 7: 541–47).
18. The Vienna meeting was the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit of 3–4 June 1961. Kennedy is
alluding to the fact that Khrushchev threatened at Vienna to force an immediate Berlin crisis,
then did not do so.
19. The Sino-Soviet split.
267
Thompson: —and this was important.
President Kennedy: Because otherwise after the Cuba thing—20 Do
you think that the Cuba thing and the fact that we hadn’t gone into Laos
might have given him the impression that we were going to give way in
Berlin?
Thompson: I don’t think so very much.
Thompson: I really don’t. I really don’t. It could have had some bearing on that; but I don’t . . . I think Khrushchev has always been . . . he’s
always felt he had us over a barrel in Berlin.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I think he does.
Thompson: [Unclear.] [Laughs.]
President Kennedy: [Chuckles.] He’s always been right. Do you think
it was useful calling up our troops?21
Thompson: I do. And he said, very—I didn’t understand quite what
he was driving at. I’m not sure what he’s driving at, he said, “I understand the President on this.”
Thompson: I don’t know what he . . . quite [unclear] he meant by
that, I wasn’t sure. But this has led to their [resumption of nuclear] testing and so on, these efforts at . . .22 But at the same time, he said, “I
understand the President on this and [unclear].”
These conversations with him bob back and forth, and I didn’t get to
follow up on that. I had wanted to say, well the important thing for us
was they not misunderstand our intentions, but I didn’t get a chance to
get it in, particularly with all these ambassadors and . . .
Thompson: Particularly when I am talking to him in Russian, the
thing goes pretty fast, and I don’t have too much time to think. But I
think he still, he’s got a lot of really serious internal problems. The agri-
20. The Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961.
21. On 25 July 1961 President Kennedy announced his intention to request congressional
standby authority to call up 150,000 reservists to meet the Soviet challenge over Berlin. The
President had considered declaring a national emergency, which would have permitted him to
call up one million reservists; but he worried that his European allies would consider this an
overreaction. Thompson from Moscow had been one of those advising the President that the
Soviets were likely to be persuaded by “substantial but quiet moves that did not panic our
allies” [see Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 588–89].
22. In the fall of 1961, the Soviets broke the three-year moratorium during which neither
superpower had detonated any nuclear test devices. The United States then resumed its own
testing in the spring of 1962.
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8, 1962
culture thing is lasting; it’s going to be a long time before [unclear]. And
I think their crop this year is going to be far worse than he lets on and
our Agriculture boys think that.
Thompson: And this makes a real problem for him.
President Kennedy: We ought to be thinking about what, if he goes
to the U.N., what his proposal would be.23 He obviously could propose
that the U.N. assume the responsibility, and I wouldn’t be surprised if it
has a rather . . . it could have a good ring to it—24
Thompson: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —as far as the committee of the . . . the Indians
and so on. Whether we ought to have a counterproposal such as the willingness to submit this to a plebiscite of the people, whether they want
the U.N. or the continuation of the Communists, whether that should be
our counter.25 But obviously we have got to have some counter.
Thompson: This could, of course, be a way for him trying to get off
the hook.
Thompson: Because he mentioned something about having a commission of jurists, or something of this kind, look at this thing. Well, on
that we’d be on very strong ground.
Thompson: But I think it would be wise for us, if we just, if we get to
the point where it looks like it’s going to happen to get at [Jawaharlal]
Nehru, and [Gamal Abdul] Nasser and maybe [Josip Broz] Tito and
just lay it on the line that he has brought up, he has made this a problem
by the attempts to focus on [unclear].26
To us, this is whether or not you’re thrown out of Europe or not and
23. As Thompson was making his way home from Moscow, he cabled from Copenhagen, “I
believe Khrushchev is likely to bring Berlin problem before the United Nations and probably
will present Soviet case. Suggest we should be thinking about how to prevent neutrals from
proposing compromise solutions unacceptable to us and from giving him impression he can
proceed with his plans with strong support from world opinion” (see Telegram to Secretary of
State, 28 July 1962, FRUS, 15: 255).
24. Kennedy is referring to a possible Soviet proposal that U.N. troops assume allied responsibility for the security of West Berlin.
25. Presumably Kennedy is discussing here the possibility of a referendum in East Germany.
The United States had previously discussed the possibility of a referendum in West Berlin on the
future of that enclave.
26. The prime minister of India, the president of the United Arab Republic, and the president of
Yugoslavia, respectively—then the three most powerful figures in the nonaligned movement.
269
we can’t have this. We’ve got to keep our troops there now in these circumstances and that any compromise which threatened this could mean
that these people would be responsible for bringing on a conflict. And
[we tell them] that they had better not put up any compromise proposals without thorough consultation with us to make sure that we’re not
put in this position. Because this, they don’t want a conflict and. . . . But
it has to be driven home to them because of the temptation to be the—
Thompson: —guy who pulled off the thing—
Thompson: —is very great.
President Kennedy: But I think the part where they could regard us
as being unreasonable would not be on our staying in Berlin, and so on,
particularly if we say we’ll put it to a judgment of the people there; but
the fact that we refuse to recognize East Germany.
I think the Yugoslavs . . . I am sure the Indians . . . everyone . . . I
think there would be a general agreement in a lot a part of the world
that that is an unrealistic position, in general.
Thompson: Certainly on the frontier thing; I think there’s one [where]
I think they’re right. It probably is a bit. If that were the issue [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: You mean the Oder—
Thompson: Oder-Neisse.
Thompson: Precisely. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: But the recognition of East Germany: I can see
where they would think that . . . they would consider that our failure to
acknowledge that after 17 years, at least as a de facto situation . . . we do
really, as a de facto, but even—that is where, I think, you will have the
most difficulty.
Thompson: I think there, I thought that the Secretary did a good job
at Geneva in laying out the case this last time.27
Thompson: He spelled it out in that . . . On that he said that, he made
quite clear we weren’t going to take any action which would show that
they weren’t a sovereign state in effect. We weren’t demanding any
[unclear], just that they not interfere with us, with our communications
with our troops [in West Berlin]. And . . .
27. Ambassador Thompson is referring to Secretary of State Rusk’s handling of the July meetings with Soviet foreign minister Gromyko in Geneva.
270
8, 1962
President Kennedy: Was . . . he was very formal with you, was he?
Thompson: Yes, he always is. And I told him, I had tried to prepare a
way for [Thompson’s replacement] Foy [Kohler] and he said, he was
very cagey on that [unclear] at one of these conferences. I can make no
judgment [unclear].
Thompson: But he said, “We’ll welcome him. We will try to work
with him.” And . . .
President Kennedy: Did he say anything about Dobrynin?
Thompson: No, he didn’t bring that up. [Unclear.] First of all, it was
just purely social.
Thompson: His wife was there.28 And she was . . . she and Jane got on
very well.29
Thompson: Jane had found in London one of these little drinking
cups that has a false bottom—
Thompson: —and she gave it to him. And Mrs. Khrushchev came
over and kissed her. [He laughs.] She tries to hold his drinking down.30
President Kennedy: Yeah. [Mumbles something.]
Thompson: He cursed at me, [unclear] an old handicap because he . . .
drinking out of this little glass—[Thompson laughs again]—like drinking
with his fingers. And . . .
President Kennedy: He was very nice to [Pierre] Salinger, wasn’t he
[when Salinger visited Moscow in May 1962]?
Thompson: Yes. [Unclear.] Of course all this is . . . it’s like dealing with
a bunch of bootleggers or gangsters. There’s a kind of hypocrisy that—
Thompson: That’s a little hard to take. But . . . oh, we talked a lot
about agriculture and his crops and that stuff, that sort of thing. But he
is a fascinating character.
28. Nina Petrovna Khrushchev (?–1984).
29. Jane Thompson, wife of the ambassador, understood Russian and Mrs. Khrushchev knew
some English. See Jane Thompson’s colorful memorandum on their time together during the
Soviet leader’s visit to the United States in September 1959, Record Group 59, Bureau of
European Affairs, Office of Soviet Affairs, Box 4, National Archives.
30. Ibid. Nikita’s drinking had been a subject of light conversation between Jane Thompson
and Nina Petrovna for some time. Apparently Khrushchev liked to tease his wife that she
refused to drink anything at all, even cognac for formal toasts.
271
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, listen, Tommy, I will—[President
Kennedy rises from his chair.]—perhaps we could, perhaps you could just
get . . . before you [unclear].
Thompson: I’ll do that tomorrow.
President Kennedy: Somebody, before you go, can just get on that
buzzer [Thompson agrees] and [unclear] want to be like because we did
have the [Paul] Nitze meeting [unclear] know more about it than anybody. But he asked me whether we ought to see if we can change our
procedures and then perhaps you could work out a memorandum for me
[unclear] . . .31
Thompson: Fine. Then, this would be my following request. The
first one, [unclear] here, I thought if you had no objections, I might say
something about how much I appreciated the close cooperation [unclear]
close contact [unclear] had with Cuba in the time before Khrushchev
[unclear].
President Kennedy: All right. That would very nice [unclear].
Thompson: [Unclear] give him a specific [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah. All right. We’ll see [unclear].
They left the Oval Office together—talked in the hall for awhile, with
the occasional word intelligible. Kennedy is heard discussing his concerns
about the allies and his hope for a basis for resolving the Berlin crisis
satisfactorily. Once Thompson had left the West Wing, Kennedy
returned to the Oval Office. Just before shutting off the tape machine,
Kennedy said, “[unclear] with Thompson.”
The President did not tape any of the labor-related conversations of the
day. He also did not record a conversation with his budget director,
David Bell. He did, however, choose to make a recording of his next foreign policy discussion, a focused discussion of initiatives in two problem
areas, China and the Congo.
31. The President may be referring to the 19 July 1962 meeting of State-DOD-JCS and
White House staff representatives with him to consider the approval of Berlin contingency
plans and those maritime contingency plans concerning Berlin (see Memcon, 19 July 1962,
FRUS, 15: 230 –32).
272
8, 1962
5:30 –6:12 P.M.
Your next exasperation now, Mr. President . . .
Meeting on China and the Congo32
The Soviet Union was not the only major Communist power threatening
United States interests. After spending part of the morning of August 8,
1962, discussing Kremlin-generated problems, Kennedy turned that
afternoon to the general threat posed by the Mao Zedong regime in the
People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.).
Despite initial hopes of improving U.S. relations with the People’s
Republic of China, President Kennedy remained trapped in the rigid
nonrecognition policy of his predecessors. Mao’s policies themselves had
much to do with the administration’s unyielding position. Chinese
Communist denunciations of “peaceful coexistence” between the East
and West, China’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, and Beijing’s
support of the North Vietnamese and Laotian Communists—all reinforced the Kennedy administration’s nonrecognition policy.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist government in
Taiwan, backed by a supposedly powerful U.S. China lobby, also inhibited the
Kennedy administration’s flexibility regarding China. For over a year, the
Nationalists had pressed the administration for military support of a mainland invasion, which Chiang believed would inspire an uprising against
Mao’s regime. In mid-1961, Kennedy approved the preparation for six
intelligence drops of 20-man teams over South China. Claiming the
groups were too small, Chiang never carried out the drops. During the
spring of 1962, the Nationalists stepped up demands and requested 16 B57 bombers, additional C-123 aircraft for intelligence-gathering drops, and
approximately 35 ships capable of carrying a platoon of tanks or an
infantry company. Those demands were the subject of discussion when the
President, McGeorge Bundy, Desmond FitzGerald, Michael Forrestal,
Averell Harriman, and John McCone met in the Cabinet Room.
The Kennedy administration’s initial response to Nationalist pressure had been to temporize. Worried about provoking a Communist
Chinese or Soviet military reaction, President Kennedy absolutely refused
32. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Desmond FitzGerald, Michael Forrestal,
Averell Harriman, and John McCone. Tape 8, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Meeting on China and the Congo
273
to send Chiang either ships or bombers without sure knowledge that the
PRC would not respond with military action. His concern seemed to be
justified when, during mid-June 1962, the People’s Republic of China
began to amass forces in the Fujian area across from Taiwan. Mao
declared that they were for defensive purposes. To defuse the situation,
the Kennedy administration assured Beijing that the United States was
not backing a Nationalist invasion of the mainland.
The administration continued delay tactics with Chiang, partly out of
fear that the generalissimo might proceed with invasion plans without
U.S. support. President Kennedy did not want another Bay of Pigs, yet
he was personally intrigued by guerrilla warfare tactics and searched for
temporizing measures. He was therefore willing to consider amphibious
landings and intelligence drops of 200-man teams.
On June 5, McCone visited Taiwan as part of a two-week trip to
Southeast Asia. He informed Chiang that the United States was willing
to prepare but not yet implement intelligence-gathering airdrops. Two
C-123 aircraft were being equipped, and the President had approved the
training of Nationalist aircrews. The administration promised to consider Chiang’s requests for three additional C-123s.
McCone was uncertain whether any intelligence-gathering team could
survive on the mainland. He also worried that a 200-man drop as
opposed to a 20-man drop approximated the first phase of active military
operations. The Director of Central Intelligence’s doubts were reinforced by the newly appointed ambassador to Taiwan, Admiral Alan G.
Kirk, who assumed his post at the beginning of July. Not coincidentally,
Ambassador Kirk was a specialist in amphibious operations, an action
also under consideration by the administration.
Kirk similarly swayed Mike Forrestal, the National Security Council
officer for Asia, who was in Taipei on July 23, 1962. For several months
Forrestal harbored doubts about the advisability of intelligence airdrops,
especially 200-man teams. Now, in early August, he expressed firm
opposition to Bundy: “I have thought a good deal about whether anything should be done, but I have not come up with any course of action
to suggest. Unless you have other ideas, I would propose to let the matter drop without letting it go any further.”33
Averell Harriman, the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
affairs, had also consistently advised the President to resist Nationalist
demands. He shared the concern that Chiang was using intelligence-
33. Michael Forrestal to McGeorge Bundy, 7 August 1962, National Security Files, Meetings
and Memoranda series, Staff Memoranda, Michael Forrestal, John F. Kennedy Library.
274
8, 1962
gathering schemes as a way of drawing the United States into support of
a mainland invasion.
President Kennedy began taping as he opened discussion of a draft
telegram to Ambassador Kirk about the timing, size, and overall merits
of intelligence drops over mainland China.34
President Kennedy: Now that we’ve got those ships, it’ll take at least
three months to get those shipments in. Don’t you think?
John McCone: October is the [C-]123s.
Michael Forrestal: Landing craft, sir, or the airplane?
President Kennedy: Landing craft.
Forrestal: Landing craft. Now that’s a big operation.
Desmond FitzGerald: Operation.
McCone: They’d have to be moved forward by then.
Forrestal: Yeah.
McCone: Because—
Forrestal: It’ll take six months, I was told out there by Admiral Kirk.35
McCone: When were you there, Mike?
Forrestal: Two weeks ago, sir.36
McCone: You came back [unclear]? [Long pause.]
President Kennedy: [marking up text] Dare we modify [the] present
policy of the movement of C-123s to Taiwan, updating use as is necessary? That’s how many C-123s?
McCone: Those are two of the five C-123s that we’re going to keep
in this country.
President Kennedy: They’re the ones that we—
McGeorge Bundy: Well, the dropped aircraft—
McCone: Two hundred–man drop—
President Kennedy: [reading while writing and scribbling out text]
“And therefore it suggests . . . [reading very fast and mumbling] the President . . . on the same basis . . . aircraft with all . . . the [unclear].
[Unclear] agree to modify policy in 1962 . . . brought out already in a
different frame [unclear] . . . as long as it takes . . . be made . . . planes
will be made available.”
[Unclear] get Kirk out there.
34. For a copy of the completed telegram that is being drafted and sent to Ambassador Kirk,
see Message from Harriman to Kirk, 8 August 1962, FRUS, Northeast Asia, 22: 301.
35. Admiral Alan G. Kirk was U.S. ambassador to the Republic of China since July 1962.
36. Forrestal was in Taipei on 23 July 1962.
275
McCone: I agree.[Scribbling out text.] [Long pause.]
Averell Harriman: Now this says the telegram—I think it will be . . .
[Let’s] send it around. We could save time from running around on this
memorandum.37 [Unclear] memorandum, if you want to underline something. [Unclear.] [Possible break in the tape recording.]
President Kennedy: [scribbling text as he speaks] Well, do you think you
ought to give him a . . . Is it best to give Ambassador Kirk an explanation
of why to take [unclear] 100,000 tons of shipping [unclear] to be in service
immediately be it for two-, three-, or four-months’ period . . . from the time
it began for service to take place, from the time of their arrival? This is not
the kind of situation we want at all because [to] anyone it would seem
illogical unless it was real. [scribbling out text] “Is it necessary for us to
explain why we can’t go with this 100,000 tons?” That . . .
McCone: I thought our reason for not giving it to them was so as to
not give them the capability of doing something without our approval.
McCone: And—
President Kennedy: Well, only because if we did give it to them without these three months’ periods, obviously I would think [it] would
encourage the Chinese Communists to launch an attack on Quemoy and
Matsu and force them to build up their defenses. And world opinion
would consider this an insane action.38
McCone: Sure, it would become known [unclear].
President Kennedy: In three months, for us to ship a hundred thousand tons . . .
Bundy: The trouble with that is that it gives them some incentive to
try and figure out a quieter [unclear] way of doing it, and we just don’t
want to do it.
FitzGerald: And, also, to avoid any three months’ delay that keeps us
here.
Bundy: We’d have to emphasize the length of time that it takes but at
this point [unclear]—
37. According to a note in Harriman’s personal papers, he took the following four documents
with him to this meeting: FE No. 884 and attachment (message from Kirk); FCT-7903; memorandum for President from Harriman (original and copy) dated 8 August 1962; and the draft
telegram for Kirk from Harriman (see “JFK 1961” folder, W. Averell Harriman papers, Box
479, Library of Congress). None of these items appear in his papers or in the holdings at the
John F. Kennedy Library.
38. Since 1954 the People’s Republic of China had intermittently threatened to seize these offshore island groups. A buildup of six divisions in Fujian Province that began in June 1962
renewed President Kennedy’s concern that Beijing was planning to launch an invasion of the
Quemoys and Matsus.
276
8, 1962
President Kennedy: How long is it now?
McCone: Really, [unclear] basically we did not think [unclear].
President Kennedy: Only two? [Unclear.] This . . . he always wanted
two didn’t he?
McCone: He wanted five.
Forrestal: Five total—[Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Who says that?
Harriman: Admiral Kirk only wanted two.
President Kennedy: Oh, yeah. [Unclear.]
Forrestal: Why do we say, “One or two?” [Several voices at once.]
President Kennedy: Well, let’s check that first.
McCone: But with two we cannot put it in 200-man drops. We need
at least five, so—
Unidentified: We need five for a 200-man drop.
FitzGerald: We can take about 50 men apiece. [Discussion about the
text they are reading.]
McCone: We’d like to remove the last sentence from that first page
[unclear] message [unclear] and move it into here. [Garbled voices—elliptical comments about rewording of the text.]
Forrestal: Mr. President, in paragraph 4, I think Mr. McCone has
made the point that he would just as soon we stopped the pressing about
these drops. He suggested that we change the sentence in B in paragraph
4 at the very bottom: “Although we do not object to 20-man team drops,
we do not want to press this—we do not wish to press any drop into the
PRC” in view of that other telegram that you’ve got in front of you. The
theory here being that [unclear] actually printed.
Twenty-six seconds excised as classified information.
McCone: For two months, they’ve had no drops although they had
the troops there all the time—a secret deploy[ment] of over a thousand
men. And I think they’ve had two amphibious landings, as well, in two
months’ time. I think that there’s a hell of a lot of talk going on about
this, presently. I think it’s very relaxed. I think if they were dynamic in
the movement of those, if we feel they are completely on top of it, then
we could send in commando raids of all kinds [unclear] all the rest.
President Kennedy: Is this language clear enough? [reading]
“Although we do not object to 20-man drops, we would not want to press
this size drop.”
Harriman: No, [unclear] we ought [to] argue along the lines of what
John had in mind—that we do not believe you should press for any
drops. But if they made one, we would cooperate with . . . But [unclear]
says they . . .
277
McCone: I was encouraged, and I was very willing to aid drops that
they need up to 20 men. I said increase them when I was over there—for
the purpose of this intelligence and testing the conditions on the mainland.
President Kennedy: Do we want to say we would support drops up
to 20 men?
McCone: [Unclear] not the question [unclear]. Do you have the
number?
Forrestal: Do we want to support any such drops up to 20 men? Or
are we saying we’re opposed?
McCone: Uh, huh.
Harriman: I think we might say to him that [what] we have in mind
are smaller drops.
Forrestal: [writing] “Soon, we will also have in mind—”
Harriman: From the telegram, that they have in mind smaller
[unclear].
Forrestal: We were talking about seven-man.
Harriman: Seven-man drops. Do you have . . . And do you have the
[unclear] put out this [unclear]—
McCone: I wouldn’t say that entirely, but I have a certain feeling about
pressing for a contingency study for various reasons. I think that—
Bundy: I know what Kirk has in mind there and wants contingency
staff officers and amphibious operations. You get a sense that if we can get
them to look at this problem honestly it will cool the hell out of them.
McCone: Is this what he said?
Bundy: I have an inclination to believe that under his direction, it will
have that effect rather than the reverse effect.39
McCone: Uh, huh.
Harriman: I think that—
Forrestal: The thing that is bothering us, Mac, is that this might get
some publicity. The fact that overt representatives of the U.S.—
Bundy: It’s not too hard to put this out on another channel that we’re
engaged in bringing home the reality of his lies to these people. I think
that . . . It is a hazard, but they live in a never-never land, which really
does affect their behavior. We [unclear] really amphibious men would be
needed. How many thousand tons of supplies are you going to have to
get across the beach per day? I don’t know how you would have to con-
39. McGeorge Bundy has known Admiral Kirk a long time. In 1944 he served as an assistant
to Admiral Kirk, who commanded the maritime component of the 6 June 1944 invasion of
Normandy.
278
8, 1962
trol and manage the . . . You could put that warning in that you will be
glad—[unclear, as someone asks another for coffee]—has to be carefully
handled so that it is not an appearance of current planning of a landing.
McCone: That’s correct.
Forrestal: That’s what I would [unclear].
FitzGerald: Kirk is under the—[Garbled voices.]
McCone: —to educate and demonstrate how difficult it is, that’s fine.
Harriman: Well, let’s use the word again encouraging because [unclear]
encouraging contingencies.
Forrestal: He said he would cooperate, but the study may generate
additional requests for U.S. equipment and may have security problems
or may . . .
Bundy: Hadn’t you better make that a new sentence?
McCone: Yeah, I think I would.
FitzGerald: We want to avoid having a statement on the aspect of
general planning.
Bundy: I assume your purpose is educational and that you will make
every effort to avoid any possibly damaging appearance of joint amphibious planning. [Several garbled voices.]
Twelve seconds excised as classified information.
Bundy: It’s been increasingly their line, Mr. President. It’s the argument they have used to justify the 200-man team.
McCone: Well, he agreed about that and after we had two long discussions on this. We’d start off through the summer with 20-man drops,
and if they were successful . . . And we would jointly agree upon each
one of those, analyzing the success of the earlier drops. If they worked
out successfully, then we’d drop about a 200-man drop in October and
there would be five of them. Each one would be subject to concurrence.
And the first one would go by the success of the 20-man drop. Then if
the fire had been started, then we’d go to the other [unclear], but he said
indeed that all actions could be concurred in to go step by step building
up into the larger one, to be first started by allowing the 200-man drops.
Finally he agreed that he didn’t have any intelligence findings to support
their success. Therefore he agreed to the 20-man drops really as
exploratory and as intelligence finding.
Harriman: Then we swing back to the 7-man drop?
McCone: The reason for the 7-man drop was that the 20-man drop
would be from a C-54 and the electronic countermeasures for this left it
somewhat exposed, so we reduced that to a 7-man so that he could fly
them in on a P2V, which had a better chance of survival really than the
C-54 transport plane, more maneuverable, and had somewhat better
279
electronic gear but it would only take seven men, that’s why I proposed a
7-man drop.40
Harriman: The 123 would be better protected than any other planes
we have.
McCone: Yes, but it’s not there. It would be better protected and, it’s a
better plane to drop them. It’s one of these things we’ve had to worry about
with the 20-man drop. You can drop quickly and in a pattern rather than
to—sure enough. The one serious problem, you know, these planes will be
in the radar, and they have to pull up into slow motion. And I know that
with 20 men, the radar will spot them so that then on the ground they will
know almost where to go to find the team, whether it’s a 200-man team or
a 20-man team. And this is a very serious problem for the whole operation.
In other words, if you make it [unclear] high for them to establish their—
Forrestal: [Unclear] they’re gonna have to make a visible pattern,
but with a—
McCone: —prepare to drop—
Forrestal: —prepare to drop, you’re going a little bit slow—
McCone: Quite slow. Sufficiently slower so that the radar operators
can pinpoint where the drop is taking place.
Forrestal: If they’re exactly on the [unclear], yes.
McCone: [Unclear.] Observing that last U-2 plane, where they picked
the plane up—the last U-2 we sent in according to [unclear] from
[unclear]. They picked it up 12 minutes after it took off the runway at
Taiwan, and they had it in the radar continuously until it was within 10
minutes away. The lights on all the time. They have very good coverage.
President Kennedy: Did some planes come up from that last one?
McCone: What’s that?
President Kennedy: Did they have some planes come up from that
last one?
McCone: No, I don’t think so, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: They didn’t try to . . . They didn’t get close?
McCone: They were at 55,000 feet if I recall, and so they were . . .
President Kennedy: They never charged us with flying U-2 flights,
have they?
McCone: Never have. Never have. And incidentally it was a very successful flight. [Unclear] 90 percent . . .
40. The P2V was a slightly smaller plane with two fewer engines than the C-54. It was primarily used as a land-based submarine hunter and therefore carried special detection gear and an
electronic countermeasures package.
280
8, 1962
Forrestal: That’s humorous. At 10,000 feet, we’ll give the President
another U-2 disaster.41 [Chuckles.]
McCone: You can talk [unclear] about how good the weather was.
[Laughter.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] get our cover story?
Unclear exchange. Several voices can be heard responding to President
Kennedy’s joke about getting a cover story.
President Kennedy: [chuckling] What is it going to be this time—
the Chinese Communists? [Unclear] without warning, be it Vietnam and
that’s going to be a [unclear].
McCone: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] the Chinese Communists or the Nationalists doing anything [unclear] Formosa.
Harriman: But I think he got into trouble because he admitted it.42
Khrushchev [unclear] told me so. He took me aside, and he said, “I publicly
asked the President now not to admit, but he insisted upon saying he did.”
McCone: [apparently jumping to Eisenhower’s defense] Well, I know he
had a difficult problem, Averell. I sat in on some of those discussions.43
Twenty-three seconds excised as classified information.
McCone: One of the reasons and [unclear] on that—
President Kennedy: In drawing that up evidently Ambassador [to
the Soviet Union Llewellyn “Tommy”] Thompson told us this morning
that [unclear] the fellow from Stockholm the other day on account of
[Andrew H. T.] Berding’s book.44
McCone: Oh.
President Kennedy: And I guess Tommy didn’t feel comfortable that
the President [Eisenhower] couldn’t very well deny it—
McCone: With Tommy there he probably couldn’t.
President Kennedy: —very well have denied it, I think . . . I don’t . . .
41. Thompson and Kennedy had talked at length about the U-2 affair of May 1960 in a conversation that morning. See note 2 in “Meeting with Llewellyn Thompson on Khrushchev,” 8
August 1962. On 9 September 1962, Communist China would down a U.S.-made Nationalist
China U-2 flying a reconnaissance mission over East China.
42. Harriman is voicing the opinion that President Eisenhower had worsened his position
because in May 1960 he admitted publicly that he had authorized the violation of Soviet airspace by Francis Gary Powers’s U-2.
43. In May 1960 John McCone was the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
44. On 27 July 1962 the New York Times reported that Andrew Berding, assistant secretary of
state for public affairs in the Eisenhower administration, argued in his recently published
book, Foreign Affairs and You! How American Foreign Policy Is Made and What It Means to You
(New York: Doubleday, 1962), that Eisenhower’s decision to accept personal responsibility for
the decision to send a U-2 over Russia in May 1960 was “one of the greatest mistakes in the
diplomatic history of the United States.”
281
He didn’t say anything about whether there was an alternative statement.
As I say, the only thing that I’ve ever felt . . . would have been something:
“It’s a matter that . . . It’s being looked into.” Period. Or something. And
not made it [the denial] fuller. But I guess [Berding’s] statement probably disturbed Presi[dent Eisenhower]—
McCone: Probably so [unclear]. I think [unclear] would write a book
on [unclear]. [Mixed voices and laughter, unclear exchange.]
Harriman: [Unclear.] At one point, [unclear] Ike turned to Chris
[Herter] and said, “Now why shouldn’t I apologize for this?”
And [unclear], “No, don’t do it.”45
Now Chip [Bohlen] says that he never heard him say that.
President Kennedy: He could have saved himself a lot of trouble by
saying he would express regret.
Harriman: I know. [Unclear.] I’m saying that this is what Khrushchev
told me. It was President Eisenhower that turned to Herter and said, “Well,
why shouldn’t I apologize for this?” Chris said, “No, you mustn’t.” Now
Chip says he never heard that. Khrushchev told me that [unclear]—
President Kennedy: You know, this has nothing to do with anything
we talked about, but I was reading this week [Robert] Sherwood’s
account of the [1945] Tehran meeting in which you played some role.46
[Unclear exchanges involving Harriman.]
[referring to Harriman] He’s a real . . . [unclear] other interest meetings about that [unclear] . . . You’re a survivor. [Unclear exchange.]
Their discussion shifts to the civil war raging in the former Belgian
colony of the Congo. The Kennedy administration found Moise
Tshombe’s determination as exasperating as the unremitting pressure of
Chiang Kai-shek. Tshombe was the leader of Katanga, a state that two
years earlier had declared its secession from the newly independent
Congo. The day before, a U.S. representative in Geneva had received
information that Tshombe was anxious to speak directly with Harriman,
who felt he grasped the complexities of the Congolese problem and
could serve as Kennedy’s personal emissary.47 Harriman was one of the
few open admirers of Tshombe within the Kennedy administration. The
45. Christian A. Herter was secretary of state from 1959 to 1961.
46. The President was referring to Robert E. Sherwood’s book, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an
Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1948).
47. Roger W. Tubby (assistant secretary of state for public affairs) to Dean Rusk (secretary of
state), 7 August 1962, “Tshombe” folder, W. Averell Harriman papers, Box FCL 18, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
282
8, 1962
Department of State, especially the African Bureau, was the center of the
anti-Katanga sentiment.
On June 30, 1960, after virtually no preparation for decolonization,
the Belgian Congo received independence and quickly degenerated into
chaos. The Congolese central government was initially divided between
President Joseph Kasavubu, a moderate nationalist who headed a regional
party, and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, a radical nationalist whom
many Western leaders considered a Communist. A host of regional and
tribal parties, which preferred a confederated political system, created
further divisions. Tshombe was head of the largest regional party, the
Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (Conakat), based in the
mineral-rich Katanga province. Financially backed by the Belgian mining
company Union Minière du Haut Katanga, Tshombe announced the secession of Katanga on July 11, 1960.
President Kennedy sought the reintegration of the province because
most of the developing countries considered Tshombe a Belgian stooge.
The Congo posed a serious foreign policy dilemma for Kennedy. If he
supported European clients in Africa, he risked antagonizing the developing countries and possibly paving the way for Soviet influence. Yet if
he opposed his allies in Africa, he might alienate the NATO allies.
Kennedy viewed U.N. intervention as a way out of this policy conundrum. Outside aid poured into the fighting parties from East and West
bloc countries. Foreign mercenaries supported various Congolese factions. Murder and political chaos prevailed. Lumumba was delivered
to Katanga and killed by his enemies there. On September 17, 1961,
U.N. secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash while
en route to meet Tshombe in Northern Rhodesia. Speculation that
Tshombe’s forces were responsible added to the confused state of affairs.
The U.N. forces had helped prop up a fragile national government in
Leopoldville (now renamed Kinshasa) but had not yet intervened decisively against the rebel government of Katanga.
Kennedy, who was committed to a united Congo under a nonCommunist leader, worried that as long as Tshombe’s secession continued,
leftist separatist Antoine Gizenga (Lumumba’s successor) would draw
Soviet support for his rival national regime at Stanleyville (now renamed
Kisangani). From Kennedy’s perspective, the first major breakthrough in
resolving the civil war came in 1961 when Cyrille Adoula formed a moderate central government. Despite continued U.N. mediation talks and
intermittent cease-fire agreements, hostilities between Tshombe’s forces
and those of the central government persisted.
In early August 1962, the Kennedy administration worked with
283
Belgian, British, and French representatives on a proposal for national reconciliation, which they planned to present to acting U.N. secretary-general
U Thant.48 On August 3, Under Secretary of State George Ball submitted a
four-phase course of action to Kennedy. The first phase would be the
approval of the reconciliation plan by Adoula, while the second phase
demanded Tshombe’s acceptance within ten days after receipt. The third
phase asked for an embargo of Katangan copper, while the fourth phase
called for U.N. enforcement of such an embargo.49 On August 6, President
Kennedy approved the program.
As the conversation shifted to the Congo crisis, uncertainty remained
about Tshombe’s cooperation for reintegration.
Forrestal: Your next exasperation now, Mr. President—Tshombe.
[Laughter.]
President Kennedy: Did you realize that [unclear]. [Explosive laughter.]
Tshombe wants to meet with Governor Harriman?
Forrestal: Tshombe said that he is at his wit’s end and the man that
could help him was Harriman.
President Kennedy: He said that?
Harriman: I was told to see him in Geneva, and I ended the telegram
by saying I think this fellow could be made a good friend of ours if we
pay some attention to him. Nobody’s paid any attention to him since . . .
He’s never seen anybody.
President Kennedy: Are you [unclear].
Harriman: And he told me on . . . He said he’d come back to meet
with the four powers anytime.50
President Kennedy: When did the recent procedure—
Bundy: He told David at the ILO a couple days ago that he would go
anywhere to meet Governor Harriman.51
President Kennedy: How about going back to Geneva? [Laughter.]
48. For a text, see, “Proposal for National Reconciliation,” “Congo, 7/28/62–8/2/62” folder,
National Security Files, Box 28a, John F. Kennedy Library.
49. Memorandum, George Ball to President Kennedy, 3 August 1962, FRUS, 20: 527–32.
50. Belgium, Great Britain, France, and the United States were the four nations involved in
devising the plan for national reconciliation.
51. On 7 August, during a private dinner in Geneva, Tshombe told David Morse, the director general of the International Labor Organization (ILO), that he was “most anxious to
talk to Averell Harriman under any circumstances, in any place that could be arranged”
(FRUS, 20: 534).
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8, 1962
Bundy: He’ll go anyplace, but the Governor won’t.52 [Laughter.]
Harriman: I think if—
President Kennedy: Well, what about somebody seeing Tshombe?
Forrestal: That’d [unclear] good idea.
Harriman: Well, seriously, I could go to him and go and see, if there’s
any reason to be—
President Kennedy: How about let’s look into that. I don’t think we
ought to just—
Forrestal: I agree.
Harriman: Harlan’s supposed to meet this morning.53 He said he’d go
tonight—
President Kennedy: I think you’re the one to go. I think it—
Harriman: [Unclear] and I saw him. He kept his word to me. He
came to see me with one of these native grandfathers. He came to the
United States in May of 1960.54 Two black men—
President Kennedy: Tshombe?
Harriman: Tshombe and this other fellow.
Unidentified: Lumumba?55
Harriman: No, no. The other fellow next to him who created
trouble.56 Anyway, he told me then. He said, “Now, Lumumba’s going to
win the election—because we haven’t got enough money. We can carry
our tribes locally, and Lumumba’s going to be Communist and we’re
going to have difficulty.” And so we discussed that.
And I went to see him—called on him at the hotel, as I was asked to,
and the press caught me there. I said, “I’m just going to tell him . . . I’m
going to do nothing except tell him that you called on me in my house,
52. Harriman, who felt uncertain about President Kennedy’s opinion of his usefulness, often
believed he had been “exiled to Geneva” and jokingly used that phrase with colleagues.
53. Harlan Cleveland was assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. In
that capacity, he worked closely with U.N. representatives to end the Congolese civil war.
54. On 3 May 1960, at his New York residence, Harriman hosted 34 corporation executives to
garner support for an African trade and investment conference scheduled four months later at
New York University. At this time, Tshombe was visiting the United States for the first time.
He was in Washington, D.C., where he hoped to win political friends with his pro-Western
stance. On 10 May 1960, at 4:30 P.M., in Washington, Harriman met with Tshombe and Chief
Albert Kalonji. The meeting was not reported in the press, and no record of their conversation has been found. Kalonji, the principal leader of the Baluba tribe of South Kasai, traveled
to the United States with Tshombe in May 1960 and later, in August of that year, followed his
example and declared South Kasai an autonomous state.
55. Patrice Lumumba, former prime minister of the Republic of the Congo, had been killed in
January 1961, just before Kennedy took office.
56. Reference to Chief Albert Kalonji.
285
so I returned the courtesy call.” Well, we lunched together the next day,
and he stuck to that story. There was no publicity about it at all. Now he
could have used my having called on him very much to his advantage at
that point.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we look into this and see whether we
can figure out some reason for the Governor to be going to Europe anyway.
Bundy: He can go to Paris and serve the French some news on Laos.
Or he can go to . . . There are lots of reasons for Averell to go.
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we wait and see how long
Tshombe’s going to stay in Europe and whether we ought to respond to—
Harriman: He’s only going to stay until Friday, I think, and Congress . . .
Bundy: He would stay over. And then—I mean, if we could get the
people who see to this.
Harriman: I have no idea—
Bundy: I think the hazard is that the U.N. crowd and Adoula crowd
will then put a plan . . .
President Kennedy: I think that would be—
Harriman: On a fresh note, the news is that this fellow is as a confirmed non-Communist as the Communists are Communists. He was
educated by a Baptist fishing house, and he is as intelligent in many
ways, converted by a black man.57 They see things very rigidly. He’s
concerned over what’s going on in Leopoldville.58 He says he trusts
Adoula but not to run. . . . What he wants, of course, is a much looser
federation than anything that anyone’s had in mind. And I’m not going
to agree to that. I do have a feeling that if we paid a bit more attention
to him he would be more amenable. I don’t know that he’d be completely amenable.
He’s a very determined young man. I must say I respect the fellow in
spite of the fact he may be on the wrong side. On the basis . . . They beat
him up pretty badly. He described that they beat him, and so on, and put
him in jail, and he said he was lucky to get out alive. And he didn’t want
to go through that one again.59
57. Moise Tshombe was actually brought up in the Methodist religion by U.S. missionaries. The
eldest son of 11 children, Moise, as a young adult, kept the account books for his father’s successful businesses, organized a troop of boy scouts, and directed a Methodist youth association.
58. Capital of the Congolese central government under Cyrille Adoula.
59. On 26 April 1962, Congolese soldiers of the central government detained Tshombe at the
Coquilhatville airport and placed him under house arrest until his release on 22 June 1962. He
was treated hospitably. Harriman’s reference to Tshombe’s beating is from an earlier undetermined incident.
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8, 1962
President Kennedy: Well, let’s check into that, shall we?
Unclear conversation as meeting breaks up. The machine was turned off.
Ultimately President Kennedy did not send a personal emissary to
Tshombe in Geneva. Harriman had been an unpopular choice for this
mission among the Africanists in the State Department and was discarded in favor of Under Secretary of State George Ball. But Ball never
made it to Geneva, either. United Nations officials opposed separate U.S.
mediation, fearing this would undermine their own efforts at conciliating
the parties in the Congo. And Kennedy himself began to have doubts
that this initiative was a risk worth taking. If Tshombe refused to accept
the reintegration of Katanga with the rest of the Congo, a presidential
mission might only achieve international embarrassment.
Director of Central Intelligence John McCone remained behind in the
Congo meeting to speak privately with the President. Kennedy did not
tape this meeting, which lasted 20 minutes, and no memorandum of the
conversation has been found. Nevertheless, the topic was almost certainly
Cuba. The members of the Special Group (Augmented), which included
McCone and all of the rest of Kennedy’s covert action policy team, had
received that morning a key paper on U.S. policy toward the Castro
regime: “Consequences of (U.S.) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include
cost (personnel, units, and equipment), effect on worldwide ability to react,
possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national
mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction.” The paper was to be the
basis for discussion at the next meeting of the Special Group, scheduled
for August 10. McCone may well have also raised in this short discussion
with the President some new intelligence about developments on the
island. A report then circulating in the intelligence community argued
that the Soviets were establishing a submarine base in Cuba.60
Following the meeting with McCone, the President tidied up some
loose ends in the office for three-quarters of an hour, then went to the
Mansion for the day.
60. Indeed, at that time, in addition to their secret plan to place medium range and intermediate
range ballistic missiles on Cuba, the Soviets had also decided to build a submarine base in Cuba.
Seven ballistic missile submarines and four diesel submarines with nuclear-capable torpedoes
had already been designated (see Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” pp. 188–89).
Khrushchev would get cold feet about the submarine base in September but, of course, would
push on with plans to deploy the nuclear missiles. On 10 August, General Edward Lansdale,
the chief of operations, Operation MONGOOSE, called the State Department to request a
Meeting on Per u and Haiti
287
Thursday, August 9, 1962
The President had an especially difficult set of problems, foreign and
domestic, to occupy his time. He was in the midst of two major discussions on future policy toward Peru and on the quickie tax cut that were
being followed closely in the press. Any delay in those might signal indecision. The recognition of the Peruvian junta was the first decision he
would tackle this day.
10:00 –10:55 A.M.
Mr. President, I think we ought to consider seriously whether
or not the [Central Intelligence] agency should not be
entrusted to continue with the evaluation of personalities and
possibilities to see whether or not a plan could be developed
with our help, which might be coordinated and sensible and
might have some chance of success both in terms of removing
[François] Duvalier and replacing him with something we
can live with.
Meeting on Peru and Haiti1
President Kennedy faced two important decisions. Since the end of July, he
had wanted to recognize the military junta in Peru if a way could be found
that would not make him look like a hypocrite. The President had identified himself with the policy of not recognizing the government. To find a
way out, the President used the State Department and his friend the jour-
paper outlining certain possible U.S. responses to the establishment of a Soviet submarine base
in Cuba. Although State Department experts considered the possibility “too remote to waste
time on,” Lansdale circulated the report anyway (see “Thoughts for 2:30 Meeting,” 10 August
1962, FRUS, 10: 920–23).
1. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Richard Goodwin, Richard Helms, J. C. King,
Edwin Martin, Graham Martin, Teodoro Moscoso, and Frank Sloan. Tape 8, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
288
T H U R S DAY, AU G U S T
9, 1962
nalist Charles Bartlett to present a three-point package to the Peruvian
generals that would allow the U.S. government to recognize them.
The junta had responded favorably to U.S. actions. In an interview
with Ben Meyer of the Associated Press on August 5, the head of the
junta, Major General Ricardo Pío Pérez Godoy, promised the restoration of civil rights, committed the junta to a free and fair election in June
1963, for which none of the junta members would be candidates, and
added that, if asked, the junta would allow OAS observers during the
election campaign. These were the three conditions for recognition
established by the Kennedy administration.
When President Kennedy read about this the next morning, he was
prepared to establish relations with the junta. He was persuaded by
Edwin Martin and Arthur Schlesinger, however, to wait until at least
August 8, the date of a scheduled Organization of American States
(OAS) Council meeting at which the Peruvian delegation might formally
reaffirm these promises.2
The second issue for the President also involved making a choice
between Edwin Martin, the assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs, and other members of his Latin American policy team.
Haiti’s leader, François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, had become an embarrassment to Washington. An ally of the United States since coming to power
in 1952, Duvalier was diverting U.S. economic assistance to build monuments to himself while using U.S. military support to raise a civilian
militia that only he controlled.
Duvalier’s decision to “re-inaugurate” himself in May 1961 after only
four years of a six-year term set off a reexamination of the Kennedy
administration’s policy toward the dictator. There was much talk of possibly a military solution to remove Duvalier. But no new policy initiatives emerged. Secretary of State Rusk summed up the prevailing
feeling: “[W]aiting for a chance to use force is no answer either, because
the problem is neither military nor cloak and dagger.”3
Official U.S. patience with Duvalier, especially on the part of the
State Department, waned over the next 12 months, especially as evidence mounted of the misuse of U.S. development assistance to build
Duvalierville, a huge complex dedicated to the glorification of the dictator and his family. On June 1, in a meeting with U.S. ambassador
2. Memorandum for the Record, 6 August (Maxwell Taylor Papers), cited in FRUS, 12: 876.
3. Rusk to Department of State (from Paris), 2 June 1961, FRUS, 12: 757–58.
289
Raymond L. Thurston and the deputy assistant secretary of state for
inter-American affairs Richard Goodwin, President Kennedy authorized
a policy of identifying and supporting a “viable alternative” to Duvalier,
putting in motion what was termed a “probing operation.”4 Meanwhile it
was decided to close down most of the Agency for International
Development program in Haiti and to suspend deliveries under the
Military Assistance Program [MAP].5
In early August signs that a coup to overthrow Duvalier might be at
hand set off a policy debate in Washington. On August 2, Thurston
cabled that a pro-American group of Haitian military and civilian officials represented the “most cohesive and effective challenge to Duvalier
that has come to our attention.”6 Although both State and the CIA
agreed that Thurston had probably exaggerated the capabilities of this
group, the agencies disagreed over what to do about it.7 The CIA, in the
person of Richard Helms, the deputy director for plans, and his chief of
the Western Hemisphere Division, J. C. King, believed that there was little that U.S. covert assistance could do to undermine Duvalier in the
short run. The State Department’s Edwin Martin, on the other hand,
wished the CIA to take a more active stance.
Just as this meeting with Kennedy was to begin, news reached
Washington that seemed to confirm the CIA’s pessimism. On August 8
Duvalier had foiled a coup attempt by the chief of staff of the Haitian
Army, General Jean René Boucicaut. Within hours of reporting his
intentions to Colonel Robert Heinl, the head of the U.S. Naval Mission
in the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince, Boucicaut had sought asylum at
the Venezuelan Embassy.8 For the State Department this was especially
ominous news. Boucicaut had been considered Duvalier’s most serious
4. Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 1 June 1962, FRUS, 12:
pp. 764–66.
5. Oral History Interview with Raymond Thurston, 9 June 1970, John F. Kennedy Library;
Port-au-Prince to SecState, 7 July 1962, “Haiti” folder, National Security Files, Box 103, John
F. Kennedy Library.
6. Telegram 56, Port-au-Prince to SecState, 2 August 1962, FRUS, 12: 769, note 4.
7. “The Situation in Haiti,” FRUS, 12: pp. 767–69.
8. Thurston’s cable describing Boucicaut’s flight to the Venezuelan Embassy reached the State
Department at 10:45 A.M., 9 August 1962. Telegram 67, Port-au-Prince to SecState, 9 August
1962, National Security Files, Haiti, Box 103, John F. Kennedy Library. Comments by the CIA
representatives of the 10:00 A.M. meeting with President Kennedy indicate that CIA headquarters learned of Boucicaut’s flight earlier.
290
9, 1962
opponent. Now the question for President Kennedy was whether, in view
of the failure of the local Haitian opposition, the United States should
adopt a policy of creating a viable alternative.
The meeting began with a report from Edwin Martin on the
Peruvian junta’s statement at the Council of the OAS.
Edwin Martin: Yes, well, not very fully, but we did know about it a
little before it was made public, fortunately.
President Kennedy: Then why did . . . They [the Peruvian junta]
had said there would be [unclear]. Didn’t they?
Edwin Martin: Their man here had said that, but they didn’t live up
to that.
I think, we feel that we probably, in getting the formal statement to
the OAS—of things they have said previously elsewhere—have gotten
what they consider to be a major concession and are not going to
[unclear] anything more.9
President Kennedy: Was there anything about the observers?
Edwin Martin: They will not make any formal statement about
observers. What they have said is that they will welcome representatives, individuals or groups, who will observe the election [unclear] the
country, if they wish. And it is possible that they may invite somebody.
What we’re hoping to show the Secretary this morning . . . is a statement on resumption which calls attention to the commitments they have
made, emphasizes the fact that they have offered to let people in. They
just need to come forward . . . for us to arrange to have—
President Kennedy: When did they make the statement about inviting people in?
Edwin Martin: Well, they made this first in the Godoy statement to
Ben Meyer, of the AP; and then they reaffirmed it yesterday at the OAS,
quite categorically.10 And . . . that we are looking forward to arranging
9. At the OAS, the junta’s representative agreed to permit OAS observers at the 9 June 1963
election. It was in hopes of getting this statement at the OAS that Martin had counseled delay
in recognizing the junta.
10. Ben F. Meyer, “Peru Chief Pledges Anti-Red Stand,” Washington Post, 6 August 1962. For a
text of the full interview see “Interview Granted by Major General Ricardo Pérez Godoy,
president of the government Junta of Peru, to Mr. Ben Meyer, Associated Press correspondent
in Washington,” “Peru” folder, National Security Files, Box 151, John F. Kennedy Library. In
response to a question about “inviting an impartial group of eminent persons to observe the
elections in June 1963,” Godoy said, “It is possible that qualified groups or persons will be
invited for that purpose.”
291
for people of international stature to be present to see how they carry
out these commitments that they have made.
President Kennedy: What about—Did you see, was it, Tad Szulc’s
article this morning?11
Edwin Martin: Yes, we knew he had the—one of our people was
there when the tape was shot.
President Kennedy: How was the tape taken?
Edwin Martin: I guess that if anything he just did [it] without
telling anybody, he had it someplace around the room.
Edwin Martin: Yes.
Unidentified: I’d say he has a great deal of experience. [General
laughter.]
President Kennedy: But I would think that . . . that makes it a little
more [unclear].
Edwin Martin: Oh, Víctor Belaunde has been running around town
making very strange statements, I spent an hour with him and—
President Kennedy: Does he represent the government here or is he
sort of self-appointed?
Edwin Martin: I think there was a certain amount of [unclear]. He’s
not an official representative in any sense, but they are happy to have him
come and use his international stature if that’s good to lobby for their
cause. But I don’t think you could label him as an official representative,
in any sense. They would be free to disown what he said if they chose.
President Kennedy: How can we get this in a way in which these
points that have been made . . . and there haven’t . . . I think we can point
to quite a lot of—
Edwin Martin: Yeah.
President Kennedy: progress, verbal and—
Edwin Martin: And the recognition of the inter-American system by
making the commitment publicly and formally to the OAS. I think we’ve
got to say that . . . which helps.
President Kennedy: The thing is, what would you see as the time
schedule on this?
Edwin Martin: Well, I think it’s, as far as we’re concerned, I think we
could be ready for tomorrow, [unclear] tomorrow noon, especially when
11. “Peru Bids Latins Oppose U.S. Move,” New York Times, 9 August 1962. Szulc reported
statements made by Dr. Víctor Andrés Belaunde, a special envoy of the junta, during official
visits in Washington.
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9, 1962
we know and give a little more time to the Latin American countries to
notify their . . . We’re checking—
President Kennedy: What about the Venezuelans, et cetera, what
would be their position?
Edwin Martin: Well, they, I think, from the start have made it clear
that they will not resume relations.
President Kennedy: What about the small, the small countries?
Edwin Martin: I’m not so sure about Costa Rica. But certainly the
Dominican Republic. Costa Rica and Honduras are a little less clear. But
two would certainly not.
President Kennedy: Do they feel that we have . . . ?
Edwin Martin: Well, I think that we have a chance at helping with
them. I don’t think they will feel hurt that we’ve resumed relations.
They’ve expected this and [unclear] to be isolated on this. They accept
that. But they introduced yesterday a modified resolution for a foreign
ministers’ meeting; instead of asking for a decision then to convoke at
another time, they said, “we propose that a committee be appointed to
study the question of the time, place and agenda for a foreign ministers’
meeting,” which is a little less severe. And our present feeling is that, in
view of the failure of the Peruvians to come forward with an invitation to
the OAS, we perhaps ought to vote for this: a meeting at an indefinite
future, perhaps with a somewhat broadened agenda possible. This is
coming up for a vote tomorrow afternoon.
President Kennedy: Will it carry?
Edwin Martin: With our vote, we think it will.
President Kennedy: Yeah. All right.12
Their statement with regard to observers, I heard you say, I didn’t
see anything about it in the paper, really, today?13
Edwin Martin: There is not, no. But—
President Kennedy: You said that they would correct the [unclear].
Edwin Martin: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Clear it up. Is there any way we can still take
that up, the . . . ?
12. The United States abstained on the Venezuelan resolution at the OAS meeting. It did not
pass. In his memoirs, Edwin Martin writes that this vote took place 9 August. Edwin Martin,
Kennedy and Latin America (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), pp. 355–56.
13. Kennedy is concerned that the junta’s 8 August statement at the OAS Council guaranteeing an invitation to OAS election observers is not widely enough known.
293
Edwin Martin: Yes. Well, I think we can take that up.
President Kennedy: The OAS, up?
McGeorge Bundy: Have they gone that far, Ed?
Edwin Martin: Well, that they would be willing to receive, and
that their country is open to observers, either individuals or from
organizations.
Bundy: That goes a little bit further than the interview then?14
Edwin Martin: A little bit I think, yeah.
President Kennedy: Would we be, could we—
Edwin Martin: Don’t have that.
President Kennedy: We couldn’t get the OAS to accept that and say
that they will send them, would they?
Edwin Martin: No, I don’t think so at this time. The noninterventionists would oppose, would block an OAS resolution to say, “we accept
we’re going to send.”15 We’ve explored that and we think not.
If the situation should develop in a somewhat unsatisfactory [way]
such that maybe next spring you could have a better chance of getting it;
but this leaves it the [unclear] open for the OAS to make a decision.
President Kennedy: Do you think that we ought to wait until next
week or go ahead tomorrow?
Edwin Martin: I think we ought to go ahead myself.
Edwin Martin: I think that we’ve squeezed all the juice we’re going
to get out of this. Jim feels, I think, the same way.16
We’ve got one other little problem that also presses for time. The
sugar issue is ominous. The Department of Agriculture, not realizing
the pitch, okayed a couple of shipments a couple of days ago. And, up to
that point, the sugar companies, both [unclear] Grace did not apply; but
one of the companies that is less cooperative did apply for two shipments
and Larry Myers from Agriculture called me yesterday to say that we
had just found out that one of his people had okayed it.17 Now this is a
legal problem; there’s some question whether he was legally authorized
to do so and Larry is trying to [unclear]—
14. The interview with Ben Meyer of the Associated Press; see note 4.
15. The noninterventionists were countries like Mexico that opposed all intervention by the
OAS in the internal affairs of member states.
16. James Loeb was the U.S. ambassador to Peru and had returned to the United States after
the military coup.
17. Lawrence Myers was the director of the Sugar Branch, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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9, 1962
President Kennedy: How could he okay it with all that has been in
the paper about Peru and . . . Did he not see it?
Edwin Martin: One would have thought so. [Laughter.] Larry Myers
is trying to persuade the company to let it sit in the in box until the end
of the week, and not get any publicity on it.
President Kennedy: Why . . . do you think that the publicity would . . .
Edwin Martin: Well, the publicity would—we would have to explain
how we did it under the law and this would give [unclear].
President Kennedy: What? Because we haven’t recognized them?
Edwin Martin: Because we haven’t [unclear].
President Kennedy: Couldn’t we override the—
Edwin Martin: Well, I don’t know if we could withdraw the authorization already given or not. This would be a little problematic [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, in any case . . . the only thing would be, it
seems to me, that Belaunde, that earlier Szulc’s et cetera, [Martin
mumbles agreement] doesn’t it raise the question of whether we want to
go ahead this week or [unclear] wait till Monday? But it’s a little bit
like . . .
Edwin Martin: We’re operating under pressure?
President Kennedy: Well, yeah, particularly as their statements did
not get the kind of publicity that would have—
Edwin Martin: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —made it easier, but we can think about that.
Edwin Martin: We will. We’ll do that. I’ll talk to the Secretary about
that.
Bundy: Do we have a text that would, in fact [unclear]?
Edwin Martin: I have not seen an English translation as yet, at the
moment. [Unclear] or not. I didn’t get a chance to see it. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: You can’t think of any [unclear] way that, so that
it doesn’t look like [unclear] . . .
Edwin Martin: Yeah.
President Kennedy: You see, we haven’t gotten really the kind of
publicity yet. . . . He may [unclear] and get conscious of the degree . . .
how far really they’ve gone.
Edwin Martin: And of course, the most previous New York Times
story that focused on Belaunde saying [unclear]. So that won’t be a surprise. [Unclear.] But it would be nice if the New York Times [unclear].
The New York Times [unclear].
Martin then turned the conversation to the principal item on the meeting’s agenda, U.S. relations with François Duvalier of Haiti.
295
Edwin Martin: With respect to Haiti, Mr. President, I’d just like to
make two or three general observations and then ask for various agency
representatives here to comment on their situation.
I think we have come to the very firm conclusion that the Duvalier
regime is irredeemable, there’s no possibility of persuading them to
adopt a more reasonable course. That it is one of the most brutal and
dictatorial [regimes] that Haiti has suffered. They’re doing little, if anything, to help the people with their economic or social development of
any kind. And it is following a consistent policy of encouraging a
buildup of a militia devoted to Duvalier at the expense of the regular
armed forces.
As a result of this situation, we feel that we must consider seriously:
one, the prospect that unrest within will accelerate and cause a crisis—particularly, unrest stimulated by the military fear that time is against them.
And we must consider secondly, what it is in our interest to do, following upon this framework.
There is also some reason for concern about Castro influence.
Duvalier has replaced some of his top officials with people who’ve had
Marxist-Leninist connections and there are some elements that might
take advantage of chaos to move in this direction. I don’t think we feel
Duvalier has any particular principles and would move in whatever
direction that suited his purpose in maintaining himself in power.
Within this framework, we have to some degree encouraged dissatisfaction by a series of actions making it clear or trying to make clear that
we were not in full-hearted support of the Duvalier regime. And this is
clearly known to Duvalier and to informed people in Haiti, I believe, at
the present time. We have just taken some further steps which will be
interpreted in this way, although their basis was essentially technical
problems with the aid programs.
And, I think it would be useful if Graham Martin could explain just
where we stand on economic aid.18 And then [Frank K.] Sloan can
explain where we stand on military aid at the present time.19 Because
these do affect not only our aid program but the political situation in
Haiti because of their impact.
Graham Martin: When [Under] Secretary [George] Ball on July
21 signed off on the joint AID-ARA recommendation cutting down to a
18. Graham Martin was deputy coordinator, Alliance for Progress.
19. Frank K. Sloan was deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.
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9, 1962
hard core, we put in motion the cancellation of the Artibonite area
development20 and the Poté Colé area development project.21 We decided
to go ahead on the airport loan on the basis that we had to do something to stay within the policy guidelines about the [unclear]. This has
the advantage as we understand it of providing a jet-capable airport
that we assume [unclear] would be for military use.22 We decided not to
go ahead with the road project because this would automatically trigger
an IDB loan, which was a maintenance thing, which would come along
afterward.23 We had canceled other parts of the program, leaving, in
effect, those elements which were more of a humanitarian nature, fairly
educational:
A rural educational project which is small but fairly well based
The malaria eradication program, which is largely and jointly, an
international program under the WHO24
We can phase our personnel down from the current strength, the
ongoing strength of about 70 to about 36 over the next few weeks. This
about, I think, sums it up.
Unidentified: Would you say . . . why were you in trouble there . . .
the technical reasons?
Graham Martin: Well, the technical reasons are that on the use of
personnel there has been a progressive, both on equipment and personnel
. . . a diversion of the resources for purely political uses of the Duvalier
regime. Because of this, actually, the Artibonite and Poté Colé suspension
20. In the Artibonite Valley Project, the U.S. Agency for International Development [AID] supplied assistance to promote vegetable and fruit production in the valley. A State Department
inspection in late June 1962, conducted by the Bureau of American Republics Affairs [ARA], concluded that AID should divorce itself from the Artibonite Project: “Massive expenditures over a
long period of time, plus a level of Haitian administrative, technical, and financial support which
we see no serious prospect of coming into being, would be required to make the project work”
(J. K. Mansfield to Fowler Hamilton, 26 June 1962, RG 59, Haiti 1952–64, Box 4, Archives II.
Mansfield was a special assistant to the Secretary of State for foreign aid coordination. See Oral
History Interview with Raymond Thurston, 9 June 1970, John F. Kennedy Library).
21. The Poté Colé area development project was under joint U.S.-Haitian management, initiated in 1958, in the northern part of Haiti. The goal was to assist the development of small
manufacturing plants and tourist facilities. (“Designation, Joint Responsibilities and Duties of
Principal Haitian and American Officials in Operations Poté Colé,” 4 May 1961, RG 59, Haiti
1952–64, Box 4, Archives II.)
22. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT)
were interested in the completion of the new commercial airfield in Port-au-Prince. In May
1962 the DOD was able to alter the specifications of the runway, lengthening it from 7,460 to
8,000 feet, to accommodate jets (see correspondence on the Airport Loan, ibid.).
23. The abbreviation IDB stands for the International Development Bank.
24. The acronym WHO stands for the World Health Organization.
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is not really being noticed, because in effect they had been suspended for
quite some time while this technical issue was in debate over there.
President Kennedy: Is there—did we make, did we make a commitment in front of [unclear] in regard to the [unclear] project or [unclear]
project?
Graham Martin: It’s a question of whether it actually was a commitment on the airport loan and the highway loan.25 And they were discussed.
Unidentified: And I think that there was a commitment.
President Kennedy: There was?
Unidentified: Since we [unclear] at the time.
Unidentified: Was it? Was it? It was—
Unidentified: And they understood it as well.
Unidentified: It was a commitment, Mr. President, that had certain
conditions attached to it, that the Haitians were to perform in connection with the loans. That they were to meet normal requirements established for loans of this type and one of the serious difficulties we have
had with the Haitians is that they have violated written assurances on
the diversion of equipment as Mr. Martin has said from our projects for
entirely political purposes.
President Kennedy: To do what?
Unidentified: They have used trucks and earthmoving equipment for
a special project arranged by President Duvalier, which is entirely,
almost entirely a shakedown of the business community in Port-auPrince. This is supposed to be a model city called Duvalierville. The
earthmoving equipment has been diverted to the preparation of the
ground for this undertaking. In the May 22 ceremonies marking the
reinauguration, the anniversary of the reinauguration of Duvalier, they
stripped the Artibonite project of trucks and used them to haul civil
militia and the peasantry into Port-au-Prince for the celebration.26
Edwin Martin: They were gone ten days, weren’t they?
Unidentified: They were gone ten days—yes, sir. And they have,
they . . . this kind of diversion which had existed in the past and on
which we had received written assurances from the Haitians—
President Kennedy: How much is involved in these two projects?
Unidentified: The Artibonite, for the last year, took about 1 million
25. An AID loan to build a road to Aux Cayes.
26. On 22 May 1961, four years after his election to a six-year term, François Duvalier had
“reinaugurated” himself for an additional six-year term, thus effectively canceling the presidential election scheduled for May 1963.
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9, 1962
of the total 7.25 million of the, what we call a hard-core aid program,
aside from the loans. The Poté Colé has about 750,000 dollars.
President Kennedy: Were these very important to him?
Unidentified: The . . . this is the point I would like to make, Mr.
President, one of the very important factors we have to take into account
is Duvalier’s use of our economic assistance and the military assistance
as evidence of U.S. support for him. He plays this line very hard and it
has had a substantial impact in the past on the opposition to him, who
look upon it as evidence of our—
President Kennedy: How much opposition is there to him?
Unidentified: The opposition—it’s hard to give in numerical figures,
Mr. President, but it is very widespread. It is centered in the business community, in most of these military sectors and among the intellectuals.
President Kennedy: Now, what about the . . . our Army mission
there . . . Marine mission? What’s gonna— what are we going to do
with that?
Edwin Martin: Do you want to talk about the [unclear]?
Frank Sloan: 27 Necessarily, the status of it is, the MAP28 [unclear]
deliveries were all suspended a couple of months ago for the very same
reason, that they were, well first, that they were refusing to account for
the material and to permit our people to inspect them.29 And I think you
have a good bit of the ammunition in the basement of the palace and
were not permitted to be examined and they were all—30
Edwin Martin: This is under the palace guard, which is not part of
the regular military that is supporting us. . . . And the military did not
have access to [unclear] [stock]piles.
Sloan: Yes, that’s correct, and he’s building up also the militia units
which have nothing to do with the MAP planning program for the regular army units with which we are working.
President Kennedy: Is that Marine . . . Marine colonel in charge of it?
27. This is a tentative voice identification. Frank Sloan’s voice has not been identified.
However, he is listed as the DOD representative at this meeting, and this is the voice that
briefs the President on the DOD situation in Haiti.
28. The acronym MAP stands for Military Assistance Program.
29. Although the suspension took place, the United States chose not to make a public
announcement of the suspension of military assistance.
30. The U.S. ambassador, Raymond Thurston, later recalled that the United States was “sending in a million dollars a year in ammunition, small arms and so on” (Thurston, Oral History,
9 June 1970, John F. Kennedy Library).
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Sloan: Yes, Colonel [Robert D.] Heinl.31 [An unidentified speaker also
says “Heinl.”]
President Kennedy: He’s living at the Palace?
Unidentified: No, sir.
President Kennedy: Where does he operate out of now?
Sloan: He worked with the regular Army people.
Unidentified: He works out with General [unclear].
President Kennedy: Now you keep him, you keep this mission there,
will you.
Sloan: Yes. We have 21 officers and 19 enlisted. The ambassador suggested that we might at one time consider letting this decrease gradually
by normal attrition but counter to that is the problem of not only maintaining our connection with the military that is very friendly to us but also
the use of these people on the ground in case of a coup or an uprising
because the ambassador and General [Andrew P.] O’Meara have also suggested a thing which we are going forward with CINCLANT to consider
at this time, the prepositioning of some riot stuff and small arms and
things of that sort which can be put in there quickly.32 And the principal
problem in this, from a strictly military viewpoint, is not getting the stuff
there but getting it distributed and having it used in a controlled and sensible manner. And so, I think that we have determined, both for its military
value and because it probably has very little effect on Duvalier anyway to
try to reduce the number of missions as a pressure proposition, to just go
along with them at their present strength and—
Edwin Martin: We [unclear] assumption that we’ve made clear was
that we did not want them to press Duvalier so far that he would throw
the missions out—
Sloan: Right, right.
Edwin Martin: We thought it was important to keep them in.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Now our relations are pretty good with
the . . . Is the Haitian army disturbed by the development of the militia?
31. Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., was a Marine officer who had written a history of the Marines.
Thurston recalled him as “a very rambunctious, colorful guy” who “came down here with the idea
that the Marines still had a historical role to play in Haiti.” He “pictured himself as kind of the
chief American, you know, sort of reincarnation of the Marine occupation in somewhat different
conditions.” However, as Thurston describes it, it was Duvalier who ultimately took advantage of
Heinl, regularly inviting the large Marine component of the naval mission to attend presidential
gatherings in their dress whites, seeming to act the part of Duvalier’s protectors (ibid.).
32. General Andrew P. O’Meara, commander in chief, Caribbean, visited Haiti on 23–24 July.
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Sloan: Oh, very much so. I—
President Kennedy: The militia, they have what, about five thousand?
Sloan: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: It’s [unclear] . . . What? . . . put to ten [thousand]?
Sloan: Well, we’re applying all the pressure we can to—
President Kennedy: Oh.
Sloan: —prevent this; but they’re [unclear]—
President Kennedy: What pressure can we put . . . what pressure can
we put on Duvalier now? Not much, I suppose—
Sloan: We haven’t been very successful. General O’Meara in his meeting there laid these things very hard out on the line to Duvalier;33 but
apparently got very little response.34 And about all we can do is what we
have done, suspend the deliveries and press forward with trying to keep
the army, which is U.S.-oriented, in a better condition and better—
President Kennedy: What about . . . the . . . possibly on the political,
military . . . you keep the military mission there, you go ahead with this
air base, which costs, this jet strip, which costs how much?
Unidentified : Two-point-seven million, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: And will be finished by when?
Unidentified: Probably in late ’63 it would be—
President Kennedy: The reason for that is primarily milit—, it is primarily military, partly political?
Unidentified: Well, this is . . . [He shows a chart to the President.] The
maintenance of the road loan, of the airport loan was a device to give
Duvalier something in order to avoid a premature showdown with him.
But an additional consideration, which was important, although not
decisive, is this military interest—
Unidentified: — in a jet-capable airport in Port-au-Prince for contingencies.
33. General O’Meara met Duvalier for an hour on 23 July 1962. O’Meara raised four problem
areas with the President: (1) civil militia, (2) continued closedown of military academy, (3)
misuse of and premature retirement of U.S.-trained Haitian military personnel, and (4) Heinl’s
difficulties in obtaining access to MAP materiel and ammunition in the basement of the
National Palace (see Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, “Haiti—Report on Conversation of
General O’Meara with President Duvalier,” August 1962, “Haiti” folder, National Security
Files, Box 103, John F. Kennedy Library).
34. According to Ambassador Raymond Thurston, who attended the meeting, Duvalier
deflected O’Meara’s presentation with “characteristic tactics of distortion, evasion, obfuscation, and outright mendacity.” He pretended not to care that the United States had suspended
MAP assistance (ibid.).
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Edwin Martin: The airport is to be run by Pan Am and [unclear].
Unidentified: Yes, I mean, this is a turnkey contract and the airport,
as Mr. Martin points out, is to be administered by Pan Am.
President Kennedy: What is, what are we saying to Duvalier? What
is our political proposal to him now? Under what condition would we
renew? Or what is it we’re, what is the attitude the United States has
towards him, now?
Edwin Martin: I think that we have not made any political conditions
to him, only discussing aid matters, particularly in terms of technical
factors involved in specific cases; but—
President Kennedy: The stories in the paper—what, a week or ten
days [ago] . . . it looked as if we’d [unclear] for political reasons, we had
more or less—
Edwin Martin: Well, I think that—
President Kennedy: That’s all right.
Edwin Martin: [Unclear] a story saying it was a technical factor.
Edwin Martin: And this is the line we take with Duvalier.
President Kennedy: What does, what is the opinion in Haiti in
regard to? Is it known that we’ve—
Unidentified: Oh, yes, this is—
President Kennedy: —had a break with him?
Unidentified: I don’t think that Duvalier is under any illusions about
our unhappiness with him. We have not had a confrontation with him on
the political level. On the public side, on the opposition side, the various
actions which have been taken, specifically the recall of Thurston from
the—
Edwin Martin: I would think that a note disclaiming his assertion that
the continuation of our aid meant we endorsed his artificial reelection—
Unidentified: Reelection, yes.
Edwin Martin: —for another six-year term, which he [unclear word
from Martin because of an unclear interjection from another speaker] last year
without the course of the term expiring, he got himself elected for
another six years. . . . He said that our aid meant that we believed there
needed to be a strong man in there and we’re supporting him. And we
sent an official aide-mémoire which managed somehow to get out to a . . .
public notice saying this was not true.
Unidentified: No, on the—another very important recent development, Mr. President, along these lines was a letter sent from Heinl, as
chief of naval mission to the chief of staff of the [Haitian] armed forces
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commenting on the technical level about the effects of the existence of the
civil militia on the role of the naval mission and the limitations which it
put upon the activities of the mission and the general negative effects it
had upon the development of the Haitian armed forces. Now this is—bootleg copies of this have circulated in Port-au-Prince—and have had the
effect of indicating again that Duvalier is not our boy. So I think that in
opposition circles and within government circles there is no question
about our—
Unidentified: —general posture.
President Kennedy: But the only question is—what will all this
cause him to do? What are we waiting . . . for what?
Edwin Martin: At this point I would ask the [Central Intelligence]
agency—
Edwin Martin: —to talk a little about the plotting that’s going on.
[Unclear.]
Richard Helms: I might say, Mr. President, that the plotting doesn’t
seem to be very successful. General [Jean-René] Boucicaut, the chief of
the armed forces, told Colonel Heinl yesterday morning that he is planning to have the coup in October. And by afternoon he and his family
had sought asylum in the Venezuelan embassy. So [some others begin to
laugh] it didn’t take Duvalier very long to move in on him, apparently.
The other plotters that we know about—
President Kennedy: I just wonder about the colonel, doesn’t that
look . . . This was going on for some time?
Helms: Apparently he’s had this in his mind for some time. He just
told the colonel this quite openly, to qualify—35
J. C. King36: We’ve had reports for some time that he was interested.
35. During O’Meara’s visit to Boucicaut in late July, the Haitian general told Thurston that he
found Heinl’s critical report on the civil militia very helpful (Thurston to State Department,
24 July 1962, “Haiti” folder, National Security Files, Box 103, John F. Kennedy Library).
36. This is a tentative voice identification. J. C. King’s voice could not be identified. However,
King, the head of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, is
listed as a participant in this meeting, and this voice complements Richard Helms’s presentation of the intelligence situation in Haiti.
303
Helms: Yeah, but apparently he’s had it now. There is a man here in
Washington named [unclear], with whom we’ve been in touch, at the
suggestion of the department, who also has a plan of action. He has four
cells, one in New York, one in Washington, one in Caracas, and one
[unclear] Puerto Rico or Santo Domingo. Whether this—
King: He works for the Pan American Union.37
Helms: He works for the Pan American Union. He is a sort of an
exile from Haiti. His family, though, is still there, a wife and four children, which makes this kind of complicated. We haven’t gotten far
enough along with this to find out whether he is the strong reed, but he
looks as though he might be.
But he has an organization called the National Democratic Union
which seems to stand for the right things and as far as anybody knows
and from our conversations with him, is a relatively honest person. He is
a 45-year-old man who used to be head of the Coast Guard in Haiti and
is supposed to be a very good administrator. But frankly we haven’t gotten far enough along now to find out whether he really has the assets
that he claims to have.
Now we think it might be useful to try and spin this out. See if we
can get down to brass tacks and [unclear] further, then find out if he
indeed does have something inside and possibly this would be a useful
mechanism. But this is all brand new now, and we are in no position yet
to talk about any specific plans or anything of that kind.
King: Our impression [is] that there are a good many different elements in the military in Haiti . . . have come to us. But the atmosphere
there is such that none of them trust each other, and we know a lot more
about the various people that are dissatisfied than any of them are willing to share with each other.
Helms: That’s right.
Unidentified: You have an impression there are congeries of little
groups, all of them the same with not too many contacts with each other.
Richard Goodwin: I say one thing that I think is important that
Duvalier is surrounded by two or three militants—Dessimore Blancher
and [unclear], who are very anti-U.S., [unclear] a Communist background. And I think that if Duvalier really loses hope that he can ever
37. The Pan American Union was a predecessor to the Organization of American States and,
as an institution in Washington, D.C., was incorporated into the Secretariat of the OAS.
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deal with the United States it can’t help but strengthen their position
within the government and their obvious efforts to strengthen their positions for the time when Duvalier goes. I think this is a danger [unclear
interjection] of a holding operation that they will get stronger. At Punta
del Este, the Haitians there were about as far left as Che Guevara was at
his press conference and [unclear] just probably following instructions
but those leaders there were fantastically . . .38
Helms: Well, Mr. President, one organization we haven’t even mentioned this morning: the secret police, known as the Ton Ton Macoutes
(TTMs) which is, estimates say it varies in size from 1 to 5,000 people. It
is a repressive force of no mean substance, and this is the one that goes
into the houses and takes the people out to jail and shoots them and so
forth and is pretty all-pervasive these days. So it makes plotting rather
dangerous business.
King: And it lives on theft.
Unidentified: Extortion.
King: Extortion.
Helms: Graft, extortion and all the other undesirable things.
Unidentified: The details . . . we really don’t have. I wouldn’t characterize it as the secret police. Say they are sort of the bully boys of the
regime. They’re not—
Helms: They’re goon squads.
Goodwin: I think in a lot of ways, we really ought to avoid any more
public anti-Haitian [unclear] until we have an idea that something’s definitely going to happen as a consequence. Because these people are very
dangerous fellows and they’ll succeed in strengthening their hands with
Duvalier if they feel that the U.S. is moving away from him very strongly.
Edwin Martin: I might say, Mr. President, on this business of open
moves that I was called in two weeks ago by the Latin American Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for a session on Haiti.
And this went for two hours. This was stimulated by a letter that Senator
[Wayne] Morse had received from a Newsweek correspondent with a
rather full account of a so-called crucifixion that got some publicity up
here and with other charges against the brutality of the regime and—39
President Kennedy: Who are they supposed to have crucified?
Edwin Martin: It was a watchman on a [unclear] project financed by
38. Ernesto “Che” Guevara was an Argentine-born Cuban revolutionary.
39. Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) was the chairman of the Latin American Subcommittee
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
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the IBRD.40 [Unclear] the TTMs had tried to get the tires [unclear]
come back a few minutes later and strung him up, apparently.
I think that the committee, Hickenlooper and Morse, particularly, I
think, are quite convinced that there is no hope for Duvalier.41 Capehart
wasn’t quite so sure, although he, I think, tended in the end to accept our
position.42 I think that . . . I emphasized the importance of training . . . of
not getting in[to a] crisis before anybody was ready for it, which is very
important. I think that this perhaps may have helped to dissuade some of
them who had been thinking of a resolution on the Senate floor cutting
off aid and the like [unclear] and so forth. But we would want to be sure
that this may not happen. But at the moment at least, this seems to be
sidetracked. But there is some active interest up there in this . . .
President Kennedy: Now, Duvalier has a . . . The ambassador spoke
to me about these left-wing people he has got around him, and then he
has this militia. Then he has this secret police. Now [unclear] let’s hope
in opposition to him. The question is really [unclear] what Dick brought
up? How do we sort of adjust ourselves so that the Communists do not
become his heirs and the opposition will?
That’s why we really should just pursue our [unclear] I think that
[unclear] antiseptic attitude towards him, somewhat removed but not in
any way, not verbalizing it. Because another coup really doesn’t do any
good if you don’t have anybody to work with. If all you’ve got is one fellow here in the United States and there is no evidence that he’s got anything in the island itself. And there isn’t really very much hope right
now of doing anything about him [unclear].
Edwin Martin: I think that publicly our position should certainly be an
antiseptic one, in which the aid actions are taken for technical reasons and
we do have the paper. The inspector general was in there, and he was in
trouble with the Port Authority, therefore he has it. He takes [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear] the heat.
Edwin Martin: [Unclear] talked about a hearing [unclear] . . .
Unidentified: It does raise the question about a Port Authority hearing and whether the stance that we take there will prevent this sort of
[unclear] to emerge.
Edwin Martin: Well, I think this would be desirable. On the other
40. The abbreviation IBRD stands for International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank).
41. Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa).
42. Senator Homer E. Capehart (R-Indiana).
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hand, Mr. President, I think we ought to consider seriously whether or
not the [Central Intelligence] agency should not be entrusted to continue with the evaluation of personalities and possibilities to see whether
or not a plan could be developed with our help, which might be coordinated and sensible and might have some chance of success both in terms
of removing [François] Duvalier and replacing him with something we
can live with. I would think that the next step that I would foresee
would be in this direction. Now they have done some preliminary thinking . . . [unclear] discussions.
President Kennedy: [quietly] What would the reaction to this be?
Bundy: [whispered]—[unclear].
Edwin Martin: —discussions we have had. But . . . I would think it
would be useful, if you agree, to move, to indicate you would like this to
proceed—
Thirty seconds excised as classified information.
King: Not very much. He’s got—They have done fairly full reporting
on people that come in and names of people that are [unclear interjection]
good contacts.
President Kennedy: What’s the last time he saw Duvalier?
Unidentified: About three weeks ago, Mr. President. They had a
long talk. He was flying on the 23rd July with General O’Meara.
Unidentified: They had a long discussion at that time.
King: They are in contact, I mean there is no breakup. [Unidentified
speaker agrees.]
President Kennedy: What is, what was the attitude at that meeting?
Unidentified: Well, General O’Meara made the military pitch, our
general unhappiness with the Haitian conduct on our military programs. Duvalier took note but made no promises of correcting the situation. It was, in other words the U.S. position was made very clear but
there were no —
President Kennedy: Promises.
Unidentified: —promises of [unclear]—
Edwin Martin: Since then we’ve gotten pretty much a brush off on
the Heinl memorandum about the naval program.
Sloan: Yes, [unclear interjection] [unclear] . . . a little rejection, that
sort of thing. The thrust of Heinl’s memorandum was that he had built
up this civil militia that was destroying morale and the usefulness of his
army, his organized regular army. He sent him back with a two line . . .
Unidentified: Yes.
Edwin Martin: “The morale is fine. The militia is an essential adjunct
of the military forces.” [He laughs.]
307
Sloan: Right. Yes.
Unidentified: “And this letter goes beyond the limits of technical
advice.”
President Kennedy: Oh, is that what he said?
Unidentified: Yes.
Thirty seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: Is it— do we want to encourage or discourage
our military and State Department people from engaging in these conversations? Because then it becomes . . . But I’m sure it goes right back
to Duvalier; and then if we . . . whether we produce anything from
these rather gossipy things, about whether it’s Duvalier or some person very far up.
Edwin Martin: People ask to come to see us; but it’s a little hard to
turn these around.
President Kennedy: Do you have any instructions, though, [about]
what their response should be?
Edwin Martin: The one question that has come up is [that] one or
two of them have asked whether or not, in case they undertook a coup,
we would come in to protect the Duvalier government as the established regime. We have sent back a response that “you should not volunteer any response to this but if you continue to be pressed on this point,
you should say that, well, you are sure that the normal U.S. policy of
nonintervention would be applied.” And if this gets back to Duvalier,
we see no harm in that either. This is good for both sides. [The President
murmurs.]
Unidentified: There is one point, Mr. President, regarding here, I
think. Duvalier’s constitutional term of office expires in May of ’63. As
you know there was this phony—
Unidentified: —reelection in ’61 extending his period to ’67. Now
from a legal point of view, we would be in a very good position to withdraw recognition from him after the first of the, May 15th, ’63. And, on
that occasion, if I assume we would be joined by Venezuela, the
Dominican Republic, Colombia, and others who are concerned about the
Haitian situation—on that occasion we would have an opportunity if we
wanted to take it, of a showdown with him. And this, in effect, this date is
a touchstone to the opposition. If we were to continue to recognize the
legality of Duvalier’s [unclear] beyond the 1st of, beyond May of ’63,
this would crush all hopes on the part of the opposition—
Edwin Martin: [Unclear] this recognition problem is a ticklish one. So,
if anything’s going to happen, it’d be desirable to happen before May ’63.
Unidentified: Right. Make it clear that [unclear].
308
9, 1962
President Kennedy: The fact that, it says here there are definite indications of awareness on the part of the Haitian officials that Duvalier no
longer enjoys unqualified United States support [unclear]. Does it weaken
him or is he able to appeal to the laymen? [Unclear response.]
Unidentified: I think there’s no question that it weakens him, Mr.
President.
Edwin Martin: He’s liable to appeal to national sentiment. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: No, I think the great mass of the people are inert politically; I think that he can, he or any strong leader can get them behind it
but they don’t identify themselves particularly with him. If there were a
change, I think that the adjustment in the countryside would be relatively easy.
President Kennedy: Well, all we want to be able to do now is to
maintain a relationship with Duvalier sort of removed, we’re not going
to, I mean we’re going to keep our military mission there, do the airport.
Nine seconds excised as classified information.
Unidentified: See if we can slow down the other program and the aid
cut off.
Edwin Martin: And see if we can develop some kind of program with
the personalities that we know about that is worthy of consideration by
you or perhaps the Special Group.43
President Kennedy: I think that probably we should not encourage . . .
well, we know a lot . . . but this cancellation no matter whether we put it
on about technical grounds or not—
Edwin Martin: I think so.
President Kennedy: —[should] be interpreted the best. We probably ought not to give him any more of an excuse because if it looks like
we’re carrying out a—he will obviously go more and more off . . . and if
the timing isn’t right then we don’t want [agreement from an unidentified
speaker] [to] have him liquidate all our chances, so I think we oughtn’t
to indicate any . . . you said that one of the recommendations [is] we
carry out on occasion acts of hostility towards him. Now it doesn’t seem
to me there’s much use in that now. We’ve made the point. I’d like to
have you all meet again next month on the —
Goodwin: I think also, [unclear] conversation between the ambassador [unclear]. We ought to keep open with Duvalier at least [unclear].
43. The Special Group (Augmented) of the National Security Council oversaw U.S. covert
action (see “Meeting on Brazil,” 30 July, 1962).
309
President Kennedy: Yeah. We’d set some conditions if he would do
something about that—
Goodwin: That’s right.
President Kennedy: —these. We shouldn’t have him feel that this is a
. . . We don’t, until . . . unless we see some alternative then there might
become a time when we just break it. But when we don’t have any alternative today, I think it’s just foolish to push him into extreme positions.
I’d like the [unclear] to find out . . . The only thing that I would like to
have added here is: What is it that we’d like Duvalier to do? So that at
least Thurston understands if he ever gets into a conversation, what it is
. . . We have what appears to be a reasonable posture [unclear].
Edwin Martin: [Unclear] about that.
Unidentified: Mr. President, if I—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] Duvalier [unclear].
Unidentified: —might make one point, in connection with this
Communist influence, I think we should all bear in mind that the continued existence of Duvalier in itself, the repressive apparatus does stimulate either the growth of Communist [unclear] or there is no . . . there
are two sides to this question of his turning to Communists for support
in the face of pressure from us. Even [unclear interjection] if we were to
withdraw completely from pressure, Communism will be stimulated by
his continuance in office.
President Kennedy: Yes, I know he’s staying until we look like we
have some opposition [unclear]. I suppose that we have to maintain—he
may be, he may be, he may be all we have.
President Kennedy: I mean, if we had something else then I think, I
agree go [unclear] him out; but it seems to me—
Edwin Martin: We need to try to create something else.
President Kennedy: Yes, but pending creating something else, you
maintain at least a link which would permit either he or us to a degree
to walk back towards each other, if that should prove desirable, if we
don’t have anything else. So I think the odds are . . . But I think we
ought to meet next month. I’d like to have . . . Perhaps we could see
what it is we’re . . . instructions we’re sending to Thurston, as to what
the conversation, what the response would be by Americans if they’re
approached by Haitians asking for some assistance. We ought to have a
rather formal answer. We don’t want a lot of different fellows talking to
different people.
Edwin Martin: So far we have just listened and given no answers . . .
agreed to do nothing.
310
9, 1962
President Kennedy: What do you think that colonel said to the chief
of staff, though, yesterday morning?44 We ought to know.
Sloan: Sir, that’s already done. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: I think we ought to, we ought to get a general
line on these talks. Otherwise we may all be out there [unclear]—
[Unclear response by Edwin Martin.]
Meeting broke up. The President left the recording machine running as
the Haiti team filed out and the next group of national security advisers
arrived.
The concerns expressed by President Kennedy at the end of the meeting
restrained U.S. policy toward Duvalier. There would be no active effort
to remove him in the short term. On August 10, Ambassador Thurston
in Port-au-Prince was advised that “subsequent discussions here at highest levels have led to conclusion that until we see more clearly path to
better future we should keep channels open to President Duvalier should
he attempt [to] seek accommodation with us.”45
Having just attempted to restore some control over U.S. government
plotting against the Duvalier regime, the President now turned to a
more-pressing security problem: Berlin. The cast of characters changed
in the Cabinet Room. President Kennedy may have stepped out as the
men got settled.
44. Kennedy is apparently asking whether Colonel Heinl encouraged General Boucicaut to
stage a coup.
45. Martin to Thurston, 10 August 1962, “Haiti” folder, National Security Files, Box 103, John
F. Kennedy Library.
Meeting on Berlin
311
10:55 A.M.–12:15 P.M.
[T]here is still a lingering attachment to the old philosophy
that if you simply threaten to use nuclear weapons, then the
Soviets will be deterred from any military action or political
aggression.
Meeting on Berlin46
President Kennedy was personally immersed in the ongoing Berlin crisis. Not content to deal with only the broad questions involved, he called
a briefing meeting on Berlin contingency planning in order to educate
himself again in the minutiae of the problem. Deputy director of the
Berlin Task Force John Ausland used National Security Action
Memorandum 109, approved by the President in October 1961, as the
basic guideline for Berlin planning. Ausland’s briefing had already been
given to General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk.
The President now asked to receive it. The briefing covered not only
current conditions in Berlin and contingency planning but also diplomatic, military, economic, and legislative aspects. It also dealt with positions, options, and possible actions of NATO, the United Nations, and
the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy had severe misgivings about the feasibility of
NATO’s policy of massive retaliation—using all available nuclear
weapons—as the West’s response to any sort of Soviet aggression in
Central Europe. NATO, and especially the United States, faced either
humiliation or nuclear war under that policy should the Soviets invade
West Germany or escalate a situation over Berlin access routes to the
point of conflict. The Kennedy administration’s proposals to increase conventional forces in Europe to allow a more-measured escalation of conflict met with little enthusiasm from the Western allies when Secretary of
Defense McNamara presented them at the NATO Conference in Athens,
Greece, in May 1962. The strongest reaction came from French president
Charles de Gaulle, who resented the implicit attack on national nuclear
forces. British prime minister Harold Macmillan also favored a policy of
46. Including President Kennedy, John Ausland, McGeorge Bundy, Walter Dowling, Carl
Kaysen, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk. Tapes 8 and 9, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
312
9, 1962
relying on national nuclear forces but, anxious to preserve Britain’s special relationship with Washington, was never as critical as the French.
The West Germans objected to the new policy for different reasons. They
believed that it would encourage the Soviets to grab as much German
territory as possible while calculating at what point the United States
would actually shift from a conventional to a nuclear response.
Unclear discussion occurs as the recording machine picks up the chatter
of officials taking their places. Only fragments are intelligible. As the
men settled down there is an intelligible segment of 27 seconds that has
been excised as classified information. An unidentified official is then
heard saying, “From a military point of view. . . .” The secretary of
state, Dean Rusk, opened the meeting.
Dean Rusk: Mr. President, we thought it would be helpful to give
you a brief review of the probable sequence of events in the event of a
major crisis on Berlin. Mr. [John] Ausland is going to give you the outline. There are a good many details under each subheading which we
could [unclear] at any point which you might require. But you might
want to see how this shapes up from beginning to end on a sequential
basis. Mr. Ausland, would you . . .
John Ausland: Mr. President, gentlemen. During the past year, the
United States and its allies have devoted considerable time and effort to
contingency planning for Berlin. The Berlin task force has prepared an
inventory of this planning, with a view to determining what has been
accomplished. This briefing is designed to review the results of this
inventory. In doing this, we shall use the four-phase framework set forth
in NSAM 109, which is commonly called Poodle Blanket.47
I shall begin by reviewing in general the four phases. I will then
examine each of the phases in more detail. This examination will
describe the political, military, economic, and covert actions which might
occur in each phase. The description will also include an account of
allied planning, the extent of allied agreement, and the degree to which
governments are committed in advance to a given course of action.
Following this review of the four phases, I would like to examine briefly
the allied organizational arrangements for Berlin planning and operations.
Finally, I shall review briefly the planning currently in progress.
National Security Action Memorandum 109 divides the developing
47. See “Meeting on Berlin,” 3 August 1962.
Meeting on Berlin
313
Berlin crisis into four possible phases. Phase I, during which Soviet or
G.D.R. interference with access is short of a significant blockage of
access to Berlin. Phase II, after there is a significant blockage of access,
such as a blockage of civilian ground access to Berlin. This essentially
noncombatant phase would be characterized primarily by intense diplomatic activity, a NATO military mobilization, economic countermeasures, and naval measures not involving use of force.
Phase III, during which substantial blockage of access continues.
The dominant event in this stage would be the use of force, which would
include nonnuclear ground and/or air action in East Germany or possibly Eastern Europe. These could be supplemented by worldwide naval
measures involving use of force. The purpose would be to induce the
Soviets to restore access. Phase IV would take place only after nonnuclear actions had failed to restore access. The dominant event in this
phase would be the use of nuclear weapons.
Now, I should like to emphasize at this point that this is a conceptual
framework which indicates the order in which we would prefer events to
occur and is useful as a basis for planning. It’s not an attempt to predict
necessarily how history will unroll. I might also mention that we have
no idea of rushing from one phase to another. Our aim rather would be
to stabilize the situation as early in the scenario as possible and work out
an acceptable arrangement on Berlin with the Soviets.
The four phases have now been examined quadripartitely by the U.S.,
U.K., France, and Germany in some detail. I believe it’s safe to say that
there is considerable agreement on them. The differences regarding
some of the details will emerge in the course of this briefing. Now I’d
like now to examine the four phases in more detail.
During phase I, allied vital interests remain substantially intact but
are actively challenged by the Soviets or the G.D.R. I should say that we
are presently in this phase. We will remain in it until some means of
access to Berlin is interrupted or until an actual agreement on Berlin is
reached.
The recording stops. The following portion of the briefing was not captured on tape:
The U.S. goal during this phase was to maintain its vital interests
and to seek an agreement on Berlin with the Soviet Union.
The bulk of allied planning had been devoted to this stage. There was
general agreement on measures to be taken in this stage, particularly with
regard to the preservation of ground and air access to Berlin. The major
exception was related to naval countermeasures. The United States,
France, and Germany believed that it might be suitable to use naval meas-
314
9, 1962
ures not involving the use of force to supplement direct responses to
Soviet/G.D.R. harassment of access. The United Kingdom, although
agreeing to plan quadripartite naval measures, did not believe they should
be used before phase II.48 The recording resumes in midsentence.
Ausland: . . . preservation of ground and air access to Berlin. The
major exception, as I shall explain, [unclear], is related to naval countermeasures.
Now, I’d like to describe the events which might occur in phase I.
This current phase, the same as phase II, is dominated by diplomatic
activity. Although a summit conference is not excluded, the effort to
reach agreement is pursued primarily at the foreign minister and ambassadorial levels. As specific problems arise, a resolution is pursued at the
appropriate level. This might be the commandant in Berlin, as in the
case of sector border incidents, or the foreign ministers in Geneva, as in
the case last March with regard to the air corridor incident.
Rusk: Or it might at this stage also include a reference to the U.N. in
certain circumstances.
Ausland: In 1959, the U.S., U.K., and France set up a tripartite staff
in Paris known as Live Oak, under the command of the U.S. commander
in chief for Europe. Within the framework of Live Oak plans, the allies
have made military preparations to deal with possible interference with
the allied access to Berlin.
Considerable tripartite planning has been done to preserve air access
to Berlin, for the most part within the framework of what is known as
the Jack Pine plans. This planning includes provision for dealing with
Soviet or G.D.R. efforts to threaten or interfere with civil flights. In
event civil flights should cease, there is provision to continue flying civil
aircraft with military crews. Should the Soviets damage, shoot down, or
force down and destroy an aircraft, there is provision for the use of
fighter protection. There is also provision for flights over 10,000 feet, in
certain circumstances. At the present time, although we maintain the
right to fly over 10,000 feet, we do not in fact do so. Finally, there is a
plan for attacks on antiaircraft or [surface-to-air] SAM sites if they fire
on allied planes.
Now, within the framework of the Jack Pine plans, the U.S. and U.K.
governments, but not the French, have delegated certain authority to
48. John C. Ausland, “Briefing for President Kennedy: Berlin Contingency Planning,” in
Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis: 1961–1963 (Oslo, NOR: Scandinavian
University Press, 1996), p.159.
Meeting on Berlin
315
[SACEUR] General [Lauris] Norstad. This existing authority extends
up to, but does not include, attacks on ground installations. In other
words, it extends through the introduction and use of fighter aircraft.
There has also been planning to deal with interference with ground
access. Since the end of the blockade in 1949, both German and allied
access have been subjected to intermittent but frequent harassment.
Methods of dealing with minor harassment have been developed informally. They are characterized by brief resistance and negotiation of each
incident until the incident is resolved.
Now recent, more formal planning includes serious forms of interference which border on blockage. Live Oak, for example, has submitted to
governments proposals for rules of conduct for allied convoys in event
they encounter unacceptable harassment. The U.S. has approved these
proposals for use for U.S. convoys pending allied agreement, which we
expect to reach in the near future. The rules of conduct and the delegation of authority under the Jack Pine air access plan, constitute the
extent of advanced commitments by the U.S. government regarding precisely what we will do in various contingencies on Berlin. [Unclear], we
would suspend with the actual decision, reserved until the event.
If allied autobahn access appears to be blocked, Live Oak plans provide
for several alternative tripartite military probes, which are known as Free
Style. These range from a few vehicles to platoon size. Governments have,
however, not delegated advance authority to employ any of these probes.
Planning has also been done to deal with German access, largely through
the application of countermeasures, economic countermeasures.
We, the French, and the Germans have agreed that the allies might
use naval measures not involving the use of force, such as in-port harassment and close surveillance at sea of Soviet-G.D.R. ships, to counter
severe interference with access analogous to some of the interference
last February and March. The British have, however, thus far resisted
the concept of using naval measures prior to blockage of access,
although they have agreed to plan for it.
Now, with regard to economic countermeasures, the nearly complete
ban on issuance of temporary travel documents to the East German residents, which was put into effect in September 1961 after the division of
Berlin, continues. Although there might have been advantages to further
relaxing the ban, so as to be able to use it again, on balance we have
thought it best not to lift it, in order to bring pressure to bear on the
G.D.R. to relax restrictions on travel to East Berlin. Quadripartite
agreement has been reached in principle on mildly restricting bloc travel
to the West if access to East Berlin is denied to the allies. Tentative
316
9, 1962
agreement has been reached with the Germans and the French to take
selective economic countermeasures [unclear] if persistent harassment
of access to West Berlin occurs. The British, however, reserve their decision until the event. NATO has also agreed in principle to cut off air
traffic to and from the Soviet bloc if a serious incident of physical interference with an allied airliner occurs in the corridors.
Now, it is not possible to predict exactly how long phase I will last.
By definition, it will end when it becomes clear that the Soviets or
G.D.R. are prepared to use force to maintain a significant blockage of
access to Berlin or until a viable agreement is reached on Berlin. The
Soviets have given every indication thus far of preferring to minimize
their risks and avoid a step which seriously challenges allied vital interests. There is no guarantee, however, that this will continue. There have
been indications recently that the Soviets may be planning to sign their
long-heralded peace treaty with the G.D.R. If they do, the scenario will
obviously be significantly altered. I’d like, therefore, to examine this contingency briefly.
Allied planning for a peace treaty, which now is once again under
review, has been based on two assumptions. First, while we seek to discourage the Soviets from signing the treaty, in the last analysis we probably cannot prevent this step without the use of force. Second, we are
prepared to continue our normal use of rail and autobahn access routes if
the Soviets withdraw from the checkpoints and the G.D.R. personnel
take their place and continue to carry out differing procedures. Now,
these assumptions in effect set the limits for allied reactions to any
Soviet move to sign a peace treaty. Prior to any peace treaty conference
called by the Soviets, we would propose to take action designed to deter
the Soviets from concluding a treaty, especially one which would infringe
our vital interests. At the same time, we would not want to engage our
prestige too heavily in the signature of the treaty itself. Our actions after
the treaty would depend on our estimate of the possible effects of the
implementation of its provisions. Our measures would be directed
toward deterring the Soviets or the G.D.R. from taking steps which
could lead to infringement of our vital interests respecting Berlin.
If the Soviets decide to conclude a treaty, they could bring this about
in a time period ranging from a few days to a matter of months.
However, it seems most likely that they would first take time to enlist
political support, including a possible U.N. initiative.
Now, a peace treaty would undoubtedly precipitate a crisis atmosphere.
Nevertheless, given careful handling and determination, it should prove
manageable. In the absence of overt action on their part, we would attempt
Meeting on Berlin
317
to treat the treaty as of no more significance than the Soviet agreements
with the G.D.R. in 1955. It is, however, always possible that either intentionally or through miscalculation, Soviet or G.D.R. action will result in
some infringement of our vital interests such as a significant blockage of
access to Berlin. In this case, we would find ourselves in phase II.
Phase II would provide our last chance to resolve the Berlin problem
without the use of force. The prestige of both sides would be heavily
engaged and tensions would be running high. We can expect the dominant pressure of world opinion would be to make concessions to the
Soviets in order to avoid the risk of war, although there of course would
be some pressures in the other direction.
The allied goal during phase II would be to employ noncombatant
actors to restore their vital interests. The Soviets, on the other hand,
would probably aim at negotiations without access restored, on the
assumption that this situation would exert maximum pressure on the
allies to make concessions.
Now it’s become evident in our quadripartite discussions that the
U.S., U.K., France, and Germany are in general agreement as to the preferred configuration of phase II. Particularly as we have examined the
alternatives available in phases III and IV, it has been agreed that we
should be prepared to use all measures short of force to reach an acceptable settlement during phase II.
During this phase, diplomatic activity would continue to dominate
events. At an early point, we will probably find ourselves in the Security
Council, if we weren’t there already, if not on our initiative, [then] on
some other country’s. Plans have been prepared, for example, to go to the
Security Council as soon as Soviet activity in the air corridors requires the
introduction of fighters. This could be in phase I or phase II. We would at
this point probably want to make unpublicized warnings to the Soviets as
well as the satellites. We would, however, probably try to avoid a formal
conference until the Soviets indicate a willingness to restore access. Now,
this diplomatic activity would be conducted against a background of
mounting pressure. To make clear to the Soviets our intentions, determination and prepare for the possible failure of our combination of diplomatic and noncombatant pressures, there is quadripartite agreement that
NATO should engage in a further military buildup or mobilization. There
have, however, been no commitments on details on this.
Robert McNamara: May I interrupt just a moment, Mr. President,
this is one of the weaknesses of our present plan: the lack of agreement
on the extent and type of the schedule for mobilization in phase II. It
depends to some degree on acceptance of the sequence of military opera-
318
9, 1962
tions considered for phases III and IV, and until we can get further
agreement on phases III and IV, it’s unlikely we can obtain any agreement on the type of mobilization for phase II. But I simply draw your
attention to the fact that it doesn’t exist at the present time and we will
have to work toward it in the weeks ahead.
President Kennedy: What holds this . . . Now what is the difficulty of
getting the planning on phase III?
McNamara: Phase III. Well, it goes to phase IV, basically. There’s
still disagreement as to the character and timing of nuclear operations.
Several of our allies believe they should occur earlier than we do in the
sequence of military operation, and this of course affects the extent to
which they would be willing to mobilize in phase II. But these problems
are being talked out at the present time and I think we’re making a little
progress, but it’s very, very slow.
President Kennedy: Where is the . . . Where do you have these discussions?
McNamara: In the quadripartite military subcommittee.
President Kennedy: Oh.
Rusk: Mr. President, I can’t help but observe . . . I think that this difference, basically, though, is still a readiness in Europe to rely heavily
upon the fact that if you threaten nuclear weapons nothing will happen.
McNamara: This is exactly [unclear] point [unclear].
Rusk: It is based upon an actual sequence of events.
McNamara: Neither do I, but it’s a. . . .
Rusk: So the [unclear] agreement is [unclear]. The other side is not
thinking about this on the same basis in which we’re thinking about it.
President Kennedy: And in addition, of course, by . . . They feel that
if we announce our willingness, that lessens the necessity for them to
take some of the economic and military [unclear] measures. [Unclear
exchange.]
Rusk: On the one side, they want you to [unclear] ahead of the event.
[To] threaten immediate use of nuclear weapons, but when you get
around to talking about what you actually do, then the Germans, for
example say, “Well, let’s go in with naval countermeasures at maximum
risk” definitely rather than use the military measures, than phase III.
McNamara: But because they talk and think in those terms, they
can’t bring themselves to consider the mobilization actions necessary to
provide an alternative capability. This is why we’re having trouble in
phase II. And that trouble won’t be resolved until we resolve the differences in phases III and IV.
President Kennedy: How much is . . . This story in the New York
Meeting on Berlin
319
Times this morning, was there some background briefing in an attempt
to . . . when we disagreed with [West German defense minister Franz
Joseph] Strauss? There’s a story in the Times [unclear] be giving our
view that we never asked them to go to 750,000 after this . . .49
Rusk: I don’t know the source of that and . . .
McNamara: I don’t either.
President Kennedy: So have you ever asked them to go to 750,000?
McNamara: I personally asked Strauss to go above—
President Kennedy: Five hundred thousand.
McNamara: Five hundred thousand, not necessarily to 700,000, but
to the point at which he could fulfill the NATO commitments.
Rusk: My understanding is he asked you to ask him to go to that
[unclear]—
McNamara: He specifically asked me to ask him.
Bundy: Exactly!
President Kennedy: So now he’s saying that we asked him but that . . .
well . . . [what] happened?
McNamara: Well, he blows hot and cold, and at the moment he’s saying in effect that we asked him, and he refused. Now somebody has said
this isn’t true, but it’s not true, on either account, that we did ask him
and he didn’t refuse. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: Then I wonder who . . . That story this morning
sounds like a very precise briefing.50
McNamara: It couldn’t have come from the Pentagon because there
are only a hand[ful] . . . there are only three or four of us that know of
this conversation—Ros[well Gilpatric] and I and Paul [Nitze]. We’re
the only ones that know of it.
President Kennedy: We didn’t put this out? That’s how [unclear].
McNamara: No, definitely not. Definitely not.
Unidentified: The Times had been working on it for two or three
days. [Unclear] called . . . [Unclear] asked me about a figure and I unfortunately never heard of him, so . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I suppose this is all really tied in because
49. The day’s New York Times carried a story, “U.S. Aides Dispute Strauss on Army.” Officials
in both the Defense and State Departments denied telling Strauss that the United States
expected the West Germans to increase their forces from 500,000 to 750,000. For details
about conversations between Strauss and Kennedy administration officials in early June 1962,
see “Meeting about Berlin,” 3 August 1962.
50. With the Hanson Baldwin investigation still going on, the President is especially sensitive
to the problem of leaks.
320
9, 1962
this article this morning, there’s all this question of when, at what point
to use nuclear weapons. Is there a basic, is this because they’re unwilling
to do the conventional [unclear] responsibility for us for . . . by our own
insistence on building up conventional . . . [unclear] ruining the credibility of this really genuine feeling or is it just because they want to put—
Rusk: What they are worried about is that if we don’t use nuclear
weapons or make it highly likely that we would early, that the Soviets
will grab off a considerable part of Germany and then want to negotiate
at that point, holding onto—
Unidentified: What they’ve got.
Rusk: —large bites of Germany. Now, what we’ve been trying to do
is to get the conventional forces up so that we have a genuinely forward
strategy in Germany, so that you don’t rely upon these plans that pull
you back 1,500 miles that the General proposed in the [unclear].
President Kennedy: But even with the use of nuclear weapons, I
thought the conventional force level of 30 divisions is a . . . that force
level was set on the presumption that you could use nuclear weapons
quite early.51
Walter Dowling: That’s right.
Rusk: That [unclear] force level is the initial level.
McNamara: But Mr. President, the analyses of last summer indicated
that with 30 divisions, assuming the Soviet buildup didn’t exceed something on the order of 50, the 30 divisions would be adequate to carry on
conventional warfare for some reasonable period of time during which
negotiation could continue. [When] I say reasonable period of time, I
don’t mean months, but at least weeks.
Rusk: Several weeks.
President Kennedy: I’m just trying to understand what the basis is
for the last month’s difficulty which you connected with the change in
demands at least as a signal and whether Strauss is putting these arguments out for his own purposes or whether there is a genuine dispute.
Dowling: I think there is perhaps a genuine dispute coming from some
. . . coming from one respect. That and I think that Strauss would never
really, or at least his military men would [never], accept that there’s a concept that you really could carry on with conventional means for a very long
period. There seems to be a feeling that very early on in this [unclear]. This
is the only real basis of this. The rest of it is just [unclear]. . . .
51. NATO policy directive MC 26/4 of 1961 established Central European ground strength at
30 divisions.
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President Kennedy: That’s because they’re unwilling, though . . . that’s
because they’re unwilling to pay the price of the conventional buildup, isn’t
it?
Dowling: No, I think actually the Germans are doing about as much as
anybody in Europe in the conventional field, but they wanted to tie it in
very closely with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Is this right, Bob?
McNamara: I would say, that it’s the result of three differences in
judgment, or I would call them errors in judgment. One is an overestimate of the Soviet conventional capabilities.
Dowling: Yes, yes, this is a great error.
McNamara: This has been a point of difference. It remains a point of
difference. It is not as great a point of difference today as it was a year
ago but it is still a point of difference. We’re continuing to try to bring
the two views closer together.
Secondly, they believe that there is a salvation in tactical nuclear
weapons. I think part of this is a function of lack of understanding of the
use of tactical nuclear weapons and the results thereof.
And thirdly, an unwillingness to build to the conventional force limits that they have agreed to in the NATO Councils. Now those three factors combined lead them to seek alternatives other than the use of
conventional forces. So then I think we can attack all three of those problems and we have, and are making some progress.
Rusk: So far as we know, Adenauer did not put any pressure on
General de Gaulle to get de Gaulle’s contribution.
Dowling: Increased.
Rusk: Increased. [Unclear.] When I was there, but Adenauer isn’t
trying to do something about that because it’s the French contribution
that is standing in the way most now of this forward strategy.52
President Kennedy: Why is it, Ambassador, that they didn’t go into
these . . . this at the meetings because it means it is difficult for us. We
seem complacent. They spend so much time emphasizing that. And we’ll
never take on this French issue, but the reason, I think . . . at least it’s
high for us, which are highly publicized and never with the French?
Dowling: I think that basically . . .
Unidentified: Watching to see [unclear].
Unidentified: Which isn’t to say that [unclear].
Rusk: Oddly enough Mr. President, I think it also is that he
[Adenauer] knows really that he can be more certain about American
52. France had shifted only two of its required four divisions under MC 26/4 to Central Europe.
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9, 1962
policy than he can about de Gaulle’s policy, so he doesn’t want to let de
Gaulle win. This is the anomaly of the situation.
Dowling: Yeah. That’s true.
Rusk: And he can afford to be fretful about us because he knows he
can rely on us [unclear] events.
McGeorge Bundy: It doesn’t give you much comfort. [Unclear
exchange.]
President Kennedy: But I think [unclear] because we spend an awful
lot of time reassuring, don’t we, and probably the French don’t do it. I
don’t know whether . . .
Dowling: Well, the French tend to, the French do, and I think that
every time that de Gaulle and Adenauer meet, Adenauer comes away
with a sort of euphoria: the most wonderful man in the world [referring
to de Gaulle], a great leader, [unclear] but actually to a lesser extent, the
problem isn’t between the French and the Germans. It’s [unclear] the
continent. But it’s nothing they’d [unclear] debate [unclear].
Rusk: But they can rely upon us.
Dowling: They can rely on us. But I think that—we’ve talked about
this—I think the problem is to tie this to some [unclear]. [Unclear] tell
Adenauer. [Unclear.]
Rusk: But we’ve got to turn this inquiry around. If they can keep asking questions, and throwing up questions about our motives first, we’ve
got to convert that into a flagging to us that there’s something wrong
with their side; therefore they’ve got to find a way to reassure us about
what they’ll do. [All sit silent for a moment. Ausland continues his briefing.]
Ausland: If Soviet action resulted in . . .
Rusk: [Unclear] just a little, Mr. Ausland? Speak up just a little
[unclear].
Ausland: Okay. If allied ground access were affected by the Soviet
action, plans exist for a garrison air lift to carry the necessary passengers and freight. If civilian ground access were blocked, it would become
necessary to resort to the Berlin stockpile, and implement QBAL, or the
Quadripartite Berlin Airlift. The quadripartite powers are also examining the possibility of the alliance taking civilian motor traffic at some
point under their aegis. This would involve giving civilian motor traffic
the outward character of allied military traffic. If such an attempt were
resisted by the Soviets, which seems likely, the Soviets would have
directly engaged the allies on the ground, and contingency planning for
a blockage of allied access would become applicable.
Now if the interruption in phase I were related to air access, the
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323
Soviet challenge would have been met within the framework of the Jack
Pine plans, which I described in connection with phase I. These actions,
such as the Military Sponsored Air Service, which would [unclear] civil
planes, or fighter escorts, could carry over into phase II.
Quadripartite agreement has also been reached that naval measures
not involving the use of force, such as close surveillance of Soviet/G.D.R.
ships, and declaration of exercise areas across sea lanes used by Soviet or
G.D.R. vessels, could be used at this time to bring pressure on the Soviets.
There is also quadripartite agreement that another form of pressure
that we could bring to bear on the Soviets would be economic countermeasures. Now these fall into three categories: severing or limiting
exchanges with the bloc in other than trade fields, such as cultural,
restrictions on transport and movement of persons, particularly those
involved in trade, and selective or full trade embargo, including interzonal trade. And the extent to which you would go in implementing full
embargo I think would depend on the situation at the time.
The NATO Council has examined these measures and substantial
agreement has been reached, particularly regarding the total embargo
and air countermeasures which would involve stopping Soviet flights
into the West.
The U.S. would also propose during this phase to encourage passive
resistance in the G.D.R., and we are at present discussing this with our
three allies.
Now the question [is] sometimes asked, “How long would phase II
last?” This has been hard to predict with any certainty. Since, however,
unless blockage were ended, phase II would last until either we or the
Soviets resorted to force to resolve the impasse, we could hope that it
would be a matter of months rather than days.
President Kennedy: How much of the selective or full trade embargo
has been agreed upon for example, with regard to NATO countries as
opposed to Soviet bloc countries? Is there any agreement on that?
Ausland: They’ve agreed in principle, sir. The best that you have
there is an agreement in principle.
Rusk: I think if we have a complete embargo of Berlin, I think measures
would move very fast. I really don’t think that in the face of that embargo
you would have much trouble getting [unclear] agreement on this.
Ausland: As I say, we would hope that phase II would last a matter of
months rather than days. We and our allies would want to explore every
avenue for a peaceful result. We would also want to give the pressures
we will bring to bear on the Soviets a chance to take effect. Time will
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also be required for our mobilization, to place us in a position to use
force, if necessary, with acceptable risk. We should keep in mind, however, that the length of phase II will be conditioned by the fact that allied
prestige will be heavily engaged in the restoration of our vital interests.
Since we are unable to predict the length of phase II, we believe that our
plans should be flexible enough to provide for various lengths.
Now, if despite the actions taken in phase II, allied rights are not
restored, and there is a serious deterioration of the Berlin situation, the
U.S. believes that the tripartite allies should take appropriate action to
clarify whether the Soviets and G.D.R. intend to maintain blockage of
ground or air access, while at the same time making clear allied intention to reopen access. This would be done with some sort of probe.
Now, if it were clear that the Soviets or G.D.R. intend to maintain
blockage of access, as a result of this probe, the U.S. believes that the
allies should initiate military actions designed to induce the Soviets to
reopen access.
Now this phase, or phase III, would mark the commencement of
offensive, nonnuclear combat. It would be implemented by means of a
plan, or plans, drawn from the Live Oak or NATO catalogue. It is the
U.S. view that phase III should start under tripartite control, and that
the shift to NATO control would take place at the time when a tripartite
operation came under attack by Soviet or G.D.R. forces.53
Now, plans available for phase III include, on the ground: the Live
Oak battalion-level plan, Trade Wind, the division-level plan, June Ball,
and the NATO BERCON Charlie plans, which range from one to four
divisions.54 In the air: Live Oak Jack Pine III, which is an attack on antiaircraft or SAM sites in East Germany, and the NATO BERCON
Alphas, which range from fighter sweeps of the corridors to large-scale
attacks on Soviet bloc installations in Eastern Europe to attain local air
superiority for a particular period [unclear]. At sea, quadripartite and
NATO naval measures involving use of force, up to and including the
worldwide blockade of the Soviet bloc. As you will recall, General
[Lyman] Lemnitzer, on July 19, presented a more detailed briefing on
these SACEUR and SACLANT plans.55
53. The tripartite countries were the three Western occupying powers of Germany, the
United States, Great Britain, and France.
54. The acronym BERCON stands for Berlin Contingency.
55. See the memorandum for the record, 19 July 1962, FRUS, 15: 230–32. The acronym
SACEUR stands for Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; SACLANT stands for Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic.
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325
Phase IV, beginning in the U.S. use, first use of nuclear weapons in
any form, follows phase III when it has become evident that the conventional measures which have been used have been unsuccessful in inducing the Soviets to restore allied rights to Berlin, and when conventional
measures still in sight offer no reasonable prospect of success. BERCON
BRAVO, SACEUR’s plan for the demonstrative use of a limited number
of nuclear weapons, is the only Berlin contingency plan which is exclusively nuclear.
The other plans, however, include nuclear annexes for provision of
the use of nuclear weapons. These would be implemented with presidential authority under any one of the three following circumstances: First,
prior use by the enemy; second, the necessity to avoid defeat of major
military operations; or third, a specific political decision to employ
nuclear weapons selectively in order to demonstrate the will and ability
of the alliance to use them. In addition, depending upon the circumstances at the conclusion of phase III, phase IV could begin by direct
recourse to general war.
Now, I think it’s a little difficult to predict precisely what diplomatic
activity would be taking place just before and during these operations.
But it would be important that the allies make clear to the Soviets their
intentions, particularly the terms on which they would discontinue any
military operations. They should also make clear to the world their reasons for undertaking them.
During military operations, the U.S. would propose to encourage isolated acts of active resistance in East Germany, such as isolated acts of
sabotage. The U.S. would seek, however, to avoid encouraging an uprising, unless general war appeared imminent. We are now discussing these
questions of types of these activities [unclear] with the U.K., France, and
Germany.
Now, having described the framework within which allied planning is
taking place, I’d like to turn briefly to the machinery. Within the U.S.
government, coordination is accomplished primarily by the Berlin Task
Force, which meets regularly and includes all of the organizations listed
here at the bottom: Commerce, Defense, JCS, State, CIA, Treasury,
USIA,56 and FAA.57 The Ambassadorial Group is primarily responsible
for the coordination of quadripartite contingency planning, and has
under its aegis subgroups on East Germany information, contingency
56. The abbreviation USIA stands for U.S. Information Agency.
57. The abbreviation FAA stands for Federal Aviation Administration.
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coordination, and that’s really a political body, economic committee, and
military subgroup.
Then, on the . . . taking into account the organization in Europe as well,
you get a fairly full picture of the organizational arrangement involved.
The Ambassadorial Group is responsible, under the authority of the governments, for coordination of the activities of all these various groups. Live
Oak is the tripartite body responsible for tripartite military planning with
regard to Berlin and uses British Headquarters for ground planning, the
U.S. Air Force headquarters in Wiesbaden [West Germany] for air planning, that also has a tripartite command post to conduct actual air operations. Live Oak also, of course, is U.S. CINCEUR58 and SACEUR, and in
this capacity keeps NAC, the NATO Council, fully informed on what he is
doing. We also look to our four permanent representatives to the NATO
Council for pursuing our interests in the council.
The Quadripartite Committee in Bonn is responsible for political
planning, the commandants in Berlin for planning regarding Berlin
itself, and for this purpose, they have a tripartite allied staff [unclear].
And then of course we look to our four ambassadors in the U.N., who are
there. But that gives at least a simplified view of the machinery.
Now, in conclusion, I’d like to review briefly some of the planning
details on these works now in progress. The military subgroup of the
Ambassadorial Group is at present, as Mr. McNamara indicated, discussing general strategic questions and, to that end, is preparing a draft
four-phase paper for submission to the NATO Council in September in
connection with consideration of the NATO military plans.
President Kennedy: Are we really in such disagreement with them
when we get down to the practice of saying [unclear]? Because there’s
some theoretical argument that we’re [unclear]?
McNamara: No, I don’t believe we are, Mr. President, but because the
theoretical argument continues, we haven’t gotten down in the quadripartite planning to the level of detailed mobilization planning that we
ought to have on hand as we enter phase II.
President Kennedy: As a practical matter, there wouldn’t be really
very much difference in the timing of the . . . using nuclear weapons,
probably, once the situation began . . . ?
McNamara: I don’t believe so.
President Kennedy: It’s getting to be theoretical arguments; you’re
58. The acronym CINCEUR stands for Commander in Chief, Europe.
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327
never supposed to give way until . . . You’ll never get a compromise on
theoretical arguments. . . .
Rusk: I think this is a very important point, because in [unclear] case,
when these decisions have to be made, you want to know an awful lot
about the dozens of factors that have been proposed by every chief of government [unclear]. It’s a lot of help to know . . . what the question is . . . a
little more accurately before he tries to give a final answer, so there’s
bound to be a certain tentative element, and this tends to slow down the
detail and the accuracy of planning, on some of these questions.
McNamara: Yeah, but I think, therefore, we must seek to move over
this potential theoretical disagreement and into some assumptions, in
saying, “Well, assuming that we defer nuclear weapons, their use for a
certain period of time, what kind of conventional forces should we have
at that point and how should we plan to mobilize them?” To see if we
can’t get some attention to this mobilization very quickly, which might
come relatively soon. Now, in our own case I think we have some ideas of
what’s required. But to the best of my knowledge, there are no detailed
mobilization plans for phase II for our allies.
President Kennedy: So they . . . Well, how would you see the time
schedule as far as getting any . . . ?
McNamara: Well, I think within the next four to six weeks we
should try to arrive at those in the quadripartite military subgroup.
Rusk: There are of course, events that could expedite that greatly
because . . . simply of necessity.
McNamara: Yes.
Rusk: I think there are mobilization capabilities among our allies not
directly related to phase II, if actually brought to bear, and the mobilization could start [unclear]—
McNamara: But they’re so general.
Rusk: Yeah.
McNamara: They should be made far more specific. They’re the same
kind of capabilities we had a year ago spring which had to be greatly
refined and changed to serve the purpose of last summer and fall.59
Ausland: With regard to phase I, the contingency coordinating subgroup is conducting consultations on operational details such as Live
Oak’s proposals for rules of conduct for allied convoys, and the question
of possible G.D.R. efforts to require passports and visas for travel by
59. McNamara is referring to the Berlin Crisis of 1961.
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Germans to and from Berlin. We are also reviewing at present on an
urgent basis, our existing planning for a peace treaty.
With regard to phase II, the military subgroup is planning to examine
the details of a NATO mobilization and the question of coordination of
quadripartite naval measures. With regard to phases III and IV, the NATO
standing group has now examined the BERCON/MARCON plans,60 and
has returned the [unclear] submitted by SACEUR and SACLANT to
them for amendment. At the same time, the field commanders are preparing the detailed plans.
Rusk: Mr. President, you had a briefing about ten days ago on phases
III and IV. One of the key purposes of this briefing is to let you see in
broader terms everything that comes before it. So you can see that a
great deal would have happened before we get to these phases III and IV.
President Kennedy: When do we get on the . . . when do we . . . did
you say you’re meeting in September on the—?
McNamara: No, I said that I hope within the next four to six weeks
that some of the mobilization questions will be advanced and answers
will be developed within the quadripartite military subgroup. They’re
meeting continuously.
President Kennedy: I think that we ought to, if we can’t seem to get
an agreement on this question at what point we use our tactical weapons
. . . and then they say that until we get an agreement on that, they won’t
go ahead with the divisions. It seems to me we ought to consider turning
around and saying, “Well, we’ll [unclear] your position on tactical
[nuclear weapons], providing you will and the French and others will
agree to a satisfactory buildup of forces because the 30 divisions
assumed the use of tactical nuclear weapons almost immediately anyway.
McNamara: Yes, it did.
President Kennedy: So that’s no excuse. It’s not fair [unclear] their
NATO 30 divisions [unclear]. This way, it seems they’ve put it on us,
that we are less sympathetic [unclear] they can use that as the excuse for
not going ahead with the system of the French and all the rest, I should
think . . .
McNamara: However, Mr. President, I’m afraid that if we say that we
would consider the use of tactical [nuclear] weapons early, they’ll then
go on to say, and, of course, . . . it’s clear now that we don’t need 30 divisions under those circumstances. This is the next move. [Henry]
Kissinger makes this very clear, for example, in his July Foreign Affairs
60. The acronym MARCON stands for Maritime Contingency.
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article, and I’m certain that this is an underlying belief in the minds of
the Germans.61
Bundy: It’s a number they’d like to get away from—
McNamara: Yes. But I think we can approach the problem somewhere along those lines, nonetheless, and say, “Well, assuming for the
minute that we wish [for] an option at that point, either use nuclear
weapons immediately or not use nuclear weapons [unclear], what kind of
conventional forces should we approach at that point?
Unidentified: But they say—
McNamara: What mobilization should we have?
President Kennedy: I completely agree that if you didn’t have the
problem of Berlin then you would say that they’re right about this and
then as the first Russian soldier comes across the West German border,
then you’d consider using nuclear weapons. But given the problem over
the probe into Berlin, and the fact that we would have to initiate it, and
they have the forces up there, which may get involved in the fighting
inside East Germany, that’s what causes, it seems to me, our position of
the use of nuclear weapons to have validity. Now, they don’t agree with
that? Even though . . . I think their position’s not valid because of the
Berlin corridor part of it.
McNamara: Well, as Secretary Rusk pointed out, they’re quite unrealistic when they imply that nuclear weapons would be used very early
without question, because the heads of government at that point would
wish to seriously consider the alternatives in a way that those alternatives are not currently considered. There’s no question in my mind but
what that’s true of the British. And yet the British representatives at
various points in the military subgroup have talked as though they were
strongly in favor of immediate use of nuclear weapons. I am positive,
based on my own discussions with the British, that their government
would take a different attitude when they reached that particular point
in time.
President Kennedy: Well, the reason, though, for their theoretical
position is that they don’t want to meet the conventional [targets]. Is it
an economic . . .
Unidentified: Well, he thinks—
61. Kissinger was a consultant to the Kennedy administration for German affairs. In July
1962, he published an article entitled, “The Unsolved Problems of European Defense,” in
Foreign Affairs, which argued that a conventional NATO force based on 30 divisions “reflected
psychological and not strategic considerations.”
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9, 1962
Rusk: Mr. President, [unclear] they are hoping that nothing will
happen and they won’t have to pay the money for the additional
[unclear]. Now this is just about what it amounts to.
McNamara: And there is still a lingering attachment to the old philosophy that if you simply threaten to use nuclear weapons, then the
Soviets will be deterred from any military action or political aggression.
And it’s a combination of these two beliefs that leads them to the support of an immediate use of nuclear weapons.
Carl Kaysen: Their older concept is just more comfortable with . . .
McNamara: Yes.
Dowling: I don’t think any of these people that would advocate the
early use of nuclear weapons, would have endorsed the use of nuclear
weapons to take some of the military actions we discussed on page 3. That
would be the one to go out and seize, say, to the Kassel salient. I don’t
think Strauss himself . . . [unclear] say that we should use nuclear weapons
at that time because it presents a real hazard for West Germany.
Bundy: They’re . . . It’s only a good thing to do if you’re never going
to do it.
Dowling: That’s exactly right. [Unclear exchange. Someone says, “Yes,
I’d expect it.”]
President Kennedy: Well, now what is it that we’ve got to do in this
area? [Unclear] general [unclear].
Rusk: Well, I think we continue inspection on the political consultation, planning. The Germans want a final list to appear just before the
[U.N.] General Assembly opens. And I know we probably ought to go
along with that if the others agree. But I think the principal problem,
really, is what Secretary McNamara was talking about, to get them moving on these military plans and reinforcement because those are the signals that the other side will pay some attention to.
President Kennedy: Now, it isn’t considered likely that the peace
treaty would be signed over a weekend?
Rusk: Well, I think there’s a difference there, too. I don’t think that
they could move very fast. We are inclined to think that they would go
through a period of preparation, and not get, get a few of their bloc people together to sign a peace treaty in secret and then suddenly announce
it. They could do that; and that could happen over a weekend, but we are
inclined to think that would go through a much more elaborate period of
political preparations, going to the U.N. or soliciting support from neutrals or a variety of other threats. So we don’t expect it, but it could happen, and we’ve got to be ready for it.
Meeting on Berlin
331
President Kennedy: If Khrushchev comes . . . If they come to the U.N.
with a proposal in regard to Berlin that they would—a free city—there’ll
be strong pressure, I would think, that the U.N. for the recognition of East
Germany. I don’t think the unification of Germany has much appeal up
there. The only thing that does have some appeal is the free choice of the
Berliners. Do you think at any time we can indicate that we’ll abide by the
choice of the people as a counter to any proposal they might make at the
U.N., that we will abide by the choice of the people of West Berlin: to
either, one, accept the Soviet plan; two, provide for the continuation of the
present arrangement; or three, accept U.N. supervision.
Rusk: Well, I would think that we, in the first place, took the line
completely, of the West Berliners, on that point.
Rusk: Secondly, that we ought to make it clear that, if you could get to
the U.N. that what the West Berliners think about [unclear] East Germans
. . . would be very important to hear this at the U.N. I think in the U.N. that
the weakest point the Soviets would have would be the lack of any selfdetermination for the East Germans as well as for the West Berliners.
President Kennedy: That would be the theme we’d stress?
Rusk: Right. Yeah.
President Kennedy: Well, now, you say over the next two months the
chief problem really will be the . . . to fill out this framework? [Unclear]
this commitment?
Rusk: Well, we’re . . . as you may recall at Geneva, I urged Gromyko to
pay some serious attention to our deputy foreign ministers’ proposal, and
he said that you’ll have to take it up again in Moscow; they’re not going to
answer that in Geneva.62 He has not yet given us any reply on that, and
[Anatoly] Dobrynin yesterday didn’t have any new instructions.63 But I
think we may get a proposal from them of a sort that involves a ministers’
meeting of some sort, perhaps with some conditions or circumstances that
make it difficult for us, but I don’t think they’ve dropped the idea at all yet
of further discussions, either bilaterally or on a quadripartite basis.
President Kennedy: Now, if they should sign this treaty overnight at
the end of August, over a weekend, what is it . . . have we got our
response? Are we clear?
62. Andrei Gromyko was the Soviet foreign minister.
63. Dean Rusk met Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on 8 August. Dobrynin explained
that Gromyko and Soviet leader Khrushchev were on vacation. See “Secretary’s Conversation
of August 8 with Ambassador Dobrynin,” 9 August 1962, FRUS, 15: 262–66.
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9, 1962
Rusk and McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: It doesn’t look like we—
Rusk: We have a good many. . . . We have notes. We have public statements drafted on a quadripartite basis, and actually at the last minute we
are going to see what changes would have to be made in view of the circumstances. . . .
Bundy: Signing overnight, Mr. President, is extremely unlikely,
because they do have to . . . They will at least have to issue invitations to
those with a reasonable [unclear] the right to attend such a conference.
Dowling: I think they want to make it quite a show, sort of, you know, a
big event. But I think they won’t do it overnight, they were too [unclear].
Rusk: Mr. President, I think in the United Nations, whatever the attitude up there might be about the merits of the thing there would be
powerful support throughout the Assembly for a simple [unclear] talk
while you leave the situation [unclear] status and get the parties to get
together and talk about it further. And that’s the recommendation from
the [unclear]. That we move that way first.
President Kennedy: What about this matter we were talking about the
other day, about getting the Congress to give us powers to call up—?64
McNamara: Mr. President, we’ve looked into that. I think it’s our
view at the present time that it would be unwise to attempt to obtain
that authority now. We can obtain it rather quickly if it’s required.
McNamara: Exactly, but we thought we might wait to that point. In
the meantime, we’ve developed alternative plans, as I told you we would,
to call up Army units, either those that we have just demobilized or,
alternative units to fill in our strength, and similarly for the air units,
we’re in a much stronger position, as you know, today than we were a
year ago, and it wouldn’t be necessary, to achieve the combat effectiveness level of a year ago, for us to call very many men. In the case of the
Air Force, for example, we could accelerate the readiness dates of these
new squadrons that we’ve activated by calling up about 2,000 men, and
have a rough equivalent of the force that we called up a year ago, with a
total strength then of 25,000 men. In the case of—
President Kennedy: [Can we] call up those 2,000 men [unclear]?
McNamara: We cannot call them up, at best, unless you declare a
national emergency or unless we have a joint resolution as authority for
that action.
64. See “Meeting on Berlin,” 3 August 1962.
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In the case of the Army, a year ago we had 11 combat-ready divisions.
We added the two Reserve divisions, and then had a total of five divisions in training. Today we have 16 combat-ready divisions, or near
thereto. We could flesh out the support of those divisions by calling up
some additional Reserve or Guard personnel, anywhere from perhaps
10,000 up to as many as 80,000.
In the case of the Navy, we called up 40 destroyers last year, and 8,500
men, including the men for 18 antisubmarine warfare squadrons. Those 40
destroyers remain in what I call a semioperational condition today. They
have not been deactivated. Each one of them has crews. We could place them
on a fully ready condition by calling up something on the order of four or
five thousand additional men, and the 18 antisubmarine warfare squadrons,
if needed, could be called back to service. We’ve added to the Navy active
strength over what it was a year ago by increasing the amphibious lift by
about a third, and by increasing the logistical support ships.
So, it’s conceivable that, apart from the political advantage associated
with a call-up, we could avoid a call-up during phase II.
President Kennedy: Though we could decide [unclear], I would be
sure we could get them to give us authority to call up 50,000, between . . .
from the middle of [unclear]?
McNamara: Yes.
Unidentified: That’s the point. [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: If we call for a smaller number, it’s another period.
McNamara: Exactly so, being back [unclear].
Unidentified: You wouldn’t have to have a lot of hearings. You can
have a . . . speak to the leadership, you could get a joint resolution for this.
McNamara: And I thought if it was agreeable with you I would talk
to [Senator Richard] Russell and [Congressman Carl] Vinson myself
about this, and explain our views next week or the week after.65
President Kennedy: Right. OK.
As the meeting broke up, there was considerable room noise. After five
minutes of muffled and indistinct conversation, Rusk said, “Thank you
very much, gentlemen, for your help.” A few moments later, the machine
was turned off.
65. Senator Richard Russell (D-Georgia) was the chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee. Congressman Carl Vinson (D-Georgia) was the chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee.
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9, 1962
Meanwhile the President walked over to the Oval Office for a brief
conversation with Philip Graham, the publisher of the Washington Post.
Then, after making some telephone calls, the President went for his
before-lunch swim.
The President would spend the afternoon mainly on domestic issues.
After a short speech to a group of Peace Corp trainees, the President
attended a reception for Jewish leaders in the Fish Room, off the Cabinet
Room. All of this was secondary to the important fiscal discussion set to
start at 4:30 P.M.
The newspapers that morning signaled that this day and the next
would be the days of decision for the President as he considered whether
to press for an immediate tax break this fiscal year to jump-start the
economy. On this day he had a chance to listen to a group of business
leaders explain their point of view on the matter.
The President, in his remarks, would underscore one of the more
salient themes of his earlier foreign policy conversations: If he smelled
failure, he was quite capable of walking away from an initiative in which
he believed. He had committed himself to a tough policy against Peru
only to see support of nonrecognition dissolve in the region. Now he
wanted out of it. Covert action against Duvalier in Haiti was another
good idea; but as he had just reminded his Haiti team, the idea was good
insofar as there was actually a chance of removing Duvalier. Similarly,
for the President the tax cut debate was becoming less a matter of preference than of pragmatism. The meeting on Monday with the powerful
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills, had
left the President unsure Congress would let him get his tax cut, regardless of whether it was the right thing to do or not. The business leaders
visiting President Kennedy this afternoon—traditional opponents of
Democratic fiscal policies who were still carrying bruises from April’s
steel price controversy—were also not likely to offer the political cover
that Mills had been unwilling to extend. The President was looking for
powerful allies. He would not seek a tax cut in 1962 alone.
Meeting with Business Leaders on the Tax Cut Proposal
335
4:30 –5:47 P.M.
Let me ask you, isn’t it partly . . . if you want to stimulate the
economy, of course, you want to pass the cut. Really what you
want is a . . . is a deficit, and you want more money being
spent than is being taken out of the economy.
Meeting with Business Leaders on the Tax Cut Proposal66
Following an earlier meeting (Monday, August 6) with Wilbur Mills,
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and anticipating a
meeting the following day with his chief economic advisers, President
Kennedy met this afternoon with a contingent of business leaders to discuss his tax cut and tax reform proposals. Republican secretary of the
treasury Douglas Dillon joined the meeting as the President’s representative, a symbol of Kennedy’s appreciation for “sound financial policies,”
a strong dollar and for the general concerns of the U.S. business and
banking communities.67 Continuing to struggle with the business community after the April 1962 steel showdown, during which he famously
referred to businessmen as “sons of bitches,” Kennedy remained skeptical
about the possibilitiesfor cooperation from business leaders but knew, at
the same time, that it would be hard for him to succeed on the economic
policy front without their support and forbearance.
The ostensible leader of the contingent meeting with the President,
Roger Blough, chairman of the U.S. Steel Corporation, somewhat chastened by the steel price showdown earlier that spring, had become a
leader of the drive to help President Kennedy mend fences with the business community at large. Along with Alan Sproul, recently retired president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Blough urged Kennedy to
keep the balance of payments problem foremost in his mind as he deliberated on his budget and tax policies.
Sproul, who began the meeting by reading from a prepared statement,
66. Includes President Kennedy, Henry Alexander, Roger Blough, Harold Boeschenstein,
C. Douglas Dillon, Crawford Greenewalt, Robert Roosa, and Alan Sproul. Tapes 9.2 and 10.1,
67. For a first-person description of Dillon’s selection as secretary of the Treasury, see C.
Douglas Dillon, “The Kennedy Presidency: The Economic Dimension,” in The Kennedy
Presidency: Seventeen Intimate Perspectives of John F. Kennedy, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), pp. 128–31, 140–41.
336
9, 1962
had chaired a transition task force for President Kennedy in 1960–61.
The international economic policy counterpart to Paul Samuelson’s
domestic economic policy task force, Sproul’s transition task force outlined a program for the management of the nation’s international payments difficulties. These difficulties, both real and potential, remained his
chief concern. The President was no stranger to Sproul’s opinions. The
under secretary of the Treasury for monetary affairs, Robert Roosa, had
worked for Sproul at the New York Federal Reserve Bank and would give
much the same advice to Kennedy. In this meeting, the President would
use Sproul as a sounding board for his own ideas and proposals. The
other participants in the meeting were Harold Boeschenstein, president
of Owens-Corning Fiberglass Company; Crawford Greenewalt, retired
president and current chairman of E. I. DuPont de Nemours; and Henry
Clay Alexander, chairman of the Morgan Guaranty Trust.
The recording begins in midconversation.
Alan Sproul: [reading from a written statement]
. . . 10 percent in all income tax rates, both personal and corporate,
with a greater percentage reduction in the highest personal tax
bracket to the fixing of the lower maximum rate. And, three, the committee recommends that the administration, to avoid any possible loss
of confidence in the dollar as a result of an enlarged deficit, cover a
portion of the tax cut by reducing expenditures not less than three
billion dollars in the current fiscal year, making reductions especially
in foreign expenditures so that both the balance of payments and the
domestic budget will be benefited. Further, that so long as the budget
is in deficit, new programs that involve increased expenditures should
be avoided. And finally, this recommendation assumes that every
effort will be made to finance the deficit out of savings.
Then we pick up with the notes for discussion today:
Since we were here about a month ago, concern about the dollar
has calmed down somewhat, but there has been no reliable improvement in its underlying position. Revised figures of the balance of
payments for the second quarter of the year are not so good as earlier
estimates indicated they might be and are really rather poor when
the crisis flow of funds [unclear] from Canada to the United States
337
during the quarter is eliminated.68 Nor do the July figures seem to be
as good as they should be, taking account of the debt repayments to
the United States by foreign governments during the month.
The paradoxical situation is that a month ago the balance of payments was looking better and the dollar looked worse, while now the
balance of payments looks worse and the dollar is acting better. That
is the danger of our exposed liquidity position, as distinguished from
our long-term solvency. The dollar is continually subject to swings
in confidence and sentiment on the part of foreign holders of shortterm dollar balances. Such swings within limits are an ordinary part
of the currency arrangements of the world, but the predominant
position of the dollar as the reserve currency of the world limits its
tolerance of continued uncertainty.
Meanwhile, the domestic economy has continued, in the aggregate, to lag behind our hopes and needs. The evidence of the leading
indicators of business activity is that business is approaching the end
of recovery from the recession of 1960–61. A certain amount of
skepticism concerning the accuracy and timing of the signals given
by these leading indicators is justified, particularly in view of the situation in steel during the past several months, but they can’t be
ignored.69 At best the present prospect does not seem good enough
in terms of continuing recovery and then sustained high levels of
production and employment.
We continue, therefore, to recommend a change in the mix of
monetary and fiscal policy as the best way of moving to correct a
precarious position of the balance of payments and to promote a
more vigorous recovery of the domestic economy. The way to such a
program, in terms of the balance of payments, lies through increasing the willingness of foreigners to hold dollars and reducing their
tendency to convert dollars into gold by permitting interest rates to
rise to more competitive levels and thus giving additional evidence of
the firmness of our purpose to defend the dollar.
The way to offset the effect of such monetary action upon the lagging domestic economy lies in a reduction of taxes such as we have
recommended. The way to avoid the damage to confidence which a
68. Following the recent Canadian dollar devaluation.
69. The steel industry was then grappling with the problem of a widely reported lag in profits, caused chiefly by rising foreign competition.
338
9, 1962
tax-induced increase in the budgetary deficit might create is to avoid
further increases in government spending and to bring about some
reductions. A planned budgetary deficit growing out of action taken
to reduce the tax burden on economic growth is less destructive of
confidence than an unplanned budgetary deficit growing out of the
failure of a sluggish economy to produce adequate revenues.
Our feeling of urgency has not abated. A loss of confidence in the
dollar, illogical or irrational though it might be, is a constant threat.
Our previous policy for meeting our responsibilities for the balance
of payments and the domestic economy, which comprised balancing
the budget for fiscal 1963, maintaining relatively easy money, and
taking a number of special steps to improve particular items of the
balance of payments, has now run down.
[Stops reading to interject.] And I might say there that we do not tend
to play down what has been accomplished in the field of improving our
financial relationships and our cooperative arrangements with international institutions and foreign central banks. We think a great deal has
been accomplished, but we say, [begins reading again]:
that we are backing into a budget deficit, easy money no longer
provides an obvious thrust to the economy, and that our various special moves to improve the balance of payments do not add up to a
program which is easily understood and which gives assurance of
strong purpose and ultimate success.
We think the hazards of waiting for further definition of our
domestic position before moving on taxes and of relying on a more
favorable balance of payments position which may exist after 1963—
these hazards are greater than the risk of acting boldly now while
our strength is still great and our repeated affirmations of our intention to maintain the gold value of the dollar still carry conviction.
We and the international monetary system cannot afford many more
dollar crises. We ought to move decisively now from the program
suggested to reduce the hazard inherent in our short-term liability
position. In that way we shall earn the time to grapple with the more
difficult longer-term problems which involve our technical equipment and skills, our innovational ingenuity, and our cost-price levels
as compared with other advanced industrial countries, all of which
will ultimately determine our balance of payments position.
A strongly presented program for meeting the existing simple situation, which is simple in its outlines but comprehensive in its atten-
339
tion to the discipline of the balance of payments and the requirements
of the domestic economy, could galvanize sentiment at home and
abroad. It could be much more effective than promises of a favorable
balance of payments after 1963 and of a tax cut effective in 1963.
We are not unaware of the obstacles for the adoption of such a
program, which you can assess much better than we. We do think,
however, that if such a program is not immediately feasible, you
should support your declared intention of defending the value of the
dollar with a further declaration that we will not countenance easier
money and increased government spending as an alternative to the
program we have outlined—an alternative which we believe would
be disastrous to our balance of payments positions.
President Kennedy: You know . . . I don’t know what impression you
got up there at the Joint Committee, but Mills told me that he thought
the committee was not convinced that there was a majority for a tax cut,
that a number of the members are rather fractious.70 He said that the . . .
at least half of them were against any tax cut and the remaining half that
might be for it, they’d all be for something so different that it’d be very
difficult to get a consensus.71 Even though—looking over all the testimony—I would say that the general weight is probably more in favor of
a tax cut, though a different kind.
Crawford Greenewalt: Well, the impression I got was that there was
no enthusiasm, whatever, for a quickie.
President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s right—
Greenewalt: By quickie, I mean a needle in and then to be pulled out
later on. And I didn’t feel that there was any enthusiasm for a tax cut to
save a business recession. I didn’t get the same feeling about a tax cut in
principle, assiduously accomplished, which is the position I took very
strongly.
President Kennedy: Well, you . . . the problem is that . . . I think
that’s right, that there’s some . . . Paul Douglas has an article—who is
considered to be, probably would have thought that he’d be more in favor
of a tax cut. . . . That he’d done an article in the New Republic in which he
is debating against it. . . .72
70. Wilbur D. Mills was chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.
71. See “Meeting with Wilbur Mills on the Tax Cut Proposal,” 6 August 1962.
72. Paul H. Douglas was a Democratic senator from Illinois, 1949 to 1967, and vice chairman
of the Joint Economic Committee, 1959 to 1967. Having earned a Ph.D. in economics at
340
9, 1962
So that we’ve got a very divided Congress here on this matter, and
these problems are compounded by an election coming up in two and a half
months. Most of their positions probably would be that they would only go
in for a tax cut if the economic indicators were much clearer than they may
be, number one, and, number two, that a cut in spending . . . And it’s pretty
tough, they’re pretty good spenders up there this year. They will look
pretty good on the cut in foreign assistance and security, but they put in a
half a billion dollars more on defense. Their pay bill is tremendously more
expensive than the one we suggested.73 We failed in agriculture, and they
put 150 million dollars in the . . . on the improvements and increases in welfare, which, with the recent bill on reorganizing public assistance . . . So
that . . . and they haven’t really done anything about the postal.
So that the chances of getting a three billion dollar cut, as I said a
month ago, unless you took it right out of the hide of defense and space,
which would be . . . you’d have to change the whole space program, and
you’d have to take a pretty heavy cut at Defense, I don’t know where
you’d get the rest of it out. I know that you say . . .
Greenewalt: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: But, you know, I know it’s always impossible to say
until you say you’ve got to. But I would think the three billion figure . . .
we’re going to hold back on the defense part. And we’re going to hold back
on some of these others, but I think we, probably . . . the most we’d get out
of it, the total, you could by law, really, would be, probably be a billion
[unclear] what the Congress appropriates in the nondefense areas.
Roger Blough: A few . . . a few of the members of the committee
were talking about this. Mr. [Harold] Boeschenstein just returned from
a little visit to the Midwest where he visited what, eight installations?
Columbia University in 1921 and taught labor economics at the University of Chicago,
Douglas came to be recognized as one of the leading economic policy experts in the U.S.
Congress. He voted against President Kennedy’s investment tax credit legislation in 1962, and
he criticized the tax cut proposal for its eventual lack of progressive tax code reforms but ultimately voted for it in February 1964. See Paul Douglas, “A Tax Cut Now? II—It Would be
Wiser to Wait,” New Republic, 13 August 1962, pp. 20–21. In this article Douglas suggested
that “a tax cut now would inevitably make tax reform next year impossible” by leaving the
administration nothing with which to “purchase” tax reform from conservative business lobbyists. He counseled easier money and stricter antitrust policy as a means to improve economic performance.
73. Legislation (H.R. 7927) signed into law by President Kennedy on 11 October 1962, just
two months after this meeting. It passed in the Senate on October 3 and in the House on
October 5, and it mandated that the federal government increase the salaries of its employees
to levels more competitive with those prevailing in private industry. Its estimated cost for fiscal year 1963 was $504 million, and for fiscal year 1964, $1.049 billion.
341
Unidentified: Yes . . .
Harold Boeschenstein: Yes, some missile and space operators. I think
there’s some opportunities there.74 I mean, I think three billion . . . three
billion is an arbitrary kind of a figure. I think the important thing is
establishing a principle . . . of holding the line and . . . and pulling some
of this off wherever you can.
President Kennedy: Well I agree. We did save [unclear] last year,
just about—[Unclear exchange.]
Boeschenstein: This is terribly important. This is really terribly
important, and I think this is basically taken out of this kind of program.
McNamara, who understands these things, is in a much better position
because he’s got a seasoned organization, besides, to work with . . . to
work these things out.75 I’m satisfied that he will. I think an agency like
the space agency is like any new agency in government, in my experience, it is that they just aren’t organized to handle things as competently
and consequently there’s just one hell of a lot of waste.
I think there’s a failure, too, to profit by past experience. I spent three
years down here during the war—the War Board and ran the allocation of
materials and production for a period of time.76 And what . . . we tried to
coordinate everything by subcontracting, and handling all the subcontracts all over the lot is just an impossible undertaking. The logistics of it
are impossible, and your control of the money and the time, are impossible. And I think they’ve got to learn to deal through trying . . . trying to
deal through self-seeking, not established criteria and policies on all those
things. This is part of the way of saving money and . . . and not losing
effectiveness . . . but gaining effectiveness here.
President Kennedy: I agree; I think the space agency—
Boeschenstein: The same thing is difficult politically because the
political pressures are terrific in these areas.
President Kennedy: No, well, it’s not really that so much. . . . I agree
with that and the space agency is the prime target for . . . And then it’s
rather . . . Well, it’s the one area that the Congress gives them everything that [unclear]—
Boeschenstein: It sure does. That’s right.
President Kennedy: There’s no real congressional needle in as
there is—
74. For cutting federal expenditures.
75. Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense.
76. The War Production Board.
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9, 1962
Boeschenstein: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —in a good many other . . . foreign aid and the
rest of them. Instead, everything they ask for they get, so it puts a
tremendous burden on us to make sure that they—
Boeschenstein: Any new agency, as AEC was, they all are . . . the new
ones coming up.77
Blough: Crawford, you had some ideas about this?
Greenewalt: Well, there’s . . . there’s nothing very novel about anything I have to say. I just . . . take an example of our own book. We were
having a rugged time in 1958, with sales and profits all off, and we
thought we simply had to cut our costs. And it was perfectly obvious
that you could not approach it by finding a few big items and lopping
them off. It couldn’t be done that way.
The way you did it was to [tape skips] tell our departments simply to
do their job for less money. We didn’t cut out anything. There was no
activity that we were engaged in that we could cut out. Well, the result of
it all was we were able to get the cooperation of everybody in the management group right down to the foremen. There were some very silly little
things that came up, but the net result of it was that we knocked 50 million
dollars, annually, out of our costs. That was about 6 percent of our cost, ex
raw materials. There was not an item that was as much as a million dollars. There were an enormous number of items for two thousand, three
thousand, and some two hundred, and the way you had to do it—I couldn’t do it—but the way you had to do it was to get the cooperation of everybody, that had any control whatever of the purse strings and simply say,
“Well, will you do your job for 5, 6, 7, 10 percent less money?” Just do it.
And what this would mean is that Doug and his associates would
have to start the line and get everybody down imbued with the idea of
doing their job for less money.78 Not cutting out anything, but just doing
it for less. This will work. It can be done, but the thing is what it takes is
an esprit de corps, that goes from the top to the bottom with no delay. It
can happen, and it . . . as a matter of fact, you’d be astonished at the
results that you could get if you could get that kind of cooperation. I
think that really . . . I took this same position about a tax cut associated
with a reduction of government expenditure before the Ways and Means
Committee. But I think that really . . . a determination to do it, and a
clear feel on the part of yourself and to members of your cabinet that you
are going to do it. I think that if that was made clear to the public, I think
77. The abbreviation AEC stands for Atomic Energy Commission.
78. C. Douglas Dillon, secretary of the Treasury.
343
that would . . . that associated with a tax cut, would not be taken as an
evidence of profligacy.
President Kennedy: Let me ask you, isn’t it partly . . . if you want to
stimulate the economy, of course, you want to pass the cut. Really what
you want is a . . . is a deficit, and you want more money being spent than
is being taken out of the economy.
Greenewalt: Well, I was asked that question by Mr. Ullman . . . wasn’t it?79 And I replied to him this way, that if you look at the psychological point of view, you make a tax cut in personal income tax rates in the
order that we’ve been talking about, and everybody and his brother has
got some money in his jeans that he didn’t have before. This is going to
be felt by 150 million people very directly and very personally. They’ve
got money that they didn’t have before. Now, to me this is a very important psychological factor. Whereas, for example, a cut in government
expenditures of the sort that I’m talking about and in the way I’m talking about is not really going to be felt in a detrimental way by anyone.
There was an interesting study—I don’t know whether you saw it,
Doug—by the [unclear] people, who evaluated the tax cut that was made
in ’53. And they show that the leverage of the actual tax cut itself was
multiplied by some three- or fourfold.
Boeschenstein: The turnover?
Greenewalt: So that it’s so that if the tax cut was of the order of
three billion dollars, they had to run a multiplier of . . . well, I don’t think
it was that much. But the effect on the GNP was something like three or
four times that. There’s a leverage to it, due to a feeling of confidence
that was important. And the reverse on the part of government expenditure would not be so.80
Blough: Mr. President, on the question of the economy, Mr.
President, we had a lot of discussions about that. And we understand the
problems that you know better than we do. I’d like, if Henry Alexander
would comment on this, and give you a little bit of our thinking with
respect to the timing.
79. Al Ullman was a Democratic congressman from Oregon and member of the House Ways
and Means Committee.
80. President Kennedy’s Keynesian economic advisers recognized a similar multiplier but tied
it to Keynes’s appreciation of a consumption function not materially affected in distinct ways
by increased consumer or government spending. The tax cut to which Greenewalt referred
became law in 1954. It totaled approximately $7.4 billion, $5 billion of which was due to the
expiration of an existing Korean War income surcharge and excess profits tax. About $1.4 billion of the tax cut stemmed from tax reforms, much of which was offset by a concurrent $1.3
billion Social Security tax increase.
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9, 1962
Particularly, the question of the uncertainty with respect to when the
. . . You may have to face up to a very, very major problem as far as the
dollar is concerned. And there is a number in the Ways and Means
Committee . . . if . . . unless you and Henry testify that it’ll actually
recover with the total picture, that at least we’re talking about, that is,
reduction of expense, reduction of taxes, and change in the interest rates.
I think we—
Henry Alexander: When I was here last time, Mr. President, I talked
a good deal about my uneasiness about the dollar and gold.
Alexander: And gold. And you asked me if I would cut taxes if we
didn’t have a balance of payments or a gold problem just to stimulate the
economy at this stage, and I would say no. And I so testified before the
Ways and Means Committee. However, before them, as before you last
time, I did stress the point of maintaining the value of the dollar, and
that money was, if not running out of the country, it was certainly oozing
out of the country. And my whole approach and interest in the tax cut
stemmed from my uneasiness about the dollar and the gold problem.
Then, I think, the first popular step that anyone would take is to level
out the interest rates, but to the extent that that has any restraining effect, I
favor the tax cut in order to ameliorate any conceivable degree of restraint
with the [unclear]. I, obviously, just to my eyes, after three hours I suppose,
I didn’t get much reaction except I saw considerable interest on the part of
the chairman [of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills] in
the balance of payments, and the dollar, the gold . . . [unclear] which had
not been stressed in perhaps the whole course of these hearings. It had to
do with shall we have a tax cut to stimulate the economy and create a very
big deficit. My whole thinking and my whole testimony was to the fact that
it’s a part of our job of defending the dollar.
Secondly, there’s no quick trick that will do these. What’s been done
and the cooperation that you’ve gotten have been terribly helpful. I would
guess essential, essential. Some of these arrangements that you have
worked out in the trade [unclear] whole balance of foreign investment.
But the money is still oozing out, Mr. President. Your Telstar broadcast was effective; . . . there was some reaction to that.81 It was dramatic,
81. Due to the recent launching of the AT&T Telstar communications satellite on 10 June 1962,
the first ten minutes of President Kennedy’s 23 July 1962 news conference was broadcast live in
Europe. Included in his remarks transmitted to the Europeans, were the sentences, “The United
States will not devalue the dollar. And the fact of the matter is the United States can balance its
345
they saw you in person say that you were going to defend the dollar. But
the flow of money is still outward, and the dollar is rather weak. And I’m
uneasy that between now and even January we might have a heavy run
on the dollar. It continues to be the subject of talk and conversation,
both at home and abroad. And I think the orthodox, the clear way to
cure that—and I believe this program would—is an increase in interest
rates. And I’m not talking about high interest rates; I’m talking about a
movement upward in the general area of foreign [unclear] long rate,
that—offsetting any possible adverse effect by the tax cut—which in
turn, I think would surely stimulate the economy. It surely would do it,
more than any other way I could think of.
Of course, the members of the Ways and Means Committee, many of
them would want . . . They are against high rates. As I talked about rates
like they have in the Argentine which run as high as 25 percent, but they
can’t accept that [unclear] very well. We talked about currencies, then
it’s profligacy, and we’re not talking about currencies that are depreciating 25 percent a year. Of course rates are bound to be high. In a good
discussion I got no idea of what they really were thinking about, but I
had enough time and enough questions to emphasize the gold and
soundness of maintaining the dollar. Whether any of them were interested in that approach, I could . . . I think the chairman was.
President Kennedy: Probably there’d be a short-term flow of . . .
tremendous [unclear] . . . losses. What are they primarily? [Unclear.]
Robert Roosa: Well, Mr. President, a lot of the . . . these short-term
capital flows . . . part of it is the backwash following the turn around in
the main position—things that came down have gone back. Part of it is a
continuing spread of an awareness by American corporations that the . . .
whether or not the dollar is weak, they can hedge their bet by putting a
little more money abroad, taking care in advance of needs that may come
later, and I think at a time when they were still shell shocked by the surprise of developments in Canada.82 This brought home these possibilities
much more to American businessmen than they had seen previously.
So that a little bit of change by a number of firms caused a larger
outflow for these reasons in July than anybody could have anticipated. I
think that may already be slowing down. My own hunch is that this is
balance of payments any day it wants if it wishes to withdraw its support of our defense expenditures overseas and our foreign aid” [see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John
F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 568–76]. The
broadcast led to a temporary break in the price of gold on the London market.
82. After the Canadian devaluation and imposition of import surcharges earlier in 1962.
346
9, 1962
partly borrowing against upward movement that wouldn’t come later so
that it’ll still be a part of the same year’s balance of payments deficit.83
We just got more a little sooner.
President Kennedy: Where are these funds going to?
Roosa: Well, Mr. Alexander can tell Herb and I in detail, but broadly
they’ve gone to Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and France. Now, in the
case of Italy, I haven’t had a chance to talk with this about this group,
where the biggest increase has been, we’ve completely neutralized that
flow . . . absolutely locked up those foreign currency operations. We’ve
got nine hundred million dollars locked up. It didn’t all come in this
period, but all the increase, has—
Greenewalt: This is Italy?
Roosa: Italy. In the case of Switzerland, ourselves and the Federal
Reserve, within the last three weeks we’ve locked up another two hundred million that went in there. So while it is bad . . .
President Kennedy: When you use the phrase “locked up,” what do
you mean?
Roosa: We . . . oh, about . . . what . . . well, all we do is provide a way
in which, through offering facilities for forward cover—I have a memorandum on this which is coming through to you tonight, it should be
here84—providing forward cover for, that is, we sell the other currency
forward to make it possible for them to maintain their dollar holdings
without risk and keep investment here.85 It just means, however, that the
transfer of ownership has been to a foreigner, and it shows up as a loss in
our balance of payments. It does not, though, lead to a pressing of those
holdings on the foreign exchange market, and that is locked up in the
sense that it will not produce a demand for gold. Well—
President Kennedy: Regarding the American companies’ stake, what
are they doing with them in July? What would they do? What is . . .
where are those dollars going? I mean what . . .
Roosa: Well . . .
83. In the common parlance, particularly among political figures, the current account deficit—
part of the overall balance of payments—was often referred to, incorrectly, as the balance of
payments deficit.
84. “Memorandum from Secretary of Treasury Dillon to President Kennedy,” 9 October 1962,
FRUS, Foreign Economic Policy, 9: 35–43.
85. In these transactions, the U.S. Treasury would contract to sell any one of the subject currencies at a future date (often three or six months afterward) and at a fixed price. Were this currency
to appreciate against the dollar over this period, the issuing country would be protected against
losses incurred by maintaining, rather than cashing in, their dollar holdings for gold.
347
President Kennedy: For what purpose are they going?
Roosa: Well, for the most part, these are short-term investments,
bank deposits, and other money market instruments in these countries.
Some also under France but France is a little different case. A lot of companies want to plug a little money in there. There isn’t much of a money
market that goes into bank deposits there.
President Kennedy: Why do they want to move it into France?
Roosa: This is the most roaring, expanding economy. American businesses who are operating there, need funds. They can borrow or obtain
the money here much more cheaply than in France. The borrowing rate
in France is 7 percent.
President Kennedy: Yeah, now the thing I . . . the thing that I’ve . . .
even if you affected your interest rate by the amount we talked about last
time, which is half a percent—
Roosa: Yes.
President Kennedy: —that wouldn’t, it seems to me, you’d still
[unclear] it. You suggest that it would not have a very much of an adverse
effect on our economy, it would seem to me it would not discourage a person who wanted to invest in France or get into the European . . . with that
kind of a flow . . .
Boeschenstein: That’s, that’s part of the—[Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Now despite these . . . even with these high
interest rates, these . . . none of these European countries permit the
kind of flow we’re talking about?86 Do they out there?
Alexander: Yes they do. They—
Greenewalt: They permit—[Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] it’s just the interest rate differential
that keeps the flow going in the direction it’s going? Is there a [unclear]?
Alexander: Well, it’s—
President Kennedy: Controls of the national government?
Alexander: It’s the interest rate plus, I think, Mr. President, now,
from the outflow is motivated to some extent [unclear] Canadian
devaluation.
Alexander: Or we might have it here. And just yesterday, I guess it
was, before I left the office, there was a customer I [unclear], a fairly big
one out in the Middle West. They make a consumer product. They said,
“We are thinking of building a plant in Holland in the next year . . . year
86. Regarding the flow of foreign currencies into the country, particularly U.S. dollars.
348
9, 1962
and a half. It’s cost completed is five million dollars. We think we’d like
to go ahead now”—they have dollars—“and buy guilders.”
Alexander: They want to buy between five million dollars—they
don’t have that [unclear] be enough—of guilders. But meanwhile, they
could be employed, in Holland, at a better rate. They can rest there at a
better short-term rate than they can rest here. We now have them in
Treasury bills and commercial paper.
Roosa: That difference isn’t very much, though. They won’t make
more than—
Alexander: I know.
Roosa: —half of 1 percent.
Alexander: [Unclear] what they’ve got there if they want to—that
doesn’t cost them anything to do it.
Unidentified: [Unclear] devaluation.
Roosa: Uh-huh.
Alexander: And that doesn’t cost anything. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: What . . . for a half or a quarter of 1 percent?
[Unclear exchange.]
Sproul: You add slightly . . . a slight difference in interest rates to a
concern about the dollar over the future. Then you can get quite a pull.
Alexander: And the fact that we are willing to raise them in this lagging economy would be psychologically a very different pull as an
expression that the United States will move to defend the dollar.87
President Kennedy: Let me just ask you, though, if this company . . .
Now, I was just trying to figure out why if there’s only a half a percent,
right, that’s some advantage. But they figure that maybe in two or three
years we will have devalued the dollar?
Alexander: In the hope that—
President Kennedy: And they don’t think the Dutch guilder would
be devalued at the same time?
Alexander: In a year or two, they think that they may be short. They
may be used . . . to be needing the money to build a plant in the next year
and half. Plus there may be some droppage in the economy and they
won’t be allowed to move dollars abroad without a license [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, now, I can see where that would be, really,
87. Raise interest rates.
349
possibly, though I think probably we could get out of it if we wanted to
get out of it by changing the tax laws here . . . if you really want to make
it . . . prevent them from running away. I mean, these are all things you
don’t want to do to defend the dollar.
Alexander: These are things that—
President Kennedy: But—
Alexander: —people have some fear of, though.
President Kennedy: They’re going to just induce all these things is
what they’re going to do; that’s—
Alexander: I know it. I just meant [unclear].88
Blough: . . . we don’t know, but the total industrial activity could be
down somewhat next year. If any action is taken to . . . shall I say, move
in a certain type of direction—I’d prefer not to name the direction, the
direction we’re talking about—is delayed too long, the difficulty of moving in that direction is going to become just that much greater . . . just
that much greater. The possibility of changing interest rates will be that
much harder. The possibility of the tax reduction that would in turn
stimulate investment in this country is going to be that much greater
when a deficit looms that is greater than the deficit that you . . . that
you’re now facing. The possibility of cutting government expenditures
at a time like that is going to be that much greater because the . . . those
who feel that the total amount of money that’s pumped into the economy
is what’s necessary whenever you have a decline in economic activity are
going to be that much more vocal in their approach.
So the total . . . problem—and I’m sticking to the balance of payments now and not anything else—the total problems, as I see it, is
going to loom a great deal larger from the standpoint of any corrective
action, and in the meantime our friends abroad are going to look over
here at something, and they’re going to say, “What are the avenues that
are available to America?” And in my book they’re going to pick out
some avenues that are going to be different than the ones we’re now suggesting. And when they decide that those are the avenues, then they’re
going to do just what you suggested a while ago. They’re going to say,
“Let’s protect ourselves.”
Now, I think that—for the small contribution I might make to this—
I think that the last paragraph of the statement that Alan Sproul read
88. At this point Tape 9.2 ends and Tape 10.1 begins. Tape 10.1 covers the same meeting, but
an undetermined gap went unrecorded between Tapes 9.2 and 10.1.
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9, 1962
here is of a good deal of importance in the . . . in your immediate consideration. And we’re . . . I think we’re resolved among ourselves not to talk
about politics, but we realize the problems that certainly could be
involved between parties; we realize also a lot of other things. But when
you’re dealing with the value of the dollar you’re talking about a national
issue as distinguished from a party issue . . . at least that’s the way I look
at it. And you’re dealing with confidence, both here and confidence
abroad. And those things are not going to wait too long.
So, my view is that some kind of resolution should be made, and that
certainly this would be the direction that we would recommend. And the
second view I would have is that the actual implementation of your . . . of
this resolution, and I think Fowler or Henry, or Alan here, could indicate to
you, Doug . . . Doug raises the question of how you would do this.89 Would
you announce tomorrow a change in interest rates? No. But there are other
things that could be done in preparation. [Unclear] or would you immediately come out for a tax cut now? No, not necessarily. I mean, we . . . we’re
not trying to indicate whether you should or you shouldn’t; that’s something that’s way beyond us. But the kind of a . . . of a proposal, the nature of
it, the timing of it, the separation, possibly, during the early months of 1963
between the stimulant-for-the-economy type of what we’re talking about,
the investment type . . . But the separation of that from the . . . shall I say,
the reform-type proposals. In the consideration by Congress, it could, at
least we guess, be separated and the two worked out separately.
President Kennedy: I don’t understand, though, what you say about
the rescue of a sinking ship. We resolve this matter now and therefore
proceed again . . .
Blough: I’m talking about—
Blough: —I’m talking about. I’m talking about your own options.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but what I’m talking about is whether we
go . . . for what the problem is, is that we have to decide is whether we go
for this tax cut now with the chance of getting it before this session of
the Congress ends and with that we increase interest rates, or whether
you’re suggesting this is a matter that can be put off until—
Blough: Well—
President Kennedy: —after the election.
89. Henry H. Fowler was under secretary of the Treasury, January 1961 to March 1964. He
was later appointed secretary of the Treasury by Lyndon Johnson in 1965, a position in which
he served until December 1968.
351
Blough: —I don’t think anybody knows. We were talking about that
before.
Sproul: I would say that we would like . . . If we could do it, we would
go for it now, but we think you’re in a much better position to discern
whether that’s a practical program or not. And, that if you decide you
can’t get the whole program now, we . . . it’s not a piecemeal program
that could be done.
President Kennedy: I completely agree with you. If we had the
administrative . . . if we had that set-aside power, we’d go right . . . I completely agree with you; there wouldn’t be any question about—
Sproul: Well—
President Kennedy: —doing it right now on both these areas. But
the problem really comes down to the question of what the effect will be
of our recommending a tax cut and failing.
Sproul: I think that would be—
Boeschenstein: I think we agree that that’s bad.
Sproul: —that would be bad.
President Kennedy: So therefore, as tax cuts go, your judgment
would be that this . . . you know, you see, you could do it two ways. Say
that you recommend it, give the arguments for it, probably not get it, but
increase your chances of centering attention on the matter and therefore
perhaps get it more quickly, perhaps in a special election, a special session after November or in January. The other thing is, or the other thing
would be to say, “Well, if you can’t get it, then you shouldn’t try because
the fight itself would be damaging,” particularly if you try and fail.
Blough: But then, let’s see . . . there’s still a third thing; that’s the
resolution for the program. Take a position, a direction . . .
President Kennedy: Well, how do you mean? I don’t—
Sproul: Could that resolution be in your own mind and in your executive branch that you have decided this is the approach to the dollar?
President Kennedy: Well, yes, but I think we’ve decided about . . .
we’re obviously going for the tax cut. We’re obviously either going for
the tax cut now, or we’re going for it in January. With the economic indicators . . . if we do not go for it now, and the economic indicators become
more alarming, then we would definitely separate the reform. . . . We’d
go . . . it would be much more important to have the stimulation of the
economy. So that’s, I think, quite clear.90
90. In a televised evening broadcast the following Monday, 13 August 1962, President
Kennedy announced that there would be no quickie tax cut (cutting rates temporarily) but
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9, 1962
The question we have to decide is whether there’s any hope of . . .
depending on whether—what we take a look at from our view of the economic indicators—whether they would be clearly alarming enough to
cause the Congress to support the action. If they’re not, and they’re
mixed, then you have to make a judgment on whether the Congress
would act. And if you assumed that it would not, then, unless the economic indicators were quite clear, my assumption is that it would not.
You then have to decide whether it would be . . . how disastrous it
would be to try and fail . . . which I think, probably, what would happen
is that we would fail probably. Now, when you say, therefore, we’re right
about resolving it, I’d resolve it in my own mind what I’d like to do if I
were able to do it, but I haven’t resolved what I’m able to do yet.
Sproul: Well, is that your direction—
President Kennedy: A little bit depends on, well, for example, if the
November election continued the House in about the way it was now so
that there wasn’t a sharp change, we could meet in November in a special
session just on this one problem without the . . . Of course, if there’s a
marked change in the House or the Senate, then it would be regarded as
a lame-duck session. There’d be a paralysis there, you’d have to go over
till January. So that these are some of the [unclear] . . . but when you say,
but I’m not quite clear, therefore, I think it would be well for us to decide
whether we’re going to do this—which we will over this weekend—now,
or otherwise to wait. Is that what you . . .
Blough: Alan, you speak first.
Sproul: Well, now, I think that it’s just possible that that resolution
also include putting the quietus on talk and recommendations to you and
recommendations outside from within the executive branch that no, you
can do this by increased government spending and not increasing interest rates, or even lowering interest rates.
President Kennedy: Yes, I think the government spending . . . I think
we’re in agreement. I don’t think we’re going to . . . We’re doing it in a
number of areas, even though the Congress acts, so that if you particu-
that the administration would, instead, send up permanent tax cut legislation in 1963 (see
“Radio and Television Report to the American People on the State of the National Economy,”
13 August 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, pp. 611–17). Use of the term quickie tax cut was
derived from a 28 May 1962 memo sent to President Kennedy from CEA chair Walter Heller.
It was sent on Blue Monday in response to the precipitous decline in the U.S. stock market
witnessed that day. Heller saw the quickie tax cut as a way of shoring up business confidence
while the administration planned for a permanent cut.
353
larly do . . . if you’re going to . . . if you’re going to try to go for the tax
cut. If you’re not going for the tax cut, then, of course, there really isn’t
much use in attempting to squeeze too hard between now and January,
because you don’t want to deepen the—91
C. Douglas Dillon: I think these gentlemen, one thing they’re talking about is . . . I think they’re very deeply concerned about the thrust of
Mr. Patman’s hearings on monetary policies, is that right?92
Blough: That’s right. Yes.
Unidentified: Yes.
Dillon: My idea is they might need to have lower . . . lower interest
rates—
Unidentified: [Unclear] any route—
Dillon: [Unclear] think it’s an alternative to a tax cut or something.
[Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: We’d like to be sure that you—[Unclear
exchange.]
Alexander: [Unclear] have made up your mind not to go for—
President Kennedy: No, I’m not a . . . I’m not a . . . what Sam
Rayburn called a money crank. Why bother to destroy a great career by
becoming a—
Boeschenstein: A lot of people are preaching to you, Mr. President.
And I happen to think the dollar would go down the drain if you did—
Greenewalt: I like it, I like that. That’s all I can say.
Alexander: Having done that, if you’ve got a chance, after you see the
figures, of putting this thing through now, I’d go ahead now. If you conclude, after seeing the figures and feeling around and all, that you can’t
put it through Congress in any decent way or workable way, then—very
soon—I’d find some occasion to say that you are not going that moneycrank route, that you are going to deal with this problem in a way, that
this administration is going to try to deal with it in a way that is sensible, and in a way that it will cure it . . . namely watching these government expenditures. You’re going to chance this for a higher level [of
91. Squeeze the budget.
92. Wright Patman, a populist representative from Texas and chairman of the Joint Economic
Committee (JEC), had begun JEC hearings in the summer of 1962 on the state of the economy. Also as chairman of the House Small Business Committee, Patman had convened hearings in 1961 on the tax code abuses of charitable foundations. A perennial opponent of the
Federal Reserve and the large banks that he believed dominated Fed policy, Patman also used
these hearings as a platform from which to warn against the maintenance of artificially high
interest rates.
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9, 1962
unemployment] . . . are going to [unclear] a high level abundantly clear,
Mr. President. But besides that, and that you, are in favor of—as early as
possible—a tax cut to alleviate that, and if circumstances remain the
same. The sooner you make that point, and if you can’t get the legislation, you, the President of the United States, are for such a program,
you’ll do a great deed.
President Kennedy: Well, I intend to speak Monday night on that
anyway.93
Alexander: Are you? Well—[Unclear exchange.]
Boeschenstein: [Unclear] what’s the purpose of that and you have to
state what the form of that would be.
Greenewalt: Mr. President, I’d like to make a comment on this tax
cut question, because this rather bothered me . . . something that you
said bothered me a bit, but . . . and I was somewhat bothered by the attitude of the Ways and Means Committee. This question of a recession, or
the indicators in July, to my way of thinking, has nothing to do with the
case at all.
Greenewalt: Conceivably, if you really, if the economy really fell on
its face, you might have to take strong medicine; I don’t think it’s going
to. Furthermore, I think we’ve been rocking along under the present tax
system for a great many years; the economy’s done very well. I think,
however, it can do better. I think it can do substantially better. I think a
tax cut will give a permanent, long-range stimulus to the economy. And
I would recommend—
Sproul: All this growth fever?
Greenewalt: Growth? What growth?
Sproul: That’s the word we use.
Unidentified: That’s synonymous with stabilization. [Unclear
exchange.]
Greenewalt: I hoped to avoid . . . I wanted to avoid growthmanship,
but I have a very strong feeling that the economy would do better if
taxes were cut, than it is now. It’s now going at a very high level. Our
company’s having a record year, a wonderful year. We could do better . . .
the whole economy could do better. So I don’t think, really, a tax cut
ought to be contemplated from the point of view of will it save us from
some fate worse than death or will it do this? It ought to be contem-
93. As noted previously, the President delivered a live television and radio address on the
economy and the tax cut proposal the following Monday evening.
355
plated from the point of view that this will be a long-range stimulus to a
higher rate of growth.
President Kennedy: But of course, if you’d use that argument, then
you really wouldn’t try to do it in this session, would you?
Greenewalt: Well, that’s what . . . that’s what I said. I would . . . I
think it’s so important, that I don’t think risks ought to be taken to having it turn out to be either no tax cut or the wrong kind of tax cut.
Either one would be equally bad in my view. I’d like to make just one
point on this stimulus question. . . . I’m not going to be argumentative,
gentlemen. [Laughter.]
We’ve got a few differences of opinion. But, I’d like to make this point
about the potential for growth. The DuPont Company’s going to sell
about 2.4 billion this year, which will be an all-time high, 8 to 10 percent
higher than last year. We will operate this year at about 80 percent of
capacity. This means that we have a[n untapped] sales potential of 600
million dollars. Now, if some needle could be stuck in the economy in a
way that would encourage demand and would make people more willing
to spend or buy things, so that we could realize some fraction of that 600
million potential sales that we have before us, without spending anything
for capital investments, it’s there. All we have to do is open the valve
wider and make it and sell it.
Now, if we could . . . But this is built in. . . . I mean the whole chemical
industry, I know, has this excess capacity. The fact that we’re not selling,
the fact that there is the excess capacity, weakens prices, weakens profits,
and is frustrating for all participants. The minute you start the thing going
up, so that you’re approaching that capacity operations, your profits will
improve, your competitive position will improve, and the capital investment
program, at least as far as we’re concerned, will take care of itself.
President Kennedy: I’d say, Craw—now what are you putting into
capital investment this year, at DuPont?
Greenewalt: Well, we’re authorizing—there’s this distinction I want
to make between expenditures and authorizations—we’ll authorize this
year some 400 million dollars. We’ll spend this year perhaps 250 million
to 300 million. I mean, the difference between authorization and expenditure is a lag of about two [unclear].
Alexander: [Unclear.]
Sproul: Now, while he is approaching it from the standpoint of a
stimulus to the economy. I come in from the other side, from the balance
of payments. While agreeing with what he says about seeing no need for
a tax cut now to stimulate the economy if we’re not going to fall on our
face tomorrow. From the standpoint of the balance of payments and the
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9, 1962
dollar and gold, it may be tomorrow, or it may be next month, it may be
six months from now, that we might be faced with a run on the dollar,
and that therefore the time element enters in aside from stimulus to the
domestic economy. But that that gives me the feeling of urgency about
this package of actions to meet the balance of payments problem, and
not just as Henry says to ameliorate the effect of a rise in interest rates,
[but] to alleviate it. I think we would get both relief of the balance of
payments and an improvement in the domestic economy by a—
Greenewalt: I agree with what you are saying.
Alexander: Both purposes. I do say, both purposes. When you find
out there in the thinking world, the tax reform bill is going to be—any
way you figure it—they’re going to hold hearings, it’s going to be a long
delayed thing, there are going to be arguments pro and con with the
thing, and I do think that it would be important to think in terms of a
two-part proposition.
Greenewalt: I would like—
Alexander: One that you can move on promptly, that accomplishes the
package part of this thing, and the other to follow. That’s needed anyway.
Greenewalt: I would like to second that very heartily. I would be
very uneasy in the . . . if I understand the present temper of the Ways
and Means Committee, in trying to pull through a tax cut right this
minute, well, I’d be afraid. I believe it would fail, which might make it
difficult to try again; or you’d get a tax cut, but it would be the wrong
kind of a tax cut—
Alexander: Uh-huh.
Greenewalt: —from the point of view of the stimulus that I’m looking for. On the other hand, the thing that bothers me is that this tax cut
question is wrapped up with tax reform. My God, you could go through
a year and a half before you got anything. I was really hoping that the
thing could be done in two packages; that you could recommend the kind
of a tax cut that would do nothing to increase or decrease the inequities
of the present system, and then do your tax reform question as a separate package.94 I would hope very much that that could be done. Alan
94. President Kennedy’s economic advisers were beginning to tell him the same thing, especially
CEA chairman Walter Heller. On 7 June 1963, when Kennedy decided to postpone attempts at
general tax reform, Heller conveyed his affirmation: “As you know, I opposed cluttering up the
1963 tax cut by the inclusion of tax reforms—and I never bought the argument that the vested
interests, just because we fed them a high protein diet of tax cuts, would be any less venal or
voracious when we kicked them in their private parts” (Memorandum, Walter Heller to
President Kennedy, Tax Cut File, Papers of Walter Heller, John F. Kennedy Library).
357
could speak of the sense of urgency with respect to the balance of payments problem. From my point of view, the stimulus to the economy, if
you will. . . . I would far rather do it in an orderly way and get what
you’re after, than to try to push it through now and fail. But this is a
political decision, that—
President Kennedy: This is a matter, really, which is . . . We’re ill
equipped in this country, in Congress to deal with.
Greenewalt: Yes.
President Kennedy: The balance of payments, and move the tax program, really, underneath, sort of, a gun. With the domestic difficulty and
also our foreign difficulty, it’s really almost too difficult a question for a
system of divided powers like ours to deal with. We have got the Federal
Reserve independent of the Executive and the Congress, and the
Congress independent of the Executive, and the body or division which
is quite close to all of us. That is unprecedented. I’m sure from your
experience before the committee, they just, really . . . When you look at
the . . . just like almost the rest of us, because really, you can’t . . . you
don’t get the proper balance between [unclear] we all know [unclear] on
tax system and monetary policy in terms of everything.
Blough: Yes, it is in a way, but it’s going to become more pressing—
at least some of it looks like it—
President Kennedy: Then you’ve still got these carryovers, that are
like Patman, where all . . . you know, this is [unclear] getting bribed
[unclear]—
Unidentified: Yes.
President Kennedy: —on the money market. [Unclear exchange.]
That’s the group. That group . . . sort of people.
Blough: Well, Mr. President, you’re looking across the table at two different industries and two different companies.95 I shouldn’t let you go away
with the impression that the steel business is like the chemical business.
Here we’ll have a poor year. We would spend much more money if we had
it this year to spend it. We would appropriate much more money this year.
Now, Brother Dillon hears that well, you’ve helped some, perhaps, but
we’re the picture of industry, [that] generally, is not, shall I say, completely portrayed by the rosy glow that comes from the—
President Kennedy: Well, I won’t go away like that! [Laughter.]
The . . . actually, the reason we put this in the [unclear] is because I
thought the bill would . . . to get the Congress to act, and also this com-
95. Greenewalt’s DuPont and Blough’s U.S. Steel.
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9, 1962
mittee hearing of Wilbur [Mills]’s was an effort to try to see if we could
see what the temperature was without having to go out. But I think that
we’d better call an end to. Which we will over this weekend and see
whether we’re going to or not. But I think this is very . . . this meeting has
been very useful to try to . . . to try to—
Blough: Yes.
President Kennedy: —put this in a way that will have the mostdesired effect. If we don’t go, tomorrow I think we ought to indicate that
. . . consideration of the matter.
Blough: I think what they’re saying, Mr. President, is that whichever
way you decide, this is the time when a kind of sketch of the approach
and the reconciling of domestic needs and the balance of payments
requirements ought to be brought forth, taking advantage of all the
attention that has now befallen us.
President Kennedy: Probably—
Blough: Rather than regarding it as a retreat.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] but it’s terribly difficult—
Sproul: It sure is.
President Kennedy: —matter.
Unidentified: This is the interesting—
President Kennedy: I find it interesting that whenever I talk with
anybody about it that the whole thing is very [unclear]. Well, I think
that, well, I . . . in any case, I do think it’s time we indicated what we’re
going to do about the taxes and I gather that you meant, Roger, that we
indicate the sort of philosophy behind the action taken?
Blough: Well, I think that—
President Kennedy: The philosophy of [unclear].
Blough: [Unclear] balance of payments, and we’ll get the chance to
[unclear].
Unidentified: Yes.
Sproul: And as far as your official family is concerned, that’s it now,
and not several contending parties who are trying to make up your mind
for you.
President Kennedy: Well, that’s a pretty good—
Dillon: That goes beyond [unclear]. That’s a good order. [Laughter.]
[Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Well, you know what happened one time when they
asked Mayor O’Brien in New York to elect . . . who he was going to appoint
sheriff, he said, “They haven’t told me.” [Laughter.] [Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: I think at this point, that there weren’t very many people
[unclear] knowledgeable about this particular subject, that I. . . . I would
359
say that, really, we had a very good meeting . . . a very good meeting.
[Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: I said before the meeting [unclear].
At this point, the meeting broke up and the participants engaged in less
formal discussions that can often not be heard over one another. Only
the following segments are clear.
Unidentified: Yes . . . Yes.
Dillon: All right.
Sproul: [Unclear] 23 percent, down now [unclear].
President Kennedy: The industrials?96
Boeschenstein: Yeah, they’ve moved ahead because, they apparently
read your . . . the market is more concerned about a couple of strikes that
they had had that had tied up construction in northern California for 54
days, and in Seattle and the Northwest for about 40 —
President Kennedy: What [unclear]—
Unclear exchange.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] broad industries index.
Blough: Do you remember Mayor O’Brien’s platform?
President Kennedy: No, I don’t think so.
Blough: He was for a larger army and navy. He was for being kind to
mothers and children. [Laughter; unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] against . . . against everything.
Unidentified: Well, Mr. President, we’ll keep thinking.
Unidentified: And preaching.
President Kennedy: As far as the short-term part, though, as far as the
broad governmental effect of the thing, as far as the American . . . aside from
American investments abroad, that part . . . Short term, do you think that it
can only be handled by interest rate adjustments, and not by any other—
Unidentified: Strategy?
Greenewalt: That’s right, Mr. President.
Alexander: And that is not going to affect development. It reflects
what [unclear] expand development of business. It isn’t that much.
96. Dow Jones industrial average.
360
9, 1962
Blough: We have relied [unclear].
Unidentified: Thank you, Mr. President. Bye.
President Kennedy: Bye.
Blough: [Unclear.] We have operated the business on [unclear].
President Kennedy: Oh yeah . . . right.
Blough: I have a suggestion. [Unclear exchange.]
If you wish that the 20th anniversary of your [unclear] and I would
suggest that you are getting too close to anything else that we’ve ever
had in the first or second week of September.
President Kennedy: If I can do it, could I do it the week after Labor
Day? Do it the week after Labor Day?
Blough: Oh, well then, that would be, say, Thursday the 6th?
Blough: That’d be a good day?
President Kennedy: Sort of . . . yeah.
Blough: So we could . . . late Monday, September 3d. Is that the holiday?
President Kennedy: Why don’t we do it Thursday the 6th, at four
o’clock?
Blough: Four o’clock?
Blough: Fine. Right here?
President Kennedy: Right here.
Blough: One minute?
Blough: And we’ll meet and we’ll talk with our people about this.
President Kennedy: Fine. OK. Good.
Blough: And shall I mention this thing to anyone else?
President Kennedy: I’ll do it right now. I’ll tell [unclear].
Blough: Thursday, September 6th.
President Kennedy: Good. Fine.97
Blough: Thank you. [Unclear exchange.]
Crawford Greenewalt seemed to espouse views most similar to those of
the President. Indeed, during the meeting with his economic advisers
the following day, Kennedy would cite none but Greenewalt in his pres-
97. From 4:00 to 5:15 P.M. on Thursday, 6 September, the President did meet with the
Business Council, which included Roger Blough.
10, 1962
361
entation of the business community perspective.98 The idea introduced
by Greenewalt was the notion that many large corporations were currently beset with excess capacity that might well be put to profitable use
were a tax cut enacted that enlarged consumer purchasing power. And
though the Kennedy administration had already introduced changes that
promised to spur growth and investment with direct supply-side initiatives, it was this notion of demand-led growth and investment which
seemed to captivate the President and to dovetail most favorably with
the thinking of Kennedy’s chief economic advisers.99
For the remainder of the day, the President had a series of short
meetings with Under Secretary of Commerce Clarence “Dan” Martin,
Dean Rusk, Larry O’Brien, George Gardner, and Senator Thomas Dodd
of Connecticut. He did not tape any of them.
Friday, August 10, 1962
The press reported the morning of August 10 that the President would
not make his decision on an immediate tax cut for another week.
Welcoming Wilbur Mills into his office at 9:30 A.M. for the second time
in four days, the President needed to put an end to this policy debate.
Although he and the powerful legislative leader disagreed over the
advantages of a temporary tax cut, Kennedy had reason to be grateful to
Mills. The House Ways and Means Committee, which Mills chaired, had
just concluded two weeks of hearings on the tax cut without issuing a
statement of any kind, though Kennedy assumed the committee opposed
it. This had bought the administration some time, and now Kennedy
wanted to talk with Mills about what came next.
The President had likely given up on getting a quickie tax cut in
1962, but he remained committed to some kind of significant tax relief in
1963. He would need Mills’s support for that. Following their 30-minute
chat in the Oval Office, which Kennedy did not tape, the President
invited Mills to sit in on an administration discussion in the Cabinet
98. See “Meeting on the Tax Cut Proposal,” 10 August 1962.
99. The supply-side initiatives were a 7 percent investment tax credit, wending its way
through Congress at this point, and the accelerated depreciation guidelines, already enacted
by executive order earlier in 1962.
362
10, 1962
Room about the pros and cons of tax cuts. In the room would be Paul
Samuelson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), one of
the first and certainly among the more eloquent proponents of a tax break
for the American people. Kennedy wanted Mills to hear Samuelson’s
views. It was also useful for the Kennedy team to listen to Mills, to sound
him out on how quickly tax cuts could be enacted. The timing was
important. Kennedy did not want his tax initiative to take so long that
the economy slid into a recession.
After the President and Mills walked over to the Cabinet Room, the
meeting began. Kennedy decided to tape it.
10:10 –11:10 A.M.
Thinking about a tax cut next year, we’ve got a major budgetary problem because we’re going to have a deficit. So we’re
going to have to cut taxes at the time of a deficit. As long as we
don’t have an inflationary problem, do you see the cutting . . .
running a prospect of a two- or three-year deficit as a very serious problem?
Meeting on the Tax Cut Proposal1
Continuing to solicit advice on the knotty tax issue—having met just
the day before with five business leaders—President Kennedy convened
his domestic policy advisers to decide, finally, whether to go for an
immediate, or quickie, tax cut in 1962. Uncertain of the proposal’s merit
and status within a jumble of strong congressional concerns, lukewarm
economic numbers, and commitments to the long-range goal of tax
reform, Kennedy asked his principal economic advisers to make the
strongest case for or against an immediate and temporary tax cut before
he killed it three days later, as he suggested he would on August 6 to
Chairman Mills.
1. Including President Kennedy, Gardner Ackley, David Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, Henry
Fowler, Arthur Goldberg, Kermit Gordon, Walter Heller, Luther Hodges, Wilbur Mills,
Kenneth O’Donnell, Robert Roosa, Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, Theodore Sorensen, Elmer
Staats, James Tobin, and Robert Turner. Tape 10.2, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on the Tax Cut Proposal
363
“Send me down some good economists,” Kennedy told Harvard law
professor Archibald Cox in August 1960, launching a tutorial that would
continue unabated throughout his presidency. And though nagging questions remained to the very end, by the time he convened this meeting, the
President was very much in tune with the logic and analysis of advisers
such as CEA chair Walter Heller and MIT economist Paul Samuelson, the
latter being Kennedy’s first choice as the council’s chair who, as this meeting will attest, remained an important outside consultant even after turning down Kennedy’s offer. Chastened somewhat by his recent (April 1962)
showdown with steel companies over wages and prices and by the adverse
stock market reaction in May, the President still exhibited an unshaken
faith in his economic advisers and a newfound confidence in his own ability
to comprehend the economic prescriptions they had offered for his consideration.2 “Throughout Kennedy’s presidency,” James Tobin recalled,
“Walter Heller taught him economics; we others helped, but no one could
match Heller’s knack of making points in concise readable colorful language. The President was an apt pupil, intrigued by the subject intellectually as well as pragmatically.”3
On June 7, 1962, at a White House press conference, President
Kennedy announced his intention to seek a tax cut that was not revenue
neutral. Four days later, in an address at Yale University, Kennedy
assailed the prevailing and popular mythology that marked this type of
initiative unwise or foolish, insisted that government debt and the deficit
were bad things in and of themselves, and convinced many that economic cycles were natural and unavoidable. Beseeching his audience to
discard these myths and others like them, he urged the Yale graduates to
move beyond the “reassuring repetition of stale phrases to a new, difficult but essential confrontation with reality.”4 Called the “key manifesta-
2. The Dow Jones industrials, for example, had plunged from approximately 740 to 560 by the
end of May. With price-earnings ratios that averaged approximately 26:1 just before the drop,
many saw the stock market plunge as an event that was simply waiting to happen. Walter
Heller noted that, in this case, Wall Street was a victim of its own propaganda regarding a
squeeze on profits, while John Kenneth Galbraith read the drop as a positive signal, suggesting that it implied public respect for the administration’s inflation fighting efforts and the
resulting recognition that common stocks would no longer appreciate forever for reasons of
inflation [see William J. Barber, “The Kennedy Years: Purposeful Pedagogy,” in Exhortations
and Controls: The Search for a Wage-Price Policy, 1945–1971, ed. Crauford Goodwin
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 177].
3. James Tobin and Murray Weidenbaum, eds., Two Revolutions in Economic Policy: The First
Reports of Presidents Kennedy and Reagan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), p. 6.
4. “Commencement Address at Yale University,” Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy,
1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 470–75.
364
10, 1962
tion of JFK’s conversion to the New Economics,” by CEA economist
Arthur Okun, the Yale address signaled, at the very least, that President
Kennedy was now eager to transform political rhetoric into substantive
economic policy change.
By the time he met with his economic policy specialists this August
morning in 1962, President Kennedy believed that, given the existing
circumstances, deficit spending was economically appropriate but politically uncertain, that a recession remained a distinct possibility in the coming months, that accelerating inflation was very unlikely, that increased
purchasing power was what the economy needed most, and that tax
reform—including new supply-side incentives—remained a feasible and
perhaps necessary adjunct to tax reduction. How to succeed with
Congress, when to call for the tax cut itself, and how to be certain of its
medium- or long-term effectiveness were the questions foremost in the
President’s mind as he commenced the following discussion.
President Kennedy started recording as Walter Heller briefed the
group on the latest economic figures.
Begins in midconversation.
Walter Heller: . . . you’d find in unemployment, and the rebound in
total retail sales, particularly automobile sales. I guess the poorest news
was the downturn in housing activity and the further decline in the factory workweek. I’d say, by and large, the July indicators confirm an outlook for a continued slow advance in the economy. They do not indicate a
recession in the next few months, but it is still a possibility because the
pace of advance is slow.
Now, as to some of the specific figures . . . as you know, unemployment
dropped to 5.2 percent. Retail sales rose about 2 percent which brought
them back to their May levels. Sales of new autos ran at about 6.9 million
apace on an annual basis. The industrial production index, which won’t
be announced for a couple of days, will probably be up a point.
Luther Hodges: One eighteen-seven, we just got it, preliminary,
through Mr. Dillon.
President Kennedy: Well, they’re just . . . they’re going to round it
out, aren’t they?
Hodges: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Say, one point?
Heller: Yeah, I agree. It rounds out as far as public information is concerned; that means a rounding up from 118 to 119. Personal income
increased at a slow rate, but it increased. Nonagricultural payroll employ-
365
ment rose about 124,000 . . . that was equal to the average of May and June.
Those are all on the plus side. On the minus side, housing activities, I’d say,
declined. Factory workweek declined. And we have an advance report on
the capital appropriations by manufacturers in the second quarter.
President Kennedy: That’s the Newsweek one?
Heller: That’s the Newsweek one; that went down 10 percent. Ones
that aren’t in yet are housing starts and construction contracts.
President Kennedy: When do you get those?
Heller: Those will come in next week.
Heller: Thursday.
President Kennedy: End of the week?
Heller: But—
Heller: —about Thursday. Building permits we got an advance notice
on this morning. They’re holding at about . . . holding about level with
June. New orders for durable goods, inventories, and manufacturers’ sales
are the other three that will come in. Questions on the meaning—
C. Douglas Dillon: One question I wanted to ask you: I notice that
construction, new construction, was down about $900 million, oh . . .
from June to July, but the entire decline was in the governmental field.
Heller: Yep.
Dillon: And it . . . I also noticed, when I look back last year—when
we were starting up like this—that the exact same thing occurred.
There was a billion dollar decline in the flow of governmental [unclear]
and it was all picked up promptly in August. So I wonder if that might
be some sort of a statistical aberration or something like that?
Heller: Well, I . . . well, I don’t know. I think it’s important, though,
to point out that it was—
Unidentified: Private construction activity.
President Kennedy: Why is that . . . oh, private not . . . why did the
government decline?
Dillon: Well, as I say, it may be a statistical aberration of the way
they use—
David Bell: It’s news to me, Mr. President. I haven’t heard about this
figure before.
President Kennedy: Paul?
Bell: We’d better check it. It may well be a statistical aberration.
Heller: But that’s [unclear] federal, state, and local, of course?
Dillon: Yes. Federal, state, and local—all of them.
Bell: The summer is the construction season, right? [Unclear exchange.]
366
10, 1962
Dillon: Something [unclear] counting last year. This is the season—
Kermit Gordon: It needs the right adjustments.
Unidentified: Seasonal adjustments.
Dillon: Seasonal adjustments.
President Kennedy: Back to the drawing board. What are the . . .
maybe we could just check that.
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: Because it is peculiar, the end of June . . .
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: I guess we’d—
Arthur Goldberg: I’d like to mention something about the unemployment figure. It’s not as good, actually, as it sounds. You’ve got about a 5.3,
and rounded out, a 5.345. If it had gone up an extra five one-hundredths
[sic] it would have been reported as 5.4 . . . see?
Unidentified: Yeah.
Goldberg: Actually, they round it out. They round . . . so it was 5 . . .
it fell to 5.345.
Robert Solow: Not only that, but the whole decline in unemployment
is a decline in the labor force, so there’s no increase—
Goldberg: The labor force figures are absolutely . . . we’re not going
to show—I mentioned to Wilbur, Wilbur’s committee—we’re going to
show a total increase in the civilian labor force this year of only 150,000.5
That’s against a progressive increase—which would include the military, of about 350,000—of over a million. So we really have had a very
dramatic lack of increase in the labor force this year.
Dillon: I was talking to Stan [unclear] about that yesterday and he
says that they didn’t know whether that was a good sign or a bad sign.
He said it was just . . . didn’t know enough about it to know.
President Kennedy: Well, Walter Reuther says it’s because they’ve
gotten discouraged working, but I don’t think that could be. . . .6
Goldberg: No, no . . .
President Kennedy: That can’t be it.
Goldberg: That’s too glib.
5. Wilbur Mills (D-Arizona), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, was also
present at this White House meeting. Mills had met privately with President Kennedy to discuss tax cut proposals just four days earlier (“Meeting with Wilbur Mills on the Tax Cut
Proposal,” 6 August 1962) and stressed both the importance of timing and his appreciation of
how administration economists and business leaders differed on the desired type of tax cut
(creating added purchasing power versus incentives for capital investment).
6. Walter Reuther was the president of the United Automobile Workers, 1946 to 1970.
367
President Kennedy: There’s more to it than that.
Goldberg: It’s a combination of three factors . . . we’re going to
develop some figures. It’s a combination of three factors: one is the older
people are retiring because of the improvements in Social Security.
Unidentified: Sure.
Goldberg: Second, we’re making a little hay among the youngsters
about staying in school . . . which is good. I mean, both of those developments are good developments. The third is probably the decline of adequate job opportunities. The women in the middle ages are not going
into the labor force at the present time in the same proportions that they
had been going in previously.
President Kennedy: Yet, would they be . . . I wouldn’t think . . . or is
this so . . . Arthur, is that the group that would find it particularly hard
to get jobs?
Goldberg: No. The funny part is that even . . . I can’t make it that
category because the women beyond that age are going in and finding
jobs— over 45. It may be a good development. It may be that the factory earnings what they are, and the workweek coming up, there’s
enough money in the family so they don’t have to go into the labor
market. It doesn’t mean, necessarily, a bad development, but it’s what’s
happening.
President Kennedy: Do we have any figures on factory earnings—
Goldberg: Yes.
President Kennedy: —In July?
Goldberg: Factory earnings in July were . . . fell 71 cents; $96.56 for
average weekly factory earnings. The decline, even in this little amount,
is due to the fact that the hours have dropped.
President Kennedy: By that point-three-tenths [sic]?
Goldberg: Point-three-tenths [sic] from June. Instead there are 40.4
hours. It’s over 40 hours.
Heller: It should be noted on these unemployment figures that manufacturing unemployment increased, or manufacturing employment
dropped. Isn’t that right, Arthur? You haven’t talked about June or July.
Goldberg: That’s right.
President Kennedy: Did anybody . . . we got some charts of the ’49 . . .
’48 and ’49 period, the ’53–’54 period, the ’57–’58 period, then ’58–’59. We
ought to see if the ’60–’61 period, then this . . . . Is there . . . they’re all . . .
there isn’t any general pattern, is there, that is . . . fairly foreshadows a—7
7. These are all periods of economic recession.
368
10, 1962
Dillon: You mean by these indicators?
Paul Samuelson: Well, my recollection is that in the ’53–’54 and the
last three recessions—not the first one, the ’48 . . . I don’t remember
that—the leading indicators went down very early, and then there’s a
long period of shallow, just holding on. And it looks as if that’s about
what’s happened here. And it would have seemed surprising if we actually had the downturn in the middle of the year, as some people thought,
in terms of that previous pattern, because just applying the previous
methods, there’s quite a lag between when the indicators first begin to
go down. . . . That they cried wolf too soon, [unclear] too soon, some as
early as the, as May of ’56 they were already calling the downturn which
didn’t come until the summer of ’57.
Dillon: One other thing that’s interesting here, remember we talked
about this fallback in government expenditures, and that’s been reflected
now in some revised GNP figures which showed that the total federal
government purchases are half a billion less than they originally thought
and were only identical in the second quarter with the first quarter.
There’s no increased [unclear], and all our projections show that there
will be increases after we find out who borrowed from [unclear] at this
time. So if there will be bigger increases, then we have to expect it in the
third quarter, you see?
Bell: Most of what didn’t happen in the spring isn’t going to happen
at all, because of this . . . differences in agricultural price supports and
differences in housing financial transactions. And so that there’s not
something pushing forward . . .
Dillon: But housing things don’t come in under federal goods and
services.8
Bell: That’s what I mean.
Dillon: No, but let’s say I’m talking about this divergence of federal
goods and services—down—
Bell: Uh-huh.
Dillon: —about 500, not your budget figure . . . a billion [unclear].
Bell: Well, our figures show only about $350 million pushing forward into [unclear] year.
Dillon: Well, that’s . . . that’s it. That would compare with the 500
million or so.
Bell: But I have it less here.
8. Government loans or government-backed loans are not included in the national income
accounts budget.
369
President Kennedy: Well there’s a quarter . . . now, let’s say, for this,
the . . . what are our expenditures going to be—the amount of money
actually going into the economy—and where is the fourth quarter compared to the first and second?
Bell: He’s using a . . . Doug is using the income and product
figures9—purchase of goods and services by government. You’ve got the
figures there, Doug, do you?
Dillon: Yes, we have figures that we’ve estimated that we all agree
on. Now the figures were . . . sixty-one-nine for the first quarter, sixtytwo for the second quarter, sixty-two-eight estimated for the third quarter, and sixty-four for the fourth quarter.
Bell: Yeah, that’s right.
Dillon: This thing is—
Bell: Yeah.
Dillon: Sixty-two and the [unclear].
Dillon: [Unclear] increase it a billion, another billion in the third
quarter and another billion there. So it’s roughly a billion. So it’s going
to be a quarter . . . well, roughly a billion every quarter right through.
We go . . . we start at ’62 . . . we go to roughly—
Bell: Yeah. One, two, three, four.
Dillon: —in ’63, ’64, ’65, ’66.
President Kennedy: How about other expenditures? They go . . .
they go up a billion, don’t they? This goes up another billion in the
fourth quarter. What’s the significance of the phrase “other expenditures” then?
James Tobin: Nondefense expenditures.
Bell: Nonnational . . .
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] It says “purchases of goods and services,” and then it says “other expenditures.” What’s that mean, now?
Unidentified: I don’t know.
President Kennedy: Why do we separate goods and services and
other expenditures?
Bell: I’m not looking at the same table.
Dillon: I don’t . . . I don’t know what that other [unclear].
Goldberg: Mr. President, you asked about the unemployment figures
prior to [unclear] periods. And it’s . . . you may notice that if you’ll put
together the [unclear]—
9. Figures associated with the national income accounts budget. See the definition of this
budget in note 10.
370
10, 1962
Bell: This is the other half of the other parts of the budget, Mr.
President, including—
Unidentified: Salaries and trust payments.
Bell: No, salaries would be in here, because you deduct social services
first, but this would be the transfer payments of various kinds.
President Kennedy: Now they’re going up, aren’t they?
Bell: Yes.
President Kennedy: They’ll go up one billion in the third quarter . . .
another billion in the fourth?
Unidentified: Roughly.
Bell: No, less than that. This is . . . these are the federal expenditures,
national income base, total expenditures during the year.10
Goldberg: You know, if you put this little piece along with what you
have—I’ve managed to mangle it up trying to get it out of my folder—
you’ll see that in the . . . all those prior periods, the unemployment rate
dipped lower and started to rise later than is happening now. That’s part
of the problem. If you look back to ’48—
Goldberg: —and ’54, and ’58 [unclear] now. That the chart indicates
[unclear].
Goldberg: Also it’s true that at some point they went up higher. And
the recession was a deeper recession than some of the prior ones.
President Kennedy: What is the highest it has been since the . . .
World War II? Is that ’49?
Goldberg: Forty-nine. See, it went up past seven to— 11
Unidentified: Oh, but that was a coal strike. That was just one—
President Kennedy: Incident.
10. The national income accounts budget differs from the traditional administrative budget in
that it (1) includes trust fund activity (Social Security, transportation, unemployment compensation, etc.), (2) records transactions on an accrual rather than on a cash basis (when liabilities
are incurred rather than when cash changes hands), and (3) omits transactions in financial
assets and already existing assets (loans extended by the federal government, etc.).
Because the trust fund activity was so large (approximately $25 billion for FY 1962) and
because there was often a significant difference between accrued corporate tax liabilities and
actual amounts rendered during a period of rising economic activity (an estimated $3 billion
for FY 1962), the national income accounts budget would better reflect actual economic
impact and would also produce substantially different deficit-surplus budget figures.
11. The civilian unemployment rates for 1949, 1954, and 1958, respectively, were 5.9, 5.5, and
6.8 percent. By comparison, the first two years of the Kennedy administration, 1961 and 1962,
registered unemployment rates of 6.7 and 5.5 percent.
371
Unidentified: One incident.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Goldberg: The long coal strike?
Unidentified: Yeah, the ’58 figure is, I guess, the worst in the postwar period.
Goldberg: We’re talking a [unclear].
Unidentified: Seven and a half.
Unidentified: Seven and a half percent.
Bell: Summarizing on those government expenditures, Mr. President,
I think it’s accurate to say that the government outlays, the purchase of
goods and services and other kinds of outlays, will be rising slowly
through the next several quarters. These expectations have all been taken
into account in the economic projections that have been put before you and
that have been placed before the committee by these various outside economists and so on. These figures are all public and well known. Those who
say that we’re going to have a sidewise movement, a downturn, or a very
slow upturn are all basing those judgments on figures which include these
projections here.
President Kennedy: Professor Samuelson, would you care to . . . ?
Samuelson: Well, I would . . . my own summary would be that if the
case for a tax cut had to rest on disaster figures in July, the issue is
already resolved. The July figures are a little better than might have
been expected, even better in some of the aggregates.
I think that—speaking now noneconomically—that that’s quite important politically because it makes it more difficult to identify a downturn
with any particular governmental action that—
President Kennedy: I heard your point. There isn’t any doubt that
the longer we go from the May–June stock thing . . .12
Samuelson: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Politically it’s to some advantage. And, in addition, the more of these figures come out about the difficulty in Germany
and all the rest . . . all this changes somewhat this from being a personal
to being a national problem.
Samuelson: Yes, and it isn’t just politically in the sense of elections,
but—
12. The precipitous decline in all stock market indices registered in the wake of Kennedy’s
showdown with the steel industry over wage-price agreements.
372
10, 1962
Samuelson: I never trust historians getting anything right, but
they’re too tempted to get things very wrong. If certain things happen
very close together then they take a superficial explanation.
So I think that’s a very significant indication of July’s figures. It also
pretty much precludes, in my mind, the notion that we’ve already had a
downturn—which you couldn’t rule out. I mean, that’s your last kind.
Now the question is that it may have very great implications for the
political feasibility of any action right now, maybe [unclear]. But I’ve tried
to address myself to the economics of the situation just to see what difference the July figures make in my mind on that. And although a lot of the
July figures are incomplete, we do have one month’s more figures on even
things that aren’t available in July. And it’s sort of a mixed bag there. It
looks to me as if any initial shock of the stock market, precipitating a dropoff in the discounted . . . now on the basis of the July figures—
Goldberg: Paul, can I interrupt you for one point?
Samuelson: Yeah.
Goldberg: What would be the effect . . . I got some information
which has to remain confidential, that Republic Steel—Tom Patton came
in to see me the day before yesterday—he said they’re going to have to
announce a reduction in their dividend at their annual meeting, which
may set off, in other steel companies, the same thing.13 Their dividend is
three dollars and you cut it to two on August the 22nd because they say
they’re not earning their dividends. [Unclear exchange.] I raise that as to
whether we’re not going to have another stock market reaction.
Dillon: Well, I think . . . the thing about other steel companies, the
important thing there is that . . . the fortunate thing is that Bethlehem14
and U.S.15 have already taken their action. They—
Heller: This . . . this quarter.
Dillon: [Unclear] it was a difficult thing.
Samuelson: That was a glancer.16
Dillon: They don’t, but there’s—
Samuelson: But the real psychological danger has been averted now
because U.S. Steel and Bethlehem have; even in the subsequent . . . maybe
in a quarter from now—
Dillon: Yeah.
13. Thomas F. Patton was president of Republic Steel Corporation.
14. Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
15. U.S. Steel Corporation.
16. Glancing blow.
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Samuelson: —go down, but it won’t be bunched up all together. . . .
That’s the big point.
Goldberg: See [unclear], I fear this—
Samuelson: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Do you think he’s attempting to put it . . .
Goldberg: Well, he came in as a matter of courtesy, and he says on
the basis of their earnings that they have to recommend to the executive
officers that they reduce their dividend, and they will do that when they
meet on August 22nd.
President Kennedy: Where would they have been if they had put in . . .
with that price increase with all . . . with the difficulties?17 What would
have happened there?
Goldberg: Well, they say—
President Kennedy: What do they say now?
Goldberg: This may be a move for a price increase, Mr. President.
That’s what may be behind it. They may say they just can’t meet their
dividends and that the only way . . . and since operations—even in the
last quarter—don’t promise to be much better, they think they’ll be
improved some.
President Kennedy: But you think they probably—
Goldberg: Their only way is . . . to pay their dividends is to increase
their prices.
Gordon: Well, you remember the steel companies, Mr. President,
raised their dividends very sharply in 1956–57?
Goldberg: Yeah.
Gordon: Some, I think, even doubled their dividend on the basis of a
rate of operations which was then around 90 percent of capacity, when
they were earning, clearly earning enough to cover these higher dividends.18 Now that they’re running at about 50 percent of capacity, they
simply can’t . . . they closed—
Dillon: U.S. Steel is threatening to demand to cut their dividend
unless we get the investment credit or unless the . . . oh, there’s an indication that there’s going to be some tax action and they can sort of stag-
17. The steel price increase of 10 April 1962 was rescinded after Kennedy moved against the
action he considered both unfair and in violation of an earlier unofficial agreement.
18. Kermit Gordon, among Kennedy’s economic advisers, was the most familiar with the steel
industry’s costs and pricing strategies and was the principal figure who urged that the wageprice guideposts be applied first in the early 1962 steel industry–labor contract negotiations.
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10, 1962
ger along for just another period, because the first half of the year they
earned . . . $1.50, $1.52 and the dividend was $1.50.19 And they’ve had a
labor increase the 1st of July which will add to that. And, the 3rd quarter
it’ll be down, their production, so they’ll come way short.
Goldberg: Well, Doug, they . . . let’s say I think their dividend is too
high, so—
Dillon: Well, that’s—
Goldberg: They show . . . part of the projection that they showed me
was that with the tax credit, with the depreciation allowance—which
actually cuts down their profits on the surface—and with an anticipated
permanent tax credit at the rate of operations, of course, that they’re
going in now, they can’t earn their dividends at Republic with all, I
guess, with all those tax features.20
Tobin: On the other hand, I think Inland Steel covered their year’s
dividend the first half of the year.
Goldberg: Oh well, Inland is sui generis. Joe . . . Joe Block did so
much better than any . . .21 But what I worry about . . . the reason that I
mention that, Paul, is that knowing the way the steel industry operates—even in these days with a vigilant look on the part of Bobby at
their operations—this indicates to me a movement by the steel industry
to cut their dividends.22
Dillon: Well, U.S. Steel would have cut—
President Kennedy: Cut their dividends.
Dillon: U.S. Steel, I think, would have cut their dividends this time if
they hadn’t felt it would—
Tobin: Public reaction . . .
19. The Kennedy administration had proposed both an investment tax credit (signed into law
at 7 percent) and a change in IRS Bulletin F depreciation guidelines (accelerated by executive
order) as a means to spur new investment and garner additional business support for the
administration’s overall economic strategy. At the time of this meeting the new depreciation
guidelines had been enacted but the investment tax credit had not yet been signed into law.
20. Accelerated depreciation guidelines were issued in 1962 by President Kennedy’s executive
order. They allowed a more rapid writing off of capital investments and equipment and, as a
result, larger depreciation charges on the affected company’s balance sheet. This change diminished reported profits but increased corporate cash flow (by an estimated $1.5 billion for 1962).
21. Joseph L. Block was chairman of Inland Steel Company.
22. Robert “Bobby” F. Kennedy was U.S. attorney general and ostensibly the overseer of the
antitrust division of the Department of Justice, headed then by Lee Loevinger. Though the
Federal Trade Commission—headed then by Paul Rand Dixon, former counsel to Senator
Estes Kefauver’s Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee—had primary responsibility for the
antitrust analysis of mergers and acquisitions, the Justice Department generally exercised
responsibility for the policing of price-fixing and the criminal activity implied by such action.
375
Dillon: —cause public reaction that would upset things at this time,
and they wanted to carry on just as long as they could. Blough talked to
me two or three days before the meeting . . . He said, well, he didn’t
know what they were going to do but that they realized this was a very
serious thing and that they’d look at it in the national interest and so
forth.23 I thought that meant that they were just going to keep it on.
They did keep it on, but—
Goldberg: Well, I raise this because of the possibility—
Samuelson: Well, I think that . . . I think that—
Goldberg: —of a stock market reaction.
Samuelson: —in terms of simple business prudence without any politics, which is very understandable, the implication of it to me is that I
believe the 2nd quarter profits are now . . . estimates are now available—
which weren’t yet available when we met last—and they aren’t good.
They are . . . they do indicate, which is an open question, what I
thought would be resolved in this way, that the fourth quarter of last
year probably would have peaked more profits. So from now on there
will be a lot of companies that if they don’t have the increase in GNP . . .
but experience shows that in order to hold profits constant you can’t just
hold GNP constant. At this stage of the business cycle you have to have
an increase.
So the profit picture is, I think, in overall totals, I think this year is
somewhat down. And Ed and Mark, will have to reckon with that; everybody who receives their list will have to reckon with that.
Goldberg: So we may not be through our stock market reaction.
That’s the point I wanted to make.
Bell: Hmm . . . yeah.
Goldberg: Well, now, just return to two things at this point—
Dillon: Though . . . because I think the stock market itself . . . oh, just
looking at it, is on the high side of values and whether it will go forward24 . . . but it’s a . . . I would hope that any reaction that is ordinary
and [unclear], that if it goes down that it goes down gradually and you
don’t have any more of these [unclear] in services which you . . .
President Kennedy: [to Paul Samuelson] Continue what you were
saying.
Samuelson: Well, I would . . . I am now addressing myself to the
23. Roger M. Blough was the chairman of the board of U.S. Steel Corporation.
24. Price to earnings ratios. Secretary Dillon is reminding the meeting participants again of
the relatively high ratios that prevailed before the May decline.
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10, 1962
coward’s way to the pure economics of the problem. I would say that
there is nothing in the July figures that I’ve seen that would shake the
majority viewpoint that we’re in the final stages of a boom which will
peter out the way booms have petered out in the postwar—not with a
sharp peak and then down but just hold on, hold on, then finally go off.
And the majority opinion now that it has . . . resolved it wasn’t . . .
the turn didn’t come midyear but probably, say, around the turn of the
year. The more optimistic view would be the middle of the year . . . that
the thing could go on until the middle of the year. I’m not aware that,
from the pure economics of the case, that a tax reduction is affected by
which of those views is right, because it’s . . . Take these arguments for a
tax reduction. There’s, first, that the early action is the efficient and, in
the end, the dollar-saving action. Well, we still can take the action while
it’s early if we want to do so now. It also, just in terms of the timing of
the different deficits, I think, might have a politically slightly better timing. Rather than throw a big deficit into fiscal ’64—which to my mind is
going to be the bigger deficit—you could move a little bit into fiscal ’63.
Also, the total amount of the deficit, if you have early action that gives
promising effect, it ought to be smaller. That part is the same.
The argument that—against too early action, in the past . . . I think a
very powerful and good argument has been there’s always been a danger
that you’d keep up an inflationary boom and that there’d be a price increase
if you acted prematurely. This time I don’t know any group who argue
that there’s a price inflation danger from a tax reduction. I happen to think
that a tax reduction, in the short run, is in line with the general direction
of the intermediate run: a change in the tax structure that’s needed. I
speak now not in terms of qualitative change, but quantitative change.25
And . . . and, finally, this hanging-on period means very slow growth
and justifies the tax in . . . the tax cut.
President Kennedy: Paul, I have just two questions for you.
Samuelson: Yes?
President Kennedy: First, let’s say we had between a 5 and 6 billion
dollar tax cut now that would put 5 or 6 billion dollars more into the
economy. But would that mean that we’re just going to postpone, say for
six months, the downturn? Why would 6 billion dollars now give a . . .
25. Though President Kennedy eventually separated the two issues and then dropped most
large-scale efforts at tax code reform, a tax reduction and tax reform were, at this point, considered equally critical policy proposals.
377
enough of a thrust to keep this thing going?26 Of course, to answer that
question you’d have to . . . I’d like to ask you the question coming first:
Why is it that this boom and downturn has been really so short? First—
Samuelson: Yes. Well, I . . . let me, let me an[swer] . . . try to answer
that question. As far as I can see, the thing has been so short because in
the private investment sector—taking into account the level of capacity,
taking into account the need for cost reduction, the availability of funds,
and all the rest—there just has been no . . . no plus signs working for us.
There hasn’t been any keenness to invest in advance. Business is pretty
liquid; it promises to become more liquid if some of the things that we’re
going to do for it go through.27 But the plant equipment thing has just
not been like the first postwar period.
Let’s take the 1948 downturn: it hasn’t been at all like the ’56–’57; it
hasn’t had that feel at any time. It would be whistling in the dark, it
seems to me, to dream up that kind of buoyancy in the private economy,
though. The things we do are going to help but you can’t just put in a
drop of water into the pump and then think the pump is going to start
spilling forth things. At least there’s no evidence for it . . . for that. Now,
I think in the case of the tax reduction—28
President Kennedy: Well, let me just ask before you go on . . .
Samuelson: Yeah?
President Kennedy: In other words, what . . . the unused capacity is
so great in the economy that there really isn’t an incentive for more
investment than modernization or technological changes require. But
26. This was a reiteration of a question Kennedy had been asking his advisers since the 1960
presidential campaign. “You know,” Kennedy asked Walter Heller in October 1960, “Paul
Samuelson tells me that I can turn a $500 billion economy around with about a $5 billion tax
cut. How is that possible?” [see “Walter W. Heller,” in The President and the Council of Economic
Advisers: Interviews with CEA Chairmen, ed. Erwin C. Hargrove and Samuel A. Morley (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 172–73]. Okun’s law, the product of research undertaken by
CEA staff economist Arthur Okun, was in part an attempt to answer this question.
Underscored principally in the January 1962 Economic Report of the President, Okun’s law estimated that an extra 3 percentage points in unemployment meant a 10 percent gap between
actual and potential GNP.
27. The estimated increased cash flow to corporations resulting from administration plans
to change depreciation guidelines and to introduce an investment tax credit was $2.5 to $3
billion.
28. Despite the overarching emphasis on government action in the pronouncements of the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations on economic policy, both Presidents and virtually all of
their key advisers labored to point out that the response to new policies and changes initiated
mostly in the private sector were just as critical to economic performance.
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doesn’t that indicate that . . . that’s the situation we’re going to face all
through the sixties?
Samuelson: Uhh . . .
President Kennedy: It looks rather that way?
Samuelson: Well, I would avoid long-term forecasting, but I would
say for the next three or four years the burden of proof would be on
somebody who turned it in the other direction.
Dillon: There’s a big—
Samuelson: Yeah.
Dillon: —school of thought that thinks that we’re . . . this is . . . always
has thought that this is the most difficult time, up until about, I’d say, ’65
when the mass of war babies—the bigger increase in population—begin to
get married, go on to form homes, and become real consumers on themselves. And at that point that there would be a lifting effect.
Samuelson: And also getting the economy moving does help. You
can take industry after industry—the paper industry and others—where
they’re growing into their capacities slowly and it’s—
President Kennedy: Well, now, yesterday we had Mr. Greenewalt
here.29 He said they had the best year in their history; they’re up 8 percent. But he said they’re only using 80 percent of their capacity. They
still have 20 percent more and while they’re . . . He said they’re going to
put in some . . . I don’t know if it’s between 250 and 300 million dollars
for a new . . . And yet, obviously, there’s . . . for every dollar they spend,
they could save that extra 20 percent. This is an industry which is having a good year.
Unidentified: I don’t . . .
President Kennedy: How do you see that . . . even if, therefore you . . .
if this thing has run out of gas as quickly as it is, not because I had my
fight on steel, or do you . . . How important, as an economic historian, do
you consider that situation—
President Kennedy: —with steel?30
29. Crawford H. Greenewalt, chairman of E. I. DuPont de Nemours; Roger Blough, chairman
of U.S. Steel; Harold Boeschenstein, president of Owens-Corning; Alan Sproul, retired president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank; and Henry Alexander, chairman of Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company, met with President Kennedy and Treasury Secretary Dillon the
previous afternoon to discuss the budget and the tax cut proposal.
30. Often referred to as “The Battle of Blough Run,” after the President’s chief adversary in
this situation, Roger Blough of the U.S. Steel Corporation, President Kennedy’s fight with
steel involved his efforts to rescind an April 1962 steel price increase that he believed to be a
379
Samuelson: I try not to be partisan.
Samuelson: But I don’t think that’s the significant—
President Kennedy: That might have had an effect on the vigor of
the stock market decline, but not on this basic economic problem of the
tax cut.
Samuelson: No, it had an effect upon the rationalization and the
degree of articulation of feeling.
President Kennedy: Yes. Well, that you know—
President Kennedy: —that kind of [unclear].
Samuelson: Yeah.
President Kennedy: But as far as just looking at the basic economic
problem?
Samuelson: No.
President Kennedy: Well, if the problem is the . . . what we’re talking
about, I don’t really see how much the $8 billion tax reduction, even if
we did it today . . . Wouldn’t that just postpone our troubles because our
troubles seem to be that we’re eating up our inventories? Is that what it’s
coming to?
Samuelson: No. I . . . my way of interpreting the mechanics is always
just the reverse. This suggests to me that what you need is a tax reduction—and I want to comment on one part if I can. Some people think
that what a tax reduction does is get you something at the beginning—
with the announcement effect—then that wears off, now, what’s your
new gimmick? That isn’t what I’ve . . . the way I think of it. I think of it
as a change in the amount of the purchasing power in the hands of people, and every month, so long as the tax . . . the rate reduction is in effect.
double cross perpetrated by steel company executives. Kennedy believed he had been given a
tacit guarantee by the steel companies that if he could convince the steelworkers to sign a new
contract with wage or benefit increases less costly than the 3.2 percent figure representing
average industrial productivity, then they would hold the line on prices. On 6 April 1962 the
steelworker’s union signed a new contract with no wage increases and only a few cents’ worth
of benefit increases, well below the 3.2 percent target.
The President was taken by surprise, then, when U.S. Steel announced a 3.5 percent
across-the-board price increase on April 10, followed by five other companies on April 11.
Kennedy remarked to Ben Bradlee, “It looks like such a double cross. I think steel made a deal
with Nixon not to raise prices until after the election. Then came the recession and they didn’t
want to raise prices. Then, when we pulled out of the recession they said, ‘Let Kennedy squeeze
the unions first before we raise prices.’ So I squeezed McDonald and gave him a good statesmanship leg to stand on with his workers. And they kicked us right in the balls” [quoted in
Benjamin C. Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 76].
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So, I don’t look for . . . I’m not as optimistic, for example, as the secretary is on the immediate effects of these different—I think even qualitatively. I just think the ’54 code had an effect upon equipment.31 It took
years to take place. I think the investment credit will have its effect, but
people have to sharpen up their pencils and . . . wake up.
Dillon: What about the effect of the tax cut, immediately, on demand,
though? On consumer . . . . If you cut income, personal income taxes
now, doesn’t that reflect pretty quickly in—
Samuelson: Yes, but it’s not by pronouncement effect.32
Dillon: Oh, no, no . . .
Samuelson: It’s not because somebody reads in the papers that Mr.
Mills has given him something.
Dillon: [as Samuelson continues, below] No, no . . . I never said that.
Samuelson: He finds at the end of the week that—
Dillon: No, I think it’s just—
Goldberg: [Unclear] that Mr. Mills has given anybody anything.
[Laughter.]
Samuelson: No, I was just speaking in the subjunctive.
Goldberg: Oh. [Unclear exchange.]
Wilbur Mills: Mr. Samuelson?
Samuelson: Yes?
Mills: Were you talking, in response to the President’s inquiry, about
a permanent tax reduction or a temporary tax reduction? I think it’s
very important, in answer to his question—
Samuelson: Yeah.
Mills: —what you mean.
Samuelson: I was thinking about a . . . an immediate tax reduction,
but that was simply bringing in earlier a longer-lasting rate reduction.
Mills: Which would be a permanent reduction?
Samuelson: . . . be a permanent . . . yes.
Mills: Yes, thank you.
President Kennedy: Well, now, given the state of the economy and of
the Congress, aside from all the . . . would you say that what we really
should anticipate . . . Thinking about a tax cut next year, we’ve got a major
31. The 1954 revisions in the federal tax code included some tax cuts.
32. The psychological, or “pronouncement,” effect was precisely the factor highlighted by
Crawford Greenewalt in the previous day’s meeting with the President and Secretary Dillon.
381
budgetary problem because we’re going to have a deficit. So we’re going to
have to cut taxes at the time of a deficit. As long as we don’t have an inflationary problem, do you see the cutting . . . running a prospect of a two- or
three-year deficit as a very serious problem? Increasing the size of the debt,
increasing . . . I mean, obviously, giving the Treasury more of a problem as
far as floating bonds . . . Is that a problem to you?
Samuelson: Are you speaking now in terms of the economics of the
problem?
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.
Samuelson: I would say definitely it is not a problem. This is . . . I’ve
just come back from Europe . . . this is something that they just can’t
understand in Europe, because in Britain . . . because they don’t know
what the deficit is the way we measure it. And I was talking to officials
and they just can’t understand why we wouldn’t realize that if the private investment were sluggish, that that would mean for some period of
time you’d want to have lower tax rates. And that . . . that I’d say would
be what the doctor ordered for this.
President Kennedy: What is their debt, national debt, do you know?
In England?
Samuelson: Uhh . . . Bob?
Tobin: I think that they must have a beauty, right now.
Robert Roosa: Yeah, it’s about twice their GNP.
Samuelson: Yeah, oh, it’s much heavier in terms of—
Roosa: And ours was about three-fifths of the GNP.
Samuelson: Yes . . .
President Kennedy: Twice their GNP?
Samuelson: Yes. Oh, it’s much—
Dillon: But they, you know, they came through the war without writing off debts. They were the only country besides ourselves that did that.
And so, therefore, they’re saddled with this tremendous debt. Whereas,
all these other countries, oh . . . started out at what was zero. [Unclear]
their currency . . .
Solow: But that figure includes their local debt as well. We’d have to
add in our local . . . state and local debt to be comparable.
Unidentified: Yes.
Roosa: And which might be true literally, then that . . . there’s a
change in ratio. Our ratio, then, would be four-fifths of the GNP.
Dillon: And theirs is twice.
Roosa: And theirs is twice.
Dillon: So theirs is still way . . . way ahead of us.
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President Kennedy: In other words, then, you—from an economic
point of view, in fact—you’d recommend our running—
Samuelson: I would recommend . . . I recommend it, in two senses.
First, there is reason to think when you actually get into the figures that
if you can keep the economy from going down and growing, that you . . .
that capacity is . . . we’re growing into our britches and so we’d get help
from the private economy.33 So . . .
Heller: Paul, at that point, it’s worth noting—
Samuelson: Yes?
Heller: —that across the board, we’re at about 87 percent of capacity.
That’s a . . . so it doesn’t take—
Samuelson: Yeah.
Heller: —many more points to push industry to expand their capacities, if they like to operate at around 90, 91 percent of capacity.
Samuelson: And when you take the estimates that have been made . . .
I mean take some of the governmental estimates that I’ve seen or take
the Eckstein and so forth, when they put in the tax reduction, they pick
up something.34 It isn’t that you’re giving away a dollar of revenue and
then there’s no effect on the economy at all.35 But I would go farther and
say that if you didn’t pick up anything—as would perhaps be the case in
the Great Depression, in the 1933–34 period—every extra dollar of
deficit . . . There was so much excess capacity that it wouldn’t get you
much in the way of private investment; the economic case would be . . .
wouldn’t be very strong.
And, in a way, it purely is a matter of arithmetic. If you don’t get the
private investment, naturally, and you have more people coming in all
the time, you’ve . . . you have the need for production. To have that filled
33. Spurred by new demand and by relatively high capacity utilization, corporations would be
likely to increase their capital investment, according to this conception.
34. The “Eckstein” is most likely a reference to the “Study of Employment, Growth, and Price
Levels” promulgated in January 1960 by the Joint Economic Committee (JEC). This study is
commonly referred to as the “Eckstein Report,” after Harvard economics professor Otto
Eckstein, who served as the technical director for the JEC study. It recommended a combined
fiscal and monetary policy designed to achieve 4.5 percent annual growth in the U.S. economy.
Eckstein would later serve on the Council of Economic Advisers in the Johnson administration
from 2 September 1964 to 1 February 1966.
35. Never under the impression that the tax cut would pay for itself, in the short term, in new
revenue added by growth, President Kennedy and his advisers, nonetheless, did believe in and
count on the generation of some new revenue that would partly offset the revenue lost with a
general tax reduction.
383
in by a more expansionary governmental policy—taking out less from
the economy—makes sense in terms of the arithmetic. In other words,
things have to grow . . .
The tape machine stopped.
Although his most persuasive economic adviser, Paul Samuelson, was
still strong for an immediate and permanent tax cut, the President had
decided not to go with even a temporary tax cut in 1962.36 The July economic figures were not bad enough for the administration to make a case
to Congress that the country was on the verge of a deep recession.
Kennedy had not shown his hand in the taped portion of the morning
meeting; but after it had ended, the White House announced that the
President would be making a special television and radio address to the
nation on the economy, Monday night. It was his fourth special address
since January 1961.
On August 13, in an uncharacteristically leaden presentation that he
would later describe as his worst as President, Kennedy would explain
the reasons for postponing a tax cut and pushing for general tax reform
in 1963. In an oblique defense of the permanent tax cut and the deficit
spending he now sought, President Kennedy declared that recessionary
deficits were different and that the federal debt, relative to our nation’s
expanding wealth, had steadily declined since World War II. “This
administration intends to cut taxes in order to build the fundamental
strength of our economy,” the President intoned, “to remove a serious
barrier to long-term growth, to increase incentives by routing out
inequities and complexities and to prevent the even greater budget
deficit that a lagging economy would surely produce . . . . And the right
time for that kind of bill, it now appears in the absence of an economic
crisis today . . . is January 1963.” Reminding his listeners that he had
“not been talking about a different kind of tax cut, a quick, temporary
tax cut, to prevent a new recession,” Kennedy wound down his presentation by noting that “timing is of the essence” and by noting his belief in
the U.S. willingness “to bear the burdens of freedom and progress, to
face the facts of fiscal responsibility and to share my view that proposing
36. The President may have tipped his hand a little when he asked Samuelson to describe the
effect on credit markets of asking for a tax cut in the winter of 1963, when a recession would
have already worsened the federal budget deficit.
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an emergency tax cut tonight, a cut which could not now be either justified or enacted, would needlessly undermine confidence both at home
and abroad.”37
Tax cuts were not the only instrument Kennedy was considering to
improve the condition of the U.S. economy. At the end of his meeting
with Wilbur Mills on August 6, Kennedy had let drop that he was not as
worried about the state of the U.S. dollar as he had been before. But he
still thought about it. Besides the worrisome 25 percent drop in the
stock market in the late spring, Kennedy had observed a huge drop in
U.S. gold reserves, largely due to a sale of dollars by the French. Among
the many factors that a U.S. president had to consider was the strength
of the dollar. If foreigners did not want to hold it, then interest rates
would have to rise or imports would have to be cut, either of which
would mean more price inflation. Just as thoughts of Berlin had entered
into Kennedy’s discussion of the politics of a domestic tax cut, so too,
would the problem of European defense stand behind this discussion of
the dollar overseas. Kennedy believed the Europeans were not carrying
their fair share of the burden of NATO. Nothing brought that home
more vividly than the amount of cash that flowed out of the country to
subsidize European defense. On July 30, the under secretary of state,
George W. Ball, had assured the President that he had found a way to
work with Treasury on this.38 Ball had an idea for applying the concept
of European burden sharing to the U.S. balance of payments problem.
For a week the President’s chief domestic policy assistant, Theodore
Sorensen, had been working with Ball to be sure this idea could be
acceptable to Treasury.
With the departure of some of his domestic economics team,
Kennedy turned immediately to a discussion of international monetary
policy. Advisers who served double duty like Sorensen, Paul Samuelson,
James Tobin, Walter Heller, Kermit Gordon, and, of course, Treasury
Secretary Douglas Dillon, stayed for both meetings.
37. “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the State of the National
Economy,” 13 August 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 615, 616–17.
38. See “Meeting on Europe and General Diplomatic Matters,” 30 July 1962.
Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis
385
11:20 A.M.–12:30 P.M.
Mr. President, we’re in this situation, to put it in rather
oversimplified terms, we’re running an enormous business.
We’re running it on a demand credit basis. This is a business
many times bigger than any of the biggest corporations in
the United States and yet our notes can be called at a
moment’s notice.
Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis39
The conventional wisdom held that the Bretton Woods monetary system
functioned smoothly in the early 1960s and that the United States benefited, both economically and politically, from the advantages the system
bestowed on the dollar. But this meeting and those which followed on foreign economic policy told a story somewhat at odds with that conventional view. Beginning in 1958, a whole series of factors—including the
move toward current account convertibility among the Europeans—
enlarged the U.S. balance of payments deficit. As the U.S. payments deficit
increased, the world’s central bankers became less inclined to hold surplus
dollars in their reserves and began to convert them into gold instead.
Many observers worried that a crisis of confidence in the dollar could
spark a mass conversion into gold, rendering the dollar unusable as a
reserve currency and in the process destroying a large portion of the
world’s liquidity. This problem had come to be known as the “Triffin
Dilemma,” after the Yale economist Robert Triffin published a book, Gold
and the Dollar Crisis, in 1960 highlighting the confidence problem.40
The U.S. dollar and gold crisis worsened during the summer and fall
of 1960. There were several causes, but the perception that the Kennedy
administration would pursue looser fiscal and monetary policies in order
to jump-start the economy stoked fears of inflation and even a dollar
devaluation. In order to squelch such fears, Kennedy issued a statement
the week before the election promising to maintain the gold convertibility
39. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, C. Douglas Dillon, Walter Heller, Kermit
Gordon, Carl Kaysen, John Leddy, Robert Roosa, Paul Samuelson, Theodore Sorensen, and
James Tobin. Tape 11, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
40. Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1960).
386
10, 1962
of the dollar at $35 an ounce.41 Not long after the April 1962 showdown
with U.S. steel companies and the subsequent stock market plunge, he
would reiterate this pledge with his Telstar broadcast of July 23, 1962.
Recognizing the potential dangers, political and economic, of a ballooning deficit and gold outflow, the new President immediately set out to correct the problem. A transition team issued a blue-ribbon report.42 A
stalwart and fiscally conservative Republican, Douglas Dillon, was named
secretary of the Treasury. Dillon’s under secretary for international monetary affairs, Robert Roosa, negotiated a whole series of innovative arrangements—the gold pool, swap arrangements, and the General Arrangements
to Borrow—to ease the dollar and gold drain.43 On the political front, the
members of NATO were pressured to make offset payments, in other
words, to use surplus dollars obtained as a result of U.S. military expenditures in Europe to purchase U.S.-made military hardware.
Despite the elaborate measures taken by the Kennedy administration
in 1961, the balance of payments deficit did not disappear in 1962. The
steel crisis and the dramatic drop in the stock market, though both crises of
transitory import, appeared to signal economic problems at home.
Overseas, Kennedy worried as political relations with the two countries
holding the most surplus dollars—West Germany and France—became
strained. In May, rumors reached the President that France—alone or with
West Germany—might convert its surplus dollars into gold as a way to
pressure the Kennedy administration into changing its European policies.44
41. See Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 406. See also John
Kenneth Galbraith’s letter to the President from October 1960, in his Letters to Kennedy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 29–31.
42. “Report to the Honorable John F. Kennedy by the Task Force on the Balance of Payments,”
dated 27 December 1960, from file AP/SD & WNA/Report to the President on the Balance of
Payments, 25 February 1963, found in the Papers of Dean Acheson, Harry S. Truman Library.
43. The gold pool refers to the London gold pool established by the United States, Belgium,
Holland, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland to feed a supply of gold to private
buyers as demand for the precious metal increased. Swap arrangements are agreements
between the United States and its major trading partners to exchange U.S.-held foreign currencies for U.S. dollars held abroad to forestall demands for U.S. gold. The General
Arrangements to Borrow, entered into in 1962 by the so-called Group of Ten, introduced a
standby credit of $6 billion designed to accommodate nations otherwise dependent on U.S.
dollars with increased international liquidity.
44. Dillon, Memo for the President, 25 May 1962, National Security Files, Departments and
Agencies: Treasury, Box 289, John F. Kennedy Library. Dillon told the President that a Bank
of France official made a statement “which could indicate possible difficulties ahead with
France. He said that it must be realized that France’s dollar holdings represented a political as
well as an economic problem.” See also Memo of Meeting between the President, Ambassador
Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis
387
The international monetary issue came to a head in July when the
French finance minister, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, visited Washington.
Giscard told U.S. officials that the dollar’s defenses against a speculative
attack were weak and that cooperation was needed on a “grand scale.”45
Was Giscard making a threat or offering to help? Under secretary of
state George Ball, concerned that Kennedy’s worry over the dollar and
gold problem might tempt him to pull U.S. troops from NATO, saw
Giscard’s statement as an opportunity to negotiate a new set of monetary arrangements with the Europeans to protect the dollar.46 To Ball,
the problem was that European central bankers did not recognize that
the deficit was a political problem caused by the United States’s worldwide security commitments.
Ball produced a plan whereby NATO Europe would recognize the
monetary costs of U.S. protection by agreeing to hold mostly dollars
instead of gold for a period of two years.47 The Europeans and the IMF
would provide temporary, large-scale financing to cover the U.S. payments deficit. In return, the United States would distribute an agreed
amount of gold to the Europeans and would use the grace period to
bring the U.S. balance of payments into equilibrium. At the end of the
temporary arrangement, a new set of monetary agreements could be
negotiated to replace the Bretton Woods structure.
The State Department supported the plan because it would remove
the pressure on the President to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe. The
Council of Economic Advisers—and in particular, Yale University econ-
Hervé Alphand, M. Malraux, and McGeorge Bundy, 11 May 1962, FRUS, 13: 695–701, where
Kennedy threatened to pull troops out of Europe if the French and/or the West Germans ever
tried to use their monetary power against the United States.
45. Gavin to Rusk, 12 July 1962, “France” folder, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy
Library. See also Heller, Memo to the President, 16 July 1962, President’s Office Files, Council
of Economic Advisers, John F. Kennedy Library.
46. Memcon, “Payments Arrangements Among the Atlantic Community,” 20 July 1962,
FRUS, 13: 733. Note Ball’s descriptions of the views of central bankers as “pre–Herbert
Hoover” and “reminiscent of Dr. Schacht.”
47. Memo, Ball to the President, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem,” 24 July 1962, the
Papers of George W. Ball, Box 15b, “Memorandum to the President on the Gold Problem,”
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. Note especially Ball’s comment:
“What we must tell our European allies is, therefore, clear enough: If we are to continue to carry
our heavy share of the Free World burdens we can do so only under the conditions where our
exertions in the common cause do not imperil the dollar and in fact, the whole international payments system. To create those conditions is the first and most urgent task for the Atlantic partnership.” For a similar plan produced by the CEA, see James Tobin, “A Gold Agreement
Proposal,” 24 July 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department and White Advisory Report to the
President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63, Harry S. Truman Library.
388
10, 1962
omist James Tobin—advocated an amended version of the plan because
it would give the dollar protection while the administration jumpstarted the economy with tax cuts and budget deficits.48 But Dillon and
Robert Roosa from Treasury were adamantly opposed.49 They argued
that Wall Street and international capital markets would see any standstill arrangement on dollar-gold convertibility as a declaration that the
U.S. economy was in “receivership.” Dillon and Roosa contended that the
steps they had already taken during the first year and a half of the
administration—swap arrangements, offset agreements, the gold pool
operation—were adequate to protect the U.S. dollar and gold supply.
During this contentious and argumentative meeting on August 10,
1962, Ball, supported by James Tobin and Kermit Gordon of the CEA
and special assistant Carl Kaysen, would argue in favor of a modified
version of Ball’s plan.50 It was hoped that this plan, which would be presented by Theodore Sorensen, was something that the Treasury
Department could live with. Paul Samuelson, who had just finished
arguing for a tax cut and a fiscal stimulus, was brought in to help sell the
modified Ball plan to Treasury.
Ken

john f. kennedy - Chicago Tribune

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