Regional organizations and democratic conditionality Andrea

Regional organizations and democratic conditionality
Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann
Prepared to be presented at
EUI/RSCAS Seminar on Global Governance /Comparative Regional Integration
Draft – please do not quote without permission!
Introduction
Most existing regional organizations have adopted norms and created instruments to promote
and protect democracy, even organizations whose member-states are not democracies, such as
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
The literature of comparative regionalism has addressed this puzzle and offered a number of
alternative explanations for this development; a common point of departure is the structural
changes at the global level which took place after the end of the Cold War. Historically, the
first regional organization to include a commitment with democracy was the Organization of
American States (OAS), in 1948, but most norms and instruments to promote and protect
democracy were established after the 1990s (Börzel and van Hüllen 2015).
The idea that regional organizations can play a relevant role in strengthening democracy is not
obvious; the literature of democratic transition and democratization has controversially
discussed the possibility to promote democracy from ‘outside-in’ (O`Donell 1988, Schmitter
and Whitehead 1996). The spread of democratic conditionality in regional organizations all
over the globe is also particularly relevant given the lack of a consolidated regime at the
global level, i.e. at the United Nations System (UN), unlike the case of Human Rights (Rich
2001). In other words, the regional level has been presented as a the best way to promote
democracy multilaterally.
The main objective of this paper is to explore if and under which conditions regional
organizations can play an effective role to protect and promote democracy, and to identify the
main challenges they face. The main argument advanced is that regional organizations can
indeed play a more effective role than global multilateral institutions and single donors in
their bilateral relations given their better positioning in reaching consensus on key definitions
and models of democracy. However, a proper assessment has to take into consideration not
only the characteristics and activities of individual regional organizations separately, but the
crossed effects of organizations which have overlapping mandates and member-states. For
1
reasons of time and length, the paper focuses so far only on regional organizations which can
intervene in South American countries, i.e. the Organization of American States (OAS), the
Common Market of the South (Mercosur), and the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR); it does not include (yet) regional organization from other regions, or the Andean
Community (CAN), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alba) and the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The case of the democratic
crisis in Paraguay in 2012 will be used to illustrate how overlapping organizations promoting
democracy do not always perform complementary roles.
The first part of the paper briefly summarizes the commitments to protect and promote
democracy at the global level. The second part summarizes these commitments by regional
organizations, and the third focuses on South America. The fourth part of the paper analyses
the behaviour of these organizations during democratic crises in their member-states, and the
fifth explores the driving forces of the democratic interventions, and the conditions under
which they were successful. The paper concludes with some remarks about the challenges that
regional organizations face in order to effectively protect democracy in their member-states.
Global norms and instruments to protect and promote democracy
The UN Charter, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, did not have any explicit
commitment with democracy, except from the reference to ‘we the peoples’ in the Preamble,
give the disagreement about the pertinence of including it among the founding members. As
Rich argues (2001:23), ‘the logical place for the concept of democracy to develop as a
functioning principle of the international legal order is in human rights law’. Indeed it was in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art.21) where the ‘the will of the people’ as the
‘basis of the authority of government’, and the calls for that will to be discerned through
‘periodic and general elections’ appeared for the first time at the UN. Art.25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) defined democratic procedural
mechanisms (op.cit), but was not signed or ratified by most of the UN members at the time,
for the same reason that precluded a consensus for the inclusion of democracy in the Charter.
The separation and disagreement about the prioritization of civil and political rights on one
hand, and social and economic rights on the other hand, remains a key aspect for the lack of a
strong regime to protect and promote democracy at the global level, but more than 165
countries have by now ratified the ICCPR, more abut 85% of the UN member-states. The
Soviet Union and the recently decolonized countries were the main voices against the
2
adoption of universal models of democracy and political legitimacy of national governments
during the Cold War, but cultural specificities and local preferences persist, even among
Western countries, generating a colourful debate about the pros and contras of representative,
participative and deliberative democracies, as well as the persistence differences among
liberal and social democracies, as it will be explored below.
Despite these differences, the end of the Cold War was a turning point for the idea of
democracy promotion. The relationship between security, democracy and development was
reframed and, among others, development policy became to be used as an instrument to
promote democracy, opening up the possibility of establishing economic sanctions in cases of
democratic crisis, via the suspension of aid. Democracy, development and security became
also intertwined in peacekeeping operations.
In terms of international law, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Actions
adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights asserted that ‘democracy, developed and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing (paragraph 8 of section I). In 1996, the UN Human Rights Committee adopted
General Comment 25, which elaborated on ICCPR’s Art.25 (Rich op.cit:25). The UN
Commission on Human Rights adopted a Resolution 1999/57 on the ‘Promotion of the Right
to Democracy’, and Resolution 2000/47 on ‘Promoting and Consolidating Democracy’. The
UN also expanded its role in the area of democracy outside the Human Rights regime in the
last decades, especially in the area of electoral assistance. Rich (op.cit:26) also mentions the
International Conference of Newly Restored Democracies, convened in 1988, 1994 and 1997,
and the Agenda for Democratization issued in 1996 by Boutros-Boutros Ghali as important
developments in the early 1990s. More recently, the concept of Responsibility to Protect went
further in the establishment of conditions under which sovereignty should be conditioned to
how domestic regimes treat their citizens. In addition, the UN has created a number of
instruments to promote democracy and democratic governance such as the United Nations
Democracy Fund (UNDEF). 1 Democracy is now referred as ‘one of the universal and
indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations, despite the fact that not all its
member-states are democratic. Despite promoting democracy, the UN does not have a
democratic conditionality.2
1
2
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/
http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/democracy/democracy_and_un.shtml
3
Regional organizations and democratic conditionality worldwide
The literature of comparative regionalism has expanded its original focus on trade and
economic issues to, among others, the role of regional organizations in the promotion of
normative standards, such as democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law.
This session only briefly shows the main commitments in the area of democracy in some
regional organizations. They are presented in the table below.
Table1: Commitments with democracy by Regional Organizations (selected)
Regional
Charters, Protocols, Declarations
Organization
African Union (AU)

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981)

Protocol to the African Chapter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (1998)

Lome Declaration on the framework for an OAU response to
unconstitutional changes of government (2000)

Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic
Elections in Africa (2002)

African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
(2007)
of

Bali Concord (2003)
Asian

Vientiane Action Programme (2004)

ASEAN Charter (2007)

ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint (2009)

ASEAN Declaration on Human Rigths (2012)
League of Arab States

Pact of the League of Arab States (1945)
(LAS)

Tunis Declaration (2004)
Association
Southeast
Nations (ASEAN)

Pacific Islands Forum

Biketawa Declaration (2000)
(PIF)

PIC Agreement (2000)

Pacific Plan (2005)

Political Governance and Security (Strategic Plan 20094
2011)
Asia

SAARC Charter (1985)
for

SAARC Social Charter (2004)
Regional Cooperation

16th Summit Declaration (2010)

SADC Charter , Article 5 (1992)
Development

Revised SADC Charter, Art. 5.1 (2001)
Community (SADC)

Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,
South
Association
(SAARC)
Southern
African
Art2 &11 (2001)

Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections
and a Code of Conduct for Election Observers (2004)
Economic

Declaration of Political Principles (1991)
Community of West

Revised Treaty 1993)
African

Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention
States
(ECOWAS)
Source:
(1999)
various

Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001)

ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008)
including
Börzel
and
van
Hüllen
(2015)
and
http://www.idea.int/democracydialog/upload/Annex_A_-_DemocracyRelated_Charters_and_Declarations_of_Regional_Organizations.pdf
Regional norms and instruments to protect and promote of democracy in South
American countries
OAS
Democracy was a key principle in the Charter of Bogota (1948) but only after the 1990s the
OAS developed norms and mechanisms to promote and protect it in practice (Herz 2004). In
1990, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy was created with the aim of providing
technical assistance and consultancy to OAS member-states for the strengthening of their
democratic procedures and policies but, importantly only if solicited. In 1991, the General
Assembly adopted the Resolution 1080, an instrument whereby the General Secretary can call
a meeting of Permanent Council to examine a case of democratic crisis, as well as meetings
with Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or special sessions of the General Assembly, within ten
5
days. In 1992, the Washington Protocol was concluded. It entered in force in 1997, and gives
the OAS the right to suspend a member-state in which a democratically elected government
was removed from power by force. In 2001 the Interamerican Democratic Charter was
concluded, defining elements of democracy, and how it must be protected when threatened,
offering member-states a path to guide collective actions. In 2005 the 35th General Assembly
discussed the possibility of including interventionist mechanisms, proposed by the US, but
was blocked by the majority of Latin American member-states, who still value the primary of
the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Gindin 2005, Burguess 2005).
Mercosur
Protocol of Ushuaia
The Protocol of Ushuaia is referred as Mercosur democratic clause; it was signed in July
1998 and entered in force in January 2002. Article 1 state that the existence of
democratic institutions is an essential condition to the development of the process of
integration. Articles 2 and 3 state that in case of a rupture (note that not in case of risk of
rupture!) of the democratic order the protocol shall be implemented. Article 4 states that
in case of a rupture of the democratic order the other member-states shall promote
consultation among themselves and with the affected party. Article 5 states that in case
the consultation with the affected party is not productive the other member-states shall
consider the nature and extension of measures to be adopted. These measures include the
suspension of the rights of the affected party to participate in the decision-making bodies
and the suspension of the rights and duties of the process of integration.
Montevideo Protocol of Democracy (Ushuaia II)
The Montevideo Protocol was signed on the 20/12/2011 by the CMC Dec. 27/11, but is not
yet in force. It reaffirmed the contents of the Protocol of Ushuaia and included in its article 1
that it is to be implemented not only in the case of a rupture of the democratic order (as in
Ushuaia) but also in the case of a menace of rupture of the democratic order, the violation of
the constitutional order or any other situation which puts in risk the legitimate exercise of
power and the democratic principles and values. Ushuaia II broadened therefore the cases in
which Mercosur’s democratic clause can be implemented. Article 6 is also much more precise
in the description of measures, referring to the closure of borders (Art6.), promotion of the
suspension of the affected party from other international and regional organizations (Art.6d),
additional political and diplomatic sanctions (Art.6f). Article 7 however states clearly that the
6
measures should not risk the wellbeing and the human rights of the population, and should
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the affected party.
Protocol of Human Rights
Human Rights and democracy have been treated quite differently in Mercosur, democratic
conditionality was addressed by the Protocols of Ushuaia and Ushuaia II, as just seen, while
human rights has been addressed in another protocol, the Mercosur Protocol of Human Rights
signed in 2005 (in force in 2010). The Protocol of Human Rights states that respect of human
rights and fundamental freedoms are essential conditions for the process of integration
(Art.1). It foresees the suspension of the violating party in case consultations to deal with
serious and systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in one of the
member-states as ineffective, especially in times of institutional crisis or during a state of
emergency foreseen in their respective constitutional orders (Art.3,4).
Others instruments in Mercosur
Other instruments that Mercosur has to promote democracy and human rights are for instance
the Observatory of Democracy, created in 2007 with the aims of, among others, contributing
to the strengthening of the objectives of Ushuaia Protocol and the democratic commitment in
Mercosur; following the electoral processes in member-states; coordinating the activities of
the Electoral Observation Missions. The Presidential Declaration on Human Rights (2005),
made reference, for the first time in Mercosur, to the right to the truth and fight against
impunity (Art. 5), and states that it is a collective right to know the truth about the past events
(Art.6). The Protocol establishing the Mercosur Parliament also contains a number of
references to democracy, human rights and good governance of member-states. Art. 4 which
deal with its competences, establishes that it shall elaborate and publish a report on the
situation of human rights of Mercosur member-states annually and affirms that the Parliament
shall protect the democracy of Mercosur member-states and refers to the Protocol of Ushuaia.
The Meeting of High-level Authorities in Human Rights of Mercosur (HR Meeting), created
in 2004, and the Mercosur Human Rights Public Policy Institute (HR Institute), created in
2009 are also key institutions to consolidate the agenda of human rights. 3 Mercosur does not
3
The protection of fundamental rights is also addressed in the (mandatory) Decision of the Common
Market Council (CMC Dec.64/10) which approved an Action Plan for a Mercosur Citizenship Statute.
According to Art.2 of the decision, the Statute shall include fundamental rights and benefits to
Mercosur member-states, and conform to the objectives of the implementation of a policy of free
movement of peoples, equal civil, social, cultural and economic rights and freedoms, equal access to
7
provide for the opportunity of litigating against human rights violations. However, the
expansion of the jurisdiction of Mercosur’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) into the
area of human rights is currently being discussed (Lixinski 2010; Giopone 2012).
An expansion of its jurisprudence into the area of human rights would not require any changes
in the DSM structure, but most experts consider it very difficult to do so in the absence of a
regional court or a Charter of Human Rights (Sant’anna Rosa Apud Lixinski 2010: 357).
Proposals for the creation of a regional court have been discussed by legal scholars and
magistrates in the context of the ‘Dialogue Between the Supreme Courts of Mercosur
member-states’ and the ‘Permanent Forum of Supreme Courts of Mercosur’ (both created in
2004). However, a regional court would demand changes in the Brazilian and Uruguayan
Constitutions, which are considered very unlikely. The so-called Bridges Case has exposed
the limits of such a development. The case was brought to the ad hoc arbitration court in June
2006 by Uruguay against Argentina. It refers to the blockade of international bridges between
both countries by environmentalist groups protesting the construction of pulp mills on the
Uruguay River located on the border. The case is analyzed in detail by Lixinski, who argues
that the ruling took a narrow view and gave clear preference to goals of economic integration
over the question of human rights (2010: 364).4 The case of the suspension of Paraguay from
Mercosur in 2012 brought new elements to this discussion. Paraguay was suspended from
Mercosur in June 2012 following the impeachment of President Lugo, interpreted as a coup
d’état by the other member states, who followed the procedures established by the Protocol of
Ushuaia. Paraguayan interim President Federico Franco, however, questioned the legality of
the decisions taken by the Presidents, and his government took the case to Mercosur’s Court.
The finding 01/2012 of the Court was against Paraguay, but significantly, it included a
discussion about its competences to judge political cases. While the Court explicitly stated
that there is nothing that precludes it to judge such cases, this, however, did not apply to the
procedures established for exceptional cases of urgency established by the Protocol of Olivos,
which is strictly limited to trade cases (Perotti 2013). The Court did not settle the question
whether cases of violations of democracy and human rights referred to by the Protocol of
work, health and education. Detailed objectives in these areas are established in Art. 3; most refer to
social rights, but it also includes references to the rule of law, such as the creation of a Mercosur
system of consumer protection. According to Art. 7, it should be implemented by Mercosur’s 30th
Anniversary in 2021.
4
The Ad Hoc Arbitration Court finding 09/2006 stated the “omission of the state of Argentina to adopt
appropriated measures to prevent and/or stop the impediments to the free circulation of the derivates of
beef in the Argentinian territory and the routes to the international bridges San Martin and gral which
unite the Republic of Argentina with the Oriental Republic of Uruguay” (translation by author).
8
Ushuaia and the Protocol of Human Rights could ever be brought to the Court in a nonemergency situation; it argued that Mercosur’s normative structure does not create a
supranational order which can replace the sovereignty of its member-states.
Unasur
Unasur was created in 2008, in a context of changing paradigms of economic integration in
South America. Free trade lost its centrality to other activities of cooperation such as in the
areas of infrastructure and social policies. To achieve these aims, several Councils were
created in the areas of social development, health, education and culture, in addition to the
Council of Economics and Finance. The Social Development Council, for instance, has a broad
mandate and seeks to contribute to the achievement of fairer, more democratic societies, and to
promote cooperation mechanisms in order to achieve an integrated social development, reduce
asymmetries and deepen the process of regional integration (Tussie and Riggirozzi). While some
of these areas have also become more relevant in other existing regional organizations such as
Mercosur, a striking innovation of Unasur is the establishment of cooperation in the areas of
security and defence. The creation of the South American Defence Council (SADC) is
exceptional in that regard. It is the first time that defence was included in a South American
regional organization, and that security was addressed from a broader perspective (Briceno and
Ribeiro Hoffmann 2015).
A central substantive element in the concept of security and defence in Unasur is the collective
commitment to the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights. Unasur has a
democratic clause, in the form of a protocol signed in November 2010 (Additional Protocol to
the Constitutive Treaty of Unasur on Commitment to Democracy), which builds from the
democratic clauses of Mercosur and the Andean Community, Unasur’s constitutive treaty and
the Declaration of Buenos Aires from October 2010. The Protocol reinforces the commitment to
the promotion, defence and protection of the democratic order, the rule of law and its institutions,
Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. All are considered as essential and indispensable
conditions to participation in Unasur. Art. 1 states that is shall be applied in cases of breach or
threat of breach against the democratic order, a violation of the constitutional order or any
situation that jeopardizes the legitimate exercising of power and the application of the values and
principles of democracy. Art. 4 established that the rights of the violating member-state to
participate in the various bodies and branches of Unasur can be suspended, as well as its rights
and benefits under the Constitutive Treaty. It also foresees the closure of borders and trade ,
9
communication, provision of energy, services and supply (economic sanctions) , and additional
political and diplomatic sanctions. Such the cases as Mercosur and the Andean Community, the
commitment to democracy and human rights is balanced with commitments to sovereignty and
non-interference, and do not include military sanctions or references to the principle of
Responsibility to Protect.
Protecting democracy in practice in South America
South American regional organizations have reacted to crises in their member-states by the
means of diplomatic pressure, no one has, so far, implemented economic or military sanctions
(the latter are not even foreseen). Before analyzing the reaction of regional organizations, this
session discusses how democratic crises in South America have been defined by contrasting
two indicators. Table 1 below lists events of political instability in South American countries
as developed in the Stability Map Reports, published twice a year by the Observatório Político
Sul-Americano (OPSA).5 OPSA Reports define five types of political instability: coup d’état,
civil war, state of emergency, interruption of presidential mandate and social revolt. The first
two can be defined as democratic ruptures, and all involve risks to the protection of human
rights (Ribeiro Hoffmann 2010).Table 2 shows the democratic indicators from Freedom
House.
As it can be observed by contrasting the two tables, it is possible to measure democracy in
very different ways, leading to different interpretations of the quality of democracy and the
existence or not of democratic crises or threats of democratic crises. Cases of military coups
are less problematic, but cases of so-called constitutional coup d’état can often become very
controversial, such Paraguay 2012. Venezuela has also been a particularly controversial case,
given the long list of complex events since the beginning of the 1990s led by former President
Chavez, or against him. The situation in Venezuela and Ecuador, for instance, was differently
interpreted by the OPSA Map of Stability and by Freedom House. According the OPSA Map
of Stability, Venezuela and Ecuador “are going through a process of deep institutional reform
in a political context of dispute and active popular participation, but do not show signals of
instability”.6 According to Freedom House , instead, “The run-up to Venezuela’s state and
local elections in November 2008 was characterized by politically motivated disqualifications
5
The last available Stability Map was the one published in 2010. For details about the methodology
used
see
the
report
online:
http://www.opsa.com.br/images/pdf/mapa/11_mapaestabilidade_10_mapa_10_01.pdf.
6
OPSA (2008, p.6). http://observatorio.iuperj.br/pdfs/7_mapaestabilidade_mapa_2008_2.pdf .
10
of opposition candidates and the abuse of state resources, though the balloting itself was
orderly and the vote count appeared fair”7. The problem of the definition of democracy and
models of democracy are analysed in the next session.
Table 1: Events of political instability in South American countries (1991-2010)
Arg
Bra Par
Uru Chi
Bol
Per
Col
2010
C
C
B
2009
A
C,E
B
Equ
2008
E
C
B,E
2007
E
C
B
2006
E
C
B
C,E
2005
D,E A,C
B
C,D,E
B
E
C
Ven
2004
E
E
2003
D
D,E C,E
B
D
B,C C
A,C,D,E
2002
D,E
A,C,D
E
2001
C,D,E
A,C,D,E
D,E
B
A,C,E
A,E
A
C,E D,E
B
A
A
A,D,E
E
B
A,C,D,E C
E
E
B
E
A
E
B
A,D,E
A,E
C
B,C C
E
2000
1999
E
1998
1997
E
A,D,E
C,E
A,C,D,E
1996
A
E
1995
A
C,E C
B,C A,E
A,E
E
B,C
B
A,C,D,E
A
E
A,B,C
B,C
A
D
A,B,C,E B,C E
A,C,D,E
B,C
A,E
1994
1993
E
1992
D
1991
C,E
B
A,D
Source: OPSA (2010:27)
A- Coup d’etat
B- Civil war
C- State of emergency
D- Interruption of presidential mandate
E- Social revolt
7
Freedom House,
2009 Freedom in the World Venezuela Report,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/countryreports/Venezuela2009.pdf .
11
2009,
p.1.
Table 2 : Political and civil liberties of South American countries (1991-2008)
Arg
Bra
Par
Uru
Chi
Bol
Per
Col
Equ
Ven
2008
2,2,F* 2,2,F
3,3,PF 1,1,F 1,1,F 3,3,PF 2,3,F
3,3,PF 3,3,PF 4,4,PF,
2007
2,2,F
2,2,F
3,3,PF 1,1,F 1,1,F 3,3,PF 2,3,F
3,3,PF 3,3,PF 4,4,PF
2006
2,2,F
2,2,F
3,3,PF 1,1,F 1,1,F 3,3,PF 2,3,F
3,3,PF 3,3,PF 4,4,PF
2005
2,2,F
2,3,F
3,3,PF 1,1,F 1,1,F 3,3,PF 2,3,F
4,4,PF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF
2004
2,2,F
2,3,F
3,3,PF 1,1,F 1,1,F 3,3,PF 2,3,F
4,4,PF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF
2003
3,3,PF 2,3,F
4,3,PF 1,1,F 2,1,F 2,3,F
2,3,F
4,4,PF 3,3,PF 3,4,PF
2002
3,3,PF 3,3,PF 4,3,PF 1,1,F 2,2,F 1,3,F
1,3,F
4,4,PF 3,3,PF 3,5,PF
2001
3,3,PF 3,3,PF 4,3,PF 1,1,F 2,2,F 1,3,F
1,3,F
4,4,PF 3,3,PF 3,5,PF
2000
1,2,F
3,3,PF 4,3,PF 1,1,F 2,2,F 1,3,F
3,3,PF 4,4,PF 3,3,PF 3,5,PF
1999
2,3,F
3,4,PF 4,3,PF 1,2,F 2,2,F 1,3,F
5,4,PF 4,4,PF 2,3,F
4,4,PF
1998
3,3,F
3,4,PF 4,3,PF 1,2,F 3,2,F 1,3,F
5,4,PF 3,4,PF 2,3,F
2,3,F
1997
2,3,F
3,4,PF 4,3,PF 1,2,F 2,2,F 1,3,F
5,4,PF 4,4,PF 3,3,PF 2,3,F
1996
2,3,F
2,4,PF 4,3,PF 1,2,F 2,2,F 2,3,F
4,3,PF 4,4,PF 2,4,PF 2,3,F
1995
2,3,F
2,4,PF 4,3,PF 2,2,F 2,2,F 2,4,PF 5,4,PF 4,4,PF 2,3,F
3,3,PF
1994
2,3,F
2,4,PF 4,3,PF 2,2,F 2,2,F 2,3,F
5,4,PF 3,4,PF 2,3,F
3,3,PF
1993
2,3,F
3,4,PF 3,3,PF 2,2,F 2,2,F 2,3,F
5,5,PF 2,4,PF 2,3,F
3,3,PF
1992
2,3,F
2,3,F
3,3,PF 1,2,F 2,2,F 2,3,F
6,5,PF 2,4,PF 2,3,F
3,3,PF
1991
1,3,F
2,3,F
3,3,PF 1,2,F 2,2,F 2,3,F
3,5,PF 2,4,PF 2,3,F
1,3,F
Fonte: Freedom House: Freedom in the World Reports, Subscores. 8
DP
LC–
–
Political
Civil
rights
(1-7)
rights
(1-7)
Status - F-free; PF-partial free; NF- not free
8
About
the
methodology
adopted
by
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=333&year=2007
12
FH
see:
Tables 3,4 and 5 below indicate the reaction of the OAS, Unasur and Mercosur to
these crises. The OAS includes the invocation of Resolution 1080 and the Democratic
Charter, and the cases of preventive action by the Permanent Council. Mercosur reaction
includes invocation of the Protocol of Ushuaia and presidential declarations. Unasur reaction
includes Presidential Declarations and the invocation of the Democratic Protocol. <to be
completed>
Table 3: OAS’s reaction to crises in South America (1991-2008)
Arg
Bra
Par
Uru
Chi
Bol
Per
1996
2003
1999
2000
Col
Equ
Ven
1992
1997
2002
2005
2003
2000
2008
2005
2005
Sources: Based on Sacasa (2005: 151), and Arrighi (2004: 132), updated by author.
Table 4: Mercosur’s reaction to crises in South America (1991-2010)
Arg
Bra
Par
Uru
Chi
Bol
Per
1996
2003
2005
1999
2005
2009
2008
Col
Equ
Ven
2005
2010
Source: complied by author
Table 5: Unasur’s reaction to crises in South America (1991-2010)
Arg
Bra
Par
Uru
Chi
Bol
Per
1996
2003
1999
2000
Col
Equ
Ven
1992
1997
2002
2005
2003
2000
2008
2005
2005
Sources: Compiled by author
OAS Resolución 1080 was invoked four times: Haití (1991), Perú (1992), Guatemala (1993)
y Paraguay (1996). In the cases of Ecuador (1997 y 2000), Paraguay (1999 y 2000) y Bolivia
(2003), the Permanent Council acted preventively and did not invoke the formal mechanisms
(Sacasa 2005). The Democratic Charter was invoked in the case of Venezuela (April 2002),
Ecuador (April 2005) and Nicaragua (June 2005).
13
Democratic conditionality has been invoked by Mercosur towards its member-states in the
crises of Paraguay in 1996, 1999 and 2012, and during the process of accession of Venezuela.
If has been formally applied only in Paraguay in 2012. The reaction of Mercosur to the crises
in Paraguay in 1996 and 1999 has been extensively analysed by a number of scholars
(Velenzuela 1996, Stömberg 1997, Ribeiro Hoffmann 2007). Despite the fact that the Ushuaia
Protocol did not exist in 1996 and was not in force in 1999, Mercosur reacted promptly and
decisively. Presidents issued declarations to support democracy in Paraguay (Presidential
Declarations 3/1996 and 2/1999). As seen above, the crisis of 2012 was more complex, but
the Ushuaia Protocol was formally invoked and implemented. Mercosur also reacted to crises
in associated member-states such as: Bolívia 2003 (President Gonzalo Lozada renoucement),
2005 (President Carlos Mesa renoucement) and 2008 (Referendo Revogatório); Peru e2005
(coups attempt against President Toledo)9 ; and Ecuador 2005 (destitution of President Lucio
Gutierrez).10 Most reactions consisted on ad hoc press statements, but a Presidential
Communication was issued in the case of Bolivia in 2008, supporting the La Moneda
Declaration by Unasur in favour
of President
Evo Morales
(Comunicado de
CMC_2008_ACTA02, para 13). Mercosur also sent an electoral observation mission to the
Referendo. Regarding associated member-states, it is clear that Mercosur has transferred its
role to Unasur. Finally, the process of accession of Venezuela was the object of controversy
and was delayed by the opposition in Brazil and in Paraguay who questioned the democratic
qualities of Chavez’ regime.11 The Brazilian government did not engage in a debate about the
definition of democracy, but former Minister of External Relations, Celso Amorin states that
9
About Peru see Coutinho, Marcelo, Intentona de Ano Novo: uma análise da crise institucional do
Peru. OPSA/IUPERJ. Análise de Conjuntura n.2 2005 , Vecchione, Marcela, Eleições e violência
Política no Peru. OPSA/IUPERJ. Observador Online v.1, n.2 Abr 2006 e Cruz Jr, Ademar, Novos
rumos, velhos problemas – as tortuosas vias de negociação e conciliação no segundo mandato de Alan
Garcia. OPSA/IUPERJ Análise de Conjuntura 11 2007; about Bolívia see Taboyo, Juan R.Q. ,
Bolivia, entre La crisi y El caos¿Existe una salida negociada? OPSA/IUPERJ Análise de Conjuntura
11 2005, Guimarães, Cesar, J.M.Domingues e Maria Moreno, A História sem fim. OPSA/IUPERJ
Análise de Conjuntura 5 2005, Zucca Jr, Cesar , Bolívia: Política Doméstica e Inserção Regional.
OPSA/IUPERJ Estudos e Cenários. Ago 2008, Zucca Jr, Cesar, O legislativo no conflito político
Boliviano. OPSA/IUPERJ Papéis Legislativos Abr 2009, Domingues, J.M , A Bolívia às vésperas do
futuro. OPSA/IUPERJ Análise de Conjuntura n.9 2008.
10
Ecuador signed the Ushuaia Protocl only on 29/06/2007.
11
Venezuela signed a Treaty of Accession on the 4 th July 2006, which was ratified by Argentina on the
14th Feb 2007 and Uruguay on the 30th Aug 2007. Ratification in Brazil took place only on the 4 th
March 2010 having being delayed due to criticism by the opposition on the democratic credentials of
Chavez regime. Paraguay did not ratify it for the same reason, however, other member-states profited
from the period of suspension of Paraguay to approve Venezuela’s entry in July 2012 as established by
the CMC Decision 27/12 from the 30/07/2012.
14
“to live in coexistence with democracies in Mercosur will help the strengthening of
democracy in Venezuela”.12
Unasur’s first reaction to a crisis of democracy was in the case of Bolivia, in 2008, then it
issued the La Moneda Declaration in support of President Evo Morales (Comunicado de
CMC_2008_ACTA02, para 13). It reacted decisively again in the political crisis in Paraguay
2012, when the democratic clause was invoked, and Paraguay suspended from Unasur until the
new president was elected in August 2013.
Explaining democratic intervention
Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann (2007) proposed an analytical framework to explain
democratic intervention by regional organizations based on the interests of the regional
leading power, the pressure exercised by an external actor, and the pressure’s effectiveness
depending on the match of regional identities. 13 Based on the comparison of six cases in
three regional organizations (EU, Mercosur and SACD), they concluded that the behaviour of
regional organizations can be explained by taking into account the interests of regional
leading powers and the ideational costs of external pressure. In other words, a regional
organization acts if intervention serves the geopolitical, domestic political or material interests
of regional leading powers, or if pressure by a third party with a matching identity increases
the reputational costs of non-intervention. In regional organizations with a democratic
identity, the enforcement of democratic governance indeed becomes part of the ideational
interest of the leading power. Such regional organizations can be shamed though – provided a
powerful ‘other’ is ready to do so. However, whether shaming can be costly enough to
overrule even the material interests of the regional leading power remains to be seen. In none
of the cases studied here, this combination of factors was found. Clashing regional identities
seem to nullify the costs of shaming and therefore its effectiveness. This argument could hold
for Western pressure on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well. In the
12
Estado de São Paulo, 21/11/2007.
These authors define intervention as the planned interference in the domestic affairs of a member
state, which aim at defending democracy, for instance, by ensuring that the democratic principles
contained in the charter of the regional organization are observed, the outcome of elections is
respected or a democratically elected government is defended against an actual or imminent military
coup. Intervention is more in line with the concept of Joseph Nye, who points out that intervention can
range from verbal condemnation or economic sanctions to military invasion (Nye, 2005), than in more
traditional security studies, where intervention is defined as military intervention (Finnemore 2003).
Non-intervention, in this respect, is the absence of interference in spite of alleged violations of
democratic principles and practices.
13
15
absence of external pressure, the behaviour of a regional organization can be explained by the
interests of its major power(s).
While Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann did take into consideration the interplay between
overlapping regional organizations, such as for instance the OAS and Mercosur in the cases of
Paraguay, in this paper I argue that the impact of overlapping regionalism must be analysed in
more depth in order to evaluate more precisely the effectiveness of regional organizations to
protect and promote democracy in their member-states. In other words, while the analytical
framework developed by van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann is suitable to answer the
question of why regional organizations intervene in particular cases, but the question of
overlapping memberships and mandates must be incorporated in greater depth in order to
assess the effectiveness of democratic conditionality of regional organization to protect
democracy. The phenomena of overlapping regionalisms has only recently become a concern
in regional studies, and there still no consensus about their causes and impact (Weiffen et all
2013, Nolte 2014, Merran at all forthcoming). <to be completed>
For the case of Paraguay in 1996 and 1999, which Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffman
analysed, the question of overlapping regionalism did not pose an empirical problem because
the OAS and Mercosur reacted similarly, i.e. both defined the attempt of coup d’etat as a
democratic crisis and reacted in a complementary way. In the crisis of Paraguay of 2012 the
situation was less straight forward than a coup detat. Different member-states of the OAS ,
Unasur and Mercosur interpreted different the process of impeachment of President Lugo and
the reaction by the Paraguayan Congress.
Conclusions
This paper has explored how democracy and democratic governance has been addressed by
multilateral and regional organizations in the last century. It has shown that the commitments
have increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War, and that regional organizations
have gained a prominent role in that regard. The paper has also offered an analytical
framework to explain why particular regional organizations decide to intervene in their
member-states in the name of democracy. The remainder of this session explores some of the
challenges which regional organisations face in order to protect and promote democracy
effectively based on the analysis of the case of South America. The following discussion does
16
not imply that the cases analysed can be generalizable, rather, they are used to highlight some
points which might be useful for other organizations despite their local (regional) specificities.
All regional organizations face institutional challenges in terms of designing effective
instruments in a context of extremely limited resources, with the possible exception of the
EU. However, in this paper I argue that the main challenges that they face relate to the
conceptualization of democracy, as well as the issue of overlapping memberships and
mandates.
The discussion about participation and representation is as old as the concept of democracy
itself, and well established in the literature of democratic theory (Pateman 1970), but it has
gained a new dimension in the last decade in Latin America. Different aspects of direct
participation are practiced currently in many countries, the most common being referenda.
Other examples are the ballot propositions in California, the participatory budget in Brazil,
and the Citizens Initiative in the European Union. In other words, the innovation of the model
advanced by Bolivia and Venezuela is not its participatory element per se, but the centrality of
popular participation to political legitimacy, and the fact that participatory democracy is seen
as only part of a more comprehensive project which includes an alternative economic model
of development, the so called ‘Socialism of the 21st Century’. Other concepts, including the
concept of deliberative democracy are also discussed in this context (Habermas).
The model of society promoted in Venezuela, initially by former president Hugo Chavez
(1999-2013), and now his successor Miguel Maduro, includes a definition of democracy as
‘protagonist and revolucionary´. The key element of the model is the direct participation of
stakeholders at all stages of the policy cycle, from decision-making to implementation. The
main instruments created to increase participation are local councils with direct control over a
number of social policies such as education, health, and housing. The notion of participatory
and protagonist democracy was discussed in Venezuela, originally, in the context of the
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200 in the 1980s, in which Chavez played a leading
role; in its view, the oligarchies which had adopted foreign models of development had
betrayed the original ideals of Simon Bolivar and his continental project, thou this
interpretation of Bolivar is also controversial (Smilde 2011, Seabra and Silva 2013). The case
of Venezuela is also illustrative of the complexity of the promotion of democracy from the
outside; efforts of democracy promotion by the US in Bolivia and Venezuela have led to
contestation and conflict, culminating in extreme reactions such as the expulsion of the United
17
States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives from
Venezuela in 2011, and USAID from Bolivia in 2013. In fact, Bolivia and Venezuela have
reacted strongly to the US’ approach, opposing its efforts both bilaterally, and via the regional
organization Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). In 2012, ALBA
took the extreme measure when the Political Council issued a Resolution for the immediate
withdrawal of USAID from its member-states.
If, on the one hand, there is an urgent need for a serious discussion about models of
democracy and of legitimacy of political regimes in different cultural contexts, this discussion
cannot, on the other hand, risk banalizing the concept of democracy. Fierlbeck (2008) argues
that: ‘since the demise of communism, the idea of democracy had gone from being undertheorized to being accepted uncritically in all sorts of shapes and manifestations’. This
represents a key challenge to regional organizations if they are to pay a role of the protection
and promotion of democracy.
Finally, regarding the question of overlapping memberships and mandates, it was seen that
currently several regional organizations have mandates regarding democracy in all regions of
the world. In the Americas, the OAS, Unasur, Mercosur, Alba, Andean Community, Caricom,
Central American Common Market and CELAC have all developed commitments in the area
of democracy and human rights in the last years. In Africa, the African Union, SADC and
ECOWAS; in Europe, the European Union, CSCE and the Council of Europe, just to name a
few. It was seen that in the case of South America, this plurality of memberships in
organizations which are engaged in protecting and promoting democracy and human rights is
not free from frictions. Further analysis is required to explore the differences in these world
regions regarding the problems of defining democracy, and of being member of overlapping
regional organizations, this paper represents a first step in that regard.
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