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Demographic Transition Theory
Population Investigation Committee Demographic Transition Theory Author(s): Dudley Kirk Reviewed work(s): Source: Population Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Nov., 1996), pp. 361-387 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Population Investigation Committee Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2174639 . Accessed: 18/08/2012 16:20 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and Population Investigation Committee are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Population Studies. http://www.jstor.org PopulationStudies,50 (1996), 361-387 Printedin GreatBritain DemographicTransitionTheory* DUDLEY KIRKt In spiteofthisithas butrichinquantification. is a scienceshortontheory, Demography in the social sciences:the generalizations producedone of the best-documented transition. demographic covertheperiodin moderndemography The 50 yearsofPopulationStudiesroughly Frank a leadingtopic.By convention, been has transition in whichthedemographic definition, although first is as its regarded in 19451 published Notestein'sarticle as a 'transition';2thefirstto use this Notesteindid not referto his generalization in his entitledLa RevolutionDemographique book Adolphe Landry was expression in 1934.3 whichwas published it statesthatsocieties to essentials transition Whatis demographic Stripped theory? and ofhighfertility a regime from pre-modern progress thatexperience modernization 'modernization', term are low. The both oneinwhich to a post-modern highmortality nordoesit includethecrucialquestionsaboutcausationthatformthe is notdefined, literature. subjectofmuchmoderndemographic demography. For some,transition theorylies at the centreof modernscientific To othersit demography'.4 modern of preoccupation has it 'the central called Demeny of much unworthy generalization as an unproven to be dismissed is a non-theory discussion.5 THE FORERUNNERS differentiated ofpopulations modelbeganas a classification Thedemographic transition intheEnglish Thefirst formulation offertility andmortality. combinations bydifferent in 1929.6He specified is thatbyWarrenThompson, literature published demographic The first (GroupA) withdifferent ratesofpopulation growth. threetypesofcountries werethosewithfallingratesof increaseand whichwerefacingpotentialpopulation was low,theirrapidlydeclining fertility in thesecountries decline.Although mortality and latera declining population.Includedin thiscategory a stationary, presagesfirst whichhadbeensettled ofWestern by werethecountries Europeandoverseascountries ofEuropeanorigin. immigrants in whichbothbirthand deathrateshad fallen,but GroupB consistsof countries their thanbirth rates.As a result earlier andmorerapidly wheredeathrateshaddeclined * Helpful acknowledged. andChrisWilsonaregratefully Coale,CharlesHirschman, from Ansley comments USA. Stanford t Food ResearchInstitute, University, 1 FrankNotestein, 'Population:Thelongview',in T. Schultz(ed.),Foodfor the World(Chicago,1945) ofthetheory. statement pp. 36-57.Though,as notedlater,it as not,in fact,thefirst 2 at thesame thatheeditedwhichwaspublished ina publication Davisreferred tothetransition Kingsley Annalsof theAmericanAcademy intransition', K. Davis(ed.)'Worldpopulation article. timeas Notestein's written byhimself. chapter thefirst of Politicaland Social Science,237 (1943),especially (Paris1934). La Re'volution Deimographique, A. Landry, in D. V. transition', A lessonin demographic declinein Austria-Hungary. P. Demeny,'Earlyfertility Glassand R. Revelle(eds.),Populationand Social Change,(London,1972). andR. Schofield (eds.),The State ofModernPopulationTheory.ForwardfromMalthus, 5 Cf.D. Coleman theintroduction. (NewYork,1986),especially 6 W. S. Thompson, 'Population'.AmericanJournalof Sociology,34 (1929),pp. 959-975. 361 362 DUDLEY KIRK populations weregrowing veryrapidly, untilfallingbirthrateswouldbringabouta stationary, and thena declining population. Includedin thisgroupwerethecountries of Easternand SouthernEurope.Thompsonpointedout thattheirdemographic situation was comparable to thatofcountries in GroupA some35 to 40 yearsearlier. Butsincedeathrateswerenowfalling morerapidlythanin thepast,ratesofnatural increasein thisgroupweregreaterthan thoseexperienced earlierin countriesin GroupA. Countries inGroupC inwhichneither birthnordeathrateswereundercontrolwere classified as 'Malthusian'.7 Thompsonsuggested thatthisgroupcontained between 70 and 75 percentoftheworld'spopulation. Butbecausedataweregenerally sparse,he confined hisanalysisto threelargecountries inwhichdatawereavailable:Japan,India and Russia.He foundsomeevidenceof changein Japan,butlittlein eitherIndia or Russia.He predicted thatpopulationgrowth in Russiawouldbe muchlargerthanin India,becauseofitsmuchlargerresource base.He thought thatitwouldtakethreeto fourdecades,beforemanyof thecountries in GroupC enteredGroupB. A good forecast! Thompson's roughforecasts ofearlypopulation declinein GroupA provedto be in errorbecauseheprojected birthratestodeclinelinearly. He predicted thatdirepolitical effects wouldresultfromexisting demographic trends: 'Is itprobablethatpeoplesinGroupsB andC willsitquietly byandstarvewhiletheGroup A countries enjoythelion'sshareofthegoodthingsoftheearth?'.8 However,he didpresent thetransition as a continuing globalgeneralization. ThoughThompson continued towarnoftheconsequences inmanyofhissubsequent hedidnotcarryhistypology writings, further. In theseveraleditions ofhispopulartext on population problems he didnotuse thistypology, nordidhe refer to thetransition as such.In hischapterentitled 'Some population theories sinceMalthus'histypology andthetransition arenotevenmentioned! thatneither Apparently Thompson thought couldbe described as a theory. Rathersurprisingly, Thompson'stypologywas not taken up in the English forsome15years.Thisis curious,becausein 1934Landryhad demographic literature La Re'volution inwhichhe developed published thesamebasicideasas De'mographique, Thompsonthoughhe didnotappearto be familiar withhiswork. Landry,too, postulatedthree stages of populationdevelopment:primitive, intermediate, andcontemporary, to Thompson's threegroups.In a roughly equivalent sectionentitled "En quoi a consiste'la re'volution dimographique',9 he,likeThompson, forecast thatthenewregimewouldspreadthroughout theworld.In hisview,it had as wellas somedistant(i.e. overseas) already'conquered'all theEuropeancountries, take countries. 'Far frombeingabsurdtherearereasonsto thinkthatitwilleventually overthe entireworld'.He also predicted in whichthe thatin the 'new' countries transition camelater,declinesin bothbirthand deathrateswouldbe faster. Landryprovideda muchfullerexplanation thanThompsonof thereasonsforthe declineinmortality andfertility. Modernmortality declinewasunprecedented inhuman It is mucheasierto explainthanfertility history. decline:thereduction ofepidemics by vaccination andbetter ofdisease,reduction hygiene, improved diagnosisandtreatment offamines, fewer deathsfrom ininfant and violence andcivilwars,reductions mortality, 7 'Populationinevitably increases increase.'(T. R. MalthusAn Essay on whenthemeansofsubsistence in Londonin 1972. Population,Vol. 1 (1826).p. 314in theedition published 8 loc. cit.in fn.6, p. 975. ' Landry, op. cit. in fn.3,pp. 45-55. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 363 thatreduction standards oflivingallplayeda part.He didpointout,however, improved A in materialwelfare. couldnowbe achievedwithoutanyimprovement in mortality modernanalysis! strikingly harderto explain,exceptin the reductions Likeeveryone else,Landryfoundfertility asidenotionsthatthe He brushes useofcontraception. senseoftheincreased proximate evidence and presents or to moralcorruption, factors declinewas due to physiological ' (he didnotliketheword'control')wasin generalusein France that'birthrestriction andthusraisedan issuethathasnot century, as earlyas thelatterpartoftheeighteenth Whendidit begin?In Western ofthetransition. yetbeenfullyresolvedin discussions beganto declinelongbeforethelastquarterofthe andmortality Europe,bothfertility ofthetransition. quotedforthebeginning nineteenth century, thedategenerally What is the motivefor birthregulation?Landrybelievesthemto be largely totheirparents, tocausepainanddistress theirability thecostofchildren, 'egotistical': women and,ofcourse,theproblems andrelaxation, thelimitation ofparents'activities and childcare. His analysisprecededmuchof the later in pregnancy experience fertility. as a causeofdeclining ofindividualism and 'self-fulfilment' discussions in France,wherebirthratesand withconditions concerned Landrywas particularly fora long had beenlowerthaninneighbouring and rivalcountries growth population time.His concernis indicatedby the titleof the companionpiece to his book: et De'cadence.Unlike some later authors,Landrydid not see the Depopulation ofbirths anddeathsat a lowlevel,butas a as a newequilibrium regime contemporary situation in whichthepopulationof Europewas facingdeclinein spiteofprosperity. by invasionby foreigners Like Thompson,he regardedthissituationas favouring peacefulor warlikemeans.He believedthatthisprocesshad alreadybegunin France, thedeclineofGreeceand Rometo depopulation. and attributed His book WorldPopulation:Past Anotherforerunner was A. M. Carr-Saunders. of a longdiscussion in 1936,and contained andPresentTrends was published Growth He didnot countries. transition inspecific whatcamelaterto be calledthedemographic hisdata and discussedthe butpresented formulate a generaltheoryof thetransition butsurprisingly readable Hisis a massive, ' smallfamily anditscausesatlength. system' sizeanddemographic changein many ofmaterials to population relating compendium werelimitedhisexamples populations But becausedata fornon-European countries. ofEuropean withpopulations to Europeand overseascountries weremainlyconfined background. THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY Research ofPopulation wasformulated Thedemographic transition bytheOffice theory frompreviousworkon TheFuture as a culmination of or abstraction in Princeton PopulationofEuropeand theSovietUnion,whichwas publishedin 1944on behalfon the LeagueofNations.10 of thetheoryof the Thoughhe was by no meansthefirstto statetheessentials is conventionally acceptedas Notestein's earlyformulation transition, demographic unawareofLandry'swork,andperhapsalsoofThompson's. classic.He wasapparently as a theory. thinkofhisformulation likeThompson hedidnotinitially himself, Perhaps, ofdataandhis compilation owedmuchtoCarr-Saunders's He statedthathisdiscussion 10 F. W. Notestein et al., The FuturePopulationof Europe and theSoviet Union: PopulationProjections, PresswereW. Moore,The by Princeton University 1940-1970 (Geneva,1944).Parallelworkspublished EconomicDemographyof Easternand SouthernEurope (1945);D. Kirk,Europe'sPopulationin theInterwar The Populationof theSoviet Union: Historyand Prospects(1946). Years (1946);andF. Lorimer, 364 DUDLEY KIRK discussion of demographicprocesses. Though not completelyoriginal,Notestein's statementsare lucid and sharplyfocused.In his initialarticle(1945), he presenteda typologyof populations as an introductionto a reviewof the prospectsfor world populationgrowth.His threetypesare closelyparallelto thoseofThompson(1929), and Landry(1934). Notesteinthoughtthatthepopulationsof Westernand CentralEurope would peak in about 1950 and declinethereafter. The corresponding date forSouthernEurope was 1970. Like Thompson,Notesteinassumedthatfertility would fallmore steeplythanit did in fact.His estimateof the totalworldpopulationin theyear2000 was 3.3 billion in contrastto today's expectedfigureof nearlysix billion. In his articleNotestein elaboratedon the reasonsforfertility decline.In his own words: 'The newideal of the smallfamilyarosetypically in theurbanindustrial society.It is impossibleto be preciseabout the variouscausal factors,but apparently manywere of manyfunctions in production, important. Urbanlifestripped thefamily consumption, recreation, and education....In factoryemployment the individualstood on his own ofcitylifereduced Thenewmobility ofyoungpeopleandtheanonymity accomplishments. In a thepressure towardtraditional behaviour exerted bythefamily and thecommunity. for periodofrapidlydeveloping technology newskillswereneededand newopportunities individual advancement arose.Educationand a rationalpointofviewbecameincreasingly As a consequence, thecostofchild-rearing foreconomic important. grewandthepossibilities contributions declined. thesizeofthefamily bychildren Fallingdeathratesat onceincreased tobe supported andlowered tohavemanybirths. found theinducements Women, moreover, with newindependence fromhousehold andneweconomic roleslesscompatible obligations childbearing'." Such quotationshave been criticizedon the groundthatNotesteingave too much attentionto socio-economicfactorsas causes of the decline, and paid insufficient is perhapsunfairsinceelsewherehe refersto attentionto culturalfactors.This criticism changes in norms and values associated with the process of modernization.Later to socio-economicfactors, authors,such as Coale and Hoover, also gave pre-eminence thoughtheydid not entirely ignoreculturalaspects.12The theoryenjoyeda honeymoon whichlastedfornearly20 years,and was widelyaccepted,at least as a generalization.13 THE HISTORICAL RECORD The firstmajor criticismsof the theoryrelatedto the accuracyof its presentationof weresilent,or almostsilent,on European demographichistory.The originalstatements what may be describedas the first(or Malthusian) transitionin WesternEurope. Malthus advocated postponementof marriageas a means of restraining population growth.This was whatactuallyoccurredin WesternEurope and was thechieffactorin a pre-modernreductionof fertility, though,to be sure,at higherthanmodernlevels. in pre-modern werenotfullytakenintoaccountin theinitial Large differences fertility formulations of transitiontheory.Total fertility was as low as 5.0 in earlynineteenthcenturySweden,and as highas eightin sub-SaharanAfricatoday.A major reason for " F. W. Notestein, 'Economicproblems of population change',Proceedingsof the EighthInternational Conferenceof Agricultural Economists,(NewYork,1953),pp. 13-31. 12 A. J.CoaleandE. M. Hoover, inLow IncomePopulations, PopulationGrowthandEconomicDevelopment (Princeton, 1958). 13 Transition In a demographers. theory had alreadybeenchallenged as a theorybysomemainstream whichcan becauseitwasa generalization classicbook,HauserandDuncanreferred to itas a 'non-theory', itcan onlybe appliedto onehistorical era,i.e.themodemera.'Hencethereis a bigquestionas to whether in the likelyto govern[population] growth providemorethanvaguegeneralsuggestions aboutthefactors future'. P. M. Hauserand 0. D. Duncan,The Studyof Population.An Inventoryand Appraisal,(Chicago, 1959),p. 14. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 365 agewhowere ofwomenofchildbearing intheproportion wasvariation thesedifferences or livingin a union. married thecauses although werealso substantial, maritalfertility in pre-modern Differences arelikelyto have practices in breast-feeding Differences arenotalwayseasyto specify. theupperclassesand the thatin somesocieties beenonefactor.Thereis also evidence and thusreducedmaritalfertility. birthcontrol, practised bourgeoisie theorywas theassertionthatmortality of theinitialtransition Anothercriticism werecitedwherethisdidnot decline.Manyinstances declinealwaysprecededfertility declinedsimultaneously, andmortality appearto havebeenthecase,i.e. wherefertility as is shownin the actuallyprecededthatin mortality, or wherea fallin fertility Projectdiscussedbelow. EuropeanFertility theorywas thatin severalEuropeanregions of earlytransition Anothercriticism but ratherto modernization, actualdeclinewas not tiedcloselyto socio-economic region.In otherwords,indicessuchas culturalor linguistic diffusion withina specific wereless usefulin employedin agriculture or percentage literacy, infantmortality, decline,whichoccurredmoreor less simultaneously theonsetof fertility predicting withintheregion. of Walloon(French)and A striking exampleis thestudyby Ronald Lesthaeghe indifferent inBelgium.14 In hisstudyoffertility Flemish(Dutch)languagecommunities (one Flemishand one manyexamplesoftwincommunes he demonstrated communes and situatedonlya few characteristics Walloon)withverysimilarsocio-economic Thedatewhenfertility began levelsdiffered greatly. kilometres apart,in whichfertility thedata forthetworegionsintoa nationalfigure to declinealso varied.Combining between town be notedthatdifferences results. It should,however, ambiguous produces within linguistic persisted characteristics as wellas inothersocio-economic andcountry, and culturalregions. and doubtsaboutthe qualifications, As Coale has noted,despitemanyobjections, is remains.15 Itsgreatest strength transition theforceofthegeneralization demographic will occurin everysocietywhichis experiencing the prediction thatthe transition its greatestweaknessits inabilityto forecastthe precisethreshold modernization; haveonlybeensuccessful thisthreshold todetermine forfertility tofall.Efforts required theproblem As Coalepointedoutinhisclassicstatement, ina limited ofcases.16 number a well-defined threshold indetermining maybe thatthereismorethanonepre-condition In abbreviated termstheseare: fora declinein maritalfertility. mustbe withinthecalculusofconsciouschoice; (1) Fertility as advantageous; mustbe [perceived] (2) Reducedfertility reduction mustbe available.17 offertility techniques (3) Effective THE EUROPEAN FERTILITY PROJECT declinein some600 administrative In 1963Coale organizeda majorstudyoffertility divisionsin Europe.Elevenvolumeswerepublishedover20 yearswithmassesof between1870 datato coverindetailchangesinvitalratesthathadoccurred supporting 14 15 R. Lesthaeghe,The Decline of BelgianFertility1800-1970 (Princeton1977). Liege, PopulationConference, A. J.Coale, 'The demographictransition',ProceedingsoftheInternational (Liege1973),p. 69. 16 Cf.F. Oechsli in LatinAmericaandthe transition andthedemographic andD. Kirk,'Modernization and CulturalChange,2 (1975), pp. 391-419,in whichtheauthorscorrectly Caribbean', EconomicDevelopment indicesforeachcountry byconsidering transition thedatewhenMexicowouldenterthefertility predicted lessdeveloped forcountries However, measures. ofvarioussocialandeconomic froma combination derived area. thewholecultural sweptthrough delaydidnotoccur,as thetransition thanMexico,theanticipated 17 Coale,loc. cit. in fn.15, p. 65. 366 DUDLEY KIRK and 1960. The supportingmonographswrittenby distinguisheddemographerswere generallyof high quality. This was an enormouslyambitious enterpriseand was regardedas the definitive studyof the subject. Information on age-specific fertility in nineteenth-century Europe was scarce,so that in most areas it was impossibleto determineinitial fertility decline directlyfrom available statisticalsources, and an indirectmethod for findingI(g) (total marital fertility) was used as evidenceforinitialfertility reduction. Possible weaknessesof this methodwere noted by Susan Watkinsin the chapter entitled'Conclusions' in theproject'ssummaryvolume.18 As is notedbelow,muchmore seriousdoubts about thismethodhave been raised recently. A serious limitationof this approach is that it disregardsthe large variationsin 'natural' fertility, whichis apparentlynot subjectto consciouscontrol.These variations in total fertility were apparentlyregardedas unimportant,but observeddifferences whichrangefromfiveto eightcan scarcelybe dismissed. Further,the concept of 'natural fertility'is needed to show that people in preand did notin fact transition populationsdid not knowhow to regulatemaritalfertility do so. Though the evidence is mixed, there are persuasivedata which show that conscious control of marital fertility was, indeed, practised(e.g. among the upper classes).19 Some researchershave raised a philosophicalconcern.The findingsof the study decline.But clearlypointto a cultural,ratherthanan economicinterpretation offertility the Princetonprojectwas not designedto measurea culturalhypothesis.It does not declinein a particularcultural explainwhat it is thatdeterminesthe timingof fertility or linguisticgroup.As George Alterhas said: 'thedatabasedoesnotincludeindicators ofculture, intheprojecthaveyet andparticipants to explainwhatitis aboutlinguistic offertility decline.20 regions thatdetermines thetiming Did thecontextof cultureperhapsnot make muchdifference? The timingmay simply suchas railways,roads,the reflect thedegreeof access to majorlinesofcommunication, Danube etc. Nor does it explainthemechanismof thediffusion processwhichremains in thetiming.21 Is thelack of specificity in thisregard postulatedbutis notdemonstrated as seriousas it is in regardto socio-economicvariables? The totaleffectof thesecriticisms weakenssome of theconclusionsof the European thatin herconcludingcommentsin thefinalvolumeof Fertility Project.It is interesting the studySusan Cotts Watkinsstatesthat: ' although to describe andexplain thegoalsoftheEuropeanFertility Projectwereprimarily in thefertility shouldnot obscurethe a concernfordifferentials differentials transition, fromnineteenthIn thecontext ofa concern forlessonsthatcanbe exported similarities.... to emphasize itis tempting countries diversity; century Europeto contemporary elsewhere, intheend,seemmostlikely inthecontext inEuropethesimilarities, ofthehistory offertility to be instructive.22 It is these similaritiesthat are picked up by transitiontheory.They have been so persuasivethatthe United Nations and the World Bank have based theirpopulation forecastson the assumptionof a standardtransition. 1986),pp. 424-425. The Decline of Fertilityin Europe(Princeton, A. J.Coale and S. CottsWatkins, andR. S. Schofield, (London, ThePopulationofEngland:1541-1871.A Reconstruction, Cf.E. A. Wrigley withthepast',Proceedingsof the transition: Continuity or discontinuity 1981),and J.Blake,'The fertility Florence,1985, Vol. 1,pp. 393-405. International PopulationConference, 20 In Coleman (eds.)op. cit.,in fn.5. p. 21. and Schofield, 21 S. Preston, in SociologicalForum,2 (1987),p. 667. problem', 'The socialsciencesandthepopulation 22 Coale andWatkins, op. cit. in fn.18,p. 449. 18 19 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 367 the countries, in non-European theory is appliedto theexperience Whentransition and has been has declinedfirst In everyinstancemortality areimpressive. regularities and the resultin each case has been a considerable fertility, followedby declining the of the transition, of populationgrowth.In the initialformulation acceleration As underestimated. wasgreatly naturalincrease) created(i.e.thepercentage momentum oftheworldpopulationfortheyear projection was notedabove,in 1945Notestein's whichis closeto sixbillion. at present, expected 2000was muchlowerthanthefigure Europe.Growth hasbecomemuchmorerapidthanitwasinWestern Thetransition nolarger Europe,withpossibly periodthaninWestern isconcentrated ina muchshorter fortheworldas a wholestartsfrom increase.But,ofcourse,theincrement percentage is vastlygreater. so thatactualgrowth a verymuchlargerbase figure, is thatthetransition finding Project'smostimportant PerhapstheEuropeanFertility Whilsta highlevelof conditions. diversesocio-economic has occurred understrikingly is transition transition, byfertility wasoftenaccompanied development socio-economic in less As has been demonstrated fordevelopment. not a necessary pre-condition may programme planning family ofan effective theintroduction developedcountries, Thereis an to fertility declineevenat verylow levelsof modernization. contribute thatsweptoverEurope in thetransition ofinnovation/diffusion dimension important oftransition a relatively within shorttime.Thishasbeena widelyacceptedmodification is experience A good summary ofwhathas beenlearnedfromthishistorical theory. givenbyKnodeland vande Walleas follows: anddemoofsocial,economic, declinestookplaceundera widevariety (1) Fertility graphicconditions; was not practised(and was probablyunknown)among (2) Familylimitation began,even broad sectionsof the populationbeforethe declinein fertility have been unwanted; ofbirths may proportion thougha substantial planningand thedeclineof maritalfertility (3) Increasesin thepracticeof family irreversible onceunderway; wereessentially processes, declineinde(4) Culturalsettingsinfluencethe onset and spread of fertility conditions.23 ofsocio-economic pendently oncestarted, LatinAmerica, quickly declineintropical Ithasbeenshownthatfertility development. oftheirlevelofsocio-economic independently spreadto othercountries andinthe'little inChinaitself, ofChineseculture, Thishasalsobeennotedincountries and Taiwan. dragons'ofHongKong,SouthKorea,Singapore, THE SEARCH FOR CAUSALITY: MORTALITY transition theoryhas oftencometo meanthefertility literature In thedemographic thatofmortality. transition, thanjoinedto theotherimportant transition alone,rather aremucheasierto explain, ofmortality Thereasonis simple.Motivesforthereduction and causesaremoreeasilyidentified. worldmaybedistinguished: declineinthemodern Threestagesofhistorical mortality earlierin Western ofmortality maywellhaveoccurred (1) Thoughsomereduction half andthefirst in thelatterpartoftheeighteenth Europe,itis mostclearlyidentified of the nineteenth centuries.Duringthe earlystages,risingincomespresumably Butthe in mutualinteraction). in mortality to reductions (and conversely contributed 23 studies'. fertility ofhistorical thepast.Policyimplications J.KnodelandE. vandeWalle,'Lessonsfrom Populationand DevelopmentReview,2 (2) (1979),p. 219. 368 DUDLEY KIRK development ofthemodernstatewasa decisive influence. In general, theestablishment of publicorderdirectly reduceddeathsfromlocal wars,tribaland clan feuds,and randomviolence.Probablyeven more important was the indirecteffectof the establishment ofan infrastructure in transport and commerce in themodernstatethat brought abouta reduction infamines, andperhapsalsoinepidemics. Stability probably also contributed to improvements in agriculture. Therehasbeendisputeaboutthecausesofmortality declineduring thisearlyperiod. Some have arguedthatthe earlydeclinewas primarily in due to improvements agriculture, reflected in improvednutrition and resistanceto infectious diseases independently of medicalintervention, improvedhygieneetc. This view has been challenged in effectively by otherswho ascribemortality reductions to improvements hygiene, as measuredbytheincreasing consumption of soap and ofwashablecotton clothing.24 (2) Duringthelastthirdofthenineteenth century up to WorldWarI, therewas a in medicine revolution of Pasteur,Koch,and others.The inducedby thediscoveries resulting reductions in childmortality, and somewhat laterin infantmortality, were responsible formuchofthedeclineinmortality, inmortality fromdiseases particularly suchas diarrhoeaand tuberculosis.25 Duringtheinter-war periodsolid gainswere madeduringand achievedin medicine, healtheducationetc.,stimulated byprogress afterWorldWarI. (3) DuringWorldWarII andthefollowing inthe periodtherehasbeenan explosion useofantibiotics, initiated ofpenicillin anditssynthesis in 1943. byFleming's discovery The cumulative effectof thesedevelopments has been a dramaticreductionin epidemicand contagiousdiseases.Muchmoredifficult to reducehas beenmortality fromorganicdiseases,suchas diseasesofthecirculatory system, andcancers, although important gainshavebeenachieved inreducing fromcirculatory mortality diseases,and in increasing the longevity of olderadults.However,the adoptionof particularly modernlifestyles has not beenresponsible forincreasedmortality fromdegenerative diseases.They were simplyless evidentearlier,becauseof the highincidenceof diseases.Current backthanis usually trendsin mortality contagious go muchfurther supposed.26 A feature ofboththemortality andthefertility transitions hasbeentheirincreasingly fastertempo.A mortality transition thattook 75-100yearsin Northern Europeto was achievedwithin evenshorter complete 20-25yearsin EasternEurope,and within periodsin the less developedcountries whichcame on the scenemuchlater.The at existence ofan overallincomeeffect on mortality has beendemonstrated, especially lowerincomelevels,butthesetendto diminish at higheraveragelevelsofincome.27 It is perhapssurprising thatwhilemortality declineis usuallycitedas theraisond'e'tre decline. forfertility itis notoftenaccordeda primary decline, placeas a causeoffertility This is understandable, sinceefforts to establisha directclose connection havehad mixedresults.28 thereexist Whilstdefinitive proofofthisconnection maynotbepossible, andmorbidity cogentreasonsforsupposing thatitexists.Certainly, reducedmortality 24 T. McKeown,R. C. Bowerand G. Record,'An interpretation in of themodernriseof population Europe',Population Studies,26 (3), (1972),pp. 45-82; P. E. Razzell,'An interpretation of the riseof population in Europe.A critique', PopulationStudies,28 (1) (1974),pp. 5-17. 25 R. Schofield, D. ReherandA. Bideau(eds.),The Decline of Mortalityin Europe,(Oxford, 1991). 26 T. B. Gage,'Thedecline inmortality inEnglandandWales,1861-1964. Decomposition bycauseofdeath andcomponents ofmortality', PopulationStudies,49 (1) (March1993),pp. 47-66. 27 S. Preston, 'The changing relation between mortality andlevelofeconomic development', Population Studies,29 (2) (July1975),pp. 231-246. 28 S. Preston, The Effectsof Infantand Child Care on Fertility.(NewYork,1978). DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 369 anda healthier population aremajorcontributors toa riseinlivingstandards, whichare oftenregarded as a majorfactor infertility decline.Perhapspsychological effects areas orevenmoreso. Reductions inmortality andmorbidity strengthen thebelief significant, thathumanscan controland modifytheirenvironment and destinies. Membersof modernsocieties takea lessfatalistic and passiveviewoflifethando members ofpreindustrial populations. Someeconomists, e.g.Kuznets,see reducedmortality as an absoluteprerequisite of Itis,ofcourse,difficult modernization.29 toputanything otherthana mostgeneral value onthecontributions ofreductions inmortality andmorbidity toeconomic development. physical healthand lowermortality were But,whatwouldbe thepositionifimproved theprimary causesof changing economicattitudes? Viewsof lifehavechangedand people believethatit is possibleto influence one's fate; an attitudethat fosters individualism. Butitwouldbe fatuousto consider a singlecause,andfocuson itas the onlycause.Socio-economic, sociological, cultural, andideationalfactors aremuchtoo to be isolated. closelyintertwined Nevertheless, mortality reduction shouldbe givengreater attention as one causeof fertility economicproductivity, decline,notablyby promoting especiallyin a more productive labourforce.The majorfocusof theWorldBank's WorldDevelopment Report for1993is 'Investing inHealth',andincludesan exhaustive studyoftheburden ofdisease.Theconceptofthe'disability lifeyear'(DALY) hasbeenusedas a measure thatcombineshealthylife-years lostbecauseof premature withthoselost mortality becauseof disability. The figures rangefrom17 per 1,000populationin established to 344in India,and 574in sub-Saharan marketeconomies Africa. toputa monetary Againitisimpossible valueonthesedifferences, buttheymusthave had a majorimpacton economicproductivity. In otherwords,reductions inmorbidity andrelated arereflected inimproved mortality productivity andeconomic development. As westatedearlier, theindirect psychological effects ofdeclining areprobably mortality evengreater thanthedirectones. It is true,however, thatmortality reductions in poorcountries and theconsequent rapid growthof populationmay impedecapitalformation and otheraspectsof The results in eachindividual willdiffer development. case,butareat leastas likelyto be positiveas negative. In practice, economicdevelopment has usuallykeptpacewith, or exceededpopulationgrowthand has reducedfearsabout the adverseeffects of in themodernworld. populationgrowth THE SEARCH FOR CAUSALITY: ECONOMIC THEORY or socialandideationalfactors aremore Therehas beendebateon whether economic, important ininitiating decline.Thedominance ofeconomic factors wasreflected fertility A pervasive intheearlyformulations oftransition theme inthesediscussions was theory. thatmodernization and makesit seento be changestheeconomicsof childbearing Thishas ledto theformulation ofeconomictheories of economically disadvantageous. decline. fertility In economic wasacceptedas rational pre-modern highfertility theory, behaviour, just as thefertility declineis viewedas beingbasedon rationalchoices.Thishasreplacedthe The classictheorywhichcontrasts modernrationality withpre-modern irrationality. firstapplication of micro-economic to transition thinking theorywas the'new home 29 Simon Kuznets'Populationtrendsand moderneconomicgrowth.Notes towardsa historical Bucharest perspective', in PopulationDebate, Dimensionsand Perspectives,WorldPopulationConference, (1975),vol.i, pp. 425-432. 370 DUDLEY KIRK economics'.The centralthemeof this'ChicagoSchool' approachwas thatreduced demandforchildren as determined byincome,prices,and tasteswas thebasicdriving forceinthefertility transition. Prominent exponents ofthetheory wereGaryBeckerand T. W. Schultz,eachofwhompublished severalbooksand articleson thesubject.30 In thetheory's earlyform, consumer choicewas treated as beingrather mechanistic, anddidnotdistinguish between acquisition ofa babyandpurchase ofa motorcar.This gave riseto Blake's acerbiccommentin an articleentitled'Are babies consumer durables?'.3 In a highly sophisticated article, Pollakand Watkins32 calledattention to thefailure oftheeconomist's 'rationalactor'to dealwithvarying preferences andotheraspectsof culture. 'Culturemaydefine thetypesofbehaviour thataresubjecttoindividual choice in a particular societyand thusdelimittheareaswithinwhichtherationalactoris appropriate'. Be thatas it may,economicand relatedsocio-economic theories have oftentendedto prevailbecausetheyweremoresuccessful thancultural-ideational in givingconceptual theories and mathematical precision to theirmodels. Thisratherfragmentary exposition doesnotperhapsdo justiceto thesophisticated natureofeconomic theories. Laterformulations weremoresophisticated, butaccording to Hirschman'the approachremainstoo narrowto be a significant challengeto demographic transition theory'.33 As Robinsonsomewhatunkindlyput it: 'the proposition [themicro-economic theory offertility] has notbeenproven,onlyasserted oftenenoughto gaina certaincredibility and forcethrough repetition'.34 In a landmark article,Clelandand Wilsonchallenged theeconomicapproach.For them, theevidence suggests thatintraditional societies consciousfertility control within marriage was largelyabsent(i.e. it was not a viablechoice).This absencedoes not necessarily implya demandforlargefamilies. The timing ofthetransition is strongly influenced bylinguistic andcultural lessstrongly boundaries, bymodernization factors, ofsocialdevelopment, amongwhichindicators suchas women'seducationand status aremoreimportant thaneconomic ones.Thelinkwithcultural factors thatthe suggests transition wasmorecloselyconnected withthediffusion ofnewideasthanwithchanges in micro-economic forces.3 One economist,RichardEasterlin,has made a sophisticated to combine effort economicand sociological offertility theories decline.He broadenstheusuallydefined factors ofdemand,supply, andcostsoffertility Under'demand'heincludes regulation. thestandardsocio-economic ofthetransition determinants usedin themodernization hypothesis; thatconstrain naturalfertility. 'supplyfactors'are theculturalelements 'Costs' arethemonetary, in theuseofbirthcontrol.36 All time,andpsychic constraints determinants of fertility one or otherof thesevariables.Demandis operatethrough measured ofchildren bystateddesiredfamily a couplewould size,supplybythenumber have'naturally' intheabsenceofconscious control. 'Costs' lumptogether those fertility 30 Cf. G. S. Becker, A Treatiseon theFamily,(Cambridge, Mass.,HarvardUniversity Press,1981),and T. W. Schultz(ed.),Economicsof theFamily: Marriage, Childrenand Human Capital (Chicago,Chicago, University Press,1974). 31 Judith Blake,'Are babiesconsumer durables?'PopulationStudies,22 (1) (1968),pp. 5-25. 32 R. A. PollakandS. Cotts Watkins, 'Cultureandeconomic approaches tofertility. A proper marriage or mesalliance?' Populationand DevelopmentReview,19 (3) (1993),p. 490. 3 C. Hirschmann, 'Whyfertility changes',AnnualReviewof Sociology(1994),p. 215. 3 W. Robinson, 'Kenyaenters thefertility transition', PopulationStudies,46 (3) (1992),pp. 445-458. andC. Wilson,'Demandtheories ofthefertility 3 J.Cleland transition. Aniconoclastic view',Population Studies,41 (1) (1987),pp. 5-30. 36 R. A. Easterlin andE. Crimmins, TheFertility Revolution (Chicago,1985).SeealsoR. A. Easterlin, 'The economics and sociologyof fertility', in C. Tilly(ed.),HistoricalStudiesof ChangingFertility(Princeton, 1978). DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 371 costs,suchas dislike withpsychic time,andinconvenience, ofmoney, interms incurred not suchas abortion, orforspecific techniques, planning notionoffamily forthegeneral beliefs. religious to mention through fertility as influencing envisagesmodernization Easterlin'sframework births. Hence,it does variablesofsupply,demand,and costofcontrolling intervening and socio-economic, economic, amongdifferent ordominance priority notassumeeither thatinducedthe NationalResearch It is thischaracteristic culturalexplanations. forits to adoptit as thebasicframework Determinants Council'sPanelon Fertility massivestudy.37 But its practical modelhas thusreceiveda good deal of attention. The transition a woman ofchildren variableis thenumber Thedependent facesdifficulties. application rather than takesa cohort, life,and,therefore, hasbornebytheendofherreproductive butnotfortheanalysisofcurrent Thisis usefulforsomepurposes, a periodperspective. decideat thetimeoftheir itassumesa fixedlifecycle,(i.e.parents events.Furthermore, theywant,and adhereto thisdecisionthroughout whatnumberofchildren marriage theirfecundyears),and it makesno allowanceforchangeswithtimeand experience. withactualexperience. conflicts Thisviewcertainly Easterlindoes not deal adequatelywiththewide Like someof his predecessors, on societies.He, liketheearlywriters in pre-modern in 'natural'fertility variations factors thatexplaindemand.38 thesocio-economic failsto specify transition, demographic withtraditional Thoughtheseeconomicvariablesarenotincompatible Theirsignificant restatement. transition theory, theyare too narrowfora satisfactory beforethefall maybeginbyraisingfertility is to showhowmodernization contribution in a number thathas beenobserved a phenomenon modernization, inducedbyfurther Project,cultural to thefindings oftheEuropeanFertility ofcountries. Butin contrast variablesare onlygivennominalattention. THE SEARCH FOR CAUSALITY: CALDWELL S RESTATEMENT by Caldwellin an theoryhas been offered of transition An interesting restatement offertility decline.39 theories and institutional to integrate cultural, economic, attempt was behaviour fertility In contrast to theoriginaltheoryhe holdsthatpre-transition and assertsthat fertility rational.But he criticizeseconomictheoriesof fertility established theframework bysocialends.All societies is rationalonlywithin behaviour fromsocietyto society.His are economically rational,but the ends serveddiffer anthropological enriched aregreatly byexamplesfromhisownextensive observations fieldresearch. between distinction makesan important theorists, Caldwell,unlikeearliertransition as in economicorganThe firstis structural 'modernization' and 'Westernization'. - twoverydifferent As he correctly pointsout processes. ization;theseconda copying and economicmodernization between theredoesnotappearto be a closerelationship offertility declinein themodernworld. thebeginning whichincludesideasof The primary forceofchangeappearsto be Westernization, This mass education,and masteryover the environment. progress,secularization, doneinlessdeveloped as ithasincreasingly development, processcanprecedeeconomic whichhaveoccurred at declines is supported areas.Caldwell'sargument bythefertility of Fertilityin DevelopingCountries.(New York, 1983). R. A. Bulatao and R. D. Lee, Determinants Hirschmann,loc. cit. in fn.32, p. 215. 3 See especially J.C. Caldwell 'Towards a restatementof demographic theory', Population and DevelopmentReview,2 (1976), pp. 321-366. 3 38 372 DUDLEY KIRK - in southern as in Bangladeshand- morerecently verylow levelsofmodernization, Africa.In hisviewan important exportofWesternization is thepredominance ofthe nuclearfamilywithits concentration on expenditure for one's children,e.g. on education. Thisviewhas beenchallenged byCain,whoassertsthatthenuclearfamily is no morepronetodeclining fertility thantheextended family, sincethelatterprovides an alternative to children as insurance forsecurity in old age.40 Caldwell'snameis identified withhiswealthflowtheory offertility decline.In this issueindemographic view,thefundamental transition is thedirection andmagnitude of Atfirst, inpre-modern intergenerational wealthflows. societies, theflowis from children toparents or,morebroadly, fromtheyounger totheoldergeneration. Wealthis defined hereas including money,goods,and resources. Whenthereis a transition fromtheextended to thenuclearfamily, thependulum oftheflowis nowfromparentsto children. swingsand thedirection In thissituation, is themostrational economic beingchildless behaviour! But,ofcourse,couplescontinue toprocreate forsocialandpsychological children reasons, though theyhavemanyfewer thanformerly. As Caldwelladmits, hisrestatement doesnotclarify thenatureofthespecific appeal of Westernized valuesand familysystems. Whydoes Westernization proceedmore rapidlyand reacheverlowerlevelsof socio-economic development, as in Bangladesh and sub-Saharan Africa?WhilstCaldwell'stheory is veryappealingitis,as he himself notreadily Oneseriousattempt admits, testable. to testitdidnotresultinconfirmation ofthetheory.4' THE SEARCH FOR CAUSALITY: CULTURAL AND IDEATIONAL THEORY A morespecifically cultural theory thanCaldwell'shasbeenputforward byLesthaeghe in fertility who arguesthatdifferences behaviourare primarily relatedto cultural Thiscontrasts ofsocio-economic differences. withthestructural influences development whichhavebeendescribed as 'primary' inclassicaltransition asserts theory. Lesthaeghe in thatdifferences in fertility levelsand theirspeedofchangearerelatedto differences religiousbeliefsand practicesand in the degreeof secularism, and materialism, individuation. of classicaltransition Lesthaeghe's analysisand resultsare a majormodification oneconomic theories ofeconomically rational theory. Basinghimself fertility behaviour, of exogenousand constant'tastes', he describesthe limitedby its assumptions ofchanging andexogenous tastes.'In otherwords,a cost-benefit implication paradigm is necessary, butnotsufficient'. adds a theoryof 'higherorderneeds'to Lesthaeghe classicaleconomicutility ofneeds Economicprosperity createsa newhierarchy theory. ina tree-like structure: a trunk ofbasicphysiological needsabovewhichgrowa diversity of branchesor 'higher'needs,including a plethoraof luxurygoodsand,especially, needs.42 non-material psychological in WesternEurope this has meantgreaterfreedomof choice and Historically ofreligious relaxation orsecularization. documents control, Lesthaeghe fully thedecline in traditional religiousbeliefsand churchattendanceand the risingemphasison 40 M. Cain,'Perspectives onfamily andfertility indeveloping countries', PopulationStudies,36 (2) (1982), pp. 159-175. 41 declinein rural T. E. Dow, Jr.,L. Archer,S. Khasianiand J.Kekovole,'Wealthflowsand fertility Kenya,1991-92',Populationand DevelopmentReview,20 (1994),pp. 343-364. 42 'A century R. Lesthaeghe, ofdemographic and cultural changein Western Europe.An exploration of underlying dimensions', Populationand DevelopmentReview,9 (3) (1983),p. 411. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 373 individual discretionand 'higher' needs, such as individualwants: in contrastto community wants;in otherwords,changesdirectedtowardsindividualism and concepts of self-fulfilment. How does thisrelateto fertility decline? ' A fertility declineisinessencepartofa broaderemancipation process.Morespecifically, the demographic regulatory mechanisms, upheldby theaccompanying communalor family and exchange authority patterns givewayto theprinciple ofindividual freedom ofchoice, thereby an extension ofthedomainofeconomic allowing rationality to thephenomenon of reproduction.43 'The underlying dimension ofthisshift is theincreasing importance ofthecentralposition givento theattainment ofindividual goals.As a result, theextentto whicha trendin this direction of greater individual orientation and personaldiscretion is curbedor permitted seemsto be ofparamount forthepattern significance ofchangewithrespect to all aspectsof lifeand procreation family '. While eminently logical,the applicationof theseideas to fertility declineis somewhat tenuous,because the preciselink is not always clearlydefined.It is truethat fertility transitionduringthelate nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuriesproceededin parallel withcultural-ideational changesin thedirectionofindividualism and self-fulfilment, and accordingto Lesthaeghe,in thequalityof conjugalrelationships and of childrenwithin the nuclear family.This appears to be a weak link in the chain of reasoningand empiricaldemonstration. It is, ofcourse,truethatrecentchangesin thedirectionofevergreaterpreoccupation withthewelfareand selffulfilment of individualshave been accompaniedby increases in pre-maritalsexualityand cohabitation,more childrenborn out of wedlock,more divorce etc., as well as by furtherdeclines in fertility.Thus, as a sociological generalizationit is veryattractiveand could be applied to familystructure and fertility decline,at least in theory. Lesthaegheis a leadingrepresentative of the European emphasison culturalvalues, as opposed to emphasison materialaspectswhichis favouredby Americanauthors. However,as noted below,the two are not as opposed as theymay seem. THE SEARCH FOR CAUSALITY: HISTORIANS' VIEWS 'Demographyis too importantto be leftto demographers'.Economistsreachedthis conclusionmanyyearsago and have takenan activeinterestin thisfield.Now, some historianshave reachedthe same conclusion. Of course, historianshave not been entirelyabsent among early writerson the transition.Especially noteworthyare the contributionsby E. A. Wrigleyand his have dealt exhaustively withhistoricaltopics,but colleagues.45Actually,demographers as 'historicaldemographers'ratherthandemographichistorians.The latterhave been rathersparse. A reflection of historicalinterestsis providedin a notable book, editedby Charles Tilly,46who is himselfan historian,and which includes contributionsfrom five historiansand threedemographers.As Tillypointsout, the questionis how and why basicallyagrarianpopulations(and moreespeciallypeasants)turnedfirstintoan urban industrialproletariat,and later into a bourgeois society.The firstchange leads to continuedhigh,if not rising,fertility; the second to fertility decline. 43Ibid. p. 411. Ibid.,pp. 429, 432. 4 45 Cf.hisbooksentitled IndustrialGrowthand PopulationChange(1961); Populationand History(1969), and,as editor, Introduction to EnglishHistoricalDemography(1966). 46 C. Tilly(ed.),HistoricalStudiesof ChangingFertility(Princeton, 1978). 374 DUDLEY KIRK In a more recentbook, edited by Gillis and others,thereis a strongplea for the The massive transition. inclusionof historicalculturalfeaturesin studiesof thefertility In an appraisalof Princetonproject,did not includehistoriansamongitscontributors. the study,Altersays: of fertility regionsclearlypointsto aculturalinterpretation of linguistic 'The importance of thedemographic bythetheory declinein contrast to theeconomicfactorsemphasized wellenoughto Projectwas notdesigned transition. theEuropeanFertility Unfortunately, of culture, and The data base does notincludeindicators examinea culturalhypothesis. regionsthat in the projecthave yetto explainwhatit is about linguistic participants offertility declines.'47 determines thetiming between Thus farno attempthas been made to characterizethe culturaldifferences linguisticregions.In Alter'sview,Lesthaeghecomes closestto thisin his measureof suchas hisanalysisoftherelationbetweenvotingforsocialistcandidates secularization, a as fundamentally change.He regardsCaldwell's restatement in electionsand fertility culturalratherthan an economicmodel.48Historiansare criticalof the standardfocus whichholdsthatthe on economicand social structure, and of an economicdeterminism rates. sweepsaway highfertility broad broom of industrialization to the book focuson thecultureof reproductionas a factorin Severalcontributors declineor lack of it. Accordingto Seccombe: the fertility inthe1970sand 1980s,but relations 'Greatadvanceshavebeenmadeinthestudyofgender .... Sexualdesireand indemographic offertility decline theories veryfewofthemarereflected offertility regulation.49 paradigms conjugalpowerareabsentfromthemainstream bothspousesmusthavea strong contraception] limitation [through 'To engender family actiontowardthatend.The and thecapacityto takeeffective desireto ceasechildbearing wasthatthe families in theearlytwentieth century fora greatmanyworking-class dilemma butlackedthe Thewomenwerestrongly motivated conditions weredisjointed. twonecessary whilemenhaditintheirpowerto powerto avoidcoitusandthemeansto avertconception, to restrain their motivated or use condoms,butwerenot sufficiently abstain,withdraw, sexualitywithconsistency....If marriedwomenwere alreadykeen to shortentheir themajor whatbrought husbandsroundto theirwayof thinking?... childbearing careers, shiftin the familyeconomy,movingmen's impetus,in my view was the underlying in linewiththoseoftheirspouses.50 interest increasingly reproductive and This shiftwas relatedto theremovalof children'srole as economiccontributors, to theincreasingcost of children,whichwerethe consequenceof threeprocesses: in fixinga minimumlegal age at marriage,compulsoryschool(1) stateintervention ing, a minimumlegal workingage, and social policies aimed at redistributive justice; in the labour market,as in the increasein the numberof ser(2) transformations vice posts suitableforwomen(e.g. in thecivilservice); towardschildrenwhichresulted of familyresponsibilities (3) a culturalredefinition in a flowof responsibility firstfromchildrento parents,and laterfromparents of motherhoodfromchildbearingto child to children.There was a redefinition rearing.5debate',in J.R. Gillis, guideto thecurrent 'Theoriesoffertility decline:A non-specialist's 47 G. Alter, L. A. Tillyand D. Levine(eds.), The European Experienceof DecliningFertility1850-1970. The Quiet (Oxford, 1992)p. 21. Revolution, 48 Ibid. pp. 24,39. in the conjugalrelations duties:Changing 'Men's 'maritalrights'and women's'wifely 49 E. Seccombe, fertility decline',in Gilliset al., op. cit. infn.46,p. 66. 50 Ibid. p. 77. women's lives',inGillisetal., op. cit.infn.46,pp.251-252. families. Shaping 'Constructing 51 C. Saraceno, DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 375 Thechangeinparents' attitudes towards theirchildren wasnotmotivated onlybythe family's economic situation, butalsobychangesinvalueswhichemphasized thequality ofchildren, ratherthantheirquantity.52 A featureof thecultureof reproduction was theobstructions by members of the medicalprofession whoinitially opposedbirthcontrol, sometimes forbizarrereasons. LeadersoftheBritish MedicalAssociation condemned contraception as unnatural, and warnedthatall sortsofmaladieswouldbefalltheirusers.Semenwasenvisaged bysome as an elixirforwomen'shealthwhenabsorbedthrough thevaginalwall!5 Professional advocatesofbirthcontrolwere,ofcourse,opposedto abortion, and sometimes to the use ofcondoms,becauseoftheirassociation withpremarital intercourse. Othercontributions includea discussion ofthehistorical effects ofwaron women's roles;a subjectnotcoveredin conventional transition theory. In itsinitialstages,war greatlyexpandswomen'sroles because of the mobilizationof men. Post-war demobilization bringsthembackto family responsibilities. According to Winter, this resultedin the post-warbaby-boom.54 However,the war openedwomen'seyesto In thelongerrun,fertility continued different choicesanddifferent rolesforthemselves. to declinein accordance withpre-war trends. Hainesreviewed theeffects ofsocialclassin promoting or retarding thetransition.55 Leesshowedhowthewelfare statefirst encourages fertility reduction, butlaterattempts to prevent it.56In sum,historians havecontributed to transition theory, in somecases in theculturesurrounding byusingdifferent emphases, and in othersbynewinsights reproduction. THE SEARCH FOR CAUSALITY: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT Theroleplayedbygovernment is manifestly ofgreatimportance in thedeclineofboth mortality and fertility. Withincreasingly activegovernments and theriseofthenation - the provisionof pure water, state came public servicesthat reducedmortality controlofepidemics as wellas otherpublichealthmeasures. vaccination, andfamines, Expansionof the peace area in the modernstatereduceddeathsfromtribaland internecine warfare;throughpolicingit also reducedviolenceand increasedpublic safety. Governmental influenceon fertility decline is, of course, equally apparent. thecostofchildren, as didmeasuresto outlawchild increased Compulsory schooling of theeconomycreatedjobs The changingstructure labourand childexploitation. itself. suitableforwomen,notleastin government The mostconspicuousaspectof intervention, however,is the attitudetakenby is the and politicalleaderson populationpolicy.Perhapsmoststriking government and rigidly of China,wherethe government launcheda comprehensive experience enforcedfamilyplanningpolicyduringthe late 1960s whichbroughtabout an 52 Saraceno, gear:Culture, inreverse 'Goingforward andP. Schneider, ibid.p. 252.See alsoJ.Schneider trends ina ruralSiciliantown',inGillisetal., op. cit.in inthedemographic economy economy, andpolitical ideaswhich withnon-Western compatible to coitusinterruptus fn.46, pp. 146-178.'Reversegear' refers contraceptive modern thantheunliked inthelowerclasseswhenused,rather thetransition actually promoted (p. 225). 5 Seccombe, in Gilliset al., op. cit. in fn.46,p. 71. Europe',in Gillisetal., op. cit.in fn.46, in twentieth-century andfertility 'War,family, 5 J.M. Winter, caused inbirths ofsomeofthedeficit thata majorcausewasthemaking-up however, pp.291-309.I suspect, bythewar. inGillis,et perspectives' decline.Historical thefertility andsocialclassduring 'Occupation 5 M. Haines, al., op. cit. in fn.46,pp. 193-226. Europe',Gillis, 56 L. H. Lees,'Safety andfertility declineinWestern legislation Socialwelfare innumbers. et al., op. cit. in fn.46,pp. 310-325. 376 DUDLEY KIRK in the1970s,whenthepolicieswererelaxedandfertility unprecedented dropinfertility reacheda plateau.Thiswas followed morerecently bya return to theold policyand a newdeclineoffertility whichbrought itdownto replacement level,witha TF of2.0 to 2.1. A comparisonof the experienceof two Latin Americancountriesillustrates government influence in thatregion.In Colombiaduringthemid-1960s a groupof progressive medicalpractitioners organizeda family-planning associationcalled Profamilia, whichinitiated a community-based programme to providefamily-planning services. Thegovernment at first adopteda stanceofbenignneutrality, butlaterbegan itselfto providea nationalprogramme offamily TF in Colombiawas close planning. to 7 duringtheearly1960s,butfellrapidlyto itspresent valueof2.7. In Mexico,thegovernment was firmly opposedto family planning until1972,when thepolicywas reversed and a nationalfamily-planning programme launchedrather rapidly. Thebirthratewhichhadremained at pre-transition levelsuntiltheearly1970s, fellprecipitously thedeclinein Colombiaandcontinued to do anditscourseparalleled so untilthepresent, thoughat 3.2, TF in 1992was stillhigherin Mexicothanin Colombia,in spiteof thefactthatindicesof socio-economic statuswerehigherin Mexico. The experience in Pakistanand Bangladesh illustrates thelimitations ofgovernment intervention, whenconditions are not ripeforit. Duringthe 1960s,President Ayub Khanintroduced a crashprogramme forPakistan.It wasa complete failure andfertility in Pakistanhas onlybegunto fallveryrecently. In Bangladesh, thegovernment initiated a cautiousfamily-planning programme which was progressively strengthened. By 1992,TF had fallenfrom7.0 whichappliedbefore theprogramme startedto 3.4. The difference, withPakistan,is thatbythelaterdate, Bangladesh had beenaffected byWesternization, and extreme poverty had spurred on publicand governmental support. The importance ofpoliticalorientation is illustrated bythecomparative experiences of Southand NorthKorea. In theRepublicof Korea TF is 1.8,in theDemocratic Republicof Korea 2.5. In SouthKorea therewas an activeprogramme designedto provideknowledge ofand accessto family Therewasno suchprogramme in planning. communist NorthKorea. is as expected a clearcorrelation between thestrength oftheprogramme Overall,there effort and ratesof fertility with decline.57 Also, the degreeof successis correlated readiness to adoptcontraception, as measured bylevelofsocio-economic development, desiredfamily sizeetc. Whiledirect offamily is undertaken implementation planning programmes bynation the states, international andtargets havehadsomeinfluence, guidelines as, forinstance, WorldPlanofActionadoptedat thePopulationConference in Bucharest in 1984.The WorldPopulationConference heldin Cairo in September 1994established a more theInternational on comprehensive Conference plan.The Cairoconference (formally Populationand Development) ofaction',a 20-year produceda 'programme blueprint forstabilizing worldpopulationand fostering This economicand socialdevelopment. calledongovernments toprovide'universal accesstoa fullrangeofsafeand programme reliablefamily methods planning andto relatedreproductive healthservices bytheyear 2015'.In a dramatic fromprevious itstatesthatraising thestatus departure manifestos, of womenis a prerequisite forfurther in birthrates.Such international reductions 5 W. P. Mauldin andJ.Ross,'Prospects andprograms forfertility reduction 1990-2015', StudiesinFamily Planning,25 (1994),pp. 77-95.See also thesameauthors' 'Familyplanning programs. Efforts andresults', Studiesin FamilyPlanning,22 (1991),pp. 350-367. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 377 on theadoptionof nationalfamily-planning agreements are boundto havean effect programmes. increased planning programmes and theconsequent Evenwiththespreadoffamily use of contraception, estimatesof futurepopulationgrowthin the less developed contraception are countriescaused by unwantedfertility uncheckedby effective and population staggering. Desiredfamilysize remainshighin manycountries, ageis another offemales ofreproductive momentum resulting fromthelargepercentage wereto be eliminated early,(whichseemsunlikely) reason.Evenifthefirst twofactors alonewillcarrythepopulationofthelessdevelopedworldto populationmomentum planning programmes, in thetwenty-first century, so thatfamily muchhigher numbers to stemhighpopulationgrowth. no matter howsuccessful, willnotbe sufficient An additionalstrategyis needed to reducepopulationgrowth,whichwould particularly education, raisingwomen'sstatus,and emphasize'humandevelopment', but improving childhealth.Ofcourse,suchpoliciescoursearevaluedintheirownright, ofgirls,hasbeenshownto be thefactormostcloselyrelatedto education, particularly the and first births.Increasing equalitybetween marriage fertility decline,bydelaying rolesother bymaking sexesinlegal,economic, raisesthecostofchildren andsocialaffairs towomen.Reducing childmortality and andattractive thanchildbearing morefeasible been associatedwithfertility measuresto improvechildwelfarehave everywhere reduction. It is possiblethattheEuropeanand Japaneseexperience willbe repeatedin some underdeveloped areas of theworldwhichare more countries in the contemporary level in Hong Kong, developed.Fertilityhas alreadyfallenbelow replacement level.In SouthKorea,and Taiwan.In China,TF at 2.0 is at replacement Singapore, in zeronatural someEuropeancountries reductions in fertility havealreadyresulted or eventhebeginning ofpopulation decline,thoughin somecasestheeffects increase, havebeenweakenedbyimmigration. in Europeas inevitable. declineofpopulation Van de Kaa andothersregarda future is thatEurope,at leastmostof 'Whenall is saidanddone,theonlyreasonable expectation at low levels,followed bypopulation it,willinevitably see birthand deathratesconverge decline'.58 ratherthanreduce thereis growinginterestin efforts to raise fertility, Not unnaturally, it. In France, of course,thereis a long historyof familyallowancesdesignedforthis have not been such programmes purpose.But, exceptin special circumstances successful. conspicuously THE SEARCH FOR CAUSALITY: THE ROLE OF DIFFUSION Diffusionist ideas are commonin the demographicliteratureand can be foundin the earliestexpositionsoftransition dynamics theory.But eventodaydiscussionofdiffusion in the fertility transitionis lackingin conceptualclarity,and littleattentionis givento Yet withoutthe generaldiffusion theory,as presentedby EverettRogers and others.59 - ifnot impossible- to explaintherapidity it would be difficult assumptionof diffusion and pervasivenessof fertilitydeclines. With reason, some authors have depicted diffusionas a thirdtypeof causal agent,in additionto supplyand demand.60 58 D. vande Kaa, 'Europe'sseconddemographic PopulationBulletin,42 (1987),Washington transition', D.C. p. 46. Strategyfor FamilyPlanning,(NewYork,1973). 5 E. M. Rogers, Communication effects 60 C. L. Rosero-Bixby Population in fertility transition', 'Modellingdiffusion and J.Casterline, Studies,42 (1993),pp. 147-167. 378 DUDLEY KIRK Thecasefordiffusion is strengthened becausechangesinreproductive behaviour have proceededmuchfasterthan economicchangeswhichhave commonly been given priority. Morebroadly, thewidespread adoptionoffamily planning cannotbe explained without assuming a majordiffusion ofnewideasand techniques, notablyin itsrapid adoptionwithinlinguistic and culturalareasin whichlevelsof modernization differ is likelyto followestablished widely. Diffusion linesofcommunication between friends, neighbours, relatives, and thelocal community and in thelargerarenaof common languageand cultureand established linesofcommunication. Diffusion is notmerely a residual, butan activeagentin promoting or retarding the practice offertility control. Historically, fertility reduction is an innovation followed by notmerely diffusion, an adjustment An individual's to newsocio-economic conditions. or couple'sacceptanceor rejection of familyplanningis explainedby theadoption potentialof an innovation ratherthanby socio-economic conditions. Accordingto Carlson: Birthcontrolbehaviour is contagious ofa population is notthe and thefertility behaviour of isolatedindividual but theend productof complexsocial simpleaggregate decisions, interactions.61 In otherwords,controlof fertility is as mucha groupdecisionas a decisionof an individual or couple.In themodernworldfertility declinesaremorecloselyassociated withthediffusion ofan idea thanwithmicro-economic forces.62 Thereis a shortage ofstudieson theroleplayedbydiffusion, exceptwithreference to birthcontrolprogrammes, government-organized whereit has beenthesubjectof a specialstudy.Freedman hasemphasized itsimportance. 'Familyprograms areunlikely to succeedunlesstheyreachthemassoftheruralpopulation thesmallprimary through groupsthatdefinethesocialworldofvillageresidents.63 It is no coincidence thatthe new fertility transition in less developedareas was ofideasthrough advancesin accompanied (andpossibly preceded) bythetransmission themedia,notablyradioandespecially television. Thesecanreadily crossinternational even(perhapsparticularly) boundaries whentheirpurposeis to amuseratherthanto in informal instruct. Buttheirlegitimation thattheybe confirmed requires day-to-day withsignificant and leadersin the communications others,suchas relatives, friends, localcommunity. As Watkinshas said: 'evenwhenthecoupleis literally alonein the theiraction.64 theechoesofconversation withkinand neighbours influence bedroom, A potentially in countries lineofinquiry, thatarejustentering the fruitful especially is thenetworking or legitimizes transition birthcontrol.Thisis fertility thatinitiates especiallytrueof ruralpopulationsin whichsocialcontrolacts through gossipand informal conversations thatdefine thesocialworldofresidents. as McNichol However, 65 'is stilldescription in searchofa theory'. has putit,theroleofdiffusion 61 G. Carlson,'The declineoffertility. Innovation oradjustment process?',PopulationStudies,20 (1966), p. 165. ClelandandWilson,loc. cit. in fn.34. R. Freedman, 'The contributions of socialscienceresearch to population policyand family program effectiveness' Studiesin FamilyPlanning,18 (1987),pp. 57-82. 64 S. CottsWatkins, Thetransformation 'Fromlocalto nationalcommunities. ofdemographic in regions Western hasrepeatedly Europe,1870-1960, Populationand DevelopmentReview,16 (1990),p. 242.Watkins emphasized theroleof diffusion and theimportance of studiesof howgossipand conversations withkin, friends, andcommunity leadersaffect theacceptance or rejection ofbirthcontrol. 65 G. McNichol, 'The agendaof populationstudies.A commentary and a complaint'. Populationand DevelopmentReview,18 (1992),p. 406. 62 63 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 379 Thisreviewhas indicated thatalmostanychangein thedirection ofmodernization maybe listedas a 'cause' of thetransition, and rightly so, sincethedemographic transition is itselfan integralpartof theprocessand henceinterrelated withother aspects. All theaspectsof causalitymentioned aboveoperatethrough proximate variables, suchas age at marriage, age at first exposureto theriskofpregnancy, breastfeeding, coitalfrequency (including absenceofspouse,orreturn ofwomento theirnatalfamily to givebirthand livewiththempostpartum), infertility as wellas contraception and abortion.Thatis whythecultureofreproduction is so important. Another aspectofcausationis theroleplayedbycontraceptive technology which,in somecases,is themostobviouscauseofdemographic change.Murphy has shownthat fertility changein Britainduringthe1960sand 1970swas dominated bythespreadof thecontraceptive pill,ratherthanby remoteeconomicfactors,66 theimportance of whichhe suggests havebeenoveremphasized. Thisreview mayleavean impression ofchaos.An admirable effort to providesystem andorderis thetwo-volume inDevelopingCountries.67 workonDeterminants ofFertility Thesevolumes containsome38contributions, including manybyleadingdemographers noneofwhomcontributed to thePrinceton EuropeanFertility Study,and conversely. Partofthereasonforthismutualseparation is dueto thefactthatoneworkdealswith Europeandemographic history, the otherwiththe situationin contemporary less thereis a notabledifference in pointsof view,one developedcountries. Nevertheless, workisconcentrated theotherusesa basicframework oncultural andethnic differences, derivedfromeconomictheory. If thereis a singleor principal causeoffertility decline,itis reasonableto ascribeit to fallsin mortality, whichwas themajorcauseofdestabilization. It was a vitalfactor in reducing thispassivefatalism ofmostofhumanhistory. characteristic Theseand othercontributions to transition havegivena deepermeaning But theory. severalotherpointsarerelevant. (1) All thesuggested causesofthetransition are,in fact,closelylinked,and likethe No demographic transition itselfarean essential partoftheprocessofmodernization. thedemographic and has beenmodernized without country goingthrough transition, thisis likelyto be thecase in thefuture as well; features are moreeasilymeasuredand (2) Becauseeconomicand socio-economic henceregarded as being'morescientific', theyhavebeenaccordeda perhapsundeserved thaninEuropean dominance inexplanatory inAmerican theories. Thisis moreevident on thesubject; writings (3) Theoriginal withwhichmosttheories ofcausationaremutually theory compatible was verybroad,butemphasized different elements; areno moreabletopredict theinitiation andcauseofthe (4) Theproposedrevisions transition thantheoriginaltheorists. had The EuropeanFertility transition thatoncethefertility Projectdiddemonstrate been established in a linguistic or culturalarea in Europeit spreadrapidlyand of socio-economic levelachieved.Thoughthishad notbeengenerally independently in it did,in fact,so spreadin LatinAmerica, and in areasofChineseculture forecast, afterthe East Asia. Again,thelatterdevelopment was notforecast, butonlyobserved event.It remains to be seenwhether thesameprocesswillapplyintheAraborMoslem MiddleEast,and in sub-Saharan Africa. 66 M. Murphy, changein Britain as factors in fertility 'The contraceptive pilland femaleemployment view',Population Studies, 42 (1993),pp. 221-243. 1963-80.A challenge to theconventional 67 See fn.37. 380 DUDLEY KIRK The diversity ofcultures,socio-economiclevels,and demographicfactors,suchas age at marriage,precludepreciseprediction.This failureis neitherunique nor is it limited to demographictheories;it is characteristic of all theoriesin the social sciences. But I returnto an earliertheme.No unique cause exists.Perhaps all aspects of whichin itself modernizationmaybe describedas relatedto thedemographictransition is an essentialpartof modernization.In a perceptivearticle,Karen OppenheimMason wrote: 'It is timeto stopfighting thatthereis likelyto aboutan either/or scenarioandtorecognize be a complexinterplay decline- witha amongseveralfactorsinvolvedin any fertility in eachdecline,68 different mixinvolved and Most of the presentpaper has been devoted to the determinantsof fertility mortality, ratherthan to the transitionas a determinant of socio-economiclevelsand trends.Demographicchange was perceivedas being determinedby socio-economic causes, ratherthan as an interactionbetweenthem. The economic implicationsof the demographictransitionare many,but are too complexto be fullydiscussedhere. They have been organizedand fullydiscussedby Chesnaisin his impressivebook on the demographictransition.69 Broadly,thereare two opposingtheoreticalperspectivesin whichthe natureof the demographictransitioncan be discussed. The firstsees population growth,and especiallyrapid populationgrowth,as a major brake on economicdevelopment.The used second viewsit as a stimulantto economicgrowth.The firstis characteristically whenreferring to theless developedworld,thesecondforindustrialeconomieswithlow fertility. A veryseriousand importantcriticism for transition oftheimplicationsofthefertility publicpolicieshas beenputforwardduringtherecentpast. This is thefindingthatrapid population growthis not necessarily,nor even usually, a crucial impedimentto economicdevelopmentand risingincomes.70 Dramatically differentresults can be obtained by slight changes in the initial Evidenceof thechangingviewis theNational ResearchCouncil'sreport assumptions.71 on PopulationGrowthand EconomicGrowth,whereit is stated: 'But it is clear despiterapid populationgrowthdevelopingcountrieshave achieved andlifeexpectancy overthepast unprecedented [gainsin]levelsofincomepercapita,literacy, 25 years.72 In earlierstudiesit has been assertedthathighdependencyratioscaused by thelarge numberof childrenin countriesin which fertility was high would requireincreased expenditureon education,and thus reduce the savingsneeded to achieve economic growth.In morerecentstudiesno clearrelationhas beenestablishedbetweeninvestment in educationand othersocial measureson one hand, and age structureand rates of populationgrowthon the other.73 68 K. Oppenheim ontheories offertility decline'.Genus, Mason,'Cultureandfertility transition. Thoughts 40 (1992),pp. 1-14. 69 J.C. Chesnais, from Translated TheDemographicTransition. Stages,PatternsandEconomicImplications. theFrench.(Oxford, Clarendon Press,1992). 70 Cf.S. Enke,Economics for Development (Prentice Hall,1963),andCoale andHoover,op. cit.infn.12. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 7 H. Leibenstein, A TheoryofEconomic-Demographic Development nations.The 1954); D. Ahlberg, 'The impactof populationgrowthon economicgrowthin developing evidencefrommacro-economic and R. Lee (eds.),PopulationGrowthand demography' in D. G. Johnson 1987). EconomicDevelopment:Issues and Evidence(Madison,Wisconsin, 72 National D.C. 1986). ResearchCouncil,PopulationGrowthand EconomicGrowth,(Washington, 1960-80',inJohnson andLee,op. cit. in fn. 7 Cf.T. P. Schultz, 'Schoolexpenditures andenrolments, DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 381 betweenthescientific Thesefindings haveresulted in increasingly strained relations a worldand policy-oriented authors.The former havebeenblamedforundermining majorrationaleforbirthcontrolprogrammes to reducefertility. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE TRANSITION With50 yearsofhindsight, standtoday? wheredoesthedemographic transition has fallenin First,givena modicumofdomestic and international peace,mortality Themortality transition everycountry andhasbeena partofsocio-economic progress. high-income has spreadthroughmostof the world.Life expectancy in industrial countries is nowbetween a ceiling, but,at best 75 and80yearsandmaybe approaching inthesecountries is lessthan10per increases willbe slow.Infantmortality anyfurther Thelowest 1,000births, andfurther progress can onlybe slowanditsimpactminimal. infant mortality has beenreachedin Japanwitha rateoffiveper1,000,whichmustbe closeto thebiologicalminimum. transition. Therest Thesecountries havepresumably reachedtheendofthemortality oftheworldis on a moving Africa Onlyinsub-Saharan escalator ofdeclining mortality. do pre-modern levelsof mortality butevenin thatregion,thereis progress. persist, at birthis less Amongcountries withmorethanonemillioninhabitants lifeexpectancy than50yearsin 18,allinsub-Saharan Africa.Butas recently as 1975therewere43 such violence, and countries, andin 1960thenumber wasabout70.Apartfrom wars,internal naturalcatastrophes deathratesare falling everywhere. thefertility every Secondly, transition hasreachedeverymajorregion.It hasaffected in LatinAmericaand theCaribbean, of Haiti.In country withthepossibleexception in China,where moststrikingly Asia,thetransition has begunin all majorcountries, fertility has nowbeenlowformorethana decade(at a levelof2.1-2.5,andnowat 2.0 below replacement slightly level).Apparentexceptionsare marginal:Afghanistan, Cambodiaand Bhutan, mostoftheArabMuslimcountries inAsiaMinor,andwar-torn thetransition. Laos. Vietnamhas clearlyentered than CountrieswithMoslemtraditions have been slowerto enterthe transition TF was3.0in 1991wellontheway others. Butinthelargest Moslemcountry, Indonesia, to replacement level.The Arab NorthAfricancountriesare well advancedin the In the thereis movement. transition. In Pakistan, andmoreremarkably in Bangladesh, Notmanyyearsago,TF latterverypoorcountry, declinehasbeenastonishing. fertility was4.3,andonly sixandsevenchildren wasbetween perwoman.By1990-91thefigure threeyearslaterit was 3.4. Resultsfromthe 1992-93NationalHealthSurveyin India,basedon some90,000 respondents showednationalTF tobe 3.39,withonestate- Kerala- belowreplacement levelwitha figure of 1.8. has The fertility transition has evenreachedpartsof MoslemAsia Minor.Fertility in andto someextent clearlyfallenin BahrainandQatar(TF 4.2 and4.5 respectively), in Oman,TF remains In SaudiArabia,and especially Kuwaitand theArabEmirates. highat 6.5 and 7.8 respectively.74 somefertility decline Mostresistant tochangehasbeensub-Saharan Africa.However, in all the 20 countriesof the regioncoveredby the has been reportedrecently Demographicand Health Survey,withthe exceptionof Uganda. Methodological ofcountries, but ofthesedeclinesin a number problems raisedoubtsaboutthereality of southern in contiguous countries thereis clearevidenceof a fallin fertility Africa, 7 in current fertility levelsand infantmortality variation 'Six Arabnationsshowconsiderable rates', 20 (1994),pp. 79-81. International FamilyPlanningPerspectives, 382 DUDLEY KIRK theblack Namibia,andespecially Zimbabwe, Lesotho,Swaziland, Botswana, including TF for black the the is that ofSouthAfrica.Whatis perhapsmoststriking population of mortality high level given the a figure which, ofthechiefcitiesis now2.6, population levelof2.1 to 2.2. is nearthereplacement in thesecountries declinecomes evidenceforfertility In otherpartsof theregion,themostdramatic fromKenya.Froma situationwheretheTF exceededeight,(thehighestrecorded progress In general, fallenprecipitously. has apparently fertility in theworld),fertility and Italian Portuguese Britishcolonies,theformer has beengreatest in theformer are foundin the reported colonieshave laggedbehind;thehighestlevelscurrently takenduring the1990s former FrenchSahel,exceptSenegal.It is probablethatsurveys clearly list of those which are add countries to the many, will several,perhaps fertility decline. experiencing canbe placed andeverycountry universal In short, thefertility transition is becoming some50 yearsago.75 in thetransition, as was predicted on a continuum ofprogress itis has begun(e.g.bya tenpercentreduction) oncethefertility transition Thirdly, ofpeaceand prosperity, In everycountry in theworld,givena modicum inescapable. on thepathoffertility firmly hasstarted continues to decline.Oncea country mortality it in it to low levels. Some authorshaveasserted has been successful reducing decline, for provided evidence thatthebabyboomintheUnitedStatesandsomeothercountries blips haveprovento be temporary thecontrary view.Butin generalthesephenomena wheretherewas caseisNazi Germany, processofchange.Aninteresting ina continuing infertility policyandpropaganda. causedbygovernment a substantial allegedly rebound in However,it has beenshownthatthemaincause of thisincreasewas a reduction and thatit didnotcontinue afterthewar. unemployment A numberof papershave been publishedwhichsuggestthatin somecountries CostaRica,TrinidadandTobago,and Malaysiathedeclinestalledat a level including will newinformation It remains morerecent wellabovereplacement. tobe seenwhether in whichis notoftenmentioned is thecaseofArgentina, confirm this.Mostconvincing had fertility ofEuropeanorigin, thiscontext. In thiscountry witha population largely levelis fallenearlier,butthedeclinestalledwhenTF was about3.0,and thepresent inIran,wherethebirthrate also is thesituation as about2.6.Quitesignificant reported fertility but morerecently Muslimrevolution, the conservative increasedfollowing action It that pro-natalist declinehasbeenresumed. is,ofcourse,alwayspossible strong reversal a and in about permanent strong onthepartofgovernmenta country maybring andseems anywhere, ofthetrend, butthishasnotyetbeenreported as havingoccurred in to do so thefuture. unlikely decline to theviewsofa number observers, fertility ofprestigious Fourthly, contrary the 1980s. up during not really slow China) did inthelessdeveloped countries (excluding to declines required the percentage slow in in terms of terms, but not It did absolute = have to experienced The countries appear developed reachreplacement less (TF 2.1). Thisanomalyis due infertility as greata reduction duringthe1980sas theydidearlier. further alongthepathof as a wholewere to thefactthatthelessdevelopedcountries thepercentage in the1980s,so thatwhilequantitative weresmaller, declines transition declineswereequivalent.76 decline In China therewas, indeed,a temporary stall.Aftera veryprecipitous the associatedwithstronggovernment backingforbirthcontrolpoliciesduring 1970s 75 D. Kirk,'Populationchangeand thepostwarworld',AmericanSociological Review,91 (1944),pp. 76 An update', InternationalFamily Planning R. Freedmanand A. K. Blanc, 'Fertilitytransition. 28-35. Perspectives,18 (1992),pp. 44-50. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 383 duringthe aroundthisfigure fluctuated whichloweredtheTF to 2.3 in 1980,fertility However, relaxed. were period the of policies anti-natal rigid as the decade, following onealmost TF has fallen by few last years. the during again fallen has fertility Chinese quarterbetween1987and 1992,from2.46 to 1.9. to conformed traditions withnon-European ofdeclineincountries thetiming Fifthly, fallsin Withoutexception, theory. by theoriginalauthorsof transition theforecasts greatly theory oftransition Whilsttheoriginators infertility. declines preceded mortality in generaltheperiodof the therateof increasethatwouldemerge, underestimated countrieswas shorterthan in countriesinhabitedby in non-European transition Europeans. level,andin a few has declinedto wellbelowreplacement inEuropefertility Sixthly, byimmigration hasbeentempered thoughtheeffect actuallydeclined, areaspopulation in somecases. of bytheearlyproponents thenewbalanceofbirthsand deathsforecast Seventhly, likeIceland,Ireland, Exceptfora fewoutliers, has notmaterialized. theory transition Most in all Europeancountries. has been belowreplacement and Albania,fertility and Greece)where Europe(Italy,Spain,Portugal, in Southern is thesituation striking level. ofreplacement is between1.3and 1.4,two-thirds TF at present such countries, VerylowvaluesofTF havealso beenfoundin somenon-European SouthKorea,andTaiwan,butinnonehastherebeen as Japan,HongKong,Singapore, has wherethegovernment offat 1.8 in Singapore, a rebound,exceptfora levelling policy. adopteda pronatalist lowerlevelsof socioat increasingly is now beginning the transition Eighthly, oneofthepoorestnations in Bangladesh, Thisis moststriking economicdevelopment. in theworld. of is enhancedbythefactthatthereis no theory theory The survivalof transition or actas a guide trends, population future equalvaluewhichcouldbe usedto forecast schemewhich As Chesnaishas stated'it is theonlyinterpretative research. to empirical changes'.77 demographic viewofcontemporary and coherent reflects a synthetic duringthelast published reviewofthetheory Chesnais'sbookis themostthorough He statesthatwhilethe above is the theory's decadeand meritsspecialattention. of to predictthetiming weaknessis itsinability itsallegedgreatest strength, greatest thisweakness However, countries. inparticular offuture development patterns specific Chesnaisdeploresthefactthat is commonin all thesocialsciences.Likemanyothers, andothercultural hadlittletosayaboutthepartplayedbynuptiality theory theoriginal societies. traditional or in levels pre-modern fertility divergent widely in creating aspects as did many of the theoryforignoring, the earliestproponents He also criticizes migrationand the the parts played by international subsequentcommentators, times. modern in communications of and transport development in spite in Bulgaria, whichoccurred theearlytransition Thus,someauthorsregarded theexplanation to thetheory. However, as an exception ofitslowlevelofdevelopment, hereis the Danube whichhas fora long timeservedas an avenueof tradeand duringtheinter-war has notedearlier,fertility writer As thepresent communication. inareasadjoining been lowest had generally mid-stream of transition, in the periodand thanin other and Bulgaria Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, theDanube in Austria, arteryof this important from more remote which were these countries regionsof communication.78 and commerce op. cit. in fn.68. 77 Chesnais, 78 D. Kirk,Europe'sPopulationin theInter-warYears (LeagueofNations,1946),Fig. 17 andChapters 5 and 12. 384 DUDLEY KIRK of transition and teststhreecentralpropositions In his book Chesnaisidentifies theory: first, followedby declining declining sequenceof mortality (1) The chronological at all.79This citedarenotrealexceptions He showsthatmostoftheexceptions fertility. (e.g. the presented is mademoreplausiblebythechargethattheevidencecommonly flawed; Project)is methodologically EuropeanFertility of in twophases:restriction transition (2) He providesa modelofthereproductive ofthe versions inearlier Thiswasnotincluded ofbirths. followed bylimitation marriage in Europe. oftransition theory, and is a suitablemodification decline.Earlierversions on theonsetoffertility ofmodernization (3) The influence butfailed ingredient as an essential development socio-economic ofthetheory regarded conditionsduringthe and socio-economic of demographic to predictthe diversity and institutional geographical, of historical, But despitethemultiplicity transition. bysimilarmechanisms. was promoted truethatthetransition it remains contexts, failedto notethe ofthetheory aspectis thatearlyand(manylater)versions Another trade,communications, (migration, movements international ofincreased importance of theimportance underestimated ofthetheory and thatthefounders and transport), culturalor in a specific planning The rapidspreadoffamily and diffusion. innovation of early buthas becomea veryusefulmodification area was notforeseen, linguistic havenotalways ofdiffusion theory As notedabove,evenproponents transition theory. and trade. ofcommunications theimportance fullyrecognized THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF TRANSITION THEORY thedemographic whether of 50 yearsit has notbeenresolved Evenwiththehindsight ormerely an 'idea'. Or foranalysis, a framework is a theory, a generalization, transition term'?The debate model,or a meredescriptive is it an 'historical model,predictive tooccupya central placeindemography. continues theory aboutthestatusoftransition literature has to someextentturnedfromthediscussionof Recentdemographic and itsinstitutional contexts, ofthetheory's survival, substantive issuesto explanations becauseno thetheoryhas survived In simplest terms, foundations. itsphilosophical in themodernworld. behaviour to explaindemographic bettertheory has emerged shattered' bytheworkof was 'dramatically transition theory For somehistorians, theEuropeanFertility Project.But as has been particularly historical demographers, ofthisstudycan be conclusions damaging pointedoutabove,someoftheapparently on methodological grounds. challenged othersbyDennisHodgsonand amongst context has beenexplored Theinstitutional ofThompson's thereception contrasts In hisscholarly SimonSzreter.80 paperSzreter thischangetothreefactors: in 1945.He attributes in 1929withthatofNotestein's article of levelof acceptability context(i.e. the 'heightened (1) A changedinstitutional at theendofWorldWarII, exemplified economic andsocialplanning bygovernment)' bytheNew Deal projectsofthe1930s; of stateeconomicplanning thelegitimacy concerning developments (2) intellectual and neo-classical economics,focusedon between new Keynesian a synthesis (e.g. economic in and matters); planning policy government 7 Op. cit. pp. 170-182. Populationand Development in Americandemography', and revisionism D. Hodgson,'Orthodoxy andthestudyoffertility transition 'The ideaofdemographic Review,14 (1988),pp. 541-569,andS. Szreter. Populationand DevelopmentReview,19 (1993),pp. 659-701. history', intellectual change.A critical 80 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 385 forthe rationalmanagementand (3) The formulationof transnationalinstitutions co-ordinationof world political and economic affairs,as in the United Nations. Transitiontheoryprovidesa generalhistoricalmodel of how all currentand emerging colonial and non-Europeansocietiescould be placed in rankorder,and an evolutionary typologyconstructed: for rationale botha ready-made toprovide hascontinued transition 'theideaofdemographic under futures demographic toolforforecasting projection anda convenient activism political planning forthefamily It is thisutility as to policyeffectiveness.... varying assumptions, of theidea fordemographic thathelpsto explainthesurvivaland persistence industry transition.8' Demenyhas assertedthattherehas been a 'prostitution'of demographywhenit was used to servethe interestsof internationalfamilyplanningprogrammes.He draws a demographyhas and policyresearchand findsthatrecently betweenscientific distinction beenattractedbythelatter,a decisionthat'theirtaskis notjust to interpret increasingly theworld,but to changeit'.82 I can testify frompersonalknowledgethatthefoundersof transitiontheorywerenot value. However,Szreter at firstattractedby its policyimplications,but by its scientific findsthat: of social conception theorywas itselfa productof a particular transition 'demographic and and forprediction scienceas at one and thesametime,an engineforinvestigation guidanceforsocialchange'.A3 Increasingattentionhas been devotedto thephilosophicalbasis of transitiontheory. explanationand its methodsis therefore Thus, Szreterassertsthat'the aim of scientific He findsthatNotestein,Davis, and or 'control'. not prediction onlyand understanding werealreadyspeakingthe same generation 'in the immediate post-war theircolleagues scientistsand administrators.84 as policy epistemologicaland methodologicallanguage rather interpretation this historian's find might others Natural scientistsespecially,and to predict. lies in its capacity scientific theory true test of any in thatthe surprising conceptualized In Szreter'sviewthereis needforan accumulationofpatient,carefully theform where in communities, specific that fertility changes study projects investigative theidea to subscribe is those who as done not by prejudged, changetakesis thatfertility of fertility transition. of contexts in specific reconstruction thehistorical fertility requires 'to understand changing costsof childin theperceived relative thevarying waysin whichchangeshaveoccurred bearing.8" One wonderswhetherincreasingnumbersof studieswillprovidemanynew answers used in transitiontheory. forthemacro-trends CONCLUSION The demographictransitionwas born a lustyinfantsome 50 years ago. With all its it remainsat the centreof the demographicstage. In thisreviewI have shortcomings, attemptedto showthestagethatthetransitionhas reached,and thediverseapproaches cultural,ideational,etc. Interto causation: socio-economic,economic,institutional, 81 Szreter,ibid.p. 686. 82 P. Demeny, Review,14 (1988), and Development 'Social scienceand populationpolicy',Population p. 455. 83 Szreter, loc.cit.p. 689. 84 ibid. p. 691. p. 692. 85 ibid., 386 DUDLEY KIRK estingly, noneofthesemeetthedemandforspecificity inregardto thetiming andspeed of thetransition, in spiteof thefactthatthiswas a commoncriticism of theclassic formulation ofthetheory. No twocountries havefollowedidenticalpathsto transition, becausethereare so manypossiblecombinations of nuptiality, fertility, mortality, and migration at each stageofthetransition. However, thisdiversity is notirreconcilable withtheuniversality ofthetransition. As Notestein saidmorethan40 yearsago 'it is impossible tobe precise aboutthevariouscausalfactors' behindthefertility Theheterogeneity transition'.86 of explanatory frameworks in the nationalmonographsof the PrincetonEuropean Fertility Projectis impressive. But,as pointedoutin theconclusion ofthisstudy,the differences are not so great.Theymay accelerateor delaythe transition, but the transition itselfis inescapable. Demographers and othersin searchofcausality aredealingwitha verycomplexand highlyinterrelated structure of causationthatat timesseemsnebulous.Perhaps,as Chesnaissays,likeso manyareasof humanbehaviour, and fertility cannot mortality be resolvedintoan equationwitha fewquantifiable parameters.87 Conceptssuchas individualism, freedom, and selffulfilment are difficult to quantify It is meaningfully. truethata fewauthors, likeLesthaeghe, havemadeimpressive efforts in thisfield. It is tempting to suggestthatit was the declineof mortality whichled to the thattriggered notonlythefertility disequilibrium butmorethananything transition, else reducedtheshacklesof fatalism whichlay behindsecularization, theriseof the moderneconomy, and eventheknowledge explosion. Perhapsmostpromising fortransition theoryis an equilibrium or homeostatic framework. Demographers andothers havetoooftenlimited theiranalysis oftheorigins andextent ofconsciouscontrol onmarital Therearemanyotherpossiblesocial fertility. to population adaptations ruleswhichgoverntheextent of size,particularly andtiming sexualabstinence, ofbreast-feeding, to theremarriage of marriage, rulesrelating length and infanticide widows,migration, (eitherdirect,or by neglect).However,as Hirschmann has said: 'consciouspatterns offertility controlarean important partof theprocess,butthetheoretical of transition framework shouldbe builton a broader base.88 In a sophisticated studyLee has discussedthe evidencefor the existenceof inhistorical ofhunting homeostasis thenearlystationary and populations: populations offrontier fromdemographic gathering peoples,therapidgrowth populations, recovery economic thecorrelation between crises,population growth following progress, fertility inEuropeanhistorical andthesizeoflandholdings, thelong-term andespecially swings populations.Accordingto Lee, demographic homeostasishas changedsince the nineteenth Theinfluence ofwhathedescribes as 'populationdensity' hasbeen century. The positiverelationwithfertility weakened. no longerexists.89 greatly In theperspective of reallylong-term swingsin thepast,perhapshis viewof the He couldfollowhisownadviceandlookat really present century maybe short-sighted. long-term swings.Afterall,thedemographic transition has yetto playitselfout. ofthehomeostasis ofwhat Application principle couldleadtoa better understanding levelsoffertility level post-transition arelikelyto be. I venture to guessthatthepresent offertility inEurope,belowandin somecaseswellbelowreplacement level,is an overcorrection thatwillbe modified. As children becomescarcertheirvalue rises,both 86 87 88 89 Loc. cit. in fn.11. Op. cit. in fn.68. p. 409. Op. cit. in fn. 32, p. 227. R. D. Lee, 'Populationdynamics ofhumansandotheranimals'.Demography,24 (1987),pp. 443-465. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 387 economically andpsychologically, Thereis alreadymounting concernabouttheageing of thepopulationwhichis a resultof low birthrates.It can be expectedthatpublic attitudesand governmental actionswillgiveexpression to thisviewin pronatalist To meitis surprising measures. thatso littlehasbeenpublished on thistopicinWestern Europe,exceptin France. In Western areasoflowfertility we aremovingintoa post-transition era,wherethe oldguidelines areno longerappropriate, an erainwhichmuchmoreattention willhave to be givento raisingfertility, ratherthanto lowerit. Itis thusquitepossiblethat,as manyofthefounders predicted, theworld'spopulation willapproacha newequilibrium ofbirths anddeaths.True,intheworldas a wholethis cannotbe expected tohappenformanyyearsas thetransition runsitscourseinallparts oftheworld.Whathappensafterthetransition is themostexciting inmodern problem forwhichtransition demography, theory can providesomeguidancebutfewanswers, as it is tiedto a particular epochofhistory.
