Chronologie 2006 - Genfer Initiative

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1 – Chronologie 2006
Chronologie 2006
Dezember 2006
29.12.2006:
Die Nachrichtenagentur Reuters meldet, dass nach Angaben der
israelischen Menschenrechtsorganisation „B’Tselem (Im Angesicht,
Gen. 1,27)“ im ablaufenden Jahr 660 Palästinenser – dreimal soviel
wie im Vorjahr – getötet worden seien, davon seien 332 Personen
nicht an Kampfhandlungen beteiligt gewesen. Im selben Zeitraum
2006 seien siebzehn israelische Zivilisten und sechs Soldaten durch
palästinensische Angriffe ums Leben gekommen.
28.12.2006:
Israels Außenministerin Tsipi Livni bekennt sich im Interview mit
„Haaretz” zur Zweistaatenlösung, fürchtet aber, dass religiös
extremistische Palästinenser gegen die Gemäßigten die Oberhand
behalten könnten, wenn Israel keine bedeutsamen Schritte in der
Westbank in Absprache mit ihnen unternimmt. Auf Details ihrer
politischen Vorstellungen verzichtet Livni. Sie spricht sich gegen eine
„dramatische Militäroperation“ aus, um den „Qassam“-Beschuss aus
dem Gazastreifen zu beenden, denn danach sei die diplomatische
Situation wie zuvor. Mit den „Trennungsmauern“ habe der „Prozess
der Teilung“ des Landes begonnen, ohne eine Lösung für die
gegenwärtigen Sicherheitsprobleme zu bringen. Sie seien nur in
einem diplomatischen Kontext zu erbringen. Im Blick auf Gespräche
mit Syrien äußert sich Livni vorsichtig. Jeder, der von Gesprächen
rede, verstehen, dass es um die Golanhöhen gehe. Deshalb wolle
Syrien nur Verhandlungen, keinen Frieden. Livni beklagt sich
darüber, dass hinter dem Libanon-Krieg kein diplomatisches
Ausstiegs- und Zukunftsszenario gestanden habe. Von der atomaren
Aufrüstung Irans befürchtet sie einen Dominoeffekt, der auf
arabische Staaten durchschlage: Entweder würden sie mit Teheran
konkurrieren oder sich Iran anschließen. Die wachsende Zahl von
Israelis, die ihre Kinder ins Ausland zum Studieren schicken, eine
fremde Sprache erlernen und einen zweiten Pass beantragen, sei
nicht nur auf die externe Bedrohung, sondern auch auf eine interne
politische Führungskrise zurückzuführen. Abschließend kündigt sie
ihre Kandidatur für die Nachfolge von Ehud Olmert an, um ihre
bislang unerfüllte politische Mission zu erfüllen1.
Akiva Eldar berichtet in „Haaretz“, dass Yossi Beilin Außenministerin
Tsipi Livni gefragt habe, ob sie Unterschiede zwischen seinem mit
Yasser Abed Rabbo vorgelegten Friedensplan2 und ihren eigenen
Vorstellungen erkenne, worauf Livni mit einem Lächeln geantwortet
habe, dass es tatsächlich schwierig sei, diese festzustellen. Eldar
berichtet weiter, dass der Einfluss der US-Amerikaner auf die
israelische Politik und mit ihm das Selbstbewusstsein Livnis
gewachsen sei.
26.12.2006:
Die israelische Regierung genehmigt den Ausbau von Maskiot im
nördlichen Jordantal, wo es nach seiner Gründung 1982/83 nur eine
vormilitärische religiöse Schule für mehr als fünfzig junge Männer
gab, mit dreißig Häusern mit der Option der Erweiterung. In die
Häuser sollen ehemalige Siedler aus „Gush Katif“ (Gazastreifen)
einziehen. Die finnische EU-Ratspräsidentschaft veröffentlicht eine
Erklärung mit der Feststellung, dass der Rückzug aus dem
Gazastreifen nicht begrüßt worden sei, damit sich die ehemaligen
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Siedler in der Westbank niederlassen .
Die in Luxemburg residierende Europäische Investitionsbank gibt
nach einer elfjährigen Unterbrechung die Vergabe von 200 Millionen
Euro als zinsgünstige Kredite bekannt, die besonders den
arabischen Gemeinden im Norden Israels zugute kommen sollen.
Außerdem sollen weitere 75 Millionen Euro zur Finanzierung
israelischer kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen gewährt werden.
25.12.2006:
In einem Beitrag für die „Jerusalem Post“ berichtet Gershon Baskin,
gemeinsam mit Hanna Siniora Vorsitzender des „Israel/Palestine
Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)“, dass ihm zwei
israelische Kabinettsmitglieder in persönlichen Gesprächen mitgeteilt
hätten, die Freilassung des in israelischer Haft einsitzenden Marwan
Barghouti sei nur eine Frage der Zeit.
23.12.2006:
Ehud Olmert und Präsident Machmud Abbas treffen in der Residenz
des israelischen Ministerpräsidenten zu einem unangekündigten
zweistündigen Gespräch zusammen. Abbas wird von dem früheren
Ministerpräsidenten Achmed Qureia („Abu Ala“) und
Chefunterhändler Saeb Erakat begleitet. Olmert kündigt die Freigabe
von 100 Millionen US-Dollar aus einbehaltenen Zoll- und
4
Steuereinnahmen gemäß dem Pariser Protokoll vom April 1994 an,
die direkt an das palästinensische Präsidialamt und nicht an die
„Hamas“-geführte Autonomiebehörde ausgezahlt werden sollen;
nach Schätzungen belaufen sich die ausstehenden Zahlungen auf
700 Millionen U-Dollar5. Die Freigabe ist an die Schaffung von
Mechanismen durch Abbas gebunden. Außerdem sollen einige
Checkpoints aufgehoben und die Warentransporte in den
Gazasteifen liberalisiert werden. In Zukunft sollen 400 statt
gegenwärtig zwölf Lastwagen die Kontrollpunkte passieren dürfen.
Hinsichtlich der Freilassung von Gefangenen soll eine Kommission
eingerichtet werden. Olmert fordert Abbas auf, für das Ende des
„Qassam“-Beschusses aus dem Gazastreifen Sorge zu tragen.
Schließlich vereinbaren beide Seiten regelmäßige Zusammenkünfte.
Der Generalsekretär der Arabischen Liga, Amr Mussa, räumt nach
Gesprächen in Beirut ein, dass alle arabischen Bemühungen
gescheitert seien, die Krise in Libanon beizulegen.
Der UN-Sicherheitsrat beschließt mit den 15 Stimmen seiner
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Mitglieder Sanktionen gegen Iran wegen dessen Atomprogramm .
Teheran kündigt daraufhin die Beschleunigung seines
Entwicklungsprogramms an.
Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger berichtet in der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen
Zeitung“ von Gesprächen in den arabischen Golf-Staaten und zitiert
zwei Minister des Sultanats Oman, darunter den Kultusminister
Heitham bin Tarik Al Said: „Wenn Washington die Lage stabilisieren
und das Land [gemeint ist Irak] befrieden wolle, müsse es den Dialog
suchen – auch mit Iran. Amerika müsse aufhören, Fanatikern,
Extremisten und Terroristen eine Ausreise für ihr verwerfliches Tun
zu geben. Das gelte für den Irak und noch mehr für den Kern aller
nahöstlichen Konflikte, den zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern.
›Amerika muss etwas tun, um diesen furchtbaren Boden für den
Terrorismus trockenzulegen.‹ Und Heitham, der zur Königsfamilie
gehört und dessen Name immer fällt, wenn die Rede auf die
Nachfolge des Sultans Qabus kommt, fügt hinzu: ›Solange das
Palästina-Problem nicht gelöst ist, wird es Terrorismus geben, wird
Amerika bei den Muslimen im schlechten Ansehen stehen.‹ Die
Vereinigten Staaten müssten endlich die globalen Auswirkungen
ihrer Politik zur Kenntnis nehmen – und auch deshalb eine Lösung
des Palästina-Konflikts herbeiführen. Ja, sie müssten sie erzwingen.
Amerika sei der einzige Akteur, der dazu in der Lage sei. ›Wir
können das nicht.‹ Das ist eine realistische Sicht. Vielleicht
unterschätzen sich die Golf-Araber ein wenig. In der Wirtschaft und
Entwicklung verbindet sie ja auch Weitsicht mit politischer Klugheit.“
22.12.2006:
Einer der führenden Publizisten Israels, Nachum Barnea,
veröffentlicht in der Tageszeitung „Yediot Achronot (Letzte
Nachrichten)“ einen Sechs-Punkte-Plan zur Beendigung des
israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts7. Er sei zwischen Schweizer,
britischen und norwegischen NGO’s und mit einer „Hamas“Delegation unter Leitung von Hassan Yousef8 erarbeitet worden. In
seinem Begleittext fügt Barnea hinzu, dass alle „politischen
Gefangenen“ freigelassen werden sollen. Ohne ins Detail zu gehen,
solle das „Recht auf Rückkehr“ gewährleistet werden. Auffällig ist,
dass von der Schaffung eines palästinensischen Staates in
endgültigen Grenzen nicht die Rede ist – mutmaßlich eine Geste an
„Hamas“ und ihre Charta von 1988, die von ganz Palästina als
strategischem Endziel spricht. In diesem Sinne erklärt ein „Hamas“Abgeordneter nach Medienberichten am 23. Dezember, dass ein
Waffenstillstand („hudna“) keine Anerkennung Israels bedeute und
dass das palästinensische Volk das Recht auf ganz Palästina habe.
Dementsprechend lehnt Präsident Machmud Abbas einen Vertrag
mit Israel über einen Staat Palästina in vorläufigen Grenzen ab und
fordert Verhandlungen über einen vollständigen Frieden.
Nach einem Bericht der in New York erscheinenden jüdischen
Wochenzeitung „Forward“ erwägt die US-Administration den Plan,
sich für einen palästinensischen Staat in vorläufigen Grenzen bis
Ende 2007 einzusetzen9.
21.12.2006:
Im Interview mit der „Süddeutschen Zeitung” betont
Bundesaußenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, dass die
„Wiederbelebung des Nahost-Quartetts (…) an Fahrt“ gewinne. Es
sei eine „wachsende Bereitschaft zu mehr Engagement“ erkennbar.
Eine gemeinsame EU-Außenpolitik werde jedoch letztlich nur über
eine europäische Verfassung funktionieren.
In derselben Zeitung kritisiert der Schriftsteller Amos Oz die
ablehnende Haltung Ehud Olmerts, mit Syrien in einen Dialog
einzutreten10. Die Regierung benehme sich wie ein Vasall der USA –
ein Vorwurf, den Yossi Beilin schon am 20. November in einem
Gastbeitrag für „Haaretz“ erhoben hatte11.
Nach einem Bericht der „Jerusalem Post“ hat Israels
Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz die 68 Kilometer lange Route der
„Trennungsmauer“ um die Jerusalemer Trabantenstadt Maale
Adumim genehmigt. Damit gehen 64.000 Dunam palästinensischen
Bodens – 640 Hektar – an Israel.
US-Präsident George W. Bush unterzeichnet ein Gesetz, nach dem
mit zwanzig Millionen US-Dollar Demokratie, Menschenrechte und
Pressefreiheit in den palästinensischen Gebieten gefördert werden
sollen. Gleichzeitig werden Hilfen und Kontakte für die von „Hamas“
geführte Autonomiebehörde unterbunden, weil diese das
Existenzrecht Israels nicht anerkenne.
19.12.2006:
Im Gazastreifen halten die gewaltsamen Machtkämpfe an, bei denen
fünf Palästinenser ums Leben kommen. In einer Rede verlangt
Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh das Ende der Gewalt und ruft zur
Bildung eines palästinensischen Staates in den Grenzen vor dem
Junikrieg 1967 auf. Danach sei eine bis zwanzig Jahre lange
Waffenruhe mit Israel möglich. Haniyeh beschwert sich über den
unausgesprochenen Boykott seiner Regierung durch Machmud
Abbas, kritisiert die palästinensischen Medien wegen ihrer
Abhängigkeit vom Präsidenten und schließt mit einem Neun-PunkteKatalog zur innenpolitischen Versöhnung12. Der jordanische König
Abdullah II. bietet seine Vermittlung zwischen den rivalisierenden
Gruppen an.
Der israelische Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert hält sich zu einem
zweistündigen Gespräch mit dem König Abdullah II. in Jordanien auf.
Die Einladung geht nach einer Meldung der Nachrichtenagentur
„Petra“ von dem Monarchen aus.
Nach Auskunft westlicher Diplomaten hat Syriens Präsident Bashar
Assad einen Brief an Ehud Olmert übergeben lassen. Einem Bericht
des TV-Senders „Al-Arabiyeh“ zufolge erklärt sich Assad darin bereit,
den Einfluss des Politischen Büros von „Hamas“ in Damaskus auf
die Westbank und den Gazastreifen zu drosseln, Waffenlieferungen
an „Hisbollah“ zu unterbinden, die Grenze nach Irak besser zu
kontrollieren und einem internationalen Tribunal zur Untersuchung
des Mordes an dem ehemaligen libanesischen Ministerpräsidenten
Rafiq Hariri zuzustimmen. Das Außenministerium in Jerusalem
dementiert nicht den Eingang des Briefes, während in Berlin die Hilfe
bei seiner Übermittlung geleugnet wird.
18.12.2006:
Der britische Premier Tony Blair bekräftigt auf einer Pressekonferenz
in Ramallah mit Präsident Machmud Abbas seine Bemühungen um
den Friedensprozess. „Ich werde keinen Moment ruhen“, betont
Blair. Wenn die internationale Gemeinschaft tatsächlich meine, was
sie über Menschen sage, die die Vision einer Zweistaatenlösung
unterstützen, und die gemäßigt und bereit seien, ihrer Verantwortung
nachzukommen, dann sei die Zeit für die internationale
Gemeinschaft gekommen, darauf zu antworten. Blair begrüßt die
Ankündigung von palästinensischen Neuwahlen durch Abbas und
sagt britische Finanzhilfen für den Aufbau der Sicherheitskräfte zu,
ohne die Frage zu beantworten, wie hoch diese ausfallen soll. Abbas
betont, dass Israelis und Palästinenser einander brauchen13. Der
Premier wird von seinem Sondergesandten für den Nahen Osten
Lord Michael Levy begleitet, dessen Sohn Daniel Levy als Jurist
gemeinsam mit seinem palästinensischen Kollegen Ghaith al-Omari
für den juristischen Feinschliff der „Genfer Initiative“ sorgte14.
Bevor Blair zu Gesprächen mit Ehud Olmert, Tsipi Livni und Amir
Peretz nach Israel aufbricht, wird in Jerusalemer diplomatischen
Kreisen darauf hingewiesen, dass er sein geringes innenpolitisches
Gewicht durch außenpolitische Erfolge zu kompensieren versuche.
Bei seinen Gesprächen in Jerusalem gibt Blair seiner Hoffnung
Ausdruck, dass die internationale Gemeinschaft in den kommenden
Wochen eine Initiative vorlege, um Abbas zu helfen und „die Not der
Palästinenser“ zu lindern.
17.12.2006:
Die Autokolonne von Außenminister Machmud Zahhar gerät in
Gaza-Stadt unter Beschuss. Wenig später kommen eine 19jährige
Frau, die zwischen die Fronten gerät, und ein weiterer Palästinenser
ums Leben. Rund hunderttausend Menschen versammeln sich in der
Stadt zu einer Demonstration für Machmud Abbas. Die „Al-AqzaBrigaden“ von „Fatah“ besetzen vorübergehend das Landwirtschaftsund das Transportministerium, die von „Hamas“ geführt werden. Am
Abend vereinbaren beide Seiten eine brüchige Waffenruhe. In den
folgenden Tagen werden immer wieder Kämpfe und Entführungen
gemeldet, bei denen Menschen ums Leben kommen.
16.12.2006:
In einer öffentlichen, vom Fernsehen übertragenen und volkstümlich
15
gehaltenen Rede kündigt Machmud Abbas in Ramallah Neuwahlen
für das Amt des Präsidenten und für das Parlament – den
„Palestinian Legislative Council“ – an, um den anhaltenden
Machtkampf zu beenden. Kurz vor der Ansprache wird ein
Angehöriger der Präsidentengarde „Force 17“ getötet. Abbas
bekennt, sich mit Ehud Olmert wegen der Freilassung
palästinensischer Gefangener getroffen zu haben. Andererseits
beschuldigt er Ismail Haniyeh der Konspiration gegen das
palästinensische Volk, die Chaos produziere. Den saudischen
Friedenplan der Arabischen Liga vom März 2002 habe Haniyeh nicht
einmal gelesen. Die 35 Millionen US-Dollar habe der
Ministerpräsident in den Gazastreifen schmuggeln wollen. Es sei
gemäß der mit „Hamas“ vereinbarten Leitlinien16 sein Recht, die
Regierung jederzeit entlassen zu können. Abbas’ enger Berater
Yasser Abed Rabbo avisiert die Bekanntgabe des Wahltermins in
den nächsten zwei Wochen und Neuwahlen innerhalb von drei
Monaten. „Hamas“ weist die Ankündigung des Präsidenten mit dem
Vorwurf zurück, er plane einen Staatsstreich. Er droht mit einem
Boykott der Wahlen und fordert Abbas zum Rücktritt auf. Ähnlich
ablehnend äußert sich das Politische Büro von „Hamas“ in
Damaskus, warnt aber vor einem Bürgerkrieg. Danny Rubinstein
urteilt in „Haaretz“ nach der Rede von Abbas, dass dieser zum
Kampf bereit sei, nachdem er und seine Verbündeten alle Illusionen
über die Bildung einer neuen Regierung und einen ideologischen
Kurswechsel von „Hamas“ verloren hätten.
Die Nationale Nachrichtenagentur Malaysias meldet, dass die AsienGruppe der Vereinten Nationen in Kuala Lumpur eine sechzehn
Punkte umfassende Erklärung verabschiedet hat, die die
einschlägigen UN-Resolutionen zum israelisch-palästinensischen
Konflikt, die internationale Madrid-Konferenz vom Oktober 1991 und
den saudischen Friedensplan der Arabischen Liga vom März 2002 in
Erinnerung ruft. Die Konferenz kritisiert den Bau der
„Trennungsmauern“ und drückt ihre Unterstützung für die
Bemühungen von Machmud Abbas um die Bildung einer Regierung
der nationalen Einheit aus. Israel wird aufgefordert, seine
Verpflichtungen zu den internationalen Menschenrechten zu achten,
gleichzeitig wird das Ende der Raketenangriffe aus dem
Gazastreifen auf Israel verlangt. Auf derselben Konferenz fordert der
scheidende UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan die internationale
Gemeinschaft auf, ihrer Verantwortung im Nahen Osten endlich
gerecht zu werden.
15.12.2006:
Der frühere Sprecher von Yasser Arafat, Bassam Abu-Sharif, gibt die
Gründung einer neuen Partei unter dem Namen „Die dritte
Strömung“ bekannt und ruft „Fatah“ und „Hamas“ zum Ende ihres
Machtkampfes auf.
US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice bittet den Kongress um die
Bewilligung von einigen Millionen US-Dollar zur Stärkung der
Reformbemühungen bei den palästinensischen Sicherheitskräften,
die Machmud Abbas unterstehen. Die Nachrichtenagentur „Reuters“
berichtet am 4. Januar 2007, dass sich der Betrag auf 86,4 Millionen
US-Dollar belaufen soll, „um den Präsidenten der Palästinensischen
Autonomiebehörde in die Lage zu versetzen, die Verpflichtungen der
Autonomiebehörde gemäß der Road Map zu erfüllen, die
Infrastruktur des Terrorismus aufzulösen und Recht und Ordnung in
der Westbank und im Gazastreifen herzustellen“. „Hamas“ kritisiert
die geplanten Zuweisungen als Einmischung in
innerpalästinensische Angelegenheiten.
In einem Interview mit der italienischen Zeitung „La Repubblica“
betont der syrische Präsident Bashar Assad, dass Frieden im Nahen
Osten ohne Beteiligung Syriens nicht möglich sei. Er fordert Israel zu
Verhandlungen auf und bezeichnet die Rede von David Grossman
17
auf der Friedenskundgebung am 4. November als richtig. Wenn die
israelische Regierung an einen Bluff glaube, wären Verhandlungen
die beste Gelegenheit, den Beweis anzutreten. Am 17. Dezember
weist Ehud Olmert die Rede zurück, weil sie im Widerspruch zu der
Position von George W. Bush stehe. Dagegen fordert
Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz (Arbeitspartei) eine „dringende
Debatte“ über das syrische Angebot. Im Gegensatz zu Stimmen aus
den Sicherheitsdiensten verlangen auch Angehörige des Militärs
seine Prüfung, statt es sofort zurückzuweisen. Am 19. Dezember
schließen sich mehrere Kabinettsminister der Aufforderung an, mit
Syrien Gespräche aufzunehmen. Der Vorsitzende des Außen- und
Sicherheitspolitischen Ausschusses der Knesset, Haim Hanegbi,
erklärt, dass Israel Syrien helfen müsse, sich aus seiner Isolation zu
befreien.
Die Vollversammlung der Vereinten Nationen beschließt mit 162
Stimmen die Einrichtung einer Datenbank in Wien zur Registrierung
palästinensischer Entschädigungsklagen gegen Israel wegen
Einbußen durch den Bau der „Trennungsmauern“. Gegen die
Stimmen der USA und Israel votiert auch die deutsche
Bundesregierung für die Datenbank.
In einem Interview mit der „Washington Post“18 betont der syrische
Außenminister Walid Mualem, dass politische Ergebnisse nur durch
einen „konstruktiven Dialog“ erreicht werden könnten. Das gelte auch
für Verhandlungen über die Golanhöhen, die ohne Vorbedingungen
eröffnet werden müssten. Syriens drei Ziele seien Frieden, Stabilität
und Wohlstand. Mualem wirft Washington vor, dass es Israel daran
hindere, auf den „Pfad des Friedens“ zurückzukehren19, den Yitzhak
Rabin in den 1990er Jahren eingeschlagen habe. Moalem entdeckt
einen Widerspruch in der US-amerikanischen Politik, einerseits für
Stabilität in Libanon und im Irak Sorge tragen zu wollen, aber
gleichzeitig Syrien zu destabilisieren. Wenn Wohlstand das Interesse
Washingtons sei, machten die Sanktionen gegen sein Land keinen
Sinn. In den Gesprächen im Irak habe er den Kurden aufgefordert,
das Land nicht zu teilen, sowie den Schiiten erklärt, dass sie Irak
nicht allein regieren könnten, und den Sunniten zu verstehen
gegeben, dass das alte sunnitische System [der Alleinherrschaft]
beendet sei und dass sie mit den Schiiten zusammenarbeiten
müssten. Mualem leugnet die Lieferung von Waffen an libanesische
Parteien als „Gerüchte“. Für die „Hisbollah“ gebe es moralische,
nicht jedoch operative Unterstützung. Damaskus sei für Stabilität,
Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit der Zedernrepublik, doch
Ministerpräsident Fuad Siniora sei nicht Libanon. Dieser sei dreimal
ergebnislos zu einem Besuch nach Damaskus eingeladen worden.
Mualem weist Berichte über syrische Waffenlieferungen an „Hamas“
zurück, gleichzeitig bemühe sich die Regierung – ohne Partei zu
ergreifen – über das Außenministerium Qatars um eine
Vereinbarung zwischen „Hamas“ und „Fatah“. Zur Zusammenarbeit
mit der Untersuchungskommission der UN zu den Umständen der
Ermordung des ehemaligen libanesischen Ministerpräsidenten Rafiq
Hariri am 14. Februar 2005 äußert sich Mualem nur allgemein.
Bei den Wahlen im Iran zu den Stadträten und zum 86köpfigen
religiösen Expertenrat, der den geistlichen Führer des Landes wählt,
müssen die Listen von Staatspräsident Machmud Achmadinedjad
herbe Verluste hinnehmen.
Frankreichs Präsident Jacques Chirac kündigt für den 25. Januar
2007 eine internationale Geberkonferenz für den Wiederaufbau
Libanons an. US-Präsident George W. Bush und Bundeskanzlerin
Angela Merkel verständigen sich bei ihrer Begegnung am 5. Januar
2007 in Washington auf die Einberufung des Nahost-Quartetts am
selben Tag wie die Libanon-Geberkonferenz.
14.12.2006:
In der Nacht zum 15. Dezember kehrt der palästinensische
Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh vorzeitig in den Gazastreifen
zurück. Die in arabischen Ländern und im Iran gesammelten
Spendengelder – es soll sich um einen Betrag von 35 Millionen USDollar handeln – darf Haniyeh auf israelische Anordnung nicht über
die Grenzstation Rafach einführen, sondern muss sie nach einer
ägyptischen Intervention auf einem Konto der Arabischen Liga
deponieren. Als Reaktion stürmen bewaffnete „Hamas“-Anhänger
den Grenzübergang. Die palästinensische Präsidentengarde „Force
17“ von Machmud Abbas erwidert das Feuer, wobei ein Leibwächter
Haniyehs ums Leben kommt. Ein Sprecher von „Hamas“ beschuldigt
den früheren Sicherheitschef im Gazastreifen Mohammed Dachlan
des Anschlags auf Haniyeh. In Gaza-Stadt demonstrieren
hunderttausend Palästinenser gegen Abbas, dem sie das Attentat
auf Haniyeh anlasten. Bei Zusammenstößen in Ramallah werden
mehr als dreißig Personen verletzt.
Der demokratische US-Senator Bill Nelson (Florida) durchbricht den
offiziellen Syrien-Boykott der Regierung in Washington und trifft in
Damaskus mit Präsident Bashar Assad zusammen.
12.12.2006:
Während seines Berlin-Besuchs führen Ehud Olmert und Angela
Merkel ein fünfstündiges Gespräch über die kommende deutsche
EU-Präsidentschaft im ersten Halbjahr 2007, die die deutsche
Bundeskanzlerin mit einer neuen Nahost-Initiative krönen will. Olmert
legt im Gegenzug seine bekannten Auffassungen zur iranischen
Bedrohung und zur Absage an Verhandlungen mit Syrien dar und
findet nach eigenen Worten bei Merkel „offene Ohren“. Zur Reise
von Frank-Walter Steinmeier nach Damaskus gibt Merkel dem
Eindruck Nahrung, dass es sich um einen Alleingang gehandelt
habe: Der deutsche Außenminister habe den Versuch
unternommen, neue politische Chancen auszuloten, doch seien von
der syrischen Regierung „keinerlei positive Signale“ ausgegangen.
Das Oberste Gericht Israels entscheidet, dass in bestimmten Fällen
Entschädigungen an Palästinenser gezahlt werden müssen, die bei
„nicht-militärischen Zusammenstößen“ mit Israel verletzt worden
sind. Die Entscheidung schließt Kompensationen für Angehörige von
„Feindstaaten“ und von „aktiven Angehörigen von
Terrororganisationen“ aus. Das „Palestinian Centre for Human
Rights (PCHR)“ kritisiert am 14. Dezember die Ausnahmeregelungen
des Urteils und ruft in Erinnerung, dass trotz einer gegenteiligen
Entscheidung des Obersten Gerichts aus dem Jahr 1999 die Folter
palästinensischer Gefangener nicht eingestellt worden sei20. Aus
dem rechten Lager in Israel wird der Vorwurf erhoben, dass das
Urteil das Militär bei der Abwehr von Gefahren behindere.
In einem zweiten Urteil verkündet das Oberste Gericht, dass
„gezielte Tötungen“ von Palästinensern in bestimmten Fällen
zulässig seien und nicht durchgängig internationales Recht
verletzten. Der israelisch-palästinensische Konflikt trage die
Charakteristika eines bewaffneten internationalen Konflikts, so dass
Israel beim Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus gemäß
dem internationalen Recht handeln müsse. Jede dieser Operationen
müsse jedoch einzelnen bewertet werden. „Die Ziele rechtfertigen
nicht die Mittel.“ Terroristen seien, rechtlich gesehen, keine
Kombattanten und müssten deshalb als Zivilisten betrachtet werden,
die nicht denselben Schutz wie unschuldige Zivilisten gemäß dem
internationalen Recht in Anspruch nehmen könnten21. Nach
Angaben der israelischen Menschenrechtsorganisation „B’tselem (Im
Angesicht, Gen. 1,27)“ sind seit dem Ausbruch der zweiten „Intifada“
im Herbst 2000 von der israelischen Armee 339 Palästinenser
getötet worden, davon seien 119 unschuldig gewesen. Am 17.
Dezember bezeichnet Gideon Levy in „Haaretz“ Aharon Barak, der
das Urteil in seiner letzten Amtshandlung als Präsident des Gerichts
gemeinsam mit zwei weiteren Kollegen fällte, trotz seiner
„eindrucksvollen Formulierungen und hehren Worte“ als „einen
aufgeklärten Besatzer“22.
In einem Exklusivinterview mit „Agence France Presse” betont USAußenministerin Condoleezza Rice gegenüber der syrischen
Regierung, dass die Souveränität Libanons nicht verhandelbar sei23.
Die FDP-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag legt einen Antrag vor, in
dem sie sich für eine Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit
im Nahen Osten (KSZNO) ausspricht und in diesem Zusammenhang
die Bundesregierung auffordert, „die deutsche EURatspräsidentschaft dafür zu nutzen, die europäischen Partner für
eine solche Initiative zu gewinnen und diese auf dem EUFrühjahrsgipfel zu beschließen“, „sich während der deutschen EURatspräsidentschaft als Vertreter der EU innerhalb des NahostQuartetts dafür einzusetzen, die Road Map in eine regionale
Friedensinitiative nach dem Vorbild der KSZE/OSZE einzubinden,
und gemeinsam mit den Partnern des Nahost-Quartetts eine
entsprechende Empfehlung des VN-Sicherheitsrates zu erwirken“
und „bi- und multilateral bei allen beteiligten Staaten in der Region in
direkten Gesprächen für einen regionalen Friedensansatz nach dem
Vorbild der KSZE/OSZE zu werben“.
11.12.2006:
Im Vorfeld seines Besuchs am 12. Dezember in Berlin gewährt Ehud
Olmert dem „Spiegel“ ein Interview, in dem er sich unbeeindruckt von
der unverkennbaren internationalen Isolierung seines Landes zeigt
und auf die militärische Stärke Israels setzt24.
In Teheran eröffnete der iranische Außenminister Manutjer Mottaki
auf Veranlassung von Präsident Machmud Achmadinedjad eine
internationale Konferenz, die den „Mythos des Holocaust“ auf
wissenschaftlicher Basis untersuchen soll. Beobachter vertreten die
Auffassung, dass Achmadinedjad mit dem Beharren auf der
Konferenz, an der acht ultraorthodoxe Rabbiner teilnehmen, von
innen- und außenpolitischen Problemen ablenken wolle. Deshalb
habe er möglicherweise auf eine Grußbotschaft verzichtet. Die
„Süddeutsche Zeitung“ veröffentlicht am 12. Dezember einen
Offenen Brief von Machmud al-Safadi an Achmadinedjad, in dem er
sich gegen eine solche Unterstützung für die Palästinenser verwahrt.
Safadi, der 27 Jahre lang in einem israelischen Gefängnis gesessen
hat, schreibt: „Wir kämpfen um unsere Existenz und unsere Recht
und gegen die historische Ungerechtigkeit, die uns 1948 zugefügt
wurde. Unser Erfolg wird nicht dadurch verwirklicht, dass wir den
Völkermord leugnen, der am jüdischen Volk verübt wurde, auch
wenn sich Teile dieses Volkes aus eben jenen Kräften rekrutieren,
die uns bis auf den heutigen Tag besetzt und enteignet halten25.“
Ibrahim Ramey, Direktor der „Human and Civil Rights Division of the
Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation“, verwahrt sich in
einer Erklärung gegen die Leugnung des Holocaust und ihre
revisionistischen Protagonisten26.
Syrien und Irak eröffnen ihre Botschaften in Bagdad und Damaskus.
Beide Regierungen hatten am 21. Oktober ihre diplomatischen
Beziehungen wieder aufgenommen.
In Amman beginnt unter Beteiligung Jordaniens, Israels und der
Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde eine Konferenz der Weltbank,
um Baupläne für einen 180 Kilometer langen Kanal – davon 134
Kilometer unterirdisch – zwischen dem Golf von Aqaba / Eilat und
dem Toten Meer zu prüfen. Das Projekt, das einen
Höhenunterschied von sechshundert Metern überwinden würde, soll
27
zwischen drei und vier Milliarden US-Dollar kosten .
10.12.2006:
„Haaretz“ berichtet, dass zwei enge Berater von Ehud Olmert den
palästinensischen Präsidenten Machmud Abbas in Ramallah
betroffen haben. Nach palästinensischen Angaben sei das Treffen,
in dessen Verlauf Olmert und Abbas miteinander telefoniert hätten,
„sehr positiv“ ausgegangen.
Auf einer jährlichen „Israel Business Conference“ in Tel Aviv
wiederholt Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz seine grundsätzliche
Unterstützung für die saudische Friedensinitiative der Arabischen
Liga vom März 2002. In derselben Richtung lässt sich der frühere
Chef des israelischen Inlandsgeheimdienstes Ami Ayalon in
Washington, D.C., aus28.
Das Exekutivkomitee der PLO fordert Präsident Machmud Abbas
auf, Neuwahlen auszuschreiben, um die politischen Spannungen
nach dem Scheitern, eine Regierung der nationalen Einheit zu
bilden, zu überwinden. Juristen befürchten eine Verfassungskrise, da
29
dem Präsidenten dieses Recht nicht stehe .
Die Arabische Liga versucht mit einer Initiative, beruhigend auf die
politische und verfassungsrechtliche Krise in Libanon einzuwirken.
Nach ihrem Treffen mit Ägyptens Präsidenten Hosni Mubarak
kündigt Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel im ersten Halbjahr 2007,
wenn die Bundesrepublik die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft innehat, eine
Initiative zur Wiederbelebung des nahöstlichen Friedensprozesses in
Zusammenarbeit mit Ägypten, Jordanien und Saudi-Arabien an.
09.12.2006:
Abgeordnete der Arbeitspartei mit dem stellvertretenden
Verteidigungsminister Ephraim Sneh und der früheren israelischen
Generalkonsulin in New York Colette Avital sowie von
„Meretz/Yachad” unter Führung von Yossi Beilin vereinbaren mit
einer palästinensischen Delegation unter Leitung von Yasser Abed
Rabbo und Qadura Faris bei einem Treffen im Jerusalemer
Ambassador-Hotel, ihre Regierungen zu politischen Verhandlungen
30
aufzufordern . Avital, Beilin, Abed Rabbo und Faris gehörten zum
Leitungsteam der „Genfer Initiative“.
08.12.2006:
Der palästinensische Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh, der sich auf
einer Rundreise durch Länder des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens
befindet, erklärt vor Studenten in Teheran, dass „Hamas“ niemals
„die zionistische Okkupationsregierung anerkennen“ und den
heiligen Kampf zur Befreiung Jerusalems fortsetzen werde. Die
iranische Regierung will den Palästinensern im kommenden Jahr
250 Millionen US-Dollar zur Verfügung stellen.
06.12.2006:
Die „Iraq Study Group” unter Vorsitz von James A. Baker III und Lee
H. Hamilton präsentiert in Washington, D.C., ihren Bericht unter dem
Titel „The Way Forward: A New Approach“ mit 79 Empfehlungen
zum weiteren politischen und militärischen Vorgehen im Irak31. Darin
schlägt sie den fast vollständigen Abzug aller US-amerikanischen
Kampftruppen bis zum Frühjahr 2008 vor und empfiehlt die
Einbeziehung Syriens und Irans in den Prozess der Suche nach
Frieden. Zum israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt mahnt die
Kommission ein stärkeres politisches Engagement der
32
Administration an . Während Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert die
Verbindung zwischen dem Krieg im Irak und dem israelischpalästinensischen Konflikt zurückweist, verlangt die israelische
Bewegung „Frieden jetzt“ von der Regierung, den Kopf nicht länger
in den Sand zu stecken. Der palästinensische Chefunterhändler
Saeb Erakat begrüßt die Empfehlungen. Syrische Kommentatoren
bezeichnen den Bericht als wichtigen Schritt, weil er die Nachbarn
Iraks in eine Friedensordnung einbeziehen wolle. Die Regierung in
Teheran kritisiert das US-amerikanische Junktim zwischen dem
iranischen Nuklearprogramm und der Aufforderung, Teheran solle
eine aktive Rolle bei der Überwindung des Konflikts im Irak
übernehmen.
05.12.2006:
Die israelische Erziehungsministerin Yuli Tamir (Arbeitspartei), die
zum Leitungskreis der „Genfer Initiative” gehört, schlägt die
Auszeichnung der „Grünen Linie” in den Lehrbüchern vor33. Ihr
schlagen heftige Proteste entgegen. Der „Rat der Siedlungen in
Samaria, Judäa und Gaza“ fordert die Schulen zum Boykott der
neuen Lehrbücher auf. In ihrer Untersuchung von sechs
Schulbüchern hat die Sprach- und Erziehungswissenschaftlerin Nurit
Peled Elhanan 2004 festgestellt, dass nicht nur die „Grüne Linie“,
sondern auch in Israel liegende arabische Orte auf Karten nicht
ausgewiesen sind. Der liberalkonservative Kommentator Uzi
Benziman wundert sicht am 10. Dezember in „Haaretz“, warum die
Gegner den Rückzug aus dem Gazastreifen hinter die Grüne Linie
unterstützten und heute erklären, dass diese tot sei34.
Der von US-Präsident George W. Bush für die Nachfolge von
Verteidigungsminister Donald Rumsfeld nominierte frühere CIADirektor Robert Gates erklärt vor dem Senat, dass der Krieg in Irak
für die USA nicht zu gewinnen sei, auch wenn er nicht verloren
gehen könne. Deshalb wolle er im Falle seiner Bestätigung alle
Optionen prüfen. Weder bei Iran noch bei Israel sei er sicher, dass
sie auf den Einsatz von Kernwaffen gegeneinander verzichten
würden. Die iranische Aussage, die Kernenergie lediglich für zivile
Zwecke nutzen zu wollen, bezeichnet Gates als Lüge, doch sei eine
US-Militäraktion gegen Iran das absolut letzte Mittel. Wie Amerika im
Irak gesehen habe, sei der Ausgang eines Krieges unvorhersehbar.
Gates spricht sich auch gegen jeglichen Angriff auf Syrien aus. Er
wird vom Senatsausschuss mit 95 gegen zwei Stimmen nominiert.
Während der Begegnung mit Bush im Weißen Haus am gleichen
Tag warnt Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, der Führer der größten schiitischen
Partei Iraks, des „Obersten Rates für die schiitische Revolution im
Irak (Sciri)“, die USA vor einem übereilten Abzug seiner Truppen aus
dem Land.
04.12.2006:
Bei seinem Besuch in Damaskus mahnt Bundesaußenminister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier dringlich einen mäßigenden Einfluss
Syriens in Libanon an. Dass die UN-Resolution 1701 eingehalten
werde, in der die Respektierung der Souveränität Libanons gefordert
wird, sei so entscheidend, dass Deutschland daran „alle Staaten
messen“ werde. Der syrische Außenminister Walid Moalem betont
nach der Unterredung mit Steinmeier, dass sich Syrien nicht in
libanesische Angelegenheiten einmische. Gleichzeitig sagt er
„prinzipiell“ Verhandlungen über die Aufnahme diplomatischer
Beziehungen zu Libanon zu, wenn die Zeit dafür reif sei. Als Priorität
seiner Regierung bezeichnet Moalem die Rückgabe der israelisch
besetzten Golanhöhen. In den ARD-Tagesthemen bezeichnet
Steinmeier die Demonstrationen um das Parlamentsgebäude in
Beirut als „Belagerungszustand“. Es liege an Damaskus, das Land
„aus dem gegenwärtigen Stand der Selbstfesselung, der Isolation,
(zu) befreien“. Wenn dies nicht geschehe, sehe er nicht, „wie
Kooperation mit anderen, mit westlichen Staaten, ermöglicht werden“
solle35.
Der US-amerikanische UN-Botschafter John Bolton kündigt an, dass
er sich nach dem Ausgang der Zwischenwahlen zum Kongress im
November nicht um eine Verlängerung seines Mandats bemühen
werde. Der Republikaner Bolton, dem enge Beziehungen zu
Präsident George W. Bush nachgesagt werden, ist ein harter Kritiker
der Vereinten Nationen. Die Verlängerung seiner Berufung, die Bush
im Sommer 2005 am Kongress vorbei durchgesetzt hatte, wäre
angesichts der veränderten Mehrheitsverhältnisse zweifelhaft.
01.12.2006:
Das „Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel (Mossawa)“ mit Sitz
in Haifa legt ein 10-Punkte-Papier vor, in dem es das Recht
arabischer Staatsbürger einklagt, in ihre Dörfer zurückzukehren, die
diese „internal refugees“ im Krieg von 1948 verlassen mussten. Sie
würden ein Viertel aller arabischen Staatsbürger Israels ausmachen.
Außerdem verlangt „Mossawa“ eine Änderung der israelischen
Flagge und der israelischen Staatshymne, die den arabischen
36
Staatsbürgern keine Chance der Identifikation bieten würden . Der
liberalkonservative Kommentator Uzi Benziman von „Haaretz“ wägt
in einem Kommentar am 6. Dezember Ursachen und Folgen der
Initiative ab37. Der Wirtschaftsredakteur der Zeitung Avraham Tal
38
erkennt in dem Bericht eine Kriegserklärung . Am 5. Dezember legt
das „Higher Arab Monitoring Committee“ als Repräsentantin aller
politischen Formationen der arabischen Bevölkerung Israels ein acht
Kapitel umfassendes Schriftstück unter dem Titel „Die Zukunftsvision
der palästinensischen Araber in Israel“ mit der Forderung vor, dass
die arabische Bevölkerung als nationale Minorität mit dem Anspruch
auf Einbeziehung in Israels internationale Foren anerkannt werde.
Israel sei die gemeinsame Heimat zweier Völker, mithin ein
binationaler Staat, an der Seite des künftigen Staates Palästina.
Gegenwärtig sei Israel keine Demokratie, sondern ein
ethnokratischer Staat. Der Jerusalemer Soziologe Meron Benvenisti
bezeichnet in einem „Haaretz“-Gastbeitrag am 17. Dezember den
Staat Israel als „eine binationale Realität“, welche die jüdische
Hegemonie über den gesamten öffentlichen Raum konterkariere.
Wenn einmal der Teufel aus der Flasche gelassen werde, gebe es
keine Umkehr. Eine Konsens-Demokratie, die eine neue Balance
kollektiver Rechte schaffe, sei nur eine Frage der Zeit39.
Nach einem Bericht der palästinensischen Zeitung „al-Quds (Die
Heilige = Jerusalem)“ bezeichnet Präsident Machmud Abbas in
Anwesenheit von US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice in Jericho
die Gespräche zwischen ihm und „Hamas“ als gescheitert. Es müsse
nunmehr alles vermieden werden, was auf einen Bürgerkrieg
hinauslaufe, sagt Abbas auf der gemeinsamen Pressekonferenz.
Der Sprecher von „Hamas“, Ismail Radwan, fordert Abbas zur
Fortsetzung des Dialogs auf. „Hamas“ zeige ein Höchstmaß an
Flexibilität, damit eine Regierung der nationalen Einheit zustande
komme.
In Beirut demonstrieren nach Polizeiangaben 800.000 Menschen
unter Führung der „Hisbollah“ und der pro-syrischen christlichen
Splitterpartei von Michael Aoun gegen die Regierung von Fuad
Siniora und fordern ihren Rücktritt. Sie werfen Siniora vor, eine USamerikanische und israelische Marionette zu sein. Am 3. Dezember
kommt ein Schiit bei Zusammenstößen mit dem Militär ums Leben.
Die Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen verabschiedet mit
157 Stimmen eine Resolution, in der Israel zum Rückzug aus der
Westbank und aus Ost-Jerusalem aufgefordert wird. Gegen die
Resolution stimmen Israel, die USA, Australien, die Marshall-Inseln,
Mikronesien, Nauru und Palau. Eine zweite Resolution verlangt den
Rückzug Israels von den Golanhöhen; ihr stimmen 107 Staaten bei
sechzig Enthaltungen zu. In einer dritten Resolution wird Israels
Rückzug aus dem Gazastreifen begrüßt, und beide Seiten werden
aufgefordert, den vor kurzem vereinbarten Waffenstillstand
einzuhalten.
Am Vorabend seines Besuchs in Beirut verteidigt
Bundesaußenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in einem Beitrag, der
in mehreren libanesischen Zeitungen erscheint, die Entsendung
deutscher Soldaten in den Libanon, um „dem Töten ein Ende zu
setzen. Uns war klar: Ohne die UNIFIL und ohne die Resolution
1701 wäre der Krieg weitergegangen“. Steinmeier begründet die
humanitäre Hilfe in Höhe von achtzig Millionen Euro mit dem Ziel, die
Wasserversorgung instand zu setzen, Berufsbildungsschulen
aufzubauen, Beratungsleistungen in libanesischen Behörden bei
Polizei und Zoll zu leisten40.
November 2006
30.11.2006:
Nach einem Bericht der ägyptischen offiziösen Zeitung „al-Ahram
(Die Pyramiden“) hält der Leiter der Politischen Abteilung von
„Hamas“ in Damaskus, Khaled Meshal, nach seinen Gesprächen in
Kairo ein Tauwetter in der israelisch-ägyptischen Beziehungen für
möglich. Ägyptens Sicherheitschef Omar Suleiman sei am 28.
November nach Jerusalem gereist, um einen Gefangenenaustausch
vorzubereiten. Meshal habe darauf hingewiesen, dass sich das USamerikanische Zeitalter im Nahen und Mittleren Osten dem Ende
zuneige und Israel in einer tiefen Krise stecke.
29.11.2006:
Israel lässt den am 3. November festgesetzten palästinensischen
Minister für Öffentliche Arbeiten und Wohnungsbau, Abdel-Rachman
Zidan, frei.
Der UN-Menschenrechtsrat hat den früheren südafrikanischen
Erzbischof Desmond Tutu zum, Vorsitzenden einer Kommission
ernannt, die die Umstände des Todes von 19 Palästinensern in Beit
Hanoun am 11. November untersuchen soll.
Die „Zionist Organization of America“, der US-amerikanische
Rechtsprofessor und Autor Alan Dershowitz und der NahostHistoriker Kenneth W. Stein, der viele Jahre mit Carter
zusammengearbeitet hat, kritisieren Jimmy Carter für sein Buch
„Peace Not Apartheid“, indem er seine Erfahrungen mit den Parteien
des israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts niedergelegt hat. In einem
Interview mit der „Chicago Tribune“ verweist er auf seine Hilfe bei
41
der Entstehung der „Genfer Initiative“ . In einem Feature verweist
der Historiker und Publizist Tom Segev am 14. Dezember in
„Haaretz“ darauf, dass Carter von Israel nicht mehr verlange, als die
Mehrheit der Juden in den USA und mindestens die Hälfte der
Israelis: einen Rückzug aus den palästinensischen Gebieten als
Gegenleistung für Frieden. In einem Interview der liberalen USamerikanisch-jüdischen Monatszeitschrift „Tikkun“ (Januar/Februar
2007) erklärt Carter den provokativen Titel seines Buches: Mit
„Apartheid“ sei nicht Rassismus wie in Südafrika gemeint, sondern
der Wunsch einer Minorität von Israelis, palästinensisches Land zu
42
besetzen, zu enteignen und zu kolonisieren .
Der ägyptische Sicherheitsgerichtshof verurteilt drei Islamisten zum
Tode, die bei einem Bombenanschlag im Badeort Taba im Oktober
2004 34 Menschen, darunter elf Israelis, getötet hatten.
28.11.2006:
Im Interview mit der „Frankfurter Rundschau“ drückt
Bundesaußenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier die Hoffnung auf,
dass der israelisch-palästinensische Waffenstillstand halten und den
Weg zu Direktgesprächen ebnen werde. Den spanisch-französischitalienischen Vorschlag einer internationalen Friedenskonferenz
beurteilt Steinmeier skeptisch und verweist stattdessen auf die
„Road Map“ des Quartetts vom Frühjahr 2003. Auch wenn die Politik
Syriens im Zusammenhang mit der UN-Resolution 1701
inakzeptabel gewesen sei, könne der Frieden im Nahen Osten nur
mit und nicht gegen Syrien errungen werden. Auch ohne die USA
werde sich nichts Entscheidendes bewegen43.
Seit seinem Amtsantritt im Frühjahr tritt der von Gaza-Stadt aus
arbeitende palästinensische Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh seine
erste Auslandsreise an. Sie führt ihn in sechs arabische Staaten und
nach Teheran. Wie es heißt, will er damit den Weg zu einer
Regierung der nationalen Einheit erleichtern, ohne vorher formell
zurückzutreten. Andere Vermutungen laufen auf einen politischen
Stillstand während seiner einmonatigen Abwesenheit hinaus.
Die Außenminister der 8. Euro-Mediterranen Konferenz in Tampere
(Finnland) bekräftigen ihre Verpflichtung für einen gerechten,
umfassenden und dauerhaften Frieden zwischen Israel und den
Palästinensern.
Eine bisher unbekannte und als unabhängig auftretende Homepage
„Israel Justice“ verwahrt sich in ihrem „Mission Statement“ im Namen
von Demokratie und Menschenrechten gegen die Festnahme und
Verurteilung von friedlichen Demonstranten, die gegen die
israelische Politik eines Rückzugs aus der Westbank und aus Gaza
protestieren44.
27.11.2006:
Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert begründet bei einer Rede in David
Ben-Gurions Altersruhesitz Sde Boqer seinen Kurswechsel
gegenüber dem Gazastreifen, sagt in Verhandlungen mit Präsident
Machmud Abbas einen unabhängigen, lebensfähigen und in der
Westbank territorial zusammenhängenden palästinensischen Staat
mit voller Souveränität und definierten Grenzen zu und bietet im
Gegenzug zur Freilassung des israelischen Gefreiten Gilad Shalit,
der am 25. Juni im Gazastreifen entführt wurde, die Freigabe von
45
„vielen Palästinensern“ an, die in Israel festgehalten werden . Damit
gibt Olmert seinen Plan einseitiger Maßnahmen auf. Der saudischen
Friedensinitiative der Arabischen Liga vom 27. März 2002 gewinnt er
„positive Züge“ ab. Der palästinensische Chefunterhändler Saeb
Erakat begrüßt die israelische Bereitschaft, fordert aber
Verhandlungen über alle ungelösten Probleme, so auch das
Rückkehrrecht der palästinensischen Flüchtlinge, dessen
Realisierung Olmert ablehnt. Auch Präsident Machmud Abbas
äußert sich am 30. November zur Rede Olmerts gegenüber USAußenministerin Condoleezza Rice positiv46. Der „Haaretz“Kommentator würdigt am 28. November Olmerts Ansprache, weil
dieser den Verzicht auf das Gros der Siedlungen, die Evakuierung
der Mehrheit ihrer Siedler und die Schaffung eines unabhängigen
palästinensischen Staates als die Voraussetzung für die Existenz
des Staates Israel auf Dauer genannt habe47.
In dem Internet-Portal „bitterlemons“ sieht Gershon Baskin, neben
Hanna Siniora Vorsitzender des „Israel/Palestine Center for
Research and Information (IPCRI)“, sich verändernde Haltungen in
der israelischen und palästinensischen Öffentlichkeit. Beide
Gesellschaften lernten den Preis des Friedens, den sie zu bezahlen
bereit seien. „Unsere Führer haben uns in die Irre geführt“, schreibt
Baskin, „und waren nur mit ihrem eigenen Überleben beschäftigt“.
Da beide Regierungen unfähig seien, sei die Stunde der Völker
gekommen, einen neuen Friedensprozess zu entwerfen und
anzuführen. Es sei nun Aufgabe, in beiden Gesellschaften den
Kampf mit den Extremisten und Radikalen aufzunehmen. „Wenn wir
nicht handeln, sind wir für die Fortsetzung des Niedergangs
verantwortlich.“ Eine neue Verbindung aus über hundert israelischen
und palästinensischen Organisationen der Zivilgesellschaft unter
dem Namen „The Israeli-Palestinian Peace NGO Forum“ würden
jenseits aller Unterschiede jetzt zusammenarbeiten, um die Ziele des
Friedens zu erreichen48.
In Ramallah erscheint die erste unabhängige palästinensische
Zeitung „Palestine Times“ im Umfang von zwölf Seiten. Sie ist in der
Westbank und im Gazastreifen käuflich zu erwerben.
Der Menschenrechtsrat der Vereinten Nationen fordert Israel auf, die
Erweiterung der Siedlungen in der Westbank einzustellen und sie
aufzulösen. Für die Erklärung stimmen außer den arabischen und
moslemischen Mitgliedern die EU-Staaten und die Staaten
Lateinamerikas. Der Vertreter Kanadas stimmt dagegen, Kamerun
enthält sich. Zuvor bezeichnet die Organisation die Annexion der
Golanhöhen als illegal.
Der iranische Präsident Machmud Achmadinedjad sagt seinen
irakischen Amtskollegen Djalal Talabani in Teheran die
Unterstützung bei der Stabilisierung des Landes zu. Ein stabiler und
starker Irak liege im Interesse der gesamten Region49.
26.11.2006:
Die israelische Regierung und die Palästinensische
Autonomiebehörde vereinbaren für den Gazastreifen eine
Waffenruhe. Präsident Machmud Abbas verlangt von den
Sicherheitsdiensten, dass sie gegen militante Palästinenser
einschreiten, findet aber bei „Hamas“ entgegen der Anordnung von
Ministerpräsident Ismael Haniyeh und beim „Islamischen Djihad“
kein Gehör, die weiter „Qassam“-Raketen auf israelische Ziele
abfeuern. Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert sagt „Ruhe und
Zurückhaltung“ gegenüber Verletzungen der Waffenruhe zu. Am 28.
November erheben das israelische Verteidigungsministerium und
Angehörige des Generalstabs Einwände gegen die Ausdehnung der
Waffenruhe auf die Westbank. Condoleezza Rice bittet die
israelische Regierung bei ihrem Besuch in Jerusalem am 30.
Dezember um eben diese Ausdehnung, nachdem die „Iraq Study
Group“ unter Leitung von James A. Baker III and Lee Hamilton nach
einem Bericht der „New York Sun“ am 29. November der
Administration in Washington laut einem vertraulichen Memorandum
vorschlagen soll, den Druck auf Israel zu erhöhen, um Syrien und
Irak für eine politische Stabilisierung im Irak zu gewinnen.
In einem ABC-Interview äußert der jordanische König Abdullah II. die
Sorge, dass über die israelisch-palästinensische Zweistaatenlösung
nichts mehr zu verhandeln gebe, wenn in den kommenden Monaten
bis Mitte 2007 der Friedensprozess nicht neu angestoßen werde. Die
emotionale Wirkung des Konflikts setzt sich in Form von
Unsicherheit und Frustration im gesamten Mittleren Osten und in der
arabischen Welt fort. „Palästina ist das Herz. Es ist mit dem
verbunden, was im Irak vor sich geht. Es ist mit dem verbunden, was
in Libanon vor sich geht. Es ist mit Dingen verbunden, in denen wir
uns mit den Syrern befinden50.“
24.11.2006:
US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice sagt eine für kommende
Woche geplante dreitägige israelisch-palästinensische Konferenz ab,
die auf Einladung von König Abdullah II. in Amman stattfinden sollte.
Als Grund gibt Rice, die an ihren Reiseplänen nichts ändert, die
ausbleibende innerpalästinensische Verständigung über eine neue
Regierung an. Außerdem sollen beide Seiten Vorbedingungen
gestellt haben, die das Treffen gefährden und die Administration in
Washington beschädigen würden. US-Präsident George W. Bush
hatte vor einigen Tagen angekündigt, dass er ebenfalls in die
jordanische Hauptstadt reisen werde.
Nach Medienberichten will die US-amerikanische Beratungsfirma
„Ernst & Young“ für Israel eine politische Image-Kampagne
organisieren, nachdem internationale Meinungsumfragen
herausgefunden hätten, dass Israel weltweit das Land mit dem
schlechtesten Ansehen sei.
23.11.2006:
Israelische Zeitungen melden, dass die französische Regierung
ihren in Libanon stationierten UNIFIL-Einheiten die Erlaubnis
gegeben hat, im Falle ihrer Bedrohung israelische Kampfflugzeuge
zu beschießen. Nach Angaben aus Jerusalem will die israelische
Regierung die Praxis der Aufklärungsflüge überprüfen.
22.11.2006:
Auf einer Pressekonferenz in Jerusalem stellt der Vorsitzende von
„Meretz/Yachad“, Yossi Beilin, einen dreistufigen Plan mit
verschiedenen Optionen für die Endstufe des israelischpalästinensischen Konflikts vor, die zwei Jahre nach dem
endgültigen Rückzug Israels aus der Westbank erreicht werden
solle51. Die „Jewish Telegraphic Agency“ veröffentlicht am 16. Januar
2007 einen Bericht ihres Israel-Korrespondenten Leslie Susser,
wonach Beilins Dreistufenplan von führenden israelischen und
palästinensischen Politikern als „Brückenformel“ zwischen der
gescheiterten „Road Map“ und neuen Verhandlungen enthusiastisch
aufgenommen worden sei. Außenminister Tsipi Livni habe ihre
politischen Vorstellungen noch nicht preisgegeben, doch neige sie
dem Beilin-Modell zu, schreibt Susser.
In einem Interview mit der „Jerusalem Post“ bezeichnet der frühere
Generalmajor Uzi Dayan nach einer langen beruflichen Karriere im
Militär und in der Politik die Korruption in Israel als den „Öffentlichen
Feind Nummer Eins“, bestehend vor allem aus Vergünstigungen,
Nepotismus und sexueller Nötigung von abhängigen Frauen. Jeder
politische und gesellschaftliche Lebensbereich werde von der
militärischen Agenda durchdrungen.
21.11.2006:
Die Verhandlungen zwischen „Hamas“ und „Fatah“ zur Bildung einer
palästinensischen Regierung der nationalen Einheit brechen
aufgrund unüberbrückbarer Gegensätze zusammen. Das Scheitern
wurde bereits einen Tag zuvor von der Presseabteilung der
Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde prophezeit52. Am 25.
November verbreitet die palästinensische Nachrichtenagentur eine
Liste mit bekannten Kabinettskandidaten53.
Der 34jährige libanesische Industrieminister Pierre Gemayel, Sohn
des früheren Staatspräsidenten Amin Gemayel (1982 – 1988), wird
in seinem Auto in Beirut erschossen. Viele Vermutungen, so von
Ministerpräsident Fuad Siniora und dem Drusen-Führer Walid
Djumblat, halten Syrien für verantwortlich. Die Gemayel gehören
neben den Frandjieh, Karame, Chamoun, Hariri und Djumblat zu den
einflussreichsten Großfamilien im Land. Zur Trauerfeier in der
maronitischen St.- George-Kathedrale am 23. November, an der der
französische Außenminister Phillippe Douste-Blazy, der
Generalsekretär der Arabischen Liga Amr Moussa, der libanesische
Parlamentspräsident Nabich Berri und Djumblat teilnehmen, strömen
200.000 Libanesen in die Beiruter Innenstadt. Die
Wirtschaftsverbände rufen für den 23. und 24. November zu einem
Generalstreik auf, bei dem alle Branchen ihre Betriebe schließen
sollen.
Syrien und Irak beschließen die Wiederaufnahme ihrer
diplomatischen Beziehungen auf Botschafterebene.
20.11.2006:
Nach einem Telefonat zwischen Präsident Machmud Abbas und
Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz am 19. November über eine
Waffenruhe im Gazastreifen untersagt Ministerpräsident Ehud
Olmert diesem weitere Gespräche. Im Gegenzug werden Gerüchte
gestreut, wonach Olmert selbst ein Treffen mit Abbas vorbereite.
Der israelische Generalstabschef Dan Halutz zeigt sich verärgert
über den Einsatz von 400.000 Streubomben während des LibanonKrieges54. Er habe ihre Verwendung ausdrücklich verboten. Nach
Medienberichten sollen seit dem Ende des Krieges am 14. August
22 Libanesen durch Explosionen ihr Leben verloren haben.
„Peace Now“ unter Leitung von Dror Etkes und Chagit Ofran, die
Enkelin des Neurobiologien und Talmudgelehrten Yeshayahu
Leibowitz, legen auf einer Pressekonferenz in Jerusalem den Bericht
„Breaking the Law – One Violation Leads to Another“ vor und
betonten anhand amtlicher Daten und Landkarten, dass 39 Prozent
der Böden in den Siedlungen der Westbank palästinensischen
Eigentümern und nicht der jordanischen Krone („Staatsland“)
gehörten55. Die Regierung widerspricht den Ergebnissen des
Berichts nicht ausdrücklich. Auf der Grundlage von Rechtsgutachten
vertritt sie wie ihre Vorgängerinnen die Auffassung, dass die
Westbank völkerrechtlich Niemandsland sei und der Anspruch
Israels am besten begründet werden könne56.
Der israelische Publizist Leslie Susser lässt die verschiedenen
internationalen Friedensinitiativen Revue passieren und prüft ihre
Zukunftsfähigkeit57. Am 22. November bemerkt der frühere
Außenminister Shlomo Ben-Ami dazu, dass die israelische
Unterscheidung zwischen „moderaten“ und „extremistischen“
Palästinensern nicht weiterhelfe, weil „Hamas“ indirekt immer mit am
Verhandlungstisch sitze. Außerdem kritisiert Ben-Ami die übereilte
israelische Ablehnung des gemeinsamen Friedensplans von
Spanien, Frankreich und Italien vom 15. November, auch wenn an
ihm weitergearbeitet werden müsse. Nur in der Zusammenarbeit mit
den USA gebe es eine Chance für einen gewichtigen diplomatischen
Durchbruch. Die USA würden vor einer erheblichen
Richtungsänderung ihrer Politik in der Region stehen. Eine
internationale Friedenskonferenz sei zwar wünschenswert, doch
werde sie nur mit einer gemeinsamen Plattform erfolgreich sein: Sie
müsse auf den „Clinton-Parametern“58 vom Dezember 2000 und auf
den saudischen Friedensplan der Arabischen Liga vom März 2002
59
beruhen . Akiva Eldar berichtet in „Haaretz“ am 1. Dezember, dass
die Europäer zugesagt hätten, die Dreier-Initiative nicht ohne die
USA in Gang setzen würden, womit sie tot sei.
Der ägyptische Präsident Hosni Mubarak erklärt vor der
gemeinsamen Sitzung des Parlaments und der Ratsversammlung,
dass Ägypten von niemand „eine Erlaubnis für die Entwicklung der
friedlichen Nuklearenergie“ brauche. Kritiker halten Mubarak vor,
dass er bei derselben Gelegenheit eine nochmalige Kandidatur für
das Amt des Präsidenten im Jahr 2011 angedeutet habe; Mubarak
wäre dann 83 Jahre alt.
19.11.2006:
In Antalya (Türkei) beginnt eine viertägige Konferenz des in
Jerusalem ansässigen „Israel/Palestine Center for Research and
Information (IPCRI)“ mit rund 270 teilnehmenden Palästinensern,
Israelis und internationalen Referenten aus den Bereichen
Pädagogik, Medien und Wissenschaft. In den 150 Workshops,
Vorträgen und Präsentationen steht der Appell im Mittelpunkt, eine
internationale Gemeinschaft der Friedenserzieher zu schaffen.
Einige hundert Palästinenser schützen im Norden des Gazastreifens
ein Haus, das von der israelischen Luftwaffe zerstört werden soll,
weil es von einem Terroristen bewohnt worden sei. Das Militär sagt
daraufhin den Angriff ab, um das Leben von Zivilisten zu schonen,
wirft der Autonomiebehörde jedoch vor, diese als Schutzschilde zu
missbrauchen. Nach palästinensischen Angaben soll diese Art des
Widerstandes zum Modell erhoben werden. Am 20. November
werden erneut sechs Palästinenser bei israelischen Angriffen im
Gazastreifen getötet. Zuvor war ein israelischer Soldat ums Leben
gekommen.
Die Londoner „Times“ berichtet, dass Syrien als Gegenleistung, den
USA aus der Bedrängnis in Irak zu helfen, die Unterstützung bei der
Wiedergewinnung der israelisch besetzten Golanhöhen erwarte.
17.11.2006:
Nach einer Meldung der Nachrichtenagentur „Reuters“ hat die
syrische Regierung „Hamas“ aufgefordert, ihre Macht mit Präsident
Machmud Abbas zu teilen. Die Richtungsänderung wird auf den
Besuch von Mustafa Barghouti in Damaskus zurückgeführt.
Barghouti sitzt gemeinsam mit Hanan Ashrawi und dem früheren
Finanzminister Salem Fayyad für die Partei „Der Dritte Weg“ im
palästinensischen Parlament, dem „Palestinian Legislative Council“.
Gideon Samet berichtet in „Haaretz“ über einen neuerlichen Vorstoß
der Urheber der „Genfer Initiative“, Yossi Beilin und Yasser Abed
Rabbo, dem Friedensprozess neue Impulse durch ein 4-PunkteProgramme zu verleihen: sofortige Waffenruhe, Rückzug aus der
Westbank, Gespräche zwischen Ehud Olmert und Machmud Abbas
60
und Wiederaufnahme der Verhandlungen über den Endstatus .
Israels neuer stellvertretender Ministerpräsident Avigdor Lieberman
von der Partei „Unser Haus Israel“ verlangt von der Regierung, sie
solle von Machmud Abbas abrücken, die Führung von „Hamas“
auslöschen und die „Road Map“ des internationalen Quartetts
ignorieren61.
Die UN-Vollversammlung verabschiedet mit überwältigender
Mehrheit eine Resolution, in der der israelische Angriff auf den
palästinensischen Ort Beit Hanoun im Gazastreifen am 11.
November verurteilt und eine Untersuchungskommission gefordert
62
wird. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland schließt sich dem Votum an .
Die israelische Regierung weist die Resolution zurück und wirft ihren
Unterstützern moralische Heuchelei vor.
Ein führendes Mitglied des „American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC)“, Gidon B. Remba, berichtet in „Haaretz“ von Versuchen
dieser pro-israelischen Lobby, nach dem Wahlsieg von „Hamas“ im
Januar 2005 mit Hilfe einer Gesetzesvorlage im Kongress die
gesamte palästinensische Führung politisch auszuschalten. Diese
Bemühungen seien von der Administration in Washington
zurückgewiesen und von vier amerikanisch-jüdischen
Organisationen ablehnt worden, den „Americans for Peace Now“,
dem „Israeli Policy Forum“, der Organisation „Brit Tzedek v’Shalom
(Bund für Gerechtigkeit und Frieden)“ sowie vom „Religious Action
Center of Reform Judaism“, das mit Hilfe des Philanthropen George
Soros eine gemäßigte pro-israelische Lobby unter dem Namen
„Israel Project“ aufbauen wolle und mithin eine Konkurrenz zu AIPAC
sei. Soros selbst entscheidet sich gegen die Unterstützung. In einem
Interview mit der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung“ am 19.
November begründet er seine Ablehnung damit, dass er sich „in der
Vergangenheit nicht ausreichend für die jüdische Gemeinschaft
eingesetzt habe“, um jetzt „eine Revolte gegen AIPAC zu führen“;
eine Richtungsänderung müsse von innen kommen. Remba führt
aus, dass AIPAC in den letzten zwanzig Jahren rechtsstehende
Regierungen in Israel aus vollem Herzen und linke Regierungen eher
zögerlich unterstützt und dafür gesorgt habe, dass vielen USamerikanischen Juden und häufig mehr als der Hälfte der
israelischen Bevölkerung auf der Suche nach Frieden und Sicherheit
geschadet worden sei.
Die „Süddeutsche Zeitung“ berichtet, dass auf Veranlassung des
„UN-Department for Peacekeeping Missions“ das deutsche Außen-
und das Verteidigungsministerium am 16. November die neuen UNEinsatzregeln für die UNIFIL-Truppen in Libanon mitgeteilt haben.
Sie laufen auf das Recht auf Selbstverteidigung aus der Luft hinaus,
was faktisch der Abwehr der israelischen Kontrollflüge gelte.
Außerdem würden die Befugnisse des Kommandeurs der neunzehn
UN-Marineeinheiten, des deutschen Admirals Andreas Krause,
erweitert. Die neuen Regeln, die geheim gehalten würden, klärten
das Verhalten bei Scheinangriffen israelischer Kampfflugzeuge,
heißt es in dem Bericht. Außerdem dürfe die Marine nunmehr auch
ein verdächtiges Schiff durchsuchen und festhalten, wenn es illegale
Waffen und Rüstungsgüter transportiere. Bisher war nur die
Beschlagnahme der Ladung vorgesehen. In Berlin würden die
Regeln als „technische Präzisierungen auf operativer Ebene“
heruntergespielt, ihnen also politische Relevanz abgesprochen.
16.11.2006:
Der „Toronto Star“ berichtet, dass der palästinensische Publizist und
frühere Arbeitsminister Ghassan Khatib die Zeitung über
palästinensisch-israelische Gespräche „unterhalb des Radars“ – also
geheim – mit dem Ziel einer zehn- bis fünfzehnjährigen Waffenruhe
informiert habe.
15.11.2006:
Spanien, Frankreich und Italien legen einen Fünf-Punkte-Plan vor,
um den Nahostkonflikt zu überwinden: sofortiges Ende der Gewalt;
Bildung einer palästinensischen Regierung der nationalen Einheit;
Austausch von Gefangenen; Gespräche zwischen Ehud Olmert und
Machmud Abbas; Entsendung einer internationalen Truppe zur
Überwachung der Waffenruhe in den Gazastreifen. Der Plan soll im
Dezember dem EU-Ministerrat vorgelegt zur Beschlussfassung
werden, nachdem er bereits mit dem EU-Außenbeauftragten Javier
Solana abgestimmt worden sei. Obwohl der spanische
Außenminister Miguel Moratinos seiner israelischen Kollegin
versichert, dass der Plan nicht gegen Israel gerichtet sei, weist ihn
Tsipi Livni mit der Bemerkung zurück, er sei mit Israel nicht
koordiniert worden. Ein Regierungssprecher bezeichnet ihn als
„Privatinitiative“. Der palästinensische Chefunterhändler Saeb Erakat
betont zurückhaltend, dass das Rad nicht neue erfunden werden
müsse, sondern dass die bestehenden Abmachungen umgesetzt
werden sollten. Der britische Premier Tony Blair erklärt, dass der
Konflikt auch deshalb gelöst werden müsse, um den Extremisten in
der Region die Anlässe und Begründungen aus der Hand zu
schlagen.
Bei einem Raketenangriff aus dem nördlichen Gazastreifen wird in
der israelischen Stadt Sderot eine 57jährige Muslima, die mit einem
jüdischen Mann verheiratet ist, getötet. Sie ist das erste israelische
Todesopfer seit langem.
14.11.2006:
Nach einer Meldung der Nachrichtenagentur Reuters überlegt das
saudische Königshaus, künftig den Frauen zumindest das
Kommunalwahlrecht einzuräumen.
13.11.2006:
„Hamas“ und „Fatah“ verständigen sich darauf, den sechzigjährigen
früheren Präsidenten der Islamischen Universität in Gaza-Stadt, den
fünfzigjährigen Mikrobiologen Mohammed Shabeir, zum nächsten
Ministerpräsidenten der „Expertenregierung“ vorzuschlagen.
Vorausgegangen ist die Bereitschaft von Ismail Haniyeh zum
Rücktritt, um den internationalen Boykott gegen die
Autonomiebehörde zu beenden. Shabeir studierte in Alexandria
(Ägypten) und an der Universität West Virginia in den USA.
Zwischen 1993 und 2006 leitete er als Rektor die Islamische
Universität. Israels Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert betont im
Interview mit der palästinensischen Zeitung „al-Quds“ („Die Heilige“ =
Jerusalem), dass er mit der neuen Autonomiebehörde
zusammenarbeiten wolle, wenn diese die bekannten drei
Bedingungen erfülle: Anerkennung des Existenzrechts Israels,
Verzicht auf Gewalt und Einhaltung unterschriebener
Vereinbarungen. Palästinensische Quellen bestehen darauf, dass im
Gegenzug zur Freilassung des Gefreiten Gilad Shalit, der seit dem
25. Juni von Palästinensern gefangen gehalten wird, die in Israel
festgesetzten Minister und Abgeordneten von „Hamas“ auf freien
Fuß gesetzt werden müssten. Shalits Vater stattet am 16. November
den Angehörigen der Opfer des israelischen Artillerieangriffs auf Beit
Hanoun am 11. November einen Kondolenzbesuch ab und plädiert
für Ende von Hass und Gewalt auf beiden Seiten.
US-Präsident George W. Bush begrüßt Israels Ministerpräsident
Ehud Olmert im Oval Office des Weißen Hauses und stellt sich der
63
Presse . Dabei preist er Olmerts „strategisches Denken“ für Israel
und den Frieden im Rahmen einer Zweistaatenlösung. Abgeordnete
der Demokratischen Partei verwahren sich gegen die Bemerkung
Olmerts, Israel sei „sehr beeindruckt und ermutigt von der Stabilität,
welche die große [Militär-]Operation Amerikas in Irak dem Nahen
Osten gebracht hat“. Nach Pressemeldungen soll Olmert einen
geheimen Plan für die Evakuierung großer Teile der Westbank mit
nach Washington gebracht haben. Die größte jüdische
Friedensorganisation in den USA, „Brit Tzedek veShalom (Bund für
Gerechtigkeit und Frieden)“, protestiert in einer Presseerklärung
gegen die politisch unbefriedigenden Ergebnisse der Begegnung
zwischen Bush und Olmert64.
Im Hauptkommentar von „Haaretz“ wird die Verlegung einer
internationalen Schutztruppe in den Gazastreifen verlangt, um die
israelischen Angriffe und die palästinensischen Raketen zu stoppen.
Nach einem Bericht der israelischen Zeitung „Maariv“ ist ein Streit
zwischen der Regierung und dem „Rat der Siedlungen in Judäa,
Samaria und Gaza“ über die völlige oder teilweise Auflösung von
fünfzehn Außenlagern („outposts“) der Siedlungen in der Westbank
ausgebrochen.
In einem Kommentar in „Haaretz“ geißelt Akiva Eldar die israelische
Doppelmoral gegenüber den Palästinensern und fragt, wie lange
Israelis mit Gewissen und die ganze Welt weiterschlafen und sich mit
den zahllosen offenen Ungerechtigkeiten abfinden wollen, die zur
65
Routine geworden seien .
Die Außenminister der Europäischen Union beschließen auf ihrer
Sitzung in Brüssel Erklärungen zum Nahen und Mittleren Osten. Im
Blick auf den Gazastreifen und die Westbank bedauern sie zutiefst
die Eskalation der Gewalt und beklagen die israelischen
Militäraktionen mit vielen zivilen Opern unter der palästinensischen
Bevölkerung. Gleichzeitig verlangen sie die Freilassung des
israelischen Soldaten Gilad Shalit, fordern die Palästinenser zu
nationaler Einheit auf und wiederholen die Absicht der EU, sich im
Rahmen des internationalen „Quartetts“ aktiv für die
Wiederaufnahme des Friedensprozesses mit dem Ziel eines
unabhängigen, demokratischen und lebensfähigen
palästinensischen Staates einzusetzen. Im Blick auf Libanon
ermutigen die EU-Außenminister alle Parteien zur Wiederaufnahme
des nationalen Dialogs, bekennen sich zur Verpflichtung, die
demokratisch gewählte libanesische Regierung zu unterstützen und
bei der Erfüllung der UN-Resolution 1701 zu helfen. Gleichzeitig
verlangen sie die Freilassung der am 12. Juli von der „Hisbollah“
gefangen genommenen zwei israelischen Soldaten Udi Goldwasser
und Eldad Regev. Zum Thema Iran beschränken sich die
Außenminister auf die Wiederholung ihrer Position, das
Nuklearanreichungsprogramm räume der EU keine andere Chance
ein als die Fortsetzung der Konsultationen mit dem Ziel
66
angemessener Maßnahmen gemäß Artikel 41 der UN-Charta .
Nach einem Bericht der „Jerusalem Post“ rät der Vorsitzende der
„Jewish Agency“ Zeev Bielski allen US-amerikanischen Juden zur
Auswanderung nach Israel, weil sie als Juden aufgrund von
Assimilation und Mischehe keine Zukunft in den USA hätten. Mit
dieser Bemerkung trifft Bielski auf heftigen Widerstand. So
entgegnet der Exekutivdirektor des „American Jewish Congress“,
David Harris, dass solche Töne periodisch wiederkehren und unter
den US-amerikanischen Juden kein Echo finden würden. Vor Bielski
hatte der israelische Schriftsteller A.B. Yehoshua im Mai erklärt,
dass das Judentum außerhalb Israels keine Zukunft habe67. In
einem Begleitbericht aus New York macht die „Jerusalem Post“
darauf aufmerksam, dass die jüdischen Organisationen in den USA
in den letzten fünfzehn Jahren dreißig Prozent ihrer einstigen
Spender verloren und dennoch das Gesamtaufkommen gesteigert
haben, weil es gelungen sei, von den übrigen Spendern mehr Geld
zu sammeln.
12.11.2006:
Vor seinem Besuch in Washington, der am 12. November beginnt,
erklärt Israels Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert im Interview mit der
„Washington Post“, dass seine „Vision“ eines Rückzugs aus Teilen
der Westbank („realignment“) nach dem Krieg gegen die „Hisbollah“
in Libanon zwar nicht tot sei, aber überprüft werden müsse. Das
„palästinensische Problem“ dürfe nicht ignoriert werden, setze
jedoch eine legitime palästinensische Führung voraus. Präsident
Machmud Abbas habe zwar seine Gegnerschaft gegen den Terror
und seine Unzufriedenheit mit „Hamas“ geäußert, doch wenig Kraft
gezeigt, „diese Regierung von Terroristen“ niederzuringen und den
Einfluss von Khaled Meshal – dem Leiter des Politischen Büros mit
Sitz in Damaskus – zu schwächen. Wenn der syrische Präsident
Bashar Assad die bisherige „totale Unterstützung“ Meshals und der
„Hisbollah“ beende, werde er sehr gern mit Syrien verhandeln. In
gemäßigten arabischen Staaten gebe es eine wachsende Einsicht,
dass die „Achse des Bösen“ aus Iran, Syrien, „Hisbollah“ und
„Hamas“ nicht nur Israel, sondern auch diese Regimes bedrohe. Der
Frage, ob er bereit sei, den im Juni 2004 wegen der Ermordung von
fünf Israelis und des versuchten mehrfachen Mordes zu fünfmal
lebenslänglich und vierzig Jahren Gefängnis verurteilten Marwan
Barghouti freizulassen, weicht Olmert aus. Den iranischen
Präsidenten Machmud Achmadinedjad vergleicht Olmert mit Adolf
Hitler, ohne auf die Frage nach einer militärischen Operation gegen
Iran zu beantworten. Gegenüber US-Präsident George W. Bush
drückt Olmert sein höchstes Vertrauen aus68.
Israels Außenministerin Tsipi Livni betont vor der
Generalversammlung der „Vereinigten Jüdischen Gemeinschaften
(United Jewish Communities)“ in Los Angeles, dass sie vor den
Delegierten zuerst als Jüdin und in zweiter Linie als Israelin spreche.
Dabei nimmt sie vor allem zu Sorgen Stellung, dass sich Israel zu
weit vom jüdischen Erbe und dass sich die jüdische Diaspora von
Israel löse, bevor sie zu politischen Fragen im Nahen Osten Stellung
nimmt, so zur Bedrohung durch Iran, zum Krieg in Libanon und zur
„Vision zweier demokratischer Staaten“ für Israelis und
Palästinenser. Der historisch berechtigte Anspruch des jüdischen
Volkes auf das ganze Land Israel finde seine Grenzen im Anspruch
auf einen jüdischen demokratischen Staat69.
In seinem Reisebericht in der „Los Angeles Times“ schildert der für
die Kommentarspalten zuständige Redakteur Nicholas Goldberg die
innere Erschöpfung der israelischen Gesellschaft nach dem Fiasko
des Krieges in Libanon, der Bedrohung aus Iran, den
Korruptionsskandalen und Affären mehrerer Minister und dem
Scheitern der Beziehungen zu den Palästinensern. Dies alles, zitiert
Goldberg den Autor David Grossman, habe eine schwere
Identitätskrise bewirkt70.
11.11.2006:
Ein in den UN-Sicherheitsrat von Qatar eingebrachter
Resolutionsentwurf, mit dem nach dem israelischen Artillerieangriff
auf das palästinensische Dorf Beit Hanoun am selben Tag eine
sofortige Untersuchung eingeleitet und Israel aufgefordert werden
soll, „alle Akte der Gewalt gegen die Zivilbevölkerung in den
besetzten Gebieten, einschließlich Jerusalems“ zu beenden,
scheitert am Veto der USA. Großbritannien, Japan, Dänemark,
71
Japan und Slowakei enthalten sich der Stimme . Einen Tag später,
am 12. November, bricht die außerordentliche Sitzung der
Außenminister der Arabische Liga in Kairo den Boykott der „Hamas“geführten Autonomiebehörde ab und sagt Finanzhilfen zu. Arabische
Kommentatoren zeigen sich skeptisch, weil in der
Abschlusserklärung jede Kritik am US-amerikanischen Veto gegen
die Resolution des UN-Sicherheitsrates ausbleibt. Die Sitzung war
mit dem Ziel einberufen, eine gemeinsame Position gegenüber den
israelischen Militärangriffen im Gazastreifen zu entwickeln72.
In einem Bericht für das „Neue Deutschland“ berichtet der
Bundestagsabgeordnete der Linkspartei, der Völkerrechtler
Professor Norman Paech, nach einem Besuch im Gazastreifen, dass
dort sechzig Prozent der Bewohner den Wunsch nach
Auswanderung äußern würden.
10.11.2006:
Das „Israel Policy Forum“ berichtet, dass 88 Prozent der USamerikanischen jüdischen Wahlberechtigten bei den
Kongresswahlen für die Kandidaten der Demokratischen Partei
gestimmt haben.
09.11.2006:
Nach den israelischen Beschuss des palästinensischen Orts Beit
Hanoun im nördlichen Gazastreifen, dem in den vergangenen Tagen
insgesamt 53 Palästinenser zum Opfer fielen, ruft das
Generalsekretariat der Arabischen Liga die Vereinten Nationen zur
Stationierung einer internationalen Truppe zum Schutz der
palästinensischen Bevölkerung auf und bittet die arabischen Staaten
dringend um Nahrungsmittel- und medizinische Hilfen. Israels
Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert bedauert das Artilleriefeuer als
„technischen Fehler“ und erklärt seine Bereitschaft, sich sofort und
bedingungslos mit dem palästinensischen Präsidenten Machmud
Abbas zu treffen. Nach israelischen Medienberichten will die USAdministration die israelische Regierung zwingen, der Stationierung
einer jordanischen Militäreinheit im Gazastreifen zuzustimmen. In
einem Kommentar in „Haaretz“ fordert Ari Shavit den
Ministerpräsidenten auf, sich persönlich an die Opfer und an das
palästinensische Volk zu wenden, Entschädigungen anzubieten und
Absolution zu erbitten, während der Verteidigungsminister die volle
Verantwortung übernehmen solle. Alles andere sei unakzeptabel,
unmenschlich, unjüdisch und unbegreiflich. „Unbegreiflich?“ fragt
Shavit mehrfach. „In dem Land der gehaltlosen Führung ist alles
möglich, alles geht73.“
Im Interview mit „Haaretz“ bekennt der kürzlich zurückgetretene
Wissenschafts- und Sportsminister Ophir Pines-Paz
(„Arbeitspartei“)74, dass er nicht länger gewillt gewesen sei, politische
Entscheidungen mitzutragen, die er ablehne. Ausschlaggebend
gewesen seien letztlich der Krieg in Libanon, die Ablehnung einer
unabhängigen staatlichen Untersuchungskommission, die
Einbeziehung von Avigdor Lieberman ins Kabinett als Minister für
strategische Angelegenheiten – dessen Ernennung Pines-Paz als
Provokation gegenüber Ägypten und Jordanien bezeichnet – sowie
die Führungsschwäche von Ehud Olmert. Die Wurzel des Problems
seien jedoch die israelischen Politiker, ihr Zynismus, ihr Unfähigkeit,
hinter ihren öffentlichen Erklärungen zu stehen und für ihre
Überzeugungen zu kämpfen, sowie ihr Zickzackkurs. Israel befinde
sich in der schwersten Führungskrise in seiner Geschichte mit dem
Ergebnis, dass die Demokratie in Gefahr sei. Pines-Paz beschuldigt
Olmert außerdem, das Oberste Gericht schwächen und den Einfluss
der Politik auf seine Entscheidungen erhöhen zu wollen. Seine
Arbeitspartei sei gegenwärtig nicht bereit, einen politischen Preis für
ihre Überzeugungen zu zahlen. Setze sich der Opportunismus fort,
werde die Partei untergehen. Am 10. Januar 2007 kündigt der
Vorsitzende der Arbeitspartei, Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz, an,
dass an die Stelle von Pines-Paz der arabische Abgeordnete Raleeb
Majadele treten soll. Majadele wäre der erste arabische Minister in
einem israelischen Kabinett.
Libanons Ministerpräsident Fuad Siniora lehnt den Rücktritt der fünf
schiitischen Minister – davon gehören zwei der „Hisbollah“ an,
Außenminister Salluh steht ihr nahe – ab, die aus Protest gegen
dass Scheitern einer „Regierung der nationalen Einheit“ mit
Sperrminorität für die Schiiten ihre Demission eingereicht haben. Für
Staatspräsident Emile Lahoud hat die Regierung ihre legitimierte
Handlungsfähigkeit verloren, ohne dass gemäß der Verfassung
daraus Konsequenzen gezogen werden können. Ein Sprecher der
„Hisbollah“ erklärt, dass eine Lösung bis zum 13. November
gefunden werden müsse, ansonsten werde „die Straße sprechen“.
Am 13. November gibt Umweltminister Jakub Sarraf seinen Rücktritt
bekannt. Am selben Tag übernimmt die Regierung die Forderung
nach einem UN-Sondertribunal zur Untersuchung des Mordes an
den früheren Ministerpräsidenten Rafiq Hariri am 14. Februar 2005.
05.11.2006:
Das irakische Sondergericht in Bagdad verurteilt Saddam Hussein
zum Tod durch den Strang wegen des Massakers in der Stadt
Dudjeil 1982, bei dem nach einem missglückten Attentatsversuch auf
ihn 148 schiitische Einwohner ermordet wurden. Mit Saddam
Hussein werden dessen Halbbruder Barzan Ibrahim al-Takriti und
der frühere Vorsitzende des Revolutionsgerichts Awad Hamid alBandar zum Tode verurteilt. Dagegen soll der ehemalige frühere
Stellvertreter Saddams Taha Yassin Ramadan eine lebenslange
Haftstrafe antreten. Die Urteile können frühestens nach 60 Tagen
vollstreckt werden.
04.11.2006:
Aus Anlass des elften Todestages von Yitzhak Rabin demonstrieren
nach Polizeischätzungen rund hunderttausend Israelis gegen die
Politik ihrer Regierung. Der Schriftsteller David Grossman verurteilt
75
sie mit scharfen Worten und fordert eine politische Umkehr . In
einem Beitrag vom 17. November setzt sich Uri Avnery kritisch mit
Grossmans Rede auseinander, würdigt seine Beschreibung des
trostlosen Zustandes des Staates, vermisst aber eine klare Aussage
76
zur Lösung der Probleme .
01.11.2006:
In einem Interview mit der Wochenausgabe der offiziösen
ägyptischen Zeitung „al-Ahram (Die Pyramiden)“ bekennt sich
Machmud Abbas von seinem Amtssitz in Ramallah aus zur „Road
Map“ des Nahost-Quartetts – sie verkörpere alles: Zwischen- und
Endstatus-Antworten, die Vision von George. W. Bush für eine
Zweistaatenlösung, die saudische Friedensinitiative vom März 2002
und sämtliche relevanten UN-Resolutionen. Abbas beharrt
ungeachtet ihrer Schwäche auf der internationalen Legitimität der
palästinensischen politischen Ansprüche und erteilt den
Vorstellungen von „Hamas“ erneut eine Absage77. In derselben
Ausgabe veröffentlicht „al-Ahram“ ein Interview mit Ismail Haniyeh in
dessen Haus in einem Flüchtlingslager in Gaza-Stadt, in dem er sich
gegen die Anreden „Ministerpräsident“ und „Exzellenz“ verwahrt. Die
Frage nach der Anerkennung Israels, der – mit Einschränkungen –
78
arabischen und der internationalen Legitimität, dem Verhältnis zu
unterschriebenen Vereinbarungen sowie zur Rolle der PLO und zum
Widerstand beantwortet Haniyeh mit dem Hinweis auf das „Nationale
Versöhnungsdokument“ („Gefangenenpapier“) vom Juni 200679. Zu
den Differenzen zwischen ihm und dem Leiter des Politischen Büros
in Damaskus, Khaled Meshal, äußert er sich vage80.
Nach einem Bericht des israelischen Rundfunks haben etwa
zehntausend Palästinenser wegen der schweren
sicherheitspolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Lebensbedingungen
Anträge auf Ausreise in arabische und andere Länder gestellt.
Weitere 45.000 Anträge würden gegenwärtig von den Konsulaten
geprüft.
US-amerikanisch-ägyptische Gespräche über die Stationierung einer
internationalen Truppe an der ägyptischen Grenze zum Gazastreifen
scheitern am ägyptischen Widerstand. Indessen verspricht Kairo,
dort seine eigene Präsenz zu verstärken.
Oktober 2006
31.10.2006:
Israels Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz plädiert in einem Vortrag
an der Universität Tel Aviv dafür, den saudischen Friedensplan der
Arabischen Liga vom März 2002 als „Grundlage für Verhandlungen“
zu akzeptieren.
Hassan Nasrallah, Generalsekretär der „Hisbollah“, berichtet unter
deutscher Vermittlung von Verhandlungen mit Israel über die
Freilassung der zwei israelischen Soldaten Udi Goldwasser und
Eldad Regev, die am 12. Juli den Einmarsch israelischer Truppen
nach Libanon auslösten.
30.10.2006:
Eintritt von Avigdor Lieberman („Unsere Haus Israel“) in die
Regierung als Minister zur Abwehr strategischer Bedrohungen und
stellvertretender Ministerpräsident. Wissenschafts- und Sportminister
Ophir Pines-Paz (Arbeitspartei) reicht darauf seinen Rücktritt ein, der
am 1. November wirksam wird.
26.10.2006:
Bei seinen Gesprächen mit der israelischen Außenministerin Tsipi
Livni in Tel Aviv dringt der EU-Außenbeauftragte Javier Solana auf
die Auflösung der Siedlungsaußenlager („outposts“), wenn Israel
tatsächlich zur „Road Map“ des internationalen Quartetts
zurückkehren wolle. Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz erklärte am
Vortag, die Auflösung zu verschieben. Verteidigungsminister Amir
Peretz kündigt gegenüber Solana die Fortsetzung der
Aufklärungsflüge über Libanon an, solange nach israelischer Ansicht
die UN-Resolution 1701 nicht vollständig durchgesetzt sei.
Der zum Leitungstermin der „Genfer Initiative“ gehörige Shlomo
Brom vom „Institute for National Security Studies“ in Tel Aviv warnt
vor dem Zusammenbruch des Gazastreifens aufgrund der
Rivalitäten zwischen „Hamas“ und der „Alten Garde“ von „Fatah“ um
Machmud Abbas, die durch die Ablehnung der saudischen
Friedensinitiative vom März 2002 seitens des Leiters des Politischen
Büros von „Hamas“ in Damaskus Khaled Meshal verschärft werde,
sowie aufgrund israelischer und US-amerikanischer Forderungen an
„Hamas“. In der „Islamischen Widerstandsbewegung“ wachse die
Sorge vor einem Putsch gegen sie von Seiten der personell und
instrumentell verstärkten Präsidentengarde im Gazastreifen. Die
daraus entstehende Schwächung könnte jene politischen Kräfte in
Israel in der Auffassung bestätigen, dass es keinen
palästinensischen Verhandlungspartner gebe81. Dagegen hebt der
Direktor des „Cambridge Arab Media Project“ an der University of
Cambridge (Großbritannien), Khaled Hroub, in der Beiruter Zeitung
„Daily Star“ die politischen Mäßigungen von „Hamas“ in den
vergangenen Jahren dar82.
25.10.2006:
Der Berliner „Tagesspiegel“ berichtet, dass sechs israelische F-16Jäger ein deutsches Marineschiff der UNIFIL-Mission in geringer
Höhe überflogen, sogenannte Infrarot-Täuschkörper abgeworfen und
zwei Schüsse in die Luft abgefeuert hätten. Der Sprecher des
israelischen Verteidigungsministeriums weist den Bericht zurück. Am
24. Oktober seien ein deutsches Schiff und ein Helikopter an der
Küste vor Rosh Haniqra (Nord-Israel) identifiziert worden, ohne dass
das israelische Militär davon in Kenntnis gesetzt worden sei. Er
fordert die deutsche Marine zur besseren Koordination auf. Am 26.
Oktober korrigiert ein Sprecher des israelischen Militärs die bisherige
Darstellung, das deutsche Schiff habe sich in israelischen
Gewässern aufgehalten. Am 30. Oktober entschuldigt sich
Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert bei Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel
für den Zwischenfall. Am 31. Oktober schreibt „Haaretz“, dass
Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz erst nach Berichten in den
deutschen Medien davon erfahren habe.
24.10.2006:
Israels Erziehungsministerin Yuli Tamir (Arbeitspartei) ordnet in
Schulen Gedenkfeiern zum Jahrestag des Massakers dreier
israelischer Grenzsoldaten im arabischen Dorf Kfar Qasserm in
Galiläa an. Am 29. Oktober 1956, dem Beginn des israelischbritisch-französischen Feldzugs gegen Ägypten, waren in dem Dorf
47 Bewohner erschossen worden, die meisten bei ihrer Rückkehr am
Abend von der Feldarbeit. Über das Dorf war eine Ausgangssperre
verhängt worden, um die Ruhe angesichts des Einmarsches in den
Sinai sicherzustellen.
Nach einem Bericht der ägyptischen Nachrichtenagentur „Middle
East Agency”, der sich auf Mitteilungen des Ministers für Elektrizität,
Hassan Yunis stützt, will Ägypten in den nächsten Monaten mit der
Entwicklung von Nuklearkapazitäten für die Energieversorgung und
die wissenschaftliche Nutzung beginnen.
23.10.2006:
Ehud Olmert und der Vorsitzende der der weit rechts stehenden
Partei „Unser Haus Israel (Israel Beiteinu)“, Avigdor Lieberman, mit
elf Abgeordneten unterzeichnen eine Koalitionsvereinbarung. Mit
dem Eintritt in die Regierung soll Liebermann neben Tsipi Livni und
Shimon Peres der dritte stellvertretende Ministerpräsident im Range
eines „Ministers zur Abwehr strategischer Bedrohungen“ im Amt des
Ministerpräsidenten werden. Nur fünf Abgeordnete der Arbeitspartei
– die Palästinenserin Nadia Hilou, die frühere TV-Moderatorin Shelly
Yachimovich sowie der ehemalige Präsident der Gen-GurionUniversität in Beersheva, Avishai Braverman, General d.R. Danny
Yatom und der aus Äthiopien stammende Raleb Majedele verwahren
sich scharf gegen den Eintritt Liebermans in die Regierung –,
plädieren für den Verbleib in der Regierung. Im Mai bezeichnete
Lieberman, der 1978 aus Moldawien über Riga einwanderte,
arabische Abgeordnete mit Kontakten zur „Hamas“ und Syrien als
Nazi-Kollaborateure, die man hinrichten müsse. In einem
Kommentar schreibt „Haaretz“ am 24. Oktober, dass Lieberman
nichts an der Regierungspolitik ändern, aber eine zentrale Rolle als
Verantwortlicher für die Abwehr strategischer Bedrohungen
übernehmen werde. Seine politischen Äußerungen an die Adresse
der Palästinenser vergleicht das Blatt mit denen des iranischen
Präsidenten Machmud Achmadinedjad gegenüber Israel. Jörg
Bremer fragt am 26. Oktober in der FAZ, wie ernst Israel die
iranische Atomgefahr nehme, wenn es aus ein neues StrategieRessort für einen innenpolitisch höchst umstrittenen Politiker
schneidere. Der Vorsitzende von „Meretz“, Yossi Beilin, lädt die
rebellierenden Abgeordneten der Arbeitspartei zur Zusammenarbeit
mit seiner Fraktion ein.
In der „Jerusalem Post“ beklagt sich Isi Leibler, der für die
Beziehungen zur jüdischen Diaspora im rechtskonservativen
„Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs“ verantwortlich ist, über den
Druck angeblich links stehender US-amerikanischer jüdischer
Gruppen – genannt werden „Brit Zedek veShalom (Bund für
Gerechtigkeit und Frieden)“ sowie das „Israel Policy Forum“83 – auf
die Administration in Washington, ihre Politik gegenüber der
Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde zu mäßigen, und damit das
„American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)“ herausfordere.
Washington solle sich um mehr Ausgewogenheit bemühen und die
anhaltende Gewalt und Gegengewalt beenden. Der Autor erinnert
daran, dass ein Teil der Medien den israelischen Krieg in Libanon
kritisch begleitet habe und dass der frühere
Präsidentschaftskandidat für die Demokratische Partei, Joseph
Lieberman, bei den Vorwahlen gegen einen relativ unbekannten
Bewerber unterlegen sei, der dem Krieg in Irak kritisch
gegenüberstehe und von vielen jüdischen Wählern im Bundesstaat
Connecticut unterstützt werde. Besondere Sorgen bereitet Leibler
die „bizarre“ Ankündigung des von ihm als Antizionisten
bezeichneten Billionärs und Philanthropen George Soros, dieser
werde eine Organisation als Gegenwicht gegen AIPAC finanziell
fördern, obwohl er ein Holocaust-Überlebender sei und deshalb
wissen müsste, wie man den Antisemitismus bekämpfe. Es sei kein
Zufall, dass der Vorsitzende von „Meretz/Yachad“, Yossi Beilin,
Soros bei seinen Bemühungen unterstütze. Der Autor wirft Ehud
Olmert vor, sein politisches Gewicht nicht zur Verhinderung der
neuen Gruppierung in die Waagschale werfen.
Der palästinensische Außenminister Machmud Zahhar spricht sich
im Interview mit „Spiegel-online“ für einen provisorischen Staat
Palästina in den Grenzen von 1967 aus und gibt zu Protokoll, dass
„wir niemals Israel anerkennen werden“. Die Zionisten hätten das
Land wie die Nazis während des Zweiten Weltkrieges Frankreich
besetzt. Israel sei ein fremdes Element im Nahen Osten. „Warum
gründen die Zionisten ihren Staat nicht in Europa?“
22.10.2006:
Die „International Harald Tribune“ berichtet, dass die ägyptische
Regierung auf Washington starken Druck ausübe, die Schaffung
eines palästinensischen Staates zu fördern, um ihre Prestigeverluste
in der arabischen Welt zu beheben und der islamischen Bewegung
den Wind aus den Segeln zu nehmen. Diese Botschaft mit drei
zentralen Punkten „Grenzen dieses Staates“, „Hauptstadt des
Staates“ und „Rückehrrecht der Flüchtlinge“ sei US-Außenministerin
Condoleezza Rice während ihres jüngsten Besuchs in Kairo
vermittelt worden, berichtet das Blatt. Zur selben Zeit bemüht sich
die ägyptische Regierung weiter um eine Verständigung zwischen
Präsident Machmud Abbas und der „Hamas“-Führung zur Bildung
einer palästinensischen „Regierung der nationalen Einheit“.
20.10.2006:
Der iranische Präsident Machmud Achmadinedjad fordert in einer
Rede den Westen auf, seine Unterstützung für Israel aufzugeben.
16.10.2006:
In seiner Regierungserklärung vor der Knesset bezeichnet
Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert den palästinensischen Präsidenten
Machmud Abbas als „legitimen Partner“ für Friedensverhandlungen.
Gleichzeitig fordert er den libanesischen Ministerpräsidenten Fuad
Siniora zu direkten Gesprächen auf und weist Verhandlungen mit
Syrien zurück84. Siniora weist in einer Erklärung die Offerte zurück
und fordert die Beachtung der Friedensinitiative der Arabischen Liga
vom März 2002 ein85. Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz beschuldigt
Syrien vor dem Außen- und Sicherheitsausschuss des Parlaments,
die „Hisbollah“ weiterhin mit Waffen zu versorgen. Israel werde das
nicht lange hinnehmen. Auch wenn zu befürchten sei, dass
französische Soldaten der UNIFIL auf israelische
Aufklärungsflugzeuge das Feuer eröffnen, werde Israel an den
Flügen über Libanon festhalten. Zum wiederholten Male kündigt
Peretz die Auflösung von Siedlungsaußenlagern („outposts“) in der
Westbank an. Am 17. Oktober bitten die USA darum, dass Israel
seine Aufklärungsflüge einstellt und sie durch Satellitenaufnahmen
ersetzt. Der Siedlungsexperte der Bewegung „Frieden jetzt“, Dror
Etkes, betont am 10. Oktober, dass fast zwei Drittel der 102
„outposts“ in der Westbank zumindest teilweise auf privatem
palästinensischem Boden errichtet worden seien. Am 24. Oktober
berichtet „Haaretz“, bereits vor zwei Jahren habe dem damaligen
Verteidigungsminister Shaul Mofaz und später seinem Nachfolger
Amir Peretz ein Bericht vorgelegen, der mit einem
Geheimhaltungshinweis versehen worden sei, weil er „politisches
und diplomatisches Dynamit“ beinhalte. „Jeder spricht über die 107
outposts“, zitiert „Haaretz“ einen Informanten unter Berufung auf
Daten aus dem Verteidigungsministerium, aber dabei geht es um
Kleinigkeiten. Die großen Sachen geschehen in den älteren,
angeblich legalen Siedlungen. Dort geht die Bautätigkeit seit Jahren
voran, und zwar in klarer Verletzung des Rechts und der
Bestimmungen eines ordentlichen Regierungshandelns.“
Der Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2005, Professor
Israel (Robert) Aumann, befürchtet, dass Israel keine fünfzig Jahre
überleben werde, wenn Juden weiterhin so müde seien, für die
Auseinandersetzungen mit ihren arabischen Nachbarn Opfer zu
bringen, und sie wie alle anderen Völker leben wollten.
15.10.2006:
Die israelischen Ermittlungsbehörden teilen mit, sie hätten genügend
Beweismaterial für eine Anklage gegen Präsident Moshe Katzav. Sie
werfen ihm sexuelle Nötigung in zehn Fällen und Bestechlichkeit vor.
Er verzichtet auf seine Anwesenheit bei der Eröffnung der WinterSitzungsperiode der Knesset. Abgeordnete aller Parteien fordern
Katzav zum Rücktritt auf, während dieser sich als „Opfer reiner
Lügen“ sieht. Auch Katzavs Vorgänger Ezer Weizman musste
frühzeitig aus dem Amt scheiden, weil ihm die Annahme einer
millionenschweren Spende vorgehalten wurde.
Das deutsche Kontingent der UNIFIL mit 1500 Soldaten übernimmt
vor der libanesischen Küste das Kommando von seinen
europäischen Alliierten.
11.10.2006:
In einer seit April 2005 geplanten Ansprache vor der „American Task
Force on Palestine“, einer Organisation palästinensisch-stämmiger
US-Amerikaner, betont US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice, dass
Präsident George W. Bush als erster US-Präsident von der
Schaffung eines palästinensischen Staates mit territorialer Integrität
und Lebensfähigkeit and er Seite Israels gesprochen habe.
Gleichzeitig jedoch begnügt sie sich mit der Zusage, „die
ökonomischen Grundlagen eines erfolgreichen [palästinensischen]
Staates“ unterstützen zu wollen, und verweist auf die Finanzhilfen
Washingtons sowie auf den Einsatz für die Sicherung der inneren
Ordnung eines künftigen Staates Palästina. Sie, Rice, werde ihr
ganzes persönliches Gewicht in dieses Problem einbringen86. Dieser
Ankündigung hält „Haaretz“ am 13. Oktober eine Umfrage vom
vergangenen Juli entgegen, wonach nur 56 Prozent der USAmerikaner den Konflikt für eine Angelegenheit halten, die die USA
betreffen. Des weiteren zitiert das Blatt die monatliche Umfrage der
US-amerikanischen Zeitschrift „The Atlantic Monthly“ unter Experten,
von denen 62 Prozent die Auffassung vertreten, die Unterstützung
Washingtons für Israel sei zu stark, und 30 Prozent glauben, dass
sie in Zukunft geringer ausfallen werde.
Nach Angaben des „UN Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA)“ mit Sitz in Ost-Jerusalem liegt die Zahl der militärischen
„checkpoints“ in der Westbank bei gegenwärtig 528. Hinzu kämen
andere Straßenbarrieren, die die Bewegungsfreiheit der
palästinensischen Bevölkerung stark beeinflussen und ihre Dörfer
voneinander isolieren.
Der Leiter des Politischen Büros von „Hamas“ in Damaskus, Khaled
Meshal, erklärt in einem Interview mit der in London erscheinenden
arabischen Zeitung „al-Hayyat“ („Das Leben“), dass er einen
palästinensischen Staat in den Grenzen von 1967 und einen
Waffenstillstand akzeptiere. Die „zionistische Entität“ sei ein Faktum,
das er jedoch nicht anerkennen werde.
In den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten hat die Bevölkerung in den
jüdischen Siedlungen der Westbank nach einem Bericht von
„Haaretz“ das durchschnittliche jährliche Bevölkerungswachstum in
den palästinensischen Gebieten bei fünf bis sechs Prozent gelegen,
dagegen bei zwei bis drei Prozent im Raum Jerusalem und im
Zentrum des Landes. Nach einer Untersuchung von Soziologen und
Städteplanern am „College of Judea and Samaria“ in Ariel
(Westbank) verlassen 30 bis 40 Prozent der zweiten Generation –
die Nachkommen der Gründer in den Siedlungen – ihre Wohnorte
und ziehen zeitweilig oder auf Dauer in Gebiete westlich der „Grünen
Linie“ von 1967.
09.10.2006:
Im Interview mit der BBC bejaht Syriens Präsident Bashar Assad die
Frage, ob sein Land mit Israel in Frieden leben könne, wozu es
allerdings einen Vermittler brauche, der Washington nicht sein
könne, wohl aber Europa87. In den israelischen Medien werden jene
Stimmen lauter, die Verhandlungen mit Damaskus als einen
strategischen Gewinn fordern, raten aber auch zur Vorsicht. So
befürchtet der Wirtschaftsredakteur von „Haaretz“, Avraham Tal, am
7. Oktober nach Rückgabe der Golanhöhen an Syrien die
Besiedlung durch Hunderttausende Flüchtlinge, so dass an der
Grenze zu Israel eine „libanesische Lage“ entstehen könnte. Der
Schriftsteller Meir Shalev kritisiert in der Zeitung „Yediot Achronot“
(„Letzte Nachrichten“)88, dass sich Ehud Olmert in einen logischen
Widerspruch mit der Ankündigung verwickle „Solange ich
Ministerpräsident bin, werden die Golanhöhen auf ewig in unserer
Hand bleiben“. Der stellvertretende Ministerpräsident Shimon Peres
fordert Assad in verschiedenen Interviews zu einem Besuch in
Jerusalem auf.
07.10.2006:
Nach dem Interview des syrischen Präsidenten Bashar Assad mit
der spanischen Zeitung „El País“ am 30. September89 ist sein
Informationsminister Mohsen Bilal um eine Beruhigung der
Atmosphäre bemüht. Die Sicherheitslage habe sich nicht
verschlechtert, doch müsse sich Israel als Voraussetzung für einen
90
Frieden zurückziehen von den besetzten Golanhöhen .
04.10.2006:
Präsident Machmud Abbas bricht die Gespräche mit „Hamas“ über
die Bildung einer Koalitionsregierung ab und droht von seinen
verfassungsmäßigen Rechten Gebrauch zu machen, die
Autonomiebehörde aufzulösen91.
Israels Justizminister Meir Sheetrit („Kadima“) fordert seine
Regierung in einem Interview mit dem israelischen Rundfunk zu
Gesprächen mit Saudi-Arabien auf der Grundlage des von Riyadh
eingebrachten Friedensplans der Arabischen Liga („Erklärung von
92
Beirut“) vom März 2002 auf . „Wenn wir über einen vollständigen
Frieden reden, müssen wir nicht jedes Details und jede Initiative zum
Rückzug auf die Linien von 1967 akzeptieren. Doch wir müssen
darüber sprechen, also lässt uns darüber sprechen“, erklärt Sheetrit.
03.10.2006:
In ihren Halbjahresbericht führt die Bewegung „Frieden jetzt“ aus,
dass im Schatten des Krieges in Libanon die Bautätigkeit in 31
Außenposten („outposts“) der Siedlungen in der Westbank
ausgeweitet worden sei. Auch wenn sie von Siedlern selbst
betrieben werde, könne sich der Staat nicht seiner Verantwortung
entziehen, heißt es in dem Bericht.
In einem dramatischen Appell fordern 135 Politiker aus aller Welt
eine sofortige internationale Aktion zur Herstellung einer
umfassenden Regelung des arabisch-israelischen Konflikts93.
02.10.2006:
Nach den vergeblichen Vermittlungsbemühungen Ägyptens
zwischen „Fatah“ und „Hamas“ hat nun Qatar einen Vorschlag zur
Bildung einer neuen palästinensischen Regierung vorgelegt. Er sieht
vor, dass an ihre Spitze eine unabhängige Persönlichkeit treten
solle. Darüber hinaus solle die Regierung die drei Bedingungen des
internationalen „Quartetts“ und im Zuge eines
Gefangenenaustauschs den israelischen Gefreiten Gilad Shalit
freilassen. Präsident Machmud Abbas begrüßt den Vorschlag aus
Qatar.
01.10.2006:
Mit den letzten 200 Soldaten verlässt die israelische Armee gemäß
der UN-Resolution 1701 fast vollständig am Vorabend von Yom
Kippur den Süden Libanons. Nur der libanesische Grenzort Ghadjar
bleibt vorerst unter israelischer Kontrolle.
Die Redakteure Aluf Benn und Akiva Eldar lassen in „Haaretz“ die
Diskussionen und Erklärungen der israelischen Regierung seit dem
Kriegsbeginn in Libanon am 12. Juli kritisch Revue passieren,
beschreiben die eigenständige Rolle von Außenministerin Tsipi Livni,
die auf die politische Diplomatie setzt, und befassen sich mit den
Äußerungen von Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert in dessen Interview
94
mit der „Jerusalem Post“ am 28. September . Während Livni
kontinuierlich das Konzept einer diplomatischen Lösung vertrete,
habe sich Olmert mit seiner Forderung durchgesetzt, dem Militär
mehr Zeit für seine Operationen zu geben. Andererseits habe Livni
gegenüber dem UN-Sicherheitsrat auf ein „robustes Mandat“ im
Falle eines internationalen Einsatzes gedrängt. Benn und Eldar
sprechen von einer „Kluft“ zwischen der Außenministerin und Olmert,
die bis zum heutigen Tage nicht überwunden sei. Von
innenpolitischer, bisweilen bösartiger Kritik an ihrer eigenständigen
Position bleibt Livnis nicht verschont, besonders aus
95
Siedlerkreisen .
In derselben Zeitung fragt Uzi Benziman, ob nicht die israelische
Politik kein Partner für Machmud Abbas und Bashar Assad sei statt
umgekehrt. Ehud Olmert und Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz
hätten kein emotionales Problem mit beiden, sondern sie fürchteten
die israelischen Siedler auf den Golanhöhen und auf der
96
Westbank .
Bei Zusammenstößen zwischen „Fatah“- und „Hamas“-Angehörigen
im Gazastreifen kommen zwölf Palästinenser ums Leben. Der
Versuch, in Ramallah das Parlamentsgebäude in Brand zu stecken,
scheitert. Die Demonstranten werfen der von „Hamas“ kontrollierten
Autonomiebehörde vor, die internationalen Finanzhilfen nicht für die
Auszahlung von Gehältern zu verwenden. Aufforderungen von
Machmud Abbas von Amman aus97 und Ismail Haniyeh zur Ruhe
verhallen. „Fatah“ ruft am 2. Oktober einen Generalstreik in der Stadt
aus, die Autonomiebehörde schießt alle Ministerien. Das
„Palästinensische Zentrum für Menschenrechte (PCHR)“ verurteilt
98
die Zusammenstöße .
September 2006
30.09.2006:
In einem Interview mit der Madrider Zeitung „El País“ räumt der
syrische Präsident Bashar Assad Israel sechs Monate für den
Abschluss eines Friedensvertrages ein, ansonsten werde es Krieg
geben. Gleichzeitig räumte er ein, dass politische Dissidenten in
syrischen Gefängnissen sitzen99.
28.09.2006:
Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert äußert sich im Interview mit der
„Jerusalem Post“ zum Krieg in Libanon, zur Zukunft seiner Partei
„Kadima“ und seinen innenpolitischen Widersachern100.
21.09.2006:
Der palästinensische Präsident Machmud Abbas äußert sich vor der
UN-Vollversammlung zum Krieg in Libanon und zu den negativen
Rückwirkungen auf die Palästinenser. Abbas fordert Israel zur
Rückkehr zu Verhandlungen, für die die PLO unter seinem Vorsitz
verantwortlich sei, mit dem Ziel der Zwei-Staaten-Regelung auf und
sagt zu, dass die neue „Regierung der nationalen Einheit“ Israel
anerkennen, alle unterzeichneten Vereinbarungen einhalten, Chaos
und Disziplinlosigkeit beenden und für Sicherheit und Ordnung
101
sorgen werde . Abbas spielt damit auf die Forderungen des
internationalen Quartetts an, die die Erfüllung dieser Forderungen
zur Voraussetzung für die Wiederaufnahme der Hilfe für die
Palästinenser macht.
Am Vorabend des neuen Jüdischen Jahres 5767 beläuft sich die
Bevölkerung Israels auf 6.990.700 Personen. Davon sind 5.313.800
Juden und 1.377.100 Araber.
20.09.2006:
In namentlicher Abstimmung verabschiedet der Deutsche Bundestag
mit 442 gegen 152 Stimmen bei fünf Enthaltungen das Mandat für
den Einsatz von deutschen Soldaten in Libanon unter dem Dach der
Friedenstruppe der Vereinten Nationen (UNIFIL). Für das Mandat
stimmen die große Mehrheit der Koalitionsparteien sowie Bündnis
90/Die Grünen, dagegen die FDP und PDS/Die Linke.
Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel nennt die Entsendung einen
„Einsatz von historischer Dimension“. Nirgendwo anders werde die
deutsche Verantwortung für die Lehren aus der Vergangenheit so
deutlich wie im Nahen Osten. Die Bundesrepublik stellt zwei
Fregatten, einen Tender, ein Truppenversorgungsschiff sowie vier
Schnellboote zur Verfügung. Am Libanon-Einsatz beteiligen sich
unter deutschem Kommando auch Schiffe aus Norwegen,
Dänemark, Schweden und den Niederlanden. Sie sollen das
Seegebiet bis fünfzig Meilen vor der libanesischen Küste
überwachen und den Waffenschmuggel verhindern.
Das Nahost-Quartett bekräftigt die „Road Map“ vom Frühjahr 2003
als Leitlinie für die israelisch-palästinensische
Zweistaatenregelung102.
Nach einem Gespräch im New Yorker „Waldorf Astoria“ treten USPräsident George W. Bush und der palästinensische Präsident
Machmud Abbas kurz zu einer Erklärung vor die Presse. Darin
wiederholt Bush seine Würdigung seiner Rede vor dem Plenum der
Vereinten Nationen vom Vortag, Abbas sei „ein Mann des Friedens“,
der an die Zweistaatenlösung glaube. Abbas seinerseits bedankt
sich für die „wundervolle Rede“ Bushs in New York103.
17.09.2006:
Die israelische Regierung beschließt auf ihrer wöchentlichen
Kabinettssitzung die Zusammensetzung und die Aufgaben einer
104
Untersuchungskommission zum Krieg in Libanon .
16.09.2006:
Im Interview mit der arabischen Zeitung „al-Hayyat“ („Das Leben“)
bezeichnet der jordanische König Abdullah II. den israelischpalästinensischen Konflikt als Kernproblem der Region, das
umgehend mit der Wiederherstellung der palästinensischen Rechte
und der Schaffung eines lebensfähigen palästinensischen Staates
aus der Welt geschafft werden müsse. Die Beziehungen zu Syrien
seien seit der Ermordung des früheren libanesischen
Ministerpräsidenten Rafik Hariri Mitte Februar 2005 belastet. Die
Islamische Bewegung in Jordanien sei überwiegend loyal und gegen
den Terrorismus. Andererseits verteidigt Abdullah II. die
Verlängerung des jordanischen Passes des von Damaskus aus
arbeitenden Chefs des Politischen Büros von „Hamas“, Khaled
Meshal. Dessen Familie sei bei Ausbruch des Libanon-Krieges nach
105
Amman übergesiedelt .
14.09.2006:
Der Präsident des Obersten Gerichts Aharon Barak gibt nach 22
Jahren sein Amt auf. Mit ihm endet eine Ära der Unabhängigkeit des
Gerichts, die besonders durch Baraks rechtsschöpferische
Leistungen geprägt war. Sie setzten der Politik, dem Militär und den
Sicherheitsdiensten Grenzen. Nachfolgerin Baraks wird die Richterin
Dorit Beinisch.
Die von „Hamas“ geführte Regierung tritt geschlossen zurück, um
der Bildung einer „Regierung der nationalen Einheit“ Platz zu
machen. Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh betont in einem Interview,
dass allein die PLO als Vertragspartnerin Israels die internationalen
Verhandlungen ermächtigt sei. Die Verhandlungen über die
Regierungsbildung verlaufen ergebnislos. Zeitungen berichten, dass
die Vereinbarung zur Neubildung der Regierung zwischen Machmud
Abbas und Haniyeh das Recht bekräftige, „für die Befreiung des
Landes zu arbeiten und zu kämpfen sowie mit allen legitimen Mitteln
und Methoden die Besatzung zu beenden sowie die Siedlungen und
die Apartheid-Mauer niederzureißen, um einen unabhängigen
palästinensischen Staat mit voller Souveränität in allen 1967
eroberten Gebieten mit Jerusalem als Hauptstadt zu errichten“.
Der Kommentator Ari Shavit prophezeit in „Haaretz“ das baldige
Ende der Amtszeit von Ehud Olmert. Dieser sei der schlechteste
Ministerpräsident Israels gewesen: hohl, überhastet und
verantwortungslos. Er habe eine Partei – gemeint ist „Kadima“ – mit
Leuten ohne Rückgrat gegründet und eine Regierung der
Untalentierten gebildet. Shavit vergleicht Olmerts Schicksal mit dem
Fall von Richard Nixon 1974. Ohne die notwendige moralische
Autorität sei Olmert unfähig, Israel auf die dem Land
bevorstehenden Herausforderungen vorzubereiten. Zur Debatte
stehe nicht, wer Olmert nachfolgt – Shavit nennt die Namen
Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, Avi Dichter, Tsipi Livni, Ami
Ayalon und Moshe Ya’alon –, sondern entscheidend sei die Qualität
der politischen Kultur, die Israel von den schmutzigen Stallungen
befreien könne, damit ein Neuanfang möglich werde. Der frühere
Generalstabschef Moshe Yaalon schließt sich der Forderung an.
Die Menschenrechtsorganisation „amnesty international“ verurteilt
die „schweren Verletzungen der internationalen Menschenrechte
einschließlich der Kriegsverbrechen“ von „Hisbollah“. Die Willkür
habe zum Tod von 43 israelischen Zivilisten, darunter sieben
106
Kindern, geführt . „Amnesty“ weist die Behauptung der „Partei
Gottes“ zurück, dass das internationale Recht Angriffe auf Zivilisten
und Vergeltungsmaßnahmen zulasse.
13.09.2006:
In einem Interview mit der „Süddeutschen Zeitung“ berichtet der
Vorsitzende der Sozialistischen Fraktion im Europaparlament Martin
Schulz nach seiner Rückkehr aus Damaskus, dass nach seinem
Eindruck die syrische Regierung an politischen Fortschritten
interessiert sei und nicht an Konfrontationen mit den USA. Aus
seinen Gesprächen mit Präsident Bashar Assad und Außenminister
Walid Mualem habe er den Eindruck mitgenommen, dass Syrien als
gleichberechtigter Partner in der Region an der Konfliktlösung in
Libanon interessiert sei.
12.09.2006:
Das Außenministerium in Jerusalem veröffentlicht seine
Vorstellungen zur Arbeit in den Gremien der Vereinten Nationen
107
während der bevorstehenden Sitzungsperiode .
Bei einem Anschlag auf die US-amerikanische Botschaft in
Damaskus werden die drei Attentäter und ein Wachmann getötet.
Die syrische Regierung bezeichnet den Anschlag als einen Akt des
Terrors.
11.09.2006:
Palästinensische Zeitungen berichten über die (vorläufigen) Leitlinien
einer neuen Regierung der nationalen Einheit und veröffentlichen
ihren Text108. In den kommenden Wochen brechen die
Verhandlungen jedoch zusammen.
Der Sprecher der Bundesregierung bestätigt den Eingang der Bitte
aus Beirut, entlang der libanesischen Küste in einer Länge von 130
Seemeilen Sicherungsaufgaben im Rahmen der UNIFIL-Mission
wahrzunehmen.
09.09.2006:
30.000 Israelis demonstrieren am Abend in Tel Aviv für die
Einsetzung einer unabhängigen Untersuchungskommission zum
Krieg in Libanon.
Unter dem Eindruck des Krieges in Libanon und der israelischen
Militäroperationen im Gazastreifen sprechen sich in einer
Repräsentativumfrage des in Ramallah ansässigen „Near East
Consulting“ vom August 51 Prozent der Palästinenser für einen
Friedensvertrag mit Israel aus; die Unterstützung unter den „Fatah“Anhängern ist mit 77 Prozent höher als unter den „Hamas“Anhängern (48 Prozent). Gleichzeitig befürworten 84 Prozent der
Palästinenser einen Waffenstillstand mit Israel. 90 Prozent der
„Fatah“-Anhänger vertrauen Präsident Machmud Abbas, nur neun
Prozent der „Hamas“-Anhänger stimmen dem zu. Unter allen
Palästinensern findet Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh („Hamas“) mit
51 Prozent mehr Zustimmung als Abbas (49 Prozent).
Der italienische Ministerpräsident Romano Prodi berichtet von
Telefonaten mit dem syrischen Präsidenten Bashar Assad, in denen
Syrien prinzipiell der Stationierung europäischer Soldaten an er
Grenze zu Libanon zustimmen werde.
Der frühere iranische Staatspräsident Mohammed Khatami verurteilt
den Anschlag auf das World Trade Center in New York am 9.
September 2001. Wer das Attentat im Namen des Islam billige, lüge,
erklärt Khatami, der sich gegenwärtig in den USA aufhält.
08.09.2006:
UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan berichtet von einem Telefonat mit
dem syrischen Präsidenten Bashar Assad, in dem ihm die
Unterbindung illegaler Waffenlieferungen von syrischem Boden an
die Hisbollah zugesagt worden sei.
07.09.2006:
Das israelische Militär beendet um 17 Uhr Mitteleuropäischer Zeit die
Seeblockade Libanons; die Luftblockade wird am 8. September
eingestellt. Der Ankündigung ging am 6. September ein Brief von
US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice und UN-Generalsekretär Kofi
Annan an Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert voran. Am 8. September
beginnen französische, italienische und griechische Marinesoldaten
mit der Überwachung der Küste.
06.09.2006:
Das Außenministerium in Jerusalem bezeichnet den Einsatz von
Streubomben in Libanon als völkerrechtlich gedeckt109.
Die libanesische Regierung bittet die Vereinten Nationen um die
Entsendung von Schiffen zum Schutz ihrer Küsten. Damit schafft sie
prinzipiell die Voraussetzung für den Einsatz eines deutschen
Kontingents.
Nach Angaben der Weltbank wird das Leben der Palästinenser im
Gazastreifen und in der Westbank durch 550 israelische
Kontrollposten und rund zwölfhundert Straßenkilometer belastet, die
nur für Israelis zur Verfügung stehen. Von den 65 Übergängen an
den „Trennungsmauern“ dürften nur 27 von Palästinensern benutzt
werden.
04.09.2006:
Die israelische Regierung beschließt den Bau von 690
Wohneinheiten in jüdischen Siedlungen um Jerusalem herum. Die
Europäische Union protestiert am 6. September gegen diese Pläne.
Am 21. September melden israelische Medien die Genehmigung von
weiteren 164 Wohneinheiten in Ariel, Alfei Menashe und Karnei
Shomron.
Unter israelischen Soldaten macht eine „Petition zur Modifizierung
der Kampf- bzw. moralischen Regeln“ eines Rechtsanwalts aus
Ramat Gan die Runde. In ihr wird von der Regierung und vom
Generalstab verlangt, die eigenen Bodentruppen erst nach dem
Bombardements der Luftwaffe in Feindesland – nach Libanon, die
Westbank und den Gazastreifen – zu schicken und bei den Kämpfen
von der Schonung „einer pseudo-unschuldigen Zivilbevölkerung“
110
Abstand zu nehmen .
02.09.2006:
Die ersten 880 der angesagten 3000 italienischen Soldaten der UNSchutztruppe landen in Libanon.
165.000 Angestellte der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde
demonstrieren wegen der ausgebliebenen Gehaltszahlungen.
01.09.2006:
Bei ihrem informellen Treffen im finnischen Lapeenranta loten die
EU-Außenminister die Änderung ihrer Boykotthaltung gegenüber der
„Hamas“-geführten Autonomiebehörde aus. Der deutsche Amtschef
Frank-Walter Steinmeier fordert die internationale Gemeinschaft auf,
sich nach dem Krieg in Libanon nun wieder der „Lösung des
Kernkonflikts“ zuzuwenden. Joschka Fischer nennt am 2. September
in einem Gastbeitrag für die „Süddeutsche Zeitung“ drei „zentrale
Konflikte“: den „israelisch-arabischen Konflikt, Irak und Iran“. Der
Krieg in Libanon habe aller Welt vor Augen geführt, wie weit der
Prozess ihrer Verschränkung fortgeschritten sei.
UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan erklärt nach einem Treffen mit
Staatschef Bashar al-Assad in Damaskus, dass Syrien das von der
UN-Resolution 1701 verlangte Waffenembargo gegen die
libanesische „Hisbollah“ einhalten und die Grenzen zu Libanon
überwachen wolle.
August 2006
31.08.2006:
In Tel Aviv demonstrieren 40.000 Israelis für die „Rückkehr unserer
Jungs“ aus Libanon.
Im Interview mit der „ZEIT“ teilt Außenministerin Tsipi Livni mit, dass
die Resolution 1701 zwei Tage nach Beginn des Krieges, also am
14. Juli, in ihrem Haus entworfen worden sei.
Auf der internationalen Geberkonferenz für den Wiederaufbau
Libanons in Stockholm werden 700 Millionen US-Dollar zugesagt.
Der libanesische Ministerpräsident Fuad Siniora schätzt die
unmittelbaren Kriegsschäden auf 3,6 Milliarden US-Dollar. Nach
Medienberichten zahlt die „Hisbollah“ jeder Familie, deren Haus
zerstört wurde, ein im wesentlichen aus iranischen Quellen
stammendes Hilfsgeld von zwölftausend US-Dollar aus. Am 1.
September bewilligt die Geberkonferenz 390 Millionen Euro für die
Palästinenser.
Das Ultimatum des UN-Sicherheitsrats gegen das nukleare
Anreicherunngsprogramm des Iran verstreicht ergebnislos.
27.08.2006:
„Hisbollah“-Führer Hassan Nasrallah erklärt in einem Interview mit
dem libanesischen Fernsehen, dass er die heftigen Angriffe Israels
auf die Entführung der zwei Soldaten Ehud Goldwasser und Eldad
Regev am 12. Juli nicht vorhergesehen habe, und bestätigt
Verhandlungen über einen Gefangenenaustausch mit Israel. Nach
einer Meldung der offiziösen ägyptischen Tageszeitung „Al-Ahram“
(„Die Pyramiden“) soll die deutsche Bundesregierung in die
Verhandlungen einbezogen sein. Dagegen zeigt der Vorsitzende von
„Meretz/Yachad“ Yossi Beilin nach einer Begegnung mit Präsident
Machmud Abbas keine Zuversicht, dass der israelische Soldat Gilad
Shalit bald freikommen werde. Shalit war am 25. Juni von radikalen
Palästinensern im Gazastreifen entführt worden.
Die deutsche Bundesregierung räumt erstmals ein, dass im Zuge
eines „robusten“ UN-Mandats zur Kontrolle des Waffenschmuggels
deutsche Soldaten in Kampfeinsätze vor der Küste Libanons
verwickelt werden könnten. Ihre Gefährdung sei allerdings
kalkulierbar.
24.08.2006:
Frankreichs Präsident Jacques Chirac kündigt die Entsendung von
zwei französischen Bataillonen mit 1600 Soldaten zur Verstärkung
der UNIFIL-Präsens in Libanon an. Damit würde das französische
Kontingent 2000 Mann umfassen. Zuvor hatte bereits Italien die
Bereitschaft zur Stationierung von 3000 Soldaten gezeigt. Am 25.
August beschließen die EU-Außenminister in Brüssel in Anwesenheit
von UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan die Entsendung von 7000
Soldaten. Frankreich behält die Führung der UNIFIL-Truppen bis
Februar 2007, danach soll sie von Italien übernommen werden.
Der israelische Generalstabschef Dan Chalutz räumt in einem
Offenen Brief an seine Soldaten Fehler im logistischen und
operativen Bereich der Kriegsführung in Libanon ein und kündigt
eine „tiefgreifende, ehrliche, schnelle und umfassende
Untersuchung“ an. Der Soziologe und Kolumnist Meron Benvenisti
begrüßt in „Haaretz“ eine Untersuchungskommission, befürchtet
aber, dass sie mit einem unklaren Auftrag ausgestattet werde: Die
einen würden die Kriegsmaschinerie auf ihre Tauglichkeit für einen
weiteren Waffengang überprüfen wollen, während die anderen die
Verursacher des Krieges mit der „Hisbollah“ bestrafen und dafür
sorgen wollten, dass Kriegstreiber politisch und moralisch künftig
abgeschreckt würden.
Nach Angaben des Geheimdienstausschusses des US-Kongresses
sind die Erkenntnisse über die Massenvernichtungswaffen Irans
unzureichend und weisen „erhebliche Lücken“ auf. Auch das Wissen
über die mögliche Entwicklung von biologischen und chemischen
Waffen sei „weder umfassend noch schlüssig“.
Washington prüft nach einem Bericht der „New York Times“, ob
Israel in den USA gefertigte Streubomben im Libanon-Krieg
eingesetzt hat.
San Salvador unterrichtet die israelische Regierung über die
Verlegung seiner Botschaft von Jerusalem nach Tel Aviv. Mit Costa
Rica hatte die letzte Regierung Anfang August ihre Botschaft nach
Tel Aviv verlegt.
23.08.2006:
Die israelische Regierung lehnt die Beteiligung von UN-geführten
Kontingenten jener Staaten bei der Libanon-Mission ab, die keine
diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Israel unterhalten. Bisher haben
Indonesien, Bangladesch, Malaysia und Nepal Soldaten angeboten.
Syriens Präsident Bashar Assad bezeichnet in einem
Fernsehinterview Absichten als eine „feindliche Situation“, UNgeführte Kontingente entlang der dreihundert Kilometer langen
libanesisch-syrischen Grenze zu stationieren.
„Amnesty international“ beschuldigt Israel, während des Krieges bei
seinen Angriffen vorsätzlich und unverhältnismäßig keine
Unterscheidungen zwischen „Hisbollah“-Stellungen und der
libanesischen Zivilbevölkerung getroffen zu haben. Zwischen dem
12. Juli und 14. August habe die israelische Luftwaffe rund 7000
Ziele angegriffen, hinzu kämen etwa 2500 Bombardierungen durch
die israelische Marine. Die israelische Regierung verwahrt sich
gegen die ai-Kritik und erklärt, die militärischen Operationen seien
von Fall zu Fall vorab juristisch geprüft worden.
22.08.2006:
Der israelische Justizminister Haim Ramon tritt von seinem Amt
zurück, weil gegen ihn ein Verfahren wegen sexueller Nötigung einer
früheren Mitarbeiterin läuft. Sein Nachfolger wird Meir Sheetrit, der
bereits zwischen 2001 und 2003 dieses Amt bekleidete. Eine
Untersuchung ähnlicher Vorwürfe, die als „dramatisch“ bezeichnet
werden, ist gegen Staatspräsident Moshe Katzav im Gange. Katzav
bestreitet die Vorwürfe und lehnt einen Rücktritt ab.
Im Interview mit der Zeitung „Junge Welt“ befürchtet der frühere UNGeneralsekretär Boutros Boutros-Ghali, dass bis zur Lösung des
israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts noch viele Jahre ins Land
geben würden. „Ich sage heute sogar, dass der Krieg im Libanon der
letzten Wochen in gewisser Weise ein neues Hindernis für den
Frieden darstellt. Wir sind wieder am Nullpunkt angelangt. Wir sind
wieder dort, wo wir vor dem Jerusalem-Besuch von Präsident Sadat
waren.“
21.08.2006:
Der israelische Schriftsteller S. Yizhar (Yizhar Smilansky) stirbt
90jährig an Herzversagen.
20.08.2006:
Die Tageszeitung „Haaretz“ veröffentlicht den Text einer Petition von
israelischen Reservisten der „Pfeilspitz-Brigade“, in der sich die
Unterzeichner über die Kriegsführung seitens der Politik und der
Generalität beschweren.
„Haaretz“ berichtet von einer Dringlichkeitssitzung der Außenminister
der Arabischen Liga in Kairo, bei der es um den Wiederaufbau
Libanons ging, ohne dass konkrete Beschlüsse gefasst worden
seien. Die Zeitung zitiert einen namentlich nicht genannten hohen
Repräsentanten der Liga mit den Worten: „Dies ist ein Krieg um die
Herzen und Sinne der Libanesen, den die Araber diesmal nicht
gegen die Iraner verlieren sollten.“ Der syrische Außenminister Walid
Muallem habe die Sitzung boykottiert.
Im Interview mit der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung“
antwortet der Vorsitzende von Bündnis 90/DieGrünen Fritz Kuhn auf
die Frage, ob es weniger schlimm sei, auf arabische Muslime als auf
israelische Juden zu schießen: „Nein. Auf Menschen zu schießen, ist
immer schlimm. Allerdings kommen wir um die Tatsache, dass sechs
Millionen Juden von Deutschen planvoll umgebracht wurden, nicht
herum. Heute leben in Israel viele, deren Familien vom Holocaust
betroffen waren. Wenn ein deutscher Soldat einen Israeli tötet, hat
das eine besondere Dimension. Aber man darf auch nicht den
Einsatz jeder deutschen Schiffsschraube mit Rückgriff auf das
besondere historische Verhältnis zu Israel ablehnen.“
Im Kölner Alten Rathaus findet die Feier zum zehnjährigen Jubiläum
der Städtepartnerschaft mit Bethlehem statt. Dabei wird nicht nur die
geleistete Arbeit der vergangenen Jahre gewürdigt, sondern auch die
politische Lage vor Ort spielt eine prominente Rolle. Hierzu äußern
sich übereinstimmend besorgt Kölns Oberbürgermeister Fritz
Schramma, der Bethlehemer Bürgermeister Victor Batarseh sowie
der Vorsitzende des „Vereins zur Förderung der Städtepartnerschaft
Köln-Bethlehem“, Altbürgermeister Norbert Burger. Mit besonderem
Interesse wird von den Gastgebern die politische Erklärung
aufgenommen, die der Stadtrat Bethlehems am 17. Mai
verabschiedete111.
19.08.2006:
Mit den Verhaftungen des stellvertretenden Ministerpräsidenten und
Erziehungsministers Nasser a-Shaer, einem pragmatischen
„Hamas“-Mitglied der Autonomiebehörde, und des
Parlamentssekretärs Machmud Ramhi am 20. August befinden sich
gegenwärtig vier Minister und 28 Abgeordnete von „Hamas“ in
israelischen Händen. Ein Sprecher des israelischen
Außenministeriums rechtfertigt die Festnahme mit dem Hinweis,
dass „Hamas“ international als terroristische Vereinigung gelte. Am
22. August wird der seit dem 6. August festgehaltene
palästinensische Parlamentspräsident Abdel Aziz Dweik unter
derselben Beschuldigung einem israelischen Gericht in Fesseln
vorgeführt.
Avi Dichter, israelischer Sicherheitsminister, schlägt die Vorbereitung
von Verhandlungen mit Syrien vor. Im Falle eines Friedensvertrages
müsse Israel zum Verzicht auf die Golanhöhen bereit sein.
Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert widerspricht Dichters Ideen scharf.
Außenministerin Tsipi Livni betraut ihren politischen Berater Yaacov
(„Yaki“) Dayan mit der Prüfung der Chancen für israelisch-syrische
Verhandlungen. In den Medien wird darüber gerätselt, ob diese
Ernennung mit Olmert abgesprochen ist. Im Interview mit der „ZEIT“
am 31. August bezeichnet Livni Meldungen über die Ernennung als
„Übertreibungen“.
18.08.2006:
Das Präsidium der SPD beschließt einstimmig „Anstöße für ein
112
politisches Gesamtkonzept in Nahost“ .
17.08.2006:
Die libanesische Regierung beginnt mit der Stationierung von 15.000
Soldaten im Süden des Landes.
Die Bundestagsfraktion DIE LINKE. legt „Vorschläge für eine neue
deutsche Initiative zur Nahost-Politik“ vor113.
16.08.2006:
Israels Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz will eine Kommission unter
Leitung des ehemaligen Generalstabschefs Amnon Lipkin-Shahak
einsetzen, um die Vorbereitungen und das Vorgehen der Armee im
Krieg gegen die „Hisbollah“ zu untersuchen.
Die Bundesregierung stellt die Stationierung eines deutschen
Versorgungs- und Lazarettschiffes sowie die Entsendung von
Sanitätseinheiten und von Angehörigen der Bundespolizei für die
Sicherung der libanesisch-syrischen Grenze in Aussicht. Nach den
Worten von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel ist der Einsatz
kämpfender Bodentruppen für die Bundesregierung nicht denkbar.
15.08.2006:
Nach einer Ansprache von Präsident Bashar Assad sagt der
deutsche Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier von Amman aus
seinen Besuch in Damaskus ab. Assad hatte am Vormittag den
Widerstand der „Hisbollah“ als einzigen Weg bezeichnet, Israel
niederzuringen114.
14.08.2005:
Nach 33 Tagen endet der Krieg zwischen Israel und der „Hisbollah“.
Die Gesamtverluste während des Krieges werden unterschiedlich
hoch beziffert: Während die Zahl der libanesischen Opfer zwischen
790 und 1150 schwankt, kommen nach israelischen Angaben 118
israelische Soldaten und 43 Zivilisten ums Leben, darunter sechzehn
Araber. Nach Angaben des UN-Flüchtlingswerks schwankt die Zahl
der libanesischen Flüchtlinge zwischen 700.000 und 900.000. Die
Schäden in Libanon sollen zwischen 2,5 und fünf Milliarden USDollar ausmachen.
Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert verteidigt vor der Knesset den Krieg
in Libanon115.
Die Internetzeitung „Hagalil“ meldet, dass der geistliche Führer der
„Sefardischen Torawächter (Shas)“, der ehemalige Oberrabbiner
Ovadia Yosef, gemeinsam mit einem führenden aschkenasischen
Rabbiner regelmäßige Treffen mit „Hamas“ angeregt habe. Sie
sollten als „Begegnung zwischen Hamas und dem jüdischen Volk –
also nicht mit dem Staat Israel“ – ausgewiesen werden, um den
Boykott seitens der israelischen Regierung zu umgehen. Nach
Auffassung des Leiters einer nach dem früheren britischen
Oberrabbiner Immanuel Jakobovits benannten religiösen
Lehranstalt, seines Sohns Shmuel Jakobovits, gebe es zwischen
orthodoxen Juden und Moslems aufgrund ihrer Ablehnung der
westlichen multikulturellen Gesellschaft viele Gemeinsamkeiten.
„Hagalil“ meldet weiter, dass für den amtierenden sefardischen
Oberrabbiner Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron das Verbleiben des Jerusalemer
Tempelberges und der heiligen jüdischen Stätten in der Westbank
bei Israel nicht zwingend sei, solange den Juden der Zugang
gewährt bleibe. Am 9. August hatten hundert US-amerikanische
Rabbiner erklärt, dass das Judentum keinen Alleinanspruch auf den
Tempelberg erhebe, weil er gemäß dem Propheten Jesaja ein Ort
des Gebiets für alle Nationen sei.
Zwei Fernsehjournalisten der US-amerikanischen „Fox News“,
Steven Centanni und Olaf Wiig, werden in Gaza-Stadt von bisher
unbekannten „Brigaden des Heiligen Krieges“ verschleppt. Die
Entführer verlangen, dass „die in den USA inhaftierten Muslime“ bis
zum 25. August freigelassen werden. Mehrere palästinensische
Journalisten schließen sich der Forderung nach Freilassung der
beiden Kollegen an. Sie werden am 27. August auf Vermittlung des
palästinensischen Ministerpräsidenten Ismail Haniyeh freigelassen.
13.08.2006:
Das israelische Kabinett billigt mit 24 Stimmen bei Enthaltung von
Verkehrsminister Shaul Mofaz die Aufforderung des UNSicherheitsrates zum Waffenstillstand. Die libanesische Regierung
hatte ihre Zustimmung schon am 12. August erteilt. Gleichzeitig
kündigt „Hisbollah“-Chef Hassan Nasrallah die Fortsetzung der
Kämpfe an, solange sich israelische Soldaten auf libanesischem
Territorium befänden. Der Waffenstillstand tritt am 14. August um 7
Uhr morgens in Kraft. Außenministerin Tsipi Livni bekräftigt, dass
sich Israel erst dann vollständig aus dem Libanon zurückziehen
werde, wenn die libanesische Armee und die „UN-Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL“) die Kontrolle übernommen hätten. Israel will an
der See- und Luftblockade Libanons festhalten, um den
Waffenschmuggel zu verhindern. Der iranische Präsident Machmud
Achmadinedjad bezeichnet die Resolution als ein „zionistisches
Dokument“.
11.08.2006:
Der UN-Sicherheitsrat verabschiedet die Resolution 1701 nach
Kapitel VI der UN-Charta, der bewaffnete Eingriffe ausschließt116.
Darin werden Israel und die „Hisbollah“ zum sofortigen Ende der
Feindseligkeiten aufgefordert. Die libanesische Regierung und die
UNIFIL, deren Mandat bis zum 31. August 2007 verlängert wird,
werden aufgefordert, ihre Soldaten im Süden Libanons zu
stationieren, während die israelische Regierung aufgerufen wird,
parallel dazu ihre Streitkräfte vom libanesischen Territorium
zurückzuziehen. Die israelische Armee erlebt mit 24 toten Soldaten
ihre schwersten Verluste seit Ausbruch der Kämpfe. Bei israelischen
Luftangriffen kommen 19 Libanesen ums Leben. Die „Hisbollah“
feuert mehr als 250 Raketen auf Haifa und andere Orte in Israel ab,
wobei in Shlomi ein israelischer Mann getötet wird.
07.08.2006:
Die Außenminister der Arabischen Liga treten in Beirut zu einer
Dringlichkeitssitzung zusammen. Dabei unterstützen sie die
Änderungsvorschläge des libanesischen Ministerpräsidenten Fuad
Siniora zum Entwurf der UN-Sicherheitsratsresolution, so den
Rückzug der israelischen Truppen aus dem Süden des Landes und
die Stationierung libanesischer Soldaten. Die israelische Regierung
lehnt diese Vorstellungen umgehend ab.
06.08.2006:
Nach langem Tauziehen zwischen den USA und Frankreich
verständigt sich der UN-Sicherheitsrat auf den Entwurf einer
Libanon-Resolution, in der es heißt: „Der Sicherheitsrat fordert eine
vollständige Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten, in erster Linie auf der
Grundlage der sofortigen Einstellung aller Angriffe der Hisbollah und
der sofortigen Einstellung aller militärischen Offensivoperationen
Israels.“ Die libanesische Regierung lehnt den Entwurf mit der
Begründung ab, er verlange von Israel nicht den Abzug seiner
Truppen von libanesischem Territorium nach Eintritt des
Waffenstillstands. Dagegen zeigt sich die Regierung in Jerusalem
mit dem Text zufrieden. Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel sieht in dem
Entwurf „einen wichtigen Schritt zur Beendigung der
Kampfhandlungen“, er sei „ein starkes Zeichen“.
Beim Angriff einer Katjuscha-Rakete der „Hisbollah“ werden im
nordgaliläischen Kfar Giladi zwölf israelische Reservisten getötet. In
Haifa kommen durch einen weiteren Beschuss drei Bewohner ums
Leben.
In einem Aufruf in „Haaretz“ fordern die israelischen Schriftsteller
Amos Oz, David Grossman und A.B. Yehoshua die Einstellung des
Krieges, bleiben jedoch bei ihrer vor wenigen Tagen abgegebenen
Rechtfertigung der israelischen Militäroperationen: „In unseren
Augen handelt es sich um einen moralisch gerechtern und
völkerrechtlich legitimen Akt der Selbstverteidigung gegen eine
Aggression aus einem feindlich gesinnten Land“, schreiben sie. Am
12. August wird Grossmans Sohn, Uri Grossman, als Soldat im
Libanon getötet.
Die israelischen Sicherheitskräfte nehmen den Präsidenten des
palästinensischen Parlaments Abdel Aziz Dweik in seinem Haus in
Ramallah fest. Dweik sei einer der führenden Repräsentanten von
„Hamas“, lautet die Begründung.
04.08.2006:
Im Interview mit der „Süddeutschen Zeitung“ und anderen Zeitungen
drückt Israels Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert den Wunsch nach
Beteiligung deutscher Soldaten an einer künftigen UN-Schutztruppe
im Süden Libanons zur Verteidigung Israels aus. Der Staatsminister
im Berliner Auswärtigen Amt, Gernot Erler, erklärt in einem Interview,
dass Deutschland nicht allein außergewöhnliche Beziehungen zu
Israel habe, sondern auch „recht gute und einsatzfähige
Beziehungen zu den arabischen Staaten“. Dies bringe die
Bundesregierung in eine Lage, in der „wir unsere guten Dienste
anbieten dafür, um endlich aus dem militärischen Geschehen in
einer Art Verschränkung zwischen militärischen Aktionen und
politischen zu einer diplomatischen Lösung des Konflikts
beizutragen“. Die Einengung des Interesses auf die Entsendung
deutscher Soldaten sei eher störend, „weil wir ja eher glauben, dass
wir unsere Drähte zum Beispiel nach Damaskus, zu den anderen
arabischen Staaten nutzen sollten und auch nutzen können, um
endlich dieser Verhandlungslösung näherzukommen“.
Juli 2006
30.07.2006:
Bei einem israelischen Luftangriff auf das südlibanesische Dorf Kafr
Kana werden 28 Dorfbewohner getötet. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat
äußert sich „extrem schockiert und erschüttert“.
27.07.2006:
Israels Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz kündigt die Einberufung
weiterer Reservisten an. Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert verlangt die
Verstärkung der militärischen Offensive.
26.07.2006:
In Rom findet eine internationale Libanon-Konferenz statt. Zu ihr hat
die „Libanon-Kerngruppe“ aus USA, EU, UN, Russland, Frankreich,
Großbritannien, Libanon, Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien und die Weltbank
eingeladen. Israel, Syrien und Iran sind nicht eingeladen. Die
Teilnehmerstaaten halten eine Waffenruhe für dringlich, können sich
aber nicht auf die Forderung nach einem sofortigen Waffenstillstand
verständigen.
Bei zwei israelischen Luftangriffen im nördlichen Gazastreifen
werden sieben Palästinenser getötet.
Beim israelischen Beschuss einer Beobachtungsstation der „United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)“, die seit 1978 in Libanon
stationiert ist, werden vier der rund 2000 unbewaffneten UNBeobachter aus Österreich, Finnland, Kanada und China getötet.
UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan beschuldigt Israel, den Stützpunkt
„offensichtlich vorsätzlich“ angegriffen zu haben. Die österreichische
Außenministerin Ursula Plassnik verurteilt den Angriff scharf und
bestellt den israelischen Botschafter ein. Der finnische
Außenminister Erkki Tuomioja, gegenwärtig EU-Ratsvorsitzender,
bezeichnet den Vorfall als „völlig inakzeptabel“, Bundeskanzlerin
Angela Merkel belässt es bei einem „tiefen Bedauern“. Frankreichs
Präsident Jacques Chirac erklärt, wer Friedenssoldaten angreife,
greife die internationale Gemeinschaft an. Nach UN-Untersuchungen
sollen Präzisionsbomben abgefeuert worden sein. Die israelischen
Streitkräfte hätten zuvor auf zehn Bitten nicht reagiert, den UNPosten nicht anzugreifen. Israels Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert
bedauert den Tod, weist aber die Vorwürfe Annans zurück, zeigt sich
aber „tief schockiert“. Der Sicherheitsrat scheitert am Veto der USA
mit einem Resolutionsentwurf, in dem Israel für den Tod der UNSoldaten verantwortlich gemacht werden soll.
Die Europäische Union gibt weitere zehn Millionen Euro als
humanitäre Soforthilfe für Libanesen frei. Insgesamt sollen fünfzig
Millionen EU zur Verfügung gestellt werden.
25.07.2006:
Der libanesische Präsident Emile Lahoud beschuldigt die
israelischen Streitkräfte, Phosphorbomben einzusetzen. Auf Zypern
tätige Ärzte, die dorthin geflohene Ausländer betreuen, bestätigen
den Verdacht.
Die israelischen Streitkräfte erleben ihre stärksten Verluste in
Libanon mit dem Tod von acht Soldaten, die in einen Hinterhalt der
„Hisbollah“ geraten.
24.07.2006:
US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice trifft in Beirut zu
Sondierungsgesprächen über einen Waffenstillstand ein, bevor sie
am Abend nach Jerusalem weiterreist. Zum ersten Mal befürwortet
sie eine Waffenruhe.
Beim israelischen Artilleriebeschuss, der einer Waffenwerkstatt des
„Islamischen Djihad“ in Gaza-Stadt gelten soll, werden fünf
Palästinenser getötet.
21.07.2006:
Israel zieht mehrere tausend Reservisten an seiner Nordgrenze zur
Verstärkung seiner Bodentruppen im Süden Libanons ein.
Beim Beschuss eines Hauses im Gazastreifen sterben fünf
Palästinenser, eine Mutter, ihre drei Kinder und ein Verwandter.
Beim Besuch des saudischen Kornprinzen Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz in
Paris unterzeichnet der französische Staatspräsident Jacques Chirac
mit dem Königreich ein Memorandum, mit dem der 1982 zwischen
beiden Staaten geschlossene Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspakt
erweitert wird.
20.07.2006:
Das israelische Militär beginnt mit dem Einsatz von Bodentruppen in
Libanon, verneint jedoch die Absicht einer Invasion. Die Medien
berichten, dass Ehud Olmert einen zwei Kilometer breiten
Sicherheitsstreifen auf libanesischem Territorium anstrebe, bis ein
UN-Mandat beschlossen sei.
Im Flüchtlingslager Mughazi bei Nablus sterben fünfzehn
Palästinenser, als das israelische Militär vorrückt.
19.07.2006:
Die israelische Armee fordert die Bevölkerung im Süden Libanons
zur Flucht auf, um sich vor israelischen Angriffen zu schützen. Nach
Agenturmeldungen befinden sich bereits mehr als eine halbe Million
Libanesen auf der Flucht.
Die israelischen Medien berichten über den ersten
Kriegsdienstverweigerer Itzik Shabbat.
Im Gazastreifen sterben zwanzig Palästinenser.
16.07.2006:
Auf dem Weltwirtschaftsgipfel im russischen St. Petersburg stellen
die Teilnehmerstaaten eine UN-Friedenstruppe im Libanon in
Aussicht.
12.07.2006:
Im Zuge eines Luftangriffs auf Gaza-Stadt nimmt das israelische
Militär den 36jährigen „Bombenbauer“ Mohammed Deif fest, der von
Israel als Nummer 1 des militärischen Arms von „Hamas“, den „Iz alDin al-Quassam“-Brigaden, zwei Jahre lang gesucht worden ist. Bei
den Angriffen werden vierundzwanzig Personen getötet, darunter
viele Kinder. Der Führer der Brigaden Raed Sayed entkommt. Durch
die jüngsten Militäroperationen wird der Gazastreifen faktisch geteilt.
„Hisbollah“-Angehörige töten, um palästinensische Gefangene
freizupressen, drei israelische Soldaten bei einem Angriff auf eine
israelische Geländewagen-Patrouille an der libanesischen Grenze
und entführen zwei weitere Soldaten, Udi Goldwasser und Eldad
Regev. Die libanesische Polizei und „Hisbollah“ behaupten, dass
sich die Soldaten auf der Straße bei Aitaa el-Chaab 120 Meter
innerhalb Libanons aufgehalten hätten. In einer „Hisbollah“-Erklärung
heißt es in diesem Sine: „In Erfüllung unseres Versprechens,
arabische Gefangene aus israelischen Gefängnissen zu befreien,
haben unsere Kämpfer in Südlibanon zwei israelische Soldaten
gefangen genommen.“ Das israelische Militär zieht sechstausend
Reservisten ein und rückt in Richtung Beirut vor, wobei Brücken und
Straßen zerstört werden, um den Rückzug der „Hisbollah“ zu
erschweren. Die Regierung in Jerusalem beschuldigt die Regierung
in Beirut, der „Hisbollah“ freie Hand zu lassen. Generalstabschef
Dan Halutz droht, „die Uhr im Libanon um zwanzig Jahre
zurückzudrehen“. Vier Soldaten kommen ums Leben. Durch einen
Raketenbeschuss aus dem Libanon wird in der nordisraelischen
Stadt Nahariya eine Frau getötet. Viele Bewohner verlassen die
Stadt. Nach dem vergeblichen Versuch der israelischen Luftwaffe,
den Wohnsitz von Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut zu töteten,
erklärt dieser Israel den „offenen Krieg“. Israel beginnt die „Operation
Richtungswechsel“ („Shinui Kivun“), die „Hisbollah“ die „Operation
verlässliches Versprechen“ („Amaliye al-Waad al-Sadeq“).
Die US-amerikanische Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice begnügt
sich in einer Presseerklärung mit der Entführung der beiden
Soldaten durch die „Hisbollah“ und weist der Regierung in Damaskus
eine besondere Verantwortung bei i9hrer Freilassung zu. Die
Bundesregierung verurteilte die Entführung „auf das schärfste“. Der
israelische UN-Botschafter Dan Gillerman verlangt in einem
Schreiben vom 12. Juli an UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan die
Befassung der UN-Vollversammlung mit dem israelischlibanesischen Konflikt117.
Der frühere Auslandsgeheimdienstchef und heutige Abgeordnete der
Arbeitspartei Dani Yatom spricht sich in einem Fernsehinterview für
die Freilassung von palästinensischen Gefangenen zum Zwecke der
Vertrauensbildung aus, wenn der „Qassam“-Beschuss vom
Gazastreifen eingestellt werden sollte.
Die in London erscheinende panarabisch orientierte Zeitung „alHayyat“ („Das Leben“) berichtet von Rücktrittsabsichten, die
Präsident Machmud Abbas geäußert haben soll.
11.07.2006:
In einem Meinungsbeitrag in der „Washington Post“ verlangt der
palästinensische Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh die Errichtung
eines palästinensischen Staates in der Westbank und im
Gazastreifen mit der Hauptstadt im arabischen Ost-Jerusalem sowie
eine faire Lösung der palästinensischen Flüchtlingsfrage von 1948
auf der Basis internationaler Legitimität und anerkannten Rechts.
Bedeutsame Verhandlungen mit einem nicht-expansionistischen
Israel, das sich an die Gesetze halte, könnten erst nach Beginn
dieser gewaltigen Arbeit beginnen118.
Die Europäische Union beginnt mit ihrer Finanzhilfe in monatlicher
Höhe von 600.000 Euro zur Sicherstellung medizinischer Leistungen
in Krankenhäusern des Gazastreifens.
Sechs israelische Menschenrechtsorganisationen verlangen vom
Obersten Gericht, juristisch gegen den unproportionalen Einsatz der
israelischen Streitkräfte im Gazastreifen einzuschreiten. Israel sei
gemäß dem internationalen und dem nationalen Recht verpflichtet,
zwischen militärischen und zivilen Zielen zu unterscheiden, heißt es
in der Petition. Außerdem fordern die Organisationen die Öffnung
der Grenzübergänge für die Einfuhr von Lebensmitteln,
medizinischen Gütern, Kraftstoffen und anderen lebenswichtigen
Produkten.
Auf einem Symposium aus Anlass seines neuen Essay-Bandes
„Israel – Palästina: Frieden oder Heiliger Krieg“ erklärt der
peruanische Schriftsteller Mario Vargas Llorca gegenüber „Haaretz“,
als Freund Israels empfinde er Scham angesichts dessen
proportionsloser militärischer Operationen im Gazastreifen. Es sei
die Rolle der Freunde Israels, seine Politik vernehmlich zu kritisieren.
10.07.2006:
Präsident Machmud Abbas erklärt in einem Dekret, das er an die
palästinensischen Botschaften und Vertretungen verteilen lässt, dass
der Chef des Politbüros der PLO, der in Tunis residierende Faruk
Kadumi, palästinensischer Außenminister sei, der das
palästinensische Volk vertrete. Die von „Hamas“ geführte Regierung
sei lediglich für die innenpolitischen Belange zuständig und trage für
die Außenpolitik keine Verantwortung. Abbas’ Anordnung legt es
darauf an, den nominellen „Hamas“-Außenminister Machmud Zahhar
auszuschalten.
Die israelische Außenministerin Zippora („Tsipi“) Livni wendet sich in
der Knesset gegen Interpretationen, wonach der „Neuordnungsplan“
(„convergence plan“) ihrer Regierung darauf hinauslaufe, dass den
Palästinensern in der Westbank eines Tages der Schlüssel über den
Zaun geworfen werde und dann alles in Ordnung sei. Auf einer
internationalen Pressekonferenz bekräftigt Ministerpräsident Ehud
Olmert seine Absicht eines Rückzugs aus dem größten Teil der
Westbank, so dass ein palästinensischer Staat an der Seite Israels
119
entstehen könne . Der Prozess der Trennung von Israelis und
Palästinensern sei unabwendbar. Bauminister Meir Sheetrit, der um
bei den nächsten parteiinternen Wahlen Olmert als Vorsitzenden von
„Kadima“ herausfordern will, erklärt gegenüber dem Fernsehen, dass
er nicht an eine unilaterale Entflechtung glaube. Sein Kollege, der für
die innere Sicherheit zuständige Avi Dichter, bekräftigt seine
Auffassung, dass die israelischen Streitkräfte auch nach Abschluss
des „Neuordnungsplanes“ überall in der Westbank verbleiben
müssten, bis eine verantwortliche palästinensische Entität
geschaffen sei. Olmerts Büro bestätigt, dass der „Neuordnungsplan“
bislang nicht im Kabinett erörtert worden sei. Die
Fraktionsvorsitzende von „Meretz/Yachad“ Zahava Gal-On fordert
Generalstaatsanwalt Menachem Mazouz auf, von Olmert gemäß
dem Grundgesetz über die Regierung eine Erklärung vor der
Knesset über den Kriegszustand zu verlangen.
08.07.2006:
Der finnische Außenminister Erkki Tuomioja äußert als neuer EURatspräsident die „Sorge angesichts der neuen Verluste an
Menschenleben, die durch den disproportionalen Einsatz von Gewalt
durch die israelische Armee [in der „Operation Richtungsänderung“]
verursacht worden“ sei. Zwar müsse der israelische Soldat Gilad
Shalit von den Palästinensern bedingungslos freigelassen werden,
aber seine Entführung rechtfertige nicht die kollektive Bestrafung der
ganzen Bevölkerung im Gazastreifen. Die israelische
Außenministerin Tsipi Livni bedauert, dass in auswärtigen
Erklärungen zunehmend die Begriffe „disproportionaler Einsatz von
Gewalt“ und „kollektive Bestrafung“ Eingang gefunden hätten.
06.07.2006:
Die Kieler HDW-Werft schließt mit Israel einen Vertrag über die
Lieferung von zwei U-Booten der Dolphin-Klasse. Von den
Gesamtkosten soll ein Drittel, rund 333 Millionen Euro, von der
Bundesrepublik übernommen werden. Am 24. August fordert der
Verteidigungsexperte von „Bündnis 90/Die Grünen“ im Bundestag,
Winfried Nachtwei, die Bundesregierung müsse sicherstellen, dass
die U-Boote nicht nur nuklearen Aufrüstung benutzt würden.
Juni 2006
28.06.2006:
Das palästinensische „Nationale Versöhnungsdokument“ wird
vorgelegt120.
25.06.2006:
Mehrere palästinensische Einheiten unter Führung von „Hamas“
greifen den israelischen Grenzort Kerem Shalom an und entführen
den israelischen Unteroffizier Gilad Shalit, zwei israelische Soldaten
werden getötet. Damit beendet „Hamas“ die seit 2005 eingehaltene
Waffenruhe („hudna“). Die israelischen Streitkräfte leiten eine
umfangreiche Offensive unter dem Namen „Sommerregen“ im
Gazastreifen zu Boden, Luft und Wasser ein, bei bis zu einem
Waffenstillstand am 26. November fünf Israelis (davon einer durch
„frienly fire“) und 416 Palästinenser getötet werden. Der UNSicherheitsrat findet am 30. Juni keine gemeinsame Stellungnahme.
Dagegen erklärt das Schweizer Außenministerium am 4. Juli, dass
die Militäraktion in mehrfacher Hinsicht das Prinzip der
Proportionalität der Mittel verletze und eine Form kollektiver
Bestrafung darstelle. Ohne sie beim Namen zu nennen, bezieht sich
die Schweizer Erklärung auf die Vierte Genfer Konvention von 1949.
Am 06. Juli verurteilt der neue UN-Menschenrechtsrat die
israelischen Militäraktionen, wobei sich die Mitglieder der
Europäischen Union der Zustimmung enthalten.
22.06.2006:
Bei einem Treffen von Nobelpreisträgern in Petra (Jordanien) finden
zwischen Machmud Abbas, Ehud Olmert und Eli Wiesel kurze
Gespräche statt. Abbas und Olmert vereinbaren einen
Verhandlungstermin „in den kommenden Wochen“. Bei einer
anschließenden Wirtschaftskonferenz in Jerusalem spricht sich
Olmert für die Fortsetzung der „gezielten Tötungen“ von
Palästinensern aus, bedauert aber „aus tiefstem Herzen“ Opfer unter
der Zivilbevölkerung. Bei einer sich anschließenden Konferenz
erklärt Olmert, dass jeder Siedler entscheiden müsse, ob er künftig
in einem palästinensischen Staat leben wolle, wenn der
„Konvergenzplan“ zum durchgesetzt wird. Olmert beantwortet damit
die Beschuldigung des israelischen Nobelpreisträgers für Ökonomie,
Israel (Robert) Aumann, dass die geplanten Evakuierungen „ein
Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit“ seien.
In einem Exklusivbericht meldet die „Jerusalem Post“, dass das
israelische Militär das Nato-Hauptquartier in Brüssel davon informiert
habe, israelische Hilfs- und Rettungseinheiten stünden ab sofort als
Teil der westlichen Militärallianz zur Verfügung. Ein hochrangiger
israelischer Offizier werde in den kommenden Monaten nach Neapel
entsandt werden, um an Antiterror-Operationen teilzunehmen. Das
Angebot, so die Zeitung, solle die Beziehungen zwischen Israel und
der Nato aufwerten.
In einer vorab veröffentlichten Rezension des Buches von Gershom
Gorenberg „The Accidental Empire. Israel and the Birth of the
Settlements, 1967–1977“121 in der Website „The New York Review of
Books“ bezeichnet der israelische Publizist und Autor Amos Elon
unter dem Titel „What Does Olmert Want“ die israelische Okkupation
als eine „monströse Krankheit“, deren Tage gezählt seien. Eine
nähere Begründung für diese Einschätzung liefert Elon nicht.
21.06.2006:
In einer knappen Bilanz meldet das „United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)“ in Jerusalem, dass
zwischen dem 09. und 21. Juni insgesamt 23 Palästinenser getötet
und 88 verletzt worden sind. Auf israelischer Seite gab es im selben
Zeitraum sechs Verletzte unter der Zivilbevölkerung.
20.06.2006:
„Haaretz“ berichtet, dass das israelische Verteidigungsministerium
an einem Kodex arbeite, der Kontakte mit Angehörigen der
Autonomiebehörde erlauben soll, ohne die Kontaktsperre gegenüber
„Hamas“ zu verletzen.
Der Londoner „Guardian“ veröffentlicht einen Bericht von Max
Hastings, wonach die Enttäuschung in den jüdischen Gemeinden
Europas über die israelische Politik wächst. Das Blatt zitiert aus
einem Buch „The Divided Self“ von David Goldberg, dem Rabbiner
der liberalen Synagoge in London, wonach die Diaspora die Ehre
und das Erbe des jüdischen Volkes mehr als Israels Bürger
bewahre.
19.06.2006:
Der israelische Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz (Arbeitspartei)
möchte nach einem Bericht von „Haaretz“ den Gesamtverlauf der
Sperranlagen einer Prüfung und gegebenenfalls der Revision
unterziehen lassen, um den Interessen der palästinensischen
Bevölkerung Rechnung zu tragen. Die „Trennungsmauern“ dürften
nicht zur „Zementierung von Gebietsansprüchen“ missbraucht
werden.
Die EU-Außenkommissarin Benita Ferrero Waldner trifft in
Jerusalem mit Außenministerin „Tsipi“ Livni zusammen und
überreicht ihr Pläne für die Kanalisierung der europäischen
Hilfszahlungen an die Palästinenser. Besonders strittig sind
„Gehälter“ an palästinensische Ärzte, die nach israelischer
Auffassung die Sanktionen gegen „Hamas“ unterlaufen würden. Die
Europäer schlagen deshalb die Bezahlung von „Vergütungen“ vor.
Ferrero-Waldner hebt hervor, dass die Europäer keinen einseitig
festgelegten Grenzverlauf akzeptieren würden.
Bei einer Meinungsumfrage des „Palestinian Research Center for
Policy and Survey Research“ unter Leitung von Khalil Shikaki
(Ramallah) sprechen sich 73 für die Wahrnehmung des Rechts auf
Widerstand mit allen Mitteln gegen die israelische Besatzung
innerhalb der besetzten Gebiete von 1967 aus.
18.06.2006:
Machmud Abbas ruft von Amman aus die arabischen Staaten dazu
auf, den „Konvergenzplan“ von Ehud Olmert zu verhindern und die
Regierung in Jerusalem auf die Übernahme der „Road Map“ zu
verpflichten.
Die konkurrierenden palästinensischen Parteien verständigen sich
auf 15 der 18 Artikel des „Nationalen Konsensprogramms“ der in
Israel einsitzenden Häftlinge122. Die drei ausstehenden Fragen
betreffen die Rolle der PLO, den Widerstand und den Charakter
einer Schlussvereinbarung mit den Israelis.
Der Präsident der „al-Quds“-Universität Sari Nusseibeh erklärt
gegenüber der Nachrichtenagentur Associated Press, die von
„Haaretz“ in der heutigen Ausgabe zitiert wird, dass er gegen den
von britischen Dozenten ausgehenden Boykott israelischer
Universitäten sei123. Denn dort habe er die fortschrittlichsten
Friedenskräfte angetroffen. „Wenn man einen Sektor [in Israel]
bestrafen will, dann ist dies der letzte, dem man sich zuwenden
sollte.“ Er wundere sich, wird der Politologe David Newman (Ben-
Gurion-Universität, Beersheva) in „Haaretz“ zitiert, nicht China, Chile
oder Burma mit einem akademischen Boykott bedroht würden,
obwohl die dortige Achtung der Menschenrechte ungleich weniger
verbreitet sei. Anscheinend werde Israel ständig als Sonderfall
behandelt.
Der Präsident des israelischen Obersten Gerichts Aharon Barak
erklärt gegenüber einer Delegation US-amerikanischer Juden, dass
das in Israel geltende Verbot der zivilen Eheschließung eine schwere
Verletzung von Menschenrechten darstelle. Nach israelischem Recht
sind Eheschließungen nur unter Religionsgleichen möglich. Da das
jüdische Eherecht unter der Kontrolle des orthodoxen Rabbinats
steht, sind auch Eheschließungen zwischen orthodoxen und Juden
erschwert, die sich zu einer anderen Glaubensinterpretation
bekennen.
17.06.2006:
Der Israel-Korrespondent der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung“,
Jörg Bremer, berichtet, dass „Hamas“ in den vergangenen Monaten
mehrere hundert Millionen Euro über den Grenzübergang Rafach
von Ägypten in den Gazastreifen geschmuggelt habe. Allein der
palästinensische Außenminister Machmud Zahhar sei vor kurzem
mit zwanzig Millionen Euro an der Grenze festgehalten worden. Das
Geld solle zur Bezahlung der rund 3000 Milizionäre von „Hamas“
dienen. Im Gegensatz dazu verteidigt Machmud Abbas generell den
Transfer von Finanzmitteln, weil es kein Gesetz gebe, das ihn
verbiete.
16.06.2006:
Die 25 Staats- und Regierungschefs der Europäischen Union stellen
aus Mitteln des Gemeinschaftshaushalts den Palästinensern hundert
Millionen Euro für Gesundheits- und Sozialdienste einschließlich der
Grundversorgung mit Wasser und Elektrizität zur Verfügung. Das
Geld soll über den neuen Finanzmechanismus („Temporary
International Mechanism“), an dem die Weltbank beteiligt ist, auf ein
Konto von Präsident Machmud Abbas ausgezahlt werden. Die
israelische Regierung reagiert verhalten. Das Nahost-„Quartett“
bestätigt am 17. Juni die Entscheidung für die auf drei Monate
angelegte Soforthilfe124.
15.06.2006:
Bei der Überreichung der Ehrendoktorwürde an der al-NadjachUniversität in Nablus weist Machmud Abbas Behauptungen der
israelischen Medien, dass Israel der Präsidentengarde Waffen
liefere, als Lügen zurück, die das palästinensische Volk spalten
sollen. Jede auswärtige Hilfe werde dem Finanzministerium
ausgezahlt, denn die Autonomiebehörde könne nicht mit
geschmuggeltem Geld überleben.
14.06.2006:
Das Oberste Gericht Israels entscheidet, dass der Verlauf eines fünf
Kilometer langen Abschnitts des Trennungswalls östlich der
jüdischen Siedlung Tsufin bei Qalqilya als politisch motiviert sei und
verlangt Korrekturen innerhalb von sechs Monaten. In ihrem Urteil
beschuldigt das Gericht die Regierung, nur „teilweise richtige“
Informationen geliefert zu haben. Shaul Arieli, Mitglied des
israelischen Verhandlungsteams der „Genfer Initiative“ und
Gutachter vor dem Obersten Gericht, erklärt am 18. Juni im
israelischen Armeerundfunk, dass er besonders um Jerusalem
Veränderungen beim Verlauf der „Trennungsmauern“ erwartet. In
nicht wenigen Fällen kämen sie einer Annexion gleich.
13.06.2006:
Wegen der innerpalästinensischen Gewalttätigkeiten tritt
Tourismusminister Djudeh Murkos, der einzige Christ im
palästinensischen Kabinett, von seinem Amt zurück.
Bei seinem Besuch in London berichtet Ministerpräsident Ehud
Olmert von israelischen Waffenlieferungen an die Machmud Abbas
unterstehenden Sicherheitskräfte.
125
Die „International Crisis Group“ kritisiert in seinem jüngsten
Bericht, dass es die westlichen Regierungen über den Boykott von
„Hamas“ hinaus an der Formulierung politischer Perspektiven
mangeln lassen.
12.06.2006:
Bei Schießereien zwischen „Fatah“- und „Hamas“-Anhängern in
Gaza-Stadt sterben zwei Menschen. „Fatah“-Anhänger der „al.AqzaBrigaden“ stürmen in Ramallah das Gebäude des Parlaments und
das leer stehende Büro von Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh und
legen Feuer. Ein „Hamas“-Abgeordneter wird vorübergehend
entführt. Voraus gehen laute Auseinandersetzungen im Parlament
über das von Machmud Abbas angekündigte Referendum über das
„Nationale Konsensprogramm“. Das Parlament verschiebt seine
Entscheidung darüber auf den 20. Juni. Gespräche am 11. und 12.
Juni zwischen Abbas und Haniyeh in Gaza-City enden ergebnislos.
Erst am 14. Juni verständigen sich beide darauf, den Kämpfen ein
Ende zu setzen.
10.06.2006:
Die zu „Hamas“ gehörigen, in Israel einsitzenden palästinensischen
Häftlinge – darunter Abdel Khaleq Natche – ziehen ihre Unterschrift
unter das „Nationale Konsensprogramm“ zurück, weil sie das von
Machmud Abbas’ geplante Referendum ablehnen, und bezeichnen
es lediglich als Grundlage für den Dialog. Abbas missbrauche das
Dokument in nicht hinnehmbarer Weise, klagt Natche.
09.06.2006:
Nach einer Umfrage der Universität Tel Aviv im Auftrag von
„Haaretz“ zeigen sich nur 35 Prozent der Israelis von Ehud Olmerts
„Konvergenzplan“ erfreut, während sich 56 Prozent dagegen
aussprechen. Unter den Gegnern befinden sich 83 Prozent, die am
28. März für die orthodoxen „Sefardischen Torawächter (Shas)“
stimmten.
Israelische Kanonenboote töten am Strand im Norden des
Gazastreifens sieben Mitglieder einer palästinensischen Familie –
darunter eine Mutter mit zwei Babys –, nachdem einen Tag zuvor der
Milizenführer Djamal Abu Samhadana („Hamas“) getötet worden ist,
der vom Innenministerium als Inspekteur nominiert worden war. Die
israelische Armee entschuldigt sich auf den „Schlag gegen
Unschuldige“, Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz und
Generalstabschef Dan Halutz ordnen eine Untersuchung an. Der
Vorsitzende von „Meretz/Yachad“ Yossi Beilin fordert den Rücktritt
von Peretz. Zuvor tötet die israelische Luftwaffe drei Mitglieder eines
„Komitees des Volkswiderstandes“, als diese eine Rakete auf die
israelische Stadt Sderot abfeuern wollen. Präsident Machmud Abbas
verurteilt das „blutige Massaker“ auf Unschuldige, will aber an seinen
Referendumsabsichten festhalten. Westliche Regierungen bedauern
die israelischen Operationen und fordern beide Seiten zur
Zurückhaltung auf. Die „Hamas“ kündigt die Waffenruhe („hudna“)
auf. An der Protestdemonstration in Tel Aviv mit rund zweihundert
Teilnehmern nimmt auch die Tochter des Ministerpräsidenten Dana
Olmert teil. Ein israelischer Untersuchungsausschuss unter Leitung
von Generalmajor Meir Kalifi kommt am 13. Juni zu dem Ergebnis,
dass die Detonation auf eine Bombe zurückgeführt werden müsse,
die von „Hamas“-Angehörigen im Sand vergraben worden sei, um
die Landung israelischer Marineboote zu verhindern.
Palästinensische Kommentatoren äußern sich vorsichtig dazu. Dan
Chalutz lehnt eine internationale Untersuchungskommission ab. Die
Abgeordnete von „Meretz/Yachad“, Zahava Gal-On, wird als
„Dolchstoß-Politikerin“ beschimpft, als sie ebenfalls eine
unabhängige Untersuchung verlangt. Die
Nichtregierungsorganisation „Human Rights Watch“ bleibt bei ihrer
Darstellung, dass das israelische Militär die Verantwortung für den
Tod der sieben Palästinenser trägt. Am 12. Juni sterben im
Gazastreifen erneut elf Palästinenser nach israelischem Beschuss.
Machmud Abbas bezeichnet ihn als „Staatsterror“.
08.06.2006:
Ehud Olmert reist zu seinem Antrittsbesuch nach Amman. Am
Vorabend warnt König Abdullah II. in einem Interview mit der
israelischen Zeitung „Yediot Achronot“ („Letzte Nachrichten“) die
israelische Regierung vor einseitigen Schritten in der Westbank.
Gleichzeitig unterstützt er indirekt Machmud Abbas’
Referendumsabsichten. Die Warnung vor einseitigen Maßnahmen
Israels wiederholt Abdullah II. in seinem Direktgespräch mit Olmert.
„Jordanien ist Jordanien, und Palästina ist Palästina“, heißt es in
jordanischen Medienberichten in Anspielung auf israelischen Thesen
aus den 1980er Jahren, wonach die wahre Heimat der Palästinenser
Jordanien sei („jordanische Option“). Bei der abschließenden
Pressekonferenz beschränken sich der König und Olmert auf kurze
Erklärungen, während Fragen nicht beantwortet werden.
Nach Angaben aus dem Umfeld von Machmud Abbas soll das
Referendum über das „Nationale Konsensprogramm“ der
palästinensischen Häftlinge am 26. Juli stattfinden. Es soll sich auf
die Frage „Stimmen Sie dem Programm zu oder nicht?“
beschränken.
Nach einem Exklusivbericht der „Jerusalem Post“ hat der
palästinensische Finanzminister Omar Abdel Razeq („Hamas“) einen
schriftlichen Hilferuf an seinen israelischen Amtskollegen Avraham
Hirchson gerichtet, in dem er dringend um die Überweisung der
ausstehenden Zahlungen aus einbehaltenen Zolleinnahmen ersucht,
die der Autonomiebehörde laut „Pariser Protokoll“ vom April 1994
126
sowie Steuereinnahmen zustehen . Hirchson habe nicht die
Absicht, den Brief zu beantworten, denn „Hamas“ könne nicht auf die
Einhaltung von Vereinbarungen dringen, die sie nicht anerkenne,
schreibt das Blatt unter Berufung auf das israelische
Finanzministerium.
07.06.2006:
Fünf palästinensische Parteien und Gruppen, darunter „Hamas“ und
„Islamischer Djihad“, weisen die Referendumsabsichten von
Machmud Abbas zurück.
06.06.2006:
Der Vorstand („Executive Committee“) der PLO stimmt in Ramallah
der Durchführung eines Referendums über das „Nationale
Konsensprogramm“ der palästinensischen Häftlinge zu.
05.06.2006:
„Haaretz“ berichtet, dass Yasser Abed Rabbo, Leiter des
palästinensischen Teams der „Genfer Initiative“ und gegenwärtig
Beauftragter von Präsident Machmud Abbas für die Durchführung
eines Referendums über das „Nationale Konsensprogramm“ der in
Israel festgehaltenen Häftlinge127, darauf besteht, dass das an
„Hamas“ gerichtete Ultimatum heute um Mitternacht abläuft und nicht
verlängert wird. Am Nachmittag besuchen „Fatah“-Abgeordnete
Marwan Barghouti im israelischen Gefängnis „Hadarim“ bei Tel Aviv,
um mit ihm die Lage zu erörtern. Andere Abgeordnete spekulieren
öffentlich über eine Neuwahl des Parlaments, wenn „Hamas“ den
Termin verstreichen lassen sollte. Repräsentanten von „Hamas“
verlangen eine Revision des Programms, um es annehmbar zu
machen. Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh wiederholt seinen
Standpunkt, dass es für ein Referendum keine gesetzliche
Grundlage gebe. Im Vorfeld kommen am 4. und 5. Juni fünf
Palästinenser bei Zusammenstößen zwischen den Parteien im
Gazastreifen ums Leben. Am selben Tag erklärt der israelische
Minister für Innere Sicherheit, Avi Dichter, auf der wöchentlichen
Kabinettssitzung in Jerusalem, dass das Programm der „Mörder“
nichts enthalte, was den politischen Vorstellungen Ehud Olmerts
entspreche. Am 6. Juni erklärt sich Abbas bereit, die Zeit für eine
Übereinkunft zu verlängern.
Bei der gemeinsamen Pressekonferenz mit Machmud Abbas in
Ramallah kündigt der EU-Außenkommissar Javier Solana an, dass
die Europäische Union die Palästinenser nicht enttäuschen werde.
Die Finanzhilfe 2006 werde höher als die im vergangenen Jahr
liegen, erklärt Solana. Außenministerin Tsipi Livni kündigt vor dem
Außen- und Sicherheitsausschuss der Knesset an, dass ihre
Regierung die Namen der Regierungsmitglieder und Parlamentarier,
die „Hamas“ angehören, den Europäern übermitteln werde, damit
das Geld nicht in ihre Hände gelange. Sie beobachte mit Sorge die
schleichende Delegitimierung Israel als Staat des jüdischen Volkes
und habe die israelischen Botschaften angewiesen, dagegen
vorzugehen. Außerdem sollen sie auf die Regelung des Konflikts im
Rahmen einer Zweistaatenlösung hinweisen.
04.06.2006:
Der aus dem Amt scheidende Vorsitzende des israelischen
Nationalen Sicherheitsrates, Generalmajor Giora Eiland, betont in
einem „Haaretz“-Interview, dass der einseitige Rückzug Israels aus
dem Gazastreifen keinen Beitrag zur Lösung des Konflikts mit den
Palästinensern leiste, vielmehr sei er eine „verpasste Gelegenheit
historischen Ausmaßes“. Der israelische Weg einseitiger
Entscheidungen führe zu der klassischen Lösung zweier Staaten für
zwei Völker auf der Basis der Grenzen von 1967, doch sei dies ein
Irrweg. Denn allein zwischen dem Mittelmehr und dem Jordan gebe
es keinen Platz für zwei Staaten. Für verteidigungsfähige Grenzen
brauche Israel zwölf Prozent der Westbank. Da ein palästinensischer
Staat selbst in allen Teilen der Westbank und des Gazastreifens
nicht lebensfähig sei – er werde arm und radikal sein, und der
demographische Druck werde unerträglich werden –, schlägt Eiland
vor, a) dass Ägypten 600 Quadratkilometer in der nördlichen SinaiHalbinsel an den künftigen palästinensischen Staat für einen Seeund einen Lufthafen sowie eine palästinensische Millionenstadt
abgibt; b) dass Israel im südlichen Negev Ägypten mit 150
Quadratkilometern entschädigt und für internationale ökonomische
Kompensationen sorgt; c) dass zwischen Israel und Jordanien
nördlich von Eilat ein Tunnel gebaut wird128; d) dass Jordanien 100
Quadratkilometer an den palästinensischen Staat abgibt, so dass
dieser nicht nur in zwölf, sondern in 17 Prozent des historischen
Palästina entstehen würde. Der frühere Ministerpräsident Achmed
Qureia („Abu Ala“), der ehemalige Sicherheitschef in der Westbank
Mohammed Dachlan und andere hätten sich an seinem, Eiland, Plan
interessiert gezeigt, denn die Palästinenser „sind praktischer, als wir
meinen“. Zu ägyptischen und jordanischen Reaktionen auf seine
Überlegungen äußert sich Eiland vage. Ihren Leitartikel stellt
„Haaretz“ am 7. Juni unter die sarkastische Überschrift „Eiland hat
keinen Partner“. Wohnungsbauminister Meir Sheetrit beklagt sich
darüber, dass im Kabinett bislang keine Debatte über den
Konvergenzplan stattgefunden habe.
Nach dem Kairoer Außenminister Achmed Aboul Gheit im
ägyptischen Fernsehen begrüßt Präsident Hosni Mubarak bei
seinem ersten Treffen mit Israels Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert im
Hotel „Mövenpick“ in Sharm el-Sheikh jeden Rückzug Israels aus der
Westbank, verlangt aber dazu Verhandlungen mit der
Autonomiebehörde. Wenn sie scheiterten, müssten andere Wege
gefunden werden. Wenn Israel und die Palästinenser einen Vertrag
erreichten, würden die arabischen Staaten ihre offiziellen
Beziehungen zu Israel einer Revision unterziehen. Erneut lehnt
Mubarak auf der gemeinsamen Pressekonferenz einseitige
Entscheidungen Israels ab. Olmert wiederholt die israelische
Bindung an die „Road Map“ als Weg für „echte Fortschritte“ sowie
die Bereitschaft zu Verhandlungen mit Machmud Abbas. Gleichzeitig
geht Olmert Journalistenfragen aus dem Weg, ob Mubarak seinen
Konvergenzplan unterstütze.
03.06.2006:
Rund 2.500 „Fatah“-Milizionäre ziehen in Jenin auf, um gegen die
Schaffung einer Sicherheitstruppe zu protestieren, die von „Hamas“
gegen den Willen von Präsident Machmud Abbas eingerichtet
worden ist. Es kommt zu schweren Auseinandersetzungen.
Bei einer Demonstrationen israelischer und palästinensischer
Friedensorganisationen und -gruppen in Tel Aviv gegen die
Besatzung und den Boykott der „Hamas“-geführten Regierung, die
das palästinensische Volk treffe, bezeichnet die ehemalige
Vorsitzende der Partei „Meretz“ („Kraft, Stärke“), Shulamit Aloni,
Israel als einen „Staat ohne Recht und Richter“. Die Organisatoren
der Demonstration zeigen sich über die geringe Zahl der Teilnehmer
enttäuscht. Sie entspricht der allgemeinen politischen Lethargie, die
von der Politik keine positiven Veränderungen erwartet und sich
auch in der geringen Wahlbeteiligung am 28.März kundtat.
01.06.2006:
Im Interview mit „Haaretz“ schließt der „Likud“-Vorsitzende Benjamin
Netanyahu eine Rückkehr Israels in den Gazastreifen und die
Wiederaufnahme der Siedlungstätigkeit aus. Ehud Olmert wird er
vor, bis zum Jahr 2010 siebzig- bis hunderttausend Siedler zu
evakuieren, die östlich der bis dahin fertiggestellten
„Trennungsmauern“ in der Westbank leben. Das würde bis zu
hundert Milliarden Neue Shekel (rund 18 Mrd. Euro) kosten, was die
israelische Wirtschaft ruinieren würde. Selbst wenn internationaler
Druck den Rückzug auf die Grenzen von 1967 verlange, könne Israel
dies nicht akzeptieren. Erst wenn sich die Palästinenser gegen einen
islamischen Staat und für die gegenseitige Anerkennung und einen
Kompromiss mit Israel entschieden hätten, könnten sie
Verhandlungspartner sein. Dabei müssten das Jordantal und die
Siedlungsblöcke bei Israel bleiben, außerdem brauche Israel
militärische Überflugrechte. Er sei gegen die Herrschaft über 98
Prozent der Palästinenser, lehne aber gleichzeitig die Teilung des
Landes Israel ab: Die Uhr lasse sich nicht zurückdrehen.
Mai 2006
31.05.2006:
Der palästinensische Präsident Machmud Abbas ernennt den Leiter
des palästinensischen Teams der „Genfer Initiative“, Yasser Abed
Rabbo zu seinem Repräsentanten für das von ihm vorgeschlagene
129
Referendum . Die Ernennung stößt bei „Hamas“ auf scharfe Kritik,
weil Abed Rabbo im Genfer Vertragsentwurf auf das Recht der
Palästinenser auf Rückkehr verzichtet habe.
30.05.2006:
Angehörige des palästinensischen Sicherheitsdienstes
demonstrieren vor dem Parlamentsgebäude in Gaza-Stadt, weil sie
seit drei Monaten ihr Gehalt nicht bekommen haben, und ziehen zum
Amtssitz von Machmud Abbas, um ihm ihre Unterstützung zu
dokumentieren.
Ronen Bergman berichtet aus Anlass der 39. Wiederkehr des
Beginns des Sechs-Tage-Krieges 1967 in der Wochenbeilage von
„Yediot Achronot“ („Letzte Nachrichten“) aus den Tagebüchern des
damaligen Auslandsgeheimdienstchefs Meir Amit, dass Washington
Israel mit einem Angriff gedroht habe, sollte es gegen Ägypten in
den Krieg ziehen. Amir befürchtet, dass Israel trotz seines
erfolgreichen Waffengangs den Frieden nicht gewinnen werde.
Die Administration in Washington vollzieht einen dramatischen
Schwenk in ihrer Iran-Politik. Auf einer gesondert einberufenen
Pressekonferenz erklärt Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice die
Bereitschaft zu Verhandlungen mit dem Ziel, die Entwicklung des
iranischen Nuklearprogramms einzufrieren.
29.05.2006:
Nach israelischen Medienberichten räumt das Militär ein, seit einigen
Wochen Ziele im Norden des Gazastreifens unter Beschuss zu
nehmen, um den Beschuss auf israelische Ortschaften zu
unterbinden.
Die libanesische „Hisbollah“ („Partei Gottes“) liefert sich nach
Angriffen auf Israel, die bis nach Beersheva reichen, schwere
Gefechte mit dem israelischen Militär.
Die britische Vereinigung der akademischen Dozenten („The
National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education“
[NATFHE] bestätigt mit 106 gegen 71 Stimmen ihre frühere
Empfehlung, unter Bezug auf Entscheidungen gegen das
Apartheidsregime in Südafrika gegen israelische akademische
Einrichtungen einen Boykott zu verhängen, wenn ihr Lehrpersonal
persönlich direkt oder indirekt durch Forschung und Lehre die
Besatzung fördere. In einer ersten Reaktion verlangt der Rat der
Universitäten in Israel unter Führung der Bar-Ilan-Universität die
Rücknahme der Entscheidung, weil sie die internationalen Prinzipien
der Freiheit von Forschung und Lehre schwer beschädige sowie die
Bemühungen um Frieden und Verständigung im Nahen Osten
verletze. Yosef Yeshurun, Rektor der Bar-Ilan-Universität, erwartet
keinen unmittelbaren Einfluss der Entscheidung auf die israelische
Wissenschaft, warnt aber vor den langfristigen Implikationen, weil
weitere akademische Einrichtungen den Boykott übernehmen
könnten. Der Vorsitzende des Wissenschaftsausschusses der
Knesset, Zevulun Orlev („Nationalreligiöse Partei“), wendet sich an
die Parlamente in Deutschland, Kanada, England und Frankreich mit
der Aufforderung, gegen die Entscheidung vorzugehen. Lord
Triesman, Minister des „Foreign and Commonwealth Office“,
bedauert sie, betont jedoch die Unabhängigkeit der Vereinigung130.
Am 8. Juni veröffentlicht „Haaretz“ einen Kommentar von Alexander
Yakobson, in dem dieser die jüdischen Sympathisanten eines
Boykotts in zwei Kategorien einteilt: Entweder seien sie glühende
Zionisten, die aus Liebe zu Israel handelten, dann sollten sie nach
Israel einwandern, oder sie seien Antisemiten. In jedem Fall würden
sie weder die israelische Öffentlichkeit überzeugen, noch die
Beziehungen zwischen Europa und Israel negativ beeinflussen. Im
Gegenteil: Die finanziellen Beziehungen hätten sich großartig
entwickelt. Das Freihandelsabkommen sei aufgewertet worden, und
auf verschiedenen Ebenen sei die Zusammenarbeit gewachsen. „Die
Europäische Union hat keinen politischen Willen, die Bindungen an
Israel zu beschädigen. Noch hat sie ein finanzielles Interesse daran“,
schreibt Yakobson. Deshalb müsse man sich in Israel nicht groß
aufregen. Laura Ribeiro, Koordinatorin der „Right to Education
Campaign“ an der Universität Bir Zeit, beklagt in ihrem Beitrag „The
Israeli Boycott of Palestinian Education“ am 7. Juni in der Website
„Counterpunch“, dass in den internationalen Debatten die
Boykottierung palästinensischer Bildungseinrichtungen samt ihres
Lehrpersonals und der Studierenden seitens der israelischen
Behörden seit Jahren übersehen würde. Dazu gehöre unter anderen
die Verweigerung von Ausreisegenehmigungen zu internationalen
Tagungen. Ausländischen Referenten würde die Einreise zu
palästinensischen Konferenzen ohne Angabe von Gründen ebenfalls
versagt. Israelische Medien berichten am 8. Juni, dass die
schwedische Regierung dazu übergegangen sei, Weine von den
Golanhöhen mit der Bezeichnung „Israel, occupied Syrian land“
auszeichnen zu lassen. Die schwedische Regierung verfügt über ein
Monopol beim Verkauf von Alkoholika.
Professor Menachem Ben-Sasson, weltweit anerkannter Spezialist
für die Geschichte der Juden in arabischen Ländern, der zwischen
1997 und 2001 Rektor der Hebräischen Universität war, bricht
seinen Lehrauftrag an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in
München ab, um der Aufforderung von Ministerpräsident Ehud
Olmert nachzukommen, als Mitglied der „Kadima“-Fraktion den
Vorsitz des Verfassungs-, Rechts- und Justizausschusses der
Knesset zu übernehmen.
27.05.2006:
Das israelische Kabinett will 28 Außenlager der Siedlungen in der
Westbank auflösen. Ehud Olmert kündigt in einem Interview mit
„Yediot Achronot“ („Letzte Nachrichten“) am 1. Juni an, dass die
Räumung in einem Schritt erfolgen soll. Im Gegensatz dazu, tritt
Olmerts Stellvertreter Shimon Peres für einen Dreistufenplan ein. Er,
Olmert, werde alle seine Erfahrungen und seine Kraft in die
Durchsetzung seiner Pläne investieren, und am Ende werde sich das
israelische Volk einer anderen Lage gegenübersehen. Ende Juni
werde er nach Begegnungen mit Ägyptens Präsident Hosni
Mubarak, Jordaniens König Abdullah II. und europäischen
Regierungschefs mit Machmud Abbas auf der Grundlage der „Road
Map“ zusammentreffen. Sollten die Palästinenser den Bedingungen
der „Road Map“ nicht zustimmen, werde er unabhängig, aber nicht
allein handeln, wobei er auf die Beziehungen zu den USA und
Europa vertraue. George W. Bush habe den israelischen Verzicht
auf ein Viertel der jüdischen Siedlungen verlangt.
26.05.2006:
In einem Interview mit der israelischen Tageszeitung „Maariv“
(„Abenddämmerung“) bezeichnet der italienische Außenminister
Massimo D’Alema die „Genfer Initiative“ als das ihm wertvollste
Friedensdokument, das er kenne131.
25.05.2006:
Der Machtkampf zwischen Präsident Machmud Abbas und der
„Hamas“-geführten Regierung erreicht einen neuen Höhepunkt, als
Abbas bei der Eröffnung des „Nationalen Palästinensischen Dialogs“
in Ramallah und Gaza-City droht, innerhalb von vierzig Tagen eine
Volksbefragung durchzuführen, sollte die Regierung nicht den
„Entwurf einer nationalen Charta“ akzeptieren, den die in Israel
festgehaltenen palästinensischen Häftlinge vorgelegt haben132. Das
von „Hamas“ kontrollierte Parlament, der „Palestinian Legislative
Council“, bezeichnet ein Referendum als illegitim, weil es in der
Verfassung dafür keine Grundlage gebe.
23.05.2006:
Im Interview mit „Haaretz“ bietet der palästinensische
Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh Israel einen Frieden und eine
langjährige Waffenruhe unter der Bedingung des Rückzugs auf die
Grenzen von 1967 an.
Vor dem Auswärtigen und Sicherheitsausschuss der Knesset erklärt
Generalstabschef Dan Halutz, dass die Ächtung der „Hamas“geführten Regierung das Gegenteil dessen erreichen dürfte, was
damit beabsichtigt sei: Die palästinensische Bevölkerung werde die
Islamische Widerstandsbewegung unterstützen.
Nach der Begegnung zwischen Ehud Olmert und US-Präsident
George W. Bush auf der gemeinsamen Pressekonferenz in
Washington betont Bush, dass einige Vorstellungen Olmerts „mutige
Ideen“ auf dem Weg zu einer Zweistaatenlösung seien, sollte der
Weg zu Fortschritten der „Road Map“ in der kommenden Zeit nicht
offen sein; auf die Aufnahme der Formel „mutige Ideen“ hatte die
israelische Delegation nach einem Bericht der israelischen Zeitung
„Yediot Achronot“ („Letzte Nachrichten“) im Vorfeld des Treffens
gedrängt. Jede Schlussvereinbarung, so Bush weiter, könne jedoch
nur auf der Grundlage vereinbarter Veränderungen erfolgen, wobei
keine Partei den Ausgang von Verhandlungen präjudizieren dürfe133.
Im Gegenzug erklärt Olmert, dass Bushs Vision zweier Staaten für
zwei Völker die Grundlage für jeden künftigen Vertrag bilden werde.
Er, Olmert, werde jede Chance wahrnehmen, um zu diesem Ziel
gemäß der „Road Map“ zu gelangen.
21.05.2006:
Zu Beginn des Weltwirtschaftsforums im ägyptischen Sharm elSheikh treffen Israels Außenministerin Tsipi Livni und der
stellvertretende Ministerpräsident Shimon Peres mit dem
palästinensischen Präsidenten Machmud Abbas zusammen.
Israelische Medien berichten, dass auf Beschluss des israelischen
Ministerpräsidenten Ehud Olmert, der auf eine Anordnung des
früheren Verteidigungsministers Shaul Mofaz zurückgreift, die drei
Siedlungen Betar Illit, Giv’at Ze’ev und Oranit in der Westbank
erweitert werden. Sie liegen im Bereich des „Konvergenzplanes“ der
Regierung, wonach die Siedlungsblöcke Ariel. Maale Adumim und
Gush Etzion annektiert werden sollen. Eine neue Siedlung unter dem
Namen Maskiot soll im Jordantal errichtet werden.
16.05.2006:
Der palästinensische Präsident Machmud Abbas kritisiert vor dem
Europaparlament in Strassburg die internationalen Sanktionen, die
das palästinensische Volk treffen würden. Die Behauptung, dass es
keinen palästinensischen Verhandlungspartner gebe, sei grundlos,
betont Abbas. Gemäß dem palästinensischen Grundgesetz liege die
Verantwortung für Verhandlungen in seinen Händen als Vorsitzender
des PLO-Exekutivkomitees. Wenn dem palästinensischen Volk
durch die Okkupation die Freiheit vorenthalten werde, bleibe die
Demokratie seelenlos.
Der stellvertretende Vorsitzende des Zentralrates der Juden in
Deutschland, Salomon Korn, überreicht in Frankfurt am Main dem
Dirigenten Daniel Barenboim den Friedenspreis der „Korn und
Gerstenmann-Stiftung“ und hebt in seiner Ansprache Barenboims
Leistung für das „West-Eastern-Divan Orchestra“ hervor, in dem
junge jüdische und arabische Musiker zusammen spielen. In seiner
Dankesrede bekundet Barenboim seine Trauer über die politische
Entwicklung in Israel nach 1967 und fordert die Regierung zur
Beendigung der Besatzung auf.
15.05.2006:
In einer Rede aus Anlass des Jahrestages der palästinensischen
Flüchtlingskatastrophe von 1948 erinnert der palästinensische
Präsident Machmud Abbas an die Leiden des palästinensischen
Volkes unter den Bedingungen der Besatzung und ruft die
israelischen Nachbarn zu einem gerechten und dauerhaften Frieden
134
auf .
Der russische Präsident Wladimir Putin trifft in seiner
Sommerresidenz Sotschi am Schwarzen Meer Machmud Abbas und
sagt diesem die Fortsetzung der russischen Finanzhilfe zu.
Israels Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert bekennt in einer Rede vor
Siedlern, dass es im Sommer 2005 besser gewesen wäre, mehr als
zwei Siedlungen in der Westbank zu räumen. Statt Entscheidungen
hinauszuzögern, sollten sie sofort in Angriff genommen werden135.
14.05.2006:
In einem der als besonders wichtig betrachteten Entscheidungen
weist der Oberste Gerichtshof Israels entgegen dem Votum seines
Präsidenten Aharon Barak mit sechs gegen fünf Stimmen Petitionen
auf Familienzusammenführung von palästinensischen Ehepaaren
diesseits und jenseits der ehemaligen „Grünen Linie“ zurück. Seit der
Prinzipienerklärung von 1993 sind beim Gerichtshof rund 22.000
Petitionen eingegangen, von denen etwa sechstausend positiv
beschieden worden sind. In den übrigen Fällen wurde die Ablehnung
mit staatlichen Sicherheitsbedürfnissen „in Kriegszeiten“ begründet.
Im Jahr 2002 hatte die Knesset die Notstandsverordnung zunächst
für ein Jahr erlassen, bevor es 2003 in das Staatsbürgerrecht
aufgenommen wurde.
Israelische Medien berichten, dass die israelische Armee nach
eigenen Angaben seit dem 31. März mehr als 5100 Geschosse auf
palästinensische Abschussbasen vor allem im Norden des
Gazastreifens abgefeuert hat.
12.05.2006:
In einem Interview mit „Haaretz“ bezeichnet der Jerusalemer
Historiker Yehuda Bauer die Durchsetzung der Warnung, dass die
Shoah nicht wieder passieren dürfe, als „heiße Luft“. Die
internationale Teilnahmslosigkeit angesichts der Ermordung der
schwarzen Bevölkerung in Darfur durch die sudanesische Regierung
beweise das Gegenteil. Gleichzeitig warnt Bauer vor einem
Völkermord, sollten die Extremisten unter den Israelis und den
Palästinensern die Oberhand gewinnen.
11.05.2006:
Israelische und palästinensische Medien berichten, dass die im
israelischen „Hadarim“ und in anderen Gefängnissen einsitzenden
palästinensischen Häftlinge Marwan Barghouti („Fatah“), Abdel
Khalek Natche („Hamas“), Bassam al-Saadi („Islamischer Djihad“),
Abed al-Rheem Malouch („Volksfront für die Befreiung Palästinas“)
und Mustafa Badarna („Demokratische Front für die Befreiung
Palästinas“) ein achtzehn Artikel umfassendes „Nationales
Konsensmemorandum“ vorgelegt haben, in dem sie das
„palästinensische Recht auf Widerstand in jeglicher Gestalt mit
Widerstandsaktionen im Land, das 1967 besetzt worden ist, in
Verbindung mit politischen Verhandlungen, diplomatischen
Bemühungen und der Fortsetzung des Massenwiderstandes gegen
die Okkupation“ betonen. Die PLO sei die einzige und legitime
Vertretung des palästinensischen Volkes. Der Vorsitzende der
„Hamas“-Fraktion im Parlament, Khaled Suleiman, äußert sich in
ähnlicher Weise. Der Präsident der Autonomiebehörde Machmud
Abbas begrüßt die Plattform als einen „wichtigen Plan“. Hingegen
verlangt der Leiter des Politischen Büros von „Hamas“ in Damaskus,
Khaled Meshal, während einer Konferenz in Qatar ein Ende des
Streits zwischen seiner Organisation und „Fatah“ und fordert die
Rückkehr zu den Prinzipien „des heiligen Krieges zur
Wiedererlangung des Landes zwischen dem Jordan und dem
Mittelmeer“. In Anwesenheit von Machmud Abbas, der „Hamas“ bis
Mitternacht des 5. Juni ein Ultimatum stellt, zuzustimmen oder
abzulehnen, stimmt das Zentralkomitee von „Fatah“ unter Vorsitz
von Faruk Kadumi am 31. Mai in Tunis der Durchführung eines
Referendums über das „Nationale Konsensprogramm“ der Häftlinge
zu. Dagegen bezeichnet Gershon Baskin, gemeinsam mit Hanna
Siniora Leiter des „Israel/Palestine Center for Research &
Information (IPCRI)“, das Dokument als einen „non-starter“, weil es
aufgrund seiner diffusen Aussagen über die Anerkennung Israels
und die Anwendung von Gewalt der israelischen Ablehnungspolitik in
die Hände spiele136.
Der israelische Verteidigungsminister Amir Peretz (Arbeitspartei)
kündigt die Überprüfung der Sanktionen gegenüber dem
Gazastreifen und die Einstellung des Artilleriebeschusses gegen
dortige Ziele an.
Nach einer Meldung der palästinensischen Nachrichtenagentur
WAFA sind Präsident Machmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) und der
Vorsitzende von „Meretz/Yachad“ Yossi Beilin vor einigen Tagen in
der jordanischen Hauptstadt zusammengetroffen. Die beiden kennen
137
sich seit den Verabredungen im Herbst 1995 .
10.05.2006:
Die jordanischen Sicherheitsbehörden geben die Verhaftung von
zwanzig „Hamas“-Aktivisten bekannt, denen sie Waffenschmuggel
und die Vorbereitung auf Anschläge vorwerfen. Der palästinensische
Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh bestreitet, dass „Hamas“ an der
Destabilisierung der Haschemiten interessiert sei. Jordaniens König
Abdullah II. versucht, die Kontroverse herunterzuspielen.
09.05.2006:
Nach ihrem Treffen in New York veröffentlichen die Repräsentanten
des internationalen Nahost-„Quartetts“ eine Erklärung, in der sie dem
scheidenden Nahost-Sondergesandten James D. Wolfensohn für
seine Arbeit danken, ihre bleibende Unterstützung für eine israelischpalästinensische Zweistaatenlösung auf der Grundlage der „Road
Map“ bekunden, ihre „ernste Sorge“ über die ausgebliebene
Selbstverpflichtung der Autonomiebehörde zur Gewaltlosigkeit, zur
Anerkennung Israels und zur Akzeptanz früher eingegangener
Vereinbarungen zum Ausdruck bringen, die unweigerlich zu
nachteiligen Folgerungen für die palästinensische Bevölkerung
führen würden, ihre „Sorge“ über israelische Militäroperationen, die
unschuldiges Leben kosten, über die Erweiterung der Siedlungen
und die Route der „Barrikade“ äußern, weil sie mit der Konfiszierung
palästinensischen Bodens und der Einschränkung der
Bewegungsfreiheit von Menschen und Gütern verbunden sei, ihre
„große Sorge“ über die sich verschlechternde humanitäre Lage in der
Westbank und im Gazastreifen zum Ausdruck bringen, sowie die
Geberländer und die internationalen Organisationen auffordern, sich
dem Ende Januar 2006 verabredeten „Mechanismus“
anzuschließen, den Palästinensern Mittel über die Weltbank
zukommen zu lassen. Die Außenminister, UN-Generalsekretär Kofi
Annan sowie die Repräsentanten der EU danken dem israelischen
Ministerpräsidenten Ehud Olmert für seine Bereitschaft, auf der
Grundlage der „Road Map“ „mit einem palästinensischen Partner“ zu
verhandeln. Abschließend bekräftigt die Erklärung die Resolutionen
242, 338, 1397 und 1515 des UN-Sicherheitsrats. Zu den
Beratungen werden teilweise die Außenminister Ägyptens,
Jordaniens und Saudi-Arabien hinzugezogen. Bei der
anschließenden Pressekonferenz bekräftigt US-Außenministerin
Condoleezza Rice die Position ihrer Regierung, dass die endgültigen
Grenzen für Israel und Palästina nur durch eine Vereinbarung
zwischen den Parteien festgelegt werden können. Ferner gibt sie
eine 10-Millionen-US$-Überweisung für humanitäre Zwecke an die
Palästinenser bekannt. Die israelische Außenministerin Tsipi Livni
kündigt am 11. Mai die Überweisung von elf Millionen US-Dollar aus
dem zurückgehaltenen Bestand der den Palästinensern
zustehenden Steuer- und Zolleinnahmen an. Das Geld dürfe nur für
die medizinische Versorgung der Palästinenser verwendet werden.
138
Nach einer Untersuchung des „Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) “,
die „Haaretz“ veröffentlicht, würden 62 Prozent der israelischjüdischen Bevölkerung eine Politik ihrer Regierung befürworten, die
den arabischen Bevölkerungsteil zur Auswanderung ermutigt. 14
Prozent der Befragten halten die jüdisch-arabischen Beziehungen in
Israel für stabil. 22 Prozent vertrauen den Parteien, 68 Prozent dem
Obersten Gericht und 79 Prozent den Streitkräften. 62 Prozent sind
sich sicher, dass es politische Korruption in Israel gibt, ungefähr die
Hälfte der Befragten glaubt, dass ein Kandidat mit politischen
Ambitionen korrupt sein muss. Nur zehn Prozent zeigen sich davon
überzeugt, dass Politiker die öffentlichen Interessen gut
wahrnehmen. In einer Vergleichstudie von „Transparency
International“ rangiert Israel unter den ausgewählten 36 Demokratien
an zwanzigster Stelle; 2003 lag Israel noch auf dem vierzehnten,
2004 auf dem siebzehnten und 2005 auf dem zwanzigsten Platz.
Finnland und Neuseeland liegen vorn, während Argentinien und
Indien die Schlusslichter bilden.
08.05.2006:
Der iranische Präsident Machmud Achmadinedjad schreibt an USPräsident George W. Bush einen Brief, in dem er seine
Einschätzung der weltpolitischen Lage und die Chancen schildert,
die bilateralen Probleme zu lösen. Da es zwischen beiden Staaten
seit 1979 keinen diplomatischen Beziehungen gibt, wird das
Schreiben über den Schweizer Botschafter in Teheran nach
Washington weitergeleitet. US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice
bezeichnet den Brief als untauglichen Versuch, die Spannungen
zwischen Iran und den USA zu entschärfen.
In einem Interview droht Shimon Peres Iran im Falle eines Angriffs
mit vernichtenden Vergeltungsschlägen. Seine Ausführungen rufen
landesweit Unverständnis und Kritik hervor.
Bei gewaltsamen Zusammenstößen zwischen Anhängern von
„Fatah“ und „Hamas“ im Gazasteifen werden drei Palästinenser
getötet.
07.05.2006:
Die Weltbank bezeichnet die Finanzkrise der Autonomiebehörde als
dramatischer als bisher angenommen.
Internationale Medien berichten, dass ein Anschlag der „Izza Din-alQassem“-Brigaden, dem militärischen Arm von „Hamas“, auf den
palästinensischen Präsidenten Machmud Abbas vereitelt worden sei.
Der israelische Geheimdienst habe Abbas von der Gefahr in
Kenntnis gesetzt.
In einem Meinungsbeitrag für die „International Harald Tribune“
verwahrt sich der frühere US-Präsident Jimmy Carter gegen die
Behandlung unschuldiger Palästinenser wie Tiere, als ob sie mit der
Wahl von „Hamas“ ein Verbrechen begangen hätten. Unter den 62
Wahlen, die von dem nach seinem Namen benannten „Carter
Center“ begleitet worden seien, würden diejenigen in den
palästinensischen Gebieten am besten den Willen des Volks
widerspiegeln.
04.05.2006:
Die neue israelische Regierung aus „Kadima“, Arbeitspartei und
Rentnerpartei wird im Parlament vereidigt. Bei der Abstimmung
votieren 65 der 120 Abgeordneten für sie, 49 Abgeordnete stimmen
dagegen. Das Kabinett setzt sich zusammen aus Ministerpräsident
Ehud Olmert; Außenministerin und stellv. Ministerpräsidentin Tsipi
Livni; Finanzminister Avraham Hirchson; Verteidigungsminister Amir
Peretz; Erziehungsministerin Yuli Tamir; Infrastrukturminister
Benjamin Ben-Eliezer; Tourismusminister Yitzhak Herzog; Minister
für Wissenschaft und Technik Ofir Pines-Paz;
Landwirtschaftsminister Shalom Shimchon; Minister ohne
Geschäftsbereich und Vorsitzender der Rundfunkbehörden Eitan
Cabel; Innenminister Ronni Bar-On; Justizminister Haim Ramon;
Minister für Bau, Wohnungsbau und Landverwaltung Meir Sheetrit;
Minister für Einwanderung und Integration Ze’ev Boim;
Umweltminister Gideon Ezra; Parlamentsminister Yaacov Edri;
Kommunikationsminister Ariel Atias; Minister ohne Geschäftsbereich
Yitzhak Cohen; Minister ohne Geschäftsbereich Meshulam Nahari;
Minister für die Entwicklung des Negev und Galiläas sowie
stellvertretender Ministerpräsident Shimon Peres; Minister für
Rentner Rafael Eitan; Gesundheitsminister Yaacov Ben-Izri. Zur
Vorsitzenden des Parlaments wird Daliah Itzik gewählt.
Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel unterstreicht auf der
Hundertjahrfeier des „American Jewish Committee“ in New York
„(d)as entschiedene Eintreten für das Existenzrecht Israels und für
das Recht seiner Bürgerinnen und Bürger, in sicheren Grenzen und
im Frieden mit seinen Nachbarn zu leben“ als „eine unverrückbare
Konstante deutscher Außenpolitik“. Den „berechtigte(n) Wunsch des
palästinensischen Volkes, in einem eigenen Staat zu leben“, knüpft
sie an dessen Bereitschaft, mit Israel in Frieden leben zu wollen.
01.05.2006:
US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice gibt ihrer Hoffnung Ausdruck,
dass die von „Hamas“ geführte Regierung die Bedingungen der USA
und Europas – Anerkennung Israels, Verzicht auf Gewalt, Einhaltung
von Vereinbarungen, die von der PLO unterschrieben sind – erfüllen
wird. Bis dahin werde Washington mit Präsident Machmud Abbas
zusammenarbeiten und ihn stützen. Dagegen äußert sich Shimon
Peres in einem Gespräch mit der „Jerusalem Post“ pessimistisch:
„Hamas“ könne sich nicht ändern.
In einem Bericht über den möglichen US-republikanischen
Präsidentschaftskandidaten John McCain zitiert „Haaretz“ aus einem
Gespräch dessen Sympathie für die „Parameter“ Bill Clintons im
Dezember 2000 zur Lösung des israelisch-palästinensischen
139
Konflikts . Wer auch immer der nächste Präsident sein werde,
prophezeit der Korrespondent Amir Oren – die israelische Regierung
mache sich etwas vor, dass ihre Pläne zur „Konvergenz“ (damit soll
der Begriff „begrenzter Rückzug“ aus palästinensischen Gebieten
vermieden werden) nach 2009 Bestand haben werden.
Der engste Rechtsberater von Ariel Sharon, Dov Weissglas,
wechselt nach Presseberichten in den Vorstand des israelischen
Energieunternehmens „Bezeq“. Die Vorbereitung der Reise von
Ehud Olmert nach Washington140 findet in den israelischen Medien
höchstes Lob.
April 2006
30.04.2006:
Das israelische Kabinett beschließt auf der Basis einer Vorlage des
amtierenden Verteidigungsministers Shaul Mofaz Pläne zum
Abschluss der „Trennungsmauern“ in der Westbank und um
Jerusalem in einer Gesamtlänge von 870 Kilometern, von denen
bislang 335 Kilometer fertiggestellt worden sind. Abgesehen von
Absichten, das Jordantal zu annektieren, würden rund zehn Prozent
der Westbank an Israel übergehen. Vor dem Obersten Gericht sind
noch zahlreiche Klagen von Palästinensern und israelischen
Menschenrechtsgruppen gegen den Verlauf der „Trennungsmauern“
anhängig.
Der Vorsitzende der Arbeitspartei Amir Peretz setzt sich gegen seine
innerparteilichen Widersacher im Zentralkomitee knapp durch und
präsentiert seine Kandidaten für die neue Regierung: Er selbst
werde das Verteidigungsministerium übernehmen, während Yuli
Tamir Erziehungsministerin, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer Nationaler
Infrastrukturminister, Shalom Simchon Landwirtschaftsminister,
Ophir Pines-Paz Minister für Kultur, Sport und JerusalemAngelegenheiten, Yitzhak Herzog Tourismusminister und Eitan
Cabel Minister ohne Geschäftsbereich mit der Verantwortung für die
Rundfunkbehörde werden sollen. Prominente Abgeordnete wie Ami
Ayalon, Ehud Barak, Ephraim Sneh und Avishai Braverman, die
ohne Beauftragung blieben, kündigen ihren Widerstand gegen die
Kabinettsliste an. Am 1. Mai wird bekannt, dass die „Kadima“Abgeordneten Tsipi Livni Außenministerin und eine der
stellvertretenden Ministerpräsidenten, Shimon Peres
Verkehrsminister, verantwortlich für die Entwicklung Galiläas und des
Negev sowie weiterer stellvertretender Ministerpräsident, Avraham
Hirchson Finanzminister, Haim Ramon Justizminister, Meir Sheetrit
Wohnungsbauminister, Ronni Bar-On Innenminister, Ze’ev Boim
Einwanderungsminister, Yaacov Edri Minister für die Pflege der
Beziehungen zwischen Regierung und Knesset, Avi Dichter
Sicherheitsminister und Gideon Ezra Umweltminister werden sollen.
Dalia Itzik soll Reuven Rivlin, der sich im November 2005 der
Abspaltung vom „Likud“ nicht anschloss, als Parlamentspräsidentin
ablösen.
„Kadima“ und die Partei der „Sefardischen Tora-Wächter (Shas)“
unterzeichnen eine Koalitionsvereinbarung. In einem
Begleitschreiben wird „Shas“ ein Vorbehalt gegenüber einer
Reduktion von Siedlungen in der Westbank eingeräumt. In der
Übereinkunft setzt „Shas“ die Bereitstellung von 1,7 Milliarden Neue
Shekel (~ 303,6 Millionen Euro) für soziale Leistungen durch, die vor
allem ihrem orthodoxen Wählerpotential zugute kommen dürften.
Außerdem wird vereinbart, dass Änderungen an der
Heiratsgesetzgebung von allen künftigen Koalitionspartnern getragen
werden müssen. Die Partei hatte zuvor die Zustimmung des „Rates
der Tora-Weisen“ unter Vorsitz des früheren sefardischen
Oberrabbiners Ovadia Yosef eingeholt. Der „Shas“-Vorsitzende Eli
Yishai soll in der neuen Regierung das Ministerium für Industrie und
Handel übernehmen.
28.04.2006:
In einem 62seitigen Regierungsprogramm, das „Kadima“ und die
Arbeitspartei vorlegen, wird die Festsetzung der Grenzen Israels
gegenüber der Westbank in dieser Legislaturperiode vereinbart. Sie
schließe die Verminderung der jüdischen Siedler und die Auflösung
der „Außenposten“ der Siedlungen ein. Nach Medienberichten
würden von den Plänen rund 70.000 Siedler betroffen sein. Betont
wird, dass das Programm durch Verhandlungen und in Vereinbarung
mit den Palästinensern durchgesetzt werden solle. Sollten diese auf
die Bedingungen nicht eingehen, werde die israelische Regierung
auf der Grundlage breiter nationaler Zustimmung und in Absprache
mit den Freunden Israels im Ausland, besonders mit den USA, für
die Durchsetzung sorgen.
„Haaretz“-Redakteur Akiva Eldar wirft dem scheidenden
Verteidigungsminister Shaul Mofaz vor, eine „Spur der Verwüstung“
in den palästinensischen Gebieten zu hinterlassen.
27.04.2006:
Der palästinensische Außenminister Machmud Zahhar erklärt in
einem Interview mit dem arabischen TV-Sender „al-Djazeera“ die
Bereitschaft zur Einschaltung einer dritten Partei, um Verhandlungen
mit Israel auf der Grundlage eines „Friedens der Gerechtigkeit“ zu
erleichtern.
Der Nahost-Sondergesandte des „Quartetts“, James D. Wolfensohn,
der nach dem Abzug Israels vor allem beim Aufbau der
palästinensischen Wirtschaft im Gazastreifen behilflich sein sollte,
gibt Ende April seine Tätigkeit auf141. Er sei mit seiner Mission
gescheitert. Die von Israel zurückgehaltenen Steuer- und
Zolleinnahmen seien eine systematische Verletzung von
Verpflichtungen, die im Blick auf den Gazastreifen eingegangen
worden seien. Andere Beobachter vermuten unter Berufung auf
Berichte aus New York außerdem, dass er nach dem Aufstieg von
„Hamas“ die Chancen für die Fortführung des Friedensprozesses
schwinden sieht. Er selbst fordert in seinem Abschlussbericht das
„Quartett“ auf, sofort politische Schritte zu unternehmen, um
schwerwiegende Konsequenzen für die gesamte Region und den
Weltfrieden abzuwenden. „Wir müssen uns fragen,“ schreibt er
selbstkritisch, „ob humanitäre Hilfe ausreicht, um uns dem
erwünschten Ziel der Zweistaatenlösung gemäß der ›Road Map‹
näherzubringen.“ Die Mitglieder des „Quartetts“ wollen am 9. Mai mit
UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan grundsätzlich prüfen, ob sie im
Friedensprozess weiterhin eine Vermittlerrolle übernehmen wollen.
26.04.2006:
Die Nachrichtenagentur „Agence France Press“ meldet aus
Ramallah, dass der stellvertretende palästinensische
Ministerpräsident Nasser-Edin al-Shaer auf der Website von
„Hamas“ eine Ankündigung platziert habe, wonach die neue
Autonomiebehörde prüfen werde, den Friedensplan der Arabischen
Liga von Beirut im März 2002 zu akzeptieren. Der Plan ist auf der
diesjährigen Sitzung der Arabischen Liga am 27./28. März in
Khartum bekräftigt worden.
„Kadima“ und die Seniorenpartei, die aus den Wahlen am 28. März
mit sieben Mandaten hervorgegangen ist, gehen eine Vereinbarung
ein, in der Knesset zusammenzuarbeiten.
Der israelische Generalstaatsanwalt Menachem Mazouz teilt mit,
dass er gegen den Führer der „Volksfront für die Befreiung
Palästinas“, Achmed Sadaat, aus Mangel an Beweisen keine
Anklage wegen Mordes an dem israelischen Tourismusminister
Rehavam Zeevi („Ghandi“) erheben werde. Sadaat war am 14. März
von israelischen Soldaten aus dem Gefängnis in Jericho geholt
werden142. Nun soll er lediglich wegen der Verletzung von
Sicherheitsbelangen vor Gericht gestellt werden. Gegen vier andere
Gefangene, die ebenfalls in Jericho einsaßen, will Mazouz hingegen
Anklage wegen Beihilfe und Beteiligung an dem Mord erheben.
Yossi Melman kritisiert in „Haaretz“ die Verlängerung der
Beschränkungen, denen Mordechai Vanunu von Seiten der
israelischen Sicherheitsbehörden unterworfen bleiben soll. Vanunu,
der als Techniker im Atomzentrum Dimona gearbeitet hatte, wurde
Mitte der achtziger Jahre wegen Geheimnisverrat in besonders
schweren Fällen zu 18 Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt, die er zum
erheblichen Teil in Einzelhaft bis zu seiner Entlassung 2004
verbüßte. Melman bezeichnet die offizielle Behauptung, Vanunu
stelle nach wie vor ein Sicherheitsrisiko dar, als „grundlos,
bedenklich, unmoralisch und ungerecht“, weil die Atomtechnik
seither erheblichen Veränderungen unterworfen sei. Es sei
unerträglich, dass ein Mann ständig von neuem für dieselben
Vergehen bestraft werde. Es sei daran zu erinnern, dass sowjetische
Behauptungen, jüdische Wissenschaftler seien im Besitz von
Staatsgeheimnissen, einst deren Auswanderung nach Israel
verhindert hätten. Vanunu lebt heute im St. George College in OstJerusalem. Seine Bewegungsfreiheit ist eingeschränkt. Die Ausreise
aus Israel wird ihm verwehrt. Solange ihm der Kontakt zu
ausländischen Journalisten verboten ist, verweigert er auch
Gespräche mit israelischen Journalisten.
Zwei Selbstmordattentäter sprengen sich auf der ägyptischen SinaiHalbinsel in die Luft. Der Anschlag gilt der internationalen
Friedenstruppe, die dort seit der Räumung der Sinai-Halbinsel 1982
durch Israel stationiert ist. Von den Soldaten wird niemand verletzt.
25.04.2006:
Machmud Abbas beschuldigt in mehreren Interviews den Leiter des
Politischen Büros von „Hamas“ in Damaskus, Khaled Meshal, den
Bürgerkrieg betreiben zu wollen. Gleichzeitig appelliert Abbas an die
internationale Gemeinschaft, durch die Sperrung von Finanzhilfen
nicht das palästinensische Volk den Preis für die gewaltsamen
Zusammenstöße in den vergangenen Tagen bezahlen zu lassen.
Einen Tag zuvor, am 24. April, erklärt Abbas im türkischsprachigen
CNN-Fernsehen, dass ihm als Präsidenten im Notfall die rechtlichen
Mittel zur Verfügung stünden, die von „Hamas“ geführte Regierung
zu entlassen. Der Sprecher der Autonomiebehörde Ghazi Hamad
kritisiert die Äußerungen als „unangebracht“. Abbas solle seine
Vorwürfe an die Adresse der israelischen Regierung richten, denn
diese verweigere Verhandlungen. Gleichzeitig räumt Hamad „einige
Schwierigkeiten“ beim Transfer der Hilfsgelder an, die von
ausländischen Staaten angekündigt worden sind. Der jordanische
König Abdullah II. und Ägyptens Präsident Hosni Mubarak
bekräftigen auf ihrem Treffen in Aqaba am 29. April die Haltung von
Abbas.
24.04.2006:
Eine dreifache Explosion im Abstand von fünf Minuten erschüttert
den ägyptischen Badeort Dahab („Gold“) auf der Sinai-Halbinsel, bei
dem 23 Menschen, darunter ein zehnjähriger Deutscher, getötet
werden.
23.04.2006:
Israelische Medien berichten, dass sich nach den Gesprächen von
Ehud Olmert eine von ihm geführte neue Regierung mit 28 Ministern
abzeichnet, die sich auf 84 der 120 Knessetmandate mit den
Parteien „Kadima“, Arbeitspartei, „Sefardische Torawächter (Shas)“,
„Unser Haus Israel“, der antizionistischen „United Tora-Judaism“ und
der Rentnerpartei stützen könne.
Der Präsident des Jerusalemer Bezirksgerichts Boaz Okon fällt ein
Urteil, wonach die Autonomiebehörde in der Zone A der Westbank
die Kriterien der politischen Souveränität erfülle. Die Vereinigung der
143
Fachschule der Siedlung Elon Moreh hatte eine Klage eingereicht,
wonach ein Palästinenser zur Rückzahlung der Summe verpflichtet
werden sollte, die ihm für den Verkauf eines Stücks Land gezahlt
worden war. Okon weist die Klage mit der Begründung zurück, dass
das israelische Gesetz in der Zone A nicht gelte.
22.04.2006:
Über die Ernennung von Djamal Abu-Samhadana, dem Vorsitzender
der „Komitees des Volkswiderstandes“, zum Kommandeur der
Sicherheitskräfte im Gazastreifen, und die Ablehnung der Ernennung
durch Machmud Abbas entzünden sich in Gaza-Stadt mehrtägige
Straßenunruhen. Die ägyptische Regierung bemüht sich um ihre
Beendigung.
21.04.2006:
In einem langen Interview mit der israelischen Zeitung „Maariv“
bezichtigt der frühere palästinensische Sicherheitschef Machmud
Dachlan („Abu Fadi“) die von „Hamas“ beherrschte Regierung der
politischen Unfähigkeit. Die Niederlage von „Fatah“ bei den
Parlamentswahlen am 25. Januar führt er auf den Unwillen zur
innerparteilichen Demokratie und auf das Versagen zurück, die
jüngeren Generationen an politischen Entscheidungen teilhaben zu
lassen. Gleichzeitig verweist er auf seine Erfahrungen in den
vergangenen zehn Jahren als Beteiligter an Verhandlungen, wonach
Israel nicht zum Frieden auf der Grundlage eines unabhängigen
Staates Palästina in den Grenzen von 1967 bereit sei. Israel wolle
einen Staat, der von der Besatzung beherrscht werde. Selbst
Machmud Abbas brauche von den israelischen Behörden eine
Genehmigung, wenn er sein Haus verlassen wolle.
19.04.2006:
Israelische Medien spekulieren, dass der in einem Gefängnis bei Tel
Aviv sitzende Marwan Barghouti alle palästinensischen Gruppen zu
einer Waffenruhe aufrufen könnte.
Gemäß einer Meinungsumfrage der Bir Zeit University halten 63
Prozent der Palästinenser die Zeit für die Anerkennung Israels durch
die „Hamas“ nicht für gekommen; 29 Prozent sind anderer
Auffassung. Die Beliebtheit von Machmud Abbas fällt auf 43, die von
Ismail Haniyeh auf 57 Prozent. 32 Prozent bezeichnen die Arbeit der
Autonomiebehörde als gut.
18.04.2006:
Israels Oberstes Gericht weist eine palästinensische Klage ab, die
Abschlussarbeiten am Trennungszaun im Norden Jerusalems bei
den Ortschaften Bir Naballah, Beit Hanina, al-Djib, Djedira, Qalandia
und a-Ram aufzuschieben.
Die jordanische Regierung sagt den geplanten Besuch des
palästinensischen Außenministers Machmud Zahhar in Amman mit
der Begründung ab, dass „Hamas“-Angehörige versucht hätten, von
Syrien aus Raketen, Sprengstoff und automatische Waffen ins Land
zu schmuggeln.
17.04.2006:
Ein 21-jähriger palästinensischer Selbstmordattentäter, der dem
„Islamischen Djihad“ angehört, aus der Gegend von Djenin sprengt
sich am alten Busbahnhof in Tel Aviv in die Luft und reißt neun
Israelis mit in den Tod. Er nutzte eine Lücke in der Trennungsmauer
im Norden Jerusalems. Präsident Machmud Abbas verurteilt den
Mordanschlag, der die nationalen Interessen der Palästinenser
beschädige. Dagegen rechtfertigt ihn der Sprecher von „Hamas“,
Ghazi Hamad, als Teil des palästinensischen Widerstandes. Der
stellvertretende Leiter des Politischen Büros von „Hamas“ in
Damaskus, Mussa Abu Marzouk, kritisiert Abbas für die Verurteilung
der Tat. Die israelische Regierung sieht von Vorschlägen ab,
Angehörige und Einrichtungen der Autonomiebehörde zu
bombardieren, und entzieht statt dessen drei Parlamentariern mit
Jerusalemer Identitätskarten, Mohammed Abu Tir, Achmed Atun und
Mohammed Totah, den Status als Stadtbürger mit Wohnrecht.
Außerdem kündigt sie die strenge Kontrolle von Palästinensern an,
die aus dem Umland nach Jerusalem kommen wollen.
16.04.2006:
Während arabische Staaten die Überweisung ihrer Finanzhilfen
hinauszögern, weil sich die „Hamas“-geführte Regierung bislang
weigert, der saudischen Friedensinitiative vom März 2002 zu folgen,
transferiert die iranische Regierung eine Spende vom 50 Millionen
US-Dollar an die Autonomiebehörde. Einen Tag zuvor, am 15. April,
veröffentlicht die Arabische Liga einen Appell an arabische
Zuwendungsgeber, ihre Beiträge auf ein von Ägypten kontrolliertes
Konto zu überweisen. Der ägyptische Außenminister Achmed Abul
Ghait vermeidet es, in Kairo seinen palästinensischen Amtskollegen
Machmud Zahhar zu treffen.
Die Abgeordneten der am 28. März gewählten Knesset werden unter
Leitung von Alterspräsident Shimon Peres in Jerusalem vereidigt.
Dem neu gewählten Parlament gehören zwölf Parteien an. Ran
Cohen, Abgeordneter von „Meretz/Yachad“, bezeichnet die
abgelaufene Legislaturperiode als die schlimmste in der Geschichte
Israels.
Die Regierung von Qatar kündigt die Überweisung von 50 Millionen
US-Dollar an die Autonomiebehörde an. Auch der russische
Außenminister Sergej Lawrow bietet eine Finanzhilfe von zehn
Millionen US-Dollar an. Saudi-Arabien will 92 Millionen US-Dollar zur
Verfügung stellen. Der syrische Außenminister Faruk Shara plant
eine internationale Kampagne zur Unterstützung der
Autonomiebehörde.
11.04.2006:
Das israelische Kabinett erklärt auf einer Sondersitzung Ariel Sharon
für „dauerhaft arbeitsunfähig“. Nach geltendem Recht übernimmt
Ehud Olmert am 14. April das Amt des Ministerpräsidenten.
Olmert kündigt zur Umsetzung seiner Rückzugspläne aus Teilen der
Westbank einen „Dialog“ mit den dort lebenden Siedlern an, um die
Wiederholung der schweren Auseinandersetzungen im Gazastreifen
zu vermeiden. Israelische Kommentatoren begrüßen diesen Schritt,
warnen Olmert jedoch davor, sich einem Diktat der Siedler zu
beugen.
10.04.2006:
Die EU-Außenminister beschließen auf ihrer Sitzung in Luxemburg,
die Finanzhilfe für die Autonomiebehörde zunächst einen Monat lang
zu unterbrechen. Die humanitäre Hilfe für die palästinensische
Zivilbevölkerung soll davon nicht betroffen sein. Gleichzeitig fordern
die Außenminister Israel nachdrücklich zu Schritten für eine
Verhandlungslösung auf. Unter Verweis auf die Mauern und den
Siedlungsausbau betonen sie, es müsse alles unterlassen werden,
was die „vereinbarte Zwei-Staaten-Lösung“ gefährde.
Die israelische Regierung schließt das israelisch-palästinensische
Koordinationsbüro zur Regelung von Sicherheitsangelegenheiten in
der Nähe von Jericho.
Die neue „Meretz/Yachad“-Fraktion in der Knesset sieht nach einem
Treffen mit „Kadima“-Repräsentanten nur geringe Chancen für ihren
Eintritt in die Regierung, weil sich der designierte Ministerpräsident
Ehud Olmert offensichtlich für Avigdor Liebermans Partei „Unser
Haus Israel“ entscheiden wolle.
09.04.2006:
Der palästinensische Finanzminister Abdul Razeq räumt öffentlich
die Zahlungsunfähigkeit der Autonomiebehörde ein. Es sei unklar,
wann ihren 140.000 Angestellten das März-Gehalt ausgezahlt
werden könne. Dafür würden 118 Millionen US-Dollar benötigt.
Ohne Machmud Abbas persönlich abwerten zu wollen, beschließt
das israelische Kabinett auf seiner wöchentlichen Sitzung, alle
politischen Kontakte zu der von „Hamas“ geführten
Autonomiebehörde einzustellen, weil es sich bei ihr um eine
„feindliche Entität“ handele. Im Gegenzug beschuldigt Abbas die
israelische Regierung, international gültige Vereinbarungen seit Oslo
1993 zu verletzen. Die gemäß dem Pariser Protokoll von 1994 von
Israel erhobenen Steuer- und Zolleinnahmen aus palästinensischen
Importen und Exporten sollen nicht an die Autonomiebehörde
abgeführt, sondern für die Begleichung von Strom- und
Wasserrechnungen einbehalten werden.
In einem Interview mit der „Washington Post“ teilt der amtierende
Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert mit, dass der Bau des rund 700
Kilometer langen „Trennungszauns“ bis Ende 2006 abgeschlossen
sein soll. Danach würde kein Israeli mehr jenseits des Zauns leben.
Olmert bestätigt damit seine Absichten, die östlich des Zauns
gelegenen Siedlungen aufzulösen und die dortigen Siedler
„zurückzuführen“. Friedensgespräche würden gegebenenfalls nicht
mit Machmud Abbas, sondern mit der neuen Autonomiebehörde
geführt werden, wenn diese drei Bedingungen erfülle: Anerkennung
Israels, Verzicht auf Gewalt und Bekenntnis zu den früheren
Vereinbarungen.
In einem Interview für das russischsprachige Fernsehen betont
Avigdor Lieberman, dass die Einführung der Zivilehe die
Voraussetzung für den Eintritt seiner Partei „Unser Haus Israel“ in
die Regierung sei. Nach Schätzungen entsprechen mehr als ein
Drittel der seit den frühen neunziger Jahren Einwanderern aus der
ehemaligen Sowjetunion nicht den Bedingungen, gemäß dem
jüdischen Religionsgesetz („Halacha“) als Juden anerkannt zu
werden.
In einem „Haaretz“-Kommentar wendet sich der aus den
palästinensischen Gebieten berichtende Gideon Levy gegen das
öffentliche Geschrei, die palästinensische Bevölkerung würde durch
die Blockadepolitik Israels verhungern. Auch wenn 64 Prozent der
Bewohner des Gazastreifens und 48 Prozent der Bewohner der
Westbank unterhalb der Armutsgrenze leben würden – Stand
Dezember 2005 –, würden internationale Organisationen für das
Nötigste sorgen. Doch auch wenn es Mehl und Reis gebe, lebe die
Bevölkerung in einem Gefängnis. Die tägliche Routine schließe
Demütigungen ein, die nicht weniger schrecklich als Unterernährung
seien. Dafür liege die Verantwortung auf den Schultern Israels. Doch
das israelische Bewusstsein reagiere in den letzten Jahren nur auf
Proteste aus Washington. Wenn Washington ruhig bleibe, könne
alles unter den Teppich gekehrt werden.
07.04.2006:
Die Sprecherin der EU-Außenkommissarin Benita Ferrero-Waldner,
Emma Udwin, gibt in Brüssel bekannt, dass die EU-Kommission die
144
Hilfe für die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde eingestellt habe .
Der palästinensische Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh kritisiert die
Brüsseler Entscheidung und spricht von einer kollektiven Bestrafung
des palästinensischen Volkes, das mit „Hamas“ eine demokratische
Wahl getroffen habe.
Der Militärkommentator von „Haaretz“, Ze’ev Schiff, berichtet, dass
„Hamas“ kürzlich über ägyptische Mittelsleute Israel „Ruhe gegen
Ruhe“ angeboten habe und Gewalttaten palästinensischer
Organisationen verhindern wolle. Schiff verweist auf den
innenpolitischen und internationalen Druck, unter dem „Hamas“
steht. Dennoch würden politische und militärische Kreise in Israel die
Angebote als „Trick“ zurückweisen.
06.04.2006:
Staatspräsident Moshe Katsav beauftragt Ehud Olmert mit der
Bildung einer neuen Regierung.
Der für die palästinensischen Angelegenheiten zuständige
Redakteur der „Jerusalem Post“, Khaled Abu Toameh, berichtet,
dass hochrangige „Fatah“-Mitglieder eine Schattenregierung bilden
wollen, um dem internationalen Boykott der „Hamas“-Regierung
entgegenzuwirken und den Machtkampf mit „Hamas“ zu ihrem
Gunsten zu beenden.
Die Minister der Autonomiebehörde verzichten auf ihre Ämter bei
„Hamas“ und geben damit innenpolitischem und internationalem
Druck nach, der die Islamische Widerstandsbewegung zur Änderung
ihrer Charta von 1988 zwingen will.
Nach Angaben des US-State Department hat Washington die Hilfe
für die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde um 300 Millionen USDollar gekürzt. Davon sollen rund 100 Millionen US-Dollar in
humanitäre Projekte fließen. Die Gesamthilfe beläuft sich 2006 auf
reichlich 400 Millionen US-Dollar.
05.04.2006:
In seiner Erklärung zum Nahen Osten betont der EUAußenbeauftragte Javier Solana, dass für Europa nur die Gründung
eines Staates Palästina in den Grenzen vor dem Junikrieg 1967 in
Frage komme.
04.04.2006:
Ehud Olmert („Kadima“) und Amir Peretz (Arbeitspartei) vereinbaren
die Aufnahme von Koalitionsverhandlungen.
03.04.2006:
Der amtierende Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert kündigt die
Aufnahme von Avigdor Lieberman, den Vorsitzenden der unter dem
Vorwurf des Rassismus stehenden Partei „Unser Haus Israel“, in die
Regierung an und löst damit beträchtlichen Unmut in der
Öffentlichkeit aus. Dem Vorsitzenden der Arbeitspartei Amir Peretz
wird übelgenommen, dass er sich als künftiger Koalitionspartner
gegen die Aufnahme der Partei nicht wehrt.
„Haaretz“-Reporter Meron Rapoport berichtet von einer Konferenz
des Jerusalem-Instituts („Machon Jerushalayim“) vor einer Woche,
bei der der frühere Sekretär des „Rates der jüdischen Siedlungen in
Judäa und Samaria“ Othniel Schneller, der als neuer Abgeordneter
von „Kadima“ in die Knesset einzieht, die Auffassung vertreten habe,
dass im Zuge eines Friedensvertrages die Altstadt Jerusalems, das
„Heilige Becken“ aus Ölberg, Skopusberg, Davidstadt und Sheik
Jarrah bei Israel bleiben müsse, während die Bezirke Shuafat, Anata
und Abu Dis in palästinensische Hände übergehen sollen. Wie
Rapoport weiter berichtet, seien jüngst Bewohner in einem der
größten palästinensischen Wohngebiete der Stadt, in A-Tur, und in
Silwan mit Hilfe fadenscheiniger Kaufverträge aus ihren Häusern
vertrieben worden.
März 2006
31.03.2006:
In einem Gastbeitrag für den Londoner „Guardian“ beklagt der
palästinensische Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh die „skandalösen
Doppelstandards“ der USA und Europas. Von den Palästinensern
würden die Anerkennung Israels und das Ende ihres Widerstandes
erwartet, und sie würden dazu aufgefordert, alle früheren
Vereinbarungen mit Israel einzuhalten. Gleichzeitig würden
Washington und Europa die israelische Regierung mit Forderungen
wie der Befolgung von UN-Resolutionen verschonen. „Wir sind krank
und müde von dem rassistischen Konfliktverständnis, bei dem die
Palästinenser als minderwertig betrachtet werden. Dennoch strecken
wir als Opfer unsere Hand zum Frieden aus.“ Es werde aber so
lange keinen Frieden geben, solange Israel nicht auf die Grenze von
1967 zurückkehrt, Ost-Jerusalem nicht räumt, nicht alle
palästinensischen Gefangenen freilässt, nicht alle Siedler evakuiert
und das Recht aller Flüchtlinge auf Rückkehr nicht anerkennt.
Im Rahmen bewaffneter Auseinandersetzungen rivalisierender
palästinensischer Gruppen kommt der Anführer des bisher nicht in
Erscheinung getretenen „Komitees für den Volkswiderstand“ Khalil
Kuka ums Leben, als sein Wagen im Gazastreifen vor einer
Moschee explodiert. Seine Anhänger vermuten hinter dem Anschlag
den Präventiven Sicherheitsdienst, der von „Fatah“ beherrscht wird.
30.03.2006:
Der neue palästinensische Kulturminister Abu Sabach verlangt, nur
Filme und Theaterstücke gemäß der islamischen Tradition
aufzuführen. Die Sprachkurse auswärtiger Kulturinstitute will er bis
auf weiteres weiterlaufen lassen. Außerdem kündigt er die
Unterbindung von Kontakten zu israelischen Friedensinitiativen wie
„Peace Seeds“ und der Bildungs- und Begegnungsstätte „Givat
Chaviva“ an.
Außenminister Machmud Zahhar erklärt gegenüber der chinesischen
Nachrichtenagentur „Xinhua“, dass es „für Israel in diesem Land
keinen Platz“ gebe. In einem Schreiben an UN-Generalsekretär Kofi
Annan am 4. April drückt Zahhar nach einer englischen Übersetzung
des „Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre“ in Ost-Jerusalem
die Hoffnung des palästinensischen Volkes auf „Freiheit,
Unabhängigkeit und ein Leben in Würde an der Seite mit dem Rest
unserer Nachbarn in dieser heiligen Weltregion“ aus145.
Bei einem Selbstmordanschlag nahe der jüdischen Siedlung
Kedumim (Westbank) tötet ein als frommer Jude verkleideter
Palästinenser vier Personen, den sie in ihrem Auto mitnahmen.
Das „Quartett“ aus USA, EU, Russland und UN verabschiedet eine
Erklärung, wonach die Nichtbeachtung der Prinzipien „Bekenntnis
zum Gewaltverzicht“, „Anerkennung Israels“ und „Übernahme aller
bisheriger Vereinbarungen und Verpflichtungen“ durch „Hamas“
„unvermeidliche Folgen für die Direkthilfen an die [palästinensische]
Regierung und ihre Ministerien“ haben werde. Am 7. April gibt die
Sprecherin der EU-Außenkommissarin Benita Ferrero-Waldner in
Brüssel die sofortige Einstellung der gesamten finanziellen
Unterstützung für die palästinensische Regierung bekannt.
Humanitäre Hilfen über Nichtregierungsorganisationen sind von der
Anordnung nicht betroffen. Kommentare in der „Süddeutschen
Zeitung“ und in der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung“ bezweifeln die
politische Weisheit der Brüsseler Entscheidung und befürchten eine
weitere Radikalisierung der palästinensischen Bevölkerung,
nachdem sogar in der israelischen Regierung Stimmen für Kontakte
zu „Hamas“ vernehmbar seien.
29.03.2006:
Die 24 Mitglieder der neuen palästinensischen Regierung unter
Führung von Ismail Haniyeh werden in Ramallah und Gaza-Stadt per
Videoschaltung vereidigt; 14 Mitglieder kommen aus dem
Gazastreifen und zehn aus der Westbank. Von den Parlamentariern
stimmen 72 für die Regierung und 36 – Abgeordnete von „Fatah“,
des „Dritten Weges“ des früheren Finanzministers Salam Fayyad
und der „Unabhängigen Palästina-Liste“ von Mustafa Barghouti –
gegen sie. 13 Abgeordnete der Volksfront für die Befreiung
Palästinas, von „Hamas“ und „Fatah“ nehmen an der Abstimmung
nicht teil, weil sie in israelischen Gefängnissen sitzen. Neuer Minister
des Innern und Minister für Nationale Sicherheit wird Saeed Siam.
Dem Kabinett gehören außerdem an Machmud Khaled al-Zahhar als
Außenminister, Achmad Abdul Hamid al-Khalidi als Justizminister,
Atallah Abdul al-Sabeh als Kulturminister, Basem Naim als
Gesundheitsminister, Samir Abdullah Saleh Abu Eisheh als
Planungsminister, Issa Khairi al-Jaabari als Minister für städtische
Belange, Alladin Hussein al-Araj als Minister für die nationale
Wirtschaft, Abdul Rachman Zeidan als Minister für öffentliches
Bauen und für Wohnungsbau, Ziad Shukri Abed Rabbo Thatha als
Transportminister, Jamal Naji al-Kudair als Minister für
Telekommunikation und Technologie, Nayif Machmud al-Rjub als
Minister für religiöse Stiftungen („aqaf“) und religiöse
Angelegenheiten, Mohammed Ramdan al-Agha als
Landwirtschaftsminister, Judeh George Morqos als Minister für
Tourismus und Baudenkmäler, Mohammed Ibrahim Musa alBarghouti als Arbeitsminister, Fakhri Fahd Musa Turkman als
Sozialminister, Wasfi Mustafa Izzat Qabha als Minister für die [in
Israel einsitzenden] Gefangenen, Matar Abdul Razeq als
Finanzminister, Miriam Machmud Hassan Saleh als
Frauenministerin, Atef Ibrahim Utwan und Khaled Ibrahim Abu
Arafeh als Staatsminister146, und Yousef Rizqa als
Informationsminister. In seiner Ansprache räumt der
Autonomiepräsident Machmud Abbas der neuen Regierung „einige
Monate, wenn nicht weniger“ für die Änderung ihres Programms ein,
das mit dem Programm der PLO und der Beschlusslage der
Arabischen Gipfelkonferenz übereinstimmen müsse.
Der palästinensische Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh erklärt nach
der Vereidigung seiner Regierung, dass sie keine Einwendungen
gegen Verhandlungen von Machmud Abbas mit Israel erhebe.
Gleiches gelte für die Ergebnisse solcher Verhandlungen, wenn
Abbas sie dem palästinensischen Volk präsentiere und sie in dessen
Interesse liegen. Die palästinensische Tageszeitung „al-Ayyam“ („Die
Tage)“ berichtet sm 6. April, dass Haniyeh allen Ministern Kontakte
zu Israel erlaubt habe, um das Leben der palästinensischen
Bevölkerung zu erleichtern. Gleichzeitig gibt Haniyeh bekannt, dass
die palästinensischen Kassen leer seien. In Nablus fallen die Kurse
an der Börse.
Die Arabische Gipfelkonferenz in der sudanesischen Hauptstadt
endet mit einer „Khartum-Erklärung“, in der die Staats- und
Regierungschefs im Blick auf den israelisch-palästinensischen
Konflikt ihre Verpflichtung vom März 2002 wiederholen, Israel „einen
umfassenden Frieden im Austausch für einen Rückzug von
arabischem Land“ anzubieten. Außerdem erwarten sie von der
internationalen Gemeinschaft die Respektierung der
palästinensischen Wahlentscheidung vom 25. Januar und weisen
einseitige israelische Maßnahmen zurück, „die auf das Ende des
Friedensprozesses abzielen“.
28.03.2006:
Nach mehrfacher Bereinigung von Fehlern bei der Auszählung der
Stimmen bei den israelischen Parlamentswahlen, bei denen sich 31
Parteien um die 120 Mandate bewerben, gewinnt die Partei des
amtierenden Ministerpräsidenten Ehud Olmert 29 Sitze, die
Arbeitspartei von Amir Peretz verfügt künftig über 19 Mandate, die
„Sefardischen Torawächter (Shas)“ mit ihrem Spitzenkandidaten Eli
Yishai und der „Likud“ mit Benjamin Netanyahu über je zwölf, „Unser
Haus Israel (Israel Beitenu)“ mit Avigdor Lieberman über elf, die
Nationalreligiöse Partei/Nationale Union über neun, die
Rentnerpartei „Gil (Alter)“ mit dem 79jährigen Rafael Eitan an der
Spitze über sieben – Eitan verordnet seinem Wahlkampfteam
sogleich eine Ruhepause, denn „wir sind nicht mehr die jüngsten“ –,
die Partei Vereinigtes Tora-Judentum unter Leitung von Yaacov
Litzman über sechs, „Meretz/Yachad“ von Yossi Beilin über fünf, die
Vereinigte Arabische Liste (Koalition aus der südlichen Fraktion der
Islamischen Bewegung in Israel und der Beduinenliste) in
Verbindung mit „Ta’al“ – der Arabischen Bewegung für einen Wandel
unter Führung von Achmed Tibi – über vier sowie die jüdischarabische „Demokratische Front (Chadash)“ und die arabische
National-Demokratische Liste („Balad“) mit Azmi Bishara über jeweils
drei Mandate. Rund vierzig Parlamentarier gehören der 17. Knesset
nicht mehr an. Es gilt eine Sperrklausel von zwei Prozent.
Wahlberechtigt sind 5.014.622 Israelis, darunter rund 600.000
Araber. Die Wahlbeteiligung liegt bei nur 62,3 Prozent. Noch am
selben Abend erklärt der Abgeordnete Abd-el Malekh Dahamshe,
dass seine Partei „Ta’al“ für eine Regierung unter Führung von
Olmert ein „Sicherheitsnetz“ aufspannen werde. Nach
Medienberichten erringen die drei arabischen Parteien nur ein Viertel
aller abgegebenen arabischen Stimmen. Beilin trifft am 3. April mit
Olmert zusammen und schlägt eine Koalition aus „Kadima“,
Arbeitspartei, „Meretz/Yachad“, der Rentnerpartei und einer
orthodoxen Partei vor, weil eine Regierung unter Führung von Amir
Peretz nur mit Hilfe rechtgerichteter Parteien möglich sei. Im „Likud“
kündigt sich eine Zerreißprobe an; Limor Livnat und Silvan Shalom,
die von Netanyahu im Zusammenhang mit der Evakuierung des
Gazastreifens im Sommer 2005 zum Rückzug als
Erziehungsministerin bzw. Außenminister aus der Regierung Ariel
Sharons gezwungen worden sind, kündigen ihre Kandidatur um die
Spitzenposition der Partei an. Der mit der Regierungsbildung von
Staatspräsident Moshe Katzav beauftragte Kandidat hat 28 Tage
Zeit, wobei die Frist um noch einmal zwei Wochen verlängert werden
kann. In einer Erhebung des „Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace
Research“ an der Universität Tel Aviv vom 3./4. April befürworten 37
Prozent der jüdischen Befragten die Beteiligung einer arabischen
Partei an der künftigen Regierung.
Die Euro-Mediterrane Parlamentarische Versammlung (EMPA)
verweigert dem „Hamas“-Abgeordneten Machmud Achmad alRachimi, einem Anästhesisten aus Ramallah, die Teilnahme an ihrer
Tagung in Brüssel. Zu EMPA, der parlamentarischen Dimension des
„Barcelona-Prozesses“ von 1995 ohne Beschlusskompetenz,
gehören 240 Delegierte, je zur Hälfte aus der EU und den Partnern
rings um das Mittelmeer: Algerien, Ägypten, Israel, Jordanien,
Libanon, Marokko, Syrien, Tunesien, Türkei und Palästinensische
Autonomiebehörde.
Die „Saarbrücker Zeitung“ meldet in ihrer Internetausgabe, dass im
deutschen Bundeshaushalt 2006 für die Lieferung von zwei UBooten der „Dolphin“-Klasse an Israel eine Finanzhilfe in Höhe von
333 Millionen Euro – ein Drittel der Gesamtkosten – ausgewiesen
147
sei .
27.03.2006:
Vor dem Obersten Gericht Israels beginnt die Anhörung über eine
Petition von Palästinensern aus zwei Dörfern gegen den Verlauf der
Trennungsmauern um die östlich von Jerusalem gelegene
Trabantenstadt Maaleh Adumim und sieben weitere kleine
Siedlungen. Die Antragsteller berufen sich auf den pensionierten
israelischen Polizeigeneralmajor Shaul Givoli, der dem „Rat für
Frieden und Sicherheit“ vorsteht, und auf den Reservegeneral Shaul
Arieli, der zum israelischen Team der „Genfer Initiative“ gehörte148,
der die Behauptung zurückweist, dem Bau der Trennungsmauern
lägen Sicherheitserwägungen zugrunde.
Vor dem Militärgericht in Jerusalem beginnt das Verfahren gegen
Achmed Saadat, der am 14. März mit vier weiteren Palästinensern
von israelischen Soldaten im Gefängnis in Jericho festgenommen
wurde149.
25.03.2006:
Der UN-Sondergesandte für den Nahen Osten, der norwegische
Diplomat Terje Rœd-Larsen, fordert in Beirut die syrische und die
libanesische Regierung auf, diplomatische Beziehungen
aufzunehmen und ihre Staatsgrenzen auszuweisen.
24.03.2006:
In einem Interview in „Haaretz“, das Akiva Eldar am 22. März geführt
hat, betont der Präsident der Autonomiebehörde Machmud Abbas,
dass in weniger als einem Jahr der israelisch-palästinensische
Konflikt beendet werden könnte. Er habe den USA verdeckte
Verhandlungen unter Führung von Präsident George W. Bush für
eine Schlussregelung entlang der „Grünen Linie“ von 1967 mit der
Möglichkeit des Gebietsaustausches vorgeschlagen – eine Option,
die der Vertragsentwurf der „Genfer Initiative“ beschrieben hat.
Eine Antwort aus Washington liegt nach Angaben aus
palästinensischen Kreisen noch nicht vor. Eine von „Hamas“
geführte Regierung, so Abbas, würde ihn nicht davon abhalten, mit
Israel zu verhandeln, wenn die Regierung in Jerusalem von der
Behauptung abgehe, es gebe auf der anderen Seite keinen
Verhandlungspartnern. Wenn er nicht der Partner sei, so fragt Abbas
rhetorisch, wer dann? Die Ankündigung von Ehud Olmert, weitere
einseitige Rückzuge vorzunehmen, werde keinen Frieden schaffen,
sondern höchstens eine vielleicht zehnjährige Waffenruhe mit einem
palästinensischen Staat in vorläufigen Grenzen. Der Sieg von
„Hamas“ sei der Preis der Demokratie, führt Abbas aus, doch werde
der Triumph ihn nach Einschätzung von Eldar nicht daran hindern,
die Ernennung der neuen Regierung bis zur Tagung der Arabischen
Liga am 28. März in Khartum hinauszuschieben. Abbas betont, dass
eine Regelung des palästinensischen Flüchtlingsproblems auf der
150
Grundlage der UN-Resolution 194 vom 11. Dezember 1948 , der
151
Parameter von Bill Clinton im Dezember 2000 und des
Schlusskommuniqués der Arabischen Liga in Beirut im März 2002,
das von einer „gerechten und vereinbarten“ Lösung spricht,
gefunden werden müsse.
23.03.2006:
Beim Treffen mit den in Israel akkreditierten ausländischen
Korrespondenten erklärt Shimon Peres, er habe nicht die Ideale der
Arbeitspartei verraten, sondern durch seinen Übertritt zu „Kadima“
nur den Rahmen gewechselt. Er glaube weiter zu hundert Prozent an
den Frieden mit den Palästinensern, aber dafür brauche es mehr
Zeit, als er bislang gemeint habe.
22.03.2006:
Gemäß einer Meinungsumfrage, die heute vom „GeoCartographia
Research Institute“, Tel Aviv, im Auftrag des „Center for the Struggle
Against Racism“ veröffentlicht worden ist, lehnen es 68 Prozent der
jüdisch-israelischen Bevölkerung ab, mit einem arabischen
Landsmann unter einem Dach zu wohnen und 64 Prozent würden es
ablehnen ihn in ihr Haus einzuladen. Die Neigung zu diesem
Verhalten falle, so das Institut, mit der Höhe des Einkommens und
steige mit dem Niveau religiöser Observanz.
20.03.2006:
Der Führer der „Nationalen Jüdischen Front“ Baruch Marzel
bezeichnet die Führer von „Kadima“ als Verräter und Verbrecher und
ruft die Armee auf, Uri Avnery zu töten. Israel werde von einer Junta
regiert.
19.03.2006:
„Hamas“ überreicht dem Präsidenten der Autonomiebehörde
Machmud Abbas ihre Kabinettsliste in Gaza-City.
18.03.2005:
Haim Oron, Abgeordneter von „Meretz/Yachad“, erklärt die
Bereitschaft seiner Partei, gemeinsam mit den „Sefardischen
Torawächtern (Shas)“ in eine Regierung einzutreten, schließt aber
eine Koalition mit den rechtskonservativen Parteien „Likud“ von
Benjamin Netanyahu und mit „Unser Haus Israel“ von Avigdor
Lieberman aus1.
17.03.2006:
In einem Gastbeitrag für „Haaretz“ schreibt der ehemalige USamerikanische Präsident Jimmy Carter, der zu den ersten
152
internationalen Unterstützern der „Genfer Initiative“ gehörte“ ,
dass Israels anhaltende Besetzung Palästinas ein umfassendes
Friedensabkommen im Heiligen Land verhindert habe, und zwar
unabhängig davon, wer die Palästinenser regiere. Gleichzeitig nimmt
Carter die Administrationen in Washington in Schutz und hebt
hervor, dass schon Dwight D. Eisenhower die Grenzen Israels mit
den Waffenstillstandslinien von 1949 gleichgesetzt habe. Obwohl es
am 25. Januar 2005 ehrliche, faire und friedliche Wahlen gegeben
habe – Carter führte das US-amerikanische Beobachterteam –, habe
Israel eine Politik der Isolierung und Destabilisierung der neuen
Regierung unter „Hamas“ angekündigt. Die Position der
gegenwärtigen Regierung in Jerusalem sei weder für die
Palästinenser noch für die internationale Gemeinschaft akzeptabel,
sondern werde unweigerlich die Spannungen in Palästina und die
Vorbehalte der arabischen Welt gegen Amerika verstärken, warnt
Carter.
16.03.2006:
Die Harvard University und die University of Chicago veröffentlichen
eine Studie, in der sie zum Ergebnis kommen, dass die USamerikanische Nahostpolitik nicht im nationalen Interesse der USA
liege und vorrangig von der pro-israelischen Lobby motiviert sei. Die
Analyse stützt sich auf israelische und US-amerikanische Berichte
und Studien und beruft sich auf die israelische
Menschrechtsorganisation „B’tselem“ („Im Angesicht“, Gen. 1,27).
Das Zentralkomitee von „Fatah“ beschließt, sich nicht der von
„Hamas“ geführten Regierung anzuschließen. Auch andere Parteien
wie die „Volksfront für die Befreiung Palästinas (PFLP)“, „Der Dritte
Weg“ des früheren Finanzministers Salam Fayyad, „Die Alternative
Liste“ und das „Unabhängige Palästina“ wollen das Angebot
zurückweisen. Die Führung von „Hamas“ will ihr Kabinett am 17.
März Präsident Machmud Abbas präsentieren.
Der designierte palästinensische Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh
unterstreicht in einem Interview mit der US-amerikanischen TVStation „CBS News“, dass er nie die Entsendung eines
Selbstmordattentäters befohlen habe. Dagegen betont der
amtierende israelische Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert, dass Haniyeh
ein enger Vertrauter von Sheikh Achmed Yassin gewesen sei. Ein
israelisches Militärkommando hatte Yassin im März 2004 getötet.
1
Vgl. den Eintrag am 16.03.2006 in dieser Rubrik.
Nach Angaben diplomatischer Kreise in Israel, auf die sich die
„Jerusalem Post“ beruft, hat die Regierung nicht die Absicht, den
palästinensischen Gebieten die Lieferung von Wasser, Gas und
Elektrizität vorzuenthalten. Außerdem sei die Lieferung von
medizinischen und landwirtschaftlichen Gütern und von anderen
Waren in die Westbank und den Gazastreifen gewährleistet. „In
außergewöhnlichen Fällen“ würde Palästinensern auch die Einreise
zur Behandlung in israelischen Krankenhäusern genehmigt.
Unter der Überschrift „Keine Angst vor der Autonomie“ bezeichnet
der Vorsitzende von „Meretz/Yachad“, Yossi Beilin, die arabischen
Staatsbürger Israels als eine nationale Minorität mit dem Recht, ihre
Einzigartigkeit bewahren zu können. Nur einen Anspruch, innerhalb
Israels einen eigenen Staat zu bilden, weist Beilin als „nicht
wünschenswert“ für Juden und Araber zurück. Gleichzeitig
distanziert er sich scharf von dem Vorsitzenden der „Nationalen
Union/Unser Haus Israel“, Avigdor Lieberman, der vor kurzem die
israelischen Araber zum Verlassen des „Kleinen Dreiecks“ und der
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Ortschaft Um el-Fachm aufgefordert hatte . Ein arabischer
Abgeordneter der jüdisch-arabischen „Demokratischen Front
(Chadash)“ fordert Lieberman am 21. März auf, nach Russland
zurückzukehren, wenn ihm das Zusammenleben mit Arabern in
Israel nicht passe. Der frühere Vorsitzende von „Meretz“, Shulamit
Aloni, warnt am selben Tag in „Yediot Achronot“ von einer
„Ethnokratie“.
15.03.2006:
Führende Mitglieder von „Fatah“ – der größten Partei innerhalb der
PLO – fordern Machmud Abbas auf, die Autonomiebehörde
aufzulösen und die Verantwortung voll an die israelische Regierung
zurückzugeben. Zur Begründung schreiben sie, dass es ihr nicht
gelungen sei, die Entführung von Achmed Sadaat aus dem
Gefängnis in Jericho zu verhindern, der Okkupation ein Ende zu
setzen und eine Verhandlungslösung mit Israel zu erreichen
14.03.2006:
Inmitten des politischen Machtvakuums zwischen der
Autonomiebehörde und „Hamas“ stürmen zwei Bataillone einer
israelischen Eliteeinheit das Gefängnis in Jericho, um den Führer der
„Volksfront für die Befreiung Palästinas (PFLP)“ in der Westbank,
den 51jährigen Achmed Sadaat, der am 25. Januar ins Parlament
gewählt worden ist, und vier weitere, zur PFLP gehörige Häftlinge
festzunehmen, damit sie in Israel vor Gericht gestellt werden. Bei
den Zusammenstößen zwischen der palästinensischen Polizei und
den israelischen Soldaten kommen zwei palästinensische
Gefangene ums Leben. Den Festgenommenen legt Israel die
Verantwortung für den Mord an dem israelischen Tourismusminister
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Rechaham („Gandhi“) Ze’evi am 17. Oktober 2001 im Hyatt-Hotel
in Ost-Jerusalem zur Last, wo Ze’evi ein ständiges Büro unterhielt.
Ze’evi war ein führender Vertreter jener Kräfte in Israel, die für einen
„Transfer“ der palästinensischen Bevölkerung – auch der arabischen
Staatsbürger Israels – plädierten. Nach den Festnahmen Sadaats
und der anderen Beschuldigten werden ausländische Helfer und
Journalisten im Gazastreifen vorübergehend entführt; ein Aufruf zum
Generalstreik wird teilweise befolgt. In der Westbank gehen viele
tausend Palästinenser aus Protest auf die Straße. Die israelische
Regierung verfügt die vollständige Abriegelung der Westbank und
des Gazastreifens bis zum 18. März. Das deutsche
Außenministerium in Berlin fordert alle Staatsangehörigen auf, aus
Gründen ihrer Sicherheit die Westbank und den Gazastreifen zu
verlassen. Die Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
in Ramallah schließt vorübergehend ihre Pforten. Der
palästinensische Präsident Machmud Abbas kehrt vorzeitig von einer
Europa-Reise zurück und verurteilt die Operation als ein „hässliches
Verbrechen“. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat fordert beide Seiten zur
Zurückhaltung auf. Das Europäische Parlament in Straßburg kritisiert
Israel für seine „illegale Aktion“. Jordaniens König Abdullah II.
beklagt „eine unglückliche Eskalation“. Der ägyptische
Außenminister Achmed Aboul Ghait beklagt die Gewalt, statt
friedliche Mittel zur Beilegung von Konflikten einzusetzen. Ein
ehemaliger britischer Sicherheitsberater der Europäischen Union
erklärt gegenüber der „Jerusalem Post“, dass Sadaat, der im Januar
2002 festgenommen worden war, von einem palästinensischen
Militärgericht zu 18 Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt worden sei, Yasser
Arafat aber entschieden habe, dass er diese Strafe nicht antreten
müsse, weil sich die israelischen Behörden geweigert hätten,
Beweise für die Verwicklung Sadaat in den Mord an Ze’evi
vorzulegen. Am 8. März hatten der britische und der USamerikanische Generalkonsul einen Brief an Abbas geschrieben, in
dem sie der Autonomiebehörde vorwarfen, seit Monaten die für
Sadaat im Mai 2002 vereinbarten Haftbedingungen nicht einzuhalten
– sie sollten eine Auslieferung an Israel verhindern –, und hatten mit
dem Abzug des im Gefängnis postierten britischen und USamerikanischen Personals gedroht. Der britische Premierminister
Tony Blair verteidigt die Maßnahme.
Der amtierende Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert erklärt bei einem
Besuch in Ariel, dass diese in der Westbank liegende Stadt mit rund
18.000 Bewohnern im Falle einer Vereinbarung mit den
Palästinensern auf jeden Fall bei Israel bleiben werde.
„Yediot Achronot“ meldet, dass die langjährige Leiterin der
Jugendorganisation von „Meretz“, Sharon Dolev, die Partei verlassen
hat, um sich der der „Neuen Kommunistischen Liste (Chadash)“
anzuschließen. Ihre Entscheidung begründet Dolev damit, dass
„Meretz“ in den vergangenen Jahren zu einem „elitären Flügel der
Arbeitspartei“ geworden sei und „Chadash“ den jüdisch-arabischen
Beziehungen einen hohen Stellenwert beimesse. Gleichzeitig
beschuldigt sie die arabischen Mitglieder ihrer bisherigen Partei des
politischen Konformismus.
Die Führer rivalisierender Parteien in Libanon einigen sich darauf,
die Palästinenser außerhalb der Flüchtlingslager innerhalb von sechs
Monaten zu entwaffnen und auch über ihre Bewaffnung in den
Lagern eine Entscheidung herbeiführen zu wollen. Außerdem sollen
diplomatische Beziehungen zu Syrien aufgenommen werden – diese
Formalität war bislang auf syrisches Betreiben unterblieben, so dass
zwischen beiden Regierungen nie zum Austausch von Botschafter
gekommen war.
13.03.2006:
Die russische Einwandererpartei „Unser Haus Israel (Israel Beitenu)“
und die Partei der „Sefardischen Torawächter (Shas)“ weisen ein
Angebot des „Likud“-Vorsitzenden Benjamin Netanyahu zurück, in
eine von ihm geführte Regierung einzutreten.
Die US-amerikanischen Professoren John J. Mearsheimer
(Department of Political Science, University of Chicago) und Stephen
M. Walt (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University) legen ihren Untersuchungsbericht „The Israel Lobby and
U.S. Foreign Policy” vor. Darin fragen sie, warum Washington gegen
die nationalen Interessen im Nahen Osten Israel ganz und gar
unterstützt, und führen dies fast durchgängig auf innenpolitische
Faktoren zurück. Sie stützen ihre Ergebnisse, wie die Autoren
betonen, vor allem auf israelische Wissenschaftler und Journalisten
sowie auf internationale Menschenrechtsorganisationen. Außerdem
seien Aussagen von Angehörigen der „jüdischen Lobby“ in den USA
in den Bericht eingegangen. Die Schlussfolgerungen könnten
zurückgewiesen werden, räumen die Autoren ein, doch die
Beweislage, auf denen sie beruhe, sei nicht strittig. Sie fordern, dass
über den Einfluss der Lobby eine offene Diskussion sowie eine
Debatte über die Interessen der USA im Nahen und Mittleren Osten
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geführt werden .
12.03.2006:
Nach einem Bericht der „Jerusalem Post“ beabsichtigen Ägypten,
Jordanien und Qatar die Auslieferung von flüchtigen Palästinensern
an die Autonomiebehörde, die der Korruption beschuldigt werden.
Einige von ihnen seien bereits in den Gazastreifen überstellt worden.
Niemand stehe über dem Gesetz, erklärt der palästinensische
Generalstaatsanwalt Achmed al-Mughni.
„Haaretz“ meldet, dass der Nahost-Sonderbotschafter des
„Quartetts“, James D. Wolfensohn, sein im April auslaufendes
Mandat nicht verlängern will, wenn sich die USA, die EU, Russland
und die UN nicht auf eine gemeinsame Politik verständigen.
Wolfensohn soll im Auftrag Washingtons den Personen- und
Warenverkehr nach und aus dem Gazastreifen organisieren. Israel
hatte am 9. März den für den Güter- und Warenverkehr in den
Gazastreifen bestimmten Grenzübergang Karni geöffnet und ihn am
14. März wieder geschlossen. Die zeitweise Wiedereröffnung stand
in Verbindung mit Warnungen vor einer Hungersnot im Gazastreifen
wegen fehlender Grundnahrungsmittel zu erschwinglichen Preisen.
Den Betreibern von Gewächshäusern sollen durch Verkaufsausfälle
täglich Schäden in Höhe von 500.000 US-Dollar entstehen. Am 14.
März schließt Israel erneut den Grenzübergang. Auf Druck des USamerikanischen Botschafters Richard Jones wird Karni am 20. März
später kurze Zeit für die Lieferung von Lebensmitteln und Arzneien in
den Gazastreifen geöffnet, während Exporte nicht zugelassen
werden. Am 20. März wird der Grenzübergang für 40 Minuten
geöffnet.
Die israelische Regierung beschließt einen Maßnahmenkatalog
gegen die Diskriminierung von arabischen Staatsbürgern,
Einwanderern aus Äthiopien und Behinderten. So soll die Zahl der
Araber im öffentlichen Dienst um zehn Prozent sowie die der
Äthiopier und Behinderten um weitere vierzig Prozent angehoben
werden. Der Katalog wird von arabischer Seite und von
Repräsentanten der politischen Linken, so von Yossi Beilin, dem
Vorsitzenden von „Meretz/Yachad“, als übliches Wahlkampfmanöver
zurückgewiesen.
11.03.2006:
„Hamas“ veröffentlicht ihr Regierungsprogramm156. Die Kolumnistin
Amira Hass bezeichnet es am 15. März in „Haaretz“ als eine
„Mischung aus Erklärungen und Slogans einer nationalen
Befreiungsbewegung und vagen Kompromissen für eine künftige
Regierung“. Es tue dem palästinensischen Volk nicht gut und werde
niemanden in Israel beeindrucken. Die Internet-Portal „bitterlemons“
publiziert am 14. März ein Interview mit dem designierten
Regierungschef Ismail Haniyeh, in dem dieser jeder konkreten
Aussage über seine künftige Politik ausweicht.
Ein „Hamas“-Sprecher verlangt von der „Volksfront für die Befreiung
Palästinas (PFLP)“, die bei den Wahlen am 25. Januar drei Mandate
gewonnen hat, und von der Liste „Unabhängiges Palästina“ von
Mustafa Barghouti, die zwei Mandate gewann, bis zum 13. März
über ihren Eintritt in die neue Regierung zu entscheiden. Die
Terminvorgabe verstreicht ergebnislos.
In einem Bericht israelischer Zeitungen über das mögliche
Wahlverhalten am 28. März wird berichtet, dass rund ein Zehntel der
Bevölkerung – rund 630.000 Personen – über keinen
Telefonanschluss verfügen, weil sie ihn nicht bezahlen könnten. Da
sie in Umfragen nicht einbezogen seien, könnten Prognosen eine
erhebliche Fehlerquote haben.
Der Vorsitzende der „Sefardischen Torawächter (Shas)“, Eli Yishai,
wiederholt die Zusage des spirituellen Führers der Partei, Rabbi
Ovadia Yosef, dass derjenige einen Platz im Himmel haben werde,
der „Shas“ am 28. März wählt. Der Werbespot wird von der
Zentralen Wahlkommission beanstandet.
10.03.2006:
In mehreren Interviews bekräftigt der amtierende Ministerpräsident
Ehud Olmert seine Absicht, auch gegen anhaltenden USamerikanischen Widerstand im „E-1-Sektor“ zwischen Ost-Jerusalem
und Maale Adumim neue Siedlungsstrukturen bauen zu lassen, um
die territorialen Kontinuität in diesem Raum sicherzustellen. In
Jerusalem selbst werde es möglicherweise Veränderungen
zugunsten der Palästinenser geben. Innerhalb von vier Jahren – bis
2010 – werde sich Israel von „einer entscheidenden Mehrheit der
palästinensischen Bevölkerung“ in der Westbank getrennt und
endgültige Staatsgrenzen entlang des „Sicherheitszauns“ festgelegt
haben. Dabei würden die Bewohner isolierter Siedlungen in die
großen Siedlungsblöcke Jerusalem einschließlich Maale Adumim,
Gush Etzion und Ariel umgesiedelt. Olmert leiste in dem Interview,
das am 8. März geführt worden ist, nach Auffassung der beiden
„Haaretz“-Journalisten Aluf Benn und Yossi Verter der „Road Map“
und dem Dialog mit den Palästinensern den obligatorischen
Lippendienst, aber klar sei, dass er nicht ernsthaft an sie glaube,
sondern auf weitere einseitige Schritte setze in der Hoffnung auf
Unterstützung der USA und der EU. In seinem Kommentar zu dem
Interview kritisiert Uzi Benziman am 12. März in „Haaretz“, dass
Olmert nicht den Mut habe, den Gordischen Knoten der Fehler seit
1967 zu durchschlagen. Er kündige die Trennung von den
Palästinensern an, nicht jedoch von den Gebieten, in denen sie
leben. Er verkünde seine Bereitschaft zum Rückzug, zeichne jedoch
im selben Atemzug das Ausmaß der Siedlungsblöcke und der
Sicherheitszonen, die er in israelischer Hand wissen wolle. Das
israelische Fernsehen berichtet am 13. März über den Baubeginn
einer Polizeistation im „E-1-Sektor“.
09.03.2006:
„Hamas“ übermittelt dem Präsidenten der Autonomiebehörde
Machmud Abbas eine Erklärung, wonach sie dessen Forderung
umgeht, die Bewegung vor der Regierungsübernahme auf alle mit
Israel unterzeichneten Vereinbarungen festzulegen. Sie werde, heißt
es in der Erklärung, alle Vereinbarungen und Verpflichtungen der
Autonomiebehörde im Lichte der Interessen des palästinensischen
Volkes beachten.
Der Vorsitzende der Arbeitspartei, Amir Peretz, gibt bekannt, dass er
als Bedingung für den Eintritt in die neue Regierung darauf bestehen
werde, alle 105 illegalen Siedlungsaußenposten aufzugeben.
Die „Jerusalem Post“ berichtet, dass nach Untersuchungen des
Soziologen Sammy Smooha von der Universität Haifa mehr als zwei
Drittel der israelischen Araber den Wahlsieg von „Hamas“ begrüßen
und gleichzeitig Israel als jüdischen Staat unterstützen, nicht jedoch
die Beschränkung des Einwanderungsrechts auf Juden und das
Recht auf eine jüdische Mehrheit.
„Haaretz“ zeigt an, dass Dorit Beinisch im Herbst 2006 die Nachfolge
von Aharon Barak als Präsidentin des Obersten Gerichts Israels
antreten werde. Beinisch war jahrelang Generalstaatsanwältin und
gehört seither dem Obersten Gericht an. In der heutigen Funktion
verbietet sie eine Wahlwerbung der „Herut“-Partei mit der Aussage
„Ein guter Araber ist nicht ein toter Araber. Ein guter Araber möchte
manchmal weggehen.“
07.03.2006:
Der amtierende Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert kündigt in einer Rede
in Tel Aviv an, dass die Regierung in den kommenden Jahren nicht
mehr so große Finanzmittel in den „Bau und die Entwicklung der
Infrastruktur jenseits der Grünen Linie“ investieren werde.
Stattdessen würden die Gelder in den Negev, nach Galiläa und
Jerusalem so umgelenkt, dass sich „das Gesicht des Staates
grundlegend verändern“ werde.
06.03.2006:
Das palästinensische Parlament nimmt alle Beschlüsse zurück, die
ihre Vorgängerin in ihrer letzten Sitzung am 13. Februar beschloss,
so die Erweiterung der Vollmachten für Präsident Machmud Abbas,
insbesondere das Recht der Ernennung der Mitglieder des
Verfassungsgerichts, die parlamentarische Beschlüsse aufheben
könnten. Ein enger Berater von Abbas bezeichnet die Entscheidung
als einen Putschversuch.
Nachdem die israelische Außenministerin Tsipi Livni in den
vergangenen Wochen keine Gelegenheit ausgelassen hat, westliche
Regierungen vor Kontakten mit „Hamas“ zu warnen, warnt sie
nunmehr vor dem Außen- und Sicherheitspolitischen Ausschuss der
Knesset vor einer „humanitären Katastrophe“ der palästinensischen
Bevölkerung und ermutigt die internationale Gemeinschaft zu mehr
Flexibilität gegenüber Hilfsorganisationen in der Westbank und im
Gazastreifen.
Yossi Alpher157, neben Ghassan Khatib Mitherausgeber der
Internetseite „bitterlemons“, bestätigt die kürzliche Aussage von Tsipi
Livni, dass Machmud Abbas irrelevant sei, weil er in der
palästinensischen Politik kein Durchsetzungsvermögen bewiesen
habe. Unter Verweis darauf, dass weder in Israel noch in westlichen
Staaten die stärkste Partei mit absoluter Mehrheit regiert, plädiert
Alpher dafür, „Hamas“ im Guten wie im Schlechten als „Partner“ zu
behandeln. „Hamas“ habe die parlamentarische Mehrheit gewonnen
und sei nun ihrerseits verpflichtet zu regieren. In derselben Ausgabe
von „bitterlemons“ weist Daniel Levy darauf hin, dass Abbas nach
wie vor der beliebteste Politiker für die Palästinenser sei, und stellt
die rhetorische Frage, wie viele israelische Politiker sich solch hohen
Ansehens im eigenen Land erfreuen würden. Der Jurist Levy sorgte
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im israelischen Team für den Feinschliff der „Genfer Initiative“ .
Die auch in deutschen Zeitungen verbreitete Absicht der israelischen
Regierung, nach den Wahlen am 28. März weitere 17 Siedlungen in
der Westbank aufzugeben, bezeichnet der Kommentator von
„Haaretz“ als „nicht gut genug“: Sie seien keiner Diskussion wert.
Denn die Zahl der Siedlungsblöcke, die nach amtlicher Auffassung
keinesfalls aufgegeben werden sollen, würde sich in ihrer Größe
ständig ändern. „Der Appetit nach der Annexion von Gebieten hat
sich keinen Augenblick verflüchtigt“, schreibt er. Weitere
Rückzugspläne müssten auf der Grundlage der Grenzen von 1967
basieren, zwar mit Anpassungen an echte Bedürfnisse, nicht jedoch
auf dem Fundament falscher Entscheidungen. So gebe es keinen
Grund, die Teilung Jerusalems zu verschieben, denn mit jedem Jahr
werde es schwieriger, die demographischen Verflechtungen zu
entmischen. Die Annexion des Jordantals sei ebenso falsch wie
diejenige des gesamten Geländes von Maale Adumim, die die
Westbank zerteile. Am 14. März berichtet Akiva Eldar in „Haaretz“,
dass die israelische Zivilverwaltung rund zweitausend Palästinensern
die Rückkehr ins Jordantal verbiete, nachdem viele tausend
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Dunam enteignet worden seien.
Die israelischen Medien berichten über ein Programm der
Militärischen Planungsabteilung für eine „Trennungspolitik“. Danach
solle sich Israel vollständig der Verantwortung für den Gazastreifen
entledigen, indem es dieses Territorium von der israelischen
Elektrizitäts- und Wasserzufuhr abkoppelt. Geplant sei ferner der
Ausbau der Übergänge Erez und Karni zu internationalen
Kontrollpunkten. Die Palästinenser sollen einen eigenen Seehafen
und einen Flugplatz bauen können. Palästinensischen Arbeitskräften
soll der Zugang nach Israel verwehrt sowie die immer wieder
diskutierte Verbindungsstrecke zwischen dem Gazastreifen und der
Westbank nicht gebaut werden. Während den Siedlungen in der
Westbank keine unmittelbare Sicherheitsfunktion zugerechnet
werde, schlage die Planungsabteilung „Sicherheitsgürtel“ im
Jordantal und auf den Höhenzügen vor.
04.03.2006:
Der Revolutionsrat von „Fatah“ kündigt an, dass der Eintritt in eine
von „Hamas“ geführte Regierung solange nicht in Frage komme, bis
deren interne Auseinandersetzungen um den künftigen Kurs
anhalten. Außerdem sei es wichtig, dass „Fatah“ zunächst ihre
eigenen Schlüsse aus der Niederlage bei den Wahlen am 25. Januar
ziehe.
In einem Interview mit Ari Shavit in „Haaretz“ begründet der
Vorsitzende der Arbeitspartei Amir Peretz den Vorrang der
Sozialpolitik in seinem Programm: Die Politik von Benjamin
Netanyahu, dem früheren Finanzminister, von Ariel Sharon und
Ehud Olmert habe dazu geführt, dass von den rund 2,5 Millionen
Gehaltsempfängern in Israel eine Million weniger als 3.300 Neue
Shekel (~ 580 Euro) verdienen würden, eine Million erhielten keine
Rente und eine Viertelmillion seien Vertragsarbeiter. Bei den Wahlen
am 28. März gehe es vor allem um das Verhältnis von arm und reich,
Herren und Knechten. „Kadima“ sei den achtzehn kapitalstärksten
Familien verpflichtet. Im Blick auf die „Genfer Initiative“ erklärt
Peretz wörtlich: „Ich glaube nicht, dass wir die Genfer Grenze
akzeptieren sollten. Genf ist nach meiner Ansicht zu weit gegangen.
Insgesamt gesehen, war die Genfer Initiative eher schädlich als für
den [Friedens-]Prozess von Nutzen. Doch die Demarkationslinie für
die Grenze wird 1967 sein. Es wird nicht möglich sein, die
Siedlungsblöcke Gush Etzion und Maaleh Adumim aufzulösen, aber
für sie werden wir entschädigen müssen – entweder viel Geld oder
Gebiete.“
03.03.2006:
Ein jüdischer Israeli bringt mehrere Feuerwerkskörper in der
Verkündigungskirche während der katholischen Messe in Nazareth
zur Explosion. Dem Mann wird geistige Verwirrung nachgesagt, er
sei bereits mehrfach auffällig geworden. Bei den anschließenden
Zusammenstößen werden arabische Bewohner der Stadt und
Polizisten verletzt.
02./03.03.2006:
Eine Delegation von „Hamas“-Repräsentanten unter Leitung von
Khaled Meshal, dem Leiter des Politischen Büros in Damaskus, trifft
am 2. März in Moskau ein. Der russische Außenminister Sergej
Lawrow fordert nach Agenturmeldungen, dass alle Vorstellungen des
internationalen „Quartetts“, dem Russland angehört, von „Hamas“
respektiert werden müssten: die Zustimmung zu unterschriebenen
Vereinbarungen, die Anerkennung des israelischen Rechts auf
Existenz und der Verzicht auf bewaffnete Mittel zur Regelung
politischer Fragen. Als Voraussetzung fordert Meshal den Rückzug
Israels auf die Grenzen von 1967 und die Rückkehr der
palästinensischen Flüchtlinge in ihre Heimat. Dann sei „Hamas“ zu
einem „großen Schritt in Richtung Frieden“ bereit. Eine Begegnung
mit Präsident Wladimir Putin wird der Delegation versagt.
Die für den diesjährigen Israel-Preis für rechtswissenschaftliche
Forschungen nominierte Jura-Professorin Ruth Lapidoth (Jerusalem)
erklärt in einem Gespräch mit „Haaretz“, dass die Souveränität über
den Tempelberg Gott überlassen werden sollte, weil weder Juden
noch Moslems zu Kompromissen bereit seien. Der zweite Preisträger
in dieser Abteilung wird der Tel Aviver Rechtsprofessor Amnon
Rubinstein sein, der gegenwärtig eine Kommission zur Überprüfung
der Einwanderungspolitik leitet.
01.03.2006:
„Haaretz“ berichtet, dass nach einer Umfrage 46 Prozent der
arabischen Bevölkerung Israels nicht vorhabe, am 28. März zu den
Wahlurnen zu gehen. Von den drei arabischen Parteien würden nur
zwei die Sperrklausel von zwei Prozent überwinden. Am 9. März
berichtet das Blatt, dass nach einer arabischen Umfrage 66 Prozent
von ihrem Wahlrecht Gebrauch machen wollen. Danach würden sich
voraussichtlich reichlich zwanzig Prozent für eine überwiegend
jüdische Partei entscheiden, darunter knapp zehn Prozent für
„Kadima“ – obwohl auf ihrer Wahlliste kein arabischer Kandidat zu
finden ist – und 7,5 Prozent für die Arbeitspartei. Rund 65 Prozent
würden eine arabische Partei wählen.
Februar 2006
27.02.2006:
Das Oberste Gericht Israels weist die Verletzung des Grundrechts
auf menschliche Würde und Freiheit zurück und besteht darauf, dass
die Mittel des Erziehungswesens gleichermaßen der arabischen wie
der jüdischen Bevölkerung des Staates zugute kommen. Das
Erziehungsministerium wollte zuvor das Land in Zonen mit
nationalem Vorzugscharakter einteilen und die Finanzierungsströme
für Lehrkräfte, berufsfortbildende Kurse, Fortbildungsmaßnahmen,
Stipendien und Zuweisungen für die außerschulische Bildung
dementsprechend lenken.
Khaled Meshal, Leiter des Politischen Büros von „Hamas“ mit Sitz in
Damaskus, erklärt gegenüber der in London erscheinenden
arabischen Zeitung „al-Hayyat“ die Bereitschaft zu Verhandlungen
ohne Vorbedingungen mit jeder Regierung, nicht jedoch mit dem
„zionistischen Feind“.
Die EU-Außenminister stellen auf ihrer Sitzung in Brüssel der
Autonomiebehörde für den Zeitraum bis zur palästinensischen
Regierungsbildung eine Soforthilfe von knapp 121 Millionen Euro zur
Verfügung, um Gehälter für 135.000 Angestellte (unter ihnen 60.000
Angehörige der Sicherheitsdienste) und ausstehende Rechnungen –
darunter 64 Millionen Euro für die Bezahlung von Stromlieferungen
vor allem aus Israel – zu bezahlen, ein weiterer hoher Betrag ist als
Hilfe für das Flüchtlingswerk der Vereinten Nationen (UNWRA)
bestimmt. Am 25. Februar hatte James D. Wolfensohn,
Sonderbotschafter des Nahost-Quartetts, in einem Brief an die USamerikanische Regierung vor einem Zusammenbruch der
Autonomiebehörde innerhalb von zwei Wochen gewarnt, falls keine
Lösung gefunden werde, nachdem Israel die Überweisung von
Einnahmen aus Steuern und Zöllen eingestellt habe160. Nach einem
Bericht der „International Herald Tribune“ vom 28. Februar hat
Saudi-Arabien zwanzig Millionen US-Dollar zugesagt, die noch nicht
ausgezahlt worden seien, während Norwegen zehn Millionen USDollar bereitstellen wolle. Ein Kredit von Qatar über vierzehn
Millionen US-Dollar sei im Januar 2006 als Rückzahlung fällig
geworden.
26.02.2006:
In einem Interview mit der „Washington Post“ erklärt der designierte
Ministerpräsident Ismail Haniyeh, dass „Hamas“ zur Anerkennung
Israels bereit sei, wenn Israel den Palästinensern einen Staat in den
Grenzen von 1967 gebe und ihnen all ihre Rechte zurückerstatte.
Später widerspricht Haniyeh gegenüber Journalisten der zitierten
Zusage. Er habe lediglich von der Möglichkeit eines Friedens in
Stufen auf der Grundlage einer langen Waffenruhe („hudna“)
gesprochen. Im Interview nach seiner Einstellung gegenüber den
Osloer Vereinbarungen befragt, behauptet Haniyeh
fälschlicherweise, dass sie einen palästinensischen Staat im Jahr
1999 zugesagt hätten.
Gegenüber dem privaten britischen Fernsehsender ITV erklärt
Machmud Abbas, dass für ihn ein Punkt erreicht sein könnte, an
dem er von seinem Amt zurücktreten werde, weil er seine Pflichten
nicht mehr erfüllen könne.
Der russische Sonderbotschafter für den Nahen Osten, Alexander
Kalugin, erwartet, dass sich „Hamas“ beim Besuch ihrer Delegation
in Moskau am 3. März klar zur Anerkennung Israels äußert.
Israels Verteidigungsminister Shaul Mofaz erklärt in einem Gespräch
mit Siedlern, dass die endgültigen Grenzen Israels die
Siedlungsblöcke Ariel, Maale Adumim und Gush Etzion sowie das
Jordantal – es macht ein Drittel der Westbank aus – und die
Siedlungen Rehan und Shaked bei Djenin einschließen würden. Zu
den Siedlungen Ofra-Bet El, Elon Moreh und Hebron äußert sich
Mofaz nicht.
Der Washingtoner Korrespondent von „Haaretz“, Shlomo Shamir,
berichtet, dass unter den US-amerikanischen Juden die Sorge vor
einer riesigen christlichen Missionierungswelle wächst. Während
Amerika einen globalen Kampf gegen den internationalen
Terrorismus führe, zitiert Shamir den führenden liberalen Rabbiner
James Rudin, der 35 Jahre lang im Auftrag des „American Jewish
Committee“ für den interreligiösen Dialog verantwortlich war,
betreiben starke und aggressive „Christokraten“ eine umfassende
Kampagne zur Missionierung Amerikas, die auf alle Bereiche des
öffentlichen und privaten Lebens überzugreifen drohe.
25.02.2006:
Erstmals nach dem Sieg von „Hamas“ trifft ein hoher USamerikanischer Diplomat mit Machmud Abbas zusammen.
Unterstaatssekretär C. David Welch versichert in Ramallah dem
Präsidenten der Autonomiebehörde der weiteren humanitären
Unterstützung Washingtons. Schon bislang ist sie über die
halbofizielle „U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)“
abgewickelt worden. Gegenüber Journalisten erklärt Welch nach
dem Gespräch: „In dieser kritischen Zeit für das palästinensische
Volk wiederhole ich unser Vertrauen in das Programm, das Abbas in
seiner Rede vor dem Parlament dargelegt hat, wo er zu einer
verhandelten Zweistaatenlösung aufrief161.“
24.02.2006:
In seinem Kommentar macht „Haaretz“-Chefkommentator Yoel
Marcus darauf aufmerksam, dass „im Prinzip“ über siebzig Prozent
der israelischen Bevölkerung das Gefühl hätten, dass Israel den
größten Teil der palästinensischen Gebiete verlassen sollte, auch
um den Preis eines einseitigen, mit der Autonomiebehörde nicht
abgesprochenen Rückzugs. Damit hätten die gegenseitigen
Beschuldigungen der Parteien im Wahlkampf, die jeweils anderen
seien Verzichtspolitiker, nicht verfangen. Dazu berichtet Gil Hoffman
in der „Jerusalem Post“, dass 49 Prozent der israelischen Wähler
Ehud Olmert für das Amt des künftigen Ministerpräsidenten nicht für
geeignet halten, bei dem „Likud“-Vorsitzenden Benjamin Netanyahu
sind dies 61 Prozent und bei dem Vorsitzenden der Arbeitspartei
Amir Peretz 75 Prozent.
23.02.2006:
Im Vorfeld eines Gesprächs mit Repräsentanten von „Hamas“ zeigt
sich „Fatah“ prinzipiell bereit, in die neue palästinensische Regierung
einzutreten. Die Entscheidung hänge vom Regierungsprogramm ab.
Die israelische Außenministerin Tsipi Livni bekräftigt die „tiefe
strategische Partnerschaft“ mit Jordanien. „Die Zweistaatenlösung
mit den Palästinensern fußt auf zwei Staaten zwischen Mittelmeer
und Jordan, nirgendwo sonst.“
In einem Interview, das der Publizist und Historiker Tom Segev für
„Haaretz“ mit Uri Avnery führt, zeigt sich letzterer davon überzeugt,
dass „Hamas“ den Terror des „Islamischen Djihad“ zu stoppen in der
Lage sei. Würde „Hamas“ dabei versagen, sollte Israel keine
Gespräche mit ihr führen.
Nach Ägypten lehnt auch Saudi-Arabien gegenüber Condoleezza
Rice den Abbruch der finanziellen Unterstützung für „Hamas“ ab.
20.02.2006:
In ihrem Tageskommentar unter dem Titel „Diät statt Verstand“
schreibt „Haaretz“, dass die israelische Forderung, „Hamas“ müsse
ihre Überzeugung und ihre Charta ändern, so lange unrealistisch sei,
solange Israel keine Verhandlungen mit ihr führe.
Ägyptens Präsident Hosni Mubarak nimmt davon Abstand, eine in
Kairo zu Gesprächen weilende „Hamas“-Delegation zu empfangen.
Ein höchst beachtenswerten Kommentar „Bestraft nicht die
Palästinenser“ veröffentlicht der frühere US-Präsident Jimmy Carter
162
in der „Washington Post“ . Carter war am 1. Dezember 2003 der
Hauptgastredner bei der internationalen Präsentation der „Genfer
Initiative“ und leitete die US-amerikanische Beobachterdelegation
bei den palästinensischen Parlamentswahlen am 26. Januar.
19.02.2006:
Die israelische Regierung beschließt die vorübergehende
Aussetzung der Überweisung von Einnahmen aus erhobenen
Steuern und Zöllen in einer Größenordnung von 42 Millionen Euro
an die Autonomiebehörde. Der amtierende Ministerpräsident Ehud
Olmert bezeichnet sie gegenüber seinen Kabinettskollegen als
„Terrorbehörde“.
Das palästinensische Parlament nominiert Ismail Haniyeh formell als
Kandidaten für das Amt des Ministerpräsidenten. Gegenüber den
Medien erklärt Haniyeh, dass sich die Palästinenser durch Israel
nicht in die Knie zwingen lassen würden. Nach dem Stopp der
israelischen Überweisungen gebe es „Alternativen in der arabischen
und islamischen Welt“. Die Meinungsunterschiede mit Präsident
Machmud Abbas sollten durch „Dialog und Zusammenarbeit“
bereinigt werden.
18.02.2006:
Zu Beginn der Vereidigung der Mitglieder des am 25. Januar
gewählten palästinensischen Parlaments betont Präsident der
Autonomiebehörde Machmud Abbas die palästinensischen
Verpflichtungen gegenüber Vereinbarungen, die mit Israel
unterschrieben worden sind, die nationalen Interessen zu wahren
und das Chaos in den palästinensischen Gebieten zu beenden163.
Der neue Parlamentspräsident Abdel-Aziz Dweik erklärt im
Anschluss, dass „Hamas“ im Prinzip die Vereinbarungen, die dem
palästinensischen Volk dienen, akzeptieren werde. Dieser Zusage
widerspricht der „Hamas“-Sprecher im Gazastreifen, Mushir al-Masri.
Die Abgeordneten aus dem Gazastreifen, die nicht nach Ramallah
reisen dürfen, leisten ihren Eid in Gaza-Stadt. 14 Abgeordnete,
darunter Mustafa Barghouti, können an der Zeremonie nicht
teilnehmen, weil sie in israelischen Gefängnissen sitzen.
Der israelische Armeerundfunk meldet unter Berufung auf das
Auswärtige Amt in Jerusalem, das sich gegenüber der „Washington
Post“ äußert, dass die Regierung entgegen anderslautenden
Ankündigungen vorerst von Sanktionen gegen die Palästinensische
Autonomiebehörde absehen will. Im Gespräch waren unter anderen
die Unterbrechung der Auszahlung von Steuer- und
Zolleinnahmen164, die Verweigerung von Arbeitserlaubnissen für
Arbeitskräfte aus dem Gazastreifen in Israel und die Sperrung von
Reisen zwischen dem Gazastreifen und der Westbank.
17.02.2006:
Der Nummer 2 auf der Kandidatenliste von „Kadima“, Shimon Peres,
empfiehlt gegenüber dem israelischen Armeerundfunk die
Bestrafung von „Hamas“. Sie sei ein Unglück für die Palästinenser
und den Frieden.
Der Vorsitzende der Arbeitspartei, Amir Peretz, trifft in Fez den
marokkanischen König Mohammed VI. und stellt ihm eine
„diplomatische Initiative“ seiner Partei vor. Ohne Details zu nennen,
soll sie nach den Worten von Peretz die „Kommunikation zu
gemäßigten Kräften in der arabischen Welt“ verbessern.
16.02.2006:
Ein Sprecher von „Hamas“ gibt gegenüber der Nachrichtenagentur
Reuters die Nominierung ihres Spitzenkandidaten im Gazastreifen,
Ismail Haniyeh, 43, für das Amt des neuen Ministerpräsidenten
bekannt. Da die israelischen Behörden Reisen zwischen dem
Gazastreifen und der Westbank streng kontrollieren und im Falle von
„Hamas“-Repräsentanten nicht mit Ausnahmen zu rechnen ist, dürfte
sich der Schwerpunkt der künftigen Regierungsarbeit in den
Gazastreifen verlagern. Palästinensische Experten sehen schwere
Konflikte zwischen einer „Hamas“-geführten Regierung und
Präsident Machmud Abbas voraus.
Die „Jerusalem Post“ berichtet, dass „Fatah“ für den Eintritt in eine
„Hamas“-geführte Regierung drei Bedingungen gestellt habe:
Anerkennung des Existenzrechts Israels, Zustimmung zur
Zweistaatenlösung und Bejahung der arabischen Friedensinitiative
von Beirut im März 2002.
Das State Department in Washington bestätigt, dass die
Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde der Rückzahlung von fünfzig
Millionen US-Dollar zugestimmt hat, die für die Finanzierung von
Infrastrukturprogrammen vorgesehen waren. Die US-amerikanische
Forderung wurde nach dem Sieg von „Hamas“ übermittelt. Bis zum
1. März sind 30 Millionen US-Dollar zurückgezahlt worden.
In einem Exklusivbericht meldet die „Jerusalem Post“, dass „Hamas“Repräsentanten eine Änderung der Charta vom August 1988 ins
Auge fassen wollen. „Die Charta ist nicht der Koran“, wird ein
führender „Hamas“-Vertreter aus Nablus zitiert. Aus der Charta
würden demnach alle antisemitischen Formulierungen entfernt und
ein langfristiger Waffenstillstand („hudna“) mit Israel entlang der
Grenzen von 1967 vorgeschlagen werden, ohne förmlich auf das
Endziel der Auflösung des Staates Israel zu verzichten, um den
Eindruck zu vermeiden, die Bewegung habe sich internationalem
Druck gebeugt.
In der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen“ geht ihr Israel-Korrespondent Jörg
Bremer mit der deutschen Nahostpolitik scharf ins Gericht. Er
schreibt: „Der frühere Außenminister Joschka Fischer interessierte
sich zwar für den Nahen Osten, und auch sein Nachfolger Frank-
Walter Steinmeier versprach, zweimal im Jahr in die Krisenregion zu
reisen. Doch weder die Botschaft in Tel Aviv noch die Ständige
Vertretung in Ramallah dürfen mit den Islamisten reden, die die
palästinensische Wirklichkeit mitbestimmen. Sie haben sich damit
selbst geknebelt. Immerhin reisen diese Diplomaten in den besetzten
Gebieten herum, anders als die amerikanischen, die vollends ohne
Kontakte zur Wirklichkeit urteilen. Aber warum fährt nicht auch mal
ein deutscher Außenminister, wie die österreichische Ministerin oder
der EU-Außenpolitiker Solana, nach Qalqilija oder zur Mauer nach
Abu Dis? Die Freunde Israels müssen Israel helfen, aus seiner
beklemmenden Lage nach dem Hamas-Sieg herauszukommen;
dazu gehört eine schonungslose Bestandsaufnahme.“
15.02.2006:
Medienberichten zufolge plant „Hamas“ die Nominierung von AbdelAziz Dweik zum Präsidenten des palästinensischen Parlaments.
Zehn Prozent der Mitglieder von „Meretz/Yachad“ treten zur
Arbeitspartei über. Sie begründen ihren Entschluss mit der
mangelnden sozialpolitischen Komponente ihrer Partei im
Wahlkampf und kritisieren die starke programmatische Betonung der
„Genfer Initiative“ in der Partei.
Israel lässt den „Hamas“-Abgeordneten Hadj Ali frei, der in den
vergangenen fünf Monaten in einem Gefängnis saß.
14.02.2006:
Die legendäre Sängerin Shoshana Damari stirbt im Alter von 83
Jahren im Ichilov-Krankenhaus in Tel Aviv an einer Lungenembolie.
Die Regierung und das Parlament ordnen ein Staatsbegräbnis an.
Viele hunderttausend Libanesen demonstrieren am ersten Jahrestag
der Ermordung des früheren Ministerpräsidenten Rafik Hariri in
Beirut und klagen Syrien der Mittäterschaft an. Die Schulen bleiben
ebenso wie viele Geschäfte geschlossen.
13.02.2006:
Der Vorsitzende der Partei „Sefardische Torawächter (Shas),“ Eli
Yishai, bezeichnet in einem Interview mit der „Jerusalem Post“ die
Bewahrung aller Siedlungen in der Westbank als unrealistisch. Die
meisten Siedler würden die Notwendigkeit territorialer Kompromisse
verstehen. „Wir und die Palästinenser trinken dasselbe Wasser und
atmen dieselbe Luft. Wir müssen vorankommen.“ Gleichzeitig
verwahrt er sich gegen einseitige Rückzüge. Die Räumung des
Gazastreifens sei „ein kolossaler Fehler“ gewesen. Israel hätte mit
Machmud Abbas einen Friedensvertrag schließen sollen, um die
moderaten palästinensischen Kräfte zu stützen.
Das aus dem Amt scheidende palästinensische Parlament, das von
„Fatah“ dominiert worden ist, verabschiedet mit 41 gegen drei
Stimmen einen Zusatz zum Verfassungsgesetz, der die
Machtbefugnisse von Machmud Abbas bei der Ernennung von
Richtern stärken soll. Die bei der Sitzung als Beobachter
anwesenden „Hamas“-Mitglieder protestieren. Abbas selbst sagt zu,
keine Veränderungen in der Verfassung vorzunehmen, solange die
Mitglieder des neuen Parlaments nicht ihren Treueid abgelegt
haben.
11.02.2006:
In einem Gastbeitrag für die „Süddeutsche Zeitung“ äußert
Außenminister Joschka Fischer die Sorge, dass nach den
aggressiven Demonstrationen in Ländern mit moslemischer
Bevölkerung „die Annahme nur noch schwer von der Hand zu
weisen“ sei, „dass freie Wahlen im Nahen und Mittleren Osten – mit
Ausnahme des Sonderfalls Libanon –nahezu überall islamistische
Mehrheiten oder zumindest sehr starke Minderheiten hervorbringen
würden. Damit ist klar, dass eine bloße Demokratisierungsstrategie,
die die soziale, ökonomische und kulturelle Modernisierung und den
historischen Eigensinn der durch und durch islamisch geprägten
Gesellschaften für nachrangig hält, das Gegenteil von den
beabsichtigten Ergebnissen erreicht.“ Eine Überprüfung der
westlichen Politik lasse sich danach kaum umgehen. „Israel wird mit
hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit seinen einseitigen Rückzug aus den
besetzten Gebieten fortsetzen und versuchen, seine Grenzen zu
bestimmen und auszubauen. Disengagement, wirksame
Abschreckung und Festigung der einseitig geschaffenen Realitäten,
heißt dort die Strategie. Man findet in Israel kaum noch jemand, der
an die Fortsetzung des Friedensprozesses glaubt. Hamas ist eine
gelistete Terrorgruppe und verneint das Existenzrecht Israels. Es fällt
schwer zu glauben, dass sich Hamas in kurzer Zeit wesentlich
ändern wird. Damit stehen Europa, die USA und das gesamte
Nahost-Quartett vor einem grundsätzlichen Problem. Denn man wird
mit einer solchen Regierung weder zusammenarbeiten noch diese
gar finanzieren können. Für einen möglichen Friedensprozess gäbe
es keinen Partner mehr, und für den internationalen Friedensplan,
die sogenannte Road Map, bräche eine entscheidende Säule weg –
die palästinensische. Damit aber hätte sich die Road Map erledigt.
Andererseits beinhaltet eine Nichtkooperation des Westens mit der
neuen, von der Hamas gestellten Regierung und das Ende der
Finanzierung der Palästinenser durch die EU kein geringes Risiko.
Saudi-Arabien, Iran und andere würden wohl die Finanzierung
übernehmen, und damit wäre die künftige innere Entwicklung in den
palästinensischen Gebieten vorgezeichnet. Es stehen also grimmige
Entscheidungen an.“
Nachrichtenagenturen melden, dass der palästinensische
Generalstaatsanwalt Achmed al-Meghani die Bankkonten von
einigen Dutzend Beamten und einem stellvertretenden Minister
gesperrt und ihre Einlagen wegen des dringenden Verdachts der
passiven Bestechung im Wert von vielen Milliarden US-Dollar
eingezogen hat. Ein Abgeordneter führt die Korruption auf das
„System Arafats“ zurück und fordert Machmud Abbas auf, härter
durchzugreifen.
10.02.2006:
In Israel stellen sich nach der Vereinigung von der
rechtskonservativen „Nationalen Union“ und der „Nationalreligiösen
Partei“ am 28. März 31 Parteien zur Wahl. Nur wenige haben jedoch
die Chance, die Zwei-Prozent-Hürde hinter sich zu lassen.
Gershon Baskin berichtet in der Website „The Jerusalem Times“,
dass der israelische Export in die arabische Welt im Jahr 2005 um
29 Prozent gestiegen sei und den Wert von 232,6 Millionen USDollar erreicht habe. Davon entfielen auf Jordanien 115,2, auf
Ägypten 93 auf Marokko 11,2 und auf Tunesien 1,9 Millionen USDollar. In der vergangenen Woche, so Baskin, habe sich eine
Delegation von Geschäftsleuten aus Qatar in Israel aufgehalten,
ohne dass sie von den Medien beachtet worden sei.
In einem Interview mit der Zeitschrift „Council on Foreign Relations“
zeigt sich der frühere US-Botschafter in Israel, Dan Kurtzer, erstaunt
darüber, dass Präsident George W. Bush Israel militärisch gegen
Iran beistehen wolle. Zu Recht, so Kurtzer, habe Ehud Olmert darauf
zurückhaltend reagiert. Denn Bush könne nicht einerseits den UNSicherheitsrat einschalten wollen und andererseits militärisch
drohen. Eine diplomatische Klärung des Streits um ein künftiges
iranisches Atomwaffenpotential werde auch Israel zugute kommen.
09.02.2006:
Die israelische Regierung hat die russische Einladung an „Hamas“
zu Gesprächen in Moskau scharf kritisiert. „Was würde Moskau
sagen, wenn wir tschetschenische Vertreter eingeladen würden?“
fragt Erziehungsminister Meir Sheetrit. US-Außenministerin
Condoleezza Rice erhält von ihrem russischen Kollegen Sergej
Lawrow die Zusicherung, dass Moskau „Hamas“ zur Anerkennung
Israels und zum Gewaltverzicht drängen werde. Die französische
Regierung lobt die Initiative von Präsident Wladimir Putin und äußert
dieselbe Erwartung.
Palästinensische Extremisten entführen in Gaza-Stadt den bei der
Autonomiebehörde akkreditierten ägyptischen Militärattaché Hussam
al-Musaly. Am 11. Februar wird er befreit.
In einem programmatischen Beitrag für „Haaretz“ zählt Yossi Beilin
die zentralen Ziele der nächsten israelischen Regierung auf: a) die
Teilung des Landes mit den Palästinensern und das Ende der
Okkupation; b) ein israelisch-palästinensisches Friedensankommen
auf der Grundlage zweier Staaten für zwei Völker, die Anerkennung
Israels als die nationale Heimstätte des jüdischen Volkes mit
Jerusalem als seiner Hauptstadt, die Anerkennung der endgültigen
Grenzen Israels, eine Lösung des Flüchtlingsproblems ohne das
„Recht auf Rückkehr“ und das Ende der gegenseitigen Ansprüche; c)
die Garantie für den palästinensischen Staat als Demokratie und
Hort der Stabilität, der Israels Sicherheit nicht verletzt, und d) die
Zusammenarbeit auf den Gebieten der Verteidigung, der Wirtschaft
und der Kultur.
08.02.2006:
Die „Nationalreligiöse Partei“ und die rechtskonservative „Nationale
Union“ gehen für die israelischen Wahlen am 28. März eine
Listenverbindung ein.
Die israelische Außenministerin Tsipi Livni trifft bei ihrem
Antrittsbesuch in Washington zu getrennten Gesprächen mit dem
jordanischen König Abdullah II. und ihrer Amtskollegin Condoleezza
Rice zusammen. George W. Bush kommt bei der Begegnung mit
Rice „zufällig“ hinzu.
07.02.2006:
In seinem ersten Interview seit der faktischen Übernahme der
Regierungsgeschäfte erklärt Ehud Olmert, dass sich Israel vom
Großteil der palästinensischen Bevölkerung in der Westbank trennen
wolle und dass dies Israel zu weiteren Rückzügen verpflichte, um
seine dauerhafte Grenze festzulegen. Die Aufgabe von Maale
Adumim, „Gush Etzion“ und Ariel schließt Olmert jedoch aus. Auch
die Kontrolle über „Israels östliche Grenze“, das Jordantal, komme
nicht in Frage. Auf Fragen nach Hebron, Bet El, Ofra und andere
jüdische Orte geht Olmert nicht ein. Mitglieder seiner „Kadima“-Partei
melden heftigen Widerstand gegen weitere territoriale
Verzichtsleistungen an. Olmert will nach den Wahlen am 28. März
eine Koalition mit dem „Likud“ nicht grundsätzlich ausschließen,
obwohl sie eine rechtsextremistische Partei geworden sei.
In Interview mit Verantwortlichen aus der Armee und dem
Verteidigungsministerium berichtet die „Jerusalem Post“, dass nach
den bisherigen Planungen der Bau der rund 85 Kilometer langen
„Trennungsmauern“ von drei Seiten um Jerusalem herum mit elf
„Checkpoints“ am Ende des Sommers 2006 beendet sein soll,
während der Bau um Ariel und „Gush Etzion“ – dort leben 45.000
Israelis und 17.000 Palästinenser – bis Ende 2007 dauern werde.
Von den 160.000 Palästinensern würden 90.000 auf der israelischen
Seite der „Trennungsmauern“ bleiben.
06.02.2006:
Die Synode der Kirche von England beschließt, Verbindungen zu
Unternehmen aufzugeben, die wirtschaftlich von der „illegalen
Besatzung“ der palästinensischen Gebiete profitieren würden.
In einem „Memorandum of Joint Understanding“ zwischen der
„Hisbollah“ und der christlichen „Freien Patriotischen Bewegung“ in
Libanon vertreten beide Seiten in einem 4-Punkte-Programm die
Auffassung, dass a) die sozialen Bedingungen der Palästinenser im
Lande verbessert werden müssten, b) das libanesische Volk die
Ansiedlung der Palästinenser im Lande „einmütig“ ablehne und auf
der Rückkehr nach Palästina bestehe, c) die Beziehungen zwischen
der libanesischen und der palästinensischen Bevölkerung unter
Einschaltung einer einzigen palästinensischen Institution geklärt
werden müssten, die alle Palästinenser repräsentiere, und d) das
Tragen von Waffen in den Flüchtlingslagern und außerhalb im Dialog
mit dem Ziel zu klären sei, die Autorität der libanesische Regierung
165
über alle Teile des Landes wiederherzustellen .
05.02.2006:
Unter dem Slogan „Olmert ist schlecht für die Juden, Olmert will den
Bürgerkrieg“ versammeln sich viele tausend Gegner der
Regierungspolitik auf dem Zionsplatz in Jerusalem zu einer
Protestdemonstration gegen die Auflösung des „Außenpostens“
Amona mit neun Häusern am 1. Februar. Die Demonstration wird
von „Likud“, der „Nationalreligiösen Partei“, der „Nationalen Union“
und „Unser Haus Israel (Israel Beteinu)“ unterstützt.
„Peace Now“ veröffentlicht seinen neuen Bericht, wonach die Zahl
der Siedler im Jahr 2005 von 243.000 auf 250.00 Personen
gestiegen ist, obwohl die 21 Siedlungen im Gazastreifen und die
zwei Siedlungen im Norden der Westbank aufgegeben worden sind.
12.000 Israelis seien 2005 in die Westbank gezogen. Gemäß den
Veröffentlichungen des israelischen Statistischen Zentralamtes seien
keine neuen Siedlungen errichtet worden, jedoch 33 neue
„Außenposten“, so dass sich ihre Zahl auf 102 belaufe.
Nach dreiwöchiger Sperrung öffnet Israel den Übergang Karni zum
Gazastreifen für palästinensische Güter und Waren.
Der „Islamischen Djihad“ kündigt an, dass er in keine
palästinensische Regierung eintreten und die zwischen der
Autonomiebehörde und „Hamas“ ausgehandelte Waffenruhe nicht
einhalten werde.
04.02.2006:
Die Konsultationen zwischen Machmud Abbas und „Hamas“ unter
Leitung von Ismail Haniyeh und Machmud Zahhar über die Bildung
einer „Regierung der nationalen Rettung“ beginnen. Die offiziellen
Konsultationen sollen nach der Konstituierung des Parlaments
einsetzen, die für den 16. Februar vorgesehen ist.
Jörg Bremer meldet in der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung“ aus
Jerusalem, dass nach einem Bericht des israelischen
Forschungsinstituts für wirtschaftliche und soziale Angelegenheiten
der Staat Israel seit dem Ende der 1960er Jahre mehr als 11,6
Milliarden Euro für den Bau der Siedlungen in den palästinensischen
Gebieten ausgegeben habe, davon 7,5 Milliarden Euro für den
dortigen Wohnungsbau. Die Ausgaben für den militärischen Schutz
der Siedlungen sowie die Kosten für Bildung und Soziales seien in
dem Gesamtbetrag nicht enthalten.
02.02.2006:
Bewaffnete Palästinenser belagern vorübergehend das Büro der EUVertretung in Gaza-Stadt, um gegen die Veröffentlichung von
Karikaturen in dänischen und anderen europäischen Zeitungen zu
protestieren, in denen nach ihrer Auffassung der Prophet
Mohammed verunglimpft wird. Die diplomatische Vertretung
Norwegens schließt ihr Büro in Ramallah. In Nablus drohen
Palästinenser mit der Entführung von Ausländern. Beim Sturm auf
die dänische und norwegische Botschaft in Damaskus werden am 4.
Februar deren Gebäude zerstört. In Gaza-City wird das deutsche
Kulturzentrum angegriffen. Die iranische Regierung kündigt den
Stopp dänischer Importe an. Viele arabische Läden nehmen
dänische Produkte aus dem Warenangebot. Am 5. Februar wird die
dänische Botschaft in Beirut in Brand gesetzt. Auch in Teheran,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indien, Indonesien und Somalia finden
Massendemonstrationen statt. Der Großmufti der libanesischen
Sunniten Mohammed Qabbani fordert die Muslime zur Besonnenheit
auf, damit das Bild des Islam nicht verzerrt werde. Auf der Tagung
seiner Partei verlangt der türkische Ministerpräsident Tayyib Erdoğan
„Vernunft, „Menschenverstand und Reife“. In einem Interview mit der
in London erscheinenden saudischen Zeitung „Al-Sharq al-Awsat“
(„Der Mittlere Osten“), verurteilt der Generalsekretär der
„Organisation der Islamischen Konferenz“ die Angriffe auf die
Botschaften in Damaskus und Beirut scharf. Dagegen ruft die
auflagenstärkste Zeitung in Teheran zu einem internationalen
Karikaturen-Wettbewerb zum Thema „Holocaust“ auf. Am 7. Februar
verlassen die Angehörigen des internationalen Beobachtungsteams,
das nach der Ermordung von 29 Palästinensern durch den Arzt
Baruch Goldstein im Februar 1994 installiert worden ist, die Stadt,
nachdem ihr Büro angegriffen worden ist. Am 10. Februar
protestieren 7000 Palästinenser in Gaza-Stadt. In Jerusalem
marschieren rund 2000 Demonstranten um den Tempelberg-Bezirk
mit dem Slogan „Bin Laden, schlag noch einmal zu“. Einen Tag
später löst die Jerusalemer Polizei unter Einsatz von Tränengas eine
Demonstration palästinensischer Jugendlicher am Damaskus-Tor
auf, die eine dänische Flagge verbrennen wollten.
Der frühere Ministerpräsident Ehud Barak (1996 – 2001) gibt
bekannt, dass er in der Arbeitspartei bleiben werde. Abgeordnete der
Partei appellieren an ihren Vorsitzenden Amir Peretz, Barak einen
guten Platz in der Kandidatenliste für den 28. März anzubieten.
01.02.2006:
Nach einer Entscheidung des Obersten Gerichts räumt Israel unter
Einsatz einiger tausend Soldaten und Polizisten den aus neun
leerstehenden Häusern bestehenden „Außenposten“ Amona östlich
von Ramallah, wobei es zu schweren Auseinandersetzungen vor
allem mit jugendlichen Siedlern aus Ofra und ihren Sympathisanten
aus Israel kommt. Der nahe gelegene „Außenposten“ Ofras wird
nicht geräumt. Die Sicherheitskräfte berufen sich in Amona auf Ehud
Olmerts Konzept der „Null-Toleranz“ gegenüber gewalttätigen
Siedlern. Einige von ihnen beschuldigen die Sicherheitskräfte, dass
sie „genauso behandelt werden wie Araber“. Die israelischen Medien
zeigen sich einig in der Einschätzung, dass die Zusammenstöße in
Amona schlimmer waren als alles, was während des Rückzugs aus
den Siedlungen des Gazastreifens passierte. „Amona wurde in
Sünde geboren“, schreibt der „Haaretz“-Leitartikler am 3. Februar.
Gideon Ezra, Minister für Innere Sicherheit, kündigt gegenüber der
„Jerusalem Post“ die Auflösung weiterer drei „Außenposten“ an.
Der Sicherheitschef des Gazastreifens, Mohammed Dachlan, der
erfolgreich für „Fatah“ bei den jüngsten Parlamentswahlen kandierte,
kündigt an, dass sich an der politischen Verantwortung für die
Sicherheitskräfte nichts ändern werde. Dachlan bestätigt damit die
Warnung des Spitzenkandidaten von „Hamas“ im Gazastreifen,
Ismail Haniyeh, der die Übertragung der Kontrolle von der Regierung
auf Präsident Machmud Abbas ablehnt, wie er in einem Interview mit
Amira Hass in „Haaretz“ am 1. Februar betont. Abbas selbst hatte
am 28. Januar die Chefs der Sicherheitsdienste zur absoluten
Loyalität ihm gegenüber als dem „Oberkommandierenden der
Sicherheitsdienste“ aufgefordert166, nachdem er früher gegenüber
Yasser Arafat auf die Übertragung der Vollmachten auf den
Innenminister gedrängt hatte.
Die israelische Regierung stoppt vorübergehend die Überweisung
von Zolleinnahmen und der Erhebung der Mehrwertsteuer an die
Autonomiebehörde, weil die Mittel unter die Kontrolle von „Hamas“
gelangen könnten. Gemäß dem „Pariser Protokoll“ vom April 1994 ist
Israel verpflichtet, die aus dem internationalen Warenverkehr der
Palästinenser stammenden Einnahmen an diese abzugeben167. Es
soll sich diesmal um 250 Millionen Neue Shekel (rund 44,2 Millionen
Euro) handeln. Nach Presseberichten zeigen sich die Regierungen
Irans, Saudi-Arabiens und Qatars bereit, die Haushaltslöcher der
Autonomiebehörde finanzielle zu stopfen. Am 5. Februar beschließt
das israelische Kabinett die Freigabe der einbehaltenen Steuern und
Zölle. In Kürze sollen knapp 250 Millionen Neue Shekel (~ 45,5
Millionen Euro) an die Autonomiebehörde überwiesen werden. Der
amtierende Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert erklärt gleichzeitig, dass
die monatlichen Überweisungen von der sicherheitspolitischen
Gesamtlage abhängig gemacht würden.
Nach Gesprächen mit der neuen israelischen Außenministerin
Tsipora („Tsipi“) Livni in Kairo erklärt ihr ägyptischer Kollege Achmed
Abu Gheit in die Adresse von „Hamas“, dass Israel keine
Verhandlungen im Dunstkreis von Gewalt und im Feuer zugemutet
werden können. Der ägyptische Sicherheitschef und Vertraute von
Präsident Hosni Mubarak, Omar Suleiman, fordert „Hamas“ zum
Gewaltverzicht und zur Einhaltung von Abmachungen auf, die die
Autonomiebehörde unterzeichnet hat.
Das palästinensische „Jerusalem Media & Communication Center
(JMCC)“ veröffentlicht die Ergebnisse der Umfrage unter den
Wählern der Parlamentswahlen am 25. Januar. Danach haben 43
Prozent der Befragten „Hamas“ in der Hoffnung gewählt, dass sie die
israelische Besetzung beenden könne, 18,8 Prozent wählten sie aus
religiösen Gründen, 10,7 Prozent in der Erwartung besserer
Lebensbedingungen und 11,8 Prozent wegen ihres Programms. 66,3
Prozent erwarteten von „Hamas“ die Fortführung der Verhandlungen
mit Israel. 51,7 Prozent plädierten für die Einstellung der
„Operationen“ gegen israelische Ziele, 39,1 Prozent sprachen sich
für ihre Fortsetzung aus. 73,9 Prozent sahen den überwältigenden
Erfolg von „Hamas“ nicht voraus. Der beliebteste Politiker bleibt
Machmud Abbas mit 12,8 Prozent, gefolgt von dem „Hamas“Spitzenkandidaten im Gazastreifen Ismail Haniyeh (10,7 Prozent),
dem Leiter des Politischen Büros von „Hamas“ in Damaskus, Khaled
Meshal (8,5 Prozent), und dem Spitzenkandidaten von „Fatah“, dem
im israelischen Gefängnis sitzenden Marwan Barghouti (5,8
Prozent). 21,1 Prozent wollten keinem Politiker trauen.
Das „Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research“ an der Universität
Tel Aviv veröffentlicht die Ergebnisse seiner Meinungsumfrage
zwischen dem 30. Januar und 1. Februar. Danach halten 79 Prozent
der Israelis einen politischen Kurswechsel ihrer Regierung nach dem
Wahlsieg von „Hamas“ am 25. Januar nicht für erforderlich, auch
wenn 55 Prozent in dem Sieg eine existentielle Gefahr für Israel
sehen (38 Prozent verneinen dies). Zwölf Prozent glauben, dass
Verhandlungen mit einer „Hamas“-geführten Regierung zu einem
dauerhaften Frieden führen, doch gleichzeitig betrachten vierzig
Prozent „Hamas“ als legitime Vertreterin des palästinensischen
Volkes (44 Prozent lehnen diese Ansicht ab). 43 Prozent fordern ihre
Regierung zu Verhandlungen mit „Hamas“ auf, 53 Prozent lehnen
dies ab. Nach Auffassung von 46 Prozent wird „Hamas“ ihre
Beteiligung an Terroranschlägen gegen Israel mäßigen. Das
„Center“ kommentiert. „Ein beträchtlicher Teil der jüdischen
Öffentlichkeit [in Israel] glaubt gegenwärtig, dass Gespräche mit
Hamas versucht werden sollten, obwohl die Chancen für einen
dauerhaften Friedensvertrag extrem gering sind.“
In einem Interview mit der Wiener „Presse“ kehrt Shimon Peres zu
den Ideen seines Buches „Die Versöhnung. Der neue Nahe Osten“
zurück und sagt zu, dass er sich auf wirtschaftliche Fragen in der
Region konzentrieren wolle, wenn der nächste Ministerpräsident ihn
in sein Kabinett berufen sollte. „Wir können nicht weiterhin nur auf
politischer Ebene versuchen, Frieden zu schaffen. Wir müssen ein
wirtschaftliches Standbein für den Frieden aufbauen. Motor von
Veränderungen ist immer die Wirtschaft.“ Im Blick auf Iran verweist
Peres darauf, dass das dortige Regime nicht nur ein ziviles
Nuklearprogramm entwickeln wolle, sondern eine Menge Geld für
Langstreckenraketen mit einer Reichweite von 2000 Kilometern
ausgebe. Gleichzeitig sei das Land in einer schrecklichen
Verfassung mit horrender Arbeitslosigkeit. „Das Regime wird stürzen,
denn es kann nicht wirtschaften.“
Januar 2006
31.01.2006:
In einem Gastbeitrag für den Londoner „Guardian“ führt der Leiter
der Politischen Abteilung von „Hamas, der im Damaszener Exil
lebende Khaled Meshal, aus, dass die Bewegung des Islamischen
Widerstandes „kein Problem mit Juden“ habe. Ihr Kampf habe nichts
mit Religion zu tun, sondern sei politischer Natur. Die Juden haben,
so Meshal, „unser Land genommen und sich mit Gewalt uns
aufgedrängt, unsere Gesellschaft zerstört und unser Volk vertrieben.
Wir werden niemals das Recht irgendeiner Macht anerkennen, die
uns unser Land raubt und uns unsere nationalen Rechte verweigert.
Wir werden niemals die Rechtmäßigkeit eines zionistischen Staates
anerkennen, der auf unserem Grund und Boden errichtet wurde, um
die Sünden anderer wiedergutzumachen oder die Probleme anderer
zu lösen. Doch wenn man bereit ist, das Prinzip eines langfristigen
Waffenstillstands zu akzeptieren, sind wir unsererseits bereit, über
Bedingungen zu verhandeln. Hamas streckt jenen ihre Hand zum
Frieden entgegen, die an einem Frieden tatsächlich interessiert sind,
der auf Gerechtigkeit gründet.“
30.01.2006:
Machmud Abbas kündigt an, dass er seine Amtszeit bis 2008 voll
ausfüllen werde. Damit widerspricht er Spekulationen, er werde sich
unter dem Druck der palästinensischen Wahlergebnisse vorzeitig
zurückziehen.
Die in den arabischen Markt von Hebron eingedrungenen Siedler
ziehen sich gemäß einer Anordnung des israelischen Militärs zurück.
Generalstaatsanwalt Menachem Mazouz widerspricht Stimmen – zu
denen auch Yossi Beilin gehörte –, wonach den Siedlern
versprochen worden sei, zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt unter legalen
Bedingungen zurückzukehren. Beilin warf der Regierung vor, sich
dem Druck der Siedler zu beugen.
US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice gibt zu erkennen, dass die
USA die Finanzhilfe für die Autonomiebehörde nach dem Wahlsieg
von „Hamas“ nicht sofort einstellen würden. Beim Treffen des
Nahost-Quartetts in London wird das Bemühen deutlich, „Hamas“ für
die Neuformulierung ihrer politischen Strategie Zeit einzuräumen.
Nach Medienberichten will Saudi-Arabien mit Hilfsgeldern für
„Hamas“ einspringen.
Das internationale Nahost-„Quartett“ gratuliert nach seiner Sitzung in
London dem palästinensischen Volk zu den Wahlen und gibt sich
überzeugt, dass es ein Recht auf Erfüllung seiner Ansprüche auf
Frieden und Staatlichkeit habe. „It is the view of the Quartet“, heißt
es in der Erklärung weiter, „that all members of a future Palestinian
government must be committed to nonviolence, recognition of Israel,
and acceptance of previous agreements and obligation including the
Roadmap.” Die künftige Unterstützung der Palästinenser hänge
davon ab, dass sich jede neue Regierung an diese drei Prinzipien
halte. Das Quartett wiederholt seinen Appell, die Erweiterung der
Siedlungen zu beenden, äußert seine Besorgnis über den Verlauf
der „Barriere“ und nimmt Ehud Olmerts jüngste Erklärung „zur
Kenntnis, die „nicht-authorisierten Siedlungen aufzulösen“.
29./30.01.2006:
Die deutsche Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel führt in Jerusalem mit
Israels Präsident Moshe Katsav, dem amtierenden
Ministerpräsidenten Ehud Olmert und in Ramallah mit dem
palästinensischen Präsidenten Machmud Abbas Gespräche.
28.01.2006:
Angesichts der gewaltsamen innerpalästinensischen
Auseinandersetzungen fordert Machmud Abbas fordert die Chefs
der Sicherheitsdienste zur absoluten Loyalität ihm gegenüber als
dem „Oberkommandierenden der Sicherheitsdienste“ auf.
Auf einer Pressekonferenz in Damaskus gibt der Leiter der
Politischen Abteilung von „Hamas“, Khaled Meshal, bekannt, dass
seine Bewegung bald in die PLO eintreten werde, um sie
wiederaufzubauen und zu reformieren.
Der Generalsekretär der Arabischen Liga, Amr Moussa, fordert beim
Weltwirtschaftsforum in Davos die Konfliktparteien im Nahen Osten
zur Rückkehr zu Beiruter Friedensinitiative vom März 2002 auf. „Die
Initiative gründet auf einem Frieden mit Israel und erklärt, dass die
Zeit für eine neue Seite reif sei, den Konflikt zu beenden.“
Im Interview mit der „taz“ zeigt sich der frühere israelische
Botschafter in Bonn und Berlin, Avi Primor, optimistisch, dass Israel
und die „Hamas“ miteinander ins Gespräch kommen, spätestens
nach den israelischen Wahlen am 28. März. „Die Hamas weiß, dass
die Bevölkerung etwas ganz Bestimmtes erwartet, nämlich eine
rasche Verbesserung der schrecklichen Lebensbedingungen in den
Gebieten – und sie weiß, dass sie das nur erreichen kann im
Einklang mit Israel: Sie sind von den Israelis umzingelt, beherrscht,
meistens auch besetzt – ohne Zusammenarbeit mit den Israelis gibt
es überhaupt keine Chance, die Lebensbedingungen der
Palästinenser zu verbessern.“
26.01.2005:
Der Historiker und Publizist Tom Segev berichtet in „Haaretz“, dass
sich fünf arabische Familien mit israelischer Staatsbürgerschaft um
den Kauf von Wohnungen in der südlich Jerusalems gelegenen
Siedlung „Har Homa“ / „Djebel Abu Ghnaim“ bemühen. Mehrere
säkulare jüdische Familien würden das Viertel verlassen und ihr
Eigentum verkaufen. Die Rodung der Bäume auf der Anhöhe war in
der Regierungszeit Benjamin Netanyahus begonnen worden. Im Jahr
2001 erklärte Ariel Sharon gegenüber UN-Generalsekretär Kofi
Annan, dass die Siedlung gebaut würde, um die palästinensische
Verbindung zwischen den Orten Beit Sahur und Bethlehem sowie zu
den arabischen Stadtviertel Jerusalems zu unterbinden, berichtete
„Haaretz“ damals. Der neue Verlauf der „Trennungsmauern“ in und
um Jerusalem, so Segev weiter, würde rund 40.000 Palästinenser
von ihren Arbeitsplätzen, ihren Schulen, Krankenhäusern und
Gewerbeflächen trennen.
25.01.2006:
Nach dem amtlichen Endergebnis gewinnen „Fatah“ bei den
Parlamentswahlen 45 und „Hamas 74 der 132 zu vergebenden
Sitze, wobei Hamas auf 44,45 Prozent und „Fatah“ auf 41,43
Prozent der Stimmen kommt. Rund 900 ausländische Beobachter,
zu denen der ehemalige U-Präsident Jimmy Carter gehört,
verschaffen sich in eigenes Bild vom fairen Verlauf, bei dem ein
gemischtes Wahlverfahren zum Zuge kommt: Je die Hälfte der Sitze
werden gemäß des Verhältniswahlrechts auf nationaler Ebene
beziehungsweise gemäß Mehrheitswahlrecht in sechzehn Bezirken
vergeben. Insgesamt bewarben sich elf Parteien und Listen um die
Stimmen der mehr als 1,3 Millionen Wahlberechtigten, der
„Islamische Djihad“ boykottiert die Wahlen. Die Wahlbeteiligung im
Gazastreifen lag bei 82 Prozent, in der Westbank bei 74 Prozent und
in Ost-Jerusalem bei 50 Prozent. Von den 120.000 Wahlberechtigten
in Ost-Jerusalem konnten nur sechstausend durch Briefwahl direkt
teilnehmen, die übrigen mussten auf Wahllokale außerhalb der Stadt
ausweichen. Unter den 414 Kandidaten befanden sie 31, die in
israelischen Gefängnissen sitzen, allen voran der Spitzenkandidat
von „Fatah“ Marwan Barghouti. Die „Volksfront für die Befreiung
Palästinas (PFLP)“, die als Liste „Märtyrer Abu Ali Mustafa“ antritt,
schickt drei Abgeordnete in den „Palestinian Legislative Council“, die
Liste „Unabhängiges Palästina“ des Arztes Mustafa Barghouti und
„Der Dritte Weg“ mit dem früheren Finanzminister Salem Fayyad
jeweils zwei; den anderen Sitz nimmt Hanan Ashrawi ein; dem Leiter
des palästinensischen Teams der „Genfer Initiative“, Yasser Abed
Rabbo, gelingt der Sprung ins Parlament nicht. Hinzu kommen vier
Mandate für die „Unabhängige Palästina-Liste“, die einen
Abgeordneten aus Tulkarem und drei Abgeordnete aus Gaza-Stadt
ins Parlament schickt, darunter den früheren Minister für Kunst und
Kultur Ziad Abu Amr, der an der Universität Bir Zeit Politische
Wissenschaften lehrt und Absolvent der Georgetown University,
Washington D.C., war. Von den sechs in Jerusalem zu vergebenden
Sitzen gewinnt „Hamas“ vier, zwei Sitze sind christlichen Kandidaten
vorbehalten (Bernard Sabella und Emil Djardjoul [beide „Fatah“]). In
Bethlehem fallen zwei Sitze an „Hamas“, während die beiden
Christen vorbehaltenen Plätze an Fayez al-Saqqa und Fouad Kokali
(beide „Fatah“) gehen. In Hebron gewinnt „Hamas“ sämtliche neun
Mandate mit dem Spitzenkandidaten Naef Radjoub – Bruder des
Sicherheitschefs in der Westbank, Djibril Radjoub. Dasselbe gilt für
Nablus. Dagegen teilen sich „Hamas“ und „Fatah“ die vier Sitze in
Djenin. In Tulkarem gehen zwei Mandate an „Hamas, eines an
„Fatah“. In Ramallah gehen von fünf Mandaten vier an „Hamas“, das
fünfte ist für einen christlichen Kandidaten reserviert (Muhib Salameh
[„Fatah“]). Dagegen holt „Fatah“ in Qalqilya beide Mandate. In
Jericho setzt sich Chefunterhändler Saeb Erakat („Fatah“) durch. Die
absolute Mehrheit gewinnt „Hamas“ im Norden des Gazastreifens
(fünf Mandate), in Gaza-Stadt fünf Mandate (drei Mandate fallen an
„Unabhängige“, so an Ziyad Abu Amr) und im Flüchtlingslager Deir
el-Balad zwei von drei Mandaten, in Khan Yunis vier von fünf
Mandaten, das fünfte Mandat geht an Machmud Dachlan, während
in Rafach alle drei Mandate „Fatah“ zufallen.
Der Vorsitzende von „Meretz/Yachad“, Yossi Beilin, ruft den
amtierenden Ministerpräsidenten Ehud Olmert auf, sofort die
Verhandlungen mit der palästinensischen Autonomieregierung
aufzunehmen. Israel trage die Schuld für das Erstarken von
„Hamas“, erklärt Beilin weiter, weil es Machmud Abbas durch sein
Handeln geschwächt habe. Der Vorsitzende der Arbeitspartei Amir
Peretz will „Hamas“ nicht als Verhandlungspartner akzeptieren. Am
29. Januar schließt „Fatach“ 120 Personen aus ihren Reihen aus, die
als Unabhängige kandidiert haben. Gleichzeitig räumt Erakat
organisatorisches Chaos ein: „Wir wissen nicht einmal, wie viele
Mitglieder Fatah hat.“ In Damaskus fasst der Leiter der Politischen
Abteilung von „Hamas“, Khaled Meshal, eine Große Koalition ins
Auge: „Auch wenn die Verträge von Oslo von allen schon beerdigt
und betrauert wurden, so gibt es doch eine palästinensische
Autonomiebehörde, die auf dem Fundament von Oslo steht. Wir
werden so handeln, dass wir diese Fakten mit großem Realismus
sehen, solange sie nicht den Rechten unseres Volkes
widersprechen.“
Bereits vor der offiziellen Bekanntgabe des Endergebnisses der
Wahlen reicht die Autonomieregierung unter Führung von Achmed
Qureia geschlossen ihren Rücktritt ein.
Vor der sechsten Jahreskonferenz in Herzliya, die gewöhnlich im
Dezember stattfindet, bezeichnet Ehud Olmert den Rückzug aus
dem Gazastreifen und aus vier Siedlungen im Norden der Westbank
im Sommer 2005 als „einen Wendepunkt für den Staat Israel“. Die
größte Herausforderung sei die Festlegung endgültiger Grenzen, die
Israel eine jüdische Mehrheit sichere. Israel brauche
Sicherheitszonen sowie die Hauptsiedlungsblöcke und vor allem
Jerusalem. Ein „moderner“ palästinensischer Staat komme für ihn
nicht ihn Frage, solange es kein vollständiges Ende der Angriffe auf
Israel gebe. Bis dahin müssten sie sich mit einem Staat in
vorläufigen Grenzen zufrieden geben. Aluf Benn, der DiplomatieRedakteur von „Haaretz“, macht am 1. Februar auf den Widerspruch
zum israelischen Willen nach endgültigen Grenzen aufmerksam.
23.01.2006:
Vor der sechsten Herzliya-Konferenz stellt der Vorsitzende der
Arbeitspartei, Amir Peretz, sein politisches 4-Punkte-Programm vor:
zwei Staaten für zwei Völker, direkte Verhandlungen mit den
Palästinensern, Kampf gegen den Terrorismus und schnelle
Fertigstellung des Trennungszauns. Seine Regierung wolle große
Siedlungsblöcke unter israelischer Kontrolle behalten, aber andere
Siedlungen aufgeben. Jerusalem solle die ewige Hauptstadt Israels
mit einer jüdischen Mehrheit bleiben. Jeder Siedler, der aus „Judäa
und Samaria“ nach Israel zurückkehre, solle faire
Kompensationsleistungen erhalten.
In einer Vorschau auf die israelischen Wahlen am 28. März schreibt
Akiva Eldar in „Haaretz“, dass der Widerstand gegen die Besatzung
und die Unterstützung für eine diplomatische Lösung über „den
engen Kreise der Linken“ hinausgewachsen seien. Ein erheblicher
Teil der Sympathisanten von „Kadima“ könne daraus die einzigartige
Chance ableiten, die Regierung in den kommenden Jahren unter
Druck zu setzen. Die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung unterstütze die
Wiederaufnahme der Verhandlungen mit den Palästinensern auf der
Grundlage einer Zweistaatenregelung mehr oder weniger entlang der
einstigen „Grünen Linie“ von 1967, ebenso eine Teilung Jerusalems
und eine Lösung des palästinensischen Flüchtlingsproblems
außerhalb des Modells des „Rechts auf Rückkehr“. Auch in der
palästinensischen Öffentlichkeit würden 58 Prozent eine Regelung
gemäß der „Genfer Initiative“ befürworten.
Nach dem Bericht der israelischen Menschenrechtsorganisation
„B’tselem“ für 2005, aus dem der Jerusalemer Soziologe Baruch
Kimmerling in „Haaretz“ zitiert, beträgt die Länge der
„Trennungsmauern“ 670 Kilometer. Bis Ende 2005 seien davon 35
Prozent fertiggestellt worden, 25 Prozent würden gegenwärtig
gebaut, zwanzig Prozent seien genehmigt, und für weitere zwanzig
Prozent stehe die Bevollmächtigung noch aus. Der Verlauf der
„Trennungsmauern“ würde rund zehn Prozent der Westbank zu
Israel schlagen. Rund eine halbe Million Palästinenser seien davon
betroffen, und die Westbank würde in mindestens drei Teile
zerschnitten.
Auf der Jahreskonferenz in Herzliya wird eine Umfrage diskutiert,
wonach rund achtzehn Prozent glauben, dass Israel auf die Grenzen
von 1967 zurückkehren werde, während weitere 27 Prozent davon
ausgehen, dass Israels Rückkehr auf diese Grenzen mit einer
Annexion der großen Siedlungsblöcke verbunden sei. Dreißig
Prozent erwarten, dass Israel die Souveränität über die Westmauer
(„Klagemauer“) behalte, während der Tempelberg / Haram al-Sharif
in palästinensische Souveränität übergehen werde.
Das Tel Aviver Bezirksgericht veröffentlicht ein Urteil, wonach das
Gesetz über das Eigentum (arabischer) Abwesender – das
„Absentee Property Law“168 – nicht auf Böden angewendet werden
darf, die von Palästinensern nach dem Junikrieg 1967 verlassen
worden sind. Denn dabei handele es sich nicht um „Land unter
Israels tatsächlicher Souveränität“, heißt es in dem Urteil. Im Juni
2004 hatte Generalstaatsanwalt Menachem („Mani“) Mazuz die
Entscheidung zweier Kabinettsmitglieder, Natan Sharansky und
Zevulun Orlev, aufgehoben, das Gesetz auf viele zehntausend
169
Dunam palästinensischen Bodeneigentums in Ost-Jerusalem
auszudehnen. Die Absenz von Bewohnern der Westbank aus OstJerusalem, hatte Mazuz seine Entscheidung begründet, sei eine
technische Angelegenheit, die durch eine einseitige Handlung Israels
hervorgerufen worden sei.
22.01.2006:
Wenige Tage vor den palästinensischen Parlamentswahlen zeichnet
sich ein Machtkampf bei „Hamas“ darüber ab, unter welchen
Bedingungen und Voraussetzungen die Bewegung nach Eintritt in
die künftige Regierung zu Gesprächen mit Israel bereit ist. Während
der „Hamas“-Führer im Gazastreifen, Machmud Zahhar, die
Gesprächsbereitschaft unter der Schirmherrschaft einer dritten Partei
andeutet, („Verhandlungen sind kein Tabu“), bezeichnet sie der
Vorsitzende des Politischen Büros von „Hamas“ in Damaskus, der
50jährige aus einem Dorf bei Ramallah stammende Khaled Meshal,
als Verbrechen. Nach Ansicht des 55jährigen Sheikh Mohammed
Abu Tir aus Jerusalem, der 22 Jahre lang in israelischen
Gefängnissen saß, könne die Bewegung mit Israel besser
verhandeln „als die anderen, die zehn Jahre lang ohne Ergebnis
verhandelt haben“.
Der im israelischen Hadarim-Gefängnis einsitzende Marwan
Barghouti, der die Wahlliste von „Fatah“ anführt, ruft in einem
Interview für die arabischen TV-Sender „al-Djazeera“ und „alArabiyah“ zur Bildung einer „Regierung der nationalen Rettung“ auf.
Es gäbe keinen Friedensprozess, und ohne den bewaffneten Kampf
hätte Israel den Gazastreifen nicht geräumt, erklärt Barghouti.
Die letzten der 58.000 Angehörigen der palästinensischen
Sicherheitskräfte sind aufgerufen, ihre Wahlscheine abzugeben. Sie
konnten ab 19. Januar von ihrem Stimmrecht Gebrauch machen.
Der „Islamische Djihad“ fordert die Palästinenser zum Boykott der
Wahlen auf.
Bei der Jahreskonferenz in Herzliya tragen Geographen der Bar IlanUniversität die Idee vor, das sogenannte Kleine Dreieck mit den
arabischen Städten Um el-Fahm und Taibe im Zuge eines
Endstatusvertrags an den Staat Palästina abzugeben und dafür die
Westbank-Siedlungen Elkana, Ober-Modiin und Gush Etzion zu
annektieren. Der Landtausch solle entlang der ehemaligen Grünen
Linie auf der Grundlage 1 : 1 erfolgen. Der arabische KnessetAbgeordnete Achmed Tibi weist den Vorschlag zurück: Israel gehe
dazu über, so befürchtet er, seine arabische Bevölkerung als Feinde
zu betrachten, statt eine Atmosphäre der Koexistenz und der
Gleichheit zu schaffen. Tibi schlägt für die arabische Bevölkerung
den Status einer „nationalen Minorität“ gemäß dem kanadischen
Modell vor. Am 26. Januar verlässt Tibi die „Nationale
Demokratische Allianz (Chadash)“ und schließt sich der „Vereinigten
Arabischen Liste“ an, die mit dem Führer der Nordfraktion der
„Islamischen Bewegung“ Sheikh Abdulmalik Sarsur antreten will. Der
bisherige Vorsitzende Abdel Malik Dehamshe, der die Südfraktion
der „Islamischen Bewegung“ repräsentiert, wird mit dem vierten Platz
auf der Wahlliste für den 28. März abgespeist.
21.01.2006:
Die „Washington Post“ berichtet, dass die „United States Agency for
International Development (USAID)“ der Palästinensischen
Autonomiebehörde zwei Millionen Dollar für den Wahlkampf zur
Verfügung gestellt habe. Damit würden vor allem Straßen gereinigt,
Kosten für die Wasserversorgung abgedeckt und Passanten an den
israelischen Kontrollstellen mit Lebensmitteln versorgt.
18.01.2006:
Der amtierende Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert kritisiert scharf
israelische Beamte, Angestellte vor Ort, Angehörige der
Sicherheitskräfte und politisch Verantwortliche, weil sie unter den
Siedlern in Hebron nicht für Ordnung sorgen würden. Er droht den
Siedlern die Evakuierung aus dem Zentrum der Stadt an, nachdem
diese drei Tage lang in Teilen des arabischen Marktes randaliert
hatten, ohne dass gegen sie vorgegangen worden war.
16.01.2006:
Ehud Olmert wird in Nachfolge von Ariel Sharon zum Vorsitzenden
der Partei „Kadima“ gewählt.
15.01.2006:
Als Nachfolgerin des zurückgetretenen Silvan Shalom („Likud“)
nominiert das israelische Kabinett die bisherige Justizministerin Tsipi
Livni („Kadima“) als neue Außenministerin. Mit ihr tritt erstmals eine
Frau an die Spitze dieses Amtes. Ihre Ernennung erfolgt offiziell am
18. Januar. Livni behält gleichzeitig das Justizministerium.
13.01.2006:
Amira Hass berichtet in der Tageszeitung „Haaretz“, dass die
israelische Armee faktisch den Norden der Westbank vom Süden
abgeschnitten habe. Davon sei die Bewegungsfreiheit von mehr als
800.000 Palästinensern betroffen.
Die Partei „Shinui“ (Wandel“) spaltet sich, als der zweite Vorsitzende
Avraham Poratz bei der Kandidatenaufstellung für die Wahlen am
28. März gegen den Bezirkschef der Partei Ron Leventhal in Tel Aviv
durchfällt. Am 25. Januar tritt der bisherige Vorsitzende Yosef
(„Tommy“) Lapid aus Partei und Fraktion aus. Die Abspaltung tritt
unter dem Namen „Chetz“ („Pfeil“) auf.
12.01.2006:
Auf Verlangen des „Likud“-Vorsitzenden Benjamin Netanyahu treten
Erziehungsministerin Limor Livnat, Landwirtschaftsminister Israel
Katz und Gesundheitsminister Danny Naveh von ihren
Regierungsämtern zurück. Außenminister Silvan Shalom folgt am
13. Januar.
Mehr als 350 moslemische Pilger kommen in der Nähe von Mekka
ums Leben, als bei einer symbolischen Steinigung des Teufels eine
Panik ausbricht.
In der Wochenzeitung „Die Zeit“ zieht der frühere deutsche
Außenminister Joschka Fischer unter dem Titel „Es gibt keinen Weg
zurück“ eine kritische Bilanz der Amtszeit Ariel Sharons. Darin
bezeichnet er die Entscheidung über den Rückzug aus dem
Gazastreifen als einen „unerhörten, ja fast revolutionär“ zu
nennenden Vorgang. Doch Sharon sei „weder als Militär noch gar als
Politiker ein Mann des Friedens“ gewesen. In „der Frage Jerusalem
war und ist er völlig unbeweglich“. Seine „Politik der ausschließlichen
Terrorbekämpfung ohne politische Verhandlungsperspektive hatte in
Israel und auch international ein politisches Vakuum entstehen
lassen, das mit der Vorlage der Genfer Initiative im Dezember 2003
sichtbar gemacht wurde“. Seine Skepsis gegenüber den
Palästinensern als Verhandlungspartnern sei ungebrochen. Er
„glaubte niemals ernsthaft an die Möglichkeit eines Friedens mit den
Palästinensern und schon gar nicht mit Jassir Arafat.“ Seine Politik
der Trennung verfüge „über entscheidende Schwächen. Die erste
Frage betrifft die Lage und die Zukunft der Palästinenser jenseits der
Grenzsicherung. Was wird aus ihnen ohne die Perspektive einer
politischen Verhandlungslösung werden? Was passiert in Gaza nach
einem israelischen Rückzug? Darauf gab es niemals eine
befriedigende Antwort von der israelischen Seite. Sie erschöpfte sich
in der knappen Feststellung, Gaza und seine Entwicklung wäre[n]
dann fortan eine Sache der Palästinenser.“ Da sich Israel jedoch
„nicht wirklich“ von den Palästinensern trennen könne, bleibe „die
Zukunft eines palästinensischen Staates eine der zentralen Fragen
für die Sicherheit und die Interessen Israels, die nicht
ausgeklammert werden kann“. Auch die arabischen Staaten würden
Israel nach Auffassung Sharons auf absehbare Zeit „nicht wirklich
akzeptieren“. Die Vorstellungen über einen Endstatus im israelischpalästinensischen Konflikt lägen „zu weit auseinander“ und wären
„deshalb in Verhandlungen nicht überbrückbar“.
10.01.2006:
Der amtierende israelische Ministerpräsident Ehud Olmert kündigt
gegenüber der US-amerikanischen Außenministerin Condoleezza
Rice an, dass für seine Regierung die Teilnahme von
Terrororganisationen an den Wahlen am 25. Januar in OstJerusalem nicht in Frage komme. Es wird jedoch erwartet, dass die
israelischen Behörden nicht gegen Kandidaten vorgehen werden, die
mit „Hamas“ identifiziert werden. Dagegen teilt Machmud Abbas mit,
dass er die schriftliche Zusicherung der Vereinigten Staaten erhalten
habe, „dass der Wahlkampf und die Wahl in Jerusalem stattfinden
werden“.
Die israelische Regierung erlaubt den im Gefängnis sitzenden
Marwan Barghouti, der auf der Wahlliste von „Fatah“ den ersten
Platz einnimmt, den unbegrenzten Empfang von Besuchern und die
Beteiligung am Wahlkampf von seiner Gefängniszelle aus.
In der Wahlplattform, die „Hamas“ veröffentlicht, wird ohne nähere
Spezifizierung als politisches Ziel die Gründung des Staates
Palästina mit der Hauptstadt in Jerusalem angegeben. Andererseits
heißt es, dass „Palästina Teil des arabischen und islamischen
Landes“ sei. Ein Hinweis auf die Zerstörung Israels fehlt jedoch in
dem Dokument. Im Zusammenhang mit dem Flüchtlingsproblem wird
vom „unveräußerlichen Recht auf Rückkehr ohne politische
Zugeständnisse“ gesprochen. Gleichzeitig nimmt „Hamas“ im
Gazastreifen eine eigene Fernsehstation in Betrieb.
09.01.2006:
Vor dem Auswärtigen und Verteidigungsausschuss der Knesset
bedauert der Chef des Inlandsgeheimdienstes („Shin 0Bet“), Yuval
Diskin, das weder das israelische Militär noch die Polizei gegen die
Verwüstung von vielen hundert Olivenbäumen – die Rede ist von
773 Bäumen – auf palästinensischem Grund und Boden durch junge
radikale Siedler („hilltop youth“) eingeschritten sei.
Der palästinensische Chefunterhändler Saeb Erakat bestätigt einen
Bericht Nahost-Direktors der Weltbank, Nigel Roberts, in der „New
York Times“, dass die Autonomiebehörde vor dem Bankrott stehe
und kaum noch die Gehälter ihrer Angestellten bezahlen könne. Am
29. Januar berichtet Zvi Bar’el in „Haaretz, dass nach Angaben der
Weltbank vom Dezember 2005 das monatliche Haushaltsdefizit der
Autonomiebehörde bei 57 Millionen US-Dollar liege, im Jahr 2006
dürfte es 900 Millionen US-Dollar erreichen. Mit den Einnahmen
würden sich kaum die Gehälter der Angestellten der
Autonomiebehörde bezahlen lassen, ganz zu schweigen von den
Ausgaben für Entwicklung und Infrastruktur. In der Altersgruppe
zwischen 20 und 24 Jahre liege die Arbeitslosigkeit bei 44 Prozent.
Ohne die Fortsetzung der ausländischen Finanzhilfen – die USA
tragen jährlich vierzig Millionen US-Dollar bei −, so Bar’el, würde
„Hamas“ noch stärker werden. Anfang Februar 2006 legt die
palästinensische Generalsstaatsanwaltschaft in Ramallah ihren
Untersuchungsbericht vor, wonach hohe Beamte der
Autonomiebehörde mehrere Milliarden US-Dollar „gestohlen“ haben
sollen.
Nach dem Treffen zwischen den Präsidenten Hosni Mubarak und
Bashar Assad im ägyptischen Badeort Sharm el-Sheikh zeichnet
sich die Bereitschaft Syriens zur besseren Zusammenarbeit mit der
UN-Kommission zur Untersuchung des Mordes an dem ehemaligen
libanesischen Ministerpräsidenten Rafik Hariri am 14. Februar 2005
ab. Zuvor war Assad mit dem saudischen König Abdullah in Djiddah
zusammengetroffen.
05.01.2006:
Die palästinensische Wahlkommission tritt zurück, nachdem das
Innenministerium angeordnet hat, dass die Angehörigen der
Sicherheitskräfte am 25. Januar ihre Stimme in den Kasernen
abgeben sollen.
04.01.2006:
Israels 77jähriger Ministerpräsident Ariel Sharon erleidet am Abend
einen weiteren Schlaganfall mit schweren Hirnblutungen und wird ins
Hadassah-Krankenhaus in Ein Karem bei Jerusalem eingeliefert.
Ärzte der Neurochirurgie teilen nach mehreren Notoperationen mit,
dass Sharon aufgrund der Gehirnschäden kaum mit der
Wiederaufnahme der Amtsgeschäfte rechnen könne. Sharons
Stellvertreter, Finanzminister Ehud Olmert, übernimmt die Leitung
der Regierungsgeschäfte. Gemäß Artikel 3 des „Grundgesetzes“
(„Basic Law“) „Die Regierung“ von 1968 kann Olmert hundert Tage
im Amt bleiben, bevor Neuwahlen ausgeschrieben werden müssen.
Diese sind nicht ausgeschöpft, weil bereits beschlossen ist, dass am
28. März die Knesset neu gewählt werden soll. Der Vorsitzende der
Arbeitspartei Amir Peretz ruft seine Partei zu „politischer Abstinenz“
auf. Palästinensische Politiker, allen voran Autonomiepräsident
Machmud Abbas, äußern sich über die Zukunft des
Friedensprozesses besorgt und fürchten nach dem Ausscheiden
Sharons ein politisches Vakuum. Beobachter im In- und Ausland
befürchten Diadochenkämpfe um die Nachfolge Sharons. In einem
Kommentar für die Tageszeitung „Die Welt“ schreibt der Jerusalemer
Politologe Shlomo Avineri am 7. Januar, Sharons Partei „Kadima“
(„Vorwärts“) müsse jetzt beweisen, dass sie für ein eigenständiges
politisches Programm steht.
Bewaffnete „Fatah“-Mitglieder durchbrechen in Rafach die
Grenzbefestigungen zwischen dem Gazastreifen und Ägypten und
töten zwei ägyptische Soldaten, dreißig werden verletzt. Ägyptische
Regierungskreise zeigen sich über die Schwäche der
Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde besorgt, Extremisten Einhalt
zu gebieten, und kündigen die Überprüfung der Kontrollen am
Grenzübergang an.
01.01.2006:
Die zwischen der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde und
„Hamas“ vereinbarte Waffenruhe endet im technischen Sinne an
diesem Tag.
Der ehemalige syrische Vizepräsident Abd al-Halim Khaddam, 73,
der heute im Pariser Exil lebt, beschuldigt im saudischen
Fernsehsender „al-Arabiyeh“ das Regime in Beirut der
Mitverantwortung für die Ermordung des ehemaligen libanesischen
Ministerpräsidenten Rafik Hariri am 14. Februar 2005 in Beirut.
1
Ari Shavit: The Livni Plan, in “Haaretz”-Magazine 29.12.2006:
Does Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni have a clear diplomatic plan that she is trying to
promote? Livni implies that she does, but refuses to explain. She speaks of the
two-state vision. She talks about the need to divide the country politically. She
speaks of the fact that she has a clear, high-resolution picture of what can be done
vis-a-vis our Palestinian neighbors in the coming year. However, she does not
explain what the plan really is, the nature of the operative Israeli idea now under
discussion.
Apparently the idea is as follows: to promote a diplomatic process by means of a
package of gestures that includes transferring money to the Palestinians, releasing
prisoners and bringing in the Egyptians to help stop the arms smuggling on the
Philadelphi route. Then, to conduct negotiations with Palestinian Authority
Chairman Mahmoud Abbas about the second stage of the road map and about the
establishment of a Palestinian state within interim borders. Then, to convene the
moderate Arab countries to give him backing. And then, to hold elections in the PA
in which the moderates will have a reasonable chance because they will be able to
offer the Palestinian public a clear and existing political horizon.
And only then, if the moderates do in fact win, to return to the first stage of the road
map, to deal with the dismantling of the terror infrastructure and to begin to move
forward toward the evacuation of the settlements, a reduction of the occupation and
the establishment of a real Palestinian state, while ensuring Israel's security needs
and receiving international guarantees that Israel will be recognized as a Jewish
state and will not be asked to absorb Palestinian refugees.
Can this plan be implemented? Isn't it totally divorced from reality? The foreign
minister is very careful not to mention any details, but she radiates optimism. She is
full of self-confidence, is Livni. Energetic. Upon leaving a meeting with hostile
European MPs, she is full of adrenaline. The challenges with which she presented
them. The arguments with which she surprised them. The way in which she
convinced them that they themselves don't want to return to the 1967 lines. And
when she finally sits down in her armchair and treats herself to some chocolate,
Livni tries to overcome the directness that is gushing from her and to become
formal once again. To become a stateswoman. To be the real alternative to the
prime minister.
Palestinians? Two states for two peoples
Shavit: Tzipi Livni, it's been 10 months since you became foreign minister. Have
you learned anything you didn't know before?
Livni: "As a person, I haven't changed. I think I've learned how significant diplomacy
is. I've seen how much the right conversation between leaders can influence
decision-making. That doesn't mean there are no vested interests. That doesn't
mean there are no political constraints. But in the end it's people. And in most
cases these are people who want to do the right thing. That's why if you identify the
common interest but also show them our real argument, they'll listen to you. You
can change things that are significant."
Shavit: What do you see as the main challenge now facing Israel?
Livni: "I'm disturbed by the process of turning national conflicts into religious ones.
And the Iranian issue is, of course, a problem. But my main commitment is to the
Israeli-Palestinian issue. I think that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians
is a keg of gunpowder that we're sitting on and for which we have to find a solution.
Time is not on the side of the moderates on both sides. Time is working against a
solution of two nation-states."
Shavit: And is the two-state solution still relevant? Is the present government
committed to dividing the country?
Livni: "Of course."
Shavit: The practical significance of dividing the country is the establishment of a
Palestinian state as soon as possible.
Livni: "Yes. Yes. My vision says that the principle of two nation-states is not only an
Israeli gift to the Palestinian but a promotion of Israel's interests."
Shavit: And do you believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state during the
term of this government is a possible goal?
Livni: "I don't like to set timetables. I'm not talking only about a Palestinian state but
about two nation-states living in peace side by side. And in my view there is a
Palestinian public that considers this goal its own as well. Up until now, the
Palestinians have missed every opportunity. They could have been celebrating the
60th anniversary of their state – had they accepted the Partition Plan – and
alternatively they could have been celebrating the sixth anniversary of their state –
had they accepted the Camp David ideas. But I believe that today there is another
opportunity. The moderate Palestinians must understand that Islamization and
religious extremism are working not only against Israel, but against every
Palestinian who wants a nation-state of his own."
Shavit: In effect, do you see the government bringing about a significant change in
Judea and Samaria in the coming years?
Livni: "If that doesn't happen, it's because the Palestinians have become more
extreme."
Shavit: But do you, for your part, have the determination to bring about this
dramatic change?
Livni: "Absolutely. And I'm not talking only about a vision. I'm talking about an
operative diplomatic plan with quite a high resolution. I won't reveal all the details to
you now, but I can tell you that I, for my part, know exactly what must be done."
Shavit: Do you propose returning to the road map?
Livni: "The road map contains stages, not content. It lacks content to a certain
extent. It affirms that in the second stage, a state with temporary borders and
symbols of sovereignty will be established. But what does that mean? I think that in
talks with the Palestinians, I can get into details on this issue. I think that I can
conduct talks with Abbas that will clarify what they want to achieve in the two-state
vision. On the one hand, I want to anchor my interests on the security issue,
demilitarization and the refugee problem, and on the other I want to create a
genuine alternative for the Palestinians that includes a solution to their national
problem. If we achieve such an alternative, the moderate Palestinians will have to
receive a mandate to implement it. At a certain point, it will also be necessary to
bring in moderate Arab countries to support the plan. It may also be possible to
formulate some of the basic principles of the final status agreement, even if it's
impossible to reach such an agreement now."
Shavit: You're optimistic.
Livni: "Anyone who lives in the Middle East and has his feet on the ground cannot
permit himself to be optimistic. But I see a type of opportunity. On the one hand,
we're surrounded by a growing threat and extremism and zealotry. But on the other
hand, precisely because of this threat, moderate countries and moderate factors in
the region understand today that their problem is not Israel. I think that this
opportunity must not be missed. At least we must examine it. We must clarify for
ourselves whether it has a chance."
Shavit: But meanwhile Qassam rockets are falling on Sderot. What you are
proposing is negotiations under fire.
Livni: "Even during Sharon's term of office, I claimed that we shouldn't say that we
won't talk under fire, but that we won't make concessions under fire. We have an
obligation to work to stop the Qassams. As of today, as we speak, I don't think that
it's right to carry out a dramatic military operation for that purpose. But even if the
situation changes and there is no escaping some kind of incursion, at the end of the
operation the diplomatic question will remain the same. The plan that I am
proposing can also be a consequence of such an operation."
Shavit: And aren't you afraid that if we leave the territories in Judea and Samaria in
the near future, the Qassams and Katyushas will pursue us?
Livni: “The plan that I'm talking about must provide an answer to the problem of
steep-trajectory firing. That is one of the reasons why I prefer a consensual
diplomatic process to a unilateral one. I think that after the disengagement, it's
absolutely clear that we cannot simply throw down the keys and leave. The
separation fence provided a solution for the suicide bombers and it began the
process of partition, but it is not providing a solution to the present security
problems. We have to find an answer for them in a diplomatic context.”
Shavit: Is the separation fence a reference point for you for dividing the country?
Livni: "Yes."
Shavit: And do you believe that the present government will be capable of
evacuating the tens of thousands of settlers living to the east of the fence?
Livni: "The behavior of the Palestinians in Gaza after the disengagement creates a
major problem. But I believe that in the final analysis, if a reasonable solution is
found for the security issues, most of the Israeli public will support this process."
Shavit: What you are in effect proposing is a return to the convergence plan. But
your convergence is a convergence in agreement with the Palestinians.
Livni: "I didn't use the term convergence a year ago, and I certainly won't use it
now."
Shavit: But in effect that is your vision. That's what you're aiming for.
Livni: "The vision is the State of Israel as a national home for the Jewish people,
which provides a solution for the problem of the Jewish people and for Jewish
refugees, and provides a national expression for each and every Jew, and
alongside it a Palestinian state that is the national home of the Palestinian nation,
which provides a total solution for the problem of the Palestinian nation and the
Palestinian refugees, and provides a national expression for each and every
Palestinian. I feel that I have the obligation to make that happen."
Syria? I'd remain silent
Shavit: And Syria? What will happen with Syria meanwhile?
Livni: "I'm not ruling out anything. The question is mainly one of timing and wise
tactics. Here, too, it's clear that we want to achieve peace. But when you enter
negotiations, you have to know what you'll do if they fall apart."
Shavit: Have you undergone the same ideological process in relation to the Golan
Heights that you underwent in relation to Judea and Samaria? As far as you're
concerned, is there no basic deterrent to leaving the Golan Heights?
Livni: "Anyone who talks about a future discussion with Syria understands that we
are talking about the Golan Heights."
Shavit: In other words, there is no basic problem here. You're simply afraid that a
possible failure of negotiations with Assad will increase the chances of war.
Livni: "In the Syrian context, it's not clear what outcome we will have at the end of
the process. There is a package that we call peace. At this point, entering
negotiations will not lead to this outcome, but will enable Syria to enter Lebanon
through the door rather than through the window. At the moment, I must take that
into consideration. Syria knows exactly what it must do in order to be part of the
international community, but it is doing the opposite. The meddling in Lebanon, the
embargo on the Syria-Lebanon border, Gilad Shalit. There is a gap between Syrian
statements and Syrian actions.”
Shavit: Some people in the Israel Defense Forces top brass and the intelligence
community are warning that in the wake of the Lebanon war, the status quo with the
Syrians is over. Now it's either-or. If there is no progress within a few months, there
will be deterioration. Maybe even war.
Livni: Like everything in life, the Syrian issue is also a matter of timing. I think the
statements on the subject do not contribute a thing. Neither the refusal to negotiate
nor the peace festivities contributes a thing."
Shavit: In that case, you wouldn't openly refuse the Syrians?
Livni: "I would remain silent. I don't think I have to reply every time someone offers
me a microphone. There is significance to what a foreign minister says. There is
significance to what a prime minister says."
Shavit: But meanwhile the impression is being created that we are refusing. The
Syrians are knocking at our gate, begging for peace, and we're slamming the door
in their face.
Livni: "I'm not sure that the Syrians are begging for peace. We want peace. They
want negotiations."
Shavit: In that case, the right thing to do is to expose the bluff. But we aren't doing
that because we are obeying the orders of the Americans.
Livni: "It's not only the Americans. Many people all over the world understand the
problematic nature of Syria. Many understand that the Syrians must be pressured."
Shavit: What you are saying is that certain Europeans are also cool to the idea of
Israeli talks with Assad at the present time?
Livni: "Cool? That's an understatement. Go to France."
Shavit: But neither France nor the United States will bear the results of this policy.
As before the Yom Kippur War, the government of which you are a member is
waiting for a phone call. Aren't you afraid that in the future we'll see this winter as
the winter in which we didn't prevent war?
Livni: “I ask myself that question every day. That's why I think it's proper to conduct
a situation assessment every day. To examine at every moment whether conditions
have changed. As of today, Syria is totally involved in terror. It is doing as it pleases
in Lebanon and is trying to bring down the Siniora government. Really? And I
thought that the situation on the northern border is excellent. The declarations of
the prime minister convinced me that our historic victory in the second Lebanon war
led to a situation where Hezbollah was smashed, Nasrallah is in a bunker and the
situation of the moderates in Lebanon has never been better. I still think that the
situation in Lebanon is better than it was. But the pressure on Siniora and his
government is disturbing."
The war? And I say, boys, stop it
Shavit: Do you view the war as a success?
Livni: "The diplomatic result of the war – UN General Assembly Resolution 1701 –
is a success. It reflects the Israeli interest. But there were failures in the war. There
were failures. Something very negative happened to the public as a result of the
war."
Shavit: What happened?
Livni: "There was a huge gap between the expectations and the reality. And it's not
that the public got up in the morning and said 'I expect.' This gap was fed. There
was a problematic dynamic of talk and of declarations and of raising expectations."
Shavit: Were there moments when you looked around you and saw belligerence?
Livni: "Yes, yes."
Shavit: Was there an excess of enthusiasm at the beginning of the war?
Livni: "Yes. About everything. It was a real heartache. The period that was hardest
for me was the period of euphoria. I wasn't there."
Shavit: Did you return from meetings with a heavy heart?
Livni: "Forget it. I don't want to talk about personal feelings. But did I have a heavy
heart during that period? Yes."
What was the root of the problem?
Livni: "I think that from the second day of the war, it was clear that the exit would
have to be political. The military campaign was important to make it clear that Israel
will not conduct business as usual when soldiers are kidnapped, but the campaign
couldn't stand on its own. That's why I thought that the exit must be diplomatic and
immediate."
Shavit: Did you support a diplomatic exit from the war right from the start?
Livni: "From the second day. I wanted us to begin to create it then. That was the
great difficulty. Part of the leadership and certainly the army had a feeling that the
issue was the military campaign itself. Whereas I thought that the military campaign
had to be only an entry point to a diplomatic process. People expected the military
campaign to produce something that it couldn't provide."
Shavit: Did you think that it was possible to arrive at a good diplomatic exit point at
a much earlier stage?
Livni: "And that it should be done immediately. After the blow of the first night, we
should have been concerned about how the future would look. And how the future
will look is more than a military campaign."
Shavit: Did you see male hormones raging around you?
Livni: "Sometimes there are guy issues."
Shavit: Was there a guy problem in the conduct of the war?
Livni: "Not only in the war. In all kinds of discussions, I hear arguments between
generals and admirals and such and I say guys, stop it. There's something of that
here."
Shavit: Did the Israel Defense Forces worry you during the course of the war?
Livni: "Yes. During those days, the thinking was too militaristic. But I think that
today, in the wake of the war, there's a better understanding that the strategy
cannot be only military. They understand that in the army too. At the beginning of
the war, some people thought that the diplomatic role was to provide the army with
time. That's understandable: In the past we always achieved, we conquered, we
released, we won, and then the world came and took away from us. The victory
was military and the failure political. But this time it was the opposite."
Shavit: So what should be changed now? What cannot be repeated in the next
war?
Livni: "We have to tell the army officers that they're wonderful and they know how to
do wonderful things, but we also have to ask them how. We have to ask them more
questions. To ask the right questions."
Shavit: And the right questions weren't asked?
Livni: "The main question that must be asked is, Then what? Okay, do such and
such a thing, but then what."
Iran? People know what they know
Shavit: In light of the way in which Olmert, Peretz and you conducted the small war
in Lebanon, do you have confidence in your ability to conduct the major battle
against Iran?
Livni: "Yes."
Shavit: Don't you feel a need to expand the government?
Livni: "It's not as though there is someone outside the government who has a magic
solution in his hat."
Shavit: Can Israeli citizens sleep peacefully when Olmert, Peretz and Livni are
repelling the Iranian threat?
Livni: "Yes. There's always room for improvement. But that's not something that is a
function of a different coalition or a different composition of the cabinet. I feel very
confident about what I want to do and what I'm capable of doing. Nor do I feel any
lack of group confidence on this issue."
Shavit: And the Iranian threat itself – how serious is it?
Livni: "The danger of Iranian nukes is more than just the Iranian nuke. The fear is of
a domino effect. Many countries in the region understand that the combination of
Iranian ideology and a nuclear bomb is not something that they can tolerate.
Therefore, if Iran goes nuclear, they will do one of two things: Either they will
compete with Iran or they will join it. Countries that can develop nuclear weapons
on their own will do so in order to compete with Iran, and countries that cannot
develop nuclear weapons will join the neighborhood bully, Iran. For many of the
moderate countries in the Middle East, the choice will be between creating their
own bomb or asking for sponsorship. That will have two consequences: widespread
nuclear proliferation not only to countries but to terror organizations as well, a fact
that will change all the international rules of the game on the nuclear issue, and
moderate countries being dragged toward the extremist ones. The world cannot
permit itself a nuclear Iran."
Shavit: 1938?
Livni: “My texts are different."
Shavit: Is the threat dramatic?
Livni: "Israel has been a threatened country during all the years of its existence. We
are a country that lived under threats for many years and knew how to deal with
them. There's a problem here. On the one hand, you can hear even me saying
terrible things about the Iranian threat, all over the world. And it's true. But I wouldn't
want the citizens of the country to reach an almost physical sense of dread. The
public today is filled with anxiety and that bothers me. We are here and we will be
here for many years to come. We and our children and our children's children after
us."
Shavit: The things you are saying are heartwarming. But the feeling is that
Ahmadinejad is continually marching forward and there is nobody stopping him.
Livni: "It's true that Ahmadinejad is moving forward. And it's true that he must be
stopped. But nobody has given up. Neither the Israeli government nor the world."
Shavit: Do you see enough determination and ability in the West to stop the Iranian
nuclear bomb? Don't you think that both the West and Israel have failed so far in a
big way in their attempts at stopping it?
Livni: "Everyone agrees about the need to prevent Iran from having nuclear
weapons. The problem is that the attempt to arrive at consensus decisions at the
UN leads to delays in the timetables and to compromises. That's why even the
decision taken this week in the UN Security Council was taken very late, and deals
only with soft sanctions. There is a need to impose harsh sanctions on Iraq,
immediate and unequivocal ones. Most members of the Security Council
understand that."
Shavit: It's not too late?
Livni: "The important point is the acquisition of know-how. The crossing of the
technological threshold.”
Shavit: Crossing the threshold is liable to take place in 2007. Maybe even in the
coming months.
Livni: “Israeli policy is to lower our profile on the Iranian issue. And if I continue to
answer your questions that won't be lowering our profile. We have to be aware of
the fact that time is working against us. But we are working. We're in a process.
We're maintaining international awareness of the Iranian threat. And not only that.
We're doing even better, and coming out with a series of unprecedented
declarations that create a feeling that the policy of ambiguity has changed.”
Shavit: Did you like the declarations?
Livni: “To be fair, it must be said that a problem has been created. Even in places
where they understand the Iranian threat, they were forced to respond aggressively
on this matter because of inner discomfort stemming from the fact that Israel is
seen as a threat. But a large part of the impression was created due to media
coverage."
Shavit: Are the media to blame?
Livni: "The media are always to blame. By definition."
Shavit: Is there a change in the policy of ambiguity?
Livni: "There's no change. I'm a partner in this context and there is no decision
about a change in policy."
Shavit: And shouldn't there be a change?
Livni: "No. What people know they know."
Shavit: Shouldn't the change in the situation lead to an increase in the level of
Israeli deterrence vis-a-vis Iran?
Livni: "Israel has deterrent power in this area. People know what they have to
know."
Shavit: Are you aware of the fact that since the Lebanon war there has been a
sense of profound crisis in Israel?
Livni: "I see it. People have a feeling of an existential threat. If there is anything that
disturbs me, it's the sense that people feel a need for physical survival. I think that's
extreme. There's no justification for that. But this process disturbs me because it
has internal consequences. Anyone who can is beginning to think in family terms of
bank accounts abroad, to send the child to study abroad, a foreign language, a
foreign passport. I feel that's wrong both from a Zionist and a social point of view.
Because this is being done by those who are able, and that increases the distress
of those who are unable.”
Shavit: The distress does not stem only from the external threat. It also stems from
the sense that there is a leadership crisis in Israel.
Livni: That's the situation. I can't argue with feelings. Yes. It exists."
Olmert? I'll run if I have to
Shavit: You were close to Sharon. What did Sharon give the Israeli public and what
was lost with his leaving?
Livni: "Sharon provided a sense of security. The public does not expect the
leadership never to make mistakes. The public expects the person who is sitting
there on top to have the right considerations. To consider the good of the nation
and the country over the long term rather than in the here and now. That's why the
question is not whether the leadership makes mistakes. It's natural to make
mistakes. The question is whether there is someone sitting and weighing things in
such a way that even if he makes a mistake, it will not be a dramatic one. And if he
makes a mistake, he'll know how to fix it. That's how it was with Sharon. Slower
movement is good."
Shavit: Do you remember the moment of Sharon's collapse?
Livni: "Yes. There was that terrible night. When most of the night you crossed your
fingers. A silent prayer. And then I went to Jerusalem and I had a buzzing in my
head that the public is looking toward Jerusalem and it needs a government in
Jerusalem. Otherwise everything will fall apart. I remember the feeling that they
were looking at us, and now we would either take responsibility or everything would
fall apart. And we had to convey the message that there was a responsible adult.
There are responsible adults. And that we were together. Therefore, when I heard
people in the media already talking about the fact that there were two heads –
Olmert and me – I knew we had to cut off a head immediately, and that was my
head. I approached the television cameras and said that there was a deputy prime
minister and that we were standing behind him and with him."
Shavit: And when you look back after a year – did you fulfill the assignment? Is
there a responsible adult in Jerusalem?
Livni: "I know that the public feels otherwise."
Shavit: Are you satisfied with the government in which you are serving?
Livni: "The fact is that the public feels a lack of confidence."
Shavit: And what is the source of that feeling?
Livni: "The leadership in Israel is a very lonely place, unfortunately. I believe in
teamwork. But in teamwork, you also expose weaknesses. That's why many
politicians in Israel refrain from that. I feel that the problem is one of an absence of
teamwork as it should be.”
Shavit: We all hope that the term of Prime Minister Olmert will continue for as long
as possible. But after the Olmert era, do you see yourself qualified for the
premiership?
Livni: "In terms of qualifications, yes. I did not set my sights on being prime minister.
I really didn't. It's something that was created. A while ago, I would have answered
you differently. But there was a process here that has prepared me."
Shavit: So that as far as you're concerned, you've grown and matured and today
you're qualified to be prime minister?
Livni: "I'm qualified to be prime minister."
Shavit: So when the Olmert era is over, you're next in line?
Livni: "If I see that at the point when the contest takes place, there are missions that
I haven't completed and that I must complete and I'll be able to complete by being
prime minister – I'll run for the premiership."
Shavit: Is there a possibility that you would run against Olmert?
Livni: "I've told you what my test is. It's not personal. It's not connected to some
identity or other. If I can do what I believe in and receive that same cooperation that
we discussed – I'm happy where I am. If I can't do that, I'll compete for the place
where I can do it, which is the place of prime minister. I don't hear any outright
rejection of running against Olmert. I'm interested not in the job but in the issue. I
entered politics first and foremost to further the diplomatic issue. At the point where
I am, that can be done if there is support from the prime minister. Therefore, if I
have such support and I can do what I believe I must, I won't look for the next slot.
If not, I'll run for prime minister."
2
3
Vgl. die Eintragung am 09.12.2006 in dieser Chronologie.
Vgl. Daniel Ben Simon: Men in suits in Maskiot, in „Haaretz“-online 05.01.2007:
Last Friday two black cars approached the entrance gate of the settlement. Two
men who looked like security guards emerged from them, looked around and tried
to figure out whether they had arrived in the right place. At exactly the same time,
Oz Aviad was about to go on a hike with his friends in the untamed landscapes of
the Jordan Valley.
"Can I help you?" Aviad asked the two.
"We're looking for the settlement of Maskiot," one of them replied."Who are you?"
asked Aviad.
"We're from the United States Embassy," replied one of them.
"And what have you come to do?" asked Aviad, continuing his interrogation. "We've
come to check that there's nothing unusual going on here," was the reply.
A few moments later two more black Chevrolets arrived at the gate of the
settlement, and two more men in suits got out. Aviad called Lior Frenkel, the 28year-old director of the pre-army mechina (a post-high-school program combining
religious studies with preparation for military service) on the site, and informed him
of the arrival of the uninvited guests. Frenkel phoned Rabbi Shlomo Azualos, the
rabbi of Maskiot, and also informed the regional security officer. After the
consultations were done, the American entourage was allowed to enter Maskiot.
A few days earlier the Americans had been informed of the Israeli intention to
expand the community and to build a settlement there to absorb dozens of families
formerly from Gush Katif. The news upset the U.S. State Department and even the
White House. The European Union also demanded explanations from Israel, and
EU countries urged their ambassadors in Israel to check where in heaven's name
the remote settlement is located. They discovered that Defense Minister Amir
Peretz had personally signed the building permits for 30 residential units there. This
was the first time in almost a decade that Israel had established a settlement in the
territories.
That is how the tiny community in the northern Jordan Valley, with a population of
52 students and a few teachers, found itself embroiled in an international incident.
The Palestinians went wild, the Americans went crazy and the Europeans reached
the conclusion that someone in Israel had lost his mind. They were particularly
angry at the attempt to settle evacuees from Gaza in the West Bank. Finland, which
now holds the rotating presidency of the EU, published a statement that said,
among other things: "We didn't support the disengagement from Gaza so that you
would transfer the evacuees to the West Bank." Angered by the furor
Aviad gave up the idea of a hike and escorted the Americans. "They were
enthusiastic," he recalled a few days later. Like dozens of his friends, he came to
Maskiot because of the one-year study program.
"I made Turkish coffee for them, and because I speak English, I told them about
the place," said Aviad. "They asked all kinds of questions about Maskiot: when it
was established, who studies here, who lives here and when it will become a
settlement. The truth is that they were nice. One of them, who introduced himself
as a consul, told me that if he were an Israeli, he would come to live here, because
he loved the landscape and the peace and quiet."
But American manners are one thing, and diplomatic fury is another. The heads of
the Maskiot program understood that something bad was about to happen.
Although they had received all the necessary permits and even flaunted the
signature of the defense minister, expansion work on the premises has come to a
standstill, and the area that was prepared for the construction of new residential
units has been abandoned. The heavy machinery has disappeared. Attempts to
contact the Defense Ministry and other ministries were met with an embarrassing
silence.
"The Americans are angry," explained a senior settlement activist to Frenkel. "This
is not the time to make a fuss. Wait patiently until the uproar dies down."
The rabbi of the pre-army program, Azualos, is still angry about all the furor. Three
years ago he saw the place and fell in love with it. As part of his job as the regional
rabbi of the Beit She'an Valley, he was given the assignment of finding a site for
such a program. Before it was abandoned by the army, Maskiot served as a Nahal
paramilitary brigade outpost, established in 1983. After the soldiers left, the place
was destroyed.
"Everything was barren, there was terrible neglect," said Azualos, recalling his first
visit there. "I asked where the buildings were, where the soldiers' residences were.
They told me that everything was buried under the weeds."
Azualos, 48, an admired figure, has developed an exceptional method of
communicating with his students: Anyone who meets him gets a big hug that ends
with kissing the rabbi's hand. He was born in Morocco, immigrated to Switzerland,
studied engineering in Geneva, and about 20 years ago immigrated to Israel after
becoming religious.
From living in Israel he has managed to learn that the first Zionist rule is to establish
facts on the ground; the second rule is to ignore the protests of the world. "They'll
shout and we'll continue to instill pride in the young men who come here," he said.
"We will give them spiritual strength, we will teach them halakhot (religious laws),
we will deepen their faith and their knowledge of the Jewish heritage."
In the rabbinical district for which he is responsible, the charismatic Asualos has
gained a reputation as someone skilled at shalom bayit (reconciliation of married
couples) and kiruv levavot (attracting people to religious observance). His social
awareness enhances his reputation.
"Most of the pre-army preparatory programs speak to an elitist youth," he explained
on the way to teaching a class. "I have attracted a different type of youth to Maskiot,
from the periphery of the country, from a disadvantaged economic background.
They come here with doubts as to whether to enlist at all, and here we instill pride in
them and build their backbone."
'Kosher' settlement
After their expulsion from Gaza in the summer of 2005, leaders of the religious right
set their sights on the Jordan Valley. Of all the sites for settlement adventures that
took place after the Six-Day War in 1967, this valley is considered an exception –
both because it is not yearned for by the religious community, and because its land
is not densely populated with Palestinians. The almost-barren land there has
always attracted people who wanted a settlement without Arabs surrounding them.
The second intifada almost destroyed the Jordan Valley settlements. The dangers
accelerated the process of mass desertion and put an end to agriculture there.
Anyone who was able to do so left, leaving behind a settlement dream that
shattered in the face of the new reality. The uncertainty regarding the future of the
region was also a factor. In spite of patriotic declarations and promises by the
leaders of the country, it was clear to the residents that at the right opportunity, they
would be sacrificed on the altar of negotiations. Then prime minister Yitzhak Rabin
signaled the departure from the valley, and Ehud Barak followed in his footsteps.
Suddenly permission was granted to turn Maskiot into a completely "kosher"
settlement, and the permit bears the signature of Labor Party leader Amir Peretz,
the dovish defense minister. Now it turns out that the first 30 residential units that
are to be built legally on the land are only a preparation for the expansion of the
community to 100 residential units. Already now dozens of families of evacuees
from Gush Katif want to come to live in the new settlement.
The thought that a person who has been uprooted would want to settle in a place
from which he is liable to be uprooted again, is horrifying. What intelligent person
would want to relive the pain of such uprooting, and even turn it into a way of life?
And how are the children of those same evacuees supposed to handle the question
marks that will hover over their lives from the day they enter their new houses?
Frenkel agrees that it is not a simple situation, but he is certain that in light of the
failure of the disengagement from Gaza, no additional withdrawal is anticipated in
the foreseeable future.
Documented story
Lior Frenkel pulled out documents that tell the story of Maskiot from its inception in
1982 until the recent day when its existence came to the attention of U.S. President
George W. Bush and made his blood boil. Here is the government decision, the
military permits, the signature of the defense minister, the approval of the head of
the IDF command, documents from the settlement division and the Amana
settlement movement – you name it.
Rather than discouraging them from embarking on new adventures in the
territories, the disengagement from Gaza has encouraged Azualos and Frenkel.
"The disengagement is a major rupture that harmed the religious-nationalist
community," Frenkel explained. "But there was a war this summer in Lebanon that
exposed the dysfunctional nature of the political leadership. That's why we have to
strengthen the settlements." He believes that had he and his friends not taken over
the abandoned outpost, the Bedouin and the Palestinians would have done so.
Now the Americans and the Europeans are threatening to put an end to the party.
But nobody in Maskiot gets upset by the foreign intervention. Between lessons the
52 students are busy with building, plowing, gardening, setting up an animal corner,
cooking and fixing up the place. They are certain that once the diplomatic uproar
subsides the trucks and bulldozers will return, and that it won't be long before
Maskiot becomes a milestone of renewed settlement momentum in the territories.
4
Vgl. Reiner Bernstein: Der verborgene Frieden. Politik und Religion im Nahen
Osten. Berlin 2000, S. 178 ff.
5
Gershon Baskin: Serious leaders doing serious work, in “Jerusalem Post”
25.12.2006.
6
UN-Security Council 23.12.2006: The UN Security Council unanimously
approved a resolution (document S/2006/1010) sponsored by France, Germany
and the United Kingdom) imposing sanctions against Iran for refusing to suspend
uranium enrichment, culminating two months of tough negotiations aimed at
pressuring Teheran to return to negotiations and clarify its nuclear ambitions. The
following is the text as provided by the UN:
www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8928.doc.htm
"The Security Council,
"Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and
its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,
"Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II
of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,
"Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General
and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran's nuclear
programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board
resolution GOV/2006/14,
"Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27
February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns
on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear
dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
"Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General's report of 28 April
2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of
Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the
existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is
unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,
"Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General's
reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14
November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in
resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the
Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of
Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696
(2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran's refusal to
take these steps,
"Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated
solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful
purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation
elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the
support of the European Union's High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,
"Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of
the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in
support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security
Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,
"Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme
and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the
IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council
resolution 1696 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
"Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
"1. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA
Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build
confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to
resolve outstanding questions;
"2. Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:
(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and
development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research
reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;
"3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply,
sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or
using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and
whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related,
reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, namely:
(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of
INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document
S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:
(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;
(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled
nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;
(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items
covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;
(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as
necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18
below (herein "the Committee"), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or
reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems;
"4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply,
sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or
using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and
whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology:
(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State
determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy
water-related activities;
(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State
determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy
water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of
activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or
identified as outstanding;
"5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment,
goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the
export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a)
above, States shall ensure that:
(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents
S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the
end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in
document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale
or transfer;
"6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the
provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance,
investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or
services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4
above;
"7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and
S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items
from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in the territory of Iran;
"8. Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests
to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all
outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon Iran to ratify
promptly the Additional Protocol;
"9. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not
apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis
that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would
clearly not contribute to the development of Iran's technologies in support of its
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food,
agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:
(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user
guarantees; and
(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities
or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
"10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit
through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with
or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all
States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories
of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein "the Annex"), as
well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee
as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the
prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and
under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for
activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;
"11. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own
nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the
above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the
necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the
IAEA Statute is engaged;
"12. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and
economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this
resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or
entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities
designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled
by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph
shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as,
the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides
further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic
resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any
persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and
entities;
"13. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to
funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by
relevant States:
(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or
mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and
public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and
reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal
services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine
holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic
resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention
to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or
economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee
within five working days of such notification;
(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has
been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by
the Committee;
(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which
case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to
satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into
prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity
designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the
relevant States to the Committee;
(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in
subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the
Committee;
"14. Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to
the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those
accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose
prior to the date onwhich those accounts became subject to the provisions of this
resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue
to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
"15. Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated
person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the
listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined
that:
(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment,
goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment,
brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;
(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated
pursuant to paragraph 12 above; and after notification by the relevant States to the
Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize,
where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic
resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;
"16. Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its
auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian
purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified
in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation
shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out
in paragraph 2 above;
"17. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or
training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines
which would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
"18. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of
the Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and
4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively
the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution
and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by
the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 17 of this
resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations
of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in
paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods
and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the
measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of
the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a
requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any
individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any
relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the
implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in
particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
"19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the
adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;
"20. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as
well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA
Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that
guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,
underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such
a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage
with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such
engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
"21. Welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European
Union's High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages
Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed
by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive
agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with
Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;
"22. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly
supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the
Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and
impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the
framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to
clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;
"23. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on
whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities
mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with
all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this
resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council
for its consideration;
"24. Affirms that it shall review Iran's actions in the light of the report referred to in
paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran
suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and
development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12
of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its
obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has
not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article
41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply
with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further
decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
"25. Decides to remain seized of the matter."
7
Nachum Barnea: Proposal for Creating Suitable Conditions for Ending the
Conflict, in “Yediot Achronot” 22.12.2006:
1. Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank to an agreed temporary line. 2. Five year
armistice/hudna, i.e. no Palestinian attacks in Israel or on Israelis anywhere and no
Israeli attacks on Palestinian territory or Palestinians anywhere.
3. No Israeli steps to change the status quo that existed in areas outside the territory
under Israeli control on the 4th of June 1967 lines. No houses to be built in
settlements/no roads or any change of the landscape.
4. Free and unhindered access for Palestinians to East Jerusalem and the rest of the
Israeli occupied West Bank.
5. Free and unhindered travel from Gaza to West Bank (and vice versa) as well as to
Jordan and Egypt.
6. International supervision: any violations of points (1-5) is to be considered a
violation of the armistice/hudna.
8
Vgl. Reiner Bernstein: Von Gaza nach Genf. Schwalbach/Ts. 2006, S. 50.
9
Nathan Guttman: State Department Weighs Plan for Palestinian State, in
„Forward“ 22.12.2006: The Bush administration is considering a plan to declare an
independent Palestinian state with provisional borders by the end of 2007.
The idea has been “kicked around” in the State Department for several weeks,
according to sources. It could be one element of a new American Middle East
peace plan, the sources added, if President Bush decides to push forward with the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process as part of a fresh Middle East policy he is
constructing.
At the same time, in an effort to bolster the regime of Mahmoud Abbas, the
administration also has begun lobbying Congress to provide $100 million to fund
forces loyal to the Palestinian president.
Talk of new ideas for breaking the deadlock in the Middle East come as pressure
mounts on the United States and Israel to take action toward resolving the conflict.
Jordan’s King Abdullah, who met Tuesday with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert in
Amman, offered his services in brokering a deal and announced he would hold
talks with all parties in an attempt to reach an agreement. The Jordanian monarch,
who also has urged the United States to be more active on the issue, warned that
without progress between Israelis and Palestinians, violence would increase.
The prospects for a meeting between Olmert and Abbas seemed greater this week
after chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat declared Tuesday that preparations
for a summit “are ongoing.”
The idea of an independent Palestinian state with temporary borders is based on
the American-backed peace plan known as the road map. The second phase of the
plan, which was formally accepted by both Israelis and Palestinians, calls for a
declaration of an independent state even before final borders are agreed upon
between both sides.
Though the United States has maintained that the road map is still the only viable
peace plan for the region, it never took off. This was mainly because of the Israeli
insistence that the Palestinians curb terrorism as demanded in the first phase of the
plan.
The State Department announced this week that Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice will be visiting the region “early next year” and, according to spokesman Sean
McCormack, will “devote a lot of time and energy” to implementing a two-state
solution. Rice is not expected to present new initiatives during her visit.
A diplomatic source, briefed by administration officials on the idea of a state with
provisional borders, said this week that the most significant advantage the plan has
is that it would allow President Bush to achieve his goal of a two-state solution
within a reasonable timeframe. If implemented, such a plan also could help
generate support for the United States among moderate Arab countries and
possibly assist the American efforts to gain stability in Iraq.
In a meeting with Jewish educators and students this week, President Bush
mentioned the need for improving ties with moderate Arab countries, saying,
according to one participant, that “as time evolves, strange relationships evolve.”
A Washington source close to the issue said the administration believes that the
idea of an independent state with temporary borders could be accepted by the
Israelis, especially in light of Olmert’s latest remarks on his willingness to give up
land and push for a two-state solution.
The idea, however, may turn out to be a hard sell for both Israelis and Palestinians.
Israeli leaders have insisted throughout the years that a fundamental condition for
moving forward with any diplomatic initiative is the renunciation of terror by
Palestinians and dismantling of the terror infrastructure in the territories. A
diplomatic official argued that, because of the chaos in the Palestinian Authority, the
Israeli demands are no longer relevant, since it is clear that there is no Palestinian
leader who can deliver on the issue of fighting terror. A source close to the P.A.
said that such a plan could be acceptable only if America provides assurances that
the temporary state does not become a final one and that the border issue remains
on the table.
As long-term peace plans are being discussed and await a green light from the
president and from the secretary of state, senior administration officials are working
to provide temporary relief to Palestinian moderates.
The administration now intends to funnel $100 million to the Fatah-controlled
Palestinian security forces, mainly to Abbas’s presidential guard. In recent weeks,
Keith Dayton, the American military envoy to the region, and other State
Department officials have briefed key congressional staffers on the government’s
plan to provide funding for the Palestinian security forces.
The request, according to congressional sources, is for providing up to $100 million
that was previously appropriated for the P.A. but was never delivered because of
the Hamas victory in the January elections. The money is to be used for paying
salaries of members of the security services and presidential guard, and for
equipment, but it will not be used for the purchase of lethal weapons. Weapons for
the security forces are to be provided by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, according to
sources familiar with the plan.
The administration’s plan for strengthening Abbas’s forces is gaining support in
Congress and is not expected to encounter significant resistance.
“It might just be too little and too late,” said Democratic Rep. Gary Ackerman of
New York, who in January 2007 will take over as head of the Middle East
subcommittee. Though Ackerman told the Forward he believes that the United
States still can help Abbas “without making him look like a puppet,” he criticized the
administration for dragging its feet in providing support for the Palestinian leader. “I
hope it’s not too late,” Ackerman said, promising that once he and the Democrats
take over the subcommittee, they will scrutinize the administration’s Middle East
policy.
“The oversight will be there, you can count on that,” Ackerman said.
Both Democratic and Republican staffers voiced skepticism over the possibility that
America’s money actually will make a difference in the rapidly deteriorating P.A. “It’s
between investing in the crooks or in the killers, so we invest in the crooks,” one
staffer said. In the last days of its final session, the outgoing Congress passed the
Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act, which imposes restrictions on American aid to the
P.A. The law, however, also includes a provision allowing the transfer of funds to
forces loyal to Abbas.
Pro-Israeli lobbyists and Israeli officials said that they favor American efforts to
bolster Fatah-controlled security forces, stressing the need to strengthen Abbas in
light of the challenges he is facing.
Concerns in the United States of being seen as meddling in internal Palestinian
politics led McCormack, the State Department spokesman, on Tuesday to say that
this “is certainly not our intent.” The spokesman added that the American
assistance is designed to “shore up the institutions of a future Palestinian state,” not
to shore up support for Abbas.
Before the Palestinian parliamentary elections last January, the United States was
criticized for providing $2 million worth of assistance to Abbas’s Fatah party through
the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Some think it is too late for clarifications.
“It’s a shame they made this whole issue public,” said the American Task Force on
Palestine’s president, Ziad Asali, who just returned from a trip to the region. “This
money is seen as being used against Hamas and creates a problem for Abbas.”
Rice made an effort this week not to enter the Palestinian political debate, saying
that the decision to call for early elections in the P.A. “is something that I think the
Palestinians will decide.” Rice stressed, however, that violence in the Palestinian
territories must stop and that “the political crisis also has to be resolved.”
10
Amos Oz: Selbstentmündigung. Israels Zurückweisung des syrischen
Gesprächsangebots ist ein Fehler, in SZ 21.12.2006, S. 19.
11
Yossi Beilin: Vasallen Amerikas, in “Haaretz”-online (hebräische Ausgabe)
20.11.2006.
12
PM Ismail Haniyeh: Excerpts of the speech, 19.12.2006:
At the start of this comprehensive speech, I greet our Palestinian people in the
homeland and in the Diaspora and to the Arab and Islamic masses who supported
us. We salute our martyrs and wounded and heroic prisoners in the Israeli
occupation prisons who sacrifice their lives for Jerusalem and the holy sites and
Palestine. We salute the souls of the martyrs who fell in these recent days since the
start of the Rafah Crossing and until now all Hamas and Fatah members and the
members of the Palestinian security services. Our battle should be against the
occupation and we should defend our constant rights and in particular the refugees
rights. We salute the Arab countries who received me and the delegation. We
appreciate our Arab and Islamic countries.
We heard the speech of Abu Mazen and his speech tackled several points that
required from us, the government, to explain certain things not to score points or
retaliate but we need to be honest and say the truth and reveal everything to our
people.
The explanations on our behalf came in two parts: the first part came yesterday
from the Interior Minister Saeed Siam and today I want to stop at several points,
mainly the political points and dialogues and what was mentioned by the President
on concepts and cultures of our people here and in the Diaspora.
I would like to stress that we are all Palestinians in the same boat and we are
interested to see this boat reached safe shores. We are in the same trench. There
are political differences, and maybe there is pain, but I stress from my post and my
sense of belonging to my religion and people and stress that the Palestinian people
will remain unified in front of the occupation. Our people will rectify matters and
correct the compass towards regaining the rights of our people, the steadfast
people who erupted this blessed Intifada and who offered and sacrificed their lives.
We will not allow internal disputes to expand.
Our Palestinian people,
We started one of the most important junctures in the history of our struggle and
that was the Cairo Agreement
[1-] which was based on several topics: holding municipal and legislative elections to
end in 2005;
2- to restructure the PLO to absorb all the Palestinians inside and the Diaspora;
3- work on making use of the Israeli unilateral withdrawal.
That is why we decided to enter in the elections. Some used to say that we seek an
alternative authority and everyone used to stress that Hamas must enter the
political system and the first way to do that was the elections. The elections came
and they were free and honest and many counted on the elections to be a way for
internal disputes but we all cooperated and presented the elections in a civilized
manner and we said this is a source of pride to hold such elections under
occupation. We wanted to reinforce the national unity and to end the political
monopoly. The results of the elections came and the Palestinian people gave their
trust to Change and Reform Bloc in the PLC which took the majority. We said since
the start that we wanted to form a national unity government because the
challenges facing the Palestinian people are many. So we started dialogue with all
forces and independent figures. After I was commissioned to form the government,
I visited several figures and factions. We used all the constitutional period in the
dialogue; we wanted to form a national unity government. This was not achieved,
and here I want to stop at this point which was mentioned by Abu Mazen. He said
that all factions refused to join Hamas because Hamas refused the PLO. First, in
the Cairo Understanding, we had an item talking about the need to reactivate and
restructure the PLO. We also mentioned this in our program stressing on the Cairo
Understanding regarding the need to reactivate the PLO.
I say the truth now. Some on the arena found it difficult to join a government led by
Hamas. Someone said in March that it is a shame to join a government led by
Hamas. Others saw that this is a failing project. There were external and American
pressure on figures, and America said anyone participating in the government will
be classified as a terrorist.
From the first moment we formed the government, we were faced by political and
financial siege and isolation and then the Israeli war machine started to strike and
kill our people. We felt this from the first moment. From the start, with regards to
the political siege, seminars and conferences are held in the region and figures
outside from the government go and attend them and we remain excluded.
President Abbas never met with the government not even once. He never hosted
any of the ministers. I used to tell the President about this and he used to tell me
that some countries don't want to deal with the government, this is true but what
about the governments which deal with us?
The second trend, we faced the issue of taking away the jurisdictions and sending
them to the President’s Office. We took a government without funds and without an
information ministry. Palestine TV didn't cover any of the meetings I held with
leaders and presidents of countries in my tour. Some employees in the ministries
send letters to our embassies abroad ordering them not to deal with the ministers
but deal with employees. An undersecretary sends the following letter to an
ambassador: We would like to inform you that the correspondence will be direct
between the embassy and my office and not to deal with Minister Zahhar. Then we
had the protests and armed protests and then we had the strikes of schools and
health system, and we didn't ignore the strikes.
We didn't give up and we made tours and in the last tour we gathered $700 million.
Regarding the long term truce, President Abbas was not accurate. We talked about
15 years after the establishment of the Palestinian state.
With regards to the dialogue and the prisoners’ document, President Abbas said we
refused the document first and then we agreed after three weeks, this is not true.
We accepted the document after certain amendments made on it, and you can go
and refer to the original document and see the changes on it. Second, we are
saying let us form a government based on the National Conciliation Document.
Who is turning his back to the document?
Regarding the guidelines, we told President Abbas that we agree to them, but we
need to mention resistance in the statement.
Finally, they don't want Hamas in the ministries of finance, foreign affairs and
interior and media. They wanted to achieve in the dialogue what they failed through
the siege. There is an unannounced decision to frustrate the Palestinian
government.
We even accepted to give up the foreign affairs ministry and information ministry.
We wanted to keep the finance and interior ministries. In the dialogue, we made
concessions on the posts and flexibility on the political positions.
Abu Mazen had a golden opportunity to form a national unity government, but he
insisted on a certain figure for the finance ministry. Then, they announced the
failure of the dialogue. We hold no responsibility for the failure of the dialogue.
We wanted more political partnership and why shouldn't we have people from
Hamas in the embassies and the governorates. but we didn't set this as a condition.
This is the homeland of everyone. Everyone sacrificed in it.
The call for elections is not constitutional. We refuse this call and we stress on the
need to respect the choice of the Palestinian people. Despite all of the attempts to
cause our government to fail, the Palestinian people are under collective
punishment. Abu Mazen talked about smuggling. Smuggling is when one takes
funds abroad, but we are bringing funds inside. All funds that we brought were
registered at the finance ministry.
Anything that is taken without national conciliation will result in the regretful events
that we are witnessing in the Palestinian lands. I am not happy to see our men from
Hamas and Fatah and the security services fall in these clashes.
I salute all the Arab and Islamic attempts to reconcile us and end the current crisis.
I welcome all these efforts and mediation. We are all in the same boat, Arabs.
I stress the following points:
1- The need to maintain national unity national unity inside and abroad; six million
Palestinians in the Diaspora are part of the Palestinian people. They cannot return
because there is occupation that prevents them from returning; the people have the
right to express their voice. Palestinian youth from Fatah and Hamas: this is not
your battle.
2- The dialogue is the sole means and we should not resort to arms; I call on
everybody to show self restraint; the language of dialogue must prevail.
3- We should not drown in the strategy of Israel and America.
4- The need to respect the results of the elections and deal with them on practical
grounds
5- National conciliation is the basis
6- We still want to form a national unity government on the basis of the national
conciliation document on national grounds; I commend the position of the ten
factions which met in Damascus in the presence of Qaddumi which rejected the
elections and stressed on the need to form a national
7- I demand from now to return all the abducted persons from both sides.
8- I call now Minister of Interior to hold an immediate meeting with the security
services this evening to set up a joint plan to end the tension and to keep in the
streets the services responsible for the internal services and set up investigation
committees and start investigations and start with the case of killing the three
children of Ba'lousheh. I urge the minister to start the meetings immediately
9- I call on all the Palestinian people for national comprehensive reconciliation. I am
ready and I extend a call to all prominent figures in our society to solve the tensions
and work on tribal laws and reconcile matters and we are ready to pay all
expenses.
We will keep our just cause. The siege will break; this is not an illusion. The mobility
in the region shows that changes will happen.
13
Press conference with the Palestinian President Abbas and Prime Minister Blair,
December 18, 2006:
President Abbas: In the name of God the Mighty and the Merciful, it is my pleasure
to welcome Mr Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, our friend Mr
Tony Blair, here in Ramallah which he visits for the second time this year, and for
the third time during his term as Prime Minister. And these visits reflect personal
interest and concern, as well as the interest of the government of the United
Kingdom for the need to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East region.
I seized the opportunity to thank Mr Prime Minister and the government of the
United Kingdom for their efforts, continuous efforts, and support for a
comprehensive and just solution for the Palestinian question.
We conducted today very important negotiations that address the critical and
dangerous situation in the Palestinian territories and the region as a whole, and we
also discussed ways and means of overcoming this crisis and we asked from the
Prime Minister the need to work on anything, the economic siege and the closure of
crossing points, the need to release Palestinian prisoners, including Ministers and
Parliamentarians and Palestinian leaders, as well as ending the settlement
expansion, the construction of the wall and Israel's practices and ... in Jerusalem.
We also reiterated to him that we exerted continuous efforts over these past few
months in order to establish a national unity government which unfortunately hit an
impasse and reached a dead end. As we also stated in our speech two days ago,
we are calling for early Presidential and legislative elections for the Palestinian
people to have their say based on a programme that realises the Palestinian best
interest, national interest, and corresponds and is consistent with Arab and
international requirements and leads of course to the ending of the siege and
ending the current crisis, and achieving reciprocal and simultaneous calm between
the two sides, the Israeli and the Palestinian, in both the West Bank and Gaza strip
which will allow the prospect for a comprehensive political settlement, but by
keeping priority though for the formation of a government of experts, of technocrats,
national experts who would realise such a cause. In view of the serious decline of
the Palestinian question on the international arena and the severe and dangerous
internal crisis that we are living in, I hereby reiterate that political pluralism does not
mean multiplicity of authorities and having several authorities, and the race for
factional armament and aspects of ... and breaking down of law and order and I am
confident that everybody will assume their responsibility to ... the security and safety
for Palestinian citizens and establishing the principle of one authority, one weapon
and one law.
In this context our negotiations with the Prime Minister focused on the need to
intensify the Arab and international efforts in order to achieve a comprehensive and
fair peace agreement based on the two state solution and ending the occupation
that started in 1967 according to international and UN resolutions and also the Arab
peace initiatives.
On another level we are also exerting efforts, continuous efforts, at the Arab and
international level in order to go back to the negotiating table in order to find a
drastic solution to the question of the Middle East and invest in the realisation by
the international community that military force and the continuation of occupying the
Arab and Palestinian lands is counter-productive and will not yield any results, and
that stability and security in the region could be only achieved when the rights, the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are granted and the implementation of
international UN resolutions and the establishment of an independent and
sovereign Palestinian state with its capital Jerusalem, and finding a solution for the
Palestinian refugees question, and the visit of Prime Minister Blair and his recent
statements, and his positions, at all times come within this context.
Here we also reiterate in front of you that we are ready to meet Mr Olmert in order
to start serious negotiations, direct negotiations that will end the conflict and put an
end to the cycle of violence in the region.
Mr Prime Minister, I would like to thank you again and thank the government of the
United Kingdom for your effective role in assisting the Palestinian people and
alleviating their suffering, and we are confident that you will exert all efforts, and you
have actually exerted efforts, intensified efforts with all the relevant parties to assist
the Arab and international efforts for the realisation of peace in the Middle East.
Again I welcome you here in Ramallah, I welcome Mr Tony Blair in Ramallah and I
thank him for his visit.
Prime Minister Blair: Mr President, thank you very much for your kind welcome to
me here today and thank you also for your leadership at this time which is
immensely important for the Palestinian people and for the international community.
We have had a very detailed discussion today and some of those discussions
obviously involve issues that I want to take further with other parties, as indeed you
do as well. But let me try and set in context what we are trying to do. It is important
for us, but I think for the whole of the international community, to work with people
who want a genuine two state solution – a state of Israel and a state of Palestine
living side by side in peace. We want to work with people of moderation and
tolerance who understand that in today's world people from different faiths and
background should work together, and we want to work with people who shoulder
their responsibilities, who understand the issues that are at stake and are prepared
to make sure that we do everything possible to ease the plight of people who are
suffering and to make progress. And I have no doubt, Mr President, that you satisfy
all of those criteria. You want the two state solution, you are a leader of moderation
and tolerance and you are showing and demonstrating how you are prepared to
shoulder your responsibilities in achieving that. And your speech a couple of days
ago was I think a landmark speech, a very important speech, and I believe that the
next few weeks I would say, not merely the next few months but the next few
weeks, are going to be a critical time and it is a critical time for all of us who want to
see progress and we want to see progress because people are indeed suffering,
your people, the Palestinian people are suffering, the security of the region is
affected and you demonstrated by the speech that you gave that you do not want
anything to stand in the way of helping the Palestinian people to make progress.
Now when I was here I think six months ago you went almost immediately from the
press conference that we had then to try to bring about the national unity
government that you desire to see in accordance with the principles that have been
laid down by yourself and by the international community, the United Nations and
others, to make sure that the basis of that unity government was secure. What has
happened unfortunately in those six months is that despite your best efforts you
have been unable to reach agreement on that national unity government. Now as
you rightly say, if people want to participate in such a government the way of doing
so is clear and open to them, but nobody should have a veto on progress, nobody
should be able to say to you, or to the Palestinian people, or to the international
community that we are going to stop progress being made towards that two state
vision which is the only solution that will work in order to bring peace between the
people of Israel, the people of Palestine and the wider region.
So I believe what is important following your speech is that the international
community mobilises its efforts to support you in your office as President, to support
the Palestinian people and make sure that we stand ready now to do everything we
can to give you the strength and purpose to be able to deliver what you wish for
your people. And I hope therefore that we will be in a position over these coming
weeks to put together an initiative that allows us both to give that support, in
particular support for reconstruction and development and to alleviate the suffering
and the plight of the Palestinian people, but also crucially that gives us a political
framework within which we can move forward on that two state solution.
Now I hope and believe that that can be done, but I would like to make one thing
very, very clear from not just my own country's position, but I think this should be
the position of the international community today. You have given leadership in this
situation, you have said you are determined to find a way forward. If the
international community really means what it says about supporting people who
share the vision of a two state solution, who are moderate, who are prepared to
shoulder their responsibilities then now is the time for the international community
to respond to the vision that you have set out. And I intend to do everything I can
over the next period of time, but in particular because I believe this is so critical and
urgent, over the coming weeks to make sure we can deliver that support both in
terms of helping people who are suffering, but also in terms of the political
framework that can deliver a just and lasting peace. Now that is my commitment to
you and to the Palestinian people today.
And once again Mr President thank you very much for welcoming me here today. I
said when I was here before that I would come back, I have come back again and I
will not rest for a single moment until we have delivered what we both want to see.
Question:
My question is to Mr Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair. Do you have with you any plan
to push the peace process according to your previous commitments and promises,
and do you have any British ideas about a true calm in return for Israeli withdrawal,
as Hamad Yousef the Deputy Prime Minister is saying?
Prime Minister Blair: Yes, we have been obviously discussing the details of the plan
to move us forward, but you should just remember one thing, that we were very
supportive of the President's attempts to form the national unity government, but
the truth of the matter is that we have been unable to do so because the principles
on which such a government could be formed, and those principles are not just the
principles of the President of the Palestinian Authority but also the international
agreed principles, those aren't accepted by Hamas. And the difficulty therefore is
that we can't be in a situation where the Palestinian people are held back, where
progress is held back by that refusal, and I can assure you that everybody is on that
line, the same line, and any reporting to the contrary is quite mistaken.
Question: Mr President first of all, can you give us your idea of what message you
would like the Prime Minister to take on to the Israelis later on this afternoon,
particularly on the issue of Palestinian prisoners; and secondly, can you give us
your assessment of your situation at the moment, in your view to be frank how
weak are you? And Mr Prime Minister, you have made this tour of the Middle East
in the last few days, you have extolled the virtues of democracy, particularly in Iraq,
how do you respond to the accusation that here you are picking and choosing your
democracies, you like the democrats you like, you are rejecting those you don't like;
and secondly, can you be more specific about how much money you have put on
the table today and how you respond to the criticism that this is effectively an
attempt to if you like and to be frank, to bribe the Palestinian people into supporting
the President?
President Abbas: The current situation is a very difficult one from a security
perspective and we are always attempting and seeking to avoid these kinds of
tensions and which also happened last night and this morning, because it is in the
best interest of the Palestinian people to have calm, and regardless of the results of
this conflict and tensions it is going to be a big loss for the Palestinian people. We
do not look at who wins or who loses, we look at it as any bullet that is being shot in
any area to target any person is a loss, we are in a lose-lose situation and this will
not be in our best interest currently or in the future. What we discussed with the
Prime Minister, we discussed about his visit to Mr Olmert, we talked about the
British position. We are confident of the Prime Minister's position in terms of the
peace process. What he also mentioned today, and what he mentioned in the past,
and he is committed to everything he has stated, and this is the image that he will
take with him and the message that he will take with him to the Israeli Prime
Minister. We demanded many things related to the prisoners, related to the
Palestinian money that is being restricted, and also the alleviation of suffering of
Palestinian people, the road blocks that are imposed, the restrictions, these are
things that we want Israel to alleviate and lift and this is what we discussed with the
Prime Minister so that he can take this message and these demands to Mr Olmert.
And I reiterated in my statement today that I am ready to meet with Mr Olmert at
any time because we need each other, we have a joint cause, we have to deal with
each other, we have to communicate in order to address our problems jointly.
Prime Minister Blair: First of all we respect any democratic mandate, but the
President also has a democratic mandate, he is the elected President of the
Palestinian people. And it is not that people are refusing to allow Hamas to
participate in the way forward, that way is open to them, they know what has to be
done, but what we are saying is that they cannot have a veto on the process or the
progress that all of us want to see. Because if the real issue is indeed the suffering
of the Palestinian people, the desire for people to achieve statehood, we have a
way forward. And one of the things I want to say to people in this region is
understand the international community is in one place on this, we all of us want to
see the two state solution, we want a viable independent Palestinian state where
Palestinian people can govern their own affairs, where they can achieve prosperity,
where they can achieve justice. We can't do that however unless it is done with
people who accept the very basis of that two state solution, namely that we have
two states.
And therefore the issue is not about excluding anybody, the issue is whether people
exclude themselves. And as for the financial support, the reason why it is important
that we give support to the Palestinian Authority and to the President in the work
that he is trying to do is precisely because we recognise that over the past period of
time the incomes of Palestinian people have fallen, there have been much lower
levels of economic development, people are suffering as a result of that. So if the
international community means what it says, this is the moment, when the
President has set a way forward, to come behind him and support him. Now that is
really what we are saying. And in the end, the democratic decisions are obviously
for the Palestinian people themselves, they will make that decision themselves. But
what we are saying is our job has got to be to support the people of moderation
who want to find that two state solution and are prepared to show the leadership to
get it.
Question: Mr President, in your speech you kept the door open for establishing a
national unity government. If the calm is established on the street would there be a
dialogue with the Hamas movement about this government? And for the Prime
Minister, Mr Blair, a senior Hamas official has said that they have contacts between
the party and your government. Could you confirm please?
President Abbas: I stated in my speech, it was very clear, we negotiated about a
national unity government that is able to end the economic siege that will fulfil the
Palestinian, Arab and international requirements, and this is something I have
mentioned everywhere and it is also stated in the national consensus document
that was endorsed by all parties, including Hamas. The new government should be
able to have the support of the Palestinian people, the Arabs and the region and the
international community. These are the principles that we wanted to form a national
unity government accordingly, the main principle and basic objective of this
government is to end the siege. We were unsuccessful until this moment and
therefore I said the other option was to go back to the people because the basic law
stipulates that the people are the source of all powers, then we have to go back to
the people. But let me assume that we are able today, or tomorrow, or after
tomorrow we are able to establish a national unity government on this basis I think
then we will go for it and we will establish it and at the highest peak possible.
Prime Minister Blair: Let me make one thing clear to you, the British government is
certainly not negotiating with Hamas or with any part of Hamas, and what is more I
think the events of the past few days have demonstrated how impossible it would
be to conceive of a situation in which people were able to reach out in
circumstances where Hamas is making it so clear that they cannot agree to the
principles that have been set out. So I think the President has absolutely correctly
described the situation. It is always open for people to participate provided they
participate on the same basis as everybody else, but if they are not prepared to do
so there is no way forward with them. Because you cannot, as I have constantly
said to people, you cannot have a negotiated solution to this issue, which is what
we all want to see, it is the reason I am back here again, we all want to see it, but
you can't have such a solution unless people accept the basic principles, and those
are the principles laid down not just by the President of the Palestinian Authority but
by the international community, they are United Nations principles. It is all people
are asking for. And really the significance of what has happened over the past few
days is that people are saying look you know the train should leave the station, it is
time to start making progress on this journey and if people want to get on board,
that is their choice, but they are not going to prevent the rest of us moving forward
precisely in order to help the suffering of people who are suffering, and suffering a
very great deal at the moment, and they are the people who should come first.
Question: The Prime Minister's Special Envoy, Lord Levy, is sitting on the second
row of this press conference, this is the same question for both of you. President
Abbas, what has Lord Levy done for you? And Prime Minister what has Lord Levy
done for you?
Prime Minister Blair: I think perhaps I may be able to answer this first. He has
performed an excellent job as my Envoy in very difficult circumstances where we
desperately want to make progress. And the whole reason I am here is because of
the importance I attach to this process and anything and anyone who can help that
is someone who is immensely helpful to me.
President Abbas: We know Lord Levy for a long time and we have met on several
occasions, and he visits us frequently and he always has constructive ideas for us
in order to push the peace process forward, in order to clarify the road ahead
between us and between his government and his Prime Minister who holds him in
high respect and esteem and he is also supportive of Mr Tony Blair. And therefore
we appreciate the efforts of Lord Levy in this context as a special envoy of Prime
Minister Tony Blair and as a friend to us.
Question: President Abbas, are you still going to go ahead with the elections
despite the violence and the fighting in Gaza, and if elections take place are you
going to run for President again?
President Abbas: When we decided yesterday through the organisation, official
institutions, which is the central executive committee of the PLO which is also
responsible for the PMA, as well as internally when we discussed with my brothers
in the central executive committee of Fatah movement the decision was very clear
and we are going to early elections, legislative and presidential. There is nothing
from our point of view that prohibits that, we are democratic people, we believe in
democracy. And if this is our case, why then can't we go back to the people to have
their say? The will of the people, the people elected me on 9 January 2005 and
elected Hamas on 25 January 2006, we want to experience and test the decisions
of the people, do they still have confidence in those people who they elected? It is
their say now, we are in a problem, we find ourselves in an impasse and this
impasse has lasted for more than 9 months and the people cannot wait any longer,
the people are suffering, the people are suffering from the economic situation, the
social, the financial, the security situation. As the person who is responsible, what is
my duty? My duty is to look for solutions to alleviate the plight of the people and I
am determined, as I stated in my speech, and please go to my speech, and I am
determined to conduct the elections.
Question: A question first of Mr Blair. Israeli newspapers this morning quote Israeli
sources saying that they attach no special significance to your visit, and also that
you only go on these kind of trips when you are weak at home. They are right,
aren't they? And the second question for President Abbas. You are already being
labelled by Hamas as the candidate for Israel and the United States. Is high profile
support from Mr Blair actually going to lose you support among the Palestinians?
Prime Minister Blair: First of all I think that my interest in the Palestinian issue is
hardly new. I think over the past few years I have made it clear why I think it is so
important and I don't think this is actually something to do with how domestic
politics interacts with international politics, I think it is all to do with whether we can
find the right plan that fits the bits together, that is the really crucial thing. What we
need to do now is to concentrate on the fact that the President, after many many
months of trying, has said well there are obstructions in the way to making
progress, I am nonetheless going to find a way round those obstructions and
ensure that progress is made. And really I think it is as simple as that. And I think
you probably also you know misjudge where people are in this region. The most
important thing is that people want the progress to be made, and they realise there
isn't going to be progress unless the whole of the international community comes
behind such progress, and that includes Britain and European countries, it includes
America, it includes the Arab countries as well. And as I shall say in the last part of
my visit out to this region, I think there are very clear strategic choices opening up
in this region today for everybody and it is important we make the right choices.
President Abbas: When I went to the Presidential elections on 9 January 2005
there were several other candidates for Presidency, there were 6 other candidates,
there were 4,000 international and Arab observers. I haven't heard from one single
observer that he saw an Israeli or American voting and casting their ballots in the
ballot boxes, I don't think that 62.5% of the Palestinian people represent the Israeli
will or the American will the vote of the Palestinian people represents the will of the
Palestinian people and the decision of the Palestinian people, I was elected by the
will of the Palestinian people and I am here by the will of the Palestinian people.
Other than that, the accusations that I will go back alone.
14
15
Vgl. Reiner Bernstein. Von Gaza nach Genf. Schwalbach/Ts. 2006, S. 114 ff.
The major excerpts from the speech of President Abbas in Ramallah, Saturday,
16 December 2006:
In the name of God the forgiving and the Compassionate,
These days, we had to talk to our people after the long suffering that we faced in
the past months and in which our people remained patient in front of these
conditions. We had to address our people and tell them what happened because
the people are the source of all authorities and our reference.
I want to refer to the ugly crime against humanity which is the killing of the three
innocent brothers. A group of murderers who don't belong to the people of Islam or
religions besiege the children's car and kill them. How can a human being commit
such a crime. All religions prohibited such crimes. Why did they commit this crime.
There was previous killing against officers and judges who were killed in cold blood.
I ask everyone and all those who carry this illegitimate weapon: why?
These children will go to heaven and will tell God about the murderers. These
incidents call on us to talk about what happened last Thursday at Rafah Crossing.
The PM decided to have a tour abroad and this is his right and we held contacts
with all parties: the Israelis first, the Europeans and the Egyptians, and we wanted
the PM to travel abroad in a dignified manner. I commissioned Tayyeb Abdul
Rahim, Saeb Erekat and the conspirator Dahlan – they call him a conspirator –
imagine. We heard that he has funds to smuggle into the country; we say here that
we are in need of fund but not smuggled funds. When he arrived back, masses
came to welcome him but they were carrying weapons and RPJ rockets. They are
supposed to meet him with flowers and not machine guns.
Thousands came and when he was delayed, these masses broke into the Crossing
and damaged and robbed the Crossing. Why? We exert all efforts to let him enter
back in a dignified manner. The Europeans left the Crossing. So he couldn't enter.
We asked them to return to the crossing; the Europeans told us that they were fired
at. Who would fire at them. Finally, he entered the crossing and returned home.
Where is the conspiracy? Then, they say that they entered the crossing to stress on
the Palestinian sovereignty. is this the way to stress this. We deceive ourselves.
We have no sovereignty. We are under self autonomy. We agreed with the Israelis
on the crossing and it facilitated the crossing of the people instead of standing for
hours in long lines. The crossing was closed after the entry of the PM and we
appealed to all parties to re-open it for the passage of the Pilgrims to Hajj. Talking
about conspiracies is a shameful act. Fabricating facts is shameful. Then, they talk
about deploying troops. When do you see troops in the streets. These troops are
not against anyone; these troops are against those who try to sabotage and
destroy.
If we ask ourselves why we have this chaos. We know that there is chaos, and we
sought a political solution through which we can unify ourselves. I say that when we
see that the conditions are like this, we have to see what we can do. The
reasonable people should look and seek the truth and I say that without political
conciliation, we will have chaos. We accepted all insults and promises to reach this
conciliation and we will continue to do so. I wished in this meeting to keep my
promise. We said that the national unity government is coming in November. Why
didn't this happen? And why did I say that the dialogue reached a dead-end.
If you remember, we held presidential elections, and we were clear on the political
principles and slogans, and we said that this is our positions and this is the truth
which might harm some, but we said the whole truth because I don't want to
deceive anyone.
I am very honest because lies are short lived and this is not part of my qualities.
Many events happened in 2005, mainly the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza
Strip. Voices came out saying “we don't want this.” They wanted an agreement, and
we said we don't want an agreement because the agreement entails commitments,
and after a long dialogue, we said the Israelis will leave and we will facilitate the
departure of the Israeli army and settlers. We said Thanks God, we liberated one
important part of our lands. We received dozens of investment projects from Arab
countries and western countries and Japan and economic projects and tourism
projects, but this never happened. Why? Because we are determined to fire
rockets. Israel left [the] Gaza Strip. Let us keep this Strip calm for investments, but
there are people still determined to fire rockets. Who dictates this to them? I am
sure that this does not serve the national interests. Before we held the legislative
elections, there were vicious protests saying they don't want Hamas to participate in
the elections. We said Hamas is part of the Palestinian people and should
participate. I am proud of signing [the] Oslo Accords and all elections were held
under the umbrella of [the] Oslo Accords. Israel tried to prevent Palestinians in
Jerusalem from participating in the elections. I stressed on this and the Israelis
finally accepted their participation and Hamas won and took the majority and we
welcomed them because we believe in democracy and I hope that everybody
believe in democracy which is participation and not exclusion. We respect the
democracy and we commissioned the majority to form the government they
deemed appropriate and they held contacts with everybody but no party accepted
to join because Hamas refused the source of authority which is the PLO. Despite
this, I told them present your government but I advise you to abide by the
international and Arab legitimacy. We are not isolated. We are part of the Arab
world and the whole world. They refused. I faced two options: either to stop the
formation of the government and this is my right or to let them try their chance and
we did that and at the same and despite the accusations, I said everywhere in the
world, give them their chance; they have no experience, give them time. But
unfortunately, we were faced with an oppressive siege and we tried all efforts to get
out of the siege and we reached with the Europeans on TIM so that the people can
eat and the funds came to the Arab League which cannot and I repeat the Arab
League cannot send us the funds, so I found a solution which is to transfer the
funds to me and I will deliver the funds. But they said: We allowed the funds to
come to your account.
I go back to the PLO issue and I hear many statements: Activating the PLO and
they talk from outside and then they say that this PLO Executive Committee is not
legitimate and they know that this legitimacy of the PLO allows them to be hosted in
the countries where they are staying. The PLO Executive Committee is the sole and
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. People issue orders from
outside. The people here should decide things and not the people who are sitting
abroad and relaxed. The siege was imposed and the Israelis continue with their
aggression and killing and incursions and arrests and their planes fire missiles at us
and then they talk about the sovereignty of the Crossing. We failed in ending the
siege and we could not end the siege which led to decrease of revenues by 61%
and halt of operational expenses and the arrears in the salaries of the civil servants.
We ask how people are living? Shouldn't the people ask us why these conditions.
The crisis is escalating. Debts to the banks reached $642 million and then there are
the funds seized by Israel which is more than $600 million. So the situation is
getting worse and add to this the security chaos which led to the killing of 320
persons. Part of our ministers are in prison and another part are wanted. Then, the
PLC does not convene, so all institutions are paralyzed and the security services
are also paralyzed because they are not getting paid. All of the above led to the
dialogue. The PLC made an initiative and after three months, they started to feel
the crisis and the siege which is the result of this government. We welcomed the
dialogue. We want a solution to this crisis. they started the dialogue and I said then
we don't want a dialogue for the sake of dialogue, and we received several
initiatives from various parties and then finally we got the initiative from the
prisoners who are more responsible than all of us.
Then they started to describe it as an American document and an Israeli document.
When the legislative elections took place, they said President Abu Mazen is the
best person, now with regards to the government, they criticized me. We need a
clear position from them. I said then, either you reach a solution in the dialogue or
we go to referendum. They said the referendum is illegal. Why? The people are the
source of all authorities. We want to ask the people about the reconciliation
document of the prisoners. We should not close our eyes in front of the truth. We
said: either you agree or you go to referendum. Then, the event of the soldier took
place. Then they signed the national reconciliation document immediately and they
consider it sacred now. It is so easy to launch accusations against each other.
Then, they signed the document and then the war erupted against Gaza Strip and
this soldier cost us 500 martyrs and 4,000 wounded. We pay the sacrifices from our
people who are under the poverty line.
The war on Lebanon ended and we sat to talk and return to the document and how
to form a national unity government, and the document has good principles. Before
that, I met with Olmert who told me that they will release a large number of
prisoners, and this happened before all of this. We never forgot our prisoners. We
always sought a solution for the prisoners. It is a sacred cause and top priority in
any dialogue or negotiations with any party, then the events happened and the
dialogue on the prisoners was obstructed. then we sat in a dialogue to form the
government. Then, we set the guidelines which say that we recognize the
references signed by the PLO which is the political reference of the PNA. The
Cabinet is supposed to assist the President; we don't have two heads. It is my right
to discharge the government any time I want. They can’t scare us. They can’t
export fear to us. This is my constitutional right. it is written in the guidelines which
were signed by both parties. it said the government assists the President in setting
the policies based on the Arab Initiative and international legitimacy. We came out
to the masses and informed them that we signed these guidelines and the
breakthrough is soon and that was in September 11, 2006. After three days, I was
going to the UN to promote a government headed by Ismail Haniyeh. I personally
respect this person. I was convinced then that it is my duty to tell the Americans
that I want to form a government headed by Haniyeh. I wanted to convince the
Arabs, the Europeans and the Americans about this government. Haniyeh came to
me before I leave and said: We refuse the Arab initiative and we don't want to be in
the negotiations teams. I asked why you refuse the Arab Initiative; he said: because
it ignores the rights of the refugees and because it calls for recognizing Israel. I
answered: the Arab Initiative includes a clear text talking about an agreed upon
solution based on Resolution 194. The Arab Initiative comes from an Arab country
which commits itself along with all Arabs to have normal relations with Israel if
Israel withdraws from the Palestinian and Arab territories and if a Palestinian state
is established and if the refugees cause is solved. Then, we want to New York
without anything. The Arabs also didn't buy this. You can’t pick and choose. We
need to abide by the international legitimacy. Qatar then initiated and invited us
here and we made the six point initiative which includes mutual end of violence.
Qatar exerted tremendous efforts but they told him that they accept this but they
wanted a slight change on the six points to include that the President would
recognize these legitimacies and not the government. Of course this didn't work.
Then, Nasser Eddin al-Sha'er came to me and said we have to find a solution. We
said fine, so we agreed on a government of technocrats that can end the siege and
the government must abide by the letter of commissioning and to add to it the
national conciliation document.
Then, Hamas told Nasser Eddin al-Sha'er that you are not authorized to talk. Then,
Mustafa al-Barghouthi and Ziad Abu Amro worked on the matter. I then sat with
Haniyeh to try to reach an agreement. We wanted a government to end the siege.
Then, they started talking about shares of each faction, I told them I am talking on
behalf of Fatah and I say that Fatah is ready not to take any ministry if we can form
a government that can end the siege. The people are burning and we are still in the
dialogue. Then, they started asking for ambassadors and governor, I said this
needs a lot of time. Then PM Haniyeh came to me and said he wants to travel in a
trip abroad. I told him I fear that all our efforts have collapsed. There are ideas here
and there and half truths. There are the regional alliances; we still suffer because of
our position regarding the invasion of Kuwait. Until now, we still suffer. We refuse
any regional or international alliances. We have a sacred cause and we have to win
the support of everybody.
We don't want to engage in a war against anyone. We are still under occupation.
We have to keep balanced relations with everyone. When I arrived in Kuwait, I
announced that I apologize to Kuwait about our position. We need to keep relations
with all. We must not interfere in other affairs of countries. Then, there are ideas
about a Palestinian state on all of Palestine because the land of Palestine is a Waqf
land. Then they say they accept a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and will
give Israel a 15-year truce. We seek the interests of our people. We are facing a
difficult situation. We have become beggars. The gains have retreated. People are
starting to lose hope and then there is the collapse of social values and the collapse
of the institutions. We have our constants and we will struggle for them: Jerusalem
is ours and the settlements are illegal and a Palestinian state within the 1967
borders living in peace next to the state of Israel and solving the refugees cause
based on Resolution 194 which says compensation for those who don't desire to
return and I accept this. Despite our internal conflicts, we will not reach a civil war.
The Palestinian blood is a red line. We will abide by the democratic process.
Now, some people are talking and living in illusions and saying that they are
breaking the siege. [Former British intelligence agent] Alistair Crook told them some
things but he is retired. These are illusions. I wish these are facts. They are
receiving illusionary signs. When we want to form a government, the factions have
nothing to say; the minister is part of the government but as a member of his faction
he is not committed to anything or recognizing anyone. Today, there is a European
initiative and then there is the Baker-Hamilton Report which mentions important
points and this is the first time that the world recognizes that the Palestinian Cause
is the core of the Middle East. We should not waste these chances and
opportunities. Some even say their government is God's will: what does this mean?
Religion is the property of God.
Can we continue like this? therefore, after all the above, and as I see the people
looking to me as the president who is responsible for the people, so I decided to
call for early presidential and legislative elections because the people are the
source of all authorities and I want the people to choose and everyone has to bear
their responsibilities. I will always remain open to forming a national unity
government.
16
Vgl. die Dokumentation am 11.09.2006 in dieser Chronologie.
17
Vgl. den Eintrag der Rede David Grossmans am 01.11.2006 in dieser
Chronologie.
18
David Ignatius: Interview – the Syrian FM Walid Moalem explains the "agreed
goal" of the "dialogue" be that Israel hands over the Golan Heights to Syria:
Q: Perhaps you could begin by giving an overall view of the Baker-Hamilton Report
A: Moallem: During my work in Washington (as Syrian ambassador in the early
1990s) I knew Baker and I knew Hamilton. I know their objectivity. I know that both
of them and others on the (Iraq Study Group) committee who I used to know have
vision. The first question Baker asked me when we met in New York (in September
2006) was: Walid, how can we return to the Syrian-American situation of the early
1990s, when we succeeded to build mutual trust? I told him: This is our wish also in
Syria.
But how can we make it? We need to ask ourselves one question: Has the prior
American policy against Syria – isolation – worked or failed? I think from what we
are seeing in the region today, it failed. What will be another option? The challenge
is to adopt policies of engagement. The method is dialogue.
Why is this challenging? Through dialogue, no side can stay in his position.
Constructive dialogue means both sides have to meet. We can call it a 'common
ground.' Through an engagement policy, you agree on certain principles and goals.
What are Syrian goals in the region? There are three: Peace, stability and
prosperity. These are the Syrian goals. Are these three goals contradicting
American national interests in the region? I don't think so. – If we tackle first the
issue of peace: The American administration knows that during our previous direct
talks with the Israelis (during the early 1990s) we achieved 90 percent of the
agreement. We lacked the political will from Israel to achieve the noble cause of
peace between Syria and Israel. Is it contradicting American interests to continue
the path of Madrid (the 1991 Madrid peace conference, which laid the ground for
subsequent Israeli-Syrian peace talks) on the same basis? I wonder why the
administration is preventing Israel to go on this path of peace, to secure its northern
border. I wonder why this administration failed to achieve the question the late
Prime Minister Rabin asked: What is the meaning of peace between Syria and
Israel? When I say this, I mean a comprehensive peace – including Syria, the
Palestinians and Lebanon. But as foreign minister of Syria, I will speak on behalf
only of Syria.
Q: You referred to Bush administration efforts to prevent Israel from negotiation
with Syria. What are you referring to?
A: I have been told this in New York by Americans who are attached to peace. Why
is this administration preventing Israel?
Q: When did this happen?
A: Immediately after the war between Israel and Lebanon. (August 2006). In Israel,
there is a weak government. This means that this government needs
encouragement from Washington to move on the way to peace. If this
administration put on its priorities peace in the Middle East, why didn't they
(encourage the Israelis). Is this an administration for war only? In December 1990,
when President Hafez al-Assad met President Bush the father in Geneva, Assad
told Bush: Mr. President, no one can challenge your military strength. But we
understand when you hold in one hand the gun, you need to hold in the other the
olive branch. This is how superpowers can survive. President Bush the father was
honest to his promise. After the ceasefire (in the 1991 Gulf War) in March,
Secretary Baker in April moved to call for a Mideast peace conference. This is how
we understand the responsibilities of a superpower.
Second, I turn to regional stability. Is it contradicting American interests? I don't
think so. How do we achieve this when the administration is at a crossroads. Either
we go for stability or the region will fall, and religious civil wars and the extremists
behind them will take over. Will this serve U.S. interests? It is not useful for anyone
to tackle the deep concerns in the region by giving us tablets of aspirin. You need to
tackle the biggest issues. One of them is a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. It will lead to a solution in Lebanon, immediately. It will help Iraqi stability
and security.
Syria always asked America to change its behavior. The Syrians are asking the
Americans: When you are showing keenness on Lebanese stability and Iraqi
stability, why do you try to de-stabilize Syria? If you want us to have constructive
dialogue, you need to reassure us about your good intentions concerning our
stability.
Third, prosperity. If you achieve peace and stability, you can focus on prosperity.
Prosperity in the region has an effect on illegal immigration, terrorism, poverty. All
these objectives serve our interests and the Americans'. So the question here is:
Why do you sanction Syria?
We are ready for constructive dialogue to achieve these three objectives, based on
our knowledge that you need to take history and geography into account. We are in
the middle of three crises –Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinians – and you are far away.
Q: Let me ask you to discuss the specifics of the Baker-Hamilton report. Do you
support the report?
A: There are many positive elements in this report. But it is not a Bible or Koran.
This is the first time there is a report on the desk – another plan for the
administration. We are not the decision-makers. It is up to the president to decide.
We say: We are not against the U.S. To the contrary, we want to be part of a
regional dialogue that in our opinion serves American interests in the region.
Q: Let's go through the specific recommendations in the report that concern Syria.
The first is recommendation 4, which calls for an Iraq Support Group composed of
Iraq's neighbors and the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council.
Would Syria join in such an Iraq Support Group?
A: I will explain: I went to Iraq (in November 2006). I spent three days there. When
others visited they have spent three hours. I met with all the Iraqi leaders. I
discussed issues with them on the basis of agreed principles. One, the unity of Iraq.
Two, the independence of Iraq. Three, an agreed timetable of withdrawal between
the U.S. and Iraqi leadership.
When I refer to a timetable, it is not to offend the U.S. To the contrary. It is a
timetable for withdrawal and building Iraqi security. They will go in parallel. It is not a
timetable of immediate withdrawal.
Q: Do you have in mind a time frame? What about the Baker-Hamilton suggestion
of early 2008?
A: It is not up to me to answer. It depends on Iraqi ability to take over
security. Immediate withdrawal? This is an immoral step. Iraq must be
prepared to take over. It is not a duty (for the US military in Iraq) of fighting. It is a
duty of training. Iraq is similar to Lebanon. You cannot rule Iraq by majority. You
rule Iraq by consensus. All Iraqi groups have to participate in the political process.
The first steps must start with the Iraqis themselves. They need to end existing
divisions within themselves. They need to agree on the constitution, unity, the
distribution of wealth, dismantling of militias. When they reach agreement on these,
they need to start preparation of a national reconciliation conference. Even their
legislation of uprooting the Baath (de-Baathification), they realize they need a
change, to uprooting the Saddamists.
(Moallem goes off [the] record to describe his conversations with the leaders of
each of the main groups in Iraq. He agreed to allow me to summarize the basic
outlines of his advice: To the Kurds, don't secede; to the Shia, recognize that you
can't rule Iraq alone and work with the Sunnis; to the Sunnis, recognize that old
system of Sunni rule is gone and work with the Shia.)
Q: But what about the Baker-Hamilton idea of a regional Iraq Support Group?
Should that come later?
A: The Iraqi consensus (after it is reached) has to be supported by the neighboring
countries. That is the third step, after Iraqi agreement on issues and the national
reconciliation conference. The third step is a meeting between Iraqis, their
neighbors and the five members of the UN Security Council.
Q: Let me return to the specific recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Report.
Recommendation 12 says the U.S. and the Support Group should encourage Syria
to do three things: control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible,
including joint Syrian-Iraqi patrols; open a Syrian hotline to Iraq; increase Syrian
political and economic cooperation with Iraq.
A: Leave that language aside. These are Syrian ideas that have been offered to the
Iraqis. Tomorrow we will have the Iraqi interior minister in Syria, for talks based on
these ideas. We will have 22 generals coming, from the Defense ministry, the
Interior ministry. We are not doing this to please the US. We are doing what is in
the Syrian and Iraqi interest. We promise to do things with Iraq, and we started
doing them Dec. 11, when we raised flags at our two embassies. The next step is
security arrangements, economic arrangements.
Q: So you are already doing the things mentioned in recommendation 12.
A: Yes.
Q: The next is recommendation 13, which calls for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace on all fronts. I assume from what you said before you favor that. And then
recommendation 14, which calls for an unconditional meeting, like the 1991 Madrid
conference.
A: It is a good idea. I would like to see this administration really honestly have
interest to accomplish this goal. It has a duty to encourage Israel to walk on this
path.
Q: Finally, Lebanon, which is discussed in recommendation 15. It has a series of
specific items. First, it says that Syria should pledge full adherence to UN Security
Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006 (which called on Syria to halt deliveries of
arms to Hezbollah.)
A: We are adhering to it. We have increased our border patrols on the Lebanese
border. I deny all rumors that Syria is sending arms to Lebanese parties. You have
satellite and air surveillance over these borders. Nobody has presented us a
document telling us that there is this transfer of arms. President Assad committed
to (UN Secretary General) Annan that Syria will work with the UN to implement
1701.
Q: The Baker-Hamilton Report next calls on Syria to cooperate with the UN
investigation of the Hariri assassination and other killings. I know that [UN envoy]
Brammertz said this week in his latest report that Syria is cooperating, but will you
continue to cooperate?
A: We will continue our cooperation with the Brammertz investigation, as long as
this investigation is proven it is professional. Because discovering the reality of this
crime is serving the Syrian interest.
Q: Next, recommendation 15 calls for cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and use
of Syrian territory to transport weapons.
A: There is no such cooperation (with Hezbollah). We have moral support, not
operational support, because we want to see Lebanon stable. We want to help
UNIFIL (the UN force in southern Lebanon) in achieving its mandate, and we
believe the Lebanese are capable of solving issues.
Q: Next, recommendation 15 calls for Syria to use its influence with Hamas and
Hezbollah for the release of Israeli army prisoners.
A: Who has influence on Israel to release Lebanese, Palestinians and 20 Syrians
who are being held prisoner? Why don't we combine the two influences to achieve
a deal on exchanging prisoners. We are ready.
Q: Next, the report calls on Syria to stop its efforts to undermine the Lebanese
government.
A: We are for the stability, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon.
Q: But I believe the report is referring to the current Lebanese government of Fouad
Siniora.
A: Fouad Siniora is not Lebanon. Fouad Siniora was invited to visit Syria three
times. He was reluctant. We support Lebanese stability. We support what
Lebanese agreed upon to achieve their stability, within Taif (the 1990 Taif
agreement) and the constitution.
Q: Next, the report calls for Syria to cease arms shipments to Hamas. A: This is
nonsense. We are far from Gaza.
Q: Next, the report calls for a Syrian commitment to help obtain an
acknowledgement by Hamas of Israel's right to exist.
A: I will disclose something to you for the first time. We are exerting efforts with the
foreign minister of Qatar with Hamas and Fatah together. We kept the same
distance between them, to reach agreement to compose a national unity
government. We convinced Hamas to agree on a ceasefire in Gaza. We hope this
will be applicable to the West Bank. We convinced Hamas to agree on a
Palestinian state in the 1967 occupied territories. (An implicit recognition of Israel).
What else do you want from us?
Q: Finally, recommendation 15 calls on Syria to make greater efforts to seal its
border with Lebanon.
A: Can the US seal its border with Mexico? Unless you want us to build a wall to
seal the border with Lebanon. Are the Lebanese seeking this? Will it serve their
interests?
Q: Finally, Recommendation 16 says that in return for Syrian help in all these
matters, Israel should return the Golan Heights to Syria. Is that a precondition, for
Syria – that it would get the Golan back in any negotiations?
A: There is no precondition. A constructive dialogue has to start without
preconditions. Dialogue has a literature (of proper procedure). You don't put
demands. You put agreed goals. Under this, you put each side's commitment to
achieve the goals in a parallel way. This is how we understand constructive
dialogue. This is not a deal. This is not, 'We will do this if you give us Lebanon.' Our
only goal is to get the return of Syrian occupied territories, to get Syrian regional
stability.
Q: A last question. I am assuming that you have discussed these issues with
President Assad, and that he agrees with the views that you expressed today in this
interview.
A: I am the foreign minister of Syria. The president and the foreign minister can
speak. He is the leader. I an expressing his ideas.
19
Vgl. dazu die Beiträge von Shlomo Ben-Ami und Yossi Beilin in der Menüleiste
„Bestandsaufnahmen und Perspektiven“ dieser Homepage.
20
“Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR)” Press Release, December 14,
2006: Today, 12 December 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court issued a decision
invalidating amended article 5c of the Civil Wrongs (Liability of the State) Law that
releases the State of Israel from all liability for compensation for any damages
caused to Palestinians by Israeli Occupation Forces in areas designated as "conflict
zones" in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).
The decision came in response to a petition submitted in September 2005 by nine
human rights organizations in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Adalah;
HaMoked: Center for the Defense of the Individual; the Association for Civil Rights
in Israel; Al-Haq; the Palestinian Center for Human Rights; B'Tselem; Physicians
for Human Rights–Israel; the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel; and
Rabbis for Human Rights. However, the Supreme Court also decided not to strike
down another provision (5b) of the law, which provides that Israel does not have to
pay compensation for damages caused in military operations since September
2000, for "a citizen of an Enemy State" and "an activist or member of a Terrorist
Organization." The Court claimed that the petitioners did not bring enough factual
material before the Court concerning the applicability of this provision.
The petitioners challenged the amendments to the Civil Wrongs Law, which deny
residents of the 1967 OPT since 29 September 2000 and other outstanding cases
before Israeli courts. The law violates rights disproportionately – the rights to life,
dignity, and property of Palestinians in the OPT – and is therefore unconstitutional.
The petitioners further emphasized that the law grossly violates the fundamental
principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law,
which apply in the OPT.
The petitioners further argued that the Law sends out a dangerous and extreme
message that the lives and rights of those injured in the OPT have no value, as the
courts will not come to their aid, and those who caused their injuries will face no
punishment.
PCHR stresses that the amendments to the Civil Wrongs Law, which were passed
by the Israeli Knesset at the end of July 2005, deny residents of the 1967 OPT,
citizens of "Enemy States" and activists or members of a "Terrorist Organization"
the right to compensation for damages caused to them by IOF, even those
damages caused to them outside of the context of a military operation. The
amended law grants the Israeli Minister of Defense the authority to proclaim any
area outside of the State of Israel a "Conflict Zone," even if no war-related activity
has taken place there.
PCHR draws the attention the court ruling concerning the amended Civil Wrongs
Law bring Palestinians back to the situation that preceded the approval of
amendments, which included legal and procedural hindrances that obstructed
access of hundreds of Palestinians to justice in Israeli courts. Palestinians did not
have access to Israeli courts in dozens of cases for various reasons, including the
limited prescription period and the high court fees.
This recent Israeli Supreme Court has come as an outcome of coordinated efforts
made by local and international human rights organizations, including PCHR, to
prosecute Israeli war criminals before international courts, which have been
recently intensified.
PCHR will follow up developments to check possible access to justice for
Palestinian victims, through pursuing cases of Palestinians who sustained damages
caused by IOF as a result of the excessive use of force or during Israeli military
activities conducted during military operations.
PCHR recalls the Israeli Supreme Court ruling on 6 September 1999, which
prevented Israeli interrogators from using physical pressure against Palestinian
detainees, emphasizing that despite this ruling torture of Palestinian prisoners in
Israeli jails has not stopped. PCHR asserts that there is strong evidence that Israeli
interrogators have continued to use methods of torture prohibited by the Court
ruling.
21
Yuval Yoaz: Final Barak ruling lays down legal criteria for targeted
assassinations, in “Haaretz”-online 15.12.2006:
Targeted killings of terrorists are legal under certain circumstances, but not all
circumstances, the High Court of Justice ruled yesterday in the final decision of
former Supreme Court president Aharon Barak's career.
"It is not possible to state a priori that every targeted killing is forbidden by
international law, just as it is not possible to state a priori that every targeted killing
is permitted by international law," Barak wrote in the unanimous ruling, which was
joined by current Supreme Court President Dorit Beinisch and Justice Eliezer Rivlin.
The ruling, issued in response to petitions by two nonprofit organizations, LAW and
the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, laid down several criteria that must
be met for a targeted killing to be legal:
b There must be "convincing and well-founded" information that the target is really
involved in terrorist activity, and his involvement must be "direct." As Beinisch
stressed in her concurring opinion, "Not every involvement in terrorist activity
constitutes taking direct part in enemy action, such as would justify carrying out a
targeted killing."
– Targeted killings are only permissible if other methods of dealing with the problem,
such as arrest, are impossible, or if an arrest would gravely endanger soldiers'
lives.
– Every precaution must be taken to avoid harming innocent civilians in the vicinity,
and even then, a targeted killing will be illegal if the harm done to innocent civilians
outweighs the security benefits of killing the terrorist. As an example of what
constitutes disproportionate harm, Barak offered the following: "It is possible to
shoot at a terrorist who is shooting at soldiers or civilians from the balcony of his
house, even if as a result, an innocent civilian passerby is liable to be hit ... This
would meet the demands of proportionality. That would not be true if the house
were bombed from the air and dozens of residents and passersby were hurt."
– Targeted killings are not justified if the target has ceased his involvement in terrorist
activity. However, if he has been involved in "a series of hostile acts with interludes
between them," the state is justified in viewing these interludes as mere
"preparation for the next hostile act," and he would not enjoy immunity.
– After every targeted killing, there must be a thorough and independent investigation
into the accuracy of the target's identification as a terrorist. If it turns out that this
identification was mistaken, the state should consider paying compensation.
In addition to these guidelines, the ruling laid down several principles of broader
significance. For instance, it said, Israel's conflict with terrorist organizations in the
territories is an international rather than a domestic conflict, so international law
applies.
Additionally, the court rejected the state's argument that terrorists are "unlawful
combatants." Terrorists, it ruled, are civilians – but because they are involved in
hostile activity, they do not enjoy the immunity from attack legally enjoyed by other
civilians.
It also rejected the idea that the entire topic was not justifiable, as it deals with a
quintessential issue of defense policy: what tactics to use against the enemy. "The
claim of non-justifiability cannot be accepted in a case where the challenged policy
harms human rights," Barak wrote. "If this issue is justifiable in international courts,
why should it not be justifiable in national courts?
"Not every effective means is also legal," he added. "The end does not justify the
means."
Beinisch, in her concurring opinion, noted that the issue was a thorny one because
"international law has not yet developed the laws of combat in a way that would
adapt them for combat against terrorist organizations, as opposed to regular
armies."
In response to the ruling, Colonel Pnina Sharvit-Baruch, who heads the Israel
Defense Forces' international law department, said that while the army already
carries out a thorough examination before approving any targeted killing, it will now
need to study the ruling carefully to see whether its procedures need to be
changed.
Currently, she added, the IDF carries out an investigation after any targeted killing
with "problematic results," but not in every case, as the court's ruling requires.
"But the bottom line," she said, "is that the court accepted the state's position and
recognized the fact that targeted killings of members of terrorist organizations who
are involved in enemy actions are legal."
22
Gideon Levy: An enlightened occupier, in “Haaretz”-online 17.12.2006: The
juggler from the palace of justice has struck again. In a single week, retired
Supreme Court president Justice Aharon Barak proved his impressive acrobatic
talents. In his last rulings, all of them having to do with the occupation, the outgoing
Supreme Court president seems to have wanted, as he has during the 11 years of
his presidency, to have his cake and eat it, too. Barak wants to appear as though
he is both upholding justice and not harming security – the unofficial religion of a
state that shoots, then cries. What an enlightened occupier!
But even Barak's verbal acrobatics, his impressive formulations and his lofty words
cannot conceal the bitter truth: It would have been better had these rulings not been
handed down. Going forward, it is perhaps preferable that proponents of human
rights no longer petition the High Court of Justice. The fact that the new president of
the court and his deputy are not signed on some of these rulings ensures that
nothing will change in the future of our Supreme Court.
At the end of this productive judicial week, the Israeli occupation won significant
power. This additional power came in the form of the broad legitimization granted
its injustices by the most prestigious institution in Israeli society, also lauded
abroad. The targeted assassinations will continue in full force, the victims of the
occupation will hardly be awarded any compensation and the separation wall will be
completed as planned. The cruel reality of the occupation will not change in the
wake of these rulings, but now these actions will have the court's seal of approval.
The Israel Defense Forces assassinating unhindered is one reality, and an IDF that
assassinates with the High Court's blessing is an even worse reality. The right's
moaning about these rulings is therefore just a manipulation: It should be very
pleased.
This last ruling is also the worst of them. Barak's crescendo will echo for many
years: The court has laundered the executions. All the restrictions the High Court of
Justice placed on targeted assassinations are no more than a collection of hollow
words. A failed method of warfare, intended for thwarting 'ticking bombs,' has
become unbridled and a matter of routine. In fact, 339 Palestinians have already
been killed this way since the start of the current intifada; only 210 were intended
targets and it is doubtful that all of them deserved to be executed. The rest were
innocent bystanders.
Hit lists and death squads, death sentences without trials, and what does the High
Court of Justice say? It is necessary that there be "well-founded, strong and
persuasive information as to the identity (of the person assassinated) and his
activity."
And who will determine what is "well-founded, strong and persuasive information?"
The Shin Bet security services. And who will supervise the assassinations? The
executioners. Instead of making clear and bold statements, that, for instance,
assassination is permissible only in the case of terrorists en route to a terror attack,
the court is being disastrously – and typically – ambiguous and, is essentially
passing the responsibility to the IDF and the Shin Bet.
We spent five whole years waiting for this? The High Court of Justice could have
determined this long ago.
The court also has lofty words for conflicts where rules of international law apply,
though it has never expressed its opinion about the endless violations of such law.
Jewish settlements in the territories, the transfer of prisoners in Israel, Israel's
refusal to care for those living under occupation – all of this is one big, brazen
violation of international law. How is it that the High Court of Justice has never ruled
on the legality of the settlements, for example?
The court has proved once again that when given the chance to impact reality and
bring about significant change, it instead withdraws in panic. Even when it revoked
the Intifada Law, it knew that nothing would change on the ground.
Despite the public uproar, a Palestinian's chance of winning compensation from the
state for crimes against him remains close to zero. Maria Aman, whose mother,
brother and grandmother were killed in a failed assassination attempt in Gaza, can
only dream of compensation. She and her family were after all harmed in the
context of "an act of warfare," which the High Court of Justice has now sanctioned.
It is permissible to launch missiles at cars in the heart of crowded cities, but it is not
necessary to compensate the innocent, inevitable victims.
"The military commander must defend human rights," wrote Barak in another of his
rulings – the one that okayed the wall severing the a-Ram neighborhood –
summing up in a single sentence his efforts to safeguard the human rights being
trampled in the territories. The military commander will "preserve human rights?"
Given the reality in the territories, there could be no greater contradiction.
From now on, the Supreme Court will act without Aharon Barak. It will, however,
presumably continue to act within his legacy, which has authorized nearly all
injustices in the territories. Barak, meanwhile, will continue to be depicted in Israel
and the world as a pursuer of justice. But the question will come up one day, and
people will want to know where the High Court of Justice was when all this was
happening. And where was Aharon Barak? No, not only did he not try to stop it; he
was also a willing partner.
23
Rice Warns Syria and Iran over Lebanon protests, in YNET 12.12.2006: US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned Syria and Iran in an exclusive
interview with AFP that the "future of Lebanon is not an issue for negotiation." In an
exclusive interview with AFP, Rice rejected mounting calls to deal directly with
Damascus and Tehran as part of efforts to end the crisis in Iraq and said the two
states should have no doubts about Washington's commitment to the embattled
government of Lebanon.
"In no way is the US going to get into a situation where it is even a conceivable
notion on the part of Syria or Iran that the future of Lebanon would somehow be
compromised for other interests of the US," she said. "I want to make it very clear
that the future of Lebanon is not an issue for negotiation with anybody," she said.
Massive street protests organized by the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Shiite
movement Hizbullah have been seeking to topple the government of Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora for the past week.
The protracted deadlock has paralyzed the Western-backed government as
opposition Shiite and Christian protesters have clogged the capital in an escalating
campaign to force a new national unity administration.
"It's just extremely important that we be very clear: we understand who Lebanon's
enemies are and those that are trying to bring down the Siniora government," Rice
said. "There is no way that the United States or the international community could
ever countenance a reassertion of Syrian authority in Lebanon," she said.
'Optimistic' about resolution against Iran
Rice said she was "optimistic" the resolution aimed at convincing Iran to suspend
its nuclear enrichment program, would pass soon, though she stopped short of
predicting a final vote before the end of the year. "It has to be voted soon. I think
this has gone on long enough," she said.
The six major powers dealing with the issue – Britain, China, France, Russia, the
United States and Germany, have been negotiating for weeks over the terms of a
sanctions resolution. But agreement proved elusive as Russia and China objected
to an earlier European draft as too harsh, while Washington felt it did not go far
enough.
But Rice said on Monday that she was satisfied with the latest version, notably
because it will be voted under Chapter 7 of the UN charter, which makes the
measures mandatory for all UN members.
"It establishes Chapter 7, which to my mind is the most important element here,"
she said.
"It would make very clear to the Iranians that they are not going to be able to pursue
this program and remain integrated into the international system and I would hope
would give them pause so they might consider coming back to negotiations," she
said.
24
Israel Doesn’t Rule Out Military Strike on Iran, “Spiegel”-online 11.12.2006:
SPIEGEL: Mr. Prime Minister, in the United States President George W. Bush is
thinking about a new Iraq policy and probably intends to call for an international
conference at which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would also be discussed. Do you
support this initiative?
Olmert: I do not expect a change of American policy towards Israel. The right way
to advance our relations with the Arabs is by means of bilateral negotiations. The
Iraq issue is a domestic subject of the United States. However, we always felt that
the removal of Saddam Hussein was a major contribution to stability of our part of
the world.
SPIEGEL: One of the recommendations made by the Baker Commission is to offer
Syria the Golan Heights in exchange for a constructive role in the Middle East. Is
this in Israel's interest?
Olmert: The question of what we will give to the Syrians interests me less than the
question of what they will offer us.
SPIEGEL: Washington is also thinking about direct talks with Iran and Syria. Do you
support this new approach?
Olmert: In my view, Syria's subversive operations – its support for Hamas or
Hezbollah, for example – do not give much hope for negotiations with Syria any
time soon. I do not know what the American president will decide to do with the
report. I can only say that, in our talks, he did not favor American-Syrian or IsraeliSyrian negotiations. I count on his judgment and responsibility.
SPIEGEL: And what do you think about direct talks with Iran?
Olmert: Any compromise that will lead to Iran being unable to create nuclear
weapons is a step in the right direction. As long as the final result of talks with Iran
is an end to their nuclear program, I am not against them.
SPIEGEL: But are you dissatisfied with the delays by the international community in
taking action against Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad?
Olmert: I am not happy at all with the pace. I expect more dramatic steps to be
taken. Here is a leader who openly says that his goal is to wipe Israel off the map.
Israel is a member state of the United Nations. For someone in the year 2006 to be
able to say that publicly is absolutely outrageous.
SPIEGEL: Do you rule out a military strike?
Olmert: I am talking about effective measures that will be accepted by the
international community to stop the Iranian danger.
SPIEGEL: So you don't rule out a military strike.
Olmert: I don't rule out anything.
SPIEGEL: Your neighbor to the north, Lebanon, is on the verge of a new civil war.
Are you concerned about the images of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora's beleaguered
office in Beirut?
Olmert: Of course I am not particularly happy with these pictures. It is important that
democracy in Lebanon is protected and that Hezbollah will not be supported by
outside forces like Syria and Iran. But I must weigh my words carefully, because if it
appears that the Israelis are defending Siniora, it will not help him in Lebanon. I
would have loved to meet with Siniora for peace negotiations. There isn't much that
separates us. In one meeting we could agree on everything.
SPIEGEL: When Hezbollah kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers in July – a
declaration of war from the Israeli point of view – you also publicly blamed the
Siniora government. Do you regret today that you did not do more to stabilize him?
Olmert: There was nothing that could help Siniora more than the weakening of
Hezbollah. The present turmoil in Lebanon is not the result of the strengthening of
Hezbollah. Hezbollah suffered a major loss as a result of the war and is today
fighting for its political survival. We tried a great deal to defeat the forces that are
threatening Siniora.
SPIEGEL: But you did not defeat them. On July 18, six days after the start of the
war you said: "Only the return of the abducted soldiers will stop the operation." The
war stopped long ago but the two kidnapped soldiers are still being held. What went
wrong?
Olmert: This is not the only thing that I said at the beginning of the war. The goals
we set forth for this war were to deploy the Lebanese army in the south of Lebanon
and to remove the threat of Hezbollah from the townships of northern Israel. When I
accepted the cease-fire on August 14 these two goals were to be implemented
successfully. However, it was clear that Hezbollah would not release the two
soldiers. Therefore, it would have been senseless to continue fighting and lose
even more soldiers.
SPIEGEL: How optimistic are you that you can reach some sort of deal with
Hezbollah to get the soldiers back?
Olmert: I am not happy with the reaction of Hezbollah. They are trying to use the
same old techniques: They want everything in advance before they let us know the
status of the soldiers.
SPIEGEL: What concessions are you ready to make in order to get the soldiers
back?
Olmert: Reasonable concessions. This regards the release of prisoners, but I will
not go into any details.
SPIEGEL: Brigadier General Doron Almog, who has been investigating the failures
leading up to the kidnapping of the soldiers, says the Israeli army is experiencing a
leadership crisis. Do you agree?
Olmert: This is an exaggeration. In Israel we tend to be carried away by our
emotions. Yes, there were certain failures but I guarantee you that in every single
military confrontation between our fighters and those of Hezbollah we always had
the upper hand. I have ways of assessing what the Hezbollah leaders think: They
know that they suffered terrible damage to their strategic power, which they have
been trying to build over the last six years.
SPIEGEL: But what about the civilian victims. Are they attributable to the failures of
Israel's army?
Olmert: What do you mean by "civilian victims"? How do you know that all of the
victims were not members of Hezbollah?
SPIEGEL: There were women and children.
Olmert: I didn't say that there was not a single civilian killed. But I think the majority
of them belonged to Hezbollah.
25
„Sie machen sich lächerlich.“ Aufruf eines Palästinensern an Irans Präsidenten,
in SZ 12.12.2006, S. 7. Safada saß achtzehn Jahre in einem israelischen
Gefängnis. Eine englische Übersetzung ist via [email protected] übermittelt
worden. Als Vorlage diente die Veröffentlichung in „Le Monde“ 04.12.2006:
Mr. President, I write to you following the announcement of your intention to
organize a conference on the Holocaust in Teheran on 11-12 December, and I
sincerely hope that this letter will be brought to your attention.
First of all, allow me to introduce myself: Mahmoud Al-Safadi, a former prisoner
from occupied Jerusalem. I was released less than three months ago from the
Israeli prison where I had been locked up for eighteen years for having been a
member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and having taken an
active part in resistance to the occupation during the first Intifada. Since you were
elected president, I have followed your declarations with great interest – in
particular those relating to the Holocaust. I respect your opposition to the American
and Western injunctions concerning the Iranian nuclear program and believe it
legitimate that you complain of the double standard that the world has with regard
to the nuclear development of certain regimes.
But I am furious about your insistence on claiming that the Holocaust never took
place and about your doubts about the number of Jews who were murdered in the
extermination and concentration camps, organized massacres, and gas chambers,
consequently denying the universal historical significance of the Nazi period.
Allow me to say, Mr. President, with all due respect to you, that you made these
statements without really knowing the Nazi industry of death. To have read the
works of some deniers seems to be enough for you – a little like a man who shouts
above a well and hears only the echo of his own voice. I believe that a man in your
position should not make such an enormous error, because it could be turned
against him and, worse still, his people.
Like you and millions of people in the world – among whom, alas, are innumerable
Palestinians and Arabs – I was also convinced that the Jews exaggerated and lied
about the Holocaust, etc., even apart from the fact that the Zionist movement and
Israel use the Holocaust to justify their policy, first of all against my own people.
My long imprisonment provided me with the occasion to read books and articles
that our ideology and social norms made inaccessible to us outside the prison.
These documents gave me a thorough knowledge of the history of the Nazi regime
and genocide that it perpetrated. At the beginning of the 1990s, by reading articles
written by the Palestinian intellectuals Edward Said and Azmi Bishara, I discovered
facts and positions which contradicted mine and those of many Palestinians. Their
writings having piqued my curiosity and given birth inside me to the need to know
more, I set about reading accounts of survivors of the Holocaust and the Nazi
occupation. These testimonies were written by people of various nationalities, Jews
or non-Jews.
The more I learned, the more I realized that the Holocaust was indeed a historical
fact and the more I became aware of the monumental dimension of the crime
committed by Nazi Germany against the Jews, other social and national groups,
and humanity in general. I discovered that Nazi Germany aspired to found a "new
world order" dominated by the "pure Aryan race" thanks to the physical annihilation
of "impure races" and the enslavement of other nations. I discovered that various
"normal" official institutions – bureaucracies, judicial systems, medical and
educational authorities, municipalities, railroad companies, and others – had taken
part and collaborated in the implementation of this new world order. From a
theoretical point of view, this xobjective, just like the victories won at the time by the
Nazi armies of occupation, threatened the existence of the Arabs and Muslims as
well.
Whatever the number of victims – Jewish and non-Jewish – the crime is
monumental. Any attempt to deny it deprives the denier of his own humanity and
sends him immediately to the side of torturers. Whoever denies the fact that this
human disaster really took place should not be astonished that others deny the
sufferings and persecutions inflicted on his own people by tyrannical leaders or
foreign occupiers. Ask yourself, I beg you, the following question: were hundreds of
thousands of testimonies written about death camps, gas chambers, ghettos, and
mass murders committed by the German army, tens of thousands of works of
research based on German documents, numerous filmed sequences, some of
which were shot by German soldiers – were all these masses of evidence
completely fabricated?
Can all that be summed up simply as an imperialist-Zionist plot? Are the
confessions of high-ranking Nazis officials about their personal role in the project of
extermination of whole nations only the fruit of the imagination of some disturbed
spirit?
And all these heroic deeds of the people subjected to the German occupation – the
first among whom were Russians, Polish, and Yugoslavs – only lies and gross
exaggerations? Could the struggle of the Soviets against Nazi Germany be only a
phantasm? The Russians continue to celebrate their victory over Nazi Germany
and remember millions of their civilian and military compatriots who lost their lives
in this struggle. Are they lying, too?
I invite you to read historical studies and serious testimonies before making your
public statements. You divide the world in two camps: the imperialists-Zionists, who
manufactured the myth of the Holocaust, and the adversaries of imperialism, who
know the truth and uncover the plot. Perhaps you think that the act of denying the
Holocaust places you at the vanguard of the Muslim world and that this refusal
constitutes a useful tool in the combat against American imperialism and Western
hegemony. By doing so, you actually do great disservice to popular struggles the
world over.
At best, you cover your people and yourself with ridicule in the eyes of political
forces who reject imperialism but cannot take your ideas and arguments seriously,
due to the fact that you obsessively deny the existence of an abundantly
documented and studied historical period whose consequences are still felt and
discussed today.
At worst, you discourage and weaken the political, social, and intellectual forces
who, in Europe and in the United States, reject the policy of confrontation and war
carried out by George Bush, but are forced to conclude that you, too, jeopardize the
world by your declarations denying the genocide and by your nuclear program.
Concerning the struggle of my people for their independence and their freedom:
perhaps do you regard the negation of the Holocaust as an expression of support
for the Palestinians? There, again, you are mistaken.
We fight for our existence and our rights and against the historical injustice which
was inflicted on us in 1948. We will not win our victory and our independence by
denying the genocide perpetrated against the Jewish people, even though the
forces who occupy our country today and dispossess us are part of the Jewish
people.
26
Ibrahim Ramey: True Muslims Must never Deny the European Holocaust, in
“Tikkun”-online 15.12.2006: In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, Most Merciful.
History will recall the tragedy of the genocide that slaughtered some six million
European Jews between the rise of Adolph Hitler and the Nazi Party in 1933 and
the culmination of the Second World War in Europe in May, 1945.
The evidence of this crime, and the horrible magnitude of this killing, is irrefutable.
From sources as varied as Nazi war records, film documentation, and most
importantly, the testimony of survivors and witnesses, we know that the mass
murder of European Jews was, indeed, the single greatest crime of genocide in the
twentieth century.
Yet the world now witnesses yet another wave of historical revisionism and
Holocaust denial, this time emerging not from European Anti-Semites, but from
none other than the President of Iran. Indeed, this head of state has taken the
unprecedented act of hosting an international conference of anti-Semites,
Holocaust deniers, and even white racists like former Klan leader David Duke, to
gather in Tehran to deny the magnitude, if not the very existence, of this barbaric
act.
As a Muslim of African decent in the United States, whose ancestors were
victimized by the enormous crime of slavery, I object. And I believe that all Muslims,
like other human beings who value compassion and truth, must vigorously object to
this gathering as well.
Like many in the global Muslim community, I regard the occupation of Palestinian
land and the policies of the State of Israel as issues of extreme importance. I am
certainly among those who believe that the occupation of Palestinian territory and
the denial of full human rights to Palestinians, and even to Arab people regarded as
Israeli citizens, is deplorable.
But I find it to be morally unconscionable to attempt to build political arguments and
political movements on a platform of racial hatred and the denial of the suffering of
the human beings who were victimized by the viciousness of Hitler's genocidal
rampage through Europe.
President Ahmedinejad should recognize that the issue of the Palestinian people
must not, and cannot, be transmogrified into the ugly and spiritually bankrupt
context of racial hatred. The cause of freedom must never drink from the well of
hatred and racism.
And indeed, as the Holy Qur'an compels Muslims to demand justice for the
oppressed, we are also called to witness against ourselves when we are in error.
And in this case, the President of Iran most certainly is.
27
Sharon Kedmi_Realizing Herzl’s pipe dream, in „Haaretz“-online 11.12.2006:
What do Zionism's founder Theodor Herzl, National Infrastructures Minister
Benjamin Ben-Eliezer (Fuad) and businessman Yitzhak Tshuva have in common?
They share a dream of reviving the Dead Sea. The idea is simple: Build a canal
channeling sea water into the Dead Sea; raise the water level of the lowest water
surface on earth and save it from disappearing – something which experts predict
may happen in just a few years.
The plans for the Peace Channel, or as it was previously known, the Seas Canal,
are expected to be presented today at a special World Bank conference in Jordan;
there will be a review of the economic feasibility of the project's current incarnation.
Among those attending the conference are National Infrastructures Minister BenEliezer, Jordanian Minister of Water and Irrigation Zafer Alem, the representative of
the Palestinian Authority chairman, Dr. Muhammad Mustafa, World Bank
representatives and representatives of donor countries. The project, with an
estimated cost of around $3-4 billion, will be joint venture by Israel, Jordan and the
PA.
Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, originally proposed the idea in 1902 in his
book, "Altneuland." Herzl envisioned digging a canal that would bring water from the
Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea, an idea based on the substantial differences
in elevation between the two seas. The objective: to at once preserve the Dead Sea
and use the flow of water to generate electricity. Herzl based the idea on a plan
formulated by engineer Max Bourcart in 1899, which detailed the digging of a canal
that would channel water from the Mediterranean Sea through the Jezreel Valley,
the Beit She'an Valley and the Jordan River, ultimately to the Dead Sea.
The plan, slightly altered, was promoted several decades after the establishment of
the state by a series of public figures, including Prof. Yuval Ne'eman and former
energy minister Yitzhak Moda'i. In the 1980s, three alternatives to the project were
considered and, in 1981, the original canal plan was approved, whereby the water
would be channeled through a tunnel from the sea near Ashkelon, via the northern
Negev, to the Dead Sea.
The cornerstone for the project was even laid and during the ceremony, then prime
minister, Menachem Begin, declared the taming of the desert. Then several
hundred meters of the canal were dug. However, the project was abandoned in
1985.
In its current incarnation, the plan was promoted during the 1990s peace process
by then foreign minister Shimon Peres and then energy minister Moshe Shahal.
According to the plans, the canal would originate in the Gulf of Eilat, wind to the
Jordanian side of the border to the highest point in the Be'er Menuha region, Faran,
where the water would then flow toward the Dead Sea, utilizing the approximately
600-meter difference in elevation. The length of the canal on the Jordanian side
would be approximately 180 kilometers, of which 134 kilometers would be covered.
The project is intended to channel hundreds of millions of cubic liters of water from
the Red Sea to the Dead Sea annually, desalinate water for Jordan and the PA, and
generate electricity for Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians.
At the starting point, in the southern Dead Sea region, plans call for the world's
largest desalination facility which will produce around 800 million cubic liters a year.
The surplus water would be channeled into the Dead Sea, in an attempt to halt the
decline in its water level. In addition, along the route of the canal, there are plans to
build a hydroelectric power station that would use the elevation differences between
the Red Sea and the Dead Sea to produce 800 megawatts of electricity.
National Infrastructure Ministry officials say the importance of the canal to the
Israelis is very high given that as a result of the exploitation by Jordan, Syria and
Israel of water sources that feed the Dead Sea, the Dead Sea's water level has
dropped at a rate of 80-100 centimeters annually. The declining water level, apart
from the direct impact on the Dead Sea's receding shoreline, increases the
phenomenon of sinkholes.
So far, countless claims have been made for and against the project – economic,
ecological, environmental and political – and the ambitious (perhaps overly
ambitious) project has yet to begin. However, National Infrastructures Minister BenEliezer, who has taken the Peace Channel project under his wing, is not particularly
concerned. "Our grandchildren will not forgive us if in a few decades the Dead Sea
continues to recede. This is a natural wonder that is important not only to Israel, but
to the entire Middle East and the whole world. The Peace Channel project is the
flagship project of the National Infrastructures Ministry and will lead to regional and
economic cooperation with our Jordanian colleagues in the areas of energy, water
and agriculture. Regional development is an important step in promoting the
political process." Ben-Eliezer says that he expects a breakthrough in confidencebuilding gestures between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. "The project
is a top priority for the Jordanian kingdom, as well, and King Abdullah has in the
past said he considers it of the utmost importance to promote this project too," says
Ben-Eliezer.
The World Bank will conduct a study of the project's feasibility. It is expected to take
two years and will eventually review five elements: the environmental impact on the
Gulf of Eilat resulting from the pumping of sea water; the environmental impact of
the canal on the Arava wadi; the feasibility of building a Red Sea water desalination
facility on the shores of the Dead Sea – primarily to meet the needs of Jordan and
the PA; the feasibility of building a hydroelectric power station; the impact on the
Dead Sea's water quality as a result of mixing Red Sea water with Dead Sea water.
Thus far, the World Bank has raised $9 million of the $15 million needed for the
study. The money was donated by Japan, the United States, France and the
Netherlands, and recently there have been advanced talks with Sweden, Spain,
Britain and Germany, which are also interested in being included in the donor
group.
Not long ago, the project received a boost from an unexpected direction.
Businessman Yitzhak Tshuva recently said in New York that he had a dream and
really hoped he would be able to realize it: to build a canal from the Red Sea to the
Dead Sea. This water would be desalinated and made potable. "In my assessment,
it is possible to desalinate one billion cubic milliliters of water annually. This quantity
would be sufficient to make the entire Negev bloom and turn it into a green area.
Millions of residents could be settled in the Negev. The canal would also generate
electricity to supply the Negev's needs. On both sides of the canal, there will be
promenades and hotels, along the entire length from Red Sea to the Dead Sea.
Furthermore, it will be possible to strengthen the relationship between us and the
Jordanians and Palestinians, because they will also benefit from the water,
electricity and economic growth. I met with Shimon Peres and others to discuss this
common dream. These are not pipe dreams."
28
Vgl. die Eintragung vom 31.10.2006 in dieser Chronologie. Zur AyalonNusseibeh-Initiative s. Reiner Bernstein: Von Gaza nach Genf. Schwalbach/Ts.
2006, S. 68 ff.
29
The full text of the PLO Executive Committee decisions during the meeting held
to study the alternative options, 10 December 2006:
1- Full and serious dealing with all the international initiatives and efforts to revive
the peace process, especially on the Palestinian-Israeli track, as this represents the
key to tackling all the crises of the region.
Based on this, the PLO Executive Committee highly appreciates the BakerHamilton Report and considers the recommendations mentioned in the report as an
introduction to ending the stalemate and retreat that hit the political process; the
report also assists in setting the correct principles towards start of negotiations
within an international context that tackles the main final-status issues towards
reaching the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the 1967
borders and solving the refugees cause through a just and agreed upon solution
according to the Arab Peace Initiative. The PLO Executive Committee also highly
appreciates the European Initiative and the position of British PM Tony Blair and his
efforts to revive the political process. Based on this, the PLO Executive Committee
affirms its full readiness to participate in all steps to revive the peace process and
return to the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, since the PLO Executive Committee is
the address and it is the sole and legitimate representative, and all matters
pertaining to the crisis of the government that represent a Palestinian internal affair
that does not affect the role of the PLO, as confirmed by the recent National
Conciliation Document that the PLO is the sole body with full responsibility for the
negotiations file.
2- The PLO Executive Committee studies the report submitted to it by the sixmember committee which was commissioned by the PLO Executive Committee
last week and decided to form several committees to activate its role and the role of
its departments at the various levels.
The PLO Executive Committee also took several decisions on reformulating the
Higher Negotiations Committee and the Committee to activate the role of the
Palestinian National Fund and set up the appropriate recommendations to that
effect, and start with activating the role of the special committee dealing with
holding the national dialogue to activate the PLO.
The PLO Executive Committee also decided to call for holding a meeting of the
Palestinian Central Council and for setting a date for that meeting in agreement
with the PNC Speaker's Office.
The PLO Executive Committee decided to activate the Secretariat and commission
one of its members to be in charge of the Secretariat and to commission a special
committee to study the law for the PNC elections according to full proportional
representation. All these steps aim to see the PLO Executive Committee assume a
responsible role to end the current deterioration happening on more than one
30
Joint Statement – Geneva Initiative Israeli-Palestinian Meeting Jerusalem,
December 8, 2006:
1. The only way to resolve the conflict between the two peoples is through political and
agreed-upon means. As has been proven in the past, limited, unilateral, or violent
actions will not bring about the end of the conflict.
2. Only a political solution will serve the real interests of the two sides, and the only
way to achieve a political solution is through negotiations.
3. We call upon the leaderships of both sides to take practical steps to ensure the
continuation of the cease-fire and its expansion to include the West Bank. Both
sides must seek to bring about a significant improvement in the daily life of ordinary
citizens, including their freedom of movement.
4. We urge all relevant parties to do their utmost in order to bring about the immediate
release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit as well as the release of Palestinian
prisoners held in Israel, including ministers and members of the Legislative Council.
5. We expect from the leaderships of both sides, in parallel to ensuring the tranquility,
to commence negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement. In order
to ensure the success of the negotiations, both sides should agree in advance on
the agenda for discussions and on the parameters of the future agreement.
6. We welcome the recommendations contained in the Iraq Study Group Report, and
support the immediate opening of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians
along the lines outlined in the Report. We call upon the international community,
and first and foremost on the members of the Quartet, to adopt the
recommendations and work toward their implementation.
7. We reiterate that the goals of negotiations between the two sides must include the
establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel on the basis of the 1967
borders as stipulated by the Arab Peace Initiative, President Bush Vision and the
Geneva Initiative.
The MKs included Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh and Colette Avital of
Labor and Meretz leader Yossi Beilin. The Palestinians included former PA
ministers Yasser Abed-Rabbo and Kadoura Fares, who initiated the Geneva
Initiative with Beilin three years ago.
31
Der vollständige Bericht der “Iraq Study Group“ ist verfügbar via
www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html.
32
Die sich mit dem israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt beschäftigenden Teile
sind im englischen Original in der Menüleiste „Begleitende Dokumente“ dieser
Homepage nachlesbar.
33
Moran Zelikovich: Education Minister to return Green Line to textbooks Yuli
Tamir proposes students learn about Israel's disputed borders. 'You can't sketch
Israel's borders without bringing in politics' says Tamir, in YNET 05.12.2006:
Education Minister Yuli Tamir decided that Israeli students should learn about the
country's 1967 borders. Tamir ordered the Green Line be included on all maps in all
future textbook publications. The Green Line outlines Israel's borders from the 4th
of June 1967, just before the Six Day War broke out. This decision is politically
loaded since the 1967 borders are at the base of the Palestinian and Arab
demands for establishing an independent Palestinian state. In the meantime, Israel
has been trying its best to obscure these lines over the years, in hopes that it would
be able to include its settlements in the area in any future agreement with the
Palestinians. Tamir has been checking with the ministry how the new maps with the
Green Line can be included into the new textbooks approved by the Education
Ministry. "There have been many complaints that the Israeli map which appears in
textbooks does not have any borders," said Tamir to Ynet Tuesday morning, "I've
looked into the matter and indeed, there is no reference to the Green line. For
example Gaza is still included as part of Israel." 'Attempt to determine political facts'
Tamir is not worried about the expected criticism: "Taking the Green Line out of the
maps is also bringing politics into schools. You can't draw Israel's borders without
bringing [them] in politics. There are some things like Gaza that just need it. You
can't help it that reality changes." The expense of the new books is also not a
concern since the change will only be made in new books to be published, existing
books will remain unchanged. Elhanan Glat, CEO of Bnei Akiva Yeshiva Center, is
very disappointed with this decision. "Unfortunately the Education Minister is
forgetting that she is not the Education Minister of her party, but of all of the State of
Israel. Such a statement is un-educational. It's an attempt to determine 'political'
facts within the education system, and is generating mistrust in the Education
officials – it's a shame. We will oppose this decision." The Yesha Council
[representing the settlements in “Samaria”, “Judea” und before summer 2005 in the
Gaza Strip] said in response that "if the education minister believes that the Jewish
presence in Israel began in 1948, she should go learn some history." The council
stated that "the tie between Israel and its land has existed for thousands of years,
but instead the minister decides to ignore it." Former Education Minister Yossi Sarid
supported Tamir's decision, saying, "the students in Israel should know that Israel's
eastern and northern borders are not final, and they will be settled one day through
negotiations. Everything that is true in reality should appear in the textbooks, and
this is our reality," he added. "After 1967 the border was broken and it's important
that the students know this. This is the true border story in the east – it's not over
and done with."
34
Uzi Benziman: The Green Line, may its name be rased, in “Haaretz”-online
10.12.2006:
In Jerusalem's Mea She'arim neighborhood one occasionally sees an ultraOrthodox man covering his face with his black fedora when a woman passes by. So
jealous is the man of his modesty that he acts as if the woman crossing his path
does not exists. MK Zevulun Orlev does not want to see the Green Line on the
maps of Israel printed in Israeli textbooks, so much so that he has declared: The
Green Line is dead – as if by saying so this reality could be driven from the world.
It is amazing to watch Orlev, a former Education Ministry director general whose
highest aim in public life is to be minister of education, behave in such a simplistic
manner. Only a year and a half ago he championed the moderate position within
the National Religious Party that argued against leaving the Sharon government
over the Gaza disengagement plan. On what did that argument turn if not on
returning Jewish settlers to within the boundaries of the Green Line? How can Orlev
now claim that the Green Line is dead? What happened to the line over the last 18
months for its name to be obliterated? The line remains a solid political, military,
geographic fact. What has changed is Orlev's political positioning: Today he
belongs to the National Union and he follows the rule according to which one's
position dictates one's positions.
The Green Line is a fact that cannot be erased. It exists in every dimension of life
here: Israel has not extended its laws over the territories beyond the Green Line
(with the exception of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights); in all deliberations on the
international stage, the government of Israel has always treated the territories
beyond the Green Line as areas whose status is completely different from that of
the land within the Green Line; UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the
keystones to every diplomatic prescription Israel has considered since 1967 are
based on making a distinction between the territories beyond the Green Line and
those within it; diplomatic measures in which Israeli governments have been
involved, including those headed by the Likud and those to which the National
Religious Party was a partner, recognized the existence of the Green Line; the
course of the separation fence was determined in relationship to the Green Line;
the starting point of the convergence plan, on the basis of which Ehud Olmert won
the election, was the Green Line; the prime minister's current positions express a
willingness for generous concessions, for which the Green Line is the ruler for
measuring the proffered withdrawals. If Orlev were to examine the infrastructure
projects built by the state in the past 40 years and the 2020 National Master Plan,
he would find explicit reference to the Green Line. The plans for roads, railways and
land use end at the Green Line; they do not take it for granted that the West Bank
(and the Gaza Strip) will be Israeli territory in the future; they treat them as
territories that will be in the hands of a neighbor whose development plans (and
geographic data) must be coordinated with the Israeli master plan.
As a person with educational pretensions, Orlev must respect the significance of
historical information. When he was a schoolboy, his geography books contained
contemporaneous maps of Israel. No one ever thought to erase the map showing
the borders during Roman times or the Crusader period or the Partition Plan. The
Green Line is a chapter of the state's history that began in 1949 and continues until
today. In the name of what historic truth does Orlev declare that it has disappeared
and should not be mentioned?
There is a story about S.Y. Agnon taking his young daughter into a shtiebel
(storefront synagogue) to pray the afternoon Minha service. One of the worshippers
complained loudly about the presence of a female among the men. Agnon took his
daughter by the hand and said, "Let's go, if the yetzer hara (evil inclination) here is
so strong that it cannot stand up to a 5-year-old girl, then our place is not with
them." Nota bene, Zevulun Orlev.
35
„Wir brauchen Signale konstruktiven Zusammenwirkens“ – Interview mit
Bundesminister Steinmeier zu Nahost in den ARD-Tagesthemen am 4.12.2006:
Frage: Sie haben länger als geplant mit dem Präsidenten Assad gesprochen in
Damaskus: Wie zuversichtlich sind Sie nach Ihren Eindrücken, dass Syrien in
Zukunft verantwortungsvoll mit dem Libanon und insgesamt mit dem Konflikt im
Nahen Osten umgehen wird?
Antwort: Das hat weniger mit meiner Zuversicht zu tun und ist einer der Gründe
dafür, warum das Gespräch etwa doppelt so lange gedauert hat wie ursprünglich
geplant. Ich habe versucht deutlich zu machen, dass wir hier in Deutschland gern
gehört haben – etwa aus Interviews, die Präsident Assad hier in deutschen
Zeitungen gegeben hat – ..., dass das Land sich auf einen Weg (hin) zu mehr
konstruktiven Beiträgen für den nahöstlichen Friedensprozess bewegen will. Ich
habe versucht zu sagen, dass dieses allerdings nicht reichen kann, sondern dass
dieses unterlegt werden muss mit Taten, an denen wir nachvollziehen können,
dass nicht nur eine abstrakte Bereitschaft besteht, sondern tatsächlich auch
mitgewirkt wird an der Beruhigung von Konfliktsituationen, von denen wir im Nahen
Osten leider allzu viele haben.
Aber wenn wir auf die angespannte Lage im Libanon schauen, die
Massendemonstrationen in Beirut: Will Präsident Assad denn tatsächlich was tun –
zum Beispiel die Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit des Libanon anerkennen – oder
versucht er weiter, das Land über die Hisbollah zu destabilisieren?
Ich hatte Gelegenheit, mich am Samstagabend (02.12.) in Beirut selbst von der
Situation zu überzeugen; selbst in Augenschein zu nehmen, was sich dort auf den
Straßen tut. Und ich bin zu der Überzeugung gelangt, dass wir besser nicht von
Demonstrationen reden sollten: Das ist ein wirklicher Belagerungszustand, der dort
rund um die Parlamentsgebäude herrscht. Und ich habe das zum Anlass
genommen, gegenüber Präsident Assad auch ganz klar zu sagen, dass wir schon
von Syrien erwarten, dass die Möglichkeiten – die bestehen von Syrien aus über
Verbindungen in den Libanon hinein – auch genutzt werden, um diesen
Belagerungszustand zu beenden. Das ist keine Frage: Aus dem Konflikt zwischen
Opposition und Regierung, zwischen Parlament und Regierung müssen Wege
gefunden werden aus dieser Krise, aber die werden – da bin ich mir völlig sicher –
unter diesem Belagerungszustand, nicht gefunden werden.
Nun haben Sie nichts dazu gesagt, was Präsident Assad tun will.
Die Entscheidung wird in Syrien liegen. Meine Aufgabe war es, in Syrien diese
klaren Botschaften unserer Erwartungen zu hinterlassen. Und ich habe ebenso klar
gesagt, dass die Bereitschaft der westlichen Staaten, mit Syrien näher zusammen
zu arbeiten, am Ende auch daran hängen wird, ob Syrien bei der Lösung dieser
klassischen Konflikte einen eigenen konstruktiven Beitrag leisten wird. Wenn das
geschieht, kann man sich vorstellen, dass andere dazu beitragen, Syrien aus dem
gegenwärtigen Stand der Selbstfesselung, der Isolation, befreien zu helfen. Wenn
das nicht der Fall ist, sehe ich nicht, wie Kooperation mit anderen, mit westlichen
Staaten, ermöglicht werden sollen.
Und das ist das Angebot, was Sie ihm gemacht haben: Dass Syrien
herausgelassen wird aus der Isolation?
Das ist kein Angebot, das war der Versuch, die klare Botschaft zu hinterlassen,
dass öffentliche Lippenbekenntnisse oder Bekenntnisse anderer Natur nicht helfen,
sondern dass wir einen wirklichen Beitrag von syrischer Seite erwarten. Die
Entscheidung kann dazu nur in Syrien selbst fallen.
Versucht Syrien nur von der eigenen Verantwortung abzulenken im Moment wenn
es sagt, Deutschland müsse im Rahmen der EU-Ratspräsidentschaft und im
Rahmen des G8-Vorsitzes die zentrale Rolle bei der Lösung des Nahost-Konflikts
übernehmen?
Ja, diese Botschaft habe ich aus Damaskus auch gehört. Wir haben natürlich
darüber gesprochen, aber ich habe darauf hingewiesen, es ist nicht eine Frage der
Bereitschaft Deutschlands. Wir werden diese Bereitschaft Europas – und es ist
gleichgültig, wer gerade die Ratspräsidentschaft innehat – nur dann zeigen können,
wenn entsprechende Leistungen von Syrien tatsächlich auf dem Tisch liegen, die
auch bewertet werden können. Wir brauchen Signale dieses konstruktiven
Zusammenwirkens, sonst sehe ich im Augenblick keine Möglichkeit einer
Zusammenarbeit. Die Fragen stellte Anne Will.
36
Press Release, Mossawa Center, Haifa, Dec. 4, 2006:
The Mossawa Center, the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens of Israel, released a
legal paper that calls to protect the legal status of the Arab minority in any proposal
for an Israeli constitution. The paper was debated and discussed by leading lawyers
and law experts at the Mossawa Center's conference on the Legal Status of the
Arab Minority in Israel held in Nazareth on December 1.
For the last several years the Knesset's Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee
has discussed proposals to create a forma! constitution for the state of Israel. This
debate excluded the demands and the needs of the Arab community and its
institutions, while it ensures fiill protection of the Jewish majority's rights. Mossawa
Center legal expert, Dr. Yousef Jabareen, took part in the constitution debate, and
developed a paper that proposes constitutional protection of the minority rights of
Arab citizens.
The document examines the current legal status of the Arab community in Israel
and proposes full equality, participation and partnership between the Arab minority
and Jewish majority based on due respect for both parties' needs, historical rights,
and human rights demands.
The document outlines the following stipulations, whose inclusion into the
constitution would provide Arab citizens with full and equal rights that constitute
distinct national, cultural, linguistic, and religious rights as citizens of the state of
Israel. The document stipulates:
– The Arab minority be recognized as a "national minority" and an "indigenous
population" whose distinct collective identity should be protected through historic,
linguistic, religious, and cultural rights.
– Arab-Palestinians in Israel must be guaranteed full equality of rights on the civilindividual and national-collective basis.
– Arabic be granted equal status to Hebrew in all areas of the public sector including
governmental documents, educational materials, naming of road signs and
buildings, recognition of cultural icons, etc.
– The Arab-Palestinian minority be granted the right to self-government of the Arabic
educational, culture and religious institutions, similar to the current status of the
Hebrew culture, Orthodox education system, and Christian and Jewish religious
institutions.
– The Arab-Palestinian minority be assured full democratic participation and
representation in the governmental administration, decision-making bodies and the
judiciary systems.
– Special allocation of the financial and public resources is ensured on a collective
basis to address the extended discrimination and socioeconomic gaps that has
been created during years of discrimination in allocating public resources.
– Appropriate expression of the Arab community in the State's system of symbols be
granted, opening a door for due expression of the presence of Arab citizens of
Israel and their place in the state.
– Equality and fairness in immigration and citizenship should be guaranteed to all
citizens.
– The State must recognize the historic rights of the Arab-Palestinian minority to its
homeland. The state must respect the rights of 25% of Arab citizens that became
internal refuges in their country after 1948. The status of this population should be
arranged through processes of reconciliation and negotiation, as well as
guaranteeing the ownership of Arab citizens in the Negev over their lands.
– The State recognize the Arab-Palestinian minority's special relationship to the Arab
region and protect the rights of the Arab citizens to develop their culture, familial,
and religious relationships with other Palestinians and other Arabs in the region.
Die hebräischsprachige Fassung des gesamten Dokuments ist verfügbar via
www.mossawacenter.org/files/files/File/constitution_paper_heb.pdf.
37
Uzi Benziman: Time to contemplate reality, in “Haaretz”-online 06.12.2006: The
"vision for the future" presented in Nazareth yesterday by the national council of
heads of Arab local authorities is expected to anger most of the country's Jewish
public. The document, along with other position papers due to come out this month,
outline a revolutionary change in the relationship between Jewish and Arab citizens
here. At the root of these documents lies a demand that Israeli Arabs be recognized
as a separate national minority with the right to establish separate institutions, and
even be represented as an independent body in the international community. It is a
short distance from this approach for Israeli Arabs to demand that they be allowed
to establish their own security forces. Another issue is whether such extreme
demands will end up helping or harming the Arab minority in its struggle to abolish
the injustice the state has perpetrated since its founding. But before the Jewish
public angrily rejects the new demands, it is worth trying to understand the depth of
the distress that has brought them about, and identifying the roots of the JewishArab rift within the Green Line. At the root of the complex relationship between the
country's majority and minority is the Jews' feeling that they are under threat and
the Arabs' (Palestinians') feeling that they are being discriminated against. Each
side has convincing reasons: the Jews see Arab citizens as a fifth column due to
their ties with the Palestinian enemy and the Arab nation; the Arabs see the Jews
as invaders who stole their land and imposed a hostile government on them
through the force of arms. Sixty years of statehood have not blunted the mutual
fear. There is an opinion that if and when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved,
the formula for conciliation between Israel's Jews and Arabs will be derived from it
relatively easily. However, this assumption can only be tested when reality changes,
and it can be determined whether the establishment of a Palestinian state will
motivate Israeli Arabs to recognize the legitimacy of the Zionist enterprise and
motivate the Jewish majority to grant full equality to the minority. Until the
Palestinian vision of a state is fulfilled in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jewish and
Arab citizens here must contemplate reality soberly: They have been sentenced to
live together, and they must find a way to do this in the most harmonious way
possible. The Jews must understand that the positions now expressed in the Arab
sector indicate the extent of the discrimination and exploitation it experiences. The
Arabs must understand that the Jews cannot give up the Zionist identity of Israel,
since they see it as the sole refuge the Jewish people have left in the world, and
react harshly to what they see as a threat to their national existence. The way to
bridge the expectation gap is to minimize the area in which the Zionist character of
the state is expressed, and maximize the area of equal rights required by Israel's
democratic character. This means that the status of the minority should be
significantly changed, for instance, by revoking discriminatory laws and privatizing
the functions fulfilled by Jewish national institutions such as the Jewish Agency.
Other solutions include having the Arab minority represented, in proportion to its
percentage of the population, at the senior levels of civil service, planning
institutions and boards of public companies; granting the minority equal property
rights; letting the minority set the curriculum for its schools and giving it the
resources necessary to carry it out, in accordance with its needs; and granting the
minority freedom of speech and assembly, even when they are expressing Arab
nationalist messages. At the same time, the Arab minority must display loyalty to
the state, not act against it, fulfill the obligation of national service, and shape
curricula that will have the same core as the rest of the education establishment.
The objective is to establish a joint civil society that will provide an opportunity for
the majority and minority to remove mutual apprehension, soften their differences,
and turn over a new leaf in their relationship. This matter requires intensive care no
less than the conflict with the Palestinians in the territories.
38
Avraham Tal: This means war, in “Haaretz”-online 8.12.2006: One after another
lately, various Israeli-Arab organizations have been publishing papers dealing with
the future of the Arab public in Israel and its relations with the state authorities. The
papers present the problems encountered by Israeli Arabs in their contact with
Israeli law, with the state authorities and state institutions, and call for a
fundamental change in the relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab
minority. What led to this recent flurry of efforts to spell out "visions" of problems
and solutions for the Arab public? The standard explanation: The worsening
breakdown of trust between this public and the state institutions in wake of the
events of October 2000. Yet there can be no ignoring the fact that these visions are
blossoming just when Israel has come out of a difficult war in Lebanon, is still facing
a possible war in the North, is in a fragile state of cease-fire in the Gaza Strip, is
dealing daily with terror cells in the West Bank, and has an existential threat from
Iran hovering over it. This week, the leaders of the Arab minority in Israel declared
war in their own way on the Jewish national state in the Land of Israel. Some of the
demands presented in the "visions" are new, such as the outrageous calls for
granting veto power to the Arab minority on decisions of national import, and for
separate representation at international institutions, and more in that vein. There
are also calls for changing the flag and the national anthem, for a return to
abandoned villages and equality in immigration rights to Israel. Equality in
immigration rights means the annulment of the Law of Return, or the legislation of a
Law of Return for Arabs; in other words, opening the country's gates to hundreds of
thousands of descendents of residents of 1948 Palestine, so that the country will
have a Palestinian majority. A return to abandoned villages means situating a
quarter of a million Israeli Arabs (as one "vision" estimates) in hundreds of rebuilt
villages, something that would alter Israel's demography, create hundreds of new
friction points and foster ongoing internal intra-ethnic conflict even after the external
conflict is resolved. Changing the flag and the national anthem, to make them
express the national uniqueness of the Arab minority, would abolish – on the
symbolic level – Israel as the Jewish national state; the next stage would have to be
changing the name of the state. Every Arab knows that the Jewish majority in Israel
could never consent to any one of these demands (or several others not cited
here). If they nonetheless go on raising them with increasing vehemence, the
intention is clear: to bolster the Palestinian narrative whose origins lie in the Nakba
(catastrophe) of 1948 and to ensure that the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians does not abate even after peace agreements are signed and an
independent Palestinian state arises alongside the State of Israel. Even if Israel one
day arrives at an understanding with the leaders of the Palestinian Authority and all
of the Arab states about taking the demand for the right of return off the agenda,
the demands of Israeli Arab citizens for a right of return for descendants of the
uprooted to their forefathers' villages and their other nationalistic demands will
ensure that the flames of the conflict are not extinguished. The tension between the
Jewish population and the Arab population within Israel would only continue and
even worsen over the years in the wake of demographic developments, until the
aim of the elimination of the Jewish state is finally achieved. It cannot be repeated
often enough: In 1947-48, the Arabs were given an opportunity to establish an
independent state on part of the territory of Palestine. Their leaders passed up this
opportunity and instead tried to drown the Jewish state in blood and fire. The
leaders of the descendants of the 1948 refugees who are scattered in the United
States and elsewhere, and of the Arabs who remained and became Israeli citizens,
are trying to repeat in a different way the failed attempt of the 1948 generation, with
terror from outside and by nurturing a separatist Palestinian narrative from within.
The result will be a deepening of the rift and a heightening of the hostility between
Jews and Arabs in Israel. The leadership and the liberal Jewish public accept Israeli
Arabs as citizens with equal rights, with the exception of certain areas that touch on
Israel's essence as a Jewish state (such as the Law of Return and the Law of
Citizenship). All would agree that, over the years, the Arab minority has suffered
discrimination in certain areas and that this must be remedied. But the leaders of
the Arabs in Israel are trying to show that their loyalty is not given to the State of
Israel in its present incarnation, but only to a binational Jewish-Arab state on the
territory of Israel, or to a Palestinian state on all the territory of the Land of Israel.
It's no wonder, then, that Israeli readiness to undo the discriminations of the past is
not that strong. All these "visions" herald a much bleaker future for relations
between Jews and Arabs in Israel.
39
Meron Benvenisti: Threats of the future vision, in „Haaretz“-online 17.12.2006: It
isn't clear whether the leaders of the Arab public will succeed in arousing serious
public discussion in the wake of the publication of the "future vision" they have
presented, which includes formulated demands for a more egalitarian division of
the public space in Israel. Chances are that the discussion will be limited to
intellectual circles and to Shin Bet security service investigators, and the challenge
that has been posed will earn the most efficient answer: It will be scornfully ignored.
After all, it is hard to imagine the Jewish public allowing the Arab minority to show it,
in a straightforward way, the picture of the binational reality that prevails in Israel in
fact. Rather, it will reject the audacious demand for the creation of legal, political
and cultural arrangements for administering this binational reality.
For 60 years, the discussion of "the problem of Israel's Arabs" has been going on in
the usual runaround of "oppression and discrimination" and its remedies –
"thickening of infrastructures," increased representation in public administration,
construction of more classrooms – and not necessarily because of a Jewish
aspiration to ignore the depth of the ethnic rift.
The Arabs themselves, apart from radical intellectuals, have not been eager to
raise demands for collective equality and communal autonomy, out of fear that this
would serve as an excuse for the authorities to take revenge on Arab institutions,
as has indeed happened in the past.
The focus on the question of discrimination, which can be remedied with
development budgets and patronizing activities undertaken by do-gooders, has
enabled the Jewish majority to repress the binational tension by means of an
oxymoron: "a Jewish and democratic state," and by means of academic hairsplitting
on "balance and proportionality" between the contradictory values embedded in that
phrase.
The challenge of the "vision of the future" is not new in its contents but rather in the
identity of those who are presenting it: no longer marginal intellectuals, but rather
the Palestinian-Israeli establishment itself – the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee
and the Committee of Arab Local Council heads. It turns out that the PalestinianIsraeli collective's process of crystallization has reached the point of maturity. Its
leaders have succeeded in formulating an agreed-upon position demanding
collective equal rights, and this inevitably must lead to a process of questioning the
Jewish hegemony over the entire public space. From the moment the demon is
allowed out of the bottle, there's no returning it, and the emergence of consensual
democracy that creates a new balance of collective rights is only a matter of time.
The experience of societies that are rent by ethnic disputes teaches that despite the
power gap between majority and minority, a determined minority that conducts its
struggle with democratic means will succeed in forcing on the majority concessions
in areas that had initially been perceived as matters of principle. In the Israeli case,
too, it will become clear, after an exhausting and painful process, that ignoring and
oppression do not help, and then it will be discovered that the public space is
capacious enough to enable the granting of collective rights to the minority, without
impinging in any significant way on the majority's rights, its identity or its image.
The trouble is that the Jewish majority has been educated on the perception that
there is only one legitimate collective in the homeland, and therefore it is unable to
think in terms of a shared homeland, and the recognition of the existence of a
neighboring national minority is too hard to bear.
Institutionalized ethnic separatism among the Arab minority is a direct result of a
mistaken policy; it is not the Arabs who have created the separatism but rather the
Jews. Their oppression of the Arabs and their discrimination against them are, in
every area, based on clearly ethnic criteria, and the crystallization of an alienated
Arab minority is an inevitable result.
Now that the Arabs have responded to the challenge and are demanding that they
be recognized as a national minority, their demand is being depicted as "a
declaration of war," as a call for the elimination of the Jewish state and for, worst of
all, a "binational state."
The fear of "binationalism" causes people to use the term carelessly, and thus to
divert and muddy the debate. First of all, there is a tendency to confuse the
binational reality that already prevails in the State of Israel, in which there are two
nations in a state of conflict, with a "binational" political program.
Secondly, people define the Arab demands for a consensual democracy as a
demand for the establishment of a binational state like Switzerland or Canada, and
then they "prove" that binationalism has failed everywhere else. However, the
correct comparison is with the dozens of countries where national minorities are
granted recognition of their collective, political and cultural rights, as defined in the
laws of the European Union, or in the southern Tyrol, Spain, Canada, Australia and
many other places.
The binational bogeyman has emerged in order to prevent any real attention being
paid to the challenge of the Arab "vision," but there is a more certain way to put off
any serious discussion of the collective rights of Israel's Arab citizens: the excuse of
the Palestinian state. One of the reasons for the Zionist left's support for its
establishment is its aspiration to iron out the contradiction between the principle of
communal-national equality and the discrimination against the Arab-Israeli minority.
Therefore, they hold that the desires of the Arabs of Israel "must be expressed in
the Palestinian state that will arise, and not in Israel."
And indeed, there is an apparent connection between the "vision" and the situation
in the territories. When it becomes clear that a Palestinian state will not arise, the
documents of the Palestinian public in Israel will come to serve as the political
program of all the Palestinians, in Israel and in the territories alike. This will not be
the first time that the "Arabs of 1967" will learn from their brothers, "the Arabs of
1948."
40
Frank-Walter Steinmeier: Deutschland steht an der Seite Libanons –
Namensartikel, erschienen in mehreren libanesischen Zeitungen am 01.12.2006:
Beirut ist eine der Hauptstädte, die ich in den letzten Monaten am häufigsten
besucht habe. So beeindruckend es jedes Mal ist, in diese stolze Stadt zu kommen,
so bedrückend ist es für mich, dass auch mein morgiger Besuch wieder so kurz
nach einem blutigen Ereignis stattfinden wird – der furchtbaren Ermordung von
Pierre Gemayel. Ich hatte nur zweimal die Gelegenheit mit ihm
zusammenzukommen, aber er ist mir als junger, beeindruckender Politiker in
Erinnerung geblieben. Sein gewaltsamer Tod erfüllt uns mit Bestürzung und Trauer.
Ich komme nach Beirut, um der libanesischen Bevölkerung und Premierminister
Siniora in diesen für Sie alle so schweren Zeiten die Unterstützung meines Landes
auszudrücken. Den Libanon und Deutschland verbinden lange und ausgesprochen
freundschaftliche Beziehungen. Sie sind noch enger geworden seit die deutsche
Marine am 15. Oktober die Führung über die Seestreitkräfte der UNIFIL-Mission
übernommen hat. Erstmals treten über 1.000 deutsche Soldaten direkt für Stabilität
und Sicherheit an der Seegrenze des Libanon ein. Erstmals in der Geschichte der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland sind deutsche Truppen im Nahen Osten im Einsatz.
Für Deutschland war diese Entscheidung alles andere als einfach, und es gab
Stimmen, die aufgrund unserer Geschichte prinzipiell gegen den Einsatz deutscher
Soldaten im Libanon waren. Oberste Priorität für meine Regierung war jedoch, dem
Töten ein Ende zu setzen. Uns war klar: Ohne die UNIFIL und ohne Resolution
1701 wäre der Krieg weitergegangen, und das durfte nicht sein. Es ist im Libanon
schon viel zu viel Blut geflossen. Daher haben wir der Bitte der libanesischen
Regierung, sie bei der Kontrolle der Seegrenze so lange zu unterstützen, bis sie
diese wichtige Aufgabe allein wahrnehmen kann, entsprochen. Deutsche und
libanesische Marinesoldaten üben diese Aufgabe heute Seite an Seite aus, und wir
sind stolz darauf, wie reibungslos und vertrauensvoll diese Zusammenarbeit
funktioniert.
Die deutsche Bevölkerung hat die verheerenden Auswirkungen der jüngsten
Kampfhandlungen auf Ihr Land, das eben dabei war, sich von den langen Jahren
des Bürgerkriegs zu erholen, mit großer Anteilnahme verfolgt. Viele Libanesen sind
1990 aus dem Exil zurückgekehrt, um gemeinsam mit denen, die durch all die
Kriegsjahre im Land geblieben sind, den Libanon wieder aufzubauen – mit
beachtlichem Erfolg. Heute dürfen ihre Mühen nicht umsonst gewesen sein. Wir
dürfen nicht zulassen, dass Väter und Mütter sich erneut fragen müssen, ob ihre
Kinder im Libanon eine Zukunft haben! Daher hat sich meine Regierung
entschieden, insgesamt 80 Millionen Euro für Hilfsmaßnahmen im Libanon zur
Verfügung zu stellen. Im Süden des Landes helfen deutsche Fachkräfte, die
Wasserversorgung in Stand zu setzen und bauen Berufsbildungsschulen wieder
auf, deutsche Polizisten und Zollexperten beraten ihre Kollegen in den
libanesischen Behörden bei der Einrichtung einer effizienten Grenzüberwachung.
Der Mut und die Entschlossenheit, mit der die libanesische Bevölkerung sich der
Herausforderung des Wiederaufbaus stellt, verdient unser aller Respekt. Mein Land
weiß aus der eigenen Geschichte, wie schwer diese Aufgabe ist. Wir standen und
stehen hierbei an Ihrer Seite.
Die Regierung von Premierminister Fouad Siniora hat Gewaltiges geleistet: Sie hat
die Einigung über den syrischen Truppenabzug hergestellt, die Einheit des Landes
durch alle Turbulenzen der letzten Monate gewahrt und den Wiederaufbau
begonnen. Dafür hat sie sich den tiefen Respekt meines Landes und der ganzen
Welt erworben. Jetzt steht sie vor der großen Herausforderung, die juristische
Aufarbeitung des Mordes an Rafiq Hariri und so vieler anderer durchzusetzen. Ich
weiß um die enorme Schwierigkeit dieser Aufgabe. Aus der Erfahrung meines
eigenen Landes weiß ich aber auch, wie wichtig die Aufarbeitung solcher
Verbrechen ist, wenn eine Gesellschaft die Grundlage für eine sichere Zukunft
schaffen will: Wahrheit ist die Voraussetzung für Versöhnung und ohne
Versöhnung kann es keinen inneren Frieden geben. Daher hoffe ich und schließe
den Appell an, dass alle Parteien des Libanon und der Region sich ihrer
Verantwortung in dieser Frage bewusst werden.
Deutschland wünscht sich einen freien Libanon, demokratisch verfasst und
souverän, in der seine multikonfessionelle Gesellschaft eine Zukunft hat. Eine
gewaltige Aufgabe für ein Land, dessen Souveränität so oft bedroht war. Aber die
Menschen im Libanon haben sich schon immer durch ihre Vielfalt, ihr Talent und
nicht zuletzt ihren Unternehmergeist ausgezeichnet. Ihre Presselandschaft, Ihre
Wissenschaftler, Literaten und Musiker – kaum ein anderes Land in dieser Region
hat so viel Kreativität hervorgebracht. Sie ist das große Potenzial dieses Landes,
das es zu wahren gilt.
Wir Europäer benötigten die Zerstörung zweier Weltkriege, bis wir begriffen haben,
dass wir nur gemeinsam ein tragfähiges Fundament für Frieden, Sicherheit und
Wohlstand in Europa bauen können. Heute, 60 Jahre nach Ende des Zweiten
Weltkriegs, sind Deutsche und Franzosen wohl die am engsten verbündeten Völker
in Europa. Was unsere Großväter in ihrer Jugend noch als für alle Zeit undenkbar
hielten – heute können sich junge Franzosen und Deutsche keine andere Realität
mehr vorstellen.
Ich wünsche mir, dass dies eines Tages auch hier im Nahen Osten möglich ist. Seit
60 Jahren leben Sie und Ihre Nachbarn mit Krieg, Terror und Gewalt. Das sind 60
Jahre zu viel. Ich bin der festen Überzeugung, dass es Frieden zwischen
Libanesen, Syrern, Israelis und Palästinensern geben wird. Europa ist bereit, sich
hierfür zu engagieren, auch wenn wir über keine Zauberformel verfügen, mit der
sich alle Konflikte sofort lösen ließen. Deutschland übernimmt in vier Wochen die
Ratspräsidentschaft der Europäischen Union. Wir wissen sehr gut: Nach all den
Jahren der Gewalt wird Vertrauen nur langsam wachsen können. Damit es dazu
kommt, müssen aber mutige Politiker auf allen Seiten einen ersten Schritt machen.
Diese Verantwortung tragen wir gemeinsam.
41
Vgl. das Interview Carters zu seinem Buch in der Menüleiste „Rezensionen“
dieser Homepage.
Karen DeYoung: Carter Book on Israel ‘Apartheid’ Sparks Bitter Debate, in
“Washington Post” 7.12.2006: A veteran Middle East scholar affiliated with the
Carter Center in Atlanta resigned his position there Monday in an escalating
controversy over former president Jimmy Carter's bestselling book on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. The book, "Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid," traces the ups and
downs of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process beginning with Carter's 1977-1980
presidency and the historic peace accord he negotiated between Israel and Egypt
and continuing to the present. Although it apportions blame to Israel, the
Palestinians and outside parties -- including the United States -- for the failure of
decades of peace efforts, it is sharply critical of Israeli policy and concludes that
"Israel's continued control and colonization of Palestinian land have been the
primary obstacles to a comprehensive peace agreement in the Holy Land." Kenneth
W. Stein, a professor at Emory University, accused Carter of factual errors,
omissions and plagiarism in the book. "Being a former President does not give one
a unique privilege to invent information," Stein wrote in a harshly worded e-mail to
friends and colleagues explaining his resignation as the center's Middle East fellow.
Stein offered no specifics in his e-mail to back up the charges, writing only that "in
due course, I shall detail these points and reflect on their origins." A statement
issued by the center yesterday in Carter's name said he regretted Stein's
resignation "from the titular position as a Fellow" and noted that he had not been
"actively involved" there for the past 12 years. Carter thanked Stein for his advice
and assistance "during the early years of our Center" and wished him well. While
acknowledging that the word "apartheid" refers to the system of legal racial
separation once used in South Africa, Carter says in his book that it is an
appropriate term for Israeli policies devoted to "the acquisition of land" in
Palestinian territories through Jewish settlements and Israel's incorporation of
Palestinian land on its side of a separating wall it is erecting. He criticizes suicide
bombers and those who "consider the killing of Israelis as victories" but also notes
that "some Israelis believe they have the right to confiscate and colonize Palestinian
land and try to justify the sustained subjugation and persecution of increasingly
hopeless and aggravated Palestinians." Accusing the Bush administration of
abandoning the effort to promote a lasting peace, he calls for renewed negotiations
on the basis of security guarantees for Israel and Israel's recognition of U.N.established borders. Formally published three weeks ago, the book quickly became
a bestseller. Carter has been prominently interviewed in the media and has been
mobbed at book appearances around the country. Speaking Sunday on NBC's
"Meet the Press," he said he was glad the book had raised controversy. "If it
provokes debate and assessment and disputes and arguments and maybe some
action in the Middle East to get the peace process, which is now completely absent
or dormant, rejuvenated, and brings peace ultimately to Israel, that's what I want,"
he said. Criticism of the book, primarily from Jewish groups and leaders, began
even before it was published, and it became an issue in the midterm elections last
month. The New York-based Jewish Daily Forward noted in October that
Democrats were trying to distance themselves from its reported contents as
Republicans were seeking to widely disseminate Carter's views in an effort to win
Jewish votes. Speaking to the Forward about Carter, Republican Jewish Coalition
executive director Matthew Brooks said the coalition had "not shied away from
shining a light on some of his misguided and outrageous comments about Israel in
the past. . . . So far, there's been nothing but silence on the part of the Democratic
establishment in terms of holding Carter accountable." Rep. Steve Israel, a
Democrat from New York, told the Forward that the "book clearly does not reflect
the direction of the party." Since then, the controversy has only grown. In a widely
published commentary last weekend, Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz wrote
that Carter's "use of the loaded word 'apartheid,' suggesting an analogy to the
hated policies of South Africa, is especially outrageous." In a statement issued
Monday, the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles contended that Carter
"abandons all objectivity and unabashedly acts as a virtual spokesman for the
Palestinian cause." In a telephone interview yesterday, Stein said that Carter had
"taken [material] directly" from a published work written by a third party but that
legal action was being contemplated and he was not yet at liberty to make the
details public. He said accounts in the book about meetings he had attended with
Carter between 1980 and 1990 had left out key facts in order to "make the Israelis
look like they're the only ones responsible" for the failure of peace efforts.
Alan Dershowitz: The World According to Carter Books, “The New York Sun”
22.11.2006: Sometimes you really can tell a book by its cover. President Jimmy
Carter's decision to title his new anti-Israel screed "Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid"
(Simon & Schuster, 288 pages, $27) tells it all. His use of the loaded word
"apartheid," suggesting an analogy to the hated policies of South Africa, is
especially outrageous, considering his acknowledgment buried near the end of his
shallow and superficial book that what is going on in Israel today "is unlike that in
South Africa-not racism, but the acquisition of land." Nor does he explain that
Israel's motivation for holding on to land it captured in a defensive war is the
prevention of terrorism. Israel has tried, on several occasions, to exchange land for
peace, and what it got instead was terrorism, rockets, and kidnappings launched
from the returned land.
In fact, Palestinian-Arab terrorism is virtually missing from Mr. Carter's entire
historical account, which blames nearly everything on Israel and almost nothing on
the Palestinians. Incredibly, he asserts that the initial violence in the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict occurred when "Jewish militants" attacked Arabs in 1939.
The long history of Palestinian terrorism against Jews – which began in 1929, when
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem ordered the slaughter of more than 100 rabbis,
students, and non-Zionist Sephardim whose families had lived in Hebron and other
ancient Jewish cities for millennia – was motivated by religious bigotry. The Jews
responded to this racist violence by establishing a defense force. There is no
mention of the long history of Palestinian terrorism before the occupation, or of the
Munich massacre and others inspired byYasser Arafat. There is not even a
reference to the Karine A, the boatful of terrorist weapons ordered by Arafat in
January 2002.
Mr. Carter's book is so filled with simple mistakes of fact and deliberate omissions
that were it a brief filed in a court of law, it would be struck and its author
sanctioned for misleading the court. Mr. Carter too is guilty of misleading the court
of public opinion. A mere listing of all of Mr. Carter's mistakes and omissions would
fill a volume the size of his book. Here are just a few of the most egregious:
Mr. Carter emphasizes that "Christian and Muslim Arabs had continued to live in
this same land since Roman times," but he ignores the fact that Jews have lived in
Hebron, Tzfat, Jerusalem, and other cities for even longer. Nor does he discuss the
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Jews from Arab countries since 1948.
Mr. Carter repeatedly claims that the Palestinian Arabs have long supported a twostate solution and the Israelis have always opposed it. Yet he makes no mention of
the fact that in 1938 the Peel Commission proposed a two-state solution, with Israel
receiving a mere sliver of its ancient homeland and the Palestinians receiving the
bulk of the land. The Jews accepted and the Palestinians rejected this proposal
because Arab leaders cared more about there being no Jewish state on Muslim
holy land than about having a Palestinian state of their own. He barely mentions
Israel's acceptance, and the Palestinian rejection, of the United Nation's division of
the mandate in 1948. He claims that in 1967 Israel launched a preemptive attack
against Jordan.
The fact is that Jordan attacked Israel first, Israel tried desperately to persuade
Jordan to remain out of the war, and Israel counterattacked after the Jordanian
army surrounded Jerusalem, firing missiles into the center of the city. Only then did
Israel capture the West Bank, which it was willing to return in exchange for peace
and recognition from Jordan.
Mr. Carter repeatedly mentions Security Council Resolution 242, which called for
return of captured territories in exchange for peace, recognition, and secure
boundaries, but he ignores that Israel accepted and all the Arab nations and the
Palestinians rejected this resolution. The Arabs met in Khartum and issued their
three famous "no's": "No peace, no recognition, no negotiation." But you wouldn't
know that from reading the history according to Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter faults Israel for its "air strike that destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor"
without mentioning that Iraq had threatened to attack Israel with nuclear weapons if
Iraq succeeded in building a bomb.
Mr. Carter faults Israel for its administration of Christian and Muslim religious sites,
when in fact Israel is scrupulous about ensuring those of every religion the right to
worship as they please – consistent, of course, with security needs. He fails to
mention that between 1948 and 1967, when Jordan occupied the West Bank and
East Jerusalem, the Hashemites destroyed and desecrated Jewish religious sites
and prevented Jews from praying at the Western Wall. He also never mentions
Egypt's brutal occupation of Gaza between 1949 and 1967.
Mr. Carter blames Israel, and exonerates Arafat, for the Palestinian refusal to
accept statehood on 95% of the West Bank and all of Gaza pursuant to the ClintonBarak offers at Camp David and Taba in 2000-2001. He accepts the Palestinian
revisionist history, rejects the eyewitness accounts of President Clinton and Dennis
Ross, and ignores Saudi Prince Bandar's accusation that Arafat's rejection of the
proposal was "a crime" and that Arafat's account "was not truthful" – except,
apparently, to Mr. Carter. The fact that Mr. Carter chooses to believe Arafat over
Mr. Clinton speaks volumes.
Mr. Carter's description of the recent Lebanon war is misleading. He begins by
asserting that Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers. "Captured" suggests a
military apprehension subject to the usual prisoner of war status. The soldiers were
kidnapped, and have not been heard from – not even a sign of life. The rocket
attacks that preceded Israel's invasion are largely ignored, as is the fact that
Hezbollah fired its rockets from civilian population centers.
Mr. Carter gives virtually no credit to Israel's superb legal system, falsely asserting
(without any citation) that "confessions extracted through torture are admissible in
Israeli courts," that prisoners are "executed,"and that the "accusers" act "as
judges." Even Israel's most severe critics acknowledge the fairness of the Israeli
Supreme Court, but not Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter even blames Israel for the "exodus of Christians from the Holy Land,"
totally ignoring the Islamization of the area by Hamas and the comparable exodus
of Christian Arabs from Lebanon as a result of the increasing influence of
Hezbollah and the repeated assassination of Christian leaders by Syria.
Mr. Carter also blames every American administration but his own for the Mideast
stalemate with particular emphasis on "a submissive White House and U.S.
Congress in recent years." He employs hyperbole and overstatement when he says
that "dialogue on controversial issues is a privilege to be extended only as a reward
for subservient behavior and withheld from those who reject U.S. demands." He
confuses terrorist states, such as Iran and Syria, to which we do not extend
dialogue, with states with whom we strongly disagree, such as France and China,
but with whom we have constant dialogue.
And it's not just the facts; it's the tone as well. It's obvious that Mr. Carter just
doesn't like Israel or Israelis. He lectured Golda Meir on Israeli's "secular" nature,
warning her that "Israel was punished whenever its leaders turned away from
devout worship of God." He admits that he did not like Menachem Begin. He has
little good to say about any Israelis – except those few who agree with him. But he
apparently got along swimmingly with the very secular Syrian mass-murderer Hafez
al-Assad. Mr. Carter and his wife Rosalynn also had a fine time with the equally
secular Arafat – a man who has the blood of hundreds of Americans and Israelis on
his hands: "Rosalynn and I met with Yasir Arafat in Gaza City, where he was
staying with his wife, Suha, and their little daughter. The baby, dressed in a
beautiful pink suit, came readily to sit on my lap, where I practiced the same wiles
that had been successful with our children and grandchildren. A lot of photographs
were taken, and then the photographers asked that Arafat hold his daughter for a
while. When he took her, the child screamed loudly and reached out her hands to
me, bringing jovial admonitions to the presidential candidate to stay at home
enough to become acquainted with is own child."
There is something quite disturbing about these pictures. "Palestine: Peace Not
Apartheid" is so biased that it inevitably raises the question of what would motivate
a decent man like Jimmy Carter to write such an indecent book. Whatever Mr.
Carter's motives may be, his authorship of this ahistorical, one-sided, and simplistic
brief against Israel forever disqualifies him from playing any positive role in fairly
resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. That is a tragedy
because the Carter Center, which has done much good in the world, could have
been a force for peace if Jimmy Carter were as generous in spirit to the Israelis as
he is to the Palestinians.
Letter from Knneth W. Stein, Professor of Contemporary Middle astern Historiy,
Political Science, and Israeli Studies & Director of the Middle East Research
Program and Emory Institute for the Study of Modern Israel, Atlanta (Georgia), Dec.
6, 2006, to his colleagues and students:
HiThis note is to inform you that yesterday, I sent letters to President Jimmy Carter,
Emory University President Jim Wagner, and Dr. John Hardman, Executive
Director of the Carter Center resigning my position, effectively immediately, as
Middle East Fellow of the Carter Center of Emory University. This ends my 23 year
association with an institution that in some small way I helped shape and develop.
My joint academic position in Emory College in the History and Political Science
Departments, and, as Director of the Emory Institute for the Study of Modern Israel
remains unchanged.
Many still believe that I have an active association with the Center and, act as an
adviser to President Carter, neither is the case. President Carter has intermittently
continued to come to the Arab-Israeli Conflict class I teach in Emory College. He
gives undergraduate students a fine first hand recollection of the Begin-Sadat
negotiations of the late 1970s. Since I left the Center physically thirteen years ago,
the Middle East program of the Center has waned as has my status as a Carter
Center Fellow. For the record, I had nothing to do with the research, preparation,
writing, or review of President Carter's recent publication. Any material which he
used from the book we did together in 1984, The Blood of Abraham, he used
unilaterally.
President Carter's book on the Middle East, a title too inflammatory to even print, is
not based on unvarnished analyses; it is replete with factual errors, copied
materials not cited, superficialities, glaring omissions, and simply invented
segments. Aside from the one-sided nature of the book, meant to provoke, there
are recollections cited from meetings where I was the third person in the room, and
my notes of those meetings show little similarity to points claimed in the book.
Being a former President does not give one a unique privilege to invent information
or to unpack it with cuts, deftly slanted to provide a particular outlook. Having little
access to Arabic and Hebrew sources, I believe, clearly handicapped his
understanding and analyses of how history has unfolded over the last decade.
Falsehoods, if repeated often enough become meta-truths, and they then can
become the erroneous baseline for shaping and reinforcing attitudes and for policymaking. The history and interpretation of the Arab-Israeli conflict is already
drowning in half-truths, suppositions, and self-serving myths; more are not
necessary. In due course, I shall detail these points and reflect on their origins.
The decade I spent at the Carter Center (1983-1993) as the first permanent
Executive Director and as the first Fellow were intellectually enriching for Emory as
an institution, the general public, the interns who learned with us, and for me
professionally. Setting standards for rigorous interchange and careful analyses
spilled out to the other programs that shaped the Center's early years. There was
mutual respect for all views; we carefully avoided polemics or special pleading. This
book does not hold to those standards. My continued association with the Center
leaves the impression that I am sanctioning a series of egregious errors and
polemical conclusions which appeared in President Carter's book. I can not allow
that impression to stand.
Through Emory College, I have continued my professional commitment to inform
students and the general public about the history and politics of Israel, the Middle
East, and American policies toward the region. I have tried to remain true to a lifetime devotion to scholarly excellence based upon unvarnished analyses and
intellectual integrity. I hold fast to the notion that academic settings and those in
positions of influence must teach and not preach. Through Emory College, in public
lectures, and in OPED writings, I have adhered to the strong belief that history must
be presented in context, and understood the way it was, not the way we wish it to
be.
In closing, let me thank you for your friendship, past and continuing support for
ISMI, and to Emory College. Let me also wish you and your loved ones a happy
holiday season, and a healthy and productive new year. As ever,
Ken
Jimmy Carter: Enough Glase to Go Around (Interview), in “Chicago Tribune”
03.12.2006: Former President Jimmy Carter has sparked controversy with a new
book, "Palestine Peace Not Apartheid" (Simon & Schuster), that critics say puts
much of the blame on Israel for continued conflict with the Palestinians. In a phone
interview, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who runs the Carter Center in Atlanta
and teaches Sunday school, spoke about the Iraq war and the prospects for peace
between Israel and the Palestinians. An architect of the Camp David accords,
which led to Israel and Egypt signing a peace treaty in 1979, Carter faulted both
Israelis and Palestinians for their failure to make peace, and he accused the Bush
administration of failing to move effectively to end the conflict. Following is an edited
transcript.
Q.: Why did you write this book on this subject at this time?
A.: For almost 30 years one of my strongest commitments has been to bring peace
to Israel and have its existence accepted by all people. One of my major steps in
negotiating the Camp David accords was to have Israel withdraw from the West
Bank and other occupied territories. The Camp David accords and the Oslo
accords and the recent "road map" all would require that Israel withdraw from the
occupied territories. And Israel accepted those principles, and its leaders did, and
for that some of them won the Nobel Peace Prize. Israel always had the option of
withdrawing, and now its choice is illegal occupation and colonization of land. These
are facts, and in this country this issue [of Israel's continued occupation] is not even
debated. These issues are not even brought forward in Congress, and rarely in the
U.S. news media. They are hotly debated in other places and the decision is almost
unanimous that Israel is abusing international law. For this reason, I felt it was time,
and I wanted to bring these issues to the forefront now.
Q.: Is this aimed at the Bush administration?
A.: It's not just a matter of the current administration, which has defaulted
completely on its responsibilities. There hasn't been a single day of peace
negotiations between Israel and its neighbors in six years. In all previous
administrations, they at least made a strong effort to get Israel to negotiate with its
neighbors. There are some strong voices of Israeli moderation speaking of this
now, and among American Jewish leaders. Privately, they speak similarly to what
I'm saying in the book, but publicly they give no word.
Q.: Nearly 30 years after your achievement at Camp David, do you ever think
peace is simply not possible there?
A.: No. If I thought it was not possible, I wouldn't have taken a year to write this
book. I still think it's possible, and all those forums, including the United Nations,
can help.
Q.: How do you assess the efforts of your successors, Presidents Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, at addressing the Mideast peace
process?
A.: I describe each one thoroughly in a chapter in the book. The strongest leader
we had was George Bush senior, and with him [Secretary of State] Jim Baker, and
they condemned severely Israel's occupation of the West Bank and their building
settlements there. And George Bush senior actually withheld several hundred
million dollars [from Israel]. That was the main thing. President Reagan did not try
to negotiate peace but issued a strong statement in support of the Camp David
accords. Clinton made an effort, but he put forward proposals that were never
seriously considered by the Palestinians or the Israeli government. [Then Israeli]
Prime Minister [Ehud] Barak and [Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat never accepted
it, and it called for a partition of the West Bank into two parts, and to leave 209
Israeli settlements in the West Bank. And they proposed cancelling all the previous
UN resolutions that applied to Palestinian rights. Clinton did the best he could.
Q.: What is the solution as you see it, for Jewish settlements, Palestinian refugees,
Jerusalem, security and terrorism – the deal breakers that have stymied things
since Oslo?
A.: The [2003] Geneva Initiative, which the Carter Center helped negotiate, is the
best approach – with the exception of negotiated modifications, leaving about half
the Israeli settlers in Palestinian lands, in exchange for which the Israelis would
swap Israeli land. This is not an official plan, but a blueprint. It said the Palestinians
would have a right to return to Palestine, but the only ones to return to Israel would
be the ones approved by the Israeli government, and others could be
compensated. It was a reasonable approach, but based on the [2001] Taba
negotiations, which happened as Clinton was leaving office, that is an approach
that could be followed. And Palestinians supported it, and a majority of Israelis at
the time.
Q.: Given the situation now, with the militant Islamic group Hamas running the
Palestinian Authority, what is your reaction to the U.S., Israel and other nations
cutting off funding to a duly elected Palestinian government?
A.: It not only penalizes Hamas, but all Palestinians. I thought it was a tragedy and
a crime against the Palestinian people to cut off their own money and aid. The
Palestinian people in Gaza are starving, and they haven't been able to pay health
workers and teachers and others.
Q. With Democrats taking control of the House and Senate, do you think this U.S.
election was a referendum on the war in Iraq, and if so, do you see any Democratic
plan that could extricate the U.S.?
A.: I think the Democrats have to recognize that the commander in chief is still in
office and that any decision made about the military ultimately has to be made by
the president. It would not be fair to interfere. I've been against the Iraq war from
the start, but there has to be a good-faith discussion between all the members of
the Congress and the White House on what to do. And all in Washington are
waiting for the Baker report as well. [The Iraq Study Group] is going to be a kind of
way out, as soon as it's practical and possible.
Q.: Much has been made of how George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton have become
closer now. Do you have any similar relations with any other ex-president?
A.: President Gerald Ford and I were probably the most intimate personal friends in
history. And I noticed when we celebrated the nation's 200th birthday in the White
House that historians said Gerald Ford and I were the closest of friends.
42
Current Thinking. A Conversation with Jimmy Carter, in „Tikkun“
January/February 2007, S. 6 f.
43
„Unser Beitrag wird respektiert.” Interview mit Bundesaußenminister FrankWalter Steinmeier in FR 28.11.20006:
Frage: Herr Steinmeier, hat Deutschlands beliebtester Minister im nächsten Jahr
den schwierigsten Job?
Antwort: Im ersten Halbjahr, wenn wir Deutschen die Ratspräsidentschaft in der
Europäischen Union haben, werden wir mit einer ungewohnten Vielzahl von
internationalen Konflikten konfrontiert sein, zu denen die EU nicht nur eine Meinung
haben muss. Entweder ist sie schon selbst engagiert, oder sie muss eigene
Vorschläge zur Beruhigung machen. Hinzu kommt unsere innere Verfasstheit: Die
EU muss eine der tiefsten inneren Krisen seit Bestehen überwinden.
Die Vereinten Nationen verlieren an Autorität, die EU laboriert an ihrer inneren
Verfassung, die US-Außenpolitik ist blockiert: Versagen die gewohnten
Instrumente?
Mit Ihrer Analyse stimme ich in einem Punkt überhaupt nicht überein, bei den
Vereinten Nationen. Die UN sind inzwischen weltweit derart engagiert, dass daraus
eher ein Problem der Überforderung als mangelnder Autorität erwächst. Aber wir
stehen nach meiner festen Überzeugung vor einer Renaissance des
Multilateralismus, weil andere Lösungsformen internationaler Konflikte sich nicht
bewährt haben.
Welche Rolle kann Deutschland mit seiner Führungsposition durch den Vorsitz in
der EU und der G-8 spielen?
Unsere Rolle hängt nicht so sehr von formalen Positionen ab. Wir sind auch bisher
der Verantwortung nicht ausgewichen, wenn in kritischen Situationen die
Staatengemeinschaft und damit auch Deutschland gefordert waren. Das war in
Afghanistan so, das gilt für die Stabilisierungsmission im Kongo und erst Recht im
Nahen Osten, beim vielleicht schwerwiegendsten Konflikt dieses Jahres.
Am heutigen Dienstagabend beginnt in Riga der Nato-Gipfel. Laut Bundeskanzlerin
Angela Merkel muss das Bündnis zentrales Forum eines strategischen
transatlantischen Dialogs sein. Wird sich das in der lettischen Hauptstadt
bemerkbar machen?
Das hat sich auch schon vor dem Gipfel bemerkbar gemacht, etwa auf der
jüngsten Außenminister-Sitzung der Nato. Dort wurde der Anstoß gegeben zur
Fortentwicklung des Engagements in Afghanistan durch einen verstärkten zivilen
Anteil. In den Nato-Gremien finden substanzielle Diskussionen statt – wenn sie
auch nicht immer in die Schlagzeilen kommen.
Dort läuft statt dessen die Nato-Diskussion, ob die Deutschen sich in Afghanistan
wegducken. Zeigt das nicht, wie wenig ausdiskutiert diese Militäreinsätze sind und
wie schnell ein Gegeneinander zwischen den Nato-Partnern entstehen kann?
Jüngste Zeitungsberichte und vielleicht auch der eine oder andere Debattenbeitrag
auf der Nato-Parlamentarierversammlung in Kanada sind das eine. Andererseits
habe ich aber in Vorbereitung auf den Nato-Gipfel in Riga selbst mit vielen
Außenministern gesprochen. Was sie mir sagen, entspricht überhaupt nicht dem,
was öffentlich jetzt diskutiert wird. Dass hier ein Spiel vorbereitet werden soll, bei
dem Deutschland den Schwarzen Peter bekommt, kann ich überhaupt nicht
bestätigen. Unser Beitrag wird respektiert. Ich verweise auch sehr selbstbewusst
darauf, dass unser Philosophie, neben das notwendige militärische Engagement
immer auch ein paralleles ziviles Engagement zu setzen, der richtige Weg ist.
Bedeutet diese deutsche Vorwärts-Verteidigung nicht auch: Andere denken zu sehr
rein militärisch?
Zunächst mal ist es gar keine Verteidigung, denn die halte ich nicht für nötig. Die
Grundphilosophie des zivil-militärischen Einsatzes, die unser Engagement von
Anfang an prägte, führt ja auf einen Weg, den andere jetzt ebenfalls gehen wollen.
Und auch im Süden Afghanistans werden wir einen Neuansatz mit sogenannten
Sicherheitsinseln erleben, von denen aus der Wiederaufbau beginnen kann. Dafür
müssen wir der afghanischen Bevölkerung sichtbare Zeichen geben.
Woran es im Süden bisher mangelte?
Das mag man so sehen, und dies hat Gründe. Aufgrund der Sicherheitslage, aber
auch, weil die notwendige Parallelität zwischen militärischer Sicherung und zivilem
Aufbau nicht in gleicher Weise gesehen worden ist. Zugegebenermaßen war das
im Norden einfacher, aber wir müssen es auch in den anderen Regionen
Afghanistans schaffen. Im Westen sind wir so weit. Im Süden und im Osten muss
es Schritte dahin geben.
Der Zentralkonflikt ist jetzt wieder der im Nahen Osten. Wie verlässlich ist der
jüngste Waffenstillstand?
Ich sehe auf beiden Seiten den erforderlichen guten Willen, trotz anfänglicher
Schwierigkeiten in einen dauerhaften Waffenstillstand zu kommen. Ich hoffe, dass
dies dann den Weg für Direktgespräche zwischen Premierminister Olmert und
Präsident Abbas ebnen wird und auch endlich Bewegung in die Frage des im
Gaza-Streifen gefangenen israelischen Soldaten kommt. Ohne störenden Einfluss
Dritter wären beide Parteien nach meiner Überzeugung in dieser Frage schon
weiter gewesen.
Alle sind sich einig: Ziel kann nur ein international garantierter Friede sein. Warum
unterstützen Sie nicht den Vorschlag einiger EU-Länder für eine
Friedenskonferenz, die den Weg dorthin öffnen soll?
Im Moment haben wir im Nahen Osten bestenfalls Stagnation, und alle sind sich
einig, dass es dringend neuer Dynamik bedarf. Sie sollten es nicht missverstehen,
wenn ich den Vorschlag Spaniens und Frankreichs zu einer Friedenskonferenz
nicht vorbehaltlos unterstützt habe. Gerade an der sofortigen Zurückweisung durch
beide Konfliktparteien haben wir jedoch gesehen, wie sensibel man vorgehen
muss. Wir sollten nicht den Eindruck erwecken, dem Nahen Osten könne mit
ständig neuen Überschriften geholfen werden. Im Befriedungsfahrplan, dem
Prozess der „road-map“, hat das Nahost-Quartett aus USA, UN, EU und Russland
alle Elemente entwickelt, die auf dem Weg zu neuer Stabilität wichtig sind. Das
muss man nicht jeden Tag neu aufschreiben. Das Komplizierte sind die ersten
Schritte auf dem langen Weg. Wir müssen Israel und Palästina dauerhaft
miteinander ins Gespräch bringen und Hindernisse aus dem Weg räumen, die
einem Friedensprozess im Weg stehen. Zum Beispiel durch
Gefangenenaustausch. Dass wir später auch eine internationale Konferenz
brauchen, schließe ich nicht aus. Der Weg dorthin will aber geebnet werden.
Was gehört noch dazu?
Die Situation ist so explosiv wie noch nie in den vergangenen Jahren. Das ist
Grund zu hohem diplomatischem Ehrgeiz, was die gesamte Region anbelangt.
Syrien zum Beispiel bleibt da ein komplizierter, schwieriger Partner. Wegen der
inakzeptablen Haltung der syrischen Regierung unmittelbar nach Verabschiedung
der jüngsten Libanon-Resolution 1701 des Sicherheitsrates musste ich eine schon
vorbereitete Reise wieder absagen. Aber es bleibt richtig, dass Frieden im Nahen
Osten am Ende nur mit und nicht gegen Syrien zu erringen sein wird. Trotz aller
Schwierigkeiten müssen wir weiter versuchen, Syrien in einen konstruktiven Dialog
mit uns zu bringen. Damaskus muss aber selbst den Willen aufbringen, sich aus
der selbstverschuldeten Isolation zu befreien.
Falls der erkennbar wird, fahren Sie dann bald hin?
Der Kontakt ist nach Absage meiner Reise nicht abgebrochen.
Was wird in der Nahostpolitik der erste kleine Schritt des EU-Ratsvorsitzenden
Steinmeier sein?
Auf palästinensischer Seite brauchen wir jetzt eine Regierung der nationalen
Einheit. Auf israelischer die Bereitschaft, mit einer solchen Regierung das
Gespräch aufzunehmen. Wenn dabei die europäische Ratspräsidentschaft
behilflich sein kann, will ich mich dafür gerne engagieren. Darüber hinaus setzen
wir auf eine Reaktivierung des Nahost-Quartetts.
Wie steht’s denn nach den Wahlen mit der Bereitschaft der USA?
Ohne die USA werden wir im Nahen Osten nichts Entscheidendes bewegen. Es hat
zwar am Rande der UN-Vollversammlung im September eine Sitzung des
Quartetts gegeben – das allein reicht aber nicht. Alle Beteiligten müssen das
ernsthafte Engagement zeigen, sich dieser Region zuzuwenden. Und ich bin der
festen Überzeugung, dass das in Washington auch so gesehen wird.
Wie sehen denn die Signale aus, die Sie jetzt aus Washington empfangen?
Wir werden unsere Partnerschaft bei der Lösung uns gemeinsam betreffender
Konflikte anbieten, und ich habe den Eindruck, dass die amerikanische
Außenpolitik in jüngster Zeit auch stärker auf diese Partnerschaft setzt. Das hat
sich schon im – nicht einfachen, aber fruchtbaren – Diskussionsprozess über die
iranische Atomrüstung gezeigt. Ich selbst werde in Vorbereitung unserer EU- und
G-8-Präsidentschaft am 8. Dezember mit Außenministerin Rice zu ausführlichen
Gesprächen zusammentreffen.
Wie sieht unser Angebot für die Partnerschaft im Irak aus?
Es bleibt dabei: Unsere Soldaten werden nicht in den Irak gehen. Unser
Engagement für den Wiederaufbau in Form von Entschuldung und Barleistung in
Höhe von fast fünf Milliarden Euro ist durchaus beachtlich. Ob die Entwicklung der
Sicherheitslage darüber hinaus weitere zivile Beteiligung zulässt, bleibt abzuwarten.
Was ist der Maßstab des Erfolgs für die Etappe im EU-Vorsitz?
Ob es ein Erfolg war, werden am Ende die Partner, Öffentlichkeit und Medien
beurteilen. Das Pflichtprogramm ist anspruchsvoll: Berliner Erklärung am 24. März,
Weichenstellung im Verfassungsprozess, Energie- und Nachbarschaftspolitik.
Daneben werden wir mit alten Konflikten im neuen Gewand konfrontiert werden.
Nach einer Entscheidung über den Status des Kosovo werden wir unseren Beitrag
leisten müssen, dass diese von allen akzeptiert wird und damit die
Voraussetzungen für die bislang größte zivile Mission der Europäischen Union
geschaffen werden. Auch die militärischen Kontingente werden noch eine Zeitlang
dort bleiben müssen. Das Ziel aber ist, den Kosovo in den Stand zu versetzen,
selbst für seine Sicherheit zu sorgen.
Wird es eine Debatte über den Einsatz deutscher Soldaten in Darfur geben?
Wenn wir über Afrika sprechen, rechne ich zunächst damit, dass die KongoMission beendet werden kann und die Soldaten zum Jahresende wieder zu Hause
sind. Besorgniserregend bleibt die Lage im Darfur. Weswegen wir in der
Vergangenheit im Rahmen von Sofort- und Entwicklungshilfe, aber auch
logistischer Unterstützung durch die Bundeswehr substanzielle Hilfe geleistet
haben. Diese sollten wir fortsetzen und – wenn von der Afrikanischen Union oder
UNO angefragt – in den genannten Bereichen im Rahmen unserer Möglichkeiten
ausbauen.
Wie stufen Sie ein, was dort geschieht? Ist das Völkermord?
Es ist jedenfalls unermessliches Leid, Mord und Vergewaltigung in schockierendem
Ausmaß, ein Zustand, der schwer erträglich ist. Deswegen unterstützen wir
politisch die Afrikanische Union in ihrem Bemühen, die Konfliktparteien zu trennen.
Die Anstrengungen müssen verstärkt werden, aber nach Lage der Dinge vor allem
mit weiteren afrikanischen Truppen. Die Entsendung europäischer Kampftruppen in
den Darfur sehe ich jedoch nicht: Dass nur sie das erreichen können, was
afrikanische Truppen bislang nicht geschafft haben, ist eine gefährliche und, wie
ich finde, auch arrogante Illusion.
Zu Schröders Zeiten war die Außenpolitik auch Wahlkampfthema. Wird das am
Ende der schwarz-roten Jahre auch so sein?
Das ist ein Horizont, der mich momentan nicht beschäftigt. Ich stelle aber fest, dass
Interesse und Erklärungsbedarf in einer unübersichtlicher gewordenen Welt stark
gestiegen sind. Die Konflikte sind in ihren Ursachen, ihrer Dynamik, ihren
Perspektiven für die allermeisten nicht mehr überschaubar. Trotzdem müssen wir
uns einmischen. Diese Entwicklung schafft aber auch ein selten gekanntes
Interesse an der Außenpolitik. Und so ist man als Außenminister nach innen oft
"Erklärminister".
Interview: Knut Pries und Richard Meng
44
MISSION STATEMENT: Israeljustice.com was established to document the
Israeli policy to prosecute and detain peaceful protesters against the government's
policy of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Over the last 18 months,
the government deemed civil protesters of the expulsion of Jews from the Gaza
Strip and West Bank as enemies of the state.
During the summer of 2005, police and even soldiers were used to beat and arrest
hundreds of peaceful protesters. Those arrested and detained without charge for
months included children as young as 12. In some cases, Israeli judges and
prosecutors compared these minors to terrorists and called them the greatest
danger to democracy.
Some judges said the minors would remain in detention indefinitely to teach other
protesters a lesson. Others judges said they saw their jobs as "educating" those
who were arrested while singing Israel's national anthem or simply refusing police
orders to leave the streets.
Israeljustice.com has been covering hearings of these protesters. In most cases,
judges accepted police testimony, even when found to have been fabricated.
Prosecutors sought to intimidate youngsters with indefinite detention unless they
agreed to such measures as house arrest or leaving their communities in Judea
and Samaria.
This is a difficult period for Israeli democracy. It is made more difficult by the apathy
of most Israeli and international civil rights organizations, heavily financed by
European and U.S. institutions that support Israeli withdrawal at any cost.
Israeljustice.com plans to monitor and report on legal proceedings against those
who exercise their democratic rights of protest in the effort to stop the eviction of
hundreds of thousands of Jews from their homes. For these defendants, this has
been a lonely battle that has challenged their faith, love of Israel and their right to
live in the land of their biblical forefathers. Israeljustice.com intends to test the
commitment of Israel's democracy to guarantee the rights of these Jews.
Israeljustice.com is an independent and non-partisan website that seeks to
document the forgotten victims of Israel's justice and political system.
Israeljustice.com plans to focus on the abuses of the justice system against
peaceful protesters of Israeli withdrawal. The website does not intend to justify
either government policy or the cause of the protesters. We hope that
Israeljustice.com will serve as a magnet and bulletin board for news and
information. With G-d's help, we hope to influence change and restore democracy
and justice to the Jewish state. www.Israeljustice.com.
45
Address by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert Memorial Ceremony for David BenGurion November 27, 2006:
The Honorable President, Madam Speaker of the Knesset, Ms. Dalia Itzik,
Government Ministers, Knesset Members, The Ben-Gurion Family, Distinguished
Guests,
Three years ago, in my capacity as Vice Prime Minister for Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon, I delivered a speech here, and quoted from David Ben-Gurion's address at
a 1949 Knesset debate on the Armistice Agreements, in which he said:
"...when we were faced with the choice between the entire land of Israel without a
Jewish State, or a Jewish State without the entire land of Israel, we chose a Jewish
State without the entire land of Israel." This historic choice made by Ben-Gurion at
the conclusion of the War of Independence was painful, but courageous, heartwrenching, but sober.
Cherished and beloved parts of our homeland – the cradle of our history –
remained beyond the border, but a solid Jewish majority was guaranteed in the
State of Israel. Time passed, Arab animosity and terrorism resulted in more war,
and some 40 years ago, Israel was again faced with the difficult choice: many good
people advocated the vision of Greater Israel.
David Ben-Gurion, already a retired statesman, ruled that in exchange for true
peace, Israel must relinquish a vast majority of the territories occupied in the Six
Day War. Much has happened since then, facts were established on the ground,
agreements were signed, the international and regional arena changed beyond
recognition.
The bloody conflict with the Palestinians has not ended. Ben-Gurion's basic
diagnosis remained valid and continues to guide – with the necessary amendments
– the position of Israeli governments in our peace policy today.
Already at the time of Israel's birth, Ben-Gurion extended his hand in peace to the
Arab nations. His hand was rejected, but it remains extended. I extend my hand in
peace to our Palestinian neighbors, hoping that it will not be rejected. I
wholeheartedly identify with the statements made by Ben-Gurion regarding the duty
of every government in Israel to strive for peace: "I would consider it a great sin, not
only towards our generation but towards future generations as well, if we did not do
everything in our power to reach a mutual understanding with our Arab neighbors,
and if future generations had cause to blame the Government of Israel of missing
an opportunity for peace..."
These are not easy times for the State and people of Israel. These days, more than
ever, it is natural for us to come to this place, the burial place of the Father of our
revived nation, to draw inspiration.
If I could seek Ben-Gurion's counsel today, I believe that he would have advised me
to make the statements which I intend to make to our Palestinian neighbors today.
You, the Palestinian people, in the south and east, in the Gaza Strip and Judea and
Samaria, stand, these very days, on the threshold of an historic crossroads.
The terror, violence, murders and incessant attacks against the citizens of Israel
are liable to lead us closer to a new and painful wave of terrible violence. The
uncompromising radicalism of your terror organizations – the Hamas, [Islamic]
Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade and other organizations did not bring you closer
to attaining the goal which I am convinced many of you share – the establishment
of a Palestinian state, which will guarantee you a future of prosperity and which will
exist in good neighborly relations side-by-side with the State of Israel.
On the verge of making decisions which could plunge us into an increasingly
escalating conflict, I come today, from here, near the tomb of David Ben-Gurion, to
suggest to you a different path – a path which offers a chance for a different future,
for you and for us.
We started it the day before yesterday. We embarked on this path – and I hope that
it will lead us forward towards the goal we all aspire to – peace, tranquility and
mutual trust. We are ready and willing to pursue this path, and persevere until we
reach the sought-after solution.
If a new Palestinian government is established – a government which will be
committed to the principles of the Quartet, implement the road map and bring about
the release of Gilad Shalit, I will invite Abu Mazen [Palestinian Authority Chairman
Mahmoud Abbas] to meet with me immediately, in order to conduct a real, open,
genuine and serious dialogue between us. In the framework of this dialogue, and in
accordance with the road map, you will be able to establish an independent and
viable Palestinian state, with territorial contiguity in Judea and Samaria – a state
with full sovereignty and defined borders. In this framework, the borders of the
State of Israel will be defined, in accordance with President Bush's April 14th, 2004
letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
These borders will be different from the territories currently under Israel's control. I
understand the importance which the Palestinian society attributes to the issue of
prisoners.
I hereby declare that when Gilad Shalit is released and returned to his family, safe
and sound, the Government of Israel will be willing to release numerous Palestinian
prisoners – including ones who were sentenced to lengthy prison terms – in order to
increase the trust between us and prove that our hand is truly extended in genuine
peace.
I said it before Gilad Shalit was abducted, and I have not changed my position. I
know that many Palestinian families yearn for the day when their loved ones will
return home. This day could be very close. I believe that many of you are weary of
the dreadful price which you pay as a result of the violent extremism of the terror
organizations prevailing in your streets.
I believe that many of you yearn for a new chapter which we can open together in
the bloody history of our relations.
The cessation of terrorism and violence will enable us to offer you a series of steps,
which will be taken in joint coordination, in order to facilitate the improvement of the
Palestinian population's quality of living, which was severely affected as a result of
our need to take defensive measures against your terrorist actions.
We will significantly diminish the number of roadblocks, increase freedom of
movement in the territories, facilitate movement of people and goods in both
directions, improve the operation of the border crossings to the Gaza Strip, and
release Palestinian funds for the purpose of alleviating the humanitarian hardship
which many of you suffer.
We can assist you in formulating a plan for the economic rehabilitation of the Gaza
Strip and areas in Judea and Samaria. We can assist you in the establishment of
industrial zones – in cooperation with the international community – to create places
of employment and the means of earning a decent living, and to relieve you of your
ongoing dependence on employment infrastructures in Israel. We will seek the
assistance of those neighboring Arab States which strive for a peaceful solution to
the conflict between us, including: the Kingdom of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf States, in order to benefit from their experience and receive backing for
direct negotiations between us.
The voices emanating from those States regarding the need for recognition and
normalization of relations with the State of Israel – including, for example, some
parts in the Saudi peace initiative – are positive, and I intend to invest efforts in
order to advance the connection with those States and strengthen their support of
direct bilateral negotiations between us and the Palestinians. I have been following
with great appreciation the serious efforts made by those States to bring about a
cessation of violence in the region, and I respect their sincere desire to create a
new atmosphere between us, so as to facilitate a solution to the conflict.
The international circumstances which were created, specifically at this time, allow
you and us to take a courageous step, which involves the need to make painful
compromises and forgo those dreams which were part of our national ethos for so
many years, and to open a new chapter offering hope for a better life for all of us.
We, the State of Israel, will agree to the evacuation of many territories and
communities which were established therein. This is extremely difficult for us, akin
to the Parting of the Red Sea, but we will bear it, in exchange for true peace.
You must stop the terror, violence and efforts to harm Israeli citizens in the south,
center and north, recognize our right to live in peace and security next to you, and
relinquish your demand for the realization of the right of return. It is a right goal, a
natural goal, an attainable goal.
If you demonstrate the necessary determination and discipline, you will find in us a
ready partner. The State of Israel is a powerful State. Do not be fooled by our
internal differences, our political rivalries or the gloomy atmosphere which we
sometimes project.
In a violent battle, we will prevail, even if it is lengthy and even if it claims many
victims; even if it involves compromises on comfort or quality of living, the State of
Israel has proven its strength in the past and is prepared for it today. Do not put us
to another test, which will involve many casualties and destruction, and which will
lead to total hardship and despair.
The past cannot be changed, and the victims of the conflict, from both sides of the
border, cannot be returned. Dictates are futile and mutual accusations are nothing
but useless word games. Historic scores cannot be settled and scars cannot be
obliterated.
All we can do today is prevent further tragedies and bequeath to the younger
generation a bright horizon and hope for a new life. Let us convert animosity and
the "honing of our swords" to mutual recognition, respect and direct dialogue. From
here, from the edge of the cliff overlooking the ancient landscape of the Tzin Creek
– the site chosen by David Ben-Gurion as a final resting place for himself and his
wife Paula – the State of Israel's call for peace is heard clearly and decisively. May
it echo and be answered positively this time.
46
President Abbas: Ceasefire Paves Way to Return to Peace Process: JERICHO,
November 30, 2006 (WAFA) President Mahmoud Abass said that keeping the
ceasefire will pave the way to return to the peace process in the Middle East. "I
hope that the Ceasefire will include the West Bank so as to go back to the Sharm
el-Sheikh understandings signed by the Palestinian Leadership with the former
Israeli Prime Minister Areil Sharon towards returning to the peace process," he told
a joint press conference in Jericho with the US the Secretary of State Dr.
Condoleezza Rice. He said that talks over a national unity government have hit a
dead-end regretfully. "Forming a unity government, which is a basic goal to our
people, has reached a dead-end."
He stressed if the unity government was formed, it would have lifted the siege
imposed on the Palestinian people, affirming that he left no stone unturned and
worked on all levels to form it, but all efforts reached a dead-end, which means
suffering of the Palestinian people would continue. For her part, Rice affirmed that
her visit to the Palestinian territory is to show commitment of the two-state solution.
"The reason why I come today was to have an opportunity to talk with you about
how we can intensify our efforts to support our commitment toward a progress on a
two-state solution," Rice told the press conference.
She said that everybody recognises that the creation of a viable, independent and
democratic Palestinian state that lives side by side in peace with Israel would be not
just a remarkable achievement, but a just achievement for the Palestinian people.
Rice added that she wanted to come and continue what has been ongoing on
dialogue with President Abbas about "how we accelerate our efforts." In that regard,
she said, "I agree completely that the speech of Prime Minister Olmert was a very
positive development, I think [it is] an effort to reach out to a Palestinian partner."
"I'm going now to Jerusalem. I will speak with PM Olmert about the positive
elements in that speech and hopefully we can take this moment to accelerate our
efforts for the intensified efforts towards a two-state solution that we all desire," she
said.
She also said that she is here to talk about a number of other issues including how
to improve conditions of the Palestinian people. "We are all concerned about the
humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian people, particularly in Gaza."
47
Vgl. den Einleitungssatz von Judith Bernstein: Sanktionen gegen Israel, in
„Süddeutsche Zeitung“ 01.08.2006, S. 2: „Nur ein souveräner lebensfähiger Staat
Palästina kann die Existenz des Staates Israel in Frieden dauerhaft garantieren.“
48
Gershon Baskin: Time for the public to stand up, in “bitterlemons” 27.11.2006:
To a great extent, the Israeli and Palestinian publics have been passive observers
in the single most important issue affecting their lives--the continuation of the
conflict. During the summer of 2006, the Israeli public in its silence supported the
government in its war against Lebanon. More than one million Israelis fled from
their homes in the face of katyusha rockets falling in the north and still the public
was silent. Last week we saw the same thing in Sderot, and who can blame the
Sderot residents? In both cases we have not witnessed the masses taking to the
streets calling for an end to the violence and a return to a peace process.
But perhaps there are some changes sprouting. For the first time that I recall,
Israeli television and radio channels gave space to voices in Sderot calling for an
end of the violence, including a call not to avenge the Qassam rockets. Perhaps
there is the beginning of public understanding that the army has run out of tricks
and that the only way to end the violence is by returning to the table. Even two
Kadima ministers expressed something new, one saying that the time had come for
the prime minister to meet with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas –
"either you make history or you will become history" (Meir Sheetrit [“linke” Flanke
von “Kadima”, Wohnungsbauminister und interimistischer Justizminister]) – and
another calling for an immediate unilateral ceasefire with the Palestinians (Gideon
Ezra [Arbeitspartei, Umweltminister]).
The Palestinian public in recent weeks also demonstrated new behavior patterns
that point to new possibilities for public action. In Beit Hanoun we saw Palestinian
women face Israeli tanks, and even though soldiers opened fire on the crowds, the
following week we witnessed hundreds of civilians serving as human shields in
order to prevent the bombing of a house by the Israel Air Force.
It should be clear by now to both sides that our governments and military forces are
not going to provide security. Our leaders' policies have only brought more violence
and more suffering. Both sides suffer from weak leaders. Both sides' leaders either
use force to compensate for their weaknesses (Israel) or are incapable of
preventing the use of force because their militants are stronger than them
(Palestine). In either case, it is quite clear that the leaders have failed to bring
peace and security to their people.
Our leaders and most of the people, Israelis and Palestinians, know very well what
the price of peace is. Most Israelis and Palestinians are willing to pay that price.
Most Israelis and most Palestinians share the sense that their leaders and, even
more so, the leaders of the other side are not interested in peace and will not lead
us to negotiations. There is no "peace directive" in Israel or in Palestine; perhaps
there has not been one since before November 2005. The continued violence and
destruction has led most Israelis and most Palestinians to believe that the other
side does not want peace. But that is not so.
It is time for the people to design and lead a new peace process. In Northern
Ireland they called it "Initiative 1991". Civil society peace activists on both sides
called on their own communities to step forward and provide input into a process of
designing the future. Common citizens on both sides of the conflict were called on
to "testify" before public hearings on how they view the future. It is time for us to do
the same. The most difficult part of this work is within our own communities, where
we must confront our extremists and radicals--the spoilers who bear responsibility
for driving us off the course that Rabin and Arafat agreed to in 1993.
Our leaders have failed us. Our leaders are primarily concerned with their own
survival. Our leaders will not lead us to peace and security. When we do not act, we
are taking responsibility for the continuation of the deterioration. If we are silent and
passive, we are to blame for our continued suffering. It is time for the people to take
to the streets. It is time for the common people on both sides to raise their voices
loud and clear demanding that we return to negotiations and end the violence. It is
time for us to return to sanity. Our voices must sound out from all corners of Israel
and Palestine.
When our political leaders fail us, it is time for civil society actors to lead us forward.
There are more than 100 Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations now
working together in a new network called "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace NGO
Forum". These civil society organizations have been working together across the
conflict lines, non-stop, throughout all of the past years. New organizations of young
activists on both sides have joined the ranks and are ready to take to the streets.
We civil society peace activists must work together across the conflict lines to
design a new process that empowers the common people. Our well-established
cooperation provides the basis for bringing the voices of both societies to the table.
It is time for the public to stand up and it is time for civil society peace activists to
take the lead.
49
Iran, Iraq issue joint press statement in Tehran, Nov 29, 2006:
At the end of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's 3-day visit to Tehran, the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Republic of Iraq, by issuing a joint press statement here
Wednesday called for more cooperation between the two countries.
At the statement, the two sides called for upgrading the current level of relation and
cooperation in political, security, oil, industry, economic and cultural affairs.
Underlining deep-rooted historical, cultural and religious commonalities between
the two neighbors and Muslim states and respect for the principles of good
neighbourly relations, not interference in each other's affairs, they underlined their
commitments to implement mutually agreed conventions endorsed by the United
Nations.
The Islamic Republic of Iran underlined the need to maintain Iraq's national unity,
territorial integrity and the country's independence. Iran has also called for
establishment of democratic organizations to help restore people's control on Iraq's
natural wealth and territorial integrity and construction of the country's political
system based on new constitution.
Welcoming firm determination of Iraqi government in restoring stability and security
in Iraq along with implementing the plan proposed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
on national reconciliation with the aim of encouraging active and all-out presence of
all people from all walks of life in the country's political system, the statement
voiced its full support for continued trend to help restore the country's national
sovereignty, security and durable stability in Iraq.
The two sides also condemned strongly continued atrocities and sabotage activities
of terrorist groups in Iraq and emphasized the necessity of serious confrontation
with such criminal and terroristic activities. In the statement, Islamic Republic of
Iran expressed its readiness to help Iraqi government and nation.
The two sides expressed their pleasure over continued pilgrimage of Iranian and
Iraqi citizens to holy shrines in both countries and called for removing some
obstacles and existing problems in the border points and providing the pilgrims with
more facilities.
To facilitate traffic for pilgrims, businesspersons and traders, the Iranian side called
for Iraqi side's action to open its aerial border to establish direct and transit flights
between Tehran and Baghdad and vice versa.
The statement underlined the necessity of implementing previously signed
agreements on the opening of the Iranian General Consulates in Arbil and
Soleymanieh and the Iraqi General Consulate in Mashhad and the temporary
transfer of Iraqi consulate from Khorramshahr to Ahvaz.
Referring to the importance of support and participation in renovation and economic
development in Iraq and its infrastructural role in establishment of stability and
sustainable security in the country and the region, the statement emphasized the
participation and support of all countries, especially neighboring and friendly
countries in this process.
The Iraqi government appreciated Iran's support in all fields of politics, economics
and rebuilding the country.
Islamic Republic of Iran by expressing its readiness to participate in rebuilding
process in Iraq, called for Iraqi government assistance in participating of Iranian
creditable companies in implementing construction, service and rebuilding projects.
Welcoming the latest decision of the Iraqi government concerning expulsion of
members of terrorist group of MKO from Iraq, the Iranian side said acceleration in
implementation of the decision will be a positive step in expansion and deepening
of the ties between the two countries.
Reminding Saddam's crimes against Iraqi people and his attack against Iran and
Kuwait, the two sides emphasized necessity of a transparent and just trial of
Saddam and the other high ranking officials of his regime.
50
King Abdullah interviewed by US ABC, Amman, Nov.26, 2006:
His Majesty King Abdullah II renewed on concentration of solving the Palestinian
problem deemed to be the core issue in the Middle East. If the, King Abdullah
remarked, Palestinian issue is left without solution we will fail to avert the Middle
East from tremendous crisis.
In an interview with the ABC News made by George Stephanopoulos of ABC News,
King Abdullah expressed his fear that if we don't use the next couple of months to
rally to push the peace process forward, there will not be enough if circumstances
to create a two-state solution.
On Iraq, King Abdullah underlined that All Iraqi parties should understand the
dangers of ongoing escalation. The ongoing escalation, King Abdullah added, in
Iraq is the source of concern for us all. King Abdullah hopes that the Iraqi Prime
Minister, who will arrive in Amman next Wednesday, will have some ideas to be
provided to the US President Bush on how he could be inclusive in bringing the
different sects in side of Iraq to gather.
Following is the full text of King's interview with ABC NEWS
KING ABDULLAH: Well, George, the difficulty that we're tackling with here is, we're
juggling with the strong potential of three civil wars in the region, whether it's the
Palestinians, that of Lebanon or of Iraq. And I hope that my discussions, at least,
with the president will be to provide whatever we can do for the Iraqi people. But at
the same time, we to want to concentrate ourselves on the core issues, which we
believe are the Palestinians and the Palestinian peace process, because that is a
must today, as well as the tremendous concern we've had over the past several
days, what's happening in Lebanon.
And we could possibly imagine going into 2007 and having three civil wars on our
hands. And therefore, it is time that we really take a strong step forward as part of
the international community and make sure we avert the Middle East from a
tremendous crisis that I fear, and I see could possibly happen in 2007.
STEPHANOPOULOS: That is a frightening prospect, the prospect of three civil
wars. All three of those societies – Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority – have
had elections over the last couple of years. And now we're seeing the prospect of
civil war.
Could the United States push too hard, too fast for democracy?
KING ABDULLAH: The issue is not whether you're pushing one agenda or another.
The issue is, we have not been able to deal with the core problem of the Middle
East.
Now, I know people will say that there are several core problems in the Middle East.
Obviously, the closest to American minds, because of your commitments of
soldiers is Iraq.
But for the majority of us living in this part of the world, it has always been the
Israeli-Palestinian, the Israeli-Arab problem.
And I fear that if we do not use the next couple of months to really be able to push
the process forward, I don't believe that there will be anything to talk about. In other
words, there will not be enough of circumstances to create a two-state solution – in
other words, Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and harmony.
If we don't solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem, then how can we ever solve the
Israeli-Arab problem?
And I don't believe that beyond mid 2007, if we don't get the process going, there
will be anything of a Palestine to talk about. And therefore, do we resign this whole
region to another decade or two of violence, which none of us can afford.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Secretary of State Baker is considering just that prospect,
pushing for a comprehensive peace plan as he looks at solutions for Iraq, as well.
But help me out here. Doesn't the situation in Iraq now have a logic of its own, the
Sunnis and the Shiites killing each other in an uncontrolled manner? What does
that have to do with what's going on in Palestine? KING ABDULLAH: Well, the thing
is, as we look at the three potential flash points, before, I believe, the Lebanese war
this summer, I would have put Iraq in the number one position. After the Lebanese
war, the Palestinian scenario was in the number one position, followed very closely
in the past several weeks. I would say that the Lebanese problem and the
Palestinian ones are neck-in-neck.
They're all extremely important. Solving all three of them are going to be critical.
But the priority I believe today in the long term is the Israeli-Palestinian one,
because it resonates beyond the borders of Iraq, beyond the borders of the Arab
and the Muslim world.
And you know, you've been with this issue for many years. It is still the emotional
core issue for our part of the world.
The problem when we discuss this sometimes with the American public, they say,
no, this is just an excuse, because there are other problems in the Middle East. But
the emotional impact that the Israeli-Palestinian problem has on the ground can be
translated to the insecurity and the frustrations throughout the Middle East and the
Arab world. For me, that is the priority.
When it comes to things exploding out of control, I would put today, as we stand,
Palestine and probably a close tie with Lebanon. Iraq, funny enough, although as
concerned as I am with Iraq and the major problems that that might bring to us, is in
third position. Obviously, this is all relative.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, one of the ideas for dealing with all three of these
conflicts is an international conference that would include Jordan, would include
Saudi Arabia, would include Egypt and include the United States, but also Syria and
Iran.
Do you think it would be useful to include Syria and Iran in that kind of a conference
right now? And what kind of leverage does the U.S. have over that?
KING ABDULLAH: Well, look. We always believe that dialogue is a way of reaching
out to each other.
I keep saying Palestine is the core. It is linked to the extent of what's going on in
Iraq. It is linked to what's going on in Lebanon. It is linked to the issues that we find
ourselves with the Syrians.
So, if you want to do comprehensive – comprehensive means bringing all the
parties of the region together.
STEPHANOPOULOS: And does it also mean – when you talk about a reinvigorated
U.S. effort, what are you looking for exactly? What kind of a sign are you expecting
from the United States to prove that the Bush administration is serious about
seeking this kind of comprehensive effort?
One idea being floated right now is that former Secretary of State Baker be
appointed a special envoy by President Bush. Would that be useful?
KING ABDULLAH: Well, from my point of view, I've known Secretary Baker for
many years. He was a good friend of his late Majesty King Hussein. He has a
tremendous, strong reputation in this part of the world as being an honest broker.
Obviously, that's a decision for the American president and his administration. But
he is probably – Secretary Baker is one of the qualified (ph) people I've ever come
across in being able to deal with Middle East issues.
STEPHANOPOULOS: King Abdullah, thank you very much for your time this
morning.
51
Yossi Beilin’s Non-paper: Mapping the Road from Realignment to Permanent
Status, November 2006: Among the most salient repercussions of the recent war in
Lebanon has been the unofficial shelving of Prime Minister Olmert's plan for a
significant unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank. Responding to widespread
feelings in the Israeli public that the war has taught Israel the price of unilateral
withdrawals does and should mean not withdrawing. Withdrawing from the West
Bank remains in Israel's long-term strategic interest, and the question for Olmert is
how to transform a plan that was originally conceived as unilateral into one that can
be agreed to by the Palestinian side. Palestinian agreement to any plan would
require that it meet basic Palestinian demands, chief among them is perhaps an
assurance that the plan would bring the parties closer to a resolution of the conflict
rather than create new conditions for further paralysis, if only under terms more
convenient for Israel.
The following four-step plan is suggested as a way to bridge between Olmert's
willingness to withdraw from significant areas in the West Bank and Abu Mazen's
need of a credible political horizon for a final-status agreement. The plan reflects
the existence of broad public support on both sides for putting an end to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict on the basis of well-known and familiar parameters, including
the Clinton Ideas, the Arab Peace Initiative, the Bush vision, and the Geneva
Initiative; and it assumes that, should final-status negotiations conclude
successfully, each side would bring the agreement to approval and, if necessary,
ratification as required by its political and legal system.
Step I: Ceasefire
1. Both parties would agree to a cease-fire. Within the framework of the ceasefire,
Israel would withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip, stop all operations of lethal
nature inside the Gaza Strip, and release all the Hamas representatives arrested on
29 June as well as a certain number of prisoners. The Palestinians would cease all
rocket attacks into Israel as well as all other forms of violence, and release Gilead
Shalit.
Step II: Withdrawal:
2. Both parties would act to achieve and maintain the quiet, commit themselves to
ending all forms of violence, and end all forms of incitement to hatred.
3. The Palestinians would welcome Israel's strategic decision to carry out a
significant withdrawal in the West Bank by 2008. The withdrawal would be
coordinated between Israel and the PLO and the PA. Coordination would cover
security, civil, economic, and environmental issues, among others, and where
possible, would aim to reach agreement that could be effective also under a
permanent-status agreement.
4. The parties would view the withdrawal as fulfillment of Israel's obligations to the
Palestinians, in line with Israel's commitment to implement the Third Further
Redeployment (FRD) under the Interim Agreement of 1995 and/or Israel's
commitments under Phase II of the Roadmap.
5. Israeli settlers. The value of both public and private assets left behind in
connection with the withdrawal would be assessed and later taken into account in
the context of the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem as part of the
negotiations on permanent status.
6. Palestinian prisoners. Israel would free a significant number of Palestinian
prisoners currently held in its custody.
Step III: Exercising the Palestinian Options
7. Upon completion of Israel's withdrawal, the Palestinians would extend their rule
over the evacuated territories under one of the following options:
Option A: Declaring the State of Palestine:
i. Israel would recognize the State of Palestine and its sovereignty over the entire
area which Israel no longer occupies.
ii. Israel would recognize that all the common borders between the two
states are provisional and subject to future agreement.
iii. The State of Palestine would be a non-militarized state.
Option B: Extending the rule of the Palestinian Authority:
Should the Palestinians choose to extend the rule of the existing Palestinian
Authority as stipulated under the Interim Agreement of 1995, both sides would
agree that:
i. All areas that had been previously designated as Area B would become Area A.
(Hence the total size of Area A will be 42 percent of the West Bank (18% [previous
A] + 24% [previous B]).
ii: Israel would determine which of the areas it evacuated in the context of its
withdrawal would be considered Area B; the rest would be A.
Step IV: Negotiations on Permanent Status:
8. Negotiations on Permanent Status. Negotiations between the two sides on
permanent status would start parallel to Israel's withdrawal and no later than upon
completion of Israel's withdrawal. They would lead to the establishment of the State
of Palestine, living alongside Israel, and be based on the following parameters:
a. Border / territorial – The final border between the two sides would be based on
the 1967 line. Any adjustments reflecting security and demographic realities must
be agreed upon by both sides.
b. Jerusalem – The Jewish areas of Jerusalem will be under Israeli sovereignty; the
Arab areas under Palestinian sovereignty. Special arrangements will be found for
the Old City and the Holy Basin in order to ensure free access of worship to all
religions.
c. Palestinian refugees – A just and agreed-upon solution to the problem of the
Palestinian refugees would be found, and no Palestinian refugee would be denied
the option of returning to the Palestinian state. Both sides would consider the
agreed-upon solution as fulfillment of all relevant international resolutions.
d. Security arrangements – Mutually agreed-upon security arrangements would be
a vital component designed to ensure that Israel and Palestine would live side by
side in peace and security. Palestine would be a non-militarized state.
d. The Arab World – In line with the historic statement contained in the Arab Peace
Plan as adopted by the Arab League in Beirut in March 2002, upon the signing of a
permanent-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians the Arab
countries would "consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace
agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region." They
would "establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive
peace."
e. A timeline for the permanent status – Both sides would reach an agreement
within two years of the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank. The
international community would do its utmost to ensure that the parties meet the
deadline.
Other
9. The Roadmap. In parallel to Israel's withdrawal and the negotiations on
permanent status, both parties would fulfill their obligations under Phase I of the
Roadmap. The international community, represented by the U.S.-led Quartet, would
monitor the implementation of all Phase I obligations and certify their fulfillment.
10. International Community. The international community would view Israel's
withdrawal as a major step in a process leading to peace and stability in the region.
In the immediate term, the international community, led by the Quartet, will commit
significant resources toward the success of the withdrawal, focusing, among other
issues, on facilitating the movement and access for the Palestinians inside the
West Bank, between the West Bank and Gaza, and between the West Bank and
Jordan.
52
PA Unity Gov't Talks Stumble With Key Ministries: Reliable sources told Al
Ayam local paper that talks of forming new unity government is stumbling and
probably will reach closed door. The sources attributed the difficulties to Hamas's
insistence on keeping interior and finance portfolios as Fateh prefer to be taken by
independents. The sources also elaborated that the meeting of joint committee of
Hamas and Fateh ended Sunday with no agreement or even on the date of the next
meeting as Hamas is insisted on keeping interior and basis utilities ministries
including education, social welfare, health and Al Awqaf " religious affair) ministries,
keeping in mind that the previous convergence said gave Hamas nine ministries
plus premiership.
According to the sources Hamas' delegation demanded also for full partnership in
the National security council and command of security services and appointment of
ambassadors from Hamas and governors as well as a prerequisite to accept a new
national unity government.
To this point, the sources did not talk about the collapse of talks over the formation
of unity government but indicated that very stumbling clocks in the way faded out
the optimistic overwhelmed in the recent days.
On the other hand, Prime minister Ismael Haneyeh said Sunday that Hamas
partaking into the unity government is related to the guarantees to uplift aid
embargo once new government take the office.
Haneyeh told the reporters " we need more assurance." He added "we want to feel
they are committed to end the sanction on the Palestinian people in return of this
significant step."
"We are not going to take pictures , by taking such a step we lay the foundation for
true national unity and political partnership, end the aid embargo and release
deputies and ministers." Haneyeh indicated that talks are carrying out in depth to
form the unity government and some issues needed more talks about the details.
"The decision taken by the Arab foreign ministries over unlocking the embargo
should be translated on the grounds," Haneyeh said.
"Arab countries are setting back before the USA hegemony and did not implement
the decision at a time we are working to unlock the sanction and stop the
aggressions."
53
Abbas Proposes Names of Independents to Assume Arguable Three Ministries,
GAZA, Palestine, November 25, 2006 (IPC+Al Ayam) [Official PA website]:
President Mahmoud Abbas proposed three independents Hamas has to choose to
assume interior portfolio in the meeting with Prime minister Ismael Haneyeh
Thursday morning but Hams response has not been yet given to Abbas as the
movement is still examining the proposal.
Local Al Ayam newspaper reported that a reliable source disclosed the identity of
the three independents to take the interior portfolio; Dr. Kamal Al Shuraf, exminister and lawmaker, Dr. Salah Abed Al Shafi , from Gaza. He is also the son of
leader Haider Abed Al Shafi, and Deputy Dr. Mustafa Al Burghouti.
The paper quoted the reliable sources as saying that the President Abbas during
the meeting demanded Haneyeh to resign in order to authorize today Saturday Dr.
Mohammed Shubair to line-up the new government.
The reliable sources elaborated that Haneyeh told the President Thursday morning
that he has no final say on such a proposal and the matter under study.
Speaking to the reporters Friday, Haneyeh asserted that his resignation is related to
a full agreement over the details of new government.
The sources said that at a time the President Abbas is adamant on independents to
take interior, foreign affair and finance portfolio so as the international community
able to deal with the new government and unlock aid embargo, Hamas also
announced repeatedly that it will not give up such portfolios.
The paper has reported that the President proposed Dr. Salam Fayad as finance
minister and Dr. Ziad Abu Amro, foreign affair minister. Both are independent
deputies. To this moment Hamas movement, according to the paper, has not yet
proposed a name to assume the interior ministry and in all meetings Hamas
proposed Dr. Sameer Abu Eisha, planning minister and deputy of finance minister,
to take the finance portfolio and Mustafa Al Burgothi as foreign affair minister.
PM Ismael Haneyeh announced Friday that he will resign unless an agreement
over the national unity government is struck.
"My resignation is a part of constitutional procedures which will be set when we
agree on all the details then start out constitutional measures," Haneyeh said,
adding "The most important is the agreement and we do not keep issues unsettled
and committed to principles we already have agreed on."
About his consultations with the President Mahmoud Abbas over the unity
government, PM said "slicing the portfolios happen between factions willing to for
government by appointment but we form a government on the basis of election
results."
54
55
Steven Erlanger: Israeli map says West Bank posts sit on Arab land, in “The
New York Times” 21.11.2006:
An Israeli advocacy group, using maps and figures leaked from inside the
government, says that 39 percent of the land held by Israeli settlements in the
occupied West Bank is privately owned by Palestinians.
Israel has long asserted that it fully respects Palestinian private property in the
West Bank and only takes land there legally or, for security reasons, temporarily.
If big sections of those settlements are indeed privately held Palestinian land, that is
bound to create embarrassment for Israel and further complicate the already distant
prospect of a negotiated peace. The data indicate that 40 percent of the land that
Israel plans to keep in any future deal with the Palestinians is private.
The new claims regarding Palestinian property are said to come from the 2004
database of the Civil Administration, which controls the civilian aspects of Israel's
presence in the West Bank. Peace Now, an Israeli group that advocates
Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, plans to publish
the information on Tuesday. An advance copy was made available to The New
York Times.
The data – maps that show the government's registry of the land by category – was
given to Peace Now by someone who obtained it from an official inside the Civil
Administration. The Times spoke to the person who received it from the Civil
Administration official and agreed not to identify him because of the delicate nature
of the material.
That person, who has frequent contact with the Civil Administration, said he and the
official wanted to expose what they consider to be wide-scale violations of private
Palestinian property rights by the government and settlers. The government has
refused to give the material directly to Peace Now, which requested it under Israel's
freedom of information law.
Shlomo Dror, a spokesman for the Civil Administration, said he could not comment
on the data without studying it.
He said there was a committee, called the blue line committee, that had been
investigating these issues of land ownership for three years. "We haven't finished
checking everything," he said.
Dror also said that sometimes Palestinians would sell land to Israelis but be
unwilling to admit to the sale publicly because they feared retribution as
collaborators.
Within prominent settlements that Israel has said it plans to keep in any final border
agreement, the data show, for example, that some 86.4 percent of Maale Adumim,
a large Jerusalem suburb, is private; and 35.1 percent of Ariel is.
The maps indicate that beyond the private land, 5.8 percent is so-called survey
land, meaning of unclear ownership, and 1.3 percent private Jewish land. The rest,
about 54 percent, is considered "state land" or has no designation, though
Palestinians say that at least some of it represents agricultural land expropriated by
the state.
The figures, together with detailed maps of the land distribution in every Israeli
settlement in the West Bank, were put together by the Settlement Watch Project of
Peace Now, led by Dror Etkes and Hagit Ofran, and has a record of careful and
accurate reporting on settlement growth.
The report does not include Jerusalem, which Israel has annexed and does not
consider part of the West Bank, although much of the world regards East
Jerusalem as occupied. Much of the world also considers Israeli settlements on
occupied land to be illegal under international law. International law requires an
occupying power to protect private property, and Israel has always asserted that it
does not take land without legal justification.
One case in a settlement Israel intends to keep is in Givat Zeev, barely five miles
north of Jerusalem. At the southern edge is the Ayelet Hashachar synagogue.
Rabah Abdellatif, a Palestinian who lives in the nearby village of Al Jib, says the
land belongs to him.
Papers he has filed with the Israeli military court, which runs the West Bank, seem
to favor Abdellatif. In 1999, Israeli officials confirmed, he was even granted a
judgment ordering the demolition of the synagogue because it had been built
without permits. But for the last seven years, the Israeli system has done little to
enforce its legal judgments. The synagogue stands, and Abdellatif has no access to
his land.
Ram Kovarsky, the town council secretary, said the synagogue was outside the
boundaries of Givat Zeev, although there is no obvious separation. Israeli officials
confirm that the land is privately owned, though they refuse to say by whom.
Abdellatif, 65, said: "I feel stuck, angry. Why would they do that? I don't know who
to go to anymore." He pointed to his corduroy trousers and said, in the English he
learned in Paterson, N.J., where his son is a police detective: "These are my pants.
And those are your pants. And you should not take my pants. This is mine, and that
is yours! I never took anyone's land."
According to the Peace Now figures, 44.3 percent of Givat Zeev is on private
Palestinian land.
Miri Eisin, a spokesperson for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, said that Israeli officials
would have to see the data and the maps and added that ownership is complicated
and delicate. Baruch Spiegel, a reserve general who just left the Ministry of
Defense and dealt with the separation barrier being built near the boundary with the
West Bank, also said he would have to see the data in detail in order to judge it.
The definitions of private and state land are complicated, given different
administrations of the West Bank going back to the Ottoman Empire, the British
mandate, Jordan and now Israel. During the Ottoman Empire, only small areas of
the West Bank were registered to specific owners, and often villagers would hold
land in common to avoid taxes. The British began a more formal land registry
based on land use, taxation or house ownership that continued through the
Jordanian period.
Large areas of agricultural land are registered as state land; other areas were
requisitioned or seized by the Israeli military after 1967 for security purposes, but
such requisitions are meant to be temporary and must be renewed, and do not
change the legal ownership of the land, Dror, the Civil Administration spokesman,
said.
But the issue of property is one that Israeli officials are familiar with, even if the
percentages here may come as a surprise and may be challenged after the
publication of the report.
Asked about Israeli seizure of private Palestinian land in an interview with The
Times last summer, before these figures were available, Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert said: "Now I don't deny anything, I don't ignore anything. I'm just ready to sit
down and talk. And resolve it. And resolve it in a generous manner for all sides."
He said the 1967 war was a one of self-defense. Later, he said: "Many things
happened. Life is not frozen. Things occur. So many things happened, and as a
result of this many innocent individuals on both sides suffered, were killed, lost their
lives, became crippled for life, lost their family members, their loved ones,
thousands of them. And also private property suffered. By the way, on all sides."
Olmert says Israel will keep some 10 percent of the occupied West Bank, including
East Jerusalem, possibly in a swap for land elsewhere. The area Israel intends to
keep is roughly marked by the route of the unfinished separation barrier, which cuts
through the West Bank and is intended, Israel says, to stop suicide bombers.
Olmert, however, describes it as a putative border. Nearly 80,000 Jews live in
settlements beyond the route of the barrier, but some 180,000 live in settlements
within the barrier, while another 200,000 live in East Jerusalem.
But these land-ownership figures show that even in the settlements that Israel
intends to keep, there will be a considerable problem of restitution that goes beyond
the issue of refugee return.
Olmert was elected on a pledge to withdraw Israeli settlers living east of the barrier.
But after the war with Hezbollah and with fighting ongoing in Gaza, from which
Israel withdrew its settlers in the summer of 2005, his withdrawal plan has been
suspended.
In March 2005, a report requested by the government found a number of illegal
Israeli outposts built on private Palestinian land, and officials promised to destroy
them. But only nine houses of only one outpost, Amona, were dismantled after a
court case brought by Peace Now.
There is a court case pending over Migron, which began as a group of trailers on a
windy hilltop around a set of cellphone antennas in May 1999 and is now a
flourishing community of 50 families, said Avi Teksler, an official of the Migron
council. But Migron, too, according to the data, is built on private Palestinian land.
Teksler said that the land was deserted, and that its ownership would be settled in
court. Migron, where some children of noted settlement leaders live, has had "the
support of every Israeli government," he said. "The government has been a partner
to every single move we've made."
Teksler added: "This is how the state of Israel was created. And this is all the land
of Israel. We're like the kibbutzim. The only real difference is that we're after 1967,
not before."
But in the Palestinian village of Burqa, Youssef Moussa Abdel Raziq Nabboud, 85,
says that some of the land of Migron, and the land on which Israel built a road for
settlers, belongs to him and his family, who once grew wheat and beans there. He
said he had tax documents from the pre-1967 authorities.
"They have the power to put the settlement there and we can do nothing," he said.
"They have a fence around the settlement and dogs there." Nabboud went to the
Israeli authorities with the mayor, Abu Maher, but they were told he needed an
Israeli lawyer and surveyor. "I have no money for that," he said. What began as an
outpost taking 5 acres has now taken 125, the mayor said.
Nabboud wears a traditional head covering; his grandson, Khaled, 27, wears a
Yankees cap. "The land is my inheritance," he said. "I feel sad I can't go there. And
angry. The army protects them."
56
Vgl. Reiner Bernstein: Von Gaza nach Genf. Die Genfer Friedensinitiative von
Israelis und Palästinensern. Schwalbach/Ts. 2006, S. 60 ff.
57
Leslie Susser: Peace Plans Fill Mideast Vacuum, “Jewish Telegraphic Agency”
November 20, 2006:
Jerusalem — After rejecting a new European peace initiative, Israeli leaders are
gearing up for more international efforts to restart the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating
process on terms unfavorable to Israel.
Israel fears the initiatives might lead to the lifting of political and economic sanctions
against the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority without it having to meet the
international community’s three benchmarks for dialogue: recognition of Israel’s
right to exist, acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements and
renunciation of terror.
The European initiative, led by Spain, France and Italy, is not the only one on the
table. The Arabs have resuscitated the Saudi plan of 2002 and, perhaps most
importantly, the United States is said to be working on a new plan of its own that
includes an international conference based on the Saudi plan.
Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, worried about where the new international
initiatives might lead, wants Israel to come up with a plan to pre-empt them.
The situation is reminiscent of summer 2003. Then, too, after a long deadlock in
Israeli-Palestinian relations, international initiatives began to surface. It was partly to
pre-empt outside plans he thought were detrimental to Israel that then-Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon produced his plan to unilaterally pull Israeli troops and settlers
out of the Gaza Strip.
Sharon’s gambit worked: The international community backed him and put its own
ideas on hold. Indeed, in April 2004, President Bush promised that he would not
back any other initiative while Sharon’s disengagement plan was on the table.
The recent Lebanon war changed that. After the fighting, Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert, elected on a platform calling for a unilateral withdrawal from the West
Bank, announced that he was shelving the plan. That created the political vacuum
the new plans are starting to fill.
The European plan has five components: An immediate Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire is implemented; the Palestinians form a national unity government acceptable
to the international community; Israel and the Palestinians exchange prisoners;
Olmert and P.A. President Mahmoud Abbas start a peace dialogue; an international
force moves into Gaza to keep the peace.
Israel rejected the plan on the grounds that it contains nothing new, except the call
for an international force in Gaza, which Israel opposes. The Israelis argue that
such a force would only make it more difficult for Israel to monitor the huge influx of
weapons into Gaza across the Egyptian border.
The European plan has yet to be adopted by the European Union, several of whose
members regard it as a dilettantish piece of work. But the European Union wants to
play a role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and may well come up with a
more substantial proposal.
Here Britain could prove important. On the eve of a meeting this week with Livni,
British Prime Minister Tony Blair reiterated his view that Israeli-Palestinian peace
could greatly help the West in its battle against radical Islam. Blair, who is stepping
down soon, also has said he intends to devote much of the rest of his time as prime
minister to promoting Middle East peace.
The Arab plan, being pushed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, has two stages:
Acceptance of the Saudi initiative of 2002 as a basis for peace talks, followed by an
international peace conference. The Saudi initiative calls for full Israeli withdrawal
from all occupied territory and resolution of Palestinian refugee demands in return
for peace with all 22 Arab countries and the Palestinians.
Israel has expressed reservations about the Saudi initiative, concerned that it could
generate pressure for the return of millions of Palestinian refugees to Israel and
impose a territorial solution without room for negotiation.
But the United States is showing growing interest in the Saudi plan. As part of the
Bush administration’s exit strategy from Iraq, senior Israeli officials believe, the
United States may buy into the idea of an international conference based on the
Saudi initiative. “For months the Americans have been trying to cultivate an axis of
moderate Arab states, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as a counterweight to the
Iranian-led ‘axis of evil.’ Backing the Saudi initiative would give them added
leverage,” a senior Israeli official told JTA.
For weeks there have been rumors that the United States is trying to set up an
international conference in which Israel and moderate Arab states would be the
main players. The idea would be to explore the Saudi initiative and strengthen
Abbas by providing financial and military support for his Fatah movement in its
internal struggle with Hamas, which is even more radical.
Israel, however, fears that all three plans, the European, Arab and American, may
end up strengthening Hamas. The Israelis are concerned that the very fact that
there is a process could lead to the lifting of the political and economic boycott of
the Hamas-controlled P.A. Cabinet without it recognizing Israel. The European
initiative, for example, says nothing about such recognition.
The Israelis add that a premature international conference could fail in spectacular
fashion, and – like the failed Camp David summit of July 2000 – leave the parties
even worse off.
Livni told the Cabinet on Sunday that Israel therefore should come up with a
detailed plan of its own. She suggested a cease-fire followed by the Palestinian
government’s acceptance of the three international benchmarks and, after prisoner
exchanges, quick movement to a Palestinian mini-state and a framework for
negotiations on a final peace deal.
The call is Olmert’s. He does not believe Bush or the new Democratic U.S.
Congress will try to pressure Israel on the Palestinian or Syrian tracks. This despite
the fact that former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s Iraq exit-strategy report,
due to be submitted to Bush soon, is widely expected to include recommendations
for negotiations on both tracks.
Olmert wants to see movement, at least with the Palestinians. And some pundits
believe that behind the scenes he may be working secretly on the contours of a
deal with Abbas. On Sunday, Olmert gave a clue, berating Defense Minister Amir
Peretz for discussing a cease-fire with Abbas. “Don’t interfere,” he said. “You could
be spoiling things.”
58
Dazu Reiner Bernstein: Von Gaza nach Genf. Die Genfer Friedensinitiative von
Israelis und Palästinensern. Schwalbach/Ts. 2006, S. 30 f.
59
Shlomo Ben-Ami: Israel is in need of mediators, in “Haaretz”-online 22.11.2006:
It appears that the Israeli aversion to international initiatives for solving the conflict
with the Arab world is inherent in us. The world, and in particular Europe, is
assumed to be hostile to Israel, and every international conference is conceived of
as an ambush in which Israel's enemies will try to force it into an arrangement that
is contradictory to its existential interests.
This aversion is particularly difficult to understand in view of the fact that Israel is
sunk in a bloody conflict that has no solution, neither diplomatic nor military. The
battlefield – in Lebanon against Hezbollah and in the Gaza Strip against Hamas –
no longer makes it possible to gain easy victories or a decisive advantage. In both
cases, the governments enabled the Israel Defense Forces to push forward to a
victory but they were not able to carry out the mission.
What is the government proposing to get out of this quagmire? The foreign minister
has suggested speaking with "the moderates" in the Palestinian Authority. It is
worrisome to think that she is not aware that the distance between the moderates
and the extremists is most minute, and that the moderates will act toward setting up
a Palestinian state with its borders on the pre-1967 green line, with Jerusalem as its
capital and an agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem. In general terms, the
moderates want a solution on the basis of the Saudi initative.
There is no longer a possibility of negotiating with the moderates while neutralizing
the extremists, who today constitute the elected government. Any negotiations
conducted by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) with Israel will always include a side
glance at Hamas to see what it will be prepared to accept. In this respect, there is
no difference between Abbas the democrat and Yasser Arafat the dictator. Both of
them have always worked toward an agreement that would be based on internal
Palestinian consensus, and which would prevent a decline into civil war. In other
words, negotiation with the moderates is in effect an indirect dialogue also with the
extremists.
It is to be hoped that there is someone among the prime minister's advisers who
will make it clear to him that, even though Abbas will no doubt be "surprised at how
far" he is prepared to go, this will nevertheless not be enough to meet the minimum
demands of the Palestinians.
Israel is returning to the starting point, to an incessant war of Qassam rockets and
massive arms smuggling, in anticipation of another war, which also will not provide
a victory and also will not change the price of an accommodation, which is known in
advance. It is therefore difficult to understand the hasty rejection of the European
initative to send an international force to Gaza and following that to convene an
international conference for a regional arrangement. This kind of force would
provide Israel with an egress from an even worse outcome than that of the second
Lebanon war.
The European intiative is an expression of a growing concern that the strategy of
unilateralism – of Israel in the territories and of the United States in Iraq – has
become bankrupt, and that the road map has lost its relevance. The U.S. is
apparently facing a significant change of direction in its regional policy.
There is no greater mistake than adhering to inertia in an era of revolution. If Israel
allows the deadlock to continue, others will take the initiative in its stead. The
European initiative is not unacceptable, even if it requires reworking. The idea of an
international force in Gaza is correct, but only on condition that it will act in the
framework of an agreed-upon diplomatic arrangement. Such a framework does not
exist today, and foreign countries will not send their soldiers to an anarchic
slaughterhouse without a clear mandate.
An international conference is likewise something to be desired, but only on
condition that it is convened on the basis of an agreed-on platform. Israel would be
right not to participate in an open conference in which every proposal is permitted.
But this would not need to happen if the conference were convened on the basis of
two peace proposals – as protection against hostile initiatives – President Clinton's
plan, which was accepted at the time by Israel, and the all-Arab, Saudi peace plan.
Somewhere between these two proposals lies the possibility of a peace agreement
between Israel and the Palestinians.
If indeed the Israeli government wishes to speak with the moderates and not the
extremists, an international conference based on such a proposal would provide an
opportunity to do so. The conference would exclude Hamas – unless it were to
accept the said peace proposals as a basis for negotiations. It would also anchor
the legitimacy of a peace agreement, even if Hamas were to object to it. The true
significance of the Saudi all-Arab peace initiative lies in that it has expropriated the
monopoly about deciding on the end of the conflict from the Palestinians.
The new initiative, however, will not be able to take off unless it is coordinated with
the U.S. Only through American-European agreement on a joint strategy in the
Middle East, will there be a chance for a serious diplomatic breakthrough. The
expected change of direction in American policy is likely to bring about a mending
of the trans-Atlantic alliance that was splintered in Baghdad.
And if it is the legacy of President Bush the elder that is to be revived, via the Baker
report that is shortly to be published, then it is not unlikely that it will be understood
in Washington that Baghdad and Jerusalem are not separate entities. After all, that
same coalition that fought in Baghdad in 1991 is the one that came immediately
after that to Madrid to push forward the international conference on peace in the
Middle East.
60
Gideon Samet: There is something that can be done, “Haaretz” 17.11.2006:
How many more times are we going to hear that all the killing, the withering of
hope, will continue until Gilad Shalit is returned? That is what, in effect, the prime
minister says as Qassam rockets falling on towns and villages in the South make a
mockery of the rehashed military campaigns and the political standstill. How far can
our curiosity be strained with Ehud Olmert's declarations that he is going to surprise
the world with concessions, if Abu Mazen will just agree to talk with him? There is
nothing to disturb Olmert from speaking with Palestinian Authority Chairman
Mahmoud Abbas, and from revealing to him at last what he intends to do. Olmert is
the one who is stopping Olmert from doing this.
And what have the Israelis done to deserve the incessant ranting that there is no
one to talk to? There is someone to talk to and there is something that can be
done, if one would only want to do so. Yossi Beilin has once again proven that. In
his quiet way, behind the scenes, he has spent the past few months preparing a
platform for negotiations. So far he has not published it. Beilin believes in
clandestine work, until it bears some results. But while those indefatigably opposed
to an agreement continue to scorn the Oslo accords, without offering an alternative,
the new Beilin document presents a well-phrased path for moving rationally and
gradually toward talks on a permanent status solution. He and his advisers have
chosen an appropriate time. America is withdrawing from the caprices of the neoConservatives and the semi-religious belief that only force can work. Its president
has already made all the mistakes and is now searching for an alternative.
James Baker, who was the strong-handed secretary of state in George Bush
senior's administration, and Lee Hamilton, the former chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, are preparing to conclude a
plan for changing American policy in the Middle East, at the president's request.
If Bush decides to adopt this paper, the much delayed moment will arrive when the
United States begins to operate in this region on the basis of different assumptions.
And of course it is imperative, as a result of Iran's stance, that Washington's
international politics be adapted to its real needs. Beilin and his aides met everyone
who is anyone in the PA in the course of preparing the document: Abbas, close
advisers such as Yasser Abed Rabbo, Saeb Erekat and Salam Fayyad. Two days
before Olmert's visit began, Beilin delivered the document in Washington to David
Welch, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs; Kofi Annan in New
York and the leading figures in the European diplomatic scene, such as Javier
Solana. This is not some haphazard list of personalities. If Olmert had done even
some of this, Shalit would already have been in his hands for some time, and the
town of Sderot apparently would not have had to bury its dead.
Beilin intentionally did not speak to representatives of Hamas. He intelligently left
this to the chairman of the PA, and the latter, for his part, not coincidentally chose
this week to deliver an appeasement speech and an invitation to negotiations
("Don't miss peace"). The paper proposes skipping the first stage of the road map,
which has been experiencing a slow death for years, and to begin discussing largescale Israeli withdrawals from the territories. The decision will be in the hands of the
PA whether to establish a state within temporary borders. In the proposed talks, of
course, the first decision will regard instituting a cease-fire. The PA will release
Shalit in conjunction with the release of a significant number of Palestinian
prisoners (after all, Olmert has promised to do so) and the alleviation of the
disgraceful conditions in the Gaza Strip.
The issues of Jerusalem and the refugees will be discussed in the next stage of the
negotiations on the final status agreement, with the assistance of the United States,
the European Union and the "Arab quartet" – Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and
United Arab Emirates. The arrangement will be based on the 1967 lines and the
moderate Saudi proposal, which has twice been adopted in the past four years by
the Arab countries at their summit, with "changes that reflect the security and
demographic reality as agreed upon by the two sides."
Let those in the right-wing who detest Beilin say whatever they want. The new Beilin
document, first published in these pages, proposes what Olmert, with his wiles, was
duty-bound to have done a long time ago. The proposal, whose full details go
beyond the limits of this column, does not have tight assurances of success. It is
outlined here as renewed proof that quiet and tranquility will not be our lot if there is
no end to the irresponsible politics of the prime minister – a man whose words are
not bad but whose deeds are a dangerous failure.
61
Lieberman: Israel must forget road map, in “Jerusalem Post” 18.11.2006:
Israel should ignore Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, wipe out the Hamas
leadership and walk away from the US-backed "road map" peace plan, Israel's new
deputy prime minister, Avigdor Lieberman, said Saturday, laying out his views on
the conflict with the Palestinians.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's spokeswoman, Miri Eisin, had no comment Saturday
on Lieberman's latest remarks.
Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, a top Abbas aide, said Lieberman is stuck in
the past and that his ideas "are a recipe for the continuation of bloodshed, violence,
extremism and hatred between the two sides."
In an interview with Israel Radio, Lieberman proposed a series of measures, based
on what he said is his belief that the Palestinians are not interested in setting up
their own state, but rather in destroying Israel.
Israel must walk away from interim peace deals, the so-called Oslo Accords, and
from the US-backed "road map" plan, which envisions the establishment of a
Palestinian state alongside Israel in several stages, he said.
"A continuation of Oslo, of the road map ... will lead us to another round of conflict,
a much more bloody round, and in the end to an even deeper deadlock, and it
threatens our future," he said.
He dismissed Abbas, elected president in 2005, as an ineffective leader and said
he should be ignored, in favor of closer coordination with the Jordanian government
about the fate of the West Bank.
"We have a reliable partner there which is Jordan," he said."We have to coordinate
with Jordan. We have to say that Abbas is simply not relevant, we have to ignore
him ... He has no authority, no power."
Israel also needs to get tougher with the Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups,
particularly their leaders, Lieberman said. "I see the entire leadership of Hamas and
Jihad walking around freely, and it's continuing to incite," he told the radio. "They ...
have to disappear, to go to paradise, all of them, and there can't be any
compromise."
The leader of the Hamas bloc in the Palestinian parliament, Mushir al-Masri, said
any attack on the group's leaders would trigger immediate retaliation.
Israel has killed a series of Hamas leaders in targeted missiles strikes in recent
years, including the group's founder, but has not targeted members of the Hamas
government elected nine months ago.
Lieberman also proposed that Israel take back control of the Gaza-Egypt border to
stop weapons smuggling.
Since then, the border has repeatedly been closed over security alerts, and Israel
troops have raided the area in search of weapons smuggling tunnels.
The Israeli military has expressed concern about an influx of weapons into Gaza.
The border's Rafah crossing is controlled by Egypt, the Palestinians and EU
monitors.
Lieberman said Israel cannot rely on others to prevent the influx of weapons. "We
have heard about tons of weapons, of missiles, we have heard about the smuggling
of hundreds of millions of dollars into Gaza, and this is the fuel driving this entire
war," he said. "They have all failed, the international observers who are sitting at the
Rafah crossing, the Egyptians."
62
Text of Resolution United Nations A/ES-10/L.19, General Assembly 15
November 2006:
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory Occupied Palestinian Territory
The General Assembly,
Recalling its relevant resolutions, including resolutions of the tenth emergency
special session,
Reaffirming Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 446 (1979), 1322
(2000), 1397 (2002), 1402 (2002), 1403 (2002), 1405 (2002), 1435 (2002), 1515
(2003) and 1544 (2004),
Reaffirming also the applicable rules and principles of international law, including
humanitarian and human rights laws, in particular the Geneva Convention relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
Expressing grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situation on the
ground in the Palestinian Territory occupied by Israel since 1967 during the recent
period, particularly as a result of the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of
force by Israel, the occupying Power, which has caused extensive loss of civilian
Palestinian life and injuries, including among children and women,
Condemning the military assaults being carried out by Israel, the occupying Power,
in the Gaza Strip, which have caused loss of life and extensive destruction of
Palestinian property and vital infrastructure,
Condemning in particular the killing of many Palestinian civilians, including children
and women, by Israel, the occupying Power, that took place in Beit Hanoun on 8
November 2006,
Emphasizing the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians and
condemning all attacks against civilians on both sides,
1. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to immediately cease its military assaults
against the Palestinian civilian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and to immediately withdraw its forces from within the
Gaza Strip to positions held prior to 28 June 2006;
2. Demands the immediate cessation of military incursions and all acts of violence,
terror, provocation, incitement and destruction between the Israeli and Palestinian
sides, including extrajudicial executions, bombardment against Palestinian civilian
areas, air raids and firing of rockets, as was agreed in the Sharm el-Sheikh
understandings of 8 February 2005;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a fact-finding mission on the attack
that took place in Beit Hanoun on 8 November 2006 and to report thereon to the
General Assembly within thirty days;
4. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to scrupulously abide by its obligations
and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,1 in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem;
5. Emphasizes the need to preserve Palestinian institutions, infrastructure and
properties;
6. Expresses grave concern about the dire humanitarian situation of the Palestinian
people, and calls for the provision of emergency assistance to them;
7. Emphasizes the urgency of ensuring that medical and humanitarian
organizations are granted unhindered access to the Palestinian civilian population
at all times and of allowing the severely injured a speedy exit outside the Occupied
Palestinian Territory for needed treatment;
8. Calls upon the international community, including the Quartet, to take immediate
steps to stabilize the situation and restart the peace process, including through the
establishment of an international mechanism for the protection of civilian
populations;
9. Calls upon the parties, with the support of the international community, to take
immediate steps, including confidence-building measures, towards the objective of
resuming peace negotiations;
10. Stresses the importance of and the need to achieve a just, comprehensive, and
lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all relevant Security Council resolutions,
including resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003), the
Madrid terms of reference, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative
adopted by the League of Arab States at its fourteenth session, held in Beirut on 27
and 28 March 2002, and the road map;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on the
implementation of the present resolution in a timely manner;
12. Decides to adjourn the tenth emergency special session temporarily and to
authorize the President of the General Assembly at its most recent session to
resume its meeting upon request from Member States.
JOHN BOLTON (United States) said he would request a recorded vote against a
resolution that only exacerbated tensions by serving the interests of elements
hostile to Israel's inalienable and acknowledged right to exist. Just yesterday, the
Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) had passed a resolution
stressing the need to avoid country-specific human rights resolutions. With
resolutions such as that, the United Nations contributed to the conclusion that the
Organization was incapable of playing a helpful role in the region.
He said that the challenge of advancing towards the vision of two States, Israel and
Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security, required serious and
determined efforts by the parties and the constructive support of countries in the
region and the international community. Regrettably, he continued to see little in the
way of constructive support for genuine efforts to move towards the two-State goal.
However, in a larger sense, the United Nations must confront a more significant
question – that of its relevance and utility in confronting the vast array of global
challenges in the twenty-first century.
The United Nations was ill-served when its members sought to transform the
Organization into a forum that was little more than a "self-serving and polemical
attack against Israel or the United States", he said. Moreover, the nature of group
dynamics in the United Nations was "seriously hampering" the principles on which
the Organization was founded. While there were many who would prefer to see
improved cooperation, a more effective General Assembly and relevance of its
actions to the real world, the resolution before it was "another example of moderate
elements being held hostage by a few extreme States or those whose parochial
political agendas distort the ostensible purpose of this and other resolutions", he
said.
He said that, since its inception earlier this year, the Human Rights Council had
quickly "fallen into the same trap and delegitimized itself" by focusing attention
almost exclusively on Israel. It had failed to address real human rights abuses in
Burma, Darfur, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other countries.
"Sadly, the Human Rights Council appears to be developing into an organ that is
worse on this score than it predecessor," he said.
The problem of anti-Israel was not unique to the Human Rights Council; it was
endemic to the culture of the United Nations, he said. It was a decades-old,
systemic problem that permeated the whole panoply of United Nations
organizations and agencies. Beyond the General Assembly, the Security Council
and the Human Rights Council, the sponsors of today's resolution had diverted the
efforts of non-political United Nations bodies, such as the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International
Postal Union and the International Labour Organization, with one-sided polemics
irrelevant and harmful to the non-political mandates of those agencies, and
unhelpful to the cause of the Palestinian people and regional peace. Those efforts
served only to erode the United Nations' credibility and undermine the goal of
resolving the underlying conflict.
He warned that the consequences of that persistent, unconstructive, biased
approach were painfully clear – not one single Palestinian was helped, and the
United Nations continued to be discredited by its inability to confront the serious
challenge of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in a serious, responsible manner.
Member States must choose: did they desire a viable United Nations system
composed of agencies respected for their role in conflict resolution, human rights,
economic development, education and culture, or would it continue to acquiesce to
a narrow agenda of bias, stalemate and polemics? Member States must
demonstrate the will to break with the past and make the United Nations a relevant
voice, not only for the Israel-Palestinian conflict, but for other conflicts and issues
worldwide, he declared.
Vote on Draft Resolution on Illegal Israeli Actions:
The draft resolution on illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the
rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (document A/ES-10/L.19) was adopted by
a recorded vote of 156 in favour to 7 against, with 6 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark,
Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, San
Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against: Australia, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of),
Nauru, Palau, United States.
Abstain: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
Absent: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Grenada, Honduras, Kiribati, Liberia,
Madagascar, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan,
Uganda.
63
Office of the [US-]Press Secretary, November 13, 2006:
President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Olmert of Israel to the White House Oval
Office:
PRESIDENT BUSH: Mr. Prime Minister, welcome back to Washington. The Prime
Minister and I had a fascinating discussion the last time he was here. We were
sitting on the Truman Balcony. We spent probably an hour-and-a-half strategizing
about how we can work together to achieve peace. Our conversation today
continued this – that important dialogue. I appreciate the Prime Minister's strategic
thoughts. He cares deeply about his country, and he cares deeply about securing
the peace. We talked about our commitment to a two-state solution. We talked
about the need for a Palestinian government to embrace the principles of the
Quartet and the road map, which both our governments strongly support.
We spent a great deal of time on Iran, and about how we can work together with
other nations of the world to convince the Iranians to abandon their nuclear
weapons ambitions. I recognize the threat to world peace that the Iranians propose
– that the Iranians pose, as does the Prime Minister. We talked about Iraq. We
talked about a variety of issues.
But the whole central thrust of our discussions was based upon our understanding
that we're involved in an ideological struggle between extremists and radicals
versus people who just simply want to live in peace, and that as democracies we
have an obligation, obviously, to listen to the will of our people, but at the same
time, work together to help those who want to live in a peaceful society achieve
their ambitions.
Mr. Prime Minister, it has been a delight to be with you again. Welcome back.
PRIME MINISTER OLMERT: Thank you very much. [Mr.] President – this is
nothing to take an edge to the very accurate analysis that you made with regard to
these big issues. We in the Middle East have followed the American policy in Iraq
for a long time, and we are very much impressed and encouraged by the stability
which the great operation of America in Iraq brought to the Middle East. We pray
and hope that this policy will be fully successful so that this stability which was
created for all the moderate countries in the Middle East will continue.
We shared thoughts about the Iranian threat. There is no question that the Iranian
threat is not just a threat for Israel, but for the whole world. The fanaticism and the
extremism of the Iranian government, and the fact that the leader of a nation such
as Iran can threaten the very existence of another nation, as he does towards the
state of Israel, is not something that we can tolerate or would ever tolerate, and
certainly not when we know that he is trying to possess nuclear weapons. And I'm
very encouraged by our discussion and thoughts that we have exchanged about
what needs to be done in the Middle East.
Finally, I say time and again, on different occasions, that we want to open a serious
dialogue with the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority. And I will make every
possible effort to help Abu Mazen to get into such a dialogue with us. Indeed, we
hope that the new government will be established soon on the basis of the Quartet
and the road map, and that will allow an immediate contact between him and me
that I'm sure will lead to extend this negotiation process.
Again, Mr. President, it's always a great joy to be with Your Excellency. And I
always thank you for your friendship – your personal friendship, and even more
important, your friendship for the state of Israel.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you, sir. We'll answer two questions a side. Tom.
Q: Mr. President, the Senate – the incoming Senate Democratic leaders have
called for a phased withdrawal of troops from Iraq. You met this morning with the
Baker commission. Would you accept any solution that included a timetable, and
what options did you discuss this morning with the Baker commission?
PRESIDENT BUSH: Tom, I'm not going to prejudge the Baker commission's report.
I was pleased to meet with them. I was impressed by the quality of the – of their
membership. I was impressed by the questions they asked. They are – they want
us to succeed in Iraq, just like I want to succeed. And so we had a really good
discussion. I'm not sure what the report is going to say. I'm looking forward to
seeing it. I believe this: I believe that it's important for us to succeed in Iraq, not only
for our security, but for the security of the Middle East, and that I'm looking forward
to interesting ideas. In the meantime, General Pete Pace is leading investigations
within the Pentagon as to how to reach our goal, which is success, a government
which can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and will serve as an ally in this war on
terror. I believe it is very important, though, for people making suggestions to
recognize that the best military options depend upon the conditions on the ground.
And so it's an interesting period here in Washington, Mr. Prime Minister. You might
realize the opposition party won, won the Senate and the House. And what's
interesting is, is that they're beginning to understand that with victory comes
responsibilities. And I'm looking forward to working with the Democrats to achieve
common objectives.
Q: Mr. President, do you see any change in the administration's position regarding
Syria? Do you support the resumption of Israeli-Syrian negotiations? And the same
question to the Prime Minister, if I may. In the past, you rejected the resumption of
the Syrian and Israeli negotiations under – one of the reasons was the rejection of
the American administration regarding the policies of Syria. Do you see now, after
you discuss this matter with the President, any change in your position regarding
Syria?
PRESIDENT BUSH: My answer to your question is, Prime Minister Olmert knows
how to run his own foreign policy. And he can figure out his – he can figure out his
policy towards them. My policy towards Syria is this: that we expect the Syrians to
be, one, out of Lebanon so that the Lebanese democracy can exist; two, not
harboring extremists that create – that empower these radicals to stop the advance
of democracies; three, to help this young democracy in Iraq succeed. And the
Syrian President knows my position. We have told that to him through my
administration. We do have an embassy there in Syria. But our position is very
clear, and we would like to see some progress toward peace from the Syrians.
PRIME MINISTER OLMERT: I share the same opinion with President Bush. We
are not against negotiations with Syria. We would love to be able to have
negotiations with Syria, but that must be based on a certain reasonable,
responsible policy, which is not preformed by Syria for the time being. Everything
that they are doing is to the other direction – in Lebanon, in Iraq, and the
sponsorship of Hamas and Khalid Mashal as the main perpetrators of terror against
the state of Israel. With some changes in the Russian – I'm sorry, in the Syrian
attitude on these major issues, I hope that one day the conditions for contacts
between them and us will be created. But to be honest, I don't think at the present
time they manifest any such attitude. And that makes it impossible.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Matt.
Q: Yes, Mr. President, Tony Blair today is going to be calling for a reaching out to
both Syria and Iran to help calm the situation in Iraq. What is your response to that?
PRESIDENT BUSH: I haven't seen his comments, but you just heard my response
on Syria. And my comments on Iran is this: if the Iranians want to have a dialogue
with us, we have shown them a way forward, and that is for them to verify –
verifiably suspend their enrichment activities. We put that proposal on the table
awhile back. We said that if you want to have a dialogue with us, we're willing to
come to the table with the EU, as well as Russia and China, to discuss a way
forward. But first, you must verifiably suspend your enrichment activities. Our focus
of this administration is to convince the Iranians to give up its nuclear weapons
ambitions. And that focus is based upon our strong desire for there to be peace in
the Middle East. And an Iran with a nuclear weapon would be a destabilizing
influence. And so we have made it very clear, our position regards Iran, and it
hasn't changed.
Q: Mr. President, do you think that it's better to impose sanctions on Iran or to
handle dialogue with them? (Speaking Hebrew.)
PRESIDENT BUSH: I think it's very important for the world to unite with one
common voice to say to the Iranians that, if you choose to continue forward, you'll
be isolated. And one source of isolation would be economic isolation. In other
words, there has to be a consequence for their intransigence. They have – we went
to the United Nations, we made it very clear – we, being a lot of the world – have
made it clear that the Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions are not in the world's
interest. And therefore, if they continue to move forward with a program, there has
to be a consequence. And a good place to start is working together to isolate the
country. And my hope is, is that there are rational people inside the government
that recognize isolation is not in their country's interest. And I also, when I speak
about Iran, speak about a government, not about the Iranian people. I believe the
Iranian people want a better way forward. I don't think they want to confront the
world. I believe they need – I believe they could benefit by more trade and more
openness with the world. But their leaders have to make the decision, and the
decision is abundantly clear to them. And I say this in the interest of world peace,
that if Iran has a nuclear weapon, it will be incredibly destabilizing and obviously
threatening to our strong ally. And so my attitude is let's work in concert to convince
the government that it's not just the Israeli voices speaking, or the United States'
voices speaking, but there's a lot of other voices saying the exact same thing, and
present them with a choice.
MR. DECKARD: Thank you all.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Wait a minute. That seems a little unfair. He's got a strong
answer coming, I can feel it. (Laughter.)
PRIME MINISTER OLMERT: She said it in Hebrew, and you can blame him, he
didn't understand the Hebrew part of the question. I'll answer in Hebrew for the
Israeli voters.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Sure.
PRIME MINISTER OLMERT: (Speaking Hebrew.) And again, I want to thank you,
President Bush, for being so gracious to me and to the state of Israel.
PRESIDENT BUSH: Proud to have you here. Thank you all.
64
Brit Tzedek released the following press release yesterday, November 13, 2006,
in response to the meeting between President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert:
JEWISH PEACE GROUP DISAPPOINTED BY LACK OF PROGRESS IN BUSHOLMERT MEETING
CHICAGO –In a statement released today, Marcia Freedman, president of Brit
Tzedek v'Shalom, the country's largest and most vibrant grassroots Jewish peace
organization, expressed profound concern over the lack of progress made in the
meeting today between President George Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert.
"President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert sound as if nothing has happened to
change their worldviews in recent months, despite the fact that Israelis are still
reeling from their recent failed military policy in Lebanon, and U.S. voters have
overwhelmingly rejected President George Bush's Middle East policy."
"If ever there was a moment for a daring U.S. diplomatic initiative to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is now. President Bush, together with Prime Minister
Olmert, can forge their legacies in the region with an historic contribution to regional
stability, global security, and international peace."
Last week, Americans, including an overwhelming number of American Jews,
demanded that their government chart a new course in the Middle East, and
likewise, Israeli citizens are rejecting the isolationism of their government, with 67%
believing that Israel should negotiate with a Palestinian unity government. Yet
meeting today, even as their constituencies vehemently demand change, these two
embattled leaders, President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert, appear perfectly
satisfied with the status quo.
For the past six years, the Bush Administration has failed the people of the region
and we who support their quest for peace with security. It is totally insufficient to
address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through occasional diplomatic gestures that
produce no concrete results; Brit Tzedek calls on the U.S. Government to take
action.
Both the need and the opportunity for action are urgent. The opportunity has been
created by the anticipated formation of a Palestinian unity government and by
President Bush's entry into the final years of his Administration, when he should be
willing to take political initiative to carve out his presidential imprint. The need arises
from daily increasing violence and loss of life in Gaza that enflames and threatens
to engulf the entire region in war, the potential for disaster which we witnessed this
summer in Lebanon. Brit Tzedek calls for vigorous U.S. diplomatic intervention to
reach an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, as well as the release of kidnapped Israeli
soldiers and the cessation of Qassam rockets fired into southern Israel by
Palestinian militants. The conflict can only be resolved by immediate U.S.
leadership to engage Israelis and Palestinians in ending this crisis and bringing
back all parties to the negotiating table. This is what the American people are
calling on President Bush to do.
Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, is a national
grassroots movement more than 35,000 strong, that educates and mobilizes
American Jews in support of a negotiated two-state resolution of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.
65
Akiva Eldar: An irrelevant test of intentions, in “Haaretz”-online 13.11.2006:
Every time an errant bomb that's launched to execute a Palestinian "wanted man"
kills people who are obviously "innocent bystanders," mainly women and children,
there is first an expression of heartfelt regret and then comes the time for selfrighteousness. "As opposed to the Arabs," declares the defense minister – this
time, Amir Peretz – "we do not deliberately target innocent civilians." As opposed to
our neighbors, in our case the defense minister, known as "the man of peace,"
immediately appoints a special investigator to examine the "mishap" and to
ascertain that a "tragedy" of this kind will not recur. Until the next time. In other
words, don't judge us according to the harsh consequences of our actions. What
counts is our good intentions.
Would an expression of regret help the heads of a Palestinian organization who
sent a terrorist to blow himself up at a hitchhiking post for soldiers, if the schlemiel
were to set off the bomb near a bus load of children? Would the test of intentions
save him and the passersby from the revenge of the Israel Defense Forces? What
Israeli judge would accept the defense of an activist of the military arm of Fatah,
who claimed that his violent acts were meant to release his people from the Israeli
occupation?
The cemeteries and prisons are full of thousands of Palestinian who are loyal to the
two-state solution. For the goyim the only thing that counts is the test of results. The
test of intentions is relevant only when it comes to Israelis.
However, when it suits our politicians, the test of intentions – which finds expression
in deliberate policy – has nothing to do with the conflict. No one knows better than
they do that if Israeli governments were to be examined according to their ongoing
behavior in the territories over the past 40 years, they would be extremely lucky to
get a grade of unsatisfactory.
The dozens of settlements that were established contrary to international law, some
of them on private Palestinian land, cannot be considered an "errant bomb." This is
a policy that is designed to annex parts of the West Bank to Israel. Outposts that
were established on Palestinian land, with the assistance of government funding,
are not "an unfortunate mistake." This is a method of turning a blind eye to the
forcible establishment of facts on the ground.
If Israel is to be judged by its intentions, we cannot make do with the generous
promises of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. His nice words are worthless when at the
same time the Defense Ministry is expropriating more Palestinian land for the
purpose of building another highway meant for Israelis only. The peace declarations
of Foreign Ministry Tzipi Livni are of as much interest as the snows of yesteryear to
the residents of Nablus, who are not allowed to visit their relatives in the Jordan
Valley. Even our High Court of Justice, not to mention the International Court of
Justice in The Hague, has ruled that the route of the fence deliberately serves to
expand the settlements, under a camouflage of security considerations.
If the response to the acts of others should be based on their long-term intentions,
rather than according to the consequences of an isolated mistake, it is not certain
that Israel comes out ahead. An order that separates a Palestinian mother from her
children living in Israel is not something unavoidable that stems from the need to
fight terror. It is a "demographic policy." A law that denies compensation to
Palestinians who are "innocent bystanders" and have become disabled because
IDF soldiers do not respect the instructions for opening fire, is not a necessary
consequence of "the situation." It is a cruel amendment to a law that was passed by
a majority in Israel's Knesset.
There have been many other bad consequences with bad intentions behind them.
The severance of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, and of hundreds of
thousands of families from the sources of their livelihood, including withheld tax
money, is not a divinely ordained law. It is the method chosen by the Israeli
government to punish Palestinian children for the fact that a substantial percentage
of their parents voted for Hamas.
It’s a shame that people of conscience in Israel and the world over have fallen
asleep on their watch and have grown accustomed to living with innumerable
deliberate injustices that have become routine. It's a shame that they wake up only
when one bomb misses its mark.
66
Middle East Peace Process—Council conclusions of the EU Ministers of
Foreign and External Affairs, Brussels 13 November 2006:
The Council adopted the following conclusions:
"The Council expressed its deep concern at the escalating violence in Gaza and in
the West Bank. The Council strongly deplores the Israeli military action in Gaza
resulting in a growing number of civilian casualties, including women and children,
and deplores the unacceptable military operation in Beit Hanoun on 8 November
2006. While recognising Israel's legitimate right to self-defence, the Council urged
Israel to exercise utmost restraint and underlined that action should not be
disproportionate or in contradiction to international humanitarian law. The Council
called on Israel to cease its military operations that endanger the Palestinian civilian
population in the Palestinian Territory. The Council also strongly deplores the firing
of rockets on Israeli territory and called on the Palestinian leadership to bring an
end to such acts. The deterioration of the situation will only aggravate the already
grave circumstances in the region where a return to a comprehensive peace
process with a clear political perspective is urgently needed. To achieve this, an
immediate cessation of violence is needed.
The Council reiterated its call for the immediate release of the abducted Israeli
soldier and commended efforts including by partners in the region to that effect. It
repeated its call for immediate release of Palestinian ministers and legislators
detained in Israel.
The Council urged the Palestinians to work for national unity and to form a
government with a platform reflecting the Quartet principles and allowing for early
engagement. Such a government of national unity would also be a partner for the
international community to support the re-launching of the peace process.
The Council reiterated the EU's intention to actively contribute to the work within the
Quartet to get the Middle East Peace Process urgently back on track in order to
make progress towards a comprehensive settlement on the basis of the Roadmap,
relevant UNSC resolutions and the commitments made at Sharm el-Sheikh in
2005. This should be done in close cooperation with Arab partners.
The Council reiterated the necessity of a political perspective and reinvigorating the
peace process through re-launching negotiations. To support the objective of a
future independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state based on the rule of
law, the Council underlined the importance of preserving and strengthening the
capacity of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. To that end, the Council
underlined the work already undertaken by the EU and continued in the current
circumstances to help building Palestinian institutions and expressed its readiness
to provide enhanced support to a Palestinian Government that the EU can engage
with. Further efforts in this respect will take into account useful experiences of the
EU missions in this area, EU BAM Rafah and EU POL COPPS as well as the
results of technical assistance provided to Palestinian institutions.
The Council emphasised the importance of the implementation of the Agreement of
Movement and Access of November 2005. It called on Israel to also respect
previous agreements and to fulfil its obligations under them. It insisted on the
particular importance of regular operations at Gaza crossings, notably Rafah and
called on Israel to do its utmost to ensure that the crossings be opened and remain
open. The Council decided to extend the EU Border Assistance Mission for the
Rafah Crossing Point for a further six months.
The Council called on Israel to desist from any action that threatens the viability of
an agreed two- State solution. Of particular concern are settlement activities in and
around East Jerusalem as well as in the Jordan Valley. The European Union will
not recognise any change to the pre-1967 borders other than those agreed by both
parties.
The Council remains deeply concerned at the deteriorating humanitarian situation
in Gaza and the West Bank, as also highlighted in recent reports by UN agencies.
The Council recalled its commitment to help the Palestinian people and noted that
the EU's combined assistance in 2006 exceeds 650 million. The Council reiterated
its call on Israel for the immediate resumption of transfers of withheld Palestinian
tax and customs revenues.
The Council encouraged donors and others to make full use of the Temporary
International Mechanism."
The Council adopted the following conclusions with regard to Lebanon and Iran:
"The Council encouraged all Lebanese parties to reach consensus and to resume
the process of national dialogue. The EU continues to be committed to supporting
the legitimate and democratically elected Lebanese government and its efforts to
stabilise the situation in the country, and to maintain its unity. In this regard, the EU
fully supports the reconstruction process in the perspective of the Paris Conference
in January 2007. The Council renewed its determination to support the full
implementation of UNSCR 1701. The Council called on all parties in the region to
comply with the resolution, notably the arms embargo. Lebanon's sovereignty over
its land, sea and airspace must be respected by all. The Council urged Israel to
stop violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israeli Air Force. The Council
welcomed the deployment of UNIFIL troops and the Lebanese armed forces which
is progressing well.
The Council reiterated its call for the immediate release of the two abducted Israeli
soldiers. The Council called on countries in the region to refrain from any
interference in Lebanon's internal affairs, in accordance with UNSC resolutions and
to provide firm support to Lebanon's Government in reconstruction efforts."
– Border assistance mission at Rafah: The Council adopted without discussion a joint
action amending and extending joint action 2005/889/CFSP on the European
Union's border assistance mission at Rafah crossing point between Egypt and the
Gaza strip (EU BAM Rafah) (13571/06).
– Both the Palestinian and Israeli parties having expressed approval to the extension
of EU BAM Rafah, the Council decided to extend the mission for a further period of
six months. The joint action will again be reviewed by 31 March 2007 at the latest.
Ministers, over lunch, discussed Iran and the current state of play including
discussions at the United Nations Security Council on a draft resolution.
At its October meeting, the Council considered that Iran's continuation of
enrichment related activities had left the EU no choice but to support consultations
on appropriate measures under article 41 of the UN Charter, as envisaged by UN
Security Council Resolution 1696. It noted that the door to negotiations
nevertheless remained open.
67
Vgl. die Berichte A.B. Yehoshua: People without a land, in “Haaretz”-online
12.5.2006:
“… the deep and natural identification that a large portion of American Jewry once
felt with Israeli life has been steadily and seriously weakening in recent years. All of
the participants in the subsequent discussions [at the ACJ-symposium in
Washington] agreed that, for some years now, a slow process of disengagement of
American Jewry from Israel has been intensifying. The reasons are numerous and
complex, and relate both to the fact that the ›Israeli drama‹ has lost many of its
attractive features for American Jews, and to the accelerated processes of
assimilation occurring to varying degrees within America itself. … The Zionist
solution, which was proven as the best solution to the Jewish problem before the
Holocaust, was tragically missed by the Jewish People. … All of the reports
suggesting that I said that there can be no Jewishness except in Israel are utterly
preposterous. No one would ever think of saying such an absurd thing. It is Israel
and not the Diaspora that could be a passing episode in Jewish history, and this is
the source of my compulsion to reiterate the old and painful truths that apparently
need to be repeated again and again. Not just to Diaspora Jews, but to Israelis, too.
… What I sought to explain to my American hosts, in overly blunt and harsh
language perhaps, it that, for me, Jewish values are not located in a fancy box that
is only opened to release its pleasing fragrance on Shabbat and holidays, but in the
daily reality of dozens of problems through which Jewish values are shaped and
defined, for better or worse. … The Jews have proven their ability to live anywhere
for thousands of years without losing their identity. And as long as the goyim don’t
cause too many problems, Jewish perseverance will not falter. If Israeliness is just
a garment, and not a daily test of moral responsibility, for better or worse, of Jewish
values, then it’s no wonder that poverty is spreading, that the social gaps are
widening and that cruelty toward an occupied people is perpetrated easily and
without pangs of conscience. Since it will always be possible the escape from the
reality to the old texts, and to interpret them in such a way that will imbue us with
greatness, hope and consolation.” – A.B. Yehoshua sends ›deepest apologies‹ to
AJC [American Jewish Congress] remarks, in “Haaretz”-online 15.5.2006:
“Everything I said about the partial nature of Jewish life in the Diaspora as opposed
to the all-inclusive nature of Jewish life in Israel has been said by me over the
course of many years in the past, both in print and in addressing numerous
Diaspora Jews. Never before did this lead to such an angry reaction as it did this
time. Presumably, there was something in my tone and imprecise formulation that
insulted part of the audience.”
68
Conversation with Ehud Olmert, in ”The Washington Post” November 12, 2006:
After this past summer's controversial war in Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert has lower poll numbers than President Bush. Olmert, who will meet with
Bush in Washington this week, spoke with Newsweek-Washington Post's Lally
Weymouth about the Middle East, Iran and the prospect of a U.S. pullout from Iraq.
Q: What are you going to say to President Bush? Last year you told him you had a
vision – your convergence plan, which was to withdraw from large parts of the West
Bank. Do you have a vision today?
A: The convergence plan was a vehicle to accomplish a vision shared by both
President Bush and myself. This is a two-state solution. Before the war, I told the
Israeli public that the first step I would take is to try to establish a credible process
of negotiations, on the basis of the road map, with the legitimate Palestinian
leadership. If that didn't work, then we would try [unilateral] realignment.
Q: But after the war in Lebanon, you said the convergence plan was on hold.
A: After the fighting in Lebanon, and also the failure of the Palestinians to cope with
continued terrorist actions, I have second thoughts about the ability to accomplish
the two-state solution through realignment. It is definitely not dead but it has to be
reexamined. One thing I can promise: Under no circumstances am I going to
withdraw from the need to engage in a serious dialogue with the Palestinians,
toward the implementation of the vision which I share with President Bush. The
Palestinian issue is on the agenda. There is no way we can ignore it or that we
would want to ignore it. We have to find the best partner to do it. A lot depends on
the Palestinian leadership.
Q: How do you feel about Abu Mazen [Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud
Abbas] as a partner?
A: He personally has shown consistently his opposition to terror and his discomfort
with Hamas techniques. But it is incumbent upon him to do more than just say how
uncomfortable he is with Hamas. He hasn't yet shown enough determination and
inner strength to put down this government of terrorists and to reduce the influence
of [Hamas leader] Khaled Mashal, who controls the officials of the Palestinian
government from Damascus.
Q: How do you feel about Abu Mazen entering into a unity government with
Hamas?
A: Such a government can be measured by one criterion: Do they accept actively –
not just in theory – the principles of the Quartet? If Hamas will formally accept these
principles – which are to recognize Israel's right to exist, to end all terror and hostile
activities against Israel and to recognize and implement all the agreements signed
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority – then I'll be ready to sit down with
such a government even if it includes Hamas representatives.
Q: So you don't have much hope that there's a partner you can engage with and
you're not sure about the unilateral realignment plan you proposed last year. Do you
have another idea?
A: I'm very encouraged by some developments that have taken place lately. The
fighting in Lebanon made it much clearer that there are some shared interests
between Israel and some of the more moderate Arab countries. We have very
friendly relations with Jordan and with Egypt. As of late, I'm very impressed with the
performance and policies carried out by the King of Saudi Arabia. And the leaders
of the [United Arab] Emirates. One can feel that there is a broader examination of
the region and also maybe a better understanding of some of the constraints Israel
has to deal with. And also a realization that at the end of the day, Iran and the axis
of evil made by Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas is of greater danger not only to
Israel but to some moderate Arab countries.
Q: What are you referring to with regard to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates?
A: The position they took over the fighting in Lebanon, which was very courageous.
In the past, the Saudis have expressed some ideas about a possible solution in the
Middle East.
Q: You're hinting that this might be another route for working with the Palestinians –
via Jordan and other moderate Arab countries?
A: We have to change the balance in the Middle East and the position of the radical
elements of Palestinian society. I hope that with the joint efforts of Israel and
America on the one side and the moderate Arab countries on the other side,
something can be worked out that will help the more moderate elements within
Palestinian society, led by Abu Mazen, to take over and establish the necessary
conditions for a fruitful dialogue with us.
Q: Has the United States asked you to release Palestinian leader Marwan
Barghouti from prison, and would you consider doing that?
A: I am ready to release many, many prisoners. I made it clear long ago that I am
anxious to open up a new dialogue with Abu Mazen, and for that purpose, I'm ready
to release many prisoners. Hamas's extreme inflexible attitude prevents the
prisoners from being released because they refuse to let us have our soldier
[kidnapped Israeli Cpl. Gilad Shalit]… Hamas is not really interested in the wellbeing of its prisoners. They want to topple Abu Mazen at any cost.
Q: You brought [Avigdor] Lieberman into your coalition. But people on the left
perceive him as an extreme right-winger opposed to any kind of concessions with
the Palestinians. Does he affect your position?
A: The policies of this government are not going to be changed and you can read
my lips: I'm ready for territorial compromises, and I haven't changed my mind.
Q: How do you see the threat posed by Iran?
A: This is the first time in many years that the official leader of a major nation with
more than 70 million citizens has talked publicly and officially of the liquidation of
another nation that is a member of the United Nations. [Iranian President
Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad is a man who is ready to commit crimes against humanity,
and he has to be stopped. When Hitler began to talk about the liquidation of the
Jewish race, people heard it. But they hardly did anything to stop it. And then for
generations, nations and leaders had to explain why they didn't speak up. So we
have to have a world campaign to emphasize the moral commitment that no one
will be able to ignore what he says and what the possible ramifications may be.
There is also the process of negotiations. My position is clear: If there can be a
compromise that will stop Iran short of crossing the technological threshold that will
lead them into nuclear capabilities, we will be for such a compromise. But I don't
believe that Iran will accept such compromise unless they have a very good reason
to fear the consequences of not reaching it. In other words: Iran must start to fear.
Q: Will you talk with Bush about Iran?
A: Bush is the last person on Earth who needs to be reminded of what should be
done to stop Iran. If there is one person I can trust, it's him. I trust his moral
integrity, I trust his moral commitment and I trust his determination.
Q: Do you think regime change is the only way to stop this?
A: I can think of many different measures. The guideline has to be that this
government and the people of Iran must understand that if they do not accept the
request of the international community, they're going to pay dearly.
Q: So you wouldn't rule out the military option?
A: I think my words were clear enough.
Q: If the international community does not act, would Israel consider taking military
action?
A: It is absolutely intolerable for Israel to accept the threat of a nuclear Iran. I prefer
not to discuss the Israeli options. Israel has many options.
Q: When you look back at the war last summer, do you feel it reduced Hezbollah's
military strength but built them up politically?
A: I think Israel had a strategic, military and political success. Unfortunately, before
the war, we lacked what we thought we had – deterrence. They were not afraid of
starting a fight with us because they thought our reaction would be entirely different.
Now if you ask [Hezbollah leader Hasan] Nasrallah if he would want to repeat it, I'm
sure his answer would be definitely not. I know for sure through different sources
that Hezbollah was close to total surrender. Now the presence of the Lebanese
army in the entire southern region, together with a robust international force, is very
significant. It creates a reality entirely different to anything that existed before July
12.
Q: [Syrian] President [Bashar al-]Assad is sending out suggestions that he would
like to talk to Israel. Why wouldn't it be a good idea to explore those hints?
A: If Assad was serious, he would have stopped his total support of Khaled Mashal,
the man directly responsible for daily terrorist actions against Israel. I would be
happy to negotiate with Bashar Assad, but on the basis of a certain environment,
where you stop your support of terror and of Hezbollah. Assad doesn't show any
sign that he's ready to do this.
Q: But you negotiated with [Yasser] Arafat when he was in Tunisia, and he was
certainly a terrorist.
A: I think we learned something about negotiations of this kind from this
experience. I don't expect my enemies to be wonderful guys. But I want them to
come with clean hands when they come to negotiate. Bashar Assad doesn't come
with clean hands. When he comes with clean hands, I will talk to him.
Q: If the United States gets out of Iraq, how does that affect the security of your
country?
A: If there is a premature pullout before Iraq has a robust government with a strong
authority that can keep the country from collapsing into an internal civil war,
America will have to think about the possible ramifications on neighboring Arab
countries with moderate governments. How will it affect the stability of these
countries against the radical forces that might flourish as a result of a premature
pullout of America?
69
H.E. Tzipi Livni, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, State of
Israel, at the General Assembly [GA] of the United Jewish Communities [of North
America], Los Angeles, 12 November 2006:
Thank you Galia [Maor, Israel's GA Chair] for your warm introduction.
Dear Friends,
I am here today as a Jew and as an Israeli, in that order. Many miles separate Los
Angeles from Jerusalem, but the ties that bind us cannot, and should not, be
broken by distance, because we are one people. We are one people, but we cannot
take the bond between us for granted. I believe that Jewish identity is a choice and
a responsibility as much as it is an inheritance. Our Jewishness is more than a fact,
it is a profound feeling that must be created, nurtured, and sustained.
I know that all of us are here because our Jewish identity is precious to us – it
shapes who we are and who we want to be. Too often our relationship is defined
only in terms of common dangers. We do indeed face common dangers, but our
bond goes far beyond that.
Our bond is built on shared history and shared fate – on a rich tapestry of tradition,
values, and culture, and on a mutual responsibility not just to protect our Jewish
identity, but to make it flourish in our generation and in generations to come.
As an Israeli, I have to ask myself whether we are not in danger of creating a new
Israeli identity that feels removed from its Jewish heritage, and a result, from the
Jewish Diaspora. I am sure, too, that you ask yourselves whether there is a risk that
Jewish identity in the Diaspora is evolving in such a way that the deep connection to
Israel may, in time, no longer be one of its central pillars.
I believe strongly that we share a responsibility to prevent a rift developing between
Israeli identity and Jewish identity. Together, we need to ensure that Jewish
children throughout the Diaspora see Israel as their home, just as the Jewish
children of Israel must see you as their family.
At the same time, the collective mission of the Jewish people cannot be limited to
focusing on our own predicament.
Our unique history and talents as a people oblige us to work also for the betterment
of the world as a whole, to stand against the suffering of others, of the kind we see
in Darfur, and to continue to make exceptional contributions to the societies in
which we live.
Dear Friends,
The principles that shape the identity of the Jewish people have also shaped the
collective identity and national story of the State of Israel – a story of courage and
rebirth greater than any Hollywood scriptwriter could have imagined.
From its establishment, two core values have formed and driven our national
character. The first – that Israel, with Jerusalem at its heart, is the national
homeland of the Jewish people – it is both the spiritual and cultural heartbeat of our
ancient people, and their refuge from persecution.
The second – that Israel is a democracy; that the values of justice, peace and
humanity – first expressed by the prophets of Israel – are an integral part of our
nation's sense of mission.
The decisions we take as a state, those that I make as foreign minister and
member of the Israeli government, are guided by these core principles and values
on which our society is based. They must take account not only of the interests of
Israel, but also the interests of the Jewish people as a whole.
Together, in upholding these values, we face challenges on three different fronts:
as a people defending our basic right to a national homeland; as Jews against the
dark hatred of anti-Semitism; and as members of the free world against the forces
of global terrorism.
In each case, what is at stake is not just our physical security or existence, but our
very right to a Jewish national identity and a place our people can call home. These
three fronts have come together in the case of Iran.
We face a regime that denies and mocks the Holocaust while seeking the weapons
to perpetrate one. Iran's words and actions are not only a direct threat to Israel, but
they are no less a threat to the values that the international community as a whole
claims to hold dear.
If these values mean anything – if the promise of "never again" is more important
than the price of oil – then the time for international indifference and hesitation in
the face of the Iranian threat has long passed.
Last summer, we experienced a confrontation between Israel and Iran. Though the
war took place in Lebanon, it was the case of a rogue state, Iran, and its proxy, the
Hizbullah, abusing a weak state, Lebanon, to advance a radical and hate-filled
agenda.
For Israel, the war revealed significant shortcomings that we must correct, but it
also created opportunities that we can build upon. Our decision to halt the military
operation and give a chance to the international community and Resolution 1701
was not an easy one.
The history of our people and our state has, unfortunately, taught us to question
whether we can rely on others. I am not naїve – I live after all in the Middle East.
But I believed at the time and I believe now, that Resolution 1701, if properly
implemented, can create a genuine opportunity for positive developments.
The rules of the game in Lebanon have changed – Hizbullah, surprised by the
reaction, has suffered a setback, the Lebanese Army has deployed to the South, an
arms embargo has been decided upon in the prevention of rearmament.
In addition, a multinational force with a robust mandate has been deployed to
Lebanon. The role of this force is not to defend Israel – we have our own army to
do that, the IDF.
Resolution 1701 can help Lebanon become a normal, responsible state that
asserts sovereignty over its territory, exercises monopoly over the use of force, and
respects the rights of its neighbors.
These are elements that a military campaign, as successful as it may be, cannot
attain alone. The mission, clearly, has not yet been completed. Our soldiers – our
sons – two held by Hizbullah and one by Hamas – Ehud Goldwasser, Eldad Regev,
and Gilad Shalit, still remain in captivity.
Those who kidnapped them see in our desire to do everything possible to bring
them home a sign of our weakness. They are wrong. It is testimony to our strength.
In this effort, your voice is important. I urge you to speak up on their behalf and help
ensure that this issue stays on the international agenda and conscience. We cannot
and we will not rest until our boys are free.
During the war in Lebanon we learned again of the courage of our soldiers, the
resilience of our civilians, and the strength of our economy. We also saw you, once
again, our Jewish brothers and sisters, in action – organizing rallies, coming on
solidarity missions, contributing with extraordinary generosity and thoughtfulness –
with unconditional kindness – in so many ways: university scholarships for students
called up for army duty, air conditioners for bomb shelters, camps for the children of
the North and so much more.
I cannot tell you how much these efforts meant to us. I cannot express in words
how important it is for us to know that we are not alone.
Dear Friends,
Through the war we began to see a realignment of interests in the Middle East.
This is becoming less a conflict between peoples and more a conflict about values.
It is a conflict between moderates and extremists; between those who fight
terrorism and those who give refuge to terrorists; between those who are tolerant of
differences, and totalitarians who seek to eradicate all that is different.
No peace process in history has ever succeeded without each side recognizing the
legitimacy of the other. This is the essence of the vision of peace that must unite
Israelis, moderate Palestinians, and moderates throughout our region. It embraces
the vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace
and security that represents the basis of any acceptable and viable peace.
There is no place in this vision for terrorism. There is no justification in demanding
the right to self-determination, while rejecting that same right for others. Each
people must be willing to give up part of their dream to make room for the dreams
of others.
Israel has made its choice. I have always believed that the Jewish people has an
historic right to all of Eretz Yisrael. But I also believe that I speak for not only the
current government in Israel, and not only the Kadima Party, but for the wide Israeli
public when I say that it is our national goal to keep Israel as a Jewish and
democratic state.
For both elements to live together, and not in contradiction, and to assure our
security, we have to give up part of Eretz Yisrael. Israel – its government and its
people – are deeply committed to such a peace. Stagnation is not in our interest
and it is not our policy. It is for this reason that we embarked on the painful process
of disengagement, hoping to create an opportunity for peace, though sadly we
received terrorism in return.
It is for this reason that we are ready now, as we have been ready in the past – as
we worked with Egypt and with Jordan – to reach out and engage with all those who
share this vision and these values, including Chairman Abbas and the moderates in
the Arab world, in order to turn the dream of peace into reality.
Groups such as Hamas and Hizbullah, and their state sponsors, have a very
different vision for our region. They seek to turn a resolvable political dispute into an
endless religious confrontation. They are a threat to Israel and a tragedy for their
people. To stand against them is to stand for peace.
To appease them is to betray those among our neighbors who seek a dignified and
lasting settlement.
To succeed in our efforts, all peoples of our region must have the courage to see
that we, Israelis and Arabs alike, face a common challenge. This is not a zero-sum
game. It is in our common interest, and we all have to take responsibility for our
region's destiny.
Dear Friends,
We are profoundly grateful that we have the support and friendship of the people
and the government of the United States in facing these challenges. In the elections
that have just taken place in the United States, we have seen democracy in action,
and I would like to take this opportunity to wish all the newly elected and the
returning members of Congress mazal tov.
As you all know, the special relationship between Israel and the United States
crosses party lines. It goes beyond a strategic alliance of interests and is based on
a genuine and unshakeable alliance of values.
Our partnership with the United States is natural, but it is also critical in the face of
the many difficult tests before us and the many difficult decisions to be taken.
Not every decision has or will be popular and many meet with international criticism
– very often this reflects double standards and a biased attitude.
I know this is a source of frustration for many of you who care deeply about Israel
and its image in the world. I know, too, that it is our responsibility to provide those
who wish to advocate for Israel with the tools to do so.
We live in a world in which perception can matter more than reality. I have met
many world leaders who have told me frankly that their decisions are not always
based on principle or on what they know, but on what their public perceives. This is
a serious challenge that requires us to close the gap between the image of Israel
and the reality of Israel. In this spirit, I have launched an initiative at the Foreign
Ministry on branding Israel. Working with a broad cross-section of Israeli society, as
well as leaders in fields of public relations, education, tourism, and others, we want
Israel to be seen not only in the shadow of conflict and terrorism, but also in the
bright light of its vibrant culture and rich identity.
Let me be clear. This is not about advertising or spin. It is not a substitute for our
public diplomacy. It is not an effort to "sell" Israel but to reveal its true and diverse
nature. We want every Israeli to identify with the resilience, spirituality, creativity,
and vitality that is Israel.
We are proud of the values and qualities that make us who we are and we want to
be associated with them. We want the world to see what Warren Buffet saw when
he purchased Iscar [größter israelischer Metallwerkzeughersteller im bisherigen
Besitz von Steff und Eitan Wertheimer] last spring [Mai 2006]: "Some Americans
have come to the Middle East looking for oil," he said. "We came to the Middle East
looking for brains, and we stopped at Israel."
And today, I ask you to join me in helping the world see more of Israel than the
image they see on their television screens. Let your hometown come to know
Israel's Nobel Prize winners and performing artists. Get your federation to host an
Israeli film festival or hi-tech fair. Help us widen the lens and let the world see who
we really are.
In this, as in so many other things, you are our partners. We have a shared
connection to the past, and a common objective for the future. We will stand with
you in good times and in bad, just as you have stood with us.
We in Israel greatly appreciate your efforts, your friendship, and your support.
However unaccustomed you are to hearing this from an Israeli, let me say the
obvious, and let me say it out loud, in my name and in the name of the people of
Israel: Thank you.
70
Nicholas Goldberg: A cloud over Jerusalem, in “Los Angeles Times“
12.11.2006:
In the 1990s, when I lived in Jerusalem, Israelis were famous for a sort of stoic
optimism in the face of trouble. Hamas suicide bombers would sneak into a cafe or
a pizza parlor or step onto a bus and blow themselves up, leaving the ground
littered with body parts and broken glass, sometimes a random baby carriage or the
frame of a window. But within minutes of the blast, an extraordinarily welldisciplined, if macabre, cleanup process would begin.
No sooner were the victims' bodies carted away than a uniformed crew would arrive
on the scene to sweep up the glass and haul off the rubble, to retrieve the carcass
of the burned-out bus or fit new plate glass into the window of a bombed-out shop.
Working indefatigably through the night under eerily bright lights, they would stay
until dawn if necessary so that, in the morning, life would appear at least on the
surface to be back to normal. This was at the height of the Oslo peace process,
and there was a seemingly unshakable sense of the inevitability of peace and a
dogged willingness to believe that if you fought and struggled to make things seem
normal, then eventually they would be.
When I returned several weeks ago for a visit, however, I found a deeply changed
country, its confidence and unflappable optimism badly battered. Despite a strong
economy and substantially less terrorism today than a few years ago, Israelis
across the political spectrum are, by their own admission, depressed and anxious,
unsure about the way forward.
"Something is happening in this country that I find deeply, deeply troubling," said
Michael Oren, a senior fellow at the centrist to right-wing Shalem Center in
Jerusalem and the author of a highly regarded book about Israel's glory days during
the Six-Day War in 1967. "It's an erosion at the core."
In a Nov. 4 speech marking the anniversary of the assassination of Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin, the liberal Israeli novelist David Grossman expressed similar
sentiments. "Israel faces a profound crisis, much more profound than we imagined,
in almost every part of our collective lives," he said.
The malaise is reflected in the newspapers virtually every day. There was, for
instance, a story at the end of October reporting that olim – Jews from the Diaspora
who have chosen to move to and become citizens of Israel – are leaving the
country in such numbers that a Knesset committee had met to discuss the growing
problem. Another article, in the newspaper Haaretz, reported on a poll in which 80%
of Israelis said political corruption prevented them from "taking pride" in their state.
And the October findings of a survey conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for
Peace Research at Tel Aviv University showed that only 17% of Israelis believed
that there would be peace between Israel and the Arabs in the coming years.
"There's a sense of exhaustion," acknowledged novelist Amos Oz. There are
several clear reasons for Israel's current depression. At the top of the list is last
summer's war in Lebanon, an ill thoughtout fiasco that not only inflicted terrible
damage on southern Lebanon's civilian population but worsened (still further)
Israel's global standing and failed to destroy Hezbollah (as promised). Most
horrifying to Israelis, the army appears to have sent Israeli soldiers into Lebanon
without a clear mission, with insufficient supplies (including food and drinking water)
and faulty equipment, a situation that prompted mass demonstrations and
threatened to topple the government.
"Israel was shelled by 4,000 rockets and we didn't have a response for it," Oren
said. "We started in a position of unprecedented international strength. But we were
stunned by the gross incompetence of the decision-making process, the corruption
that was revealed, the lack of imagination of the tactics, the fear that the
government radiates and the failure to achieve our goals."
In addition to the war, there are a series of unfolding political scandals that are
feeding Israeli cynicism. Prosecutors, for instance, are weighing whether to file rape
and sexual misconduct charges against Israeli President Moshe Katsav, as
recommended by the police. (This just after former Justice Minister Haim Ramon
went on trial on charges that he kissed a woman against her will and former
Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai stepped down after being convicted of sexual
assault and harassment.) Other Israeli leaders – including Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert – are facing inquiries into corruption, cronyism or misconduct in office.
As for the ongoing, long-standing conflict with the Palestinians, Israelis appear
utterly baffled about what move to make next. Most people I spoke with believe,
rightly or wrongly, that the Oslo peace process collapsed six years ago because of
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's unwillingness to conclude a reasonable two-state
deal. But the alternative strategy of former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon — who
proposed simply disengaging unilaterally from parts of the occupied territories while
building walls and fences to separate the two populations – now appears to have
failed as well.
The country continues to lash out at the Palestinians – as in the case of
Wednesday's deadly raid that killed 18 people, mostly civilians, in Gaza – but it
does so with no apparent plan and with no strategy for building a long-term peace.
Most Israelis seem to sincerely believe that a response is necessary to what they
see as unprovoked cross-border rocket attacks from Palestinian militants in Gaza,
but as Palestinian deaths continue to mount and the rockets continue to fall, they
also express a sense of hopelessness about what they're doing. In an interview at
his home in the desert city of Arad recently, Oz said that these explanations for the
current national mood are in some sense just symbolic. "On the surface, it's about
Lebanon or the two-state solution," he said. "But really it cuts deeper than that."
The war, for instance, was about more than just the war. The truth is that last
summer's battle in Lebanon hit hard at one of the most time-honored mythologies
of Israeli life. For nearly 60 years, the Israeli army has been viewed at home as
virtually invincible, as a lean and intelligent fighting force that was incorruptible and
merit-driven and that could defend the country against a hostile and often antiSemitic world. That image, to say the least, was shaken in Lebanon last summer.
The political scandals, too, have a deeper meaning: They serve as a reminder that
the great, larger-than-life leaders who bestrode the country for decades have
disappeared. Israeli leaders such as David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak
Rabin, Menachem Begin and Sharon, whatever one thought of them, were outsized
figures who created, built and protected the country. The next generation —
including such increasingly unpopular figures as Olmert and Defense Minister Amir
Peretz – seem to many Israelis to be intellectually and politically unprepared to take
on the extraordinary challenges facing the country.
At the Rabin memorial, David Grossman — who had opposed the Lebanon war and
whose son was killed in the final days of fighting — described Israeli leadership as
"hollow."
"The people who today lead Israel are unable to connect Israelis with their identity,
and certainly not with the healthy, sustaining, inspiring parts of Jewish identity," he
said. "Today, Israel's leadership fills the husk of its regime primarily with fears and
intimidations, with the allure of power and the winks of the backroom deal, with
haggling over all that is dear to us. In this sense, they are not real leaders. They are
certainly not the leaders that a people in such a complicated, disoriented state
need." For more than a decade now, Israel has been facing the collapse of its own
founding mythologies. In the 1990s, a group of "new historians" emerged to
challenge the traditional Zionist narrative, focusing less on the standard Davidversus-Goliath view of Israel and the Arabs and more on a less heroic, but perhaps
more historically accurate, version. In some ways, the current malaise is just a
continuation of that process: Another moment in which Israel is being forced to look
at itself clearly – as normal and flawed – rather than through the prism of its own
fairy tales.
Amos Oz says that no country, except perhaps the United States, was ever built on
the kind of monumental (and contradictory) aspirations that the Zionists had when
they founded their country. Israel was to be a socialist paradise; at the same time it
was to be a classic Western democracy. Some people wanted to re-create the
kingdoms of David and Saul; others wanted an East European shtetl.
The moment you try to carry out such monumental dreams, they carry the taste of
disappointment," Oz said. "Planting a garden or carrying out a sexual fantasy or
writing a novel or building a nation – the disappointment is the same. It's what
happens when you live out a dream. Everything is better as a theory."
71
Erklärungen der Mitgliedsstaaten und Text des Resolutionsentwurfs für die
Abstimmung im UN-Sicherheitsrat am 11.11.2006: Zehn Stimmen dafür, eine
Stimme dagegen, vier Enthaltungen.
Ten Council Members voted in favour of the draft, while four countries. Speaking
prior to action on the draft, the United States representative said that the text did
not display an even-handed characterization of the events in Gaza and was
politically motivated. Nor did it advance the cause of Israeli-Palestinian peace to
which the United States aspired and for which it was working assiduously. While
joining other Council members in deeply regretting the loss of life in Beit Hanoun,
he noted that Israeli authorities had admitted that the incident had been a mistake
and intended to conduct an investigation into the events there, which he hoped
would be completed expeditiously. He said, however, that he was disturbed by the
language of the resolution that was in many places biased against Israel. For
example, one of the preambular paragraphs of the text equated military operations
of Israel that were legal with the firing of rockets into the territory of Israel that was
terrorism. At the same time, he said he was disturbed that the draft did not contain
a single reference to terrorism or any condemnation of a recent statement by
Hamas that Palestinians should resume terrorist attacks on a wide scale or strike
against United States interests, he continued, maintaining that the Palestinian
people deserved a Government that would become a legitimate partner in the
peace process and work toward a two-State solution through the Quartet's Road
Map. Following the vote, the representative of Qatar said that his country had
submitted a balanced draft that reflected the views of the majority of Council
members. Peoples and Member States should judge the objectivity of the draft for
themselves. His delegation was trying to protect the civilians who desperately
needed protection and any lukewarm reaction from the Council gave an impression
that it was shirking its responsibilities. The image of defenceless civilians killed
mercilessly at Beit Hanoun, he said, would leave a lasting image in the minds of the
people all over the world. The Council's failure to put an end to Israel's aggression
would lead to the continuation of the cycle of violence which in turn leads to further
deterioration of the situation in the Palestinian territories. The representative of the
Congo also expressed disappointment at the failure of the draft. The Permanent
Observer of Palestine thanked all those who had voted in favour of the "balanced
text before the Council" and said that he was disappointed that the draft not been
adopted. He said the Council had conveyed two wrong messages: for Israel, it had
sent a message that it could continue to behave above international law; for
Palestine 11 November 2006 United Nations Security Council SC/8867.
Speaking prior to action on the draft, the United States representative said that the
text did not display an even-handed characterization of the events in Gaza and was
politically motivated. Nor did it advance the cause of Israeli-Palestinian peace to
which the United States aspired and for which it was working assiduously. While
joining other Council members in deeply regretting the loss of life in Beit Hanoun,
he noted that Israeli authorities had admitted that the incident had been a mistake
and intended to conduct an investigation into the events there, which he hoped
would be completed expeditiously. He said, however, that he was disturbed by the
language of the resolution that was in many places biased against Israel. For
example, one of the preambular paragraphs of the text equated military operations
of Israel that were legal with the firing of rockets into the territory of Israel that was
terrorism. At the same time, he said he was disturbed that the draft did not contain
a single reference to terrorism or any condemnation of a recent statement by
Hamas that Palestinians should resume terrorist attacks on a wide scale or strike
against United States interests, he continued, maintaining that the Palestinian
people deserved a Government that would become a legitimate partner in the
peace process and work toward a two-State solution through the Quartet's Road
Map.
Following the vote, the representative of Qatar said that his country had submitted a
balanced draft that reflected the views of the majority of Council members. Peoples
and Member States should judge the objectivity of the draft for themselves. His
delegation was trying to protect the civilians who desperately needed protection and
any lukewarm reaction from the Council gave an impression that it was shirking its
responsibilities.
The image of defenceless civilians killed mercilessly at Beit Hanoun, he said, would
leave a lasting image in the minds of the people all over the world. The Council's
failure to put an end to Israel's aggression would lead to the continuation of the
cycle of violence which in turn leads to further deterioration of the situation in the
Palestinian territories.
The representative of the Congo also expressed disappointment at the failure of the
draft.
The Permanent Observer of Palestine thanked all those who had voted in favour of
the "balanced text before the Council" and said that he was disappointed that the
draft not been adopted. He said the Council had conveyed two wrong messages:
for Israel, it had sent a message that it could continue to behave above
international law; for Palestine – that justice was not being dealt within an
appropriate way by the Council. But his people, despite the disappointment, would
never lose hope. Justice would prevail and the occupation would eventually come to
an end.
Only through negotiations – and not massacres and aggression – would the
solution to the conflict be found, he continued. His people would never lose faith of
the great principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. "We will continue
coming to you until justice prevails," he said.
The four abstaining Members expressed deep sorrow over the incident at Beit
Hanoun and other loss of life in Gaza but also claimed the draft was unbalanced,
describing negotiations that had progressed toward more equity but had not
achieved a text that would have been helpful in ending the violence.
The United Kingdom's representative said she remained deeply concerned about
the consequences of Israeli military action and the resulting loss of civilian lives,
calling for restraint on the part of Israel while calling also on Syria and Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas to use their influence to stop the firing of Qassam
rockets into Israel. She said it was absolutely right that the Council act on this
issue, but that it was essential to act in a manner that was balanced.
Also looking for a more balanced text, the representative of Denmark said rocket
attacks against Israel must stop, but at the same time, Israel must make sure that
its security operations were conducted in accordance with international law and did
not hamper finding a peaceful solution on the ground. A State's response in the
right to self-defence must be proportionate.
The representative of Japan said his delegation had participated constructively in
the negotiations on the draft proposed by Qatar. He appreciated the efforts to
reflect some of Japan's concerns during discussions, but said that further
improvement was needed. Concurring, Slovakia's representative said the text
lacked recognition of the full complexity of the Middle East situation.
Following is the complete text of the draft resolution considered by the Council:
The Security Council,
"Reaffirming it previous resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 446 (1979), 1322
(2000), 1397 (2002), 1402 (2002), 1403 (2002), 1405 (2002), 1435 (2002), 1515
(2003), and 1544 (2004),
"Reaffirming the applicable rules and principles of international law, including
humanitarian and human rights laws, in particular the Geneva Convention relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,
"Expressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situation on the
ground in the Palestinian Territory occupied by Israel since 1967, during the recent
period, particularly as a result of the excessive and disproportionate use of force by
Israel, the occupying Power, which has caused extensive loss of civilian Palestinian
life and injuries, including among children and women,
"Condemning the military operations being carried out by Israel, the occupying
Power, in the Gaza Strip, in particular the attack that took place in Beit Hanoun on 8
November 2006, which have caused loss of civilian life and extensive destruction of
Palestinian property and vital infrastructure,
"Condemning also the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel,
"1. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to immediately cease its military
operations that endangers the Palestinian civilian population in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to immediately withdraw its
forces from within the Gaza Strip to positions prior to 28 June 2006;
"2. Calls for an immediate halt of all acts of violence and military activities between the
Israeli and Palestinian side as was agreed in the Sharm El-Sheikh understandings
of 8 February 2005;
"3. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a fact-finding mission on the attack
that took place in Beit Hanoun on 8 November 2006 within thirty days;
"4. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to scrupulously abide by its obligations and
responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
"5. Calls upon the Palestinian Authority to take immediate and sustained action to
bring an end to violence, including the firing of rockets on Israeli territory;
"6. Emphasizes the need to preserve the Palestinian institutions, infrastructure and
properties;
“7. Expresses grave concern about the dire humanitarian situation of the Palestinian
people and calls for the provision of emergency assistance to them;
"8. Calls upon the international community, including the Quartet, to take immediate
steps, to stabilize the situation and restart the peace process, including through the
possible establishment of an international mechanism for protection of the civilian
populations;
"9. Calls upon the parties supported by the international community to take immediate
steps including confidence-building measures, with the objective of resuming peace
negotiations;
"10. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a just, comprehensive, and
lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its
resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003), the Madrid terms
of reference, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by
the League of Arab States Summit in March 2002 in Beirut and the Road Map;
"11. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to report back to the
Security Council on the implementation of this resolution in a timely manner;
"12. Decides to remain seized of the matter."
72
Alaa Shahin: Arab Bid to Break Ban On PA Hangs On Unity Government,
Reuters November 12, 2006:
Cairo – Arab states are banking on Fatah and Hamas agreeing on a Palestinian
unity cabinet so that their unanimous decision to bypass a Western financial ban on
the Palestinians can have some chance of success. But their bluff would be called
if talks between the two rival groups run into new problems. Failure to implement
Sunday's resolution, which also called for a new Middle East peace conference,
would deal another blow to the credibility of the Arab League, analysts say.
The United States, Israel's chief ally, and its partners in the Quartet of Middle East
mediators have imposed the eight-month boycott to press the governing Islamist
group Hamas, which won general elections in January, to renounce violence and
recognise Israel.
But Hamas said on Tuesday the planned unity government would not recognise the
Jewish state or accept a two-state solution to the Middle East's longest-running
conflict.
Analysts say any collapse in talks to form a new cabinet more acceptable to Israel
would force Arab states to challenge Washington if they were to break the boycott
unilaterally, a stance they are unlikely to take.
"On the surface, this looks like an encouraging resolution ... but Arab states played
it smartly,"said Egyptian political analyst Hassan Nafaa. "They expect a national
unity government soon, which means the boycott would be lifted ... but if forming
the government gets complicated Arab states would be forced to defy the United
States and don't think this would happen," he told Reuters.
Many Arabs say the 22-member League is too weak to challenge Israel or the
United States and accuse governments like Egypt, Jordan and the oil-rich Gulf Arab
states of serving U.S. interests inreturn for Washington's political and military
backing.
Arab foreign ministers meeting in an emergency session in Cairo gave no details on
how they would bypass the ban and help banks avoid possible U.S. sanctions.
A senior Arab diplomat told Reuters on Monday the ministers have yet to find a way
to do so because of many difficulties, including Israel's control of banking licensing
in the Palestinian territories.
Mouin Rabbani, senior analyst for the International Crisis Group think tank, said the
Arab League's decision would be empty if Palestinians failed to form a national
unity government.
"If you take the (Arab) statement at face value it's hot air ... The only political
significance is that Arab states are anticipating the formation of a new Palestinian
government which will be under less Western restrictions," Rabbani said.
The United States and the European Union regard Hamas as a terrorist
organisation and have cut off direct aid to its administration. As a result, the
Palestinian government has largely been unable to pay its 165,000 workers since
April.
Even the new international peace conference the Arab ministers have called for
was unlikely toattract enough attention from key Western powers, analysts say.
"They (Arabs) can call for as many conferences as they want. It is not going to
happen," Rabbani
said.
Previous Arab calls for a solution bypassing the long-stalled, U.S.-sponsored "road
map" to the Middle East have gone unheeded. Israel says a peace conference
comes at the second stage of the road map, which Hamas rejects.
Dina Ezzat: Perpetual discord, in “Al-Ahram Weekly” 16.-22.11.2996:
"There is only one explanation for the unexpected Arab decision to break the
economic embargo imposed on the Palestinian people for months. Arab
governments are almost certain that it is a matter of days before the Palestinian
national unity government is formed. And once this government is declared, the
embargo will immediately be dropped by the whole world," commented Omar in a
readers' reaction spot on the Al-Jazeera website.
Omar's remarks were printed alongside a story on the outcome of an extraordinary
meeting of the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers that convened on Sunday at the
Cairo headquarters of the Arab League. The main topic on the agenda was to
discuss a supposedly collective Arab reaction to the recent wave of brutal Israeli
massacres against innocent Palestinian civilians.
Omar was far from being alone in expressing dismay – if not outright humiliation
and disappointment – at the results of the Arab ministerial meeting. Some
members of the Palestinian Hamas government – who had for months been given
the cold shoulder by their Arab counterparts – found it necessary to publicly praise
the decision of Arab foreign ministers to finally break an economic embargo that
they had religiously observed for close to a year, even when it starved and
suffocated Palestinians under Israeli occupation.
However, the readers of Al-Jazeera and other Arab news websites, who for the
most part shared Omar's views, did not at all feel obliged to conceal their frustration
with the official Arab reaction to Israeli aggression and American arrogance. As a
result there was abundant criticism of the humbling and humiliating results of the
Arab meeting – with some suggesting that was better left unconvened since it
ended with a new declaration of Arab frailty.
Convened in Cairo with the obvious absence of Saudi, Kuwaiti, Iraqi and Lebanese
foreign ministers, the Arab foreign ministers' extraordinary council showed a
disturbing willingness on behalf of their states to keep turning the other cheek in
response to Israeli aggression and American lackadaisicalness with regard to the
Palestinians.
Arab foreign ministers did not even have the courage to openly criticise the United
States for the use of their veto – the second in five months – to prevent the United
Nations Security Council from condemning the Israeli massacre of dozens of
Palestinians, including 19 innocent civilians in Beit Hanoun. Of course, all the while,
the Americans continued to demand strict security measures on the side of the
Palestinian Authority.
The Arab foreign ministers stated that this veto is bound to be perceived as a
negative move. Washington was not even accused by Arab foreign ministers as
exercising bias – the very word used by US officials to reject the resolution. "The
council [wishes to communicate] its utmost distress at the use of veto by the US [on
Saturday night] against a draft Arab resolution presented to the UN Security
Council. This veto constitutes an unfriendly stance against Arab peoples and
governments. It prevented the council from undertaking its responsibilities. It also
sent a message of encouragement for the Israeli aggression. It weakened the
chances of peace in the region and undermined the credibility of the US in playing a
role to bring about peace to this region," read the statement concluded after long
hours of discussions on Sunday evening.
All in all the statement adopted by the Arab ministerial meeting was consistent only
in its weakness. Israel was not threatened with the loss, or even suspension, of its
relations with Arab countries. "For Egypt and Jordan the issue of suspending
diplomatic ties with Israel is simply out of the question," commented a Cairo- based
Algerian diplomat. Speaking on condition of anonymity, the diplomat said that this is
not even something Arab Gulf countries are willing to encourage.
And unlike previous Arab League resolutions which contained strong verbal support
to the Palestinian people, this week's meeting was somewhat sparse with its
support to the Palestinian struggle. Indeed, it carefully balanced its limited support
with clear demands to suspend militant operations and to free the Israeli soldier
Gilad Shalit kidnapped by Palestinian resistance on 25 June.
Arab diplomats admit that this week's statement was devoid of any serious or
important message to Washington or Tel Aviv. Indeed, when US President George
W Bush received the visiting Israeli prime minister at the White House on Tuesday
evening, it was unlikely that they would have much to discuss about this statement
that seemed to offer Israel and the US rewards rather than political revenge for their
aggression and intransigence.
In addition to the incomprehensibly emphasised security demands required of the
stifled Palestinian side, the ministerial meeting offered Israel, with Hamas's support,
the chance of an international conference on the matter. This conference, which
has no clear conditions stipulated to it, would bring together all the Arab countries
with Israel and the five permanent members of the Security Council. This golden
offer was cushioned against the traditional Arab ministerial rhetoric of asking the
UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council to censure the Israelis
and a general demand for the presence of an international force in the occupied
Palestinian territories to provide security for the Palestinian populations. Another
demand for an international enquiry in the Beit Hanoun massacre and other Israeli
violations was also made by the ministers. Such demands have always been
ignored and obstructed by Israel and the US.
The Arab minister's most practical decision was to form a tripartite delegation
comprised of the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, the current chair of
the Arab Ministers, Bahraini Foreign Minister Bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, and the Arab
member sitting in the Security Council, Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad Ben Jassim,
to speak with key international players. In the absence of direct political
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and in view of the inability of the
traditional regional players to convince –- or even plead with – Israel to contain its
aggression against Palestinians, many Arab diplomats believe that this delegation
could help bring international attention to the huge suffering sustained by the
Palestinians.
This week, outgoing UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and European Union foreign
ministers, during a meeting in Brussels, expressed concern over the deterioration
of the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories and stressed the global
importance of resolving the Arab- Israeli conflict. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister
Tony Blair made an indirect call for an end to the isolation imposed on Syria. Arab
diplomats say that it is of primary importance for the Arab delegation to build on
these stances in order to garner sufficient support for any diplomatic movement –
no matter how humble – to resume Arab-Israeli negotiations under reasonable
conditions.
However, as Arab diplomats insist, members of the delegations – especially the
usually conflicting Bahraini and Qatari foreign ministers – need to agree amongst
themselves about the exact objectives and political ceiling that they are to abide by.
The delegation, diplomats add, would have to secure general consent from crucial
Arab capitals to fulfil its mission. In the absence of such Arab diplomatic
consensus, the mission of the delegations – which is bound to be launched shortly
– would be unlikely to produce any tangible results at all.
"If they really come together and join hands and if they really decide not to accord
Washington undue courtesy then they could really curtail the Israeli intransigence
and induce positive change in the US foreign policy," Moussa said in a press
conference following the ministerial meeting.
This is not the first time that Moussa has equated Arab success with Arab unity and
an end to the exaggerated affiliation of some Arab countries to the US. Moussa
might not have said so but, after six years at the helm of the self- undetermined
Arab organisation, it is unlikely that Arab countries will unite – not any time soon
anyway.
73
Ari Shavit: Historians won’t believe it, in „Haaretz“-online 13.11.2006:
You can't just kill 20 innocent civilians in Beit Hanun and say: "Oops, we made a
mistake. We're sorry." You can't. You simply can't. At the very least, the prime
minister should appeal personally to the victims and the Palestinian people and
express regret, offer compensation and request absolution. At the very least, the
defense minister should declare that the catastrophe was the result of a rash policy
for which he takes full responsibility. At the very least, there should be an
announcement that the evil artillery shelling will cease.
Anything less is unacceptable. Anything less is inhuman and un-Jewish and
inconceivable. Inconceivable? In the land of hollow leadership, anything is possible,
anything goes.
It is inconceivable to fail in war and to remain in one's post, and sweep things under
the carpet. It is inconceivable, simply inconceivable. At the very least, there should
be a whole new approach – if not an immediate replacement of the leadership in its
entirety, then at least a different program. At the very least, there should be the
establishment of a national emergency government comprising worthy and capable
individuals of stature. At the very least, there should be an amendment in the
decision-making mechanism when it comes to national security, and the army
should be embodied with a new spirit. At the very least, the nation should be offered
a new ethos and all its resources should be amassed ahead of the challenges of
the near future.
Anything less is unacceptable. Anything less is un-Zionist, un-Israeli and
anything goes.
It is inconceivable to see a war approaching – and fail to take action. It is
inconceivable to understand that the failure of the 2006 war brings the 2007 war
closer – and fail to do anything about it. It is inconceivable, simply inconceivable. At
the very least, there should be a repeat of what Israel did immediately after the
beating it took in the Yom Kippur War: a rebuilding of the army in record time, and
the initiation of a political process without delay. At the very least, the Syrians and
Palestinians should be brought face-to-face with a terrifying deterrent force, and
offered the alternative of a meaningful process of dialogue. At the very least, there
should be no provoking or striking out, and the neighbors should be confronted with
a big stick and soft words.
Anything less is unacceptable. Anything less is immoral, irresponsible and
anything goes.
It is inconceivable to allow the State of Israel to become a state of rot – and to
remain silent. It is inconceivable, simply inconceivable. At the very least, a man who
is essentially a mega wheeler-dealer should not be allowed to be prime minister. At
the very least, there should be public backing for the decent members of the civil
service who are trying to stop the mega wheeler-dealer in his tracks. At the very
least, the colleagues of the mega wheeler-dealer among the Israeli leadership
should refrain from giving him their support and should lower their eyes and keep
quiet. At the very least, the Israeli public should bear aloft the handful of decent
individuals at the treasury, the State Comptroller's Office, the police, the State
Prosecutor's Office and the office of the attorney general, who are now facing the
supreme test of the fight against corruption.
Anything less is unacceptable. Anything less is inconceivable. Inconceivable? In the
land of hollow elite, anything is possible, anything goes.
The historians won't believe it. They will watch the farcical programs that our
television channels aired at these times and they won't believe it. They will read the
spin that filled some of our newspapers these days and they won't believe it. They
won't be able to comprehend how, with the writing so clearly on the wall, Israel's
best agreed to collaborate with the corrupt, the corrupter and the wanton. Where
were the media, they will ask. Where was the spirit? Where was the wealth? Where
were we all when anything and everything was possible?
74
75
Englische Fassung der Rede David Grossmans in der Menüleiste „Ergänzende
Dokumente“ dieser Homepage. Eine deutsche Übersetzung findet sich in der
Wochenzeitung DIE ZEIT 09.11.2006, S. 3.
76
Uri Avnery: Grossmans Dilemma:
Das Schlusswort war „Hamas“. Es wurde auf der Tribüne ausgesprochen und unter
der Zuhörerschaft gedruckt verteilt – doch unter unterschiedlichen Aspekten.
Auf der Tribüne der großen jährlichen Gedenkfeier für Yitzhak Rabin vor zwei
Wochen hielt der Schriftsteller David Grossman, der einzige Sprecher dieser
Veranstaltung, eine wichtige Rede. Als er zum Höhepunkt der Rede kam, empfahl
er dem Ministerpräsidenten: „ Reden Sie mit den Palästinensern, Herr Olmert.
Reden Sie mit ihnen über die Köpfe der Hamas hinweg. Reden Sie mit den
Moderaten unter ihnen, zu denen, die, wie Sie und ich, gegen Hamas und deren
Ideologie sind!“
Zur selben Zeit hatten sich Dutzende von Gush Shalom-Aktivisten unter die Menge
von 100 000 Teilnehmern der Rallye gemischt und verteilten Sticker, die ganz
einfach sagten: „Frieden macht man mit Feinden – redet mit der Hamas!“. Später
wurde berichtet, dass einige der Leute sich weigerten, die Sticker zu nehmen, aber
der größte Teil nahm sie bereitwillig an.
Diese beiden Haltungen illustrieren das Dilemma, in dem sich das israelische
Friedenslager jetzt befindet.
Grossmans Rede hat großes Echo hervorgerufen. (Sie wurde sogar in der
deutschen Zeitung „Die Zeit“ abgedruckt.) Es war eine brillante Rede, die Rede
eines Schriftstellers, der mit Worten umzugehen weiß. Die Rede erfüllte und hob
die Gemüter der Anwesenden und wurde von den Medien als ein besonderes
Ereignis gefeiert. Grossman hat zwar nicht erwähnt, dass er den Krieg anfangs
befürwortete und seine Ansicht im Verlauf des Krieges änderte, aber diese
Tatsache verlieh seiner eindringlichen Kritik an der Regierung sogar noch mehr
Glaubwürdigkeit.
Er erwähnte die persönliche Tragödie, die ihn getroffen habe: in den letzten
Stunden des Krieges wurde sein Sohn Uri getötet: „Das Unglück, das meine
Familie und mich getroffen hat, … gibt mir kein besonderes Privileg bei unserer
nationalen Debatte… Aber es scheint mir, wenn man sich mit Tod und Verlust
auseinander setzen muss, dann ist dies auch mit mehr Nüchternheit und Klarheit
verbunden.“
Er prägte einen neuen Satz, der sofort die Phantasie der Leute packte und den
öffentlichen Diskurs bestimmte. „Unsere Führung, die politische wie die
militärische, ist hohl“ erklärte er. Und dies ist seit dem Krieg tatsächlich das
allgemeine Gefühl: die Führung ist bar jedes Gehaltes, ohne jeden Plan, ohne
Werte – sie hat nur ein Ziel, nämlich zu überleben. Er sprach über die „Führung“ –
nicht über Ehud Olmert persönlich. Aber dieses Adjektiv beschreibt genau diesen
Mann selbst: ein Parteifunktionär, dessen ganzes Talent darin besteht, sich
Komplotte und PR auszudenken, ohne jede intellektuelle Tiefe, ohne Vision, ohne
inspirierende Persönlichkeit.
Eine andere Wortprägung wurde auch gleich aufgegriffen. Als er über den Eintritt
von Avigdor Liberman als Minister für Strategie in die Regierung sprach, sagte er:
„Dies ist die Ernennung eines zwanghaften Pyromanen, der nun zum Chef der
Feuerwehr des Landes gemacht wurde.“
Ich konnte mich mit 90% der Rede vollkommen identifizieren. Ich konnte ihr in
allem zustimmen, was sie über den Zustand des Staates aussagte, über die
moralische und soziale Krise, über das Format unserer Führer und die nationale
Notwendigkeit, Frieden zu erlangen. Wenn ich auf der Tribüne gestanden hätte.
(Was ganz unmöglich ist, und wie ich später erklären werde), dann hätte ich ganz
ähnliche Dinge wie meine Kollegen ausgesprochen, Dinge, die ich tatsächlich seit
Jahrzehnten gesagt habe.
Der Unterschied zwischen uns – und es ist ein tief greifender Unterschied – betrifft
die übrigen 10 % seiner Rede – und noch mehr das, wovon er nicht sprach.
Ich meine nicht Taktisches. Z.B. erwähnte er in seiner ganzen Rede nicht die Rolle
der Labor-Partei in der Regierung während des Krieges und bei der Ernennung von
Liberman. Olmert ist an allem schuld. Amir Peretz tauchte gar nicht erst auf.
Nein, ich meine Wesentlicheres.
Nach den Frontalangriffen auf die „hohle“ Führung, der es an Vision und Plänen
fehlt, hätte man erwarten können, dass Grossman den auf dem Platz
versammelten zehntausenden Peaceniks seine eigene Vision und seinen Plan für
die Lösung des Problems vorlegt. Aber so klar und deutlich seine Kritik war – so
vage und banal waren seine Vorschläge.
Was schlug er vor? Mit den „Moderaten“ unter den Palästinensern zu reden „über
die Köpfe“ ihrer gewählten Regierung, um einen Friedenprozess noch einmal zu
beginnen. Das ist nicht sehr originell. Das wurde schon von Ariel Sharon gesagt
(und nicht getan), das wurde auch von Ehud Olmert gesagt (und nicht getan) und
auch von George Bush.
Diese Unterscheidung zwischen „Moderaten“ und „Fanatikern“ auf der arabischen
Seite ist oberflächlich und irreführend. Im Grunde ist es eine amerikanische
Erfindung. Es trifft nicht das wirkliche Problem. Es beinhaltet ein großes Maß an
Verachtung für die arabische Gesellschaft. Dies führt in die Sackgasse.
Grossmans Vorschlag lenkt die Diskussion in die Richtung „mit wem reden “ und „
mit wem nicht reden “, anstelle klar und deutlich festzustellen worüber geredet
werden muss: über die Beendigung der Besatzung, über die Errichtung des Staates
Palästina mit Ost-Jerusalem als seiner Hauptstadt, über den Rückzug zu den
Grenzen von vor 1967 und über die Lösung des Flüchtlingsproblems.
Man könnte vernünftigerweise erwarten, dass solch eine Rede auf solch einem
Platz und bei solch einer Gelegenheit klar und deutlich diese Statements enthält,
anstelle von den sich immer wiederholenden, absichtlich verschwommenen
Formeln. „ Geh zu ihnen mit den kühnsten, ernsthaftesten Plänen, die Israel
vorzulegen in der Lage ist. Ein Plan, bei dem alle Israelis und Palästinenser mit
Augen im Kopf die Grenzen unserer und ihre Verweigerung und Konzessionen
erkennen können.“ Das klingt gut. Aber was bedeutet es?
Nun, es ist klar, dass man der gewählten palästinensischen Führung – egal wie sie
zusammengesetzt ist – solche Vorschläge machen muss. Die Idee, dass wir nur
mit einem Teil des palästinensischen Volkes (im Augenblick die Minderheit)
verhandeln und den andern Teil (jetzt die Mehrheit) boykottieren, ist falsch und in
die Irre führend. Sie ist auch von der anmaßenden Arroganz durchdrungen, die das
Kennzeichen der Besatzung ist.
Grossman hat viel Mitgefühl mit den Armen und Unterdrückten in der israelischen
Gesellschaft, und er drückte dies in bewegenden Worten aus. Offensichtlich
versucht er, wirklich ein ähnliches Mitgefühl für das Leiden der palästinensischen
Gesellschaft zu haben. Aber hier versagte er. Es ist ein Mitgefühl ohne Pathos,
ohne wirkliche Gefühle.
Er sagt, dass dies ein Volk sei, das „nicht weniger gequält“ sei, als wir. Nicht
weniger als wir? Gaza wie Tel Aviv? Rafah wie Kfar Sava? Er bemühte sich, eine
Symmetrie zwischen den Besetzern und den Besetzten herzustellen, die so typisch
für einen Teil der Peaceniks geworden ist. Das ist ein grundlegender Fehler. Das
stimmt sogar, wenn Grossman das unermessliche Leiden der Juden während der
Jahrhunderte meinte – selbst dies rechtfertigt nicht das, was wir jetzt den
Palästinensern antun.
Über die Palästinenser, die in einer bewiesenermaßen demokratischen Wahl
Hamas wählten, sagt Grossman, dass sie „Geiseln eines fanatischen Islam“ seien.
Er ist sich sicher, dass sie sich in dem Augenblick vollkommen ändern würden,
wenn Olmert „mit ihnen spräche“. Das ist – milde ausgedrückt – eine gönnerhafte,
herablassende Haltung. „Warum setzen wir nicht all unsere Flexibilität, all unsere
israelische Kreativität ein, um unsern Feind aus der Falle zu ziehen, in die er sich
selbst begeben hat?“ Das heißt: wir sind die denkende, kreative Partei, und wir
müssen die armen Araber aus ihrem blinden Fanatismus befreien.
Fanatismus? Ist dies vielleicht ein genetischer Zug? Oder ist es der normale
Wunsch, sich von einer brutalen, erwürgenden Besatzung zu befreien, einer
Besatzung, aus deren verheerendem Griff sie sich nicht befreien konnten, als sie
eine „moderate“ Regierung wählten?
Dasselbe trifft auch auf Grossmans zweiten Vorschlag zu, der Syrien betraf. Auf
den ersten Blick ein positiver Vorschlag. Olmert soll jeden Appell eines arabischen
Führers akzeptieren, der Frieden vorschlägt. Ausgezeichnet. Aber was hat er
Olmert tatsächlich vorgeschlagen? „Biete ihm (Assad) einen Friedensprozess an,
der mehrere Jahre dauert; erst am Ende, wenn er alle Bedingungen erfüllt und allen
Anforderungen entspricht, wird er die Golanhöhen erhalten d.h. er wird ihn in einen
Prozess eines fortdauernden Dialogs zwingen.“ David Ben Gurion oder Ariel
Sharon hätten es nicht besser sagen können.
Bashar al-Assad ist sicher nicht vor lauter Begeisterung von seinem Stuhl gefallen,
als er dies las.
Um Grossmans Worte zu verstehen, muss man den Hintergrund kennen. Es gibt
nicht nur ein israelisches Friedenslager, sondern zwei – und der Unterschied
zwischen ihnen ist groß. Das 1. Friedenslager, zu dem sich Grossman zählt, nennt
sich selbst „zionistisches Friedenslager“. Sein strategisches Konzept: es sei falsch,
vom sog. „nationalen Konsens“ abzuweichen. Wenn man den Kontakt mit dem
Konsens verliert – so glaubt man – würde man die Öffentlichkeit nicht gewinnen.
Deshalb müssen wir unsere Botschaft so zurechtschneidern, dass die
Allgemeinheit sie im Großen und Ganzen jederzeit annehmen kann.
Die „Frieden-Jetzt“-Bewegung befindet sich im Zentrum dieses Lagers und noch
einige andere Gruppen und Persönlichkeiten gehören dazu. Es ist eine vollkommen
legitime Strategie, wenn sie nur Erfolg gehabt hätte, die Massen zu gewinnen.
Leider geschah dies nicht: „Frieden Jetzt!“, das 1982 Hunderttausende bei einer
Protest-Demo gegen das Sabra- und Shatila-Massaker mobilisieren konnte, gelang
es letzte Woche, nur 150 Demonstranten gegen das Beit Hanun-Massaker auf die
Beine zu bringen. (Die anderen Bewegungen, die sich der Demonstration
anschlossen, brachten es auf eine ähnliche Anzahl. Zusammen waren wir etwa
300). Etwa dieselbe Anzahl kam in letzter Zeit bei anderen Demonstrationen von
Paece-Now zusammen, auch bei denen, die mehr Zeit für Vorbereitungen hatten.
Dieses Lager hält engen Kontakt mit zwei politischen Parteien, mit Meretz und mit
dem linken Flügel von Labor. Fast alle Gründer und Führer von Peace Now waren
Kandidaten dieser beiden Parteien, und einige von ihnen wurden in die Knesset
gewählt. Eine der Gründerinnen ist jetzt die Ministerin für Bildung [Yuli Tamir] in der
Olmert-Peretz-Kriegsregierung.
Das andere Lager, gewöhnlich als das „radikale Friedenslager“ bezeichnet, führt
eine entgegen gesetzte Strategie durch: unsere Botschaft auch dann laut und
deutlich zu verkündigen, wenn sie unbeliebt und weit entfernt vom üblichen
Konsens liegt. Die Hypothese ist, dass der Konsens uns folgt, wenn unsere
Botschaft sich in der Realität als richtig erwiesen hat.
Dieses Lager, zu dem „Gush Shalom“ gehört, (und in dem ich aktiv bin) und
Dutzende anderer Organisationen, engagiert sich in täglich tatkräftiger Weise: beim
Kampf gegen die Mauer und all die anderen schlimmen Dinge der Besatzung bis
zum Boykott gegen die Siedlungen und die Unterstützung der Soldaten, die sich
weigern, in den besetzten Gebieten ihren Dienst zu tun.
Dieses Lager unterscheidet sich auch vom anderen dadurch, dass es enge
Kontakte zu den Palästinensern pflegt, mit der Führung und mit den einfachen
Dorfbewohnern, die gegen die Mauer kämpfen, die ihnen das Land raubt. Vor nicht
langer Zeit begann „Gush Shalom“ einen Dialog mit Hamasführern. Diese Kontakte
ermöglichen es uns, die palästinensische Gesellschaft in all ihrer Komplexität, ihren
Gefühlen, Ansichten, Forderungen und Hoffnungen besser zu verstehen.
Mit keiner Partei verbunden, ist diesem Lager bewusst, dass es keine
Massenbewegung wird. Das ist der Preis, den es zahlen muss. Es ist unmöglich,
allgemein beliebt zu werden, während man einen Standpunkt einnimmt und
Aktionen ausführt, die gegen den Konsens sind. Wie kann sie dann noch Einfluss
ausüben? Wie kann es sein, dass im Laufe von Jahren viele ihrer Standpunkte von
der Allgemeinheit angenommen werden, einschließlich solcher Leuchten wie
Grossman?
Wir nennen dies den „Zahnradeffekt“. Ein kleines Zahnrad mit seinem eigenen
Antrieb setzt ein größeres in Bewegung, das wieder ein größeres bewegt usw. bis
es das Zentrum des Konsenses trifft. Was wir heute sagen, wird „Peace Now“
morgen sagen und am Tag danach ein großer Teil der Öffentlichkeit.
Dies wurde in der Vergangenheit mehrfach bewiesen – auch in den vergangenen
Wochen während des 2. Libanonkrieges. Wir riefen am ersten Kriegstag zu einer
Demo gegen den Krieg auf, als die überwiegende Mehrheit ihn noch offen und
rückhaltlos unterstützte, auch Amos Oz, David Grossman u.a. Aber als die
wirklichen Motive und die tödlichen Folgen begannen, bekannt zu werden, änderte
sich der Konsens. Unsere Demonstrationen wurden größer, statt 200 kamen 10
000 Demonstranten. Sogar „Peace Now“, das zunächst mit Meretz den Krieg
unterstützte, änderte seinen Standpunkt und rief gegen Ende des Krieges
gemeinsam mit Meretz zu einer eigenen Anti-Kriegs-Demo auf. Schließlich
bewegte sich der ganze „nationale Konsens“.
Es mag stimmen, dass das „radikale Friedenslager“ und das „zionistische
Friedenslager“ – während sie verschiedene Rollen spielen – sich einander im
entscheidenden Kampf um die öffentliche Meinung ergänzen. Grossmans Rede
sollte in diesem Geist beurteilt werden. Es war eine bewegende Rede, ja eine
großartige Rede. Sie enthielt nicht alles, was wir uns wünschten, aber für
Grossman und das Lager, zu dem er gehört, war es wirklich ein großer Schritt in
die richtige Richtung.
77
Englische Fassung des Interviews in der Menüleiste „Ergänzende Dokumente“
dieser Homepage.
78
Gemeint sein dürfte die saudische Friedensinitiative („Erklärung von Beirut“)
vom 27.03.2002. Englische Fassung des Dokuments in der Menüleiste
„Ergänzende Dokumente“ dieser Homepage.
79
Englische Fassung des Dokuments in der Menüleiste „Ergänzende Dokumente“
dieser Homepage.
80
Englische Fassung des Interviews in der Menüleiste „Ergänzende Dokumente“
dieser Homepage.
81
Shlomo Brom: Gaza on the Brink of Civil War, Tel Aviv Notes No. 190, October
26, 2006. Following the failure of efforts to reach agreement between Hamas and
Fatah on the formation of a government of national unity, there are growing fears
among Palestinians that the two movements are now on the brink of an all-out civil
war. Indeed, some argue that the war has already begun, albeit still on a small
scale.
There are several explanations for the failure of the negotiations and efforts to
mediate between the two sides. The prevailing opinion in Israel is that the failure
stems from the refusal of the Damascus-based political leadership of Hamas to
accept the Quartet's demands (recognition of Israel, endorsement of previous
agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, and non-violence), especially the
demand to recognize Israel, even if indirectly. This refusal is expressed in Hamas'
rejection of the Arab peace proposal (the "Saudi initiative") as one of the guidelines
of a national unity government. This explanation may be a handy excuse for the two
parties, but their inability to agree also stems in large measure from the internal
fragmentation and power plays in both camps.
For Fatah, there is nothing new in this situation. Fatah is divided between the
elected Chairman of the Palestinian Authority (Abu Mazen [Machmud Abbas]),
other elements in the territories who demand internal party reform and are angry at
Abu Mazen for his failure to carry it out, the "old guard" leadership in the territories
that wants to preserve its status, and the "outside" leadership headed by Farouq
Qaddoumi, who has consistently opposed the Oslo Accords. To this mix are added
various armed elements pursing their own agendas or those of outside supporters
such as Hizbullah.
Unlike the situation in Fatah, such divisions within Hamas are a relatively recent
phenomenon and have become significant only since the movement's victory in the
Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006. Since then, major rifts
has appeared, particularly between the civilian echelon inside the territories and the
political leadership in Damascus, headed by Khaled Mash'al. That leadership is
linked to the military echelon (the Izz e-din al-Qassam Battalions) and it is able to
dictate the organization's policy concerning terrorist attacks. These rifts derive from
the differing perspectives of the civilian wing inside, which now controls the
Palestinian government and must provide for the public's needs and meet its
expectations, and of the political leadership in Damascus, which can more easily
maintain its devotion to Hamas' traditional policies and ideology. Beyond this
division over principles, however, there is also, and perhaps primarily, a power
struggle. The political leadership in Damascus fears that its standing will be
undermined by the "inside" leadership, which enjoys several advantages following
its electoral victory and its formation of a government. The outside actors therefore
rely on whatever levers are left to them – the claim of ideological purity and control
of the military wing – in order to frustrate attempts by "inside" elements to assert
their primacy.
Beyond the detrimental effect of political rivalries on the national dialogue, the policy
of the United States also contributed to the failure. During the recent visit of Abu
Mazen to Washington, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice made it clear that the
U.S. would not content itself with indirect or ambiguous recognition of Israel. As a
result, Hamas felt that that there was no point in continuing to discuss with Abu
Mazen compromise formulas; the organization, at least at this stage, is still
incapable of undertaking a radical change in its position.
In the aftermath of the breakdown of talks, both sides are now preparing for a
decisive showdown. Accelerated arms smuggling through the tunnels along the
border with Egypt is not just part of preparations for a confrontation with Israel; it
also reflects the determination of the various militias to be better prepared for the
expected internal clash. In Hamas there is a growing belief that Abu Mazen and
Fatah, with the assistance of the United States and Israel, are preparing a putsch
against the legitimate Palestinian government. Hamas elements interpret the
strengthening and reinforcement of the Presidential Guard in Gaza as an effort by
Abu Mazen to set up an armed force that can defeat them with the help of other
power centers in Fatah, which support such a coup. That is also the way they
understand other ideas that Abu Mazen is considering: dispersal of the elected
government and appointment of a government of technocrats or a referendum on
new elections. Both measures would be of dubious constitutional legality.
Of course, all of these preparations may just be part of a complex negotiation in
which each side actually wants an agreement on national unity, though on terms
clearly favorable to itself. And widespread public hostility to internal strife could act
as an additional constraint on both parties. But a large-scale direct clash might
nevertheless break out. If it does, it is quite likely that Hamas would prevail in Gaza,
where its forces are better organized and disciplined, but in the West Bank, where
the IDF is more actually forestalling the formation and activity of armed groups,
Fatah would have a clear advantage despite its internal divisions. If that turns out to
be the result, then the consequence could be a division of the territories into two
quasi-states, each with a different government. For many Palestinians, that would
be their worst nightmare.
Nor would a Palestinian civil war necessarily work to Israel's advantage.
A situation in which armed Palestinian groups are attacking and weakening each
other might appear, on the surface, to be beneficial to Israel. In fact, it might be
argued that if a civil war results in two separate governments – Hamas in Gaza and
Fatah in the West Bank – that could make it easier for Israel to maneuver between
them. But things could well turn out differently. Both such governments would be
weak and in their competition to further weaken the other they might see more
attacks on Israel as the most effective instrument. In any case, Israel would be
even less able to find an authoritative Palestinian partner. For purposes even of
deterrence and conflict management, not to speak of conflict resolution, a coherent
enemy could still be preferable to anarchy and the absence of any address at all.
82
Khalid Hroub: Hamas Is Being Punished for Moderate Behavior, in “Daily Star”,
October 26, 2006. A remarkable yet mostly overlooked transformation has been
taking place within the thinking and political practice of Hamas over the past few
years. The process started long before the radical Palestinian movement's victory in
the legislative elections of January 25, 2006, in the West Bank and Gaza. Its
essence has been a shift in the justification behind Hamas' "hard-line" positions: in
particular, from their rejection of any concession over the "land of Palestine" on
religious grounds – based on the claim that Palestine is waqf (endowment) for
successive Muslim generations which no one has the right to compromise on – to a
political and pragmatic argument for this stance.
The language may have changed; the policy remains. Hamas' response to
demands that it recognize Israel as a precondition of the inclusion of its government
into the regional and international system is a consistent, and political one: Israel
itself is "borderless" and the country's leaders have never – whatever the current
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proclaims about his ambition for 2010 – clearly
identified the borders of their own state, so what is the geographical extent of the
Israel that we are asked to recognize?
Yet this very line of argument is a key to Hamas' wider transformation; for when
Hamas today is asked why it has frozen its jihad against Israel by stopping suicide
attacks, its response is to present political (not religious) arguments that link its
decision to delicate calculations drawn from the disadvantageous political
conditions which surround Hamas as a governing force. Today, when Hamas is
involved in a bloody power struggle with the Palestinian president and his Fatah
movement, the parameters of this fierce rivalry too are political; no religious
pretexts (such as the old Hamas line that the Palestine Liberation Organization
[PLO] is in essence secular and un-Islamic) are invoked. The change in the
rationalizing of Hamas' positions – gradual and painful though it has been –
disconnects the movement from its inheritance of inflexible religious dogma.
The shift is in some ways still in the making and still vulnerable to regression,
especially under pressure from the regional and international environment. But if
Hamas' potential interlocutors were wise, they might realize that dialogue and
negotiation with a hard-line political Hamas is in principle far easier than dealing
with a hard-line religious Hamas.
It seems, however, that "if" can be the biggest word in global politics. For the
policies of external players – Israel, the United States, other Western states and
Arab governments – are not helping to consolidate Hamas' turn. Rather, their
shortsighted policies – especially the imposition of a crippling embargo on its
government – threaten to crush the chance for a more politicized and pragmatic
organization to emerge.
A close examination of the internal and external dynamics affecting Hamas casts
light on the nature and potential of its gradual transformation. A vacillation between
political and religious impulses is not new in Hamas' thinking and politics. From its
inception in 1987-88, Hamas strove hard to harmonize the two currents within its
movement: the national-liberationist and the religious-Islamist. These two forces
(each combining intellectual and mobilizing elements) were neither necessarily
contradictory nor fully harmonious.
They would walk hand-in-hand in certain periods, clash at others, or move at a
different pace – depending on the conjunctural political conditions. At the same
time, across Hamas' rank-and-file, the direction of opinion has been from a
"nationalist" to a more "religious" shading. This shift at the base contrasts with that
toward a political-nationalist discourse among the hierarchy of the movement.
From the outset, Hamas' identity and evolution were deeply influenced by both
nationalist and religious agendas. In the context of the political world it emerged into
– including Israeli occupation pressures on Palestinian society and politics, and the
rise of political Islam across the Middle East in earlier decades – it could hardly be
otherwise. In this, Hamas' development echoed that of other Palestinian nationalist
movements, such as the Fatah movement which Yasser Arafat established in the
late 1950s.
Hamas' ultimate nationalist aim is to "liberate Palestine." Unlike its predecessors,
however, it adopted an Islamist rather than a secular ideology in order to achieve
this aim. By espousing the core ideological objective of other classical movements
of political Islam – the establishment of an Islamic state – Hamas' rhetoric
emphasizes that once the "liberation" of Palestine is achieved, the state established
on its territory should be an Islamic one.
Hamas' unexpected victory in the January 2006 elections exacerbated the internal
nationalist-religious tension within the movement. It found itself in the international
limelight, suddenly obliged – in order to establish its status and credibility in the face
of a far larger, and predominantly skeptical, worldwide audience – to sharpen the
profile of its nationalist thinking and image at the expense of its religious one.
For Hamas, as well as for Palestinians as a whole, then, the election created a new
reality. For the first time since its foundation, the organization assumed the
leadership of the Palestinian national movement inside Palestine by democratic
elections. Also, for the first time in the history of this national movement, a party
that subscribes to Islamist/religious ideology eclipsed all other secular factions,
including the alliance between leftists and nationalists. But this victory was the
culmination of a pre-existing trend, as well as the inauguration of a new phase. The
very decision to participate in the 2006 elections, made in March 2005, was
something of a tormented birth. In the minds of many Hamas supporters (and foes),
the decision had to be measured against Hamas' refusal to join similar elections in
1996, on the basis that these were part of the 1993-94 Oslo agreements between
the PLO and Israel, which it had opposed strongly. The controversy within Hamas
over participation in the 2006 elections derived partly from the fact that they were
effectively organized under the status quo established by Oslo.
In fact, the March 2005 decision was coupled with two equally significant decisions:
a freezing of Hamas' suicide attacks and an agreement to join the PLO. Hamas
was here making important leaps in the direction of becoming a more politicized
movement at the expense of a being a religion-inspired military one. For a lengthy
period before, during and after the elections, Hamas remained committed to a onesided cease-fire in the face of all Israeli incursions in the Gaza strip and the West
Bank. But the equally important point is that all arguments over taking part in the
elections were anchored in political loss-gain calculations, rather than in religious
fatwas.
In practice, Hamas' campaign for the 2006 elections was based on an impressive
"electoral platform" of 14 pages, which offered a political, social, educational, legal
and environmental program that could almost fit into that of any other secular
Palestinian faction. Hamas deliberately minimized its "religiosity" in an effort to
represent the entire Palestinian constituency.
In trying to absorb the shock of winning the elections, Hamas has advanced its
moderate and pragmatic outlook further. It invited the defeated Fatah movement to
join a national unity government on the basis of an even more secular political
program. The secularization of Hamas' politics manifested itself again in the June
2006 "prisoners' document" created by leaders of Hamas, Fatah and other factions
in Israeli prisons, which was then endorsed by their counterparts on the outside.
Meanwhile, the wider external regional context, with its currently fast-moving
developments, merits a closer look. In the eyes of Israel, the United States and the
West in general, seeing a Hamas committed to hard-line aspirations emerging
toward a position of leadership of the Palestinians was already an unimaginable
nightmare; to see it materialize in free and fair elections was stupefying. It was not
just the West that was worried. Several Arab governments – including those in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, states significantly close to and with influence in
the conflict – were also unhappy to see an organization effectively aligned with their
"collective enemies" (that is, political Islam) coming to power by democratic
elections. They see this outcome as encouraging other Islamist movements to aim
not just for power-sharing through elections, but for outright power control.
By contrast, other regional players rejoiced in Hamas' victory. The "arc of
resistance," as it is sometimes called, to American policies in the region is led by
Iran, but it includes Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas and (potentially) the Shiites of Iraq
whose loyalties extend to solidarity with their Iranian coreligionists. These parties
saw the result of the Palestinian election as an opportunity to further include Hamas
in their range of sympathy. Thus, Hamas' election victory has been in many ways a
turning point that has – directly or indirectly – affected many parties engaged in the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
Within this regional context, the Israeli-American opposition to Hamas' government
suffers from a double flaw: It is incongruous in terms of democratic principle, and it
is counterproductive in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because it strips all
moderate voices within Hamas of credibility. The failure of Hamas' government,
now the focal point of the Israeli-American strategy toward the movement, would
have the effect of pushing Hamas back to the militarized approach of the preelection period.
Rather than a strategy of containment designed to bring Hamas further into the arc
of politics and its compromises, the United States and Israel seem content to drive
Hamas back toward its previous radicalism, in which the tactic of suicide attacks
played a central role. Such an attempt to besiege Hamas in the hope of breaking its
will to make greater concessions is a stance full of risks, not least that it will only
make a desperate Hamas even more ready to accept Iran's offers of much-needed
support.
Iran's regional ambitions, by opening a route out of the deadlock facing Hamas in
almost all directions, work to undercut the movement's nascent inclination to
moderation. The Iranians' interest in using Hamas as a future bargaining card with
the US and the West is for Tehran also a neat component of its own wider strategy
of extracting political leverage (with or without nuclear capabilities) and Western
recognition of its regional role.
In a nutshell, the regional configuration seems at present to be limiting the potential
for Hamas' pragmatic evolution to continue. A deep irony of this situation is that the
most peaceful and calm period that Israeli cities enjoyed over almost the past two
years was the period in which Hamas was preparing for the elections and after the
movement took power in Palestine (until, of course, the invasion of Lebanon on July
12 and the Hizbullah missile and rocket attacks that ensued). Hamas refuses to
make verbal concessions on the issue of clear-cut recognition of the right of Israel
to exist. It says that it acknowledges Israel as an existing fact on the ground, no
more. Yet, in power, it has stopped attacking Israel as it used to do when it was part
of the opposition to Palestine's governing authority. This again highlights the
rhetoric-practice dichotomy. Hamas needs to keep its rhetoric high and loud,
refraining from any blunt offer of recognition of Israel, in order to compensate for
the slow, daily "undoing" of its military struggle. If Hamas gives in on both rhetorical
and practical fronts, it will lose out greatly in the eyes of its supporters.
For the time being, then, the choice for Israel, the United States and other
concerned states seems to be: Do you prefer a rhetorical Hamas in power
(observing a practical truce), or a rhetorical and military Hamas in opposition, where
the resumption of suicide bombings is only one step away?
83
Auf der Gegenseite stehen vor allem neben AIPAC die „Anti-Defamation
League“, das „American Jewish Committee“ und die „World Zionist Organisation“.
84
Madam Speaker Dalia Itzik, Members of Knesset, Arad family, Class of Ron
Arad's flying course – flying course number 87, who are here with us today,
Families of the abducted soldiers, Gilad Shalit, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev,
The Hever family, Distinguished Guests. I welcome the Knesset members and the
distinguished guests who are participating in the deliberations of the opening of the
Knesset winter session.
For many in this country today is a festive day for Israeli democracy. This House is
the venue of the Legislative Authority, where all ends of Israel's political spectrum
come together, and where decisions affecting the fate of the country and the quality
of its citizens' lives, are being made. The eyes of the entire nation are on the
Knesset. Children and youth listen to the statements made by the elected
representatives and learn the culture of speech and its ways of conduct.
From this place many citizens expect to learn the meaning of supreme
responsibility and to know that their fate is in the hands of worthy representatives.
This place has known great and important moments, but it has also known low
moments, which we would rather forget.
I have been a member of this House for three decades. Thousands of times I have
attended the plenary hall, the committee chambers, the corridors and cafeteria –
the political beating heart of the democratic State of Israel. I have no doubt that in
the course of this session we will experience many disagreements, often harsh
ones. I am not suggesting that we should avoid them. At the same time – and I
hope that these words fall on attentive ears – let us do our jobs in a respectable
and worthy manner. Let us show all those who look to us for equanimity,
responsibility and respectability, that they have someone to rely on. Let us favor
that which unites us over that which separates us. Let us have faith in that which
strengthens us and not just in that which divides us and tears us apart.
Let us pray that, with the help of G-d, we will carry the supreme responsibility which
rests on our shoulders with dignity, humility and tremendous faith in this people and
this country.
Madam Speaker, Ladies and gentlemen, Members of Knesset,
My Government's guidelines are known to all. There is no intention of hanging
them. Any faction in this House of Representatives which is willing to be a partner in
the actual work, and not only in speeches delivered from the benches of the
Opposition, is invited to be a partner. I am willing to expand the coalition base and
include additional partners, in order to work together to advance the important
issues on the national agenda. During the winter session I will act to secure as wide
a parliamentary consensus as possible, in order to bring about a change in the
system of government in Israel, introduce a constitution for Israel and strengthen
the stability of the political system.
A situation of constant government instability, inability to govern and inability to
generate long-term processes is intolerable. The Knesset must formulate a
comprehensive consensus on an effective way of introducing a government system
and a constitution which will stabilize the political system in Israel.
Ladies and gentlemen, Members of Knesset,
Considerable changes have recently taken place in the political arena. A Hamas
government is currently ruling the Palestinian Authority. Unfortunately, this
government does not fulfil the minimal preconditions outlined by the international
community, which would enable it to become a possible partner for negotiations. As
long as the Hamas government fails to recognize the State of Israel, accept and
implement the agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and
act to terminate violence and eradicate terrorism, including attacks on our southern
communities, we cannot conduct dialogue with it. We, together with the
international community, will not compromise on these conditions. We have not
forgotten our soldier Gilad Shalit for a moment. Gilad will return home. It is clear to
us that the Palestinian people and its leadership are not made of the same mold.
We are making a clear distinction between the Hamas government and the
President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, who has accepted the
three conditions agreed upon by the majority of world countries. Abu Mazen is a
legitimate partner; we maintain ongoing contact with him and his people, and I am
willing to meet with him immediately to discuss ways to move forward according to
the sequence of the Roadmap and the phases therein. The State of Israel has
demonstrated many times its willingness to live in peace and good neighborly
relations with the Palestinian people. We do not wish the Palestinian people to
continue suffering. On the contrary. We prefer a thriving Palestinian society, free of
humanitarian hardship –- a society which enjoys economic welfare and which
operates in cooperation with the State of Israel. I believe with all my heart that this
reality is possible. The Palestinian people must make a profound internal decision:
should they seize the chance of becoming a healthy and strong society and
overcome the grim reality in which they live. The responsibility for their situation is
theirs alone, and the responsibility for their decision is theirs alone. We have
already made our decision. We have no desire and no intention to rule over the
Palestinians forever. If the day comes when the Palestinian government accepts
the preconditions which will make it a legitimate player, it will allow the opening of a
comprehensive political horizon, which will change the reality in the region.
However, even under the conditions existing today I pledge to act tirelessly to seize
every opportunity, every opening, every possibility of negotiations which will
generate real dialogue with responsible representatives of the Palestinian people.
Members of Knesset,
The campaign in Lebanon is over, and its results are reverberating throughout the
entire region. We are learning the lessons and confronting the problems exposed
during the fighting, and which have accumulated for many years without being
properly addressed. It is important to make it clear to all: this was a necessary
campaign. Israel's firm response proved to the entire world that we would never
again acquiesce to a blatant violation of our sovereignty. We have made
substantial achievements in this campaign: militarily we have dealt Hizballah a
serious blow and succeeded in disrupting the intricate system built by this
organization through the long arms of Iran and Syria. They were planning to
activate that system against us under different circumstances, if and when other
fronts were opened. Their plan was foiled at a heavy cost to us.
Politically the conditions were created for Resolution 1701, in the framework of
which, after more than 30 years, the Lebanese army is deployed along the border
with Israel. Moreover, a multi-national force, comprising European military units, is
deployed and is designed to curb Hizballah in the south of Lebanon and prevent it
from returning to posts which it held and which threaten the security of the north of
Israel. From our standpoint, and that of the entire world, Hizballah ceased to exist
as "a State within a State" in Lebanon. Resolution 1701 anchors the understanding
that there is one address in Lebanon –- the Government of Lebanon. I wish to use
this podium to call upon the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Fuad Siniora, to meet with
me directly, not through mediators, in order to make peace between us and
Lebanon. I know that he is in a difficult position: at home –- an attempt to weaken
Hizballah, and outside – attempts by the Syrian government to overthrow him.
Israel can be a natural and serious partner to a peace-seeking government in
Lebanon.
The suffering caused to the residents of Lebanon, as well as that inflicted upon the
citizens of Israel, compels us both –- Prime Minister Siniora and myself – to
overcome suspicion and prejudice and together find a direct channel of
communication, in order to bring peace to our peoples. We have not forgotten –
and we will not forget –- the kidnapped soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud
Goldwasser, and we will continue to work tirelessly to bring them home. Twenty
years have passed and the State of Israel has not succeeded in bringing Ron Arad
home. Today, the Knesset marks twenty years since his abduction, and I want to
assure you that we will never relinquish the effort to discover Ron Arad's fate.
We have not forgotten and will not forget the remaining Israeli MIAs, and continue
to make every effort to bring them home. Israel will continue to monitor closely the
threats surrounding us. At the same time, the State of Israel is part of a large
number of countries confronting these dangers. The Lebanon campaign has
accentuated the threat emanating from Iran and its nuclear plan to our region and
the entire free world.
Iran is deceiving the international community. It is dragging its feet and trying to buy
time in order to complete its dangerous nuclear program. The Iranian threat is an
existential threat to Israel; it is an existential threat to world peace. Israel is
cooperating with the international community in order to foil this threat. This is a
historic crossroads for the entire international community, and it is incumbent upon
it to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capability. There are no questions or
hesitations. There is only a decision: the world must make certain that Iran does not
possess nuclear weapons. The recent events in North Korea illustrate the danger:
irresponsible and reckless regimes acquire non-conventional weapons for the
purpose of threatening world peace. The international community must be
determined, clear and unequivocal in its actions. There is no room for hesitancy, no
room for compromise and no room for games. Determination and firmness is the
only way to eradicate this danger to the world.
Iran examines the way in which the international community responds to the
conduct of North Korea, and draws the necessary conclusions. Tomorrow I am
leaving for an important visit to Russia, for a meeting with President Putin, and next
month I am scheduled to meet President George W. Bush. These issues will be at
the core of my talks with these leaders. I hear responses of surprise that we are
allegedly missing an opportunity in failing to respond to the calls of peace made by
the President of Syria. Israel is interested in a peace agreement with Syria.
However, one makes peace with those who eschew terrorism and not those who
host the headquarters of terror organizations.
You make peace with those who have made a strategic decision to advocate a
moderate policy and not those who assist in the arming of a terror organization
which threatens regional stability. We cannot make peace with those who are in
alliance with a country which openly calls for the destruction of Israel and which
denies its right to exist as a Jewish state. Israel will consent to making peace with
the President of Syria only if he makes a genuine strategic decision to renounce
terrorism, and not with a leader who uses the language of peace as a tactic to
divert the world's attention from other issues. There are, however, many in the Arab
world who call for cooperation towards a political settlement. I am pleased at the
creation of an axis of moderate Arab countries, which want to take part in curbing
Iran's negative influence over the region. The Iranian threat is not only a threat to
Israel and the free world. It is also a threat to Arab states surrounding us. Terrorism
threatens the Arab world no less than it does other countries. Several Arab
countries understand this. They are willing to act to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and generate a more optimistic and positive reality in the region. It is my
intention to seize every opening of reason and common sense in the Arab world in
order to give hope for the chances of regional peace and to reignite processes
which will create a different reality in the region – a reality of life which will
compensate for dozens of years of war, pain and loss, and generate hope,
prosperity and cooperation in this region. This is an exceptionally positive and
important development, which creates new prospects for the future.
Madam speaker, Members of Knesset,
I have already mentioned that we have many reasons to feel security and hope and
to be proud of who we are. The state of the Israeli economy is a clear manifestation
of this. It is the product of a responsible fiscal policy. This year, the Israeli economy
is estimated to grow at an annual rate of at least 4.6%. It is a higher rate than that
of Euro-currency countries and the United States. It is an achievement that we have
reached despite the military campaign in Lebanon, and despite the forecasts
predicting that the fighting would impede growth.
Moreover, 2006 will yield a positive balance of some $6 billion export surplus over
imports- an all time high. Foreign investment in Israel has already reached $16
billon this year, which is also a record. This year we have also gained a "vote of
confidence" from the world's largest investor, Warren Buffet, and witnessed a
substantial strengthening of the shekel in comparison with the dollar. Furthermore,
the State deficit is expected to be less than 2% despite the considerable growth in
security expenditure following the military campaign and the heavy costs involved in
rehabilitating the north. This reality will help us face the difficulties ahead.
Only if we believe in the economic strength of the State of Israel can we do this
successfully. The rate of unemployment has been reduced, but it is still very high;
the rate of participation in the labor market is less than desired, particularly among
those with lower education; productivity in the traditional industries and the services
sector – the largest employers in the economy – has stagnated and this does not
foster further growth in employment and pay. The poverty rate has not been
reduced, and there is still economic hardship among considerable portions of the
population. These are alarming symptoms, which compel us to address them from
the core, rather than offering temporary relief. The government is determined to
take full responsibility for formulating a comprehensive, long-term plan, which will
guarantee that the entire population enjoys the fruits of growth, and which will also
reduce social gaps in Israel. There is no "quick fix" in this campaign. It requires
ongoing efforts, patience, learning lessons and changing direction, while advancing
towards the target. I have assigned the National Economic Council, which I recently
established at the Prime Minister's Office, headed by Prof. Manuel Trachtenberg,
with the task of designing an operative program, with clear objectives, for the
reduction of poverty and unemployment, increased participation in the labor market
and increase in productivity in the traditional industries and the services sector.
The program will include, inter alia, a proposal for a government policy on a number
of central issues: introduction of negative income tax; acquisition of specific tools
and skills for integration in employment; solutions for stemming poverty in the
Haredi and minority sectors; equalization of costs for foreign and Israeli workers;
and encouragement of ingenuity and research & development in the traditional
industries. The countries which succeeded in growing over the past decades and
spreading the fruits of growth to wide circles of their population – countries such as
Ireland, England, Finland and Denmark – succeeded not only thanks to being lucky.
It was the result of detailed planning, long-term comprehensive strategy, innovative
policies and adherence to the goal.
I have no doubt that we can also do it, and the responsibility not only rests with the
Government, but also with the Knesset and each of its members. The State budget
which will be presented to you during the course of the current session is necessary
for the achievement of these goals. Beyond the important plans for the future, the
budget, as approved by the Government, achieves two objectives simultaneously:
the social expenditure in this budget is higher by NIS 3.8 billion –- a net supplement
beyond the natural growth in relation to the year 2005. With the exception of onetime expenditures, the expenditure ceiling has increased from 1% to 1.7%. The
budget reflects the government's new social policy. The budget determines that the
minimum wage will continue to increase, the scope of the health basket will
increase substantially, welfare budgets will increase, the State budget for day-care
centers will increase, the nutrition project will be expanded, and the old-age
pensions will be higher. The current government views work as a fundamental
value, which stands at the basis of the partnership of every citizen in Israeli society.
The Government will act to assist employers in creating new jobs and preserving all
the rights to which employees are entitled. I hear the voices saying that we have not
added enough and that we need to add more. We do not disagree, but we must act
responsibly. An irresponsible addition to the State budget, regardless of State
income, an increased tax burden and the introduction of a short-term populist policy
will not only create a facade of social policy, and will ultimately adversely affect the
weaker sectors…
85
Text der „Erklärung von Beirut” in der Eintragung vom 04.10.2006 in dieser
Chronologie.
86
Secretary Condoleezza Rice: Helping Palestinians Build a Better Future.
Keynote Address at the American Task Force on Palestine, Inaugural Gala,
Washington, DC, October 11, 2006: Thank you very much. Thank you. I would first
like to thank Dr. Ziad Asali [President] for that wonderful introduction. But more
importantly, I would like to thank you for your leadership and for your commitment
to this very important cause, and for your friendship and counsel over my time as
Secretary of State. Thank you very much for all that you do.
Now, before I go any further, let me wish you all Ramadan Karim to those of you
here tonight, and to the millions of Muslims in America and across the world, who
are now celebrating the holy month of Ramadan.
I am honored that Senators Carl Levin and John Sununu are here joining us
tonight, along with many members of the diplomatic corps. In particular, I would like
to thank and welcome Saudi Ambassador Prince Turki al-Faisal for being here. And
I know that you will make remarks later. Thank you very much.
Finally, let me congratulate the distinguished Palestinian-Americans whom we are
honoring tonight: Governor John Sununu, a good and longtime friend; Mr. Jesse
Aweida, and Professor Mujid Kazini. These three individuals remind us of the great
contribution that Palestinian-Americans are making to our nation – adding not just
to our country's diversity, but to its character. I applaud the American Task Force
on Palestine for highlighting the success of Palestinian-Americans, and for your
continued support of all who work for peace in the Middle East.
Now, as I imagine most of you know, I traveled last week to the region. I consulted
widely with our many friends and allies. And I am pleased to have this opportunity to
share with you my sense of where we stand in the Middle East, particularly on the
Palestinian-Israeli issue.
These are, without a doubt, difficult and challenging times. And I know that the past
few months have been especially trying. In many places across the region – from
Lebanon and Iraq, to the Palestinian territories and Israel – the images of violence,
the stories of suffering, the deaths of innocent people are hard for all of us to bear.
They're hard for me and I know that they are for you.
But let me also say that it is in times of testing that courage and perseverance are
needed most by the people of the Middle East who deserve our support. It is my
belief, and that of President Bush, that when we look at the recent actions of
radicals in Hamas and Hezbollah, or at the violence of terrorists and militias in Iraq,
or at the policies of governments like Syria or Iran, we are witnessing a campaign of
extremism – not always commonly planned, but sharing a common purpose: to roll
back the promise of a hopeful Middle East, where security, and freedom, and
opportunity can expand.
If peace and dignity are to prevail in the region, then it is absolutely essential for
leaders to be able to show, for moderate leaders to show, that their ideas, and their
principles, and their vision for the future can offer a better alternative than violence
and terrorism. That is why President Bush asked me to travel last week to the
Middle East – to confer with moderate voices, with moderate Arab governments
and with moderate leaders, to build a support for those people who are trying and
who need our help more than ever now, leaders like Prime Minister Siniora in
Lebanon, Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq, and most especially, of course, President
Abbas in the Palestinian territories, from whom we have just heard.
Last month, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, President Bush reiterated
his deep conviction that the Palestinian people deserve a better life – a life that is
rooted in liberty and democracy, uncompromised by violence and terrorism,
unburdened by corruption and misrule, and forever free of the daily humiliation of
occupation. It is this belief that led President Bush, in June of 2002, to become the
first American president to make it a matter of policy that the creation of a
Palestinian state, with territorial integrity, with viability, living side by side with Israel,
in peace and security, would indeed strengthen peace and security, not just in the
region but the peace and security of us all.
At that time, President Bush pledged that, as Palestinians stepped forward to build
a peaceful, responsible state, they would find no greater partner in this endeavor
than the United States. Today, we are endeavoring to keep our promise.
First, we want to help the Palestinians to lay the political foundations of a successful
state. We supported the free and fair election in January 2005, in which millions of
Palestinians elected Mahmoud Abbas as their president. In the days and months
that have followed, we have worked to assist his government in the long and
difficult process of building effective democratic institutions. When it was time for
parliamentary elections earlier this year, we again supported the Palestinians' right
to choose their own leaders, and as you know, a plurality of voters cast their votes
for Hamas.
At the time of the election, there were those who criticized our support for the
election. And many still do. But I would ask everyone: "Is there a better way than to
allow people to express their views, to have a role in choosing those who will
govern them? And now look at how things are changing. For decades, Hamas
dwelled in the shadows, able to hijack the future of all Palestinians at will, without
ever having to answer for its actions. Today, however, the Palestinian people and
the international community can hold Hamas accountable. And Hamas now faces a
hard choice that it has always sought to avoid: Either you are a peaceful political
party, or a violent terrorist group – but you cannot be both.
All the members of the Quartet – the United States, the United Nations, the
European Union, and Russia – are holding firm in our conviction that a Palestinian
partner for peace needs to accept three principles: the disavowal of terror and
violence, the recognition of Israel's right to exist, and the acceptance of all previous
agreements between the parties, including the Roadmap, which is the only
internationally agreed-upon framework to create a Palestinian state. At the same
time, we fully support President Abbas, and the growing number of his fellow
citizens, who are urging Hamas to put the interests of the Palestinian people ahead
of their own rejectionist agenda.
Now, we in the international community recognize that the past several months
have been really hard for the Palestinian people. We know that living conditions
have deteriorated, and that many are in need of assistance.
So we are working to ensure that the Palestinian people receive the food, and the
medicine, and the humanitarian relief that they so desperately need. That is why the
United States recently increased our direct assistance to the Palestinians to $468
million a year, with much of that going to meet basic needs. We've also worked with
our foreign partners to create a temporary mechanism to channel international
donor assistance directly to the Palestinian people. We and our European allies are
now expanding this mechanism into a new international assistance program to
alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable Palestinians.
Second, we want to help the Palestinian people to lay the economic foundations of
a successful state. The Palestinians are some of the most talented, best educated,
and hardest working people in the Middle East. What they need more than anything
are opportunities to prosper. And last November, I personally worked with parties to
create an opportunity – an Agreement on Movement and Access, to help the
Palestinians travel more freely and transport their goods to market. It is important
that we continue to work so that Palestinians and Israelis can implement this
agreement.
Finally, we want to help the Palestinians establish the environment of security and
the rule of law that a successful state requires. In his speech at the United Nations
last month, President Bush specifically charged me with helping the Palestinians on
this front, and that was one of the key purposes of my recent visit. Together with Lt.
General Keith Dayton, who is leading our efforts to help the Palestinians reform
their security services, I spoke with President Abbas about how we can help him
stem the violence in the West Bank and Gaza. And we are working on a new
initiative, along with our allies such as Egypt, and Jordan, and the European Union.
I realize that the continuing problems of security are also a great challenge for
many Palestinian-Americans living in Gaza and the West Bank – and for so many
others, including many of you, who travel there often, who work for greater
tolerance and understanding, and who invest your time, and your knowledge, and
indeed your capital in the Palestinian territories. People like you have a vital role to
play in the Middle East, and I will continue to do everything in my power to support
your good work, and to ensure that all American travelers receive fair and equal
treatment.
You see, ladies and gentlemen, our government cannot by itself meet the historic
challenge that we now face in the Middle East. To empower moderate men and
women in the Palestinian territories and across the region, to help them build lives
of peace and dignity, we in government need the full support of private partners: our
businesses, our universities, our non-governmental organizations, and our fellow
citizens like you.
Recently, President Bush formed a partnership with leaders of four major American
companies to support the government and people of Lebanon. A presidential
delegation travelled to Beirut last month. And together, the State Department and
America's business community are now raising millions of dollars in new assistance
and investment, which will help the Lebanese people rebuild their country and
revitalize their economy.
This partnership can, and should, become a model for efforts to support the
Palestinian people and the government of President Abbas. So let us mobilize the
full energy of the Palestinian-American community. Let us find new and more
determined ways to realize our shared vision of two states, Palestine and Israel,
living side by side in peace and security. And let us focus our efforts to strengthen
and support moderate men and women throughout the region, who simply long for
peace, and development, and dignity.
I know that sometimes a Palestinian state living side by side in peace with Israel
must seem like a very distant dream. But I know too, as a student of international
history, that there are so many things that once seemed impossible that, after they
happened, simply seemed inevitable. I've read over the last summer the
biographies of America's Founding Fathers. By all rights, America, the United
States of America, should never have come into being. We should never have
survived our civil war. I should never have grown up in segregated Birmingham,
Alabama to become the Secretary of State of the United States of America.
And yet, time and time again, whether in Europe or in Asia or even in parts of
Africa, states that no one thought would come into being, and certainly not
peacefully and democratically, did. And then looking back on them, we wonder why
did anyone ever doubt that it was possible.
I know the commitment of the Palestinian people to a better future. I know firsthand
the commitment of President Abbas and moderate Palestinians to that future. And I
know the commitment of the people in this room and of the American Task Force
on Palestine that one day indeed there will be a Palestinian state living side by side
in peace with Israel.
I can only tell you that I, too, have a personal commitment to that goal because I
believe that there could be no greater legacy for America than to help to bring into
being a Palestinian state for a people who have suffered too long, who have been
humiliated too long, who have not reached their potential for too long, and who
have so much to give to the international community and to all of us. I promise you
my personal commitment to that goal. Thank you very much.
87
Interview conducted by John Simpson of the BBC with President Bashar alAssad on 8 October 2006:
Mr Simpson: Mr President, welcome and thank you very much for doing this
interview with us. It is a rare occasion, and you have to forgive me if some of my
questions are blunt, because sometimes it is impossible to be too polite about
some things. For instance, Syria has a really unenviable reputation in many
countries of the West. For instance, the United States has publicly said, or
American officials publicly said that Syria is a member of the axis of evil. Your
country harbors people that others would regard as terrorists.
President Assad: First of all, you are most welcome in Syria. I am going to be very
direct as usual. Actually, everybody care about their reputation, but we care more
about reality. Reputation is matter of perception. The question is: do some in the
West perceive the reality in our region as it is or as they want? The events in our
region, especially after September 11 in New York, and after the invasion of
Afghanistan, and especially after the invasion of Iraq proved that we were right; and
maybe there is some denial by most of them to confess that they were wrong. But
actually, many of those officials in the West that you have mentioned in your
question revised their policies. And it was proven that they were wrong. Actually,
when they accused Syria about supporting terrorism anywhere, they wanted to
make Syria a scapegoat to blame it for every single mistake they make; and they
absolve themselves from any responsibility. Mr Simpson: But might it not be better
not to have close links with groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas, not to have such
a close alliance with Iran, not to allow weapons to go to Hizbullah, not to allow
insurgents to pass into Iraq from your country? President Assad: Some of the
biggest mistakes made by the West – I know that the term West is very broad, but I
have to use it because I cannot name every country – was to use labels as a base
for political action. It does not matter what you label organizations or people or
countries. The most important thing in politics is whether they have effect or not. As
long as they are effective on the ground, among the people, you have to deal with
them. And when they have the support of the people, you cannot label them as
terrorist, because this way you label the people as terrorist. You cannot say this
country is a terrorist country, and this people is a terrorist people. This is not
objective; and that is why most of the policies undertaken by the West for the past
few years toward our region have failed. As for Hamas and Hizbullah, both are part
and parcel of the Lebanese and Palestinian societies. And do not believe that there
is any organization which sends its people and members to die for a third country.
This is not realistic. They die when they have a cause. Do not believe that any one
of them could be strong and win elections in both countries, whether to be at the
helm of the government or in municipal elections when they represent only
themselves or part of their society. When they win these elections, it means that
they have the full support of their people, and of course the support of the people in
the region. In Iraq the situation is different. We do not know which party or parties –
or there might be no parties at all – take part in the resistance. In Iraq, they have
two things: there is the chaos and terrorism and you have the resistance. Our public
stand is that we condemn every single attack against civilians and the innocent in
Iraq. Some times there are suicide bombers who kill tens and hundreds in one day.
While attacking occupying forces is normal.
Mr Simpson: It is acceptable!
President Assad: Whether we accept it or not, it is normal, it is a fact. Wherever
you have occupation in the region, for the last 150 years at least – we can go
further back in history, but at least for the past 150 years – you have the same
reaction to every occupation. The British were in Iraq at the beginning of the last
century and they faced the same thing, Israel in Lebanon, Israel in Palestine, and
now the British, American and other troops in Iraq. This is a normal reaction
whether we accept it or not. So, it is better to accept what is normal.
Mr Simpson: Are you prepared to help the people who kill British and American
soldiers?
President Assad: First of all, we are against the occupation, and we warned the
British and the Americans before the war that whenever you are going to win the
war – and you are going to win it – you are going to ask the whole world to extricate
you from this quagmire – and they are in a quagmire. Of course, if it is normal, and
we have to accept the normal, of course, resistance is one of our concepts that we
adopt, not against the British or the Americans in particular, but as a concept,
against any occupying forces in the world. Even the UN Charter gave people the
right to resist, whatever kind or resistance, whether it is military or through any other
way, resistance is the right of the people. It is very normal for us to support it and
adopt it.
Mr Simpson: So, you do allow insurgent to pass across the border into Iraq.
President Assad: No, this is something else, because first of all the resistance in
Iraq is Iraqi resistance. It does not come from anywhere outside the border.
Second, the insurgents, as we understand them, are the terrorists who go and kill
the Iraqis. They try sometimes to come through the borders because, you know,
terrorism has no borders. It is like the internet. It flows from place to place with no
restrictions; but we tried our best and succeeded somehow in preventing many of
those to go to Iraq. But, anyway, Iraq has now been transfigured into a nexus for
terrorism. So, nobody can stop it. But we do not allow and we do not support them
because first for the Iraqis, and second for our own interest, because if you allow
terrorists to attack somewhere anywhere in the world, it would attack you later. So,
how is the situation going to be if you allow it in your neighbouring countries.
Mr Simpson: Let me get this absolutely right. You understand the reasons for the
insurgency, either against Israel or against the British and American forces in Iraq,
but you do not help them.
President Assad: I have to be very precise about the definition. The insurgency is
something against the law. We do not support it. As to resistance, we adopt it as a
concept. That does not mean that you support it with money or armaments. I am
talking about the political concept. We adopt it as a right. It is like when you in the
West say that you adopt the human rights bill legally. That does not mean that you
support it with money or you take action or whatever.
Mr Simpson: I see. But you helped Hizbullah and you allowed them to have
weapons that came from Syria, did you not?
President Assad: Usually, and from our experience in the region, whenever you
have resistance, you have public support. Whenever you have public support, they
will be able to get arms from anywhere.
Mr Simpson: Can I just ask you: you did help Hizbullah with weapons, did you not?
President Assad: No, we helped them politically. We usually help them politically.
Mr Simpson: Are you prepared to work with the international community in
preventing new weapons getting to Hizbullah in Lebanon?
President Assad: Yes, this is part of the UN resolution 1701 which we supported.
So, are we going to implement part of it or the whole resolution? Was this
resolution passed to help the region and to prevent another war, or was it passed
just against Hizbullah? If it is going to be implemented as a whole – we said that we
do not agree about all the points in it – but we are going to support it in order not to
have another war. For example, there are incessant encroachments by the Israeli
aircraft and troops into Lebanese airspace and territory on a daily basis. Why does
not the international community interfere and talk to the Israelis about this
resolution. So, it is not a matter of Hizbullah. The whole resolution should be
implemented. This is how we see it.
Mr Simpson: How has the fighting in Lebanon in July and August changed things in
this part of the Middle East?
President Assad: First, it did not change the position of Syria. But it changed the
vision in some other countries in the world, especially the United States and some
of its allies in the West. They used to think that military force is the omnipotent
power and that it can solve anything. That was proved to be wrong. And it has
proved a very important thing: if you do not tackle the issues politically, armies
cannot do anything, no matter how strong the army is.
Mr Simpson: American officials are saying they do not think you can or will help with
the peace process; and so they do not think there is any point in talking to you.
President Assad: You have to ask them on what basis they say that.
Mr Simpson: Well, I suppose they say because they feel that you are not moving
towards negotiations with Israel, for instance. Are you prepared to move towards
negotiations with Israel?
President Assad: If we draw an analogy with a car, it is not one car with one driver.
The peace process has more than one party, and all of them have to drive in the
same direction. You say in English, 'it takes two to tango'. So, if one of the dancers
is dancing tango and the other is dancing waltz but thinks that he is dancing tango,
both of them will fall.
Mr Simpson: Which are you dancing? If you are favourable or you are helping, in
one way or another, Israel's enemies, it is going to be very hard to say, well, we can
negotiate with you openly.
President Assad: The ideal thing to achieve peace is to implement international law,
UN resolutions and Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. So, the conditions to
achieve peace are the international conditions. This is very simple, in order not to
make it complicated. If you ask the parties, each one has its own vision, you make
it complicated. Nobody will make concessions at the end. So, it is better to be
committed to the international will if you talk about the will or if you talk about the
vision. We are committed to this will and to this vision. Are the Israelis committed to
it? This is first. Second, what is the role of the United States? It is not only the
problem between the two parties. You need an impartial arbiter. This is the role of
the United States. This is the supportive role of the United Nations and this is the
supportive role of the Europeans. So far, the United States does not have the will to
play this role and does not have the vision for peace. Of course they do not have a
vision towards Iraq, they do not have a vision towards terrorism and about many
other issues. But I am talking now about peace. If you go back to the very
beginning, whether we can or we cannot, no, Syria by itself cannot make peace with
itself. We should make it with all these factors so that we can achieve peace. Now
we do not have this environment, we do not have this good climate to achieve
peace.
Mr Simpson: So, now is not the time.
President Assad: It is always the time. I mean we do not have the factors. On the
contrary, it is the time, especially after war. After war, you talk about peace, but that
does not mean we have the environment to achieve it or to move toward it.
Mr Simpson: Some senior politicians in Israel are saying it is now time for Israel to
start talking to Syria. I mean, if that were the case, if the prime minister, as opposed
to some of his other ministers, were to say to you, we are ready for talks, what
would your answer be then?
President Assad: Actually, I started talking about peace. So, we have to wait for
their answer.
Mr Simpson: Are you waiting for an answer from them?
President Assad: As I said, it is not only them, because we do not know if this
government is strong enough to move toward peace, like what happened during
Barak's term in 2000, when we went to Wye Plantation to meet with the Israelis,
and you can read that in the memoirs of former US president Bill Clinton, when he
mentions that the Syrians were ready to deliver, while the Israelis were not because
of internal issues. So, the first question is can they and do they have the will? The
other question is, as some say, the decision for peace now is not in Israel, it is in
Washington. I did not only read this in the newspapers and magazines, but actually
many officials in Europe and in the Arab world heard that from the Americans. If the
Americans do not have the will, the Israelis cannot move without the United States.
Third, as I mentioned earlier, that depends on the will and the vision of the United
States.
Mr Simpson: And that is not there, you think, at the moment.
President Assad: So far, there was no dialogue, so how can we tell. We only
expect, we hear from others. But can you achieve peace without making dialogue
with all the parties. We cannot. How can you talk about peace and at the same time
about isolation. How can you talk about peace and you adopt the doctrine of
preemption, preemptive war? This contradicts 180 degrees with the concept of
peace. You cannot adopt both.
Mr Simpson: One of the problems, particularly in Israel, is that people there feel
absolutely certain that Syria is dedicated to wiping out Israel as a state. Your friend
and ally, president Ahmadinejad of Iran has spoken about wiping Israel off the face
of the globe. What do you say about that? Is that your idea as well?
President Assad: Your question is evidence that they do not read thinks very
carefully. They do not read the lines and they do not read between the lines. I am
not going to give you my opinion. I will give the facts. How can we ask for wiping
Israel and at the same time ask for peace and negotiations. We had negotiations in
the 1990s with Israel. Do you make negotiations and put peace as a goal to wipe
out somebody? We talked about normal relations and all these details. This is not
objective.
Mr Simpson: So, would you accept that, at some future stage, no matter how long it
takes, Syria and Israel could live side by side in peace and harmony accepting each
other's existence?
President Assad: Yes, the answer is yes.
Mr Simpson: No problems about that at all?
President Assad: Of course not. Why do we want to achieve peace, to have war?
This is self-evident. I agree about what you said.
Mr Simpson: Down the decades, Syria's influence in Lebanon has divided the
different groups in the country, and of course most recently there was the murder of
prime minister Hariri, which one UN report said could only have been carried out
with the knowledge of the Syrian intelligence system.
President Assad: The assassination of Hariri has affected Syria as bad as it
affected Lebanon. Hariri was a real ally of Syria. He was never against Syria. He
supported Syria in many difficult positions and stands. So, there was no single
convincing reason to push Syria to do such a thing.
Mr Simpson: Supposing the UN does turn up evidence that Syrian intelligence
agents, for instance, who were very active in Lebanon and elsewhere, had been
responsible. I know this is a hypothetical question, but would you put them on trial,
would you deal with them?
President Assad: Yes, we announced that publicly. They would be prosecuted first
of all in Syria. Now the question whether it is going to be an international tribunal or
anything else is too early to answer. So far, our law says that whoever proves to be
complicit in such an atrocity is considered a traitor, and a traitor is punished by the
most sever punishment.
Mr Simpson: But forgive me, is it possible that the president would not know what
the security people of his country are doing?
President Assad: This means you presume that somebody in our intelligence took
part in this. We are not convinced of that.
Mr Simpson: It is what the UN report said.
President Assad: As far as we know, no Syrian is involved, whether in the state, the
intelligence, or any other apparatus within or outside the state.
Mr Simpson: Syria is a difficult country for outsiders to understand. It is a very
closed society. It does not exercise its affairs in public. We know very little about
this country. Forgive me for asking this: are you really the man in charge, or does
somebody tell you what to do?
President Assad: Of course none of this is true. I know what you mean. I am in
charge of course legally. But some people in the West used to say he is not in
control and somebody else is controlling him. At the same time they say he is a
dictator. I answered this many times. If I am a dictator I should be very strong, and
if I am not in charge I should be very weak to be a dictator. So, they have to make
up their mind about this. I have my authority according to the constitution. I am fully
in charge according to these authorities I have, but at the same time you have to
keep consulting with the largest possible number of people regarding anything.
Mr Simpson: When you took over in 2000, people talked about the Damascus
spring, that things were going to change, it was going to be possible for people to
speak openly, there were going to be forms of democracy that have not been
shown before. Some of those things or a few of them have happened, but for the
most part Syria is still just as controlled as it was under your father.
President Assad: First of all, we did not say that reform means to loose control. It
has to be under control. We need a strong state. We never thought of a weak state
in Syria. It is never part of our reform and we never talked about it in Syria. For us
reform is to have prosperity. Prosperity has more than one field: political, economic,
cultural, social, whatever. But you have priorities: you cannot do everything at the
same time, you cannot do it in a short time if we are talking about real reform. I am
not talking about pro forma ones. I am talking about real reform. The most difficult
problem that people suffer from is the economic situation. We are a poor country
not a rich country. Wherever I go as an official I meet people and the first thing they
talk about are their wages, not having a job, having good schools for their children,
having medical services. Sometimes they do not have the basic things in most of
the regions.
Mr Simpson: But it is your intention to open up Syrian society.
President Assad: Yes, of course. This is our interest and this is our goal.
Mr Simpson: I have got one last question to ask you: for much of your career, you
were an ophthalmic surgeon in London – part of it was in London. Now, you are the
president of a country which many people fear; and some people think is a
ferocious dictatorship. What does it feel like to move from examining and healing
people's eyes to being in charge of a country like Syria?
President Assad: If you are a dictator, people should hate you. Do not believe that
people like dictators. So, I think if you want to have the real answer, you would
better ask the Syrians and they will tell you: How can you be a dictator and at the
same time, as in your earlier question, I am not in charge? This is the contradiction.
Mr Simpson: Which would you prefer, though, being an ophthalmic surgeon or to be
president of Syria?
President Assad: Actually, that depends on how many people you can help, or how
much good work you can do for the national interest. I definitely enjoy being an
ophthalmologist, but now I think whatever decision I can make is going to have a
broader effect on my country. Mr Simpson: Thank you very much in deed.
President Assad: Thank you, and thank you for coming to Syria.
88
Am bekanntesten dürfte in Deutschland Shalevs Buch „Ein russischer Roman“
(Diogenes-Verlag) sein.
89
Vgl. die Eintragung unter diesem Datum in dieser Chronologie.
90
Ahmad F. Zahra: Information Minister Stresses that Restoration of Total Land
and Right Basis for Just, Comprehensive Peace, October 07, 2006. Damascus,
Oct. (SANA–Syrian News Agency): Minister of Information Dr. Mohsen Bilal
reiterated Syria's stance that establishing the just and comprehensive peace in the
region should be based on the full restoration of the occupied Syrian Golan and
Israeli withdrawal from the remaining parts in south Lebanon as well as the
establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as capital and the return of the
Palestinian refugees to their homes. Minister Bilal said in an interview with alJazeera satellite TV station broadcast Saturday that Israel's intransigence and
rejection to implement the UN resolutions and the land-for-peace principle were
behind the deadlock of the Middle East peace process. The minister said the US
strategic support to Israel encourages it to reject to return to the 4 June 1967
border line and the foundations of peace. Minister Bilal pointed out that Syria takes
into consideration any Israeli possible military adventure, adding that Syria is
prepared for any emergency and for Israel's hostile plots, particularly after the
failure of its aggression on Lebanon and its current crisis. The Minister of
Information pointed out to the absence of confidence in Israeli successive
governments, particularly the government which inherited the cabinet of Sharon
headed by Olmert with his current government which is suffering from its crisis
following the victory of the heroic Lebanese resistance. As for the Syrian-American
relations, Dr. Bilal said the total bias by the US administration on all levels to Israel
prevents establishing natural and good relations between us. He pointed out that
Syria stands for the principle of dialogue which takes into consideration the mutual
interests of both countries not the interest of a part at the expense of the other.
"Syria is willing to resume the dialogue and the peace process for the establishment
of the just and comprehensive peace in the region," he said. On controlling the
borders with Lebanon, the Information Minister said "we are working to control our
borders with Lebanon and Iraq, taking into consideration that Lebanon is full of
various world intelligence services. So we do our best to prevent all forms of
smuggling from Lebanon or any other country."
91
President Abbas: "No Dialogue Now": Ramallah, October 04, 2006 (WAFA –
PLO News Agency). President Mahmoud Abbas said Wednesday that talks over
the national dialogue had broken down, affirming an agreement announced on
September 11 "is now over, and we have to start from square one." "My
constitutional powers, granted by the basic law, will be used in the appropriate
time," President Abbas told a joint press conference with Bahraini Foreign Minister
Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa. "It is very necessary that we increase our
efforts to end this crisis, and reach a solution toward forming a new government,"
President Abbas added. He expressed hope "to reach this end as soon as possible
because the people have been suffering for the past seven months and cannot
endure further suffering." President Abbas also said that the visiting FM and he
discussed a number of issues as well as Khalifa's yesterday meeting with the US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. For his Part, FM Khalifa stressed the
necessity to condense efforts to achieve progress in the peace process, pointing
out that the situation is very dangerous. He added that supporting the Palestinian
leadership is not only an Arab responsibility, but the USA, Arab states and Israeli
should also share this responsibility. Vgl. die Eintragung unter dem 11. September
2006 in dieser Chronologie mit der Dokumentation der vereinbarten
Regierungsleitlinien.
92
Erklärung der Mitglieder der Arabischen Liga vom 29.03.2002 in Beirut: „Wir,
die Könige, Präsidenten und Prinzen der Arabischen Staaten (...), haben die
jüngsten regionalen und internationalen Veränderungen studiert und die
Herausforderungen, denen sich die arabische Nation stellen muss (...), darunter
den totalen, zerstörerischen Krieg, den Israel unter dem Vorwand der
Terrorbekämpfung in den besetzten palästinensischen Gebieten unter Ausnutzung
der katastrophalen Ereignisse vom September [2001] und der internationalen
Verurteilung dieser Ereignisse begonnen hat. (...)
Wir bekräftigen, dass der Frieden im Nahen Osten keinen Erfolg haben kann, wenn
er nicht gerecht und umfassend ist und die Beschlüsse 242, 338 und 425 des
Sicherheitsrates und das Prinzip Land gegen Frieden realisiert. (...)
Außerdem fordern wir
a) den vollständigen Rückzug aus den arabischen Gebieten, auch vom syrischen
Golan, auf die Linie vom 4. Juni 1967 und aus den immer noch besetzten Gebieten
im Südlibanon [Sheba-Farmen];
b) das Erreichen einer gerechten Lösung für das Problem der palästinensischen
Flüchtlinge;
c) die Gründung eines unabhängigen palästinensischen Staates in den seit dem 4.
Juni 1967 besetzten palästinensischen Gebieten – im Westjordanland und im
Gaza-Streifen – zu akzeptieren, dessen Hauptstadt Ost-Jerusalem ist.
Dann werden die arabischen Staaten
a) den arabisch-israelischen Konflikt für beendet erklären und eine
Friedensvereinbarung mit Israel schließen, verbunden mit der Verwirklichung von
Sicherheit für die gesamte Region und
b) im Rahmen dieses Friedens normale Beziehungen zu Israel aufbauen. Die
Sitzung der Arabischen Liga ruft alle Staaten und die Region auf, diesen Vorschlag
zu unterstützen.“
93
Crisis Group's 2006 Middle East Initiative: On 22 September 2006, Crisis Group
announced a new global advocacy initiative, designed to generate fresh political
momentum behind a comprehensive settlement following the chaos of the last few
months.
On 4 October, 135 respected global leaders – former presidents, prime ministers,
foreign and defence ministers, congressional leaders and heads of international
organisations – joined in a call for urgent international action to comprehensively
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their statement says there is a "desperate need for
fresh thinking and the injection of new political will" if the conflict, "with all its terrible
consequences", is ever to be settled.
The full text of the statement is featured below, along with previous Crisis Group
reporting and analysis on the conflict.
Full text of the statement und signatories:
Towards a Comprehensive Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
With the Middle East immersed in its worst crisis for years, we call for urgent
international action towards a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Everyone has lost in this conflict except the extremists throughout the world who
prosper on the rage that it continues to provoke. Every passing day undermines
prospects for a peaceful, enduring solution. As long as the conflict lasts, it will
generate instability and violence in the region and beyond.
The outlines of what is needed are well known, based on UN Security Council
resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973, the Camp David peace accords of 1978,
the Clinton Parameters of 2000, the Arab League Initiative of 2002, and the
Roadmap proposed in 2003 by the Quartet (UN, US, EU and Russia). The goal
must be security and full recognition to the state of Israel within internationally
recognized borders, an end to the occupation for the Palestinian people in a viable
independent, sovereign state, and the return of lost land to Syria.
We believe the time has come for a new international conference, held as soon as
possible and attended by all relevant players, at which all the elements of a
comprehensive peace agreement would be mapped, and momentum generated for
detailed negotiations.
Whether or not such an early conference can be convened, there are crucial steps
that can and should be taken by the key players, including:
– Support for a Palestinian national unity government, with an end to the political and
financial boycott of the Palestinian Authority.
– Talks between Israel and the Palestinian leadership, mediated by the Quartet and
reinforced by the participation of the Arab League and key regional countries, on
rapidly enhancing mutual security and allowing revival of the Palestinian economy.
– Talks between the Palestinian leadership and the Israeli government, sponsored by
a reinforced Quartet, on the core political issues that stand in the way of achieving a
final status agreement.
– Parallel talks of the reinforced Quartet with Israel, Syria and Lebanon, to discuss
the foundations on which Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese agreements can be
reached.
Nobody underestimates the intractability of the underlying issues or the intensity of
feelings they provoke. But if the Arab-Israeli conflict, with all its terrible
consequences, is ever to be resolved, there is a desperate need for fresh thinking
and the injection of new political will. The times demand no less.
Signatories:
Morton Abramowitz; Former US Assistant Secretary of State an Ambassador to
Turkey and Thailand; Adnan Abu-Odeh, Former Political Advisor to Kind Abdullah II
and King Hussein, Jordan; Esko Aho, Former Prime Minister, Finland; Ali Alatal,
Former Foreign Minister, Indonesia; Abdul-Kareem Al-Eryani, Former Prime
Minister, Yemen; Raúl Alfonsin, Former President, Argentina; Lord Ashdown of
Norton-sub-Hamdon, Former UN High Representative for Bosnia & Herzegovina;
Lloyd Axworthy, Former Foreign Minister, Canada; Shlomo Ben-Ami, Former
Foreign Minister, Israel; Alexander Bessmertnykh, Former Foreign Minister, Soviet
Union; Carl Bildt, Former Prime Minister, Sweden; Valdis Birkavs, Former Prime
Minister, Latvia; James Bolger, Former Prime Minister, New Zealand; Kjell Magne
Bondevik, Former Prime Minister, Norway, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Former UN
Secretary-General; Lakhdar Brahimi, Former Foreign Minister, Algeria, and UN
Special Representative; Gro Harlem Brundtland, Former Prime Minister, Norway,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor to the President, USA; Kim
Campbell, Former Prime Miister, Canada; Secretary-General, Club of Madrid,
Ingvar Carlsson, Former Prime Minister, Sweden; Frank Carlucci, Former Secretary
th
of Defense, USA; Jimmy Carter, 39 President, USA, Nobel Peace Prize 2002;
Maria Livanos Cattaui, Former Secretary-General, International Chamber of
Commerce; Naresh Chandra, Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador to
US; Claude Cheysson, Former Foreign Minister, France; Jean Chrétien, Former
Prime Minister, Canada; Wesley Clark, Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, USA; Gerard Collins, Former Foreign Minister, Ireland; Pat Cox, Former
President, European Parliament, UK; Jacques Delors, Former President, European
Commission, France; Gianni De Michelis, Former Foreign Minister, Italy; Ruth
Dreifuss, Former President, Switzerland; Roland Dumas, Former Foreign Minister,
France, Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Peace Price 2003, Iran; Uffe Elleman-Jensen, Former
Foreign Minister, Denmark; Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group,
Former Foreign Minister, Australia; Mark Eyskens, Former Prime Minister, Belgium;
José María Figueres, Former President, Costa Rica; Vigdis Finnbogadóttir, Former
President, Iceland; Joschka Fischer, Former Foreign Minister, Germany; Garret
FitzGerald, Former Prime Minister, Ireland; Malcom Fraser; Former Prime Minister,
Australia; Anil K Gayan, Former Foreign Minister, Mauritius; Leslie H Gelb,
President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations, USA; Bronislaw Geremek,
Former Foreign Minister, Poland; Kiro Gligorov, Former President, Macedonia;
Richard Goldstone, Former Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia; Filipe González Márquez, Former Prime Minister, Spain; Mikhail
S Gorbachev, Former President, Soviet Union, Nobel Peace Prize 1990; I K Gujral,
th
Former Prime Minister, India; Tenzin Gyatso, 14 Dalai Lama, Nobel Peace Prize
1989; Vahit M Halefoğlu, Former Foreign Minister, Turkey; Lee Hamilton, Former
Congressman, USA, Director Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars;
Bob Hawke, Former Prime Minister, Australia; Bill Hayden, Former GovernorGeneral and Foreign Minister, Australia; Carla Hills, Former Trade Representative,
USA; Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
Sweden, Raffi K Hovannisian, Former Foreign Minister, Armenia; Lord Howe of
Aberavon, Former Foreign Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister, UK; John Hume,
Nobel Peace Prize 1998, Northern Ireland; Lord Hurd of Westwell, Former Foreign
Minister, UK; George Iacovou, Former Foreign Minister, Cyprus; Anwar Ibrahim,
Former Deputy Prime Minister, Malaysia; James Ingram, Former Executive
Director, UN World Food Programme; Asma Jahangir, Chair, Pakistan Human
Rights Commission, UN Special Rapporteur, Max Jakobson, Former Ambassador
of Finland to the UN; Lionel Jospin, Former Prime Minister, France; Marwam S
Kasim, Former Foreign Minister, Jordan; Kim Dae-jung, Former President,
Republic of Korea; Nobel Peace Prize 2000; F W de Klerk, Former President,
South Africa, Nobel Peace Prize 1993; Wim Kok, Former Prime Minister,
Netherlands, Bernard Kouchner, Founder, Médecins Sans Frontières, Former
Minister, France, and UN Special Representative, Milan Kučan, Former President,
Slovenia; Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Former President, Poland; Ricardo Lagos,
Former President, Chile; Zlatko Lagumdžija, Former Prime Minister, Bosnia &
Herzegovina; Anthony Lake, Former National Security Advisor to the President,
USA; Lee Hong-Koo, Former Prime Minister, Republic of Korea; Ahmed Maher,
Former Foreign Minister, Egypt; Abdul Salam Majali, Former Foreign Minister,
Jordan; John Major, Former Prime Minister, UK; Barbara McDougall, Former
External Affairs Secretary, Canada; Matthew F. McHugh, Former US Congressman
and World Bank Counselor; Robert McNamara, Former Secretary of Defense,
USA; Rexhep Meidani, Former President, Albania, Najib Mikati, Former Prime
Minister, Lebanon, Mike Moore, Former Prime Minister, New Zealand, Former
Director-General, World Trade Organization; Marwan Muasher, Former Foreign
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Jordan; Klaus Naumann, Former Chairman,
North Atlantic Military Committee of NATO, Germany; Boyko Noev, Former Minister
of Defense, Bulgaria; Ayo Obe, Chair, World Movement for Democracy, Nigeria;
Sadako Ogata, Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Japan; Lord Owen of
the City of Plymouth, Former Foreign Secretary, UK; Anand Panyarachun, Former
Prime Minister, Thailand; Andrés Pastrana, Former President, Colombia; Lord
Patten of Barnes, Co-Chair, International Crisis Group, Former European
Commissioner for External Relations, UK; Thomas Pickering, Co-Chair,
International Crisis Group, Former US Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel,
Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria, USA; Josep Piqué, Former Foreign Minister,
Spain; Surin Pitsuwan, Former Foreign Minister, Thailand, Yevgeny Primakov,
Former Prime Minister, Russia; Jorge Quiroga, Former President, Bolivia; Augusto
Ramírez Ocampo, Former Foreign Minister, Colombia; Fidel V Ramos, Former
President, Philippines; Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Former Prime Minister, Denmark;
Abdur-ra’uf Rawabdeh, Former Prime Minister, Jordan; Malcolm Rifkind, Former
Foreign Secretary, UK; Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Former Defense Secretary,
UK, and NATO Secretary-General; Mary Robinson, Former President, Ireland, and
High Commissioner for Human Rights; Michel Ricard, Former Prime Minister,
France; Petre Roman, Former Prime Minister, Romania; Adam Daniel Rotfeld,
Former Foreign Minister, Poland; Nafis Sadik, Former Executive Director, UN
Population Fund; Mohamed Sahnoun, Former Algerian Ambassador, UN Special
Advisor; Salim Ahmed Salim, Former Secretary-General, Organisation of African
Union, and Prime Minister, Tanzania; Jorge Sampaio, Former President, Portugal,
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Former President, Bolivia; Mario Soares, Former
President, Portugal; Stephen Solarz, Former Chair, Africa & Asia Subcommittees,
US Congress; Cornelio Sommaruga, Former President, International Committee of
the Red Cross; George Soros, Chairman, Open Society Institute, USA; Pär
Stenbäck, Former Foreign Minister, Finland; Thorvald Stoltenberg, Former Foreign
Minister, Norway; HRH El Hassan bin Talal, Founder, Arab Thought Forum, Jordan;
Leo Tindemans, Former Prime Minister, Belgium; Alex S Trigona, Former Foreign
Minister, Malta, Desmond Tutu, Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, Nobel Peace
Prize 1984, South Africa; Cassam Uteem, Former President, Mauritius; Hans van
den Broek, Former Foreign Minister, Netherlands, and European Commissioner for
External Relations; Ed van Thijn, Former Minister and Mayor of Amsterdam,
Netherlands; George Vassiliou, Former President, Cyprus; Hubert Védrine, Former
Foreign Minister, France; Franz Vranitzky, Former Federal Chancellor, Austria;
Richard von Weizsäcker, Former President, Germany; Baroness Williams of
Crosby, Former Cabinet Minister, UK; Ernesto Zedillo, Former President, Mexico.
94
95
Vgl. den Text des Interviews am 28.09.2006 in dieser Chronologie.
Caroline B. Glick: Tzipi Livni and us, in “Jerusalem Post” 03.10.2006: Foreign
minister Tzipi Livni is an interesting case study in how a public image can trump
professional competence in Israeli politics. Livni was brought into politics by then
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in 1999. The back-bencher became prominent
in 2003 after undergoing two major transformations. First, she exchanged her frizzy
light brown curls and dowdy dresses for straight blond hair and couture. Next she
followed former premier Ariel Sharon from the nationalist camp to the post-Zionist
camp.
In the aftermath of these stunning changes, the leftist media crowned this woman
with pidgin English and no understanding of international diplomacy the queen of
Israeli politics. While bereft of actual accomplishments, with the media's bottomless
indulgence, Livni enjoys a reputation as a savvy, competent, and scrupulously clean
politician.
All this no doubt explains a poll published Sunday by Ma'ariv which claims that if
Livni were to replace Prime Minister Ehud Olmert as head of Kadima, she could
lead the embattled candidates' list to victory in the next general elections.
One of Livni's chief advantages over Olmert is that she is less identified than her
boss with Israel's defeat in Lebanon. There are two main reasons that this is the
case. First, unlike Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, Livni maintained a low
profile throughout the war. Second, Livni was kept out of the loop of the war's
military management.
More than anything else, Ma'ariv's poll exposes the public's ignorance of Livni's
positions on issues of national concern. This is so because in repeated polls since
the war came to its sudden cessation, the public has expressed views diametrically
opposed to those that Livni seeks to advance.
On Friday, Livni clarified her positions in an interview with Yediot Aharonot. Her
views were also given expression in an article in Haaretz on Sunday regarding the
government's diplomatic handling of the war. During the war, the principal
difference between Livni and Olmert was that Livni gave up on the idea of Israel
winning the war on July 12 – that is, on the day that Hizbullah attacked an IDF
patrol along the northern border, kidnapped IDF reservists Eldad Regev and Ehud
Goldwasser and began pummeling northern Israel with rockets and missiles. It took
Olmert another 10 days to be convinced that Israel ought to lose the war.
Both in her interview with Yediot and in her statements to Haaretz, Livni makes
clear that unlike the public, she doesn't see why the war in Lebanon proves that the
policy of surrendering land to terrorists is misguided. Ignoring the fact that Israel's
withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza enabled the empowerment of Jihadist terror
groups and paved the way for the war that ensued, Livni sees the terror wars as an
opportunity to bring foreign troops into Lebanon. Indeed, on the first day of the war,
Livni instructed her advisers to begin drawing up plans for foreign forces to come to
Lebanon to protect Israel. Although UNIFIL commanders have made clear that they
will not disarm Hizbullah, enforce an arms embargo, or remove Hizbullah forces
from the border, Livni views the UNIFIL deployment in Lebanon as a model for both
Gaza and Judea and Samaria.
Livni's aversion – already on the first day of the war – to any attempt on Israel's part
to secure a military victory in Lebanon on the one hand, and her enthusiastic
advocacy of the international force model in Lebanon and in Gaza and Judea and
Samaria on the other stems from her basic misconception of both Israel's regional
security environment and its international position.
This conception makes her behave more as the EU and UN's ambassador to Israel
rather than as Israel's chief diplomat. As she put it to Yediot, Israel has to stop
seeing the US as its only ally, and reach out to the UN, the Europeans, the Sunni
Arab states in the region – Jordan, Egypt, Mahmoud Abbas in the Palestinian
Authority, the Persian Gulf emirates and Saudi Arabia – and to the Saniora
government in Lebanon. Livni believes that all these players will cooperate with
Israel because they share some of Israel's interests.
While it is true that these international players share interests with Israel, Livni
ignores the fact that they have other interests diametrically opposed to Israel's
national interests. Those divergent interests have always trumped the shared
interests and nothing that Israel has done in the past or could do in the future will
change this basic calculus.
Livni began her interview with Yediot by attacking the religious Zionist public. "In the
Israeli political system there are no real gaps concerning the [vision of a]
comprehensive settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians," she said. "The
dispute is between the religious public and the rest of the Israelis."
She argues her case by asserting that aside from the religious Zionists, all Israelis
agree that we have to expel the Israelis who live in communities in Judea and
Samaria and transfer their land and communities to the Palestinians. Livni's
assertion is extraordinary given that in a recent Maagar Mohot poll, 73 percent of
Israeli Jews stated that they object to territorial withdrawals from Judea and
Samaria.
Livni continued her analysis arguing that Israel must immediately move to destroy
the so-called outpost communities in Judea and Samaria. She justified this view by
claiming that these communities were built without government permission and that
anyway, Israel intends to give the Palestinians the lands the communities are
located on. There are three basic flaws in her reasoning.
First, her claim that the communities must be destroyed because they were built
without government approval is ridiculous on its face.
The government decided in 2005 that it wanted to destroy them. Tomorrow it could
just as easily decide that it wants to expand them. What Livni is effectively saying
is, "I don't like them and therefore I want to destroy them."
Second, assuming that she is right that Israel would want to give the lands on which
those communities have been built to the Palestinians in the framework of a peace
agreement, it is far from clear what Israeli interest would be served by conceding
them today, when the Palestinians are governed by their popularly elected Jihadist
government. Why would Israel want to give up its bargaining chips before it has a
Palestinian government willing to accept its existence?
Finally, while Livni mindlessly insists that "everyone knows" the contours of the
peace settlement, Israel's experience since the onset of the peace process with the
PLO in 1993 has proven incontrovertibly that those contours are wrong.
The Palestinians have repeatedly rejected the vision of two states west of the
Jordan River and have repeatedly made clear through their actions and words that
they are not interested in having a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and
portions of Jerusalem. As they have clarified repeatedly, they want to destroy the
Jewish state. So claiming that the solution is known is to simply deny reality.
Livni forcefully argued that Israel cannot rest on its laurels but must move forward
immediately to restart negotiations with the Palestinians. In this vein she supports a
massive release of Palestinian terrorists from Israeli jails. In her words, "The world
doesn't suffer a vacuum in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When we don't initiate
solutions, the world comes with its own solutions."
What she fails to recognize is that the world did not rest on its laurels after Israel
made massive concessions on its own initiative to the Palestinians in the past.
Rather each Israeli concession was seen as but a starting point for further
concessions. Indeed the statement makes one wonder where she has been for the
past 13 years.
Livni's argumentation stems from her central misconception that Israel's national
security is secured not by the IDF but by opinion polls in Paris and Brussels. She
fails to understand not only that this is false, but that Israel's popularity ratings in
Europe have little to nothing to do with Israel's actual policies or actions.
Finally, Livni told Yediot that her great plan now is to get the Arab states to work
with Israel on solving the Palestinian refugee problem. Now that Israel supports
Palestinian statehood, she said, the Arabs will want to help solve the problem by
settling the refugees in the Palestinian state and by normalizing the status of the
Palestinians who have been living in refugee camps in the Arab world since 1948.
Here too, Livni fails to understand reality. The Palestinian refugee problem is not a
problem that the Arab world wishes to solve. The Arab world invented the problem
because the Arab League wishes to destroy Israel. The refugee problem does not
stand on its own. It is a consequence of the Arab world's continued refusal to
accept Israel's right to exist. Were this not the case, the refugees would have been
resettled 50 years ago.
There is a question of how long the leftist media will be able to maintain Livni's
image as a responsible, competent leader.
They managed to prolong a similar fiction of Olmert as a national leader until he led
us to disaster in Lebanon this summer. We must hope that Livni is exposed as an
incompetent, opportunistic phony before she can do us similar, if not greater
damage in the future.
96
Uzi Benziman: Is Israel a Partner, in “Haaretz”-online 01.10.2006: In the 1967
war, Jordan's King Hussein was considered an enemy of the state of Israel. In the
1973 war, Hussein refrained from joining the combined assault of Egypt and Syria,
and there are those who say that he even warned Israel about it. Twenty-one years
later, Jordan signed a peace agreement with Israel: The enemy of 1967 and covert
ally of 1973 became an overt friend.
When official Israel claims to have no partners with which to establish peace, the
development of the relationship with King Hussein should be placed in the public
eye. The "no partner" status is reversible, and Israel can have a significant
influence on its expiration date. Egypt's President Anwar Sadat was not considered
a partner in '73, and earned the status of very desired guest in '77. Government
spokesmen in Jerusalem explain in retrospect why Sadat does not resemble Hafez
or Bashar Assad, why Hussein does not resemble Yasser Arafat, why the hostile
situation that Israel had with Egypt and with Jordan had the potential to change
while the relationship with the Palestinians is fated to be eternally drenched in blood
and Syria will remain an enemy forever. These explanations, however, ignore the
Israeli side of the equation: The desire to hold onto the West Bank and the Golan
Heights has a critical impact on the development of the conflict.
A state that seeks peace with its enemies must, before anything else, change its
mental approach to them so that it views them as potential partners. If the enemy is
a priori perceived as a devil whose hatred cannot be overcome, then the chances
of reaching an understanding with him are null. If the Syrian government and the
Palestinian Authority appear to be eternal enemies as a matter of principle, then
any attempt to initiate a dialogue with them is a lost cause. In addition, the
likelihood of the decision makers in Jerusalem launching such an initiative is slim;
they have closed themselves off from such a possibility by virtue of the rigidity of
their approach to the leaders in Damascus and Ramallah.
These are naive observations, however: Israel missed and continues to miss
opportunities to normalize relations with the Palestinians and with the Syrians not
because of mental blocks, but rather because of domestic political considerations.
Mahmoud Abbas and Bashar Assad are defined as non-partners not because Ehud
Olmert and Amir Peretz have an emotional problem preventing them as partners in
dialogue, but because they do not have the political power to do so. The real
deterrent factor acting upon Israeli leaders, including Ehud Barak, Benjamin
Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon, has come from within the domestic political system:
They feared the residents of the Golan Heights and the West Bank settlers more
than they did the plotting of Arafat, Hafez Assad and his son. Olmert and Peretz
suffer from the same weakness.
There is no way of knowing whether Israel's willingness to withdraw from the West
Bank and the Golan Heights would result in reliable, long-term peace agreements,
but it can be confirmed that Israel is largely responsible for the fact that such moves
have not been seriously considered or formulated. Israeli governments since 1967
have preferred domestic tranquility over the possibility of unrest on the foreign
fronts. Defining the Palestinian and Syrian enemies as non-partners is a direct
consequence of that order of priorities.
The automatic negative reactions to any Palestinian or Syrian signal of a willingness
to end the conflict is based on persuasive evidence: the attitude of Hamas to
Israel's very existence; the limited degree of control that Abbas commands over the
PA; the role of Assad in arming Hezbollah as well as its connection to Iran; and the
like. This volley of reasons is aimed at concealing the strength of the opposite
possibility: Conciliation will radically change the hostile relationship; peace
agreements will include security arrangements whose purpose is to head off any
potential threats; the experience with Egypt and Jordan proves that Israel can have
peaceful relations with its Arab neighbors.
The way things stand now, the right question is not whether Israel has a partner,
but rather whether Israel itself is a partner.
97
President Condemns Internal Clashes. Amman, October 1, 2006 ([transmitted
by] WAFA–PLO News Agency): President Mahmoud Abbas condemned the
internal clashes emerged in Gaza Strip and West Bank (WB) that so far led to the
death of nine citizens and the injury of dozens others. In a TV message delivered
Sunday to the Palestinian people, the President said that the Palestinian national
unity is in great danger and the latest clashes threat to lead us to catastrophic
results. Abbas pledged, according to the basic law and his responsibilities, to
protect Palestinians rights to freely express their point of views without breaching
law, adding that he ordered the Palestinian attorney general to open a probe to
investigate on the latest clashes. "I appeal to all factions to be responsible, to
abandon their differences, and to ensure dialogue especially in the time we are
facing an Israeli threat to reoccupy Gaza Strip," Abbas added. The President called
also to exert utmost efforts to form a national unity government on the basis of
Palestinian, international and Arab legitimacy in order to end international siege
imposed on the Palestinian people. Abbas concluded by ordering all security
personnel as well as the Executive Force, which belong to the Ministry of Interior, to
pull out and to end all demonstrations, calling on the Palestinian government,
headed by Ismail Haniya, to shoulder its responsibilities and to end the crisis
through peaceful and democratic means.
98
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Press Release 02 October 2006: PCHR
Condemns Bloody Incidents in Gaza. Eight Palestinians, including a child, and at
least 115 others were injured in bloody incidents that included armed clashes in
Gaza City on Sunday, 1 October 2006. PCHR strongly condemns these incidents,
which extended to other areas throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(OPT), and calls upon the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), represented by the
Attorney-General to investigate these incidents and bring those found responsible
for them to justice.
These clashes came in the context of increasing tension and mutual violence
between Hamas and Fatah movements, especially as efforts to reach an
agreement between the two sides and form a national unity government failed.
Soon after, protests organized by public employees against the Hamas-led
government demanding their salaries escalated when members of Palestinian
security services, which are under control of the Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas, joined the protests.
The clashes erupted first in Khan Yunis between members of services and
members of the Executive Force of the Ministry of Interior. Soon, these clashes
extended to Gaza City. Various areas in the city witnessed armed clashes between
the two sides. In the evening, clashes broke out in al-Boreij refugee camp in the
central Gaza Strip between supporters of Hamas and Fatah movements. As a
result of all of these clashes, 6 Palestinians, including a child, were killed, and at
least 115 others, mostly civilian, were injured.
According to investigations conducted by PCHR, at approximately 09:30 on
Sunday, 1 October 2006, armed clashes broke out between members of security
services and the Executive Force of the Ministry of Interior at Bani Suhaila
intersection, east of Khan Yunis. As a result, 20 persons, including 4 children and 7
of the clashing security men, were injured.
These clashes extended to several areas in Gaza City. As a result, 7 persons,
including 3 civilians, were killed and 58 others, including 23 civilians, were injured.
The clashes were accompanied by attacks on publics institutions, including
ministries. Demonstrators set fire to the buildings of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Ministry of Civil Affairs in Gaza City. Armed persons also fired at the Palestinian
Legislative Councils. Additionally, demonstrators attacked a branch of Bank of
Palestine in al-Nasser neighborhood in Gaza City.
Armed clashes erupted between members of the Executive Force and those of the
Preventive Security Services near a house belonging to Safwat Rahim, and officer
of the Preventive Security Service, in Sheikh Radwan. A civilian bystander, 36-yearold 'Alaa' Tayseer Jaras, was killed, and 17 persons, mostly security men, were
injured.
Later, clashes erupted in the Unknown Soldier area in the center of Gaza City. As a
result, 15-year-old Hussam Maher Abu al-Hatal, was killed when he was on his way
back home from school. In addition, 33 other persons were injured, including 34year-old Jamal Ahmed al-Sheikh (Abu Nahel), a camera man of al-Arabiya Satellite
Channel, who was injured to the feet. In the afternoon, two of the injured died from
their injuries: Ramadan Mohammed Ramadan, 24, a member of the Presidential
Gurad; and Mohammed Kamal al-Afghani, 23, a civilian bystander. At
approximately 16:30, Mohammed Mohammed Mohsen, 21, a member of the
Preventive Security Service, was killed, and 8 other security men were injured in
clashes in Tal al-Hawa neighborhood in the southwest of Gaza City. In the same
area, a number of members of the Palestinian Military Intelligence fired at a number
of members of the al-Dairi family, killing Rateb Tawfiq al-Dairi, 45. Later, a number
of gunmen attacked a site of the Military Intelligence in Tal al-Hawa, and fired at
security men who were in the site, killing Mohammed Abu Shammala, 25.
And in Nusairat refugee camp, Fatah supporters organized a popular
demonstration against the regrettable events in Gaza and Khan Yunis. The
demonstration headed towards Salah El-Deen Street and then to the nearby alBoreij refugee camp. When the demonstration passed in front of the Hamas leader
Mohammad Taha in al-Boreij refugee camp on the way back to Nusairat, someone
threw a hand grenade among the demonstrators. A number of persons were
injured. Afterwards, armed clashes erupted between Fatah and Hamas supporters.
These clashes resulted in the death of Ashraf Abdo Abu Dalal, 31, from Nusairat
refugee camp. In addition, 37 others were injured, including 5 seriously injured and
12 children.
The violence spread to the West Bank, in Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho.
Tens of demonstrators, including some armed persons, attacked several public
buildings and Hamas institutions.
In Ramallah, tens of demonstrators burned tires before heading to the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) building and Palestinian Government building in the city.
Eyewitnesses reported that gunmen fired at the PLC building and then headed to
the nearby government building. They broke into the building, destroyed windows
and furniture, and threw files and equipment into the street. They also set fire inside
some rooms. The security forces charged with protecting the building intervened
only after 30 minutes. The demonstrators then headed to the nearby Ministry of
Education building; but the security guards prevented them from breaking in. They
burned two of the Ministry's cars. The demonstrators then broke into the "Change
and Reform" pro-Hamas party office in El-Isra Building. They ransacked the office
belongings. In addition, gunmen attacked the house of the Assistant UnderSecretary of the Ministry of Finance, Tamer El-Birawi, in the city of El-Bireh. They
kidnapped him; but he was released later.
In Hebron, tens of demonstrators attacked the "Change and Reform" party offices
in Ein Sarah area in the city. They ransacked the furniture and equipment, throwing
it in the street and setting fire to it.
In Nablus, the principal and guard of the Islamic Secondary School were injured in
an armed attack on the school and on other Islamic institutions in El-Dahia area
and in Balata refugee camp. Furthermore, the house of Deputy Prime Minister,
Naser El-Deen al-Shaer in al-Makhfeya area in Nablus came under fire. The
Deputy Prime Minister was inside the house at the time; and no injuries were
reported.
In Jericho, tens of demonstrators attacked the "Change and Reform" party offices
in the city, and set fire to them.
PCHR strongly condemns the escalating bloody events in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (OPT), especially in the Gaza Strip, and
– Views that these events are part of the increasing tension between Fatah and
Hamas supporters, and the resulting polarization within the security forces. These
events are a continuum of the security chaos plaguing the OPT, with the price paid
by Palestinian civilians;
– Calls upon all parties to resort to dialogue and the rule of law;
– Calls upon the Attorney-General to seriously investigate these events, and to bring
the perpetrators to justice;
– Calls upon the Palestinian National Authority to unite security services under one
institutional framework, and to issue clear instructions on the use of firearms and
using fire by security forces; and
– Calls upon all parties to keep all forms of militancy clear of civilian areas, and to
keep civilians and their homes and properties out of any armed confrontation.
99
President Assad's Interview with Spanish El Pais Newspaper, Sunday, October
01 [2006], Damascus, ([as transmitted by] SANA–Syrian News Agency): President
Bashar al-Assad summarized in an interview with the Spanish best selling
newspaper of El-Pais Syria's stances over the regional and international
developments, particularly after the Israeli war on Lebanon as well as several topics
regarding internal affairs. ...On the safe return of the Spanish troops participating in
the UNIFIL to their country, President Assad said that "if Spain or the other
countries commit themselves to Spain's neutral stance, and not like the stance of
the Germans who said they have come to protect Israel. These forces should not
come to be part of the Lebanese problem. This means that if a later resolution is
issued by the UN Security Council under the 7th Article, then these forces would
become part of the problem." … President Assad pointed out to Syria's cooperation
with the issues of the existence of technical equipment to supervise the borders as
proposed by UN chief Kofi Annan and the Italians. He indicated that these
procedures are all "time wasting as they are an escape from the big solution." His
Excellency added that "experience in our region over the past decades has proved
that if resistance has a public support then it can get what it wants. So time should
not be wasted in small things like this subject." The President pointed out that the
countries concerned have no choice but to have confidence in Syria "because if
there is a real desire in smuggling then neither the UN Security Council resolutions
nor all technologies or armies of the world can prevent this process. There must be
a return to the peace. "President Assad reiterated Syria's support to the resistance
as long as there is occupation to the lands, particularly that our lands are also
occupied. … His Excellency went on to say that "our stance in Syria over the
current situation in Lebanon is to encourage the Lebanese dialogue. But surely we
support the Lebanese national trends which don't accept foreign intervention." On
the situation of some arrested people in Syria, President Assad pointed out that
nobody in the past intervened with the groups that continuously criticized the State
in Syria. The President indicated that "the subject is quite different as there are
groups from Lebanon which publicly and officially called on the US to occupy
Damascus and strike Syria, and these according to the Syrian law have become in
the enemy line, and any person or state that calls for occupying your country is an
enemy. These groups have dealt directly with these forces and there was an official
meeting and direct coordination with them, and this according to the law
immediately leads to prison because it's a dealing with an enemy." His Excellency
pointed out that the number of those are more than 200, ten of them who were
considered as responsible were detained, and then with the investigations six were
released. "The trail proceedings are continuous as any other trial. There are
lawyers and other persons may be released. We don't intervene in the case as it
has nothing to do with the opinion or something like that. It's rather a case of
relations with somebody who is considered an enemy." On the existing situation
between Syria and Israel, President Assad said "the problem is linked to two sides
not one side. This situation is linked to one thing which is peace or maybe war if
there is no peace process."
100
PM [Ehud Olmert] to Post: I had no illusions about this job, in “Jerusalem Post”
28.09. 2006: Considering that he led the country into a war most Israelis don't think
they won, that his polling numbers are abysmal, that realignment – the raison d'être
of his party – has been shelved, that opposition to him is mounting inside Kadima,
and that the State Comptroller is breathing down his neck, Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert doesn't look or sound particularly beleaguered.
There are no deep circles around his eyes, no new noticeable furrows in his brow,
no contrition in his voice, nor newfound humility in his demeanor. Olmert, during an
hour-long interview with The Jerusalem Post this week, remained quintessentially
Olmert: sure of himself, combative, articulate and ever ambitious.
"I am ready for this job," he said after suffering through what by most objective
criteria could only be described as a nightmarish first summer in office. "I still feel
I'm ready for this job, and I'm prepared to deal with all the difficulties, challenges
and complexities that are part of it."
While his legions of critics may doubt that last statement, they have not succeeded
in chinking the man's self-confidence. Sitting behind his desk at the Prime
Minister's Office in Jerusalem, a sign "The Buck Stops Here" resting on one of his
bookshelves, Olmert has ready answers for all the questions about his
management of the war.
No, the campaign could not have been stopped earlier. Yes, Israel proved to the
Arab world its strategic capabilities. No, the final, controversial ground offensive
that killed 33 soldiers was not ill-conceived.
Like all leaders during these types of interviews, Olmert came prepared with a
determination to get across certain messages, regardless of the questions. One
was that former chief of general staff Moshe Ya'alon is a jerk; another was that US
President George W. Bush is a great guy.
Ya'alon is the subject of Olmert's wrath because of recent comments he made
calling for the prime minister's resignation, and saying that the decision to launch
the final ground offensive was for purposes of "spin." And Bush is the object of
Olmert's admiration because of his unstinting support and his anticipated courage,
of which Olmert will entertain no doubt, in stopping Iran's nuclear drive one way or
another.
While Olmert's predecessor, Ariel Sharon, used to come to interviews such as
these with notes containing messages he wanted to convey, Olmert's desk
contained no such visible cues – except for one: There was a sheet of paper sitting
just to his left that had a few phrases printed on it. When discussing Bush, Olmert
glanced at the paper, picked up a pen and jotted down what looked like a check
mark. This was one key message the prime minister obviously wanted to get
across, but there were others. The following are excerpts from the interview:
Did you know, when this conflict began in Lebanon, that Israel had no defensive
answer to the short-range Katyushas?
I knew very well that as of yet there is no technology that can stop short-range
missiles. It was obvious. I said in the cabinet on July 12 that Israel was going to
have to bear the shooting of missiles on its townships across the northern part of
the country. I want to raise this issue: What happened to all of you guys who so
enthusiastically joined in the decision to respond [to the Hizbullah attack] on July
12, knowing precisely what I knew – that there was not yet a technological response
that could shoot down short-range missiles or rockets? It was well known. So how
come everyone who was so enthusiastically in favor of the response that we made,
suddenly, retroactively, started to question the wisdom of that decision?
Initially, there was the sense that Israel was reasserting its deterrent capability,
hitting back. It was what happened next, the feeling that Israel should either have
stopped after the initial response, or used ground forces to stop the Katyushas, that
dimmed enthusiasm.
Normally, when I ask a question, I also intend to answer it.
My apologies. Please...
No, go ahead... We were also all told by the chief of staff that the war could be won
from the air, so there was a feeling that there was nothing we didn't have a
response to. I can't speak now for anyone else. We are in a very delicate situation
right now because there is an inquiry... But I said from day one, and all the way
through, that the purpose was not to destroy Hizbullah. The purpose was not to
destroy every launcher. The ambition was not to catch every Hizbullah fighter. The
purpose was to impose a new order on Lebanon that would remove to a large
degree... the threat to the state of Israel that was built up over the last 6 or 7 years
to an intolerable degree. I never said we would destroy Hizbullah. What I said was
that we had to create a new order on the basis of implementation of [UN Security
Council resolution] 1559, and the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south of
Lebanon, and so on. How to do it? Not by catching every launcher... Just think. If
we had started a large-scale ground operation from day one and reached the Litani
– forget about the price – the Katyushas would still have continued. There were
launchers to the north of the Litani. Had we gone north of the Litani on the ground
and reached the Awali, again regardless of the cost, there would still have been
Katyushas. There were launchers beyond the Awali and beyond the Zaharani. The
purpose was to act in a subtle, sophisticated and smart manner, to combine military
power with political leverage, to impose a new order. And that's precisely what we
did. This is the first time in a war between Israel and Arabs that we have done so;
that a war ends up not with a cease-fire imposed on us, against us, but with a
cease-fire imposed by us to suit our political interest. This is what happened with [a
vote of] 15-0 at the UN Security Council, without one word of criticism on Israel
after fighting for 33 days against a Muslim society, when a large part of the world
complained that Israel was destroying all of Lebanon, and that this was
disproportionate and what not... I think this was a very smart, subtle and
sophisticated use – proportionally – of the military power together with the political
power to achieve what we set forth to achieve... [including] a change in the entire
political make-up in Lebanon, which is on the way, and a change in the posture of
moderate Arab countries against the Shi'ites in Lebanon, which is an outcome of
this war... Of course there were failures and mistakes and errors of judgement. I
don't want to argue about this. But in all the wars – the Six Day War, the Yom
Kippur War, the Lebanon War – there were accidents and mistakes and failures in
specific places. But altogether there was never a war that so successfully
implemented the political objectives that were set out in advance.
Yet Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah is now an icon, an idol, in the Arab world.
Aren't you concerned by this?
I am concerned. There is no question that the Shi'ite community sympathizes with
Nasrallah. This is something we will have to deal with. But to summarize [and draw
conclusions] – as some do – about the overall impact of the war by looking at only
one aspect of it, and ignoring the others, is a terrible mistake. For instance, when
one talks about Israel's deterrence vis-a-vis the Arab countries, don't be misled by
the rhetoric of Hizbullah for the sake of petty arguments. Is [what happened in the
fighting at the southern Lebanon villages] Maroun a-Ras and Bint Jbail going to be
the criterion by which the threat that Israel [can constitute] to an Arab country is
going to be measured? Or is it going to be the power [displayed by] the IAF to hit
every target, to the right millimeter, at the right time, everywhere we wanted? That
is what slightly scares the other countries watching the war. The wars that we are
going to be able to fight, or forced to fight in the future, won't be the wars of Maroun
a-Ras and Bint Jbail, but rather the strategic wars that depend very much on the
accuracy, efficiency and power of Israel's strategic arm and technology. And that
was very well manifested during the war.
You don't share the concern that we were harmed [not only directly, but in terms of
enemy perception of Israel's capabilities] by not being able to stop the short-range
rockets for a month? That a quarter of the population was in bomb shelters, that we
have Kassams in Gaza and attempts to bring rockets into the West Bank?
Everyone understands that this is something that has to be dealt with, and it will be
dealt with. We will find a technological answer, and once a technological answer is
found, we will be done with it. So it is just a matter of time. It is true that in the
meantime it is a major nuisance, but it is not a strategic threat to the state of Israel.
What we did to the long-range missiles is of much greater significance in terms of
[perceptions of] the degree of threat that the Arabs feel they can impose on Israel.
Their perception, rightly or wrongly, is that they can defeat Israel. Isn't that a
strategic threat?
Can't we link Syrian President Bashar Assad's recent comments about going to war
with Israel – comments unthinkable a few years ago – to his perception of what
happened in Lebanon?
I have a different perception of what their view is of Israel, based on [my]
knowledge, from what I read and see. Unfortunately [the sense that Israel's
enemies think it can be defeated] is one of the most damaging perceptions, and it
was generated entirely, completely, wholeheartedly here, not there – only because
of political considerations, only because of a total lack of proportion. These
perceptions are created here, and they are spread from here to the outside. But last
Friday you had 800,000 Shi'ites praising Nasrallah – there – calling the war a
"divine victory." You can produce eight million Shiites all over the Muslim world who
hate and want to liquidate the state of Israel. What is new about it?
You talked about Bashar Assad. Why is it that Bashar Assad did not make use of
the very unique circumstances during the war and attack the state of Israel? Why
was he afraid to do it?
Maybe he knew something that some of those who are so enjoying the selfcriticisms here ignore, and this is that if he were to start something, the response to
Syria would not be measured by the number of direct confrontations like Bint Jbail
and Maroun a-Ras, but in entirely different ways. And this was a risk he didn't want
to take. We passed messages to Syria that we are not interested in attacking it, and
we suggested that it not be tempted to do anything that it would live to regret... We
respect Syria, and we respect its president, and we made clear that we had no
intention of fighting it, and we hoped that it would not be tempted to fight us. And it
didn't.
You were quite new as prime minister when this conflict erupted. Were the
decision-making forums as they should be, or is there too little interaction between
the top political and military hierarchy? The former head of the National Security
Council [NSC], Giora Eiland, is adamant that the prime minister needs a staff of his
own, so that he doesn't have to say "yes" or "no" to the army, but has a range of
options, better understands those options, and has his own people check the
options that are being presented. Do you feel you are ill equipped, or underequipped to deal with the types of decisions that have to be made?
In principle, all the prime ministers of Israel were ill-equipped with the staff-work
that is necessary for every prime minister to be able to weigh the different options
and make decisions on that basis. From day one I said I wanted to strengthen the
NSC and create an entirely different basis for its daily operation. That's why I said to
move the NSC from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. And that is what I am doing. It is starting
to move back to Jerusalem. The NSC needs to be close to the prime minister, to
prepare and analyze the options for the prime minister... I made three basic
decisions during the war. One was the decision to respond on July 12 in a manner
that almost inevitably guaranteed that there would be a comprehensive
confrontation between us and Hizbullah. The second was to understand that there
must be an exit through a mechanism that had to be created by the international
bodies. Some people say we could have finished [the conflict] after the G-8
declaration [on the first weekend]. Exactly how? Let's suppose that after the G-8
resolution, we had said, "We will stop tomorrow." What would happen? We would
move out. Would there be a mechanism to take over? Would the Lebanese army
come to the South? ...
What about an international force? And what about control over the borders, and
above all, the rearmament of Hizbullah?
You had to create a mechanism through some international bodies. All those
arguments that [the war] could have been finished here or there – only show the
critics' lack of experience and understanding. The third decision was to instruct the
army to move forward on [the war's final] Friday, when it turned out there was not
an acceptable [text for the] resolution [being submitted to the UN Security Council].
How did that original resolution differ from the one that was finally produced?
[There were] four major issues. One was about a supposedly minor, but for me a
fundamental, issue of moral proportions. The statement about the [need to return
the] abducted soldiers was in the same sentence as the desire to settle the issue of
the Lebanese prisoners [held by Israel]. Can you imagine? Here are two soldiers
who were abducted through a violation of the territorial integrity of the state of
Israel, which is recognized by the UN, with eight soldiers killed, and an attack on
Israeli settlements all across the north. And at least one of these [Lebanese
prisoners, Samir Kuntar] killed Israeli kids with his own hands. I saw [the text] and
exploded with rage. How could anyone combine these two issues? It was not just a
technical issue, it was something that was fundamental for any future dealings that
we might have on similar issues.
You won't release Samir Kuntar?
I don't want to go into that at this point. I don't want to say anything about the
possible negotiations. To link Samir Kuntar and [abducted soldiers] Eldad Regev
and Udi Goldwasser on the same basis was morally totally unacceptable. Even if
this had been the only [objection], I would not have accepted the resolution. Another
issue was the Shaba [farms territorial dispute]. It turned out [in the final text] exactly
as I wanted – that Shaba is an issue between Syria and Lebanon. I said before the
war, when I met with Bush, and with Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac and the others,
that I was ready to discuss the Shaba issue if Lebanon wanted to discuss it with
me. Let them implement 1559, deploy the Lebanese army in the South, and then,
according to 1559, I'll be ready to pull out from Shaba. But they will first have to
pass a resolution in the United Nations that Shaba is Lebanese [territory], and not
Syrian, because under the present ruling it is Syrian. This is what I was ready to say
during the war. On Friday morning what I got was something different, and a
footnote saying that within 30 days the Secretary-General has to take an action that
would resolve this issue, which meant that we would essentially be punished, to
"pay" with Sheba, now that they had started a war, over an issue that we were
ready to resolve before the war. I couldn't tolerate that. Nobody in Israel would have
tolerated that. Also, the definition of the powers of the international force was
entirely different. And the definition of the embargo was entirely different. In other
words, it was an entirely different resolution. Even 1701 is not good enough for
some people. People ask, "How could you stop the war on the basis of 1701?" This
[earlier text] was worse. It was clear to me on the basis of the draft, Friday morning,
there was no way that I could stop the war. At that point there was no way I could
not instruct the army to expand the operation... I still waited until the last minute,
until I could check with the Americans. But as it turned out, it was Friday noon [in
Israel], and in America it was 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning. Only at 5 could we get
hold of those with whom we changed the resolution. But I already had to give
instructions to the army... I have good reason to believe that only because of the
expansion of this operation was the resolution changed.
Was this a bluff, or if the final wording had not been amended to your taste, would
you have expanded the ground operation and gone further north, doing all the
things you had wanted to avoid?
At this point, it is not important. The resolution was [ultimately] acceptable, and I
could end it. But I had started a genuine operation, and that's why we couldn't stop
it on the spot at 3 a.m., at the time the resolution was adopted, because at that time
we didn't have any guarantee whatsoever that Hizbullah would not continue to fight.
They said they would continue to fight, and Nasrallah appeared on Monday and
threatened that until the last Israeli soldier was pulled out of Lebanon, they would
continue to fight. I had to give the army the time framework to allow them to move
into positions that were defensible, in the event that Hizbullah would continue to
fight. I must say that when I heard the stupid words of General "Bogie" Ya'alon, I
couldn't believe my ears. If you want to attack me because of some political
consideration, so be it. But to say about your own colleagues in the army, the
people you served with until a year ago, that they were ready to sacrifice lives for a
corrupt spin? To be able to say this not knowing what really took place, and then to
lie and spread the word that he met with me during the war in order to kind of argue
that it could have been done a different way had I listened to his advice... He never
met with me. He asked to see me and I refused, because I didn't think it was
appropriate to meet with the former chief of staff, who was in a very delicate
relationship with the current chief of staff, in the middle of a war. He met with my
military secretary, whom he has known for years. My military secretary... never
gave me a full report of what they talked about, only saying that what "Bogie" said
was entirely irrelevant to the situation. So for him to go to that degree was very
extreme.
How comfortable are you with what is taking shape now in southern Lebanon?
UNIFIL commander Alain Pellegrini told the Post a few days ago that his force is
not going to initiate action against Hizbullah – that if Hizbullah gunmen are on the
way to an attack, UNIFIL would consult first with the Lebanese army to see if it
needed help. Kofi Annan has said he is not sure the UN will take action [to stop
Hizbullah rearming via] the border [with Syria]. We've heard a European foreign
minister saying that the international force is there to help the Lebanese army
deploy in the South, and then get out as quickly as possible...
There are many, many people saying many things. The situation on the ground is
different. There is not one single Hizbullah [gunman] who is ready to surface with a
gun or fight against the Israeli soldiers still there... It is a slow process, and
sometimes some of the UNIFIL people – Pellegrini and others – because of all
kinds of complex political considerations, prefer not to announce publicly [things]
that might irritate some [people]. But at the same time, when you look at what is
going on, the reality is that you don't see Hizbullah anywhere.
A slow process that will end with Hizbullah where?
Hizbullah will cease to play the same role it used to play. The rearmament of
Hizbullah will be entirely different from what it expected. It will never have the same
[capability] – heavy weapons that can be a real, genuine threat, a strategic arm of
the Iranians. The sentiment of the people of Lebanon – not the Shi'ite community,
but the rest – is entirely against Hizbullah. I think [the war] has started a process
that will change the nature of politics in Lebanon, and will also change the nature of
the role Hizbullah will play. It has diminished the significance of Hizbullah as a
strategic arm of Iran. And it will certainly help quiet down the south part of Lebanon
as a major source that can trigger violent confrontations between Israel and
Lebanon. Perhaps the key disconnect between what we're asking and what you're
saying is how you interpret the short-range Katyushas, which you insist should not
be perceived as a strategic threat, even though a quarter of the country was forced
into bomb shelters or forced to flee, and even though we are vulnerable on the
Gaza border, and who knows what potentially... I don't say it is pleasant to be with
these Katyushas. I didn't say we like them falling on our heads. And I didn't say my
plan is to engage [militarily] with Hizbullah every year for 30 days with a million
people sitting in shelters. What I am saying is that this is something to which I think
we can and will find a solution. Had we not responded in an appropriate matter on
July 12, we would have been sleeping for another two or three years. And when we
woke up, it might have been too much for Israel to cope with. Not only with the
short-range rockets, but with much longer, stronger, deadlier, heavier missiles that
could have fallen not only on the North, but on every part of the country.
Why wasn't the military hierarchy screaming, before this conflict erupted, that we
had to find an answer to the Katyushas?
At the time of this confrontation, I was two months in power. There were many
things I didn't ask the [military establishment], and there were many thing they didn't
have a chance to tell me. Maybe [Hizbullah] wanted to challenge us because of this
timing, but thank God we were smart enough to meet the challenge in this manner,
rather than avoiding it and postponing it for another four or five years, which could
have been very dangerous for the very existence of the state.
The Americans are keen on ensuring the survival of Fouad Saniora's government in
Lebanon, but Nasrallah is threatening it. There is some talk of a civil war. Is a civil
war there in Israel's interest?
I tend to think that Nasrallah will try to avoid civil confrontation. The question is how
tough, determined and consistent the Saniora government, the international
community and the local population will be if there is a new civil order in Lebanon
and a much-reduced influence of Hizbullah. That definitely would not be against
Israel's interests. But whether it should be [achieved] through a violent confrontation
or not? I am never enamored of violent confrontations. But if there is one, I'd rather
it end up with the moderate side changing the situation, rather than surrendering to
it.
Let's move on to Iran. One or two members of your cabinet are saying that Israel
may have to reconcile to the fact of a nuclear Iran. Do you share that assessment?
No, I don't think Israel can be reconciled, nor do I intend to [reconcile] to the nuclear
capabilities in Iran.
Do you think President Bush has the capacity, as well as the stomach, to stop Iran
going nuclear?
I think President Bush has the courage. This is something that is very important.
There is no one in the world today who has greater courage, determination and a
sense of mission about these issues than President Bush, and I admire him for this.
So President Bush will stop Iran from going nuclear, one way or another?
I believe so.
We're not the only ones worried by Iranian nukes. The Saudis and the Egyptians
are also afraid. Is there going to be a time when they stand up and say, "This needs
to end," and begin pressuring Russia and China to vote for sanctions at the UN?
I don't know, but the reason I said some positive comments about Saudi Arabia is
that when you examine its performance over the last couple of months, you see
something that you haven't seen in the past: more sense of responsibility, and a
greater degree of readiness to stand up and speak up against Shi'ite extremists like
Hizbullah.
Where did you see that – at the beginning of the war? But after a week, you didn't
see it.
They stood up against Hizbullah. Don't underestimate that. Israel was fighting
against Muslims, and a Muslim country stood up against the Muslims, criticized
their actions and entirely disagreed with how they handled themselves. This is not
insignificant. And I think they are very much opposed to Syria and the statements
that were made by the Syrian president. They have also signalled their opposition to
Iran.
Now, do I want them to make all that more noticeable, more powerful, more
persuasive, more aggressive? Yes, but I also understand the constraints.
Did you meet the Saudi king?
I've said what I said. [Olmert flatly denied reports of such a meeting.] The rest is
speculation, imagination.
Are there are other regional players with whom you have had contact who give you
cause for optimism?
I am in contact with [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak all the time, and we are
also in contact with the Hashemite kingdom...
What about Qatar, for example?
What do I have to talk to the Qataris about, al-Jazeera?
What do you think about Mubarak's statements on the nuclear plants he wants to
build now?
They are talking about a civil nuclear [program].
So are the Iranians.
You know the difference. In principle, I say that every country that is ready to submit
itself to the real, genuine, effective control of the IAEA – and that you can effectively
make sure that their technologies are developing in this direction, not in the military
direction – is one thing. I tend to believe that the Egyptian statement was in this
direction. It is not similar in any form or manner to what the Iranians are trying to do.
The problem with Iran to start with are the statements of President Ahmadinejad,
who says publicly that the ultimate goal of Iran is to wipe Israel off the map. It starts
with an ideology, a philosophy that doesn't find a place on earth for the existence of
Israel. When on top of this they also develop nuclear capabilities and delivery
systems that can reach Israel and European countries, and when you hear the
statements made by Ahmadinejad, you say, "Hey, here you can't take a risk."
Does Israel have a military option vis-a-vis Iran?
Israel can't accept the possibility of Iranians having nuclear weapons, and we will
act together with the international players, starting with America, in order to prevent
it. As I also said, I believe that President Bush is absolutely determined to prevent
it, and America has the capabilities to actually prevent it.
Would you consider releasing Marwan Barghouti in the context of a deal to free
abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit?
I won't discuss any of the options that are being raised now. I think it is
irresponsible.
Was Barghouti one of those you said you were prepared to release before Shalit
was kidnapped? You said then that you were going to surprise people.
You may want to surprise people, but you don't want to startle them.
When Ariel Sharon came out with disengagement, it was a time of diplomatic
vacuum, and he wanted to stave off other initiatives...
When Sharon and Olmert came out with disengagement, if you don't mind. You hit
me all the time so much. At least give me some credit.
... Do you feel the need to come up with a new initiative, now that realignment has
gone by the wayside?
I want to deal effectively and seriously with the Palestinian agenda. We can't
escape it. If we do not deal with it, we will pay dearly. I originally thought that if and
when we find out that the road map and the principles of the international
community are not accepted by the Palestinians, and there is no partner, we would
have to think of realignment. That was my strategy. But I said all along the way that
I would first try negotiations, and first try on the basis of the road map. Now the
situation is not the same. The worst thing that can happen to any leader is to fall in
love with what he has said in the past, overlook changed circumstances and
continue to repeat what he said in the past only because he once said it. I am not
made this way. I am ready to reexamine my premises every day, and see whether
they are still applicable. The priorities have somewhat changed. We will have to
check things, and see what emerges from this reexamination. We certainly need to
deal with the Palestinian issue. And we definitely prefer [PA head] Abu Mazen over
anyone else because he is fundamentally committed to the international
community, to the road map, to the principles of the Quartet, and to the agreements
signed between Israel and the PA over the years.
But he can't deliver.
If it is true that he can't deliver, maybe the outcome of this will be that,
unfortunately, he can't be a partner. But you'd agree with me that I'd prefer those
who are ready, even if they are unable, over those who say at the outset, "We don't
want to accept any of these principles; we don't want to recognize Israel; we don't
want to make peace with Israel; we want to fight Israel forever." And the alternative
among the Palestinians today is made up largely of these guys. So even though I'm
unhappy with the performance of Abu Mazen, at least he says that he is against
terror, and wants to resolve the outstanding issues between the Palestinians and
Israel in a reasonable, restrained and peaceful manner.
You said in another recent interview that you are looking for a potential alliance on
the right – maybe the National Union. Why not bring in Zevulun Orlev as your social
affairs minister, expand the coalition in that direction?
I like Orlev, and on a personal basis we are friendlier than he is with most of his
colleagues in the National Union. But the question is what the preliminary
requirements for the National Union to join a coalition are. Is it just a welfare
minister, or is there a fundamental policy which will not be acceptable to us? My
judgement is that it will be very difficult. I'm not an enemy of the Right. I'm not an
enemy of the National Union. They are all Jews. They are all genuine Zionists, a
patriotic party. How can I be against it? It's a matter of whether or not we can
establish a basis of cooperation for handling affairs of state.
How confident are you of the solidity of your party, Kadima? The leader of the
opposition is telling people it won't make it to the next elections.
If I have to compare the solidity of my party with the solidity of the Likud, and [given]
what some Likud members are telling me about how they are trying to maneuver in
order to outsmart their own leaders, they should be worried about themselves
before they try to change the structure of Kadima.
Are you enjoying this job? Is it harder than you thought it would be?
Did I ever say I wanted to be prime minister for the joy of it? I wanted to do it
because I believe genuinely that I can do something good for the Jewish people, for
the state of Israel. I am fully aware of the enormity of this responsibility. I am
certainly aware now of how difficult it is. If I had any illusions in the past, I don't have
them anymore. It is ultimately a very lonely position. You have no one in the end but
yourself, your conscience and your God. Nothing else. Two former prime ministers
– Bibi [Netanyahu] and Ehud Barak – said to me at different times during the last
few months, "You will find out this is a very, very difficult job." And it is. But I say that
I am ready for this job. And I still feel I'm ready for this job, and I'm prepared to deal
with all the difficulties, challenges and complexities that are part of it.
In the end, what I really desire, which goes far beyond my personal status, is that
there be a little bit more compassion in Israeli society, that we not be so anxious
and enthusiastic to attack each other and punch each other in the face, that there
be greater tolerance, and more humbleness among us. I had no illusions when I
came here. I worked closely with [some previous prime ministers]. I remember the
days when Yitzhak Shamir went through difficulties and pains that were
unbelievable. I saw Arik Sharon going through these pains – loneliness and hatred
and incitement [against him]. It was heartbreaking. So I knew, when I crossed the
doorstep to this room, that I was on my own. And I am ready to take it.
101
President Abbas Addresses the United Nations General Assembly, September
21, 2006: In the name of God, the Compassionate and Merciful.
Your Excellency President of the General Assembly Sheikh Haya Rashed alKhalifa,
Your Excellency General Secretary of the UN Kofi Annan,
Your Majesties and Highness and Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Allow me first to extend my congratulations to you after you were elected to be
President of this term, wishing you all success in achieving the goals agreed upon
by all peoples in the world who believe that this international organization was born
to protect the world peace and human rights and the rights of peoples in self
determination and I can recall on this occasion the words of late US President
Woodrow Wilson who said: "There is no other place on earth where noble men and
women gather reflecting the brightest images of beauty and potential deeply rooted
in sympathy, cooperation and consultation through their efforts to achieve justice,
and alleviate suffering and lead the weak on the path of power and hope."
So, I hope that the works and results of this term will lead to encouragement of
cooperation among the peoples and nations for their joint interests and these are
the principles stipulated in the UN Charter and abiding by them is one of the basic
conditions to join this organization.
We have to point to the effective role and the good will efforts exerted by the
Secretary General of the UN in the past years to reinforce the status of our
international organization and in activating its role, including his efforts on the ArabIsraeli conflict and its core, the Palestinian cause.
President of the General Assembly,
A few weeks ago, the war in Lebanon stopped and despite the gravity of the losses
and destruction and the tragedies, the international community rushed successfully
and achieved an effective intervention and put an end to this and is working to
provide support to Lebanon and to its people and its legitimate government to
protect its security and independence and end the wars on its territories; as we
praise this international role, we do hope to see this positive and influential role
expand at the political and practical levels in order to tackle and handle the roots of
the conflict and wars witnessed in the region for long decades. I don’t need to prove
once again, after all the experiences and wars and sufferings that we passed
through, that keeping the cause of Palestine without solution and the continuous
occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories since 1967 will constitute causes
of explosion and tension and will keep the flames of the conflict alight and will open
the room in front of all forms of violence and terrorism and regional confrontations
and international crises.
It is unfortunate to see today that international plans and schemes, mainly the
roadmap plan, which gained the ratification of the UN Security Council, reached a
state of stalemate and retreat and even the call to resume negotiations is facing
obstacles and preconditions as despair and frustration increase in light of the work
of the bulldozers that are building the illegitimate settlements to change the
demographic nature of Jerusalem and as the apartheid separation wall is being
built inside our occupied territories and within its various parts while the horrible
siege continues through military checkpoints that transformed our cities and
districts into cantons, and as the wave of killings and assassinations continues
leading to the death of hundreds of citizens, and the home demolition and as arrest
campaigns continue resulting in the detention of more than 8,000 Palestinians,
including members of the parliament and government, and some of those
Palestinians have spent more than three decades in prison, and their families and
people are waiting for their release to enjoy their freedom.
I have the right to ask under these conditions, how can the international community
expect to see reduction or retreat of extremism or to see a decrease in waves of
violence? How can we and all forces of moderation and peace in the region
intervene and convince the public opinion in our country that there is still hope in the
horizon and that choosing the path of dialogue and negotiations and clinging to
international legitimate is the strategic option and path, which we call for and which
we will never give, can lead to any real success?
I, who is living amidst this tragedy, am not the only person who should give the
answer to this big question. The international community and the influential
international forces are invited to provide concrete evidence that they will support
the unconditional resumption of negotiations and that they will offer a successful
international umbrella to these negotiations to reinforce them and make them
successful and to work on halting the settlements and the collective punishment
measures and the separation wall so that we can achieve a positive atmosphere
towards launching the negotiations to reach the aspired destination which is to
achieve a just peace based on the two state solution as called for by President
George Bush.
This solution must be based on international legitimacy which was the basis of the
Arab Peace Initiative through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state
on the borders of June 4, 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital and to reach a
just and agreed upon solution to the cause of the refugees, who constitute more
than half of the Palestinian population, according to Resolution 194.
We have heard from the government of Israel recently that it will give up the policy
of unilateral steps; this is encouraging on condition that the alternative to this should
not be the stalemate and continuation of the policy of imposing the status quo, but
the alternative should be to return to the negotiations table and reach a
comprehensive solution to all issues of the final status in a manner that guarantees
a secure future for our children and their children.
Recently, I exerted efforts with all colors of the Palestinian political spectrum to
establish a national unity government that responds and meets with the Arab and
international legitimacy and that works in harmony with the principles set by the
international Quartet Committee, and based on our commitment to these criteria, I
would like to affirm the following: any Palestinian future government will abide by
the past commitments of the PLO and the PNA in terms of agreements, especially
the letters of mutual recognition dated on September 9, 1993, between the two late
big figures Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin. These two letters include mutual
recognition between Israel and the PLO and denounce violence and adopt
negotiations as a means to achieve a permanent solution based on the
establishment of the independent state of Palestine next to the state of Israel.
Any coming government shall abide by the necessity to impose security and order
and end the phenomena of several militias and end eth security chaos and abide by
the rule of the law because this is a Palestinian national need in the first place.
The efforts we exerted came to establish national unity with real content to achieve
a Palestinian national consensus around our national goals which match with the
international legitimacy and the Arab Peace Initiative and on the peaceful means to
achieve those goals, and when such a consensus is achieved and when a new
national unity government is established, one has to view this as a substantial
achievement and not a step backward or retreat from the approach that we have
always clung to and that we have insisted on all the time under the worst conditions.
I would like to affirm that the negotiations with Israel have always been and will
remain an affair and a responsibility of the PLO which I head and I will present all
the results coming from those negotiations to the Palestinian National Council
which represents the highest Palestinian national authority or to a national
referendum.
What we have achieved so far should be adequate to lift the oppressive siege
imposed on our people and which has caused major and grave damage to our
society, its standard of living and its means of growth and progress.
I came here carrying the wounds of people bleeding every day, a people who are
seeking to live a normal life where the children can go to their schools feeling
secure and where there are children who were born to live and to die, and young
men who want to look for decent work to provide them with a dignified path to move
securely into the future and to be partners in formulating and designing their history
and not victims of the barbarism of history and women who bring birth to their
babies in hospitals and not at the occupation checkpoints and families that could
gather in the evenings to dream about a new day free of killing, prison or arrest.
To put it very simply, I want tomorrow to be better than today. I want for my
homeland Palestine to be a homeland and not a prison, an independent homeland
like all peoples in the world and I want Jerusalem to become the meeting point for
dialogue of all prophets and a state for two countries living side by side in peace
and equality.
Late President Yasser Arafat said on this same podium his famous appeal 32 years
ago: "Don’t make the olive branch fall from my hand", and here I repeat the same
appeal: Don’t make the olive branch fall from my hand, Don’t make the olive branch
fall from my hand. Peace be upon you.
102
Quartet Statement, New York, September 20, 2006: Quartet principals – United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,
Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
High Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and
European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner – met
today in New York to discuss developments in the Middle East since their last
meeting May 9.
Taking stock of recent developments in the region, the Quartet stressed the urgent
need to make progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the
Middle East. The Quartet expressed its concern at the grave crisis in Gaza and the
continued stalemate between Israel and the Palestinians.
The Quartet welcomed the efforts of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to form
a government of national unity, in the hope that the platform of such a government
would reflect Quartet principles and allow for early engagement.
The Quartet underlined the urgent need for the parties to implement fully all aspects
of the Agreement on Movement and Access. Accordingly, Rafah and all other
passages should remain open consistent with relevant agreements.
The Quartet encouraged greater donor support to meet the needs of the
Palestinian people, with a particular emphasis on security sector reform,
reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, and economic development. The Quartet
commended the efforts of the World Bank and the European Union to facilitate
needs-based assistance directly to the Palestinian people via the Temporary
International Mechanism endorsed by the Quartet on June 17. Mindful of the
continuing needs of the Palestinian people, the Quartet endorsed the continuation
and expansion of the Temporary International Mechanism for a three month period,
and agreed to again review the need for such a mechanism at the end of that
period.
The Quartet noted that the resumption of transfers of tax and customs revenues
collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinian Authority would have a significant
impact on the Palestinian economy. The Quartet encouraged Israel and the
Palestinian Authority to consider resumption of such transfers via the Temporary
International Mechanism to improve the economic and humanitarian conditions in
the West Bank and Gaza.
The Quartet welcomed the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
to request Mr. James D. Wolfensohn to report on the situation on the ground.
The Quartet reaffirmed its commitment to the roadmap as the means to realize the
goal of two democratic states – Israel and Palestine – living side by side in peace
and security. The Quartet stressed the need for a credible political process in order
to make progress towards a two-state solution through dialogue and parallel
implementation of obligations. In this context, the Quartet welcomed the prospect of
a meeting between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas in
the near future. The Quartet agreed to meet on a regular basis in the coming period
at both the Principals and Envoys level, including with the parties and other regional
partners to monitor developments and actions taken by the parties and to discuss
the way ahead.
103
President Bush Meets President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, Waldorf
Astoria, New York, N.Y., September 20,2006:
President Bush: Mr. President, thank you for coming. Yesterday in my speech to
the United Nations, I said, that you’re a man of peace who believes in a two-state
solution. And after our conversation today, once again you confirmed that. I, too,
believe that the best way to bring peace to the Holy Land is for two democratic
states living side-by-side in peace. I said in my speech yesterday that the
Palestinian state must have territorial contiguity. I firmly believe that. I also said in
my speech that the one of the great objectives of my administration is to achieve
this vision. I fully understand that in order to achieve this vision, there must be
leaders willing to speak out and act on behalf of people who yearn for peace, and
you are such a leader, Mr. President. I can’t thank you enough for the courage you
have shown. I assure you that our government wants to work with you in order – so
that you’re able – capable of delivering the vision that so many Palestinians long
for, and that is a society in which they can raise their children in peace and hope.
And I know that society is possible. And I appreciate your vision along those lines.
So, welcome to Washington, D.C. [e.g. New York] I think this is our fifth visit. Every
time, I’ve left our visits inspired by your vision.
President Abbas (as translated): Mr. President, thank you very much. I’m honoured
to meet with you, as you said, for the fifth time during these past years. First of all, I
would like to thank your greatly for the wonderful speech that you have delivered
yesterday before the United Nations, and talk about the Palestinian issues and your
vision of two states, and you adopt this vision. Mr. President, you are the first
American president to adopt the vision of two states living side-by-side. Of course,
I’ve talked with the President about the situation in the Palestinian Territories, and
the difficulties that the Palestinian people are facing, as well as the possible solution
that can get us out of these difficulties. And I mentioned to the President that more
than 70 percent of the Palestinian population, they believe in that two-state solution,
a state of Palestine and a state of Israel, living in peace and security next to each
other. That means that the Palestinian people desire peace, and there is no power
on earth that can prevent the Palestinian people from moving toward the peaceful
solution, and living and coexisting in peace. Of course, we look forward to activate
the various plans and various resolutions and the road map in order to be in a
position to reach with our neighbors the desired objectives. We always, Mr.
President – we look forward to our support and your help and your aid, because we
are in dire need for your help and support. Mr. President, we will always be faithful
and truthful to peace, and we will not disappoint you.
President Bush: Thank you, sir. Thank you very much.
Quelle: White House press release.
104
Communiqué der israelischen Regierung vom 17.09.2006:
A. Der Ministerpräsident und der Verteidigungsminister werden mit der Berufung
einer Regierungs-Untersuchungskommission, in Einklang mit Artikel 8A des
Gesetzes zur Regierung aus dem Jahr 2001, betraut (nachstehend: die
Kommission).
B. Die Zusammensetzung der Kommission ist wie folgt:
Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, Richter a.D. (Vorsitzender)
Prof. Ruth Gavison [Hebräische Universität, Jerusalem]
Menachem Einan (Generalmajor a.D.)
Dr. Haim Nadel (Generalmajor a.D.)
C. Die Kommission wird eine Bandbreite von Aspekten hinsichtlich des politischen
Echelons und des Sicherheitsapparates während der Operation im Norden, die am
12. Juli 2006 begann, untersuchen und Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen
weiterleiten. Die folgenden Angelegenheiten werden untersucht:
Das politische System:
Die Kommission wird das Vorgehen des politischen Echelons hinsichtlich dessen
Führung der Kampagne im Norden von einem politischen, militärischen und zivilen
Standpunkt aus untersuchen und Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerungen beschließen.
Die Kommission wird außerdem den Grad der Bereitschaft und Vorbereitung des
politischen Echelons hin zu den Kämpfen mit der Hisbollah und den entstandenen
Bedrohungsszenarien durch die Stationierung der Hisbollah entlang der
Nordgrenze betrachten, wenn die Kommission dies für notwendig erachtet.
Der Sicherheitsapparat:
Die Kommission wird die Bereitschaft und das Management der
Sicherheitsapparate bezüglich der Kampagne im Norden in folgenden Bereichen
untersuchen und Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerungen beschließen:
– Bereitschaft und Vorbereitung des Sicherheitsapparates vis-a-vis der Bedrohung
vom Libanon ausgehend: inklusive der Bereitschaft der Nachrichtendienste,
Truppenaufbau und der Vorbereitung hinsichtlich verschiedener
Bedrohungsszenarien.
– Handhabung der Kämpfe, die Führung der Truppen inklusive der Zivilverteidigung
sowie das Nachschub- und Logistik-System während der Kämpfe inklusive des
Entscheidungsprozesses von der Entführung der Soldaten am 12. Juli bis hin zum
Beginn der Waffenruhe am 14. August 2006.
D. Die Kommission wird ihre Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerungen sowie
Empfehlungen hinsichtlich der Verbesserung der zukünftigen
Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse des politischen Echelons und des
Sicherheitsapparates präsentieren.
E. Aufgrund der unerlässlichen Bedeutung für eine umgehende Bereitschaft und
verfrühter Schlussfolgerungen über die existierenden Bedrohungsszenarien, denen
sich der Staat Israel ausgesetzt sieht, wird die Kommission gebeten, ihre Berichte
so schnell wie möglich anzufertigen. Wenn von der Kommission gewünscht, kann
diese vorläufige Berichte und Teilberichte veröffentlichen, wenn die
Implementierung von deren Empfehlungen und Schlussfolgerungen als besonders
wichtig erachtet werden.
F. Die Kommission wird ihre (Teil-)Berichte dem Ministerpräsidenten und dem
Verteidigungsminister übergeben, die diese dem Kabinett vorlegen werden. Die
(Teil-)Berichte werden öffentlich publiziert; die Kommission wird Instruktionen
hinsichtlich der Publizierung, im Einklang mit den Prinzipien des Gesetzes für
Untersuchungskommissionen von 1968, beschließen.
G. Die Kommission wird über die Tagespunkte der Untersuchungsgegenstände
entscheiden. Die Treffen der Kommission werden je nach Beschlusslage öffentlich
oder geschlossen abgehalten. Es wird keine öffentlichen Aussprachen geben, falls
dies die Sicherheit des Landes, seine internationalen Beziehungen oder andere
Gründe riskiert.
H. Nach Abschluss der Arbeit wird die Kommission die Protokolle der Diskussionen
und anderes Material dem Staatsarchiv anvertrauen.
I. Wenn von der Kommission angefordert, müssen der Ministerpräsident, die
Mitglieder der Regierung, Staatsangestellte, das Personal der Armee sowie aller
anderen Bereiche des Sicherheitsapparates zur Zeugenaussage zur Verfügung
stehen sowie alle Informationen und Dokumente präsentieren, die von der
Kommission erfragt werden.
J. Die Kommission kann Personal zur Assistenz engagieren, das qualifiziert ist, das
Material zu sammeln, welches für die Arbeit des Ausschusses notwendig ist.
K. Das Finanzministerium wird der Kommission einen Haushalt zur Verfügung
stellen, um entsprechend der Notwendigkeit, Assistenten anstellen zu können.
Zusätzlich werden die Büros des Ministerpräsidenten und des Kabinettssekretärs
alle Mittel zur Verfügung stellen, damit der Ausschuss seine Arbeit durchführen
kann.
L. Zur Bestätigung, im Einklang mit dem Artikel 8A des Gesetzes zur Regierung
von 2001, wird die Kommission, durch Beschluss des Justizministers, jegliche
Autorität einer Untersuchungskommission besitzen, so wie im Gesetz zur
Untersuchungskommission von 1968 in den Artikeln 9 bis 11 und 27B festgelegt.
Quelle: Botschaft des Staates Israel in Berlin.
105
Jordan King Abdullah II's interview with Al Hayat
September 16, 2006:
Q. There are growing fears of a breakout of civil war in Iraq. Do you share this fear
and does Jordan anticipate such an eventuality?
King: We are concerned at what is happening in Iraq, particularly as we see
continuing violence take sectarian form at times. But at the same time, I count on
the awareness of the Iraqi people and their realization of the dangers threatening
the country. I also appreciate the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's keenness on
unity and the territorial integrity of Iraq. I have recently met Maliki in Jordan and
could see his keenness on Iraq's unity. He has a program to escape the cycle of
violence in the country. We are all invited to support his program and make it
succeed for the future of Iraq and the future of the region. All the Arabs are also
called upon to support Iraq and stand by it and not allow anyone to interfere in its
affairs. Let us leave Iraq for the Iraqis to decide their future. I have, on many
occasions, warned about the repercussions of the deterioration of Iraq's security
situation, which is increasing day by day. This stands in the way of any serious
effort to save Iraq from the disturbances, violence, blind fighting and a plunge to
civil war that would consume all and its effects, God forbid, would destabilize the
entire region. We in Jordan, as a neighboring country with historic brotherly ties with
the Iraqi people, are naturally the first to be affected by what happens there, and it
is in our interest that Iraqis succeed in their efforts to establish a secure, united,
sovereign and independent Iraq.
Q. You will be participating in the UN General Assembly meetings. Are you carrying
a Jordanian or an Arab proposal to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict?
King: We do not carry a Jordanian proposal, but there are some ideas that were
agreed in coordination with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and some other Arab states
and Palestinian President Abu Mazen to revive the peace process based on
international resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative as well as the Road Map.
Q. The aggression on Lebanon undermined confidence in peace negotiations.
What are the steps to return to the peace process?
King: A peace that secures the rights of all parties and ensures the establishment
of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian soil is a peace that will last and
be protected and preserved by future generations. But an incomplete peace that
does not restore rights to the Palestinian people will remain fragile and unstable.
We have tried several initiatives since Oslo but these initiatives were incomplete
and soon collapsed, returning things to square one. The peace has to be based on
international resolutions as stipulated in the Arab Peace Initiative endorsed in Beirut
in 2002 – a return of Arab rights in exchange for security guarantees for Israel to
live in peace and security with surrounding Arab countries.
Q. Why do you feel that unilateral and piecemeal solutions do not contribute to
establishing peace?
King: Because we have seen what happened in Gaza after the Israeli unilateral
withdrawal and we have seen what happened in Lebanon from which Israel
withdrew in 2000 only to return. The only lasting peace is one that all sides are
convinced of and believe in and one that follows negotiations and international
agreements. What is called unilateral peace has proven its failure in reality.
Q. For more than a year, you said that there needed to be a settlement within two
years. Has this period decreased or increased?
King: Unfortunately it has decreased and so has room for optimism. I am warning of
a bleak future for the region if there is no movement on a basis that is clear and
acceptable by all sides within the coming few weeks, to reach a solution that people
are convinced of.
Q. You said after the aggression in Lebanon that there is no military solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and that occupation breeds resistance. But Israel killed the
peace process. What is the solution?
King: The solution is through a return to peace, to the negotiating table. After the
war in Lebanon, the failure of unilateral solutions has been underscored to Israel
now, just as it has to the US and the entire world. For there is no future for Israel
unless there is a just peace that restores rights to the people. Israel cannot, and the
region cannot enjoy security unless the Palestinians enjoy stability. It is high time to
return to the root causes of the conflict and the core issue, which is the Palestinian
issue, without a just solution that restores Palestinian rights and ensures the
establishment of a viable Palestinian state on Palestinian land, people of the region
will not enjoy security and stability. I am warning that unless we start within the next
weeks and months with a comprehensive negotiating process between the
Palestinians and Israelis, resulting in the establishment of an independent and
geographically contiguous Palestinian state within a specified time, then people of
this region will have to live many more difficult years characterized by violence.
Q. There is a movement towards a Palestinian national unity government. Will this
help efforts towards negotiation and solutions?
King: We hope this step would succeed and would include enough factors for a
revival of the negotiation process. The Palestinian situation has been dire during
the past months and I am deeply concerned about its future unless there is
progress.
Q. The region is experiencing or living the Iranian nuclear file. Do you fear this file
would lead to a military confrontation?
King: We hope that there will be no military confrontation. Our region cannot endure
a new catastrophe, for which we will all pay the price. The people of the region are
fed up with war and cannot endure more violence, catastrophes and destruction.
What is required today is for the international community to seek to resolve the
Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and diplomacy. This option has to remain
open, for it is not only in the interest of Iran but also in the interest of regional and
global peace and stability. A resumption of negotiations to reach results agreeable
to all and that achieves regional security is what is needed.
Q. Some Arab parties fear what they call Iranian attempts to seize a primary role in
the region through political, military, security and financial operations. There are
those who speak of attempts to convert Sunnis into Shia. What is Your Majesty's
view?
King: It is regrettable that there are some regional powers and parties that seek to
escalate the conflict and incite fitna between Sunni and Shia. I, as a member of the
Aal al-Bayt, am very keen on Muslims wherever they may be, Sunnis and Shia, and
whoever tries to undermine the relationship the sons of the one religion is a traitor
to his religion and the Umma. Out of our concern about events in Iraq, we have
sought to bring together the Islamic scholars, Sunni and Shia, and other sects, at
the International Islamic Conference, which convened in Amman in 2005 and which
was a step towards emphasizing the commonalities between all Muslims. The
delegates endorsed the legitimacy of all eight schools of jurisprudence. We had
also released the Amman Message, through which we sought to challenge the fake
claims of extremists in the world. In the coming couple of months, we will host a
conference in Amman of the Iraqi religious leaders of all sects with the aim of
fostering Iraqi unity and reaching religious reconciliation that can pave the way for
political reconciliation. This could help put an end to violence and sectarian fighting
in Iraq and redirect the energies of the Iraqis towards building a secure and stable
country. Allow me to stress here that we are concerned about any external
interference in Iraq's affairs. And that the field has been left open for violence to
continue. Only the Iraqis themselves have the right to decide their future without
any external interference or ambitions.
Q. How do you describe Syrian-Jordanian relations today? And why haven't the
leaderships of both countries developed the close relationship that was expected by
some years ago?
King: Frankly I cannot say the relations are excellent. I have been keen since
President Bashar Assad became president to open a new page with Syria, of trust
and work in the interest of both countries because we believe in the necessity and
importance of building positive relations between Arab states. We also believe that
the success of any Arab state is a success for Jordan. But unfortunately, the
expressions of good will we've been hearing from the Syrian leadership have not
been translated on the ground. We continue to wish that Syria's important role in
fostering Arab security and stability will be preserved.
Q. There have been reports that you were seeking, at different times, to alleviate
the American-Syrian dispute. What does America want from Syria now? To change
the regime or to change its policies, particularly with regards to the alliance with
Iran?
King: I have tried time and again to ease the dispute between the US and Syria. We
used to advise the Americans to listen to the Syrian point of view and to open
diplomatic dialogue with the Syrian leadership. But after recent developments in the
region, especially after the Syria-Lebanon dispute and the assassination of Rafik
Hariri, the differences have widened and the issue has become more complicated
over the past months. We wish for Syria's well-being and progress. Any harm to
Syria, God forbid will affect us.
Q. Why did you refuse to take part in the international peacekeeping force in
Lebanon?
King: Participating in such international forces has to have the support of the Arabs.
That's why I see that the Arab League is an institution more capable of settling the
issue of committing Arab troops to international forces in Lebanon.
Q. You seek to build a united Arab strategy to face the challenges in Palestine, Iraq
and Lebanon. What are the bases of this strategy?
King: Our strategy depends on uniting the Arab position and emerging with a united
Arab vision towards the challenges we face in the region. Because we strongly
believe that without a united Arab position, that makes our voices heard, this region
will become booty for the greedy. I've said clearly lately that I fear the Arab role
would be marginalized, for the world power, if they don't find a united, clear, Arab
position, they will look for an alternative to negotiate with on our behalf. And then
we will all be sorry. That is why I have been exerting efforts over the past months to
meet with Arab leaders to formulate an Arab position that would foster our strategy
to protect the future of all the Arabs.
Q. Does this mean that the trilateral Jordanian-Saudi-Egyptian coordination is
moving towards forming a new axis in the region?
King: Jordan is farthest from the axis policy. Its coordination is not restricted to
Saudi Arabia or Egypt but includes other Arab states. We have worked with those
in Saudi, Egypt and some other Arab countries to formulate a united Arab position
to deal with the region's crises with one vision, which is the opposite of creating an
axis. Regrettably some regional powers and some Arab brothers do not like these
countries to coordinate and seek a united Arab position. They cast doubt over the
objectives of this coordination. Here, I wonder if coordinating with Egypt, Saudi,
UAE, Kuwait, Yemen and Sudan is unacceptable; is it acceptable to coordinate and
ally with other regional powers that may not have the interests of this region at
heart?
Q. In your estimation, what are the lessons learned from the aggression on
Lebanon?
King: The biggest lesson is the failure of Israeli unilateralism and the failure of
dependence on force as a solution to the regional conflict and the failure of the
policies of powerful countries that have not seriously sought to help the countries of
the Middle East find a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
[There is also] the failure of interference in Lebanon's affairs. If Israel had destroyed
villages and cities and attacked Hezbollah's infrastructure, I think this does not
ensure the emergence of another Hezbollah, perhaps in another country. The
biggest lesson we should learn from the aggression on Lebanon is that there can
be no peace and security in the region unless we return to the root causes of
conflict, which is the Palestinian issue, and work to end the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian lands and to establish the Palestinian state on Palestinian land.
Q. Are you concerned about the situation in Lebanon?
King: Very much so. You know that Lebanon is loved and respected by all
Jordanians. Throughout the past six years, I was very optimistic about Lebanon in
terms of political, economic and social development, and I considered Lebanon a
model for all Arabs in its openness and in its desire to develop and build. We in
Jordan were hoping to follow that model right here at home. The assassination of
President Rafik Hariri, God bless his soul, shocked us and had a great impact on
us all in Jordan. Then came the most recent war that set Lebanon back 30 years.
Although we are doing all that we can for the Lebanese, we always feel we are not
doing enough, for Lebanon means a lot to Jordanians and Arabs in general. We are
in contact with the Lebanese on a daily basis to inquire about more ways in which
we can help. We dispatched a field hospital and our Air Force helped re-open the
airport. We are also thinking about ways in which we can help the Lebanese private
sector and encourage Arab investment there. We are in constant touch with
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Seniora and believe it is an Arab duty to assist
Lebanon in overcoming its difficulties.
Q. Are there threats of a relapse in the implementation of Resolution 1701 and a
puncturing of the international umbrella?
King: Today, there is a strong sentiment that it is necessary to protect Lebanese
stability. It is a feeling shared by Europeans, Americans and a large number of Arab
countries. Sentiment towards what was happening in Lebanon during the first week
of the war did not reflect the magnitude of the crisis. The situation today is much
better. What I am especially concerned about is division among the Lebanese and
that political disputes move beyond the realms of political and PR campaigns,
especially since there are some who want Lebanon to remain unstable, or who
would like to undermine the steps that have been taken towards stability. These
parties must realize that we will not accept that such a dangerous game be played
in Lebanon or in the region.
Q. Do you mean interference in Lebanese affairs?
King: I believe it is time to leave Lebanon to the Lebanese, and to let them
determine their own affairs and future without interference or pressure. If this
happens, the Lebanese people, with their vivacity, will guarantee Lebanon's return
to the path of reconstruction. The interference of all parties should cease, and to
this end, we must also push Israel on the issue of Shebaa Farms. The resolution of
this issue is important to the future of the relationship between Lebanon and Syria.
We are moving in this direction, and there is a European effort, as well. The issue
of prisoners also needs follow-up. It will take time, but these issues are important. If
they are resolved, and if interference ends, Lebanon will surely rise again and the
Lebanese will be able to move forward. I am optimistic and confident that the
Lebanese people will be able to overcome the repercussions of the war.
Q. Do you think that the Hariri assassination was part of a bigger problem?
King: I believe that the Lebanese have a right to know the truth. The Arabs, too,
have a right to know. Attempts to prevent the truth from emerging are totally
counterproductive. The details of a crime of this magnitude must be revealed in the
service of the stability of Lebanon and the region. The Investigation Commission
enjoys international legitimacy, and it must focus on this terrorist crime in order to
hold accountable those involved and any accomplices they may have had. The
investigation must take its course.
Q. Do you think that some American political errors in the region bolster the position
of terrorist groups and those who sympathize with them?
King: Unfortunately this is what has happened. Since September 11, the American
reaction to the attack has contributed to the empowerment of terrorist groups. We
have warned since September 11 of the existence of those who are trying to drive a
wedge between East and West and exploit American errors in the region in the
interest of fostering hatred and division whereby margin for moderates to maneuver
has been narrowed. This is a cause of concern for all of us. The voices of
moderation have been neutralized and the region abducted in the interest of
agendas which do not want Arab unity. That is why we are demanding today that
moderation achieve tangible results; so that the moderate camp can win popular
support. Otherwise people will adopt other means to defend their rights, and these
means we all know. We've all experienced its danger and the destruction it brings.
Q. How do you see the war on terrorism moving in the world? And what are the
major challenges terrorism presents to Jordan? Are there countries seeking to
destabilize Jordan?
King: Jordan and the whole region today are in a constant state of war on terror,
especially that most victims have been Arab and Muslim. We have to solve the
problems in order that the terrorists can not use them as excuses for their criminal
actions, and which strengthen parties and individuals that stand behind and support
criminal acts. We have many challenges to deal with because if the Palestinian
issue remains unresolved and Israel continues its policy of besieging the
Palestinian people, and the killing, which breeds despair and frustration, and if the
daily killing continues in Iraq, the feelings of despair will increase and breed
extremism and terrorism. As we see today, Jordan is between a war in Palestine,
escalating violence in Iraq and regional powers working hard to destabilize the
whole region.
Q. There is much clamor among the Jordanian opposition criticizing the anti-terror
draft law as a martial law that restricts free speech and violates human rights. What
do you think?
King: Consideration of an anti-terror law emerged after Jordan was attacked twice.
The victims were innocent civilians; the hotel blasts in Amman which killed 60
people and the Aqaba incident before that. Several sectors of society demanded
the endorsement of this law. It also came about due to a national forum
representing political parties and civil society and an awareness among large
numbers of Jordanians that Jordan is facing huge challenges from terrorism due to
external factors. Jordanian legislators also found that current laws are not
sufficiently firm in dealing with terrorism. I don't think that any citizen who has
Jordan's national and security interests and the security of other citizens at heart
would oppose this move, which is meant to preserve the security of our people and
our guests. The government did not impose the anti-terror law as a temporary law,
but the law won wide acceptance among the people's representatives in parliament.
I say to those who fear for freedoms that the Jordanian constitution and other
legislation preserve their rights. But we do not want to ensure freedom for terrorists
or those who seek to threaten Jordan's security and that of its people.
Q. The shooting of tourists in central Amman. Would it lead to a more stringent
enforcement of the law? Or would it be used as a pretext to restrict public
freedoms?
King: Not at all. This incident re-emphasized citizens' opposition to terrorism. It
reflected the unity of the people once again in facing terrorism. For ordinary people
present at the Roman amphitheatre where the incident took place played a key role
in apprehending the perpetrator, which preliminary investigations show was acting
independently. There are no indications so far that another party stands behind him.
Q. The relationship of the government with the Islamist movement has been tense
lately. Especially after the visit of the four MPs to the Zarqawi mourning house. Do
you think the Muslim Brotherhood crossed the red lines in their traditional
relationship with the government?
King: There have been several signals from the Islamist movement rejecting the
move by the MPs in visiting the Zarqawi mourning house. They have emphasized
their commitment to Jordan's commitment to preserving security and rejecting
terrorism. I know very well that the majority of the Islamist movement's members
love their country and reject attempts to undermine national security. The Muslim
Brotherhood continues to have representatives in parliament and several national
institutions, and they have several platforms to work through in freedom. Our battle
is against the takfiris who find the community apostates and believe that of the
moderates in the Islamist movement. The constitution will remain the authority that
governs the government, the Islamist movement and all of us. But being
empowered by non-Jordanian parties and supporting takfiri thought at the expense
of the country are absolutely unacceptable.
Q. Does this mean you are calling for a reformulation of the relationship with the
Islamist movement?
King: The Islamist movement is a political movement like any other in the Kingdom
and the relationship has and will continue to be based on concern for immutable
national interests and will be guided by the constitution.
Q. What was meant by renewing the Jordanian passport of the head of the Hamas
politburo, Khaled Mishaal, after seven years of tense relations with the movement?
King: Khaled Mishaal sent his passport to our embassy in Doha to be renewed, just
as any Jordanian citizen would do, and he got it. This emphasizes that we have no
personal problem with this man, as much as there is a security and political one. I
would like to add here that when the war in Lebanon erupted, Khaled Mishaal sent
his family to Amman to ensure their security, and the government facilitated their
entry into Jordanian land. Once again, let me say that differences with Khaled
Mishaal were over the issue of targeting Jordan's security, and it is a difference
over policies the man follows. Nothing else.
Q. The Jordanian opposition is calling for a new elections law. But recently there
has been less talk of this law, and it has been postponed for an unspecified period.
What is preventing the law from being amended?
King: We want first to strengthen political life and look forward to the day we have
elections base on political party lists. But the obvious truth is we have a problem in
political life which is that people are reluctant to join parties, and that is probably
due to two reasons; first, fear of joining parties. This may be a result of the
experience of the 1950s and 1960s. Second, people are not convinced of the
efficacy of joining parties, especially in light of their fragmentation and redundancy
in their political programs. Today we have more than thirty parties, but the number
of members is less than one percent of the population. There is a political parties
law now before parliament. We hope it will be endorsed so we can regulate political
work and ensure the success of elections based on parties in the near future, God
willing.
Q. You have raised the slogan of internal reform and spearheaded several
initiatives. Are you satisfied with what has been achieved?
King: We are moving in the right direction. The achievements of the last seven
years have been substantial and brought about quality results at the economic,
social and political levels. I am proud of my Jordanian people and their ability to
achieve and to face challenges. Jordan, as you know, has no natural resources
except the Jordanian people themselves on whom we depend to build modern
Jordan. But despite these great achievements, I cannot say I am completely
satisfied with what has been achieved. Our ambitions for Jordan and its people are
unlimited. Challenges will not deter us from seeking to build a model Jordan and
achieve a better future for our people.
Q. Several international parties have raised the issue of extraordinary rendition of
prisoners to Jordan, where those arrested by the US are tortured during
interrogation?
King: This is untrue. There are no US detainees in Jordan at all. And Jordanian
prisons have always been open to international institutions, and there has never
been mention of such violations at detention centers.
Q. The fuel bill has become a burden on the Jordanian budget, especially after the
rise in international fuel prices. What are you doing to solve the problem?
King: Ensuring better living conditions for our people, especially those with limited
income and the poor, is one of our priorities. There are several ambitious
development projects and programs which we hope would contribute to alleviating
the effects of the fuel bill on us and would achieve our ambitions to improve the
conditions of the poor who are the most affected by the rise in prices. The support
and assistance we have received from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and
Kuwait amid the huge rise in oil prices has played a major role in alleviating the
pressures of this rise on the state's national budget, and has helped us overcome
the repercussions of that. We hope that this assistance will continue so that we can
move forward in our development programs.
Q. Does Jordan always live in the eye of regional storms?
King: Unfortunately, we live in a tough neighborhood, and being at the center of the
storm is part of our life in Jordan. There is the Palestinian question and its
implications. Many Arab-Israeli wars have occurred and we have paid the price.
Many regional crises have taken place and we have paid the price. Upheavals are
part of our lives. Unfortunately, we have become experts [smiles]. What is
important is that we never lose direction. What continues to guarantee our ability to
face these storms is the solidarity of the Jordanian people.
Q. Would you bet on the army from whose ranks Your Majesty graduated? How
would you evaluate the level of the Jordanian army today?
King: The first guarantee is the people, of which the army is part. The experiences
of the past few decades have [strengthened] solidarity in the face of danger within
the greater Jordanian family. Jordanians are strong in facing crises and do not
allow anyone to harm their homeland. This is the feeling of every Jordanian citizen
and soldier. As for my evaluation of the Jordanian army, I consider it one of the best
in the region because of its discipline, professionalism, and accumulated
experience. In addition, it enjoys great popularity among the people.
Q. In recent weeks, Jordan was the subject of several campaigns, the most recent
of which is the accusations of Ayman al-Thawahiri, the "second man" in al-Qaeda.
King: Frankly speaking, had we been silent and refrained from transparently
expressing our convictions and opinions, no one would have criticized us. Be it in
closed meetings or in public, we consider it our duty to speak our minds about the
situation in the region and about the threats that we see are staring the Arabs and
their interests in the eye. The magnitude of these threats sometimes pushes us to
call things by their name in order to underscore the urgency of the situation and of
finding a solution. Those powers that campaign against us do so because they feel
that Jordan, with its experience and expertise, is fully aware of its objective and how
to achieve it. The model of moderation that Jordan has adopted does not prevent it
from being candid and taking initiative. This also provokes some powers whose
agendas serve neither peace nor stability and development.
106
107
The Israeli Agenda for the 61st UNGA, 18 Sep 2006 Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Jerusalem:
1. The 60th General Assembly was concerned with reforms and the UN's attempt at
renewal. Indeed, a number of the reforms that the outgoing Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, tried to promote were instituted. Among other things, the Human Rights
Council was established, a Peace-Building Commission was established, and some
changes were made in the secretariat relating to the management of the
organization.
2. This year the GA will continue to work on the reforms that remain on the agenda.
Mandates that the UN has established over a period of 60 years are still being
examined, albeit very slowly, and the reform of the Security Council will be
reopened for discussion. This year the international community is marking "The
International Year of Deserts and Desertification", in which Israel is participating (an
international conference on desertification will take place in Sde Boker in November
2006). Two other issues on the GA agenda this year, prior to the opening of the
general debate: immigration and development, and the issue of Least Developed
Countries (LDC's). Israel will participate actively in these forums.
3. This year the world is awaiting Security Council action on issues such as the
serious political and humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Iran's nuclear program, conflicts
in Africa, the topic of small arms and the situation in countries with recurring
problems (such as East Timor and Haiti). Israel is particularly concerned with the
situation in Lebanon, following Security Council Resolution 1701, and the end of the
war in Lebanon. Other topics are also waiting to be dealt with by the UN; at the top
of the list is the expectation of progress in implementing the Millennium
Development Goals that were agreed upon in 2000 and that were reinforced by the
special session in 2005. And, of course, the situation in Africa: food security,
diseases such as malaria and AIDS, elementary education, access to potable
water, etc.
Israel's [General] Priorities at the 61st UNGA
4. The topics on Israel's agenda at the 61st General Assembly, which opened on 12
September, derive from the world agenda with which the GA will be dealing
(mentioned briefly above) as well as from Israel's specific interests. The main
issues are explained below:
The Northern Border
5. The war in Lebanon, which has recently ended following the adoption of Security
Council Resolution 1701, confronts the international community with new
challenges. First and foremost among them is thr implementation of the Resolution
in full. Israel will spare no diplomatic effort to see that this is done, in contrast to
resolution 1559, which was never fully implemented. This year will highlight Israel's
struggle with terrorist elements that have dominated the politics in our region and
dragged the region into war. Our activity vis-à-vis UN Member States will include
also the allaying of criticism of Israel resulting from the confrontations of the past
few months on the Lebanese front and in the Gaza Strip, especially pertaining to
the humanitarian situation in these areas. The Secretary General and his staff have
been emphasizing the subject of humanitarian damage and the severe damage
caused to the environment (Lebanese beaches as well as forests in northern
Israel), and have invited other states to take an active part in the worldwide effort to
rehabilitate Lebanon. The UN will also deal this year with encouraging states to
support the newly upgraded UNIFIL force in Lebanon (UNIFIL 2).
Integration of Israel in Western Consultation Groups
6. Israel is a full member (temporarily, for election purposes) since 2000 in the
Western European and Others Group (WEOG). Israel is elected to membership of
UN committees, organizations and agencies. This year we are participating,
representing WEOG, in the committee on drugs CND, the boards of UNEP and
Habitat, the Committee for Sustainable Development (CSD), the Committee for
Program and Coordination (CPC), and the UN Committee on NGO's. This is an
impressive accomplishment, and we fulfill our role with the utmost seriousness in
every one of these fora. Israel however is not a member of Western consultation
groups (JUSCANZ or alike) in most of the UN organizations and committees. Our
right to be an active and full participant in the work of these committees, through
informal discussions of the Western groups is still being withheld, even in
committees to which Israel has been elected to represent WEOG.
Mandate Review
7. As mentioned, the 61st GA intends to continue the process of reforms in the
United Nations. One such area for reform is the process of review of mandates set
up by the UN (the GA, the Security Council or ECOSOC) over the past 60 years, all
of which are costly and often redundant. There are several thousands of these
bodies or procedures, listed in detail in the UN internet database "Mandate
Registry". As a rule, Israel believes it is important to abolish many of these bodies,
and agrees with Western states, who are interested in furthering speedily the
process of review.
Palestinian Organs in the UN
8. Israel believes that the time is right to deal with the mandates of the Palestinian
organs in the UN, by abolishing them or merging them with other mandates or
organs in the Secretariat. There are at least four such organs that were established
by the General Assembly over the years, starting in the late 1960s and continuing
until the mid-1980s. During this period of the Cold War, the General Assembly was
misused for anti-Israeli, one-sided political purposes and set up the aforementioned
organs by means of the pro-Arab automatic majority in the GA. No other existing
people, region or conflict ever received as much attention from UN as the
Palestinian people.
9. The time and energy spent on promoting the Palestinian narrative was often at
the expense of many other topics and conflicts in the world that were more
important and cost a much higher price in blood, but which many Member States
often preferred not to deal with. In its preoccupation with the Palestinian issue, the
GA was for many years a tool of the Arab States, which profited twice over: once,
because the GA provided them with an excuse to avoid dealing with other conflicts
within the Arab and Muslim world; and a secondly since it enabled them to pay lip
service to the Palestinians through UN actions that had little cost, but brought
considerable political benefit.
10. Over the years, the GA and the Councils established 120 mandates and
procedures relating to the Palestinian issue. These should now be examined to see
if they are needed or should be abolished, as the GA is attempting to do with
hundreds of other mandates. Every year the GA renews the mandates of
Palestinian organs through the familiar annual resolutions. Israel views the
maintaining of these mandates and organs as superfluous and one-sided and as a
distorted and wasteful use of the resources of Member States against a fellow
Member State, whose narrative is neglected.
11. Israel is interested in seeing these organs abolished or transformed into
programs that will promote understanding and peace between Israelis and
Palestinians. From Israel's point of view, we will encourage the use of resources,
presently earmarked for the Palestinian organs, to directly support programs that
promote regional peace, programs that maintain balance and objectivity appropriate
to organs of the United Nations.
12. In any case, we will not agree that these organs be exempt from the review that
other organs undergo as a matter of course.
13. The following are the organs that we would like to see abolished or changed:
a. The Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR) in the Department for Political Affairs
(DPA) Budget: $5,826,700 (2006-7). This is a heavy burden on the DPA (13% of its
budget). The division has 16 posts (compared to a similar number in the
Department for Electoral Assistance). Established in 1977 by GA Resolution 32/4.
b. The mandate: "Logistical and legal aid to the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (see "b" below), organization of
meetings, operation of a website UNISPAL, production and distribution of material
etc. "Israel wishes to abolish the division and to integrate some of its employees
into the Asia and Pacific Division of the DPA.
c. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People
Budget: $61,000 (for travel expenses). The activities of the committee are financed
by the Division for Palestinian Rights (see "a" above). Established in 1975 by GA
Resolution 3375 The mandate: "To promote the exercise of the inalienable rights of
the Palestinian people, to extend aid to Palestinians and to channel international
solidarity and support, to publish reports.
Member states: Senegal (Chair), Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Cyprus, Genoa,
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Malaysia, Namibia,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine
Publications: "The Question of Palestine" – annual publication, annual committee
report, monthly schedule of events and information, tri-monthly bulletin, website
with more than 15 million pages, bi-monthly publication of Palestinian NGO's and
international organizations that aid the Palestinians, collection of maps.
Israel requests to abolish this committee that promotes the agenda of one people in
a way that is unprecedented in the UN system, presenting the Palestinian narrative
at the expense of the Israeli and Jewish narrative.
d. Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories Budget:
$227,500 (from the operations budget of the Human Rights Commission)
Established in 1968 by GA Resolution 2443. The mandate: "To examine Israel's
policies and actions in the territories, including Jerusalem, especially violations of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, and to consult the ICRC on this subject"; "to
examine the situation of Palestinian detainees and prisoners being held in Israel"
Member states: Sri Lanka (Chair), Senegal, Malaysia. Publications and method of
operation: The committee publishes an annual report. For this purpose, it meets
twice a year in Geneva and in New York and visits the Middle East for a two-week
period "to gather evidence about the human rights situation in the territories."
Israel requests that this committee be abolished. Its activities are superfluous and
are duplicated by other organs (the Fourth Committee, the raporteur on the
territories, and others).
e. Information Activities on the Question of Palestine in the Department for Public
Information, Budget: $604,600 (for traveling expenses of journalists) Established in
1983 by GA Resolution 38/58E. The mandate: "To raise the consciousness of the
international community regarding the Question of Palestine, to advertise the
actions of the UN on this subject, to publish updates, pamphlets, videos, to send
delegations to investigate the situation in the territories, to organize seminars and to
help the Palestinians in the realm of the media."
This is a one-sided program and Israel requests to transform it into one that will
promote dialogue and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel will
cooperate with such a reformed program.
14. To put things into perspective, out of the regular UN budget (not including
donations or extra-budgetary funds), the funds allocated for these four Palestinian
organs for 2006-2007 is $6.7, compared to allocations for development in Africa of
$9.7 (in the Regular Budget). Annual Resolutions Relating to the Conflict
15. Out of 250 resolutions adopted by the General Assembly every year, about 70
are voted on, and about 20 of these deal with the Israeli-Arab conflict. Among these
resolutions are, as mentioned, the four which renew the mandates of the
Palestinian organs. Regarding the remaining resolutions, we are interested in
promoting two processes: (1) a renewed attempt to combine them into 4-5
resolutions and (2) introduction of amendments to adjust them to today's reality,
including the three benchmarks demanded by the Quartet and the international
community of the Hamas-led PA.
16. In the past, at least until 1996, the General Assembly and the Main Committees
(the Second, Third and Fourth) adopted fewer resolutions, which were comprised of
several parts (called "Omnibus Resolutions"). The need to limit the number of
annual pro-Palestinian resolutions, or to consolidate them, dovetails with the
proposals of the Secretary General and Member States to streamline the work of
the GA and to make it more effective.
17. Four resolutions are being adopted that deal with UNRWA (at the 60th GA, their
numbers were 100, 101, 102, and 103). The resolutions could and should be
combined into one. Under the agenda item "Special Committee for the Territories"
there are five resolutions on the agenda (last year – numbers 104, 105, 106, 107,
and 108). Also here, the resolutions should be combined into one resolution. In this
way, the work of the General Assembly could be made much more efficient.
Furthermore, there are four resolutions relating to the agenda item "The Question
of Palestine (numbers 36, 37, 38, and 39 at the 60th GA) and two resolutions on
the agenda item "The Situation in the Middle East" (numbers 40 and 41 at last
year's GA). These six resolutions could be consolidated into two, thus bringing the
organization a step forward in the direction of increased efficiency. In all, the
number of resolutions on this topic could easily be reduced from 15 to four.
UNRWA
18. The UN agency for relief and work has become, after almost 60 years of
existence, the second biggest employer of Palestinians operating in the PA.
(UNRWA operates also in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon). UNRWA perpetuates the
Palestinian problem, rather than resolving the refugee status of the people or
rehabilitating them. It devotes all its resources to three functions that are usually run
by a state or governing authority: elementary education, public health and food
security. We believe that it is possible, in the long term, to transfer the daily tasks,
together with existing budgets, of the agency to governmental bodies in the PA as it
should be done in Jordan and elsewhere.
The Peace-Building Commission
19. This year the GA established the Peace-Building Commission subordinate to
the Security Council and the Socio-Economic Council. The commission, which is
charged with coordination between all UN agencies and bodies in everything
relating to building peace and reconstruction in a post-conflict situation, is still
searching for its identity and duties in the UN system. What is already clear is that
the commission will propose ways of rehabilitating government institutions,
rebuilding the economy and reestablishing civil society in countries that have
recently emerged from a conflict or war. Along with Member States that are major
contributors to the UN budget or UN peacekeeping forces, and countries chosen by
the GA and ECOSOC the commission will include the World Bank and the IMF as
members. Although Israel is not a member of the Commission it supported the
creation of the Commission and intends to follow closely the work of the
Commission. Israel is also committed to contribute both to the consultations and to
assist Member States affected by conflict.
Security Council – Reforms and Elections
20. The topic of Security Council reform will also be on the GA's agenda this year.
Japan, Germany, Brazil and India are asking to be granted, together with two
African Member States permanent seats on the Security Council. Israel continues
to adhere to the position that expanding the Council by ten members, some
permanent and some not, will make the work of the Council cumbersome. At the
same time, Israel notified Germany and Japan that it views them as suitable
candidates for a permanent seat on the Council, in light of global changes that have
occurred since the establishment of the UN and also the considerable contribution
of these two states to the UN in terms of budget, truce contributing and voluntary
contributions.
The Human Rights Council
21. In the framework of reforms, the UN upgraded the Commission for Human
Rights to the status of a council. Israel voted against its establishment, in a
resolution adopted by the GA, together with the US, due to the worry that the new
council would not be an improvement over the Commission it replaced. Indeed,
since its first meeting our worries have been confirmed, as it discriminated against
Israel in the topics under its purview (human rights violations in the entire world vs.
human rights violations in Israel). The council also decided to enact the new
procedure of convening an emergency session twice in its short history – once,
regarding the situation in Gaza and once regarding Lebanon. In both cases, the
council decided on action against Israel: to send an investigative delegation to the
region in the case of Lebanon, and a special human rights report in the case of
Gaza.
22. The international community should know that the Council is failing to deal with
real humanitarian crises and cases of serious violations of human rights in other
parts of the world because it is dealing nearly exclusively with the Middle East and
particularly with Israel.
Election of New Secretary General
23. The campaign for the position of UN Secretary General in place of the outgoing
Secretary Kofi Annan will end in December, possibly sooner. This is one of the
central topics of diplomatic discussion all over the world, especially in Asia,
because the understanding is that the new Secretary General will be from Asia.
Previous Secretary General were from Europe, two from Africa, one from Latin
America and one from Asia, and now it is again the turn of Asia. Israel will take a
position in due time.
Israel in the UN
24. Israel is interested in promoting its status in the UN and also in improving the
way Israelis perceive the UN and other international organizations. We are planning
on launching the first Model UN project is Israel (in Jerusalem high schools). Israel
will continue to promote its own candidates for senior positions in the UN, and will
try in the future to integrate Israeli army and police officers in UN peace-keeping
forces and in UN courses and to increase UN procurement in Israel.
Sustainable Development and Social Topics
25. The year 2006 was declared by the UN as The International Year of Deserts
and Desertification. Israel is considered a world leader in this field, specializing not
so much in the war on desertification as in the exploitation of the desert to serve
humanity's needs. Many countries with arid regions are very interested in this
subject and in learning from Israel's experience. The 60th GA noted in its resolution
on the subject, 60/200, that Israel will be hosting the international convention on the
subject "Deserts and Desertification – Challenges and Opportunities" to take place
in Sde Boker later this year.
26. At the opening of the 61st GA, a high-level panel (of heads of states and
leaders) will discuss the topic of immigration. This subject has become more and
more central in recent years, and the UN approaches it mainly in the context of
immigrant women. Israel will be represented at the summit by the Minister for
Immigrant Absorption, Mr. Zeev Boim.
27. The central topic of the Committee for Sustainable Development this year will
be renewable energy. Israel intends to contribute much to this subject. Israel will
also take an active part in General Assembly and committee discussions on the
agenda item regarding Persons with Disabilities. Israel welcomes the recently
completed convention on this subject which was drafted with active Israeli
participation.
28. MASHAV, the main Israeli avenue for foreign aid, will continue this year to be
Israel's flagship in the realm of assistance to developing countries. This year the
UN will convene a summit of LDC's, and Israel intends to continue presenting at the
UN its achievements in the area of cooperation in the development of these states,
and to emphasize its considerable experience it has accumulated in fields such as
food security, agricultural technology and management of water sources,
community development and small businesses entrepreneurships, empowering of
women, public health, and extra-curricular education.
108
Full Text of the Agreement on the Guidelines of the Political Program of the
National Unity Government That Was Signed on September 11, 2006:
"Based on what came in the national conciliation document which was signed by
the Presidency and the government and the PLC and the forces and factions which
are considered the reference of our people regarding their cause at this phase, and
in honor to the martyrs and prisoners and injured and the deportees and in honor to
the sacrifices of our Palestinian people and to protect their rights and maintain their
national constants and to affirm the national unity of the Palestinian people and
translate the principle of partnership on real grounds, the program of the
government shall include the following:
1- The government stresses on the right of the Palestinian people in action and
struggle to liberate their land and end the occupation using all the legitimate means
and to remove the settlements and the apartheid wall and to establish the
Palestinian independent state with full sovereignty on all Palestinian territories
occupied in 1967 with geographical contiguity with al-Quds as its capital.
2- The government supports and encourages all efforts that are exerted to
conclude all what has been agreed upon in Cairo in March 2005 in relation to the
development and activation of the PLO which is the legitimate and sole
representative of the Palestinian people and affirms on the need to accelerate the
measures and procedures towards this end before the end of this year.
3- The government respects the agreements signed by the PLO which is the
political reference of the PNA in a manner that protects the higher interests and
rights of the Palestinian people.
4- The government shall assist the President of the PNA in setting a Palestinian
plan for political moves to achieve the national goals on the basis of the Arab
initiative and the resolution of international legitimacy pertaining to the Palestinian
cause in a manner that doesn’t affect the rights of the Palestinian people.
5- The government and the presidency shall cooperate to lift the oppressive siege
imposed on our people and the government shall work to lift the siege with all
possible efforts and to mobilize Arab, Islamic and international political, financial,
economic and humanitarian support.
6- To work on releasing all prisoners and detainees without any exception or
discrimination and to work for the return of the deportees to their homes.
7- The government stresses on the right of return and clings to it and calls on the
international community to implement what came in Resolution 194 pertaining to
the right of return of the Palestinian refugees and to compensate them. The
government shall work also on doubling the efforts to support and care and defend
the rights of the Palestinian refugees.
8- The higher negotiations committee shall be reformulated in a manner that
reinforces political partnership and protects the national interests."
The agreement was signed by Ahmad "Abu Maher" Halles, one of Fatah leading
figures in Gaza Strip, and Jamal Mahmoud Abu Hashem, one of Hamas leading
figures in Gaza Strip, and Dr. Ziad Abu Amro, a PLC member (independent), in
addition to Rawhi Fattouh, the representative of the President in the dialogue.
Published at Al- Quds Newspaper on October 8, 2006.
109
Behind the Headlines: Legal and operational aspects of the use of cluster
bombs: Israel Foreign Ministry, Sep 5, 2006. International law does not prohibit the
use of 'cluster bombs'. Consequently, a discussion of Israel's use of such weaponry
should focus on the method of their use, rather than their legality.
1. The accepted legality of cluster weapons
Both international law and accepted practice do not prohibit the use of the family of
weapons popularly as 'cluster bombs'. Consequently, the main issue in a discussion
of Israel's use of such weaponry should the method of their use, rather than their
legality.
A 2002 report by Human Rights Watch on explosive sub-munitions – the category
of weapons to which cluster bombs belong – states that these weapons are
stocked by 56 countries and have been used by at least nine (including the US,
Britain, Russia, and Israel). There are 208 types of sub-munitions, which are
manufactured by 33 countries. The US used cluster bombs during the Gulf War, as
did NATO forces in Serbia and Kosovo. One of the arguments used by those who
support the use of cluster bombs is that this weapon causes in most cases less
damage than that caused by a regular (250-1,000 kg) bomb.
2. The legal method of use
It goes without saying that any use of weapons in warfare must comply with the
international laws of armed conflict concerning legitimate targets (the principle of
distinction between combatants and civilians), avoidance of deliberately harming
civilians, the principle of proportionality, and the need to take reasonable care. In
addition, it is prohibited to use weapons that cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering, and weapons that are inherently indiscriminate. When
examining the legality of an attack on a legitimate military target, additional
parameters may also be examined, such as the extent of incidental injury to the
civilian population in the vicinity of the target and the military advantage achieved in
attacking the target. The balance between the two determines the legality of the
entire attack.
3. Israel's use of weapons in compliance with international law
These considerations of compliance with international norms were paramount
features of the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) operations in Lebanon, in which
strenuous efforts were made to ensure that these were carried out in complete
accordance with international law, both with regard to method and weaponry. IDF
operations are directed only against legitimate military targets (the terrorists
themselves, the places from which they launch attacks against Israel, facilities
serving the terrorists, and objectives that directly contribute to the enemy's war
effort). The IDF does not deliberately attack civilians and takes steps to minimize
any incidental collateral harm by warning them in advance of an action, even at the
expense of losing the element of surprise. This measure, which is not obligated by
international law, proved itself in practice by in fact reducing injury to civilians.
4. Hizbullah use of civilians as human shields
This concern for civilian welfare points out one of the clearest distinctions between
the IDF and a terrorist organization such as Hizbullah, which cynically exploited
Israel's humane practice by deliberately operating among civilians, using them as
human shields by storing and even firing missiles from inside their homes. The use
of human shields is banned by international law, which states that hiding a terrorist
objective in the heart of a civilian population does not afford it immunity against
attack.
5. Clean-Up efforts after hostilities
On conclusion of hostilities, questions arise from both sides regarding unexploded
ordnance left behind on the battlefield. For example, many deadly explosives fired
by Hizbullah against northern Israeli population centers still remain unexploded.
Israeli civil defense authorities are consequently making great efforts to locate and
disarm these weapons in order to protect Israeli civilians from further harm. Israel
regards the welfare of Lebanese civilians in same manner. Immediately after the
cease-fire the IDF gave UNIFIL maps indicating the likely locations of unexploded
ordnance, to aid the international attempt to clear these areas and avoid injury to
the population. Furthermore, immediately after the cease-fire the IDF distributed
warning notices to the residents in the areas of warfare, and recommended that
they wait a few days before returning to the south until the UNIFIL forces were
deployed there and the area had been cleared of unexploded ordnance.
110
Petition for modification of the battle / moral rules of the IDF (Israel Defence
Forces) and fitting them to warfare environment of the Middle East in order to put
and end to the abandonment of the lives of the IDF's soldiers (www.tohar.org.il).
"The one who is merciful with the cruel will end up by being cruel to the merciful
people." We hereby call upon the political echelon and the IDF authorities to come
back and to act according to the well-known military doctrine known as ›rolling fire
screen‹ according to which no foot of an infantry soldier touches enemy's ground
only after this territory had been ›softened‹ by massive artillery and air raid attacks.
All of this in order to enable infantry forces carry their duties of clearing the
destroyed enemy's territory, ascertaining death, collecting captured weapons,
military equipment and documents without being forced to be engaged in urban
warfare from house to house and enter wasps nests full of Islamic terrorists
ambushing behind every door, window or corner and turning them into being an
easy prey for the enemy. An order given to enter this kind of inferno and to clear
terrorists nests without first softened by heavy artillery and crushing [them] from the
air, will be considered, under the circumstances of fighting Islamic terror, as in
reality order an unlawful which in vain and without any moral and / or military
justification endangers the life of our dear sons, the IDF's soldiers. Consideration
and sensitivity regarding human lives should first be regarding our sons, the
worriers of the IDF, and certainly not towards a pseudo-innocent civilian population
that under their umbrella / human shield fanatic Islamic terror cancer grows and
blooms (both in Lebanon, the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip). In order to put and
end to the ›stupidity march‹ in which the lives of our sons, the soldiers of the IDF,
are being sacrificed daily and in order to regain deterrence power in front of our
enemies in the Middle East, as far as they are concerned (both Hamas and
Hizbullah), they are not conducting war over a territory but a Jihad (Islamic holy
war) in order to destroy the State of Israel. We should all become sober and
immediately redefine the IDF's battle and moral rules. We have to do so in order
that the saying – ›let the IDF win‹ – will be a meaningful saying, otherwise it will
mean "send the IDF's worriers to fight with both hands cuffed behind their backs
and let them sacrifice their souls in order to save the lives of terror supporting
terrorists"! Based on the above I call and plea not to stand aside, to sign this
petition and join this civilian initiative in order to protect and save the lives of the
IDF's soldiers. This protection of human lives will be carried out by an immediate
redefinition of the IDF's battle and moral rules according to the warfare environment
of the Middle East, this in order to put an end to sacrificing lives of the IDF's
soldiers and regaining IDF's deterrence power as of without we have no right of
existence in the Middle East.”
111
Erklärung der Stadt Bethlehem vom 17. Mai 2006: „In diesem Monat Mai, vor
einem Jahr, haben wir unser Amt und Mandat als Bürgermeister und Mitglieder des
Rats der Stadt Bethlehem angetreten. In einer demokratischen und
ordnungsgemäß durchgeführten Wahl haben die Bürgerinnen und Bürger
Bethlehems votiert und ihre Repräsentanten frei gewählt.
Vom ersten Tag an haben wir uns mit allen Kräften darum bemüht, der
Bethlehemer Bevölkerung zu dienen und unsere Stadt weiterzuentwickeln.
Bedauerlicherweise fanden wir uns mit einer Situation konfrontiert, in der wir und
unsere Mitbürger nicht nur unter den anhaltenden israelischen Praktiken wie den
Sperren und der Trennmauer zu leiden haben, sondern auch von der
internationalen Gemeinschaft im Stich gelassen und boykotiert werden.
Innerhalb der Mauern unserer gefangenen Stadt ist die Arbeitslosigkeit auf 55%
angestiegen, und mehr als 65% der Bethlehemer leben heute unter der
Armutsgrenze. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser dramatischen Situation und dem
Mangel an Ressourcen ist unser ohnehin schon spärliches Budget außer
Reichweite geraten. Wir mussten viele der für unsere Bevölkerung lebenswichtigen
Dienste einstellen. Selbst die Gehälter der städtischen Bediensteten konnten wir in
den letzen zwei Monaten nicht mehr zahlen.
In dieser schwierigen Zeit strecken wir unsere Hände in der Hoffnung aus, draußen
auf hilfsbereite Hände zu stoßen. Wir sind bereit, Mechanismen bereitzustellen, um
unserer Bevölkerung direkte Hilfe zukommen zu lassen. Wir können konkrete
Projekte vorlegen, die das Leiden unserer Bevölkerung lindern und zu ertragen
helfen. Jeder, der uns unterstützen will, kann sicher sein, dass unsere Konten
offen, transparent und für externe Prüfungen zugänglich sind.
Trotz seiner kleinen Größe ist Bethlehem eine berühmte Stadt. Ihr Name lebt in
den Herzen von Millionen und symbolisiert für die Menschheit Hoffnung und
Frieden. Bethlehem ist die Stadt des Friedens und ein sehr kostbarer Teil des
Welterbes. Ihre Verantwortung sollte daher auf den Schultern der internationalen
Gemeinschaft liegen.
In diesem Sinne rufen wir die internationale Gemeinschaft auf, uns in unserem
Streben nach Frieden zu unterstützen. Wir glauben, dass der Frieden die einzige
Lösung ist, dem lang anhaltenden israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt und dem
Kreislauf von Gewalt und Blutvergießen in unserer Region ein Ende zu setzen, ein
Friede, welcher auf Gerechtigkeit basiert und die Rechte der anderen anerkennt.
Wir verurteilen das Töten von Menschen auf beiden Seiten. Wir glauben an die
Zwei-Staaten-Lösung und unterstützen sie: Israel und Palästina, zwei unabhängige,
demokratische Staaten, die gemeinsam auf diesem Heiligen Land leben können, in
gegenseitigem Respekt, Anerkennung und friedlicher Koexistenz, ohne jegliche
Aggression einer Partei gegen die Rechte der anderen.
Man sagt, dass Friede zu Hause beginnt. Friede kann nicht erreicht werden, ohne
unseren Kindern eine Zukunft zu geben.“
gez. Dr. Victor Batarseh, Bürgermeister der Stadt Bethlehem
112
Monika Knoche, Gregor Gysi, Wolfgang Gehrcke: Gerechtigkeit für Palästina –
Sicherheit für den Nahen Osten – Waffenstillstand festigen: „Vorschläge der
Fraktion DIE LINKE. für neue deutsche Initiativen zur Nahost-Politik“. Seit Montag,
dem 14. August 2006, schweigen die Waffen im Krieg zwischen Israel und den
Hisbollah-Milizen im Libanon. Der prekäre Waffenstillstand auf Basis der UNResolution 1701, dem die Konfliktparteien zugestimmt haben, soll durch den
Einsatz einer internationalen UN-Truppe in Ergänzung zur geplanten Stationierung
von Soldaten der libanesischen Armee im Südlibanon stabilisiert werden und
schließlich in Verhandlungen der Konfliktparteien münden. Die Bundesregierung ist
entschlossen, sich an einer solchen UN-Truppe zu beteiligen und treibt die
Vorbereitungen dazu zielstrebig voran. Sie beruft sich dabei auf die Stimmen
befreundeter Regierungen und nicht zuletzt auf den Wunsch der israelischen
Regierung, die eine deutsche Beteiligung ausdrücklich befürworten. Unabhängig
davon, welches Mandat eine solche UN-Mission erhält und unabhängig von der
Frage, in welcher Form eine militärische Beteiligung Deutschlands erfolgte, lehnt
die Fraktion DIE LINKE. eine solche ab. Deutschland hat eine besondere
Verantwortung gegenüber Israel. Es ist aber auch gegenüber den Palästinensern
deutlich verpflichtet, die einen Teil der Folgen zu tragen haben, ohne dafür
verantwortlich gewesen zu sein. Deutsche Soldaten oder Polizeieinheiten können
als Bestandteil einer internationalen UN-Friedenstruppe keine Stabilisierung
bewirken, weil jede ihrer Handlungen von der jeweils betroffenen Seite in den
historischen Zusammenhängen bewertet würde. Damit würden deutsche Soldaten
und Polizisten nicht Teil der Lösung, sondern Teil des Problems. Notwendig sind
neue und weit reichende politische Initiativen. Deutschland kann helfen, aber
anders. Die Fraktion DIE LINKE. fordert von der Bundesregierung neue politische
Initiativen und schlägt dazu vor:
1. Humanitäre Hilfe für den Libanon. Deutschland leistet Soforthilfe für den zivilen,
humanitären Wiederaufbau im Libanon. Dazu gehören medizinische Unterstützung
und der Einsatz deutscher Ärztinnen und Ärzte zur Betreuung von verwundeten und
traumatisierten Opfern des Krieges; Hilfe bei der Minenräumung, Hilfe bei der
Bekämpfung der Öl-Umweltkatastrophe, Hilfe zum Wiederaufbau der zerstörten
Infrastruktur, Häuser und Wohnungen,. Die Bundesregierung stellt der
libanesischen Regierung Erfahrungen zur Verfügung, die deutsche Diplomaten in
anderen UN-Missionen gesammelt haben zur Eingliederung von
Bürgerkriegsparteien in das zivile Leben. Deutschland hilft bei der Ausbildung von
libanesischen Zoll- und Polizeibeamten und ist auch zur vorübergehenden
Aufnahme von Kriegsflüchtlingen bereit.
2. Deutscher Sonderbotschafter bei der Arabischen Liga. Die Bundesregierung
ernennt einen Sonderbotschafter bei der arabischen Liga. Er soll die
Zusammenarbeit mit der Arabischen Liga und arabischen Staaten befördern. Das
könnte hilfreich sein für die Fragen, die nach dem Waffenstillstand, dem Rückzug
der israelischen Armee aus dem Süden Libanons, dem Vorrücken der
libanesischen Armee und dem Ausbau der bestehenden UNIFIL-Mission auf der
Tagesordnung stehen, wie: Gefangenenaustausch, Regelungen zwischen Israel
und Libanon zu den Sheeba-Farmen sowie zwischen Israel und Syrien zu den
Golan-Höhen. Der Ausbau der UNIFIL-Mission soll weiter auf der Grundlage des
Kapitels VI der Charta der Vereinten Nationen vor sich gehen. Gerade das
notwendige Einverständnis aller Konfliktparteien zu der Blauhelm-Mission ist derzeit
und generell politisch wichtiger als ein so genanntes robustes, Frieden
erzwingendes Mandat nach Kapitel VII. Eine Ausweitung dieses Mandates nach
Kapitel VII ist nicht zu vertreten. Die Fraktion DIE LINKE. bleibt im Übrigen bei ihrer
Forderung, dass die UN-Truppe nicht nur in der südlichen libanesischen
Grenzregion stationiert wird, sondern auch in der nördlichen Grenzregion Israels
und in naher Zukunft beidseitig auch an der Grenze Gaza – Israel.
3. Jugendprojekte für israelisch-palästinensische Verständigung auf den Weg bringen
Deutschland gründet ein Jugendprojekt speziell für die israelisch-palästinensische
Verständigung, zusammen mit Jugendlichen aus Europa. Die Wunden, die der
jahrzehntelange Krieg und Bürgerkrieg im Nahen Osten geschlagen hat, sind tief.
Es bedarf besonderer Anstrengungen, damit eine junge Generation den Hass
überwinden und zu Verständnis und Akzeptanz finden kann. Die Erfahrungen des
deutsch-französischen Jugendaustausches und zivilgesellschaftlicher israelischpalästinensischer Projekte sind dafür wertvoll.
4. Hilfe für Palästina wieder aufnehmen. Deutschland setzt sich in der Europäischen
Union dafür ein, die materiellen Hilfen für die palästinensische Autonomiebehörde
ohne Einschränkungen sofort wieder aufzunehmen. Die Lage in den
palästinensischen Gebieten hat sich dramatisch verschlechtert. Die
palästinensische Autonomiebehörde ist kaum mehr handlungsfähig. Die
Bundesregierung appelliert an Hamas und Hisbollah, die gefangenen israelischen
Soldaten frei zu lassen. Die Bundesregierung appelliert an Israel, die inhaftierten
Minister der palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde, den Parlamentspräsidenten und
die palästinensischen Abgeordneten frei zu lassen. Dies wären wichtige Zeichen für
einen Beginn des Dialogs als Voraussetzung für einen Friedensprozess. Dabei
sollte die Bundesregierung auch die Initiative des palästinensischen Präsidenten
Abbas für eine Wiederbelebung von Friedensverhandlungen unterstützen.
5. Ständige Nahost-Konferenz in Berlin ähnlich der KSZE. Die Fraktion DIE LINKE.
schlägt vor, eine unbefristete internationale Friedenskonferenz, eine Konferenz
über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit im Nahen Osten (KSZN), die den
Friedensprozess wirksam in Gang setzt, in Berlin zu organisieren. Ziele dieser
Konferenz sind:
a.
die Anerkennung des Existenzrechts Israels von allen
Beteiligten mit völkerrechtlich verbindlich festgelegten und gesicherten Grenzen;
b.
die Schaffung eines palästinensischen Staates in
völkerrechtlich, von allen Beteiligten anerkannten Grenzen, der wirtschaftlich und
sozial lebensfähig ist;
c.
die Vereinbarung eines „Marshall-Planes“ zur sozialen und
ökonomischen Entwicklung insbesondere Libanons und Palästinas;
d.
eine Regelung über die Rechte palästinensischer
Flüchtlinge;
e.
eine Regelung zwischen Israel und Syrien über die strittigen
Grenzfragen und über die Rückgabe der Golanhöhen;
f.
eine Verständigung über einen Fahrplan zur zügigen
Beendigung der Besetzung Iraks und
g.
Schritte zur Entmilitarisierung der Nahostregion, Abbau aller
Massenvernichtungswaffen einschließlich der israelischen Atomwaffen, die
Verhinderung einer atomaren Rüstung des Iran und die Vereinbarung gegenseitiger
und internationaler Sicherheitsgarantien für die Länder der Region.
Ein deutscher Beitrag zur Demilitarisierung des Nahen Ostens ist eine sofortige
Beendigung eigener Waffenlieferungen in die Krisenregion. Die Bundesregierung
soll dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen vorschlagen, den UNOGeneralsekretär zu beauftragen, diese Ständige Konferenz für Sicherheit und
Zusammenarbeit im Nahen Osten zu verhandeln, dafür die Voraussetzungen zu
schaffen und sie in Berlin stattfinden zu lassen. Die internationale Konferenz mit
allen Beteiligten unter der Schirmherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen und ihres
Generalsekretärs wäre ein längerer Prozess. Sie sollte – im Unterschied zu
früheren Friedensverhandlungen – die Bevölkerungen der beteiligten Staaten und
Regionen dadurch einbeziehen, dass sie von einem breiten gesellschaftlichen
Dialog begleitet wird. Mit dem Angebot von Berlin als Ort für eine solche Konferenz
wird die besondere deutsche Verantwortung für eine friedliche Lösung der
Nahostkonflikte unterstrichen. Diese Vorschläge der Fraktion DIE LINKE. richten
sich an die Bundesregierung und an den deutschen Bundestag. DIE LINKE. ergreift
darüber hinaus eigene Initiativen. In Zusammenarbeit mit der Rosa-LuxemburgStiftung findet in Berlin vom 3. bis 5. November ein Nahost-Treffen statt, an dem
sich Linke aus Israel, Palästina und Europa beteiligen. DIE LINKE. vertieft ihre
Zusammenarbeit mit jüdischen und palästinensischen Organisationen in
Deutschland. In Zusammenarbeit mit der Meretz-Partei aus Israel wendet sich DIE
LINKE. der Aufarbeitung der Geschichte linker Positionen zum Zionismus zu. DIE
LINKE. setzt sich mit der Europäischen Linkspartei dafür ein, unabhängig von der
hier vorgeschlagenen staatlichen Konferenz eine Konferenz der nichtstaatlichen
Organisationen aus dem Nahen Osten einzuberufen.
113
SPD-Nachrichtendienst vom 18.08.2006: „Für einen dauerhaften Frieden –
Anstöße für ein politisches Gesamtkonzept in Nahost“: Unter Leitung des SPDVorsitzenden Kurt Beck hat das Präsidium der SPD am Freitag einstimmig Anstöße
für ein politisches Gesamtkonzept in Nahost beschlossen. Lesen Sie hier den
Beschluss des Präsidiums im Wortlaut: Durch die UN-Resolution 1701 gibt es die
Chance, ein Ende des erschütternden Konflikts im Nahen Osten zu erreichen. UNGeneralsekretär Kofi Annan hat mit der israelischen und libanesischen Regierung
eine Vereinbarung über eine Waffenruhe getroffen, die von den Konfliktparteien
weitgehend eingehalten wird und die Anlass zur Hoffnung gibt, dass das
entsetzliche Leid der Menschen vor Ort beendet werden kann. Dabei ist klar, dass
der Nahost-Konflikt nicht allein durch militärische und polizeiliche Maßnahmen
gelöst werden kann. Sozialdemokratinnen und Sozialdemokraten wissen, dass man
bei den Ursachen von Konflikten ansetzen muss, wenn man zu einem dauerhaften
und stabilen Frieden kommen will. Unsere Ziele sind auch hier die Förderung von
Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechten. Neben der schnellen
humanitären Hilfe, die die Menschen erreichen muss, ist es nun entscheidend, eine
weitgehende politische Flankierung vorzunehmen, um eine nachhaltige Perspektive
in der Region zu entwickeln. Nur die Kombination aus einer starken politischen
Initiative mit dem Einsatz einer UN-Friedenstruppe hat Aussicht auf Erfolg. Jede
Initiative muss dabei international eingebettet sein: Den Vereinten Nationen im
Quartett mit der EU, den USA und Russland kommt dabei eine zentrale Rolle zu.
Das Nahost-Quartett muss seine seit 2002 laufende gemeinsame Arbeit zur
Umsetzung des Nahost-Friedensfahrplans (roadmap) nun wieder verstärkt
aufnehmen. Ebenfalls sind die Länder in der Region gefragt, einen substantiellen
Beitrag für einen stabilen Frieden zu leisten. Außenminister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier hat diesem Ansatz Rechnung getragen, indem er seine diplomatischen
Initiativen eng mit unseren internationalen Partnern abgestimmt hat. Mit seinem
unermüdlichen Engagement und durch seine Reisen nach Israel, Libanon, in die
Palästinensischen Autonomiegebiete, nach Ägypten, Jordanien und Saudi-Arabien
leistet der deutsche Außenminister einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur Regelung des
Konflikts und zu einem umfassenden Lösungsansatz. Die Beschlüsse der
Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union, des G8-Gipfels und der LibanonKonferenz in Rom zeigen, dass die internationale Gemeinschaft weiß, dass ein
breiter Lösungsansatz für den Nahen Osten Not tut. Aus Sicht der SPD muss ein
politisches Gesamtkonzept u.a. folgende Punkte enthalten:
•
Israel sichern: Alle Initiativen in und für die Region messen darauf
hinauslaufen, die Sicherheit Israels zu verbessern. Jeder, der auch nur den
leisesten Zweifel am Existenzrechts Israels aufkommen lässt, muss mit unserem
entschiedenen Widerstand rechnen. Israel hat ein selbstverständliches Recht, in
Frieden und ohne Furcht vor unsäglichen Attacken zu leben. Die als Geiseln
genommenen israelischen Soldaten müssen unverzüglich und bedingungslos
freigelassen werden.
•
Libanon stärken: Der Libanon war nach Beendigung des
Bürgerkriegs auf einem guten demokratischen Weg. Die Menschen im Libanon
haben ein Recht auf eine friedliche Zukunft. Ziel aller Maßnahmen für den Libanon
muss sein, eine – auch für die Menschen vor Ort – funktionierende Staatlichkeit
wieder herzustellen, die für eine innere Befriedung des Libanon notwendig ist. Dies
beinhaltet humanitäre Hilfe und umfassende Aufbauhilfe für die zerstörte
Infrastruktur, beispielsweise beim schnellen Wiederaufbau der Wasserversorgung.
Zusätzliche Instrumente für eine Stabilisierung des Libanon könnten u.a. eine
internationale Geberkonferenz, ein Schuldenerlass und die Einstufung des Libanon
als Kooperationsland für Entwicklungshilfe sein.
•
Palästina aufbauen: In erster Linie muss es hierbei darum gehen, den Geist
der sogenannten roadmap, den von Israel und Palästina anerkannten, bislang aber
nicht umgesetzten Friedensplan, wieder neu zu beleben. Es bleibt dabei, dass ohne
die Herstellung eines eigenständigen überlebensfähigen palästinensischen Staates
eine Lösung des Nahost-Konfliktes nicht möglich ist. Außerdem müssen mit
großem Nachdruck die Fragen der Grenzziehung, der palästinensischen
Flüchtlinge, der Siedlungen, des Status Jerusalems und der Verteilung der
Wasserressourcen geklärt werden. Deutschland und die EU werden sich weiterhin
mit großem Engagement und substantieller Finanzhilfe für Palästina einsetzen.
Israel muss, um die Lebensbedingungen vor Ort zu verbessern, die
palästinensischen Mittel aus Steuern und Zoll freigeben, sowie die
Bewegungsfreiheit für Menschen und Güter wiederherstellen.
•
Humanitäre Hilfe verstärken: In den palästinensischen Gebieten ist die
humanitäre Situation zum Teil erschütternd. Die internationale Gemeinschaft – und
damit auch Deutschland – muss über das bereits Veranlasste hinaus schnell und
unbürokratisch Mittel zur Verfügung stellen, um eine Versorgung der Menschen
sicherzustellen.
•
Zivilgesellschaftliche Strukturen fördern: In den palästinensischen
Autonomiegebieten gibt es positive zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklungen und
Ansätze eines konstruktiven innerpalästinensischen Dialogs. Es ist notwendig,
diesen Prozess zu begleiten und zu fördern, mit dem Ziel, zu einer inneren
Befriedung in Palästina zu kommen. Der palästinensische Präsident Machmud
Abbas ist der gewählte Repräsentant seines Volkes, der unsere intensive
Unterstützung verdient. Darüber hinaus hat das Nahost-Quartett der HamasRegierung einen Dialog angeboten. Die hierfür genannten Forderungen
(Anerkennung Israels, Abschwören von Gewalt und das Akzeptieren der
einschlägigen internationalen Vereinbarungen) gelten unverändert. Auf dieser Basis
befürworten wir einen Dialog mit der gewählten palästinensischen Regierung. Die
Bildung einer Regierung der nationalen Einheit, die die Quartett-Kriterien
anerkennt, wird befürwortet.
•
Freilassung von Gefangenen: Die Europäische Union hat zu Recht
gefordert, die gewählten palästinensischen Regierungsmitglieder und
Parlamentarier freizulassen. Dies ist ein wichtiger Schritt, der zu einer Entspannung
der Situation beitragen würde.
•
Regionale Mächte einbeziehen: Es ist ein richtiger Ansatz des deutschen
Außenministers, den schwierigen Gesprächspartner Syrien in die diplomatischen
Aktivitäten einzubeziehen. Allerdings kann ein solcher Dialog nur auf der Grundlage
eines klaren Bekenntnisses zum friedlichen Ausgleich regionaler
Interessenunterschiede erfolgen. Erst damit bietet sich die Chance, in einen
umfassenden Dialog über nachhaltigen Frieden einzusteigen und Grenzfragen
endgültig zu klären. Auch andere Länder in der Region und die Arabische Liga sind
Gesprächspartner, die einen Beitrag zu einer Gesamtlösung leisten können und
müssen. Wir wollen den Dialog mit allen Partnern, die an einem umfassenden
Frieden auf der Basis internationaler Vereinbarungen interessiert sind. Das
Angebot, das die Europäische Union zusammen mit den ständigen
Sicherheitsratsmitgliedern an Iran gemacht hat, zeigt, dass wir bereit sind, mit allen
Staaten in der Region in einen konstruktiven Dialog einzusteigen. Iran sollte die
Chance nutzen und konstruktiv auf den Vorschlag reagieren.
•
Abrüstungsinitiativen wiederbeleben: Wir müssen das Thema Abrüstung
wieder mit größerem Nachdruck auf die Tagesordnung setzen. Dabei gilt es, den
Nichtverbreitungsvertrag insgesamt zu stärken und alle Länder, die ihn bislang
nicht unterzeichnet haben, zu ermutigen, dies zu tun. Wir halten am Ziel einer
atomwaffenfreien Welt fest und müssen auch über regionale Sicherheitsstrukturen
den berechtigten Sicherheitsinteressen der Länder Rechnung tragen. Im Bereich
konventioneller Waffen, auch der sogenannten kleinen und leichten Waffen,
müssen wir verstärkt initiativ werden. Die Zusammenarbeit Deutschlands mit der
Arabischen Liga und ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten im Bereich der Kleinwaffenkontrolle und
-zerstörung ist ein gutes Beispiel für eine vorausschauende Politik, die intensiviert
werden muss. Regionale Abrüstungsinitiativen – auch in Nahost – und ein Konzept
gemeinsamer Sicherheit in der Region sind Instrumente, Stabilität zu erreichen und
Ressourcen für Zukunftsinvestitionen freizumachen.
•
Terrorismus rechtsstaatlich bekämpfen: Terrorismus ist durch nichts zu
rechtfertigen, egal mit welcher Begründung er auftritt. Dies gilt im Nahen Osten
ebenso wie weltweit. Der Terrorismus muss weiterhin entschieden bekämpft
werden. Dabei ist es elementar, dass beim Kampf gegen den Terror die
internationalen Standards, die in den allgemeinen Menschenrechten und im
Völkerrecht rechtsverbindlich verbrieft sind, strikt eingehalten werden.
•
Transkulturellen Dialog ausbauen: Wir werden es nicht zulassen, dass
geistige Brandstifter überall auf der Welt, einen Konflikt zwischen dem
sogenannten Westen auf der einen und „dem Islam“ oder der arabischen Welt auf
der anderen Seite herbeireden. Der Islam ist eine friedliche Religion, die wir
wertschätzen und respektieren. Und die arabischen Länder blicken auf eine lange
Tradition zurück. Es gilt, auf allen gesellschaftlichen Ebenen in einen tiefgehenden
und kontinuierlichen Dialog einzutreten. Hier haben staatliche Stellen ebenso eine
Aufgabe, wie Parteien, Kirchen, Gewerkschaften, Stiftungen und andere
zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure.
•
Überprüfung bestehender Instrumente: Die Europäische Union hat eine
Reihe von Kooperationsinstrumenten mit den Ländern des Nahen Ostens
entwickelt. Es muss überprüft werden, ob diese Instrumente zu einer kohärenten
EU-Politik in der Region führen. Die EU muss – bei Bedarf – hier nachsteuern,
feinjustieren und ggf. neue Instrumente entwickeln. Spätestens mit der deutschen
Ratspräsidentschaft könnte hierfür die Initiative ergriffen werden. Gleiches gilt
selbstverständlich auch für die Ressortabstimmung innerhalb Deutschlands.
Der Nahost-Konflikt, das entsetzliche Leiden der Menschen, hat uns alle betroffen
gemacht und schockiert. „Ohne den Frieden ist alles andere nichts“, hat Willy
Brandt sehr zutreffend formuliert. Es ist zu hoffen, dass unter dem Eindruck des
Krieges der letzten Wochen die Chance für eine breitangelegte Friedensregelung
ergriffen wird. Die SPD und ihre Vertreterinnen und Vertreter werden sich weiterhin
mit großem Nachdruck für eine solche nachhaltige und dauerhafte Lösung
einsetzen. Dies sind wir den Menschen schuldig - und unserem eigenen
Verständnis als Friedenspartei.
114
The speech of President Bashar al-Assad at the 4th General Conference of the
Journalists Union Al-Umawyeen Conference Palace, Damascus, August 15, 2006,
Translation as appears on the SANA – Syrian News Agency –:
Ladies and gentlemen members of the fourth general conference of the Journalists
Union,
Ladies and gentlemen,
It gives me pleasure to meet you at the opening of the proceedings of your 4th
conference and to express my appreciation to you and through you to the honest
and honorable journalists who have been fighting a media battle no less ferocious
and dangerous than the battles fought by your brothers on the fields of honour and
dignity. Your battle aims at preserving the intellect and the spirit of the nation and
protecting its identity and heritage against the systematic invasion which violates its
dignity, tears apart it unity, distorts its cause, and strikes at its will to resist by
promoting a culture of defeatism, submission and blind adherence to agendas set
by the enemy and those who support it and promote its projects.
I am glad to meet you in this new Middle East, new in the sense that we understand
and the shape we want, although it is not complete yet. It is new with the
achievements of the Resistance; new in that it drew clear lines between the
different forces; new in uncovering the games and conspiracies and lifting their
masks and fake terminology in an unprecedented manner. This is the new Middle
East which Syria has been promoting again and again as the only hope for Arabs if
they are to have a place under the sun in the political and material sense. You all
know that it was not easy for us to convince many people of our vision of the future.
We had to wait for the future to become the present and to speak for itself. Today
facts speak for themselves, not only as we imagined them in the past but in a
clearer and more expressive manner.
We meet today when the Middle East they aspire to and which is based on
submission, humiliation and on depriving peoples of their identities and their rights,
has become an illusion. It has actually turned into a popular uprising throughout the
Arab world, an uprising which is ban-Arab by nature, characterized by dignity and
the rejection of all pretexts and excuses for keeping us submissive so that we are
killed in silence in the same way that sacrifices used to be offered in the past to
avoid the wrath of the gods. But offering sacrifices in the past was considered a
form of wisdom. So, are we supposed to adhere to that wisdom today? And does
wisdom have a meaning if it was separated from courage?
If we are supposed to follow the lead of the invasion of Iraq, the invasion which
reminds us of humanity's past, I believe that this kind of wisdom is still a valid
testimony to the fact that some of our Arab sages still adhere to that wisdom today.
For wisdom to exist, it has to be coupled with courage in order to give the people
the stability necessary to make people wise. But when fear exists, there is no place
for fake wisdom which leads those who possess it to defeat and humiliation under
the mask of wisdom. In our present Arab world, we might achieve victory under
another false assumption which is adventure or recklessness.
If wisdom has come to mean defeat and humiliation in the lexicon of some Arabs, it
is natural to find in their lexicon that victory is equal to adventure and recklessness.
In order not get ourselves absorbed in theoretical discourse, let us ask ourselves
about what we have achieved by being unwisely, irrationally and recklessly led by
some of our supposed Arab sages for many past decades. We have achieved a
great deal, but against our interests. Le us take the peace process as an example;
and let us ask whether it has succeeded or failed. We have been talking repeatedly
recently about the failure of the peace process. And all this talk about the failure
and death of the peace process is absolutely true; but it is more accurate to say
that the Arabs are the ones who failed in the peace process when they did not
understand the meaning of making peace a strategic choice. They did not
distinguish between making peace a strategic choice and making it the only choice.
When there is a certain strategic choice, it does not mean that there are not other
strategic choices, or there are not other tactical, if not necessarily strategic,
choices.
Throughout the peace process, we the Arabs, have adopted the only choice for
peace and abandoned all the other choices. We then replaced the spirit of the only
choice with the choice of cheap or free peace. Under this choice we offer
everything to Israel and get very little in return. In real fact, and in practice, we have
offered a great deal, and some of us offered everything, and got nothing in return.
That is why we see the Palestinians paying the price now, and that is why Syria
refused, through its vision, to abandon any of its rights.
When we say that we have made peace our strategic choice, it does not mean that
we have cancelled the other choices. On the contrary, the more illusive the
realization of peace becomes, the more important and necessary other ways and
methods become in order to regain our rights. On the other hand, we in Syria have
stressed this choice, the peace choice, from the very beginning of the peace
process, but we adhered to the choice of resistance as long as peace has not been
realized, particularly that the assumed partner in peace does not believe in this
theory in the first place and has given us one evidence after another in confirmation
of this fact.
If we leave aside the many massacres perpetrated by Israel against the Arabs and
other evidence, there is a clear evidence stated clearly by former Israel prime
minister, Yitzhak Shamir at the beginning of the peace process when he said in
1991 that they will make the process last for ten years, which means that peace will
not be achieved. That is what happened. Today, and fifteen years later, peace has
not been achieved. Before the peace process, Israel used to say that Israel wanted
peace while Arabs wanted war. It was a surprise for them that Arabs accepted to
get involved in the peace process. That is why they reacted by making this public
statement.
But the received Arab wisdom used to be that we have to close our eyes in order to
corner Israel before the international community, which has been reduced into a
few states which support Israel, ignoring and neglecting the rest of the world which
mostly supports our causes. The result was that we have become embarrassed in
front of our Arab people. We lost our respect and credibility in front of our friends
and enemies alike. This was the Arab responsibility for the failure of the peace
process. But what about the responsibility of others, with the exception, of course,
of Israel and the United States. The whole world got interested in the Middle East
after the 1973 war. They focused all their attention on our region and started to talk
about peace. This continued until we started the peace process in Madrid. This
went, of course, through different stages. When most countries of the world were
assured that the peace process has been launched through negotiations, they
handed the whole process over to the United States, which remained the sole
sponsor of this process. It, in turn, handed the process over to Israel. So, every
proposal made to the Arabs during that period was either and Israeli proposal or a
proposal approved by the Israelis. When most countries realized that the Arabs
have dropped the real choice for peace and replaced it with a peace at the pleasure
of Israel and the United States, they turned their back on the peace process and on
us. Only today, during these battles, they remembered the peace process and
remembered us. Of course we have to exclude Israel and the United States from
this category, because Israel is an enemy, and as I said, does not want peace.
Peace requires that Israel return the occupied land and return the usurped rights,
while it is an enemy which was built on the bases of aggression and expansion.
We have always said that the United States is necessary and essential for the
peace process based on its position as a superpower and through its relations with
different parties. But it is not any United States. This administration adopts the
principle of preemptive war that is absolutely contradictory to the principle of peace.
Six years on with this administration, and there is no peace. Consequently, we do
not expect peace soon or in the foreseeable future.
We ask here, have they remembered us lately because of the death and
destruction Israeli terrorism has caused in Lebanon? Of course not. There have
been years of killing and destruction against the Palestinians, yet we have not
heard of initiatives, solutions and extensive activity at the UN Security Council as is
the case today. Have they moved because they are afraid of chaos or because of
their concern for the security of the region which concerns them directly? The
region's security is a sufficient cause for them to move, but the region has been on
the verge of an explosion for years, and they have not moved. So, why did they
move at this stage?
The fact of the matter is that they move only when Israel is in pain. And Israel is
never in pain except when we have power. This means, in the final analysis, that
the world does not care about our interests, feelings and rights except when we are
powerful. Otherwise, they would not do anything. They push us towards peace with
what they say, but push us towards war with what they do. Here, the countries
concerned with the peace process, and they are mostly European, are responsible
for what is happening.
We might wonder what motivates some officials in these countries to send
messages and make statements concerning an ill prisoner. They are so concerned
for the medical condition of this prisoner. What nobility! What humanity! What
greatness! We might ask as well, where are these same officials concerning the
massacres perpetrated in Lebanon? All those women, children and elderly people,
and all this destruction and we have not heard anything from them, no messages,
no protests, with the exception of some timid statements. I say that this has struck
at the heart of their credibility. This means that there are other objectives for these
messages. We know these objectives, but things have now become very clear. We
might also ask that French official with burning enthusiasm, particularly concerning
Syria, is he going to call for an international investigation committee to investigate
the massacre of Qana [July 30, 2006] , not to mention the other massacres, as he
called for an investigation into the assassination of prime minister Hariri [February
14, 2005]? Is the reason here that in the first case the suspect was Syria, and this
is sufficient motive and justification, and in the second the suspect is Israel, and
nothing should be done. Or is it that the children of Qana and other poor people do
not deserve this official's attention?
We are convinced that the natural way to achieve peace is through negotiations.
But when this option fails, or when it is not available in the first place, resistance, in
its different forms, is the alternative for restoring rights. Resistance is not
necessarily or exclusively armed, it could be cultural or political or might take
different forms of rejection. So, supporting resistance aims at achieving peace not
war through deterring against aggression. If this does not work, it might be through
war in order to liberate the land. Resistance is not contradictory to peace or an
alternative for it. In our circumstances at least, it is necessary for the achievement
of peace. Otherwise, the result will be that we will lose the battle of war and the
battle for peace, particularly that Israel and those who stand behind it have shifted
completely to adopting the military option based on preemptive war, while we the
Arabs have remained in our place discoursing and negotiating with ourselves
convinced of a promised peace with an illusory party which prepares itself on a daily
basis for its next aggression on the Arabs.
This subject of resistance and its importance has been under long discussions for
over a decade now with foreign and Arab officials, and in the stage that preceded
liberating the largest part of the Lebanese territories in 2000 we used to get into
discussions with Arab and foreign officials about this issue. Of course, it did not
surprise us that foreigners were not able to understand our logic, but in our
deliberations with Arabs, which is of interest to us, we used to tell them that this
resistance will liberate Lebanon and they, I mean some of them of course, used to
answer that it is more like cat scratching. In 2000 Lebanon was liberated thanks to
the resistance, which proved they were wrong and we were right. After 2000 once
again we started to have the same kind of discussion as we, Arabs, are fond of
repeating history with all its details without advancement sometimes. The same
discussion took place by exerting pressure on Syrian with regard to the same issue.
Our answer was that the resistance is a deterrent to any Israeli aggression, a logic
which they once again rejected. Now the most recent battles prove the same logic.
They were wrong and we were right, which means a double mistake in
mathematical terms. If we want to calculate the result of previous discussions
regarding other subjects starting by terrorism and going through the war on Iraq
and Iran, we would have scored a big number of mistakes.
The latest developments in Lebanon have proven the validity of that logic. As
aggression against Lebanon is not mainly linked to the abduction of the two
soldiers; rather it was preplanned before with the objective of regaining balance to
the Israeli scheme that went under several relapses such as the defeat of the
Israeli army before the resistance strikes and its withdrawal in 2000 and the failure
of its allies in Lebanon in carrying out the missions that were delegated to them
during the past short period of time. As for the abduction, it was for them a mere
justification to start this aggression before the world. However, the result was more
failure experienced by Israel, its allies and its masters and more steadfastness of
the national forces that support the resistance, which made the concept of
resistance more rooted in the minds and hearts of hundreds of millions in the Arab
and Islamic region.
Everyone knows now that the plan was prepared in advance and many wrote about
the fact that this plan, of the war, has been set years before. In the Western and
Arab media it is said that the Israelis have been well-prepared for these battles and
it is also said that the scheme took its final shape last June and it was expected to
be implemented next fall. Some say that considerations were made about the
tourism season, but of course it is not possible that Israel would worry about the
season of tourism, may be they would worry about the interest of their agents in
Lebanon. This reminds us of what I said in my speech before the Parliament on
March 5th, 2005 that what is happening now is the same that happened on the 17th
of May. Many of the young generation do not recall what took place in the real 17th
of May, 1983 where there were Lebanese forces that worked as agents for Israel
before the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Those forces failed in their plans of hitting
the joint Palestinian-Lebanese resistance, so they started to incite and call Israel to
save them by waging a war. Indeed the war took place with the objective of hitting
the resistance and having Lebanon join the Israeli convoy. 17th of May failed.
Today, the same repercussions have taken place: Lebanese groups fail in
achieving their pro-Israeli scheme; so they incite Israel to come militarily in order to
save them from the predicament and hit the resistance, therefore having Lebanon
join the Israeli camp. In both incidents there is an Arabic coverage. That is why I
stress the 17th of May incident. When a product fails in the world of business, it is
reintroduced to the market under a new brand with certain superficial amendments.
Similarly, and no matter what name we give to those groups whether we call them
February or March forces, I would stress here that their product is that of May the
17th and this is an Israeli product.
This will, naturally, invoke many attacks that you will hear on T.V. screens, which is
helpful in assessing the use of this speech. The more violent the attack, the better
the speech, I think. Of course we will laugh a lot because there is a lot of political
comedy now in the Lebanese political class. Now we can establish the correlation
between resolutions 1559, 1780, and 1701, the assassination of Hariri, and the last
war on the one hand and the role of those Lebanese forcers and certain Arab
forces on the other. The link has now become clear. You remember that two years
ago or less than that before we used to say that resolution 1559 has nothing to do
with the extension of President Lahoud's term of office. It was quite difficult then to
convince people of that. Now the same thing is happening once again. The war has
nothing to do with the capture of the two soldiers and the whole world
acknowledges this. Therefore, nothing has to do with anything. There is a preplanned scheme and whoever fails to see this reality after all these events and
clarity of matters must be suffering from a problem in their vision, what I mean here
is the vision of the mind rather than of the eye.
Therefore, this resistance is essential in as much as it is natural and legitimate. Its
legitimacy stems from the fact that the Israeli aggressions have not stopped since
2000 taking the form of the almost daily violation of Lebanese air space by Israeli
warplanes. Add to this that Israel is still occupying part of the Lebanese territories
and still keeps Lebanese prisoners who have been in Israeli jails for a long time. As
for why this resistance is essential, let us just think of the direct achievements of
the latest battles on the ground. The greatest achievement of those battles is that
they came as a national response to the cowardly propositions that have been
circulated through our region especially after the Iraq invasion. What made them
more glorious is the reaction of the Arab people in general which was marked by
being a purely pan-Arab response to the abominable, seditious propositions that we
have heard recently and to those who stand behind them. As though these people
are saying to them, "we are Arab and this is our resistance and those who do not
support it are against us." This means that the national feeling is still there and has
not been weakened as some might claim. On the contrary, this feeling is at its peak
now, thus exceeding all the destructive thoughts that suspicious parties with wellknown ends are seeking to market among Arab citizens.
The glorious battles fought by the resistance with rare faith and competence have
proven a number of facts: The first is that military force, no matter how great,
produces defeat when it does not have faith and morals, and when it is not based
on legitimate rights and principled policy. The second is that the resistance that has
faith, determination and steadfastness and that encompasses the vision, principles
and goals of the people and is encompassed and adopted by them produces
victory. In this case the victory of the heavy-armed enemy does not exceed being a
destruction of stones and killing of civilians. And as every occupation is an immoral
act, then it is doomed to, and must, fail and meet defeat. Israel is the best example
here.
Military force is not everything and the destructive force of weapons is not
everything. The only thing Israel possesses is the destructive force at the military
level and some other factors at the international level, but at the same time it
possesses a very big force; namely the weakness of the Arabs, both morally and
physically. When we decide to overcome this gap, a decision that we ourselves can
make, there is no doubt that the balance is in our favour. Hence the third fact that
stresses the limitation of the Israeli force despite its superiority. This limitation is
determined by the intensity of our faith, steadfastness and will to fight, which must
enhance our self-confidence and erase all traces of psychological defeat fostered
by the enemy's propaganda that sees the battle as being settled in advance in the
interest of Israel or that defeat is the destiny of Arabs. This fact has to further
motivate Israel to consider the future results of its terrorist policy against Arabs.
Here we can draw a comparison between what took place in between the 1982 war
24 years ago and the last war in Lebanon a few days ago. In 1982 Israel started its
war or land invasion of Lebanon on the 6th of June where it reached Ba'abda that
overlooks Beirut on June 13th, i.e. on the seventh day Israel was very close to
Beirut. Then they resumed the process of encircling and occupying Beirut. Today,
after five weeks almost, Israel is still struggling and suffering to occupy several
hundreds of meters here and several hundreds of meters there, and they are trying
to reach the closest point to the Litani River, which is only six kilo meters, yet they
fail. And I am sure that had there been a spring or a stream of the Litani on the
Palestinian-Lebanese borders, they would have put their feet in the water and said,
"we have reached the Litani!." They have become the subject of sarcasm and lost
the credibility which they have never enjoyed before. They say, "we have occupied
a site", then they say, "we have bombed the site". It is supposed to happen in the
opposite way. This is common sense that we first bomb a site then occupy it.
Anyhow, what is the difference between the first war and the second? In 1982 the
technical gap between Israel and the opposite Palestinian-Lebanese side in military
assets was smaller than the gap today. Israel's force has doubled several times
during this time and there is a big gap between it and that of the resistance today.
But the difference is the will to fight. In fact, in 1982 there were tough Palestinian
and Lebanese fighters who fought in the real sense of the word.
But this is not enough as certain leaderships did not enjoy the will to fight at all in
1982, while now the will to fight is there in the base and at the top and there is a
popular embracing of this resistance that helped it succeed. This is a major
difference that we have to know about the two wars. One of the other positive sides
of this war is that it has completely uncovered the Arab situation. Of course if we
asked any Arab citizen about the Arab situation before this war, they will say that it
is bad, which is true. But Arab citizens used to see the Arab situation under
makeup. Now they see it as it is in reality without any cosmetics. This war
prevented the use of such cosmetics as it classified positions in a clear way. There
was no room for half solutions in such a war where it unveiled half men, or people
with half positions as it unveiled all late positions, i.e. those who were waiting to see
where the scale of strength will settle have fallen along with their positions. This is
one of the very important qualities of this battle.
For all the above mentioned reasons, this battle has been considered by Israel a
matter of life or death, because it makes Israel lose its dignity and its moral
influence on us, thus losing its historic role which it was created for and its mission
for the West. That is why, they have started working hard to make up for their
military defeat and failure in achieving their objectives on the ground by means of
any political, international achievement that justifies the survival of Israel and its role
before its citizens, leaders, and allies. As usual, the only outlet for them is the
Security Council which the USA has transformed from a council to preserve
security into one that destroys it by issuing a resolution that responds to the
demands of Israel and saves it from its predicament at the expense of Lebanon,
paving the way for further division and instability.
If we go back to the Security Council resolutions issued in the past two years, i.e.
resolutions 1559, 1860, and 1701, and those concerning Darfur for instance,
among other resolutions, we would completely comprehend where the Security
Council is heading to. It is heading towards interfering in the domestic affairs of
member countries and creating turbulence. Some people say the Security Council
is impotent, and this is not true. The Security Council was impotent when there was
an international balance. Had the Security Council been impotent at present, the
United States would not have relied on it to harm different places around the world.
The truth is that the rest of the world, or perhaps most of it, has become impotent
before the Security Council. We used to say "the international community". The
international community is a group of countries, some of which are members of the
Security Council, and some are their allies outside the Security Council. They fight
us with or without the Security Council resolutions, which means they will fight us
anyway. Yet the Security Council resolutions give them more freedom to move in
this fight. On the other hand, our weakness lies in the fact that when we speak of
the Security Council – some people in the Arab World and in the world at large say
this is a Security Council resolution, or this is what the Security Council wants – as
if it were a council with a divine power, or as if its resolutions were sacred or
revealed by God, and indeed this is dangerous.
Therefore, the solution, as I said at earlier stages when I talked about resolution
1559 at Damascus University, is that the national decision is always higher than any
international decision even if this led to fight and war. We do not have another
option. This is what we recently expressed to whoever contacted us, to whomever
we contacted and to everybody we met during the hostilities. We said that any
resolution to be issued by the Security Council, whether under Chapter VII or any
other chapter, will either not be implemented or will lead to instability if they try to
implement it by force and against the will of the countries of the region, and in the
case of Lebanon outside the Lebanese consensus. In such a case the situation will
be different for the Security Council. That is when all the countries decide that the
national decision is the higher, we wouldn't feel afraid of the Security Council
because it reflects the balance of powers and we decide to be weak. Whereas
when we decide to be strong, this balance will change with or without resolutions.
So, we shouldn't waste time and speak of a good or bad resolution in light of this
international balance. Here I will move away from the diplomatic expressions used
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in its recent statement, to say that there is a
bad resolution, a worse resolution, and a less bad resolution as far as this
resolution has to do with Israel and the Arabs. And as far as the United States is
the antagonist and the arbitrator at the same time, the assessments will be like this.
But does this mean that resolution 1701 doesn't have any positive elements at all?
No. It does have positive elements. The most important element for us is to stop
the war, stop destroying Lebanon and stop killing innocent civilians, kids, women,
the elderly and others. This is an essential goal for the Arabs, Lebanon and Syria,
and I believe for many countries and peoples around the world.
Yet, experience has taught us that positivity covers the form and negativity covers
the content. This is the only problem with this resolution. It held the Resistance
Movement accountable. I don't want to go through the details, but this point is one
of the striking and stark facts which we cannot accept. Naturally, who should be
held accountable? I'm not expressing a position here, but for everybody, even
outside the Arab and Muslim region, Israel is the party who should be held
accountable. We still have to say that those who encouraged Israel to attack
Lebanon, stood by and supported it should be held accountable as well.
The May 17 Group is responsible for the destruction, massacres and the war from
A to Z. Hence come resolution 1701 as a political lift for this group, aiming of
course at granting Israel political gains that it failed to achieve by military means.
The resolution came also as an international political lift, but why international?
Because there isn't anymore a national lift that can lift these people, and thus they
were forced to find an international one. They will use this lift to start attacking the
resistance, and we have already seen that. Before the blood of the victims dried,
before anything else, and even before the displaced headed back to their villages,
the May 17 Group members started to talk about disarming the Resistance
Movement. This means that one of their future tasks after the war failed is saving
the current Israeli government and Israel's domestic front either through making a
sedition in Lebanon, and consequently transferring the political fight from inside
Israel to inside Lebanon, or through the possibility of disarming the resistance. But I
tell those people that they have failed and that their fall is looming.
The battles have also proved that Arabs' words have no weight or importance in
international forums. It has been rare that we, Arabs, agree on something from A to
Z, but we achieved that in the Beirut meeting and an Arab delegation, representing
all the Arab countries without exception, flied to New York to face rejection and
neglect. Of course this neglect wasn't directed at the delegation members but
rather at those who stand behind it, i.e. the Arab countries.
Indeed, it was the situation on the ground, and the steadfastness of the Lebanese
people and of the resistance and not the Arab political performance which modified
the previous draft resolution into the current formula, which is less bad. This is an
important fact we should comprehend. In all these matters we have come to the
conclusion that relying on the international situation doesn't yield fruitful results. As
Arabs, if we do not search for points of strength, then we have no weight or political
performance, and all this talking is mere illusions.
In my belief, the real battle has just started but not in military terms. After the
uncovering of the post-war positions, the real battle has just started in Lebanon. But
we all listened to the speech of Hizballah's Secretary General, Mr. Hasan
Nassrullah, who answered them. He who reads the messages understands the
content. We believe that not only the Syrians but also all the Arab people stand by
the resistance completely and unequivocally.
In military terms, the resistance achieved victory, whereas Israel, by all military
standards, was defeated, not at the end of the war but rather from the very
beginning of it. Yet wars bring woes and Lebanon paid a big price, material and
humanitarian. Arabs, therefore, must stand by Lebanon to build what was
destroyed. Yet, the question is: will the blood of the martyrs and civilians be lost
without any gain? As a bottom line, we have to change the military victory into a
political victory, at least in the peace process. The early results of the battles at the
political level were the talk about the necessity of realizing peace and returning
lands and rights to their owners. To this effect, we, as Arabs, have been consulted
on the issue, even after such a long time. This means that part of this issue has
come to lie in our hands now, but only a small part. This is of course thanks to the
resistance. Hence, standing by and supporting the resistance will help us possess
the bigger part of the peace file, which in turn will make the concerned countries
take our opinion and interests into account.
In other words, resistance and peace constitute one pillar rather than two pillars,
and he who supports part of it has to support the other part. Whereas those who
claim to have the experience and vision for peace, here we are. come and show us
your achievements in the field of resistance. Apart from that, any experience is
incomplete to learn from. And as we are living an exceptional and historic period,
there is no room for courtesies, bargains or settlements. Rather, we have to speak
frankly: We, in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, still have occupied lands; this means
we are the ones concerned with war and peace. In the fist place we want from our
Arab brothers to stand with us, and we welcome anyone who wants to do so but
only through our vision and evaluation of our interests. We were the ones who
suffered in war and in peace negotiations in the last decades. As for those who do
not share our vision, we only ask them to stand aside so that we do what we have
to do, and we won't ask anyone to fight with us or for us.
I say this because every time there is turbulence, we come to hear an X official
saying, "Why did they drag us into this?" Nobody drags anyone into anything. The
truth is that every country is responsible for itself. They didn't of course say this to
us; they said it to the resistance. But as a general principle, everyone is responsible
for his own country. Yet as a bottom line, they must not adopt the vision of the
enemy towards our issues, and their roles shouldn't be at the expense of our
interests. We say this because anyone never had experience in war is not entitl

Chronologie 2006 - Genfer Initiative

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