Title: Poverty and Peace in the PALOP

POVERTY AND PEACE IN THE
PORTUGUESE SPEAKING
AFRICAN COUNTRIES1
Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues
Ana Bénard da Costa
(Editors)
SUMMARY
Introduction
Cristina Rodrigues and Ana Bénard da Costa
PART I
Angola at war and at peace
The Nature of the Parties on the Prospects of Power-Sharing in the Angola Peace Processes
Ricardo de Sousa
What Effects From Peace in Reducing Poverty? A perspective from empirical records collected in
the cities of Huambo and Luanda
Carlos Manuel Lopes
„We Create Minimum Conditions‟: survival of the female market vendors of Luanda in the postwar
Aline Afonso Pereira
Reflection on poverty of displaced populations: the Hanha case
Emanuel Lopes
PART II
War, poverty and peace in Mozambique
„Quantitative Literature‟ and the Interpretation of the Armed Conflict in Mozambique
(1976-1992)
João Paulo Borges Coelho
Mozambique: poverty in war and poverty in peace
Ana Bénard da Costa
PART III
Reflections regarding poverty, conflicts and violence: the Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and
Principe and Cape Verde cases
(Intermittent) Poverty and Peace in Guinea-Bissau
Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues and Alfredo Handem
The Harsh Fight against Poverty in Sao Tome and Principe
Augusto Nascimento
‘Poverty…, of course we have it…‟ Notes for the analysis of an institutional conscience about
poverty and micro-violence in Cape Verdean contexts
Augusto Nascimento
Conclusion
Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues and Carlos Manuel Lopes
1
This document is a translation of the book published in Portuguese, Pobreza e Paz nos PALOP, by the
Sextante Editora (2009), ISBN 978-989-676-007-6. Enquiries and orders contact [email protected].
Introduction
Ana Bénard da Costa
Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues
As the end result of a multidisciplinary investigation project conducted in Africa, this
publication about Poverty and Peace in the Portuguese-speaking African Countries1 has
the purpose, on one hand, of presenting the main conclusions of the studies conducted
in these countries and, on the other, to provide a collection of guidelines for future
research relevant to the comprehension of the combination of both phenomena.
In spite of most part of the existent analysis about poverty in the Portuguese-speaking
African Countries (PALOP) being related to the war‟s significance and role, in
particular the post-independence conflicts, there is not a significant amount of studies
focusing specifically on the direct connection between war/peace and the
increase/decrease of poverty in these countries. Although there are several analytic
approaches implicated in this correlation – for instance, with reference to development,
to conflicts and peacekeeping, to cooperation – it is still difficult to interconnecting
these areas, in term of research and in terms of performance. Among the possible
explanations for this difficulty is emphasized the handling of poverty and war issues by
differentiated actors, both at an academic level and in matters of political (and
economic) management.
On the other hand, the perspectives about the correlations between poverty and peace
are, generally, bidirectional. In the African context, peace is seen as a condition for the
elimination of poverty or the eliminations of poverty is seen as a path for reaching peace
(Smith, 2005; Bush, 2004; Green & Hulme, 2005; Narayan, 2000; Bernard, 2002;
Solomon & Cilliers, 1996; Bryant & Kappaz, 2005; Murshed, 2002; Collier & Hoeffler,
1998). In the case of Angola, the issues of war and peace remained longer at the center
of the research on poverty and development, appearing systematically in studies of
social, political and economic nature, referring to the reciprocal implications (Anstee,
1997; Grobbelaar, Mills & Sidiropoulos, 2003; Abreu, 1989; Ferreira, 2006; Ferreira &
Barros, 1995; UNDP, 2000; Grobbelaar, Mills & Sidiropoulos, 2003). In Mozambique,
the studies conducted about poverty are decreasing its focus on the relevance of war and
conflicts, due to the long period of stability experienced since the end of the war,
although are occasionally mentioned its long-term effects on the country‟s
socioeconomic condition (Adam e Coimbra, 1996; Green, 1991; Oppenheimer e
Raposo, 2002; AMECOM, 2004; G20, 2004; Oppenheimer, 1992-1994; Simler, 2004).
In countries where the evolution of war and peace is defined by stages of instability or
crisis – such as Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe – the studies rarely refer the
influences of the political situation over poverty‟s reduction or growth (Kovsted & Finn,
1999; UNDP, 2003; Inec, 2002; Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 2004; Sao Tome and
Principe Ministry of Planning and Finance, 2002, 2003; Rodrigues et al., 2006). In Cape
Verde, the only country among this group where there has always been an absence of
1
PTDC/AFR/64207/2006, funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Science and
Technology Foundation) and by the FEDER through the programme PTDC and hosted by the Centre of
African Studies (CEA) of the ISCTE-IUL.
1
conflicts and war, poverty studies do not demonstrate, as would be expected, a
substantially more positive evolution and poverty still constitutes one of the country‟s
main concerns (Costa, 1999; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Regional Development,
2004).
This research intended to reflect on this relation, analyzing situations of poverty and
conflict in the lusophone African countries throughout these last decades, based on a
multidisciplinary team research and on a data research methodology fundamentally
centered, but not exclusively, in meaningful interviews and personal narratives. The
team is composed by two anthropologists (Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues and Ana
Bénard da Costa), one economist (Carlos Manuel Lopes), one historian (Augusto
Nascimento), and has counted with the participation of researchers in the stage of
preparing their masters dissertations in Interdisciplinary African Studies
Interdisciplinary (Sílvia Pereira, Susana Mendes, Emanuel Lopes) and doctorate
dissertations in African Studies (Ricardo de Sousa and Aline Pereira). All these
investigators have conducted a documental and bibliographic research, most of the time
supplemented by field research for the collection of information and life narratives
(mostly during 2008). In the cases of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, the team also
counted on the support of local investigators – Luís Filipe Pereira, from the Cruzeiro do
Sul – Instituto de Investigação para o Desenvolvimento José Negrão and João Paulo
Borges Coelho from the Mondlane University, both located in Mozambique; and
Alfredo Handem, from the Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas (INEP), in
Guinea-Bissau – that have equally contributed to the preparation of this volume.
The project at the origin of this manuscript is, therefore, focused on the connection
between poverty and peace, analyzed according to the perceptions of several social
actors. Regardless of a growing multiplication of studies about either one or the other
phenomena in several African countries – and, namely, in lusophone African countries –
the instances where the causal relation or mutual implications between these
occurrences is explored and established are rare. Even less common is the systematical
collection of empirical data about the correlations between poverty/wealth and
peace/war from the standpoint of the social actors who have experienced those
circumstances throughout their lives. The study integrates examples of African counties
that, in spite of sharing some common elements of their recent history – colonial
regime, period when the independences occurred, post-independence political and
economic regimes – also are quite distinctive from each others: regarding the
background of regional geopolitical insertion and the models of productive
specialization related to dissimilar allocation of natural resources; in terms of processes
and levels of development during the colonial and post-colonial periods; in accordance
to the evolution of peace/conflict situations in the post-independence; relating to the
perspectives of development and poverty eradication. The focus on the correlation
peace/poverty, in the realm of a more comprehensive research about the causes for the
high poverty rates observed in each on of these nations, inscribes this project in the
framework of studies that aspire to contribute for the clarification of the processes
conditioning development.
Therefore, the purpose was to understand which influence a war, of over thirty years,
may have on the poverty situation of Angola; which is the influence of war, also longlasting, in Mozambique, and of peace that has been lasting for over fifteen years in this
country, over the current poverty situation; which influence the war and more recent
conflicts have over poverty in Guinea-Bissau; which influence have decades of peace –
somehow unstable in these last few years, on account of coups – over the situation in
2
Sao tome and Principe; in which measure has the peaceful condition that Cape Verde
has uninterruptedly experienced for centuries contributed to the explanation of its
poverty rates. The purpose is to confirm if it can be established a direct relation between
these two types of condition – poverty and war – or, if on the contrary, there are other
factor to account for in the processes for development and poverty control that play a
larger part and have more direct influence over the living condition in these countries.
The research entailed the study of the available information about the previously
mentioned correlation, focusing mostly on live narratives and in some particular cases
related to diverse types of social actors and circumstances in several countries. It was
also included records produced by institutions and experts directly associated to these
topics, being integrated in the existing theoretical framework alongside new data
collected during the field researches. The influence of peace on the living conditions is
analyzed at the level of its repercussions on the personal social and spatial mobility; the
economic choices and opportunities; the restraints to education; the access to
infrastructures and essential goods; the present welfare level and the way it is perceived.
The qualitative approach, centered on the practices and representation used by the social
actors – as a result, positioned in a emic domain, in other words, the social actors
provide their own perceptions and explanations – provides added value to the studies
about poverty, particularly in the African context (White, 2002; Bevan, 2004), and has a
particular significance in the case of lusophone countries.
The interviews were conducted in the capital cities of Angola, Mozambique, GuineaBissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, in urban and suburban areas – and, in
some occasions, in rural locations or in secondary towns (Huambo, Bafatá, Gabu,
Mindelo; Fogo, Boavista) – distributed according to previously defined typologies,
consistent with poverty/wealth situation, rural/urban origin, age and experienced time
for distinctive peace situations, as a manner to overcome the limited time and resources
available for this investigation. The life narratives collected were mostly centered on
individual trajectories, but have also incorporated a more far-reaching feature, relating
to the individual‟s family histories.
The present manuscript is the end result of this research project, congregating a
compilation of nine articles. Eight of these articles were written by participant
researchers in this project, and one of them results from the collaboration with the
researcher Alfredo Handem. The article The „Quantitative Literature‟ and the
interpretation of the armed conflict in Mozambique (1976-1992) was written by the
Mozambican historian João Paulo Borges Coelho, who has been pursuing a research
about the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo and has accepted to collaborate in this
volume.
These nine articles, although having as background the project‟s subject matter, present
very distinctive characteristics. On one hand, the relevance afforded to the relations
poverty-war-peace, or separately to each one of the occurrences, is not consistent among
the collected articles. This is explained by the different situations experienced in each of
the five African countries, either in matters of poverty as in matters of existence, or
inexistence, of wars, conflicts and governmental and political instabilities. The lack of
uniformity among the articles is equally explained by the theoretical and thematic
options that the authors were compelled to do, by reason of the vast subject at hand. It is
also explained by the diversity of the diversity of disciplinary areas of its authors and by
their respective research trajectories, necessarily implying the conception of reflections
in accordance to diverse theoretical, thematic, methodological and analytical
perspectives. At last, this diversity is yet explained by the fact that this volume compiles
3
a collection of contributions from authors who have important distinctions in terms of
research experience: some are still in graduation stages, while others are researchers
with a vast curriculum.
The multiplicity of perspectives and approaches about the same issues contained in this
manuscript would certainly pose a problem of insoluble result if the main purpose was
to compare the occurrences of poverty, war and peace and their connections in these
five countries. However, the purpose of this project is to understand how this
correlation, poverty-war-peace, is perceived by the social actors and, simultaneously,
how the knowledge of these perceptions may influence the investigation regarding these
issues and its complex implications. Despite the fundamental significance of more
abstract approaches, whose interest is centered on the critical interpretation of
perspectives anchored in quantitative methodologies with incidence over comparative
analysis, (see article by João Paulo Borges Coelho) or in discussions about the
operationality of certain concepts in the analysis of conflict situations (see article by
Ricardo de Sousa), most articles in this volume have focused, as mentioned above, on
the social actors‟ perceptions and make use of an empirical research that employs
qualitative methodologies of investigation. From this last alternative resulted a
compilation of articles (seven) embracing a large diversity of social actors. Some of
these articles are primarily centered on determinate social groups (Emanuel Lopes‟
article about the Hanha) or economic groups (the articles written by Aline Pereira and
Carlos Manuel about the economic agents in the informal economy); other search
randomly to understand the social actors‟ perceptions and the manner in which these are
molded by their life experiences (the articles by Ana Bénard da Costa, Cristina
Udelsmann Rodrigues and Alfredo Handem, and by Augusto Nascimento). In some of
these contributions the presented analysis and macro contextualization of the
phenomena of poverty and war have a significant relevance, while in others there is a
larger focus on regional or thematic framings.
The plurality of situations under scrutiny in these different articles and the diversity of
focuses and approaches illustrate the multiple dimensions included in the occurrences of
war/peace and poverty and the extreme complexity of finding extensive theoretical
approaches which can convincingly explain the causes, effects and connections that are
applicable in these diverse spatial and temporal contexts. In particular when, as in the
present situation and in many of the articles, the research option that support them come
from the development of qualitative approaches based on life narratives. The analysis of
the different actors‟ perceptions on the subject of these events, their connections and the
manner which they have affected and still affect their lives, reflects a set of unique
experiences that, even when sharing some common elements – for example, similarities
of situations experienced during the war, ages, economic status, socio-cultural or
geographical origins – can hardly be incorporated within generalist justification or
theories. If it can be reached some kind of general conclusion about this set of articles
compiled in this volume, is that there is no direct causal connection between poverty
and war that might explain every individual and/or family conditions, as it can be
acknowledged while reading this volume.
Another factor that must be emphasized and clarified and which reflects as well the
analytical options of the project aggregating the contributions compiled in this volume
is related to the differentiated importance that the five countries have in the complete
collection of articles. There are four articles concerning Angola, two concerning
Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe are revised
in three articles, on for each country. This situation does not reflect any kind of priority
4
afforded to Angola among the group of research countries, but it is mostly due to the
fact that among the members participating in this project there is larger number of those
who have an academic trajectory anchored in this country, furthermore the most
affected by war in recent times. Concurrently, since poverty, war and peace and their
complex connections are multidimensional phenomena, whose comprehension is
positively supplemented by the possibility to observe the analysis which allows to
wholly embrace an effective diversity (more theoretical studies, analysis centered on the
macro level and qualitative analysis or case studies), has caused to choose a plurality of
thematic approaches as the main criteria, instead of choosing national representativity.
In the Angola case, the issues of poverty, peace and war are approached in four articles.
The first one, by Ricardo de Sousa, focus exclusively on a biographical analysis about
the war between Unita and Mpla, and the literature concerning the „power sharing
accords‟. The author presents the mains limitations and challenges that this type of
accords pose.
Afterwards, he describes, in general, the different stages in the evolution of the Angolan
conflict and the several moments when solutions were tried to achieve for power
sharing. He concludes this section mentioning that these solutions only achieved the
sought result – peace – after the death of Jonas Savimbi, which confirms that the
accords imposed by the victorious party are more enduring than the accords negotiated
among parties, meanwhile stressing that during this stage “the negotiating process, as
well as the settled dimensions of power sharing were also important to establish peace”.
Then the author describes the nature of the confrontational political forces, summing up
its evolution.
In the fourth section of his article, Ricardo de Susa presents what he considers to be the
limitations in the application of power sharing models to the Angola case, separating the
factors which have contributed to the failure of these solutions in the following manner:
inadequate external pressures; lack of a solution for structural power sharing;
leaderships‟ characteristics and ambitions; lack of trust following a prolonged war; and
the resources‟ role in the determination of the parties‟ incentives. After explaining the
influence these factors had over the impediments to a long-lasting and settled peace, the
author adds another factor that, in his opinion, was decisive to clarify the conflict‟s
continuity. Ricardo de Sousa defends that the monolithic nature of both parties in this
conflict has caused the “insufficient organic flexibility to fuse or share structures with
another similar party”, and implies that “it was the neo-patrimonial nature of these
parties that allowed the Mpla to accommodate Unita‟s factions into his neo-patrimonial
net and finally to settle peace in 2002 through a victory over the remaining, only and
isolated militarist faction headed by Jonas Savimbi”.
This article, by providing a global vision on a conflict that for 27 years has deeply
affected the daily lives of several generations of Angolans and by presenting the main
factors which have impeded throughout the years and, despite several attempts, to settle
enduring peace accords, is a frame for the following three articles about this country.
The first of these articles, written by Carlos Manuel Lopes, based on Angolan‟s
accounts collected in the cities of Huambo and Luanda, refer to the manner how the
war‟s effects during peacetime are conditioning and, in some cases, preventing an
effective poverty reduction. In the second article, Aline Pereira emphasizes, in her
analysis, the behaviors and survival strategies developed by the female vendors in the
informal market at Luanda in the post-war period, stressing the way how the previous
experiences occurred during the conflict are still conditioning, nowadays, these same
5
behaviors, particularly in matters of gender relations. At last, the article by Emanuel
Lopes, focusing on the perception that the Muhanha have about their own poverty and
welfare, throughout several periods since the independence until the peace in 2002 and
from then until the present time. In each one of these articles, the reflections are
preceded by a contextualization falling upon the main subject of research. Carlos
Manuel Lopes reflects on the evolution of the Angolan economy and informal economy,
Aline Pereira frames her analysis with a brief reference to the gender problematic and
the connection between gender and conflict, and Emanuel Lopes precedes his reflection
on the Hanha with an historical synopsis which approach the socioeconomic issues of
this social grouping.
Resuming the core of these three articles, it is considered relevant to draw attention to
the following features in each one of them:
The article by Carlos Manuel Lopes, besides the necessary introduction where, among
other subjects, the author describes the methodologies used during the research, is
divided into three distinctive sections: (i) the “Context”, (ii) “Some notes about the
general impact of the military conflict in the cities of Huambo and Luanda” and (iii)
“The actors‟ perceptions on the effects of the military conflict and peace”. In this last
section, more extensive than the previous ones, is analysed the empirical information
that was specifically collected for the research project anchoring this volume. In the first
part, the author gives a proposal for the periodization of the political and institutional
background involving the evolution of the Angolan economy since the independence in
1975, followed by an recognition of what he considers to be the five major stages of the
evolutionary process of the informal economy in Angola and by the presentation of data
concerning the evolution of poverty in this country. During this part, the author
connects these different features (evolution of the Angolan economy, informal economy
and poverty), allowing a macro contextualization which frames the generic description
about the evolution and present situation of the cities of Luanda and Huambo, where his
research took place, and which is presented in the final part of the first section of his
article.
In the second section, the author recalls the fact that Huambo was, after 1992, one of the
cities most ravaged by war, stressing some of the effects that have lasted until these
days. He namely refers to the “retraction of the production capacity in the formal sector
(public and private) and reduction of its relative importance on consumer satisfaction;
increase in the socio-economic significance of informal activities as the population‟s
labour source, in generating income and producing products and services; general
increase in poverty rates”. As well in this part and in regards to Angola, Carlos Manuel
Lopes selects one of most significant war impacts, the massive flux of dislocated people
that caused the urban expansion and its population growth, besides “substantial rise in
the population within active age excluded from any possible formal occupation”.
In the third section, where are analysed the actors‟ perceptions about the effects of the
military conflict and peace, the author emphasizes that among the group of interviewed
participants exist differentiated perceptions regarding the impact of war, being “the
memories of the conflict‟s destructive effects” more vivid in the Huambo‟s participants
or in those interviewed in Luanda who had been active agents in the conflict. He
declares that peace‟s benefits are patent in the majority of discourses and in these are
mentioned, in particular the rehabilitation of material assets, the recuperation of a safe
territorial mobility; the reunion of family members, the multiplication of business
opportunities and access to products and services. Meanwhile, Carlos Manuel Lopes
stresses “the lack of unanimity in the outlook of the interviewed individuals regarding
6
which effects the end of the war has had over the Angolan‟s lives” and that “some
suggest that nothing has changed”.
With reference to the interviewed participants‟ perceptions about their own situation in
terms of poverty/prosperity, Carlos Manuel Lopes assumed from his research that
„despite peace, many individuals are living with difficulties. Part of them considers their
personal situation as being similar to what it was in the war” and even these with
“considerable income, never assume to be rich. (...) they only rarely assume to be poor
either”. Another conclusion that the author offers and it seems important to mention is
that “having the ability to earn larger incomes does not necessarily constitute a
protection against the risk of impoverishment”.
Finally, in the conclusion of this article, the author point to the “prolonged military
conflict that arises from the narratives of the interviewed social actors from Huambo
and Luanda as one of the main determinant factors of poverty in the country” and that
they have selected as on of the most damaging effects “the prolonged process of
compulsory dislocations experienced by various Angolan families in the course of 27
years”.
Having started her article with brief references to the gender notion and the manner it
has been regarded in relation to Africa, Aline Pereira subsequently provides a reflection
where she questions the potential interactions between women and armed conflicts,
followed by a selection of testimonies from Angolan women who have been afflicted by
the war, namely, by being forced to flee and migrate to Luanda. The fourth part of her
article begins with a description of some of the most important features that the
adaptation to city life has entailed for these women, giving particular attention to
everything related to their insertion in the “informal” market‟s circuits. The author
groups women according to their sale spots, ordering them hierarchically in terms of the
greater or lesser advantages they offer to the vendors (the market being the most
advantageous, followed by the doorway sellers and for last the street vendors –
zungueiras). The author declares: “The street is a last resource, the outcome of their lack
of sufficient money to have a spot in the marketplace or of not having enough customers
at their doorway. These women do not have suitable working conditions; they endure
under the weight of the merchandise they carry around the streets – under the sun, in the
dust, in the polluted atmosphere. They prepare the food to be sold and eat their own
meals sitting in the streets, without any sanitary conditions”.
In the next section, the author approaches the mutual aid strategies, mentioning that the
family becomes on of the most significant social support networks for these women,
followed by the religious institutions. The occurrence that Aline Pereira calls an
informal “joint-venture” is discussed in the sixth section of the article. Telling how
these “joint-ventures” create “shopping groups” composed by more experienced sellers
who buy their merchandise in foreign countries. She assumes that these groups are an
important mechanism for business development and allow for savings. In the final part
of her article, the author analyses some of the credit systems available, namely the
rotating credit system called kixikila, which is funded and managed by the women
themselves.
From the presented conclusions, it must be given emphasis to the fact that she mentions
that among the interviewed women few are those who have adopted some sort of
expansion or market positioning strategy, and “although within a limited reach, several
microcredit programs have resulted to be, particularly in the case of women from the
informal sector, an important course for the development of small businesses and,
7
consequentially, to the improvement of living conditions” but, she adds, “these
programs cannot be interpreted as the ultimate solution to the promotion of women in
the Angolan society. In general, the scarcity of training, low employment, limited
access to social assistance as well as to many others services and resources, have been
blocking the inversion of structural inequalities to which women have been submitted
until now”.
In the last article pertaining to Angola, written by Emanuel Lopes and titled “Reflection
on poverty afflicting migrant populations: the Hanha case study”, the author searches to
find out how the Muhanha people regard poverty, how they indentify it and perceive it
when afflicted by it, and clarifies that this has required the execution of an historical
research through which he attempted to find out about the Muhanha‟s past since the
time previous to the colonial war until now. In consequence, after presenting the
methodology and elucidating about the central concepts in use (absolute poverty, rural
poverty, property and exchange rights, and social exclusion), the author describes the
Muhanha‟s history. He explains the multiple transformations that have occurred for this
people since a period of time preceding the arrival of the Portuguese, passing through
the several phases of the colonial period when the Muhanha have converted from
caravan traders into commercial farmers equally undergoing a certain “proletarization”
that comes along with the occupation of their better farming lands by Portuguese
colonists and corporations. According to this author, in the end of the 1960s decade, the
Muhanha produced for self-consumption, having some surplus and some income earned
in job posts in several services of the Portuguese administration.
The author proceeds with his historical analysis about the Muhanha during the postindependence period, focusing on features that might enlighten the evolution of the
poverty rates among this social group. He mentions that in the year following the
independence “the immediate impoverishment is not perceived and none of the
interviewees has mentioned it”; however, the situation inverts in the subsequent years
(until 1991/92), and the perception of those (..) who experienced those times is that it
was when they have “become poor, for being expelled from their homeland without any
means of subsistence”. Emanuel Lopes highlights the importance that the familial and
religious networks still had during this period, establishing links among those who
migrate to the city (Benguela) and those who remain in the region.
About the following period – peacetime between 1991 and 1992 – the author considers
that this had a „propagating effect on the informal economy, improving the living
conditions of both Vahanha groups, particularly those located in Benguela‟ and
permitting somehow the return to the fields that was rapidly interrupted by the war‟s
reoccurrence. Emanuel refers that the Muhnaha region became again the stage for
conflicts, impelling the population to take refuge in the urban locations and refugee
centers created in the meantime. The author stresses that, in these centers, the familial
and religious networks tend to disintegrate, being then „replaced‟ by the International
Aid and everything it will indirectly permit and instruct: obstacles to circulation,
corruption and trafficking of products offered by the international community. From all
this has resulted the creation of new social nets, juxtaposing the traditional nets, but
they all become target of a powerful political manipulation that would entail, according
to the author, the „posterior political indifference of the Vahanha population‟. The
author claims that „the period between 1994 and 2002 is when the population is afflicted
by the most serious poverty conditions. This is not restricted to life below the poverty
line, but concerns physical survival, recalling absolute poverty‟. This situation, and the
fact that the new social networks are, perhaps, much more volatile and precarious than
8
the traditional solidarity nets, elucidate the reason why the author, contradicting what
had mentioned before, talks about this period when the Muhanha reinforce their
solidarity nets and „those living in Benguela find ways to help out those living in
refugee camps or isolated in some designated locations. The religious relations are
undoubtedly noticeable‟.
In the final section of his article, Emanuel Lopes describes the post-period period and,
after mentioning several restraints to which the Muhanha have been submitted, he
implies that generally those restraints have not prevented the return to their original
homelands and going back to a traditional agricultural living, or to migrate to Benguela.
He adds that the solidarity networks do not seem to have been very affected and, in
some instances, (the religious ones) seem to have been reinforced, having recuperated
the links among those living in urban centers and those residing in the rural region. On
the subject of the perceptions that the interviewed participants have about their current
situation as regards of lesser or greater poverty, the author assumes that they „believe
this peace period to be better than the last stages of conflict‟ and „the Vahanha became
poor when they lost the possibility to hold cattle and farmland‟.
In the last part of the article, the author approaches the issue of social exclusion,
finishing off with „the Vahanha, owing to an integrative sense conceded by their
religious solidarity network, do not feel excluded, but they tend to self-exclude from
public political and social structures‟.
In the second part of this volume are published two articles about Mozambique, the
previously mentioned article by the historian João Paulo Borges Coelho, and an article
written by Ana Bénard da Costa titled „Mozambique: poverty in war poverty in peace‟.
These two articles, although essentially distinctive in nature – one centered on
dissecting the application of quantitative models to the analysis of the armed conflict in
Mozambique, and another focused on the connections between this conflict and poverty,
significantly anchored in the analysis of qualitative research results – do intersect and
complement each other.
Borges Coelho‟s article explicitly explores some features related to war that Ana Bénard
da Costa‟s article refers to without going further, and the qualitative analysis she
performed founded on the participants‟ narratives elucidates some of the features that
the previous article points as being important criticisms to the quantitative model,
namely some features related to „the dismemberment of real social processes and their
reduction to a sequence of data‟.
João Paulo Borges Coelho‟s article is divided into four sections, the required
introduction and conclusion, and two analytic chapters titled respectively „Origin and
nature‟ (2nd) and „Duration and Transformation‟ (3rd). In the introduction is
demonstrated the Quantitative Literature (QL) in the study of civil wars, declaring he
intends to discuss the effectiveness of utilizing these quantitative models to the
Mozambican case. The author mentions that these models search for „new
methodologies based on a “data” compilation plentiful enough to allow, by its statistical
treatment, establishing general probabilistic relations which will configure theoretical
principles‟, and create large databases on conflict, „presuming the general theory
developed from its interpretation permits to analyze concrete cases and predict future
cases, as well as to inform political decisions‟. Recognizing the existence of several
factions, the author affirms that most of them, under the influence of Paul Collier, see
„economics, and concurrently econometrics, as the answer to the most important
matters‟.
9
In the first chapter, the author discusses the origins of the conflict that, in the initial
stage, opposed MNR and Frelimo, in accordance to a compromise among the QL
concerning the significance of the internal causes in the instigation of civil wars. Borges
Coelho starts by mentioning that most authors working on the subject of the
Mozambican conflict believe it was started by a foreign aggression headed by Rhodesia
which had created the MNR (Mozambique National Resistance) with the purpose of
„combating the Zimbabwean forces located in Mozambique and destabilizing the central
land strip adjacent to the Beira Corridor‟. For this author, this theory, though true, is
contrary to the QL‟s theory that, while admitting the influence of external factors in
civil wars, does not consider them to be structuring, since that would be
„overcomplicating the distinction between conflict among states and civil wars‟.
Nevertheless, Borges Coelho defends that „as intense and militarily efficient the
Rhodesian offensive had been, by itself it could never explicate the prompt support
given by a considerable number of Mozambicans to the rebel contingent‟ and then
searches to verify if any other of the independent variables which the QL associates to a
risk of occurrence of civil wars (poverty, temporal distance from the previous conflict,
ethnical dominance and political instability) have taken place in the Mozambican
conflict.
Studying these variables in an attentive and profound manner, and refuting the motives
offered by the other authors as explanations for the beginning of the conflict, Borges
Coelho concludes as followed: „it is therefore very difficult to believe the QL,
specifically the CH model, has produced stimulating perspectives. The relevant
independent variables either ignore any context, or are chronologically dyslexic (for
instance, the social impact of the economic decline during this stage), are reductive and
rather inconsistent (for instance, all analysis made on the performance of the new
regime), or practically incomprehensible (the case of ethnic dominance); and when the
inference seems to be correct, such as in the case of the proximity to the previous
conflict, such happens for the wrong reasons‟.
In the third chapter (“Duration and Transformation”), Borges Coelho approaches the
independent variables presented by the QL for explaining the duration of the conflicts
(the territorial geographical features, the social fractionalization – ethnic and religious –
and the economic opportunities subsequent to the hostilities), referring, on the other
hand, that this last explanation is the most recurrent in relation to the causes for the
Mozambican conflict‟s continuity, and submits a collection of motives, highlighting the
relevance of the external factors for this conflict‟s development, putting further
emphasis on the complex connection between conflict and the profound transformations
occurred in South Africa.
However, Borges Coelho does not forgo the importance of the all set of internal factors
that, particularly since the beginning of the 1980s decade become clearly manifest and
coincidental, thus elucidating the conflict‟s development. In his article, Borges Coelho
demonstrates the extreme complexity regarding the military conflicts. To the
multiplicity of causes and actors in attendance is added its essentially processual and
dynamic nature, which causes internal transformations alongside the necessary
transformation of the (frequently ambiguous or even incompatible) connections among
them. Borges Coelho advises of the danger of explanations, like those defended by the
QL, which search to „to reduce the number of actors and also to immobilize them, so it
can be obtained absolute values to provide input for statistical operations‟. He proceeds
by pointing out, amid other factors, the lack of rigor in the display of data – specifically
those related to Mozambique – and questioning „the general meaning of the
10
dismemberment of real social processes and their reduction to data sequences‟. In the
end, to finalize this brief synopsis of the article, one of the author‟s sentences that
accurately summarizes his critical perspective on the conflict analysis performed by the
Quantitative Literature: „By looking for the numbers‟ objectivity as an evasion from the
beliefs that swarm the research labor, the QL becomes ironically attached to them,
transmitting a strange and contradictory sensation of “high-tech” technology prompted
by a neoclassic conception inspired in the 19th century colonial flavor. Such an example
is the perception of ethnic or religious groups, evaluated by head tallies and placed into
clearly demarked territories, collective movements acting under a single infuriated and
ambitious individual, backed by a state always repressing everything – all this
transmitted by a terminology worthy of semiotic research‟.
In the second and last article about Mozambique, Ana Bénard da Costa offers a
summary of „the political and economical evolution of Mozambique since the end of
colonialism until the present time and cross-referencing it with narrations of
Mozambicans who experienced these distinctive stages of their country‟s recent
history‟. In the prologue, the contributing informants are generically identified and it is
stressed the relevance of using an historical perspective in the study of the social actors‟
perceptions regarding poverty and war occurrences. She also mentions that this analysis
is „preceded by a reflection on the features explaining the absence of historical framing
and anthropological approaches in studies about poverty‟. This reflection comes up in
the first part of her article and, in some pages, the author assumes there is an „absence of
studies providing appropriate answers related to the real capacities of the societies in
Mozambique (or in the whole Africa) in fulfilling the basic needs of the population‟,
and that the „studies on poverty as a specific topic of research have been arousing an
interest quite restricted to the Anthropology‟s realm‟.
In the second section of her article, the different meanings of poverty are approached
and, after synthesizing the ideas supported by the Universalist and Relativist
perspectives about this concept, the author discusses the possibility of reconciling these
perspectives, as long as poverty is perceived as a multidimensional phenomenon,
product of social and historical relations among the distinctive cultural contexts that
never were homogeneous and secluded entities, and a category through which the social
agents classify and perform in the world, influencing the universal definitions of
poverty, the lives of those who are defined as such, and the dimensions and values
supporting these definitions then become universal references.
In the following article‟s section part, Ana Bénard da Costa starts by referring to the
inexistence of studies about poverty in Mozambique previous to 1989, while the
numerous wars occurred in this country are target of interest for several authors, and it
is possible to find analysis on the relations between the conflicts and the socioeconomic
conditions in Mozambique, particularly since the beginning of the colonial war. The
author finishes this part by stating that „although war by itself does not explain the
occurrence of poverty, it certainly contributes to exacerbate it, while poverty by itself
does not explain the occurrence of war‟ and delineates the (recent and former) causes
for poverty and war, a whole set of political factors of internal and external nature,
proposing next to analyze the most important ones throughout the article‟s following
pages. Thus, through the analysis of some bibliography and the informants‟ perceptions
regarding the impact of the last military conflict occurred in Mozambican territory, the
author considers that although the living conditions during this period were quite
unbearable for most of the population, the war had varied effects through the time and
these have afflicted the Mozambican population in distinctive manners, in some cases
11
occurring an appropriation of the conflict and/or it has had positive aftermaths.
Meanwhile, she defends that the „converging war effects and socialist economic policies
shunned, in many cases, a distinction between causes at the root of these conditions‟.
In the forth section of the article, the author begins by presenting the participant‟s
perceptions in regards to their current living conditions in terms of poverty/wealth,
comparing to the living conditions they had during wartimes, stating that their
perceptions diverge according to the socioeconomic and educational levels. Aftermost,
she enlarges the analysis about the connection war/poverty to include matters of
(in)security and poverty/wealth that, as mentioned, „are interlinked, connecting to a
recent past of wartime and to the policies implemented in the country since the
independence until the present time‟. She finishes with an argument in favor of the tight
connections between the country‟s socioeconomic situation and the insecurity and
violence in peacetime, mentioning the fact that the informants (residing in Maputo
during the war) say that there is more insecurity and violence now than it was during
wartime.
In the final section of her article, Ana Bénard da Costa examines the links among
poverty rates and development policies existing during the peacetime. She starts by
declaring that the poverty rates are a result of political options constrained by guidelines
from international development organizations and donor countries, which have never
been opposed by the ruling elites benefiting from them, and are „the direct causes of the
poverty levels registered, since the first instance they were measured until the present
day‟. She finishes this part mentioning that the factors chosen as the causes for the
impasse in the „fight against poverty‟ (diseases, natural calamities, and others) are still
unrelated to the economic policy followed by the Mozambican government.
From the offered conclusions, it must be stressed the mention made to the necessity of
studying complex phenomena such as war and poverty, by means of the multiple
approaches of the several social and human sciences‟ disciplines and its compulsory
insertion into the cluster of economic and social relations from which they are both
local and globally an integral element, and considering as a indispensable fact to reflect
upon the economic policies on which are supported the international aids.
The third section of this book contains a collection of three articles focusing on
countries with extremely distinctive features from Angola and Mozambique
(particularly in terms of geographical dimension and duration – or nonexistence – of
post-independence conflicts), but where the poverty occurrences are felt with more or
less severity. We may find formal and methodological similarities in the articles
concerning Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde, since they result from researches
conducted by the same author, the historian Augusto Nascimento, that are not shared by
the article about Guinea-Bissau, which was produced by the collaboration between the
anthropologist Cristina Rodrigues and the sociologist Alfredo Handem. While the
„flavors‟ of these articles are unalike, the topics on which they are centered are
unavoidably the same. However, an attentive reading of these articles will demonstrate
the multiple approaches (and subsequent interpretations) that can be promoted by the
same problematic, and that these are, at least, as reliant on the focus of analysis and the
application and interpretation of methodologies as they are on the manifest levels of
disparity among the subject‟s backgrounds.
Cristina Rodrigues and Alfredo Handem‟s article begins by presenting, in some detail,
the project of which it is an integrant element, later referring to the advantage brought
by the collaboration with a Guinean researcher on the connections between
12
poverty/wealth and war/peace in Guinea-Bissau. It is mentioned that the article concerns
mostly the analysis and description of the evolution of war and poverty, taking into
account the (available) informants‟ narratives, „gathered together with current
theoretical and methodological information on this matter, in addition to records
concerning national backgrounds, all of these produced for various purposes‟.
The first section of the article starts with a reference to the colonial and civil wars,
occurred in the Guinean territory during the 21st century, and to the fact that these
country has been enduring, since the beginning of the initial conflicts, an instable
political situation with „intermittent periods of effectiveness‟ (attempted governmental
overthrows, coups, assassinations and several disturbances) that have intensified
following the armed conflict of 1998/1999. The authors describe this conflict and the
preceding and subsequent „incidents‟, and declare that „therefore, the precariousness of
peace has been constant since 1998, a latent menace that the Guinea-Bissauans‟ are very
much aware of‟.
The multiple consequences of Guinea-Bissau‟s conflicts and instability are examined in
the following pages, principally the weakening of the state, the opposition and departure
between the state and the remaining elements of society, the illegal emigration and the
rural exodus and, lastly, the ethnicization of public institutions.
The evolution of poverty in Guinea-Bissau is examined in the second section of the
article, restricted by references to the significant changes occurred during the 1980s due
to the economy‟s liberalization. Then are offered some information concerning the types
of poverty existing in this country and are mentioned the features characterizing its
extension, turning Guinea-Bissau into one of the most impoverished countries in the
world. The article mentions also the programs adopted in Guinea-Bissau to fight
poverty, but concludes that these programs and their respective implemented actions are
compromised by „changes at a political level, the occurrence of conflicts, and by
instability rooted in violence‟. In the third section, the authors start by analyzing the
theoretical perspectives that support the existence of causal direct relations between
poverty and war (and vice versa), then examine the difficulties inherent to the
definitions of a concept of poverty related to the phenomenon‟s multidimensionality,
and explain that the perspective employed in their article privileges „the self-definition
and self-perception of poverty in itself‟. Furthermore, the authors reveal they have
counted on (unlike other studies conducted in the realm of this project) quantitative data
concerning the correlation war/poverty and resulting from other investigations, which
assert the fact that the conflicts and political instability have been the main constraints
for the economical development and the fight against poverty. The authors propose to
confront these results with the ones collected during their research, and in the next
section of their article they analyse the participating social actors‟ perceptions. They
consider that „the connection between their parents‟ situation and childhood and the
perception these individuals have of their living condition‟s evolution rarely coincides
with any expectations regarding the correlation between educational and professional
skills and wealth‟ and that the individual evolution – before and after the war of 1998 –
relating to occupation and income is generally, perceived in a negative manner.
Meanwhile, the authors declare that there are more labor and income opportunities and
more liberty to perform economic activities, and on the other hand, they refer constantly
to the degradation of living conditions. In addition, the authors notice the existence of a
clear, though not exclusively unidirectional association between the perceptions of the
evolution of the economic conditions and the evolution of the sociopolitical conditions.
13
From the conclusion of the article, the emphasis goes to main ideas, the fact that the
participants are aware of the impact, mostly negative, that war and instability had been
having on their life trajectory and on their economic conditions, and the fact they
associate this to other personal negative events (diseases, in most cases). The authors
refer yet to the perceptions about the future, claiming that it is put a large emphasis on
the country‟s stability in political, social and economic matters, being also referred as
important the investments made on education, as a way to ensure more advantageous
political positions and to facilitate the emigration. It is equally significant to stress the
author‟s conclusions concerning the „chronic attribution to the government of
responsibility over this instability and its resolution‟ and the fact that it has
„implications in matters of development and consolidation of a civil society and of
decentralized structures of organization and representation‟.
Finally, the authors recommend that „the effects of disinvestment of families in issues of
economic dynamic and channeling of investments into education and its repercussions
on the customary high rates of emigration and departure of human resources from the
country should be turned into prospective research subjects‟.
In the article about the potential connections among poverty and micro-violence in Sao
Tome and Principe, Augusto Nascimento states that the poverty increased in the 1970s
and 1980s, principally on account of the implemented development policies that,
namely, did not set apart from the proprietary structure dating from the colonial period,
„with the European being substituted by Sao Tomeans in the farm‟s hierarchy, after
their respective nationalization‟ and prolonged the „colonialist practices, aggravated by
a loss of the former efficiency‟. Then proceeding to the issue of the existence or
inexistence of violence in this country, the author claims that this had been eliminated
by the colonial state and that following the independence, there was the „imposition of
an environment of concord and social peace‟ that is currently disappearing.
In the next section of his article, Augusto Nascimento asks „how is it possible, despite
the image the Santomean promote about themselves, that Sao Tome and Principe has
turned into a country where the prevention of violence became compulsory in everyday
politics‟. After mentioning the absence of an armed rebellion during the colonial period
and of serious conflicts in the post-independence period, the author declares that „the
implementation of policies in the post-independence period was in itself violent, seeing
as it forced swift changes to the daily routines‟ and despite the political changes
occurred – from a single-party to a multi-party system – these haven‟t generated
economic growth, although the external resources were used „for private consumption
and distribution among clienteles‟. In he final part, he declares that this country faces
economic hardships and a social and political crisis that „viciously (endorses and)
results from the dissolution of the mechanisms for social control‟. In the next instance,
the author states that „the present economic stage is rather contradictory‟, as though
there is some wealth reallocation, it is not reaching the unprivileged that search in the
informal economy for a „social buffer (…) helps to accommodate each person with their
respective destiny‟. Having examined the matter of the land reallocation, taking place at
the time, he mentions that this process has „clearly deepened the social inequalities,
once again not in favor of the workers‟ and that, in spite of contributing to the
contention of an increase in poverty, it will not reduce it and will not contribute for a
human and sustainable development.
In the next part, analyzing the Santomeans‟ perceptions in regards to poverty, Augusto
Nascimento affirms that these do not consider themselves to be poor, but instead
„average‟, and poverty „is associated to the incapacity to provide for survival and to
14
physical debility, from which results the inability to defend against potential
aggressions‟. Widening the meaning of poverty to include the „inability to influence the
structuring of social living conditions‟, the author decides that this is reflected on „a
tributary notion relating both to the perception of impracticality for interfering in
political and social arrangements, as to an attribution of liability to the leadership‟. The
author reiterates the occurrence in the Santomean society of a „corrosion in the standard
of social bonds (which) is impeding the empowerment of individuals (…) and the
subsequent fight against poverty‟. He finishes examining the prevalence of paternalistic
perspectives and the absence of changes of perception, in the sense of allowing the
implementation of collective actions in this country.
In the next to the last section of his article, titled „The disruption of social bonds‟, the
author declares that „violence has started, at several levels, to infiltrate into the social
relationships, and refers in particular to the phenomena like elder abandonment, the
existence of „street children‟ and domestic violence (inflicted upon children as well).
After exemplifying these different situations and some of the efforts to combat and
prevent them, he concludes that the „present political environment is not favorable to the
civic commitment to fight poverty and oppose what is not necessarily called violence,
may be characterized as an extensive erosion and rupture of social ties‟.
In the final section of the article, the author mentions that for years the Santomeans have
been engaged in a struggle for survival, and the observable changes may contribute „to
decrease the most immediate and serious poverty occurrences, while at the same time
doubting an effective eradication of poverty‟. He adds that during these last few years,
there have been some positive features, such as an increase of individual incomegenerating enterprises, however the „reduced economic and social diversity is limiting
the possibilities to advance by way of instruments such as the microcredit‟. In regards to
prospective expectations, the author says that these are shaped by the unemployment
and that „the occurrences of deprivation and micro-violence have not yet unraveled the
idealization of social peace in these islands‟.
From the conclusion, it should be taken into consideration as the most significant point
the fact that „poverty did not generate violence, since the one it promotes has no origin
in social deprivation. Nevertheless, under the most diversified formats, violence risks
perpetuating poverty‟ and, in the end, that „along with the concentration of wealth,
poverty seems firmly anchored in these islands. There is a high number of unemployed,
the population earns low wages and, in general, the economic performance is just
bearable. (…) such situation (…) demonstrates a voluntarist, erratic and in some way
ruinous political conduction, less due to economic records than to an erosion of the
ethics and social liability, crucial elements for a renewed political and social
mobilization and for the future of the country‟.
In the final article contained in this volume, Augusto Nascimento proposes an analysis
of the issues of poverty and micro-violence in Cape Verde, mentioning from the start
that the vast economic and social diversity in the archipelago requires an analysis with
the purpose of achieving a global consideration about this country. He mentions next
the social peace this country has been experiencing since the independence and its
„growing institutional capacity building, with the purpose of attaining good
governance‟. Afterwards, he identifies as factors inducing to micro-violence „the
asymmetry of gender relations or the heterogeneity of family relations, with significant
social consequences from the stance of both poverty and social exclusion‟. In the final
part of the introduction, he declares that „the purpose of this exploratory text is to set
15
down some questions for future researches in relation to the micro-violence
manifestations and the collective and individual impoverishment paths‟.
In the following section, he summarizes what the so-called „assistentialist approach‟ of
poverty that started in the final stage of colonialism, has prolonged during the first years
of independence, adding that this „perspective is being replaced with an institutional
conscience (...) a fresh perspective‟ that entails „to attack the multiplicity of social issues
without expecting them to dissipate because of the decrease in poverty. As a result,
issues such as gender inequalities have turned into factors of poverty and social
exclusion‟. The author refers to „the media‟s socialization of issues that once would
remain in the shadows‟ that come up related to this new perspective, and the poverty in
Cape Verde is currently perceived as resulting from „a compilation of un-protective
behaviors harbored by the families and their near social surrounding‟, forming an area
of intervention for public institutions and NGOs. Augusto Nascimento remembers too
that during several decades, poverty was considers as something ‟immanent to the
archipelago, a product of adverse ecologic conditions and apparently scarce natural
resources (…) droughts were an excuse that allowed, during the colonial age, the
manipulation of economic conditions and social strains to perpetuate the Cape Verdean
population‟s impoverishment. Only during the very last years of colonialism, when
were implemented social policies, then having the hungers ceased to cause victims‟.
The author then demonstrates some data concerning poverty in this country, mentioning
the positive strides toward its reduction, although with differentiated results among the
islands. He implies that fighting poverty successfully entails the achievement of welfare
for the whole population and this entails „an efficient and ethically consentaneous
regulation, in accordance with the contemporary social bonds‟. The author also
emphasizes the breach between the economical growth and the endurance of
phenomena such as domestic violence and child abandonment. Connecting this feature
with changes occurring in family and gender relations and with matters concerning
domestic violence and its social awareness, Augusto Nascimento declares that „the
capacitation of women will not change the dependency relation, nor it will eliminate any
subservience toward men‟ and the social changes „might all originate violence over
women‟. For this author, it is therefore difficult to assess the rates or this sort of
violence, since only recently it has become „a visible occurrence and (...) socially
disapproved‟. He adds that, meanwhile, it is happening in Cape Verde a paradigmatic
change in gender relationships. Pertaining to this matter, the author refers the issue of
polygamy, stating that „although polygamy may be listed as poverty-inducing – mainly
due to the common unreliability toward children, causing a decline of living standards
and school abandonment –, such connection is neither immediate nor necessary‟. More
specifically on the subject of fighting poverty, Augusto Nascimento says that it seems
„an attainable goal‟ and combating poverty translates into diversified actions, which in
some islands entails an investment in rural development. He concludes this section by
stating that poverty has been gradually considered less of a fatality, existing even „some
sectors for which poverty is not part of future equations, though the survival conditions
are still tight and might sway according to the economic conjunctures‟. In matters of
prospective expectations, he refers to the large efforts from institutions and NGOs in
behalf of human training, as a method to prevent poverty, and the perception that
fighting poverty will not be consequential without combating all manifestations of
social exclusion.
Augusto Nascimento finishes his article by stating: „It is hard to produce categorical
considerations, either on account of the exploratory nature of the investigation or
16
because this subject demands a multidisciplinary research, pertaining to the multiple
Cape Verdean contexts. In Cape Verde, it might be possible to associate singular
trajectories of extreme poverty to child abandonment (having repercussions, for
instance, in school dropout) or to the asymmetry in gender relationships. But there are
no discernible univocal correlations between these occurrences‟.
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18
PART I
Angola at war and at peace
19
The Nature of the Parties on the Prospects of Power-Sharing in the Angola Peace
Processes
Ricardo de Sousa
Abstract
This paper identifies the use of power-sharing dimensions in peace negotiations for the
Angola civil war and their success or otherwise. It concludes that a series of dynamics
were at play preventing successful power-sharing solutions and adds one factor to the
current literature. In particular, the monolithic nature of each contending party made it
practically impossible for the Mpla and Unita to cooperate under a shared structure.
This is illustrated through a historical revision of the conflict's power-sharing
provisions and characteristics of each party.
Introduction1
Power-sharing agreements have become a relevant topic in today's international affairs
and a common component for negotiated solutions to conflicts. Of the 38 civil wars
resolved via a process of negotiations between 1945 and 1998 (a sub-set of the overall
universe, which also includes settlements imposed by conflict victors), only one
agreement failed to have any form of power-sharing, the short lived 1989 Gbadolite
Accord for Angola (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003).
The civil war in Angola started in 1975 and ended in 2002. Throughout, a series of
significant changes occurred to the conflict and several peace processes were executed.
This paper both analyses whether power-sharing provisions were used and also
identifies key constraints in the process leading to peace and democracy.
We start with a review of the power-sharing concepts before then presenting a historical
description of the conflict in Angola and of the agreements reached. There follows a
description of the nature of each party (Mpla and Unita) throughout the conflict before
proceeding with an identification of the main factors limiting power-sharing present in
the conflict as identified in the literature. In the next section, the analysis proposes that
an additional factor, the monolithic2 nature of each party, is necessary to fully explain
the dynamics described. The paper finishes with a conclusion.
1 The paper was prepared as part of the “Poverty and Peace in Portuguese Speaking African Countries”
project funded by the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) of the Portuguese Ministry of
Science, Technology and Higher Education - research grant: PTDC/AFR/64207/2006. I would like to
thank participants at the “Southern Africa in the Cold War era Working Seminar” organised by the
Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) and the London School of Economics (LSE) Ideas
at Fundação Luso Americana (FLAD) in Lisbon on 8 and 9 of May 2009 for their feedback and
additionally to Inge Ruigrok and Gerhard Seibert for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. Any remaining errors are my own.
2 Monolithic, something which is single, massive and unchangeable (Oxford Dictionary, 1989).
20
Power-sharing, conflict resolution and democracy
Generally speaking power-sharing agreements are political architectures aimed at
guaranteeing potential warring factions a role in the country's government, through
either securing one's inclusion or the competitor‟s exclusion from specific areas, and
hence decreasing the stakes of political contestation.
Gates and Strom (2007) identify how the capacity of power-sharing agreements to
promote peace depends on the relative military capacity of each side to the conflict as
well as on the potential role of spoilers. The ideal environment for peace to be
successfully achieved is when the sides are evenly balanced and the costs of war are
relatively high. In their analysis, one of the greatest threats to peace are “spoilers” leaders and parties that have the capacity and will to resort to violence and to subvert
peace processes through the use of force.
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) categorize power-sharing into four types depending if it
intends to divide power along political, territorial, military or economic dimensions.
They conclude that when resolving civil wars through negotiated processes the greater
the number of power-sharing dimensions included, the greater the chances of an
enduring peace.
Binningsbo (2005) and Reynal-Querol (2002) have identified that the Lijphart model is,
in general, suitable for post-conflict societies. Lijphart‟s (1977) model on consociational
democracy (in Gates & Strom (2007)) has four main components: a grand coalition,
autonomy for each ethnic segment in all matters not of common concern, mutual veto
rights and proportionality in political representation, civil service appointments and the
allocation of public funds.
But several shortcomings have been identified to power-sharing agreements. Besides
the classical transaction costs, adverse selection and moral hazard (Gates & Strom,
2007), Spears (2000) lists a series of challenges to power-sharing3, specifically that: it
interferes with the option of total power offered by competitive elections; it is normally
integrated by parties into a strategy to augment military and political power; it requires
otherwise incompatible individuals and groups to co-operate; one of the groups is
required to relinquish some power, either the stronger to level the power field
(conceding more power than would be gained through electoral competition or military
victory) or the weaker to become integrated in the political game (for instances
releasing claims for regional autonomy through integration into the government);
groups fear their power can be jeopardised in the future; and there are varying degrees
of commitment to a strategy.
As is presented in the next section almost all of these challenges were present in the
Angola conflict at one stage or another of trying to reach a power-sharing solution able
to bring about peace and democracy.
The Angola conflict and power-sharing solutions
The case of the Angola conflict is paramount to this field given it spans a long period of
time where power-sharing was either not attempted or failed to be implemented both
with limited and extended formulations. Only a military victory in 2002, together with
negotiations and power-sharing provisions, would establish lasting peace in the country.
3 Additionally, Jarstad (2006) identifies that in war torn societies there can be long term negative
implications of power-sharing deals for both peace and democracy.
21
The independence process was established by the Alvor accords signed in 15 January
1975. The accords agreement committed the three liberation movements: the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola (Fnla); Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (Mpla); and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita)4 to
form a transitional coalition government, a National Defence Commission which would
integrate troops from each side and the development of a constitution to which elections
were to follow in October 1975, with 11 November 1975 as the date for independence
(George, 2005).
Nevertheless during that year the transition process collapsed and on the day of
independence a long civil war began opposing the three movements (while the Fnla
would soon cease to represent a significant party to the conflict). On the one side, there
was the Mpla supported mainly by Cuba and the Soviet Union and on the other side
there was Unita supported mainly by the United States of America (USA) and South
Africa.
The period that was dawning, and particularly from the 1980s onwards, would see the
territory divided into an area of Mpla control, where a one-party-state system was
developed, and an area of Unita control also characterised by an autocratic, militarist
structure of power relying considerably on traditional power structures for the
management of populations within their territories. According to Rothchild and Hartzell
(1995), the end to direct external involvement would only occur, among other changes,
after a military stalemate around 1987 and 1988 made it clear for South Africa that the
balance of forces had changed and the cost of war now exceeded its anticipated benefits.
The subsequent New York Accords, signed on December 22 1988, marked the end of
the internationalized Cold-War status of the conflict with the withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola and the independence of Namibia5. Nevertheless, the New York
Accords contained no provisions for addressing the internal conflict in Angola or
additional commitments by external actors to end their assistance to the parties (Hartzell
& Hoddie, 2007).
The accords were the culmination of the lengthy Chester Crocker (United States
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) negotiations process initiated seven
years earlier and which, with the initial policy paper approved by Ronald Reagan in
March 1981, also included political reconciliation between Unita and the Mpla as an
objective. The fact that such an objective was dropped from the negotiations is
supposedly due to Mpla fears over Unita, reported by the Soviets when questioned by
the US (Crocker, 1993). At this stage, the parties to the conflict were simply too far
apart for any solution, or in other words, the parties lacked the ripeness for resolution
(Hampson, 1996). Furthermore, the internal Angolan conflict was subordinate to the
overall regional solution and did not jeopardise achieving the latter.
The New York Accords closed the first Cold-War sub-period of the Angola conflict,
which started in 1975 and inaugurated the second sub-period characterised by a non4 As a reference to the relative dimensions of each movement‟s ethnic constituents, one can highlight
the Bakongo with 12 per cent, Mbundu with 24 percent and Ovimbundu with 32 per cent, more or less
associated with the Fnla, Mpla and Unita respectively. But these should not be considered as directly
reflecting the movements or the parties or their respective organizational capacities at the time or in future
periods.
5 Additionally, it would implicitly mean the end to South Africa's incursions into Angolan territory and
an informal agreement is believed to have included the closing of African National Congress (ANC)
training camps in Angola (Rothchild & Hartzell, 1995).
22
internationalized status of the Angola conflict, which would terminate with the end of
the Cold War and the Bicesse peace process in 1991.
Therefore, although the conflict in Angola continued, negotiations between the Mpla
and Unita beginning in early 1989 would lead to the Gbadolite Accord of June. The
accords did not achieve peace, nevertheless the process surrounding it was important
because it identified national reconciliation in Angola as an objective, recognized
Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko as mediator and created some regional peer
pressure to reach an agreement. Moreover, it gave Unita and its leader increased
respectability and legitimacy (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1995).
Only after the war had reached a military stalemate did both parties come to a peace
agreement. In May 1991, the Bicesse Accords were signed in the context of the ColdWar ending6. The Bicesse Accords stipulated an immediate ceasefire, the creation of a
national army and elections (James, 2004) in accordance with a semi-presidential
democratic model. It is reported that the rapport between the parties at this stage went as
far as being involved in joint operations against the Front for the Liberation of the
Enclave for Cabinda (FLEC)7 in the oil rich enclave of Cabinda (MRP, 2005).
The accords had significant military power-sharing provisions including the
establishment of a national military force in parity and some political power-sharing
provisions through verification commissions. Its significant shortcoming was that
executive power was modelled on a presidential “loser-takes-nothing” (Gates & Storm,
2007) structure. This was most evident in the absence of an agreement on a framework
for decentralization, covering the structure for regional and local government, which
was only to be decided after the elections (Rothchild & Hartzell, 1995).
Implementation of the agreement faltered as although the ceasefire held, troop assembly
and demobilization lagged behind, especially for Unita troops, amongst warning signs
that Jonas Savimbi might be contemplating the scenario of returning to conflict
(Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). Its implementation was supported by UNAVEM II (United
Nations Angola Verification Mission), a mission considered to be insufficient in size
and capacity for the challenge (Hodges, 2001).
Despite these signs, national elections were held on September 29 and 30, 1992. Unita
lost the legislative (34 percent against 54 percent for the Mpla) and presidential
elections, with José Eduardo dos Santos achieving 49.7 percent of the votes and Jonas
Savimbi 40 percent even if a second round of balloting, never carried out, for the
presidential election would be required as neither of the two main presidential
candidates had achieved a clear majority. Despite being considered “generally free and
fair” by the international community, Unita claimed electoral fraud and resumed
conflict.
Unita is normally considered an inside spoiler (because it was a willing participant in
the process) of the peace process of 1991/1992 in Angola. Stedman (1997) argues that
an important factor in the decision to reengage in conflict was a conviction by Jonas
Savimbi and his generals that a military victory was possible at that time. And, in fact,
in just a short period, Unita was able to take about 70% of the territory. Nonetheless
when a year later, in November 1993, Jonas Savimbi returned to negotiations it was
6 Bicesse is a small village in the council of Cascais in Portugal, where the accords were signed.
7 Since the 1960s, FLEC has been fighting a low intensity guerrilla campaign for the independence of
the oil rich Angolan enclave and would not be involved in any of the agreements. In August 2006, a
ceasefire was signed between FLEC-Renewed and the Angolan Government.
23
“after the rearmed Angolan army had rolled back Unita's gains, the United States had
granted diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government, the United Nations had
imposed sanctions, and 300,000 Angolans had been killed” (Stedman, 1997, 39).
A negotiated process aiming at an expanded power-sharing agreement began in 1993
leading to the relatively successful Lusaka Protocol of 1994. This protocol augmented
the power-sharing provisions of the Bicesse Accord to include not only executive power
sharing (allegedly including a non-written agreement on a vice-presidential position for
Jonas Savimbi) but also extended to the police force and the territorial level with the
provision of governorships and municipalities.
In the following years of 1996 and 1997, peace was almost reached with the support of
the international community through UNAVEM III but Unita‟s implementation of the
protocol faltered. For instance, the formation of the Government of Unity and National
Reconciliation (GURN) only occurred in April 1997, when some Unita disenfranchised
deputies took up their seats in parliament (Hodges, 2001). In September 1998, the
government suspended the coalition accusing Jonas Savimbi of continually reneging on
his commitments and specifically of holding onto his strongholds (especially Andulo
and Bailundo) while secretly rearming his army (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Vidal, 2006)
and shortly after declared the peace process annulled and that the only path to peace was
war.
The conflict would only finish with the victory of the Mpla over Unita in 2002, after
Jonas Savimbi‟s death and the signing of the April 2002 Luena Memorandum of
Understanding, which represented an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol. In particular, it
includes provisions for the integration of Unita officers and soldiers into the national
army and the rest to be demobilized. The success of this agreement confirms the study
of Licklider (1995), which identifies how among civil wars that have ended, the
settlements imposed by a conflict‟s victor prove more durable than negotiated
agreements (in Hatzell & Hoddie, 2003). Nevertheless the negotiation process at this
stage together with the power-sharing provisions of the Lusaka protocol were also
important in guaranteeing peace within Unita.
The nature of the parties
Key actors in the time-line process described above are the Mpla and Unita parties,
wherein their characteristics definitely shaped the events and choices made. For this
reason, it is important to look at the history of both the Mpla and Unita (the Fnla is not
analysed here as it did not constitute a significant military force as from the early 1980s)
and identify their main characteristics.
Mpla
The Mpla was formed in the 1950s in the coastal and urban areas of the centre north,
gaining support mainly from the Mbundus of Luanda and Malanje and from mixed-race
intellectuals. The role of each ethnic group and of socialism in the party has been
contested ever since, but the driving force of this group at the time was opposition to the
Portuguese colonial government (Spikes, 1993).
Around independence, the party fragmented into three groups, one led by President
Agostinho Neto and two contenders, who would lose the contest: Daniel Chipenda and
the Andrade brothers. Soon after independence a new challenge to Agostinho Neto
would come from within his party with an attempted coup by Nito Alves in 1977.
24
Again, Agostinho Neto emerged victorious but this time executed a process of
rectification, which extended well beyond the party, Luanda and that year (Hodges,
2001).
In the aftermath of the attempted coup d‟état, the Mpla would increase presidential
powers, create a frightening state security system, purge the party from 110,000
members to 31,000 with the establishment of rigorous selection processes and military
political control of the judiciary system (Vidal, 2006). Integrated in this process was the
transformation of the Mpla into a Workers Party in December 1977, establishing the
vision of a one-party-state inspired on the Marxist-Leninist model.
According to Hodges (2001), these initiatives created conditions for an uncontested
succession of Agostinho Neto by José Eduardo dos Santos as president in 1979 (when
the former died of illness during treatment in Moscow), but essentially the rectification
process gave birth to a generalized culture of fear, conformism, lack of initiative and
submission in society.
The characteristics of authoritarianism, rectification, inter-penetration of the state and
party structures and the political control of the judicial system continued after 1979.
Most of all, a process was initiated concentrating powers away from the party and into
the presidency, which would be justified by the war besetting the country. In the early
1980s, the Office of the President was created to deal with foreign business, most
importantly to control oil revenues (Vidal, 2006). In December 1982, the Central
Committee afforded special powers to the president empowering him to reshuffle both
the Politburo and the Mpla Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA)
(George, 2005) and in 1983 and 1984 creating a kind of parallel martial government
responding directly to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, which was the
President in office (Vidal, 2006).
Although progressively concentrating power in himself, the president needed to
carefully negotiate policy changes within his group. In 1984, Crocker (1993) could still
grasp some vulnerability in the position of dos Santos in the stances taken by the Mpla
in negotiations. Additionally, in the early 1990s, during the Bicesse accord negotiations,
the Mpla had to carry out a military and cabinet reshuffle, most likely to remove
potential critics of conciliation efforts with Unita (Hatzell & Hoddie, 2007) from
positions of influence. Or later, in early September 1991, on the eve of elections when
“Santos privately expressed interest [in a power-sharing agreement with Unita] but felt
he could not publicly commit to such a deal” (Stedman, 1997, 38).
Throughout the 1980s, a new, select group of young politicians and technicians were
promoted through the ranks of the system and owing their ascension to power
significantly to the president (as occurred also in the FAPLA and the party) (Vidal,
2006). The decade and a half of inconsistent economic plans, where reform would be
followed by counter reform (Hodges, 2001) and also the incapacity in the 1990s to
reach agreement with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) can well
be explained by the resistance that the established system made to significant changes to
neo-patrimonialism8 and the president's needs to accommodate the demands of his
power base.
8 There are several definitions of neo-patrimonialism. In this case, it intends to refer to a situation of
patrons using state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, and is
indicative of informal patron-client relationships that can reach from very high up in state structures,
down to individuals in say, small villages.
25
Correspondingly, the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s saw significant changes
with the formal elimination of the one-party-state system, introduction of a multiparty
system, some basic democracy type laws and economic reforms to partially open up the
system. The party itself was also revitalized in the run up to the 1992 elections with a
reorganization of its structure, expansion in the distribution of material rewards,
political recovery of traditional authorities and an increase in membership from 65,362
in 1990 to 544,639 at the end of 1992 (Vidal, 2006).
But the regime did essentially keep its power concentrated in the president (for instance,
there was no decentralization) and supported by two core pillars: the Mpla party, an
extraordinary instrument in the service of the president, and the army, militarily
efficient and politically loyal (Chabal, 2006).
The results of the elections afforded José Eduardo dos Santos and Angola international
prestige, which gained a significant landmark in 1993 with US recognition of the Mpla
government. Simultaneously, this lowered the risk of a presidential challenge from
within the Mpla (Hatzell & Hoddie, 2007) thereby certainly allowing more flexibility in
the negotiation period leading up to the Lusaka protocol and the envisioned GURN
coalition government.
In the second half of the 1990s, there is an intensification of the co-optation strategy of
the Mpla. It not only spread extensively to any form of civil society initiative but also to
the opposition parties, a phenomenon categorized as “Renewed”. The most symbolic is
that of Unita where there was a split in the leadership and the “Renewed Unita”
emerged and assumed seats in parliament reserved for Savimbi‟s party, although
without credibility.
In summary, ever since its inception, the Mpla is a party with significant incidence of
eliminating contestants rather negotiation and dilution. A system of neo-patrimonialism
began to be implemented as early as the creation of a one-party-state-system under the
Cold War umbrella. But the gravitational power quickly shifted from the party to the
president. The extent this system of clientelism would reach into society depended on
the overall economic situation provided by the oil revenues. Although forced to
formally change due to the war and economic collapse and to go through elections, the
main historic operating structures of the regime (for instance, the party-state
relationship, army or executive workings) were never dismantled (Messiant, 2006),
because the elections were won and then change was either not implemented or limited
in scope. This organism, with deep roots going back before independence, carefully
selected the new generation of leaders, co-opting and buying in opponents, has been led
by the same president for over two decades. There is little predisposition to seriously
release power to the other party in the conflict or open up the oil revenues to new
potential rivals. This is particularly, so after 1992-1993 when the regime was granted
international recognition and Unita started to be seen unanimously by the international
community as the spoiler of peace in Angola.
Unita
Unita was founded in the 1960s by Jonas Savimbi in the south of Angola mainly
supported by the Ovimbundu people of the central plateau. During the struggle for
independence, Unita allegedly collaborated with the Portuguese through the provision
of information. Its organization was initially based on the structure of the protestant
church and traditional popular leaders.
26
In the aftermath of the Mpla independence military victory, Unita was weakened,
particularly so because it had not achieved its strategic objective of securing the
Benguela railway, which might have gained it recognition from Zambian President,
Kenneth Kaunda, and had temporarily lost significant support from South Africa. In
early 1976, Unita resorted to guerrilla warfare, regrouping in the jungle before later in
the decade establishing its operational headquarters in Jamba, in Moxico region.
During the 1980s, Jonas Savimbi managed to develop Unita into a “quasi-state”
dimension able to exercise the monopoly of force in its areas. A diamond economy
developed and established centralized territorial control with a governance structure
including a president, government and service institutions. The authority system was
institutionalised according to a patrimonial functional logic, according to which
economic resources and power positions were distributed along patron-client relations.
The system was stabilised through the brutal use of force, applied especially for the
purpose of eliminating challengers to the authority of Jonas Savimbi (Bakonyi &
Stuvoy, 2005).
In the late 1980s, Unita is believed to rule a region in Jamba with between 8,000 to
10,000 people, 80,000 to 100,000 in the surrounding regions and with about 30,000
troops in 1984 (George, 2005).
The 1990s are shaped by an attempt by Unita to transform itself from a guerrilla force
into a political party with parliamentary and governmental responsibilities. These
changes lead to significant instability inside the party. The first sign of it was a highprofile defection in the run-up to the elections with accusations over an assassination
plot against Jonas Savimbi (Stuvoy, 2002).
The incapacity to transform into a political party and the electoral defeat saw a series of
factions challenging the Jonas Savimbi leadership. The first significant break away
faction came from the Renewed-Unita which took up seats in both the parliament and
GURN in 1997. In the following year, 1998, a new Unita Chivukuyuku faction would
emerge, but failed to recruit influential supporters. By 2001, five factions could be
identified although the militaristic Jonas Savimbi wing continued to be the dominant
(Stuvoy, 2002).
The monolithic structure could not adapt and the disintegration of authority from the
mid-1990s led to a situation in 1998 where Unita administrative structures had nearly
dissolved (Bakonyi & Stuvoy, 2005) and with it also the patrimonial system.
Furthermore, the aggressive military stance of the Mpla after 1998 led to recurrent
military losses for Unita.
Only with the death in combat of Unita leader, Jonas Savimbi, could peace be reached.
His leadership was able to create the rebel group and party to the extent of long being an
effective threat to the Mpla government and having also acquired international status in
the 1980s9.
Once again, the Cold War setting bred a rebel group, without concern as to whether its
organizational structures would be conducive to a form of shared-power, but rather
concerned about its capacities to progressively challenge the Soviet like state. The
9 Jonas Savimbi first travels to the US in 1981 and in that year returns to be met by Reagan
administration officials. In 1986, Jonas Savimbi is officially received in Washington by President Ronald
Reagan and meets with the Secretaries of Defence and State. In 1988, Jonas Savimbi returns to the US
and meets the presidential candidate (and vice-president) George Bush. In 1991, he would return to the
US and meet President George Bush.
27
autocratic monolithic system of the organization was maintained throughout and
incapable of adapting to a post-election culture and began to break up under military,
political and economic pressure.
Additionally, the Unita party showed no signs of being able to incorporate internal
dissident voices in 1992 and therefore it does not seem likely that there would be many
chances to integrate into a structure with opposing voices. For instance, from the late
1990s onwards, it was probably more profitable for the Unita leadership to gain
entrance into the Mpla neo-patrimonial system and negotiate access to its own revenue
sources than to continue fighting. Some of the high-ranking Unita leaders did this by
establishing some break away factions. Nevertheless, the militaristic faction of Jonas
Savimbi did not. Eventually, this Unita faction, which continued to defy the elections,
may be considered a case of illegitimate representation of their constituent interests - by
this time the value of peace had increased significantly.
Limitations of the power-sharing model in Angola
Several factors can be found in the literature for the failure to reach or implement the
power-sharing agreements identified above in the Angolan conflict‟s history. They can
be grouped into: inappropriate external pressure, a lack of a structural power-sharing
solution, leadership characteristics and ambitions, mistrust after a prolonged war and the
role of resources in shaping incentives for the parties.
External pressure10 influenced the conflict in several ways. Indirectly but
fundamentally, the political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union system required
the Mpla regime to readjust. Superficially when regional actors (Mobutu Sese Seko)
pressured the Mpla and Unita into signing the Gbadolite accords in 1989, which did not
reflect the real intentions of the parties (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007) but did engage them
in a negotiated process. By the incapacity to halt the conflict given the international
community: lacked consensus after Unita‟s 1992 return to war and therefore did not
send clear signals to local parties as to how unacceptable some solutions to a country's
challenges are (Spears, 2000); and lacked effective implementation capacity to perform
its assigned role, where due to the “inability of third parties, notably the United Nations,
to provide resources needed to implement the 1991 peace accords doomed them to
failure in the face of widespread cheating and non-compliance” (Hampson, 1996, 88).
In addition, a broader and swifter array of power-sharing and power-dividing
institutions have been identified as important in order to increase the likelihood for a
negotiated peace (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). For instance, Stedman (1997) identifies the
lack of power-sharing provisions in the 1991 Bicesse accords as a reason for the
resumption of the conflict, although this author extensively identifies moments before
and after the elections where power-sharing proposals were unsuccessfully presented
both to the Mpla and Unita by a range of external actors, in particular the United States
and South Africa.
However this factor links to the next, regarding leadership, in the argument of Jarstad
(2006). It is claimed that the 1994 Lusaka power-sharing provisions were good because
10 One cautionary note is in place here. Just as Chester Crocker (1993) highlights that regional powers
(like the parties in control in South Africa or Cuba) do not hang around awaiting superpower instructions
to execute their policies, in the same manner non regional powers like the parties in Angola have a will of
their own and act as much out of the external constraints and pressures presented to them as from inner
needs, organic requirements and local constrains and pressures.
28
they were able to attract some Unita factions, isolating the militarist Jonas Savimbi
group, eventually leading to this group's defeat and its leader‟s death in combat. When
that occurred, the implementation of the agreement could resume without additional
militaristic factions emerging rendering Lusaka, and its provisions, a positive
contribution to peace. Nevertheless, this argument is based on the assumption that
Savimbi's group would not settle for peace in any case. Even if the inducement only
opened the Unita appetite for power in 1992, as Stedman (2007) argues, Jonas
Savimbi‟s behaviour can be considered that of a “greedy spoiler” where a heavy dose of
coercion combined with extremely high costs for non-compliance, might have been a
better option for achieving peace. According to Stedman (1997) Ambassador-designate
Edmund De Jarnette identified Savimbi‟s personality and his hegemonic ambitions for
Angola as the problem. Furthermore, other leadership incompatibilities included the
personalities of the leaders being a source of limitations at the time of elections (Anstee,
1996, 147) and their track record of leading their parties against each other in the midst
of fervent denunciations (Spears, 2000).
Mistrust and the results of decades of war led to a relationship of in-depth antagonism
between the groups. Messiant (2006) identifies the issue of mistrust between the parties
as limiting the implementation of the 1994 Lusaka accord. In this case, Unita would not
demilitarize until it gained power and the Mpla was determined to limit the
effectiveness of the GURN. One always needs to factor in that after almost two decades
of conflict supporters from both Unita and the Mpla, as well as the general population,
had known no other modus operandis than conflict (with brief periods of relative peace
and differing intensities depending on location) with each other. What is more, concerns
over the fragile peace process, leading to six successive amnesties between 1981 up to
the late 1990s, which allowed the development of an environment of impunity in
society conducive to human rights violations, further exacerbated the lack of trust
between the groups (Hodges, 2001).
Finally, the key role of resources in shaping the incentives of the parties is almost
unanimously identified in the literature as a factor contributing to the prolonged
continuation of the conflict11. Although this factor cannot totally explain the conflict it
had a singular role in funding it, while during the Cold War, support was also derived
from the respective external supporters. The existence of sources of funding generated
the lack of pressure to concede more and reach shared solutions.
An additional cause for failure – the monolithic nature of the parties
Nevertheless, these factors do not completely address the underlying question of the
lack of pre-disposition to enter into power-sharing solutions, conducive both to peace
and eventually to democracy. One additional factor is required to better explain the
shortcomings to the overall peace process. This underlying factor is the nature of the
two parties in the conflict. Their similarities in terms of their monolithic structures and
cultures allowed little organic flexibility to merge or share structures with another
similar party.
11 See for instance the accounts of Billon (2001a and 2001b) on the role of oil and diamonds in the
conflict and in Angola and Ferreira (2006) for an overview of the economic conditions from 1961 to
2002. For an account of external interventions see Wright (2001) for the United States and George (2005)
for Cuban involvement.
29
This is present throughout the conflict. In the 1989 negotiations, the achievement was
the recognition by the Mpla of Unita as a party with which to negotiate, even though
still pushing to maintain the one-party-state system. In the 1992 elections, there were
two mono-party systems facing each other (Mabeko-Tali‟s, 2006): one the party-state of
the Mpla and the other a rebel movement dominated by its military structure. The 1994
extended power-sharing solutions proved insufficient to convince the Unita leadership
to integrate into the state system.
Looking at one of the most determinant events of the conflict's history in more detail, to
a certain extent the “winner-takes-all” solution of the 1992 elections was in synchrony
with the internal logics of both the Mpla and Unita monoliths. There was little prospect
of success, even if properly enforced, due to their own philosophies – each movement‟s
expected non acceptance of integration into the other. Even later when the GURN was
established and Unita parliamentary seats occupied, on the one hand Unita members of
the government would not be allowed to make independent decisions and on the other
hand the Mpla majority in parliament would block any possibility of alternative action.
In this short lived period of power-sharing, naturally, the culture was not about reaching
consensus but most importantly the vision of what the future should be was also not
considered.
As suggested by Messiant (2006), the nature of the constitutional changes of 1991 and
1992, which seem significant, were more of form than of substance as the neopatrimonialist patron-client type system was kept intact while functioning within a
slightly different architecture. Following on from this perspective, the fact that the
solution envisioned at Bicesse in May 1991 did not foresee enough provisions for
power-sharing is then a result of the incapacity to move the Mpla into a more flexible
and accommodating position, which would in fact change their power structure. As
would later be confirmed, the opening up of the political system was only to the extent
that it did not jeopardise control by the incumbent and allowing for the restraining of the
system should the situation so require and as indeed would happen when conflict
intensified in 1992 and 1998. It is the sheer incapacity of the Mpla to accommodate
such demands that is at stake in the context of a belligerent challenger, which was,
according to most analysts, determined to achieve full power or make its price for peace
very high.
One conclusion is that the change process that was initiated in the middle of the 1980s
should have included provisions not only for constitutional or economic reforms but
also reform envisioning democratic practices within both parties12. It is considered that
the monolithic nature of the Mpla produced only slight, limited and, sometimes, only
superficial changes to the party-state apparatus and that Unita disintegrated when faced
with the need to integrate into this system as the defeated party in the elections.
Conclusion
In Angola, 27 years on from independence, 14 years after the New York Accords, more
than 500,000 deaths, tens of thousands of persons mutilated by anti-personnel mines
and the displacement of approximately 4.1 million people took place before peace was
secured.
12 The economic reforms attempted could also have progressively allowed for the emergence of new
groups in the political spectrum but such is not directly analysed here.
30
From a historical perspective, one can identify that in the case of Angola reality linked
both parties to power. Unita was linked to the central plateau and the Ovimbundu
possibly as much as the Mpla was linked to Luanda. The Mpla‟s openness seems
directly linked to feelings of insecurity towards Unita and Jonas Savimbi in particular.
The link of one neo-patrimonialist system and its leadership to the other was eventually
the “blessing” for peace and the “curse” for democracy, associated with each party‟s
link to oil and diamonds.
In searching for a solution to the conflict, power-sharing provisions were increasingly
considered. Starting from the 1989 absence of any provisions to the 1991 significant
military and lighter political power-sharing provisions, in 1994 power-sharing
provisions were extended to the executive level. Several factors referenced in the
literature and identified in this paper either prevent a power-sharing deal being reached
sooner or inhibit its success.
This paper adds an additional significant factor limiting the success of power-sharing
provisions: the monolithic nature of the parties. This is demonstrated by both analysis of
the conflict‟s history and the nature of both organizations – Mpla and Unita.
In the end, one of the parties would need to be integrated into the other in order to
survive. In effect, it was the neo-patrimonialist nature of the parties which allowed the
Mpla to appropriate the Unita factions into their client networks and, finally reach peace
through victory in 2002 over the sole remaining and already isolated Jonas Savimbi led
militaristic faction. Nevertheless, this also required negotiation and the implementation
of the 1994 power-sharing solutions for peace actually to be reached.
It is hereby proposed that among the several post-conflict social engineering initiatives,
one that could have positively contributed towards results would have been reform of
the party structures to move them away from autocratic-monolithic characteristics.
The analysis presents the parties in an almost unidimensional perspective, without
exploring the several axes connecting and separating them. Future research could
incorporate the dimensions of ethnicity, occupation, class, religion, culture, language,
region, urban/rural and others into the analysis and see to what extent they contributed
to process outcomes.
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33
What Effects From Peace in Reducing Poverty? A perspective from empirical
records collected in the cities of Huambo and Luanda
Carlos Manuel Lopes
Abstract
Based on narratives made by Angolans living in the cities of Huambo and Luanda, the
present article, anchored fundamentally on the assembled empirical records, searches
for clues pointing to an answer (even if provisory) to the question posed in the title. Has
peace in the Angolan context endorsed substantial progression in the reduction of
poverty? This article explores, from the perspective of the interviewed individuals,
several analytical axis: some consequences of the military conflict constituting
impoverishment factors; benefits produced by war; self-attribution from the actors
about their living conditions (how they position themselves in regard to their
situation/condition of poverty and in relation to others) and respective expectations
about the future. The article is the outcome of an investigation produced for the
research project „Poverty and Peace in the PALOP, focused on the connections between
poverty and war/peace in these countries and the manner this relation is perceived by
the social actors.
Introduction
Successive decades of military conflict have caused in Angola not only substantial
losses of material (equipments, infrastructures, housing) and human capital, but have
also caused effects, which have joined to generally achieve a reduction in the welfare of
Angolans: compulsory displacements, insecurity, alimentary insecurity, bad nutrition,
serious difficulties in accessing healthcare and education, these are some of the
consensually recognized consequences. These poverty factors are added by constraints
resulting from the volatility, precariousness and rising in negative circumstances
connected to the possibilities of productive occupation and opportunities for producing
income.
The occurrence of peace, since April 2002, has changed significantly the balance of
factors in this equation.
The purpose of this approach is to determine its context and identify, from empirical
records, which dimensions and features the end of the military conflict has had
repercussions over the living conditions of the population that, at the present time,
performs income-producing activities in the cities of Huambo and Luanda. The
suggested methodological proposal is a thematic analysis based on the narratives of
operational actors, obtained in the course of a field research, performing in this selected
informal economy. It is relevant to sustain a comparative dimension between the
information recorded in these two Angolan urban centres (Luanda and Huambo),
distinctively affected by the armed conflict and by the peace accords. For the record, it
34
will be also relevant that, due to its aim and nature, the followed stance does not fall
deliberately into a reflective approach of conceptual questions1.
Methodological approach
The chosen methodology is founded in the exploration of synergies resulting from the
combination of documental analysis and the elaboration of empirical records, obtained
by means of qualitative techniques (interviews with actors and expert informants)
during a field research produced in July/August 008.
The scarce statistical records available were assembled by the UNDP, on behalf of the
Provincial Government of Luanda and Huambo and the Ministry of Planning.
The fieldwork produced between July 30th and August 5th 2008 in the city of Huambo
has permitted listening to ten individuals, whose characteristics are resumed as
followed: eight men and two women, from which eight come from Huambo Province,
one from Bié Province and one from Uíge Province; concerning their occupation, seven
interviewees are traders, two are motor-taxi drivers and one is a housekeeper; the traders
work in Alemanha market, the largest marketplace in town with essentially informal
features; only one interviewee – the housekeeper – works as a waged worker, all the
other interviewed individuals are labouring as freelancers. All the interviewees work in
an informal manner.
The fieldwork conducted in the city of Luanda, between August 6th and August 16th
2008, has put us in contact with 25 individuals, whose characteristics are resumed as
followed: 18 men and seven women, mostly coming from Luanda Province (6),
Malange Province (5) and Uíge Province (5), being too represented in the sample the
provinces of Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul and Lunda Norte (two individuals each),
Huambo, Benguela, Moxico and Huíla (one individual each); in terms of occupation,
fourteen of the interviewees are traders, four work as security guards in private
companies, three are doleiros (negotiators in the business of buying and selling
currency), one driver for a private educational institution, one refrigeration technician,
one ambulant street seller (zungueiro) and one housekeeper; 13 of the 14 traders
perform their activities in the Roque Santeiro, Gamek and Cazenga markets in an
essentially informal manner; six of the interviewed – the housekeeper, the driver and the
security guards – carry out their activities as waged workers, from all the remaining
individuals 17 are freelancers and one is an entrepreneur. Most of the interviewed
individuals (21) work in an informal manner, since only four individuals have an
activity of formal character (three of the security guards and the driver).
1
Poverty is understood to be, in this document, a situation of deprivation resulting from insufficient
resources (Bruto da Costa et al, 2008), deprivation from welfare manifesting in the several dimensions
influencing each other mutually, and that can be measured by individual access to income, nutrition,
health, education, resources, housing and to a certain set of rights in a context of socialization (World
Bank, 2001.). Informal economy (OIT, 200X) is understood to be the “continuum” that contemplates all
economic activities produced by manpower and by economic units not covered – either by legislation or
by practice – under official regulation which would define, control and discipline them; they are excluded
from their field of activity, illicit, and criminal (narcotics and weaponry trafficking, contraband, etc…)
35
Context
I – The political and institutional environment that framed the evolution of the Angolan
economy since the independence in 1975 has gone through five distinctive stages until
the present day: 1) the transitional period into a centralized economy, between 1975
and 1977, during which were constructed different mechanism of state control and the
administration of the economy (nationalizations, foundation of monopolistic state
enterprises in all different sectors of economic activity, etc.) was centralized; 2) period
of economic centralization and governmental regulation of the economic system , which
lasted from 1977 until 1987; 3) embryonic period of transition to a market economy,
positioned between the approval of the SEF –Economic and Financial Sanitation
Program in 1987 and the ratification of the Constitution of 1992, by way of a
progressive liberalization of economic activities, extinction of some state-owned
monopolies, dismantlement of some mechanism of governmental control over the
economic activity, restricted process of privatization aimed to allocate a concentration
of resources in the hands of the political, military and administrative elites; 4) period
between 1992 and the end of the armed conflict in 2002, marked by a conditioned
continuity of the transition process to a market economy, with irregular expansion and
reliability of the economic measures applied, attributable to the reciprocal influence of
numerous factors, among which we underline the submission of economic policies to
the demands of warfare, inconsistency and incoherence of the adopted programs of
economic policy, maintenance of a mechanism of regulation for the productive activity
and segmentation of resources of administrative and clientelist nature in several
economic sectors and segments, an extensive economic crisis and macroeconomic
instability; 5) macroeconomic stabilization period during peacetime, going from 2002
until the present day, broadly characterized by an international conjuncture mostly
favourable to the Angolan economy, due to a tendency of continual growth of the oil
prices, by a nonetheless slow rehabilitation of the economic and productive
infrastructures destroyed during the military conflict, and by a relative accomplishment
in the policies of macroeconomic stabilization. This complex and rough path of
transformations been followed in the last 30 years has had repercussions on the
extension, nature and qualities of the informal economy in Angola, as well as on its
respective evolution, to which the capital of the country represents a mandatory
observatory.
II – Overall, it is possible to identify five major stages in the process of evolution of the
informal economy in Angola: 1) before the independence, the informal activities had a
strictly subsidiary role in regards to the formal economy, dominant, structuring and
equipped with the necessary mechanisms of control and regulation. The informal
economy was restricted to traditional handcrafted activities, services sector – namely
domestic labour – ambulant trading, doorway trading, to markets in the musseques
(slums) and activities related to the construction and accommodation of autochthon
populations residing in the peripheral areas; 2) the growth course started in the years
77/78 lead the informal activities – esquemas, candonga – to spread quickly into
different sectors of the economic activity and to the distinctive dimensions of
intervention of the social Angolan actors, in the socializing context of a administratively
regulated centralized economy; 3) the dismantlement of most mechanisms presented in
the economic centralism throughout the process of transition to a market economy
(1987-1991) has permitted a transition from parallel activities to informal activities, but
has not produced any substantial modifications to the dynamics of fast growth in the
Angolan informal sector, which has been increasing at a swift rate, although some
36
sectors such as transportation, urban markets and currency exchange have become
structured and complex; 4) between 1992 and 2002 was registered a generalized
increase in informal activities and behaviours, which have found a safe ground for
development in the ambiguity and impreciseness of a process of liberalization and
transition towards a market economy that coexisted within the framing and
administrative or monopolist logics in some sectors of activity, a process
emblematically represented by a vast succession of economic restructuring programs
that never came to a conclusion and, in some cases, weren‟t even implemented; 5) after
2002, with the occurrence of peace and the adoption of macroeconomic stabilization
policies, particularly in currency exchange and the internal sectors, in a framework of
conjectural evolution extremely favourable to oil prices in the international market, was
noticed a significant retraction of some segments of the informal economy (exchange
dealers, marker traders).
This process of accelerated growth of the Angolan informal economy has been a result
of the conjoint action of several factors: a) a prolonged and intense migratory flux
toward the provincial capitals and to the nation‟s capital, as consequence of the longterm armed conflict; b) the results of distortions generated by a centralized state system
of economic organization, making possible a relative profusion of instruments,
mechanisms and circumstances prone to consent to the appropriation of earnings; c)
rising incapacity of the formal sector, both public and private, in providing formal
employment; d) progressive disarticulation of salaries as main sources of subsistence for
families; e) progressive decline in the availability of products and public services
provided by the State, whose main concerns are to allocate resources to the warfare,
comply to the minimum compromises stipulated by credit institutions in regards to the
external debt, and satisfy specific interests of possession of the empowered sociopolitical groups and their respective support networks; f) adoption of macroeconomic
policies, objectively producing mechanisms for the appropriation of wealth and
resources by the socio-political groups in power (artificially inflated exchange rates,
recurrent devaluation of salaries in Public Service, etc.).
While there are not definite records about the extension of the informal economy in
Angola, the relatively scarce surveys available seem to agree about the socioeconomic
relevance of the informal activities. A report made by the UNDP (1999) draws an
outline of the evolution of the Angolan economy in 1998, highlighting the importance
of the informal sector as an alternative source of employment and estimating its
contribution to the non-oil based GNP (gross national product) to be around 20 to 30%.
A study by the UNDP (2000) about the Policies for Reduction of Poverty declares that
in Luanda 41% of the population aged between 15 and 60 years old is involved in some
sort of informal activity. The results gathered by the survey on Expenditure and Income
of Family Units (INE, 2000) brought to the conclusion that a proportionate group of
individuals have primary activities of informal nature corresponding to 62.8% of the
economically active population (PEA), although geographically this proportion may
vary between 52% and 80.2%. Recently, F. Schneider (2005) estimated the participation
of the informal economy to the official Angolan GNP as approximately 45.2%, slightly
inferior to the established average of this index in Austral Africa (45.5%), from the
surveys carried out in a gathering of nine countries.
III – The official statistic records about poverty in Angola are insufficient and usually
unreliable. Feliciano et al. (2008: 84) demonstrates, based on the available figures, that
in 2001 68% of the Angolan population could be living in conditions of absolute
poverty, while 26% would live in a situation of extreme poverty.
37
This outlook is plummeted by an increase of inequalities, demonstrated in the rising
concentration of incomes in the petroleum sector and inside the city of Luanda, and in a
Gini coefficient of 0.64 in 2005 (BAD/OCDE, 2008: 115). The country‟s capital
contains roughly one quarter of the total population (over 4 million residents) and holds
75% of industry, 65% of commerce and 90% of banking and financial activities. The
economic development is until now focused on the petroleum and diamond extraction
sectors (the GNP from agriculture and manufacturing does not represent more than 1215% of the total GNP), which correlated to declining employment and income
opportunities does not contribute to the reduction of poverty and, to be more precise,
extreme urban poverty. Unemployment rates remain high and large segments of the
population are kept in a condition of either poverty or extreme poverty. In this setting,
the informal market comes up as a resourceful segment to the survival of the urban
pauper, particularly those implicated in informal small retail businesses (Pestana, N.,
2008).
Some of the most recent analysis suggests that the combined effects of peace and the
high levels of economic development registered between 2004 and 2007 have had a
positive impact in reducing poverty. The rise of employment, as a result of augmented
levels of both public and private investments, linked to the program of national
reconstruction, the absorption of migrant labour force and some reactivation in the
agricultural activity would have permitted an improvement to the living conditions of
Angolans (BAD/OCDE; 2008: 115). This conviction is shared by the vice-minister of
Planning, Carlos Alberto Lopes, according to whom “(…) poverty in Angola has
diminished 12% between 2001 and 2007, going from 68% down to 56% (…)”, adding
that among the advances recorded in the last few years turns up the relocation of over
four million people since the end of the conflict, an increment in student population of
75%, and the rise of the national minimum salary which has almost doubled since 2003,
going from 4.014 Kwanzas (little over 50 Dollars) to 8.067 Kwanzas (approximately
120 Dollars) (Africa21, June 2008). In the opposite track, the British Secretary of State
for Africa, Asia and United Nations, Mark Malloch-Brown has said in the inauguration
of the 10th Forum Angola at Chatham House (April 2009), that “the high levels of
wealth produced by the oil industry have not yet translated in gains for the poorest”.
Angola has an estimated population of 18.5 million inhabitants, of those around 12.5
million are poor because they live on an income of roughly 1.7 Dollars per day, in a
situation of diminished basic services, low social indexes and fragile system of rights. In
this country, poverty is related to the structural vulnerability of families, to diseases and
inadequate access to basic services (Pestana, N., 2008). The social circumstances in the
country may be similarly illustrated by its human development indexes (HDI), in terms
of basic infrastructures, employment offers, healthcare and nutrition, education,
characteristics of family units, urbanization and citizenship rights, in positions of
reduced access to basic services and underprovided conduct by the part of the welfare
state (Pestana, N. 2008).
Even though there is in action a strategic plan to reduce poverty, drafted in 2004 and
denominated Strategy of Combat against Poverty (ECP – Estratégia de Combate à
Pobreza), whose main guidelines concern to social reintegration, demining, alimentary
safety, rural development, fight against HIV/AIDS, education, health and basic
infrastructures, and was the source for a plan of development in middle-long term, it is
disclosed that, its influence over recent public policies, in the period between 20052009, has been very feeble. Some of the fundamental goals of the ECP (according to the
ODM) were to reduce by half of the impoverished population and to decrease the child
38
mortality rate. It must be remembered that the ECP listed the following causes for
poverty in Angola:
1. Armed conflict that caused, for almost three decades, dislocation of
populations, destruction of traditional systems of economic activities and
social solidarity, damages in social infrastructures and communication routes
and unfeasible distribution of products and other essential supplies,
originating dramatic humanitarian disasters;
2. Strong demographic pressure, resulting from a very high rate of
fecundity, high rates of dependence on family units and massive migratory
movements toward urban centres;
3. Destruction and degradation of social and economic infrastructures as a
direct consequence of war, but also as an immediate consequence of
deficient maintenance and conservation and deregulated systems of
organization and supervision of public investment assets;
4. Fragile functionality of services providing education, healthcare and
social protection, as the result of insufficient technical and human resources,
avoiding an appropriate use of theses systems and services by the most
vulnerable populations;
5. A very accentuated fall in internal availability of important products,
particularly essential goods;
6. Debility of the institutional frame, explained by a low average
qualification of administrative and skilled workers and reduced productivity;
7. Lack of qualifications and depreciation of human resources, caused by
the disadvantages and damages done to the educational and instructive
systems, instability in sanitary conditions, low salaries and extensive
unemployment and underemployment;
8. Inefficiency of macroeconomic policies in
macroeconomic unbalances occurred during the 1990s.
correcting
strong
IV – Both cities where the research took place have characteristics reflecting their
distinctive evolution. The city of Huambo is the provincial capital of the Huambo
District, which is then organized in 11 municipalities and 37 communes. The city of
Huambo is integrated in the main municipality, integrating the Communes of Huambo,
Calima and Chipipa. The provincial population may have increased, from1.055.380
residents in the year 2000 to more recent figures of 2.301.524 (GPH, 2005) and
2.336.734 (GPH, 2006). The available records show a population of 962.111 (GPH,
2005) and 1.055.380 (GPH, 2006) in the Huambo Municipality, while the Huambo
Commune would contain 950.369 residents (GPH, 2006). In April 2006, the Municipal
Administration of the Huambo Commune talked about 1.242.614 residents in its judicial
region, to which were added 54.539 residents in the Calima Commune and 35.001 in the
Chipipa Commune, totalling 1.332.154 residents in the Huambo Municipality. The city
of Huambo has recorded a strong demographic growth together with urban spread, as a
result of combined effects from natural growth, rural exodus and enforced relocations
due to the conflict. The commercial activity in this city is at a stage of reactivation and
rehabilitation, while the formal commercial activity controlled by a few corporative
groups dedicated to wholesale commerce (Arosfram, Angoalissar, Comalca, Golfrate,
the final two are owned by Indian and Lebanese entrepreneurs), the retail business made
39
in stores isn‟t substantial enough yet, comparing to the trade happening in markets. A
significant part of the commercial activities and business services (barbershops,
hairdressers, repair shops, locksmith shops, tailors, shoe shops, photographic studios,
etc.) have an informal nature.
Luanda is the economic and administrative capital of the country and core of the main
political, financial, social and entrepreneurial institutions. In the year 2000, the capital‟s
population was approximately 2.534.800 residents (KPMG/Ministry of Planning, 2003).
The existent records consensually deduce this population growth to be accountable not
only to vegetative growth (natural increase), as well to strong contributions from
immigration (regular and war-induced). Luanda congregates 19.3% of the urban
population of Angola (KMPG/Ministry of Planning, 2003) and its demographic rate has
been followed by an extensive non-premeditated occupation of space. The commercial
activity, for its business extension and volume, plays a crucial role in the economic
background of the city, acting as a platform of provisions for the economic agents in
provincial regions. Wholesale, semi-wholesale, retail and micro-retail trade are
entwined in a commercial and services network, where the modern structures face
competition from traditional institutions, namely from markets and fairs. The informal
component, both in commercial activities as in business services, comes out in Luanda
at its maximum exponent in the Angolan background.
Some notes about the general impact of the military conflict in the cities of
Huambo and Luanda
Concerning the city of Huambo, if the first confrontations in August 1975, during the
transition period towards the independence, had caused limited damages and, in the
brief period of reconciliation lived through 91 and 92 in the aftermath of the Bicesse
peace accords gave time to make some rehabilitations in the city, the return to war after
Unita‟s non-acceptance of the results from the elections in October 1992 has caused
devastating consequences. After 55 days of extensive attacks, Unita took over the city in
March 1993, situation replicated in November 1994 when the Government regained
control of the city, from which resulted in further obvious scars of massive destruction
in one of the youngest Angolan cities.
Concerning the effects created by the long-lasting war over the productive
infrastructures and economic activities in the city of Huambo, the most significant are
the following: generalized insecurity for the economic agents, whether in rural or urban
areas; severe limitations to free circulation of merchandise and people; widespread
destruction of manufacturing infrastructures (factories, roads and rail networks, bridges,
etc.) and social infrastructures (schools, hospitals, etc.); paralysation of
transportation/distribution circuits; stagnation of agricultural, mining and industrial
production rates; broad difficulties regarding the availability of essential merchandises.
The prolonged military conflict has caused more than forced displacements2, has also
affected indirectly the characteristics of the exposed populations, specifically increasing
the cases of poor nutrition and situations of dependence on humanitarian alimentary aid
and, as a result, increasing the mortality rates, the quantity of malformations and
2
Oppenheimer, Raposo and Carvalho (2001) observe what may be considered, in Angola, two large
waves of war refugees, one before and another after the multiparty elections of 1992. The authors
mention an assessment by the Angolan government of about four million refugees in 2000.
40
mutilations3, the number of orphaned children and situations of widowhood. To these
can be adjoined a few other consequences, particularly noticeable in the city of
Huambo: accelerated expansion of informal housing areas and alterations in the
geographic profile of the city; enlarged dimensions in family units and increase in the
number of families headed by women; modifications in the attributes of urban
inhabitants and economically active populations, explicitly in age segmentation, gender,
ethnic origins, patterns of educational and professional skills, customs and way of
living; significant changes in employment projections; reduction of work opportunities
from companies in the formal sector and, in particular, from the public sector; increase
in unemployment and sub-employment rates; reduction in governmental ability of
delivering basic goods and services, such as education, healthcare, potable water,
electricity and basic sanitation; additional obstructions to industrial production, mostly
related to electricity, water and raw materials supplies; retraction of manufacturing
capacity in the formal sector (public and private) and reduction of its relative
importance on consumer satisfaction; increase in the socio-economic significance of
informal activities as the population‟s labour source, in generating income and
producing products and services; general increase in poverty rates.
Focusing on Luanda, the most significant impact of the armed conflict has substantiated
in the massive flux of war refugees entering the Angolan capital, with noticeable
consequences on the urban housing planning, since these accommodations have
expanded in the vicinity of the city in a disorganized manner. The acceleration and
continuity of these migratory fluxes has lead to an accelerated population growth, a
significant addition to population density rates, besides a substantial rise in the
population within active age excluded from any possible formal occupation. The
prolonged conflict has ultimately affected different levels of the economic activities
developed in the city. The corporative groups located in Huambo perform a similar task
as happens in the capital, where the formal commercial activity has some diversity,
being carried on at hypermarkets and other large commercial establishments, at medium
and small stores and at tiny retail spaces. Business conducted in markets counts as an
important fraction of the global commercial fluxes that supply the city and just like
happens in Huambo, there are strong or even stronger components of informal nature in
the commercial sector, either in wholesale trading, in retail trading or commercial
services.
Perception of the actors about the effects of the military conflict and peace
Impact of war
The impact of the armed conflict is mentioned throughout the accounts made by the
informants as the originator of multiple causes of impoverishment: physical and
psychological deprivation, death and disappearance of relatives, loss of family
members, forced displacements, school abandonment, constrained circulation and
restricted access to several services and products, and change of income resources.
Among the gathered information were selected four accounts, two by informants
residing in Huambo and two by informants residing in Luanda, that exemplify some of
the impoverishment factors mentioned below:
3
An official statement by the Government of the Republic of Angola, dated March 13th 2002, quantifies
the outcomes of war: 4 million displaced refugees, 100,000 mutilated, 50,000 war orphaned children and
150,000 ex-combatants and demobilized soldiers.
41
E., vendor in the Alemanha market, shares a spot with many other
fellow landsmen where they trade batteries and generator parts,
most of it bought from warehouses and markets in Luanda. He is
a twenty five year old married man with one child who attended
the 11th grade in school, has experienced the effects of war (first
in Chinguar, Bié Province, having been forced to flee with his
family to the city of Huambo) and afterwards the 55-day war that
shattered this town: “... in the war of fifty five days had much
hunger, much suffering... I lost siblings and other relatives… the
city was very ruined, nothing like it is today, this beautiful...”
H., a 30 year old single men with three children, from the Chivela
quarter in the outskirts of the Alemanha market, where he sells
motorbikes, and has abandoned school in the 6th grade “... because
of the war”. In a rather contradictory manner, he declares to have
a diversified commercial activity (lady‟s shoes, tape recorders,
cattle) that would entail regular trips to Luanda, Benguela,
Namibia and Lundas in high-risk conditions: “... during the war it
became really hard... I couldn‟t go to Benguela, Luanda,
Namibia… it was hard even to get food... just a little portion of
salt was precious... in those times there was no fuel...”
K., 54 years old, comes from Uíge Province and has arrived with
his parents and siblings to Luanda, where he has been living for
49 years. He attended the 12th grade, lives in cohabitation and has
seven offspring (the oldest is 26 years old while the youngest is
12 and is studying in the 6th grade). They all live in the same
house, plus his mother-in-law and sister-in-law. His wife is a
teacher, one son works as an engineer for Sonangol and another
works for Taag. They all contribute to the family budget. He
works as a security manager for a private parking lot. He lives in
Prenda neighbourhood. “My life? I have done many things... I
was a teacher from 1976 to 1980, was a soldier from 1972 to
1992… I was part of the colonial army... next I was part of the
Eplas, after that Fapla... I was demobilized in June 27th 1992,
acted as an assistant commissioner for the Rocha Pinto
Commune... Now I am retired, I get a monthly pension of 65
thousand AKZ... I went into a real war, with gunshots, war was
never a good thing anywhere in the world... from war folks come
out mutilated, some deceased, others orphaned... I had many
family members who died, after the elections of 1992 my life was
at risk... Now the country is at peace, there will be elections and
there won‟t be any troubles... the Angolan people does not wish
for more wars...”
L., a 32 year old woman from Canhe, Huambo Province, married
with five children. She came to Luanda because of the war, with
her Uíge native husband: “... I was in Huambo when the 55-day
war started... it was complicated to find food, find firewood... I
had to walk a lot to run away from Huambo...” She resides in
Golfe 2 quarter and explains the changes in mobility patterns of
the Angolans: “... I still have some family left in Huambo... since
42
the war, it became difficult to get there... the last time I went to
Huambo, in 2003, I rode in a taxi and it took almost a full day to
travel... nowadays the roads are improving...”.
Causes for the impoverishment induced by the military conflict Number of references
Huambo Luanda Total
Physical and psychological deprivation
2/10
2/25 4/35
Death and disappearance of relatives
3/10
5/25 8/35
Separation from family members/forced displacement
3/10
10/25 13/35
School abandonment
1/10
2/25 3/35
Mobility restrictions
3/10
5/25 8/35
Constrained access to some products and services
1/10
4/25 5/35
Change in income resources
3/10
3/25 6/35
The differentiated features of the armed conflict seem to have created distinctive
impacts in Huambo and in Luanda: the memories of the destructive outcome of the
conflict appear to be more vivid in the accounts made by the residents of Huambo or by
those who were active agents in the conflict, ex-combatants demobilized from the war,
in the case of Luanda. Concurrently, it happens more in the accounts by older persons,
compared to those by younger ones. Effects such as the forced displacements, death and
disappearance of relatives, the involuntary separation from family units and restricted
mobility, and changes in occupation and income source are the most recurrent
references in the accounts of the interviewed individuals, both in Huambo and in
Luanda.
Benefits of peace
The benefits of peace are equally obvious in most narratives. The rehabilitation of
material assets, retrieving territorial mobility in safe conditions, finding lost family
members, and crescent opportunities for business and better access to products and
services are the main consequences pointed out by the interviewees. Below are
presented three statements, two from Huambo residents and another from Luanda, that
embody most of the benefits that peace has brought, from the viewpoint of the social
actors.
B. is 30 years old and was born in the Calima
municipality, Huambo Province. He is married and has
three children, and works as a motor-taxi driver since
2002. Before, he was a farmer and worked in his family
land. The military conflict took him to the provincial
capital. Six years after the end of the hostilities, B
underlines that “... now, there is safety again, and
tranquillity...” adding that he got back to his farming
activities: “... I have my own xitaca (small farm) there in
Calima... I go there every week and bring potatoes, beans,
produce to consume at home...”
J. is a 22-year-old seller of sneakers in Alemanha market
(Huambo), is single and lives with his mother and siblings.
He attended the 8th grade and at that time he became a
vendor in the departed São Pedro market, where he
negotiated in face creams and several other merchandises.
43
He remembers that during wartime travelling used to take
much longer, the roads were awful and there were
muggings, so it was safer to travel by airplane. Since
peacetime “... I can take a trip to Luanda by land... people
are living better, there are no problems... they can buy
more things...” J considers that his activity earns him
enough income to pay for “... the essential expenses”. The
young vendor has awareness about the wide range of
circumstances in the market, remarking the clear
stratification in the abilities of earning money: “... I am not
poor, but I am not rich either... those who sells motorbikes
make more money than I do... the roboteiros (carriers) win
less than I do... it depends on the business... those who win
the most are the wholesalers...”.
M. is 24 years old, was born in Luanda but his family is
originally from Bié: “... my family escaped the military
conflict in 1981”. He only speaks Portuguese, is single and
has two daughters, lives in Sambizanga, has attended
middle school and would like to study computer science.
“I sell books and an office material, what I earn is enough
to keep my family going (I have two children, one is six
and other is three years old)... it is enough to pay for food
and healthcare...” About his activity, he says that “...I have
been in Roque since I was thirteen... First I started as
zungueiro, I sold batteries, radio appliances and every bit I
thought could give me more profit... I managed to save
some money and now I am selling books... and I also do
some work repairing computers...” He declares that since
he arrived, the market hasn‟t stopped growing: “... many
businesses which did not exist before are done now... since
2002 you can feel people‟s inner peace... There is more
variety of merchandise, before there was no
communication between the Provinces... The stress has
practically vanished and folks are getting more relaxed...”
About the living conditions of the market workers, he
assures that “... there are persons who have a harder life,
those who sell cookies, popcorns, a lady who spends the
whole day with a tub full to brim with popcorn and at the
end of the day will only make 500 kzs, ... but there are also
those who live way better, like those people selling food,
those who trade in sector 12 of the market make a lot of
money...”.
The connection between the end of the military conflict and the rehabilitation of
material assets, regained mobility, better access to basic services and business
opportunities comes as a common denominator among the interviewed individuals from
Huambo and Luanda. In Luanda, three of the informants referred to the declining latent
hostility amid the citizens, besides the internalization and consolidation of peace which
make people fell progressively less threatened. The interviews done in Luanda suggest
44
that for the interviewed individuals, peace is a given, even in the midst of the preelectoral period.
Benefits of peace
Rehabilitation of material assets
Retrieved territorial mobility
Safety
Lesser tension, hostility and stress
Reuniting with family members
Multiple access to goods and services
Multiple business opportunities
Number of references
Huambo
Luanda
Total
3/10
4/25
7/35
4/10
6/25
10/35
2/10
4/25
6/35
1/10
3/25
4/35
1/10
4/25
5/35
1/10
4/25
5/35
1/10
2/25
3/35
However, it should be emphasized the lack of unanimity in the outlook of the
interviewed individuals regarding which effects the end of the war has had over
Angolan life. Some suggest that nothing has changed. Three of the individuals
interviewed in Roque Santeiro market expressed their conviction that, although there
were many induced advantages, the end of the conflict was prejudicial as well to
businesses performed in marketplaces. This is the instance in the narrative of N., a 32year-old candies seller from Malanje. The war has brought her to Luanda: “... I came to
Luanda on holiday, but then the conflicts started and I did not return home...” She lives
in Cazenga and has been working at the Roque Santeiro market for seven years: “...
first, I started at the internal retail section and now, for the last three years, I‟ve been
selling candies...” G. believes the peace has carried a negative result to the dynamics of
the market business: “...Since peacetime, there are more products, but we have fewer
clients... They used to be more during the war, because the roads were closed, but then
the canteens got organized and now people do most of their shopping in warehouses...”.
Perceptions of poverty
The perception of poverty, one‟s own and of others around us, is presented in narratives
of several informants. These individuals were asked to position themselves, in absolute
terms, corresponding to different categories (poor, average, rich) and in relative terms,
in comparison to their neighbours or other economic agents. Among the collected
information were chosen five statements, two by informants from Huambo and three by
informants from Luanda, which seemed emblematic and evocative of the inquired
sample.
F., a 37-year-old seller of female clothing in the Alemanha market
(Huambo), has been in this commercial activity for 19 years. She
has completed the 4th grade, is married with seven children,
discloses that the income provided by her business is enough to
cover for her family needs, adding “...there are some folks having
a rough time, here at the market... there are persons who have had
money and now don‟t have it anymore, and vice versa...no, I‟m
not rich (laughter)... there are people selling bedcovers made in
Namibia who earn a lot more...”
C., one of the two taxi-drivers interviewed in Huambo, expresses
his perception: “... I live a life of poverty... there are paupers who
have to find food in the garbage... those selling in the streets have
it worse... in the hiasses (hiasse is the name which Angolan
people give to the vehicles involved in minibus taxi industry. Its
45
origin results from an adaptation of the term Hiace, that
corresponds to a Toyota vehicle model) you win more money, but
it is still a survival existence...”
O. is a18 years old attending the 9th grade, lives at the Bairro
Operário quarter in Luanda in a catholic family, with his mother,
father and four siblings. His father is an automobile mechanic and
mother is a doctor: “...I am a refrigeration technician, air
conditioning, automobiles... I learned it from master Francisco...
if the day goes well, I can earn three thousand, four thousand or
five thousand Kwanzas... the earnings depend on how the day
goes, in a good day I can end with around 100 Dollars... family
life in the last years has been kind of alright... in my
neighbourhood there are poor folks, they wash cars, carry
merchandise, some sleeping in the streets, living roughly, but
there is also some people living better... these are people making
more money... I earn more money a day than a hiasse driver... if I
do some car maintenance, I can win almost 400 Dollars...”
P. is a 23 years old single woman from Luanda, living with her
parents and two siblings. Attended school until the 9th grade, but
then dropped out “...for I had no conditions”. She has been selling
tableware (glasses, bowls, lamps, etc.) at entryways for four
years. Before, she used to sell candies in the doorway of her
home, in the Bairro Popular neighbourhood, near Cazenga
market. She used to be present at Nzinga‟s itinerant and 1º de
Maio fairs: “I have a merchant license... my father is a tailor, my
mother is a seamstress, everybody does their share... I buy
merchandise in the warehouses at São Paulo, Kinaxixe... when I
cannot be at my bench, either my mother or my helper cover for
me, I pay her minimum wage so I can help her make a living...”
P., claims that “business is enough to earn your keep” and that “...
live has improved for some, for other has gotten worse, there is
people suffering a lot, living very poorly, who don‟t get assistance
in hospitals... Peace is something good, we got water and energy
not so long ago, schools are being reconstructed... some folks are
having a much harder time than my family, living modestly, in the
dirty quarters and at the Anangola neighbourhood there are a lot
of modest folks... those are living from the zunga, in houses like
slums... but there are some traders too, who go to China, Dubai
and Congo, they sell at the markets, even at Roque, and earn piles
of money...”.
Q., 60 years old, was born in Gabela municipality, Kuanza Sul
Province, and lives at Estrada da Samba. Married with five
offspring, the oldest is 43 and the youngest is two, he was one of
the earliest residents in the quarter. He has been living in Luanda
since 1975, where he arrived when was 15 years old: “... I was
working in a lady‟s house in Gabela where I got paid 60 Escudos
a month... after that, I‟ve been always working in the tourism
business... I‟ve been here in this commercial establishment since
1986.” About his life path, he mentions: “... unfortunately, I only
46
attended the 7th grade, but I had training in touristic lodging at the
tourism school of Bicesse... I assisted in the management of
several hotel units, later this governmental corporation closed
down...” Talking about the changes induced by peace, he
supposes “... things are changing, the infrastructures... healthcare,
education and nourishment are still reserved for some... there are
still many people living poorly, many people without an
occupation in the suburban areas... even those holding a job are
paid poorly... my wife works in the Ministry of Geology and
Mining and earns 15,000 AKZ (200 Dollars)... there are a lot of
people struggling, but there are many people living a good life
too... my life is not better nor worse since the peace time, I am the
same... comparing to my neighbours, I am poor, the only thing I
have is my apartment... I get by, business pays me enough so I
manage to feed the children, and in a good day I make 6 to7
thousand Kwanzas of raw earnings, which is a profit of
1500/2000... I expect things to get better...”
From the narratives of the interviewed individuals, it is concluded that even during
peacetime many individuals are living with difficulties. Part of this population considers
their personal situation as being the same as it was in the war. Most of the actors
perceives and identifies a stratification of activities according to their potentially
produced income level.
It is taken into consideration that such stratification is reasonably connected to this
sample‟s characteristics. The interviewed, even those with patrimony or considerable
income, never assume to be rich. However, they only rarely assume to be poor either.
From the narratives of the informants, it is possible to delineate a pyramid of activities
consistent with potential monetary income, having at the bottom activities such as
carrying/ hauling merchandise (roboteiros), ambulant selling (zungueiros), alluring
clients or car washing. In the following stage are the activities performed by salaried
workers in formal, low wages occupations: teachers, security guards, domestic workers.
In a second stage are found small retail sellers in markets of several kinds of
merchandise, or sellers of low value products, like second-hand clothing. In a third
stage are the activities connected to salaried services of informal nature, such as hiasse
drivers and motor-taxi drivers, fare collectors, and freelancing activities related to
services (masonry, etc.). In the forth stage is positioned retail selling of alimentary
products, clothing and other essential goods. It is followed by retail selling of nonperishable goods, and above stand the proprietors of hiasse and motor-taxi vehicles. In
the seventh stage, the informants have put the retail sellers of highly profitable products
(positioned in the sector 12 of Roque Santeiro market). Finally, on top of the hierarchy
are located the market agents dedicated to wholesale and semi-wholesale trading.
From the accounts of the interviewed individuals, it is supposed to have a relation
between the conditions of performance for every activity and the perception of poverty,
fundamentally anchored on the notion of risk linked to each category placing in the
lowest rank of the hierarchy those working as free agents, above them property owners
and businessmen, and on top the salaried workers. This relation is demonstrated in the
narratives of these actors, both those interviewed in Huambo as those inquired in
Luanda.
B., a motor-taxi driver: “... I take home enough to support my
family... (But) motor-taxis are a part of the poor list... the poor
47
have to exist, because everyone has a place... some people are
having problems in finding something to eat... Teachers, security
guards, they are not on the poor list, since they have a profession
and guaranteed income... for the hiasse drivers it depends, those
who own their vehicles are not on the poor list...”.
The idea of security and income stability as the better options appears once more in the
narrative of A., a housekeeper with past experience as street seller at the Cacilhas fair:
“... There are many vendors making a good earning, and others who don‟t... Life in the
fairs is very insecure, you can earn money or not... and there is always those moments
when the Government decides to close or relocate the fair...” and in the account of F.,
lady‟s clothing seller in the Alemanha market: “... I want to work for a company, for the
State, as long as one is being paid, one does the job...”.
R., 27 years old, born in Benguela and living in Luanda since
2008: “... I came to earn my living, where I come from one can
not move forward...”. He resides in the Rocha Pinto
neighbourhood, sharing quarters with two brothers (24 and 22
years old), and works as an ambulant seller (zungueiro) of
brooms, buckets and mops. He attended the 6th grade, dropped out
of school because he had no means to keep studying. About his
business, he reveals that “... I have a spot in Chicala... I get there
on foot, there is no money for taxis... it is a long journey, my
regular arrival time is 7:30 a.m. and at 8 I am already working,
then I leave at 17:30... Business is only enough to survive... I buy
my merchandises at the São Paulo warehouses, buy brooms for
280 Kwanzas and sell them for 400 Kwanzas... Yesterday I made
6,000 Kwanzas... it is sufficient to save a bit of money... There are
many people doing zunga, but the police harasses us once in a
while... in the neighbourhood some folks are having it hard, those
working in construction say they have more money... but there are
people with loads of money in the neighbourhood, traders... in
peace time, the entire Angola is changing for changing, the city,
the roads, the buildings... on the subject of employment, the
opportunities are better here in Luanda... I would like to work for
a corporation, with a permanent position, because when you are
concerned your place is assured...”.
(Self)Perception of poverty
I am not poor nor rich
I make enough to provide for my family
I have a survival existence
There are others living worse and having a hard time
There are others making more money
I am poor
Not poor for having a secured income
Number of references
Huambo
Luanda Total
1/10
3/25
4/35
8/10
7/25
15/35
2/10
1/25
3/35
5/10
6/25
11/35
5/10
8/25
13/35
2/10
1/25
3/35
2/10
2/25
4/35
Both in Huambo and in Luanda, having the ability to reach larger incomes does not
necessarily seem to constitute a protection against the risk of impoverishment. Part of
the actors considers that having a job with a secure salary is better than having an
occupation that results in a larger but less steady income. Only a few consider
48
themselves to be objectively poor and none believes to be rich. A considerable
contingent of the informants declares making enough money to provide for their
families‟ needs. The perception of others living poorer or richer also is mentioned
repeatedly in the speeches of the interviewed individuals.
Trajectories of activities/occupations
The occupational trajectories are much diversified. Three facets emerge as the most
conditioning over the occupational paths, whether in Huambo or in Luanda: the
destructive effects the military conflict inflicted on the activities/occupations, the age
rank and provincial origin of the informants. The elders, the refugees and those
labouring in the areas more direct and intensely affected by the armed conflict are those
presenting a more diversified occupational trajectory.
C. is a 38 year old motor-taxi driver. He was born in the Bailundo
Municipality and moved with his parents to Huambo. He attended
school up to the 7th grade and his wife sells fertilizer at the
Alemanha market. They have five children: “... I arrived here at
Huambo in 1978, by then it was war time... my parents took me
away from Bailundo when I was young... all my siblings died
during the war... because of the war... now, I only have my father,
my mother is already deceased... I have two brothers living here
in Huambo... I began selling in 1998... Would get products here in
Huambo then sell them at the markets in other municipalities, but
afterwards I got knocked down when I was attacked by a gang of
bandits, we were robbed, they took everything... I was left with
nothing... My last resource was to take the bike I had at home and
work as motor-taxi... I am in this activity because I have no job...
this kind of activity we call “scratch a living”... what is left then is
needed to provide for the children...”
S. is a 35-year-old man from Uíge, where he used to buy fish to
sell at the border. He studied at the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Arrived at Luanda in 1992, he would select products from
the province and carry them to the capital: “... I travelled by van...
even during the war it had no risk for me, God blessed me, but it
was dangerous for other people.” His wife trades at a roadside
stall. What they earn “...is enough for daily expenses and pay for
our kid‟s tuition.” They live in the Gamek quarter, at whose
market he has been working for two years. Now he‟s an exchange
dealer and sells mobile phone cards and call credits. In a good
working day, he “... makes 45 to 50 Dollars.” He does not wish to
return to Uíge: “... in the future, I would like to attend an
accountancy course... these last years my life improved
somewhat... life in Uíge was better... I don‟t want to go back
because of the envy...”.
T., 29 years old, was born in Kalandula, Malange Province. He
arrived at Luanda in 2000 due to the war. He lives in the Cacuaco
municipality, married with four children. The interviewee
describes his occupational trajectory as such: “... in Malange I
worked the land... when I came to Luanda, I was a security guard
for a private company, but got a low wage... then I began working
49
as freelancer mason, saved some money and in 2003 I started as a
doleiro (moneychanger) in the Cazenga market (former Asa
Branca market)... I also sell phone cards and calls paid by the
minute... in a good day, I make one or two thousand Kwanzas...
today, I started the day with a thousand Dollars... the business is
sufficient to take care of my family...”.
Future Expectations
The expectations about the future are wide-ranging, going from the will to perform a
certain profession, alongside expansion in the scale or characteristics of a business, to
the pragmatic posture of those whose future perspectives basically entail creating better
life conditions to their children and those who rather wait and see. Seven of the
interviewed subjects (five from Huambo and two from Luanda) have expressed their
expectations toward the future in the following manner:
D., a 33-year-old trader of several sorts of merchandise in
the Alemanha market, is from Uíge and would like to be
“... a teacher... I have a certifications from RDC, but is not
officially recognized...”.
G., a 23-year-old single man from the city of Huambo is a
second year student at the PUNIV, makes business selling
furniture (sofas and chairs) at the Alemanha market. His
ambition is to “... be a nurse and afterwards attend medical
school...”.
J., a 22 year old single man, intends to “... get a certificate
in computer science...”, while H., a 33 year old motorbike
seller, married in the traditional way (he declares to be a
single adult) and father of three children, adds that “... I
only want to guarantee the livelihood of my children...”.
A similar aspiration is expressed by E., trader of batteries and electrical generator parts,
25 year old man married to a school teacher and father of one child: “... if I can make
more money, it will be to pay for the kid‟s school...” he also believes he will one day
have the possibility of “... improving my business... have a store just like there are so
many in town... have more money to afford more merchandise...”.
About his future expectations, U., an office supplies trader at Roque Santeiro market,
tells he would “... like to make sure my children do not have to face what I went through
(doing the zunga or selling in fairs), I want them to study and get a secure job.... I have
been told the market is going to be transferred, which is quite an injustice, many
families are counting on Roque, many people who have finished their studies and now
cannot find an occupation... If the market is relocated it will be hard on me and many
people... I‟m not sure if I‟ll follow, it is too far, too far away, I‟ll have to catch more
taxis, there will be fewer customers... it would be better to rehabilitate the marketplace”.
V. is 34-year-old single woman with two children, born in
the Kwanza Norte Province and arrived to Luanda in
1999, in result of the war. She had a traditional marriage
and lived with her husband for seven years, has separated
and now is single and the head of her family. For five
50
years, she was a vigilant in a childcare establishment, and
has been working as a housekeeper for the last year and a
half: “... I make less; however, I have more free time... I
get paid 200 Dollars with meals included, and if I need to
go s a doctor ailment my boss helps me... “. In the future
“... I would love to have a steady job as an educator... it is
difficult to attain because I don‟t have a childcare
certification, it takes on year and costs 100 Dollars a
month to get one at the MINARS school... if it is God‟s
will... my dream is my daughter becoming a medical
doctor and my son an agronomic engineer...” . She
considers that “...peacetime has brought many positive
things, free circulation, more safety, but the poverty has
not diminished since peace has arrived and some people
are living worse... Some people only have one meal a
day... zungueiros, housekeepers... those living better are
the ones with good jobs...”.
Future expectations
Perform a determinate profession
(Return to) study
Get formal employment
Increase scale of business
Diversify business
Ensure the children‟s future
Ensure the children‟s education
Number of references
Huambo
Luanda
Total
5/10
4/25
9/35
3/10
4/25
7/35
2/10
4/25
6/35
2/10
2/25
4/35
2/10
1/25
3/35
2/10
3/25
5/35
3/10
4/25
7/35
To perform a specific profession (teacher, nurse, etc.), to have access to formal
employment, to study or resume studies, to guarantee their family‟s subsistence and
their children‟s education, these are the shared expectation to most of interviewed
individuals in Huambo and Luanda.
Conclusion
The long-lasting military conflict arises from the narratives of the interviewed social
actors from Huambo and Luanda as one of the main determinant factors of poverty in
the country. It is frequently mentioned the negative impact this war has produced over
the population‟s living conditions and freedom by conditioning their circulation and
creating migratory flows directed towards urban areas and foreign countries, over the
functionality of the markets, over production, transportation, sanitation, water and
energy infrastructures, and over health and education systems. The political and military
instability resulting from, and associated to war, have introduced elements of
perturbation while defining and conducting the economic policy. Since the start, from
the options offered in terms of allocation of resources which featured in the so-called
“war economy”, to the resultant implications from a governmental centralized system of
management for the economy, including the circumstances related to a long and
complex process of transition into a market economy. Ineffective and unstable global
and sectoral economic policies have contributed to engender and enlarge economic and
51
social inequalities and to increment the risks, vulnerabilities and instabilities disturbing
the modus vivendi of most of the population.
The majority of the interviewed individuals have identified several dimensions in the
outcome of the armed conflict and peace process in their respective life paths. The
interviews exemplify the prolonged process of enforced dislocation various Angolan
families experienced in the course of 27 years, one of the causes for explaining the
accelerated urbanization of the Angolan environment.
The impact of the military conflict over the occupational trajectories of the interviewees
constitutes another explanative element resultant from the collect statements. The
gathered information suggests more clues about the features of poverty in the realistic
context of the chosen sample: the suburban environments and marginal zones of the
cities, in most cases densely populated, seem to be habitats where the poverty
conditions/situations are felt in the most severe manner; refuges and ex-soldiers are the
most vulnerable groups; low educational levels constitute indicators of vulnerability
towards poverty. For the younger crowd the precocious school abandonment, caused by
numerous different reasons according to their personal life but nevertheless linked to an
undemanding job market, comes up as an additional indicator of vulnerability and
exclusion.
The advantages of peace as a priced and treasured asset are manifestly an important
reality in the interviews, though it does not mean the informants do not possess a clear
awareness that, although war has ended, a significant portion of the Angolan population
is yet strangled in conditions of deprivation, along with an immense range of social
inequalities.
One of the most interesting facts resulting from the information collected in the chosen
sample concerns the apparent reluctance of the actors in positioning themselves socially,
either as poor or as rich. To better understand the perceptions of these social actors, who
have experienced situations/conditions of poverty, to explore the relationships of direct
causality between the military conflict and personal/occupational trajectories of the
social actors (namely, the correlation linking military conflict and informality) that
experienced situations/conditions of poverty and to obtain additional information on
which manner the peace accords have induced significant alterations (positive and
negative) in the living conditions of Angolans, these are three possible paths for
expanding the research focused on the relation between peace and poverty.
References
AIP/Ministry of Planning (2003) “Huambo - perfil sócio-económico", Luanda
Municipal Chamber of Nova Lisboa (1971) “Isto é o Huambo; estas são as suas realidades”,
Nova Lisboa
Feliciano, J., Lopes, C.M. and Rodrigues, C.U. (2008) Protecção Social, Economia Informal e
Exclusão Social nos PALOP, Lisbon: Principia
Provincial Government of Huambo (2005) “Relatório das Actividades Desenvolvidas – 2005”,
Huambo
Provincial Government of Huambo (2006) “Programa Geral – biénio 2005-2006”, Huambo:
KPMG/Ministry of Planning (2003)
Ministry of Planning (2003) “Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza”, Direcção de Estudos e
Planeamento, Republic of Angola
Oppenheimer, J., Raposo, I. and Carvalho, P. (2001) “Luanda: a cooperação direccionada para
os grupos vulneráveis no contexto da concentração urbana acelerada”, MTS, Lisbon
52
Pestana,
N.
(2008)
“Angola.
A
Pobreza,
uma
vergonha
nacional”,
http://pambazuka.org/pt/category/features/53120
Republic of Angola (1995) “Huambo - perfil sócio-económico”, Mesa Redonda de Doadores,
Huambo
53
„We Create Minimum Conditions‟: survival of the female market vendors of
Luanda in the post-war1
Aline Afonso Pereira
Abstract
On the subject of Angola, this text aims to analyse the workflow of female vendors in the
informal market of Luanda. The notion of gender and the correlation between gender
and conflict will be briefly examined. The purpose is, deriving from the collected
depositions, to find an interpretation of the behaviours and survival strategies
development by these women in the post-war period, their entrance into credit systems
and mutual aid. It was used as instruments of investigation in Luanda data compilation
methods, direct observation, semi-structured inquiries and life stories narratives.
Introduction
Walking along Kinaxixi any time of day, it is noticeable the rush of women selling all
variety of merchandise. That scenery repeats all over town. These women make use of
the informal market as a way of survival, for their own and their families. In this market
they don‟t get a fair nor equalitarian treatment; they don‟t have access to any
mechanisms of social protection. The activities these women practice don‟t demand
specific skills or assets and, consequently, it produces the lowest incomes.
Among several factors that have influenced the work market‟s dynamic in Angola, we
count the civil war2, which, with some interruptions, has extended since the
independence in 1975 all the way through to 2002. The civil war, not only long as well
as extremely violent, caused a migration of populations from rural regions to urban
areas, in search of safety and employment, although in these areas job opportunities
were already scarce and off limits to non-skilled labour. This migration to urban areas
also entailed a change of strategies to families and the loss of a structured system of
solidarity existing in the rural world. The reestablishment of strategies of mutual aid,
partly redesigned for this environment, has become the survival assurance to numerous
families.
From the observation of the activities played by the female street vendors in the
informal work market of Luanda in the post-conflict period, the present report attempts
to create an association between mutual aid strategies and the empowerment of these
1
The author would like to express her most sincere appreciation to Doctor Nuno Vidal, for his support in
the production of the field research in Luanda. This article is part of the Doctorate Thesis in African
Studies of the author, which is being developed in the ISCTE-IUL since 2007, with the sponsorship of the
FCT – Foundation for Science and Technology.
2
Other than the civil war, the largest instability was caused by the economic liberalization process that has
contributed to the increase of poverty and the reinforcement of inequalities between genders in the urban
employment market in Angola. The liberalization process was conducted in an unrestrained way, without
government intervention in terms of public policies capable of protecting the human resources involved in
this course of action. This question, though relevant for the configuration of the urban informal market,
will not be analysed in this report. See: Afonso Pereira, 2006
54
women, taking into account the main economic consequences resulting from the war.
Subsequently this manuscript proposes the notion of gender as the main outlook for the
research on the integration of women into the job market following 2002.
The report has primarily made use of to a qualitative approach, supplemented with
quantitative records. The main social actors considered were women working as street
vendors in the informal urban market. According to this project‟s guidelines, the work
was started in Lisbon, with a revision of available bibliography concerning this theme.
It was used as instruments of investigation in Luanda the collection of data, direct
observation, semi-structured inquiries and life stories narratives.
It was conducted a total of 11 interviews in Luanda, to street vendors in the informal
market working fulltime or part-time, either in the streets or outside their homes or
inside markets. It is presented an outline of the profiles of the interviewed women in the
following table:
Activity
Location
M1
Clothing seller
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6
Place of
birth
Age
Marital
status
Education
Religion
Congolenses
Primary
Income-earner
in household
no
Luanda
14.
single
IURD
Part time seller of
food products
Congolenses
no
Luanda
17
single
Second hand
clothing seller;
voluntary teacher
Teacher in the
elementary level;
seller of cooked
fish
Pharmaceuticals
seller
Clothing and
cosmetics seller
Kikolo
yes
Huambo
56
widow
3rd grade,
cannot read
nor write
Attending
the 8th
grade
8th grade
House
doorstep
yes
Huambo
54
married
12th grade
IECA
Kwanza
yes
Uíge
48
married
8th grade
Protestant
Roque
Santeiro and
outside the
house
(cosmetics)
Canteen at
home
No (although
has higher
income than
husband)
Luanda
31
married
Middle
school
(health
course)
Apostolic
Both her and
husband
(although
husband is
unemployed)
yes
Uíge
48
married
8th grade
Catholic
Bengo
48
married
9th grade
Catholic
yes
Luanda
43
single
8th grade
Catholic
House
doorstep
yes
Huambo
40
widow
8th grade
Catholic
House
doorstep
no
Kwanza
Norte
47
single (in
cohabitation)
4th grade
Catholic
M7
Beer, sodas and
sugar seller
M8
Sheets and
bedcovers seller
M9
Home textiles
door to door seller
Beer, sodas and
wine seller (by
request)
New clothing and
beer seller
M10
M11
At home and
at Roque
Santeiro
At home
Pentecostal
IECA
The sampling group was chosen according to opportunity, the interviewed sellers were
contacted directly at their workplaces or during meetings coordinated by the CSO (civil
society organizations) with which they cooperate (such as Kixicrédito – a nongovernmental organization for microcredit, and the Council of Christian Churches of
Angola – CICA). This investigation faced some limitations originated by the shortage of
current statistic information about Angola and particularly about the informal market.
55
The notion of gender
The notion of gender taken into deliberation for this research is the result of numerous
approaches. According to Connell (1987), the asymmetries of gender presuppose
different outlines in different systems along the historical periods. The hegemonic
femininity and the hegemonic masculinity are historically interchangeable. In the case
of Angola, it is understood that the relations of gender are multiple and differentiated.
The inequalities of gender are transversal to class relations 3. Although women in upper
social classes may have in some societies a higher status than men, in the lower classes
women of all strata are overall submissive to men.
Based in the theories developed in “Sex role theory” (Marchbank & Letherby, 20074;
Giddens, 2000: 120-148) that consider the processes of socialization and reproduction
as mechanisms of behavioural conditioning and definition of individual behaviour
according to their biological traits – sex. From this assumption there are, otherwise,
more mechanisms of motivation and punishment to conform the individuals according
to the social expectations for each sex. This practice occurs in the familial, institutional
and public spheres.
For Sow (1997), the relations of gender are necessarily relations of power. According to
Connell5, the sexual division of labour entails differences in the allocation of training
and production/reproduction. Consequently, the sexual division of labour has
implications in the process of accumulation and it is a significant mechanism of
constraint to the empowerment of women.
Although women are considered, in regard of this report, as active social actors and not
as victims, it is assumed that the structure of social relations (including those of gender)
is the outcome of the practice. As such, individual and collective initiatives are
contributing to a change/equivalence of social roles (choice, doubt, strategy, planning,
mistake and transformation)6. In other words, relations of gender are a dynamic
arrangement, produced and reproduced in the familial, institutional and state cores
(Connell, 1987).
3
“In general males have a material edge over women in each stratum; that man men benefit differentially
from the disproportionate concentration of males in the higher rungs of the hierarchy; and some fameless
may yet be materially better off than some males across different strata. The latter eventuality does not,
however, absolve the materially disadvantaged males from being party to the patriarchal order and its
implied male hegemony”. Mhone, 1997: 147.
4
“Gender is usually seen as a socially determined difference based upon the biological differences
between the sexes. Sex, the state of being either female or male, is determined by biological
characteristics such as anatomical, reproductive and chromosomal attributes. Sex is deemed to be natural
whereas gender is seen as the social expression of natural, biological differences primarily based upon the
appearance of genitals. Gender refers to the economic, social and cultural”. Marchbank & Letherby,
2007: 5.
5
According to Mama (1996): “conceptually, studies of women‟s informal activities show the
reproductive and productive domains to be so intimately interlinked that they cannot really be separated,
so making nonsense of the manner in which both policies and theories have relied on a division between
the two.” Mama, 1996: 75.
6
Connell equates four point of inadequacy of the “Sex hole theory” as parameters of analysis in the
thematic of gender: “its voluntarism and inability to theorize power and social interest; its dependence on
biological dichotomy and its consequently non-social conception of structure; its dependence on a
normative standard case and systematic representation of resistance; and the absence of a way of
theorizing the historicity of gender”. Connell, 1987: 53-61.
56
The notion of gender in Africa
The adequacy and/or adaptability of the concepts developed amidst the feminist
movements and in the researches on gender within an occidental context being applied
to investigations about the African society is a controversial question. For Kisiang‟ani
(2004: 10-25)7, the studies about gender in Africa, even following the processes of
independence and due to the manner Africans are still being submitted to socialization,
are conditioned by colonialism and by a prejudiced and distorted image the Europeans
have of the relationships involving African men and women8. According to this author:
“For Africa, Gender Studies embrace a profound intellectual effort to query the diverse
ways in both the African woman and man have been represented through Western
dissertations. Furthermore, gender research in Africa entails an attempt to highlight the
effects of biased Western gender confabulations on Africa and how European prejudices
about Africans could be changed”.
This perspective seems to indicate political purposes, as much as in the epistemological
realm it does not consubstantiate in pertinent proposals for the scientific investigation of
gender. Lewis (2004:27-35) declared that is already progressions and difficulties in the
recent outlook of research concerning this field of study in Africa, contrary to occidental
studies initially conducted on the subject of African women, which were characterized
as being frozen in time and space, practitioners of rituals and traditions but without a
history of their own. These women would be the antithesis of the occidental woman 9.
For Lewis, the main point of concern is the manner in which these categories have
become permanent, absolute, Africa being analysed as a counterpoint to the Occident.
Meanwhile, for Iman (1997: 25), a mention of “The African tradition and culture”
reveals a very simplistic, homogenised and romantic point of view, frequently operated
by political elites against women‟s interests. Besides, the author emphasizes the
necessity of taking into consideration some particularities: “Africa-centred gender
analysis recognizes that there are particularities as well commonalities of Africa
experiences.”
Reflecting on the regional features in this research, it is made a proposal to “gentrify”
the analysis completed about the informal urban labour market in Angola, in other
words, to examine the way some actions carried out independently by the CSO and
above all by the State have been contributing to the promotion of female emancipation.
According to Imam (1997: 23):
“Fundamentally, gender analysis highlights the necessity of
considering ideology, subjectivity and consciousness, and the role
of this „non-material‟ process in politics, productions relations,
democratic process and the state. For instance, the investigate of
various forms of gender relations indicates that‟s despite women‟s
7
The author also affirmed that: “African problems cannot be effectively addressed from the standpoint of
European perspectives. Consequently, as a significant category of analysis, Gender Studies offers us a
critical platform for confronting the deteriorating African condition (…). Gender studies can assist in
invalidating destruct forms of knowledge authored by endorsing by the West”.
8
Men are seen as irrational savages, guided by instincts, women are seen as sensual and devilish, capable
of seducing any men, whose sole abilities are to procreate and prepare food. It is yet necessary to mention
that this imagery has left a trail in time.
9
“In many ways, the fixation with an imagined „africanity‟ in relation to women and gender re-produces
the dominant discursive constructions of Africa, constantly described as everything the west is not”.
Lewis, 2004: 30
57
involvement in central aspects of productive labour, even in the
contexts were their economic contributions are sustaining
households and communities, patriarchal ideologies ensure
women‟s subordinations. They do so by rendering women‟s and
men‟s labour incommensurate, devaluing women‟s labour and
rendering it invisible an „non-economic‟”.
“Right there, the suffering is felt” – Women and Armed Conflicts
What sort of interactions can be established between women and armed conflicts? Are
they active agents or victims? For RUSSO (1994)10, armed conflicts are considered a
“men business”, while women are engaged in the roles of peace promoters. Moura
declared (2005: 52-67) that to recognize the role of women as fighters would constitute
a challenge to femininity, socially constructed as peaceful, and therefore by opposition
legitimating a certain militarized and violent masculinity: “the image of the mother
counter posed against the image of the warrior – life giving and death bringing (Moura,
2005: 52). For Turshen (1998: 10)11, inside the existing configurations of war, in
particular civil and independence warfare, women also perform as fighters, as spies,
they choose between factions, resisting and retaliating, fighting among themselves;
furthermore, when not directly involved in a conflict, they nevertheless make a direct or
indirect contribution in numerous ways to its development.
In Moura‟s opinion, (2005), the refusal to recognize the active role played by women
during conflicts, especially in the demobilization programs, encourages the
marginalization of women‟s needs after the conflicts are over. Following the author‟s
reasoning, the discourse of vulnerability and consequent victimhood of women may
lead to a de-politicization of their actions and needs in this periods of armed conflict and
during the post-war reconstruction phase, as well as lead to the minimization and
absence of information and research about the immense variety of roles that women (as
well as men) assume in wartime.
In the case of Angola, a significant portion of women affected by war were civilians,
even though there were some women who had an active participation in the conflict.
Rodrigues (2003) recounts in a first-person narrative her experiences about the activities
performed during the fight for liberation, both in supporting positions and during
10
According to the author: “Manifestly, the image of woman as the bearer par excellence of values of
peace (how can she, who generates life, wish to contribute to creating death?) is historically justified by
the front-rank role women have had within pacifist movements in this century: suffice it to mention the
mobilization of masses of women in the demonstration surrounding the two words wars”. For further
information about the role played by women in armed conflict, see: SHIKOLA, about female
participation in the SWAPO, in SWAPO Women‟s Council and fighting in PLAN, military training and
other activities such as education, family planning, logistics and combat: : “Our situation was unlike other
wars of liberation. In Zimbabwe, for example, the guerrillas asked parents to send their daughters to the
camps to help soldiers with housekeeping, laundry and preparing foods. That did not happen in Angola;
SWAPO men did the cooking. To this day I don‟t know how to cook”. (SHIKOLA, 1998: 141); “Many
women became pregnant. Some become pregnant because the situation at the front was terrible. The
conditions were so bad they couldn‟t stand it, no one could. If you got pregnant, they sent you to the rear.
Some women used pregnancy as an excuse to leave the front. I had to tell these women to use family
planning”. (Shikola, 1998: 142).
11
According to Turshen, “Women also perpetrate violence. As officers of the South African State, as
warders of prisons, women practiced institutionalized violence, inflicting torture on imprisoned women,
even pumping water into women‟s fallopian tubes and administering electric shocks to women‟s nipples”.
58
combats, when she eventually died. Botelho (2007: 261)12 quotes as well the
involvement of women in the events of May 27th 1977, on which women were the
agents and, at the same time the victims of torture13.
The Angolan civil war affected the lives of men and women directly or indirectly
implicated in the conflict. The following declarations were obtained about the aftermath
of war:
Disruptions in education:
“We got into that stage in which there were disturbances from
both parties where we belong, in Huambo... because you, folks...
(correlation with Unita after the return to combat in 1992) you
made us go to Huambo (...) When we left here in 92… 93, 94 I
couldn‟t study, 95 I did not study, only studied in 96 up until 98,
when I finished I was already in Huambo…”. (M6, 2008)
Disruptions in their children‟s education:
(At the time of displacement from Huambo to Luanda) “I have a
son who could have been studying in the 6th grade, transfer papers
in hand, but I couldn‟t place him (in school), because I had no
money to “sweeten” (for bribes); the kid had to repeat the same
year twice, but with transfer in hand. The kid studied the whole
year, but he wasn‟t put on the list, had to repeat again, but thank
God he has already finished middle school”. (M4, 2008)
Loss of family members:
“My husband died in the bush [war], fighting for Unita, in 1981,
before that he was a teacher and helped with the home expenses.
Because of the war we ran to the bush, my children, my husband
and my parents, we were all there, really suffering. In the bush,
we had classes for the children. We lived from the raids, from
farming, from foraged food, in those times there was real
suffering”. (M3, 2008)
Change of activity:
“When I got married in 76, September 7th, we went straight to
Malanje, because my husband was already working in Malanje.
There I started working in teaching. In 92, when the war started, I
had to leave it all and we came here. In Malanje, I gave classes, in
my extra time I farmed, and then I got into the market again and
sold my farm‟s produce. When I came here I had no place to live;
I had to stay at a relative‟s house, in a little room divided by
12
Botelho quotes the actions of an agent of the prison system in Angola on the following of the 27 th of
May: “The normalcy of that day, April 5th, was disturbed by the arrival of a feared female agent. (…) The
conversation became agitated, because many knew the expertise of that torturer: aggressions to the
genitalia (…) Witnesses of what had happened at the Defence Ministry, whose depositions are made after
the 27th of May, had in them indescribable descriptions of the pitiful state she left many testicles and
penises”.
13
“Young women were particularly submitted to the humiliation machine. When the moment came for
interrogatories, inspections and tortures, all of the men came and committed the vilest sorts of violence on
their naked bodies. Torture became sexual abuse, once it was customary to use several objects to
penetrate the vaginas of young detainees.” BOTELHO, 2007: 313.
59
curtains. They took me in because I could not stay in Cacuaco.
We got a rented house and my husband found a job. I couldn‟t get
a job, transfer? There was no transfer. So here we are: we brought
land, built our house, we achieved minimum conditions.” (M4,
2008)
(She finished her degree in 1971 and prior to the war was working
as a teacher) “Here, there is none; I tried because in those days all
our documents burned, there in Huambo during the war, when I
came here all that commotion, my husband died… (in the bush,
fighting for Unita), I was left alone with the children, couldn‟t do
anything, now they are saying maybe, if I could, I would have to
renew (the work documentation), but is already too late…” (M3,
2008)
“I was a typist (...) we lived almost two years (after arriving at
Luanda), my husband did not work; I, With my little experience,
got into the market, to sell, and we managed to get something,
then we got lucky, husband found work in a warehouse as a
helper, it was something… and now he does not work
anymore…” (M7, 2008)
Adaptation to Life in the Cities and Survival Strategies
The adaptation to life in the cities was the next challenge posed to the migrants. Some
families found available land to build shelter in the periphery of the urban centre (and,
in some occasions, to carry out a little subsistence farming), distant from roads and
without any transportation services available, while others have settled in the
shantytowns inside the cities. Although today they are residing in urban areas, most of
these people do not have complete access to the benefits usually associated to living in
the city: 69% of urban residents (including the urbanized area and slums) live in
accommodations without basic sanitation, 47% don‟t have sustainable access to any
source of potable water. Within children less than five years old, 31% are underweight
and 45% are under the proper height for their age category (UNDP, 2006: 308). About
68% of population lives under the threshold of poverty and from these 24.7% lives in
absolute poverty (Ministry of Family and Promotion of Women, 2007: 18).
The peace achieved in 2002 has put an end to the violence of war, but many of the
displaced families are being once again forced to abandon their homes, this time on
account of land property speculation. The Government has relocated some of the
families, but there was no conformity to proper procedures during this process. In
addition, relocation areas do not dispose of basic sanitation or suitable healthcare,
education or transportation services (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 11)14.
During the process of adaptation to life in the city, the women were specially affected
by the quantificational deficit in regard to men, a direct obstacle to their integration in
14
Housing and land were generally acquired by the migrants through informal transactions or by
occupation, so the official titles of ownership constitute only a small exception. HRW estimates that
between 2002 and 2006, public servants and police officers forced around 20 to 30 thousand Angolans
out of their homes and farmlands, or threatened to, in violent and illegal manners.
60
the urban environment. For Adepoju (1992: 21-22)15, since not that much time ago,
there was a prejudice rooted in the social roles restricting girls‟ admittance to formal
education, particularly after the elemental schooling. In the specific context of Angola,
other than the deficiencies16 displayed in the educational system and concerning the
whole population within the educational age range, girls have to face additional
obstacles to gain access to education17: they were time and again disregarded in favour
of boys18, they had to conjugate school homework and household tasks and, besides,
they had to contribute to the sustenance of their families19.
Women and the informal market
Migrant women in the urban areas had over their shoulder a heavier responsibility to
explicitly provide for their families, which they could no longer accomplish through
farming – either for being single mothers or war widows, or either their husbands have
taken other women and now have more children to provide for. For these women, the
informal market does not provide any kind of social aid or educational services.
The initial proposal for analyzing the activities carried out by the female vendors was to
classify them by type of product which in the initial stage of field research was not
feasible, for the decision over what kind of goods to sell is reliant on two variables,
namely available capital – for instance, fruit or soap are products only available to
someone with at least AKZ 300 or AKZ 500 – and knowledge of the trade. “Why
second hand clothing? I chose used clothes because when I arrived here in Luanda, the
person who help me was already selling that”, says M3, vendor for over 11 years.
Meanwhile, the entrepreneurship capacity of some sellers must be brought to light:
“We were selling in Roque before we had that place, we
start selling some little things, because today you may be
selling some little things, today you sell only banana and
peanut, tomorrow you get bombó, another day you add
some soda, another day you add… so on, as long as we
gained more experience and were getting a little bit more
money from profits, you see…” (M6, 2008)
15
“In theory girls are faced with the same education opportunity structure as boys. In practice, however,
socio-cultural constraints still inhibit the education of girls beyond a certain level”.
16
Deficient preparation and qualification of the teaching faculty, reduced class schedule, general
degradation of school facilities, almost complete inexistence of schoolbooks and other teaching materials,
bad nutrition of students, amongst many other problems. Alves da Costa, 2001: 39.
17
The contents, language and illustrations used in materials oriented to compulsory schooling (1 st, 2nd and
rd
3 levels of public teaching) reflect and reinforce traditional stereotypes about gender. Roles attributed to
girls are always secondary and of merely reproductive nature; the Ministry of Planning & United Nations
System in Angola, 2003: 43.
18
Since most families don‟t have enough resources to send all their children to school, the priority goes to
boys while girls are directed to domestic activities. According to the inquiry made by the INE in 1998
concerning the availability and capacity to pay for basic social services between those who had never
been to school, 32% said the main reason was monetary (lack of money, need to keep a job or money
demands by teacher or school). These factors were also referred as the main reason for school dropout
(53% at the first grade of the elemental school and 66% at the second grade). United Nations, 2002: 31.
19
The school dropout rate for girls is extremely high, around 29%. At national level, 79% of boys who
start 1st grade get to the 4th grade, comparing to 73% of girls. In 2001 alone, 54% of women could write
and read, comparing to 82% of men. In a higher age bracket (over 65 y.o.) men have a likelihood of 150%
to being able to write and read over women. UNICEF & INE, 2003: 123-128; see also Ministry of
Planning & United Nations System in Angola, 2003: 43.
61
Although there is an immense variety of products, most of them is imported and bought
in the warehouses of São Paulo, Rocha Pinto, Samba and Hoji-Ya-Henda, establishing a
clear link between formal and informal markets. The small vendors sometimes buy their
merchandise from others colleagues in the market to sell it next in the city streets,
diminishing their margin of profit. On the opposite side, some sellers with better
designed businesses choose direct importation of small quantities; such question will be
discussed later on in. The selling price is determined by direct bargaining with each
costumer. Another regular procedure for usual costumers is the kilapi20.
There is not a specific delineated spot for commercialization of products; women
working in the informal economy can be seen all over Luanda. For now, and as a
common trait, those possessing more capital choose to work in open markets. Here, they
have contact with a wider range of costumers (specifically inside the larger and more
traditional markets), have less physical exertion, are safer, don‟t suffer grievance from
the police forces and, in instances when the market has already been rehabilitated, they
can use sanitary infrastructures and get protection against the rain and sun. But there is a
string of expenses that come with the decision of settling in a marketplace:
Item
Registration
(“ficha”)
Cleaning
Chair
Shading cloth
Processo
“Roboteiro”
(helper)
Food
Description
Daily authorization for selling, with variable
price according to type of product and location
in the market layout (usually subdivided by
products)
Taken care by the market.
Sellers cannot take their own chair everyday,
since most goes to market on foot or uses the
services of a candongueiro
Cloths placed over the selling spot to shade from
the sun
It is not possible to transport the merchandise
daily, so it is stored in a part of the market called
processo (warehouses)
Person in charge of carrying the merchandise
from the processo to the selling spot and, at the
end of the day, from there back to the processo
There are cases in which the seller‟s family
takes homemade meals to them, other cases they
buy their food in the marketplace.
Average daily price
from AKZ 50 to AKZ 250
AKZ 100
AKZ 50
AKZ 50
From AKZ 100 to AKZ
150 per unit, according to
market and type of product
From AKZ 100 to AKZ
150, according to market
and type of product
From AKZ 150 according
to dish
Women who sell their merchandise outside or inside their houses have fewer costs for
trading their products; however, they do not have the same results in comparison to
women selling in markets, since they have fewer potential customers. On the other
hand, by selling at their doorway these women have a better possibility of conciliating
schedules amid family activities and work activities, of prolonging labour hours and
dealing with the product according to its requirements. Below are presented three
narrations in which these situations are demonstrated:
“Everybody helps at home. I go to give classes and take
my niece, who used to have alphabetization in the
morning, because when she came from Huambo I said she
couldn‟t stay at my house without attending school, I told
20
Concession of credit.
62
her it is not going to be the fish keeping you from
studying, so go to school and you can help when you get
home” (M2: 2208)
“When I get some money, I trade… even Sundays. Since I
am at home, I open (for business)… after the mass, I open
(for business)…” (M7: 2208)
“I cannot go to the market, because fish has many
demands, if I was in the market then I wouldn‟t have
enough to pay for the tub, to wash the carpets.” (M2:
2008)
In a rank below the vendors of informal market are the female street vendors, called
zungueiras. The street is a last resource, the outcome of their lack of sufficient money to
have a spot in the marketplace or of not having enough customers at their doorway.
These women do not have suitable work circumstances; they endure under the weight of
the merchandise they carry around the streets – under the sun, in the dust, in the
polluted atmosphere. They prepare the food to be sold and eat their own meals sitting in
the streets, without any sanitary conditions.
Police violence is another difficulty. Many times, their merchandise is apprehended or
they are forcefully removed from the site where they are selling. Frequently, when the
police officers are approaching, they stop their trade and remove swiftly from location21.
There are stories about women who got run over while they were escaping and children
hurt in accidents while they are being carried in their mother‟s backs. The relationship
between zungueiras and the State is far from being pacific, and were even registered
some violent reactions from zungueiras against the inspectors:
“(...) the injured party was trying, in the middle of the road, to remove the tub from the
zungueira identified only as Filó, which contained school materials. After some struggle
between them, the mentioned recipient fell to the ground and stopped the traffic. But the
tipping point happened when the baby that the lady was carrying on her back fell
violently unto the floor after she was pushed by the inspector. Filó immediately slapped
the man, who did nothing but stand there, being smacked by the other vendors” (O
Independente, 2006).
“Those Helps Don‟t Fail” – Strategies of Mutual Aid
As declared by Rodrigues (2006: 98), the means of integration of the migrant
population were numerous and, in most cases, resulted in significant variations in
relatively short periods of time, which not always allowed the social restructures and
recompositions to become discernible or entrenched. For these women, family is their
most sizeable support. In every interview conducted, this help was explicit, inferred as a
duty, to their relatives in circumstances of health, education and situations of deceased
family members.
Taking someone in and giving refuge was, and is yet a common practice. Mostly during
the civil war, when many families already located in the cities welcomed migrants from
their homeland or from the same social standing, besides their own relatives. As a
consequence of the insecurity experienced in the rural districts, many people went in
21
Fact observed by the author in Luanda, in 2006
63
search of their relatives, by their initiative. After the peace was settled, welcoming
relatives from the homeland is until now a widespread practice: “I have taken in many
people, many indeed... (...) The help, the help I gave was to welcome them into my
home, until they managed to find their own places”, said M8 (2008). Frequently, those
who have given refuge are the same ones who helped their relatives integrating into the
job market: “(...) those helps don‟t fail. We have to give them something or the
experience you have...” said M7 (2008).
Other than family, the religious institutions play a significant role in the insertion of
women into the work market. Six of the interviewees worked as volunteers in
alphabetizing programs, organized by the Council of Christian Churches of Angola –
CICA22. All of the interviewed individuals proclaim some sort of religious confession
and attend frequently religious services. As a result, the churches take on the task of
socialization spaces, where women can exchange their experiences:
“I went to sell in the market... then I left everything I had,
that God has given me... left it ... next I got somewhere,
waiting until some other woman cooks so my children can
eat... It was no good... God gave that chance, a sister from
the Church came to me and told me let‟s go, let‟s sell for
the sake of the children, because the children were
barefoot, they had nothing, the family will help you, but
they cannot help with everything, isn‟t it? So then I got
that chance...” (M7, 2208)
Informal Joint-Venture23
Some of the more experienced vendors, who have been dealing the same class of
products and have formed confidence bounds, then decide to create shopping groups.
While doing interviews were found two of such groups, the first group formed by
vendors of new clothing from the Roque Santeiro market that import their own
merchandises from Brazil and Thailand, the second group formed by door to door
sellers (they go directly to the costumer‟s home or workplace), selling home apparel
imported from Namibia.
The composition and management of these shopping groups are handled by the women
themselves and they are usually developed in the following stages: a) selection of the
buyer among the members, based in criteria such as availability to travel and practice in
shopping in foreign countries; b) constitution of a common funds account with an
amount defined by the group and the buyer: “sometimes one person sends eight
(thousand Dollars), another sends 10, another sends a different amount... and the packs
(packaged merchandises) have different weights” said M6; c) buying merchandise, in
accordance to the orientations and specific requirements of each member of the group
that, after divided into lots, is delivered by a customs dispatcher company.
Each member is responsible for retrieving their respective lot from the airport, plus for
the payment of due customs taxes. M6 mentions as well paying increasingly higher
duties for the exported products:
22
According to information released by this organization, more than five thousand people were already
alphabetized in the realm of this program.
23
In financial jargon, a joint-venture is a non definitive union of enterprises, to explore a certain business
opportunity, without any of the parts loosing their juridical autonomy.
64
“Because there is so much competition, some places making lots
of business, they saw that many people are going after that same
deal, so they just started to increase their fees. For 4 thousand to 8
thousand in merchandise, which makes for two very large packs,
for each we pay around 1,200 Dollars only to retrieve the
merchandise.”
The payment for the travelling expenses of the buyer is completed afterwards, from
revenues generated by the traded merchandise. The margin of profit declared was USD
2,500 to 3,000 Dollars a month for clothing, USD 300 to 400 for home textiles:
“Nowadays, imported clothing is in fashion… we make
money then we get it invested in this business, we are able
to gain a margin of profit, that is the way we do it,
according to each group one is chosen; we gather all the
money and send it, because travel fare is expensive, and
checking in heavy merchandise in the Bahamas is also
expensive, in a 8 thousand (Dollars) deal we manage to get
around 3 to 2.5 thousand (Dollars).”
These women‟s situations are an exception amid the informal urban work market of
Angola. Further than choosing external suppliers, these women have learned to analyse
the market, though in a non-systematic way. They possess a clear and defined business
strategy, similar to an innovation strategy, meaning they are attempting to supply a
segment of costumers who is interested in novelty, whose choices are more connected
to “wants” than to “needs”, and therefore are willing to pay more for the merchandise:
“... since the first moment she knows by herself how the
market is flowing, what is not in fashion. They work by
custom-made orders, so I call asking for X amount of
those shirts or those t-.shirts, X amount of whatever. The
seller herself goes in search of what is the latest novelty in
her marketplace” (M6, 2008)
These groups, other than being an important mechanism for the development of each
member‟s own business, since they involve larger amounts of money than customary
for the informal markets, allowing them to constitute savings with the purpose of future
prearranged shopping expeditions and business expansion (during the interview with
M6 was detected a cycle of USD 8,000 with the duration of about one month). This
activity also takes them closer to the formal market, for they have to pay for importation
and customs duties and interact with customs officers, hoteliers and dispatcher
companies.
Credit Systems
An overview of the interviews produced in Luanda has emphasized the rotating credit
system known as kixikila24. Formed and managed by the women themselves, this
24
In Brazil it is called Caixa, in Cape Verde is called Toto-caixa or Caixa; in Mozambique is Xitique;
according to SY (1993), in Chad it is called Tontines, according to Ducados (1999) Esusu in Nigeria,
Osusu in Ghana, Djangai in Cameron, Ekub in Ethiopia and Gameya in Egypt. Designated in economical
language as ROSCAS – Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. To conceptualize rotating credit
systems, Yunnus employs multiple classifications: “a) traditional informal microcredit (such as,
moneylender‟s credit, pawn shops, loans from friends and relatives, consumer credit in informal market,
65
mechanism has revealed to be one of the most significant methods of mutual aid used
all throughout and after the armed conflict. Besides, it performs equally as a savings
system, since the commitment to the group “compels” them to put aside a determinate
amount, which would be otherwise spent in everyday expenditures.
For women working in the informal sector, regular financial institutions seem
inaccessible for quite a few reasons. In one hand, these women possess no valuable
assets, which may be offered to these institutions as a surety, in the other hand they
don‟t have enough information about the existence and purpose of the credit programs
from financial institutions or from the Ministry of Family and Promotion of Women –
MINFAMU. Furthermore, many of these women do not possess official documents to
give them affordance to the formal sector (either they got lost or were destroyed during
the war), and some of them can not read or fill the necessary documentation to ask for a
loan. Another appointed reason is the fear of assuming an obligation to financial
institutions.
A kixikila25 constitutes an alternative to formal credit, and operates based on two
complementary justifications, financial and collaboration. The order of reception of
funds can be modified any time the beneficiary decides that, at any given moment,
someone else has a more pressing need for money. It does not perform as a loan, there
isn‟t any interest to be repaid nor any others taxes or expenses. It is imperative to
underline that any change made in the sequence for receiving money on account of
another member‟s necessity is not compulsory and must be approved by the group.
Another type of assistance provided by the kixikila is paying for any member‟s share for
a determinate period of time; the members abide for those payments and wait for
reimbursement without any added interest. However, if any member is incapable of
making all repayments until the end of the cycle, she/he will be excluded from the
group.
etc.); b) Microcredit based on traditional informal groups (such as, tontin, su su, ROSCA, etc.); c)
Activity-based microcredit through conventional or specialised banks (such as, agricultural credit,
livestock credit, fisheries credit, handloom credit, etc.); d) Rural credit through specialised banks; e)
Cooperative microcredit (cooperative credit, credit union, savings and loan associations, savings banks,
etc.); f) Consumer microcredit; g) Bank-NGO partnership-based microcredit; h) Grameen type
microcredit or Grameencredit; i) Other types of NGO microcredit; j) Other types of non-NGO noncollateralized microcredit”, Grameen Bank (2008), Microcredit, available at www.grameen-info.org.
25
Performance of kixikila groups: members – the criteria for their selection is trust. All members have to
trust that the other members, when their time arrives, will pay their share. A group may be composed of
neighbours, relatives, market peers, etc. Once constituted, the group remains stable for other cycles of
kixikila. Amount of contributions – women pay regularly a fixed amount that is established according to
their members‟ ability. During interviews, there were found contributions starting from 1000 Kwanza a
week. Period – variable, during interviews were found groups with three-month cycles. Hierarchy of
beneficiaries – in accordance to a common agreement made in the beginning of the process, it may be
altered during a cycle by request and with the concurrence of the other participants. Payment methods
(two main categories) – each member, individually, delivers the money to the person in charge of
recollection and payment (this usually happens in smaller scaled groups) or the group elects someone
liable for the recollection and payments (in most cases, the elder woman or the one who had the initiative
to promote the group). Failure situation – fail by one member is typically covered by the other members.
The faulty participant is excluded from the group “I had, but it was a year ago, they don‟t do it anymore
(...) gave up Kixikila when my daughter was ill, later had news about the death of my niece in Uíge, that
really made me sad” Interview with M5, in 08/11/2008. As mentioned by Ducados & Ferreira, the
limitation of rotating credit based such as kixikila are evident: possibility of mobilizing only small
amounts of capital and being based in a mutual trust principle which, facing the mutation of socialcultural values specially in environments suffering from great social instability, disrupts one of their main
structural vectors.
66
These kixikila groups have allowed women to develop their own businesses, since the
money from the contributions collected by each group reaches amounts they could not
have managed to save individually. Like this, they manage to diversify their
merchandised products and invest in better equipment (acquire larger volumes of
manufactured goods and buy refrigeration equipment to conserve perishable goods), or
perhaps spend some money in home improvement or larger home appliances, such as
television sets, sound systems, etc.
The kixikila operates as an informal instrument of social protection too, since the
savings made by the group are sometimes used to pay for domestic expenses, when they
are unable to work due to medical reasons. It can also be used to buy medicines, pay for
doctor‟s consultations, and meet the expenses of children‟s school tuitions and school
gear.
Some kixikila groups, with the support of the CSO, have evolved into microcredit26
groups. On the subject of available microcredit in the informal sector, the performance
of the NGO Kixicrédito27 has been evaluated. The sums of microcredit put forward by
this organization vary between USD 250 and USD 10,000, with an interest of 3% and a
repayment period of 5 to 10 months, depending on the chosen microcredit category.
Women negotiating with microcredit groups have gained, as their major advantages,
growth and development of their business. Although microcredit on offer is still limited,
these programs let those who have access improve their trade and better support their
families.
Conclusion
Save for the rupture of familiar bonding, the civil war has additionally caused a decline
and, in several occasions, a complete obstruction to the practice of economic activities
in rural areas, and in addition has affected all systems of social assistance. It is
concluded, anchored in the narratives given by the female vendors in the informal
market of Luanda, that the war has impacted in many manners the regular course of
their lives, mostly regarding their education, their children‟s education, the loss of
relatives and the enforced change of labour activities. Before the war, many of these
26
As defined by Psico, microcredit is a credit available from sustainable and rentable financial
institutions providing financial services involving reduced unitary sums, given to people or small
ventures, formal and informal, with low income that for that reason are excluded from the traditional
financial system. These services at large scale, in the sense of reaching the target market, are provided by
current local institutions – next to the homes and workplaces of their clients – both in rural and urban
regions. Still according o the author, savings services let savers stock the liquidity surplus for future use
and gain profits from their investments. Credit services allow an anticipated use of revenues for investing
or current spending. Globally, microfinance services may help low income populations to reduce risks,
increase their productivity, get higher profitability from their investments, enlarge their income and
improve their family‟s quality of life. Psico, 2007: 10-20.
27
This organization was founded as an evolution of a micro-financing project created in 1999 in the
Development Workshop – DW. Since 2005, it has been following a still ongoing process for the
foundation of Kixicrédito and parting from DW. Nowadays, the organization has own capital and a
portfolio valued at 4.5 millions, when it is needed to reinforce the credit liability they maintain open
credit lines with formal banking, BFA and Millenium, and do not resort to donations. Kixicrédito has a
network of four branches in Luanda, located in the neighbourhoods of Sao Paulo, Kilamba Kiaxi, Hojiya-Henda and Mabor, an HCR agency in Palanca (directed solely to refugees registered in Angola and
still linked to DW) and branches in Viana, Huambo, and Bailundo. It has about 120 employees, 70 of
which in the operational sector (agencies, credit evaluator, credit supervisors, risk assessment specialists)
and a portfolio of around 900 clients. Interview with Kixicrédito executives, 07/25/2008.
67
women already had established a determinate standard of life – in the Provinces they
were teachers, students, farmers, typists. When compelled to migrate to Luanda, without
the necessary qualifications to get hold of any job in the urban location, they found in
the informal market a harsh way to make a living.
From all the women interviewed, only a few have adopted some sort of strategy for
growing or taking a spot in the marketplace. Overall, they do business with anything
they manage to get, or whatever was traded by those who mentored their beginnings in
the activity. The profit obtained has to be distributed between feeding their families and
restocking the merchandise for the following day of dealing.
Meanwhile, some women have started to transform their stories, using a selection of
external suppliers, creating partnerships with other vendors, making use of systems of
informal credit, but mainly by revealing a strong will to grow. The precariousness of the
informal sector has made these mutual aid mechanisms and informal credit systems into
fundamental methods to beat the barriers of integration in the informal urban work
market in the post-conflict age.
These days, although within a limited reach, several microcredit programs have resulted
to be, particularly in the case of women from the informal sector, an important course to
the development for small businesses and, consequentially, to the improvement of living
conditions. Although good results have been achieved, these programs can not be
interpreted as the ultimate solution to the promotion of women in the Angolan society.
In general, the scarcity of training, low employment, limited access to social assistance
as well as to many others services and resources, have been blocking the inversion of
structural inequalities to which women have been submitted until now.
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69
Reflection on poverty of displaced populations: the Hanha case
Emanuel Lopes
Abstract
The following text presents a reflection on the study being produced by the author about
the Hanha population, one of the people included in the denominated Ovimbundu
grouping, spread along rural and urban locations. This initial reflection is focused on
the perception the Vahanha have about their poverty and wellbeing, from the period
ranging from the Independence all the way through Peace and, since then, until the
moment. Due to the sociological structure of the Hanha population, this reflection will
be preceded by a brief historical retrospective about their socioeconomic existence.
Introduction
The research leading to this essay was made in the realm of the project Pobreza e Paz
(Project Poverty and Peace) in the PALOP – Official Portuguese-speaking African
Countries. The causes for the high rates of poverty observed in these countries have
been discussed, and the occurrence of war (in the countries on which it occurred) comes
up as the main explanation. Yet that occurrence persists in a context of peace, whether
peace is an intermittent or a permanent situation, such in the cases of Cape Verde and
Sao Tome and Principe.
The area of research has been limited to the Hanha (or Hanya) population, located
between the costal line of Benguela (Angola) and the highlands in the central region of
the country, bordered by the river Cubal da Hanha and delimited by the settlements of
Alto Chimboa da Hanha, Capupa and Caviva. The town of Kambodongolo, about 45
kilometers south of Cubal, is the core of this region.
This essay accounts for the conditions on which poverty subsists and which manners it
is perceived by its protagonists in distinct chronological and geographical contexts. It
was not intended to compare poverty in these contexts, but rather to identify patterns
and similarities in the subjacent causes, and in attitudes and solutions found by the
intervenient populations to cope within the occurrence.
Part of the motivation to follow this path: the Hanha population has been living for
decades between two sociological realities, one urban and one rural; it is identified as
one of the groups composing the large ethno-linguistic Ovimbundu grouping; history
has dictated that this region, where they were ancestrally established, had become main
stage of a merciless civil wars that ravaged the country; and the Vahanha have divided
themselves into two factions, one part migrated to the seaside and settling in the suburbs
located in the axis Benguela-Lobito, and a smaller part in the regions of Lubango and
Huambo.
The investigation focused on the manner the Vahanha people looks at poverty, both the
members “gone astray” in the urban suburbs, as well as those who have remained in the
Hanha region, how they relate to it and their perception of its effects on themselves. It is
required to search into the way of life of the Vahanha before the present phase of peace
and the way they lived before the civil and colonial wars, to have a better understanding
70
of their experience of “poverty” today. For that reason, it will be presented a brief
historical retrospect, to produce an outlook of the living conditions of the Vahanha
through facts collected by the few researchers who have focused their studies on that
region and, in some cases, through the recollections of the interviewed individuals.
Chosen Methodologies
The investigation was based on a qualitative approach, supported on a non-statistical
sample by convenience. The inquired individuals are aged between 25 and 54 years old,
seven males and one female. The inquiry was formed by semi-structured interviews,
produced throughout several stages. Two of the individuals were taken into
consideration as qualified informants, given their educational level and their knowledge
of the societal structures of the population and recent historical events. The narratives of
all eight subjects allowed us to focus the research on the conception of their own reality
and assorted backgrounds in which they were implicated. The crossing of information
collected from the subjects was determinant to assess the coherence and consistency of
their distinctive life stories. Coherence in the sense of their narratives sharing the same
logic arguments and congruent conclusions, consistency in their capacity of resisting to
opposing argumentation. My knowledge of the Angolan reality, including the historical
and political progressions in the last forty years, allowed me to verify the objectivity of
the inquired individuals as well as the veracity of the narrated facts. I also made use of
some records amassed by Manuel Hamilton Fernando, our cherished fellow researcher,
resulting from 85 inquiries made in Benguela, as comparative references.
The process of investigation was prepared, followed and concluded with the assistance
of additional documental and bibliographic reading materials.
About the Conceptual Operability
The debate about the notion of poverty has been enriched with extremely active
contributions about the social policies and political measures which have been proposed
as solutions to this problem. Promoting debates about poverty, social exclusion and
other related themes became mandatory. The concept of poverty has evolved, splitting
into several dimensions to embrace all new realities associated to poverty (Costa, 1984
and Rodrigues et al, 1999).
However, this paper does not intend to explain traditional premises or the differences
between them, nor the concept‟s multiplication, since much of the concepts mentioned
along this discussion will not be applicable to the Angolan society nor particularly to
the specific target population. In addition, any references made to some of the several
dichotomies implied in the multiple meanings of the concept − relative/absolute
poverty, objective/subjective poverty, traditional/modern poverty, rural/urban poverty,
temporary/longstanding poverty (Rodrigues et al, 1999: 67). Consequently, I‟ve
selected a few of the concepts that I consider to be appropriate and worked over them,
analyzing some of these dichotomies.
 The concept of absolute poverty, based on the notion of basic necessities
(biological viewpoint) was initially defined by Seebohm Rowntree (1901) and
mentioned by Sen (1981: 27), and relates to the notion of subsistence, in which
individual and household resources are manifestly insufficient to provide for a
suitable level of “physical efficiency” (Capucha, 2005: 69). By
71
antagonism/complementary, the more used concept of relative poverty, leading
towards an analysis of poverty along the lines of general social patterns
(Rodrigues et al, 1999: 67).
 The concept of rural poverty, translated in a basic deprivation of resources
caused by low agricultural productivity, absent productivity and equally by a
lack of alternative economic activities, opposing to urban poverty which is
related to exclusion, low wages, unemployment or precarious employment,
diseases caused by inadequate sanitary conditions, addiction, physical
handicaps, urban discrimination and social segregation (Rodrigues et al, 1999:
68).
 The concept of property and trade rights, stipulating that in a market society for
each given property there is a correspondent packet of trade rights, defining the
possibilities of exchanging a viable amount of sufficient food provisions (Sen,
1981: 15).
 The concept of social exclusion, connected to the concept of poverty but at the
same time clearly separated, defined as “a disarticulation among several
constituents in a market society and the individuals, resulting in nonparticipation in the minimum set of benefits that define a full member of that
society” (Rodrigues et al, 1999: 64).
Historical Stages of the Vahanha
The Hanha region was already inhabited when discovered by the Portuguese, and
ancestrally extended from the south coastline of Benguela to Kilengue and Cikuma. The
inhabitants are subsistence farmers, hunters-gatherers and herdsmen. The Nano wars, in
the 18th and 19th centuries, had resulted in political and geographical configurations that
pushed the Hanha populations into the inland, finally settling in a region south of Cubal
in the end of the 19th century (Pélissier 1986: 67, Péclard 1995: 48).
The presence of Portuguese merchants in the Benguela region would convert the
Ovimbundu into traders and caravan traders carrying European products to the inland
kingdoms and bringing others products from there (initially slaves and natural rubber),
producing profound changes in this society. “The commercial activities permitted the
accumulation of wealth and political power in the hands of the chiefs and put
agriculture, still carried on by women, in a secondary role”. (Pössinger, 1986: 77). The
expansion of the highland kingdoms will start a process of “umbulization” of the
miscellaneous populations all over the region: Vahanha, Mundombe, Vakakonda,
Muganda and Vatchyaka then became integrated in the large Ovimbundu grouping.
The social and political transformation of the Ovimbundu during this period
encompasses a new kind of spatial occupation, creating larger population
concentrations. Pössinger underlines economic, social, political and even psychological
consequences. It is not possible to reflect in terms of the Vahanha being or not being
poor, but it is possible to take into consideration that they too have been transformed
during this period. One of the few remaining narratives about the region refers to the
attacks inflicted by the Portuguese government, European merchants and other
Ovimbundo, and even sustained violent assaults from the Ambós (Cuanhamas). This
seems to have been the motive for leaving the coastal regions and finding new roots in
the Hanha region, because “the Hanha was unwholesome” (Pélissier, 1986: 67), or since
it was at a considerable distance from the most popular itineraries (through east and
72
climbing the highlands, the path crossed the Munganda and Vatchyaka lands, and to the
south passed through Mundombe and Vakakonda lands). For that reason, the
transformations will occur at a slower pace and there won‟t be much large population
concentrations to be found.
The caravanning period lasted around eighty years and ended with the crash of rubber
prices in the international market, the Ovimbundu‟s military defeats and the arrival of
European merchants into the inland of Angola. Having become dependent of the income
provided by the caravanning trading, they found a new alternative in commercial
agriculture. This sort of agriculture, given that soil typology in the highlands is usually
depleted, will guide the territorial expansion of the Ovimbundu people. Produced by the
osongo1, the new lands are initially considered communal ground. But later a new kind
of commercial agriculture will put an end to the communal model and evolve it into
familial-based rural enterprises. The search for new domains will continue until the
sixth decade of the twentieth century.
The Vahanha would maintain some of their trading activity (particularly livestock) with
the southern populations, such as the Nyaneka-Nkumbi, and with the Europeans who
had meanwhile settled in the highland of Huíla, as well as with the Ambós and the
Herero. Although they had been “umbulized”, they kept their occupations as farmers
and herdsmen (Silva, 1974: 4). They produce corn, massambala (sorghum), beans and
sisal, and raise bovine and caprine cattle.
The agricultural produce and a few cattle are taken to European merchants located in
townships like Ganda, Cubal or other settling along the CFB – the railway of Benguela
constructed in 1903-1929. Bovine livestock are only sold in case of necessity or
preferentially to other Ovimbundu, and only in small quantities. Cattle ownership
presupposes wealth. Only in the two final decades of colonial regimen will this
presumption changed.
The movement of territorial expansion, caused by the necessity of increasing the
land dedicated to commercial agriculture, transforms the Ovimbundu society and in
result the Hanha society too. Though remaining a culture founded on economically,
socially and politically traditional structures, the ever increasing presence of familialbased commercial agriculture enterprises of European nature would introduce new
realities, new approaches to matters of land possession. Another important fact deriving
from this period is the increase of agricultural output for exportation, carried on by the
Europeans. This increase is linked to the invasive incursions of the best farming lands
(the Ovimbundu people have almost nonexistent protection mechanisms for these cases)
and to forced labour or compulsory recruitment.
This type of labour force was useful for constructing public projects such as roads, and
for large commissions such as the CFB, but was equally used by large-scaled
commercial agriculture enterprises. Not even better legislation and improved
governmental control on the matter prevented an outcome of low production rates
(caused by inadequate techniques, exhausted soils and other causes), fraudulent debts in
trades with European merchants and a corrupted supervision, which resulted in
numerous Ovimbundu workers taking “contracts”, consequently disordering their
weakened society and adding to their proletarianization.
1
Osongo is the denomination of the clan, but also of the clan‟s chieftain (note by Pössinger, 1986: 77).
73
The post-caravanning period went from around 1912 until the fifth decade of the last
century is furthermore the period when the incidence of religious missions has
expanded and multiplied the most in Angola. In the south border of Hanha was build the
first religious mission, denominated Lincon and founded by the “Philafrican Liberator‟s
League” in 1897. The originally protestant mission was under the supervision of Heli
Chatelain and according to its founder, was “an industrial and agricultural mission,
interconfessional and mostly secular” (Péclard, 1993: 37). In 1954, the Catholic Mission
of Hanha was established in Kambondogolo, south of Cubal. These missions were
extremely significant, not only for the educational (foundation of schools), sanitary
(creation of health centres) and religious components, but also for creating affordance to
qualified instruction in topics of industry and agriculture.
In the midst of a disintegrating society, the missions had become accomplished
protagonist and had simultaneously created a centripetal movement that would turn
them into the core of this population‟s life, enforcing gradually a new model of society,
but still tolerating the traditional culture. One of the interviewed individuals declared at
a certain moment that “the Mission was the civilizational and evangelical centre” (P1,
2008), the same as “each mission was, at the same time, the centre of social and
Christian living and each missionary was kind of a farmer or industrial lord, without
forgetting the role of evangelizer” (Faure, 1908: 24).
The introduction of tools such as the European plow and hoes allowed the Ovimbundu
to enlarge their farming areas, thus coping more appropriately with the loss of the best
lands to the hands of the European agriculture enterprises. But this enlargement hasn‟t
resulted necessarily in increased productivity. To compensate this loss of income from
commercial agriculture, the Ovimbundu accepted voluntarily to sign “contracts” with
European enterprises or migrated to urban areas in search of employment. The Vahanha
initiated a migration process towards Benguela, becoming themselves part of the
proletarianization of the Ovimbundu. As the number of European colonizing traders and
farmers in the Hanha region increases, roads are being built connecting the Mission to
Cubal and Ganda.
The available records confirm that after a stage of some prosperity during the
“caravanning” period, the economy of the Ovimbundu society falls into a phase of
decadence, only partially opposed by the popularity of coffee bean crops. These new
cultures occupy increasingly larger areas of soil; however, their production output
declined, given that soils were rundown or the farming techniques inadequate. The
conversion from a communal agriculture to a commercial familial-based agriculture and
the incomes from salaried jobs partially contested the impoverishment. The same
occurrence happened in the Hanha society, evolving into a sort of stability, with the
rural impoverishment being contested by cattle trading and employment opportunities in
the Missions, in european agricultural enterprises, in public or private services
institutions in Benguela, and in the CFB – Benguela Railroad.
A third long period starts in the end of the 50s and follows through until the
Independence. It was a time of great political convulsions and major transformations.
The outbursts are followed by declarations of independence all over Africa. In Angola,
the first registered incidents occurred in the end of the fifties, at the central highlands,
74
city of Nova Lisboa, Huambo. They were classified as ordinary misconduct incidents.
After came the rebellion of the residents and workers of Baixa do Cassange, in January
1961, manifesting against the conditions imposed for the production and trade of cotton.
The rebellion was smashed by the Portuguese military forces, supported by air
bombarding of villages in the region. Thousands of people died, and in disregard to the
military reports blaming the cotton corporation Cotonang and the local administration
members which collaborate with that company (Nunes, 2008: 29), the matter is silenced
as much as possible by the Portuguese regime. The following repression in the region
(in the north area of the country) is intended as a warning, and the Ovimbundu workers
labouring under “contract” in this region start to flee towards the south. This faction
will grow steadily after the beginning of the colonial war (revolt of March 15 th 1961).
The political events occurring during this period assume relevance since a) the
Ovimbundu have returned to their homelands (including the Vahanha), increasing the
demographic pressure over the agricultural production in these areas; b) by fleeing to
their homes, in most cases they return without the meagre wages from their work; c) the
corporations who had them under “contract” (farming or otherwise) take advantage of
this fearful and vengeful atmosphere to seize salaries and assets from the populations (in
the Hanha inclusively); d) the policy of mass colonization (affirmed in the statement
made by A. Salazar “To Angola, quickly and with strength!” (Gomes & Afonso 2009:
60)2 will promote the European presence, the usurpation of the best lands and
concurrency in agricultural production.
Following the period of some balance that was mentioned above, came an
impoverishment period for the Angolan inhabitants, including the Hanha population.
The arrival of thousands of Europeans colonists alters the agricultural and economic
conditions. The idea of placing agricultural colonies in specific regions is abandoned.
The quantity of European agricultural enterprises expands all over the country and the
central highlands become the “cellar” of Angola. The growing incidence of exhausted
soils from intensive farming (in particular for exportation) only endorses the
appropriation of even more land.
The last period before the Independence is a phase of extensive social transformations
completing a cycle. From subsistence agriculture with long fallow periods to an
intensive industrial agriculture in more restricted areas, from a way of life based on
farming models to a crescent proletarianization as alternative to the impoverishment of
their economic foundation. “The family, separated from the clan, living in privately
owned land and situated mainly around schools, chapels or nursing centres, does not
possess anymore a solid structure that allows it to prevent economic and social
disaggregation” (Pössinger, 1986: 83).
The Vahanha region was one of the affected by the introduction of european agricultural
enterprises. The savanization process felt in the central highlands since 1930 will
become particularly accentuated in this area. The adjustments will eventually
impoverish the agricultural complex in the central highlands and its populations, but the
individualization of economy by implementing of agricultural family enterprises will
concede a more “democratic” management of available resources, removing
responsibility from the traditional chieftains. The proletarianization (more labour for
2
Speech made by the president of the council of minister, A. Salazar, in April 14th 1961, during the
appointment of new cabinet members of the Portuguese government.
75
third parties, in European agriculture companies3, more employment in Christian
missions, more labour in public sectors, more employment in urban services sector,
incorporation in the Portuguese military forces) will lead to reinvested economic
resources in the (never abandoned) rural homelands and family businesses.
“The social structure, slowly destroyed, was being substituted by
the consolidation of family units, or what was left of them, around
new leaders that were however unaware of the ancient
Ovimbundu society. They were catholic and protestant
missionaries, their respective catechists, teachers or school
monitors (in the beginning, exclusively from the Christian
missions and later, in a large number, from the State) and nurses
from the missionary hospitals or public sanitary stations”
(Pössinger, 1986: 100).
In the end of the sixties, the economic development in the Angolan territory (though not
directly advantageous to the African populations) will bring some improvements to their
living conditions. Concerning the analyzed case study, it is observed some stabilization
in the impoverishment process. Families who were producing for self-consumption and
had surplus in their corn, massambala, beans or sisal productions would sell it to the
web of European traders, or exchange it in the missions. They complemented these
products with a few cattle, either to consume or to trade, especially swine and caprine
cattle.4 All families had avian production. To this agricultural income coming from
produce and cattle were added the wages from jobs held within several services in the
Portuguese administration, the Hanha Mission, “contract” work in urban corporations or
as domestic servants, together with some income from serving in the Portuguese
Military Forces.
But to which degree was the Hanha population poor? “We did not lack food, there was
always some left to sell to a trader, in the market or in the canteen of the Mission. Poor,
yes there were pauper folks, but those were the ones without any outfits to go to mass”
(B1, 2008). The perception of poverty itself assumes, in this instance, a determinate
relativity rooted in memories of a time posterior to the one mentioned, when the
socioeconomic conditions had deteriorated. The notion of poor is only attributed to
those who had no suitable garments (as in different from everyday garments) to attend
religious ceremonies. The presupposition founding this assumption is that everyone was
linked in networks of familial or traditional relationships that gave them affordance to
all necessary consumption goods, which did not include clothing. With a life anchored
around the Hanha Mission, this society becomes more and more proletarianized and, in
this circumstance lasts until the occurrence of Independence.
3
Although the system of “contracts” was still active, there was more supervision and less abuse, but in
the last years prior to the Independence the Ovimbundu themselves opt for contracts as a way of obtaining
financial assets.
4
According to the Agricultural Census made by the MIAA in 1972 in the regions of Hanha, Ganda and
Kakonda, the total number of swine cattle would be 255.336, while in 1961 it wouldn‟t be over 67
thousand. Concerning the caprine cattle, in an area embracing Hanha,Ganda, Kakonda, Lubango, and
south of Lubango, the increase was equally significant, going from 135,000 up to 428,000. Regarding the
avian production, it sustained an important enlargement, rising to 1,147,000 specimens in this last region
alone. In average, from slaughtered animals, 25% of caprine, 14% of swine and 48% of avian specimens
are destined for self-consumption.
76
Independence and the Vahanha
Between April 1974 and the Independence day, numerous factors will have direct
influence over the reality of the Hanha. Straight away, being at peace with the guerilla
movements permitted the entrance of these factions into the cities and into political life.
Afterwards, the beginning of a civil war5 leads to the departure of thousands of
Europeans from farming properties, commercial establishments, enterprises and
dwellings. Agricultural and commercial activities are paralyzed. Civil war rises.
Portugal, the colonialist potency, chooses to withdraw. The conflict escalates, at first
involving the Mpla and Fnla forces, then among the Mpla, Fnla and Unita forces. The
Europeans abandon Angola in clusters, disarticulating all economic and administrative
organization. During 1974 and partly 1975, subsistence cultivation is still a common
practice in the Hanha region. The unfeasibility of commercial trade due to the
disappearance of the net of European traders would be compensated by an access to the
merchandises and products left behind by the European dealers, farmers and companies,
so although in an atypical manner, their revenues would not drop immediately.
In the few months previous to the independence, with the intensification of civil war,
loss of the Portuguese administrative and military organization and intervention of two
foreign armies (Cuban and the South-African soldiers), the Hanha people will confront
their first social and political division. The absence of the Portuguese administrative
structure, the shutdown of businesses and the correlation of the movements to ethnic
grounds will lead many Vahanha youngsters to participate in the conflict by joining
Unita. The elder members of the Vahanha, as well as the women, children and other
young people who chose not to adhere to any faction remained in their homeland. The
initial combats between the Cuban army /Fapla6 and the South-African army/Fala7
happened in this region, one month prior to the Independence and throughout the
following months. The retreat of the South-African army and Unita going guerrilla
(taking refuge in the east of Angola) will permit a brief peaceful period in the Hanha
region.
The phase extending from April 25th 1974 until February 19768 was not long enough to
allow an investigation about poverty. The initial stage of tranquillity and better earnings
for the waged black populations is followed by a civil war, dispersion of the Hanha
population and therefore what can be considered a loss of incomes. After an immediate
euphoria, the independence of November 11th 1975 is recollected by the interviewed
individuals with some apprehension: “We thought we were going to have a better life,
just like the whites, and then came the war” (H4, 2008), “and those of us who had
qualifications went back to farming the land” (H3, 2008). The direct impoverishment is
not perceived and none of the interviewees has mentioned it.
5
Civil war in Angola starts with an armed confrontation between two factions within the Mpla, one
leaded by Agostinho Neto (internationally recognized as legitimate) and another by Daniel Chipenda
(who had won the internal elections for the movement‟s presidency) in October 1974.
6
Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola – Mpla armed forces.
7
Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola –Unita armed forces.
8
The joint forces of the Cuban army/FAPLA started their headway toward the south of Angola in the
beginning of February 1976, reaching the road and rail network of Benguela-Huambo in February 6th, so
this was considered a key date.
77
From Independence to Peace in 1991/1992
The Constitutional Law of November 1975, ratified in the completion of Independence
by the Mpla, imposes a planned and centralized system of economic policy, among
other structuring measures for the new nation (Ferreira, 1999: 14). Subsequently, it
compels the nationalization of companies and assets. In the period from February 1976
until the end of 1977, the region is afflicted by sporadic attacks conducted by the
guerrilla. Accustomed to self-consumption agriculture, performed at the same time as
the intensive commercial agriculture, the Vahanha will come across some stability, only
affected by the demand of various goods that could not be found. The inexistence of
traders would eventually be surpassed through the efforts of the Catholic Mission of
Hanha which, due to the endeavor of their priests, will manage to bring essential goods
into the region. “In those times, the government chased the religious and tried to
nationalize the Church‟s assets. I don‟t know how, but Father Luís Keller always found
salt, demdém (palm oil), pure olive oil, milk for the infants, rice” (P1, 2008).
Since the end of 1977, the Unita guerrilla increases their attacks, creates military bases
in the region and incorporates Vahanha elements into their ranks so they can obtain
needed information and resources. As a counter-measure, the Government will assault
villages suspected of being sympathetic towards the guerrilla. The governmental air
force bombards communities and croplands. The situation intensifies gradually,
becoming impossible to move people and merchandise or even do any farming activity.
The implementation of Marxism-Leninism will have influence over the attitude of the
Vahanha youth regarding the civil war9.
There are additional difficulties with nourishment, and the Government declares 1978
an official Agriculture Year. The population relocates in considerable number into
urban surroundings, in the initial stage going to the nearest localities, such as Cubal.
Here, they will settle along the Cubal River and try to come back to subsistence
farming. During this phase, the government enforces food rations and sets up public
corporations to buy surplus produce and allocate essential goods. The abuses and
corruption caused by these measures are well known, contributing even further to the
impoverishment of the living conditions of the Vahanha people.
Nevertheless, the interviewed subjects have a perception from those times as being a
period when they become pauper for being expelled from their homeland without any
mean of survival, other than begging along the margins of the Cubal River or making do
with subsistence farming. Those who worked as public servants, for public companies
or as “staff” for the Mission in Hanha (as catechists or teachers) will take refuge in
Benguela, where there is more certainty of receiving wages and benefits given by the
regime to their supporters, relocating mostly in the suburban quarters.
“We first arrived at Cubal, where my father had to ask for
a piece of land near the river to our distant relatives, so we
could farm it. But it wasn‟t enough for everybody. Since
9
To understand this influence, it should be taken in consideration a note mentioned by Ferreira (1999: 36,
b) “... during the visit of the Prime-Minister Lopo do Nascimento to the sugar company „4 de Fevereiro‟
in Benguela. At the time, he stated: “yesterday the comrades responsible for the National Commission
showed me the programs for courses available in the technical school (MEF‟s note: Technical School of
Sugar Amílcar Cabral, to instruct qualified labourers for the sugar industry). We asked our comrades to
make a slight alteration. An introduction to Marxism-Leninism. This request is not a personal decision. It
is a ruling made by the Politic Bureau, so that all courses and all schools can divulge proletariat‟s
ideology”.
78
father was a teacher, he had right to receive additional
ration coupons, which we would exchange for manioc and
beans…” “… but we did not stay for long, my father
preferred to move to Benguela, because he was a teacher”
(P1, 2008).
It is interesting to examine this settling, using as blueprint the study conducted in
Luanda by Rodrigues (2004: 4). The solidarity group that facilitates the settling
corresponds to an enlarged family circle. Although new links of solidarity occur, “it is
the network anchored in family relationships that supports reciprocities and exchanges
of more importance, as well as providing the basis for the definition of social status”.
The formation of this sort of solidarity links had started off before the Independence and
has become more significant and functioning in line with the numerous waves of
Vahanha arriving to Benguela. Here, the weakening of traditional solidarities
experienced in Luanda goes unnoticed, since maybe the early inexistence of large
suburban quarters in Benguela had allowed the foundation of contiguous
accommodation for the Vahanha people. As in Luanda, there are other types of network
on which these individuals can count – religious groups for example. However,
diverging from what had been observed in the capital, this type of connections were
originated before the relocation to Benguela, assuming a role almost as important as
family relationships, which in this environment will sustain and expand further.
The explanation for the large importance play by these connections of religious nature
seems to be the performance of the Catholic Mission in Hanha in the lives of the
Vahanha people, given that the institutions of the Catholic Church in Benguela had
systematically welcomed and assisted the refugees in this town (interviewed subjects
always mentioned the aid provided by the Mission of Nazaré in Benguela and numerous
schools and seminaries). While integrating in these networks other than family-based
they get admission to education10 and healthcare. But these links go beyond, while
providing jobs, alimentary aid and in some cases monetary aid. Teachers, catechists and
seminarists will acquire a new kind of social standing, but without forgoing the
traditional structure. The impossibility of contacting the traditional political leadership
remaining in the Hanha region will make the Vahanha refugee community in Benguela
select new soba leaderships amongst the most respected individuals belonging to the
main lineages in their community (usually overlapping this role with those of teacher,
nurse or catechist). However, the bond between these newly elected chieftains and the
traditional chiefdom was never forsaken; they always considered themselves to be
subordinates to the soba.
The Bicesse peace accords will find most of the Vahanha located in Cubal, Ganda and
Benguela. The complications faced by country during this stage are enormous and the
Vahanha, either from the Hanha region or from Benguela, become even more
impoverished. The peace accords and the tense period of tranquillity that followed in
1991 and 1992 have had a propagating effect on the informal economy, improving the
living conditions of both Vahanha groups, particularly those located in Benguela.
Afterward, immediately takes place a return to the homeland, but the low credibility in
this process, new relationships, better access to merchandises and services that do not
exist outside urban locations, all these will cause most Vahanha situated in Benguela to
10
There had always been access to education, even when the seminaries were shut down and their
buildings confiscated by the Angolan political regime most classes kept being instructed; the seminarians
got divided into small groups and classes were given in private homes or other buildings that had not
confiscated.
79
remain there. Now, the communication between the new sobas and the Hanha
traditional chieftains is re-established, and both leaderships cooperate.
The return of the war
As a result of the failure of the elections of 1992, the civil war returns, this time
acquiring the features of a conventional war. Once again the Hanha region is stage to
the confrontation between two armies. And once again those populations suffer the
consequences, both those remaining in the homelands as those who had returned.
Violence puts all agricultural production to a halt. The Vahanha congregate yet again in
the Ganda, Cubal and Benguela regions.
Cubal and Ganda become exile wards, with NGOs and other international institutions11
creating refugee camps for the purpose of preventing widespread hunger and its
consequences. Some interviewees consider these camps to be the places where their
traditions, families and religious beliefs were put under pressure the most. In other
words, the solidarity networks based on familial, religious and tribal relations have
become strained.
It would not appropriate to make a critical analysis of the actions performed by the
institutions managing those camps, but the requirement to put into practice survival aid
programs, connected to the choices made by the political power, will prevent most of
the population from pursuing any productive activity. Consequently, the Vahanha,
similarly to other populations in the region, survive by international intervention,
reaching their highest rate of poverty yet.
“We got food from PAM and the church, it was the only
way to feed” (H4, 2008); “We couldn‟t go to the fields”
(H2, 2008); “There, we had absolutely nothing, we just
stood waiting…” (H1, 2008); “The worst thing was not
knowing about our children or husbands, we just waited”
(H3, 2008).
The supervision of the cities of Huambo and Kuito in 1994, made by the governmental
forces, did little to change the situation in this region – the entire central highlands was
immersed in war, and the Hanha region became subjected to military procedures,
combats and more or less intensive guerrilla actions. This situation will not change
when in 1998 the governmental forces surround and pursuit Unita‟s leadership. In 2002,
after the death of Jonas Savimbi, and the agreement of a peace accord between Unita
and the Angolan Government, the country and this region finally attain Peace.
11
“There is no exact definition of what constitutes a “refugee camp”. The expression is used to describe
human settlings varying substantially in dimension and characteristics. In general, refugee camps are
delimited areas, restricted to refugees and to those providing assistance, where protection and aid are
given until their safe return or relocation into a different region. Contrary to other type of settlings, such
as the agricultural establishments or “refugee villages” in Pakistan in the 80s and 90s, refugee camps
usually are not self-sustainable. Refugee camps are, by rule, planned as temporary locations and build as
such. However, in many cases, they stand for 10 or more years, creating new problems. Water supply and
sanitation frequently do not stand long-term use and the parcels become too small while the families
grow. In many camps, wood supplies are insufficient and the refugees have to search outside the limits,
causing deforestation and numerous ecological imbalances. These problems surpass the camps, affecting
the surrounding reception communities, then the governments frequently impose restrictions to refugees,
limiting their free circulation and labour options outside the camps” (ACNUR, 200: 112).
80
From 1994 to 2002, a significant parcel of the population from this region is living in
refugee camps or in villages near the camps. But these camps, as was declared by the
UNHCR (mentioned on note 13), entail restrictive rules. The Angolan government adds
more restrictions to these rules, like prohibiting circulation between several villages and
towns. In any moment whatsoever the circulation of these internal refugees is permitted,
whether they live in camps or other sites guarded by armed forces. All circumstances
push these populations into controlled areas, surviving of international aid, without
performing productive activities.
This dependence on external aid, this unfeasibility to contribute to production will alter
the social structures of the entire central highlands. This then becomes an extreme
situation, in which all population is relocated to camps or other localities, including in
this dislocation the traditional system of chiefdom. Adding to the constraints performing
in this situation, the government, agencies and NGOs also make use of these politic
structures to control and organize the refugees. But the traditional systems can no longer
give a solidarity response to their people. Corruption, informal economy, smuggling of
goods offered by the international community, these will lead to the creation of new
systems, or new functions that will overthrow the traditional ones.
The climax of political manipulation arrives at this stage. The atrocities and physical
violence are supplemented by strong propaganda in the media, trade-off of political
fidelity in exchange for alimentary aid and access to healthcare or education, even for
survival. All these were manipulated by the belligerents to put the populations under
pressure. On one side, the Government would employ political structures of
substitution, choosing controlled lineages to elect new sobas, for mistrusting the
traditional sobas.
“At the time we went to Benguela my father was chosen
as soba. He was a teacher, and we belonged to a lineage
with privilege. And so he became soba in Benguela, but he
kept telling that the real soba was the one in Hanha” (P1,
2008). “In those days, we could not talk about anything, so
they asked the soba. And he had to say he belonged to
Unita if there were Unita soldiers coming, or to say he was
a EME supporter if the FAA were coming” (H4, 2008).
Those restrictions result in radicalization of some elements from both belligerent
parties, but also results clearly in the posterior political indifference of the Vahanha
population (very few have high profile legislative or partisan duties), as explained by a
few of the interviewed individuals: “Today we are not EME or Unita anymore, not even
those who fought in the bush... we are all the same” (H3, 2008); “... we don‟t want
politics any longer” (B3, 2008).
The Vahanha took shelter in their solidarity nets, reinforced them. Those living in
Benguela find ways to help those living in refugee camps or isolated in some designated
locations. The religious relations are undoubtedly noticeable. Nevertheless all this
assistance, the period between 1994 and 2002 is when the population is afflicted by the
most serious poverty conditions. This is not restricted to life below the poverty line, but
concerns physical survival, recalling absolute poverty.
81
Peace of 2002
While the peace was settled in February 2002, the government does not authorize the
immediate return of the population to their homelands. Their alternative is to escape
from the camps and walk back to their territories, which is a difficult and dangerous
task, since the transportation infrastructures such as roads, railroads and bridges have
been destroyed and there are minefields12 around many villages.
The reports made by the UNHCR point to obstacles found while returning to their
original homelands. Some residents opt to not return and are absorbed in the suburbs of
Luanda, Benguela and other urban centres.
“The difficult nature of the reintegration process has
manifested in numerous ways: low levels of food security
for the exiled and their communities; limited admittance to
employment, activities producing income and access to
public services; large flux of migrants from rural areas to
urban areas. These circumstances have had an outcome
particularly adverse to women, girls and other refuges with
special attributes...” “... Besides these deeds, the better
way to describe the present state of the reintegration
process is “limited” and “fragmented”. Limited, for many
refugees have faced serious obstacles in their efforts for
reintegrating in Angola, and fragmented because the
progress made during the reintegration process differs
substantially from one region to the next” (UNHCR, 2008:
2).
The target population in this research had to face all of these constraints, but the peace
brought a reconnection of contact among the entire population in this region and in this
instance the broken links, familial and traditional relationships destroyed by the conflict,
are restored. The links formed separately, in urban surroundings, have persisted too,
apparently subservient to the superiority of traditional networks in regard of matters and
circumstances specific related to the homeland. When the return is authorized, the urban
nets will assist with the reinstatement of the Vahanha refugees.
The Mission in Hanha resumed its activities with a more strictly religious facet, given
the limitations posed to some of their previous procedures (lack of teachers and
healthcare practitioners, restrictive legislation regarding these activities). The legal
alterations on land possession matters have made permissible some abusive situations
about members of the governmental elite taking ownership of communal lands or of
properties belonging to European farming companies.
Society is changing in the large urban districts, besides the “individual resistances, real
constraints (...) interferences to the effective period of integration in the urban reality”
12
The structural crisis in Angola is directly connected to the population departure caused by the longlasting civil war. Throughout the period of intensive confrontation, between 1992 and 1994, around 1.3 to
2 million individuals have fled from their homes, moving mostly to provincial capitals and Luanda. It is
estimated by humanitarian agencies that in the end of 1997 about one million habitants were still
displaced, despite the limited reassessment made after the peace accords of Bicesse and Lusaka. Since
1998, when the hostilities between factions restarted, an additional quantity of 3.1 million people was
forced to leave their homes, raising the total figure of displaced persons in Angola to 4.1 millions. From
these 3.1 millions exiled since 1998, 1.2 million were registered by humanitarian organizations. (OCHA,
2002: 18).
82
(Rodrigues, 2004: 10), these new urban centres will also be progressively
“incorporating the urbanity”.
Meanwhile, the author points to a characterization of Luanda‟s society by its “mix of
urban and rural elements, a permanent patchwork without any major definite trends
crossing its multiple features, such as economic activities, religion or family”
(Rodrigues, 2004: 24). Nevertheless, in the urban core forming the axis
Benguela/Lobito, this patchwork seems further noticeable, particularly in the suburban
areas. Solidarity nets intermingle with rural custom. Networks based on family
relationships, networks based on religion, traditional networks, they all appear to
assume major importance as bonds connecting the Vahanha people, whether residing in
the rural region of Hanha or in the urban environment of Benguela.
“The rigid policy of reassessment that forces people to return only to their homelands
and does not allow for reinstatement in neighbouring areas has proved to be totally
discouraging” (FAO/PAM; 2004: 13). Even dealing with these obstructions, peace has
allowed the return of the Vahanha to their homeland or their relocation in Benguela. In
the Hanha region, the residents went back to the traditional farming ways, cultivating
for self-consumption and raising small sized animals.
Their reintegration was accomplished with assistance from international organizations,
NGO and especially from the Catholic Church, by means of the support given by the
Mission in Hanha, the Diocese of Benguela, and their numerous institutions, and the
support from the Vahanha residents in Benguela. After the initial stage, without
measurable improvements according to available records, the agricultural production in
the region is on the rise, an average of 7.8% for cereals and 19.74% for other products
(FAO/PAM, 2004). However, this increase does not reflect yet any considerable
improvement in the revenue of this region, though the self-consumption may express an
improved food safety. The surplus production, necessary for exchanges and
consequently for trading supplementary essential products, is having a slower
progression: “The biggest obstacle to progress in this sector is the weak development of
the rural markets and their low interaction with the urban markets (...) The extremely
high costs of imported agricultural inputs, like fertilizers and machinery, also
complicate the investment in agriculture and have be considered as limitations to the
families (...) The main sources of input (fertilizers and seeds) are the international
agencies and the government. (FAO/PAM, 2004: 13).
From the Vahanha standpoint, there is a clear perception of having left absolute poverty
behind and having become progressively less destitute, even if in the course of a timeconsuming process.
“We‟ll keep using our hacks and our hands, next we‟ll buy
a couple of oxen and then we‟ll get more crops” (H1,
2008); “If there was no Mission, the children wouldn‟t be
able to attend school, because we need their help in the
farms” (H2, 2008). “The work almost does not let me help
my elders farming the land, but I have to, so I do
occasional jobs” (B3, 2008).
Peace and poverty: the Vahanha perception of the present
The Hanha natives have been facing for the last decades a series of constraints caused
by the civil war. They have equally contributed to the peaks of internal migration of
Angolan citizens (and flight to bordering countries) in the middle of the 1980/1990
83
decades, in the aftermath of the 1992 elections (until 1994) and in 1998 (Kaun, 2008:
14).
The traditional and religious solidarity networks that had been formed even before the
Independence appear to have been not too affected, and in some cases (at least for those
of religious nature), they seem to have matured. The familial networks were always
ubiquitous. The separation existing among those who had relocated to urban
surroundings and those remaining in the rural region was quite real when matters of
security prevented them from travelling, but pondering about the last forty years, then it
becomes evident that once the insecurity was brought to an end, has returned “a flow of
information and ideas between different “urban” and “rural” social spaces (...) assured
by a dense web of connections, as a result of family ties, labour-based migration,
churches and circulation of some professional groups, for instance, nursing
professionals” (Medina, 2003).
This circulation of persons and products between two worlds seems to assume two
characteristic for the Vahanha. There are some individuals who go from rural to urban
environment or vice-versa, but there are others who periodically leave the rural
environment to do “business” in urban surroundings (for periods lasting several months)
and those from urban centres who also periodically return to the rural region, to aid their
relatives re-establish or to help in farming activities. It is remarkable that some of these
individuals returning occasionally to the Hanha don‟t have origins in this region,
although they may have “roots in the countryside”. Several solidarity nets would get a
more or less significant role, in line to which environment the person stands at any
specific moment. Nowadays the effect this “flow” has on the personal wellbeing,
although beyond measurable, is systematically taken into consideration in researches
about poverty. The familial network appears to be the strongest. In economic matters or
even political matters, those individuals sharing family ties but standing in opposite
politic factions or opposite military forces constantly try to look after each other:
“Those in the EME would warn the ones in Unita and vice-versa. They were family, we
had to protect them” (P1, 2008).
The available records, although incomplete due to methodological deficiencies, confirm
the rates of urban and rural poverty. In 1995, 67% of Angolans lived in poverty or in
extreme poverty (respectively 53.6% and 13.4%). In 2000/2001, this figure had
increased slightly to 68.2%. During the segment of time linking those studies, it is less
significant the slight increase in poverty than the raise in the extreme poverty rate, 96%
for individuals and 119% for family units. In a third study (focused only on poverty in
Luanda), which followed a distinctive methodology from the previous studies since the
author choose to inquire about the informants‟ perceptions of their own and others
poverty, it is shown that 58.7% of the inquired individuals consider themselves to be
poor, 6.7% cannot classify but plunges into the poor category, totalling 65.4%
(Carvalho, 2004: 6). These figures correspond to the Vahanha‟s perception in their most
impoverished periods. One of the most interesting conclusions from this study is the
replies given by the subjects to the question about poverty affecting most Angolans,
since 75.9% agreed. It becomes interesting for the reason that it can be associated to the
interviews produced in our research. Generally speaking, the inquired individuals
consider themselves to be less poor than “other” Angolans, attending to the fact that not
every subject had Vahanha origins.
From the inquiry made to 85 individuals in Benguela, performed by our esteemed
colleague Manuel H. Fernando, only 1.18% considers to be extremely poor, 28.24% are
poor but in a sustainable situation, and 70.58% consider themselves average. These
84
records are significant because they are linked to the subjectivity of the notion of
poverty, as the perception of the subjects about their own condition and the social
perception of poverty (Gaulejac & Léonetti, 1994, apud Carvalho 2004). However, even
taking into consideration that the concept of poverty fluctuates according to each
person, with personal interests clearly influencing their values (Sen, 1999: 35), this
social perception of poverty can not be too distant from the objective experience of
poverty (Carvalho, 2004: 4).
Safekeeping all these features, it is also relevant to note that the inquired Vahanha
individuals believe this peace period to be better than the last stages of conflict. “Now
there is no hunger, we can always prepare manioc” (H1, 2008). Their perception of
extreme poverty encompasses not having enough to eat, similar to what happened in the
period from 1994 to 1998 (at which time they were required to live from the charity of
the previously mentioned agencies and NGOs), as was stated. They believe the Vahanha
became poor when they lost the possibility to hold cattle and farmland. “My father had
to ask for a piece of land to our distant relatives, near the river, so we could farm it” (P1,
2008). The inquired individuals with rural origins judge themselves to be poorer than
those living in urban environments, but recognize that one can starve in the city too.
It was also possible to detect a perception that some essential products that are needed
nowadays in the urban surroundings are not essential in rural settings (they are talking
about mobile phones - so omnipresent in the urban scenery - and transportation). “There
we don‟t have so many expenditures, where we spend a lot in terminals (mobile phone)
and taxis” (B1, 2008).
Regarding the interviewed individuals with urban origins, they consider themselves as
less poor than those in the rural regions, but they also protect the temporal period,
believing that life conditions in rural environments will get better. Furthermore, they
believe to be better food safety in the rural regions, “because in the Hanha, you can
grow anything and have always something to eat” (B2, 2008).
Despite the compulsory displacement, or perhaps due to the conditions in which it
occurred, the Vahanha appear to be reacting positively to their impoverishment,
interpreting it as a transitory situation. The familial, religious and traditional solidarity
nets prove to be resilient enough to support the recovery of most cultural and monetary
patrimonies existing before the conflict.
One last feature that should be mentioned is the social exclusion. The notion has been
deeply debated, but as mentioned in a previous chapter, it may be considered a
“disarticulation between several components of a society and the individuals, resulting
in non-participation in the minimum set of benefits that define a full membership in that
society” (Rodrigues et al, 1999: 64). The selection of this notion comes from it‟s
seemingly adaptation to the context of Angola. A large part of the Angolan population
is victim of social exclusion, from lacking access to the rights or benefits incorporated
in their citizenship. In Angola, “the traditional inequalities do not disaggregate the
society or the social relationships, because they are mainly consensual. Modern
inequalities do translate in social disintegration.” (Fernandes, 200: 206). This social
disaggregation is the result of exclusion and poverty, taking place between ruled and
rulers, clientelist elites and underprivileged majorities surviving from subsistence
agriculture and informal economy.
The existent social exclusion does not appear to be further disaggregating the structures
positioned inside familial, traditional or religious solidarity networks, but it is manifest
in the link between the governmental/administrative structures and the citizen. The
85
Vahanha, owing to an integrative sense conceded by their religious solidarity net, do not
feel excluded, but they tend to self-exclude from public political and social structures.
References
UNHCR (2000) “The State of the World's Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action”,
Geneva
UHNCR (2008)”Evaluation of UNHCR‟s returnee reintegration programme in Angola”,
Geneva
Capucha, L. (2005) Desafios da Pobreza, Celta: Lisbon
Costa, A. B. (1984) “Conceitos de Pobreza”, Estudos de Economia, IV (3)
Faure, F. (1908) ”Ce qu‟il leur faut: L‟Evangile du travail”, Paris: Maison dês missions
Fernandes, A. T. (2000) “Desigualdades e Representações Sociais”, Sociologia, X
Ferreira, M. E. (1999) A Indústria em Tempo de Guerra (Angola, 1975-91), Lisbon: Cosmos
Gomes, C. M. & Afonso, A. (2009) Os Anos da Guerra Colonial, 2, QuidNovi
Kaun, A. (2008) When the displaced return: challenges to „reintegration‟ in Angola, UNHCR.
Medina, M. C. (2003) “Angola: processos políticos da luta pela independência”, Coimbra:
Almedina
Nunes, A. L. P. (2008) Angola 1961, Lisbon: Prefácio
OCHA (2002) “Humanitarian Situation in Angola: Situation Report”, OCHA-UN
FAO/PAM, (2004) Avaliação da Produção Interna e das Necessidades Alimentares em Angola,
Relatório da Missão Conjunta, Roma
Péclard, D. (1995) “Ethos Missionaire et Espirit du Capitalisme: la mission Philafricaine en
Angola 1987-1907”, Le Fait Missionaire, nº1, Lausanne
Pélissier, R. (1986) História das Campanhas de Angola, Lisbon: Estampa
Pössinger, H. (1986) “A Transformação da Sociedade Umbundu desde o Colapso do Comércio
das Caravanas”, Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos, 4 and 5
Rodrigues, C. U. (2004) “Recomposição Espacial e Urbanização em Luanda”, Centro de
Estudos Africanos, ISCTE
Rodrigues, E.V. et al (1999) “A Pobreza e a Exclusão Social: teorias, conceitos e políticas
sociais em Portugal”, Repositório Aberto Univ. Porto
Sen, A. (1999) “Pobreza e Fomes”, Lisbon: Terramar
Silva, E. M. (2003) “Impactos da Ocupação Colonial nas Sociedades Rurais do Sul de Angola”,
Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE
86
PART II
War, poverty and peace in Mozambique
87
„Quantitative Literature‟ and the Interpretation of the Armed Conflict in
Mozambique
(1976-1992)
João Paulo Borges Coelho
Abstract
Recently, a number of reputable academic establishments have observed the fast growth
of a new literature about civil wars, based on quantitative methodologies and
privileging economic explanations. This literature, mostly rooted on a comparative
analysis, seeks to uncover tendencies which allow configuring an universal theory of the
occurrence, with the purpose of not only understanding but additionally informing the
political decisions of organisms which are supposed to be managing it. The present
article aims to bring subsidies for the discussion of the Mozambican case study under
the stance of this new quantitative literature, trying to determine in which manner it
may be useful to circumscribe and comprehend it.
Introduction
Throughout the last two decades of the previous century civil conflicts have multiplied,
and in some manner as its outcome, so have the academic projects aiming to
comprehend them, partly motivated by a need to advance knowledge, partly as a
response to the political and humanitarian needs for predicting and preventing them, as
well as to improve mechanisms for their resolution and to attenuate their effects.1
A large segment of these projects refuses the traditional qualitative stance of research of
particular processes, considering these perspectives make generalization difficult and
imprint a tendentious character on comparisons (Gates, 2002: 9-10); alternatively, the
search for new methodologies based on a “data” compilation plentiful enough to allow,
by its statistical treatment, to establish general probabilistic relations which configure
theoretical principles. It concerns a perspective that “abstains from any particular
conflict and submits the investigator to the discipline of the statistical method”.2 In one
of the programmatic texts in this new quantitative perspective, it is stated:
“Statistical patterns are useful in the way they allow to suggest policies which function
typically in particular situations. Besides, they defend us from the temptation of
illegitimate generalization of personal conflicts, and from the tendency to choose among
a multiplicity of possible causes the one that better incorporates into the investigator‟s
convictions” (Collier et al, 2003: 54).
1
At a global scale, the occurrence of civil wars has risen intensely in the 90s, reaching a peak in 1994-5,
and since then has been consistently decreasing (Sambanis, 2002: 216; Fearon, 2002; Gleditsch, 2002).
Some have found the causes for this tendency in the long cycle of general transition from empires to
nation-states (Wimmer & Min, 2006). The region most affected by the phenomenon is the Sub-Saharan
Africa, and the reasons for this prevalence are discussed, among other, by Collier & Hoeffler (2002),
Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000b) and Fearon & Laitin (2003). All websites were consulted in June 2009.
2
Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner (2208: 3).
88
Linked to this perspective is the creation of large databases about the conflicts,
presuming the general theory developed from its interpretation permits to analyze
concrete cases and predict future cases, as well as to inform political decisions.
The process is not original. It was originated in a database called “Correlates of War”
(COW), created by David Singer in the University of Michigan in 1963, with the
purpose of accumulating systematically every scientific knowledge concerning war all
over the world (www.correlatesofwar.org; Suzuki, Krauze & Singer, 2002). Following
the steps of COW, several other lines of investigation were developed, in the most part
derived from this database, and some new databases that were constituted in the
meantime.3Evidently, this “quantitative methodology” being described here in a
simplified manner has been producing diversified results, at least as many as the
perspectives which operate the records to subsequently construct a “theory”. While
some factions operate closely to the professed Political Science and pay special
attention to the “ethnic factor” or to the impact of globalization over conflicts, most see
economics, and concurrently econometrics, as the answer to the most important matters.
The particular relevance of the last one is predominantly due to the significance of the
project “Economics of Civil War; Crime and Violence” produced by Paul Collier and
sponsored by the World Bank, which has established a correlation, largely accepted in
this field, linking economic inequality and poverty to the civil war (Collier, Hoeffler &
Söderbom, 2001).
Although there is an extensive and diverse academic literature about the Mozambican
armed conflict, its comparison to this Quantitative Literature (QL) is still quite scarce.4
For that reason, the purpose is to produce a collection of written reflections, not
concerning precisely the whole complex and diverse body of work of the QL, instead
basically regarding the way it creates new perspectives intended for the study of war in
Mozambique. These notes will be organized according to two or three large nucleus of
questions which have been dominating the QL, namely the start of the conflict (causes,
nature) and its progression (transformations, inductive conditions).5
Origins and Nature
What launches a civil war? Probably the reasons are as many as there are civil wars, and
hence the large diversity of explanations which, in turn, are very much the result of the
difficulty endured by the QL while defining an operative concept of civil war. 6
3
According to Sambanis (2004: 815), “most projects don‟t perform an original historical research, being
mostly founded on COW”. Among the most important databases the emphasis is put on the “Minority at
Risk” by Ted Gurr, the “State Failure Project” by the George Mason University, the “Uppsala Conflict
Data Programme (UCDP) related to the “Armed Conflict Dataset” by the International Peace Institute in
Oslo (PRIO) (Gleditsch et. al., 2002; Gates, 2002), the “Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) by the University
of California (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009; Cederman, Girardin & Wimmer, 2006), and the
“„Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups‟ by James Fearon (Fearon, 2003). Many more are in
progress. For a global outlook on quantitative literature, see Sambanis (2002), Humphreys (2002).
4
See, for example, Weinstein & Francisco (2005). Sambanis (2003: 106-108) debates the application of
the Collier-Hoeffler model (CH) to Mozambique, but does it based on an only source, specifically an
earlier version of the works by Weinstein & Francisco. For an analytical vision of the CH model applied
to Mozambique, see Cramer (2000) and Bertelsen (2005).
5
A third set of questions is excluded, regarding the somehow distinctive subject of the ending of the
conflict (found solutions, post-conflict effects, etc.).
6
The most recent definition mentions a military conflict taking place inside a national territory between a
State and one or more groups, from which results a tally of at least 1000 direct deceased (according to the
89
However, mostly down to the influence of Paul Collier and his perspective, based on the
Rational Choice theory, the realm of the QL produced a reasonable consensus around
the internal causes, such as those that if exposed would elucidate the origins of the
conflict, being economy the most profound reason in this explanation. Civil war would
rise from the decision made by a determinate part of society to rebel against the
country‟s leadership, in a dichotomy logic of a search for material or political gains, or
to manifest some grievance (the famous collerian formulation of “greed or grievance”),
clearly more motivated by the former than by the later, and therefore guaranteeing an
economic rationality for the explanation (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000).
This internal location of the causes for conflict creates some problems since the
beginning with reference to the elementary narrative of the Mozambican civil war, such
as it is usually constructed from the profusely available documentation. According to
these records, the independence of Mozambique is included in a meaningful geopolitical
alteration occurred in Austral Africa, during the middle of the decade of 1970,
characterized by the disappearance of the colonialism in the region, leaving only the
atypical cases of South African apartheid and Rhodesia. For this last country, an
independent Mozambique ruled by a regime directly resultant from a revolutionary
movement embodied two fundamental perils: on the one hand, was broadening the
Rhodesian frontier exposed to the infiltration of the nationalist guerilla, and on the other
hand was seriously threatening the vital access to the seashore by the Beira Port and
Beira Corridor7. In this manner, the new context demanded immediate responses from
Rhodesia, becoming more urgent an open support of the new Mozambican authorities to
the ZANLA Zimbabwean guerilla, and the adoption, in March 1976, of the United
Nations‟ mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, which in reality implied a radical cut in
the relationship with that country. A classic war is swiftly initiated between these two
nations.8 In this background emerges the MNR (Mozambican National Resistance),
created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Office (CIO) as an auxiliary force for
their troops.9 During this stage, the MNR has the role of combating the Zimbabwean
forces located in Mozambique and destabilizing the central land strip adjacent to the
Beira Corridor.
This external origin of the rebel movement does not match the QL‟s dominant
expectation regarding the causes of civil war that, as mentioned before, is eminently
internal. While certainly the presence of external forces is recognized as a variable
COW criterion) or 25 direct deceased every month (according to the UCP/PRIO criterion). See, among
extensive literature on this topic, Collier & Hoeffler (2006), Blattman & Miguel (2009).
7
The alternative exportation-importation channels from Rhodesia to Mozambique was through SouthAfrica, entailing in average a distance four times longer while doubling the costs (Mlambo s/d).
8
A United Nations report affirms that the Rhodesian attacks, in the beginning directed against
Zimbabwean camps in inner Mozambique, rapidly evolved into large-scale operations aiming not only
civil population as well as economic and social infrastructures. “Since May 1977, the Rhodesian forces
have been using Mirage fighter-bomber aircrafts and 100 kg fragmentation bombs.” (see Borges Coelho,
1993: 370-371).
9
The fact that the MNR was born with a English acronym is not, in this context, inconsequential. On the
creation of the MNR/Renamo and his action during this stage, see for example Johnson & Martin (1986),
Minter (1994), and Vines (1996). The role played by Rhodesia in creating the movement is eloquently
referred by Ken Flower, its instigator: “(…) The CIO proceeded to the recruitment of Mozambicans who
were encouraged to carry on their own actions without having to depend on the support of Rhodesia. The
surprising easiness in the development of the MNR indicated that we were following the right path,
particularly since we kept it clandestinely small and manageable during the first years and, at the same
time, it served as eyes and ears for our Intelligence in Mozambique” (Flower, 1987: 302).
90
which can interfere in many ways (financing the conflict, training rebel forces, buying
products resulting from pillage, etc.), it is never considered to be a structural element,
since this would straightforwardly contradict the principle of “rational choice”,
overcomplicating the distinction between conflict among States and civil war. As a
consequence, the national frame is for the QL customarily the largest frame, and
everything beyond it is “diminished” to be able to squeeze in it as just another
secondary factor and consequently subjected to a rudimentary treatment.10
Evidently, though this interpretation of the Rhodesian origin in this stage of the conflict
has been acknowledged as historic evidence, to embrace it exclusively would leave out
many important matters. For as intense and militarily efficient the Rhodesian offensive
had been, by itself it could never explicate the prompt support given by a considerable
number of Mozambicans to the rebel contingent. For that, a few other factors must be
taken into account.
According to Gates (2002), the QL considers as main independent variables related to
the risk of occurrence of civil wars: poverty (lack of economic opportunities and low
rates of economic development), temporal distance from a previous conflict, ethnic
dominance, as well as political instability.
Pertaining to the first variable, the Collier-Hoeffler model (CH) evaluates Mozambique
as having a national raw growth “slightly under the average of other countries at war”,
within a context further damaged by Frelimo‟s economic strategy, in particular the
collectivization of agriculture and nationalization of commerce, losses derived from
sanctions against Rhodesia and restrictions to the migration of Mozambican miners to
South Africa. However, a more accurate chronologic analysis will show that, although
the mass departure of Portuguese populations was strong in the beginning having had a
direct and profound impact on the economy, the economic measures proposed by the
new government can not be associated in this manner to the beginning of the
insurgence, since they only had consequences after the Third Frelimo Party Congress in
February 1977, at a time when the MNR was already established.11 This same argument
is used in favor of the decrease of migratory labour, as opposing to what had been
assumed, in 1975 the number of Mozambican miners raised to over 115 thousand, while
the price of gold tripled and Mozambique profited from unprecedented revenues of 50
million pounds, which helped to soften the transitional blows. Just since 1976 has South
Africa selected a policy of progressive reduction of labour (Hanlon, 1984: 51).
Furthermore, the alleged social resentment caused by the economic decline must be
analyzed in a background of opposing perceptions, popular enthusiasm about the
independence and a high popularity feature, achieved through equalitarian measures
announced by the liberation movement. Sambanis himself (2003: 16) is eventually
forced to consider the relationship between poverty and the beginning of a conflict as
more complicated than the way it is proposed by the CH model, concluding in his later
“review” that Renamo‟s initial recruits were not unemployed but victims of repression
at the hands of Frelimo.
The Sambanis‟ statement should be analyzed under the perspective of the second
independent variable of the CH model, which holds the less time occurred since the
10
For instance, Sambanis (2003: 45-46, note 91), when confronted with evidence of the support given by
Rhodesia to the MNR, rushed to declare that it wouldn‟t have worked if were not for the failed
agricultural policies, intense political repression and “southern dominancy”.
11
For instance, in 1977 there were only 30 communal villages already concluded and 105 in progress
(Borges Coelho, 1993: 334). In effect, this program has only become significant since 1977, following the
floods in the Zambebe and Limpopo Rivers in 1977 and the systematic relocation policies.
91
previous conflict, the larger the risk of emergence or reoccurrence of a civil war. This in
relation to what can be considered as the only open entrance to a possibility of historic
interference.12More concretely, in the Mozambican case is made a connection between
colonial war (ended in 1974) and the new war, launched one or two years afterward.
The risk of occurrence of this conflict seemed, to the CH model, to be extremely high.
Concerning Mozambique, the MNR contingent would have been sustained by Frelimo
dissidents, dissatisfied with the institutional dominance from the part of the “southern
people” and from victims of the repression started after the independence who had taken
refuge in Rhodesia.
This is quite a sensible matter, undoubtedly deserving further research.13Here are
presented at least three potential groups of actors, namely Frelimo‟s historic dissidents,
the “dissidents” produced after the independence, and Mozambicans compromised with
the colonial regime. Regarding the first group, their ability of constituting an armed
movement in opposition to the new regime is less likely, especially if taken into
consideration the attempts for the constitution of alternative political movements which,
at that time, ended being neutralized by the imprisonments and confinements into
internment camps of its main leaders.14About the second group, there is evidence of
some elements joining the rebellion particularly after it had been initiated, that is to say
after the attacks and escapes from Frelimo‟s internment camps. 15 However, is not
credible for this component to have had significance and management enough to
constitute by itself the rebellion‟s core. Sambanis has corrected his interpretation of the
CH model and changed slightly his argument, affirming that many of the initial recruits
came from the Mozambican diaspora in Rhodesia, and then concluding that “the
diaspora may also aggravate the risk of war, by forming the foundation for the first
recruits of a rebel organization”. (Sambanis, 2003: 106). But although Rhodesia had a
traditionally significant Mozambican community, and being the birthplace of one of the
strongest nationalist organizations which have initially integrated Frelimo, it is still
unlikely that, in the midst of the Rhodesian diaspora and inside the environment of the
governing regime, existed such an immediate capacity to organize an armed action.
Thus, the structural connection to the previous conflict must be found mostly in the
context which the last stage of colonial war had created in the middle of the country,
such context being characterized by the colonial policy of africanization of war, the
complex relations between Mozambique Rhodesia and Malawi, and profound
experiences of social engineering, population relocation and creation of ethnic troops. In
fact, the nationalist Mozambican guerrilla, around 1972 after having crossed the
Zambebe River in Tete, was entering Manica and Sofala in the centre of the country,
consequently turning into a direct menace to the Beira Corridor. From that moment until
the independence, the centre became the most delicate battlefield, which, in the
Portuguese side, had more than 40 thousand Africans representing over 50% of the
12
As was pointed out by Bertelsen (2005: 7), to Collier, although the colonial heritage may presumably
influence the conflict in a certain manner, such influence is much less important than the economic
features. This way, he fights the “pollution” within the context (Collier et. al., 2003: 66).
13
Knowledgably, the difficulties in the research on this subject are partly derived from the smashing
dominance of an official narrative destitute of problematisation.
14
Three months prior to the independence, some important dissents such as Lázaro Nkavandame, Uria
Simango, Joana Simeão and Paulo Gumane were already under detention in Nachingwea, Tanzania,
among hundred other. See Hoile (1994: 26 and passim).
15
Among them, interned religious sects followers, participants in the military upraise of December 1975
and mostly victims of the purifying wave in the midst of the defence and security forces. André
Matsangaísa, the first leader of the MNR himself had escaped from a re-education camp.
92
colonial contingent (Wheeler, 1976; Cann, 1998; Borges Coelho, 2003a). The main
military response from the Portuguese consisted in the creation of highly trained and
itinerant Special Groups, located in the vicinity of Beira, composed almost exclusively
of Africans born in the regions where they operated. In 1974, when happened the coup
in Portugal which opened the door to independence, there already existed 83 companies
of Special Groups and 12 Parachuting Special Groups, in a total of thousands of men
operating in the entire region, primarily in the infiltration route between the south of the
Tete Province and the north of Manica and Sofala, which would become the initial
operational area for the MNR.16 Without any doubt, the difficulties of integration of
these forces in the new regime following the independence have paved the way to their
recruitment during the process of formation of the MNR.
The CH model variable concerning the ethnic dominance is related to the previous
question, having manifested large operational difficulties. It is quite a polemic subject
among the QL, concerning the ability to revolt of significant ethnic groups without
affordance to power17. The CH model finds a positive correlation linking this variable
and the beginning of war, derived from the northern group Macua-Lomwe, numerically
superior but without access to power, since Frelimo‟s leadership was dominated by
“southern people”. That “would have caused regional dissidences inside the liberation
movement which lead to the emergence of civil war”.18Amazed by the absence of an
armed revolution among the macua-lomwe ethnic, which would demonstrate the
effectiveness of this variable, the model then searches for an indirect orientation to link
it throughout the history of the liberation movement until the origins of the conflict. It
would be much more promising to explore this subject based on the notion – more
indistinct and, at the same time, more inclusive – of identity, to account for the regional
tensions that without a doubt were being historically constituted integrating ethnolinguistic elements, but also of distinctive paces of development and distinctive
distances regarding to power, articulated into the new context of construction of a
national identity (Borges Coelho, 2004); and answering to the central question on the
origins of the Mozambican conflict being unrelated to ethnicity matters.
16
For this question see, among extensive literature, Borges Coelho (1993), Souto (2003), Bernardo
(2003), Cann (1998), Rodrigues (1995), Freire Antunes (1995 and 1996), Santos (2008).
17
The relation between ethnicity and violence, much in vogue amid certain currents, constitutes one of
the most confusing, polemic and conceptually fragile features in the QL. The theory is founded on the
concepts of “ethnic dominance” (relationship of power and ethnicity dimension) and “ethnic
fractionalization” (heterogeneity). The main source of information for the databases, in this specific topic,
has been the soviet Atlas of the Peoples of the World (Atlas Narodov Mira) from 1964, and in some
instances the State Failure Project. The confusion instated in this field, here only superficially explored, is
well expressed in the harsh criticism patent in the words of Laitin & Posner 2001: 13-15: “the users of the
ELF index (Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization, with data from 129 countries) assume that the ethnic
fractionalization of a determinate country is fixed, like its topography or the distance separating it from
the equator. Just like the borders of a country don‟t change, it is assumed that its ELF values also remain
constant (...). The value of an ELF measure ignores the social reality crossing several dimensions of the
ethnic identity in all countries, and a political life characterized by different levels of fracture in several
different dimensions (…)”, etc. The authors have concluded that this supposed measurement is equivalent
to taking a single figure, for example the inflation rate of a country in 1945, and from it deduce the
prosperity level of this same country in 1990. For research on the ethnic factor in the QL, see Woodward
(s/d).
18
This rudimentary application of the variable in the CH model is criticized by Sambanis (2003: 40-42,
107), for being superficial and focusing exclusively on the larger group, for not always being well
measured, for omitting other components of ethnic affiliation (such as race and religion) which might be
used to support ethno-political action, for not revealing anything about the transversality of ethnic,
religious, racial and identitary ruptures in general, etc.
93
The last QL variable, in some manner associated to the first one, concerns the political
instability as a cause for the initiation of civil wars. This variable does not explicitly
make part of the CH model, but can be associated to another secondary one, called
“democracy”. In essence, this is formulated in the following manner: right away
following the independence Mozambique was characterized by a non-democratic
regime, and the MNR was originated from factions repressed by this regime, although it
was basically more motivated by a search for material benefits than by any resentment.
Sambanis believes this interpretation to be inconsistent, claiming that even though the
governmental repression may have caused resentments they might not constitute a direct
motivation for violence, instead eventually being the prospective improvement of
material living conditions. Moreover, he proposes a new variable, not integrated in the
CH model but “having possible interest for the launch of a civil war”, which he
denominates “State‟s incapacity of regulation over the entire territory”. According to
this, Frelimo as a liberation movement had hardly penetrated into the territory before
taking over power, implying that when they formed a government they had to fill the
void left behind by the Portuguese, without nevertheless being capable of managing the
territory. This incapacity might have been presumably enhanced by the repression
exerted over all of those who had connections to the colonial regime, including the
colonial security forces elements who “had they been enrolled, may have helped (to
fight the MNR) [and most likely the civil war would not have taken place]” (Sambanis,
2003: 108).
This is certainly one of the most complex questions to be analyzed. The difficulties in
managing the country (including the territory) must be undoubtedly taken into
consideration in a background of regional hostility, abrupt removal of the most
competent leaders and profound transformation and deterioration of the economy and,
for last, repression and incarceration in reeducation camps of many factions
compromised with the colonial regime, political and religious dissidents, the
unemployed, victims of a persecutory zeal resulting from a perspective of political and
ideological purity or just the whim of unprepared guerrilla men. However, this
perspective grossly ignores the huge popularity asset in possession of the new regime,
freshly out of a liberation war (Egerö, 1987), and in its reductive interpretation
disregards the complex role played out in this context by the links between Frelimo and
the State. This disregard for the context will lead to the callow and conservative position
of uncritically conceive the possibility of inclusion of forces highly trained by the
colonial regime to combat the nationalist guerilla in extremely hostile regional
surroundings as the solution to avoid a civil war. Finally, there is no doubt that the
frailty of the State may be associated to its incapacity to respond in terms of repression
to the MNR guerilla, given that during the first years of independence the new regime
faced severe tribulations while transforming its guerilla force into an effective
conventional army, and all this under attack by the Rhodesian forces (Borges Coelho &
Macaringue, 2004). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that in 1979-80 the decease of MNR‟s
leader André Matsangaísa, the independence of Zimbabwe and the governmental
military offensives in Gorongosa and Manica had taken the MNR almost to the point of
annihilation.
Concerning the cycle from the start of war (particularly noticeable in Mozambique‟s
situation, between 1976 and 1980), it is therefore very difficult to believe the QL,
specifically the CH model, has produced stimulating perspectives. The relevant
94
independent variables either ignore any context, 19or are chronologically dyslexic (for
instance, the social impact of the economic decline during this stage), are reductive and
quite inconsistent (for instance, all analysis made on the performance of the new
regime), or practically incomprehensible (the case of ethnic dominance); and when the
inference seems to be correct, such as in the case of proximity to the previous conflict,
such happens for the wrong reasons.
Some authors in the field of the QL search to attenuate the most patent difficulties in an
application of the CH model to the Mozambican case. Sambanis (2003) suggests the
diaspora as the recruitment source for the MNR, reduces Rhodesia‟s role to a substitute
factor for the internal pillage (paying the price for the serious methodological mistake of
a voluntary mix of variables, so to maintain internalized the origin of conflict), and
lastly proposes the introduction of new variables (“external actors”, “Cold War”,
“disenfranchisement and repression of colonial beneficiaries”, “State‟s incapacity to
control the territory”). Weinstein & Francisco (2205) reveal themselves more aware of
the professed external factor and recognize that, without more rigorous information, it is
impossible to examine many questions systematically, although eventually they in the
same manner integrate the “external support” into the “pillage of assets” to preserve the
endogeny of the CH model.
Duration and Transformation
When a group starts an armed rebellion, it does not pose itself the question of when and
how it will end. Collier, Hoeffler & Söderborn (2001: 17) claim, based on this fact, that
the “duration of a conflict is determined by a set of variables substantially different from
the ones determining its beginning”, and the acceptance of this principle has made these
two moments to be studied in an increasingly divided manner.20
Concerning the independent variables prevailing in conflicts, usually the most relevant
are the geographic characteristics of the land, social fractionalization (ethnic and
religious) and the economic opportunities subsequent to the hostilities. Although less
consensual, the interference of external actors has become increasingly relevant
(Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000a).
This previous variable continues to be crucial to the elementary narrative of the
Mozambican case. Indeed, previous to the independence of Zimbabwe the MNR was
practically extinct, reduced to only about 300 fighters. Its survival was due to the
introduction of a new actor in this process, South Africa,21which in the course of the
19
There is another variable in the CH model which deems the low percentage of school attendance among
young men as a dissatisfaction factor or indigence as having a positive correlation in the Mozambican
case right after the independence, this variable completely ignoring the context of transition. In fact, the
decrease in percentage corresponds to the departure of European populations, and since the African
youths practically had no access to education during the colonial times, for them the situation only could
have improved.
20
Even though accepting this separation in case the determinants of both processes are clearly distinctive,
Eldabawi & Sambanis (2002: 307-308) present a group of technical and practical reasons for which they
should be regarded jointly. Collier et. al. (2003: 80) considers the length of civil war harder to investigate
statistically than its beginning, as while comparing countries at war and at peace, such occurs in a much
limited variations among countries at war.
21
Until then South Africa had performed a rather secondary role, limited to a consolidation of the
economic connections to Mozambique and to a discreet collaboration in the Rhodesian warfare. About the
South African support to Mozambique, cf., among extensive literature, Vines (1996), Martin & Johnson
(1986), Minter (1994), Davis (1985).
95
“Operation Mila” transferred from the northeast of its territory to the extinct Rhodesia
the remaining structure of the MNR, while its fighters concentrated in the mountainous
region of Sitatonga. However, just the following year Renamo was once again operating
in Mozambique‟s inland with a contingent of thousands of men.
To understand the South African support and this powerful resurgence of the rebel
movement it is necessary to regard South Africa not in a statistical manner but as coping
with deep changes, in direct confrontation against countries with black majorities which
had organized themselves around the Frontline and the SADCC to confront them. Botha
replaced Vorster in the leadership, and the military have radicalized their position
within the frame of the “Total Strategy” elaborated in 1977 to guarantee the “survival of
the white nation” in opposition to what was seen as a communist progression in Austral
Africa. During this period, the South African armed forces became dominant and
exerted a huge influence over the relationships with neighbouring countries. They
expanded their military industry (between 1978 and 1985 their military expenditure
more than doubled), created ethnic battalions and scouting regiments – Recces –
integrating “dissidents” from all around Austral Africa. With regard to Mozambique,
this attitude has provoked a massive “investment” in the recuperation of the
MNR/Renamo.22 In turn, to understand the occidental complacency toward this South
African radicalization, it is necessary to account for an international context of Cold
War, a hardening of the North American positions during the final stage of the Carter
Administration, and especially the arrival of Ronald Reagan (Minter, 1994). Together
with Iran, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, Austral Africa then becomes scenery for
the confrontation between these two blocks.
While Rhodesia‟s interest had fallen upon a fairly circumscribed Mozambican area (the
Beira Corridor and the bordering areas of Manica and Gaza, where the Zimbabwean
nationalists had concentrated), South Africa uses the “new” Renamo to fulfil more
ambitious purposes. It certainly aims at the Beira Corridor yet (thus “reassuring”
Renamo and guaranteeing at the same time that Zimbabwe keeps depending on the
South African deliverance channels), but further than that, it seeks for the substitution of
the Mozambican regime, pressuring the entire country its capital and in particular.
However, contrary to Rhodesia, South Africa will gradually aspire for more, not just as
an auxiliary force but as a progressively autonomous movement with its own political
purposes.
In 1982-1983 Renamo‟s offensive had practically reached every part of the country,
with the exception of a few areas in Cape Delgado.23By infiltrating through the borders
or transported by helicopters, the guerrilla men retake the route from the border in
Pafúri through the south of Manica and into the interior of the country. In 1982 they
were once again standing in the Beira Corridor and Gorongosa from where then proceed
to Tete (the first ambushes in the road to Chimoio-Tete took place in June). Their swift
establishment in this region presumes the existence of infiltration lines, not only from
Manica and Sofala, but also from Malawi. At the same time, throughout 1982 they
crossed the Zambebe River and penetrated the occidental part of Zambezia Province,
invading several district headquarters and founding important bases (like Mureremba,
22
About the South African support to Renamo, cf. Among extensive literature, Vines (1991) and Martin
& Johnson (1986), Minter (1994), Davis (1985), Oliveira (2006), Africa Watch (1992). About the military
operation of the „Total Strategy‟, cf. Stiff (1999).
23
The Project Social History of War, by the History department of the UEM (Universidade Eduardo
Mondlane) gives some steps in the sense of making a meticulous cartography of the progression of
Renamo inside the territory, based on regional and local testimonies.
96
Eruruni, Alfazema and Muaquiwa24). In the beginning of 1983 they made an impressive
entrance into Nampula Province and advanced to Niassa Province. In February 3rd 1984
the railroad connecting Nampula and Lichinga was attacked for the first time, seriously
affecting the Nacala Corridor. Simultaneously, in the south of the country, Renamo
progressed rapidly from Vilanculos and along the coastline, an action facilitated by the
great drought experienced in the beginning of the decade of 1980, which had
depopulated large regions in the north of Inhambane Province. In the start of 1982 they
were approaching Inhambane, then progressed swiftly toward the south with forces
properly equipped with bazookas, mortars and machine-guns, while facing a weak
governmental resistance. At the same time, most of the inland region of Gaza becomes
the target of attacks that affected the fertile regions in the valley of the Limpopo River
and the national road crossing the country from north to south. Also in 1982, Renamo
started to perform actions along the entire southern border with South Africa, while the
bases in Matsequenha and Kwahla acted as a support to the siege around Maputo, the
national capital.
This fast and simultaneous progression of Renamo into such a wide extension as the
entire Mozambican territory raises several questions. From the start, it places the
geographical factor in a substantially different position than formerly proposed by the
QL.25The variables entailed in matters of geography are restricted to a positive factor for
the military evolution of the rebels, which may be represented by the woodland
coverage and the rocky configuration of the land.26However, this ability of the guerrilla
to, within the short period of two years, ubiquitously reach everywhere with this much
intensity and efficiency poses the possibility of going beyond mere territorial physical
configurations into a spatial dimension necessarily connected to the war choreography
and its combats, as well as to the South African strategic and tactic outlook, interested
in controlling the economic corridors (Beira, Nacala and Limpopo) to hinder the
economy in certain costal locations (to supply the guerilla) and in sieges around main
cities, particularly the capital. This factor, linked to the intensity and efficiency which
had marked the offensive, not only places many nuisances to the possibility of an
endogenous creation within the movement (in such case, its evolution would have been
much slower and circumscribed to determinate locations in the territory, never reaching
the whole country) as they provide for an exogenous explanation in accordance to the
demonstrated South African motivation, with the factual evidences of Renamo receiving
supplies by helicopters and coastal shipments, the presence of instructors and special
forces in the bases, and the sophisticated system of communications with the South
African background.27 Even if the land configuration has wielded some influence over
the military operations, the geographical factor includes many more elements and
certainly cannot be evaluated in such a simplistic and abstract manner.28
24
Muaquiwa, for example, is described as an enormous strategically positioned base, with extensive
farmland cultivated by the population. On occasion, South African planes would land there with supplies.
There were some South African instructors in this base.
25
For an elaboration on the spatial factor among the QL see for example Tearon & Laitin (2003) and
Chojnacki & Metternich (2008).
26
Both the woodland coverage and the mountainous land are measured in percentages in regards to the
total surface of the country. For a definition, go see appendix in Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2001).
27
Evidence reinforced by the implicit knowledge of the posterior stage of apartheid by the South African
authorities themselves. See, for example, Davis (1985) and Stiff (1999).
28
The CH model deducts a positive correlation, although the mountainous land is small (2.4% of total
area), when compared to the average in countries at war (24.9%) and at peace (15.2%). Sambanis (2003).
97
Once more, this perspective does not contradict the argumentation in defence of the
internal factors. Quite the opposite, the complementary nature of the fast progression of
the guerrilla should be explained by the governmental difficulty to act in response and,
now correctly, by the profoundly negative internal social and economic impact of the
selected development strategy and the policies put into practice, especially since the
beginning of the 1980s. In brief, this strategy was derived from a dualist and highly
centralized perspective whose investment efforts were canalized into a public sector
seen as modern and full of alleged potential to become a driving force for development,
neglecting the bulk of small farmers who formed the smashing majority of population,
already weakened by a rupture of the commercial networks and consecutive years of
disinvestment. In the beginning of 1983, the national exportations had fallen down to
half and the importations had decreased about one third while its value were five times
higher than the preceding (Castel-Branco, 1994). The disastrous effects of the
development strategy linked to the devastating outcome of war and drought have caused
a profound crisis. The rural world is increasingly becoming a paradoxal space, where
war violence coexists with an accelerated and compulsory population relocation
conducted by Frelimo and the State29, deteriorating the executive and productive
structure of the rural society without allowing for the predicted alternative; this world
has gradually transformed into a violent space, falling into the fringe.30
In the end of 1983, Renamo had already distinguished itself from the old Rhodesian
MNR. With military effectiveness and defiant rhetoric creates social support funds and
consolidates its presence around the territory, while growing in number. The
recruitment and funding are crucial elements to the QL variable regarding the duration
of the conflict, which is still far from being wholly comprehensible. Nevertheless, the
available information disengages from the simplicity of explanation offered by the
application of the CH model. The economic perspectives progressively blocked from
the rural communities, such as the response to this reality and to the modernist
discourse from the State that restrains traditional values (Geffray, 1991; McGregor,
1998) are evidently other factor to take into consideration, as long as they remain
circumscribed within a frame where violence is an essential mechanism for recruitment,
and the increasing possibilities for the guerilla correspond to the enlargement of their
operational areas;31 in addition, it is an essential mechanism for financing that beyond
having an external component, mostly South African, is also founded on the extortion
and extraction of resources by pillaging villages and other locations and ambushing and
trading along the border, facts that have yet to be circumscribed and registered in
detail.32
29
Between 1978 and 1982 the population involved in the relocation of communal villages has practically
doubled, going from 1.160.437 to 1.808.693 individuals , and the purpose was to embark about 6,500,000
until 1985 (Borges & Coelho, 1993: 345; 361).
30
These two explanatory lines are powerfully and simultaneously structuring the same debate over the
Mozambican conflict, opposing the supporters of war as aggression and destabilization to those who give
more importance to the negative impact of State policies. Regarding this, see a famous debate in Southern
African Review of Books between Clarence-Smith (1989), Roesch (1989), Cahen (1989), Minter (1989),
etc.
31
On the violence of the conflict, and violence as a recruitment method, see among extensive literature,
Minter (1994), Gersony (1988), Vines (1996), Geffray (1991), Nordstrom (1997), Finnegan (1992),
Borges Coelho (2003b). The “adherence”, although entailing perspectives of access to resources, is
always candidly and smashingly described by the “adherents” themselves as forced.
32
Gastrow (2001), for instance, searches to outline a frame for this kind of transactions in Austral Africa,
observing that since the middle of the 1980s was established a new link between groups of neighbouring
countries and South Africa based on trafficking merchandises such as ivory, drugs, minerals, rhinoceros
98
The Nkomati Accord33, signed by Mozambique and South Africa in March 1984, may
be the symbolic mark for this continuous “internalization” process of Renamo.
Following this accord, South Africa was forced to have a more discreet involvement,
but remained always present and efficient (Davis, 1985), which produced the
diversification of political and material supports to Renamo among the conservative
sectors in the United States of America, Europe and some African countries (Vines,
1996) and a larger political autonomy, assisting the movement in attaining its
“maturity”. Contrary to what was expected, the conflict escalated in intensity and spread
internationally, with the military participation of Zimbabwe (particularly in the Beira
Corridor, but also in the Limpopo railroad and Tete railroad corridors), Tanzania (in
Zambezia) and Malawi (Nacala Corridor) beside the Mozambican troops.34Renamo
fortifies its position in the territory like the spots in a leopard skin, provoking and
feeding off local micro-conflicts, some ancient, others related to rising tensions between
tradition and modernity, a few about access to propriety, etc. 35 Many of these microconflicts returned in the circumstances of a larger conflict and were incorporated into
Renamo‟s political rhetoric, while others simply gravitate around it. Pertaining to the
classic definition, this is the moment when one can really talk about civil war.
One of the most serious problems of the QL is the intrinsic need to reduce the number
of actors, also to immobilize them, so it can be obtained absolute values that provide
input to statistic operations. The “population” is transformed into a single category,
devoid of any diversity other than a curious ethno-territorial classification, incapable of
evolving along the process. This category is reduced to the role of victim (what it
precisely is), being as such denied a function of agent in the process. Although it would
be more productive to inquiry about the diversified strategies explored as solutions to
war and violence, those strategies are not constrained to any ideological choices and are
based on matters of survival.
Likewise the State, in accordance with the CH model, is a simple entity, devoid of
complex relations with the Frelimo Party, and its action is regarded as merely
repressive. Its contradictory nature – authoritarian and simultaneously populist – falls
out of reach, alike to the profound transformation that took place during this period,
promoted by measures resulting from the IV Frelimo Congress in 1983, and followed
by failed attempts of reconnection with South Africa in 1984, and the stirring internal
reforms after an overture to the Occident, a progressive departure from the socialist
model (despite the continuity rhetoric) and the adherence to programs of structural
adjustment in 1987, at that time in the midst of war. Such transformation would result
from it and, at the same time, affects it.
In the beginning of nineties, civil war was at an impasse, which although real
from the military standpoint, in a general perspective was only apparent. Meanwhile,
horns and others, in exchange for several products. This trade would have been pursued with other
countries bordering Mozambique, like Malawi. About extortion, see for example Vines (1998).
33
The accord, described as a non-aggression and goodwill pact, fundamentally prescribed that
Mozambique was to stop giving support and shelter to the South African ANC and South Africa would
do the same in regards to Renamo. See Armon, Hendrickson & Vines (1998).
34
About the Zimbabwean involvement, started in December 1984 and by far the most significant, see
Mlambo (s/d). Some authors give especial attention to the internationalization of conflicts (Elbadawi
1999; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). However, they always approach it as an endogenous variable that
affects neighboring countries through an effect of “contagion” or “diffusion” (Sambanis 2003: 43-44;
Kalyvas, Wood & Bell 2007).
35
From wandering across a country at war, Finnegan (1992: 71) has observed that “the nature of war is so
different from one region to another that can be deceiving to only talk about Renamo.”
99
the nature of the actors went through profound changes, consequently leading to the
reconfiguration of their relationships at several levels; since then, at a global level of
Cold War and at a regional level. Actually, it must be considered that 1989 was the year
when the Berlin Wall fell, was also the year when de Klerk rose to power in South
Africa and when the apartheid began to collapse. And, for once, these transformations
would follow the course of an internal dynamic from which they are a part of, taking
place on a fabric exhausted by war, social and humanitarian demands, political
motivations, economic needs and corporate interests concerning peace.
The interpretation of war requires, in this instance, an extreme sensibility and attention
to the multiplicity of actors and their respective transformations along the course of
time, from which results a permanent reconfiguration of their relations; a diachronic and
synchronic interpretation that the paraphernalia of binary correlations, Gini coefficients
and “dyadic” connections in the QL aren‟t able to provide. The so-called “case” to be
studied does not translate into disperse and fragmented data, but into an elementary
narrative, a construction in progress and as a result constantly polemic, being part of
this construction an accuracy of information and depuration of political and ideological
interferences. A narrative pressing forward the collected knowledge and integrating in
its body an innate rationality elaborated from the activities and choices made by its
agents and by the numerous backgrounds where they perform. This set of elements is
better understood by means of categories of process or dynamic, in the sense defined by
Kalyvas, Wood & Bell (2007).
Conclusion
Everything that was here designated as QL forms a complex and much diversified body.
However, inside this group of perspectives can be distinguished a few common
characteristics. In the first place, the operative rationality, consisting in the reduction of
war‟s social processes into a set of supposedly objective facts, so that by mean of their
statistical combination can be found general probabilistic tendencies from which to
construct independent variables able to interpret the meaning of past conflicts and
predict future conflicts. A second characteristic, not exclusive but nevertheless
dominant, is the primacy of the economic explanation and of econometrics as the
preferred technique.
This rationality raises some relevant methodological questions. Since the start it entails
meticulousness and quality of the alleged empirical data, many times coming out filled
with gross mistakes or codified according to doubtful standards. There are numerous
examples. Fearon (2002, Appendix 2) believes the Mozambican conflict has occurred
between 1976 and 1995 (ignoring the ceasefire of October 1992) and the colonial war
taking place between 1965 and 1969 as a Portuguese internal conflict. The same
standard is followed in the basic classification of the UCDP/PRIO, which considers the
colonial war as a minor conflict in 1964-1965, an intermediate conflict in 1966-1971,
and a proper war in 1972-1973 (Strand, Wilhelmsen & Gleditsch, 2002).36At last,
Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2001) demarcate the colonial war to a period ranging
from 1964 to 1975 (ignoring the 1974 ceasefire). Some authors manifest a certain
36
If it is certain that war escalated in 1972 with the start of the Manica and Sofala frontlines, then it must
be taken into account that in 1871 it was causing over 1000 deaths every year (see Borges Coelho, 1993:
183).
100
restlessness concerning these problems, suggesting new research processes37and more
careful reviews of the designated case studies (Sambanis 2003; Gates 2002; Blattman &
Miguel 2009; Mack, Humphreys & Weinstein 2004), recognizing the binary
quantitative variables would not allow to comprehend the contexts, discussing
conceptual problems of codification and simultaneously rejecting variables that “did not
deserve to be taken seriously” (Hegre & Sambanis 2005).38
Even disregarding the rigor of these “facts”, there is still a need to question the more
general meaning of the dismemberment of real social processes and their reduction to a
sequence of data. The contextual problems are multiple, both at temporal and spatial
levels. The attempts to solve them by means of establishing temporal sequences
(quinquennial, in several instances) are insufficiently convincing, since the cuts do not
correspond to periodization criteria. In this situation of application of the CH model to
Mozambique, the only defined temporal distinction is the indistinguishable separation
between start and duration of the conflict.
These are the facts that, once grouped into sequences, compose the “fast food” of this
theory. These facts are related to each “unit” (every conflict or every country represents
a “unit”) which, linked among themselves through complex formulas of probabilistic
calculation, allow to validate the independent variables, which is to say, the sentences
within the theoretical text. Subsequently, this text is not directly originated from the
reality of such processes but from this intermediation, during which its intrinsic
rationality, pre-existing before the explanative operation, is lost. The significance of this
interaction between occurrences and actors disappears and is replaced by the new
significance the investigator wants to imprint it with.39This new significance is mostly
achieved through the QL, in the exclusive realm of a hypothetical triumph of economy
over every other subject,40 not of economy in general but of a neoclassic economy
anchored in a singular individual who rationally chooses war as a way to reach his
purposes. As it was declared by Cramer (2000: 11), we are witnessing changes in the
explanation of conflicts, from the romantic perspective of grand motivations to the
cynicism of interests, while in practice the causes become reduced to “functional and
unhistorical abstractions”.41
37
Weinstein & Francisco (2005: 186 and next) suggest a daily collection of information from newspapers
during the duration of war. The problems caused by such kind of solutions are noticeable.
38
In the words of Sambanis (2003: 56), “the studies on the case may help to correct mistakes of
measurement and to improve the conceptualization and evaluation of the variables utilized to test the
proposed hypothesis from the theory of quantitative research. The case studies may also help to build
better theoretical models”.
39
There are already radical cases of application of variables in a virtual world, for example to
demonstrate hoe ethnicity and nationalism play an important role in the making of conflicts. Cederman &
Gerardin (2007: 12) have even developed a computational program that facilitates the replication,
simulation, analysis and validation of complex social processes, giving special attention to civil wars.
Besides, it allows inscribing empirical facts into the model, to calibrate environments and mechanisms to
appropriate levels of realism. We are already entering the aseptic world of a virtual country and
videogames, a world free from the pollution of reality.
40
The “triumph” of economy comes up in splendour in the words of de Jack Hirschleifer (quoted in
Cramer 2000): “as long as this continent (of conflicts) is being explored, economists will cross ways with
a certain quantity of native tribes – historians, sociologists, psychologists, philosophers, etc. – who, in the
course of their several intellectually primitive ways, have preceded us in acknowledging the dark side of
human activity. But every time we, the economists, get involved, we evidently sweep away these
atheoretical aborigines.”
41
About the general critic of the collerian perspective, see Ballentine & Sherman (2003), Malone &
Nitzschke (2005), Mkandawire (2002), Cramer (1997, 2000) and Woodward (s/d).
101
In the Mozambican conflict case, beyond a lack of rigor of the information42, the
problem is mostly structural, given that the orthodoxy of the endogenous economic
explanation prevents the apprehension of an extremely important external dynamic
which is created and presented throughout the entire conflict; 43the dyadic perspective
prevents the apprehension of the number of actors involved; their “congealment”
prevents the perception of their transformation during the conflict and which manner
this dictates a permanent reconfiguration of the links among them; the perspective of a
country as an homogeneous unit prevent from encompassing the complex territorial
variations. In whole, the outcome is like the one referred by Kalyvas, Wood & Bell
(2007: 1-2) when they declared that “these works result in essentially formal and highly
abstract models, whose main problem is in this abstraction often being obtained at the
cost of unrealistic assumptions, frequently derived from economic analogies whose
empirical operationalization appears to be hard to carry out.” It is akin to expecting a
movie and instead finding a disarticulated sequence of bad images barely connected to
reality.
By looking for the objectivity of numbers as an evasion from the beliefs that swarm the
research labour, the QL becomes ironically attached to them, transmitting a strange and
contradictory sensation of “high-tech” technology prompted by a neoclassic conception
inspired in a 19th century colonial flavor. Such an example is the perception of ethnic or
religious groups, evaluated by head tallies and placed into clearly demarked territories,
collective movements acting under a single infuriated and ambitious individual, backed
by a State repressing everything – all this transmitted by a terminology worthy of
semiotic research.44
The detachment from reality and the extremely conservative perspective in these studies
conducted under the supervision of prestigious universities and institutions as
significant as the World Bank are not that surprising, if taken into account the genesis of
the QL itself. Seemingly new, it nevertheless corresponds to an old northern outlook
over the atavistic southern barbarianism, an effort to explain it by means of the old
confliction between their social organization and modern greed, and whose interest
regarding the violence of conflicts in distant countries equates to a fear of these same
conflicts also affecting the North. In truth, most of QL is a deviation dedicated to a
laborious exercise which however has given up on reaching true explanations. It misses
out on everything that Theda Scokpol called “historical imagination”, and this wouldn‟t
be a reason for worry if it wasn‟t in this instance informing many important political
decisions related to the occurrence of conflicts; decisions which affect its course and its
outcome.
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106
Mozambique: poverty in war and poverty in peace
Ana Bénard da Costa
Abstract
Summarizing the political and economic evolution of Mozambique since the end of
colonialism until the present time and cross-referencing it with narrations of
Mozambicans who experienced these distinctive stages of the recent History of their
country, this article starts with a reflection on the explanatory factors concerning the
absence of historical framing and anthropological approaches in studies of poverty and
an interpretation of the theoretical outlooks on which these studies are based. Some of
the possible causes for the high rate of poverty registered in this country were examined
and given explanation against the existence of direct link between war and poverty. In
the end, the post-conflict period and some of features of the pursued policies were
analyzed and the author concludes emphasizing the relevance of perceiving poverty in a
contextualized manner, inserting it into the set of economic and social relations from
which it is , globally and locally, a fundamental part.
Introduction
The current article is part of the research project Pobreza e Paz nos PALOP (Poverty
and Peace in the PALOP)1, focused on the links between poverty and war/peace in
Luso-African countries and the way this connection is perceived by the social actors.
The research, predominantly anchored on the manner the association between poverty
and war in Mozambique is perceived by social actors, is equally based on the result of
analysis produced in preceding years focusing on the impact war and social and
economic situations have had over Mozambican families in several dimensions (Costa,
1995, 2004, 2006, 2007). In this article, the previous reflections are coupled with those
being developed throughout this last year, which implied the undertaking of field
research in the city of Maputo in August and September 2008. In the course of field
research, some additional documental and bibliographic investigation was completed
and key personalities, who have produced surveys on topics regarding this project in
various institutions, were contacted. With the purpose of obtaining some diversity, ten
insightful interviews were done and five life stories from a sample of individuals from
different social strata were collected. It was decided to reach people over 40 years old
who lived through distinctive stages of Mozambique‟s recent history: colonial period,
war and socialist period. We interviewed five females and ten males, all residing in
Maputo, having the following professions: driver (3), university lecturer (3), economist
(2), housekeeper (2), doorman (1), seller (1), healer (1), public servant/administrative
(1), teaching assistant (1). In terms of literary qualifications, the subjects could be
divided into two groups: one for those without formal education (1), with primary (7) or
secondary education (1) and a second group composed by those with undergraduate
college degrees (2), postgraduate Masters (1) or Doctorates degree (3). With the
1
Sponsored by the Foundation for Science and Technology - FCT and coordinated by Cristina Rodrigues
(CEA-ISCTE-IUL).
107
exception of two of individuals, all of them come from provinces in South
Mozambique.
When proposing to study the social actors‟ perceptions regarding the occurrence of
poverty and war, the historical perspective comes up as particularly relevant. The social
perceptions are molded by former experiences which inscribe themselves into recent
and past memories. One of the main requirements to the understanding of poverty in our
times is to acknowledge the past by the way of narratives, contextualize them
historically and simultaneously understand how these memories are currently recreated
and recalled within specific contexts and process, informing the procedures and
strategies of the social agents and consequentially their perceptions2.
In this article, the occurrence of poverty, war and peace in Mozambique are examined
throughout the period extending from the final stages of colonialism until present times.
This analysis is preceded by a reflection on the features explaining the absence of
historical framing and anthropological approaches in studies of poverty and an
interpretation of the theoretical outlooks on which these studies are founded.
History and Anthropology in Studies of Poverty
Many studies of poverty in Africa are relatively recent but there is a lack of any
historical focus that allows to relate the contemporary expression of the event to its
evolution in the past and under a “long term” perspective. The examination of poverty
in Africa begins on the date theses studies were initiated, which in Mozambique
happened in 1989. But if poverty, akin to its definition by current literature and
development policies, is a relatively recent construction (Green, 2006: 8), this
terminology has been used to designate circumstances of precarious livelihood since
immemorial times.
The relative “short term” these studies about poverty in Africa evoke has numerous
explanations: scarcity and inadequacy of written sources3 and oral sources who
overestimate the prosperity periods. But the largest obstacle to a historical investigation
of poverty in Africa comes from the notion that poverty would be mostly an outcome
from conflict with non-Africans. Before this contact, there would have been a balanced
situation, resulting from the security provided by the extended family to their members
(Álvarez, 2001: 60). This outlook is emphasized in studies that refer to an economic
crisis produced by the slave trade and, afterwards, on account of colonialism. Namely
those concerning the colonial period in Mozambique, situations of poverty resulting
from banning Africans from the best farming land and the negative impact it had on
exportable production in family-owned agricultural businesses (cf. Fortuna, 1993).
Therefore, beyond the effects that the slave trade and colonialism had over the
economic situation of the Mozambican populations – and depending on the period,
region and social group under study, these effects were assorted and not necessarily
conductive to situations of poverty – the most relevant fact to consider is the absence of
studies providing appropriate answers related to the real capacities of societies in
2
The theoretical outlooks in “socio-anthropology of development” (cf. Olivier de Sardan, 1998) and
sociology of development focused on the actors (actor-oriented) (cf. Long, 1992) have inspired this
current analysis.
3
Iliffe mentions written sources about poverty in Africa as scarce when compared to the existent sources
about Europe, and many of them are by non-African travellers “using a categorisation of poverty foreign
to the African people” (cf. Iliffe, 1987, cit. in Swiatkowski, 2002: 15)
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Mozambique (or in the entire Africa) in fulfilling the basic needs of the population
throughout different ages.
Studies of poverty as a specific topic of research have been arousing an interest quite
restricted to Anthropology‟s ground (cf. Booth, Leach and Tierney, 1999)4, although
anthropologists have always been preoccupied in demonstrating the social construction
of categories and the importance of social relations in sustaining inequalities (Dumont,
1970; Douglas, 1991; Hart, 2001; cit in Green, 2006: 4). However, as much for
anthropologists as for the informants, poverty is viewed as a social relation, not an
absolute condition (cf. Sahlins, 1972).
If there are few Anthropological works on this topic (cf. Ferguson, 1999; Englund,
2002), such does not imply that this science has not contributed to the construction of
poverty, as a category of studies of development and as a concept pertinent to
determinate social categories (Green, 2006: 4).
Meanings of Poverty
One of the difficulties in researches about poverty is related to their distinctive
meanings, and no coincidence exists between universalist and relativist perspectives
(cf. Swiatkowski, 2003). According to the first point of view, there are dimensions in
poverty which are shared by all poor individuals in every culture associated to a basic
functionality of the human body. The economic theory on poverty grows from this
standpoint, based on a universal concept of basic needs founded on Baulch‟s pyramid
(1996), sustaining the developmental stances followed by international institutions and
poverty rates measured in different countries. Through universal parameters, destitute
individuals from any cultural, economic or social system are standardized. “The poor
have much in common (…) and the proximate causes of their poverty are represented as
being remarkably similar across geographical regions and national boundaries”
(Green, 2006: 10).
Simultaneously, poverty being a social construction of international organizations,
means that everything constituting and defining it can be changed (and has been
changing) according to the point of view of those who define it and dispose of funds to
“fight” it. This indicates that poverty is not seen yet as an outcome of historical and
social relations, but as something existing in societies and having to be eliminated in
order to preserve social functionality (Green, 2006: 18-20).
The supporters of the relativist outlook, on the other hand, consider poverty as a
complex social occurrence that presumes a relationship between those who have the
power and means and those who do not. It implies by itself a situation of tension or
conflict. To these authors, such definitions of poverty may vary according to relational
logics and according to economic and cultural structures within societies.5
Green (2006, p.38) adds that “poverty is not a „thing‟ to be attacked, but the outcome of
social inequalities that must be confronted. (...) the poor are poor not because of
„poverty‟, but are poor because of other people”.
4
Among anthropologists who specifically focused on the topic of poverty Oscar Lewis must be
mentioned (1996[1966]).
5
In Guinea-Bissau, for instance, many populations call “hunger times” to those occasions during the year
when there is a shortage of rice, whether or not they have access to other provisions with equivalent or
superior nutritional value.
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Understanding poverty as a multidimensional event, as the outcome of social and
historical relations and as a category through which social agents classify and perform
in the world conciliates the universalist and relativist perspectives on this event. This
happens for different motives: on the one hand, by historically contextualizing poverty,
one goes beyond a perspective on the event as something that can only be defined in
terms of determinate social and cultural contexts – these in their past and present
moments are always the result of interrelations, dependencies and bonds of power, with
other contexts more or less remote and are not, and never were, homogeneous and
impermeable entities (cf. Geertz [1973] 1993; Amselle 1990, Olivier de Sardan 1998;
Long 1992); on the other hand, since the current universal definitions of poverty
stipulate the lives of those defined as such: the majority of “poor” resides in countries
that rely on international aids and whose economical and social policies derive from
development agencies‟ guidelines, consequently the dimensions and values that support
the definitions of poverty become “universal references points” (Swiatkowski, 2002: 5
and 8). However, such does not entail the existence of a uniformed concept of poverty
at a worldwide level. Quite the opposite, cultural and social specificities acquire a
special projection in this era of globalization, and sharing out determinate characteristics
of poverty between diverse cultures does not imply that only those characteristics can
describe and explain poverty throughout the world.
In short, to understand poverty it is necessary to account for its “universal” definitions
and the specificities by which it is defined in specific cultural contexts. Nevertheless,
these different perceptions and categorizations of poverty are not, in the majority of
situations, apprehensible through the selection of the same variables, as they are not
apprehensible through the same type of research methodologies.
Studies of Poverty and War in Mozambique
The first study concerning poverty in Mozambique dates from 1989. It was then
estimated that 60% of the population lived in conditions of “absolute poverty”
(Oppenheimer and Raposo, 2002: 45). Before that, poverty could only be indirectly
assessed, either by means of the memories of Mozambicans or by descriptions of
travelers, or still by records referring to economy and demography.
Although there are no specific studies about poverty before 1989, in some investigations
regarding the History of Mozambique (cf. Isaacman, 1979, 1983; Pélissier, 1984; Vial
and White, 1980; Newitt, 1995, among others) the distinctive conflicts are viewed with
more or less thoroughness: the colonial war, conflicts in the aftermath of the worldwide
wars, conflicts resulting from peace-making campaigns and in conflicts in the precolonial period. Once again, a few mentions were made about the serious economic
crisis originated by droughts that resulted in increased mortality rates, diseases, shortage
of water and food supplies and a consequent migration of populations to less affected
regions. All these lead to the escalation of conflicts and wars. Newitt (1995: 253) stated
that Frei João dos Santos (1609) depicted these events in Mozambique in 1580.
More recently, some studies have been made about the colonial war and its impact on
the economic advancement of Mozambique. For example, João Mosca (2005: 128)
describes the situation after 1960 in the following terms:
Large public investments were made, with military and policing purposes: it went from
a restrictive economic policy to an expansive one, with effects on inflation, allowing a
short term economic growth (but only later). In a context of war, the growth and
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emergence of several economic interests resulted in the acceleration of the revolutionary
movements and of the economic crisis.
Anchored in a chronology by Balthazar Jr. (1993), Jochen Oppenheimer (1992-1994:
171) declares that the end of the colonial period (since 1973) was marked by a plunge in
production with dwindled investments and capital loss. This crisis stretched until 1977,
when there was a confirmed recovery which lasted up to 1981; still the declining trend
in the gross national product was not reversed before the starting of PRE6 in 1987.
From the colonial period until the end of the 80s Mozambique had sustained regular
economical crises alternating with shorts periods of increased production. The
consequence of these periods in the living conditions of the population was assorted and
that assortment had been particularly noticeable in the last years of colonialism, in result
of political options made by the colonial government within an atmosphere of warfare.
Anne Pitcher (2002: 30-33) mentions that, in the end of the sixties, the monetary
revenues represented about 44 per cent of the income of families in rural areas, the
remaining obtained by subsistence agricultural production. The author analyzed the
discrepancies in terms of social-economic development during that period, and declares
that these discrepancies have formed an atmosphere of conflict and distrust amid the
regions and population/social groups which had grown at disparate rhythms.
Simultaneously, since the beginning of the armed conflict the Frelimo movement had
contributed to the growing tensions between distinctive social groups and regions
throughout the country7.
Surveying the final stage of colonialism gives an insightful reply regarding the postindependence economic and military events. This ensues by reasons of continuity and
discontinuity. If there is discontinuity in economic conditions (the “crisis” that falls
upon Mozambique from 1977 onwards can be explained by the policies that demolished
the situation inherited from the colonial period), continuities are found at the military
conditions, relating the colonial war to the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo.
Borges Coelho (2003: 177 and 180) says that throughout the colonial period there
emerges a potential violence produced by the militarization of society, with universal
recruitment for regular armed forces, mandatory grouping of the population into settling
and formation of militias.
These militias (mostly youngsters) had developed, until the Independence, a culture of
violence that finds fertile territory for expansion in those days. Most of all, the new
leadership sees them as collaborators of enemy, joining the several thousands of excombatants from the colonial war armies who were not only refused an integration in
the FPLM – Popular Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, but also pursued,
punished and “purified” in reeducation camps (Coelho, 2003: 1998)8.
Such potential violence was joined by external aggression (that, in a certain way, is
internal, since part of the forces that Rhodesia supported are composed by
Mozambicans persecuted and ostracized by the Socialist State), economic crisis and
6
PRE – Programa de Reablitação Económica or Program for Economic Rehabilitation, name used in
Mozambique to designate the Program of Structural Adjustment.
7
About this topic, see Abrahamson, H. and A. Nilsson, A (1995: 25)
8
In the colonial army, there were about 30 thousand Mozambicans serving it. In 1975, a treaty was
signed, in which the Mozambican army would be composed of ten thousand men who had fought for the
liberation “so that the political trust could be assured”, the compulsory military service was instituted
since 1978 and around 1980 the army was composed of 70 thousand men” (Coelho Macaringue, 2002:
49 and note 6).
111
disillusionment with the rural development policies. (cf. Abrahamson; Nilsson, 1995;
Casal, 1988).
Can the seeds of the economic crisis be situated in the Colonial State, nonetheless?
Obviously they can, if taken into consideration the analphabetism rates, absence of
Mozambican elites, and a violent colonial exploitation that by itself “imposed”
alternative policies of development for the newly independent State. But were there no
midpoint options between the extremes of a colonial policy and a nationalized and
centralized economy? One interviewee tells about an experiment conducted after the
independence on the topic of insurances, which he defined as a successful case:
“I got into the insurance business. All insurance had been
nationalized, and there was a single guideline for all
country, the EMOZE (...) we signed some contracts that
prevented the Portuguese from departing. We paid them a
good salary, they guaranteed employment in Portugal after
staying for five years in Mozambique, and then would
leave with five thousand Dollars. There was a certain
pragmatism (...) we had good results and it worked well
for a long time. (...) In banking they did not do the same
and suffered the consequences” (S.J. 6/9/2008).9
After 1977, the economic situation showed some recovery. Abrahamson and Nilsson
(1995: 48) talk about the “euphoria of independence” that allowed mobilizing the
population into taking part of “campaigns” and voluntary labour. Simultaneously real
investments in social sectors were made, such as expanding the educational system,
reducing illiteracy rates (from 93 to 70% in five years), increasing the number of health
centers in rural districts (from one center for each 26 thousand residents to one for every
10 thousand residents). But a few years later, in the beginning of the eighties, the signs
of economic retrocession became visible and the crisis became deeper until 1987
(launch of the PRE) (Oppenheimer, 1992-1994: 200). Mozambican leaders considered
this economic crisis a consequence of war, coupled with the destruction of
infrastructures and communication channels and the relocation of population inflicted
by the conflict, in conjunction with natural catastrophes10, another significant cause. The
Bretton Woods Institutions blame the economic policies as the main culprit for this
situation.
This last cause, or conjugation of two causes, does not embrace the complexity of
features that may explain the poverty rates observed in Mozambique since the time it
“became” a measurable occurrence (nevertheless clearly existing before this point) and
induce the ranks this country has been reaching in worldwide development markers.
Although war by itself does not explain the occurrence of poverty, even if certainly
contributing to exacerbate it, poverty by itself does not explain the occurrence of war.
An all set of political factors are the most liable explanative causes for poverty and war,
in our times and in the past. This set of political factors, present in the colonial stage and
remained until the present time, merging year after year, have contribute to the low rates
of productivity and socioeconomic development that have been registered, and also to
the violence rates observed in wartime and that in peacetime still constitute a menace to
the security of Mozambicans.
9
The anonymity of the interviewed is preserved.
This theory was defended by Mozambican leaders up until mid 80s.
10
112
Given that it is impossible to analyze all these factors in detail, the most important ones
will be emphasized on the following pages.
War: Interpretations and Perceptions
When approaching the last war in Mozambican territory, it becomes difficult to
delineate its designation. In Mozambique, the war was publicly seen as something more
than just “armed bandits” and terrorists pay rolled by foreign interests only after the
decease of Samora Machel. The effects of this misinformation in the identification of
the war become clear along the time, as confirmed by the field research. Immediately
after the peace agreement, (Costa, 1995) the conversations were about “attacks”,
“bandits”, troops (Frelimo‟s army), but afterward, in the midst of the consolidation of
peace from 1999 to 2001, the designation becomes “war” or “this bandits war” or even
“this last war”. The expression “civil war” was spoken by one of the informants during
the last field research as such: “During this last war, called the 16 years war, civil war, it
is called a war of destabilization, but that is the political version of the event, but it was
a civil war” (S.J. 9/6/2008 August 2008).
Another informant tells about his personal opinion on the causes of war:
“That renegade (André Matsangaíssa) had no academic
skills (...) and every single member in the Politic Bureau
was a genius. Why did not they ask him “what do you
want, a house, a car?” He remained there (in Rhodesia)
and the government makes mistakes yet again, decides the
cities are overcrowded and builds Reeducation Camps,
captures people in there and that creates dissatisfaction, so
they run to join the Renamo forces. Next there is people
fleeing to nearby countries, most were joining the
Renamo(...) When Chissano was nominated he announced
“now we are going to form a commission for peace talks
and those so called Armed Bandits will decide where we‟ll
meet” “(...) Chissano became the president in 86 – many
people died since that speech until peace arrived, the war
wouldn‟t stop (…). People‟s suffering was motivated by
war, by the Government, and isn‟t Frelimo the
Government? “(S.T. 27/8/2008).
In this quotation, Rhodesia and South Africa are not directly mentioned, for this
informant the guilty parts are the politicians and the Government.
Although there is no doubt about the role played first by Rhodesia, next by South
Africa, as main motivators in this conflict, it is also evident that Renamo has relied on a
source of internal support. This support came primarily from the rural populations
which, because of the political and economic projects promoted by Frelimo, had felt
marginalized by the same State which was supposed to integrate them (Geffray, 1991).
Other than the political changes taking place in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa,
which partially explain the discrepancies in war tactics along the years, the Mozambican
populations had extremely diverse reactions throughout the conflict opposing Renamo
and Frelimo (cf. Costa, 1995). Furthermore, this diversity is equally enlightened by
strategies shaped by the populations which allowed them either to flee or to remain and
appropriate the conflict (Lubkemann, 2005: 500-501).
113
Here are some transcripts of interviews where such diversity of situations is reported:
“My aunt‟s children were killed during this civil war, and
some other acquaintances were killed too (...), some took
refuge in Zimbabwe, but my nuclear family never went
away (...) they never wanted to go anywhere else,11 (...) I
was going there with the wife and children and we were
attacked, thank God we came out safe, some were killed,
others were injured, but not us. But I kept going back, if I
die, I die, I need to go back to the land of my parents,
never passed two or three years without going back.”
(B.C. 9/8/2008).
“I made research on cotton in 1991 (...) They took me
someplace and only after I left, I found out it was an area
under Renamo‟s control. (...) I discovered that the farmers
and the multinational companies had created a way to
produce cotton in warzones, to later be traded in areas
controlled by the Government. And all those were
informal local networks, Renamo‟s guerrilla men had
permitted the creation of a cotton-producing economy in
the regions they controlled and everybody benefited from
it.” (S.J.6/9/2008).
The statements above mirror different strategies of “conflict appropriation”, which
combined individual/collective interests with the purposes of the conflicting forces in
the field. This situation, in the case of cotton production, falls into a paradox of two
conflicting forces reaching an “agreement” with corporations and farmers of a certain
region in order to establish a local “peace” that contrasts the warfare condition inflicting
the country.
This local appropriation of the conflict goes against reports that tried to elucidate the
extreme violence of some attacks by Renamo forces as resulting merely from a “war
tactic”, planned by top of the hierarchy strategists (cf. Geffray, 1989; Vines, 1991;
Finnegan, 1992).
Eventually, that would turn out to be truthful for some cases, but in many others, as it is
referred by Lubkemann (2005:504): “Violence was an experience problematized and
fundamentally shaped by the social formations and micropolitical matrixes in which it
took place”.
Lubkemann (2005: 505) clarifies this local appropriation of violence, since certain
social actors could not be mobilized by projects the purposes of which meant
substituting one centralized power for another, in opposition they have easily committed
to projects that would bring a decreased influence of central powers over matters
intrinsic to smaller communities.
The manner which conflict between Renamo and Frelimo had escalated, though not
completely understood yet, has resulted from strategies required by distinctive politic,
economic and social contexts at regional and chronological stages, from adjustments in
the implicated foreign interests and from economic goals of leaderships on both sides of
11
Clearly, the reasons stated by the interviewee may not be truthful. For example, the family may have
decided to remain in the region to join Renamo. But we are not analysing the veracity of the statement,
but the fact that in a same region the population‟s coping strategies are so varied.
114
the court. But the changes also derived from strategies developed by the population to
cope with the presence of soldiers and the possibility of appropriation by violent
manners, as a way to solve disputes and local conflicts or to implement strategies to
achieve power and/or autonomy. At last, these strategies are as well a consequence of
assorted economic conditions, while such diversity was partially the outcome of
opportunities that were inevitably created by the conflict.
Regarding this topic, Cramer (2006a: 400-402) condemns the event of all rural
population of Mozambique being reduced to a homogeneous conglomerate, living of
subsistence agriculture. The author claims that those managing to produce spare
provisions or find additional monetary income might survive and even expand their
activities, attracting extremely cheap labour since those who did not have advantages
would accept to work for any wage, as long as it would give them some purchasing
power. The author believes this situation has lead to the devise of economic networks
that have persisted in the post-war (cf. Cramer: 2006b).
However, for most population in the period, the living conditions were unbearable.
Meanwhile, converging war effects and socialist economic policies shunned, in many
cases, a distinction between causes at the root of these conditions. For that reason, when
the informants were asked about what effects war has had over their lives, the answers
went toward this, or toward the economic conditions stemmed from socialist policies.
Wartime is designated as “suffering times”, of “big sacrifices” and “hunger moments”.
“My daughters would go to Maputo to forager and see if
they could find anything, sometimes they would bring
nothing, the supplies were only one kilogram of rice, half
of sugar. My husband would go to the border and bring
something, but sometimes we had nothing, no sugar nor
tea. Then we got a machamba, but those were times of big
sacrifices.” (R.Z. 3/9/2008).
“During childhood, things were good for me, in my home
there was nothing missing, we had it all, we had cattle and
milk, my father worked in South Africa and my mother
worked in the farm (...). It was not nice the arrival of
Frelimo, it was awful, they destroyed many things, it was
bad, and they were obnoxious, when they found the village
they started to do damages. (...) At those times, we had a
lot of bovine cattle, over sixty heads belonging to my
father, my brother and I, what ruined everything was that
war, that civil war that lasted for 16 years. They came and
took everything; we were left with nothing in a single
day.” (J.L. 26/8/2008).
Peace, (In) security and Poverty
When the informants were asked about the present situation, in terms of security
(violence) and living conditions, comparing it to the situation endured during the war,
those who have a lower education qualifications (most only attended basic school)
answered in line with their life experience, with memories they recall from the past and
expectations they have been assembling. In this group, the responses are generally
positive, for them “life is better” although there has been plenty of violence and poverty.
115
The responses given by informants with higher academic qualifications were dissimilar,
consistent with the perceptions they have of “the others”, of “the poor”. They rarely
answered according to their personal experiences. This last group frequently replied that
life conditions had actually gotten worse for the majority of population. The following
transcripts of the interviews reflect this matter:
“Things have changed, when I arrived here (Mafalala) in
1976, there were wick houses, now everything is in
concrete blocks. Though there are cries for more money,
there is already some around. (...) My son and I are not the
same anymore, I suffered a lot. The oldest is in the 10th
grade, he wears shoes, has a mobile. When I was that age,
there were no such things (…) I wanted to but couldn‟t get
to the 10th grade. My father worked so much in the mines,
still he couldn‟t get all I have today. I have a stereo, he
only had a small radio, he worked for nothing. I did not.”
(H.T. 10/9/2008).
“In the times of Samora we had it bad, there was nothing,
only cabbage, it was terrible. Now things are alright, are
good (...). In our time there was robbery, but nothing like
snatching things from other people. In Maputo, those
ruffians don‟t want jobs, don‟t want to do anything. Those
children of bandits, there are many of them around.” (F.D.
9/9/2008).
“I think living conditions are not improving absolutely at
all (...) the crime rates have raised (...). I know some
people who have become rich during the war, and in
peacetime life has completely changed.” (B.N. 28/8/2008).
“It has been said that poverty has decreased, but it has not,
it has boosted in the last three, four, five years. Now there
is access to wealth, but there is a large polarization which
is dangerous and will cause the next generation of
conflicts. (...) and there is an already built scheme for not
having security. It was a wise move to integrate the
demobilized soldiers into security companies, put to use
their knowledge of weapons (...)” (S.J. 6/9/2008).
The two topics mingle in these interview excerpts – (in)security and poverty/wealth –
are interlinked, connecting to a recent past of wartime and to the policies implemented
in the country from the Independence until the present time. It becomes particularly
important to understand these issues related to security, to policies directly affecting all
national forces with peace-keeping functions: the army and the police.
It became established in the Peace Agreement that this new national army would
assimilate elements both from Renamo and Frelimo, and all remaining soldiers would
be demobilized. The official records for demobilized combatants was 78.078, in a total
of 92.881 soldiers officially recognized as members of these armies 12 (Coelho, 2002:
12
In the Peace Agreements it was decided that the FADM would be composed by 30 thousand men in
equal parts from Renamo and Frelimo, but in December of 1995, the FADM only had 12.195 men
(Coelho, 2002a: 61-67), in 2004 the number rose to 15,000 (Leão, 2004).
116
147), and according to a study conducted in Maputo (the city, plus suburban areas and
two provincial districts with the same designation) (Coelho 2002), the majority found
jobs as security guards. So these men, many still carrying their weapons, are involved in
similar activities to the ones they had while soldiers, going against the “principle of
reintegration of keeping ex-combatants disperse and away from armament” (Coelho,
2002: 195).
If there is not, as noted by Borges Coelho, a direct link among ex-combatants and
violence, there is clearly a straight connection between insecurity and the emergence of
security companies, as well as between insecurity and the efficiency of law and order
forces: police, army and courts.
By 2003, the army was composed by a somewhat reduced number of effectives
(15,000). This figure can be elucidated by not being a priority to the Government, since
the compulsory integration of members from Renamo into the FADM – Mozambican
Defense Armed Forces, it was decided to concentrate all attentions on the police, since
this force had always remained under governmental control (and at the time, outside the
supervision of ONUMOZ – United Nations Operations in Mozambique), transferring to
the PRM (Republic of Mozambique Police) a large number of its own soldiers. This
disinvestment in the army that during the war, for evident motives, had affordance to
significant resources has generated difficulties which the security sector has to appease
nowadays: “Discontented armed forces, with a reduced capacity to defend the territory
although excessively armed, and a police force with disproportionate staff, constituted
by men without suitable law enforcement training.” (Leão, 2004:34).
The situation within the PRM is not much different, albeit governmental and private
investments substantially larger than those received by the army (Leão, 2004: 39).
However, as is told by one of the informants, on the whole “the police don‟t defend, the
courts don‟t rule, there are no institutions here”, so security companies constitute a
lucrative private business, which elucidates their high and growing number13 in a
country where the police forces are unable to defeat transnational organized crime.
The fact that security companies are a lucrative business raises some questions on
whether potential interests are pressuring the continuation of these circumstances prone
to violence (unemployment, poverty, judicial incompetence, corruption and free-range
illicit trafficking). These questions are also motivated by another point: various
elements of the Mozambican elite are involved with these companies (Serra, 2007).
Other than the private security companies being financially advantageous to their
“owners”, in addition they perform an important “social function” by employing
thousands of men. Meanwhile, their wages are meager14 and several of them had to find
a second income source.
In this description is manifested the relations between the economic situation which the
country is facing and the insecurity and violence in peacetime. When asked about this
issue, the informants told that the danger and violence have increased more in the peace
period than during wartime: “in the period of Samora there was no danger, nobody stole
anything, we had respect, and there was no corruption” (S.T.28/8/2008). But the
interests established around these conditions of insecurity don‟t elucidate the low rates
13
According to Carlos Serra (2206), in the years 2005/2006, in the phonebook of the south region of
Mozambique had registered 23 security companies, employing around 23 thousand men.
14
“The average monthly wage for security guards is approximately 800,000 Meticais (USD 33), which
leaves them vulnerable to bribes and criminal association.” (Leão, 2004:45)
117
of human progress registered in this country, since other interests concerning
International Aid15 funds also partake of the circumstances.
Poverty and Development Policies in Peacetime
Resulting from ideological options, the international political layout at the time
(following the Cold War), the colonial past, the socioeconomic condition on which most
of the Mozambican population was standing after the independence, and the instability
that directed to capital loss, departure of colonists and consequential loss of qualified
labour and leadership (Newitt, 1995: 552), the political options had conditioned and
have been still conditioning the rate of economic development in Mozambique. These
options are consequently, more than conflicts or natural catastrophes, the direct causes
of the poverty levels registered, since the first instance it was measured until the present
day.
It could be argued, in opposition to the statement above, that the political and economic
options made by the successive governments of Mozambique since the introduction of
democracy and liberal economy have been constrained by guidelines derived from
international development agencies and from donor countries and that they have
imposed, since the middle of the 80s, a compilation of measures entailing a high social
cost and have been further compromising with measures which caused (and keep
causing) enormous imbalances in wealth distribution (cf. Hanlon, 2002; Hanlon and
Smart, 2008). If such is accurate, then it is equally factual that the political leaders and
Frelimo‟s elite have been openly benefiting from quite a few of these options for these
have not been properly appraised by those responsible for implementing them.
Up to this moment, the features appointed as essential elements to economic growth and
fight against poverty formulated in Mozambique (effectively and/or rhetorically) – such
as political and economic liberalization, democracy, good governance , political and
administrative decentralization, , privatization policies, promotion of employment (in
the formal sector) capacity building (by incentives to education and health) – seem to
fall short of the necessary results. The evident growth of the GNP (gross national
product) rates is clearly the outcome, as declared by Jochen Oppenheimer, of
“megaprojects like Mozal16” (2006: 12) and of “intensive foreign investment of capitals,
with limited impact in either rising employment or reducing poverty” (UNDP, 1998, cit
in. Oppenheimer, 2006: 12).
Therefore, even after the debt pardon under the HIPC initiative17 and even after the
agreement in line with the goals included in the Millennium Development Goals, the
levels of human development in Mozambique are extremely low, despite more than
fifteen years of peace and political stability and substantial developmental aid. The
country occupies, according to the UNDP Human Development Report from
2007/2008, one of the last places in a worldwide ranking of HDI – human development
15
Jason Sumich (2008: 124) analysed the Mozambican elites, claiming that their legitimization happens
more from the perspective of the international sponsoring community and multilateral organizations, and
less from an internal perspective. Luís de Brito (2009: 8) underlines that “one of the perverted effects in
this situation is that the government and political forces are more reliant on donors than on citizens, which
weakens the process of accountability, reduces the essential possibilities for debate and negotiation in a
pluralist democracy and conveys a paternalistic attitude from the government and the State”.
16
Largest aluminium producer in Mozambique.
17
HIPC – Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative.
118
index (172 among 177, having dropped in comparison to the previous report, when it
was placed 168 among 177 countries).
Concerning the present conditions in Mozambique on poverty and its evolution since it
started to be measured, there is a whole discussion around its quantification and
respective outcome (cf. Oppenheimer and Raposo 2002, Vieira 2005; Hanlon 2007,
2008).
The official reports express a diminishing poverty level in the last few years (69% of
absolute poverty in 1997 versus 54% in 2003), but Joseph Hanlon declares: “Poverty is
increasing and deepening (...). Some people are much better off, and some rise while
others fall. But for half the population, poverty is deepening, and they are not benefiting
from the record GDP growth rates.” (2007: 15).
This author comes to a conclusion that in a way is starting to be shared by the
Government of Mozambique itself (AIM, 2007) and by other organizations (MDG,
2007), but diseases, epidemics, draughts and floods are still being considered as main
causes for the retrocession in this “fight against poverty”.
Consequently, the features selected as causes for poverty aren‟t yet being associated to
the economic policy pursued by the Government of Mozambique, which has been
substantially inspired, sponsored and subsidized by international financial organizations
and bilateral donors. The “liabilities” for poverty are nevertheless being attributed to
diseases or to the aftermath of natural calamities. If somewhat these occurrences come
equally as the consequence of policies, such does not surely contribute to design
solutions that allocate an effective reduction of poverty and to the whole series of
problems that have been addressed in this article and which are factors leading to
violence and insecurity18.
Conclusions
Along this article, war and poverty are seen as two distinctive occurrences which are not
connected in a direct relation of cause and effect, but have nevertheless a profound
influence over the Mozambican society. The complexity of theses occurrences and the
plurality of explanatory factors require multiple approaches. If some of these entail an
understanding of the logics, strategies and perceptions of the social actors that were
involved at several levels in the conflict and that nowadays are categorized as poor and
endure unsafe circumstances in their everyday lives, victims and perpetrators of all sort
of violent acts, many other approaches are also as necessary. Namely, it becomes
important to assemble contextualized studies and researches by various branches of the
social and human sciences which focus on numerous features of reality influencing
poverty, impacting over war and interlinking in current conditions of (in)security and
violence. It is pertinent to analyze more profoundly the recent war without ideological
prejudices and try to understand the accurate facts, with whom, when and where they
took place. It is important to get a better understanding of its legacies of yet latent
conflicts, of available artillery, of complex webs of connections lasting until the present
time and where economic and political interests intertwine, connecting legal activities to
18
Another interesting feature highlighted by Luís de Brito while analyzing three speeches pronounced by
President Gebuza, that poverty is mentioned in these speeches (and generally in many other political
discourses and in the Mozambican press) “almost exclusively in terms of “fight against poverty”.
Meaning, there is a lot of talk about the objective, but very little about poverty itself, and practically
nothing about the poor.” (2009:12)
119
the underworld of organized crime, formal enterprises to informal businesses. At last,
but most importantly, we need to reflect on the economic policies over which
international aid rules. The present worldwide crisis presents a unique opportunity for
such.
Poverty, war, insecurity and violence in Mozambique, or in the world, will never be
understood and much less reduced, if they are isolated and considered as exogenous to
the economic and social relations from which they are locally and globally an essential
element. The relevance and liability of international organizations and donor countries
in the manner how theses studies have been conducted are indisputable. As it was
already mentioned, very little can effectively be done if the policies ruling these
institutions are not altered. These policies, other than conditioning international
cooperation and bilateral aids, also concern the theories and methodologies validating
the studies that seek to understand the results of these same policies over the evolution
of social and economic circumstances.
Will it be possible? To what extent are these organizations and countries themselves
hostages of their own assembled development policies? At which stage there exists or
not an implemented system of worldwide international cooperation which, to selfpreserve, also preserves the problems it should supposedly be solving? These are topics
open to discussion that eventually, in our times of fast change and particularly after the
recent financial and economic global crisis, will have a prompter response than now
predicted.
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122
PART III
Reflections regarding poverty, conflicts and violence: the Guinea-Bissau,
Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde cases
123
(Intermittent) Poverty and Peace in Guinea-Bissau
Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues and Alfredo Handem
Abstract
The research on the correlations between poverty and conflicts in Guinea-Bissau has
allowed to put in evidence not only the direct implications of the effective war of
1998/1999 over the living conditions of the country‟s population, as well as the effects
the conflicts - either effective or eminent – have over life in general, individual
investments of different kinds and on reliance on the state and institutions. Although the
fundamentally qualitative investigation highlighted the diversity of individual and
family situations, it allowed identifying a denominator seen as common in most of the
collected accounts : war and, in the case study of Guinea-Bissau, the perpetuation of an
insecure environment, constitute causes for the increase in poverty and concur
simultaneously to its reproduction through time.
Introduction
The present analysis concerning the Guinea-Bissau case study is integrated in the
research project Poverty and Peace in the PALOP, sponsored by the Foundation for
Science and Technology. This project is focused on the relation between poverty and
peace, according to the standpoint of several social actors. Despite the multiplication of
research projects about either one or the other phenomenon in several African countries
– and namely in the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) – the occasions in
which are explored and established causal relations or mutual implications among them
are quite uncommon yet. Even less usual is the systematic collection of empirical data
about the correlations between poverty/wealth and peace/war under the perspective of
the social actors who experience these situations along their lifetime. Having taken into
consideration this sort of information and the opportunity to compare data between
countries with distinctive backgrounds in terms of poverty and conflicts, this article
integrates the results of the field research conducted in Guinea-Bissau, while
simultaneously outlines comparative research subjects within the framework of the
PALOP and of other African cases.
The foreseen comparison involves African countries which, while sharing some
common ground – specifically a colonial background, the period when the
independences took place, type of social and economic systems adopted following the
independence – also distinguish much from each other: regarding the processes and
rates of development in the colonial and post-colonial periods; regarding the manner
how situations of peace/conflict have evolved after the independence. The focus on the
correlation peace/poverty, in the sphere of broader researches on the causes for the high
rates of poverty registered in these countries, places this project within a scope of
studies whose purpose is to clarify the processes affecting development. The research
purposes of this project concern the research of a differentiated influence of conflicts in
several countries (including its absence). It aims to confirm if can be established a direct
connection between these two types of condition – poverty and peace/war – or if, quite
the contrary, there are other factors to consider along the processes of development and
fight against poverty.
124
This global research has entailed an analysis of the available information regarding the
mentioned correlation, however focusing a fundamental part of the investigation in the
consubstantiation of information, by means of an empirical exploration centered on life
stories of individuals who, in these countries, have seen their living conditions improve
or degrade due the occurrence of peace or war. The collection of information in the field
was made not only alongside institutions working directly on matters related to poverty
and with substantial knowledge on the subject, but equally through a range of
individuals possessing distinctive characteristics who, by open interviews and extensive
life narratives, have accounted their life paths and created correlations between their
experienced socioeconomic situations and several stages of peace and conflicts endured
in their respective nations.
The project engages on partnerships with local research institutions. In the case of
Guinea-Bissau, the research was associated to the INEP – Instituto Nacional de Estudos
e Pesquisa (National Institute for Studies and Research), with Alfredo Handem as the
corresponding researcher participating as a consultant and conducting interviews
locally. The advantage of this collaboration goes beyond the strengthening of scientific
collaboration between institutions and multinational research teams, since the skills in
specific local matters and language were of an extremely important added value. They
have, likewise, permitted a better adaptation of research tools to the reality of each
chosen country and chosen region, as well as the selection of relevant social actors.
Therefore, the elements here presented concern the analysis and description of the
evolutions of war and poverty according to the collected narratives. These narratives
are, for the purpose of this article, gathered together with existing theoretical and
methodological information on these subjects, in addition to records concerning national
backgrounds produced for various purposes. The comparative goal in the project is
followed through the presentation of relevant information, taking into account the use of
shared methodologies and research tools, adapted to the diverse national contexts.
Contextualization of conflicts
Two recent wars have shaped in a rather direct manner the generations living nowadays
in Guinea-Bissau: the colonial war, for independence, and the recent war, from ten years
ago (1998- 1999).
There are fair wars – e.g. the national liberation war – and unfair wars – e.g. the November 14th
1980 and June 7th 1998. These last two actually had legitimate grounds in the beginning, in
other words, the uprising intended to reinstate social justice and equity. Instead they brought
more social disorder and inequality (M.J., INEP, Bissau)
The political situation in Guinea-Bissau may be considered, since the first conflict, as
characterized by constant instability and intermittent periods when it occurred in fact.
This intermittency regards the occurrence of “almost war” or potentially war-inducing
episodes, such as government overthrows, attempted coups, murders, several
disturbances. Concerning the colonial war and the first years of Independence in the
country, the records mark the beginning of the colonial war in February 1st 1963
(preceded by a rebellion headed by the PAIGC in 1956), a conflict which opposed
Portugal and the PAIGC – Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo
Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) and ended
officially in December 31st 1973. It is estimated that in the period from 1962 to 1974
may have occurred around 15,000 deaths resulting from war. However, during the
125
subsequent independence the political and military situation did not become more
stable. An uprising in 1980 removed Luís Cabral from the country‟s leadership,
replacing him with Nino Vieira. During the following years, Nino Vieira and his
government became the targets of some overthrow attempts, in 1983, 1985 and 1993.
With regard to the second conflict, taking place in 1998-1999, it began in June 7th 1998
– opposing the government of Guinea-Bissau (supported by Guinea and Senegal)
against the Junta Militar para a Consolidação da Democracia, Paz e Justiça (Military
Committee for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice) – and finished in
May 10th 1999.
The civil war was launched by an attempted coup against the government headed by João
Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, conducted by Brigadier Ansumane Mané in June 1998, following
military confrontations between the national army and Senegalese separatists from the region of
Casamance (January 1998) in two locations near the northern border of Guinea-Bissau (where
the military contingents were afterwards reinforced), having caused the accusation and
suspension of the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Ansumane Mané, for diverting
weaponry to support the separatists. At April 1998, after a public demand for national elections
and an accusation made by Ansumane Mané against the Minister of Defense for supplying
weaponry to the separatists, the president gives him the resignation (June 6th) and, in the next
day, takes place the attempted military coup. The combats lasted until the 26th of June, causing a
massive population exit from the capital and even from the country, until the mediation of
CPLP office was able to establish truces between the factions. In August 25 th, under the
supervision of the CPLP and the ECOWAS is settled a cease-fire (Sal), and the negotiations are
resumed in September (Abidjan) leading to the rebel‟s acceptance, in October, of the creation of
a demilitarized separation area in the capital, which however was never formalized, since the
combats reignited in the capital and in other cities. In October 21st, after the government‟s
unilateral declaration of cease-fire, it was believed that almost all governmental troops had
already passed to the rebel‟s side, controlling 99% of the country. New conversations took place
in October 29th and in the 1st of November was signed a peace accord under the mediation of the
ECOWAS (Abuja), having then established a deal for the composition of a joint executive
committee to implement the agreement. In November 3rd Francisco Fadul is appointed PrimeMinister, then announcing in January 1999 that the elections to be supposedly carried out in
March would be postponed until the end of the year. In the end of January the hostilities
reignited in the capital, and in February 9th is once again settled another ceasefire accord, and at
February 17th Nino Vieira and Ansumane Mané agree not to return to combat (Lomé). The new
Government of National Unity is proclaimed at the 20th of February, and in the beginning of
May 1999 the president announces a presidential election during the following December. In
May 6th conflicts were started in Bissau and the next day Nino Vieira is deposed by the Military
Junta, subsequently taking refuge in the Portuguese embassy and having signed an
unconditional surrender. The president of the National People‟s Assembly, Malam Bacai Sanhá,
is then appointed interim president. Nino Vieira is accused of arms trafficking in favor of the
Casamance rebels and is determined that he should face a trial. He is, however, authorized to
leave the country for medical reasons in June 1999. In 2000 the national presidential and
legislative elections take place, resulting in the election of the PRS – Partido de Renovação
Social (Social Renovation Party), and Kumba Yalá becomes president. In 2003 a new coup
takes place, positioning Henrique Rosa (PRS) as the provisory president. In March 2004, the
PAIGC wins once more the elections and in October 2005 Nino Vieira returns to the
presidency. New legislative elections take place in November 16th 2008, which are won by the
PAIGC with 49.8 % of votes. In June 2009 takes place the presidential election that nominated
Malam Bacia Sanhá.
Although the (Abuja) Peace Accord had been settled in November 1st 1998, this
agreement only lasted for six months. With an extremely intense beginning, the conflict
diminishes in scale during 1999 and ends with the Government‟s victory, resulting in an
126
estimated tally of 6,000 deaths explicitly related to it1. The armed conflict of 1998/1999
remained fundamentally an urban war, while the population searched for protection in
rural regions where they could count on the support of family and local solidarity nets
(Temudo, 2006).
The precariousness of peace has been, therefore, a constant since 1998, a latent menace
in the Guinea-Bissauans‟ conscience. Guinea-Bissau is typically included in the group
of Fragile States, according to the CPIA classification (Country Policy and Institutional
Assessments) for the World Bank, characterized by generalized poverty and potential
destabilization caused by poverty at national and regional levels. Regarding the internal
dynamic of this instability, some reports have detected the role played by the
ethnicization of State in Guinea-Bissau (Temudo, 2006) and by the differences between
urban and rural dynamics. Concerning the latter, in Guinea-Bissau there is a clear
distinction between the urban elite and the rural populations in regards of political
matters and this tendency for political division happens mostly among the urban elites
(Temudo, 2006). Despite this fact, war and instability have affected the structure of
organization and development of the country, creating at the same time perceptions of
insecutiry, distrust towards the state and politicians, disbelief in the possibility of
improved living conditions.
In all, there were three effective coup d'état and three
overthrown presidents, three attempted overthrows
(officially declared as such), numerous governments
brought down, several assassinations, an unsustainable
drug traffic situation, thousands of Guineans migrating
daily to escape the absolute poverty affecting over 80% of
population, etc. These and other factors, namely the
generalized corruption of state institutions and the
tendency for tribalism, have placed Guinea-Bissau in the
center of attentions. Could war and institutional conflicts
be a resource for enrichment or could they be the result of
the destructuralization of society, caused by a state and
Governmental incapacity to promote sustainable policies
for fighting poverty? (Handem, 2008).
In addition, already in the 2nd of March 2009 Nino Vieira was murdered following the
assassination of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Tagme Na Waie, in the
previous day. More recently, in June 4th 2009, the ex-Minister of National Defense,
Helder Proença, and the candidate to the presidential elections and ex-Minister of
Territorial Administration, Major Baciro Dabó, were assassinated during an alleged
attempted coup. Finally, in the second turn of the presidential elections, taking place at
July 26th 2009, Malam Bacai Sanhá wins the presidency of the country with over 63%
of votes.
The consequences of these conflicts and instability in Guinea-Bissau are multiple. First,
there is a notorious weakening of the state. The state has been losing authority and can
not expand its influence over the entire national territory. There are regions where most
of the transactions are made without any governmental awareness. Land is sold, rented
or borrowed without state interference. Some events causing impact on the mobilization
of population are also conducted without the presence or knowledge of the state, which
1
Boubacar-Sid and Wodon (2007) estimate this figure to be between 2,000 and 6,000, having caused
around 350 thousand internal refugees.
127
has only intervened when conflicts and disputes lead to physical violence. For instance,
in the conflict dated from three years ago between the Fula and the Mandinga2
ethnicities, it was necessary a great deal of mediation to solve the conflict, carried out
by religious and communal individualities since the state felt incapable of imposing its
authority on its own.
Second, it is noticeable the growing opposition and parting between state and the
remaining elements of society. The weakening of state as the result of conflicts has
steered to a radical position by the state regarding certain aspects, such as charging
taxes and fees in an exaggerated and abusive manner at land and sea borders, the most
common being taxes over the trade of coal, firewood, artefacts, etc. which constitute a
large burden on the common population and seldom result in better revenues for the
state. On the other hand, the use of force by the state has perceptible raised, as a way to
impose social order. The reaction, both to the weakening of the state as to the growing
antagonism against the population, is made apparent in repeated refusals to pay taxes, in
attempted corruption of authorities or in the rejection of fees by means of
unconventional transportation and trade of merchandises, illicit or non-declared trips
across the borders, etc. This situation is frequently confirmed in popular markets
(“lumu”), where the communities make their commercial transactions without or any
sort of state regulation or registration.
War has equally contributed to the increase in illegal emigration and rural exodus.
Today, in the rural areas of Guinea-Bissau, the habitants are in the largest part elder
people. The “bolanhas”3are almost paralyzed because of the shortage of labour force.
The first destiny for the youngsters is the city of Bissau, where they search for ways to
emigrate, mostly to Europe. Overall, and throughout the years, emigration and rural
exodus have caused the decline of rural production, leaving many families dependent on
seasonal businesses (from February to July) of cashew farming. On account of the
insufficiency of labour available for these hard rural tasks, hunger afflicts almost the
entire rural population; the income provided by the cashew is not sufficient to cover for
basic expenditures. The poverty rates presently affecting the Guinean population are
quite high, given that over 80% of the population survives on less than two Dollars a
day. In rural surroundings, poverty is even more accentuated than in Bissau, being
Bafatá, Gabú, Cachéu and Quinara the poorest regions. The private sector, which
endured most of the consequences caused by this last war, still has not re-established
enough to produce and provide employment to the younger population. Families
purchasing power has declined significantly: nowadays, for instance, a 50kg sac of rice
(the basis of domestic nourishment) costs around €30 (Euros), comparing to €18 a few
years ago. The activities conducted by NGOs and churches have become almost
exclusively the only interventions in favor of the community in several rural locations in
Guinea, principally in matters of water supply, construction of schools, healthcare,
among others.
Finally, it must be mentioned another important consequence of war and instability in
Guinea-Bissau, which is a clear tendency to the ethnicization of public institutions. The
placement of staff in several ministries, ascension to positions with responsibility and
the nominations to service missions has become increasingly reliant on standards of
2
A conflict with historical origins, due to the famous conquest war of the Mandinga Empire – which
extended from Mali up to the south of the Sahara and Guinea – focused on the dispute of territories in the
Bafatá region, in the east of Guinea, that ended with the Fula‟s victory over the Mandinga, however with
significant death tallies for both ethnicities.
3
A very labour demanding extension of land dedicated to the cultivation of rice.
128
ethnic and cultural affinities. This practice transformed the Guinean public
administration into an arrangement of patronage with recurrent consequences noticed at
the level of state weakening and departure of population. Indeed, the Guinean ethnic
mosaic is portrayed by its diverse groupings, marked by the large autonomy of idioms,
values and conventions within its geographic area, although there is an elevated spatial
mobility (Feliciano et. al., 2008: 59-60). This tendency should be interpreted as a
fragmentation of the ruling structures, being also noticeable a tendency at the political
level for the continuation of instabilities and numerous disputes.
Poverty in Guinea-Bissau
It is certain that statistical data produced in Guinea-Bissau have always been associated
to frailty and low liability of information. However, in most cases, they stand for the
definition of policies and the research of socioeconomic questions, with due reserves,
given the extreme relevance in obtaining international funding for development, combat
poverty and promote the socio-political stabilization of the country. Therefore, it is
pertinent to inquiry about the effective implementation and interiorization of the
policies and measures related to the fight against poverty in Guinea-Bissau. Given the
absence of objective results, there are many voices associating the definition of policies
and production of strategic documentation for accessing international funding to the
simple fulfilment of requisites demanded by these institutions: “fight against poverty in
Guinea-Bissau should be viewed by two standpoints: a) pretending to care about the
situation of poverty only to acquire funds (for example, the elaboration of the DENARP
– Documento Nacional para a Redução de Pobreza (National Document for the
Reduction of Poverty) and b) elaborating a strategic vision to fight the food deficiency
as, for instance, is being done in Senegal. This is one factual concern and has nothing to
do with the first standpoint” (M.J. INEP, Bissau).
Despite these hesitations, some broad considerations would mostly allow to establish a
global outline for the evolutions of poverty and Guinean economy. Further below, it is
also presented some quantitative data regarding this situation, trying to focus on the
critical analysis, derived from more reliant sources.
Since the 1980s, the foundations of economic structures in Guinea-Bissau have been
submitted to a substantial transformation, going from a model of socialist economy to a
liberal free market model. This change had an immediate effect over the behaviours and
attitudes of the economic agents and operators, resulting in fast and extensive growth of
the informal economy with no corresponding growth of the formal economy. The
political instability has been, since 1998, a recurrent event in Guinea-Bissau,
contributing to the high poverty rates in this country, where is estimated over half the
population is part of a poor household. Furthermore, the extreme poverty rates are also
extremely high. According to the official records, poverty is much more alarming in
rural than in urban areas. However – as previously mentioned – households in rural
areas were able to provide for the subsistence of its members relocated in the capital
during the conflict of 1998/99. This contradiction once again puts in evidence the need
to reassess the available data on poverty and, conversely, the need to analyze more
profoundly the population‟s survival strategies – whether in rural or in urban areas –
which are not always understandable by means of statistical records and standard
indexes of poverty.
For the most part, according to available data, what characterizes poverty in GuineaBissau is its extension.
129
Absolute Poverty
%
Figures
Angola
68.0
11,000,000 2001
Cape Verde
36.7
172,727
Guinea-Bissau
64.7
764,672
Mozambique
54.0
53.8
Sao Tome
Principe
and
Extreme
Poverty
Population
Year
%
Year
16,500,000 2005
26.0
2001
2002
467,200
2004
20.5
2002
2003
1,181,641
2003
20.8
2003
11,000,000 2005
19,700,000 2005
20.5
2003
100,000
187,410
15.1
2001
2001
Figures
Year
2005
Source: Feliciano et. al., 2008: 84
Poverty afflicts more frequently not only rural family units, but also units whose head of
the family has a low educational level (Creppy and Wodon, 2007: 50-1). Consistent
with the calculations performed by Boubacar-Sid and Wodon (2007: 20) – based on
data collected by the ILAP – Inquérito Ligeiro para Avaliação da Pobreza (Light
Household Poverty Survey) in 2002 – the absolute poverty rate (less than two Dollars a
day) in Guinea-Bissau is around 65.7% while extreme poverty (less than one Dollar a
day) represents 21.6% of the population. Poverty has a larger incidence over households
headed by men (61%) than over those headed by women (51%), given the larger
percentage of women‟s insertion in the informal economy, allowing them to generate
better incomes.
This enlarged poverty rates have been systematically mentioned during these last
decades. Guinea-Bissau, considered to be one of the poorest countries in the whole
world, has adopted its National Document for the Reduction of Poverty (DENARP) in
2004, thus following the requisites defined by international donors. This strategy
document is derived from two studies, one about the perceptions of the population on
poverty (a qualitative study of poverty), and the other about numeric statistics (a
quantitative study on poverty), supplemented by additional national and international
information about this country. The largest obstacle to the practice of a strategy of
combat against poverty in Guinea-Bissau is nonetheless the recurrent institutionalized
political instability. Most actions proposed to fight poverty, as well as the previsions of
inversion of some tendencies of economic nature, are continually compromised by
changes at a political level, the occurrence of conflicts, the instability rooted in violence.
This correlation is continually mentioned by a diversified collection of actors, ranging
from the state itself, analysts and experts, to common citizens.
Analytic outlook on the correlation poverty/peace
It was proposed, in the project Poverty and Peace in the PALOP, to establish
correlations between the occurrence of poverty and war, peace, effective and eminent
conflicts, and security. These correlations are usually considered bi-directional. Peace is
seen as a condition for the elimination of poverty and the fight against poverty is seen as
a way to achieve peace and reconciliation (Smith, 2005; Bush, 2004; Green & Hulme,
2005; Narayan, 2000; Bernard, 2002; Solomon & Cilliers, 1996; Bryant & Kappaz,
2005; Murshed, 2002; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998).
130
In both perspectives, there is consensus regarding their close reciprocal implication.
Approaching conflicts as “development in reverse” puts in evidence the high costs
entailed in social and economic terms, leading to the continuance and increase of
poverty (Collier, 2003). The economic costs are normally to be found at the level of a
reallocation of national resources towards warfare, destruction caused by conflicts and
transfer of wealth to outside the country or region (idem, p.15). In social terms, the costs
are objectively related to the casualties resulting from the conflicts and the ensuing
dislocated people (refugees and IDPs). Overall, war and conflicts have aggravated a set
of consequences that seriously contribute to violence and at the same time elucidate the
reason why the economic growth in these contexts is inconsistent and has been
recurrently in serious decline since the 1970s (Rodrick, 1999).
But the “inverse” causal perspective is frequently mentioned as well: poverty has the
ability to cause war and conflicts, although there is an insufficient amount of research in
this field yet (Bryant and Kappaz, 2005: 25). Conversely, it is possible to determine the
existence of some factors which, in specific circumstances, could steer to war in a
poverty background: “catalyzing events, networks, local collective actions, agitators,
pillaged resources, transference of vindictive diaspora groups” (idem, p.26).
Another line of investigation for this correlation concerns the UN‟s Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) and their connection to the Fragile States (Torres &
Anderson, 2004). With reference to this subject, Guinea-Bissau has been placed for
decades in the worst rank positions, being frequently pointed out as the reason for the
non-attainment of the MDG its weakness as a state.
But the definition of a concept of poverty has been facing quite a few difficulties, mostly
related to the multidimensionality of the phenomenon. In several cases, as a manner to
overcome these difficulties, the option is to employ quantitative data and statistical
analysis. From these, it becomes evident a clear prevalence of the monetary approach in
most descriptions and researches on poverty (Stewart et.al., 2007: 1). Other paths for the
definition of poverty include a capacities perspective, social exclusion and a
participative approach (idem, p.2). The monetary approach is mostly focused on the
definition of poverty as a need in terms of consumption (or income) related to a line of
poverty. The capacities perspective – in accordance to the works by Amartya Sen –
concentrates on features of deprivation, associated to determinate minimal or basic
capacities. In contrast, there is the approach of poverty through social exclusion,
referring to socially defined processes of marginalization and deprivation. Regarding the
participative approach, it is outlined through a notion of poverty defined by the
individuals themselves, instead of externally (idem, p.24). In line with this notion, the
study conducted for the project Poverty and Peace chooses issues of self-definition from
the repercussions of war and peace on the processes of impoverishment and, therefore,
on the self-definition and self-perception of poverty itself.
In the PALOP, particularly in those countries where war and peace paths are
“intermittent” – such as Guinea-Bissau – there has not been given enough attention to
the influence of conflicts over the increase or decrease of poverty, even though there are
several references about poverty (Kovsted & Finn, 1999; UNDP, 2003; Inec, 2002;
Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 2004). There is, however, a fundamental reference that
supports the statements made in an original national scale survey about households
(2002) and one more qualitative and quantitative survey (2004), that allows to partially
overcome some difficulties related to the lack of informative sources and shortage of
reliable and updated information about the events which have been inflicting the country
for so many years.
131
In a collective publication by the World Bank (Boubacar-Sid, 2007), these records are
handled with some detail, being given special attention to the correlation war/poverty in
the Guinea-Bissauan background. To these authors, the conflicts and political hostilities
from the last three decades have been the main constraints to the economic development
and fight against poverty (Boubacar-Sid and Wodon, 2007: 11). The research on this
correlation is founded on the quantification of the conflict‟s impact (1998/99) over the
GNP (gross national product) per capita of the country, which was estimated to be
around 42 or 43% higher nowadays if there had been no conflict, which implies that
around one third of the present population is poor because of the conflict (idem, p.12).
Among the economic consequences mentioned by the authors ought to be emphasized
the reduction of income (manifested in the decreased GNP) and the destruction of assets:
damages to the public infrastructures (including the airport, water and electricity
supplies, sanitary and educational infrastructures, roads, markets, public corporations
and administration buildings), which have ascended up to 25-30 million Dollars (idem,
p.12). The capital city experienced damages more deeply, especially pertaining to
housing (about 5,000 buildings affected) and to the destruction, requisition, confiscation
and pillages. This type of outcome might have approximated the poverty rates in rural
and urban areas during the stage following the war, although there are no sufficiently
enlightening records on this matter. Nevertheless, and overall, it was noticed a reduction
in investments (both national and international) and the suspension of financial support
from donors.
Given this global analysis of the consequences of conflicts on poverty, it remains yet to
comprehend the manner through which it is perceived by an assortment of actors.
Perceptions and experiences of poverty and war
For the field research produced in Guinea-Bissau between June and September 2008
were made interviews of qualitative nature. It was given preference to open interviews
done to several types of individuals capable of narrating their experiences and the
manner how war and conflicts have affected and still affect their living conditions.
The personal narratives are from eight individuals, aged between 27 and 72 years old (the
average age interval is between from 35 and 45 years), equally parted in terms of gender, mostly
residing in Bissau (6) and also in Gabu. Some other interviews were produced in Bafatá as well.
Most of Bissau‟s residents were not born in this city, so they speak diversified languages. The
educational levels go from those who do not know how to read/write (2) to higher education
attendance (1), with half the participants having attended the 10th grade or above. On the subject
of professional occupations, four are retailers, two are skilled workers (one teacher and one
bank teller), one is a student and another is a washerwoman. Regarding their parents‟
occupations, most of the participants mentioned activities related to commerce and/or
agriculture, as in most cases these are linked to lower educational levels. Concerning their own
children, the majority is attending school and a significant part is attending university.
As a complement, were made some interviews to a number of experts, whose global
vision on both phenomena could contribute to this research. Although the separation
into distinctive types of participants had the main purpose of obtaining as much
inclusion as possible in terms of representative groups from the Guinean social fabric, it
is assumed, given the conditions in which the field work was produced, that many
groups have been under-represented. However, there is significant diversity in the
collected sample, likewise ensuring the possibility of comparison to other PALOP case
studies in the realm of the project supervising this research.
132
One of the main preoccupations while collecting data was to comprehend these
individuals‟ perceptions about the evolution of their socioeconomic conditions, taking
into consideration the occurrence of conflicts and war. The relationship between their
parents‟ situation and their childhoods, and the perception these individuals have of the
evolution in their living conditions rarely coincides with the expected in terms of a
correlation between educational and professional capitals and wealth. Both individuals
who have mentioned that the parents had skilled professions4 also declared that
“poverty was more noticeable during childhood” or that “childhood was very tough”
(E3, E6). Concerning those whose parents were farmers or traders, with low educational
qualifications (the remaining), their personal perceptions on living conditions varied
from “childhood was harder” (E7), “poverty was worse during childhood” (E2), “since
my childhood until today I consider myself poor” (E1) and “my relatives don‟t starve
anymore” (E4), to an opposite outlook which considers that “during childhood we had
enough food” (E5), “my childhood and youth were normal” (E8).
On the subject of personal evolution – before and after the 1998 war – concerning
employment and income, in most cases it is seen in a negative sense: “I am a
washerwoman; I don‟t enjoy it, but I have no choice (...) the present income is lower
than it was in the period before the armed conflict” (E1). Contradictorily, there are
constant references to the current existence of more employment offers and income
producing opportunities, and to individuals having more liberty to pursue economic
activities: “the end of the war has the advantage of bringing in more clients now” (E1).
However, this kind of perceptions goes against the narratives – also recurring – about
the growing degradation of living conditions in Guinea-Bissau during the last decades,
which points to a redirection from the causes of poverty to other factors.
On the contrary, most individuals refer to other conditions which had been changed,
influencing the ability of maintaining some quality of life, derived from modern
incomes. These new conditions are generally related to the increasing costs of living in
several sectors – housing, transportation, etc. – and to changes concerning security,
fiscal pressure from the state, social and political instabilities, which are obstacles to the
development of economic activities; “life is more expensive now” (E1); “I was a
prosperous trader, in the Old Town; but now I have closed my business (...) because of
the lack of security and abusive tax charges by the state, I decided to shutdown my
business” (E2); “If it were not for the war I would have build my house” (E5).
Among the participants, those transitioning or returning to activities in the formal
economy or in the public sector (teacher, bank teller) and some retailers declare to get
more income from their labor nowadays, comparing to what they got before the war.
Although not exclusively unidirectional, it is clearly made an association linking war to
the differentiated paths their lives have taken. The evolution of their economic
conditions has always been linked to the evolution of socioeconomic conditions in the
country. In one case, it is even mentioned an improvement of personal living conditions:
“meanwhile, war has given my father a better living standard; now he is a colonel and
has a better salary and other perks; (...) he met key personalities, such as Ansumane
Mané” (E3). The reference to this type of ascending life-path is often related to a
tendency to reproduce advantageous situations by contributing to the maintenance of an
unstable situation or any specific interest involved: “there are some people who have
benefited from war. Those people can not solve their problems in a situation of social
4
One whose father is a military officer with a college degree, another whose father is a public servant
who attended the 11th grade.
133
order, since mobility in such a situation demands corresponding to (certain)
requirements, to be able to ascend (...) Social mobility in disorder becomes chaotic. This
situation has made us believe there is an eagerness for conflict in Guinea (...). In the
Bafatá region, there are wealth signals from people who have benefited from war. Many
lands were sold without regulation, money that was not paid to the state. These days, in
Guinea, power has become a profession, for that reason there is war, to control the
power” (D. F, Bafatá). The perception about this situation includes in addition a true
notion of “specialization” in situations of war and the appearance of social groups
related to it: “war only has been privileging the ascension of a small group of people,
«war lords» and their nets of friendships” (M.J., INEP, Bissau).
According to the interviewed individuals, the impact war had globally over their
perceptions can be analyzed under two distinctive perspectives. On one hand, a direct
association links war to determinate objective effects and, on the other hand, an
association links war to personal events, related to experiences closely or remotely
connected to war.
In terms of direct effects identifiable by these individuals, in some cases the emphasis
falls upon the effect of war over basic survival conditions: “my children and I felt so
much hunger” (E1); “in the past I endured situations of starvation” (E4); “we went
through hunger sometimes” (E6). For most participants, it appears that poverty has a
direct connection to situations of hunger or abundance: “I don‟t consider myself poor,
not before nor after the war, because thank God I manage to have my daily meal” (E2).
It is frequently heard in many areas of Guinea-Bissau that “… I was kicked out from
home thinking I was going to starve, but thank God I have someone who provides me
lunch and dinner” or “ … I was fired from my job, but thank God I am not starving”
(Handem, 2008).
Another impressive negative effect related to war is the restriction to education, their
children‟s and their own: “war has caused a delay (in children‟s education)” (E1); “war
has provoked a recoil in learning” (E6); “departure from every life feature (including)
education” (E7). Meanwhile, the remaining narratives display an absence of war effects
over learning and education. In these cases, the interviewed bring up the difficulties in
accessing education as a result from numerous conditions (domestic, economic), war or
instability being a condition without real influence over their personal paths. Once
more, the qualitative analysis allows recognizing the existence of numerous
combinations in terms of poverty situations and causes partaking in it.
The third effect that comes into evidence during the narratives regards the impact of war
over income-producing activities and over resources: “only my husband worked during
wartimes” (E1); “several traders had good lives and had prosperous businesses before
the war, but it destroyed everything, today they can not prosper as they did before”
(E2); “war has only brought damages” (E6); “it brought losses to everybody” (E7); “to
the family, war has caused a huge economic loss” (E8). Although the descriptions of the
effects war had over the survival conditions and over the possibilities of affordance to
education diverge from one individual to another, according to the specific combination
of conditions, in regard to economic resources and possibility of accessing and
producing them it is, in that case, recorded a clear and direct correlation established by
most of the interviewed individuals. Consequently, there is a recurrent correlation
linking the decrease of income and war.
In a systematic manner, the narration of changes which had taken place during the war
is frequently coupled with some references to less subjective personal and individual
134
experiences, events unrelated to war (or just remotely related) which the interviewed
attribute to this period and the negative aspects from that period of their lives.
One of the main references concerns the occurrence of diseases during wartime. They
always seem to coincide naturally with the conflict and all lingering problems
attributable to it: “during war I endured hunger and diseases” (E1); “I suffered from
some diseases” (E2); “the family went through an illness” (E3); “my daughters caught
an illness” (E4); “we endured some diseases, mostly malaria” (E6); “(I had) an illness, I
caught meningitis” (E7); “during the war there were many diseases (meningitis,
malaria) (...) during war, the opportunities are scarce, people face hunger, diseases”
(E8). In some other cases, the connection of personal events to wartime happens in a
correlated manner, linked to all the environment of negative consequences inflicted by
war: “War has improved my father‟s living situation (...) but he divorced from mother
and built a house to live with his new wife. In this instance, war has brought dismay into
the family. (...) I had a unplanned pregnancy (...) As to me, war has deferred me a lot,
because I got pregnant and after giving birth I did not have anybody to take care of my
child” (E3). Once more, it becomes clear that their individual paths and a combination
of certain factors have shaped the way these individuals regard the correlation between
war and poverty. An exempt feature regards the conditions of income promotion and
generation which were objectively and directly altered by war.
Regarding the perceptions these individuals have about the resolution of problems
linked to war and poverty, in most situations it seems to require the socio-political
stabilization of the country and the role attributed to the government in this realm. There
are several examples of individuals who mention they could have avoided the outcome
of war by moving to other places, for example: “during the wartime, I was in Portugal”
(E2); “I relocated to Calequisse and got in touch with my family” (E4); “I was in Bafatá
(...) was living with relatives and they provided for our food” (E5); “there were many
moves for my family, in search of peace” (E6). In other cases, the integration in
international organizations has allowed to avoid the consequences of war: “during war I
worked with humanitarian organizations, distributing provisions among the refugees”
(E3).
On the subject of the long-term strategies more frequently used to cope with uncertainty
and instability in the country, the most emphasized are the investments in education and
instruction, especially those focused on children, as the method to ensure more gainful
politic standings or, alternatively, to guarantee better migration conditions. For once, the
alternatives found by the participants facing these circumstances of instable and
deficient governance are usually focused on education and instruction, in many cases
highlighting the investment they made on the education of their children: “if I had gone
to school, maybe my situation was different; I could have found a better job. I have faith
that my children will keep attending school so that, in the future, they can become
somebody important, instead of washerwomen” (E1); “At this point, my only concern is
my son who is studying in Brazil, he gets some support from his brothers too (…) now
my children are contributing with clothing, medicines and some gifts when it‟s mine or
my wife‟s birthday” (E2). Regarding the stability of the country, the overall perception
is that the volatility and systematic alterations at political and administrative levels are
still causing an effect over Guineans‟ lives: “peace and stability are important to
Guinea” (E3); “the poverty in this country is attached to these constant political and
military disturbances (…) the present situation is still quite hard. To overcome this
situation, the country needs to have better governance, to attract the international
community and construct peace and stability” (E6); “the courses which would improve
135
this situation are paying the wages of public servants on time and creating stability in
the country” (E7); “we all want peace and governmental stability. Poverty is very reliant
on political and military stability” (E8).
Instability is straightforwardly blamed on the government, furthermore the resolution of
problems related to poverty and the prospects of the country are also placed under the
responsibility of better governance: “To fight poverty, the government should increase
wages, so that we (washerwomen) could make more money washing clothes too” (E1).
It is overtly mentioned that this governance ought to provide better living conditions:
“my relatives, neighbours and colleagues are equally living in worse situations than
before the war. The reason for this situation is that there were no investments made in
the neighbourhood” (E1). Conversely, the government should invest in rural economy:
“The Government must invest in the development of rural locations, to help those poor
people struggling for survival” (E4), “the alternative for a more effective fight against
poverty is to invest in the rural regions, giving the farmers more opportunities to
produce” (E5).
Facing the common perception that this situation has been degrading over the years, the
notion that development and fight against poverty can only be done by “a credible
government and credible elite who are able to institute trust in the populations. Severe
measures are mandatory, for example, the judiciary system should be exempt and
objective, it should punish the guilty and crimes against the public treasury. There can
be no development and coherent programs if there isn‟t a credible and transparent
government” (D.F., Bafatá).
War and instability have generated rising perceptions of doubt and departure from the
state and politicians. According to D.F. (Bafatá), “there is a complete mistrust and
disbelief with the political and military forces”. For instance, an evidence of this
situation is the fact that “many people does not want to register to vote, because they
don‟t have any hope that things can change for the better”. The consequences are
multiple though, including a partition growing in the relationship between state and
population: “if the state does not fix the road this year, we will not vote in the election
of November 2008, said the farmers [who I‟ve talked to in Mansaina] (idem)”.
In line with the study based on the data collected during the surveys mentioned by
Boubacar-Sid and Wodon (2007), carried out in 2002 and 2004, the citizens have a clear
perception of the conflict having aggravated the decline of their welfare and having
been no improvements since then, which contributed to the increase of insecurity and to
the common perception of having no signs of improvement. The population has no trust
in the national institutions (Gacitua-Mario et. al., 2007). These negative perceptions are
shared by impoverished individuals as well as by those with better socioeconomic
conditions (Creppy and Wodon, 2007: 45).
It should also be taken into consideration that the fight against poverty is anchored in
investments on the reorganization of the national economy, together with socio-political
stabilization: “To fight poverty are required two things: to guarantee governmental
stability so it can be possible to have a stable government long enough to create a
strategic vision for development; and to invest in the productive sector, even if it entails
external supports and resources” (M.J:, INEP; Bissau).
136
Conclusions and thematic research lines
Considering the data collected in the field, the participant individuals recognize a direct
and profound influence of war and instability over their life paths and over their
socioeconomic conditions. In most cases, the impact is negative, although there are
some references to those who, by means of war, have gained benefits and kept profiting
throughout the following stability.
In the descriptions about the influence of war over personal paths systematically appear
some references and associations to other negative events of personal nature, from
which diseases are the most emphasized. Its occurrence is almost invariably linked to
war, either through personal experiences or through an overall perception regarding the
country and other people‟s experiences. However, individual situations have resulted in
specific combinations of events throughout life.
There is no doubt that the largest impacts were felt and still are felt at the level of
economic activities. War and instability have conditioned the abilities to generate and
access resources and revenues – particularly from labour. During the last 10 years,
while the political and military instability has increased, there has been a strong
migratory flux from the countryside towards the capital Bissau and Europe, especially
by a younger population in search of new opportunities in life. On the one hand, this
causes a considerable decline in rural production and domestic incomes and, on the
other hand, the city of Bissau remains under heavy social pressure with some direct
consequences, such as the degradation of living conditions of its residents. Nowadays,
the mistrust about the future remains quite striking and is conditioning the development
so sought by the participants. This will certainly cause an effect both on poverty and on
the progression of living conditions.
Regarding future expectations about the way to overcome poverty, it is given emphasis
to national stability at political, social and economic levels, following this exact string
of importance. In a manner, all references to the roles played by the government and the
administrative structures are greatly accentuated. In several occasions, there are
references to a standpoint considered as a possibility to minimize the effects of
instability while compensating the inexistence of solutions with immediate results,
which is the investment on education, This investment, according to perceptions, would
have the medium and long-term purposes of ensuring more advantageous political
positions or facilitating migration, which seems to be a concern to the national
development and the preservation of human resources inside the country. These days,
Guinea is facing a wave of pessimism among its citizens about the future, an outcome
of the cyclical instability which has been lasting for, at least, the last decade. Several
programs and subsidies in matters of national reconciliation, peace, restructuration of
the security and defence forces, among others, have not attained neither palpable results
nor the supposed stability and peace. The lack of trust in the institutions of the nation is
increasingly visible: “nobody believes anybody, and each one is looking out for
solutions and justice at his own terms” (Handem, 2008).
Therefore, some questions posed about the level of awareness on the correlation
between poverty and peace deserve a more profound forthcoming research and careful
observation. On the one hand, there is a predictable interiorization of the recurrent
instability and latent divergences, whose consequences at the level of socioeconomic
investments are still undetermined. On the other hand, the chronic attribution to the
government of responsibility over this instability and its resolution, for this brings
implications in matters of development and consolidation of a civil society and of
137
decentralized structures for organization and representation. Finally, the effects of
disinvestment of families in issues of economic mobilization and channelization of
investments into education and its repercussions on the maintenance of high rates of
emigration and departure of human resources from the country should be turned into
prospective research subjects.
The certain way to avoid poverty is to work and work even more (E1).
References
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World Bank Working Paper, 88
Boubacar-Sid, Barry and Wodon, Quentin (2007) “Conflict, growth and poverty in GuineaBissau”, in Boubacar-Sid, Barry et al (eds.) (2007) Conflict, Livelihoods, and Poverty in
Guinea-Bissau, World Bank Working Paper, 88:11-22; (also in Wodon, Quentin (2007) Growth
and Poverty Reduction: Case Studies from West Africa, Washington: World Bank Publications,
pp. 109-120)
Bryant, Coralie & Kappaz, Christina (2005) Reducing Poverty, Building Peace, Kumarian Press
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Papers, 50(4): 563-573
Collier, Paul et al (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: civil war and development policy,
Washington DC: World Bank e Oxford University Press
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Feliciano, J., Rodrigues, C.U., and Lopes, C. (2008) Protecção Social, Economia Informal e
Exclusão Social nos PALOP, Lisbon, Principia
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and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau, World Bank Working Paper, 88:23-41
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2001-2002
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of Economics, University of Copenhagen
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(DENARP), Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau
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collapses”, Journal of Economic Growth, 4: 385-412
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in Southern Africa, 4, The Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Foundation for Global Dialogue
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poverty”, in Stewart et al (eds.) (2007). Defining Poverty in the Developing World, Houndmills
and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 1-35
Temudo, Marina (2008) “From «People's Struggle» to «This War of Today»: entanglements of
peace and conflict in Guinea-Bissau”, Africa, 78(2): 245-263
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Temudo, Marina (2006) “Culture, Agri-culture, and Political Culture in the South of GuineaBissau: an approach in terms of social actors”, Lusotopie, 13 (2): 127-154
Torres, Magüi Moreno & Anderson, Michael (2004) “Fragile States: Defining Difficult
Environments for Poverty Reduction”, PRDE Working Paper 1, Poverty Reduction in Difficult
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African Affairs, 107(428):488-489
Wodon, Quentin (2007) Growth and Poverty Reduction: Case Studies from West Africa,
Washington DC: World Bank Publications
139
The Harsh Fight against Poverty in Sao Tome and Principe1
Augusto Nascimento*
Abstract
Starting, on one side, with a reflection about the history and political vicissitudes of the
post-independence, and on the other hand, the testimonies from Sao Tomeans
individuals from different social conditions and different degrees of political
responsibility, this article approaches some possible connections between poverty and
micro-violence in Sao Tome and Principe. It is offered an outline of research for the
difficulties of the eradication of poverty and, concomitantly, the diffusion of a growing
feeling of social disruption, processes in all contrary to the promises of independence
for this archipelago.
Frequently, the archipelago‟s visitors make hasty opinions about the imaginary
effortlessness of governing two islands with less than one hundred and fifty thousand
citizens. However, contrary to this very common prejudice, the micro-insularity is
considered an obstacle to development, a notion shared by many Sao Tomeans. Could
micro-insularity equally be, under this outlook, an impoverishment-inducing factor?
Regarding the development, there is some truth in this diagnosis, which the Sao
Tomeans also use to justify their current difficulties. Throughout the 70s and 80s, the
MLSTP – Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (Movement for the
Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe) endorsed a development founded on an
expansion of cacao cultures, at the expenses of an intensified production rate, and on an
incipient industrialization, which was intended to avoid importations and economic
dependency. At the time, the Sao Tomeans leaders justified the rising daily difficulties,
quite the opposite of the promises made during the independence, with an economic
disarticulation resulting from the gradual abandonment of economic infrastructures
inflicted by the last batch of colonists, which affected the cacao plantations too.
Simultaneously, both the inefficiency and cost of the industrial endeavors launched after
the independence and the erosion of labor and social relationships in nationalized farms
had been rather neglected.
Following the recent colonialism, exerted in farms and rooted in social immobilism and,
in particular, in the employment of foreign labor force, the independentist project
erected an economic construct under the State‟s tutelage, which implied, for instance, a
contention and diminishment of the ceiling of opportunities available for the
accomplishment of individual aspirations. In those times, insularity has also allowed the
Sao Tomean government to prevent and restrain social changes, having for that
enforced a stance of relative detachment toward the world and, in the economic sphere,
quite opposing to free enterprise. Additionally to the reverence regarding the authorities
– though a heritage from the colonial age, it was reinforced during the post* Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical; Centro de Estudos Africanos - ISCTE, Lisbon.
1
This research results from field research conducted in January 2008 and January/February 2009 in Sao
Tome, were Santomean individuals from different economic and social conditions were interviewed.
Interviews to political leaders and experts from international institutions were also conducted.
140
independence – the resultant social immobilism has supported the establishment of a
notion of social peace that was, apparently, undeniable.
After 1975, the social changes were monitorized by a tutelary State which, having
imposed itself the provision of social services, has claimed the task of development
promoter. Thus, the State framed most of the economic activities and limited individual
enterprises. Given the apparent availability of natural resources, survival was
guaranteed and poverty was not a menace. The exploitation of men by men was more
discussed about than poverty. Development was an independentist‟s goal, as was also
the distribution of wealth previously retained by white people, an assertion to which
was subjacent the manipulation of resentment against the racial cleavage and the
consequent power asymmetry in the colonial period. The residences for farm
administrators, in contrast to the housing reserved to the field workers, were an
unequivocal proof of the plentiful riches to be distributed. Such goals had very little to
do with poverty and even less to do with hunger which, while episodic, very few had
imagined it would prevail over Sao Tome and Principe.
During the colonial period, poverty did not pose an issue. Discreetly, some harbored
racist conceptions attributed poverty to laziness. In the middle of the 20th century, the
struggle against the designated mendicity would be shaped by a repressive perspective,
without any main drive, since poverty was self-marginalizing itself2. The substitution of
a repressive force for a more paternalistic stance during the last few years of colonialism
had not eliminated that prejudice which the Europeans, many of them from low social
classes, had used to justify their status. The charity activities manifested a vision of
poverty as a human fatality, particularly a racial one. While a fatality, poverty did not
derive from the economic extroversion, the farmers‟ hegemony or from the colonial
political construct. During the last years of colonialism, the political support to
charitable activities, moderators of the inescapable human condition, had the purpose of
capitalizing the political fidelity of the islanders.
After the independence, the matter was not about poverty, but instead about difficulties.
In a mechanicist manner, they were blamed on the legacy of exploitation of men by men,
at last disavowed by the collective appropriation of production assets. For a while, the
exaltation of independence promoted this conviction. However, the human nature would
reveal to be more complex than expected by the advocates of the new man, and the
country would endure impoverishment, unexplainable only if taken into consideration
the colonial legacy and the unfavorable evolution of the cacao prices at the international
market in the 80s.
Among the causes for poverty is the failure of development policies canonized in the
70s. This failure is not solely attributable to the mistake of perpetuating a cacao
monoculture3. Neither, according to a more ideological interpretation – of a disguisedly
racial or anti-occidental nature – can the poverty of the Sao Tomeans only be imputed to
2
About the marginalization of the Santomean population during the 50s, see Tenreiro (1961: 174).
See, for example, Santo, Armindo (2008). Nowadays, it is easy to criticize the adoption of cacao
cultivation as the platform for development, but it is doubtful that thirty years ago it seemed profitable
and viable to begin new economic ventures. In any case, the options were less economic than political. To
the above mentioned land worth while instrument for social stratification and power distribution, a fact
that, for example, lead to the nationalization of farms instead of the distribution of lands (concerning this
topic, see Eyzaguirre, 1986). The political and social construct built upon the income from the cacao
cultivation not only penalized agricultural exportations as also damaged the outline of diversification of
farming cultures started in the last years of colonialism.
3
141
the dogmatism of the PAE - Programas de Ajustamento Estrutural (structural
adjustment programs) arrived to the archipelago in second half of the 80s decade.
The poverty and the schemes for accessing sanctioned goods have brought along
corruption, moral profligacy and an increase of clientism4, and this has caused a
disbelief in regards of the possibility overcoming rising social divides and eradicating
poverty in the country.
An ideologized vision will make the intersection of corruption with the colonial legacy
and, more recently, with poverty. However, in relation to the first connection, it‟s a
notion out of touch with reality and it confounds exploitation and corruption. In relation
to the second implication, it may be said that corruption is related to poverty, but it is
more appropriate to say that from corruption comes an aggravation of poverty in the
country.
In line with street intuition and bush intuition, the cause for poverty resides in politics.
Unlike societies whose poor are a minority and, because of this, there is a conviction
they are responsible for their own poverty and are living at the expense of the state, in
Sao Tome and Principe where the percentage of poor is substantial, the accountability
over poverty is ascribed to the politicians.
These predispositions, poured over years of impoverishment, are relevant because they
sprout from an antagonism between rulers and ruled that is contrary to social cohesion
and, therefore, contrary to possibilities of responding to any challenge for the reduction
poverty.
Post-independence evolution
During the final years of colonialism were implemented basic services for education and
healthcare. These services, now deemed indicators of social integration and decreased
poverty, have been expanded throughout the post-independence period for the
satisfaction of basic social needs, the consolidation of foundations for economic
development and, additionally, the hypothetical political return in terms of popular
support to the independentist leadership.
Dogmas related to developmental policies set by the State and to the construction of
social and political cohesion through the configuration of consciences and formation of
a new man have leaded the rulers to exert efforts to construct the State and to
continually expand the deliverance of basic social services. Already then, in the 80s, on
account of an unsatisfying economic productivity and a dive of share values for cacao
production, it became complicated to maintain those social contributions without
increasing the public debt. Those efforts were anchored in agricultural taxations. For
that, and also because of the presumption of better rationalization and efficiency of a
political centralization for economic decisions, the proprietary structure had been
practically preserved, only with the European being substituted by Sao Tomeans in the
farm‟s hierarchy after their respective nationalization. Veiled or dubious promises made
concerning the distribution of lands among workers were forgotten, given the lack of
interest in creating an economic structure based on the free market, as it was opposing
the ideological vein of the independentist leaderships.
4
For example, see Bonfim, João (2000: 65).
142
Nevertheless, few people could have predicted this country‟s impoverishment. The
nationals had very little money, but the archipelago was not poor. The future seemed to
be straightforward, just a matter of redistributing the wealth once expatriated by white
people, who had been anyway symbolically swept away during the transitional period to
the independence.
The difficulties of those first years have brought up many justifications concerning the
obstacles found in farms. Still quoting the disinvestment performed by ex-colonists in
their plantations, those justifications have put in evidence the inconvenience of
preserving the former proprietary structure and, furthermore, the issues resulting from a
labour arrangement under state regulation. This labour arrangement replicated an
asymmetry increasingly loathed by the workers, either for denying the alleged African
fraternity and equality, either for revealing itself as inept or as a probable cause for the
deterioration of living conditions.
Each day, farms would stop being useful for the development, among other reasons, as
it is presently known, for placing all laborers under a strict dependency of the State or
its respective agents, hindering the ability to pursue individual endeavors. From this
stance, occurred in the post-independence period a sort of prolongation of colonialist
practices, aggravated by a loss of former efficiency. The proficient performance was
damaged by a veiled coercion intended for a reverential acceptance of the authority of
commissioners integrated in entrepreneurial units. To be a national has not become
synonymous of having more rights, since in effect those rights ended up deflated, but of
having more duties, among them the responsibility of abiding to strict rules of behavior
which, in an apparently paradoxal manner, were undefined. Were being followed
pathways conducting not only to social cohesion, but also to a partition between those
inside the circle of power and those outside it. In reality, if any social cohesion still
exists, it is not as much the result of social parity than due to specific factors like, for
instance, an improbable starvation and an absence of memories about previous political
conflicts.
Nowadays is being the end of the post-colonial State5. For some, this will mean that
after the mistake of adopting a Eurocentric model of state will be observed a
dismantling of the last colonial legacy that is the colonial State ruled by
Independentists. In Sao Tome and Principe, such event should be nuanced. Given the
cultural integration along the centuries, the State cannot be considered just an
instrument of modern colonialism. Yet, even if it were, the leaders did make use of the
political arrangement and social legacy left behind by the colonialism in the first years
of independence. However, this outlook about the evolution of this newborn country
began also because of the similarity with the regulating and assistentialist State‟s
performance at the end of colonialism. In the comparison with the colonial State, Sao
Tomean citizens typically criticize the bureaucratic load, and in particular the ongoing
ineffectiveness of the independentist State.
Anchored in social immobilism, since the labor market was inexistent, the colonial State
of dictatorial nature had almost completely eliminated the antagonism (including a past
of violence in the farms), indicating all potential individual aspirations and trajectories.
At this time, within a single-party regime, that legacy was exploited by the MLSTP for
the imposition of a contained environment of social peace, which the popular rebellion
against the census in August 1979 was unable to refute.
5
See, for instance, Young (2004).
143
These records contribute to deem what could have resulted from decades of prevention
of confliction as just a Sao Tomeans‟ idiosyncrasy. Now, that modem colonialism
legacy seems to be vanishing. There are increased tensions and recrudescing violence –
for example, aggressive acts against the authorities, conflicts between police officers
and their respective commands, shotguns exchanged among the soldiers guarding the
governmental palace – which may return the archipelago to a condition of borderless
land that, according to historians, had endured for centuries6.
Voluntarism and constraints to the political evolution
In May 25th 2007, president Fradique de Menezes alluded to the African continent and
the connection between development, on one hand, and peace and stability, on the
other7. Would Fradique de Menezes restraint himself to a pedagogic implementation, in
favor of political stability, a facilitating condition for governing? Without speculating,
wouldn‟t he want to refer also to the archipelago, introduced into a path of
africanization and, in any case, further submitted to political turbulence?
No matter what, a single question remains: how is it possible, despite the image the Sao
Tomeans promote about themselves, that Sao Tome and Principe has turned into a
country where the prevention of violence became compulsory in everyday politics,
especially since 2003, occasion of the second attempted coup in the archipelago?
Putting aside incidents of clientism and corruption mentioned in official documents, the
question is: is it possible for a society to resist a constant erosion of trust in its
politicians? Certainly, it could be possible the survival of individuals and probably of
some groups, but taking poverty into consideration, it will be hard to construct a
cohesive society in such political environment.
During the period of independence there were no situations of conflict, neither were
there fights against the colonists. Apart from the creation of a fight in Sao Tome after
the 25th of April, when the students got committed in the diffusion and proclamation of
the independentist ideal, the transition process was relatively peaceful. Tendentially, the
nation coincided with the territory and the MLSTP was engaged in solving any
divergences of ethnic nature, then not professed as such, principally given the alleged
cultural integration. The regime‟s authoritarianism was not particularly repressive
(despite the arbitrarity of detentions, occurred only one death in prisons and eventually
the detainees were inducted throughout the years). Nevertheless, the implementation of
policies in the post-independence period was in itself violent, seeing as it forced swift
changes to the daily routine. While the nationalist exaltation from the first years was
vanishing in the face of increasing daily difficulties, these hardships caused aggravation
to the Sao Tomeans. Fidelity to leadership was fading and labor commitment was
lacking, however a number of law enforcement displays managed to dissuade any
potential dissension. The noticeable failure of a regime which defied the temperament
6
In theory, it seems hard to concede a larger importance to “historical roots” than to “social change” in
the definition of the destiny of any society. As such, I do not partake in an interpretation of historical
relevance – in this instance, the archipelago being a borderland for centuries – which would then become
a kind of condition for the Sao Tomean destiny. But it does not remove any interpretational value to
recognize the endurance of conflicts in the archipelago, mostly until the arrival of modern colonialism,
cf., for example, Caldeira (1999: 46).
7
Jornal Horizonte in http://www.cstome.net, consulted in May 2007.
“Peace” has become once again the focus of interest during the commemoration of the 34th
independence anniversary, cf. “Reporter”, RTP África, July 13th 2009.
144
of the Sao Tomean people – meaning it defied their self-image, seen in the 80s as
opposed to experimentations of socializing nature, such as those carried out after the
independence – has produced a yearn for political change, for which, it must be
recalled, there was no notorious political and social pressure from the part of the
population8.
After the euphorically welcomed change, multipartisanism did not result in an efficient
administration, a flourishing economy or a transparent market, neither occurring any
real economic growth. Although not assessable to the new regime, this evolution is
partially due to political and institutional behaviors marked by clientism and endemic
corruption. In a more ostensive manner than in the single-party system, external
resources were used for private consumption and distribution among clienteles9.
Practically since the independence, there had been mounting livelihood difficulties
which deregulated social bonds and separated the population from the political
management of the country. Otherwise, through a point of view more related to the
present situation, these difficulties have supported the perversion of the political and
social environment, having the population become more susceptible to processes such
as the purchase of consciences, the so-called banho (bath). The decay of political and
social accords and of purposes such as fighting poverty resultant from this process
should not to be neglected.
In a sense, inside a context of impoverishment, the successive failures of these
providentialist expectations have disconnected the general population from the
politicians, visibly emphasizing the lack of political and civic participation occurred in
second half of the last century of colonialism. In some manner, the high degree of
dependency of the inhabitants either on the State or on managers may be attributed to
colonialism, since a substantial part of the population worked in farms that regulated
their daily lives from the instant of their birth. In the colonial age there was no political
representation for the Sao Tomean population, except for the one staged by the
dictatorial regime. The post-independence prolonged this situation. In spite of the
country‟s sovereignty, the coercion of individual liberty had come along with the
centralization of political decisions limited to a reduced group at the summit of the
MLSTP. Despite the sponsored associativeness, the political and social inactivity have
remained a trait of the collective life in the archipelago, a quite significant feature for
the ability to pursue the individual endeavors required for overcoming deprivation.
Steadily, the economic failures and the deceit of their leaders, professed in the
unavoidable personal interaction among Sao Tomeans, have originated a diffuse and
bitter, but politically innocuous, criticism. These days, in the midst of the individualized
and atomistic, though largely disseminated, perceptions of Sao Tomeans disappointed
with politics, the most prevalent is the impossibility of reverting the country‟s trajectory
of failure. Amid attacks against politicians rooted in rumors10, this perception
demonstrates the impotency of having no influence over the course of events.
8
There are divergences concerning the factors of change from a single-party to a multi-party system. The
authors involved with the MLSTP emphasize the internal political dynamic, particularly in the midst of
the own party (for example, see BRANCO and VARELA, 1998). Others (SEIBERT, 1999) highlight the
economic failure and the external pressures for political change. For a more circumstantial exposition of
the different analyses about change, see Nascimento (2007: 74 and ss).
9
Definition from Seibert (1999: 290).
10
About the rumors as a form of criticism of politicians see Seibert (2005); also Branco and Varela
(1998: 44).
145
Sao Tomeans politicians have less moral strength to express models of behavior for they
are allegedly involved in corruption networks. The absence of ethic – or at least of a
conventional and legally consented ethic – has repercussion on the government and on a
setting rather favorable to the institution of projects for fighting poverty, on account of
objections posed by a mounting social anomy.
Sao Tome and Principe faces economic hardships and, mostly down to a social and
political crisis that viciously (endorses and) results from the dissolution of social control
mechanisms. Alongside the steadily decreasing proficiency of the State, such
dissolution of the social controls makes inapt the existent labor force and damages the
authority, either by lacking tangible goals, either by endorsing mistrust in the political
and moral suitability of the political leadership.
Economic environment and the prevalence of poverty
The present economic stage is rather contradictory. Recently, it seems to be more
prospective activities by means of which wealth can be redistributed, though in an
uneven mode. More effortlessly than in the 80s decade, “middle class” people have the
option to build masonry houses and others, less prosperous, to build wood houses.
Nevertheless, this redistribution does not erase the perception of asymmetries, and
neither lessens the resentments anchored in memories and experiences of serious
deprivation. This resentment is permanently updated, because the ruin of the social
censure during the single-party age relating to the enrichment of the political class has
paved the way to the ostentation of richness, next to which well-meaning discourses
about the end of poverty become derisory. Besides, only a small portion of that wealth
reaches the hands of the underprivileged.
Part of those underprivileged do search for convenience in the informal economy‟s
boom11. The business volume developed in the designated parallel economy appears to
be extremely large, but for the general population the obtainable gains are few.
Regardless of the income and, occasionally, of the savings some people acquire in the
informal economy, it may be relevant to have more conservative and cautious
approaches regarding the economic and social benefits of informality. For instance, it
may be argued that, in theory, the informal economy represents a waste of labor
resources and opportunities to produce value, although in the archipelago the formal
economy and formal market do not offer better options than those of the informality. In
compensation, in spite of the unsolidary practices performed in the informal economy,
there is a noticeably subjacent political worth12. The informal economy provides almost
spontaneously a social cushion, since it helps to accommodate each person with his or
her respective destiny. In the case of this archipelago, this social alleviator joins the
prodigality of nature, which permits to assess with quite some certainty that no poor will
ever die from starvation; unless if he/she is submitted to a complete marginalization, as
occasionally happens.
11
It did not occur here any ideological bias that, alongside the neoclassic reasoning, would allow to
consider the activity in the informal sector as activities of mere survival (about this subject, see Grassi
(2003: 257). In any case, not only it must be taken in consideration the differentiation of incomes and the
social hierarchy among the individuals involved in the informal economy, as it should be avoided
ideological apriorisms similar to those of the neoclassic reductionism.
12
Attaining to features with diverse economic and social nature, it must be said that the precariousness is
the standard for labor relations inside the informal economy; however, the informal economy supplies
goods at lower prices and affords incomes that, though low, are still essential for the everyday living of
those surviving from it.
146
As demonstrated by the trafficking during the first years of the single-party era, the
informal economy was established before the programs of economic liberalization,
designed to feature the archipelago‟s economy in a different manner. A more normative
and idealist perspective of the path toward economic revitalization shows the return to
the land as a desirable occurrence13. Although reinforced by a recent validation of
agriculture within the present conjuncture, such economic desideratum seems to have
arrived belatedly to the dispute for the affectation of labor. Commerce and other urban
activities form the preferences of the Sao Tomeans.
The land allocation happened after a forceful recognition of the failure of the State‟s
economic leadership in the agricultural sector and, must be added, of private foreign
entities which, risking little or nothing of their assets, were deemed capable of
performing a better job than the agents of this nationalized economy. Deriding the
social changes occurred since the independence that had psychosocially disabled a
substantial part of the labor force for farming works in similar terms to those of the
colonial period, they misevaluated the predisposition of former farm laborers for
productive engagement in exchange of meager wages.
With the distribution of lands – a social engineering project that has clearly worsened
social inequalities, once more not in favor of the workers – the State tried to free itself
from the expensive social liability and, simultaneously, to restrict social degradation. It
is doubtful that the distribution of lands has increased the national wealth, although it
might allow for a decrease in poverty, mostly through the spread of food cultivation, to
which are added paltry revenues from the trade of small cacao crops. After some initial
improvement in local market provisions and in the fight against extreme poverty, came
the stagnation of economic indicators, and the discouragement spread among the land
beneficiaries. The property allocation has not barred the rural exodus toward the city
and other locations. In 1981, 52% of the active population was involved in agriculture.
In 1991, this activity absorbed only 22% of this population14. Farming does not provide
revenues or social differentiation, a perceptible fact to those who crave for living
standards, both in the countryside and in the cities. A few individual cases are not
enough to invalidate this low propensity for agriculture, which then faces some issues,
not only of economic but also of social nature. Concerning the economic issues, small
dimension and disarticulation of the market are obstacles to an activity with insecure
revenues like agriculture.
The recent economic evolution in Sao Tome and Principe may be having effects on the
contention of increases in poverty. However, it does not appear to be founded on bases
which suggest a capacity to reduce poverty and, concomitantly, to unhurriedly promote
human development and sustainable development.
13
Although not so commonly discussed nowadays, this was one of the slogans for the political discourse
that followed along the process for distribution of lands started in the decade of 1990. In the same
manner, it constituted a theme for several master dissertations defended by Santomeans experts.
14
Data referred by Bonfim, Feliciana (2007: 17).
147
Poverty indicators (%)
Year
1987
1990
1992
1994
1996
1999
2001
2005
2015
Poverty
Poverty Line
36
41
48
46
40 16
45 17
53.8
50
20.5
Extreme Poverty
23
33
39
35
13
8
9
1115
38.7
15.118
1519
420
16.5
It is observed in the archipelago a high populational concentration in the urban and
suburban areas. Part of the metropolitan population, in constant expansion, is composed
of displaced persons, looking for opportunities, structures and dwelling conditions that
are inexistent at the present time and will probably remain so in the medium-term. It is
being solidified by youths who, after having completed their secondary education, then
have a tough time finding professional careers, and such occurrence will, at some point,
cause problems to the college graduates soon returning to the country.
As reality is intertwined with poverty, it seems appropriate to talk about the
disempowerment concerning the masses congregated within urban spaces while earning
their living with menial expedients, as the repercussions this life pattern has on the
production of a particular political and social environment are yet to be determined.
However, without forgoing the low living standards, the outskirts around the city of Sao
Tome seem to be providing more opportunities to get by. In other words, the current
location of poverty – mostly absolute poverty – is the bush21. Here are observable cases
of economic retrocession, discernible in the circumstances of some people abandoning
their homes and exchanging them for the yards of farms they had left behind to pursue
an independent path. While this happens, their offspring drop out of school and have to
cope with a horizon of poverty. In the bush, the discourse about ways to get by is
promptly contradicted by solicitations for money, always for some sort of emergency.
Accounts of an acceptable everyday life, based on the conjugation of occasional tasks
made for someone, the preservation of leftover bananas and the income produced by
15
Figures related to 1987, 1990, 1992 and 1994 – O limiar da pobreza em STP, UNDP, 1995, cit. in
Bonfim, Feliciana (2001:22).
16
http://www.gm-unccd.org/FIELD/Bilaterals/Port/ST2.pdf, consulted in August 2006.
17
http://www.stome.com/fax1999, consulted in August 2006.
18
http://wwww.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/countries/ccs_stp_final_portuguese.pdf,
consulted in August 2006. The HDR (Human Development Report) from 2002 indicates 54% and 15% of
population living below the poverty line and in extreme poverty respectively, cf. Relatório do
Desenvolvimento Humano… 2002…. 2002:28.
19
“Repórter” in RTP África, 23 de Novembro de 2005. In 2004, it was estimated that 54% of the
Santomean population was living below the poverty line, an occurrence more accentuated in rural areas
(cf. “Repórter” in RTP África, October 25th 2004). During the emission of March 24th 2005, it was
mentioned the same percentage of individuals, 54%, living in poverty conditions.
20
http://wwww.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/countries/ccs_stp_final_portuguese.pdf,
consulted in August 2006. These are clearly estimated or idealized figures.
21
This reality, visible to the naked eye, is admited in several studies. It is expected that 65% of the rural
population is living in a poverty situation and 22% in extreme poverty, cf. Mesa redonda de infraestruturas de energia, October 30th 2006, cf. http://www.anp-stp.gov.st/port/noticias/Infra-estruturas.pdf,
consulted in July 2009.
148
cacao, is transformed into requests demonstrating deprivation. Not necessarily posing as
lies, such accounts are closer to what we could call an inspired life, predictable and
without troubles... In these terms, it is licit to deduce that some deponents are not
talking about their real lives, but about what they necessitate to survive.
Poverty is manifested in raggedy clothes and lack of personal hygiene amid the
population, particularly the children, many of whom walk around barefooted22. This
was extremely rare among the Sao Tomeans. In the same manner, it could be mentioned
the act of asking for money. Or more significantly, a social environment positively
marked by the degradation of the collective equipments, in addition to the cleanliness
deficiency in public spaces.
Keeping in mind the social and political relevance and, more specifically, its
repercussions to the fight against poverty, the matter turns out to be about how to
determine the prospective for inversing attitudes that do not appease the atmosphere,
instead denoting alienation and acrimony.
It is not unusual to see socially acknowledged persons, who provide services used by
middle and high-class individuals and assume with heartfelt indignation the intention of
punishing, with their own hands, any alleged thief. Such social tension is motivated by
the mixture of difficulties and small criminality. Indeed, essentially because of the
comparison with not so distant times, the welfare of the population seems menaced by a
feeling of unsafety, prompted by a micro-violence patent in robberies, for instance.
The consequences are not merely of civic nature. The corrosion of social bonds has
reached a point that makes difficult, if not impossible, to consider operating any idea for
the communitarian development, without forgoing political leaders who underline that
path, quoting examples of change in the social environment anchored in interventions
performed in a few communities.
Perceptions of poverty
The deprivation in Sao Tome and Principe appears to be perceived, more frequently
than in other contexts, as material deprivation, more concretely financial deprivation, as
an alternative to a more integrated perspective, consentaneous with the multifaceted
approach presently adopted in relation to poverty and development.
Nevertheless, according to the Santomeans‟ self-representation, they are not poor, they
are average. Poor is the one who is placed in a shelter. Poor is the one who, being alone,
does not gather enough strength to get himself a plate of food. Poverty is associated to
the incapacity to provide for survival and to physical debility, from which results the
inability to defend against potential aggressions.
Very few describe themselves as poor, perhaps because such condition contests their
personal self-esteem. However, complaints about the lack of money and daily hardships
are commonly shared among most Santomeans. The appearance of merchandises for
sale in stores after fifteen years of a drought of essential goods has only aggravated
those complaints, equally caused by the inaccessibility to efficient healthcare and
medicine services.
Poverty is distinguished from plain survival, which seems guaranteed, it is also
distinguished from a more comprehensive outlook concerning the deprivation from
22
Bonfim, João (2000:75).
149
basic capacities, an unrelated item on account of the weak tradition for independent
labor.
For the Santomeans, mostly those who want a secure future or who aspire for small
gains, poverty tends to be restricted to a low income. Consequently, the predominance
of this reductionist vision related to money is not surprising, considering that, except for
cases of enrichment, the most elaborated perspective about poverty is still linked to an
ideological bias. It is argued that the application of the PAE was a direct cause for the
startling increase in absolute poverty, predominantly in urban areas where were built
precarious dwellings, mostly with inadequate hygienic and sanitary conditions23. This
politicized discourse plausibly disencourages any mobilization against poverty.
Poverty does not stand solely for a lack of material resources. Likewise, it stands for a
lack of power, equivalent to an inability to influence the structuration of social living
conditions, which is particularly evident in the instance of the poorest populations24. In
Sao Tome and Principe, this is pertinent at both national and regional levels. The
poverty observed in Sao Tome and Principe is mirrored in the abdication of life,
resulting from the belief that one is being left abandoned, a tributary notion relating
both to the perception of impracticality for interfering in political and social
arrangements, as to an attribution of liability to the leadership. In a manner, it is similar
to poverty constituting an oxbow from which is tremendously hard to escape.
For a long time, the enclosure inherent to micro-insularity and the political and
institutional circumstances have blocked the emergence of a social conscience about
poverty. By imposition of an international agenda, in 2002 was elaborated the National
Poverty Reduction Strategy. The goal was to reduce by half the percentage of
population, 53.8%, living in poverty until 2010 and reduce it to less than one third by
2015. It was estimated that, by that time, the entire population would have access to
basic social services, therefore achieving an improvement of living standards. The
purpose is to reduce social and gender differences, in addition to asymmetries existing
between districts and between islands. Among others, a pivotal aspect for this strategy is
related to the reform of public institutions, the reinforcement of capacities and the
promotion of good governance25. Nevertheless, to fight poverty it matters to change the
deepest conditionalisms. From a resource stance, Sao Tome and Principe supposedly
has conditions to combat the causes for poverty and to accomplish the MDG. However,
it does not seem it will happen.
What is the worth of a sudden social and political conscience about poverty? Are there
political and civic organizations capable of incorporating and diffusing a conscience in
regard of the need to combat poverty and, more significantly, to highlight the conviction
in the resolution of social issues? In spite of an institutional progress concerning social
causes – an example is the creation of a Poverty Observatory – it is hard to mobilize on
behalf of the fight against poverty, from which there is no way out without going
beyond the induction of international aids. Despite the possibilities of promoting the
eradication of poverty under misadjusted policies, these do not decline the congregation
of efforts at the base. However, it seems the Sao Tomean society is not properly
motivated for this task.
The corrosion of social relations standards is impeding the empowerment of individuals
– or, more or less accurately, of “communities” – and the subsequent fight against
23
Santo, Armindo (2008:77).
About this subject, see Milando (2005:82).
25
Rodrigues and Lopes (2007:19).
24
150
poverty. The State‟s deliquescency and the failure of macro-economic regulations
haven‟t helped to the emergence of projects for local development, which has no
tradition in this country, because throughout the colonialism and the post-independence
periods the State has been almost exclusively the pillar for economic administration and
initiative. For that reason as well, the political tradition is to abide to strict and
hierarchized relations, unsupportive of the decentralization and, therefore, to the
delegation of power.
It appears quite straightforward to blame people from a determinate “community” for
not taking care of a water supply ditch or for the degradation of some public equipment
(conversely, it is not so simple to blame city residents for damages done to urban
patrimony). In a sense, this degradation caused by social changes, paucity and
deregulation of social bonds constitutes a form of violence – and is in itself an obstacle
to human development – which afflicts those people in the first place.
Therefore, the roots for such conduct amid any “community” are induced by the
absence of ethics and rigor in the political and administrative spheres that, beyond that,
haven‟t filled the void caused by the transference of farms from Europeans owners to
the Sao Tomean State and from the State to the hands of small landowners.
Since the most disadvantaged are witnessing the corrosion of the values by which they
had been socialized and, above all, of the former social protection, it is created an
impression of loss of identity, the notions of social equality and cohesion become
derisory as rules for a fair social relationship, regardless or even beyond all economic
distinctions. In the present economic and social circumstances, the popular dialogue
about political evolution and corruption of the social accord does not indicate nothing
more than a feeling of loss of control over one‟s future, and a propensity for dismay and
renunciation of the future, at the most reduced to the attainment of daily sustenance.
On account of this, it is complicated to congregate the multiplicity of social actors
committed in fighting poverty. It becomes easier to materialize actions of social support
– which should preferably have a tangible materialization, even if limited to the
distribution of soup – in the bush, in small luchans (villages) or in farmsteads. Smallscale actions of this sort are generally supported by outside funding. More importantly,
as the result of the political and social background, these actions can not remark an
ethical purpose for the social environment.
The institutional state of affairs affects the relevance given to “communities”, without
conditions for the emergence of leaders, as a result of the historical legacy, the
atomization of social life in the recent past and, furthermore, the deteriorated influence
of these resource-devoid “communities”. Aware of this alienation from supervisory
powers – an alienation that goes back to colonialism and has been prolonged throughout
the post-independence phase – it is difficult to place people and communities as the
focus of interest for development. There is, for example, no affordance of material
resources to be managed by the communities, and consequently one of the conditions
for the reduction of poverty is not being fulfilled, which is to have control over
resources. Appropriated by politicians without any institutional safeguards, the notion
of “community” is developing into a stereotypical cliché, a mere denomination made by
an authority at once resigned from its social responsibilities and paternalist.
It is not afforded any power to the communities (as is not given effective powers to the
peripheral administration), but the politicians demand these “communities”, being
several quite impoverished, to be responsive to the needs of the people and committed
to the construction of a regulated social environment. Without forgetting the neighborly
151
solidarity, the transformation of numerous former farms‟ yards confirms how, in the
absence of social regulation, such construction is in essence impracticable. Tactically, it
is demanded from the communities to exercise a distinct dynamic – for instance, of
economic engagement, settlement of national interests and conflict composition – and
sometimes contrary to the experienced within the national political realm. It is required
that these “communities” build a repository of solidarity values that defy the predatory
judgment of the own Sao Tomean State and, perhaps, of the whole world.
In reality, several basic civic principles – belongingness and solidarity, for example –
are required from “communities” scattered around the bush or from survivors of the
farmyards who are missing from the political landscape, since the significance of
recognizing a common identity, in this instance an African one, that gathered islanders
and the sons of the farms, and the solidary mobilization for the resolution of collective
issues has vanished with the reflux of the independence‟s political exaltation. The
logical corollary is the segregation of these “communities”, whose members feel
abandoned, since those who talk about the “communities” don‟t share their hardships or
their real living conditions.
Instead of harboring more voluntarist and hopeful expectations for a transformation
launched from bottom to top, it becomes quite hard to shape an implementation of the
political power based on experiences of participative development, as scarce and
shallow as they may be. The significance of these “communities” as a means of
assessing local competencies would require a proper institutional environment, for
instance for eventually establishing local leaderships. Once in awhile, the
communitarian needs are partially safeguarded by an NGO, although these institutions
may mitigate extreme poverty, nevertheless they cannot replace the (sought after)
participation of the subjects.
The paternalistic stance is effectively maintained, after all. There isn‟t a change of
perceptions in the way of allowing collective actions. In a manner, the appointment of
Fradique de Menezes contained an indication of this collective demission in favor of
someone with given proofs in the economic sector and, therefore, supposedly able to
attract and distribute wealth. And given the instrumentalization of the elections by the
banho phenomenon, it shouldn‟t be surprising if future presidential elections are
characterized by a similar process of identification to a tutelary and economically gifted
individuality. In such social surrounding, fighting poverty will become harder.
Apart from a lack of resources and instruments such as, for instance, associativeness,
above all there are no adequate conditions to combat poverty. Among these, the
commitment to applicable policies for fighting poverty – which does not produce
immediate results, yet has to be perceived as conducing to this purpose – and, more
decisively, the notion of political and moral involvement in a common destiny with the
land and its population that, if ever achieved, would represent the largest barrier to the
swelling of violence and of disagreements typically occurring in borderlands.
Thus, the devastation of society at the hands of poverty and micro-violence somehow
marks the failure to settle equity during the stage of independence, inferred in the Sao
Tomean‟s ethnic attachment and fellowship. The failure of this settlement for social
equity and justice becomes more serious when applied to a micro-insular space where,
according to its own political leaders, poverty should not be feasible.
152
Disruption of social bonds
When related to politicians‟ larcenies, poverty turns into a factor for social strain, as
well as explaining it and, in a way, validating it. At several levels, violence has started
to infiltrate into the social accord.
Violence against the elderly is becoming widespread, a manifestation of the dissolution
of family ties which used to be useful in the past (and to some extent, are still useful
nowadays) as a social protection network. These days, poverty appears to be causing
domestic abuse against senior citizens, then justified as beliefs in curses from acts of
sorcery whose origin is attributed to them. Such abuse configures a denial of the alleged
African values. Violence against seniors is a signal of the trajectory of social loss.
It is complicated to establish connections between family ties and child condition, a
decisive feature while combating poverty. In some manner, the existence of street
children was acknowledged years ago.
Currently, there are taking place behavioral transformations. Although so far children
represent an insurance for the old age, it has become perceptible a change of the
paradigm associated to maternity causing a decrease of the birth rate, children are the
future because after we get old (...) they come to take care of us, but it is no future to
have so many and have nothing to give them. Nonetheless, the children‟s situation,
especially those from poor backgrounds, remains characterized by an elevated
precariousness. For example, throughout the years, the government has leaded a
campaign in favor of universal birth registration. In 2000, it was estimated that around
70% of children had been registered. It was usually disputed if the children were left out
of registration for reasons of parental ignorance or unreliability. However, the
deleterious effects of the disarticulation and ineptitude of the administration should also
be reflected upon.
A portion of this precariousness comes from the deliquescence of family ties, as the
result of a pervasiveness of polygamy and male unreliability. Such facts illustrate the
enormous burden being placed upon women. Predictably, children living in monoparental homes are particularly vulnerable to poverty.
In the poorest surroundings remains a notion of children as equivalent to richness, or,
more prosaically, as family labor force. In effect, it is fairly usual to employ child labor.
For example, many children trade in the streets in order to help out the family income. It
is hard to believe this situation can be altered without the occurrence of economic
changes and unless demanding goals are pursued for the social integration.
The political discourse focusing occasionally on behalf of the reposition of social
controls and against violence does not articulate itself with the prevention of microviolence. However, it has been growing lately a perception of domestic violence,
including over children, as being a social issue which needs to be addressed 26.
Institutional conditions were actually implemented for the prevention of domestic
violence, mostly gender-based, and for sheltering its victims. It was created a
Counseling Center against Domestic Violence, which works in collaboration with the
Justice Court, Attorney General Office, Criminal Investigation Force, National Police
and Health Services, and by means of legislation dated from August 15th 2008 domestic
violence has been qualified as crime. It was equally created a National Institute for the
Promotion of Equality and Gender Parity. However, there are obvious difficulties in
26
For example, see Repórter África in RTP África, August 31th 2006.
153
dealing with social issues involving strong intimacy components and, at the same time,
a (non-anonymous) confrontation with the surrounding society.
Besides, neither the Sao Tomean State nor those institutions engaged in the
reconstruction of social bonds, more in particular family bonds, have the resources to
take the economic burden that would result from a widespread protection of the victims
of violence and, on the whole, the victims of social abandonment. Even so, at the most
the situation will get a symbolic value, standing for behaviors which, while deep-rooted,
are not longer tolerable.
In any case, the present political environment is not favorable to the civic commitment
to fight poverty and oppose what is not necessarily called violence, may be
characterized as an extensive erosion and rupture of social bonds. This occurrence
becomes apparent when handling a hypothetical rural development, for which
apparently all necessary requirements already exist. With no detriment to the defense of
agriculture as the platform for national development, anchored in food self-sufficiency,
the social environment is not encouraging for farming activities, which many say are a
target for stealing27. In spite of the possibility of being an excuse for those who have no
endurance to start again, there are frequent complaints about thefts‟ impunity, greatly
damaging the efforts for reconstruction of the rural fabric to which, in fact, also lacks a
sense of security regarding the access to agricultural property.
There is no acknowledgement of this increased violence as being the outcome of social
and political leeway, which has supported the rise of the indetermination degree
concerning the future and, in this manner; several subjects have departed from
committing to anything other than their own survival.
Fighting for survival
Besides fighting against poverty, for numerous years the Sao Tomeans have been
fighting for survival. But without prospects, it must de said, since neither development
nor economic integration can be comparable, for instance, to the multiplication of retail
sale posts of cigarette packs along the streets.
There are noticeable changes in behavior (and values) that contribute to decreasing the
most immediate and serious poverty occurrences. Forced to some extent by the
unemployment, the number of individual enterprises has fairly increased, in search of
better sources of personal income. Among the occasional occupations performed at the
informal market are streets moneychangers, palaiés (street vendors) and laundresses
(charging 25 thousand Dobras, approximately €1, for every basin of ironed laundry).
For those working in stores and receiving wages, for instance, of 400,000 Dobras, their
main concern is to get a daily meal, I face hardships everyday, but we are used to it,
today we have, tomorrow maybe not, that is the way we live… (laughter), but I‟ve
grown accustomed to my daily life. This happens inside a context that instead of
lessening the economic constraint has additionally posed various difficulties, derived
from the imported inflation, that are forcing the boundaries of survival. Although
having been in decline in these last years, the inflation is still a heavy burden, since a
substantial portion of the meager wages is meant to provide for basic needs, mostly
food.
27
While interpreted as a call or an incitement for the Santomean society, it was already made a public
declaration about existing more people robbing the camps than cultivating them, cf. “Repórter” in RTP
África, February 26th 2008.
154
For this reason, the capacity of creating saving is quite impressive, for instance, through
the chiquila, formerly known as kitembu, a type of mutual loans funded by
supplementary privation, allowing short-term completion of small projects or
acquisition of durable goods. At a distinctive stage, the reduced economic and social
diversity is limiting the possibilities to advance by way of instruments such as the
microcredit. This will allow some people to escape poverty, but it is doubtful that will
help in consolidating a myriad of ascending trajectories.
In spite of the small gains resulting from the use of opportunity niches, that have
permitted some people to break away from poverty or, at least, to fulfill some basic
needs, the popular perception is of being impossible to permanently eradicate poverty
and inverse the escalating social differentiation. Even harder if being followed a path on
the way to equality and social cohesion.
Any expectations about the future are shaped by the unemployment – a circumstance
that has been lasting for decades, engendered by the farmers‟ choice to employ an
imported labor force further vulnerable to labor exploitation, though during the last
years of colonialism the unemployment did not seen to hold the same significance it
holds nowadays – and by the bicabala, a daily struggle for survival under the law of
desenrascanço (make do). The expectation for a more prosperous forthcoming
economic condition is common ground to everyone. But it does not derive from having
confidence in their own efforts, most of which restricted to sheer survival, nor from the
country‟s trajectory. Their expectation results mostly from believing the situation
cannot get any worse, while seemingly impossible to those who experience deprivation,
is not necessarily accurate.
The generality of Sao Tomeans do hope for a better future, because they have no other
alternative. Since the middle of the 90s decade they have waited for opportunities to
lessen their poverty by means of the oil exploration, but beside the (controversial)
uncertainties regarding this industry, there is a growing stance that they will not benefit
from the petroleum extraction. So far, it simply allowed the involvement of the country
in the crossroad of geo-strategic interests for this subregion.
Although there are no strict connections between the (imaginary and/or real) corruption
and the efficiency of social policies, the progressive incompetence of the State in Sao
Tome and Principe is causing much discouragement. After all, the State has been for
decades the main promoter of social integration and welfare for the underprivileged,
replacing most of all the familial structures and other networks supporting the
integration which are only useful in more privileged circumstances. Therefore, any
exclusion from public support is considered an extremely serious matter.
The signs transmitted by the political sphere to the society in relation to the pervasive
logic for a one-off appropriation of resources and opportunities are having repercussions
on the social anomy and unattainable solidarity. Inadvertently, they harbor a quiet
conviction about the intricacy of finding solutions for the country.
The civic imperative in the eradication of poverty has been steadily reduced to a
managerial, technocratic and instrumental purpose – the invocation to combat poverty
seems to liberate from its execution – instead of turning into an ethical and moral
mobilizing compromise. Therefore, it is plausible that poverty will persist beyond
political purposes, particularly because the political and social pressures are quite
diffuse and scarce as the outcome of having around half the population living in poverty
situations. Perhaps the pressure from those who live in extreme poverty conditions will
be less important than the pressure from those who, while not being in such
155
circumstances, do aspire, based on better assertive abilities, to benefit from the
immediate allocation of resources, like those intended for project management, or
profits from an imaginary or real petroleum trade.
The occurrences of deprivation and micro-violence have not yet unraveled the
idealization of social peace in these islands. But they could hinder the social
arrangement and the engagement to inflect the country and the society from a defeatist
trajectory. Instead of blaming the confliction and consequent deprivations in the
archipelago to external factors – wars, for example –, the reasons must be found in the
land, in circumstances whose liability must be shared. This increases the dialogue‟s
complexity. This way, despite the blame being place on the politicians, it still remains to
determine if the racialization or the interiorization of some of the responsibility made by
common individuals does not indirectly restrain the belief and commitment to social
change and poverty eradication.
In the absence of social strategies, or in spite of these, the answers will be found at a
personal level and, in some measure, may involve migratory apprenticeships. The
qualification of youths in foreign lands, the search for the institutionalization of a
diaspora – regardless of unavoidable tensions with the homeland 28 – and the still
incipient creation of a public space, all these may become factors for social change,
overpowering the dynamic of loss and social disruption29.
Conclusive notes
It is believed that human development and decreased poverty, on one hand, and
economic growth, on the other, are mutually intertwined and reinforced. However, in
this equatorial archipelago and not only here, this is more of a probability than an
empirically corroborated fact. It must be kept in consideration that, in the future, some
economic growth will come alongside a divide between the most privileged and the rest
of the population. Though some economic indicators have registered a bit of progress
and there are apparently more opportunities to build a life, it is uncertain that the poorest
can get any inclusion into the development process.
Having been previously drained the affective and ideological impulses of the
independence, there are not many instruments left for weaving the social cohesion,
damaged by survival hardships and by the divergent trajectories of rulers and ruled.
Although it is also claimed that democracy promotes social and civic participation and,
therefore, development, not only is that statement missing corroboration as nothing else
indicates the possibility of a base movement being successful in demarcating the Sao
Tomean society, especially the creation of social consensus that supply political and
social references, without which the fight against poverty, then reduced to simple social
engineering, would not be mobilizing. Lacking an alteration of political behaviors, in
the sense of extensive trustworthiness in the decision-makers, it will be hard to put in
practice any agreement to eliminate persistent poverty. In reality, in spite of the
commonly accepted implication amid the poverty reduction, on one hand, and the
predominance of democracy, on the other hand, the truth is that such implication has to
be nuanced and not necessarily accurate. In spite of high standards regarding the civil
and political rights, specifically with regard to freedom of the press, and the observance
28
29
Nascimento (2007ª).
Nascimento (2007b).
156
of institutional rules, concerning in particular the obedience to election results, the
course of politics does not seem inspiring to the general Sao Tomean population. In a
way, by contradicting the conviction ensuing from experiences conducted in other
societies does not emerge a correlation between democratic participation – visibly
feeble – and the possibilities for social emancipation and development. Actually, to take
place such correlation it would be needed, among other requisites, an appropriate
institutional procedure, besides a liable performance from the politicians.
The failure of the institutional performance has been threatening the social peace.
Anyhow, by now it is seems difficult to merge the political dispute with an eventual
militancy in favor of the regeneration of customs in whole society. In reality, it is
improbable that the political leaders are able to provide the indicators to establish social
arrangements. If possible, it should be advanced gradually, particularly in the prevention
of domestic violence and gender-based violence, since the fight against poverty will not
appear mobilizing. So therefore, it would reveal itself unsystematic, inconsequential
and, moreover, non-participated.
Occasionally, comes up the notion that a politically strong environment, engaged
against the exploitation by the rich and powerful, could bring some benefits to the
society. The tutelary and authoritarian solution, the steady hand, comes out as a panacea
in times of increased unsafety, and in particular when the increase in criminality is
quoted as a cause for poverty or as an aggression against the more vulnerable, namely in
the bush. While the reversion of this dynamic of loss and exclusion associated to a rise
of poverty is less reliant on police forces than on any ethical signal the political
authorities are transmitting to society, the truth is many people would yearn for a return
to stricter rules as a condition for constructing with their lives. Poverty did not generate
violence, since the one it promotes has no origin in social deprivation. However, under
the most diversified formats, violence risks perpetuating poverty.
Besides huge and radical changes, especially since 1990, Sao Tome and Principe has
distanced itself from the forecasted and preferred goal instituted in 1975. Since then, the
economic and social evolution has been revealing to be tenaciously adverse to the
independentist promises. Along with the concentration of wealth, poverty seems firmly
anchored in these islands. There is a high number of unemployed, the population earns
low wages and, in general, the economic performance is just bearable. Undeniably, such
situation has historical roots, however at this distance from the end of colonialism, it
mostly demonstrates a voluntarist, erratic and in some way ruinous political conduction,
less due to economic records than to an erosion of ethics and social liability, crucial
elements for a renewed political and social mobilization and for the future of the
country.
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159
‘Poverty…, of course we have it…‟ Notes for the analysis of an institutional
conscience about poverty and micro-violence in Cape Verdean contexts1
Augusto Nascimento*
Abstract
Based on testimonies by Cape Verdean individuals with different social condition and
institutional responsibility on one hand and, on the other hand, on the consideration of
the historical burden and the policies adopted after the independence, this article is
focused on the creation of a social conscience about poverty and the manifestations of
micro-violence through the action of institutions and NGOs committed in the
eradication of poverty and prevention of behaviors potentially generating and
perpetuating micro-violence and social exclusion. The political environment and the
perception of an involvement of Cape Verdeans in a common destiny are deemed
crucial to the achievement of these purposes.
When landing at Fogo Island, paying attention to the landscape formed by magma
rivers, steep riversides and blackish-brown rocky soil, one asks himself how the local
population survives. However, at the town of Sao Filipe, one starts to understand the
agricultural potential of the island, which, owing to its ecologic diversity, supplies the
Santiago market and aims to invest in exportation. In a way, the discovery of economic
potentialities under a closer look resembles a metaphor to account for in the analysis of
Cape Verdean realities, much diverse from island to island and, occasionally, inside
each island.
Despite the micro-insularity, the study about the prevalence and recent evolution of
poverty and micro-violence manifestations in Cape Verde demands, as premise, the
recognition of this immense economic and social diversity which, besides causing some
perplexities, also complicates a comprehensive analysis.
In some of the poorer islands, we can find, perhaps, an incidence of more acceptable
social indicators and fewer social issues. In other words, find facts that, for a lack of
visible social repercussions or for being related to local idiosyncrasies and principles,
are not seen as social issues. In contrast, there will be fewer expectations for personal
fulfillment. The richer and more populated islands, with more opportunities on account
of their economic variety, have issues caused by an accelerated urbanization and high
unemployment, which was around 18% in 20062. In the long-term, this figure denotes
an improvement, since in 1980 and 1990 the unemployment rates were respectively
28.8% and 25.9%3. The unemployment is high and, as acknowledged, has an influence
on the roots of a resigned attitude, also anchored in the expected support from the
family. It is simple to find people, in particular youngsters, who manifestly don‟t have a
job or claim to not have employment opportunities, since there is work only as civil
* Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical; Centro de Estudos Africanos – ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon
1
It concerns an exploratory text, resulting from the project Poverty and Peace in the PALOP, constituting
a starting point to a posterior research.
2
Cf. data quoted by Monteiro (2008: 93).
3
Cf. Grassi (2003: 131).
160
servant. If one does not work in the public service then one does not have a job, similar
to not having a guaranteed survival. Some live off occasional work, whose availability
varies according to season or according to the economic conjuncture. It is said that, in
spite of the unemployment, the education has been narrowing the acceptable labour
opportunities. Indeed, the rural jobs, although scarce, are usually rejected, as also are
any poorly paid construction works. This explains the deployment of migrant labour
force in the construction sector.
The economic circumstances diverge from island to island, representing their identitygenerating narratives, in addition to the particular social configurations provided, for
instance, by the repercussions of the migratory fluxes initiated in each island. This
feature is clearly noticeable in Fogo, an island that has contributed much to the
migration toward America. Purportedly, Fogo is supported by revenues provided by the
emigration, which in some manner will influence the creation and reproduction of
certain behaviors and cultural standards – for example, concerning the construction of
family bonds in the rural regions – with larger incidence in this island than in the most
urbanized.
In a territory which, until recently, had been unanimously considered devoid of natural
resources and besides afflicted by droughts, the economic endeavors are quite assorted
and far-reaching. For example, in some islands was made a strong effort on tourism
which, according to rentist reasons, prevents the tourists from acquiring land and
opposes the dynamics of local accumulation. Following this endeavor, appeared a slum
quarter in Boavista where resides the migrant labour force deployed in the construction
of touristic enterprises. In the aftermath of the recent international crisis, some of these
immigrants lost their way to earn a living. In Fogo, as the town of Sao Filipe grows,
there is a proposition to return to irrigation-based farming, as an agricultural advantage
for the island. The social environment in Sao Filipe is completely distinctive from Praia,
whose growth is derived from its political centrality.
In opposition to this economic diversity, there is a relative institutional agreement which
intends to achieve more cohesion, by means of policies of social support performed by
public institutions and NGO. The efficiency of these efforts to provide social integration
is favored by the current political4 and cultural5 background.
The courses of politics and governance are targets of scrutiny and theme of discussion
in spaces of daily socializing. In informal conversations, Cape Verdeans tend to agree
they are fortunate for the governance of their country, following principles of
pragmatism and aptitude in the management of public resources. Such commentaries
4
Such does not imply the acceptance of the absence of economic restraints and resistances and political
and institutional inertias which oppose the purposes of social integration, laboring in favor of the
reproduction of inequalities and, therefore, of social exclusion itself. However, focusing on the
conscience of poverty and fight against poverty, it is being performed by individuals with ethic and social
motivations or by those who have become committed to some principles and social programs.
For that reason, during this research we talked to persons who fight everyday for their survival and with
experts from institutions who have an inclusive conscience, not necessarily technocratic or instrumental,
about these social issues.
5
Iolanda Évora gives attention to the weight of cultural factors, for being historically rooted – namely, the
need for composing solidarity manifestations amid precariousness and social inequalities – which allow
for a belief in the principle of institutional performance (2009: 8). Without devaluating the relevance of
history, it is however necessary to emphasize that, independently from the political color of the several
regimes, former administrative practices have maintained most of the trust asset in institutions. Thus the
possibility of reaching the purpose to transform attitudes and behaviors, which until recently would be
part of an immobile idiosyncratic path.
161
incorporate the importance given to politians, attributable to the international prestige of
Cape Verde since its independence, for instance manifested in their willingness to
consider this country as a partner for (defining and) preserving the international order,
and for some more particular goals, such as fighting the illegal drug traffic. In any case,
this is the result of the creation of international partnerships that reinforce the autonomy
of the institutional performance at distinct stages, somehow implementing a managerial
ethic recurrently opposing the eventual subservience and the clientist
instrumentalization in accordance to particular political and economic interests.
Clearly, this interpretative summary could be invalidated by examples of casuistic
decisions of alleged fostering, for instance, based on personal acquaintance. Neither the
recognition of circumstances of populism and autocracy in local governance nor a few
odd accusations of corruption announced in the media have permanently damaged trust
in the State or wrecked its social performance.
It must be said that, also on account of the structural frailty of the productive fabric, the
State is expected to assume liability for fighting poverty. So, the outcomes from this
fight depend primarily on its idoneity, plus on those of their respective agents. The same
cultural background that reinforces the State is similarly encouraging the constitution of
NGOs engaged in fighting poverty and promoting social changes as well.
The political confliction is maintained within democratic standards. Actually, with the
Cape Verdeans‟ effortless demeanor and welcoming reception, those who are familiar
with the archipelago‟s recent history will be surprised by its violent process of
transition. In fact, this process was not as pacific as expected from the diffusion of
independentist ideals by the Cape Verdean elite6. As time went by, the (indisputable)
Cape Verdean cultural identity did not transform, immediate and unconditionally, into
an independentist dream and it hasn‟t embraced at all the independence promoted by
Guinean fighters. In any case, the violence which occurred in the transitional period –
mostly imprisonments – has not turned into a canon for the single-party regime, which
was characterized by a somehow forced tolerance during its narrow course of survival.
In effect, despite the voluntarist feature of the PAIGC (later PAICV) leadership, such
tolerance was the outcome of a caution to avoid convulsions and fissures in times of
economic and social hardships. Perhaps, it was likewise originated by the mitigating
effects resulting from international aid and mostly from emigration. Founded on
affective impulses (anchored in customs and traditions that should not to be derogated
by revolutionary political choices, censured as well in the welcoming countries,
particularly the USA) and on personal interests, the emigrants‟ judgment may have been
much less paternalistic and condescending than the judgment of international donors.
So, besides symbolically priceless, the emigrants‟ contributions were no less valuable
than the international aid, because they were directly oriented to the people.
During the single-party regime, conflicts related to a proposal for agrarian reform and,
at a given time, a turbulent youth contestation against the monolithic socialist
orientation of the PAICV were not enough to withdraw the notion of social and political
peace experienced since the independence. After the political overture, most formal
rules of a representative democracy have been followed and some allusions to a lesser
6
It is not discussed the Cape Verdean cultural identity nor the disseminating yearn for independence. But
for that reason, it must be registered that an africanized independence was achieved at the cost of violence
– just as the trail of contact, sometimes tense, between these two mythicized identitary poles for the Cape
Verdeans, namely Africa and Europe, was almost erased – which justification was based on the fight for
national liberation.
162
transparency during electoral processes do not challenge – neither to the emigrant
communities nor the international partners – the political normality and, more
significantly, the notion of growing institutional capacitation, with the purpose of
attaining good governance.
There have always been manifestations of micro-violence – some culturally rooted
others product of the development – but there is not an historical record of political
violence. In other words, if some have an certain arrogated intrepidity – for instance,
there is a saying that goes “the Fogo people give it all for a good fight”, akin to the
alleged recollection about the legendary bravery of famed individuals from the inland of
Santiago, for whom the instrument of revenge was the knife – composes a conflicting
idiosyncrasy of the Cape Verdean which has no replication in the political evolution.
The verbal incisiveness of the partidarian struggle does not translate into physical
violence.
The inexistence of a trail of political violence is considered relevant for two reasons:
first, to reinforce the State as the only institution able to legitimately use force while
preventing and repressing violence and maintaining the juridical and socials orders, and
second, only apparently redundant, for a perception of micro-violence as an illegitimate
and punishable incident.
Considering the previously mentioned variety of circumstances from an economic and
social perspective, the characterization of the country‟s evolution cannot be
mechanically transposed into an analysis of occurrences such as micro-violence and
poverty. Actually, just as the normality of the political action does not reveal tensions at
the birth of independence, neither the relaxed social relations and the morabeza let
perceive the small criminality in the streets (minimized by visitants or exaggerated by
residents who find this behavior hard to handle) and even less the asymmetry of gender
relations or the heterogeneity of family relations, with significant social consequences
from the stance of both poverty and social exclusion7.
To increase its complexity, the analysis will take into consideration the processes of
social change. For example, during the last decades, Fogo‟s migration flux contributed
to subvert the former social order and change of the social landscape of São Filipe that
had, meanwhile, been occupied by people of rural origins, formerly declassified for
being outsiders. The rural exodus from some islands toward others and the accelerated
urbanization – mainly in the city of Praia – have deepened asymmetries and increased
difficulties for the people living in urban peripheries where, also on account of the
populational growth, are expected to be found ways to make a better living than in their
homelands.
It is said that the development brings it all, which seems to insinuate the perception that
the negative features of this development come from the exterior. Anyway, the rather
striking specificities of some islands, particularly the rural ones, support the notion that
social control not only prevents hunger as in addition, perhaps more importantly,
maintains the local idiosyncrasy opposing the dissemination of behaviors deemed
7
The pertinent question is whether these features have their own characteristics and social weight. The
asymmetry in gender relations is not specific to Cape Verde. But, attending to the historical and social
singularity of the archipelago, the asymmetry and heterogeny of family bonds are present in all discourses
about poverty. The association of these phenomena to poverty comes up empirically sustained by the
banality of male unreliability toward their children, which by itself already affects individual trajectories,
particularly in the lower social ranks.
163
antisocial8. In reality, the social changes are quite unbalanced, quite prompt in some
islands, in others ably accommodated into everyday routines.
The perception that development brings it all is challenge by a commitment, mixed with
militant consciousness and technocratic efficiency – for instance, the Instituto Caboverdiano da Criança e do Adolescente (ICCA) – Cape Verde Institute for Children and
Adolescents) sends text messages to mobile phones, calling for the denunciation in case
of child abuse and mistreatment, the absolute priority! – according to the social
regulation, consensual with the agreement in relation to human development. Part of the
social conscience, induced by institutions and defined by a few volitional traces, is
militating on behalf of poverty eradication and gender parity. Perhaps as a result of the
notion of explanatory obstacles resulting from the varied emotions involved, the agents
of these goals – some young professionals supervising projects – have a clear perception
of being involved in a short-term assignment.
Domestic and gender-based violence are culturally and socially entrenched 9 – for the
reason that it is a hard to approach theme – and don‟t intersect into the political
evolution10. On the contrary, political consensus and strong institutions could decisively
configure the behaviors which have been supposedly at the origin of serious social
issues. In addition, the promotion of human development conducted by institutions and
NGO might produce behavior changes and to a more mature citizenship, further
demonstrating the ethics of social behaviors, such as the belief of those who engage
themselves in fighting poverty and antisocial behaviors.
Based on the testimonies of Cape Verdean participants from different social
backgrounds and agents from public services and NGO11, the purpose of this
exploratory text is to set down some questions for future researches in relation to the
micro-violence manifestations and the collective and individual impoverishment
paths12.
8
The notion of being “in trouble with the law”, expressly referred to outline the conducts of youths, does
not enclose the whole specter of what, with unavoidable subjectivity, are considered to be young people‟s
antisocial behaviors, namely rejecting values as, for example, making a living or accepting parental
authority.
9
This is how they are known by official authorities, who talk about a “high incidence of gender-based
violence”, cf. for example, Documento de Estratégia de Crescimento e Redução da Pobreza – II, Ministry
of Finance and Public Administration, Cape Verde, May 2008.
10
Unlike violence derived from large conflicts, it is difficult for people disposed to talk about everyday
attitudes which shame them in a social environment where one can not remain anonymous.
11
The field research was produced in two stages – November 2008 and June 2009 – in three islands, São
Vicente, Santiago, and Fogo. Beside the testimonies from individuals with diversified conditions about
their trajectories shaped in different degrees by factors like poverty and violence, searching to find the
sensibilities of individuals engaged in institutions – Cape Verdean Institute of Children and Teenagers,
Cape Verde Institute for Gender Equality and Equality, Victim Support Council , Casa de Direito law
centers, Institution for the Professional Employment and Training among other institutions – , the NGOs,
social institutions and “projects” involved in the fight against poverty (in these circumstances, “projects”
refer to individual initiatives with a determinate temporal continuity without institutional sponsorship).
12
Some authors disregard the connection between impoverishment and violence, for example basing on
the evolution of violence in urban surroundings with distinctive economic trajectories, such as Bissau and
Praia (see ROQUE and CARDOSO, 2008). In fact, other than poverty, the mechanisms for integration
and, in the background, for contention are crucial, as shown by the situations experienced in the different
islands of Cape Verde.
164
The institutionalized conscience of social issues
The assistentialist approach, restored during the final years of colonialism, was
prolonged into the first years of independence. It concerned mostly poverty, from which
in principle all other issues were derived. Recently, this assistentialist perspective is
being replaced with an institutional conscience, at once plural and integrated –therefore,
interested in the actors‟ participation – about the social issues. This conscience also
entailed a different perspective, which is to attack the multiplicity of social issues
without expecting them to dissipate because of the decrease in poverty. As a result,
issues such as gender inequalities have turned into factors of poverty and social
exclusion13. The promotion of social integration has developed into a goal and an
instrument for fighting poverty and preventing micro-violence manifestations. For that
reason, while is complicated to qualify unprivileged persons and make them able to
follow their own way, must be undertaken an effort in favor of individual capacities and
local potentialities. In this manner, the mentality of dependency on assistentialist
practices would be removed.
Some years ago, the Millennium Goals, the human development goals and the
international cooperation targets contributed to a new kind of approach relating to social
relations. More consensus, more voluntarism, closer interventions, in the sense of
performing on several dimensions of the individual and collective lives, and
concurrently less ideology, similar to believing not as much in the transformation of
attitudes by effects of mere ideological motivation. The credibility of these local
organizations‟ performances comes not as much from the pertinence of their action as
from a political environment that affords credibility to several extents of its institutional
performance. In the absence of a minimum level of trust in the political performance,
then these institutions and NGOs‟ actions would become more complicated and, in a
way, rather wasteful.
As stated before, the most notorious feature in the approach of social issues in Cape
Verde – for instance, domestic violence14 - is the development of an institutional
conscience regarding several facets of human development and, consequently, the
eradication of poverty. Related to the notion of human rights and to some concrete
features of personal lives, this institutionalized conscience leads to the perception of a
necessarily deliberate change, involving every citizen into some stage of civic
commitment. Concomitantly, the social issues are reflected upon more comprehensive
approaches. For instance, “women‟s condition” has evolved into “gender parity” and, as
consequence, the sensibilization actions – like those in healthcare – are now directed
both at women and men.
In addition, due to some financial availability, were created the conditions for a
widespread conscience on social issues. With support from international partners and
the State, this conscience, seized in situations of social deprivation, will be reinforced
13
As an example, the situation of the street children. Besides a perspective able to provide social control,
more specifically police control, it is the existence of an institutional conscience and, through it, of
several dimensions of actuation that, for example, support the avoidance of reactive behaviors funded on
stereotypes which, by rule, societies are prone to demonstrate and whose effects would not be anything
but the reinforcement of social exclusion and the increase in social disruption.
14
This subject may be submitted to statistical analysis. But a qualitative analysis may allow explaining
the conditions on which domestic violence thrives and becomes persistent and damaging, particularly in
regards to the reproduction of poverty. In any case, surveys of qualitative nature which permit to get life
narratives afflicted by domestic violence are time-demanding and it is also difficult to obtain and validate
narratives of violence in micro-spaces such as the islands.
165
through the deed of numerous organizations and individuals. Although initiated by
institutionally accepted values, the society is revealing its plurality and are emerging
(and perishing) NGOs committed to several facets of the communitarian life or to the
support of specific groups, mostly women and children.
It should be said, taking into consideration Cape Verde‟s particularities and considering
that in some islands these are effectively conditioning the mentioned conducts to follow
a professed patriarchal culture, some ingrained behaviors would not change in the shortterm, despite the voluntary actions of NGOs and public agents. However, either the
opening to the world or the institutional performance‟s consistency – an example being
the selection of counselors for victim support in police stations –are giving citizenship‟s
worth to certain matters of civic rights which have gradually been integrated into the
daily arrangement, bringing out issues that had been until recently private matters.
Associated with the emergence of an institutionalized conscience is the media‟s
socialization of issues that once would remain in the shadows, the natural environment
for their reproduction and, thus, the perpetuation of social asymmetries and exclusion.
For example, few years ago women would not go publicly into television to afford
visibility to the abuse. It is unlikely this would happen, on one hand, without political
and institutional support and without going through some steps toward openness to the
world and social change, on the other hand.
It is quite difficult to establish connections between micro-violence (domestic violence,
street violence) and poverty, during a stage of decline. At the largest urban centers –
Mindelo and in particular Praia15 – the street criminality seemed to disturb everyday life
at any given moment. In islands like Fogo, where the conservativeness is more
extensive, street violence is also less frequent, probably due to social mechanism linked
to local connections that balance the lack of family relationships and familial control.
It will hardly happen something dissimilar with the domestic violence, a more
disseminate and certainly more resilient phenomena. For a long time, gender-based
social roles would have been seen as natural and imprescriptible. In the edge, it has
leaded part of the population to embrace their subalternity. These days, domestic
violence (in a wider physical and verbal definition, predominantly inflicted by men on
women) has become the target of social disgrace. The incidence of domestic violence is
hard to estimate16, but is acknowledged as a socially transversal occurrence. Men
haven‟t put aside their authoritarian stance, and the notion of leadership received during
childhood does not fade per se. When not materialized in strict control over women, the
notion of household‟s leadership translates to a conviction in their superiority and,
therefore, in the arrogated arbitrarity of male behavior.
15
Frequently, the informants, especially those from other islands, talk about Praia as the example of a
violent town. Concerning this popular perception, which may be founded as much on stereotypes as on
subjectivity, without a doubt the accelerated urbanization of the capital is linked to the changes in
behavior identified as an increase in violence; about the implication between urbanization and the
increase in violence, see ROQUE and CARDOSO, 2008.
16
In 2007, it was estimated as almost a quarter the percentage of women victims of violence, a figure
that, according to the statements of Minister Cristina Fontes would place Cape Verde in a position
equivalent
to
other
countries,
cf.
http://www.panapress.com/freenewspor.asp?code=por006028&dte=30/03/2007, consulted in July 2009.
166
Poverty, for sure
In addition to being a colonial legacy, poverty will be, in regards of recent times, the
result of a compilation of unprotective behaviors in the middle of families and their near
social surrounding. The public institutions and NGOs seek to perform in this area.
Throughout decades, poverty was considered immanent in the archipelago, a product of
adverse ecologic conditions and apparently scarce natural resources. Affecting living
conditions, droughts were an excuse that allowed, during the colonial age, the
manipulation of economic conditions and social strains to perpetuate the Cape Verdean
population‟s impoverishment. Only during the very last years of colonialism, when
were implemented social policies, have the hungers ceased to cause victims17. Having
changed the relationship between men and environment, it has become less binding and
even less determinant of the country‟s progression.
For centuries, the Cape Verdeans‟ existence has been a struggle against poverty or,
more precisely, a harsh struggle for survival. Contrary to the skepticism of the
independence stage, Cape Verde has managed to become a middle-income developing
country. However, since the development does not necessarily convert into eradication
of poverty, the country has pockets of extreme poverty. According to records from
2000, 45% of residents were considered poor, with 30% poor and 15% very poor18.
From these, about two thirds lived in rural locations.
The visitants can notice old people, mostly unaccompanied old women, catching and
packaging grinded rock. Children and teenagers can be seen carrying beams of
firewood, and perhaps transporting water to homes without water supply systems.
Poverty, for single mothers most of all, may be equivalent to eat less than sufficient and
to live in a dwelling that instead of providing shelter expels the family members into the
streets. Urban poverty, manifested in container-houses, seems in some cases more
grievous and harder to fight than rural poverty.
Around the time of the independence, poverty was a matter of survival. Policies were
directed by the imperative need of preventing hunger. In effect, since the
independence„s beginning that hunger had become a target for power and an apology
for pragmatism. Just like happened during certain periods of colonialism, several work
fronts were launched after the independence. At the time, the international aid was not
given but was instead sold for a symbolic price to prevent, for still unclear motives, a
dependency mentality from taking roots. It is doubtful that such mentality has been
prevented, remaining a target of occasional criticisms. In any case, what is being
criticized or discarded is not so much the almost absolute dependency on social support,
unavoidable in some cases, but mostly the dismissal from searching and proposing
solutions for these social issues, on account of expectations centered exclusively on the
State‟s social action.
Poverty is no longer limited to survival, it is also perceived in an inclusive and manner,
consentaneous to the perception of a changing world. The poverty factors are being
17
In fact, the launch of public endeavors, such as road construction, had composed the practice of the
colonial administration until the beginning of the last century. In few words, the growing racism and the
interest in taking advantage of the Cape Verdean labor in the farm of Sao Tome and Principe that allowed
the impoverishment of the population, so to force them into the farms, mostly during the middle of the
20th century. In the end of the 50s, and even more so in the 60s, this policy of indigenization of the Cape
Verdean residents was reverted: the doors for emigration for other destinies were open and there was a
return to large public works which have mitigated the effects of droughts.
18
Data from the UNDP, quoted by GRASSI, 2003: 150 and 280.
167
identified, namely the lack of instruction or the high number of dependents. A poor
person is a person without instruction or with a large family, for instance, submitted to
the forced contiguity of several generations inside the same dwelling, from greatgrandparents to great-grandchildren.
The circumstances have changed and, in addition to a growth-inducing macro-economic
evolution, the purpose is to alleviate poverty, nowadays no longer categorized as lack of
food, but as deprivation from basic living conditions or from affordance to essential
services. Despite the controversy in the statistics, it cannot be denied that Cape Verde
has been following a path toward the reduction of poverty19, in a more obvious manner
in Santiago and São Vicente than, for instance, in Fogo and Santo Antao, where a third
of the population is considered to be extremely poor.
In spite the nearly unavoidable discrepancy between the projects‟ results in reports and
in the field, There is a deserved pride in the benefits related to the promotion of living
standards, especially the provision to a large number of people of water and electricity
supplies– the goal is to reach 95% of the population until 2011 and have universal
supply by 201520 –, education and healthcare. This set of accomplishments has leaded
many participants to declare that nowadays nobody is starving in Cape Verde,
particularly in rural regions where the family and community solidarity networks give
assistance in the most extreme situations. In reality, such does not impede the
occurrence of hunger situations, but it is understandable that the progress attained
causes many Cape Verdeans to believe hunger was eradicated in the archipelago.
The economic evolution does not dissipate the difficulties, mostly those occurring from
conjunctural fluctuations. For example, the deficiency of resources, such as natural gas,
may increase the consumption of firewood, the energy source most used by poor people,
are having consequences on the arrangement of everyday life and eventually, causing
school abandonment (which affects more girls than boys, resulting from the prejudices
about men and women‟s social roles). With reference to the demographic growth, the
state or the Cape Verdean market will hardly absorb its impact. However, it provides for
a better social conscience and, consequently, for some effort, both volunteer and
professional, in projects for combating poverty and in behalf of the promotion of
personal and social competencies.
Moreover, there are presently more products and opportunities than before. The
economic and social diversity, while advocating dynamics of local accumulation, also
allows for small advantages in matters of survival, this being a reason for the
endorsement of the informal market. For the institutions, the matter goes beyond the
eradication of poverty, entailing the creation of welfare for the entire population, which
obviously entails the management of human resources and, in consequence, an efficient
and ethically consentaneous regulation, in accordance with the contemporary social ties.
Then, the breach between economical growth and the endurance of incidents such as
domestic violence and child abandonment is further emphasized. Such breach divides
the prognosis along those who believe in the change of traditions and those who believe
that certain conducts – like child abandonment – will persist beyond any social
disapproval.
19
From 1988 until 2002, the population living in poverty has decreased about one quarter, down to 36.7%
(cf. DECRP II, 2008:80), despite the negative evolution in the decade of 1990, when the poor population
may have increased from 30% to 37% and the extremely poor from 14% to 20%, cf data by the DECRP
from 2004, quoted by ÉVORA, 2009: 4.
20
DECRP II 2008:161.
168
Diversity of family relations
We are facing distorted domains of complicated categorization, whose connection to
other facets of the collective life are ruled by a relative indetermination. For that reason,
it is quite difficult to generalize the situations mentioned bellow.
With reference to gender relationships, they can be inscribed into supposed archaisms.
For instance, as a habitual phenomenon in nearly enclosed rural regions, where the
material deprivation is mixed with a reverence of the powerful, not only is maternity the
core of women‟s status as also occurs the sale of girls, which is the loan of daughters to
wealthy individuals. In reality, it‟s not hard to find many examples of similar family
arrangements in other social and historical contexts21. It is equally noticed that the
relationship between youths goes through or entails performing rituals – for example,
the (dramatized) coercion to sexual intercourse, after an initial (and someway fake)
resistance from the girls, who are expected to be respectful and not shameful. While this
occurs in some more isolated rural environments, if isolation is in question, the female
resourcefulness is the clearest feature in the contacts among youths, in the streets and
public places.
Anyway, gender relations will not change be mere empathy with the modern rules of
equity and gender parity, neither are ensured results from the women social promotion.
There is a clear awareness that the capacitation of women won‟t repeatedly change the
dependency connection, nor it will eliminate any subservience toward men, even by
women actively engaged in such capacitation. For that motive, staring with a pragmatic
approach, rooted in the confirmation of many unions‟ precariousness and in the juridical
issues resulting from their dissolution, are adopted precautionary measures to avert, for
example, the transference of houses loaned to women to their spouses. The multiplicity
of issues suggests several preventive responses, to reduce the unbalance in gender
relations.
Social changes, shattering of customary roles and claims for equality might all originate
violence over women. Actually, the cultural changes may become a starting point for
conflict and domestic violence – physical and psychological – sometimes ending in fatal
outcomes, whose dimension is inflated by intense personal interactions in the midst of
small surroundings. It is no wonder that, though less frequently, a couple of devaluating
discourses about domestic violence ignore the asymmetry inherent to gender relations
and instead endorse causes more closely connected to the conflicts than to the women
themselves. After all, it is easier to process a change of roles in the political stratosphere
than do it in the real world.
Apart from personal testimonies and official records, it will be very complicated to
estimate the prevalence of domestic violence, which only recently has become a visible
occurrence and, more significant, socially disapproved. In the past, the social
acceptance invalidated any impact violence domestic might have, since being neighbors
entailed abstaining from any evaluative appreciation regarding other people‟s lives.
Until recently, that family thing and the old mentality assisted in occulting conflicts and
reproducing behavioral frames that are no longer tolerated, women cannot take anything
21
The fact that this practice is noticed is a sign of change. In some opinions, such practice configures an
unacceptable derogation of individual freedom, in circumstance, the freedom of modernity, incompatible
with the personal submission to links and ties that would precede him/her and would restrict their options,
like happens in these familial setups.
169
nowadays, they cannot deal with their husbands (...) it was usual for him to get another
woman, the wife should stay quiet at home waiting for her husband, she shouldn‟t have
this attitude.
Even though socially transversal, in large measure the violence over women22derives
from their dependency, an assessable condition but also an interiorized one, a reality so
much more complex because sometimes that interiorization is bonded with the
acceptance of the familial responsibilities that fall upon women.
This is the same as declaring that the social conceptions based on individual
accomplishment and an unequivocal assumption of equality have helped to delineate a
social frame that hopefully will be proscribed, for being incompatible with the requisites
for human development. The institutions and NGOs are committed in the sensibilization
and instruction of individuals who, in turn, progress from denying to accepting of their
subordination, to which they occasionally return. Nevertheless, the mentality changes,
mostly rebalanced gender relationships, create a politically supported goal, pursued by
many institutions and increasingly gaining social acceptance. A paradigmatic change in
gender relations was accomplished, as some women refuse to accept subordinancy
anymore.
A core feature of these gender relations is polygamy – either for the rank it occupies in
social representations or on account of the much debated economic and social aftermath
–, a subject predictably avoided by the social scrutiny.
Expressions of departure from determinate tributary conceptions of patriarchy and
paternalism, defending that even women are chauvinist against other women… even
women condemn other women…, are the result of interiorized inequality and
subordination, whose utmost effect could be, for instance, the conflicts among women
themselves.
In the words of Cape Verdean women, society – in which they are included –
accommodates polygamy, since maybe it made part of the culture. Likewise, from the
women‟s perspective, violence is blamed on polygamy, considered a cause for family
deregulation, paternal negligence and, ultimately, for poverty. Although polygamy may
be listed as inducing poverty – mainly due to the common unreliability toward children,
causing a decline of living standards and school abandonment –, such connection is
neither immediate nor necessary.
It is inaccurate to typify and, in a distorted manner, to judge gender relationships, in
particular those of polygamic nature. It must be stated that cases of sequential (or serial)
polyandry, partly resulting from the search for a companion and support for the
children, are fairly widespread. Even when men have other families, some women
recognize them as support sources. To assume as truthful situations repeatedly depicted
by women involved in the defense of their fellow female citizens‟ citizenship rights,
some women become accustomed to the existence of second wives, mostly due to the
impracticality of having an independent life.
Meanwhile, the paradigm of women‟s subalternity, extended to conceptions about
sexuality and maternity, is shifting. Nevertheless, akin to the reproduction of women‟s
social subalternity not forcefully being a poverty inducer, it is not clear that the
emancipation of women results in social promotion or decreased poverty. Without
22
The ordinary conception of masculinity will sooner turn men the target of laughter than grieve his, after
all, unusual condition of victimhood.
170
forgoing the correlations between, for example, polygamy and poverty, there are no
linear causal connections between gender relations.
It is consensually established that occasionally the family fails to constitute a secure
network for social reproduction and socialization. It is often said that the organization of
family resources in any home is dependent on implicit deliberations, resulting from
more or less engrained visions of the male and female roles. The adjustment and
accommodation may be established, consistent with internalized and possibly
undeclared codes, a woman would get the food, waiting that her companion would
share the expenses with the house and the children; this woman‟s other companion
would ask her for her wage straight away... In many cases, these women don‟t have a
sway over the income of their companions, which may place them, and in particular
their children, at a disadvantage
Since family is not an unequivocally secure platform for the social integration of
youths, in fact, the individual trajectories are fulfilled by deploying the previously
mentioned aids from relatives, even distant ones. An absent father may occasionally
give financial support for his children. It must be said, the opinion of men about their
paternal responsibilities is very much reliant on the appreciations they have subjectively
made about the living conditions of mothers and children. Apparently, owing to several
reasons besides economic ones, women not always proceed with judicial actions on
matters of alimony.
Although not constantly, family relationships are extended to not so close relatives and
to emigrants and, at its most, are stretched among the neighborhood. It is taking into
account the solidarity of extensive family relations that the single mothers are able to
calculate their prospective future, one kid, we can manage...
Despite the resilience of families and the extensiveness of solidary practices, in a
approximately immediate future the urbanization, mundane values and the demographic
growth might change this extended solidarity, which has been functioning until now.
Social mobility, improved living conditions, lesser reliance on local and familial
conditions and individualism might finally fade that solidarity.
Micro-violence prevention
Notwithstanding the appearance of institutions committed in victim support, claiming
for domestic violence be declared a public crime, or demanding the adoption of
restrictive measures to guarantee the victims‟ physical integrity, the prevalence of
poverty is more easily acknowledged in Cape Verde than micro-violence, as a result of
historical and cultural motives. In any case, domestic violence is becoming increasingly
intolerable. The institutional promotion of a social conscience about poverty and microviolence has created conditions for the awareness of issues that in any other way
wouldn‟t cross the threshold of personal drama. Therefore, the indication of a minimum
moral target is implemented, becoming a premise of the equality and the fulfillment of
development goals for the citizens. On account of multiple support actions, focused on
particular facets or specific groups, which intended to reverse deprivation conditions or
to prevent risk behaviors, the political discourse about domestic violence and other
types of violence is finally gaining some moral strength.
To talk about violence implies talking about phenomena that no longer fit into this
reality channeled by ancient cultural codes, which, if not preventing, at least ensued
171
imprecise and accommodated conflicts23. Furthermore, despite coming from the outside
or being a product of development, micro-violence collides with its morabeza
(welcoming) image. Regardless of accounts about the legendary courage of some Cape
Verdeans and the appreciation for their physical intrepidity, there are some difficulties
in acknowledging the course of violence in the midst of a micro-insular society since, as
stated, it contradicts the external public image of Cape Verde. Within this mutant and
complex cultural frame that matter should be taken into consideration the most
dissimilar opinions on this matter.
Episodes of violence against street children seem to collapse into more comprehensible
approaches concerning the social roots of this foregoing phenomenon. The compactness
of housing quarters or the vicissitudes of family life are said to drive the children and
youths to the street life. The children talk about having to do chores, performing tasks
like fetching water, reasons for preferring to be taken to institutional shelters. Not
necessarily every instance of street live involves abandonment, but occasionally because
of rough family circumstances, the street environment becomes more alluring. In some
cases, street life becomes permanent, at least in the sense of tracing a glass ceiling of
opportunities for these individuals.
Although not quite adequately, children have become the target of support measures and
are being secluded in public and private sheltering centers which provide them some
sort of assistance. These shelters don‟t eliminate the risk of unemployment,
marginalization or alcohol (increasing among women) or drug addictions and, perhaps,
troubles with the law. But its purpose is for the children not getting stigmatized by
violence and poverty, going from victims of exclusion to youngsters “in trouble with the
law”.
Believing in these accounts, drugs appear as a disturbing feature, for the reason that it
incites robberies and creates fear and suspicion in the local society24.Tranquility is
gradually disturbed, whereas to the visitors the scenery is seemingly peaceful.
Naturally, the living experience must be taken into consideration, since in São Filipe
there is hearsay of how dangerous Praia can be. In the islands afflicted by small
criminality, the institutional voices are encouraging a pretension that they can ensure the
freedom of having tranquility in the streets and the predictability of everyday life, since
the touristic industry25 is reliant on it.
To bear in mind that it isn‟t clearly perceptible the relation between, on one hand,
micro-violence – domestic and street-based – and, on the other hand, other hypothetical
factors, such as the archipelago‟s scarcity of resources. Anyway, micro-violence (in this
instance, more domestic or gender-based violence than street criminality) has more
enduring effects than the armed conflicts occurring within temporally delimited
intervals.
23
For example, the event of kasubódi has social and symbolic significances radically diverse from the
emotion-based conflicts, as portrayed in the book Os dois irmãos (Two brothers), by Germano Almeida.
24
See also Roque and Cardoso (2008).
25
For this reason, there are investments made on the sensibilization needed for the establishment of a
civil society or a public opinion which does not tolerate corruption or any other kind of criminality
(potentially) damaging the State, such as for example, drugs trafficking.
172
The fight against poverty
From the macroeconomic perspective, the efforts for eradicating poverty seem a safe
bet, less in the sense of what was achieved (as, it shouldn‟t not be forgotten, the
economic situation is very diversified) than in the sense of what seems achievable. It is
usually affirmed that poverty will be eradicated. In keep with the economic conditions
for Cape Verde, the eradication of cases of extreme poverty comes up as an attainable
goal, either through the State‟s performance or through solidary actions of the familial,
communal and institutional sorts. It is deemed perfectly possible to minimize the
material poverty of the population. The symbolic gains resulting from this perception
are priceless and impel the commitment of the institutional actors engaged in social
projects.
In effect, fighting poverty is not restricted to a macroeconomic conduction, but also
concerns the people‟s empowerment. Beginning with an integral vision of human
development, it is then made a distinction between spiritual poverty and material
poverty26 . The last one is considered the most serious, for it collides with the individual
ability to search for opportunities in life.
It is attributed large economic significance to women, as the result of their
entrepreneurial mentality, quite the opposite for instance of the eagerness to hold riskfree jobs in the public sector27. This search for a life is partially motivated by poverty,
which afflicts mostly women and in particular single mothers. As the locals say, poverty
is feminine, among other reasons because women take on all responsibility for raising
the children, in most cases renouncing any demands for the paternal share in this
responsibility. Not unlike the experience from many other societies, a substantial part of
the reproduction of families and society itself rest on women‟s shoulders28.
An example of leverage for fighting poverty is the housing rehabilitation, by linking the
houses to public services providing water and electricity supplies, or building brand new
social housing intended for women and their respective families, under the sponsorship
of programs for socio-communitarian development. Although is demanded some coparticipation, for instance, in the construction materials, such endeavors help to make
dreams come true, principally the dream of finishing a house which was fought for in a
daily basis and that many times are brought to a halt in the stage of finishing the
rooftop. It is expected from the women who are afforded the housing to change their
lives, which is to believe that an improvement of the material conditions will have
repercussion in the social promotion of women and, consequently, their respective
family units. Nevertheless, the social integration resulting from these improved living
conditions will not be secure or immediate, yet on behalf of many people, it simply
must be endorsed.
The expectations regarding the important role played by women in this society collide
with the impending subalternity to which they are routinely submitted. For this, women
26
As demonstrated by its naïf feature, such expressions don‟t occur from theoretical acquisitions. They
were, actually, used by people without any other instruction than the skill from years involved in
associations fro the promotion of development, solidarity, etc. However, these expressions show a
practice converging toward the theorizations about the involvement of the poor and excluded in outlining
potential life paths.
27
For example, see GRASSI, 2003: 108-109.
28
Significantly, in the FAIMO, already over 80% of labor force was female; about this topic, see Grassi
(2003: 151).
The evaluation of FAIMO is not unequivocal; about FAIMO – also about emigration – as a mechanism
for the eventual perpetuation of poverty in rural regions, see Évora (2009: 5-6).
173
are elected as a group to further support and, according to a conception of gender
relationships ruled by equality, to endorse an awareness of their social worth. So, in
conclusion, women need an organization. In other words, without loosing sight from the
prized long–term benefits for the whole society, it is given a preferential assistance to
women and not necessarily to family units, for believing women are the fundamental
actors in this mandatory social change and finally understanding it does not exclude and
rather entails a rebalance of gender relations. The purpose is to cause changes in gender
relations that avert the subjugation of women and, more significantly, provide symbolic
and social value to their economic contribution. For that, with different degrees of
involvement in accordance with the public institutions and NGOs, it will be followed a
strategy (with growing relevance) for, at least, sustain the prevailing tendency amid the
poorer social contexts of gender differences having harder repercussions against
women.
From the NGOs that found their performance on these judgments, microcredit is mostly
ascribed to women, though it is also accredited to men. These days, in two NGOs, there
are amounts from USD 30,000 up to USD 300,000, available in exchange of an avail
approval. The concession is aimed at several business activities, according to the
economic and social background and location/island. In some cases, the concession
entails basic formation training in microcredit management. The reimbursement rates
are applied over 80% of the approved capital. Some people will reimburse with delay
and, it must be said, under mentorship. In both NGOs, there was never need for
judiciary appeals. As a rule, microcredit is not afforded to persons whose poverty
situation is extreme.
Besides the influence of the conjunctural evolution, given the diversity of social
contexts and the ethical environment prevailing in Cape Verde, there is a possibility that
the microcredit may constitute a small advantage with respect to the eradication of
poverty. Microcredit demands a proper social environment, mostly to envisage
economic performances that are not submitted to robbery, theft, etc. Although in larger
numbers than a few years ago, the manifestations of micro-violence in the streets are not
an impediment to small-scaled economic enterprises. Other than this feature, much
determined by political circumstances, the economic growth and diversification of
needs are equally crucial to the appearance of several distinctive market niches and
other facilitating opportunities for economic initiatives of small dimension, regardless
of having a non-neglectful social impact.
The attack against poverty unfolds into many diversified approaches29. In some islands,
the economic platform for the reduction of poverty entails investments in the rural
development, in order to increase the agricultural activities‟ worth, as well as to
reconstitute the rural fabric. It is expected, with the dissemination of equipments for
social support and technologies for the daily life, on one hand, and with the upgrading
of accessibilities, on the other hand, that the revalorization of rural surroundings will
attract people to the agricultural islands and to the rural areas. This purpose does not
effectively challenge the assertions made about the urban surroundings as the “main
world”30, synonymous of the place where decisive social mutations occur, in opposition
to the loss of the rural world. Undoubtedly, the urban surrounding have the most
possibilities for creating value, however the archipelago is composed of diverse
29
Based on the evaluation of economic evolutions, these institutions will adjust the offers of professional
training. The traditional areas, such as carpentry and woodwork, which no longer have guaranteed
employment, are substituted by electronics and skills for building construction.
30
Évora (2009: 6).
174
opportunities, making certain endeavors in the non-isolated rural world more profitable
than holding non-qualified jobs in the city.
The economic and social diversity is favorable to individual and collective enterprises,
since it has propitious condition for researching ways to overcome situations of
deprivation and poverty, for instance, starting with the valorization of local resources.
Among the possibilities to fight poverty are the processes of communitarian and
regional development. Nevertheless, these are not continuously replicable, because the
success of a case may not be submitted to perpetual reproduction, taking into
consideration, for example, the market‟s limitations.
Alongside an articulation with larger economic contexts, the processes of
communitarian and regional development require favorable economic and social
environments, without which it becomes much harder, if not impossible, to support the
ability to determinate their personal and collective destinies.
By way of the growth and development occurred in these last three decades of
independent existence, poverty has ceased to be considered a fatality in Cape Verde.
There are even some sectors for which poverty is not part of future equations, though
the survival conditions are still tight and might sway according to the economic
conjunctures.
Constructing expectations about the future
Poverty is no longer a fatality. In the field, institutions and NGO exert their effort on
human training as a process to prevent poverty, so that, notwithstanding the lexical
renovation, the Cape Verdean people may pace again the trails of the historical
“tradition” of this archipelago. The human training – the question is: according to
whose ethics? – is seen as the solution for the prevention of poverty. In effect,
investment in training has become a common expression, in the belief that fighting
poverty (and social exclusion) will be achieved by fighting against social and symbolic
deprivation. There is a clear perception that the changes in attitude will not occur
immediately, but they are part of the country‟s and its common citizen‟s future. In
reality, for example, since it the small gains in the lives of the most impoverished were
acknowledged, the institutions and NGO have attempted to link material supports and
sensibilization, for it is believed that training also depends on the creation of a public
opinion more favorable to behavior changes.
It should be taken into consideration that, though within a liberal social and cultural
frame, training and sensibilization (for instance, in essential domains for the shaping of
gender relations) are dealt with indifference and, possibly, a veiled resistance to social
change which has been, progressively, defeated. Before, it would not be possible to talk
about family planning. In the sensibilization sessions, men would attend in fewer
numbers and, whether to control or to feign distance and superiority, they would keep
themselves apart. In any case, the acquired information could result in a contestation of
the hierarchy existing inside their homes and, in the edge, could represent a manner to
defraud roles and codes, such as those of conjugal fidelity or maternity. All this
illustrates the complexity of connections between poverty, cultural standards and social
change.
In any case, contrary to the opinions against social change, the prevailing perception is
that the country will improve, all depending on investments in training. Removed from
eventual geo-strategic considerations related to the prospect of exporting qualified
175
labour or providing services in the region, training is believed to increase the
possibilities for personal choice, thus being a method for empowerment and poverty
reduction. Together with the supposed universality of values that inspire those who, in
the field, commit to fight poverty, it is also a widespread belief in the advancement of
Cape Verde‟s society and people. True or false, this belief is motive for the actions of
institutions and their respective agents. And this institutional action is delineating the
social and political environment.
The common person does not think about the future in a political manner, just fight for
survival and hopes things will get better. Get on with life… not only represents a
certainty, but mostly represents everyday‟s rush (comparing to the hard life of the past,
there are some who defend that it has been established an assistentialism-dependent
mentality). The search for a living is reliant on individual initiative and it frequently
requires small gains, through the satisfaction of needs and wants that become attainable
every day, even for the most indigent. This is no minor contribution to the effort in
support of social cohesion. Actually, it is still quite interesting that, in many families in
a poverty situation, food is not listed as an immediate need31.
The social differences accentuate and some of this poverty persists, without being felt, a
diffuse social acrimony32. Unrelated to the processes of social differentiation – there are
those who point out a high level of concentration of wealth and of social inequality,
which is not hard to believe, given the poverty of a significant part of the population and
the apparent prosperity of others – intervenes the perception of being implicated in a
destiny common to rulers and citizens for which, as in other circumstances, the ethic of
the rulers is crucial
The construction of a cohesive social fabric – defined by parity and social regulation –
is based on the performance of institutions, starting with the State. For instance, even
when after accepting the impossibility of achieving the required goals – for example,
completely putting an end to situations of child abandonment – what remains crucial is
the sign these institutions are giving out to society. The performance of the State and
other institutions widens the social conscience about certain political and ethical
consensus. This performance is decisive to fight against manifestations of poverty and,
more significantly, of social marginality. And it seems decisive, mostly due to the
micro-insularity, to the physical contiguity and to the (imaginary) personal knowledge
of other fellow citizens.
Removed from past ideological designs, social integration has become a new goal. The
minimalism of this desideratum makes it consensual. The institutional supervision,
partly induced by international aid33, replaces the former sociability and social
31
Cf. DECRP II, 2008, p.49.
Although aware of the subjectivity load, it must be said that the absence of social acrimony is
noticeable when, for example, comparing Cape Verde to Sao Tome and Príncipe, notwithstanding the
affability of most Santomeans. Such difference may be explained by an intuitive interpretation, based on
the recent economic evolution of the country and on an appreciation, as grossly and biased as it may be,
of its leaders‟ ethic.
33
This is a reality that is immediately emphasized when, in the field, one gets in touch with institutions
engaged in putting down or lessening several social issues. However, the social conscience of the Cape
Verdean politicians, also suggested by the hard living conditions and by the scarcity of resources in this
country, in many circumstances the State (including public institutions) and international institutions
interact as partners. If in other political contexts is referred an appropriation of the State, of privatizing its
social functions and losing sovereignty, in Cape Verde such issues don‟t seem to bother, unregardingly of
unavoidable divergences in every institutional trajectory. Quite the opposite, the partnerships have
32
176
interaction which, although geographically circumscribed, would still be relevant.
Proposing to mitigate the inhumanity of poverty and to provide the bases for escaping
poverty, the social support action is directed at familial and communitarian frames.
Using some voluntarism to slightly enforce the reality – as well as a normative structure
and values at one undefined and implicit – family and community will become nuclear
and polarizing institutions exerting efforts in the intended rearrangement of the social
fabric. Naturally, it is possible to notice, within the social fabric, some resistance to the
behavioral changes proposed by these institutions. The effort to assemble families –
from the past, the present, both extensive and dispersed – inside the model of nuclear
family has to deal with social inertias and the vicissitudes of individual, familial and
collective stories that take place in a landscape of fast social change. This entails an
engagement in individual training and, for some actors, a belief that this will wield a
normalizing function over social family ties. In any case, and as it always happens, the
behavioral changes are less dependent on a volitive component than on social evolution.
Following the independence, poverty – and in particular hunger – was chosen as an
event to eradicate, a priority purpose in managing social exclusion, regarding which has
prevailed a sense of minor pressure. Nowadays, it is a known fact that, just as poverty is
not eliminated by the economic growth, the elimination of poverty does not
immediately lead to the suppression of social exclusion. Concerning this matter, a new
path is being explored. The ideological perspective from the independence stage, in
some way lined by a paradigm of economic growth, has been discarded. The
instruments for analysis and management have become sophisticated and the cultural
openness provoked a more lucid analysis, on occasion contrary to prejudices induced by
the socialization of land or family, concerning the social relations.
At first sight, the distinction made by the individuals involved in social promotion
between material poverty and spiritual poverty – as mentioned before, a rather naïf
version of more comprehensive perspectives on the subject of the binomial
poverty/social exclusion – seems quite factitious. However, it translates the
consciousness that the fight against poverty will not be consequential without
combating the various manifestations of social exclusion resulting, for example, from
the prevalence of alcoholism – for some experts, a serious social and public health issue
– which, among other circumstances, are aggravated by social deprivation. Having said
it, several agents working in institutions for social support have a clear awareness of the
need for an enduring and continuous investment in human training and that, in spite of
this, it will be impossible to prevent every form of exclusion and every social risk.
The connection between poverty and micro-violence is not linear. It is possible to
envision the economic growth without eliminating the subalternity of women and the
marginalization of underprivileged children and youths. By itself, a decrease in poverty
will not necessarily encourage an intense change of these behaviors, which are presently
reproached for being incompatible with the human development. In Cape Verde, this
poses one of the main challenges.
Conclusive notes
It is hard to produce categorical considerations, either on account of the exploratory
nature of the investigation or because this subject demands a pluridisciplinary research,
reinforced the extension of the state‟s administrative action, making it multifaceted. As such, while being
intervener and proactive, the State does not necessarily appears as just a tutelary and customary authority.
177
pertaining to the multiple Cape Verdean contexts. In Cape Verde, it might be possible to
associate singular trajectories of extreme poverty to child abandonment (having
repercussions, for instance, in school dropout) or to the asymmetry in gender
relationships. However, there are no discernible univocal correlations between these two
occurrences. This means that, if the domestic violence was eventually to be eliminated,
this wouldn‟t entail the eradication of poverty and the end of poverty does not
accomplish an inexistence of social marginality.
However, there is a commitment in the resolution of social issues, and among the
persons engaged in the management of social support projects there is a conviction –
somehow reducible to the bias of the institutional position – in the solution of social
issues. These days, there is a political, social and cultural environment favorable to a
basic institutional commitment that operates as leverage for social changes and in favor
of the combating the numerous forms of deprivation. This sophisticated vision of the
world, on one hand, and the social and individual condition in itself, on the other hand,
are not related to the capacity for verbal elaboration of the Cape Verdean residents, both
rich and poor. Part of this vision may be constructed from the repository of accounts,
experienced and perhaps narrated by the older citizens. It may be also constructed from
the migration‟s cultural inputs, or just from the socialization afforded by the media. No
matter what, the vision of the world is favorable to change, if we want, to the absorption
of ideas and values that are becoming imperative and guides for the social and collective
action which is are advancing the world.
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179
Conclusion
Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues and Carlos Manuel Lopes
The proposal for a comparative analysis on the correlations between peace (and war)
and the evolution of poverty at Portuguese-speaking African countries has resulted in a
collection of apparently more intuitive conclusions – i.e. about the mutual implications
between events – and in another collection of ideas deserving further research. Among
these, it is emphasized the need for a rising combination of the qualitative and
quantitative types of information: the relevance of including an emic approach in
researches; the differentiated but equally important burden of situations of instability
and insecutiry on the living conditions of individuals and, consequently, on the
development; the relevance of other factors conditioning poverty, other than war and
instability; the existence of both constraints and possibilities for individuals and their
life strategies in environments of war and insecurity. The ability to establish this sort of
conclusions is fundamentally due to the meaningful and qualitative nature of most part
of the studies conducted in the realm of this project, a fact confirmed in the majority of
texts.
The starting point – as initially declared – was the recognition that this group of
countries shares a colonial and independence history that, on the surface, could concur
for the production of similar development contexts. Meanwhile, the study of the results
from over thirty years of independence clearly shows the differences in terms of
evolution of the indicators for poverty and development.
In the context of independent African countries, having conflicts and wars as a key
explanation for the economic underdevelopment and the decline (Rodrick, 1999), this
relation is not always considered to be a direct causality. The evolution of political
systems and warfare situations stipulates, in a distinguished manner, the possibilities for
economic growth and development, but this is not the only explanation for the
perseverance of the negative poverty indicators. In every PALOP, the independences
took place in 1975 – with the exception of Guinea-Bissau, where it was unilaterally
declared in September 1973. At first single-party states (until 1990/1992), currently
these countries‟ political regimes have transitioned into multi-party systems, having
been recently conducted legislative elections: in Angola, the most recent one in 2008; in
Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, in 2006; in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique,
in 2009.
In spite of many difficulties registered throughout the consolidation of democracies
following the independences, the sense of political evolution is, in every PALOP,
increasingly founded on systems of democratic representation, being the fight against
poverty their main and latest guideline. Nevertheless, along these paths there have been
several political events that leaded to the permanence or occurrence of conflict
situations. The occurrence of sporadic conflicts (in Guinea-Bissau and in Sao Tome and
Principe) and prolonged wars in two of theses countries – Angola and Mozambique –
has constituted an essential conditioning feature for the development and aggravation of
poverty situations. Conversely, the inexistence of conflicts or war in Cape Verde during
180
these decades has created conditions for the accomplishment of better development
indicators. Even so, the inequality represents yet one of the main characteristics of Cape
Verdean society and economy.
The foremost conclusion to be taken into consideration within this frame is that, despite
having been established a direct – and almost evident – correlation between the events
poverty and war, there are other factors which, in a combined manner and inside
specific contexts, also concur to the continuation and/or augmentation of poverty rates.
Therefore, these other explanations should be related in the best possible manner to the
perspective that places war at the center of the research on poverty and development,
again attributing a special relevance to the particular contexts and evolutions in each
country.
War also had differentiated durations and intensities in each one of these countries,
which has allowed, at the present time, for differentiated development conditions. In
Mozambique, it went from 1977 until 1992; in Angola, it had extended until 2002,
marked by various accords and a brief pre-electoral peace in 1992; in Guinea-Bissau, in
addition to several attempts and coups (1980, 2003) the war of 1998/9 stands as a
symbol of the “institutionalized” precariousness of political situation that, nowadays (in
2009), has been portrayed by political assassinations; with a relatively lesser frequency
but equally affecting the rates of stability and security, the attempted overthrows in Sao
Tome and Principe represent a feature enabling some instability.
Regarding the political orientation, after the independence all these countries have
adopted systems with a socialist foundation, framed within specific circumstances of
geostrategic and international politics issues which, in the final stage of the Cold War,
had been weakened and reshaped in diverse ways at each country. Furthermore, with
reference to the economic frame, these countries have shared similar post-independence
backgrounds, at first oriented to a centralized model and then, since the end of the 80s
decade, proceeding with a gradual approach to the free market. In Mozambique, Sao
Tome and Principe and Guinea-Bissau, the structural adjustment was started in 1987,
followed by reform programs conducted in Mozambique between 1984 and 1990. Since
2001 have been initiated the PARPA, specific programs for the relief and reduction of
poverty. In Angola, the transitional period into the market economy was also started in
1987, while in Cape Verde the economic stabilization programs were launched in 1991.
In all these countries, recent political and economic guidelines have put an emphasis on
the need for stabilization and development. Meanwhile, poverty is persevering and
affecting high percentages of the population: absolute poverty reaches 68% in Angola
(2001), 65% in Guinea-Bissau (2003), 54% in Mozambique (2005) and Sao Tome and
Principe (2001), and 37% in Cape Verde (2002). Regarding extreme poverty (less than
one Dollar a day), it afflicts 26% of the population in Angola, 21% in Cape Verde,
Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, and 15% in Sao Tome and Principe, at the same years
referred above (Feliciano et al., 2008: 84).
Taking into consideration the background of conflicts and wars and the poverty
indicators, it matters then to focus the analysis on probable directions – which is to say,
the product of political, social and economic orientations and the outcomes truly
achieved in every moment – more than on a simple comparison of poverty rates or
development rates among several countries, since the performances concerning the
subject of poverty are quite discouraging in all PALOP. The Cape Verde case makes for
an accurate demonstration: considered one of the best countries in Africa for matters of
political rights and civic liberties, the subjacent factors to the “good governance and the
181
construction of an open and non-violent society” were the geographic and historical
conditions, although these have not eradicated poverty or the dependency on donations
(Baker, 2006).
There are numerous contributions resulting from this study for the research theories,
either relating to conflicts in Africa or relating to studies about poverty, allowing for a
reflection on the PALOP cases which is rarely referred in these terms. The mutual
influences between poverty and peace are properly delivered in specialized literature
(Smith, 2005; Bush, 2004; Green and Hulme, 2005; Narayan, 2000; Bernard, 2002;
Solomon and Cilliers, 1996; Bryant & Kappaz, 2005; Murshed, 2002; Collier &
Hoeffler, 1998; Wodon, 2007; see also Justino, 2009: 315). Namely, these studies start
from the analysis of the direct consequences of a transfer of resources into the warfare
and material destruction and economic damages caused by war (Collier, 2003).
Although not as frequently, poverty is also considered an extremely important factor for
the occurrence of conflicts (Bryant and Kappaz, 2005: 25). Several authors have
selected as main causes for the occurrence of conflicts the scarcity of resources (or its
abundance) in determinate contexts and the existence of dysfunctional institutions
(Theisen, 2008: 815), the vulnerability of poor families participating in armed conflicts
(Justino, 2009), or the precariousness in matters of food and nutrition security (PinstrupAndersen and Shimokawa, 2008). On the contrary, in some cases is discernible that the
occurrence of conflicts takes place in less impoverished regions and in places where are
located populations with better living conditions. Among these is included, for instance,
Liberia (Hegre et.al., 2009), reinforcing the set of researches that place “opportunity”
(for conflict) as one of the main factors for the occurrence of conflicts (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004), a cause more plausible than resources deprivation.
Consequently, there is a whole field of research on this correlation among these
concepts that, in fact, underlines the extreme relevance credited to the systematical
contextualization in historical, social, political and economic levels to which the local
perspectives about poverty should be associated. This definition of a concept of poverty
has been revealing many issues, mostly related to the phenomenon‟s
multidimensionality. In some cases, when trying to overcome these issues, the best
option is to employ quantitative data and statistical analysis – namely all kinds of
national statistical records – that have been used as the basis for the formulation of
theories and rationalizations (Hegre et.al., 2009). For that reason, it is noticeable a clear
predominance of the monetary approach in most descriptions and researches about
poverty (Stewart et al, 2007: 1). Other methods to define poverty include the capability
approach, the social exclusion and the participative approach (idem, p.2). The monetary
approach is mostly centered on the definition of poverty as a shortage in terms of
consumption (or income) with reference to a poverty line. The capabilities approach –
according to the works of Amartya Sen – is focused on the features of deprivation
related to certain minimal or basic skills. The line of approach of poverty through social
exclusion is connected to socially defined processes of marginalization and deprivation.
Regarding the participative approach, it is inscribed in a notion of poverty as defined by
its own subjects instead of externally (idem, p.24). Following this outlook, the analysis
conducted in the realm of the project Poverty and Peace endorses matters concerning
the self-definition of the implications of war and peace over the impoverishment
processes and, consequently, over the self-definition and self-perception of poverty in
itself, as mentioned above, which has resulted in one of the most relevant contributions
of this investigation.
182
Finally, the cases under analysis – and their corresponding accounts – have allowed
accumulating a diversified collection, at an individual and familial level, which have
demonstrated precisely that the effects of war and conflicts are diverse and are affecting
living conditions and poverty in diverse manners. In several texts appear some
references to constraints and possibilities during wartime and peacetime, putting
forward once more not only the diversity of situations, but also a need to understand the
correlation poverty-peace within the larger sphere of individual and familial strategies,
being such strategies in constant adaptation and reformulation. This analytical
amplification to other factors at stake releases new opportunities for the research and
knowledge of poverty and peace occurrences.
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183