guest worker programs and circular migration: what works?
Transcrição
guest worker programs and circular migration: what works?
Immigration Paper Series 09 GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS AND CIRCULAR MIGRATION: WHAT WORKS? FRIEDRICH HECKMANN European Forum for Migration Studies ELMAR HÖNEKOPP Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung EDDA CURRLE European Forum for Migration Studies © 2009 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to: The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm. Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected]. GMF Paper Series The GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the view of GMF. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to [email protected]. About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. Guest Worker Programs and Circular Migration: What Works? Immigration Paper Series May 2009 Friedrich Heckmann, European Forum for Migration Studies (efms) Elmar Hönekopp, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung Edda Currle, European Forum for Migration Studies Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Lessons from the guest worker program in Germany, 1955–1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Lessons from the Bracero Program in the United States, 1942–1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 New programs for a changed situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The present discussion on labor migration programs in the European Union . . . . . . . 9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 *This first edition of the European Forum on Migration Studies policy brief presents the results of the expert meeting “Can Guest Worker Programs Work?” supported by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). We would like to thank the Washington and Berlin staff of GMF for their kind assistance in organizing the joint expert meeting in Washington, DC. 1 Introduction Somewhat surprisingly, the new millennium has seen the reappearance of temporary labor migration programs in political discourse within both Europe and the United States. Germany had already introduced temporary programs in the 1990s for seasonal and project-tied workers. “Guest worker program,” “circular migration,” “Green Card” (in Germany), and “Blue Card” are among the terms currently being used in the somewhat confusing political debate as well as in lawmaking. For example, in 2000 Germany introduced a temporary Green Card status for guest workers; the Bush-Kennedy compromise for the proposed Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 spoke of a guest worker program; and the EU Commission has presented concepts for circular migration and a Blue Card (European Commission 2007 and 2007a). This policy brief aims at evaluating these concepts for temporary labor migration programs. It first looks at two historical cases of such programs and asks what kind of lessons could be learned from the German guest worker program and the Bracero Program of the United States. A second part examines circular migration as recommended by the EU Commission, a concept that is scientifically discussed in regard to the United States as well. Guest Worker Programs and Circular Migration: What Works? 3 2 The guest worker program was conceived as a strictly temporary program in which new workers would rotate between their country of origin and Germany. Lessons from the guest worker program in Germany, 1955–1973 The German guest worker program was a response to a labor supply problem. A demand for foreign labor developed quite early in Germany at a time when the overall unemployment rate was still quite high. In 1955 Germany signed its first recruitment contract with Italy. Until 1961 the influx of immigrants from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany was high. Therefore, it was only after 1961—when immigration from East Germany abruptly stopped—that strategic recruitment in Germany gained momentum as a series of recruitment treaties with different Mediterranean countries were signed. The institutionalization and expansion of the program in the 1960s had a number of major causes, among them: • Das deutsche Wirtschaftswunder: High economic growth increased the demand for labor. • The founding of the Bundeswehr: Initially it required 500,000 soldiers plus 200,000 civilian employees, causing a sharp reduction in the labor supply. • The building of the Berlin Wall: Until construction of the wall began on August 13, 1961, some 150,000 to 300,000 people annually had escaped the East German regime and come to the Federal Republic of Germany; most were in their early working years and quite well qualified. Cessation of this labor supply severely increased pressure on the labor market from 1961 onward. • Expansion of secondary and higher education: More people remained in schools and universities, and this decreased the supply of available labor. • Demography: The number of people ages 15–65 decreased during the 1960s. • Decreased numbers of women in the labor market during the 1960s: Instead of increasing 4 and making up for the smaller supply resulting from other factors, this segment of the workforce became a little smaller. • The reduced number of hours worked per week: Germans worked an average of 40 hours per week in the 1960s instead of the 48 hours they had worked in the 1950s. The guest worker program was conceived as a strictly temporary program in which new workers would rotate between their country of origin and Germany. All participants in the program were convinced that this indeed was a temporary program. However, these parties have had different, sometimes opposed interests and perceptions of the program: The employers: Employers wanted cheap and motivated workers who could easily be laid off in times of a recession; guest workers were desirable for positions (mostly in industry) for which native workers either could not be recruited in sufficient numbers or would pose much higher costs. In many cases employers opted for cheap labor over investment in new and technologically advanced machinery. On the whole, employers took a rather short-term perspective. The receiving country: Enormous migration processes had occurred in Germany since the end of World War II. Between 1945 and the early 1950s, about 12 million German refugees and expellees came to the allied zones from former German territories or from German ethnic minority settlements in Southeastern and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, 3.8 million people migrated from East Germany to the Federal Republic. The settlement and integration of these large populations—despite an overall successful development—were still ongoing processes that needed resources. Against the backdrop of this situation, new sources of settlement migration were The German Marshall Fund of the United States not wanted. Additionally, temporary labor contracts for guest workers could serve as a buffer to protect native workers in times of a recession and keep the unemployment rate low. This happened, in fact, during the recession of 1966–1967. Another factor in the preference for temporary migration on the side of the state was the German “ethnic nation” concept. This concept helped the integration of ethnic German refugees and expellees, but hindered the integration of foreigners, who did not belong to the German Volk. These considerations were summarized in the formula: Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland, “Germany is not an immigration country.” The sending countries: Sending countries have played a decisive role in initiating contracts with receiving countries in Europe. Turkey, for example, saw its emigrant guest workers as agents for the development and modernization of the country after their return. Italy, to name another example, tried to reduce a deficit in its balance of payments through remittances (Kolb 2002, 101). The workers: People migrate in order to improve their lives. Emigrants want to improve their lives abroad when they think they cannot achieve this by staying at home. Germany’s guest workers however, by temporarily working abroad and saving money there, intended to improve their life at home. They planned to save enough money to either found or enlarge a small business or farm in their home country. Typical goals envisioned were to become independent farmers or to own a taxi or transport business, or a store or some other small business. In other words, the migrants also had a temporary stay in mind when they came to Germany. For the majority of guest workers, the program indeed functioned as it had been intended. They worked for a limited time and may have renewed their work permit, often several times, but finally returned to their home country. In that sense the program was not a total failure. But millions of other guest workers did not return. Instead, they had their families move to them, settled, and in fact became immigrants. They gave up the idea of improving their lot in their country of origin and instead tried to improve their lives in the new country. The development of this immigration situation can be better understood by looking at what happened to the initial intentions of the main actors in the process: The employers: Employers realized the advantages of keeping workers who had been socialized in their firm or factory and were known to be productive. A strict rotation principle, with ever repeating adaptation and socialization for the new workers, was costly and full of risks. Employers’ increasing consciousness of these socialization costs became apparent in an indirect way: They made the Federal Labor Office agree to a recruitment procedure by which they could hire workers who were relatives and friends of those already working in the firm. Relatives and friends would then effectively help in the socialization of the new people at little cost for the firm (Jamin 1998: 74–82). The receiving country: Until the end of the 20th century, Germany stubbornly clung to its idea of “Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland,” defending the temporariness of the migration process. The integration policy that was formulated in the 1970s and 1980s was “Integration auf Zeit.” Yet, in practice, in response to business interests the German government had to allow for prolongations of residence and work permits. It also had to support measures for integration and allow for family reunification. What Phil Martin has called the “rights revolution,” which partly derived from the international human rights discourse, continuously improved residence titles Guest Worker Programs and Circular Migration: What Works? 5 The development of the immigration situation in Germany can be better understood by looking at what happened to the initial intentions of the main actors— employers, receiving country, and workers—in the process. and integrated the migrants into the institutions of the welfare state. The main lesson to be learned from the German guest worker program is that it is very difficult to restrict such workers to an economic role. Another paradoxical development further increased the tendency toward an immigration process instead of a temporary work regime: the recruitment stop of 1973. The so-called oil crisis at the beginning of the 1970s—we would, by the way, be happy today to have the crisis-provoking prices of that time—plus a recession and labor market crisis made the government order an end to guest worker recruitment in 1973. The intention was to decrease the number of foreigners in Germany. Paradoxically, however, the recruitment ban further reinforced the settlement process: Those planning to return, but who had been counting on an option to come back to Germany, decided to stay in order not to lose their residence status, and they also decided to have their families join them. The number of foreigners increased instead of decreasing (Bauer 1998: 176). The workers: The motives, goals, and orientations characteristic at the beginning of the labor migration—that is, the firm intention to return home—cannot be regarded as static or constant. They come under the influence of conditions in the new society and the perceptions of the country of origin from abroad. In Germany, new experiences and processes of beginning to bind to the new country first resulted in the dissolution of a concrete time perspective and precise intention to return. Several surveys in the 1970s demonstrated that few guest workers continued to maintain a precise plan for return (see, e.g., Mehrländer 1986 and Hönekopp 1987). 6 Working and living in new surroundings and under new conditions led to the creation of new habits and expectations, new patterns of consumption included. Reunification of the family in the host society not only enforces a change in savings and consumption patterns, thus influencing plans for investment in the country of origin, but also removes what is probably the strongest bond of foreign workers to their native country, i.e., their families. Family reunification integrates the household into the reproductive process of the new society. A concrete plan for return is given up, and the return plan is upheld only in a general and abstract way, in many cases changing into a motivation to stay or a plan to return only at retirement age. Wanting to be close to one’s children and being able to be treated in the highquality German health system often dissolves that intention for return at retirement as well. A temporary worker has changed into an immigrant. The main lesson to be learned from the German guest worker program is that it is very difficult to restrict such workers to an economic role. On the one hand, there are the interests of employers in keeping productive workers who have been socialized into the job and the firm. On the other hand, the longer workers stay, the less they can be denied basic human rights and integration into society. Western states cannot and do not want to rotate workers in the brutal way that is practiced by authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 3 Lessons from the Bracero Program in the United States, 1942–1964 signed in the following month. Changes in the nature of the program could be observed and an important step had been taken toward the institutionalization of importing Mexican labor. On the U.S. side, the agreement clearly reflected the political power of U.S. farm interests. In spring 1942, under the pressure of California growers, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service formed an interagency committee to study the question of agricultural labor. Mexico stepped in as a supplier of labor, but for the first time Mexico and the United States entered into a bilateral government-to-government accord: The Official Bracero Agreement for the Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers to the United States (Official Bracero Agreement 1942) was signed between Mexico and the United States on August 4, 1942. Although the original agreement expired in 1947, the program continued informally and without further regulation until 1951. With the implementation of the “wetback bill” and the extension of the migrant-labor agreement early in 1952, the Bracero Program entered a period of growth and stabilization. From 1952 to 1959, more than 2.5 million Mexican nationals were employed on U.S. farms (Craig 1971: 101–102). In 1954 a new Bracero agreement was created, but after two further extensions in 1961 and 1963, Public Law 78 expired in December 1964. With its expiration, 22 years of large-scale bracero contracting came to an end. More than 4.5 million Mexican farm workers had been legally contracted for work on U.S. farms over the period from 1942 to 1964 (Craig 1971: 1). From 1942 to 1947, more than 200,000 “braceros” entered the United States and worked in 24 states. The majority were employed in California. From 1948 to 1951, around 400,000 legally contracted “braceros” worked on U.S. farms (www.farmworkers.org/migrdata.html), but the number of illegal aliens apprehended by the INS was three times as high (Calavita 1992, Appendix A). Probably the majority of the illegally entered Mexicans worked illegally on farms. The money earned by legal (and illegal) Mexican migrants constituted an important source of foreign exchange. Although a presidential commission denied the need for further Mexican braceros in 1950, the Korean War was used to justify approval of a new program: Public Law 78 was implemented in July 1951, and the new Bracero agreement was Ending the formal program, however, did not stop its consequences, as thousand of former braceros continued to enter the United States and seek jobs, albeit as illegal immigrants. The curtailment of the Bracero Program in 1960 and its end in 1964 saw the beginning of the increasing wave of illegal immigration that we see up to the present. Therefore, the predicted agricultural labor shortages didn’t occur. The impact on the labor market, however, had already begun during the program as it depressed existing wages and reduced employment of domestic farm workers (Waller Meyers 2006: 2). Guest Worker Programs and Circular Migration: What Works? 7 The curtailment of the Bracero Program in 1960 and its end in 1964 saw the beginning of the increasing wave of illegal immigration that we see up to the present. 4 Against the widespread understanding, circular migration is more than only a special form of temporary migration. New programs for a changed situation Guest worker programs in general aim to add temporary workers to the labor force without adding permanent residents to the population (Martin 2003: 1). Workers are expected to return to their home country after having worked abroad for several years. Past programs, however, have been said to have “failed” in the sense that they caused unintended effects such as permanent and illegal immigration. Martin relates these problems to two phenomena: distortion and dependence. Distortion refers to the recipient labor markets drawing on the assumption of permanent influx of guest workers, whereas dependence focuses on migrant workers and sending economies becoming dependent on foreign jobs (Martin 2003: 3). Managing labor migration in a way that does not lead to distortion, dependence, and more unauthorized migration is especially daunting. Guest worker programs may be part of the answer, but simply relaunching past programs is likely to produce the same problems (Martin 2007: 37). Both in Europe and in the United States, the concept of circular migration is being discussed as an alternative. The Global Commission on International Migration emphasized in its report the relevance of circular migration: “The Commission concludes that the old paradigm of permanent migrant settlement is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration.” The report suggested that destination countries should promote adequate models (Global Commission 2005: 31). The worldwide discussion on circular migration is based on considerations of the importance of remittances and the potential of organized migrant labor measures for developing countries. The win-win-win argument of the model is underlined. Advantages are seen not only for the receiving countries, but for the sending countries and the migrants themselves. Circular migration is also seen as a means of reducing irregular migration. Giving quotas to sending countries for legal migration should motivate them to cooperate with receiving countries in fighting illegal migration where it originates. Different stakeholders in the political and scientific discussion mean different things when talking about circular migration. Against the widespread understanding of circular migration as a special form of only temporary migration, Agunias and Newland developed a more complex typology of circular migration (Agunias/Newland 2007). Their typology includes both permanent and temporary migrants returning either permanently or temporarily. It shows that circular migration is more than temporary migration and includes a variety of migration forms and types of return. Table: Typology of circular migration according to Agunias and Newland Permanent migrants Temporary migrants Permanent return Return of Irish diaspora in the late 1990s Korean turnkey project managers in the Middle East Temporary return Taiwanese migrants from Canada Contract workers from the and Silicon Valley Philippines Source: Agunias/Newland 2007, 4 8 The German Marshall Fund of the United States 5 The present discussion on labor migration programs in the European Union1 The present situation in Europe differs from the situation in the 1960s because of the following factors:1 for legally accessing the labor market, introduce measures to reduce the brain drain by promoting circular and return migration, and by easing the granting of visas. • Increasing illegal immigration and illegal employment, especially of workers from third countries • Growing numbers of seasonal workers from the EU and third countries • High unemployment rates among lowqualified workers, very low unemployment rates among highly qualified workers • Aging of society and decreasing labor supply throughout all EU countries, especially in the new EU member states • Increasing demand for (highly) qualified workers because of the demographic, but especially due to technical developments • International competition for highly qualified workers Second proposal package: Promotion and development of circular migration Two forms of circular migration are to be differentiated: a) circular migration of thirdcountry nationals with a main residence in the EU, but additional economic activities in the home countries, and b) circular migration of thirdcountry nationals who would be granted temporary residence permits with privileged mobility between home and receiving country, but would not be allowed permanent settlement. The main group b) comprises very different persons: seasonal workers, students, university graduates, researchers, participants of training courses, and the like. Circular migration here is understood as a temporary legal permit to stay within the EU granted to a limited number of persons and including the obligation to return to the home country. Returning persons can be exchanged for new migrants. Returnees, however, can be given specific and privileged opportunities to re-enter. The European Council requested the European Commission to examine how legal migration could be better integrated into the external relations of the European Union, and how circular and temporary migration could be facilitated. In its Communication of May 16, 2007, the European Commission submitted two proposals (European Commission 2007). First proposal: Establishment of mobility partnerships In such partnerships, sending and receiving countries would agree to accept mutual obligations. Sending countries would readmit migrants without legal status, combat illegal migration, and provide for a better control of their borders. In return, the receiving countries would extend the possibilities 1 The European Commission will develop a number of legal instruments to promote circular migration such as the directives on the admission of highly qualified migrants, the admission of seasonal workers, and the admission of trainees with training contracts. The general purpose of these activities is to increase the welfare of both the member states and the sending countries (the latter, for example, by reducing the brain drain). Chapter 5 is based on Brücker/Hönekopp 2007. Guest Worker Programs and Circular Migration: What Works? 9 The European Commission will develop a number of legal instruments to promote circular migration. The general purpose of these activities is to increase the welfare of both the member states and the sending countries. Assessment of the economic impact Circular migration has pros and cons for both the receiving and sending countries: For the receiving countries, Circular migration can contribute to a reduction of unemployment via flexible adaptation of labor supply to labor demand. However, circular migration workers usually do not gain human capital in the receiving countries. • Pros: Since foreign labor is more mobile and flexible, cyclical and structural shocks can be better absorbed, thus lowering unemployment among immigrants and among all workers. • Cons: Because of shorter stays, incentives to invest in human capital are low. • Result: Circular migration is obviously more relevant for occupations and activities with lower qualification needs (e.g., seasonal workers in agriculture). It should definitely not be used for qualified workers. For the sending countries, • Pros: Human and professional skills gained in the foreign countries can easily be made available for the economies of the home countries (what is limited, however, by the aspects referred to above). Higher financial remittances can be expected compared to those for permanent migrants. This contributes to economic development. • Cons: Return migration can cause labor market frictions (search costs, mismatch), thereby increasing unemployment. • Result: Circular and temporary migration can contribute to economic development, but only to a limited extent. Empirical results for Germany confirm these hypotheses. According to findings of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 60 percent of all foreign workers have returned to their home countries at least once. With a share of 41 percent, the proportion of workers from the EU among all circular migration workers is quite high. Free movement of labor seems to promote 10 return migration and circular migration. In many cases, however, this has a negative impact on the employment situation of these workers in both the receiving and the home countries, at least if the migrants are not well qualified. Italian nationals are an example of this (see, e.g., Constant/ Zimmermann 2003: 6–12). On the other hand, the unemployment rates among highly mobile and qualified workers are low, the respective employment rates are very high, and the wage level is often much higher than that of natives. In sum, circular migration can contribute to a reduction of unemployment via flexible adaptation of labor supply to labor demand. However, circular migration workers usually do not gain human capital in the receiving countries, which has a negative impact on their labor productivity and hence on their competitiveness on the labor market. Therefore—in the long run—their contribution to the economic development in the sending countries must be considered as very limited. Assessment of the political measures regarding the control of circular migration The proposals of the European Commission are not very concrete yet. Therefore, only a very general assessment is possible at the moment. In terms of their impact, two kinds of proposals can be distinguished: a) measures intended to increase incentives for circular migration by providing more rights for legal permanent residents, and b) measures intended to promote a “forced” circular migration through the granting of temporary residency rights and through privileged reentry options. Increasing the incentives for circular migration has several implications: Against the background of empirical findings in Germany and the EU mentioned above, circular migration can be expected to increase. At the same time, such an The German Marshall Fund of the United States increase would be accompanied by a tendency toward permanent residence, which would undermine the original intentions. An increase in circular migration can be useful in economic terms, as it contributes to more mobility and flexibility. The benefits resulting from this migration for both receiving and sending countries should be better. Mobility partnerships can help reduce search and information costs, increase mobility, and decrease mismatch as well as unemployment rates in the corresponding countries. The second type of proposed measures, intended to force return migration, would not seem to make sense in economic terms, nor does it seem possible to turn such measures into practice. On the one hand, the granting of temporary work and residence permits contributes to the immigration of less-qualified workers, who often compete for jobs with native workers who have similar skills. On the other hand, temporary work and residence permits for highly qualified workers make no sense, as many of them are able to be much more productive in the receiving countries than in their home countries. Therefore, they should not be forced to return to their home countries. At the same time, past experiences show that a temporary limitation on work and residence permits often cannot be enforced. Workers and employers can find various ways to obtain permanent permits. Moreover, there are many factors that induce people to stay in a country illegally. Also, the practical implementation of mutual obligations as part of mobility partnerships (e.g., obligations to reaccept return migrants or to control borders) seems to be quite difficult. In many cases, income differences between sending and receiving countries are still huge. There is clear evidence that the most efficient way to combat illegal migration is to reduce economic incentives rather than relying on legal regulations and fines. A general assessment of the Commission’s proposals affirms that a combination of measures to promote circular migration with mobility partnerships can contribute to comprehensive and coherent approaches in labor market and economic policy. Migration policy should be integrated into an overall strategy governing development policy. This would contribute to more convergence of the economies in neighboring regions. Examples in the near past (e.g., the economic integration of the former COMECON countries into Europe and the global economy) confirm that such strategies are feasible and successful. Migration in general and circular migration can speed up the convergence process. Convergence of the income per capita does not reduce incentives to migrate in the short run, but it very clearly does so in the long run. Alternative political proposals The intention of the European Commission to increase the mobility of labor between the EU and third countries is basically very meaningful. Migration contributes to a more efficient use of labor and thus to an increase of the GDP. Simulations show that the higher the qualifications of immigrants, the better the economic impact of labor migration on entire regions in the receiving countries. The sending countries, however, do benefit more from the emigration of people with lower qualifications. Against the background of demographic changes, the receiving countries benefit additionally from considerable gains in the general welfare, which correlate directly with how high the immigrants’ qualifications are. An immigration policy for long-term change that also takes into consideration the interests of the sending countries should pay attention to the following criteria: Guest Worker Programs and Circular Migration: What Works? 11 Migration in general and circular migration can speed up the convergence process. 1. Increased qualification level of immigrants: An immigration policy for longterm change that also takes into consideration the interests of the sending countries should pay attention to six decisive criteria. In Germany and other European immigration countries, the immigrant population has on average a very low qualification level (in contrast to other countries of immigration such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) that is accompanied by a risk of becoming unemployed. Controlling immigration on the basis of qualification criteria would clearly increase welfare gains. 2. Increased immigration rates in the long run: Because of demographic changes, migration can contribute to additional gains in both the sending and the receiving countries. Empirical studies show that migration have very little or no influence on unemployment risks or wages for the native population in the long run. At the same time, welfare systems and economic growth benefit considerably from immigration. Also, in the sending countries, GDP per capita increases due to these processes as long as effects on the labor markets are taken into account. Remittances additionally stimulate these effects. 3. I ncreased incentives for return and circular migration: To better absorb economic shocks, incentives for return and circular migration should be improved, especially for qualified migrants through granting permanent residence and work permits as well as reentry options. 4.Limiting the granting of temporary work and residence permits: Temporary work and residence permits reduce the incentives to invest in human capital. Therefore, they should be applied and limited to specific cases of interest only. 12 5.Promotion and support of investments in education in the sending countries: Sending countries benefit from migration when the qualification structure of the emigrants is improved in the migration process. More recent research results on the phenomenon of brain drain show that the possibility for emigration fosters investments in qualification, i.e., emigration does not necessarily reduce the availability and development of human capital within the sending country. Better cooperation between receiving and sending countries in this area could help by further reducing negative effects. 6.Contribution to economic development and improvement of the institutional framework in the sending countries: Agreements on the promotion of circular migration in combination with mobility partnerships could become a nucleus of cooperation in development policy, e.g., by promoting corresponding economic and labor market policies and by improving the legal and administrative framework conditions. Successful examples of such an approach are the association agreements entered into between the former transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU. This would contribute to improved economic prospects for the respective sending countries (and their regions) and in particular, lessen the pressure on highly qualified workers to emigrate permanently. Final remarks: Circular migration as part of the development of a European migration policy In December 1999 the European Summit of Tampere (Finland) decided upon a general outline of a joint European migration policy to be developed. General access to the EU, border The German Marshall Fund of the United States control, asylum questions, legal and illegal entry and stay, labor migration, and cooperation with migrants’ countries of origin are the main subjects of this ambitious work program. Circular migration is part of this broader program. A number of other steps have been taken since 2007. At the end of October 2007, the European Commission released two draft proposals: a)A directive outlining a “European Blue Card” for entry and residence of third-country nationals for highly qualified employment b)A proposed application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work within the territory of a member state, and a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a member state the Commission, which has had to convince the member states of the necessity of a joint migration policy. The Hague program of 2004 was a milestone in this direction. A preliminary but central keystone has been set with the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, as passed by the European Council during the summit in Brussels that took place October 15–16, 2008. No new political measures were presented by the pact, but it binds the various political fields together into a coherent European policy concept, with a clear competence for the EU as such and for the Commission. The pact deals with the following five areas: 1.Legal immigration: demand for qualified workers, “Blue Card,” and integration These two drafts are still being discussed within the European parliamentarian procedure. Therefore, on November 4, 2008, the EU Parliament launched proposals regarding amendments to the Blue Card directive (e.g., rules on the definition of a “Blue Card” worker). With the publication of these proposals, the European Commission announced further proposals regarding seasonal workers and paid trainees, as well as company-internal mobility between EU member countries. The first proposal was to have been presented in autumn 2008, and the second was expected in early 2009. A directive for “Returning illegally staying third-country nationals” had already been passed by the European Council and by the European Parliament in June 2008. A further directive proposal is in the process, dealing with “Sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals.” 2.Illegal immigration: return of illegal immigrants, better cooperation in sending unwanted immigrants home, and treaties with immigrants’ homelands 3.Border controls: prevention of both illegal arrivals as well as tragic deaths, especially security of the southern borders, and the role of Frontex (EU agency for external border security), with more capacity and competence 4.Asylum policies: development of common guarantees on asylum, joint asylum support office (2009), and single asylum procedure (2010) 5.Countries of origin and transit: creation of a comprehensive partnership for encouraging synergy between migration and development The results in these policy fields will be discussed annually, supported by respective reports and recommendations for further steps. A new program will be designed as successor to the Hague program. 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