Wie Europa sich kaputtspart - Friedrich-Ebert

Wie Europa sich kaputtspart – die gescheiterte Idee der Austeritätspolitik
Mark Blyth Professor of International Political Economy and International Studies
Brown University and the Watson Institute for International Studies
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
November 11th 2014
UM WELCHE ART DER KRISE
HANDELT ES SICH?
Wirtschaftswachstum?
Arbeitslosigkeit?
Staatsschulden?
Eurokrise = Krise der Staatsausgaben?
• Man beachte die Kausalität im folgenden Zitat... •
”It is an undisputable fact that excessive state spending has led to unsustainable levels of debt and deficits that now threaten our economic welfare. Piling on more debt now will stunt rather than stimulate growth in the long run.”
• W. Schäuble, Financial Times, September 5th 2011
Das Problem: Falsches Timing
WENN ES DAS NICHT IST, WAS IST
ES DANN? Die Große Konvergenz
Ist die EZB so vertrauenswürdig? Oder handelt es sich um Anreize zu fahrlässigem Verhalten (moral hazard)?” Das Resultat: Europäische Bankbilanzen voller ‘bad assets’
40
Foreign banks combined consolidated claims on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain (% GDP 2011)
BIS March 2011
% GDP 30
20
10
0
10
Die Folge heute: Große Probleme mit ‘Non Performing Loans’
Europa hat ein anderes Problem als die USA • USA ‘Too Big To Fail’
• Europe ‘Too Big To Bail’
“Too Big to Fail”: Die USA
Bank Assets (millions of USD)
Bank Assets (% of GDP)
140
20.000.000
18.000.000
120
16.000.000
GDP
14.000.000
100
Other
12.000.000
Wells Fargo
80
Citigroup
10.000.000
Bank of America
8.000.000
60
Morgan Stanley
JP Morgan
6.000.000
40
Goldman
4.000.000
20
2.000.000
0
0
Bank Assets
GDP
GDP
Top 6 Bank Assets
Total Bank Assets
Das "too big to bail" Problem: Beispiel
Frankreich
Bank Assets (millions of EUR)
Bank Assets (% of GDP)
10.000.000,00
500
9.000.000,00
450
8.000.000,00
400
7.000.000,00
350
GDP
6.000.000,00
300
Other
5.000.000,00
Societe Generale
Credit Agricole
4.000.000,00
250
200
BNP Paribas
3.000.000,00
150
2.000.000,00
100
1.000.000,00
50
0,00
0
Bank Assets
GDP
GDP
Top 3 Bank Assets
Total Bank Assets
Die Situation in der Eurozone ist noch extremer
• Total Eurozone Bank Assets – 40 trillion Euros
• Total Eurozone GDP – 14 trillion Euros
• Largest economy – Deutschland – 3.0 trillion Euros
• Total Non‐Performing Loans – 1.2 Trillion Euros (40 Percent of German GDP!)
• Folge: Deutschland kann das nicht alleine
stemmen!
Und das ist ein Problem, weil…
• The underlying base capital of the banking system has lost value • The Sovereigns that house the banks can’t inflate, liquidate or devalue
• Austerity shrinks GDP and makes debts bigger and yields greater (the denominator effect)
• Result: The basic funding model for running a very big European Bank comes unstuck…
• Which is what the crisis is really all about.
ES IST EINE BANKENKRISE – UND UNS
FEHLEN DIE INSTRUMENTE, UM SIE ZU
LÖSEN
Ursache Nummer eins: ein “Eigentor" • Die ‘lokale Rationalität’ Herrn Trichets
• “... the idea is to revive the market [for covered bonds], which has been very heavily affected, and all that goes with this revival, including the spreads, the depth and the liquidity of the market. We are not at all embarking on quantitative easing." [italics added] (ECB: May 7th 2009)
Verstärkende Faktoren
• ECB denies lender of last • And 20 Summits later…
resort function (10/9)
• Greeks revise deficit figures (10/9)
• Germany Denies Backstop for Greek Rollover Risk (12/9‐3/10)
• Result: Spreads widen on perception of contagion risk
Staatsanleiherenditen gehen 2010‐2011 auseinander…
• Policy response is country bailouts (more debt) and austerity (which shrinks GDP –
denominator effect – still more debt)
• Spreads widen further…
• More summits add more uncertainty
• Attention shifts to funding of European HLFI’s
geared at 40‐60:1
THE EUROCRISIS PART TWO: THE US CRISIS REDUX
(JUNE 2011‐DECEMBER 2013)
Was passiert, wenn Banken das Geld ausgeht
USA 2007‐2008
• HLFI’s fund via repo around 50 percent
• Collateral of choice ABCP
• Subprime devalues collateral
• Collateral calls kill shadow banks and start bank run to Lehman
EU 2011‐2013
•
•
•
•
•
• Result: TBTF is bailed out
HLFI’s fund via repo around 70 percent
Collateral of choice Euro denominated sovereign debt
Sovereign ratings tumble and Repos fail
HLFI’s shut out of US money market paper (May 2011)
Yields Spike and hit Bunds (November 2011)
• Result: TBTB needs a bail out
Rettung naht
•
Die ‘Globale Rationalität’ des Herrn Draghi
•
December 2011: Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) (1 trillion Euro)
•
March 2012: LTRO 2 (0.529 T Euro)
•
June 2012: Emergency Liquidity Assistance (0.4 Euro)
•
July 26th 2012: Draghi says he will do “whatever it takes…”
•
Italian Ten Year Bond Yields June 2011 – May 2013
Ein genauerer Blick auf Italien
Italien und Frankreich: Wird
Austeritätspolitik belohnt?
A Class Specific “Put Option”?
•
Total state support approved for the EU financial sector totals more than E5 trillion, equivalent to 40 percent of [eurozone] GDP.” •
Of capital injected into banks to keep them afloat, “only about 10 percent of the original capital injected has been repaid.” •
“Otherwise insolvent banks have been recapitalized and the monetary policies of the ECB and national central banks have allowed themselves at low cost.” •
Oliver Wyman, “The Shape of Things to Come: What Recent History Tells US About the Future of European Banking.” Oliver Wyman Consulting Group, August 2013: 14
WO STEHEN WIR JETZT? MACROECONOMIC DEFLATION?
SPAREN FÜHRT ZU VERSCHULDUNG
(DEBT DEFLATION)
Sinkende öffentliche Investitionen
Wählen Sie Ihren Ökonomen
Fiscal Support and Fiscal Space
“If confidence in public finances is assured, the next stage – and this is where we are now – is to exploit the available fiscal space, so that fiscal policy can work with rather than against monetary policy in supporting aggregate demand.”
Mario Draghi, The Brookings Institute, Washington DC, USA, 9th October 2014:
Was kann man tun?
• Use the EIB as an ‘off balance sheet vehicle’ to issue bonds for infrastructure. ECB buys bonds back on secondary market – 300‐500 billion Euros
• France and Italy engage in serious structural reforms
• Germany allows loosening of fiscal stance to allow automatic stabilizers to engage
Was kann schief gehen?
• Bad Ideas: From Austerity to ‘Structural Reform’ to Demographics to ‘Secular Stagnation’
• Bad Economics: You can’t solve fiscal problems with monetary instruments no matter how hard you try
• You can damage the demand side enough to hurt the supply side
• Bad Politics: Germany says ‘nein’ ‐ Hollande invokes JB Say – Renzi can’t deliver
• Problem: No one votes for a 15 year long recession (Podemos, UKIP, NF, Syriza)
A ‘Predictable Error’ and a Warning
• What’s individually rational can be collectively disastrous
• Your Hartz are not in the right place
• ‘Staying the course’ will bring extremists to power, and soon
• Political Courage and Leadership is knowing when to change course
• If we don’t make the bargain, far worse ideas, and policies, will become the norm