Portugal, Spain and the 1893 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation

Portugal, Spain and the 1893 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.
Portuguese-Spanish relations at the second half of the 1800’s and the importance of
the Spanish market in the context of the 1891-1893 Portuguese crisis
Keywords: foreign trade, Portuguese-Spanish relations, Iberian market, Iberia
The theme of Iberian relations in modern times has strongly attracted the
attention of historians in both countries. Its importance is paramount to take an indepth approach to developments in each country, fully grasp solutions adopted
throughout the nineteenth and twenty centuries, and analyze phenomena and trends
common to – sometimes simultaneously occurred in – the peninsular and/or nonEuropean framework.
In this continued exercise of historiography special emphasis is laid on studies
in the political, military and cultural strands, in which historians soon found a similar
pattern in the pathways followed by Iberian nations in the 1800’s. This pattern, albeit
certainly influenced by the Iberian Peninsula’s geographic and orographic features, is
not exclusively determined either by the spatial proximity of both countries or by their
peripheral positioning vis-à-vis Europe’s centre. It rather resulted from an interaction
born in Iberia’s core scope, in which the dualist stability of the two Iberian partners
anchored itself to an external projection of both parties – be it through the extraEuropean territorial expansion, be it through a differentiated diplomatic stand 1.
In the early 1800’s Iberian nations were at a turn-point due to events occurred
abroad which had a unique impact on the peninsular context, upon the arrival of
changes associated with the advent of modern times 2. Such uniqueness, visible in the
1
Hipólito de la Torre Gomez, “História, identidad nacional y vecindad ibérica”, in La Mirada del outro.
Percepciones luso-españolas desde la História, coord. por Hipólito de La Torre Gomez e António José
Telo, Mérida, Ed. Regional de Extremadura, 2001.
2
António José Telo e Hipólito de Torre Gomez, Portugal e Espanha nos Sistemas Internacionais
Contemporâneos, Lisboa, Cosmos, 2000; Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, “Portugal e Espanha – estados
liberais: singularidades e afinidades”, Relações Portugal-Espanha. uma História Paralela, um Destino
Comum, II Encontro Internacional, Porto, Cepese/Fundação Rei Afonso Henriques, 2002, pp. 203-212.
anti-Napoleonic reactions throughout the Peninsula 3, in the construction process of
the liberal state, or in the resistances to the new institutional architecture, stemmed
from a readjustment of the centuries-old features intrinsic to the Portuguese-Spanish
relationship to the new European framework following Europe’s redefinition after the
fall of Napoleon Bonaparte. On one hand the Iberian nations had to address the
definition of their identity attributes in line with the rationale of prevailing liberalism,
which involved the demarcation of borders and the promotion of national economic
space 4.
On the other hand they had to accommodate the new principles of “European
sociability” established at the Conference of Vienna 5 and integrate themselves into the
international system of exchanges previously announced by the studies of William
Huskisson 6 and Emerich Vattel 7 on the relevance of foreign trade and its relationship
with the law of nature and nations, meanwhile extensively adopted in the 1860’s
following the Cobden treaty signed by France and England 8.
These were not however the only drivers impacting on the Iberian Peninsula,
which soon had to address the re-organisation of trade flows occurred in Central and
Northern Europe as from 1815. This change, owed to the impact of the Continental
Blockade on the economic regions that would henceforth constitute Belgium (1830)
and/or Germany (1871), gained new momentum with the provisions governing river
navigation determined by the Conference of Vienna, giving rise to the formation of
trade areas partially exempted from duties. This trend, subsequently strengthened by
the review of customs’ regulations, materialised in Iberia on the 31 August 1829 upon
the signature of a treaty on the navigation of river Tagus, extended to river Douro by
3
António Ventura; Alexandre de Sousa Pinto; Cristina Borreguero Beltrán (coord.), La Guerra de la
Independencia en el Mosaico Peninsular (1808-1814), Burgos, Universidad de Burgos, 2010.
4
David Justino, A Formação do Mercado Nacional, (1810-1913), 2 vols, Lisboa, Veja Editores, 1988-1989;
Miriam Halpern Pereira, Das Revoluções Liberais ao Estado Novo, Lisboa, Presença, 1994.
5
Quoting Almeida Garrett. Proceedings of Câmara dos Deputados, Session no.11, 13 November 1840, p.
212.
6
For William Huskisson cf. Denis Patrick O’Brien, The Classical Economists Revisited, Princeton University
Press, 2004 [1ª ed. 1975].
7
For Emerich Vattel cf. Frédéric Ramel, Anthologie des Relations Internationles, Paris, Presses de
Sciences Politiques, 2011.
8
G. Haberler, A Survey of International Trade Theory, Princeton, 1961; Paul Bairoch, Commerce Exterieur
et Développement Economique de Europe au XIXe siècle, Paris, Mouton e Co., 1976.
an additional clause 9. The fall of Absolutism in Portugal rendered non-viable the
enforcement of the above agreement.
In May 1835 Iberian governments again discussed the theme of river navigation
and came to an agreement. But the acceptance of the Treaty on the Navigation of
River Douro triggered strong controversy between the Setembrista party, which
promoted customs protectionism and the reserve of national space for energising
Portuguese agriculture and industry, and the Cartista party, which praised the virtuous
nature of vitalised trade as a means to boost wealth creation in the country 10.
Submitted to Parliament Chambers in January 1836, the Treaty was enforced
five years later, only after overcoming the difficulties arising from the drafting and
approval of the respective provisions and addressing the issues related with the
resistance expressed in Parliament by members such as José Estevão, Moura Cabral, Sá
Nogueira, João de Sousa Pinto de Magalhães, Vicente Ferrer or Bernardo Gorjão
Henriques. It should be stressed that throughout this decision-making process Spanish
diplomacy kept the Portuguese foreign office under strong pressure 11. Such pressure
reached its peak in December 1840, date of the ultimatum addressed by the Spanish
9
Treaty between Prince Dom Miguel and Don Fernando VII King of Spain on the Free Navigation of
Rivers Tejo and Douro, signed in Lisbon on the 31 August 1829 and ratified by the Usurping Cabinet on
the 7 October and by Spain on the 29 September 1829, in Colecção de Tratados, Convenções, Contratos
e Actos Públicos celebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal e as mais potências, desde 1640 até ao presente,
compiled by José Ferreira Borges de Castro, tomo VI, Lisboa, Imp. Nacional, 1857, pp. 78-88; António
Monteiro Cardoso, “A Questão da Livre Navegação do Douro e a crise de 1840 entre Portugal e
Espanha”, in Heriberto Cairo Caron, Paula Godinho e Xerardo Pereira (coord.), Portugal e Espanha. Entre
discursos de centro e práticas de fronteira, Lisboa, IELT, Colibri, 2009, pp- 55-56. Também Artur Teodoro
de Matos, Transportes e Comunicações em Portugal, Açores e Madeira (1750-1850), Ponta Delgada,
Universidade dos Açores, 1980; Maria da Conceição Meireles Pereira, “A navegação do rio Douro no séc.
XIX. Algumas questões”, Douro. Estudos e Documentos, vol. II, (4), 1997, pp. 251-269; João Carlos Garcia,
A Navegação no Baixo Guadiana durante o ciclo do minério (1857-1917). Dissertação de Doutoramento,
Porto, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, 1996. Maria da Graça Lopes Fernandes Martins, As
Relações do Nordeste Transmontano com Castela-Leão no séc. XIX (1834-1880). Dissertação de
Doutoramento, Porto, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, 2007.
10
Miriam Halpern Pereira, Miriam Halpern Pereira, Das Revoluções Liberais ao Estado Novo, Lisboa,
Presença, 1994; Maria de Fátima Bonifácio, Seis Estudos sobre o Liberalismo Português, Lisboa, Editorial
Estampa, 1991; João Bonifácio Serra, “Em defesa dos interesses industriais – António Oliveira Marreca
(1848-1849), Análise Social, vol. XVI, (61-62), 1980, pp. 53-69.
11
Judging from the outlook drafted by Carlos Creus, Spain’s chargé d’affaires in Portugal, on the 27 de
November 1839, the fall on the eve of the cabinet headed by Barão da Ribeira de Sabrosa would be a
key driver for unblocking the negotiations. This was however wishful thinking; the new cabinet headed
by Rodrigo da Fonseca Magalhães, albeit favouring the Treaty’s signature, did not fail to submit it to the
ratification of parliament chambers (a measure contrary to Madrid’s interest), which widely debated the
said Regulations between November 1840 and January 1841. António Monteiro Cardoso, “A Questão da
Livre Navegação do Douro e a crise de 1840 entre Portugal e Espanha”, in Heriberto Cairo Caron, Paula
Godinho and Xerardo Pereira (coord.), Portugal e Espanha. Entre discursos de centro e práticas de
fronteira, Lisboa, IELT, Colibri, 2009, pp- 55-56.
cabinet to Portugal’s government. England, both hostile to the customs-oriented
guidelines of the “Setembrista” cabinets and favourable to political change triggered
by Espartero in Spain, backed up this ultimatum 12.
This treaty, with an anticipated duration of 25 years 13, failed to meet the needs
and expectations behind its signature in Spain or Portugal. Spain pointed out the
unduly taxing of goods unloaded at Porto, heading for the neighbouring country where
they paid the same duties. Portugal considered this treaty insufficient insofar as its
restrictive nature did not yield economic complementariness of the two countries14.
This view guided the interventions of Cláudio Adriano da Costa, who advocated
the potentialities of Portugal’s economic linkage to Spain by way of a customs league,
labelled Prussian, as it stood for the replication, inasmuch as possible and desirable, of
the organisational model developed in German land since 1818 15. Also Agostinho
Albano de Silveira Pinto praised the increment of the circulation infra-structure, in
connection with the idea of a customs league in Iberia. In Eco dos Operários, Sousa
Brandão expressed his support to Iberian Federalism and claimed that the Iberian
customs league would help address Portugal’s economic bottlenecks and subsequently
the misery of Portuguese workers. In O Patriota, Manuel Jesus Coelho criticised the
Portuguese cabinet for not sharing the purposes of its Spanish counterpart, a position
similar to the one expressed by António da Costa de Sousa Macedo in Leiriense, also
shared by José Barbosa Leão 16.
The same views, albeit in a different context, underlay the statements of the
Viscount de Vila Maior regarding the road and railway network of Trás-os-Montes,
issued in January 1866 about the new challenges faced by Portugal and Spain; the
12
Idem. This treaty also required that the regulations governing the customs houses of Porto, Barca de
Alva and Sabor and monitoring posts be altered, according to the decree-law of the 18 May 1841.
13
Vd. Article 12 of the Navigation Treaty, Diário da Câmara dos Senhores Deputados do Reino, Session
no. 19, 26 January 1836, p. 236.
14
This position was not unanimously supported by the Portuguese side, as evidenced by the controversy
between Alexandre Herculano and Lopes de Mendonça in 1853 about the introduction of railway
transport in Portugal and its impact on Portuguese-Spanish trade relations, among others. Adriano
Moreira, “A Tensão Ibérica”, in Hipolito de la Torre Gomez e António José Telo, La Mirada del Outro.
Percepciones luso-españolas desde la história, Mérida, Ed. Regional de Extremadura, 2001, pp. 25-33.
15
“Poderia ter algum lugar, se nós quisessemos adoptar com a Espanha uma liga prussiana, mas nós tão
longe estamos disso que tomáramos edificar as muralhas da China, entre Portugal e Espanha”. Cláudio
Adriano da Costa, Exame do Orçamento de Portugal, Lisboa, Oficina de M. J. Coelho, 1841, p. 90. O autor
voltaria a insistir nesta temática na obra Memória sobre Portugal e Espanha, Lisboa, 1850.
16
Maria da Conceição Meireles Pereira, op. cit, pp. 258 and following.
design of the railway itineraries and the construction and funding of the railway lines
linking the two countries17.
To this extent the re-vitalisation of Iberianism in the second half of the
nineteenth century took stock of the European trends of that time, subsidiary to the
List’s doctrines 18. The objective of economic modernisation, shared by both
governments in the mid-1800’s19, became a common denominator in PortugueseSpanish relations, with a political and institutional impact. Also historiography became
decisively important, much attention was paid to Iberian geography and, lastly, a
perception of difference cropped up as to identity features in the birth and
consolidation of Iberian communities. This confluence triggered a wide debate,
involving intellectuals, politicians and economic operators, on the advantages and
shortcomings of proximity between the Iberian nations20.
In parallel Portugal and Spain were compelled to gradually adopt a new
paradigm, which did not stem from any Iberian will and/or specificity but rather from
each country’s integration into the framework of supranational dynamics that vitalised
Europe at that time. This centripetal drive at the European level triggered in the
17
Magda Pinheiro, Chemins de fer, structure financiére de l’ état et dépendance exterieure au Portugal
(1850-1890), 3 vols, Paris, 1986.
18
António Pedro Vicente, Espanha e Portugal. Um Olhar sobre as relações peninsulares no séc. XX,
Lisboa, Tribuna da História, 2003, p. 212
19
David Justino, “O Livre Câmbio e o fontismo revisitados através dos debates parlamentares”, in José
Vicente Serrão, Magda de Avelar Pinheiro e Maria de Fátima Sá e Melo Ferreira, Desenvolvimento
Económico e Mudança Social. Portugal nos últimos dois séculos, Lisboa, Imprensa das Ciências Sociais,
Abril de 2009, pp. 49-68; Gabriel Tortella, El desarollo de la España contemporánea. Historia económica
de los siglos XIX y XX, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2001.
20
Among other studies, Fernando Catroga, “Nacionalismo e Ecumenismo. A Questão Ibérica na Segunda
Metade do Séc. XIX”, Revista Cultura História e Filosofia, Lisboa, vol. IV, 1985; Jose Antonio Rocamora,
“Causas do Surgimento e Fracasso do Nacionalismo Ibérico”, Análise Social, nº 122, 1993, pp. 91-98;
Maria da Conceição Meireles Pereira, “Concertação Económica e Peninsular e União Aduaneira na
Imprensa Portuense – propostas e resistências no 3º quartel de Oitocentos”, Revista da Faculdade de
Letras. História, 2ª série, vol. 13, Porto, Universidade do Porto, 1996, pp. 423-462; Amadeu Carvalho
Homem, “O tema do iberismo no republicanismo federalista português (1870-1910)”, O Federalismo
Europeu. História, Política e Utopia, Lisboa, Edições Colibri, 2001; Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro,
“Portugal e Espanha – Estados Liberais: Singularidades e Afinidades”, Relações Portugal-Espanha, uma
História Paralela, um Destino Comum. II Encontro Internacional, org. por Fernando de Sousa e Maria da
Conceição Meireles Pereira, Porto, Cepese/Fundação Rei Afonso Henriques, 2002, pp. 203-212; José
António Rocamora, “La Alternativa Ibérica en España”, Actas dos X Cursos Internacionais de Verão de
Cascais (7 a 12 de Julho de 2003), Cascais, Câmara Municipal de Cascais, 2004; Sérgio Campos Matos,
“Iberismo e Identidade Nacional (1851-1910)”, Clio. Revista do Centro de História da Universidade de
Lisboa, nova série, vols 14-15, 2006; Idem, “Conceitos de Iberismo em Portugal”, Revista de História das
Ideias, nº 28, Coimbra, Instituto de História e Teoria das Ideias/Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de
Coimbra, 2007; Maria da Conceição Meireles Pereira, “Iberismo e Nacionalismo da Regeneração à
República. entre Utopia e Distopia”, Ibéria. Revista de História das Ideias, vol. 31, Coimbra, Instituto de
História e Teoria das Ideias/Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra, 2010, pp. 257-284.
Iberian context the signature of bilateral conventions of sectoral character and scope –
postal convention 21, consular convention 22, improvement of metric system 23, literary
and artistic property 24, emigration of nationals subject to conscription 25 – which
enshrined basic mechanisms for trans-Iberian co-operation. These in turn formed a
basic structure set up by Iberian diplomatic corps, which also had to address other
issues linked to interests vital to each Nation (but sometimes different or even
irreconcilable).
We repeatedly find such clash in domains such as communications, trade and
transit, or territorial waters and fishing activities. A paradigm of this trend was the
agreement on river and railway communications, signed on the 27 April 1866 for ruling
the circulation of people and goods and replacing the 1835 Navigation Treaty. The
agreement would be regulated much later, as it was difficult to agree on transit
regulations capable of rendering compatible Portuguese-Spanish interests 26. In force
since January 1877 its enforcement clearly fell short of the provisions laid down by the
parties, namely in articles 3 27 and 4 28. The general efficacy of the same agreement was
weakened as a result of this factor, due less to the satisfaction of national needs than
to the expansion of Spanish products to the Portuguese market and, moreover, to the
destination markets of Portuguese exports 29.
21
Signed in August 1850; renewed on the 2 April 1862, in force as from 15 January of the following year.
22 April 1871. Sinopse dos Tratados, Convenções, Contratos e Actos Públicos celebrados entre a Coroa
de Portugal e as mais potências e que não foram expressamente revogados, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional,
1889, p. 33
23
20 May 1875. Idem.
24
Signed on the 5 August 1860 and subsequently on the 8 August 1889. Idem.
25
16 June/13 July 1875. Idem.
26
This fact leads us to partially disagree with the statement of António Monteiro Cardoso on the impact
of the 1866 agreement. António Monteiro Cardoso, “A Questão da Livre Navegação do Douro e a Crise
de 1840 entre Portugal e Espanha”, in Heriberto Cairo Caron, Paula Godinho, Xerardo Pereiro, coord.,
Portugal e Espanha. Entre discursos de centro e práticas de fronteira, Lisboa, IELT/Colibri, 2009, p. 70.
27
“Estabelecer-se-ão depósitos em Madrid e Lisboa para as mercadorias de trânsito procedente de
Espanha e Portugal e para todas as que se destinem a qualquer dos dois países pela via férrea, e
sucessivamente se estabelecerão outros depósitos na fronteira de Espanha e portos do litoral espanhol,
segundo se designe e necessário for, à medida que forem abrindo novos caminhos de ferro à circulação.
Também se construirão outros depósitos onde convier, logo que em Portugal e Espanha se construirem
novas vias férreas, que hajam de entroncar na fronteira com as de Madrid e de Lisboa a Badajoz”.
28
Works done for extending navigation and making it easier in rivers crossing the respective territories.
29
We should also take stock of the speech by Mariano Cirilo de Carvalho on the 9 February 1893 (Diário
da Câmara dos Senhores Deputados, session 19, 3 February 1893, p. 8); and also the parliamentary
controversy opposing Mariano Cirilo de Carvalho, Fernando Matoso dos Santos and Ferreira do Amaral,
on occasion of the appraisal of the 27 March 1893 Commerce and Navigation Treaty between Portugal
and Spain. Diário da Câmara dos Senhores Deputados, session 40, 31 May 1893, pp. 6-12.
22
In spite of the above limitations, this agreement for rendering communications
easier would play a structuring role in the Iberian balance, marked, in commercial
terms, by a clear gap between the Spanish and Portuguese positions. Both agreed on
the basic assumption of improved proximity of Iberian markets, which would have a
virtuous impact, by multiplication, on economic activity in both countries – and,
consequently, on extra-European regions under the respective sovereignty and direct
influence. Likewise the visibility of Iberian economies in Europe was an key element in
the argument for proximity, cherished by Spain’s foreign office in the second half of
the 1800’s. Spanish diplomacy and its representatives in Lisbon certainly had not
forgotten the Portuguese resistance against the creation of a customs league similar to
others that existed in Europe, as proposed by Miguel Fernandez de los Rios in June
1870. Relying on a customs tariff common to both countries for import and export
duties, as well as on the equitable split of the revenue collected at the customs
houses30, Spain’s formula clearly diverged from Portugal’s preference for a
conservative modality for approaching customs duties and product circulation, as
could be gauged from the instructions sent by Foreign Minister Casal Ribeiro to the
Portuguese representative in Madrid, in November 1866 31.
This difference was the kick-off for the negotiations process begun on the 20
December 1872, date of signature of the first treaty of commerce and navigation
between Portugal and Spain. The agreement, with an anticipated 8-year duration,
imposed limitations to the scope originally wished by each party. Spain was forced to
immediately give up hopes for an Iberian customs union and make plans according to
the guidelines presented by the Peninsular Association in June 1869 32.
30
Negócios Estrangeiros. Documentos apresentados …. Negociações com Espanha. Comércio, trânsito,
pesca, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1893, p. 95.
31
Idem, p. 94.
32
Ricardo Molina, Portugal. Su origem, constituicion e Historia politica en relacion com la del resto de la
Peninsula, Sevilha/Madrid, Félix Periá, 1870, p. 225 and following. Special reference should be made to
the author’s interest in the customs union and the mechanisms for its materialisation – i.e. among
others, periodical Spanish-Portuguese-American industrial fairs; industrial fairs at the regional level,
simultaneously covering a part of both Portuguese and Spanish territory; on-equal foot admission and
listing of Portuguese government bonds and company stock to Spanish stock exchanges and security
markets; creation of new partnerships between merchants and bankers of the Peninsular Association to
invest in Portugal, incentive premiums and other kind of protection to Portuguese industrialists ready to
develop industries in Spain and on-equal foot treatment for Spanish investors in Portugal; adoption of
single tariffs in railway and steamership transportation, etc.; government subsidies to the construction
of new railway lines for promoting communications between the two countries; government subsidies
In exchange for the recognition of its contract formula, Portugal’s duty now was
to integrate Spain into the group of nations with whom a treaty of commerce and
navigation was signed, based on the most favoured nation clause 33. Indeed this
practice was in line with the goal of establishing a foreign trade scheme capable of
meeting the requirements of prime-minister Fontes’s economic model, which aimed to
gradually integrate Portugal into the enlarged economic system, at the pace imposed
by European and non-European industrial powers. This entailed a demanding pathway
for Portugal’s economic and social structures, not exempt from difficulties, as
evidenced by the widespread unpopularity of Fontes Pereira de Melo’s reforms in the
fields of infra-structure and administrative and tax organisation 34.
Headed by Great Britain (with whom a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation on
India was signed on the 26 December 1878, plus a convention added to the 1842
Treaty, on the 22 May 1882), the above group was joined by Russia (28 February
1851), Peru (26 March 1853), Liberia (4 March 1865), Austria-Hungary (13 January
1872), Germany (2 March 1872) and Italy (15 July 1872). The group was subsequently
joined by Switzerland (6 December 1873), Belgium (23 February 1874), the
Netherlands (9 January 1875), Greece (12 January 1877), Bolivia (10 May 1879), France
(19 December 1881 35, plus an additional convention on the 13 May 1882), Hawaii (5
May 1882) and Denmark (20 December 1887)36.
for setting up the main steamership lines linking the entire coastline; creation of more trading houses
and exhibition of Portuguese products in Spain and of Spanish products in Portugal; rendering legislation
uniform in the fields of water and pastures; creation of farming colonies in depopulated areas of both
countries, offering incentives for available Portuguese citizens to settle in Spain and for Spaniards to
settle in Portugal; creation of credit institutions common to both countries.
33
Francisco António Correia, Política Económica Internacional, Lisboa, Livraria Sá da Costa, 1922, pp. 2338.
34
David Justino, op. cit.
35
It was the second treaty of commerce and navigation signed by both countries; the first dating back to
April 1867.
36
This list includes the treaties of commerce and navigation repealed between 1890 and 1892, as they
were the structuring axes of the Portuguese trade system in the said period. Nevertheless the same
regime also implied signing covenants or specific-nature agreements and strictly keeping relationships
governed by treaties signed before the “Regeneração”. Such was the framework of trade relations
between the United States of America and Portugal, pursuant to the treaty negotiated by João Baptista
Almeida Garrett and Edward Havanagh, signed on the 26 August 1840 and ratified eight months later.
Signed to last a six-year (renewable) period, this treaty of commerce and navigation expired only on the
31 January 1892 when both signatory parties repealed it, although according to Portugal’s
understanding the McKinley tariff constituted an express breach of its articles. The timeframe of these
agreements should also be stressed, a fact that suggests a mismatch with the thesis of Pedro Lains
regarding the impact of external markets on Portugal’s economic growth (Pedro Lains, A Economia
Portuguesa no séc. XIX. Crescimento Económico e Comércio Externo 1851-1913, Lisboa, Imprensa
In this across-the-board calculation Spain typified a specific pattern for
Portugal’s economic diplomacy, whose priorities were far from favouring the criterion
of geographic proximity through the 1840’s to the 1870’s. Hence Spain’s late
integration into the group of nations with whom Portugal kept commercial relations
governed by covenant. In turn the fact that both countries produced similar goods and
the difference of scale between the Iberian economies 37, far from inspiring a broaderscale understanding in line with the objectives enounced by Spain, introduced an
element of permanent instability in Portuguese-Spanish trade relations, quite clear in
the period after 1878 in the framework of negotiations aimed to set up a new treaty.
The negotiating process between Portugal and Spain developed in this context
would drag on until 1882, year of signature of a new commercial agreement based on
different assumptions, as a means to match the customs tariff alterations approved by
Spain in that same year. Quoting a speech by José Vicente Barbosa du Bocage on the
16 January 1885, this circumstance forced Portugal to make more concessions to its
Iberian partner, especially duty exemption for goods more often trade by land – cattle,
sheep and goats – and sea, as evidenced by the tariff below 38. The “Regeneração”
Nacional, 1995; Benedita Câmara, “Relações Económicas com o Exterior”, in História Económica de
Portugal 1700-200. O século XIX, org. Pedro Lains e Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, Lisboa, ICS, 2005, pp. 337356. The so-called “treaty crisis” occurred in the early 1890’s and later on the Portuguese diplomacy did
not spare efforts to line up, by way of treaties of commerce and navigation, with rapid growth
economies such as Germany (1908) and the USA (1910).
37
Following the characterisation of large and small economies proposed by Paul Bairoch. Portugal, in
the second group, was an advocate of the strategy of complementariness with the dominant economy
in the 1800’s, i.e. England – together with Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland. Paul Bairoch,
Commerce Exterieur et Développement Economique de Europe au XIXe siècle, Paris, Mouton e Co., 1976,
pp. 260 e seguintes; Pedro Lains, op. cit., pp.
38
Tariff A
Minerals and ore in raw, unclassified
Unit
Duties
Kg
Duty free
Kg
2.7 reis
Salted and pressed pilchard sardine
Kg
3.6 reis
Other fish (salted, pressed, smoked
Kg
9 reis
Seafood
Kg
1.8 reis
Fresh and dry fruits
Kg
3.6 reis
Olive oil
Decaliter
500 reis
Fresh fish, with salt required for
preservation
and pickle)
cabinet stressed the importance of this understanding for opening up the Spanish
market to Portuguese salt and its impact on fish trade – salted and pressed pilchard
sardine, pressed and salted, smoked and pickle fish, and seafood (products then
relevant and with a strong growth potential due to the signatories’ decision of
adopting equal customs duties.
These requirements offset other drivers considered as having a lower impact,
e.g. the reduction of duties applicable to wine, olive oil, grain, flowers – products
whose easier access to the Portuguese market indicated a stronger pressure on
national producer counterparts. This fact explained the parliamentary resistances
against the ratification of the Treaty which, after its signature by António de Serpa
Pimentel and Filipe Mendez de Vigo y Osorio on the 12 December 1883, was approved
two years later, with the strong opposition of the “Progressista” Party. 39. In force since
then, such circumstance did not provide any grounds for altering the anticipated expiry
date, i.e. June 1887.
Spain however favoured the adoption of a privileged commercial agreement
with its Iberian partner, an intention disclosed in February to Portugal’s representative
in Madrid, Count de Casal Ribeiro. Spain’s objective was to negotiate a new treaty of
commerce and navigation with Portugal, while the 1883 treaty was still in force. In line
with the experience acquired through the tariff attached thereto, Madrid none the less
wanted to generally enforce it in the scope of peninsular trade relations pursuant to
the bases presented both to the Portuguese Chargé d’Affaires in Spain and directly to
the Lisbon cabinet. Such bases were (1) totally free two-way circulation of cattle across
the land border between the two countries, (2) full duty exemption at land customs
houses for all exotic items imported by Portugal and Spain from third countries, in
order to make their circulation within the peninsula entirely free, (3) free access to
Cattle, sheep and goats
Head
Duty free
Pigs
Head
90 reis
Cork in raw and in planks
Kg
Duty free
Bottle corks
Kg
9 reis
Raw wool, dirty or washed
KG
Duty free
39
Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, May-July 1885. José Luciano de Castro and José Frederico Laranjo
ranked among the critics to the Treaty of Commerce with Spain, opposed by Pinto Magalhães and
Barbosa du Bocage.
both countries by land for all items not produced on annual average, in the previous
quinquennium, above the amount of 2,500 pesetas and 500,000 reis, (4) incentives of
all kind to international exchanges, both to France and Italy and Mediterranean ports,
and (5) review of the treaty of fisheries and navigation so as to secure total freedom 40.
Portugal’s reply advocated the extension of the 1883 Treaty and showed no
interest in reviewing the terms of the agreement in force. But it failed to obtain Spain’s
agreement on sectors such as transit, by land and sea, and fisheries. After a deadlock,
on the 18 June 1887 the parties agreed on a modus vivendi and simultaneously
approved the following bases for a new treaty:
1. the governments of Portugal and Spain undertook to identify, by common
agreement, which imported products, while safeguarding the interests specific to each
country, could be equalled in duties to be paid at the maritime customs houses and
terrestrial customs houses in the border with France; 2. the two governments would
also look into which goods, object of cross-border trade and intrinsic to such trade,
could be freely imported, or subject to equal (low) duties payable and the land
customs houses. They also undertook to look into all matters concerning cross-border
livestock imports; 3. both governments undertook to include in the provisions of future
treaties the following reservation, i.e. special advantages mutually granted by the two
goverments to render cross-border trade easier, or special advantages granted by third
nations, shall not be comprised in the most favoured nation treatment; 4º both
governments agreed to fully enforce the transit covenant then in force (signed in 1866,
ratified in 1877); 5. the commerce treaty and the fisheries regulatory covenant should
be extended for one year, i.e. up to the 30 June 1888; 6. during the extension period,
cattle and pigs from Spain imported to Portugal by land would pay 5 percent ad
valorem. The same duty would be paid at Spain’s land borders, to livestock coming
from Portugal; 7. sheep and goats would be imported free of duty 41.
40
Negócios Estrangeiros. Documentos apresentados …. Negociações com Espanha. Comércio, trânsito,
pesca, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1893, pp. 92-93. In the first case, “tendo em conta que esta medida
responde melhor a fins administrativos e políticos do que comerciais, levar-se-á a cabo de maneira que
não apareça como estipulado no novo tratado excepto quando os negociadores o derem por ultimado”.
In the second, “admitida esta base, será preciso igualar os direitos que estes artigos pagam nas
alfândegas marítimas dos dois países com o objectivo de não permitir que haja preferência de um porto
sobre os outros, nem torcer-se nesse sentido o movimento comercial existente”.
41
Idem, Ibidem, pp. 124-125.
After the difficulties encountered by the Moret cabinet in having the modus
vivendi approved by Parliament chambers, Spain’s executive managed to recover its
original position meanwhile adjusted to the already mentioned Portuguese requests.
Such convergence led to new bases for negotiating, which were presented in Lisbon in
November 1887. The new (old) Spanish position relied on seven structuring articles,
requiring the simultaneous discussion of the treaties of fisheries and commerce and
duty-free access at land-based customs houses of all exotic production items imported
to Portugal and Spain from third nations, with the aim of ensuring their free
circulation. Once this basis was accepted, it would be necessary to (1) equal the duties
payable by these items at maritime customs houses, (2) ensure the free access to both
countries, by land, to all items not produced on annual average, in the previous
quinquennium, above de amount of 2,500 pesetas in Spain and 500,000 reis in
Portugal, (3) allow the completely free transit of livestock at land borders and the
removal of barriers to the total freedom of pasture, (4) create a set of exemptions and
benefits not applicable to other nations, (5) secure the benefits applicable to any
goods destined for France or the Mediterranean, and, last, (6) secure the agreement of
both countries for doing the works required by the navigation of the Tagus42.
Portugal replied very soon, on the same month. It reflected the difficulties of
Lisbon’s government in meeting Spain’s requirements and also the advocacy of
protectionist-driven domestic priorities in terms of customs duties, geared towards the
promotion of national industry and agriculture, which were not compatible with the
Spanish objectives of opening trade at the Iberian scale. Accordingly Portugal’s Foreign
Minister, Barros Gomes, invoked the changes to the Portuguese tariff to explain that
Portugal could not take on board the purposes of its Iberian partner 43. Be that as it
may Portugal remained willing to simultaneously discuss the treaties of fisheries and
commerce to be negotiated, the latter necessarily having a restrictive nature.
In early 1888 Portuguese-Spanish differences concerning this subject-matter
became more serious. Faced with the statements of the Marques de Viesca calling
upon the Spanish cabinet to promote a customs union between the Iberian partners,
42
Idem, Ibidem, p. 141.
Pauta Geral das Alfândegas do continente de Portugal e ilhas adjacentes. Aprovada por decreto de 22
de Setembro de 1887, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1887.
43
as well as the alleged convergence between the advocates of free trade and of
protectionism at to the potentialities of the Iberian market for Spanish economy,
Lisbon responded by delaying negotiations. This position was keep even after February
1888, date at which Spain determined that the entry of animals through its borders –
from then on restricted to 1st class customs houses – be ruled on health grounds. Also
Spain resented the incidents occurred at the Portuguese parliament, whose advisory
bodies refused to sign the new treaty, and the opinions voiced by Portugal’s press as to
the true motifs of the Spanish cabinet. These were the grounds for the memorandum
delivered by Mendez de Vigo to Barros Gomes, in April 1888, clearly stating that Spain
was ready to start a tariff war as a means to overcome the negotiations deadlock 44.
The Portuguese cabinet replied invoking tax legislation differences, similar
agricultural and industrial productions and the protectionist nature of the customs
legal framework in force, to justify Portugal’s difficulties in accepting Spain’s proposals.
According to Barros Gomes, agricultural crisis and the impact of health restrictions
imposed on livestock imported from Portugal by England further weakened Portugal’s
negotiating stand.
Differences remained until 1890. Their resolution would be influenced by
drivers external to the Iberian context, namely the British Ultimatum 45, the review of
customs policies in Italy and particularly in France 46 impacting on the placement of
Iberian wines, or the refusal of Brazil’s parliament to ratify the treaty of commerce and
navigation negotiated between Portugal and this South-American republic since March
1888. Approved in January 1892, the trade agreement provided significant benefits to
a vast array of national products, including wines, olive oil, vinegar, salt, bottle corks
and fruit in exchange for Portuguese concessions to Brazilian sugar 47.
44
Negócios Estrangeiros. Documentos apresentados …. Negociações com Espanha. Comércio, trânsito,
pesca, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1893, p. 188.
45
Pilar Cuesta, A Espanha Ante o Ultimato, Lisboa, Livros Horizonte, 1975; António José Telo e Hipolito
Torre Gomez, Espanha e Portugal nos sistemas internacionais contemporâneos, Lisboa, Cosmos, 2000.
46
Jean-Charles Asselain, Histoire Économique de la France du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours. I De l’Ancien
Régime à la Première Guerre Mondiale, s.l., Éditions du Seuil, 1984, pp. 152-160.
47
O Economista. Revista semanal, no. 3106, 16 January 1892, p. 1. Benefits provided under this treaty
concerned wines, olive oil, vinegar, salt, bottle corks, fresh fruit, dry fruit, onions, garlic, footwear,
brushes, paintbrushes, bristle items, stones and marbles, in addition to ceramics. Improving conditions
of access to the Brazilian market was a theme of consensus in Portugal’s party framework, both
monarchic and republican. This fact explained the intervention of Portuguese diplomacy across the
entire party spectrum, although the promoters of the agreement, the “Progressista” party, stepped
down in January 1890, being replaced by non-partisan executives and subsequently by the
This failure caused Portugal to focus on a trade agreement with its Iberian
partner, made desirable also due to drivers external to the Portuguese situation. The
1891-1893 financial crisis added to the repercussions of the so-called “treaties crisis”
on Portugal’s economy, namely the loss of external markets by certain manpowerintensive Portuguese industries; the fishing sector, particularly in the Algarve, was
affected by the repeal of the treaty of commerce between Portugal and Italy. The
same applied to the cork sector which, following the limitations to the entry of
national products into the USA imposed by the McKinley tariff, now had to face the
shut-down of the German market to processed products as from 1892. The
modifications of the Spanish tariff adopted in January 1891, with particular impact on
the import duties applicable to certain products more significantly marketed between
Portugal and Spain, represented an additional pressure on Portugal’s cabinet to carry
on its dialogue with the Iberian partner 48.
This pressure would be made even stronger by other drivers, such as the
contacts of the Spanish community in Porto with the Madrid government 49 and the
possible positive outcome of the bilateral negotiations between France and Spain
concerning customs duties on alcohol, consequently leading to the presence of Spanish
wines in the French market to the detriment of Portuguese products 50. We should also
take stock, in this context, of the publication of Spain’s new customs regulations,
considered by Portugal an instrument of pressure on the Paris government; it was
however admittedly an instrument of pressure on the Lisbon executive 51.
At this juncture the negotiations of the treaty of commerce and navigation
between Portugal and Spain gained new momentum. On the 16 February 1891,
Foreign Minister Barbosa du Bocage gave instructions to Portugal’s representative in
“Regenerador” party. Vivina Amorim Sousa, Comércio entre Portugal e Brasil nos inícios do séc. XX: o
Inquérito Comercial de 1916 e as propostas de uma comunidade Luso-Brasileira. Dissertação de
mestrado, Porto, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, 2004.
48
See Appendix A. Albert Carreras, Xavier Tafunel, Historia Económica de la España Contemporánea
(1789-2009), 1st updated ed., Barcelona, Critica, 2010, pp. 183-219.
49
“Reunião da Colónia Espanhola”, Economista Português. Revista Semanal, no. 2684, 17 August 1890,
p. 2.
50
Special reference should be made, in this regard, to the fears voiced by Elvino de Brito. Diário da
Câmara dos Senhores Deputados, session 22, 9 February 1892, p. 7.
51
Portuguese press stressed the flexibility of the new Spanish customs tariff, which consisted of a
maximum tariff applicable to nations who had made no special concessions to Spain and a minimum
tariff whose benefits were granted to nations that attributed do Spain their minimum tariffs. Economista
Português. Revista Semanal, no. 3100, 9 January 1892, pp. 1-2.
Madrid to agree on a basic understanding for the modus vivendi with the Iberian
partner. Casal Ribeiro, subsequently replaced by Count de São Miguel, was also
informed on the negotiation bases agreed by the Lisbon cabinet, i.e. commissioners
appointed by both countries would jointly study tariff specificities and the mutual
commitment to include in future treaties with third nations the reservation of not
being covered by the most favoured nation clause governing concessions exchanged
between Portugal and Spain.
In July and August 1891 each party appointed its members of the joint study
commission 52; in Portugal’s case, the Portuguese representatives appointed on the 18
July 1891 – Augusto de Sequeira Thedin and João de Sousa Calvet de Magalhães, the
latter subsequently replaced by Francisco de Salles Lencastre – received their
instructions from the Finance Minister, Joaquim Pedro de Oliveira Martins, on the
general guidelines to be adopted in this diplomatic negotiation, i.e. (1) the treaty
should not last more than 10 years, after which the Portuguese government would like
to keep it up to one year after the repeal that might be filed, (2) the principle
according to which benefits could not be extended to third nations, (3) concessions
should preferably add value to national farming products and industries, by mutually
establishing equal import duties in both countries, (4) Portugal declared itself ready to
make concessions on import duties for the following products coming from its
neighbour, i.e. cattle, filtered or laminated iron, mineral coals, or other industrial
products that did not compete with similar Portuguese products, (5) the treaty should
not apply exclusively to border regulations, and (6) the international transit scheme
should be considered separately from the treaty of commerce and navigation 53.
Negotiations lasted until the 27 March 1893, when the Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation was formally signed. In June 1893 this document was ratified, following
its debate and approval by the parliament, during which different viewpoints cropped
up as to Spain and the potentialities and/or shortcomings of the economic proximity
openly and subliminally inherent to the said treaty. Special reference should be made
to criticism voiced by two widely renowned personalities of the “Progressista” Party –
52
The Spanish commission was created on the 29 August 1891, following the appointment of Don José
Ruiz Gomez and Don Julian Castedo.
53
Negócios Estrangeiros. Documentos apresentados …. Negociações com Espanha. Comércio, trânsito,
pesca, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1893, p. 286 and following.
Fernando Matoso dos Santos and José Frederico Laranjo –, limited by the open support
given by Mariano Cirilo de Carvalho, author of the advice on the Treaty proposal. The
theme was not unanimously supported by the members of the “Regenerador” Party
with a seat in parliament – though the initiative had been launched by the cabinet
chaired by Hintze Ribeiro and resulted from the continued efforts developed by wellknown protagonists of the said party, namely José Maria Casal Ribeiro and
subsequently João Franco.
The first was a firm believer in the preferential connection, in political and
economic terms, of both Iberian nations; this belief, stated since the mid-nineteenth
century, would be kept and developed by Casal Ribeiro after his entry to the
“Regenerador” Party. Once its member, be it as Foreign Minister be it as Portugal’s
representative in Spain, he became known for sticking to his ideas, more often than
not badly accepted or feared by his colleagues or by the cabinet members in charge (as
evidenced by events in the period of 1887-1888, during the Portugal-Spain diplomatic
crisis). To a large extent this treaty meant the recognition of his long-term work, a fact
acknowledged by his fellow party members in Parliament 54.
The second case was a clear instance of political orientation driven by
pragmaticism. João Franco actually felt that, in face of England’s political and
commercial estrangement, Portugal had no alternative but to find new European and
non-European partners/allies in markets with a stronger growth potential– Brazil and
On the other hand he looked for a formula capable of neutralising any possible threats
to national sovereignty, at a time when Portugal’s position was particularly fragile
among European nations – Spain also having a top position in this ranking. These
perceptions, voiced at Parliament in May 1894 55, were evidenced by the conduct and
political solutions adopted by Franco since 1890. An example of these was his reform
of tonnage taxing, submitted in July 1890, based on the need to render Portugal’s
54
For instance Viscount de Pindela, in whose view the 1893 treaty resulted from political guidelines
gradually developed in Portugal by Casal Ribeiro, as from 1866. Diário da Câmara dos Senhores
Deputados, session 40, 31 de May 1893, p. 14.
55
“Há duas nações que, para nós, primam sobre todas as outras, uma é a Espanha e a outra é o Brasil. A
Espanha é nossa irmã, o Brasil é nosso filho. […] Não há ninguém que propugne mais abertamente pelas
cordiais e afectuosas relações entre Portugal e Espanha”. Idem, session 17, 30 October 1894, p. 304
collection duties and the object of collection similar to those practised by the Iberian
partner 56.
Both were however criticised by their fellow partisans, namely Ferreira de
Almeida who condemned the loss of sovereignty in matters as sensitive as the
demarcation of exclusive fishing zones and the criminal jurisdiction applicable to cases
of non-compliance 57
In the anti-monarchic party field, the March 1893 Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation was interpreted in many different ways. At the lower chamber of
Parliament, Teixeira Queiroz urged the other members of parliament to take a more
in-depth approach to the matrix bases of the agreement with a view to favouring the
creation of an Iberian customs alliance, a mechanism which he deemed potentially
useful to free the peninsular nations from the trend of decadence common to both, as
opposed to the growing industrialised European countries 58. Rodrigues de Freitas took
a different stand 59. In 1888 he used the same arguments to disprove of the signature
of a commerce treaty with Spain, considering the merger expectations placed on the
said agreement plus its economic uselessness60. Oddly enough the same reservations
inspired the caution of Consiglieri Pedroso 61, between March and May 1893, a
56
Idem, 28 July 1890 session, pp. 1560-1564.
Idem, session 39, 30 May 1893, p. 48.
58
“Por consequência, em vez de um tratado que significa, por assim dizer, em parte uma luta, eu
entendo que devíamos fazer uma liga económica de defesa aduaneira com aquele país e faço votos que
assim aconteça no futuro, e farei o possível para chegarmos a esse resultado […]. Eu desejaria que o
tratado em discussão fosse mais livre no ponto de vista comercial, que fosse mais amplo para se chegar
a profícuos resultados económicos e que tivesse uma margem mais largamente política para que os dois
povos se podessem conhecer e estimar intimamente, porque o comércio foi sempre considerado, e hoje
mais que nunca é reconhecido, como sendo um dos mais eficazes elementos de civilização dos povos”.
Idem, session no. 40, 31 May 1893, p. 15.
59
Jorge Fernandes Alves, Intervenções Parlamentares (1870-1893), recol. e introd. de Jorge Fernandes
Alves, Lisboa, Assembleia da República/Afrontamento, 1999.
60
Rodrigues de Freitas, “A União Ibérica e o Tratado de Comércio com a Espanha”, Comércio do Porto,
no. 102, 25 April 1888, p. 1. In this article and others that followed, Rodrigues de Freitas mentioned the
“fantasia espanhola, fácil e arrojada, acharia prontamente numerosas consequências óptimas de
unidade peninsular, tudo venturas e nem um só dano”. On the other hand he explained the uselessness
of the treaty, given the performance of Portuguese imports and exports in 1885-1887, with the treaty in
force. Its balance reverted exclusively to the benefit of Spain.
61
Lucília Rosa Mateus Nunes, Zófimo Consiglieri Pedroso: Vida, Obra e Acção Política. Dissertação de
Mestrado, Lisboa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1993.
57
rationale that blatantly contradicted the views expressed by the same MP in March
1885 on the proposed re-organisation of the customs service 62.
The treaty was globally welcomed by the Portuguese press, who looked closely
at its European repercussions. In July 1894 it was enforced by way of several
regulations on domains such as land trade via common roads63, fluvial trade in rivers
Minho, Douro, Tejo and Guadiana, along the sections that served as border between
Portugal and Espanha 64, maritime trade 65, service of surveillance and repression of
smuggling and loss of duties 66.
On one hand this treaty, in force since then, constituted the most stable
institutional bond linking the two Iberian nations in the 1800’s. It was repealed at the
end of September 1913. On the other hand it represented the beginning of a new era
in Portuguese economic diplomacy, marked by the logic of strict commercial
bilateralism emerging from the customs options made in 1892 and a new effort of
external market diversification, as relevant as urgent in face of England’s unavailability
to renew the trade agreements repealed in January 1892. Such circumstance, which
lasted until the eve of World War I, was one of the other characteristics of this period,
during which continental powers – namely Germany (mainly after the signature of the
1908 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with this power, in force after ) but also
Spain – acquired a new economic projection in Portugal’s space 67.
Appendix A
62
“Refiro-me à união das alfândegas portuguesas e espanholas, ao que poderemos chamar, para nos
servirmos de uma frase já consagrada, o zollverein peninsular. Para ninguém é desconhecido, Sr.
Presidente, que a união alfandegária dos dois países, que um zollverein hispano-português, seria uma
reforma de grande alcance económica para qualquer dos dois países”. Speech by Zófimo Consiglieri
Pedroso, at the 14 March 1885 session. Idem, 8 April 1885 session, p. 1032.
63
Diário do Governo, no. 149, 6 July 1894, pp. 1449-1759.
64
Idem, pp. 1759-1764.
65
Idem, p. 1765.
66
Idem, pp. 1766-1767.
67
Sacuntala de Miranda, Portugal: o círculo vicioso da dependência (1890-1939), Lisboa, Editorial
Teorema, 1991, pp. 33 and following. Compare the data provided by this author on the comments made
by British delegates in Portugal, issued in 1902 (Idem, p. 35), with the data provided by the Boletim
Comercial do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, reported to a previous period, regarding the system
of commercial propaganda developed by Germany, the efficacy of German agents and their impact on
English foreign trade. Boletim Comercial. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Direcção geral dos
negócios comerciais e consulares, vol. II, February 1899, no. 2, pp. 266-267.
“Pauta Espanhola”, Economista Português. Revista Semanal, nº 2830, 13 February
1891, p. 1.
Goods
Unit
Previous duty
New duty
Horses
1
128
180
Other
1
31.50
135
Mules
1
19.60
80
Donkeys
1
8.40
12
Cattle
1
13,80
40
Pigs
1
8.45
20
Sheep, goats and 1
1.40
2.40
2.80
11.60
15
50
others
Meat in brine, dry 100kg
or salted
Pork fat, including Idem
bacon
Other qualities
Idem
5.17
18
Paddy rice
Idem
3.40
5.30
Husked rice
Idem
6.80
10.60
Wheat
Idem
4.20
10.60
Wheat flour
Idem
6
13.20
3.10
4.40
4.50
7.10
Other grain (except Idem
millet)
Flour from other Idem
grain