Dispute Settlement Understanding

Transcrição

ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS
CENTRO DO COMÉRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO
Coordenadoras
Vera Thorstensen
Luciana Maria de Oliveira
RELEITURA DOS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO ÓRGÃO DE APELAÇÃO:
Efeitos na aplicação das regras do comércio internacional
Dispute Settlement Understanding
Organizadores
Alberto do Amaral Júnior
Autores
Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins
Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira
Carla Junqueira Canero
Felipe Herzog
Geraldo Vidigal Neto
Luiz Eduardo Salles
Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira
Maria de Lourdes Albertini
Rodrigo de Oliveira Franco
Túlio Di Giácomo Toledo
1
INTRODUÇÃO
Análise da jurisprudência consolidada relativa ao sistema de solução de controvérsias vigente durante o
Acordo Geral de Tarifas e Comércio 1947 (GATT 1947) e a partir da entrada em vigor da Organização
Mundial do Comércio (OMC), por meio da releitura e interpretação do Dipute Settlement Understanding
(DSU).
ACORDO GERAL SOBRE TARIFAS E COMÉRCIO DE 1947 (GATT 1947)
Felipe Herzog

Artigo XXII do GATT 1947
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article XXII
Consultation
1
Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting
party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any
contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a
satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo XXII
Consultas
1
Cada Parte Contratante examinará com compreensão as representações que lhe sejam encaminhadas
por qualquer outra Parte Contratante e deverá se prestar a consultas a respeito daquelas
representações, desde que elas digam respeito a questões relativas à aplicação do presente Acordo.
2
As Partes Contratantes poderão, a pedido de uma das Partes Contratantes, entrar em entendimentos
com uma ou várias Partes Contratantes sobre questões para as quais a solução satisfatória não poderia
ser alcançada através das consultas previstas no parágrafo primeiro.
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXII
Este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.
III.
Comentários
Nada a observar, uma vez que este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.
2
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)

Artigo 1
Felipe Herzog
IA.
Article 1
Coverage and Application
1.1
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this
Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the “covered agreements”). The rules and
procedures of this Understanding shall also apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes
between Members concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in this Understanding as the “WTO
Agreement”) and of this Understanding taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered
agreement.
1.2
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional rules
and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in
Appendix 2 to this Understanding. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and
procedures of this Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in
Appendix 2, the special or additional rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall prevail. In disputes
involving rules and procedures under more than one covered agreement, if there is a conflict between
special or additional rules and procedures of such agreements under review, and where the parties to
the dispute cannot agree on rules and procedures within 20 days of the establishment of the panel, the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2 (referred to in this
Understanding as the “DSB”), in consultation with the parties to the dispute, shall determine the rules
and procedures to be followed within 10 days after a request by either Member. The Chairman shall
be guided by the principle that special or additional rules and procedures should be used where
possible, and the rules and procedures set out in this Understanding should be used to the extent
necessary to avoid conflict.
IB.
Artigo 1
Âmbito e Aplicação
1.1
As regras e procedimentos do presente Entendimento se aplicam às controvérsias pleiteadas conforme
as disposições sobre consultas e solução de controvérsias dos acordos enumerados no Apêndice 1 do
presente Entendimento (denominados no presente Entendimento “acordos abrangidos”). As regras e
procedimentos deste Entendimento se aplicam igualmente às consultas e solução de controvérsias
entre Membros relativas a seus direitos ou obrigações ao amparo do Acordo Constitutivo da
Organização Mundial do Comércio (denominada no presente Entendimento “Acordo Constitutivo da
OMC”) e do presente Entendimento, considerados isoladamente ou em conjunto com quaisquer dos
acordos abrangidos.
1.2
As regras e procedimentos do presente Entendimento se aplicam sem prejuízo das regras e
procedimentos especiais ou adicionais sobre solução de controvérsias contidos nos acordos
abrangidos, conforme identificadas no Apêndice 2 do presente Entendimento. Havendo discrepância
entre as regras e procedimentos do presente Entendimento e as regras e procedimentos especiais ou
3
adicionais constantes do Apêndice 2, prevalecerão as regras e procedimentos especiais ou adicionais
constantes do Apêndice 2. Nas controvérsias relativas a normas e procedimentos de mais de um
acordo abrangido, caso haja conflito entre as regras e procedimentos especiais ou adicionais dos
acordos em questão, e se as partes em controvérsia não chegarem a acordo sobre as normas e
procedimentos dentro dos 20 dias seguintes ao estabelecimento do grupo especial, o Presidente do
Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias previsto no parágrafo 1 do artigo 2 (denominado no presente
Entendimento de “OSC”), em consulta com as partes envolvidas na controvérsia, determinará, no
prazo de 10 dias contatos da solicitação de um dos Membros, as normas e os procedimentos a serem
aplicados. O Presidente seguirá o princípio de que normas e procedimentos especiais ou adicionais
devem ser aplicados quando possível, e de que normas e procedimentos definidos neste Entendimento
devem ser aplicados na medida necessária para evitar conflito de normas.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 1
III.
Comentários
4

Artigo 2
IA.
Article 2
Administration
2.1
The Dispute Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures and,
except as otherwise provided in a covered agreement, the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements. Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to establish
panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings
and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the
covered agreements. With respect to disputes arising under a covered agreement which is a
Plurilateral Trade Agreement, the term “Member” as used herein shall refer only to those Members
that are parties to the relevant Plurilateral Trade Agreement. Where the DSB administers the dispute
settlement provisions of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement, only those Members that are parties to that
Agreement may participate in decisions or actions taken by the DSB with respect to that dispute.
2.2
The DSB shall inform the relevant WTO Councils and Committees of any developments in disputes
related to provisions of the respective covered agreements.
2.3
The DSB shall meet as often as necessary to carry out its functions within the time-frames provided in
this Understanding.
2.4
Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a decision, it shall
do so by consensus (1).
Footnote 1: The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member,
present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.
IB.
Artigo 2
Administração
2.1
Pelo presente Entendimento estabelece-se o Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias para aplicar as
presentes normas e procedimentos e as disposições em matéria de consultas e solução de
controvérsias dos acordos abrangidos, salvo disposição em contrário de um desses acordos.
Consequentemente, o OSC tem competência para estabelecer grupos especiais, acatar relatórios dos
grupos especiais e do Órgão de Apelação, supervisionar a aplicação das decisões e recomendações e
autorizar a suspensão de concessões e de outras obrigações determinadas pelos acordos abrangidos.
Com relação às controvérsias que surjam no âmbito de um acordo dentre os Acordos Comerciais
Plurilaterais, entender-se-á que o termo “Membro” utilizado no presente Entendimento se refere
apenas aos Membros integrantes do Acordo Comercial Plurilateral em questão. Quando o OSC aplicar
as disposições sobre solução de controvérsias de um Acordo Comercial Plurilateral, somente poderão
participar das decisões ou medidas adotadas pelo OSC aqueles Membros que sejam partes do Acordo
em questão.
2.2
O OSC deverá informar os pertinentes Conselhos e Comitês da OMC do andamento das controvérsias
relacionadas com disposições de seus respectivos acordos.
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2.3
O OSC se reunirá com a frequência necessária para o desempenho de suas funções dentro dos prazos
estabelecidos pelo presente Entendimento.
2.4
Nos casos em que as normas e procedimentos do presente Entendimento estabeleçam que o OSC deve
tomar uma decisão tal procedimento sera por consenso.1
IC.
Nada a observar.
II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 2
1. Aspectos Gerais
a) “Efeitos legais das declarações dos Membros nas reuniões do DSB”
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services (US - Gambling), Demandante: Antigua e Barbuda, WT/DS285/R, para. 6.161
Nesse caso, o Painel sugeriu que os EUA estavam legalmente vinculados a certas declarações que seus
representantes haviam feito na reunião do DSB.
Para. 6.161. “During two successive DSB meetings, the United States stated that a prohibition on the “crossborder supply of gambling and betting services under US laws” exists in the United States. (2) The panel’s
decision in US - Section 301 Trade Act appears to support the view that the United States should be bound by
these statements. (3) The statements were made by representatives of the United States to express their
understanding of US law. They were made in the context of a formal WTO meeting for the record. The United
States has not argued that the representatives were acting outside the authority bestowed upon them in making
these statements.” The statements were made by representatives of the United States to express their
understanding of US law. They were made in the context of a formal WTO meeting for the record. The United
States has not argued that the representatives were acting outside the authority bestowed upon them in making
these statements.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Regime for the importation, sale and
distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e
EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, paras. 216 e 222
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que as declarações dos Membros nas reuniões do DSB somente
poderiam ser levadas em consideração quando a interpretação das regras do Acordo não fosse clara em sua
linguagem e contexto. Sendo claro o texto do Acordo, as declarações dos Membros deveriam ter um efeito
legal limitado. O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o Painel, no caso US - Gambling, equivocou-se, ao atribuir
vinculação legal às declarações dos Membros nas reuniões do DSB e que essas apenas teriam o limitado efeito
de confirmar a interpretação da regra, que deve ser realizada pelo Painel.
Paras. 216 e 222. “[W]e conclude that the Panel erred in placing the relevance it did on the conflicting
statements of the parties at the meeting of the DSB, because, what the Panel was required to do was to provide
an interpretation of the text of the Understandings. Only once it had done so, could it then consider conflicting
statements to the DSB for the limited purpose of either seeking confirmation of the Panel’s interpretation, or
1
Considerar-se-á que o OSC decidiu por consenso material submetida a sua consideração quando nenhum Membro presente à reunião do OSC na qual a
decisão foi adotada a ela se opuser formalmente.
6
determining the meaning because the textual interpretation left the meaning ambiguous or led to manifestly
absurd results.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States/Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations
in the EC - Hormones Dispute (US/Canada - Continued Suspension), Demandante: Comunidades
Europeias, WT/DS320/AB/R e WT/DS321/AB/R, paras. 398-399
O Órgão de Apelação, nesse caso, reverteu a decisão do Painel que havia considerado as declarações dos EUA
e do Canadá nas reuniões do DSB como determinações legais definitivas.
Para. 398. “DSB statements are not intended to have legal effects and do not have the legal status of a definitive
determination in themselves. Rather, they are views expressed by Members and should not be considered to
prejudice Members’ position in the context of a dispute. As the United States rightly points out, “[statements
made by Members at DSB meetings, especially those expressing a view as to the WTO consistency of another
Member’s measures or actions, are generally diplomatic or political in nature” and “generally have no legal
effect or status in and of themselves”.”
Para. 399. “The Panel’s finding that DSB statements could constitute a definitive determination concerning the
WTO-inconsistency of a Member’s measure could adversely affect WTO Members’ ability to freely express
their views on the potential compatibility with the covered agreements of measures adopted by other Members.
(4) This would result in a “chilling” effect on those statements, because Members would refrain from expressing
their views at DSB meetings regarding the WTO-inconsistency of other Members’ measures lest such statements
be found to constitute a violation of Article 23. If this were the case, the DSB would be inhibited from properly
carrying out its function, pursuant to Article 21.6 of the DSU, to keep under surveillance the implementation of
its recommendations and rulings.”
2.
Artigo 2.1
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless
Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB, para. 156
O Órgão de Apelação, nesse caso, esclareceu a função do termo “accordingly” no contexto da segunda frase
do Artigo 11 do DSU, estabelecendo um paralelo com a função do termo “accordingly” prevista na segunda
frase do Artigo 2.1 do DSU. Ambas promovem um link entre a primeira e segunda senteça dos dois Artigos.
Para. 156 e footnote 307. “Mexico stated at the oral hearing that its claim focuses on the first sentence of
Article 11 of the DSU. However, we observe that the second sentence of Article 11 begins with the term
“accordingly”. This term creates a link between the first and the second sentence of Article 11 (5); it ties the
second sentence to the general description contained in the first sentence. The second sentence enunciates two
specific “functions” of panels, namely, the duty “to make an objective assessment of the matter before it” and
“to make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings”
under the covered agreements.”
3.
Artigo 2.4
a) “Tipos de decisões sujeitas à regra do consenso”
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) (US - Large Civil
Aircraft), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS353/R, para. 7.21
7
Nesse caso, as CE solicitaram ao Painel que determinasse que o procedimento previsto no Anexo V do
ASMC, uma vez iniciado, obrigava os EUA a responder a certos questionamentos. As CE argumentavam que
o início do procedimento previsto no Anexo V não seria uma decisão do DSB, nos termos do Artigo 2.4 do
DSU, que não deveria ser tomada por consenso, mas sim por meio de um mero “ato” que não estaria sujeito à
regra do consenso prevista no Artigo 2.4 e que ocorre automaticamente se solicitado, ao menos que ocorra o
consenso negativo dos Membros. O Painel rejeitou os argumentos das CE, sem, no entanto, manifestar-se
expressamente se o início do procedimento do Anexo V seria ou não uma “decisão” sujeita à regra do
consenso, nos termos do Artigo 2.4.
Para. 7.21. “The Panel is not convinced by the European Communities’ argument. It may well be that the
initiation of an Annex V procedure is not a “decision” that is subject to consensus within the meaning of Article
2.4 of the DSU. However, it does not follow that the initiation of an Annex V procedure “occurs automatically”
in the absence of any action by the DSB to initiate the procedure. We see no basis for such an interpretation in
the text of paragraph 2 of Annex V, which states that “the DSB shall, upon request, initiate the procedure”
envisaged in Annex V. The term “initiate” means “[b]egin, introduce, set going, originate”. The ordinary
meaning of the term “initiate”, used in the immediate context of a positive duty formulated in the active voice
(“the DSB shall … initiate”), implies that some form of action is required on the part of the DSB. Furthermore,
the European Communities’ interpretation of paragraph 2 of Annex V would effectively remove the DSB from
having any role in the initiation of an Annex V procedure, which seems inconsistent with the ordinary meaning
of the terms of that provision. Finally, accepting the European Communities’ argument that there are certain socalled DSB “actions” that may be deemed to “occur automatically” in the absence of any indication of
agreement or actual action by the DSB could have far-reaching and potentially surprising systemic consequences
that would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of providing “security and predictability” to the
multilateral trading system. For these reasons, we conclude that, even though it may well be that the initiation of
an Annex V procedure is not subject to consensus, the initiation of an Annex V procedure does not “occur
automatically” upon request, in the absence of any action by the DSB to initiate the procedure.”
III.
Comentários
A interpretação do Artigo 2 traz alguns esclarecimentos importantes sobre os efeitos e a dinâmica das
reuniões no DSB em relação às disputas. Nesse Artigo é possível observar a relação direta entre o comitê e os
órgãos adjudicantes desse comitê e como essas duas esferas se relacionam.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 2: WT/DSB/M/151, para. 47 (24 June 2003); WT/DSB/M/153, para. 47 (21-23 July 2003).
Footnote 3: Panel Report on US - Section 301 Trade Act, paras. 7.118-7.125.
Footnote 4: We note the United States’ concern that “[t]he Panel has thereby made the bold and novel move of transforming the
minutes of DSB, other WTO committee meetings, and even Trade Policy Review meetings into a fertile source of comments that…
could constitute ‘determinations’ actionable under Article 23.2(a).” (Ibid., para. 94)
Footnote 5: See also Panel Report, Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, para. 7.40, where the Panel found that the term “export
credits” was “readily understandable” in the context of a dispute under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
8

Artigo 3
IA.
Article 3
General Provisions
3.1
Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied
under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and
modified herein.
3.2
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability
to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.
3.3
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it
directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance
between the rights and obligations of Members.
3.4
Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of
the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the
covered agreements.
3.5
All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the
covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with those agreements and shall
not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the
attainment of any objective of those agreements.
3.6
Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and
Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating thereto.
3.7
Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these
procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the
covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first
objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.
The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure
is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is
inconsistent with a covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to the
Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the
other Member, subject to authorization by the DSB of such measures.
9
3.8
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the
action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that
there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members
parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the
complaint has been brought to rebut the charge.
3.9
The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek
authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the
WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement.
3.10
It is understood that requests for conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement procedures should
not be intended or considered as contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, all Members will engage
in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute. It is also understood that
complaints and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not be linked.
3.11
This Understanding shall be applied only with respect to new requests for consultations under the
consultation provisions of the covered agreements made on or after the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement. With respect to disputes for which the request for consultations was made under
GATT 1947 or under any other predecessor agreement to the covered agreements before the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the relevant dispute settlement rules and procedures in effect
immediately prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall continue to apply. (6)
3.12
Notwithstanding paragraph 11, if a complaint based on any of the covered agreements is brought by a
developing country Member against a developed country Member, the complaining party shall have
the right to invoke, as an alternative to the provisions contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 of this
Understanding, the corresponding provisions of the Decision of 5 April 1966 (BISD 14S/18), except
that where the Panel considers that the time-frame provided for in paragraph 7 of that Decision is
insufficient to provide its report and with the agreement of the complaining party, that time-frame
may be extended. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of
Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 and the corresponding rules and procedures of the Decision, the latter shall
prevail.
Footnote 6: This paragraph shall also be applied to disputes on which panel reports have not been adopted or fully implemented.
IB.
Artigo 3
Disposições Gerais
3.1
Os Membros afirmam sua adesão aos princípios de solução de controvérsias aplicados até o momento
com base nos Artigos 22 e 23 do GATT 1947 e ao procedimento elaborado e modificado pelo
presente instrumento.
3.2
O sistema de solução de controvérsia da OMC é elemento essencial para trazer segurança e
previsibilidade ao sistema multilateral de comércio. Os Membros reconhecem que esse sistema é útil
para preservar direitos e obrigações dos Membros dentro dos parâmetros dos acordos abrangidos e
para esclarecer as disposições vigentes dos referidos acordos em conformidade com as normas
correntes de interpretação do direito internacional público. As recomendações e decisões do OSC não
poderão promover o aumento ou a diminuição dos direitos e obrigações definidos nos acordos
abrangidos.
10
3.3
É essencial para o funcionamento eficaz da OMC e para a manutenção de equilíbrio adequado entre
os direitos e as obrigações dos Membros a pronta solução das situações em que um Membro
considere que quaisquer benefícios resultantes, direta ou indiretamente, dos acordos abrangidos
tenham sofrido restrições por medidas adotadas por outro Membro.
3.4
As recomendações ou decisões formuladas pelo OSC terão por objetivo encontrar solução satisfatória
para a matéria em questão, de acordo com os direitos e obrigações emanados pelo presente
Entendimento e pelos acordos abrangidos.
3.5
Todas as soluções das questões formalmente pleiteadas ao amparo das disposições sobre consultas e
solução de controvérsias, incluindo os laudos arbitrais, deverão ser compatíveis com aqueles acordos
e não deverão anular ou prejudicar os benefícios de qualquer Membro em virtude daqueles acordos,
nem impedir a consecução de qualquer objetivo daqueles acordos.
3.6
As soluções mutuamente acordadas das questões formalmente pleiteadas ao amparo das disposições
sobre consultas e solução de controvérsias dos acordos abrangidos serão notificadas ao OSC e aos
Conselhos e Comitês correspondentes, onde qualquer Membro poderá levantar tópicos a elas
relacionadas.
3.7
Antes de apresentar uma reclamação, os Membros avaliarão a utilidade de atuar com base nos
presentes procedimentos. O objetivo do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias é garantir uma
solução positiva para as controvérsias. Deverá ser sempre dada preferência à solução mutuamente
aceitável para as partes em controvérsia e que esteja em conformidade com os acordos abrangidos. Na
impossibilidade de uma solução mutuamente acordada, o primeiro objetivo do mecanismo de solução
de controvérsias será geralmente o de conseguir a supressão das medidas de que se trata, caso se
verifique que estas são incompatíveis com as disposições de qualquer dos acordos abrangidos. Não se
deverá recorrer à compensação a não ser nos casos em que não seja factível a supressão imediata das
medidas incompatíveis com o acordo abrangido e como solução provisória até a supressão dessas
medidas. O último recurso previsto no presente Entendimento para o Membro que invoque os
procedimentos de solução de controvérsias é a possibilidade de suspender, de maneira discriminatória
contra o outro Membro, a aplicação de concessões ou o cumprimento de outras obrigações no âmbito
dos acordos abrangidos, caso o OSC autorize a adoção de tais medidas.
3.8
Nos casos de não-cumprimento de obrigações contraídas em virtude de um acordo abrangido,
presume-se que a medida constitua um caso de anulação ou de restrição. Isso significa que
normalmente existe a presunção de que toda transgressão das normas produz efeitos desfavoráveis
para outros Membros que sejam partes do acordo abrangido, e em tais casos a prova em contrário
caberá ao Membro contra o qual foi apresentada a reclamação.
3.9
As disposições do presente Entendimento não prejudicarão o direito dos Membros de buscar
interpretação autorizada das disposições de um acordo abrangido através das decisões adotadas em
conformidade com o Acordo Constitutivo da OMC ou um acordo abrangido que seja um Acordo
Comercial Plurilateral.
3.10
Fica entendido que as solicitações de conciliação e a utilização dos procedimentos de solução de
controvérsias não deverão ser intentados nem considerados como ações contenciosas e que, ao surgir
uma controvérsia, todos os Membros participarão do processo com boa-fé e esforçando-se para
resolvê-la. Fica ainda entendido que não deverá haver vinculação entre reclamações e contrareclamações relativas a assuntos diferentes.
11
3.11
O presente Entendimento se aplicará unicamente às novas solicitações de consultas apresentadas
conforme as disposições sobre consulta dos acordos abrangidos na data da entrada em vigor do
Acordo Constitutivo da OMC ou posteriormente a essa data. Com relação às controvérsias cujas
solicitações de consultas tenham sido feitas baseadas no GATT 1947 ou em qualquer outro acordo
anterior aos acordos abrangidos antes da data de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC,
continuarão sendo aplicadas as normas e procedimentos de solução de controvérsias vigentes
imediatamente antes da data de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC2.
3.12
Sem prejuízo das disposições do parágrafo 11, se um país em desenvolvimento Membro apresenta
contra um país desenvolvido Membro uma reclamação baseada em qualquer dos acordos abrangidos,
a parte reclamante terá o direito de se valer das disposições correspondentes da Decisão de 5 de abril
de 1966 (BISD 14S/20), como alternativa às disposições contidas nos Artigos 4, 5, 6 e 12 do presente
Entendimento, com a exceção de que, quando o Grupo Especial julgar que o prazo previsto no
parágrafo 7 da referida Decisão for insuficiente para elaboração de seu relatório e com aprovação da
parte reclamante, esse prazo poderá ser prorrogado. Quando houver diferenças entre normas e
procedimentos dos Artigos 4, 5, 6 e 12 e as normas e procedimentos correspondentes da Decisão,
prevalecerão estes últimos.
IC.
O Artigo 3:11 do DSU contém um erro de mesóclise na expressão “se aplicará”, passível de ser sanado por
meio da substituição pela expressão “aplicar-se-á”. Sugere-se, entretanto, a tradução do termo em inglês shall
be applied, para ‘deve ser aplicado’, em função da natureza do modal verb (shall).
II.
1.
Artigo 3.1
a) “Legislação de juris e de facto”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 61
O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que a legislação interna dos Membros pode ser questionada no DSB em tese
“de jure” e não apenas após ter sido aplicada “de facto”. O Órgão de Apelação fundamentou essa conclusão
na prática do GATT e no Artigo 3.1.
Para. 61. “Thus, that a Contracting Party could challenge legislation as such before a panel was well-settled
under the GATT 1947. We consider that the case law articulating and applying this practice forms part of the
GATT acquis which, under Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement, provides guidance to the WTO and,
therefore, to panels and the Appellate Body. Furthermore, in Article 3.1 of the DSU, Members affirm “their
adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII
of GATT 1947.”
2.
Artigo 3.2
(a) “segurança e previsibilidade”
(b) “esclarecer as disposições vigentes”
(c) “normas correntes de interpretação do direito internacional público”
2
Este parágrafo será igualmente aplicado às controvérsias cujos relatórios dos Painéis não tenham sido adotados ou aplicados plenamente.
12
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
Regra geral de interpretação
Prática subseqüente
Meios suplementares de interpretação
Boa fé
Principio da efetividade
Expectativas legítimas
a) “segurança e previsibilidade”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverges (Japan - Alcoholic
Beverages II), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R e
WT/DS11/AB/R, para. 31
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que as regras costumeiras de direito internacional público sobre
interpretação estavam consolidadas na Convenção de Viena, e que a interpretação dos Acordos da OMC
segundo essas regras é um elemento de segurança e previsibilidade jurídica, fundamental ao sistema.
Para. 31. “Our interpretation of Article III is faithful to the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public
international law’. WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules are not so rigid or so
inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and
flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will serve the multilateral trading system best if they are
interpreted with that in mind. In that way, we will achieve the ‘security and predictability’ sought for the
multilateral trading system by the Members of the WTO through the establishment of the dispute settlement
system.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen
Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/AB/R, para. 249
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou o método do “objeto e finalidade” para a interpretação do tratado
e afirmou que o ponto inicial da análise seria o tratado como um todo, embora o Artigo 31:1 da Convenção de
Viena não excluísse a consideração de termos específicos do tratado, se isso auxiliasse na interpretação do
tratado em seu conjunto. Desse modo, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o critério de “preservação no longo
prazo”, estabelecido pelas CE, poderia levar a incertezas em relação à concessão contida na posição 02.10 da
Lista de Compromissos das CE, o que poderia atingir o objeto e finalidade de segurança e previsibilidade,
estabelecidos tanto no Acordo da OMC quanto no GATT 1994.
Para. 249. “In the light of these considerations, we see no reason to disturb the Panel's finding, in paragraph
7.328 of the Panel Reports, that ‘the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion of long-term
preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule [...] could undermine
the object and purpose of security and predictability, which [underlie] both the WTO Agreement and the GATT
1994.”
b) “esclarecer as disposições vigentes”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: India, WT/DS33/AB/R, pág.
19
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o Artigo 3:2 do DSU estabelece que o objetivo do mecanismo
13
de solução de controvérsias é assegurar uma solução positiva para a disputa, devendo preservar os direitos e
obrigações dos Membros negociados por meio dos acordos e esclarecer as disposições dos tratados, de acordo
com as normas costumeiras de interpretação do direito internacional público. Para cumprir as suas
responsabilidades junto aos Membros da OMC, o Órgão de Apelação não pode criar novas regras.
“As India emphasizes, Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the Members of the WTO ‘recognize’ that the dispute
settlement system “serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and
to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law” (emphasis added). Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU,
“we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to
‘make law’ by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular
dispute. A panel need only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue
in the dispute.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation
of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 135
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o Artigo 11 do DSU prevê que a obrigação dos Painéis e do
Órgão de Apelação é realizar uma avaliação objetiva da aplicabilidade dos acordos invocados pelo Membro
demandante e de sua compatibilidade com a medida adotada pelo Membro demandado. Nada no Artigo
estabelece que o Painel deva examinar todas as questões trazidas para análise ou se limitar às questões
levantadas pelas Partes.
Para. 135. “In United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, we
stated that nothing in Article 11 “or in previous GATT practice requires a panel to examine all legal claims
made by the complaining party”, and that “[a] panel need only address those claims which must be addressed
in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.” Just as a panel has the discretion to address only those
claims which must be addressed in order to dispose of the matter at issue in a dispute, so too does a panel have
the discretion to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a particular claim. So long as it is
clear in a panel report that a panel has reasonably considered a claim, the fact that a particular argument
relating to that claim is not specifically addressed in the ‘Findings’ section of a panel report will not, in and of
itself, lead to the conclusion that panel has failed to make the ‘objective assessment of the matter before it’
required by Article 11 of the DSU.”
c) “normas correntes de interpretação do direito internacional público”
(i) Regra geral de interpretação
Nesses casos, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que as regras costumeiras de direito internacional público
sobre interpretação estavam consolidadas na Convenção de Viena.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, pág. 17
“The ‘general rule of interpretation’ set out above has been relied upon by all of the participants and third
participants, although not always in relation to the same issue. That general rule of interpretation has attained
the status of a rule of customary or general international law. As such, it forms part of the ‘customary rules of
interpretation of public international law’ which the Appellate Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of the
DSU, to apply in seeking to clarify the provisions of the General Agreement and the other ‘covered
agreements’ of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the ‘WTO
14
Agreement’). That direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in
clinical isolation from public international law.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/AB/R, para. 84
Para. 84. “A Schedule is […] an integral part of the GATT 1994 […]. Therefore, the concessions provided
for in that schedule are part of the terms of the treaty. As such, the only rules which may be applied in
interpreting the meaning of a concession are the general rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna
Convention.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic
WT/DS11/AB/R, pág. 11
Nesses casos, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena estabelece como base
de interpretação o sentido ordinário (ou comum) dos termos do tratado, o contexto, em consonância com o seu
objeto e finalidade.
“Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the
interpretive process: “interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty”. The provisions of the
treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be
taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions. A fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation
flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis
valeat quam pereat). In United States of America - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we
noted that “[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that
interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a
reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility”.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 45
Para. 45. “The duty of a treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of
the parties. This should be done in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31
of the Vienna Convention. But these principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation
into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended…
These rules must be respected and applied in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement or any other covered
agreements… Both panels and the Appellate Body must be guided by the rules of treaty interpretation set out
in the Vienna Convention, and must not add to or diminish rights and obligations provided in the WTO
Agreement.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products - Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R e WT/DS48/AB/R,
para. 181
Para. 181. “[…] The fundamental rule of treaty interpretation requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret
the words actually used by the agreement under examination, and not words which the interpreter may feel
should have been used.”
15
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain CorrosionResistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany (US - Carbon Steel), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS213/ABR, para. 61
Para. 61. “At the outset of our analysis, we recall that Article 3.2 of the DSU recognizes that interpretative
issues arising in WTO dispute settlement are to be resolved through the application of customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. It is well settled in WTO case law that the principles codified in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the ‘Vienna Convention’) are such
customary rules. Article 31(1) provides in relevant part that: A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.”
(ii) Prática subsequente
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Artigo 31(3)(b) estabelece como critérios de interpretação
a prática subsequente das partes; os acordos subsequentes sobre a mesma matéria; e ainda, qualquer outra
regra pertinente de direito internacional público que possa ser parte do processo interpretativo.
WT/DS11/AB/R, pp. 12-13
“Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention states that ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’ is to be ‘taken into account together
with the context’ in interpreting the terms of the treaty. Generally, in international law, the essence of
subsequent practice in interpreting a treaty has been recognized as a ‘concordant, common and consistent’,
sequence of acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern implying the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. An isolated act is generally not sufficient to establish
subsequent practice; it is a sequence of acts establishing the agreement of the parties that is relevant.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Service (US - Gambling), Demandante: Antigua e Barbuda, WT/DS285/AB/R,
para. 192
Para. 192. “(...) (i) there must be a common, consistent, discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and
(ii) those acts or pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant provision.”
Para. 259. “We share the Panel's view that not each and every party must have engaged in a particular
practice for it to qualify as a ‘common’ and ‘concordant’ practice. Nevertheless, practice by some, but not
all parties is obviously not of the same order as practice by only one or very few parties. To our mind, it
would be difficult to establish a ‘concordant, common and discernible pattern’ on the basis of acts or
pronouncements of one, or very few parties to a multilateral treaty, such as the WTO Agreement. We
acknowledge, however, that, if only some WTO Members have actually traded or classified products under a
given heading, this circumstance may reduce the availability of such ‘acts and pronouncements’ for purposes
of determining the existence of ‘subsequent practice’ within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b).”
(iii) Meios suplementares de interpretação
16
Nesses casos, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o Artigo 32 da Convenção de Viena estabelece que outras
formas suplementares de interpretação poderão ser adotadas, como os trabalhos preparatórios do tratado e
as circunstâncias de sua conclusão, quando a utilização das regras previstas no Artigo 31 deixarem o
sentido buscado ambíguo ou obscuro, ou ainda quando for atingido um resultado que é manifestamente
absurdo ou desarrazoado.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/AB/R, para. 92
Para. 92. “In the light of our observation on ‘the circumstances of [the] conclusion’ of a treaty as a
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, we consider that the
classification practice in the European Communities during the Uruguay Round is part of ‘the circumstances
of [the] conclusion’ of the WTO Agreement and may be used as a supplementary means of interpretation
within the meaning of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation
of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 83
Para. 83. “The Oilseeds Agreement may serve as a supplementary means of interpretations of Schedule
LXXX pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, as it is part of the historical background of the
concessions of the European Communities from frozen poultry meat.”
Para. 291. “In our view, the relevance of a circumstance for interpretation should be determined on the basis
of objective factors, and not subjective intent. We can conceive of a number of objective factors that may be
useful in determining the degree of relevance of particular circumstances for interpreting a specific treaty
provision. These include the type of event, document, or instrument and its legal nature; temporal relation of
the circumstance to the conclusion of the treaty; actual knowledge or mere access to a published act or
instrument; subject matter of the document, instrument, or event in relation to the treaty provision to be
interpreted; and whether or how it was used or influenced the negotiations of the treaty.”
(iv) Boa-fé
O ponto de partida do método interpretativo do Órgão de Apelação passou a ser, então, a determinação, de
boa-fé, do significado ordinário das palavras utilizadas, com referência ao contexto e à luz do objeto e do
propósito do tratado, nos termos exatos do Artigo 31:1 da Convenção de Viena.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS/58/AB/R,
para. 158
Para. 158. “The Chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith. This
principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise
of rights by States. One application of the general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of
abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a
right ‘impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must exercised bona fide, that is to say,
reasonably. An abusive rights of the other Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the
Member so acting. Having said this, our task here is to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking
additional interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of international law.”
17
(v) Princípio da efetividade
Nesses casos, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o princípio da efetividade da interpretação estava contido
na regra geral de interpretação prevista no Artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, pág. 23
“One of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation
must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that
would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.”
WT/DS11/AB/R, pág. 11
“A fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31
is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat).”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear
(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 81
Para. 81. “[A] treaty interpreter must read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to
all of them, harmoniously. And, an appropriate reading of this ‘inseparable package of rights and disciplines’
must, accordingly, be one that gives meaning to all relevant provisions of these two equally binding
agreements.”
(vi) Expectativas legítimas
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, (WT/DS50/AB/R), para. 41
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação utilizou o método interpretativo baseado nas expectativas legítimas dos
Membros.
Para. 41. “The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty
itself.”
3. Artigo 3.3
a)
“Pronta solução às situações”
O Órgão de Apelação e os Painéis mencionaram o princípio da pronta solução das situações.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 78
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que a prática de “completar a análise era fundamental para dar
uma solução para as disputas”.
18
Para. 78. “[i]n previous appeals, we have, on occasion, completed the legal analysis with a view to
facilitating the prompt settlement of the dispute, pursuant to Article 3.3 of the DSU.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)), Demandantes Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia,
Japão, República da Coréia / Canadá e México, WT/DS217/AB/R e WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 311
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação mencionou o princípio da “pronta solução” às disputas para justificar o
direito de separar os Relatórios de painéis, no caso de Painéis múltiplos.
Para. 311 “Having made these observations, we note that Article 9.2 must not be read in isolation from other
provisions of the DSU, and without taking into account the overall object and purpose of that Agreement. The
overall object and purpose of the DSU is expressed in Article 3.3 of that Agreement which provides,
relevantly, that the “prompt settlement” of disputes is “essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.” If
the right to a separate panel report under Article 9.2 were “unqualified”, this would mean that a panel would
have the obligation to submit a separate panel report, pursuant to the request of a party to the dispute, at any
time during the panel proceedings. Moreover, a request for such a report could be made for whatever reason
— or indeed, without any reason — even on the day that immediately precedes the day the panel report is due
to be circulated to WTO Members at large. Such an interpretation would clearly undermine the overall object
and purpose of the DSU to ensure the “prompt settlement” of disputes.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 246
Na mesma linha, o Órgão de Apelação decidiu que requerer que o Membro inicie uma nova disputa para
questionar os mesmos subsídios seria contraria o princípio da “pronta solução” para as disputas.
Para. 246. “[requiring a WTO Member to initiate new proceedings to challenge the same type of recurrent
subsidies that were found to result in adverse effects, simply because the subsidies were provided subsequent
to the original proceedings, does not promote ‘prompt settlement’ nor ‘prompt compliance’.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 177
O Órgão de Apelação fez referência à relação entre o Artigo 3.3 do DSU e os Artigos 17.3 e 17.4 do
Acordo Anti-dumping, para estabelecer quais as questões do Acordo Anti-dumping que seriam sujeitas à
apreciação do DSB.
Para. 177. “Closely resembling Article 3.3 of the DSU, Article 17.3 provides that,” [i]f any Member
considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under [the Anti-Dumping Agreement] is being
nullified or impaired … by another Member or Members, it may, with a view to reaching a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the matter, request in writing consultations with the Member or Members in
question.” Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement further specifies that a Member may refer a matter to
the DSB if it considers that the consultations have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution “and if final
action has been taken by the administering authorities of the importing Member to”, inter alia, “levy definitive
anti-dumping duties”.”
4.
Artigo 3.4
19
Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandantes: Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS269/AB/R, para.
161
Para. 161. “Brazil and Thailand also refer to Articles 3.4 and 3.7 of the DSU and argue that the principle of
“satisfactory settlement of the matter” and of “secur[ing] a positive solution to the dispute” supports the
inclusion of the two subsequent measures in the Panel’s terms of reference in this case. We agree that a
positive and effective resolution of a dispute is one of the key objectives of the WTO dispute settlement
system. However, this objective cannot be pursued at the expense of complying with the specific requirements
and obligations of Article 6.2. Moreover, in this case, we believe that the non-inclusion of the two subsequent
measures in the Panel’s terms of reference would not hinder a positive resolution of this dispute.” (7)
5.
Artigo 3.7
a)
“Os Membros avaliarão a utilidade de atuar com base nos presentes procedimentos”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e
EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 135
Para. 135 “A member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding whether any such action would be
‘fruitful’.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio México - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States) (México –
Corn Syrup), WT/DS132/AB/RW, para. 74
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou se a falha de um Membro em observar a primeira senteça do
Artigo 3.7 impediria o Painel de resolver a questão sub judice. O Órgão de Apelação primeiramente indicou
que a primeira senteça do Artigo reflete o princípio básico segundo o qual os Membros devem recorrer ao
DSB da OMC com boa fé e que, portanto, o Painel não era obrigado a examinar a questão colocada em juízo
com frivolidade.
Para. 74. “Given the ‘largely self-regulating’ nature of the requirement in the first sentence of Article 3.7,
panels and the Appellate Body must presume, whenever a Member submits a request for establishment of a
panel, that such Member does so in good faith, having duly exercised its judgement as to whether recourse to
that panel would be ‘fruitful’. Article 3.7 neither requires nor authorizes a panel to look behind that Member’s
decision and to question its exercise of judgement. Therefore, the Panel was not obliged to consider this issue
on its own motion.”
b) “assegurar uma solução positiva para as disputas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS33/AB/R, pág.
19
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC tem como
objetivo assegurar uma solução positiva para as controvérsias.
“The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.”
20
c) “Efeitos legais das soluções mutuamente acordadas”
EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, paras. 211-212
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou se o Acordo sobre Bananas, firmado entre as CE, EUA e
Equador, proibiria os Membros de iniciar os procedimentos previstos no Artigo 21.5 do DSU em relação ao
regime de importação de bananas, estabelecido pela Regulação (EC) nº 1964/2005.
Para. 211. “[N]othing in Article 3.7 establishes a condition under which a party would be prevented from
initiating compliance proceedings or, indeed, dictates that the only kind of settlement envisaged in that
provision is one that bars recourse to compliance proceedings under Article 21.5. Article 3.7 is not
prescriptive as to the content of a mutually agreed solution, save that it must be consistent with the covered
agreements. The only express limitation referred to in Article 3.7 is that ‘a Member shall exercise its
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful’. The Appellate Body has interpreted
this phrase to indicate that a Member is “expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding whether any such
action would be ‘fruitful’”. (8) This is also borne out by Article 3.3, which provides that the prompt settlement
of situations in which a Member, in its own judgement, considers that a benefit accruing to it under the
covered agreements is being impaired by a measure taken by another Member is essential to the effective
functioning of the WTO.”
Ainda nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou o conceito de “solução” do Artigo 3.7 e descreveu como
sendo o “o ato de resolver um problema”. Na opinião do Órgão de Apelação, um mero acordo sobre uma
“solução” não necessariamene significa que as partes abriram mão do seu direito de recorrer aos
procedimentos do Painel. O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a interpretação do Painel de que o Acordo entre
as partes constituiria uma “solução positiva” para a disputa e precluia o recurso ao Artigo 21.5, não esra uma
interpretação correta.
Para 212. “The term “solution” employed in Article 3.7 refers to the “act of solving a problem”. There are
usually different ways of solving any given problem. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, when a panel or the
Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that
the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. Accordingly, it is, in principle,
within the Member’s discretion to choose the means of implementation and to decide in which way it will
seek to achieve compliance. The DSU thus recognizes that a solution leading to compliance can be
implemented in various ways. Similarly, a mutually agreed solution pursuant to Article 3.7 may encompass an
agreement to forego the right to initiate compliance proceedings. Or it may provide for the suspension of the
right of recourse to Article 21.5 until the steps agreed upon in a mutually agreed solution have been
implemented. Yet, this need not always be so. We therefore do not consider that the mere agreement to a
“solution” necessarily implies that parties waive their right to have recourse to the dispute settlement system
in the event of a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with the covered agreements of a measure
taken to comply. Instead, we consider that there must be a clear indication in the agreement between the
parties of a relinquishment of the right to have recourse to Article 21.5. In our view, the Panel’s requirement
that the Understandings must constitute a “positive solution and effective settlement” to the dispute in
question to preclude recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings was not a correct interpretation of what the DSU
requires.”
d) “Interesse legal em levar uma disputa ao DSB da OMC”
21
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o Membro tem ampla discricionariedade para decidir trazer
ou não um caso contra outro Membro, nos termos do DSU.
Para. 132. “We agree with the Panel that ’neither Article 3.3 nor 3.7 of the DSU nor any other provision of
the DSU contain any explicit requirement that a Member must have a ‘legal interest’ as a prerequisite for
requesting a panel’. We do not accept that the need for a ‘legal interest’ is implied in the DSU or in any other
provision of the WTO Agreement. It is true that under Article 4.11 of the DSU, a Member wishing to join in
multiple consultations must have ‘a substantial trade interest’, and that under Article 10.2 of the DSU, a third
party must have ‘a substantial interest’ in the matter before a panel. But neither of these provisions in the
DSU, nor anything else in the WTO Agreement, provides a basis for asserting that parties to the dispute have
to meet any similar standard. Yet, we do not believe that this is dispositive of whether, in this case, the United
States has ‘standing’ to bring claims under the GATT 1994.”
6.
Artigo 3.8
a) “Presunção de anulação ou de restrição”
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o Artigo 3.8 do DSU atribui o ônus de rebater a presunção de
anulação ou de restrição para a parte demandada.
Para 250. “[W]e note that the two issues of nullification or impairment and of the standing of the United
States are closely related [T]wo points are made that the Panel may well have had in mind in reaching its
conclusions on nullification or impairment. One is that the United States is a producer of bananas and that a
potential export interest by the United States cannot be excluded; the other is that the internal market of the
United States for bananas could be affected by the EC bananas regime and by its effects on world supplies and
world prices of bananas. They are … relevant to the question whether the European Communities has rebutted
the presumption of nullification or impairment.”
7. Artigo 3.10
a) “Caráter não contencioso das disputas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures
on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners), Demandante: China WT/DS397/AB/R,
fn. 205
O Órgão de Apelação seguiu o mesmo entendimento de casos anteriores ao afirmar o caráter não
contencioso que as disputas no órgão de solução de controvérsias devem ter.
Fn. 205. “[t]he procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement are designed to promote, not the development of
litigation techniques, but simply the fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade disputes”, and also found
that Article 3.10 of the DSU was inconsistent with “inappropriate legal manoeuvres to avoid dispute
settlement.”
22
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 3:2 do DSU estabelece que o sistema de solução de controvérsias é um elemento central para
promover segurança e previsibilidade ao sistema multilateral de comércio. O Artigo 3:7 estabelece que o
objetivo do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias é assegurar uma solução positiva para a disputa. Além
disso, o DSU determina que este sistema deve preservar os direitos e obrigações dos Membros, negociados
por meio dos Acordos, e esclarecer as disposições dos tratados de acordo com as normas costumeiras de
interpretação do direito internacional público. Portanto, o mandato que os Membros da OMC outorgaram por
meio do DSU ao Órgão de Apelação foi cumprir a sua função de interpretar os Acordos da OMC de acordo
com as regras costumeiras de interpretação do direito internacional público.
Observa-se, pela análise dos litígios citados, que a Convenção de Viena ainda tem sido plenamente utilizada
pelo Órgão de Apelação como a materialização das regras consuetudinárias de interpretação dos Acordos da
OMC, mesmo quando envolve Membros que não são partes da referida convenção, como é o caso dos EUA.
Essa prática permanece atual e fornece um guia para a coerência entre as decisões.
Desde o primeiro caso submetido à sua apreciação, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Artigo 31 da
Convenção de Viena havia alcançado o status de regra costumeira de interpretação do direito internacional. O
Artigo 31:1 da Convenção de Viena estabelece que um tratado deve ser interpretado de boa-fé, de acordo com
o significado ordinário das palavras em seu contexto e à luz do objeto e propósito do tratado. Essa regra de
interpretação sugere um critério de interpretação baseado principalmente no texto.
O Órgão de Apelação entendeu e continua afirmando que a função interpretativa deve, acima de tudo, estar
baseada no texto. As decisões demonstram que o Órgão de Apelação não se submete aos aspectos políticos da
OMC. Para cumprir as suas responsabilidades junto aos Membros da OMC, o Órgão de Apelação ainda adota
o texto dos Acordos e se atém ao mandato específico dos Membros de utilizar a interpretação segundo as
regras da Convenção de Viena. Por outro lado, o Órgão de Apelação não pode deixar de analisar nenhuma
questão legal que lhe é submetida à apreciação.
Ou seja, o Órgão de Apelação não pode deixar de julgar quando o Acordo é ambíguo ou quando existam
lacunas. Não há referência no DSU que autorize o Órgão de Apelação a não julgar um caso quando o texto
não é claro e específico. Ao contrário, o Artigo 3:7 estabelece a obrigação de encontrar uma solução positiva
para a disputa. De qualquer forma, uma análise atual dos casos aponta para uma interpretação restritiva dos
Acordos. O Órgão de Apelação parece cumprir a função de não criar regras.
Percebe-se o apego do Órgão de Apelação ao significado ordinário do texto, para fins de cumprimento do
mandato estabelecido pelo Artigo 3:2. Para cumprir esse propósito, o Órgão de Apelação ainda faz uso
frequente dos dicionários, nos três idiomas oficiais da OMC: o inglês, o francês e o espanhol. Essa prática
procura delimitar a margem de interpretação a ser realizada, por meio da utilização de critérios objetivos para
a definição do conteúdo das palavras adotadas. O recurso ao dicionário é apenas uma etapa da técnica
interpretativa.
Para cumprir o Artigo 3:2 do DSU, o Órgão de Apelação se refere ao texto e quando o texto não é claro o
suficiente ou determinado termo possui mais do que um significado, entende necessário utilizar os outros
critérios de interpretação da Convenção de Viena, para esclarecer o significado ordinário do texto, em seu
contexto e à luz do propósito e objeto do tratado. O Órgão de Apelação parece evitar o risco sistêmico da
utilização de outros métodos interpretativos, justamente pelo fato de o DSU estabelecer que o sistema de
solução de controvérsias não pode aumentar e nem reduzir os direitos negociados nos Acordos.
Com relação ao Artigo 3.7, parece ter ficado claro para o Órgão de Apelação que o Membro tem ampla
discricionariedade para levar uma questão à apreciação do DSB, bastando para tanto, auto-regular-se com
23
boa-fé. Nocões como “interesse legal” e “interesse econômico”, amplamente difundidas no direito processual
pátrio de vários Membros não parecem ser conceitos válidos para o Órgão de Apelação.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 7: Appellate Body Report, EC - Chicken Cuts, para. 161.
Footnote 8: Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas III, para. 135.
24

Artigo 4
Felipe Herzog
IA.
Article 4
Consultations
4.1
Members affirm their resolve to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation
procedures employed by Members.
4.2
Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting
the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former (3).
4.3
If a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement, the Member to which the
request is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the request within 10 days after the
date of its receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faith within a period of no more than 30
days after the date of receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. If
the Member does not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request, or does not enter
into consultations within a period of no more than 30 days, or a period otherwise mutually agreed,
after the date of receipt of the request, then the Member that requested the holding of consultations
may proceed directly to request the establishment of a panel.
4.4
All such requests for consultations shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and
Committees by the Member which requests consultations. Any request for consultations shall be
submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the request, including identification of the
measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint.
4.5
In the course of consultations in accordance with the provisions of a covered agreement, before
resorting to further action under this Understanding, Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory
adjustment of the matter.
4.6
Consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further
proceedings.
4.7
If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the request for
consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. The complaining party
may request a panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that
consultations have failed to settle the dispute.
4.8
In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, Members shall enter into
consultations within a period of no more than 10 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the
consultations have failed to settle the dispute within a period of 20 days after the date of receipt of the
request, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.
4.9
In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, the parties to the dispute, panels
and the Appellate Body shall make every effort to accelerate the proceedings to the greatest extent
possible.
25
4.10
During consultations Members should give special attention to the particular problems and interests of
developing country Members.
4.11
Whenever a Member other than the consulting Members considers that it has a substantial trade
interest in consultations being held pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article XXII of GATT 1994, paragraph
1 of Article XXII of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements (4), such
Member may notify the consulting Members and the DSB, within 10 days after the date of the
circulation of the request for consultations under said Article, of its desire to be joined in the
consultations. Such Member shall be joined in the consultations, provided that the Member to which
the request for consultations was addressed agrees that the claim of substantial interest is wellfounded. In that event they shall so inform the DSB. If the request to be joined in the consultations is
not accepted, the applicant Member shall be free to request consultations under paragraph 1 of Article
XXII or paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of Article XXII or paragraph 1 of
Article XXIII of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements.
Footnote 3: Where the provisions of any other covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or
authorities within the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of such
other covered agreement shall prevail.
Footnote 4: The corresponding consultation provisions in the covered agreements are listed hereunder: Agreement on Agriculture,
Article 19; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, paragraph 1 of Article 11; Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing, paragraph 4 of Article 8; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, paragraph 1 of Article 14; Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures, Article 8; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, paragraph 2 of Article 17;
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994, paragraph 2 of Article 19; Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Article
7; Agreement on Rules of Origin, Article 7; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Article 6; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Article 30; Agreement on Safeguards, Article 14; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Article 64.1; and any corresponding consultation provisions in Plurilateral Trade Agreements as determined by the
competent bodies of each Agreement and as notified to the DSB.
IB.
Artigo 4
Consultas
4.1
Os Membros afirmam sua determinação de fortelecer e aperfeiçoar a eficácia dos procedimentos de
consulta utilizados pelos Membros.
4.2
Cada Membro se compromete a examinar com compreensãoo a argumentação apresentada por outro
Membro e a conceder oportunidade adequada para consulta com relação a medidas adotadas dentro de
seu território que afetem o funcionamento de qualquer acordo abrangido2.
4.3
Quando a solicitação de consultas for formulada com base em um acordo abrangido, o Membro ao
qual a solicitação for dirigida deverá respondê-la, salvo se mutuamente acordado de outro modo,
dentro de um prazo de 10 dias contados a partir da data de recebimento da solicitação, e deverá de
boa-fé proceder a consultas dentro de um prazo não superior a 30 dias contatos a partir da data de
recebimento da solicitação, com o objetivo de chegar a uma solução mutuamente satisfatória. Se o
Membro não responder dentro do prazo de 10 dias contatos a partir da data de recebimento da
solicitação, ou não proceder às consultas dentro de prazo não superior a 30 dias, ou dentro de outro
prazo mutuamente acordado contado a partir da data de recebimento da solicitação, o Membro que
houver solicitado as consultas poderá proceder diretamente a solicitação de estabelecimento de um
grupo especial.
2
Quando as disposições de qualquer outro acordo abrangido relativos a medidas adotadas por governos ou autoridades regionais ou locais dentro do
território de um Membro forem diferentes dos previstos neste parágrafo, prevalecerão as disposições do acordo abrangido.
26
4.4
Todas as solicitações de consultas deverão ser notificadas ao OSC e aos Conselhos e Comitês
pertinentes pelo Membro que as solicite. Todas as solicitações de consultas deverão ser apresentadas.
4.5
Durante as consultas realizadas em conformidade com as disposições de um acordo abrangido, os
Membros procurarão obter uma solução satisfatória da questão antes de recorrer a outras medidas
previsas no presente Entendimento.
4.6
As consultas deverão ser confidenciais e sem prejuízo dos direitos de qualquer Membro em quaisquer
procedimentos posteriores.
4.7
Se as consultas não produzirem a solução de uma controvérsia no prazo de 60 dias contados a partir da
data de recebimento da solicitação, a parte reclamante poderá requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo
especial. A parte reclamante poderá requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo especial dentro do
referido prazo de 60 dias se as partes envolvidas na consulta considerarem conjuntamente que as
consultas não produziram solução da controvérsia.
4.8
Nos casos de urgência, incluindo aqueles que envolvem bens perecíveis, os Membros iniciarão as
consultas dentro de prazo não superior a 10 dias contatos da data de recebimento da solicitação. Se as
consultas não produzirem solução da controvérsia dentro de prazo não superior a 20 dias contatos da
data de recebimento da solicitação, a parte reclamante poderá requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo
especial.
4.9
Em casos de urgência, incluindo aqueles que envolvem bens perecíveis, as partes em controvérsia, os
grupos especiais e o Órgão de Apelação deverão envidar todos os esforços possíveis para acelerar ao
máximo os procedimentos.
4.10
Durante as consultas os Membros deverão dar atenção especial aos problemas e interesses específicos
dos países em desenvolvimento Membros.
4.11
Quando um Membro não participante das consultas considerar que tem interesse comercial substancial
nas consultas baseadas no parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXII do GATT 1994, parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXII do
GATS, ou nas disposições pertinentes de outros acordos abrangidos, tal Membro poderá notificar os
Membros participantes da consulta e o OSC, dentro de um prazo de 10 dias contados da data da
distribuição da solicitação de consultas baseadas em tal Artigo, de seu desejo de integrar-se às
mesmas. Tal Membro deverá associar-se às consultas desde que o Membro ao qual a solicitação de
consultas foi encaminhada entenda que a pretensão de interesse substancial tenha fundamento. Nesse
caso, o OSC deverá ser devidamente informado. Se a requisição para participação das consultas não
for aceita, o Membro requerente poderá solicitar consultas com base no parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXII ou
parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994, parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXII ou parágrafo 1 do Artigo
XXIII do GATS, ou nas disposições pertinentes dos acordos abrangidos.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1. Geral
a) “Objetivo da fase de consulta”
27
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (21.5 - US) (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/AB, paras. 54-55
Nos termos do entendimento do Órgão de Apelação, a fase de consultas é muito importante e serve para as
Partes trocarem informações, avaliarem os pontos fracos e fortes de seus respectivos pleitos e, muitas vezes,
chegarem a um acordo. No caso, se não se chegarem a um denominador comum, a fase de consultas
proporcionará a delimitação do escopo do conflito.
Para. 54. “Through consultations, parties exchange information, assess the strengths and weaknesses of their
respective cases, narrow the scope of the differences between them and, in many cases, reach a mutually
agreed solution in accordance with the explicit preference expressed in Article 3.7 of the DSU. Moreover,
even where no such agreed solution is reached, consultations provide the parties an opportunity to define and
delimit the scope of the dispute between them. Clearly, consultations afford many benefits to complaining and
responding parties, as well as to third parties and to the dispute settlement system as a whole.
Para. 55. “The practice of GATT contracting parties in regularly holding consultations is testimony to the
important role of consultations in dispute settlement. (…)”
b) “Dever dos Membros de consultar”
Relatório do Painel no litígio Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Brazil - Desiccated
Coconut), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS22/R, para. 287
O Painel reforçou a importância das consultas no processo de solução de controvérsias e indicou que o dever
dos Membros de consultar é “absoluto”, e não pode estar sujeito à imposição prévia de quaisquer termos e
condições por um Membro.
Para. 287. “The Philippine’s request concerns a matter which this Panel views with the utmost seriousness.
Compliance with the fundamental obligation of WTO Members to enter into consultations where a request is
made under the DSU is vital to the operation of the dispute settlement system. Article 4.2 of the DSU provides
that ‘Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the
operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former’. Moreover, pursuant to Article 4.6
of the DSU, consultations are ‘without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further proceedings’. In
our view, these provisions make clear that Members’ duty to consult is absolute, and is not susceptible to the
prior imposition of any terms and conditions by a Member.”
c) “Dever dos Membros de divulgar informações durante a fase de consulta”
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 94
O Órgão de Apelação sustentou que as partes envolvidas em uma disputa devem disponibilizar livremente os
fatos relacionados ao pleito.
Para. 94. “All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully forthcoming from the very
beginning both as to the claims involved in a dispute and as to the facts relating to those claims. Claims must
be stated clearly. Facts must be disclosed freely. This must be so in consultations as well as in the more formal
setting of panel proceedings. In fact, the demands of due process that are implicit in the DSU make this
28
especially necessary during consultations. For the claims that are made and the facts that are established during
consultations do much to shape the substance and the scope of subsequent panel proceedings. If, in the
aftermath of consultations, any party believes that all the pertinent facts relating to a claim are, for any reason,
not before the panel, then that party should ask the panel in that case to engage in additional fact-finding.”
d) “Fase de consultas como pré-requisito da fase de Painel”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil –
Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 131. (Veja também Relatório do Órgão de
Apelação em US - Continued Zeroing, para. 222; e US - Upland Cotton)
Para. 131. “Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, as well as paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, set
forth a process by which a complaining party must request consultations, and consultations must be held,
before a matter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel.”
e) “Identidade entre o pedido de consultas e estabelecimento de Painel”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil –
Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, paras. 131-132
O Órgão de Apelação sustentou que, enquanto o Membro demandante não ampliasse o escopo da disputa, não
haveria a necessidade de se exigir identidade precisa e exata entre as medidas específicas, as quais foram
objeto das consultas, e das medidas identificadas no pedido de estabelecimento de Painel.
Para. 131. “In our view, Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, as well as paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the SCM
Agreement, set forth a process by which a complaining party must request consultations, and consultations
must be held, before a matter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel. Under Article 4.3 of
the SCM Agreement, moreover, the purpose of consultations is ‘to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive
at a mutually agreed solution’.”
Para. 132. “We do not believe, however, that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, or paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of
the SCM Agreement, require a precise and exact identity between the specific measures that were the subject
of consultations and the specific measures identified in the request for the establishment of a panel. As stated
by the Panel, ‘[o]ne purpose of consultations, as set forth in Article 4.3 of the SCM Agreement, is to ‘clarify
the facts of the situation’, and it can be expected that information obtained during the course of consultations
may enable the complainant to focus the scope of the matter with respect to which it seeks establishment of a
panel’ (…).”
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267AB/R, para. 293
Para. 293. “We emphasize that consultations are but the first step in the WTO dispute settlement process.
They are intended to “provide the parties an opportunity to define and delimit the scope of the dispute between
them”. We also note that Article 4.2 of the DSU calls on a WTO Member that receives a request for
consultations to “accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation
regarding any representations made by another Member”. As long as the complaining party does not expand
the scope of the dispute, we hesitate to impose too rigid a standard for the “precise and exact identity” between
the scope of consultations and the request for the establishment of a panel, as this would substitute the request
for consultations for the panel request. According to Article 7 of the DSU, it is the request for the
establishment of a panel that governs its terms of reference, unless the parties agree otherwise.”
29
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice
(Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295AB/R, para. 138
Para. 138. “[A] complaining party may learn of additional information during consultations — for example, a
better understanding of the operation of a challenged measure — that could warrant revising the list of treaty
provisions with which the measure is alleged to be inconsistent. Such a revision may lead to a narrowing of the
complaint, or to a reformulation of the complaint that takes into account new information such that additional
provisions of the covered agreements become relevant. The claims set out in a panel request may thus be
expected to be shaped by, and thereby constitute a natural evolution of, the consultation process. Reading the
DSU, as Mexico does, to limit the legal basis set out in the panel request to what was indicated in the request
for consultations, would ignore an important rationale behind the requirement to hold consultations — namely,
the exchange of information necessary to refine the contours of the dispute, which are subsequently set out in
the panel request. In this light, we consider that it is not necessary that the provisions referred to in the request
for consultations be identical to those set out in the panel request, provided that the ‘legal basis’ in the panel
request may reasonably be said to have evolved from the ‘legal basis’ that formed the subject of consultations.
In other words, the addition of provisions must not have the effect of changing the essence of the complaint.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise
Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties (US - Customs Bond Directive), Demandante: Índia,
WT/DS345AB/R, para. 293
O Órgão de Apelação fez referência aos seus pronunciamentos anteriores e enfatizou a necessidade de uma
análise caso a caso.
Para. 293. “[a]s long as the complaining party does not expand the scope of the dispute, [it would] hesitate to
impose too rigid a standard for the ‘precise and exact identity’ between the scope of the consultations and the
request for the establishment of a panel, as this would substitute the request for consultations for the panel
request”.(…) [a] ‘precise and exact identity’ of measures between the two requests is not necessary, ‘provided
that the ‘essence’ of the challenged measures had not changed.’ ‘[e]xpand[ed] the scope of the dispute’ or
changed the ‘essence’ of the dispute through the inclusion of a measure in its panel request that was not part of
its consultations request must be determined on a case-by-case basis.”
f) “Escopo da consulta limitado por pedido escrito”
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267AB/R, para. 293
O Órgão de Apelação firmou entendimento de que não há determinação expressa de que o pedido de consulta
seja escrito.
Para. 293. “We believe that the Panel should have limited its analysis to the request for consultations because
we are inclined to agree with the panel in Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, which stated that “the only
requirement under the DSU is that consultations were in fact held … [w]hat takes place in those consultations
is not the concern of a panel”. Examining what took place in the consultations would seem contrary to Article
4.6 of the DSU, which provides that “consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of
any Member in any further proceedings.” Moreover, it would seem at odds with the requirements in Article
4.4 of the DSU that the request for consultations be made in writing and that it be notified to the DSB. In
addition, there is no public record of what actually transpires during consultations and parties will often
disagree about what, precisely, was discussed.”
30
g) “Efeito da extensão da duração das medidas identificadas após consultas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207AB/R,
paras. 7.116–7.120
O Painel analisou a questão da extensão da duração das medidas após as consultas.
Paras. 7.116–7.120. “Chile raises two different objections regarding the Panel’s jurisdiction with respect to
the definitive safeguard measures and the extension of their duration: first, the definitive safeguard measures
had ‘expired before the request for establishment was made; second, the ‘extension measures’ were not
formally included in the request for consultations. We cannot accept either of those objections, for one and the
same reason. Both of Chile’s objections are based on the proposition that the extension of the period of
application results in a measure distinct from the definitive safeguard measure. We disagree with this
proposition. In our view, Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards makes it clear that what is at issue is not an
extension ‘of the safeguard measure’, but, rather, an extension ‘of the period of application of the safeguard
measure’ or of ‘the duration of the safeguard measure’. Article 7 is entitled ‘Duration and Review of
Safeguard Measures’. (...)
This language is sufficiently clear for us as to conclude that the ‘extensions’ are not distinct measures, but
merely continuations in time of the definitive safeguard measures. As a result, we consider that the definitive
safeguard measures were not terminated before the request for establishment, but, rather, that their duration
was simply extended at that time. Thus, we need not further consider Chile’s argument that we lack the
authority to make findings in respect of the definitive measures on the grounds that they have expired. For the
same reason, we also consider the fact that the extension was not mentioned in the request for consultations
irrelevant for the determination of our jurisdiction: pursuant to Article 4.4 of the DSU, Argentina had to, and
did, identify the definitive safeguard measures in its request for consultations. The fact that the duration of the
identified measures was extended by Chile after the request for consultations cannot affect Argentina’s
compliance with Article 4.4 of the DSU.
We note, moreover, that the ‘extension’ did not in any way amend the content of the safeguard measures and
that there were, in fact, exchanges between Argentina and Chile during the period of consultations regarding
the ‘extension’. Chile must therefore have been fully informed about Argentina’s intention to challenge the
safeguard measures, as extended in time. Thus, even if the ‘extension’ were to be considered a separate
measure, quod non, Chile’s due process rights would not have been impinged upon.”
h) “Pedido de consultas aditado”
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea (US - Countervailing Duty Investigation on
DRAMs), Demandante: República da Corea, WT/DS296AB/R, para. 100
O Órgão de Apelação manteve a decisão do Painel ao considerar que a “totalidade” do disposto no pedido
inicial para consultas e no adendo estabeleceu uma indicação suficiente de base legal para o pleito, nos termos
do Artigo 4.4.
Para. 100. “The Addendum expressly refers to the initial request for consultations. It is clear that the
Addendum was intended to be read together with the original request for consultations; indeed, that is the very
nature of an addendum. Moreover, we recall that Korea explains that, under United States law, ‘the [CVD]
order is wholly dependent on the administrative determinations and is effectively a ministerial function
31
without discretion’. According to Korea, ‘it follows that the legal claims of the underlying determinations are
identical to the legal claims with respect to the [CVD] order.’ … In these circumstances, it should have been
apparent that the allegations of Inconsistency, set forth by Korea in the original request for consultations and
in the Addendum in relation to the USDOC’s subsidy determination and the USITC’s injury determination,
applied also to the CVD order. Nor can it be said that the United States was expected ‘to guess which
provision(s) applied to the [CVD] order’. Accordingly, we find that it was reasonable for the Panel to conclude
that the ‘totality’ of the provisions in Korea’s initial request for consultations and in the Addendum provides,
with respect to the USDOC’s CVD order, a sufficient indication of the legal basis for the complaint within the
meaning of Article 4.4.”
2. Artigo 4.2
a) “Medidas expiradas no escopo do pedido de consultas”
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267AB/R, paras. 260–263
O Órgão de Apelação manteve a recomendação do Painel, sustentando que o Artigo 4.2 do DSU não exclui
medidas expiradas do escopo do pedido de consultas, quando estas continuam afetando os direitos de
determinado Membro.
Para. 260. “It is clear from Article 4.2 that, although a requested Member is under an obligation to engage in
“consultation” on “any” representations made by another Member, such representations must pertain to
“measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement (…).”
Para. 261. “We agree with the Panel that the word “affecting” refers primarily to “the way in which measures
relate to a covered agreement”. As the Appellate Body stated in EC - Bananas III, “the ordinary meaning of
the word ‘affecting’ implies a measure that has ‘an effect on’” Something else. At the same time, we also
concur with the United States that the ordinary meaning of the word “affecting” suggests a temporal
connotation. As the United States submits, the present tense of the phrase “affecting the operation of any
covered agreement” denotes that the effects of such measures must relate to the present impact of those
measures on the operation of a covered agreement. It is not sufficient that a Member alleges that challenged
measures affected the operation of a covered agreement in the past; the representations of the Member
requesting consultations must indicate that the effects are occurring in the present.”
Para. 262. “Whether or not a measure is still in force is not dispositive of whether that Measure is currently
affecting the operation of any covered agreement. Therefore, we disagree with the United States’ argument
that measures whose legislative basis has expired are incapable of affecting the operation of a covered
agreement in the present and that; accordingly, expired measures cannot be the subject of consultations under
the DSU. In our view, the question of whether measures whose legislative basis has expired affect the
operation of a covered agreement currently is an issue that must be resolved on the facts of each case. The
outcome of such an analysis cannot be prejudged by excluding it from consultations and dispute settlement
proceedings altogether.”
Para. 263. “We consider that requesting Members should enjoy a degree of discretion to identify, in their
request for consultations under Article 4.2, matters relating to the covered agreements for discussion in
consultations. As the Appellate Body observed in Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 - US), consultations
present an opportunity for clarifying factual and legal issues, and for narrowing the scope of a dispute, and for
resolving differences between WTO Members. We do not think it would advance the purpose of consultations
if Article 4.2 were interpreted as excluding a priori measures whose legislative basis may have expired, but
32
whose effects are alleged to be impairing the benefits accruing to the requesting Member under a covered
agreement. Nor, indeed, do we find textual support in the provision itself for doing so. Thus, we do not read
Article 4.2 of the DSU as precluding a Member from making representations on measures whose legislative
basis has expired, where that Member has reason to believe that such measures are still ‘affecting’ the
operation of a covered agreement.”
3. Artigo 4.3
a) “General”
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (21.5 - US) (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/AB, paras. 58-59 e 62-64
O Órgão de Apelação se referiu ao Artigo 4.3, constatando que a falta de consultas prévias não seja um defeito
que prive necessariamente um Painel de jurisdição em relação a uma questão.
Para. 58. “As a general matter, consultations is a prerequisite to panel proceedings. However, this general
proposition is subject to certain limitations (…).”
Para. 59. “Article 4.3 of the DSU relates the responding party’s conduct towards consultations to the
complaining party’s right to request the establishment of a panel. When the responding party does not respond
to a request for consultations, or declines to enter into consultations, the Complaining party may dispense with
consultations and proceed to request the establishment of a panel. In such a case, the responding party, by its
own conduct, relinquishes the potential benefits that could be derived from those consultations.”
Para. 62. “In addition (…) [the requirement in Article 6.2 of the DSU to indicate] whether consultations were
held (…).” (…) “may be satisfied by an express statement that no consultations were held. In other words,
Article 6.2 also envisages the possibility that a panel may be validly established without Being preceded by
consultations.”
Para. 63. “Thus, the DSU explicitly recognizes circumstances where the absence of consultations would not
deprive the panel of its authority to consider the matter referred to it by the DSB. In our view, it follows that
where the responding party does not object, explicitly and in a timely manner, to the failure of the complaining
party to request or engage in consultations, the responding party may be deemed to have consented to the lack
of consultations and, thereby, to have relinquished whatever right to consult it may have had.”
Para. 64. “As a result, we find that the lack of prior consultations is not a defect that, by its very nature,
deprives a panel of its authority to deal with and dispose of a matter, and that, accordingly, such a defect is not
one which a panel must examine even if both parties to the dispute remain silent thereon.”
b) “Boa-fé no pedido de consulta”
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones
Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS320/R, para. 313.
(Veja também o Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities - Bed Linen, Demandante: Índia,
WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.32–6.35
O Órgão de Apelação sustentou que os Membros devem agir de boa fé ao iníciar um conflito e em sua conduta
durante o processo de solução de controvérsias.
33
Para. 313. “The DSU makes reference to “good faith” in two provisions, namely, Article 4.3, which relates to
consultations, and Article 3.10, which provides that, “if a dispute arises, all Members will engage in these
procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute.” These provisions Require Members to act in good
faith with respect to the initiation of a dispute and in their conduct during dispute settlement proceedings.”
4. Artigo 4.4
a) “Base jurídica do pedido de consultas”
Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners)(China), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R, para.
7.207. (Veja também Relatório do Painel no litígio US - Poultry (China), Demandante: China,
WT/DS392/R, paras. 7.30–7.34 e 7.43)
O Painel sustentou que o pedido de consultas, nos termos do Artigo 4.4 do DSU, é menos rigoroso que o para
estabelecimento de um Painel, nos termos do Artigo 6.2, sendo que aquele poderá ser satisfeito em um caso
particular com a lista de Artigos supostamente violados.
Para. 7.207. “While the Appellate Body has indicated that a mere listing of legal provisions alleged to be
violated may not be sufficient to provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to
present the problem clearly in the context of a panel request, it is not clear to us that a similar approach should
be taken with respect to a request for consultations. Unlike Article 6.2 of the DSU, which requires that a panel
request provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly,
Article 4.4 of the DSU requires only that a request for consultations contain “an indication of the legal basis
for the complaint”. In our view, this is a lesser requirement than that of Article 6.2, and may well be satisfied
in a particular case by listing the Articles allegedly violated.”
5. Artigo 4.6
a) “Confidencialidade do pedido de consultas”
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China
(US - Poultry) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS392/R, paras. 7.35 e 7.36. (Veja também: Relatório
do Painel em Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/R, para. 5.6)
O Painel enfatizou a “natureza confidencial” do pedido de consultas.
Para. 7.35. “The Panel is aware that in making its analysis of whether a particular claim was included in the
consultations request, it should not inquire as to what actually occurred during consultations. The panel in
Korea - Alcoholic Beverages correctly noted that ‘the only requirement under the DSU is that consultations
were in fact held … what takes place in those consultations is not the concern of a panel’. (…) Finally, the
Appellate Body noted that, there is no public record of what actually transpires during consultations and
parties will often disagree about what, precisely, was discussed.”
Para. 7.36. “Therefore, the Panel will inquire whether China indicated the SPS Agreement as a legal basis for
its complaint in its consultations request and in doing so will look at that consultations request as a whole and
in light of the attendant circumstances. However, the Panel will not use as a basis for its determination what
either party alleges took place during consultations. Therefore, while we will consider the exchange of letters
in April 2009 - which are precisely about the scope of China’s consultations request - we will not consider any
questions posed or answers given during the consultations.”
34
b) “Uso de informação obtida na fase de consulta, no pedido de estabelecimento de Painel”
Relatório do Painel no litígio Korea, Republic of - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (US - Poultry)(China),
Demandante: China, WT/DS392/R, para. 10.23
O Painel sustentou que o Artigo 4.6 do DSU exige confidencialidade entre as Partes em uma disputa, sendo
que a confidencialidade é essencial para que haja engajamento entre elas. No entanto, entendeu que esta
confidencialidade estende-se, apenas, na medida em que proibe às Partes envolvidas nas consultas de divulgar
quaisquer informações obtidas àquelas que não estavam envolvidas.
Para. 10.23. “We note that Article 4.6 of the DSU requires confidentiality in the consultations between parties
to a dispute. This is essential if the parties are to be free to engage in meaningful consultations. However, it is
our view that this confidentiality extends only as far as requiring the parties to the consultations not to disclose
any information obtained in the consultations to any parties that were not involved in those consultations. We
are mindful of the fact that the panel proceedings between the parties remain confidential, and parties do not
thereby breach any confidentiality by disclosing in those proceedings information acquired during the
consultations. Indeed, in our view, the very essence of consultations is to enable the parties gather correct and
relevant information, for purposes of assisting them in arriving at a mutually agreed solution, or failing which,
to assist them in presenting accurate information to the panel. It would seriously hamper the dispute settlement
process if the information acquired during consultations could not subsequently be used by any party in the
ensuing proceedings. We find therefore, that there has been no breach of confidentiality by the complainants in
this case in respect of information that they became aware of during the consultations with Korea on this
matter.”
c) “Uso de informação obtida na fase de consulta, no pedido de estabelecimento de Painel”
Relatório do Painel no litígio Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather (Austrália - Automotive Leather II), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS126/R, para. 9.34
O Painel entendeu que não há problema em utilizar informação obtida em primeira consulta, considerando-se
que as Partes e a disputa são as mesmas.
Para. 9.34. “Given that, in this case, the parties and the dispute are the same, no panel was actually composed
or considered the dispute in the first-requested proceeding, and there are no third parties involved in either
proceeding who might have learned information in the course of consultations, we cannot see any reason to
exclude the United States Exhibit 2 from our consideration, merely because it was developed in the course of
the consultations held pursuant to the first request (…) Australia has failed to specify what other, if any, facts
might have been derived by the United States from the earlier consultations, and so there is no basis for us to
exclude any such facts.”
Relatório do Painel no litígio Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)
from the United States (21.5 - US) (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.41
O Painel entendeu que a obrigação de manter a confidencialidade das consultas, não é violada simplesmente
pela inclusão das informações obtidas na apresentação por escrito das Partes, a um terceiro, na fase de Painel,
mesmo se este terceiro não participou das consultas.
Para. 7.41. “[I]t would seriously hamper the dispute settlement process if a party could not use information
obtained in the consultations in subsequent panel proceedings merely because a third party which did not
participate in the consultations chooses to participate in the panel proceedings. (…) As Mexico points out,
35
third party participation in the panel proceedings cannot be vetoed by the parties to the proceeding. In our
view, it would be anomalous if the decision of a Member to participate in a panel proceeding as a third party
when it did not, or could not, participate as a third party in the underlying consultations had the effect of
limiting the evidence that could be relied upon in the panel proceeding by precluding the introduction of
information obtained during the consultations. Third parties are subject to the same requirement to maintain
the confidentiality of panel proceedings as are parties. We therefore conclude that the requirement to maintain
the confidentiality of consultations is not violated by the inclusion of information obtained during
consultations in the written submission of a party provided to a third party in the subsequent panel proceeding
even if that third party did not participate in the consultations.”
6. Artigo 4.7
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (21.5 - US)(Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/AB, paras. 63-64
O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que, a falta de consultas prévias não é um “defeito” que, necessariamente,
priva um Painel de sua autoridade para tratar e dispor sobre determinado assunto, e, que, portanto, tal “defeito”
não deve ser examinado, ainda mais quando as Partes envolvidas na disputa sequer se manifestaram a respeito.
Paras. 63-64. “Thus, the DSU explicitly recognizes circumstances where the absence of consultations would
not deprive the panel of its authority to consider the matter referred to it by the DSB. In our view, it follows
that where the responding party does not object, explicitly and in a timely manner, to the failure of the
complaining party to request or engage in consultations, the responding party may be deemed to have
consented to the lack of consultations and, thereby, to have relinquished whatever right to consult it may have
had. As a result, we find that the lack of prior consultations is not a defect that, by its very nature, deprives a
panel of its authority to deal with and dispose of a matter, and that, accordingly, such a defect is not one which
a panel must examine even if both parties to the dispute remain silent thereon. We recall that, in this case,
Mexico neither pursued the potential benefits of consultations nor objected that the United States had deprived
it of such benefits.”
7. Artigo 4.11
Relatório do Painel no litígio Korea, Republic of - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/R, para. 7.13
O Painel, fazendo referência ao Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC - Bananas, sustentou que a
necessidade de um “interesse jurídico” não pode ser implícita no DSU ou em quaisquer outras disposições dos
Acordos da OMC, como um pré-requisito para solicitar um Painel.
Para. 7.13. “In EC - Bananas, the Appellate Body stated that the need for a ‘legal interest’ could not be
implied in the DSU or in any other provisions of the WTO Agreement and that Members were expected to be
largely self-regulating in deciding whether any DSU procedure would be ‘fruitful’. We cannot read in the DSU
any requirement for an ‘economic interest’. We also note the provisions of Article 3.8 of the DSU, pursuant to
which nullification and impairment is presumed once violation is established.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 4 do DSU trata especificamente da fase de consulta, abordando, mas não se limitando, aos
procedimentos e prazos.
36
A fase de consulta é muito importante e serve para as Partes trocarem informação, avaliarem os pontos fracos
e fortes de seus respectivos pleitos e, muitas vezes, chegarem a um acordo. Quando não for possível o acordo,
a fase de consulta possibilitará que as Partes delimitem o escopo do conflito, sendo que não se exige
identidade precisa e exata entre as medidas objeto de consulta, e àquelas a serem objeto de estabelecimento de
Painel.
 A fase de consulta exige, contudo, que os Membros atuem de boa fé ao iniciar um conflito, e em sua
consulta durante o processo de solução de controvérsias, assim como exige confidencialidade entre as
Partes
em
uma
disputa.
37

Artigo 5
Felipe Herzog
IA.
Article 5
Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation
5.1
Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily if the parties
to the dispute so agree.
5.2
Proceedings involving good offices, conciliation and mediation, and in particular positions taken by
the parties to the dispute during these proceedings, shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the
rights of either party in any further proceedings under these procedures.
5.3
Good offices, conciliation or mediation may be requested at any time by any party to a dispute. They
may begin at any time and be terminated at any time. Once procedures for good offices, conciliation or
mediation are terminated, a complaining party may then proceed with a request for the establishment
of a panel.
5.4
When good offices, conciliation or mediation are entered into within 60 days after the date of receipt
of a request for consultations, the complaining party must allow a period of 60 days after the date of
receipt of the request for consultations before requesting the establishment of a panel. The
complaining party may request the establishment of a panel during the 60-day period if the parties to
the dispute jointly consider that the good offices, conciliation or mediation process has failed to settle
the dispute.
5.5
If the parties to a dispute agree, procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation may continue
while the panel process proceeds.
5.6
The Director-General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices, conciliation or
mediation with the view to assisting Members to settle a dispute.
IB.
Artigo 5
Bons Ofícios, Conciliação e Mediação
5.1
Bons ofícios, conciliação e mediação são procedimentos adotados voluntariamente se as partes na
controvérsia assim acordarem.
5.2
As diligências relativas aos bons ofícios, à conciliação e à mediação, e em especial as posições
adotadas durante as mesmas pelas partes envolvidas nas controvérsias, deverão ser confidenciais e
sem prejuízo dos direitos de quaisquer das partes em diligências posteriores baseadas nestes
procedimentos.
5.3
Bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação poderão ser solicitados a qualquer tempo por qualquer das
partes envolvidas na controvérsia. Poderão iniciar-se ou encerrar-se a qualquer tempo. Uma vez
terminados os procedimentos de bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação, a parte reclamante poderá
requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo especial.
38
5.4
Quando bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação se iniciarem dentro de 60 dias contados da data de
recebimento da solicitação, a parte reclamante poderá requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo
especial antes de transcorrido o prazo de 60 dias a partir da data de recebimento da solicitação de
consultas. A parte reclamante poderá solicitar o estabelecimento de um grupo especial no correr do
prazo de 60 dias se as partes envolvidas na controvérsia considerarem de comum acordo que os bons
ofícios, a conciliação e a mediação não foram suficientes para solucionar a controvérsia.
5.5
Se as partes envolvidas na controvérsia concordarem, os procedimentos para bons ofícios, conciliação
e mediação poderão continuar enquanto prosseguirem os procedimentos do grupo especial.
5.6
O Diretor-Geral, atuando ex officio, poderá oferecer seus bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação com o
objetivo de auxiliar os Membros a resolver uma controvérsia.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
a) “Geral”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/320/AB,
para. 340
O Órgão de Apelação expôs que consultas, mediação, bons ofícios e arbitragem são alternativas à adjudicação
compulsória e necessitam do consentimento das Partes. Na ausência de tal consentimento, não se pode obter
uma decisão vinculante.
Para. 340. “Certainly, parties to a dispute are not precluded from pursuing consensual or alternative means of
dispute settlement foreseen in the DSU. Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that “[a] solution mutually acceptable
to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.” To reach a
mutually acceptable solution, Members can engage in consultations or resort to mediation and good offices.
Moreover, Article 25 provides for arbitration as an alternative to panel proceedings for dispute resolution.
Consultations, mediation, good offices, and arbitration are, however, alternatives to compulsory adjudication
and require the consent of the parties. In the absence of such consent, they cannot lead to a binding decision.
Thus, it is important to distinguish between these consensual means of dispute resolution, which are always at
the Members’ disposal, and adjudication through panel proceedings, which are compulsory (…).”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 5 do DSU trata do “Bons ofícios, conciliação e mediação”. Estes são procedimentos adotados
voluntariamente pelas Partes na controvérsia, podendo ser iniciado ou encerrado a qualquer tempo. Conforme,
explicação do próprio DSB, são alternativas à adjudicação compulsória e necessitam do consentimento das
Partes.
39

Artigo 6
IA.
Article 6
Establishment of Panels
6.1
If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting
following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless at that
meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel (5).
6.2
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate whether
consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the
legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In case the applicant requests the
establishment of a panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall include
the proposed text of special terms of reference.
Footnote 5: In the case where customs unions or common markets are parties to a dispute, this provision applies to citizens of all
member countries of the customs unions or common markets.
IB.
Artigo 6
Estabelecimento de Grupos Especiais
6.1.1
Se a parte reclamante assim o solicitar, um grupo especial será estabelecido no mais tardar na reunião
do OSC seguinte àquela em que a solicitação aparece pela primeira vez como item da agenda do
OSC, a menos que nessa reunião o OSC decida por consenso não estabelecer o grupo especial.3
6.2
Os pedidos de estabelecimento de grupo especial deverão ser formulados por escrito. Deverão indicar
se foram realizadas consultas, identificar as medidas em controvérsia e fornecer uma breve exposição
do embasamento legal da reclamação, suficiente para apresentar o problema com clareza. Caso a parte
reclamante solicite o estabelecimento do grupo especial com termos de referência diferentes dos
termos padrão, o pedido escrito deverá incluir sugestão de texto para os termos de referência
especiais.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
3
Se a parte reclamante assim solicitar, do OSC será convocada com tal objetivo dentro dos quinze dias seguintes ao pedido, sempre que se dê aviso com
antecedencia minima de 10 dias.
40

Artigo 7
IA.
Article 7
Terms of Reference of Panels
7.1
Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise
within 20 days from the establishment of the panel:
“To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute),
the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s).”
7.2
Panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the
parties to the dispute.
7.3
In establishing a panel, the DSB may authorize its Chairman to draw up the terms of reference of the
panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1. The
terms of reference thus drawn up shall be circulated to all Members. If other than standard terms of
reference are agreed upon, any Member may raise any point relating thereto in the DSB.
IB.
Artigo 7
Termos de Referência dos Grupos Especiais
7.1
Os termos de referência dos grupos especiais serão os seguintes, a menos que as partes envolvidas na
controvérsia acordem diferentemente dentro do prazo de 20 dias a partir da data de estabelecimento
do grupo especial:
“Examinar, à luz das disposições pertinentes no (indicar o(s) acordo(s) abrangido(s) citado(s) pelas partes em controvérsias),
a questão submetida ao OSC por (nome da parte) no documento ... e estabelecer conclusões que auxiliem o OSC a fazer
recomendações ou emitir decisões previstas naquele(s) acordo(s).”
7.2
Os grupos especiais deverão considerar as disposições relevantes de todo acordo ou acordos
abrangidos invocados pelas partes envolvidas na controvérsia.
7.3
Ao estabelecer um grupo especial, o OSC poderá autorizar seu Presidente a redigir os termos de
referência do grupo especial com a colaboração das partes envolvidadas na controvérsia, de acordo
com as disposições do parágrafo 1. Os termos de referência assim redigidos serão distribuídos a todos
os Membros. Caso os termos de referência sejam diferentes do padrão, qualquer Membro poderá
levantar qualquer ponto a ele relativo no OSC.
IC.
No Artigo 7.2, a expressão ‘considerar’ deve ser entendida como ‘examinar’. Não basta que o Painel declare
ter levado em conta todos os argumentos jurídicos das Partes; é preciso que estes sejam examinados
explicitamente no Relatório.
II.
1. Geral
41
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 87-89
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que o pedido de Painel condiciona os termos de referência
dos Painéis, os quais são a base de sua jurisdição e fornecem às Partes e terceiras Partes informação sobre os
pedidos em questão em uma determinada disputa. Embora não seja necessário ao demandante apresentar todos
os argumentos no pedido de Painel, os pedidos ali contidos condicionam os termos de referência do Painel, e,
portanto, delimitam a sua jurisdição.
Para. 87. “In United States - Shirts and Blouses, we said that “[a] panel need only address those claims which
must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute”. This means that a panel has the
discretion to determine the claims it must address in order to resolve the dispute between the parties - provided
that those claims are within that panel's terms of reference. We have stressed, on more than one occasion, the
fundamental importance of a panel's terms of reference. In European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (“European Communities - Bananas”), we found that “[i]t is
the panel's terms of reference, governed by Article 7 of the DSU, which set out the claims of the complaining
parties relating to the matter referred to the DSB”.70 In Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut
(“Brazil - Desiccated Coconut”), we stated:
A panel's terms of reference are important for two reasons. First, terms of reference
fulfil an important due process objective - they give the parties and third parties
sufficient information concerning the claims at issue in the dispute in order to allow
them an opportunity to respond to the complainant's case. Second, they establish the
jurisdiction of the panel by defining the precise claims at issue in the dispute.
Para. 88. “We stated also in Brazil - Desiccated Coconut that all claims must be included in the request for
establishment of a panel in order to come within the panel's terms of reference, based on the practice of panels
under the GATT 1947 and the Tokyo Round Codes. That past practice required that a claim had to be included
in the documents referred to, or contained in, the terms of reference in order to form part of the “matter”
referred to a panel for consideration. Following both this past practice and the provisions of the DSU, in
European Communities - Bananas, we observed that there is a significant difference between the claims
identified in the request for the establishment of a panel, which establish the panel's terms of reference under
Article 7 of the DSU, and the arguments supporting those claims, which are set out and progressively clarified
in the first written submissions, the rebuttal submissions, and the first and second panel meetings with the
parties as a case proceeds. There we said:
Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that the claims, but not the arguments, must all be
specified sufficiently in the request for the establishment of a panel in order to allow the
defending party and any third parties to know the legal basis of the complaint. If a claim
is not specified in the request for the establishment of a panel, then a faulty request
cannot be subsequently “cured” by a complaining party's argumentation in its first
written submission to the panel or in any other submission or statement made later in
the panel proceeding.”
Para. 89. “Thus, a claim must be included in the request for establishment of a panel in order to come within a
panel’s terms of reference in a given case.”
2.
Artigo 7.1
a) “Significado do termo ‘questão’”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland
Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 72
42
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou o significado do termo ‘questão’, esclarecendo que este inclui
tanto as medidas contestadas, quanto a base jurídica da demanda ou dos pedidos efetuados.
Para. 72. “The word “matter” appears in Article 7 of the DSU, which provides the standard terms of reference
for panels. Under this provision, the task of a panel is to examine “the matter referred to the DSB”. These
words closely echo those of Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, in view of the integrated nature
of the dispute settlement system, form part of the context of that provision. Article 7 of the DSU itself does not
shed any further light on the meaning of the term “matter”. However, when that provision is read together with
Article 6.2 of the DSU, the precise meaning of the term “matter” becomes clear. Article 6.2 specifies the
requirements under which a complaining Member may refer a “matter” to the DSB: in order to establish a
panel to hear its complaint, a Member must make, in writing, a “request for the establishment of a panel” (a
“panel request”). In addition to being the document which enables the DSB to establish a panel, the panel
request is also usually identified in the panel's terms of reference as the document setting out “the matter
referred to the DSB”. Thus, “the matter referred to the DSB” for the purposes of Article 7 of the DSU and
Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement must be the “matter” identified in the request for the
establishment of a panel under Article 6.2 of the DSU. That provision requires the complaining Member, in a
panel request, to “identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.” (emphasis added) The “matter referred to the DSB”,
therefore, consists of two elements: the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint (or the
claims).”
b) “Delimitação da jurisdição do Painel”
Chemical Products (EC - Large Civil Aircraft), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 639-640 e 786
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que a ‘questão’ referida ao DSB, e em análise pelos
Painéis, é determinada pelo pedido de Painel, estando fora da jurisdição deste órgão o exame de medidas não
incluídas no pedido de Painel.
Para. 639. “Two requirements under Article 6.2 are central to establishing a panel's jurisdiction — namely the
identification of the specific measures at issue, and the provision of a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. Together these elements comprise the “matter referred to
the DSB”, which forms the basis for a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU. (1)4 The
Appellate Body has previously noted that the panel request serves two essential purposes. First, it defines the
scope of the dispute. Second, it serves the due process objective of notifying the respondent and third parties
of the nature of the complainant's case. (2)5
Para. 640. “In our view, the requirement that a complainant identify in its panel request the specific measures
at issue thus assists in determining the scope of the dispute in respect of those measures, and, consequently,
establishes and delimits the jurisdiction of the panel. In so doing, the panel request fulfils the objective of
4
See Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 73; Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 125;
Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 160; Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan),
para. 107; and Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 416.
5
1526: See Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 73; Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 125;
Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 160; Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan),
para. 107; and Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 416.
1527: See Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 126 (referring to Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p.
22, DSR 1997:I, 167, at 186). See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 155; and Appellate Body Report, US –
Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 108.
43
providing notice to the respondent and the third parties regarding the nature of the dispute. This due process
objective is not constitutive of, but rather follows from, the proper establishment of a panel's jurisdiction. The
principal task of the adjudicator is therefore to assess what the panel's terms of reference encompass, and
whether a particular measure or claim falls within the panel's remit.”
Para. 786. “As discussed above, two requirements under Article 6.2 of the DSU are central to establishing a
panel's jurisdiction — namely the identification of the specific measures at issue, and the provision of a brief
summary of the legal basis of the complaint. Together, specific measures and claims comprise the “matter
referred to the DSB”, which forms the basis for a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU. The
panel request thus functions to establish and delimit the jurisdiction of the panel in a dispute and it serves the
due process objective of notifying the respondent and third parties of the nature of the dispute. The clear
identification of the specific measures in the panel request is therefore central to define the scope of the
dispute to be addressed by a panel.”
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 91-94
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que um pedido adicional, realizado após a solicitação de
instauração do Painel, está fora dos termos de referência deste Órgão e, portanto, fora de sua jurisdição.
Embora o Painel tenha liberdade para organizar o próprio procedimento, não pode ampliar o escopo da própria
jurisdição.
Para. 91. “In European Communities - Bananas, we accepted the view of the panel in that case that it was
“sufficient for the Complaining Parties to list the provisions of the specific agreements alleged to have been
violated without setting out detailed arguments as to which specific aspects of the measures at issue relate to
which specific provisions of those agreements”, and we also agreed with the panel that the request in that case
was sufficiently specific to comply with the “minimum standards” established by Article 6.2 of the DSU.75 In
this case, in contrast, there is a failure to identify a specific provision of an agreement that is alleged to have
been violated. This falls below the “minimum standards” that we were willing to accept in European
Communities - Bananas.”
Para. 92. “We note also the Panel's statement that it “ruled, at the outset of the first substantive meeting held
on 15 April 1997, that all legal claims would be considered if they were made prior to the end of that meeting;
and this ruling was accepted by both parties”. We do not find this statement at all persuasive in advancing the
argument made by the United States on this issue. Nor do we find this statement consistent with the letter and
the spirit of the DSU. Although panels enjoy some discretion in establishing their own working procedures,
this discretion does not extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the DSU. To be sure, Article 12.1 of
the DSU says: “Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise
after consulting the parties to the dispute”. Yet that is all that it says. Nothing in the DSU gives a panel the
authority either to disregard or to modify other explicit provisions of the DSU. The jurisdiction of a panel is
established by that panel's terms of reference, which are governed by Article 7 of the DSU. A panel may
consider only those claims that it has the authority to consider under its terms of reference. A panel cannot
assume jurisdiction that it does not have. In this case, Article 63 was not within the Panel's jurisdiction, as
defined by its terms of reference. Therefore, the Panel had no authority to consider the alternative claim by the
United States under Article 63.”
Para. 93. “(…) All that said, there is, nevertheless, no basis in the DSU for a complaining party to make an
additional claim, outside of the scope of a panel's terms of reference, at the first substantive meeting of the
panel with the parties. A panel is bound by its terms of reference.”
44
Para. 94. “All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully forthcoming from the very
beginning both as to the claims involved in a dispute and as to the facts relating to those claims. Claims must
be stated clearly. Facts must be disclosed freely. This must be so in consultations as well as in the more formal
setting of panel proceedings. In fact, the demands of due process that are implicit in the DSU make this
especially necessary during consultations. For the claims that are made and the facts that are established during
consultations do much to shape the substance and the scope of subsequent panel proceedings. If, in the
aftermath of consultations, any party believes that all the pertinent facts relating to a claim are, for any reason,
not before the panel, then that party should ask the panel in that case to engage in additional fact-finding. But
this additional fact-finding cannot alter the claims that are before the panel - because it cannot alter the panel's
terms of reference. And, in the absence of the inclusion of a claim in the terms of reference, a panel must
neither be expected nor permitted to modify rules in the DSU.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas)(21.5 II), Demandante: Equador; (EC - Bananas)(21.5),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 270
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que a expiração de uma medida após a elaboração dos
termos de referência, não impede o Painel de se pronunciar sobre a conformidade da medida com os Acordos
da OMC. Está dentro da discricionariedade dos Painéis, portanto, proceder ao exame de medidas expiradas
após a sua formação.
Para. 270. “(…). The terms of reference for a panel pursuant to Article 7 define the scope of the dispute and
the mandate of the panel. In the present case, the panel request identified, inter alia, EC Regulation 1964/2005,
and the DSB established the Panel on that basis with standard terms of reference. The European Communities
and the United States both agreed at the outset of the proceedings that this Regulation was the measure at issue
included in the Panel's terms of reference. The parties agreed that this measure was within the jurisdiction of
the Panel. The DSU nowhere provides that the jurisdiction of a panel terminates or is limited by the expiry of
the measure at issue. On the contrary, when the DSU provides for limitations on the authority of the panel in
other instances, it does so in express terms. Article 12.12 of the DSU, for example, provides that a panel's
authority lapses if the work of the panel has been suspended for more than 12 months. The absence of a
similar limitation, with respect to changes to the scope of the panel's jurisdiction after the panel has been
established and the terms of reference have been determined by the DSB, lends further support to our
interpretation that, once a panel has been established and the terms of reference for the panel have been set, the
panel has the competence to make findings with respect to the measures covered by its terms of reference. We
thus consider it to be within the discretion of the panel to decide how it takes into account subsequent
modifications or a repeal of the measure at issue. Accordingly, panels have made findings on expired measures
in some cases and declined to do so in others, depending on the particularities of the disputes before them.327
In the present case, the European Communities has advanced no reason, nor do we see a reason, for interfering
with the Panel's exercise of that discretion.”
3.
Artigo 7.2
a)
“Obrigação do Painel de examinar”
(i) ‘deverão considerar’
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Soft Drinks), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/AB/RW,
paras. 49 e 62-63
45
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação notou que o Artigo 7 produz para os Painéis a obrigação de examinar as
disposições relevantes dos Acordos da OMC citadas pelas Partes na controvérsia.
Para. 49. “The second paragraph of Article 7 further stipulates that “[p]anels shall address the relevant
provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.” The use of the words
“shall address” in Article 7.2 indicates, in our view, that panels are required to address the relevant provisions
in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute. (1)
Footnote 1: In this regard, we further note the Appellate Body's statement that, “as a matter of due process, and the proper exercise of
the judicial function, panels are required to address issues that are put before them by the parties to a dispute.” (Appellate Body Report,
Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 36)
(ii) ‘acordo ou acordos abrangidos’
Relatório do Painel do Árbitro, sob o Artigo 22.6, no caso European Communities - Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB,
para. 50
Nesta controvérsia, o Árbitro observou que o termo ‘acordo ou acordos da OMC’ não deve ser interpretado de
forma a incluir na jurisdição do Painel acordos que não sejam Acordos da OMC.
Para. 50. “The autonomous quota rights claimed by the US - irrespective of their legal status and consistency
with WTO rules - are not rights under any of the WTO agreements covered by the DSU. The rights thus
alleged are derived from bilateral agreements that cannot be properly enforced on their own in WTO dispute
settlement.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup) (21.5), Demandante: EUA,
(WT/DS132/AB/RW) paras. 49 e 62-63
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação notou que o painel não estava na obrigação de refutar explicitamente
argumentos levantados extemporaneamente.
Para. 49. “However, had we been satisfied that Mexico did, in fact, explicitly raise its objections before the
Panel, then the Panel may well have been required to “address” those objections, whether by virtue of Articles
7.2 and 12.7 of the DSU, or the requirements of due process. In such circumstances, however, the Panel could
have satisfied that duty simply by stating in its Report that it declined to examine or rule on Mexico's
“objections” due to the untimely manner in which they were raised. We note, in this regard that Mexico was
aware of all the facts on which it now relies in arguing that the Panel had no authority to deal with and dispose
of the matter as soon as the United States submitted its communication seeking recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU on 12 October 2000. Yet Mexico mentioned these alleged deficiencies, for the first time, more than four
months later, at the meeting with the Panel on 20 February 2000. Mexico did not take advantage of the
opportunities it had to raise the issues at the DSB meeting of 23 October 2000, or in either of its written
submissions to the Panel.”
Para. 62. “In addition, as we discuss in more detail below, pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, one of the
requirements for requests for establishment of a panel is that such requests must “indicate whether
consultations were held”. The phrase “whether consultations were held” shows that this requirement in Article
6.2 may be satisfied by an express statement that no consultations were held. In other words, Article 6.2 also
envisages the possibility that a panel may be validly established without being preceded by consultations.”
46
Para. 63. “Thus, the DSU explicitly recognizes circumstances where the absence of consultations would not
deprive the panel of its authority to consider the matter referred to it by the DSB. In our view, it follows that
where the responding party does not object, explicitly and in a timely manner, to the failure of the complaining
party to request or engage in consultations, the responding party may be deemed to have consented to the lack
of consultations and, thereby, to have relinquished whatever right to consult it may have had.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 7 dispõe sobre os ‘termos de referência’ dos Painéis, os quais fornecem os limites da competência de
um Painel, provendo a base para o exercício de sua jurisdição. Um Painel que formule conclusões jurídicas ou
faça recomendações fora dos termos de referência age além de sua competência; nesses casos, o Órgão de
Apelação revogará as conclusões e recomendações desse Órgão.
O Artigo 7.1 prevê termos de referência padrão para os Painéis, envolvendo um exame da ‘questão’ submetida
ao exame do DSB pelo Membro demandante. A ‘questão’ constitui o objeto da controvérsia, isto é, a medida
cuja legalidade à luz das regras da OMC é contestada pelo demandante. Não se deve, entretanto, compreender
‘medida’ como uma única norma em direito interno. A ‘medida’ em questão pode ser constituída por um
conjunto de normas, uma norma que seja substituída por normas sucessivas ou mesmo uma prática, que do
ponto de vista do direito internacional constituem a conduta a ser examinada.
O Artigo 7.2 determina que os Painéis devem examinar todas as disposições dos Acordos da OMC invocadas
pelas Partes na controvérsia. Esse exame precisa ser explicitado no Relatório do Painel, e não pode deixar de
levar em consideração um argumento jurídico de uma das Partes. Não é necessário, entretanto, que o Painel
examine a substância de cada argumento. É permitida a ‘economia judicial’, regra que possibilita ao órgão
judicante deixar de examinar matéria invocada pela Parte, caso considere-a desnecessária para a solução da
controvérsia. Contudo, essa economia deve ser realizada de maneira explícita, com a descrição dos argumentos
invocados pela Parte, seguida da decisão explicitada e motivada do Painel, de não examinar esses argumentos.
O Artigo 7.3 permite ao DSB autorizar o Presidente do Painel a elaborar termos de referência diferentes, em
conjunto com as Partes da controvérsia. Dado que a decisão do DSB deve ser tomada por consenso positivo,
dificilmente isso ocorrerá em casos em que as Partes não tenham já concordado, nos termos do Artigo 7.1,
com a elaboração de termos de referência específicos. Isso ocorreu no caso Brazil-– Desiccated Coconut, em
que Filipinas e Brasil acordaram, após autorização do DSB, adotar termos de referência levando em conta não
apenas o pedido de Painel, mas a posição sobre o caso expressa pelo Brasil e as discussões relevantes
ocorridas no DSB.
47

Artigo 8
IA.
Article 8
Composition of Panels
8.1
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals,
including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a
Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee
of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on
international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
8.2
Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a
sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience.
8.3
Citizens of Members whose governments (6) are parties to the dispute or third parties as defined in
paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to
the dispute agree otherwise.
8.4
To assist in the selection of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of governmental
and non-governmental individuals possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph 1, from which
panelists may be drawn as appropriate. That list shall include the roster of non-governmental panelists
established on 30 November 1984 (BISD 31S/9), and other rosters and indicative lists established
under any of the covered agreements, and shall retain the names of persons on those rosters and
indicative lists at the time of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Members may periodically
suggest names of governmental and non-governmental individuals for inclusion on the indicative list,
providing relevant information on their knowledge of international trade and of the sectors or subject
matter of the covered agreements, and those names shall be added to the list upon approval by the
DSB. For each of the individuals on the list, the list shall indicate specific areas of experience or
expertise of the individuals in the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements.
8.5
Panels shall be composed of three panelists unless the parties to the dispute agree, within 10 days
from the establishment of the panel, to a panel composed of five panelists. Members shall be
informed promptly of the composition of the panel.
8.6
The Secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel to the parties to the dispute. The parties to the
dispute shall not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons.
8.7
If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the establishment of a panel,
at the request of either party, the Director-General, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and
the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, shall determine the composition of the panel by
appointing the panelists whom the Director-General considers most appropriate in accordance with
any relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or covered agreements
which are at issue in the dispute, after consulting with the parties to the dispute. The Chairman of the
DSB shall inform the Members of the composition of the panel thus formed no later than 10 days
after the date the Chairman receives such a request.
8.8
Members shall undertake, as a general rule, to permit their officials to serve as panelists.
48
8.9
Panelists shall serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as
representatives of any organization. Members shall therefore not give them instructions nor seek to
influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a panel.
8.10
When a dispute is between a developing country Member and a developed country Member the panel
shall, if the developing country Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a developing
country Member.
8.11
Panelists' expenses, including travel and subsistence allowance, shall be met from the WTO budget in
accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on recommendations of the
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
Footnote 6: In the case where customs unions or common markets are parties to a dispute, this provision applies to citizens of all
member countries of the customs unions or common markets.
IB.
Artigo 8
Composição dos Grupos Especiais
8.1
Os grupos especiais serão compostos por pessoas qualificadas, funcionários governamentais ou não,
incluindo aquelas que tenham integrado um grupo especial ou a ele apresentado uma argumentação,
que tenham atuado como representantes de um Membro ou de uma parte contratante do GATT 1947
ou como representante no Conselho ou Comitê de qualquer acordo abrangido ou do respectivo acordo
precedente, ou que tenha atuado no Secretariado, exercido atividade docente ou publicado trabalhos
sobre direito ou política comercial internacional, ou que tenha sido alto funcionário na área de política
comercial de um dos Membros.
8.2
Os membros dos grupos especiais deverão ser escolhidos de modo a assegurar a independência dos
membros, suficiente diversidade de formações e largo espectro de experiências.
8.3
Os nacionais de Membros cujos governos6 sejam parte na controvérsia ou terceiras partes, conforme
definido no parágrafo 2 do Artigo 10, não atuarão no grupo especial que trate dessa controvérsia, a
menos que as partes acordem diferentemente.
8.4
Para auxiliar na escolha dos integrantes dos grupos especiais, o Secretariado manterá uma lista
indicativa de pessoas, funcionários governamentais ou não, que reúnem as condições indicadas no
parágrafo 1, da qual os integrantes dos grupos especiais poderão ser selecionados adequadamente.
Esta lista incluirá a relação de peritos não-governamentais elaborada em 30 de novembro de 1984
(BISD 31S/9), e outras relações ou listas indicativas elaboradas em virtude de qualquer acordo
abrangido, e manterá os nomes dos peritos que figurem naquelas relações e listas indicativas na data
de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC. Os Membros poderão periodicamente sugerir
nomes de pessoas, funcionários governamentais ou não, a serem incluídos na lista indicativa,
fornecendo informação substantiva sobre seu conhecimento de comércio internacional e dos setores
ou temas dos acordos abrangidos, e tais nomes serão acrescentados à lista após aprovação pelo OSC.
Para cada pessoa que figure na lista, serão indicadas suas áreas específicas de experiência ou
competência técnica nos setores ou temas dos acordos abrangidos.
6
Caso uma união aduaneira ou um Mercado comum seja parte emu ma controvérsia, esta disposição se aplicará aos nacionais de todos os países
membros da união aduaneira ou do Mercado comum.
49
8.5
Os grupos especiais serão compostos por três integrantes a menos que, dentro do prazo de 10 dias a
partir de seu estabelecimento, as partes em controvérsia concordem em compor um grupo especial
com cinco integrantes. Os Membros deverão ser prontamente informados da composição do grupo
especial.
8.6
O Secretariado proporá às partes em controvérsia candidatos a integrantes do grupo especial. As
partes não deverão se opor a tais candidaturas a não ser por motivos imperiosos.
8.7
Se não houver acordo quanto aos integrantes do grupo especial dentro de 20 dias após seu
estabelecimento, o Diretor-Geral, a pedido de qualquer das partes, em consulta com o Presidente do
OSC e o Presidente do Conselho ou Comitê pertinente, determinará a composição do grupo especial, e
nomeará os integrantes mais apropriados segundo as normas e procedimentos especiais ou adicionais
do acordo abrangido ou dos acordos abrangidos de que trate a controvérsia, após consulta com as
partes em controvérsia.
8.8
Os Membros deverão comprometer-se, como regra geral, a permitir que seus funcionários integrem os
grupos especiais.
8.9
Os integrantes dos grupos especiais deverão atuar a título pessoal e não como representantes de
governos ou de uma organização. Assim sendo, os Membros não lhes fornecerão instruções nem
procurarão influenciá-los com relação aos assuntos submetidos ao grupo especial.
8.10
Quando a controvérsia envolver um país em desenvolvimento Membro e um país desenvolvido
Membro, o grupo especial deverá, se o país em desenvolvimento Membro solicitar, incluir ao menos
um integrante de um país em desenvolvimento Membro.
8.11
As despesas dos integrantes dos grupos especiais, incluindo viagens e diárias, serão cobertas pelo
orçamento da OMC, de acordo com critérios a serem adotados pelo Conselho Geral, baseados nas
recomendações do Comitê de Orçamento, Finanças e Administração.
IC.
A tradução omitiu a parte final do Artigo 8.7, que no original lê-se: “The Chairman of the DSB shall inform
the Members of the composition of the panel thus formed no later than 10 days after the date the Chairman
receives such a request.”
II.
1. Artigo 8.1
a)
“restrições quanto à composição dos grupos especiais”
Relatório do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain
Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Branding System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, nota de
rodapé 559
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel autorizou a utilização de teleconferência em seus procedimentos, como
consequência de dificuldades práticas impostas pelas restrições contidas no Artigo 8.1.
50
Nota de rodapé: “(…) Regarding the use of teleconference, this was not the first time this has been used in
panel proceedings and is related to the constraints imposed by Article 8.1 of the DSU as regards the
individuals eligible to serve as panelists, who, given their required seniority or expertise, may be expected to
face scheduling conflicts more than once.”
2.
Artigo 8.3
a) “nacionais de Membros cujos governos sejam parte na controvérsia ou terceiras partes”
Relatório do Grupo Especial no caso United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts
and Blouses from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS33/R, para. 7.19
No caso US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, o Painel traçou um paralelo entre o papel e as funções do Órgão de
Monitoramento de Têxteis, relativo ao Acordo sobre Têxteis e Vestuário, com o papel e as funções dos Painéis
regulados pelo DSU.
Para. 7.19. “[A Textiles Monitoring Board (TMB)] member appointed by a WTO Member involved in a
dispute before the TMB, participates in the TMB’s deliberations, although such TMB member cannot block a
consensus (Article 8.2 of the ATC). On the contrary, panelists under the DSU are not selected on the basis of
constituencies and the citizens of any party to a dispute under the DSU cannot participate as panelists, absent
agreement of the parties (Article 8.3 of the DSU).”
3.
Artigo 8.7
a) “impugnação à composição realizada pelo Diretor-Geral”
Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement
from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, para. 8.11
No caso Guatemala - Cement II, o Diretor-Geral determinou a composição do Painel de acordo com o Artigo
8.7 do DSU. A representação da Guatemala arguiu que a composição do Painel estaria em desacordo com os
princípios da OMC e do direito internacional e, portanto, o Painel não teria competência para analisar a
questão em litígio. A alegação estava fundamentada no fato de que um dos Membros do Painel também fez
parte do Painel que analisou o caso Guatemala - Cement I. O Painel concluiu que nem o Artigo 8, tampouco
qualquer outro dispositivo do DSU, autorizava-o a analisar o processo de sua composição. Desse modo, não
caberia a este Órgão analisar o mérito da questão levantada pela Guatemala.
Para. 8.11. “(…) 1.4 In order to determine whether the substance of Guatemala’s preliminary objection is an
issue that is susceptible of a ruling by the Panel, we have carefully analysed the provisions of the DSU
governing panel composition. It is clear that Article 8.6 of the DSU imposes primary responsibility for panel
composition on the parties to the dispute. In cases where the parties are unable to agree on the composition of
a panel, such as this one, Article 8.7 of the DSU imposes responsibility for panel composition on the Director
General. According to Article 8 of the DSU, therefore, the composition of a panel is determined by the parties
to the dispute and, in certain circumstances, by the Director General. Neither Article 8 nor any other provision
of the DSU prescribes any role for the panel in the panel composition process. For this reason, we find that we
are unable to rule on the substance of the issue raised by Guatemala.
1.5 Should Guatemala persist with its substantive concerns regarding the composition of the Panel, Guatemala
may avail itself of the procedure provided for in the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.”
51
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland
Cement from Mexico (US - Zeroing)(EC) (Article 21.5, EC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS156/R, para. 172
Na disputa US - Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 - EC), o Órgão de Apelação confirmou o entendimento do Painel
de que não cabia ao mesmo analisar questões envolvendo a sua composição.
Para. 172. “On the substance of the European Communities' appeal, we note that, on 28 November 2007, the
Director-General was requested to determine the composition of the compliance panel under Article 8.7 of the
DSU. In our view, Article 8.7 confers on the Director-General the discretion to compose panels, which was
properly exercised in this case. We therefore find that the Panel did not err in refraining, in paragraphs 8.17
and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report, from making a finding on whether it was improperly composed. In the light of
this conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to address the other arguments made by the parties on this
matter.”
Relatório do Painel, sob o Artigo 21.5, no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland
Cotton) (Article 21.5, Brazil), Demandante: Brasil, para. 8.28
Na controvérsia US - Upland Cotton (Article 21.5, Brazil), as Comunidades Europeias, como terceira Parte,
apresentou objeções à composição do Painel, nos termos Artigo 8.7 do DSU. O Painel concluiu que não
poderia analisar uma questão levantada por uma terceira Parte e que se relaciona com a aplicação dos
dispositivos do DSU pelo Diretor-Geral da OMC.
Para. 8.28. “The Panel considers it is not within its authority under the DSU to make a “finding or ruling” on
an issue that has not been raised by any of the parties to the dispute and which concerns the application by the
WTO Director-General of the DSU provisions regarding panel composition. (1) The Panel fails to see how the
“finding or ruling” requested by the European Communities would contribute to a positive solution to this
dispute within the meaning of Article 3.7 of the DSU.”
Footnote 1: While the European Communities asserts that there is precedent in WTO dispute settlement practice that supports its
position that the Panel has the authority to rule on the propriety of its own composition, and that the Panel is under a duty to address
this issue because “it is of fundamental importance for the correct interpretation of the DSU and for the smooth and equitable operation
of the WTO dispute settlement system” (EC Third Party Submission, paras. 28-29), the Panel finds the arguments of the European
Communities in this regard unpersuasive.
III.
Comentários
O DSB da OMC mantém uma lista de possíveis Membros para os Painéis, atualizada a cada dois anos,
contendo a indicação da área de expertise de cada um. Ao contrário do caso dos Membros do Órgão de
Apelação, não há uma exigência específica quanto à necessidade de profundo e destacado conhecimento de
direito do comércio internacional e direito da OMC. Geralmente, os integrantes dos Painéis são oficiais de
governos (muitos dos quais diplomatas) de Membros da OMC, com algum treinamento jurídico.
A “suficiente diversidade de formações” (Artigo 8.2 do DSU), principalmente envolvendo áreas técnicas da
controvérsia, costumam ser características priorizadas no momento da composição de um Painel. No caso
Mexico - Telecoms, o Painel ressaltou a importância da variedade do background de seus Membros para a
análise da controvérsia marcada pela sua complexidade legal e técnica.
Em razão da restrição imposta pelo Artigo 8.3 do DSU, nacionais de Membros que não se encontram entre os
maiores litigantes dentro do sistema solução de controvérsias da OMC costumam ser, com maior frequência,
52
escolhidos para compor os Painéis. Ainda que não seja comum, em alguns casos, as Partes têm concordado em
apontar um ou mais Membros que sejam nacionais de um dos litigantes.
O Artigo 8.7 do DSU é omisso quanto aos casos de renúncia de um Membro do Painel já nomeado, e/ou de
impossibilidade do Membro em conduzir as suas atividades. No caso US - Tuna II (Mexico), por exemplo, um
dos Membros do Painel faleceu no curso dos procedimentos. Na oportunidade, as Partes acordaram indicar um
novo Membro. Já na controvérsia EC - Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, um dos Membros do Painel
renunciou, e um novo Membro foi apontado pelo Diretor-Geral, com base no Artigo 8.7 do DSU. Da mesma
forma, o Artigo 8.7 do DSU não dispõe sobre eventual impossibilidade de o Diretor-Geral da OMC determinar
a composição de Painéis. Nesse sentido, Painéis já foram integrados pelo Diretor-Geral Adjunto, atuando em
nome do Diretor-Geral, como ocorreu na controvérsia US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint).
Em que pese a previsão contida no Artigo 8.5 do DSU, nenhum Painel até hoje foi composto por cinco
Membros, conforme informações disponibilizadas no site oficial da OMC até 17 de março de 2013. Ainda de
acordo com o site oficial, até 30 de setembro de 2011, o tempo médio entre a data de estabelecimento do
Painel e a data de sua composição (Artigo 8.7 do DSU) foi de 73 dias, sendo o período mais curto de 12 dias e
o mais longo de 234 dias. Este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.
53

Artigo 9
IA.
Article 9
Procedures for Multiple Complainants
9.1
Where more than one Member requests the establishment of a panel related to the same matter, a
single panel may be established to examine these complaints taking into account the rights of all
Members concerned. A single panel should be established to examine such complaints whenever
feasible.
9.2
The single panel shall organize its examination and present its findings to the DSB in such a manner
that the rights which the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed had separate panels examined the
complaints are in no way impaired. If one of the parties to the dispute so requests, the panel shall
submit separate reports on the dispute concerned. The written submissions by each of the
complainants shall be made available to the other complainants, and each complainant shall have the
right to be present when any one of the other complainants presents its views to the panel.
9.3
If more than one panel is established to examine the complaints related to the same matter, to the
greatest extent possible the same persons shall serve as panelists on each of the separate panels and
the timetable for the panel process in such disputes shall be harmonized.
IB.
Artigo 9
Procedimento para Pluralidade de Partes Reclamantes
9.1
Quando mais de um Membro solicitar o estabelecimento de um grupo especial com relação a uma
mesma questão, um único grupo especial deverá ser estabelecido para examinar as reclamações,
levando em conta os direitos de todos os Membros interessados. Sempre que possível, um único
grupo especial deverá ser estabelecido para examinar tais reclamações.
9.2
O grupo especial único deverá proceder a seus exames da questão e apresentar suas conclusões ao
OSC de maneira a não prejudicar os direitos que caberiam às partes em controvérsias se as
reclamações tivessem sido examinadas por vários grupos especiais. Se houver solicitação de uma das
partes, o grupo especial deverá apresentar relatórios separados sobre a controvérsia examinada. As
comunicações escritas de cada parte reclamante deverão estar à disposição das outras partes, e cada
parte reclamante deverá ter direito de estar preente quando qualquer outra parte apresentar sua
argumentação ao grupo especial.
9.3
No caso de ser estabelecido mais de um grupo especial para examinar reclamações relativas ao
mesmo tema, na medida do possível as mesmas pessoas integrarão cada um dos grupos especiais e os
calendários dos trabalhos dos grupos especiais que tratam dessas controvérsias deverão ser
harmonizados.
IC.
No Artigo 9.1, a tradução mais aproximada para ‘may be established’ é ‘poderá ser estabelecido’. No Artigo
9.3, a tradução correta para ‘matter’ é ‘questão’.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo
54
1.
Artigo 9.1
a) “Sempre que possível, um único Painel deverá ser estabelecido”
Relatório do Painel no caso India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products (India - Patents) (EC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS79/R, paras. 7.14-7.15
Neste caso, a Índia solicitou que o Painel descartasse a reclamação das Comunidades Europeias, pois, sendo
“possível” unir esta reclamação àquela dos EUA (WT/DS50), as Comunidades Europeias seriam obrigadas a
fazê-lo. Contudo, o Painel rechaçou a alegação da Índia, concluindo que o Artigo 9.1 não tem como objeto a
limitação dos direitos dos Membros da OMC, não possuindo natureza de obrigação compulsória.
Para. 7.14. “Given their ordinary meaning, the terms of Article 9.1 are directory or recommendatory, not
mandatory. They direct that a single panel should (not “shall”) be established, and that direction is limited to
cases where it is feasible. We disagree with India that the addressee of Article 9.1 is not clear. Article 9.1 is
clearly a code of conduct for the DSB because its provisions pertain to the establishment of a panel, the
authority for which is exclusively reserved for the DSB. As such, Article 9.1 should not affect substantive and
procedural rights and obligations of individual Members under the DSU.”
Para. 7.15. “Indeed, the text of Article 9.1, as well as the text of Article 9.2, which is part of the context of
Article 9.1, make it clear that Article 9 is not intended to limit the rights of WTO Members. In our view, one
of those rights is the freedom to determine whether and when to pursue a complaint under the DSU. According
to Article 3.7 of the DSU, “[t]he aim of dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements
is clearly to be preferred”. It would be inconsistent with this aim of the dispute settlement mechanism to
attempt to force Members to take decisions earlier than they wish on whether to request a panel in a dispute, or
to continue consultations aimed at securing a mutually acceptable solution.”
2.
Artigo 9.2
a) “momento de solicitação de Relatório separado”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, Comunidades
Europeias, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, Coreia, República da Tailândia, WT/DS217/AB/R e
WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 310-311
Nesta controvérsia, os EUA requereram a emissão de um Relatório separado para a disputa trazida pelo
México, a qual foi rejeitada pelo Painel sob o argumento de que o pedido foi realizado em momento posterior
à fase inicial dos procedimentos (dois meses após a emissão da parte descritiva). Na ocasião, o Painel ressaltou
a necessidade de a requisição ser feita em um momento oportuno, uma vez que tais pedidos afetam a maneira
pela qual este Órgão organiza os procedimentos. Os EUA apelaram da decisão, contudo as conclusões do
Painel foram ratificadas pelo Órgão de Apelação, e este considerou que, muito embora não haja uma limitação
temporal no Artigo 9.2 do DSU, isso não quer dizer que a solicitação de Relatório separado possa ser feita a
qualquer momento.
Para. 310. “By its terms, Article 9.2 accords to the requesting party a broad right to request a separate report.
The text of Article 9.2 does not make this right dependent on any conditions. Rather, Article 9.2 explicitly
provides that a panel “shall” submit separate reports “if one of the parties to the dispute so requests”. Thus the
text of Article 9.2 of the DSU contains no requirement for the request for a separate panel report to be made by
55
a certain time. We observe, however, that the text does not explicitly provide that such requests may be made
at any time.”
Para. 311. “Having made these observations, we note that Article 9.2 must not be read in isolation from other
provisions of the DSU, and without taking into account the overall object and purpose of that Agreement. The
overall object and purpose of the DSU is expressed in Article 3.3 of that Agreement which provides,
relevantly, that the “prompt settlement” of disputes is “essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.” If
the right to a separate panel report under Article 9.2 were “unqualified”, this would mean that a panel would
have the obligation to submit a separate panel report, pursuant to the request of a party to the dispute, at any
time during the panel proceedings. Moreover, a request for such a report could be made for whatever reason
— or indeed, without any reason — even on the day that immediately precedes the day the panel report is due
to be circulated to WTO Members at large. Such an interpretation would clearly undermine the overall object
and purpose of the DSU to ensure the “prompt settlement” of disputes.”
3
Artigo 9.3
a) “na medida do possível (...) os calendários dos trabalhos dos Paineis que tratam dessas controvérsias
deverão ser harmonizados”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III) (Article 21.5, Ecuador II)(Article 21.5, US), Demandantes:
Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA,
paras. 192-194
No caso EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, Ecuador II) (Article 21.5, US), as Comunidades Europeias
defenderam que o Painel, ao utilizar calendários dos trabalhos distintos para os procedimentos do Artigo 21.5
do DSU entre as CE e o Equador e entre as CE e os EUA, agiu de forma inconsistente com o texto do Artigo
9.3 do DSU. O Órgão de Apelação, porém, considerou que a expressão “harmonizados” não implica que os
calendários dos trabalhos devam ser idênticos, como sugeriram as CE.
Para. 192. “Article 9.3 may appear to be cast in the way of an obligation, but the word “harmony” is defined
as the combination or adaptation of parts, so as to form a “consistent and orderly whole”. (1) Quite distinct
from “synchrony”, “harmony” does not require that elements coincide exactly in time. Therefore, we consider
that the use of the word “harmonized” rather than “synchronized” in Article 9.3 confers to panels a judgement
of degree and practicality. It rests with panels to organize the steps of the proceedings in a way that will ensure
that they form a consistent and orderly whole. Whereas the use of the word “shall” ordinarily connotes an
obligation, here, while the panel must seek to harmonize, the extent to which that is possible lies within its
power. We do not consider that “harmonization” requires adoption of identical timetables in multiple
proceedings. As we see it, this provision addresses a practical concern that each timetable must be framed in
the light of the other.”
Para. 193. “The phrase “to the greatest extent possible” in Article 9.3 lends further support to our
interpretation. This phrase introduces the main clause of the sentence. The phrase “to the greatest extent
possible” qualifies both elements of the main clause — the selection of the same persons as panelists and the
harmonization of the panel processes — and thus qualifies what the panel must do to harmonize the
timetables. We therefore disagree with the European Communities' reading that Article 9.3 “does not allow
panels any discretion in deciding whether the timetables should be harmonized”.” (2)
Footnote 1: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. 1, p.
1200.
Footnote 252: European Communities' appellant's submissions, para. 21 (Ecuador), para. 20 (US).
56
O Órgão de Apelação salientou que os Artigos 12.1 e 12.2 do DSU conferem uma margem de
discriocionariedade e flexibilidade aos Painéis para delimitar os seus procedimentos de trabalho. Desse modo,
o Artigo 9.3 do DSU a ser analisado à luz dos Artigos citados.
Para. 194. “Furthermore, we note that Articles 12.1 and 12.2 of the DSU confer a margin of discretion on
panels to draw up their working procedures. Article 12.1 authorizes panels to establish their own working
procedures in the event that the panel decides, after consulting the parties, not to follow the Working
Procedures for panels set out in Appendix 3 to the DSU. Pursuant to Article 12.2, panel procedures should
provide “sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel
process”. By virtue of this provision, panels are vested with a degree of discretion and flexibility to take the
necessary procedural decisions to strike a balance between providing “high-quality panel reports” and
avoiding delays in the panel process. The panel’s margin of discretion, in turn, informs our standard of review
of the panels’ application of its obligations under Article 9.3.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 9 dispõe sobre os procedimentos especiais envolvendo uma pluralidade de Partes. Tais
procedimentos têm por objetivo maior preservar a celeridade no processo de solução de controvérsias da
OMC. Essencialmente, o Artigo 9.1 dispõe que, sempre que possível, reclamações envolvendo uma mesma
questão devem ser analisadas de forma conjunta, por meio de um único Painel, ressalvado, contudo, a
necessidade das diferentes controvérsias serem apreciadas como se as reclamações tivessem sido examinadas
por vários Painéis.
O Artigo 9.2, por sua vez, faculta às Partes requerer que o Relatório do Painel seja apresentado
individualmente, visando principalmente à garantia do direito de defesa e ao devido processo legal. Muitas
vezes, tal requerimento pode implicar em um resultado pouco prático. O Artigo 9 não dispõe a respeito de
qualquer critério prático sobre como os Relatórios envolvendo uma mesma questão devem ser
individualizados, estruturados ou apresentados. No caso US - Steel Safeguards, o Painel apresentou seus
Relatórios na forma de um documento constituído por oito Relatórios, substancialmente idênticos à exceção
das conclusões que foram individualizadas.
O Órgão de Apelação agiu de modo semelhante, ao apresentar Relatórios idênticos para cada uma das
reclamações envolvendo uma mesma questão, alterando somente as conclusões de cada disputa, nos casos US
- Shrimp (Thailand), US - Customs Bond Directive, US/Canada - Continued Suspension e China - Auto Parts.
O Artigo 9.2 tampouco prevê qualquer limitação temporal sobre o momento em que a solicitação deve ser
feita. Porém, tal omissão não significa que as Partes detém o direito de proceder com o pleito a qualquer
momento dos procedimentos. A solicitação, à qual o Artigo 9.2 refere-se, deve ser encaminhada ainda nas
fases iniciais dos procedimentos, com o fim de evitar eventuais abusos que possam impor um retardamento
desnecessário aos procedimentos conduzidos pelo Painel.
O Artigo 9.3 reforça a ideia de preservar a celeridade dos procedimentos envolvendo uma pluralidade de
Partes reclamantes, prevendo que, no caso de estabelecimento de mais de um Painel visando a análise da
mesma questão, cada um dos Painéis deve preferencialmente ser compostos pelos mesmos integrantes, e os
calendários dos trabalhos devem ser harmonizados. Entretanto, tal disposição deve ser analisada de acordo
com os Artigos 12.1 e 12.2 do DSU, os quais conferem discricionariedade e flexibilidade aos Painéis na
condução dos procedimentos.
57

Artigo 10
Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins
IA.
Article 10
Third Parties
10.1
The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members under a covered agreement at
issue in the dispute shall be fully taken into account during the panel process.
10.2
Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to
the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as a “third party”) shall have an opportunity to be heard by
the panel and to make written submissions to the panel. These submissions shall also be given to the
parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the panel report.
10.3
Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the
panel.
10.4
If a third party considers that a measure already the subject of a panel proceeding nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing to it under any covered agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal
dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding. Such a dispute shall be referred to the
original panel wherever possible.
IB.
Artigo 10
Terceiros
10.1
Os interesses das partes em controvérsia e os dos demais Membros decorrentes do acordo abrangido
ao qual se refira a controvérsia deverão ser integralmente levados em consideração no correr dos
trabalhos dos grupos especiais.
10.2
Todo Membro que tenha interesse concreto em um assunto submetido a um grupo especial e que
tenha notificado esse interesse ao OSC (denominado no persente Entendimento “terceiro”) terá
oportunidade de ser ouvido pelo grupo especial e de apresentar-lhe comunicações escritas. Estas
comunicações serão também fornecidas às partes em controvérsia e constarão do relatório do grupo
especial.
10.3
Os terceiros receberão as comunicações das partes em controvérsia apresentadas ao grupo especial em
sua primeira reunião.
10.4
Se um terceiro considerar que uma medida já tratada por um grupo especial anula ou prejudica
benefícios a ele advindos de qualquer acordo abrangido, o referido Membro poderá recorrer aos
procedimentos normais de solução de controvérsias definidos no presente Entendimento. Tal
controvérsia deverá, onde possível, ser submetida ao grupo especial que tenha inicialmente tratado do
assunto.
IC.
A expressão “denominado no presente Entendimento terceiro”, constante do parágrafo 2, ficaria melhor como
“denominado no presente Entendimento um terceiro”, pois, em inglês, foi adicionado o Artigo indefinido “a”.
Além disso, “um terceiro” realça mais a possibilidade de haver mais de um terceiro.
58
No parágrafo 4, a expressão “prejudica benefícios a ele advindos” poderia ser modificada para “prejudica-lhe
benefícios”. Por uma questão de estilo, é melhor não se separar o adjunto adnominal “advindos” do
substantivo “benefícios”.
II.
1. Artigo 10.1
a) “Consideração dos interesses dos demais Membros da OMC”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”
(US - FSC) (Article 21.5, CE), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/AB/RW, para. 249
Em US - FSC, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que não somente os interesses das Partes no litígio devem ser
levados em consideração, mas também os dos demais Membros da OMC.
Para. 249. “Our interpretation of Article 10.3 is also consistent with the context of that provision. Article 10.1
directs panels “fully” to take into account the interests of Members other than the parties to the dispute, and
Article 10.2 requires panels to grant to third parties “an opportunity to be heard”. Article 10.3 ensures that, up
to a defined stage in the panel proceedings, third parties can participate fully in the proceedings, on the basis of
the same written submissions as the parties themselves. Article 10.3 thereby seeks to guarantee that the third
parties can participate at a session of the first meeting with the panel in a full and meaningful fashion that
would not be possible if the third parties were denied written submissions made to the panel before that
meeting. Moreover, panels themselves will thereby benefit more from the contributions made by third parties
and will, therefore, be better able “fully” to take into account the interests of Members, as directed by Article
10.1 of the DSU.”
b) “Mais consideração dos interesses de certos Membros do que os dos demais Membros –
inviabilidade”
Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brazil, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.1411
Em US - Upland Cotton, o Painel consignou que os interesses de certos Membros não podem ser mais tidos
em consideração do que os dos outros Membros.
Para. 7.1411. “As we have already observed, by the terms of Article 10.1 of the DSU, we are already bound to
take the interest of all WTO Members - naturally including least-developed country Members - fully into
account in our substantive examination under Part III of the SCM Agreement. In taking such full account of all
Members’ interests, we do not view it as conceptually or practically possible to take certain Members’
interests more fully into account than those of other Members.”
2. Artigo 10.2
a) “Interesse concreto” (“ substantial interest”)
(i) A dicção do Artigo 10.2 não impõe a condição de “interesse jurídico” (“legal interest”) para o
pedido de um Painel
59
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and
EUA, DS27/AB/R, para. 132
Em EC - Bananas III, o Órgão de Apelação expressou que a redação do Artigo 10.2 não significa que um
Membro, para efetuar o pedido de estabelecimento de um Painel tenha que ter interesse jurídico no processo
que está propondo.
Para. 132. “We agree with the Panel that ‘neither Article 3.3 nor 3.7 of the DSU nor any other provision of
the DSU contain any explicit requirement that a Member must have a ‘legal interest’ as a prerequisite for
requesting a panel’. We do not accept that the need for a ‘legal interest’ is implied in the DSU or in any other
provision of the WTO Agreement. It is true that under Article 4.11 of the DSU, a Member wishing to join in
multiple consultations must have ‘a substantial trade interest’, and that under Article 10.2 of the DSU, a third
party must have ‘a substantial interest’ in the matter before a panel. But neither of these provisions in the
DSU, nor anything else in the WTO Agreement, provides a basis for asserting that parties to the dispute have to
meet any similar standard.”
(ii) Interesse concreto (“substantial interest”) no assunto submetido ao Painel
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R, para.
101
Em US - Shrimp, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou que somente Membros que tenham um interesse concreto
(“substantial interest”) na questão submetida ao Painel podem se tornar terceiros no processo conduzido por
este.
Para. 101. “Only Members may become parties to a dispute of which a panel may be seized, and only
Members “having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel” may become third parties in the proceedings
before that panel.”
b) “Se o Membro notificou o DSB acerca do seu interesse em participar do processo como terceiro: o
momento da notificação”
(i) Pedidos de participação como terceiro - 28 e 68 dias após o estabelecimento do Painel aceitação
Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Export Subsidies
on Sugar), Demandante: Austrália, WT/DS265/R, paras. 2.2-2.4
Em EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, o Painel acabou aceitando os pleitos de Quênia e Costa do Marfim,
feitos 28 e 68 dias após o estabelecimento do Painel, para atuarem como terceiras Partes. O Painel entendeu
que tinha discricionariedade para resolver questões que não foram especificamente reguladas. Levou em
consideração, que a sua seleção e composição não haviam sido afetadas e que o processo não havia sido
prejudicado.
Para. 2.2. “Article 10 of the DSU is silent on when Members need to notify to the DSB their interest in
participating in any specific dispute as third parties. All parties referred to the GATT Council Chairman's
Statement of June 1994, providing for a ten-day notification period. The status of that Chairman's Statement
had been discussed on several occasions at the DSB and the timing of third-party notifications was the subject
60
of proposals in the context of the DSU negotiations.”
Para. 2.3. The Panel recalled, inter alia, the Appellate Body's decision in EC – Hormones, which stated that
“the DSU leaves panels a margin of discretion to deal, always in accordance with due process, with specific
situations that may arise in a particular case and that are not explicitly regulated.” (1) In addition, with regard
to the two requests at issue, the Panel noted that in this particular dispute:
(a) the selection and composition of the Panel did not appear to have been adversely
affected; and
(b) the Panel process had not been hampered.
Para. 2.4. “On the basis of these considerations, the Panel therefore decided, in its ruling dated 16 January
2004, to accept as third parties all Members that had expressed a third-party interest and saw no reason to treat
them differently. In doing so, the Panel emphasized that its decision was specific to this dispute and was not
intended to offer a legal interpretation of the ten-day notification period referred to in the GATT Council
Chairman's Statement.”
Footnote 1: Appellate Body Report on EC - Hormones.
c) “Prazo de dez dias para a notificação”
(i) Discurso do Diretor do Conselho Geral do GATT: Third Party Participation in Panels,
Statement by the Chairman of the Council, C/COM/3 of 27 June 1994, page 1
No encontro do Conselho Geral do GATT, ocorrido em junho de 1994, o então Diretor do aludido Conselho
propôs que a notificação para manifestar interesse em ser terceiro na disputa deveria ser feita em dez dias.
“At the February 1994 Council meeting, the United States raised the question of third-party participation in
panels. The late notification by a contracting party of its intention to participate in a panel may create
difficulties, for example in relation to the determination of the panel’s composition. Another problem that has
occurred relates to the reception by third parties, in good time, of the submissions of the parties to the dispute
to the first meeting of a panel.
After consultations, and in order to avoid such difficulties, I propose that the Council agree to the following
practices in future, without prejudice to the rights of contracting parties under established dispute settlement
procedures:
1. Delegations in a position to do so, should indicate their intention to participate as a third party in a panel
proceeding at the Council session which establishes the panel. Others who wish to indicate a third party
interest should do so within the next ten days.
2. Further to paragraph F(e) (3) of the Decision of 12 April 1989 (BISD 36S/61) and to the Decision of 22
February 1994 (L/7416), it is the understanding of the Council that third parties shall receive the submissions
of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of a panel established by the Council.”
d) “Parte principal atuando como terceiro em outra demanda – possibilidade”
Relatório do Painel em European Communities and its Member States - Tariff Treatment of Certain
Information Technology Products (EC - IT Products), Demandante: Taipei Chinesa, WT/DS377/R, para.
7.75
61
Em EC - IT Products, EUA, Japão e Taipei Chinesa manifestaram interesse em ser terceiros nas
reclamações de cada um. O Painel acatou os pedidos nos seguintes termos:
Para. 7.75. “Despite the length of delay and the fact that this Panel had already been composed, we see no
reason why accepting the complainants’ requests would affect the “independence of the members” of this
Panel or otherwise hamper the Panel process. The members of this Panel had been selected taking into
consideration the participation of the complainants as main parties. We do not see how the additional
participation of the complainants as third parties would have compromised the initial selection of these
panellists; nor has the European Communities made any such allegation. Given the foregoing, we confirm our
acceptance of the complainants’ request to participate as third parties to this dispute.”
e) “Apesar de não ter notificado o DSB, nos termos do Artigo 10.2, ainda assim um Membro pode
apresentar um arrazoado”
Relatório do Painel na controvérsia European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines (EC Sardines), Demandante: Peru, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 165
Em EC - Sardines, Marrocos, embora não tendo notificado o seu interesse em atuar como terceiro,
apresentou um arrazoado como amicus curiae na fase de Apelação. O demandante não aceitou tal
procedimento, alegando que isto implicaria burlar a sistemática do DSU. Entretanto, o Órgão de Apelação
discordou do Peru (demandante).
Para. 165. “None of the participants in this appeal has pointed to any provision of the DSU that can be
understood as prohibiting WTO Members from participating in panel or appellate proceedings as an amicus
curiae. Nor has any participant in this appeal demonstrated how such participation would contravene the DSU.
Peru states only that the DSU provides that participation as a third party is governed by Articles 10.2 and 17.4,
and appears to draw from this a negative inference such that Members may participate pursuant to those rules,
or not at all. We have examined Articles 10.2 and 17.4, and we do not share Peru’s view. Just because those
provisions stipulate when a Member may participate in a dispute settlement proceeding as a third party or third
participant, does not, in our view, lead inevitably to the conclusion that participation by a Member as an
amicus curiae is prohibited.”
3. Artigo 10.4
a) “A expressão “grupo especial que tenha inicialmente tratado do assunto” não se limita a um Painel
que ainda não tenha emitido seu relatório final”
Relatório do Painel na demanda India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products (India - Patents)(EC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS79/R, paras. 7.20-7.21
Em India - Patents (EC), o Painel rejeitou o argumento da delegação indiana de que o Painel original, ao
qual se refere o Artigo 10.4, limitar-se-ia a um Painel que ainda não tenha emitido seu Relatório final.
Paras. 7.20. “We do not see that this limitation flows from the ordinary meaning of the text. We also note that,
the phrase “original panel” is used elsewhere in the DSU (Article 21.5 and Article 22.6), where it is clear that
the reference is to a panel the final report of which has already been issued and adopted. The text of Article
10.4, read in this context, does not support the Indian view.”
Para. 7.21. “Thus, in our view, the terms of Article 10.4 have been complied with in the present case. The EC,
which was a third party in the proceeding initiated by the United States in respect of the same Indian measures,
62
decided to have recourse to a panel under the DSU. This is precisely what Article 10.4 permits. The two
members of the Panel in WT/DS50 were reappointed, while the Panel chairman, who was no longer available,
was replaced. We therefore find that India’s claim regarding a violation of Article 10.4 lacks both factual and
legal basis.”
4. Direitos adicionais de terceiros
a) “Geral”
(i) Dispositivos do DSU que enunciam os direitos de terceiros
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação na contenda United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 145
Em US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou quais os dispositivos do DSU enunciam os direitos de
terceiros: Artigos 10.2, 10.3 e parágrafo 6 do apêndice 3. Isto acabou sendo confirmado no litígio US - FSC
(Article 21.5, EC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, para. 243.
Para. 145. “[u]nder the DSU, as it currently stands, third parties are only entitled to the participatory rights
provided for in Articles 10.2 and 10.3 and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3.”
b) “Para Membros que não são demandantes em processos paralelos”
(i) Ampliação dos direitos de terceiros
Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,
WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.8
Em EC - Bananas III, o Painel concordou em outorgar aos terceiros mais direitos do que aqueles previstos
no DSU. Nesta mesma linha, os Painéis em EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, US), para. 1.5, e EC - Bananas
III (Article 21.5, Ecuador II), para. 7.722, concederam aos terceiros os seguintes direitos: a) direito de estar
presente durante a audiência com as Partes e de formular questões na audiência; e b) direito de receber todas
as manifestações, incluindo respostas às questões.
Para. 7.8. “We thereafter ruled as follows:
(a) The Panel has decided, after consultations with the parties in conformity with DSU
Article 12.1, that members of governments of third parties will be permitted to observe
the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties. The Panel envisages that
the observers will have the opportunity also to make a brief statement at a suitable
moment during the second meeting. The Panel does not expect them to submit
additional written material beyond responses to the questions already posed during the
first meeting.
(b) the Panel based its decision, inter alia, on the following considerations:
(i) the economic effect of the disputed EC banana regime on certain third parties
appeared to be very large;
(ii) the economic benefits to certain third parties from the EC banana regime were
claimed to derive from an international treaty between them and the EC;
(iii) past practice in panel proceedings involving the banana regimes of the EC and
its member States; and
(iv) the parties to the dispute could not agree on the issue.
63
As a consequence of our ruling, the third parties in these proceedings enjoyed broader
participatory rights than are granted to third parties under the DSU”.
c) “Acesso às afirmações orais das Partes na audiência e direito de tecer comentários às respostas das
Partes – impossibilidade”
Relatório do Painel em United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton), Demandante:
Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, Annex L – 1.7, paras. 6 e 12
Em US - Upland Cotton, o Painel denegou os seguintes direitos adicionais de terceiros pedidos pelas
Comunidades Europeias: a) acesso às afirmações orais das Partes na primeira sessão da primeira audiência
substantiva; e b) oportunidade de comentar as respostas das Partes às questões do Painel ou àquelas feitas
pelas Partes umas às outras.
Annex L – 1.7, paras. 6 e 12. “In our view, written versions of the parties’ oral statements and the parties’
responses to the Panel’s questions do not form part of “the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first
meeting of the Panel”, as provided for in Article 10.3 of the DSU. Articles 10.2 and 12.6 and the working
procedure in paragraph 3 of Appendix 3 use the terms “written submissions” and “submissions”
interchangeably. Appendix 3 distinguishes between “written submissions” in paragraphs 3, 4 and 10 and “a
written version of… oral statements” in paragraph 9. Under the standard panel working procedures set out in
Appendix 3 of the DSU, third parties may only attend the third party session and are not present during the rest
of the panel’s meetings. The granting of access by the Panel to written versions of the parties’ oral statements
would run counter to the standard practice under the DSU of holding the sessions at which those statements
are made in the absence of the third parties.
…
[T] the Panel has already taken into account, to a certain extent, the systemic implications of this dispute and
the issues now raised by the EC. The Panel has posed a large number of questions to third parties, including 39
questions addressed specifically to the EC. Through the third parties’ responses to these questions, the Panel
hopes to receive their views on the merits and systemic considerations presently at issue in this dispute, which
it will take into account in its assessment of the matter before it. The questions are detailed precisely to ensure
that third parties’ views are fully taken into account in what is a complex case. The Panel believes that,
through the questions that it has posed to the parties to the dispute and to third parties, it has ensured that it
will benefit from third parties’ input and that nothing prevents them from participating in a full and
meaningful fashion.”
d) “Direitos adicionais a países ACP”
Relatório do Painel em European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Export Subsidies on
Sugar), Demandante: Austrália, WT/DS265/R, para. 2.6
Em EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, as Ilhas Maurício, em nome de quatorze países ACP (África, Caribe e
Pacífico), requereram direitos adicionais na qualidade de terceiros. O Painel concedeu estes direitos nos
seguintes termos:
Para. 2.6. “(a) ‘the third parties will receive a copy of the written questions to the parties posed in the context
of the first substantive meeting of the Panel; (b) the third parties will receive the written rebuttals of the parties
to the second meeting of the Panel and the parties’ replies to the questions mentioned in (i) above; (c) the third
parties may attend the second substantive meeting of the Panel to take place on 11 and 12 May 2004, as
observers (but it is not envisaged that the third parties will provide any further written submissions or make an
64
oral statement to the Panel during that second meeting); and (d) the third parties will review the summary of
their respective arguments in the draft descriptive part of the Panel report.’”
e) “Negativa de concessão de direitos adicionais de terceiro ao Brasil”
Relatório do Painel em United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft - Second
Complaint (US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS353/R, paras. 7.14-7.17
Em US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), o Painel denegou o pedido da delegação brasileira de outorgar
direitos adicionais na qualidade de terceiro. Vale frisar, ainda, que o Painel enunciou as razões pelas quais
os Painéis em geral concedem direitos adicionais de terceiro. Entretanto, o Painel da disputa em apreço
considerou que os motivos, os quais normalmente justificam a extensão dos direitos de terceiros, não foram
demonstrados pelo Brasil.
Paras. 7.14. “On 21 December 2006, Brazil requested the Panel to grant it certain “enhanced” third party
rights in this proceeding, including the right: (1) “to attend the entirety of all substantive meetings of the Panel
with the parties”; (2) “to present oral statements and oral observations at the substantive meetings of the Panel
with the parties”; (3) “to receive copies of all submissions to the Panel, including answers to the questions
posed by the Panel or the parties”; and (4) “to review and comment on the interim Panel Report, in particular
the summary of Brazil’s arguments in the draft descriptive part of the Panel report”. Brazil submits that it has a
significant economic interest in the aircraft sector, and that any findings concerning the relevant provisions of
the SCM Agreement in relation to the aircraft sector are necessarily of direct and substantial economic interest
to Brazil. According to Brazil, granting its request would not lead to any blurring of the distinction between
the rights of parties and those of third parties. On 22 December 2006, Canada requested the Panel to grant it
any enhanced third party rights granted to Brazil. On 9 February 2007, the Panel received comments from both
parties, opposing the requests for enhanced third party rights.”
Para. 7.15. “On 23 February 2007, the Panel informed the parties and third parties that it had decided not to
grant enhanced third party rights to any third party in this proceeding. The Panel indicated that it would issue
its reasons in due course. The Panel’s reasons for declining Brazil’s request, and the conditional request of
Canada, are as follows.”
Para. 7.16. “The DSU establishes the rights of third parties in panel proceedings in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Article 10 of the DSU and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 to the DSU. Under these provisions, third parties have
the right to receive the submissions made by the parties up to the first meeting of the panel, to make
submissions to the panel, to present their views during a session of the first substantive meeting of the panel
set aside for that purpose, and to be present during the entirety of such a session. It is well-established that
panels have the discretion to grant additional rights to third parties, subject to the requirements of due process
and the need to guard against an inappropriate blurring of the distinction drawn in the DSU between the rights
of parties and those of third parties. However, all third parties in a panel proceeding may be presumed to have
a “substantial interest” in the matter before the panel, and additional third party rights have so far been granted
in panel proceedings for specific reasons only. Previous panels have granted enhanced third party rights on the
basis of, inter alia, the significant economic effect of the measures at issue on certain third parties, the
importance of trade in the product at issue to certain third parties, the significant trade policy impact that the
outcome of the case could have on third parties maintaining measures similar to the measures at issue, at least
one of the parties agreeing that enhanced third party rights should be granted, claims that the measures at issue
derived from an international treaty to which certain third parties were parties, third parties having previously
been granted enhanced rights in related panel proceedings, and certain practical considerations arising from a
third party’s involvement as a party in a parallel panel proceeding.”
65
Para. 7.17. “In this case, Brazil has not presented the Panel with any similar reasons in support of its request
for enhanced third party rights. While the Panel accepts that Brazil has a substantial interest in the aircraft
sector, the Panel considers that Brazil’s interest in “the aircraft sector” as a whole constitutes an insufficient
basis for granting Brazil enhanced third party rights. Brazil has not claimed that it produces large civil aircraft,
or that it has any trade interests in large civil aircraft, for instance as a supplier to producers of large civil
aircraft. Brazil has not claimed that regional aircraft produced in Brazil compete with large civil aircraft.
Brazil has not claimed that it maintains any measures similar to those at issue in this dispute; to the contrary,
Brazil claims that it does not confer subsidies for the development and production of new aircraft products.
While Brazil has been involved as a party in a number of WTO disputes involving the aircraft sector, these
disputes involved products (i.e. regional aircraft) and measures (e.g. export credits on the sale of such aircraft)
that are not at issue in this dispute. Brazil has not explained how, in the light of the foregoing, the measures at
issue have a significant economic or trade policy effect on Brazil. While we accept that Brazil has a general
systemic interest in the interpretation of the SCM Agreement, this does not differentiate Brazil from any other
WTO Member. Finally, both parties agree that enhanced third party rights are not warranted in this case.
We therefore decline Brazil’s request for “enhanced” third party rights in these proceedings” (notas de rodapé
omitidas).
f) “Atraso no cronograma do Painel”
Relatório do Painel no caso China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China
- Raw Materials), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS394/R, para. 1.7
Em China - Raw Materials, o Painel não acolheu o pleito de extensão de direitos de terceiro sob o
argumento de que poderia haver atraso no calendário do Painel.
Para. 1.7. “In a letter dated 24 September 2010, the Panel informed Japan and Canada that it had declined to
accept their requests. The Panel informed these third parties that, inter alia, granting enhanced third-party
rights at this stage of the proceedings would lead to delays and would have an important impact on the Panel's
timetable.”
g) “Demandantes em processos paralelos”
(i) Possibilidade de participar de encontro com peritos
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R, paras. 152-153
Em EC - Hormones, as Comunidades Europeias apelaram da decisão do Painel que outorgou alguns direitos
adicionais de terceiro tanto ao Canadá como aos EUA, em especial a possibilidade de participar de uma
reunião com peritos. O Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a pretensão de Bruxelas.
Paras. 152. “We consider the explanation of the Panel quite reasonable, and its decision to hold a joint
meeting with the scientific experts consistent with the letter and spirit of Article 9.3 of the DSU. Clearly, it
would bean uneconomical use of time and resources to force the Panel to hold two successive but separate
meetings gathering the same group of experts twice, expressing their views twice regarding the same scientific
and technical matters related to the same contested European Communities measures. We do not believe that
the Panel has erred by addressing the European Communities procedural objections only where the European
Communities could make a precise claim of prejudice. It is evident to us that a procedural objection raised by
a party to a dispute should be sufficiently specific to enable the panel to address it.”
66
Para. 153. “Having access to a common pool of information enables the panel and the parties to save time by
avoiding duplication of the compilation and analysis of information already presented in the other proceeding.
Article 3.3 of the DSU recognizes the importance of avoiding unnecessary delays in the dispute settlement
process and states that the prompt settlement of a dispute is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.
In this particular case, the Panel tried to avoid unnecessary delays, making an effort to comply with the letter
and spirit of Article 9.3 of the DSU.”
(ii) Acesso a todas as informações
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 153
Em EC - Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação aceitou a decisão do Painel de conferir aos EUA acesso a todas as
informações no processo iniciado pelo Canadá e, no outro caso em que os EUA foram demandantes, o
mesmo em relação ao Canadá.
Para. 153. “The decision of the Panel to use and provide all information to the parties in both disputes was
taken in view of its previous decision to hold a joint meeting with the experts. The European Communities
asserts that it cannot see how providing information in one of the proceedings to a party in the other helps to
harmonize timetables. We can see a relation between timetable harmonization within the meaning of Article
9.3 of the DSU and economy of effort. In disputes where the evaluation of scientific data and opinions plays a
significant role, the panel that is established later can benefit from the information gathered in the context of
the proceedings of the panel established earlier. Having access to a common pool of information enables the
panel and the parties to save time by avoiding duplication of the compilation and analysis of information
already presented in the other proceeding. Article 3.3 of the DSU recognizes the importance of avoiding
unnecessary delays in the dispute settlement process and states that the prompt settlement of a dispute is
essential to the effective functioning of the WTO. In this particular case, the Panel tried to avoid unnecessary
delays, making an effort to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 9.3 of the DSU. Indeed, as noted earlier,
despite the fact that the Canadian proceeding was initiated several months later than that of the United States,
the Panel managed to finish both Panel Reports at the same time.”
h) “Discricionariedade do Painel para conceder direitos adicionais de terceiros”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 140, 144-147 e 149-150
Em US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que o Painel possui discricionariedade para outorgar
direitos adicionais a terceiros.
Paras. 140. “The rules relating to the participation of third parties in panel proceedings are set out in Article
10 of the DSU, and, in particular, paragraphs 2 and 3 there of, and in paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 to the DSU.”
Para. 144. “Although the European Communities and Japan invoke Article 9 of the DSU, and, in particular,
Article 9.3, in support of their position, we note that Article 9 of the DSU, which concerns procedures for
multiple complaints related to the same matter, does not address the issue of the rights of third parties in such
procedures.”
Para. 145. “Under the DSU, as it currently stands, third parties are only entitled to the participatory rights
provided for in Articles 10.2 and 10.3 and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3.”
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Para. 146. “(…) Pursuant to Article 12.1, a panel is required to follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3,
unless it decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute.”
Para. 147. “In support of their argument that the Panel should have granted them “enhanced” third party
rights, the European Communities and Japan refer to the considerations that led the panel in European
Communities - Hormones to grant third parties “enhanced” participatory rights, and stress the similarity
between European Communities - Hormones and the present cases.”
Para. 149. “In our Report in European Communities - Hormones, we stated:
Although Article 12.1 and Appendix 3 of the DSU do not specifically require the Panel
to grant … [“enhanced” third party rights] to the United States, we believe that this
decision falls within the sound discretion and authority of the Panel, particularly if the
Panel considers it necessary for ensuring to all parties due process of law.”
Para. 150. “A panel’s decision whether to grant “enhanced” participatory rights to third parties is thus a matter
that falls within the discretionary authority of that panel. Such discretionary authority is, of course, not
unlimited and is circumscribed, for example, by the requirements of due process. In the present cases,
however, the European Communities and Japan have not shown that the Panel exceeded the limits of its
discretionary authority. We, therefore, consider that there is no legal basis for concluding that the Panel erred
in refusing to grant “enhanced” third party rights to Japan or the European Communities” (nota de rodapé
omitida).
i) “Rejeição da ampliação de direitos de terceiros, mas garantia da participação nos processos quando
apropriado”
Relatório do Painel em United States - Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to AntiDumping/Countervailing Duties (US - Customs Bond Directive), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS345/R,
paras. 7.3-7.4
Em US - Shrimp (Thailand) e US - Customs Bond Directive, o DSB estabeleceu dois Painéis, compostos por
painelistas idênticos. Um dos Painéis, então, não acolheu o pedido de ampliar os direitos de terceiros, mas
permitiu que estes terceiros, igualmente Partes, tivessem participação efetiva nos processos.
Paras. 7.3-7.4. “[The Panel] intends to conduct both proceedings so as to ensure that the parties who are also
third parties in each other’s proceedings, have adequate opportunity and ability to participate to the fullest
extent in a manner which is compatible with the provisions of the DSU. To this end, after having heard the
parties’ views, the Panel intends to take the following steps:
(i) holding consolidated substantive meetings with the parties (Thailand, India and US);
(ii) allowing the complainants during the joint meetings to comment on each others’
argumentation, provided they limit themselves to those claims they have in common;
(iii) holding separate Third-Party Sessions, starting with DS343 and asking the
Members which are not third-parties to DS345 (i.e., Chile, Mexico, Korea and Viet
Nam) to leave the meeting room once the Third-Party Session for DS343 is over. Note
that since Thailand and India are third parties to each other’s cases, and parties in their
own, they would be in the room during the entirety of the joint meetings, including third
party sessions;
(iv) not allowing submissions in one case to be deemed to be submitted in the other
case. The parties could however attach to their third party submissions, their
submissions made as parties in the case in which they are complaining party;
(v) issuing separate reports;
(vi) allowing all parties to respond to all questions posed by the Panel in writing.”
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j) “Alcance das manifestações de terceiros”
(i) Se não foi objeto da demanda, a argumentação de terceiro não pode aproveitar às Partes
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/R,
para. 163
Em Chile - Price Band System, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Painel errou ao considerar que houve
violação a um dispositivo em relação ao qual a Argentina, então demandante, não havia feito queixa.
Para. 163. “Argentina contends also that two third parties — the United States and the European Communities
— “provided argumentation regarding the second sentence of Article II: 1 (b).” In support of this contention,
Argentina cites those third parties’ responses to Question 3 posed by the Panel. However, even if these
responses could be interpreted in the way Argentina would have us do — an issue which we need not decide in
this appeal — these responses could not, in any event, assist Argentina in making a claim under the second
sentence of Article II:1 (b). These are the statements of third parties to this dispute. Third parties to a dispute
cannot make claims. It was for Argentina, as the claimant, to make its claim; Argentina cannot rely on third
parties to do so on its behalf. Moreover, we note that Argentina did not adopt these arguments of the third
parties in subsequent proceedings.”
(ii) Solicitação, por terceiro, de recomendação fundada no Artigo 19.1 do DSU - rejeição
Relatório do Painel em European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (EC - Trademarks and Geographical Indications), Demandantes:
Austrália (WT/DS290/R, para. 7.86) e EUA (WT/DS174/R, para. 7.35)
Em EC - Trademarks and Geographical Indications, o México, terceiro no litígio, requereu ao Painel uma
recomendação com lastro no Artigo 19.1 do DSU. O Painel apreciou a solicitação mexicana com base no
Artigo 10.4 do DSU, e acabou denegando o pleito.
Para. 7.86. “The Panel takes note of Mexico’s request. The issue of the product coverage of the Regulation is
not challenged by the claims in this dispute and is therefore outside the Panel’s terms of reference. However,
Mexico’s attention is drawn to Article 10.4 of the DSU.”
(iii) Ônus probatório do demandante não pode ser suprido por informação fornecida por terceiro
Relatório do Painel em United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton), Demandante:
Brasil, WT/DS267/RW, para. 6.54
Em US - Upland Cotton, o Painel assentou que a informação, eventualmente fornecida por terceiro, não tem
o condão de aliviar o ônus probatório do demandante, embora possa ser usada como suporte para as
alegações desse terceiro.
Para. 6.54. “Neither party suggests that evidence provided by a third party may alleviate the complainant’s
burden to establish a prima facie case. We agree entirely. Information supplied by third parties in support of
their allegations may constitute evidence, in terms of additional context and support, that we may take into
account in conducting an objective assessment of the matter before us.”
(iv) Manifestações de terceiro a embasar perguntas do Painel aos peritos – possibilidade
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Relatório do Painel no caso Australia - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand
(Australia - Apples), Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS367/R, paras. 7.76-7.78
Em Australia - Apples, o Painel afastou o argumento da delegação australiana de que as manifestações de
terceiros não poderiam ser utilizadas para embasar as perguntas dos painelistas aos peritos.
Para. 7.76. “[O]nce a claim is properly put before a panel and the complaining party has submitted its
arguments and articulated its complaint, the panel has broad powers of investigation in order to make an
objective assessment of the matter. At that point, a panel is not limited by the arguments made by the parties to
a dispute; it may develop its own arguments, and it can certainly consider the arguments made by third parties.
Australia’s proposition that a panel is precluded from considering information put forward by a third party is
contrary to the panel’s duty to make an objective assessment of the matter. It would also constitute a breach of
the rights granted under the DSU to third parties in WTO dispute settlement. Article 10.2 of the DSU provides
that third parties “shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the
panel”. The Appellate Body has noted in this respect that, not only have third parties the right to make
submissions in a dispute, but panels have the legal obligation to consider them. (…)”
Para. 7.77. “In other words, the rights of a third party to make submissions to a panel and the duty of a panel
to take into account relevant information provided by a third party in its submission are two sides of the same
coin. If panels were prevented from considering information provided by a third party, including arguments
and evidence, then third party rights under the DSU would be illusory.”
Para. 7.78. “As noted above, under the Panel’s Working Procedures, the Panel was ultimately responsible for
deciding on the questions that it would pose to the experts. Nothing prevented the Panel from using
information, including arguments and evidence, provided in the submission of a Third Party. Nothing would
subsequently prevent the Panel from using such information for the purpose of performing its objective
assessment of the matter. Nor would the Panel be prevented from using information provided by the experts in
response to the Panel’s questions, or in response to questions posed by the Parties themselves during the
meeting with the experts, as long as this information is relevant to the matter that is within the Panel’s terms of
reference.”
l) “Terceiro em diferentes fases dos processos de solução de controvérsias”
(i) Direitos de terceiro em decisões preliminares
* Terceiros podem participar da etapa preliminar do processo
Relatório do Painel em Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain
(Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.6
Em Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, o Painel entendeu que terceiros deveriam participar da
etapa preliminar do processo (posição mantida pelo Painel em US - Upland Cotton (WT/DS267/RW, para.
3)), tendo sido concedidos os seguintes direitos aos eventuais terceiros:
Para. 6.6. “(a) third parties shall receive the preliminary written submissions of the parties to the dispute; b)
third parties shall have an opportunity to make preliminary written submissions to the Panel for purposes of
commenting on the parties’ preliminary written submissions; and (c) third parties shall have an opportunity to
be heard by the Panel on the issues raised in the parties’ preliminary written submissions” (nota de rodapé
omitida).
(ii) Direitos de terceiros nos procedimentos do Artigo 21.5 do DSU
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* Sendo realizado apenas um encontro com as Partes, incluindo terceiros, estes recebem apenas a primeira
manifestação das Partes
Relatório do Painel em Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather
(Australia - Automotive Leather II)(Article 21.5, US), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS126/RW, para. 3.9
Em Australia - Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5, US), o Painel, tendo agendado apenas uma audiência
com as Partes, incluindo terceiros, repeliu a pretensão das Comunidades Europeias de receber todos os
arrazoados das Partes, consignando que terceiros receberiam somente os primeiros arrazoados. Idêntico
tratamento foi seguido pelo Painel no litígio Australia - Salmon (Article 21.5, Canada), WT/DS18/RW,
paras. 7.5-7.6.
Para. 3.9. “[T]he Panel indicated that it had decided not to change the existing working procedures which
provide for third parties to receive the first written submissions of the parties, but not the rebuttals. The Panel
stated that if it had decided to hold two meetings with the parties, as is the normal situation envisioned in
Appendix 3 of the DSU, third parties would have received only the written submissions made prior to the first
meeting, but not rebuttals or other submissions made subsequently. Thus, in the more usual case, third parties
would be in the same position as they were in this case with respect to their ability to present views to the
panel. In the view of the Panel, the procedure it had established conformed more closely with the usual
practice than would be the case if third parties received the rebuttals, and was in keeping with Article 10.3 of
the DSU in a case where the Panel holds only one meeting.”
(iii) Direito de acesso dos terceiros ao segundo arrazoado das Partes
Relatório do Painel no caso Canada - Measures Affecting Dairy Exports (Canada - Dairy)(Article 21.5,
New Zealand and US), Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS113/RW, para. 2.34
Em Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5, New Zealand and US), o Painel decidiu que terceiros poderiam ter acesso
ao segundo arrazoado das Partes.
Para. 2.34. “In the Panel’s view, the object and purpose of Article 10.3 of the DSU is to allow third parties to
participate in an informed and, hence, meaningful, manner in a session of the meeting with the parties
specifically set aside for that purpose. Third parties can only do so if they have received all the information
exchanged between the parties before that session. Otherwise, third parties might find themselves in a situation
where their oral statements at the meeting become partially or totally irrelevant or moot in the light of second
submissions by the parties to which third parties did not have access. Without access to all the submissions by
the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel, uninformed third party submissions could unduly
delay panel proceedings and, as rightly emphasised by the EC and supported by Mexico, could prevent the
Panel from receiving ‘the benefit of a useful contribution by third parties which could help the Panel to make
the objective assessment that it is required to make under Article 11 of the DSU.”
A posição acima foi igualmente adotada pelo Órgão de Apelação em United States - Tax Treatment for
“Foreign Sales Corporations” (US - FSC)(Article 21.5, EC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, para. 245.
Para. 245. “Article 10.3 of the DSU is couched in mandatory language. By its terms, third parties ‘shall’
receive ‘the submissions of the parties to the first meeting of the panels’, (emphasis added) Article 10.3 does
not say that third parties shall receive ‘the first submissions’ of the parties, but rather that they shall receive
’the submissions’ of the parties, (emphasis added) The number of submissions that third parties are entitled to
receive is not stated. Rather, Article 10.3 defines the submissions that third parties are entitled to receive by
reference to a specific step in the proceedings - the first meeting of the panel. It follows, in our view, that,
71
under this provision, third parties must be given all of the submissions that have been made by the parties to
the panel up to the first meeting of the panel, irrespective of the number of such submissions which are made,
including any rebuttal submissions filed in advance of the first meeting.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)
(iv) Direitos de terceiros nas arbitragens, sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU
* Concessão de direitos de terceiros na fase do Artigo 22.6 do DSU
Relatório do Painel de Árbitros no caso European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones)(US) (Article 22.6, EC) e (EC - Hormones)(Canada) (Article 22.6,
EC), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 7
Em EC - Hormones (US) (Article 22.6, EC) e em EC - Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6, EC), os árbitros
entenderam que terceiros podem participar da fase arbitral prevista no Artigo 22.6 do DSU. Para tanto,
levaram em consideração três fatores: a) a discricionariedade dos árbitros para decidir acerca de temas não
contidos expressamente no Artigo 22.6 do DSU; b) o fato de terceiros poderem ter os seus interesses
afetados pela decisão a ser emitida no laudo da arbitragem; e c) a ausência de prejuízo às Partes.
Para. 7. “The US and Canada are allowed to attend both arbitration hearings, to make a statement at the end of
each hearing and to receive a copy of the written submissions made in both proceedings.
The above ruling was made on the following grounds.
 DSU provisions on panel proceedings, referred to by analogy in the arbitrators’ working procedures, give
the arbitrators discretion to decide on procedural matters not regulated in the DSU (Article 12.1 of the DSU) in
accordance with due process. The DSU does not address the issue of third-party participation in Article 22
arbitration proceedings.
 US and Canadian rights may be affected in both arbitration proceedings:
First, the estimates for high quality beef (‘HQB’) exports, foregone because of the hormone ban, are to be
based on a tariff quota that allegedly needs to be shared between Canada and the US. A determination in one
proceeding may thus be decisive for the determination in the other.
Second, several methodologies are proposed to calculate lost export opportunities. Given the fact that the
product scope (HQB and edible bovine offal (‘EBO’)) and relevant trade barriers (hormone ban and HQB
tariff quota) are the same in both proceedings, both arbitration panels (composed of the same three individuals)
may consider it necessary to adopt the same or very similar methodologies. This is all the more necessary
because the arbitrators are called upon to arrive at a specific determination on the amount of nullification and
impairment caused by the ban. They are therefore not limited, as in most panel proceedings, to ruling only on
the consistency of the amounts proposed by the US and Canada with DSU provisions. Due process thus
requires that all three parties receive the opportunity to comment on the methodologies proposed by each of
the parties.
In contrast, the EC has not shown how third-party participation would prejudice its rights. No specific
arguments were made demonstrating that third party participation would substantially impair the EC’s
interests or due process rights.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)
(v) Inviabilidade da participação de terceiros na etapa do Artigo 22.6 do DSU
Relatório do Árbitro em Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft) (Article
22.6, Brazil), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 2.5-2.6
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Em Brazil - Aircraft (Article 22.6, Brazil), o árbitro entendeu que não seria recomendável a participação da
delegação australiana na qualidade de terceiro. O Painel de arbitragem levou em consideração os seguintes
aspectos: a) a ausência de previsão específica no Artigo 22 do DSU; b) a opinião das Partes; e c) o fato de
os interesses australianos não serem afetados pela decisão a ser tomada na arbitragem. Os aspectos
mencionados em “a”, “b” e “c”, também foram considerados no caso US - Gambling (Article 22.6, US),
para. 2.31. Já no caso EC - Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6, EC), para. 2.8, foram analisados apenas os
fatores citados em “a” e “c”.
Paras. 2.5. “[W]e informed Australia that we declined its request. Our decision took into account the views
expressed by the parties, the fact that there is no provision in the DSU as regards third party status under
Article 22,and the fact that we do not believe that Australia’s rights would be affected by this proceeding.”
Para. 2.6. “We note in this respect that third party rights were granted in the Article 22.6 arbitrations
concerning European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) and rejected
in the EC - Bananas (1999) Article 22.6 arbitration. We do not consider that Australia in this case is in the
same situation as Canada and the United States in the EC - Hormones arbitrations, nor even in the same
situation as Ecuador in the EC - Bananas (1999) arbitration. Indeed, Australia never initiated dispute
settlement proceedings against Brazil with respect to the export financing programme at issue. Moreover,
Australia did not draw the attention of the Arbitrators to any benefits accruing to it or any rights under the
WTO Agreement which might be affected by their decision.” (11)
(vi) Questões diversas
* Painel não pode exigir que um Membro da OMC seja um terceiro no litígio
Relatório do Painel em Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey Textiles), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/R, para. 9.5
Em Turkey - Textiles, o Painel chegou à conclusão de que não detinha competência para determinar que um
Membro da OMC assumisse a posição de terceiro no caso.
Para. 9.5. “In the absence of any relevant provision in the DSU, in light of international practice, and noting
the position of the EC to this point, we consider that we do not have the authority to direct that a WTO
Member be made third-party or that it otherwise participate throughout the panel process.” (nota de rodapé
retirada)
* “Partes essenciais”
Relatório do Painel em Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey Textiles), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/R, para. 9.10
Em Turkey - Textiles, o Painel, analisando o conceito de “partes essenciais”, entendeu que, de acordo com a
jurisprudência da Corte Internacional de Justiça, se a decisão entre os litigantes pode ser proferida sem que
seja necessária uma averiguação da posição de um terceiro Estado (na hipótese da OMC, um Membro), o
órgão julgador deve exercer a sua jurisdição entre as Partes.
Para. 9.10. “The practice of the ICJ indicates that if a decision between the parties to the case can be reached
without an examination of the position of the third state (i.e. in the WTO context, a Member) the ICJ will
exercise its jurisdiction as between the parties. In the present dispute, there are no claims against the European
73
Communities before us that would need to be determined in order for the Panel to assess the compatibility of
the Turkish measures with the WTO Agreement.”
Em Turkey - Textiles (WT/DS34/R, paras. 9.11-9.12), o Painel sustentou que inexiste, na OMC, o conceito
de “partes essenciais”.
Paras. 9.11. “[T]here is no WTO concept of ‘essential parties’. Based on our terms of reference and the fact
that we have decided (as further discussed hereafter) not to examine the GATT/WTO compatibility of the
Turkey-EC customs union, we consider that the European Communities was not an essential party to this
dispute; the European Communities, had it so wished, could have availed itself of the provisions of the DSU,
which we note have been interpreted with a degree of flexibility by previous panels, in order to represent its
interests. We recall in this context that Panel and Appellate Body reports are binding on the parties only.”
Para. 9.12. “Under WTO rules, the European Communities and Turkey are Members with equal and
independent rights and obligations. For Turkey, it is not at all inconceivable that it adopted the measures in
question in order to have its own policy coincide with that of the European Communities. However, in doing
so, it should have been aware, in respect of the measures it has chosen, that its circumstances were different
from those of the European Communities in relation to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (‘ATC’) and
thus could reasonably have been anticipated to give rise to responses which focussed on that distinction.”
(notas de rodapé retiradas)
(vii) Distinção entre terceiros e amicus curiae
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R, para.
101
Em US - Shrimp, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que somente os Membros da OMC, que participam como
terceiros no processo, com base no Artigo 10 do DSU, detém direitos que outros não.
Para. 101. “[A]ccess to the dispute settlement process of the WTO is limited to Members of the WTO. This
access is not available, under the WTO Agreement and the covered agreements as they currently exist, to
individuals or international organizations, whether governmental or nongovernmental. Only Members may
become parties to a dispute of which a panel may be seized, and only Members “having a substantial interest
in a matter before a panel” may become third parties in the proceedings before that panel. Thus, under the
DSU, only Members who are parties to a dispute, or who have notified their interest in becoming third parties
in such a dispute to the DSB, have a legal right to make submissions to, and have a legal right to have those
submissions considered by a panel. Correctively, a panel is obliged in law to accept and give due consideration
only to submissions made by the parties and the third parties in a panel proceeding.”
(viii) Confidencialidade
* Manutenção de confidencialidade por parte de terceiro
Relatório do Painel em Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from
the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.41
Em Mexico - Corn Syrup, o Painel asseverou que terceiros também estão submetidos à obrigação de manter
a confidencialidade do processo, assim como as Partes.
74
Para. 7.41. “Third parties are subject to the same requirement to maintain the confidentiality of panel
proceedings as are parties. We therefore conclude that the requirement to maintain the confidentiality of
consultations is not violated by the inclusion of information obtained during consultations in the written
submission of a party provided to a third party in the subsequent panel proceeding even if that third party did
not participate in the consultations.”
* Omissão de informações empresariais confidenciais no Relatório do Painel – necessidade de preservação
dos direitos de terceiros
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Japan - Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories
from Korea (Japan - DRAMs)(Korea)), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS336/AB/R, para. 279
Em Japan - DRAMs (Korea), o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Painel, se decidir remover informações
empresariais do seu Relatório, em razão do caráter confidencial destas, deve agir de modo a resguardar os
direitos de terceiros no processo.
Para. 279. “We note that several passages have been omitted from the public version of the Panel Report on
the basis that Japan and Korea indicated that those passages contained business confidential information
(“BCI”). The European Communities has complained that, while BCI must be respected, the Panel has dealt
with it in such a sweeping manner that the Panel Report has become unintelligible for third parties, and as a
result its rights as a third party have been affected. While a panel must not disclose information which is by its
nature confidential, a panel, in deciding to redact such information from its report at the request of one or both
of the parties, should bear in mind the rights of third parties and other WTO Members under various
provisions of the DSU, such as Articles 12.7 and 16. Accordingly, a panel must make efforts to ensure that the
public version of its report circulated to all Members of the WTO is understandable. On appeal, Japan and
Korea have designated certain information contained in their written submissions as BCI. We have found it
possible to render our Report without disclosing any BCI, designated as such.” (notas de rodapé eliminadas)
III.
Comentários
O DSU tem tido um papel fundamental na solidificação da segurança e previsibilidade do sistema multilateral
de comércio. Tendo em vista os interesses dos membros da OMC, o referido acordo contempla a importância
da participação de terceiros nos litígios levados até ao Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (“OSC”). Estes
terceiros, por seu turno, pretendem não somente prestar informações complementares ao órgão julgador, mas
influir no resultado final da demanda:
By reserving rights, third parties clearly wish to influence the outcome of dispute settlement. The belief that
their participation does, in fact, matter explains why third parties participated in 64 percent of WTO disputes
through 20027.
Para que seja viável a participação de um terceiro no litígio, é requisito que este terceiro notifique o OSC
acerca de sua intenção de ingressar no processo. Entretanto, o momento da notificação é importante. Em geral,
pode-se afirmar que é reconhecida discricionariedade aos Painéis para decidir sobre se a notificação foi
efetivada em momento oportuno. Para tanto, tem-se levado em consideração o fato do processo não ser
prejudicado e a seleção e composição do Painel não sofrerem problemas.
Como o DSU não foi expresso ao estipular o prazo da notificação do Membro interessado ao DSB, poder-se-ia
invocar o interstício de dez dias, mencionado pelo então Diretor do Conselho Geral do GATT, em junho de
1994 (C/COM/3 of 27 June 1994, page 1). Neste discurso, o aludido Diretor realçou a necessidade da fixação
7
BUSCH, Marc L.; REINHARDT, Eric. Three´s a Crowd. Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement. World Politics 58 (April 2006), pp. 446-77.
75
de um prazo certo, tendo em vista o problema do recebimento, pelo terceiro, dos arrazoados das Partes antes
do primeiro encontro com o Painel. Ocorre que, tal interregno não tem sido muito observado pela prática dos
Painéis. Assim, nota-se que o mesmo não pode ser caracterizado como costume, por lhe faltar as duas
condições para tanto: a prática reiterada e a consciência de obrigatoriedade.
No tocante à concessão de direitos adicionais a terceiros, os Painéis podem permitir tal extensão, desde que
esteja presente pelo menos uma das condições a seguir: (i) efeito econômico significativo das medidas em
discussão na causa dos terceiros; (ii) importância do comércio do produto objeto do litígio em relação aos
terceiros; (iii) eventual impacto relevante da política comercial que o desfecho do caso poderia ter nos
terceiros, se estes mantivessem medidas similares às medidas em discussão; (iv) concordância de pelo menos
uma das partes na ampliação destes direitos; as medidas impugnadas na controvérsia derivarem de um tratado
do qual o terceiro é signatário; (v) o terceiro já ter sido beneficiado com direitos adicionais em outro processo;
ou (vi) considerações de ordem prática oriundas do envolvimento de terceiro como parte num processo
paralelo.
Como se pode notar dos requisitos mencionados no parágrafo antecedente, é insuficiente que o membro
pretendente ao status de terceiro alegue possuir interesse em certa indústria ou ramo de comércio se o produto,
cujas medidas são impugnadas, for específico. Tal sucedeu na contenda US — Large Civil Aircraft (2nd
complaint), onde o Brasil, sob a ótica do Painel, havia alegado interesse apenas na indústria de aeronaves,
enquanto que as medidas objeto do litígio diziam respeito à indústria de aeronaves de grande porte.
Em US – Upland Cotton, o Painel denegou os direitos adicionais de terceiros pedidos pelas Comunidades
Europeias com arrimo numa exegese literal do DSU. Ao se analisar as explanações do Painel em apreço, notase que as condições usualmente aceitas pela jurisprudência da OMC para a extensão dos diritos adicionais de
terceiros foi relegada a um segundo plano. Em Australia – Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 – US) e em
Australia — Salmon (Article 21.5 — Canada), o Painel, na etapa do art. 21.5, do DSU, tendo agendado apenas
uma audiência com as partes, incluindo terceiros, repeliu a pretensão de terceiros receber todos os arrazoados
das partes, consignando que ditos terceiros receberiam somente os primeiros arrazoados. Outra situação em
que tem aparecido, às vezes, a exegese literal é na arbitragem prevista no art. 22.6, do DSU. Nesta última
hipótese, deve-se frisar, contudo, que os árbitros têm considerado outros fatores, além da literalidade do texto,
para deslindar a participação de terceiros, como a opinião das partes e o fato de os interesses dos terceiros não
serem afetados pela decisão a ser tomada na arbitragem.
Lamenta-se que, nas referidas oportunidades ventiladas acima, tenha imperado o método literal de
interpretação, que é, muitas vezes, o mais limitado de todos. Ademais, a escolha exegética dos Painéis colide
com o espírito do art. 10.1, do DSU, que estipula que os interesses de terceiros “deverão ser integralmente
levados em consideração no correr dos trabalhos dos grupos especiais”.
Questão interessante é sobre o alcance do art. 10.4, do DSU. No caso EC – Trademarks and Geographical
Indications, o Painel apreciou o pedido de recomendação feito por um terceiro com supedâneo no art. 19.1, do
DSU. O Painel indeferiu a pretensão. A justificativa para o conhecimento do mérito do pedido foi o art. 10.4,
do DSU. Diante do ocorrido, fica a questão de se saber se este mesmo terceiro poderia submeter o mesmo
pedido a um novo Painel, também com lastro no aludido art. 10.4. Haveria coisa julgada sobre o assunto
decidido anteriormente? Entende-se que não existiria res judicata, posto que esta está ligada ao devido
processo legal e às partes no feito. O terceiro num litígio tem uma participação limitada, sendo seu poder de
produção de prova restrito. Somente num novo processo, em que for parte, é que o então terceiro poderá
exercer plenamente seus direitos processuais para fazer valer seus direitos.
Apesar do terceiro ter direito a participar de audiência com o painel ou o Órgão de Apelação e a manifestar
suas razões, ele não pode suprir o ônus probatório das partes, em especial o do demandante. Neste diapasão, o
Painel asseverou, em US – Upland Cotton, que os dados, fornecidos por terceiro, não aliviam o ônus
76
probatório do reclamante. Acontece que, neste caso, o Painel, ao se referir ao aludido ônus, utilizou a
expressão “prima facie case”.
O significado do termo “prima facie case” pode comportar duas acepções. A primeira refere-se a um ônus leve
da parte que faz a alegação, ou seja, a prova apresentada não necessita ser contundente. Já a segunda acepção
está ligada à ideia de um ônus severo em relação à aquele que faz a afirmação, devendo a prova coligida ser
robusta. Dependendo da adoção de uma ou outra noção de “prima facie case”, as consequências processuais
podem ser diferentes:
A panel might understand the AB’s prima facie case concept to require a much too overwhelming level of
proof from the claimant; since, after all, such a case seems to have serious consequences for what is required
of the respondent in rebuttal. On the other hand, a different panel might allow a rather weak claimant’s case to
meet the prima facie requirement and then effectively reason that the full burden of proof is shifted to the
respondent. These effects might even occur inside the panel’s conference room without being expressed in its
published decision or otherwise coming to light8.
Tem-se, então, que, numa concepção de ônus leve para o demandante, eventuais subsídios probatórios
indicados por terceiros poderiam lhe aproveitar mais facilmente, enquanto que, prevalecendo uma ideia de
ônus excessivo para o proponente da ação, as informações prestadas por terceiros somente lhe trariam
vantagens efetivas se se desincumbisse do ônus em referência.
Finalmente, é preciso asseverar que apenas os membros da OMC podem atuar como terceiros. Assim, inferese que o amicus curiae difere-se daquele que é terceiro. O amicus curiae pode ser definido da seguinte
maneira:
De origem latina, a expressão amicus curiae significa “amigo da cúria”, comumente traduzido como “amigo
da corte” na doutrina da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). Seria, então, um aliado da justiça em
sentido amplo. O conceito de amicus curiae brief consubstancia-se na apresentação, por um indívíduo ou
entidade, de um relatório (brief) que não tenha sido solicitado por integrantes de uma determinada corte9.
Na esteira da jurisprudência da OMC, os arrazoados apresentados pelo amicus curiae somente serão
apreciados pelo Painel ou Órgão de Apelação se as partes incorporarem ditos arrazoados às suas
manifestações10. Todavia, uma exceção ocorre quando o amicus curiae é membro da OMC, como no caso EC
— Sardines, em que o Órgão de Apelação aceitou a manifestação do Marrocos, apesar da posição contrária do
demandante. Neste litígio, o país integrante da OMC não havia notificado o OSC acerca da sua intenção de ser
terceiro.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 11: Our decision may have been different if Australia had demonstrated that the countermeasures
which Canada plans to adopt may affect Australia’s rights or benefits under the WTO Agreement.
8
BARCELÓ III, James John. Burden of Proof, Prima Facie Case and Presumption in WTO Dispute Settlement. Cornell International Law Journal,
vol. 42, n. 1, p. 30, nov. 2008.
9
LEONHARDT, Roberta Danelon; BASTOS-TIGRE, Maria Pia. A figura do amicus curiae na OMC. In: LIMA, Maria Lúcia L. M. Pádua;
ROSENBERG, Bárbara (coord.). Solução de controvérsias: o Brasil e o contencioso na OMC. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2009, tomo I, p. 149.
10
Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 2.10; US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.2; Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 2.5; EC – Salmon (Norway), para.
1.13; US – Zeroing (EC), para. 1.7; US – Softwood Lumber IV, nota de rodapé 75; e Canada – Renewable Energy, para. 1.13.
77

Artigo 11
IA.
Article 11
Function of Panels
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the
covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it,
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult
regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory
solution.
IB.
Artigo 11
Função dos Grupos Especiais
A função de um grupo especial é auxiliar o OSC a desempenhar as obrigações que lhe são atribuídas por este
Entendimento e pelos acordos abrangidos. Consequentemente, um grupo especial deverá fazer uma avaliação
objetiva do assunto que lhe seja submetido, incluindo uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos, da aplicabilidade e
concordância com os acordos abrangidos pertinentes, e formular conclusões que auxiliem o OSC a fazer
recomendações ou emitir decisões previstas nos acordos abrangidos. Os grupos especiais deverão
regularmente realizar consultas com as partes envolvidas na controvérsia e propiciar-lhes oportunidade para
encontrar solução mutuamente satisfatória.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
78

Artigo 12
IA.
Article 12
Panel Procedures
12.1
Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise after
consulting the parties to the dispute.
12.2
Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while
not unduly delaying the panel process.
12.3
After consulting the parties to the dispute, the panelists shall, as soon as practicable and whenever
possible within one week after the composition and terms of reference of the panel have been agreed
upon, fix the timetable for the panel process, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of
Article 4, if relevant.
12.4
In determining the timetable for the panel process, the panel shall provide sufficient time for the
parties to the dispute to prepare their submissions.
12.5
Panels should set precise deadlines for written submissions by the parties and the parties should
respect those deadlines.
12.6
Each party to the dispute shall deposit its written submissions with the Secretariat for immediate
transmission to the panel and to the other party or parties to the dispute. The complaining party shall
submit its first submission in advance of the responding party's first submission unless the panel
decides, in fixing the timetable referred to in paragraph 3 and after consultations with the parties to
the dispute, that the parties should submit their first submissions simultaneously. When there are
sequential arrangements for the deposit of first submissions, the panel shall establish a firm timeperiod for receipt of the responding party's submission. Any subsequent written submissions shall be
submitted simultaneously.
12.7
Where the parties to the dispute have failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, the panel shall
submit its findings in the form of a written report to the DSB. In such cases, the report of a panel shall
set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any
findings and recommendations that it makes. Where a settlement of the matter among the parties to
the dispute has been found, the report of the panel shall be confined to a brief description of the case
and to reporting that a solution has been reached.
12.8
In order to make the procedures more efficient, the period in which the panel shall conduct its
examination, from the date that the composition and terms of reference of the panel have been agreed
upon until the date the final report is issued to the parties to the dispute, shall, as a general rule, not
exceed six months. In cases of urgency, including those relating to perishable goods, the panel shall
aim to issue its report to the parties to the dispute within three months.
12.9
When the panel considers that it cannot issue its report within six months, or within three months in
cases of urgency, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an
estimate of the period within which it will issue its report. In no case should the period from the
establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months.
12.10 In the context of consultations involving a measure taken by a developing country Member, the
parties may agree to extend the periods established in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 4. If, after the
79
relevant period has elapsed, the consulting parties cannot agree that the consultations have concluded,
the Chairman of the DSB shall decide, after consultation with the parties, whether to extend the
relevant period and, if so, for how long. In addition, in examining a complaint against a developing
country Member, the panel shall accord sufficient time for the developing country Member to prepare
and present its argumentation. The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 20 and paragraph 4 of Article
21 are not affected by any action pursuant to this paragraph.
12.11 Where one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, the panel's report shall explicitly
indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and morefavourable treatment for developing country Members that form part of the covered agreements which
have been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement
procedures.
12.12 The panel may suspend its work at any time at the request of the complaining party for a period not to
exceed 12 months. In the event of such a suspension, the time-frames set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 of
this Article, paragraph 1 of Article 20, and paragraph 4 of Article 21 shall be extended by the amount
of time that the work was suspended. If the work of the panel has been suspended for more than 12
months, the authority for establishment of the panel shall lapse.
IB.
Artigo 12
Procedimento dos Grupos Especiais
12.1
Os grupos especiais seguirão os Procedimentos de Trabalho do Apêndice 3, salvo decisão em
contrário do grupo especial após consulta com as partes em controvérsia.
12.2
Os procedimentos do grupo especial deverão ser suficientemente flexíveis para assegurar a qualidade
de seus relatórios, sem atrasar indevidamente os trabalhos do grupo especial.
12.3
Os integrantes do grupo especial deverão, após consultar as partes em controvérsia, o quanto antes e
se possível dentro da semana seguinte em que sejam acordados a composição e os termos de
referência do grupo especial, estabelecer um calendário para seus trabalhos, considerando as
disposições do parágrafo 9 do Artigo 4, se pertinente.
12.4
Ao determinar o calendário para seus trabalhos, o grupo especial deverá estipular prazos suficientes
para que as partes em controvérsia preparem suas argumentações escritas.
12.5
Os grupos especiais deverão definir prazos exatos para que as partes apresentem suas argumentações
escritas e as partes deverão respeitar tais prazos.
12.6
Cada parte em controvérsia deverá consignar suas argumentações escritas ao Secretariado para
transmissão imediata ao grupo especial e à outra parte ou às outras partes em controvérsia. A parte
reclamante deverá apresentar sua primeira argumentação antes da primeira argumentação da parte
demandada, salvo se o grupo especial decidir, ao estabelecer o calendário previsto no parágrafo 3 e
após consultar as partes em controvérsia, que as partes deverão apresentar suas argumentações
simultaneamente. Quando se houver decidido pela consignação sucessiva das primeiras
argumentações, o grupo especial deverá fixar um prazo rígido para recebimento das argumentações da
parte demandada. Quaisquer argumentações escritas posteriores deverão ser apresentadas
simultaneamente.
12.7
Nos casos em que as partes envolvidas na controvérsia não consigam encontrar uma solução
mutuamente satisfatória, o grupo especial deverá apresentar suas conclusões em forma de relatório
80
escrito ao OSC. Em tais casos, o relatório do grupo especial deverá expor as verificações de fatos, a
aplicabilidade de disposições pertinentes e o arrazoado em que se baseiam suas decisões e
recomendações. Quando se chegar a uma solução da questão controversa entre as partes, o relatório
do grupo especial se limitará a uma breve descrição do caso, com indicação de que a solução foi
encontrada.
12.8
Com o objetivo de tornar o procedimento mais eficaz, o prazo para o trabalho do grupo especial,
desde a data na qual seu estabelecimento e termos de referência tenham sido acordados até a data em
que seu relatório final tenha sido divulgado para as partes em controvérsia, não deverá, como regra
geral, exceder a seis meses. Em casos de urgência, incluídos aqueles que tratem de bens perecíveis, o
grupo especial deverá procurar divulgar seu relatório para as partes em controvérsia dentro de três
meses.
12.9
Quando o grupo especial considerar que não poderá divulgar seu relatório dentro de seis meses, ou
dentro de três meses em casos de urgência, deverá informar por escrito ao OSC as razões do atraso
juntamente com uma estimativa do prazo em que procederá à divulgação do relatório. O período de
tempo entre o estabelecimento do grupo especial e a divulgação do relatório para os Membros não
poderá, em caso algum, exceder a nove meses.
12.10 No âmbito de consultas envolvendo medidas tomadas por um país em desenvolvimento Membro, as
partes poderão acordar a extensão dos prazos definidos nos parágrafos 7 e 8 do Artigo 4. Se, após
expiração do prazo concernente, as partes em consulta não acordarem com a sua conclusão, o
Presidente do OSC deverá decidir, após consultar as partes, se o prazo concernente será prorrogado e,
em caso positivo, por quanto tempo. Ademais, ao examinar uma reclamaçãoo contra um país em
desenvolvimento Membro, o grupo especial deverá proporcionar tempo bastante para que o país em
desenvolvimento Membro prepare e apresente sua argumentação. As disposições do parágrafo 1 do
Artigo 20 e parágrafo 4 do Artigo 21 não serão afetadas por nenhuma ação decorrente deste parágrafo.
12.11 Quando uma ou mais das partes for um país em desenvolvimento Membro, o relatório do grupo
especial indicará explicitamente a maneira pela qual foram levadas em conta as disposições
pertinentes ao tratamento diferenciado e mais favorável para países em desenvolvimento Membros
que façam parte dos acordos abrangidos invocados pelo país em desenvolvimento Membros no curso
dos trabalhos de solução de controvérsias.
12.12 O grupo especial poderá suspender seu trabalho a qualquer tempo a pedido da parte reclamante por
período não superior a doze meses. Ocorrendo tal suspensão, os prazos fixados nos parágrafos 8 e 9
deste Artigo, parágrafo 1 do Artigo 20, e parágrafo 4 do Artigo 21 deverão ser prorrogados pela
mesma extensão de tempo em que forem suspensos os trabalhos. Se o trabalho do grupo especial tiver
sido suspenso por mais de 12 meses, a autoridade para estabelecer o grupo especial caducará.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
81

Artigo 13
IA.
Article 13
Right to Seek Information
13.1
Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body
which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such information or advice from any
individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member.
A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such information as the
panel considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential information which is provided shall not be
revealed without formal authorization from the individual, body, or authorities of the Member
providing the information.
13.2
Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion
on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other
technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing from
an expert review group. Rules for the establishment of such a group and its procedures are set forth in
Appendix 4.
IB.
Artigo 13
Direito à Busca de Informação
13.1
Todo grupo especial terá direito de recorrer à informação e ao assessoramento técnico de qualquer
pessoa ou entidade que considere conveniente. Contudo, antes de procurar informação ou
assessoramento técnico de pessoa ou entidade submetida à jurisdição de um Membro o grupo
especial deverá informar as autoridades de tal Membro. O Membro deverá dar resposta rápida e
completa a toda solicitação de informação que um grupo especial considere necessária e pertinente.
A informação confidencial fornecida não será divulgada sem autorização formal da pessoa, entidade
ou autoridade que a proporcionou.
13.2
Os grupos especiais poderão buscar informação em qualquer fonte relevante e poderão consultar
peritos para obter sua opinião sobre determinados aspectos de uma questão. Com relação a um
aspecto concreto de uma questão de caráter científico ou técnico trazido à controvérsia por uma parte,
o grupo especial poderá requerer um relatório escrito a um grupo consultivo de peritos. As normas
para estabelecimento de tal grupo e seus procedimentos constam do Apêndice 4.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
82

Artigo 14
IA.
Article 14
Confidentiality
14.1
Panel deliberations shall be confidential.
14.2
The reports of panels shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the dispute in the light of
the information provided and the statements made.
14.3
Opinions expressed in the panel report by individual panelists shall be anonymous.
IB.
Artigo 14
Confidencialidade
14.1
As deliberações do grupo especial serão confidenciais.
14.2
Os relatórios dos grupos especiais serão redigidos sem a presença das partes em controvérsia, à luz
das informações fornecidas e das argumentações apresentadas.
14.3
As opiniões individuais dos integrantes do grupo especial consignadas em seu relatório serão
anônimas.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
83

Artigo 15
Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira
IA.
Article 15
Interim Review Stage
15.1
Following the consideration of rebuttal submissions and oral arguments, the panel shall issue the
descriptive (factual and argument) sections of its draft report to the parties to the dispute. Within a
period of time set by the panel, the parties shall submit their comments in writing.
15.2
Following the expiration of the set period of time for receipt of comments from the parties to the
dispute, the panel shall issue an interim report to the parties, including both the descriptive sections
and the panel's findings and conclusions. Within a period of time set by the panel, a party may submit
a written request for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of the
final report to the Members. At the request of a party, the panel shall hold a further meeting with the
parties on the issues identified in the written comments. If no comments are received from any party
within the comment period, the interim report shall be considered the final panel report and circulated
promptly to the Members.
15.3
The findings of the final panel report shall include a discussion of the arguments made at the interim
review stage. The interim review stage shall be conducted within the time-period set out in paragraph
8 of Article 12.
IB.
Artigo 15
Etapa Intermediária de Exame
15.1
Após consideração das réplicas e apresenteções orais, o grupo especial distribuirá os capítulos
expositivos (fatos e argumentações) de esboço de seu relatório para as partes em controvérsia. Dentro
de um prazo fixado pelo grupo especial, as partes apresentarão seus comentários por escrito.
15.2
Expirado o prazo estabelecido para recebimento dos comentários das partes, o grupo especial
distribuirá às partes um relatório provisório, nele incluindo tanto os capítulos descritivos quanto as
determinações e conclusões do grupo especial. Dentro de um prazo fixado pelo grupo especial,
qualquer das partes poderá apresentar por escrito solicitação para que o grupo especial reveja aspectos
específicos do relatório provisório antes da distribuição do relatório definitivo aos Membros. A
pedido de uma parte, o grupo especial poderá reunir-se novamente com as partes para tratar de itens
apontados nos comentários escritos. No caso de não serem recebidos comentários de nenhuma das
partes dentro do prazo previsto para tal fim, o relatório provisório será considerado relatório final e
será prontamente distribuído aos Membros.
15.3
As conclusões do relatório final do grupo especial incluirão uma análise dos argumentos apresentados
na etapa intermediária de exame. Esta etapa deverá ocorrer dentro do prazo estabelecido no parágrafo
8 do Artigo 12.
IC.
Nada a observar.
84
II.
1. Artigo 15.1
a) “A ‘prática normal’ dos terceiros na revisão dos seus argumentos”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (US - Aircraft), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS353/AB/R, para. 8
A União Europeia submeteu ao Painel reclamações relativas a várias medidas dos EUA que afetavam o
comércio de aeronaves. Esse país rgumentou que os EUA subsidiavam os produtores Boeing Company e a
McDonell Douglas Corporation, atos proibidos pelo ASCM. Neste caso, o direito dos terceiros não limitou-se
a revisar o Relatório intermediário, os argumentos do Brasil na parte descritiva do Relatório preliminar do
Painel para “destacar” os direitos de terceiros foram declinados.
Para. 8. “During the course of the Panel proceedings, the Panel adopted additional procedures for the
protection of business confidential information (“BCI”) and highly sensitive business information (“HSBI”),
and issued a number of rulings relating to these procedures and other issues. (1)
2. Artigo 15.2
a) “Requerimento para identificar ‘aspectos precisos’ do Relatório intermediário”
Relatório do Painel no litígio Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia - Salmon),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS18/R, para. 7.3
O Canadá reclamou da proibição da Austrália de importação de salmão fresco, resfriado e congelado. O
Painel declinou o pedido da Austrália de uma “revisão de todo o Relatório” e restringiu aos comentários com
comentários que se referiam aos “aspectos precisos” do Relatório intermediário.
Para. 7.3. “Australia requested a “whole of report review” of the interim report. In so doing, it referred to
Article 11 of the DSU setting out the function of a panel and requiring that it “should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Australia argued that a large part of
the legal reasoning of the interim report was not based on an objective assessment of the matter before the
Panel and submitted that the interim report contained a number of factual inaccuracies and assertions not
supported by evidence before the Panel. At the interim review meeting, Canada objected to Australia's request
for “a whole of report review”. Canada referred to Article 15.2 of the DSU which provides an opportunity for
parties to request the panel to “review precise aspects of the interim report”. According to Canada, it is not
open to the Panel to consider anything other than comments dealing with “precise aspects” of the interim
report. We agree with Canada and have therefore only reviewed our interim report in light of the comments
made by the parties which relate to “precise aspects” of the interim report”.
Relatório do Painel no litígio Japan - Measures Affecting The Importation of Apples (Japan - Apples),
WT/DS245/R, para. 7.1
O Painel fez declarações em relação à reclamação dos EUA sobre as medidas adotadas pelo Japão, que
proibiu a importação de maçãs dos EUA. O Painel concluíu que as medidas fitosanitárias são
desproporcionais, de acordo com as evidências disponibilizadas, e declarou que, de acordo com o Artigo 2.2
do Acordo SPS, a medida do Japão foi mantida sem uma evidência científica suficiente. Neste caso, o Painel
85
revisou os comentários feitos ao Relatório preliminar pelas partes. Japão e EUA requisitaram que o Painel
revisasse aspectos precisos do Relatório intermediário.
Para. 7.1. “The Panel issued the draft descriptive sections of its report (factual and arguments) to the parties
on 6 February 2003, in accordance with Article 15.1 of the DSU. Both parties offered written comments on
the draft descriptive sections on 24 February 2003. The Panel noted all these comments and amended the draft
descriptive part where appropriate. The Panel issued its interim report to the parties on 20 March 2003, in
accordance with Article 15.2 of the DSU. In communications dated 3 April 2003, both Japan and the United
States requested that the Panel review precise aspects of the interim report. Neither of the parties requested an
interim review meeting. On 11 April 2003, Japan and the United States provided written comments on each
other's comments on the interim report, as permitted by the Panel's working procedures. The Panel carefully
reviewed the arguments made. They are discussed in this section and, to the extent necessary, are reflected in
the findings section below, in accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU.”
b) “O uso da revisão intermediária para re-argumentar um caso”
Relatório do Painel no litígio Japan - Countervailling Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from
Korea (Japan - DRAMs), Demandante: Coréia, WT/DS336//R, para. 6.2
Em 2006, o governo da Coreia requisitou consultas a respeito do governo japonês sobre os Artigos 4 do DSU,
Artigo 30 do ASCM e Artigo XXII do GATT 1994 pela imposição de tarifas à importação de certos Dynamic
Random Access Memories (DRAM’s). A Coréia trouxe de volta à discussão pontos relatados anteriormente.
Para. 6.2. “ In addressing Korea's comments, we note that Korea has sought to re-argue many of the points
that it made during its submissions. This is not necessarily the purpose of the interim review mechanism set
forth at Article 15.2 of the DSU. In particular, we do not consider that Article 15.2 of the DSU requires us to
provide a defence of our findings at the Interim Review stage.”
c) “Novas evidências durante a revisão”
Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities - Selected Customs Matters (EU - Customs),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS315/R, para. 6.3
Os EUA solicitaram o estabelecimento de Painel, com base no Artigo X:1 do GATT 1994. Alegaram que a
União Europeia administra suas leis e regulamentos de maneira não-uniforme para avaliação e classificação
de produtos para propósitos alfandegários, os quais devem obedecer ao Artigo X:3 do GATT 1994. O Painel
considerou que “os termos do Artigo 15.2 não permitem que se considere a evidência que não se reflete no
Relatório intermediário”, e, por isso, não consideraram determinadas evidências novas submetidas pela União
Europeia.
Para. 6.3. “In its comments on the Interim Report, the European Communities referred to a number of
exhibits that it had not relied upon previously in the Panel proceedings. In particular, the European
Communities referred to: (a) Commission Regulation (EC) nº 2171/2005 concerning the tariff classification of
certain LCD monitors (Exhibit EC-167); (b) Dutch Ministry of Finance, Telefaxbericht BCPP 2006/389 M
(Exhibit EC-168); (c) an extract from the EBTI database concerning expired BTI DE M/2975/05-1 (Exhibit
EC-169); (d) replies of customs authorities of member States concerning the alleged requirement of prior
approval for valuation on a basis other than the last sale (Exhibit EC-170); (e) Greek Presidential decree nº
203 (Exhibit EC-171); and (f) Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ concerning accession to the WTO (Exhibit EC-172).”
Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities and its Member States - Tariff Treatment of Certain
86
Information Technology Products (EU - TI), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R e
WT/DS377/R para. 6.48
A disputa é relacionada aos casos em que alguns produtos tenham concessões tarifárias dadas pela União
Europeia, conforme o Acordo de Tecnologia da Informação (ITA). A União Europeia submeteu dois
documentos que demonstravam que duas medidas relacionadas foram modificadas e, outra, inteiramente
repelida. A União Europeia requisitou que, com base nesses documentos, o Painel impedisse que fosse feita
qualquer recomendação em relação a essas medidas. O Painel rejeitou o pedido da União Europeia.
Para. 6.48. “We note that the documents in Attachment 1 and 2 were published in November 2009, long after
the record had closed. At no time between November 2009 and the issuance of the Interim Reports did the
European Communities seek leave of the Panel to provide this additional information. Article 15.2 of the
DSU, which provides for the Interim Review process, was considered by the Appellate Body in EC –
Sardines. It clarified that this provision does not permit parties to “introduce new evidence”, and is availabe
only “for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report”. Consistent with the Appellate Body's
approach and in the interest of protecting the due process rights of the complainants, who had no opportunity
to make submissions for the record on the documents provided, we decline to consider further the documents
attached by the European Communities to its request for interim review. The Panel also declines to make
adjustments to the Interim Reports to exclude the measures in question from the Panel's recommendation and
to add text about the European Communities' confirmation that certain measures have been repealed, as
requested by the European Communities”.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (US - Aircraft) Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS353/AB/R, para. 1.137
O Órgão de Apelação não considerou algumas evidências submetidas pela União Europeia na fase da revisão
intermediária.
Para. 1137 “The first of the European Union's arguments in support of its due process claim is that the Panel
introduced the “predominance” approach for the first time in paragraph 7.1701 of its Final Report, thereby
depriving the European Communities of any meaningful opportunity to comment on such a “novel theory”.”
(2)
d) “Reunião adicional de revisão”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute (Canada - Hormones), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS321/AB/R, para. 6.2
A União Europeia alegou que o Canadá continuou a suspender a concessão e outras obrigações contidas nos
Artigos XXII:1 do GATT 1994 e 4 do DSU, depois que a UE adotou a Directive 2003/74/EC, em 2003,
emendando a Council Directive 96/22/EC relacionada à proibição de ação hormonal. Uma reunião de revisão
intermediária adicional foi requerida em relação a vários procedimentos. O Painel explicou que o Membro é
que deveria decidir quando uma reunião de revisão intermediária adicional é necessária.
Para. 6.2. “The European Communities and Canada separately requested an interim review by the Panel of
certain aspects of the interim report issued to the Parties on 31 July 2007. The European Communities stated
that it stood ready to attend an interim review hearing to discuss the issues raised in its letter, “should the
Panel consider it useful”. The Panel notes that it is not for it to decide whether holding an interim review
hearing would be useful. Article 15.2 of the DSU provides that it is “[a]t the request of a party [that] the panel
shall hold a further meeting with the parties on the issues identified in the written comments.” The Panel does
87
not understand the EC statement above as a request by the European Communities for the Panel to hold an
additional meeting with the parties. Furthermore, the Panel notes that Canada did not request such a meeting.
As a result, the Panel did not hold an interim review meeting.”
3. Artigo 15.3
a) “Novos argumentos e novas decisões jurisdicionais”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - Act 1916)
Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS162/R, WT/DS136/AB/R e WT/DS162/AB/R, para. 54
O Painel foi estabelecido para considerar reclamações da União Europeia em relação ao Ato de 1916 dos
EUA, que argumentaram ser inconsistentes com as obrigações dos EUA, segundo os acordos da OMC. O
Painel considerou que os EUA não agiram em um momento apropriado para suscitar um argumento
jurisdicional. Os EUA, pela primeira vez, referiram-se a alguns argumentos, na fase de revisão intermediária.
O Painel rejeitou os argumentos dos EUA.
Para. 54. “We agree with the Panel that the interim review was not an appropriate stage in the Panel's
proceedings to raise objections to the Panel's jurisdiction for the first time. An objection to jurisdiction should
be raised as early as possible and panels must ensure that the requirements of due process are met. However,
we also agree with the Panel's consideration that “some issues of jurisdiction may be of such a nature that they
have to be addressed by the Panel at any time.” We do not share the European Communities' view that
objections to the jurisdiction of a panel are appropriately regarded as simply “procedural objections”. The
vesting of jurisdiction in a panel is a fundamental prerequisite for lawful panel proceedings. We, therefore, see
no reason to accept the European Communities' argument that we must reject the United States' appeal
because the United States did not raise its jurisdictional objection before the Panel in a timely manner.”
b) “revisão intermediária”
Relatório do Painel no litígio Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones
Dispute (Canada - Hormones), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS321/R, para. 6.1
A revisão intermediária é parte das declarações do Painel e isso foi concluído para esclarecer a função do
Artigo 15.3 do DSU.
Para. 6.1. “Pursuant to Article 15.3 of the DSU , the findings of the final panel report shall include a
discussion of the arguments made by the parties at the interim review stage. This section of the Panel report
provides such a discussion. As is clear from Article 15.3, this Section is part of the Panel’s findings.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 15 do DSU foi discutido em algumas decisões do DSB da OMC. O Artigo 15.1 do DSU foi
comentado para salientar como os terceiros podem se manifestar e quais são as suas limitações em participar
da revisão intermediária.
De acordo com as decisões do Painel, o Artigo 15.2 do DSU determina que sejam relatados aspectos precisos.
Apenas aqueles aspectos em que as Partes entendam que seja necessária a revisão intermediária devem ser
submetidos ao Painel. Para o Painel, também é importante destacar-se que existe uma função específica na
fase de revisão intermediária, em que não devem ser introduzidas novas evidências.
88
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 1: BCI and HSBI procedures were adopted by the Panel on 19 February 2007, at the request of, and following consultations
with, the parties. The procedures were modified several times over the course of the proceedings and the Panel issued a number of
rulings in connection with them. The final version of these procedures is attached to the Panel Report as Annex D. (Panel Report,
para. 1.11) On 21 December 2006, Brazil requested the Panel to grant it certain enhanced third party rights, and on 22 December 2006,
Canada requested the Panel to grant it any enhanced third party rights granted to Brazil. Both parties to the dispute submitted
comments and opposed the requests. On 23 February 2007, the Panel informed the parties and third parties that it had decided not to
grant enhanced third party rights to any third party in the proceedings. (Panel Report, paras. 1.14, 7.14 and 7.15).
Footnote 2: European Union's appellant's submission, para. 258. The European Union clarified at the oral hearing that its claim
concerning the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.1701 of the Final Report relates exclusively to whether the Panel violated due process,
and not whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 15 of the DSU.
89

Artigo 16
IA.
Article 16
Adoption of Panel Reports
16.1
In order to provide sufficient time for the Members to consider panel reports, the reports shall not be
considered for adoption by the DSB until 20 days after the date they have been circulated to the
Members.
16.2
Members having objections to a panel report shall give written reasons to explain their objections for
circulation at least 10 days prior to the DSB meeting at which the panel report will be considered.
16.3
The parties to a dispute shall have the right to participate fully in the consideration of the panel report
by the DSB, and their views shall be fully recorded.
16.4
Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be
adopted at a DSB meeting (7) unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to
appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. If a party has notified its decision to
appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after completion
of the appeal. This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their
views on a panel report.
Footnote 7: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled within this period at a time that enables the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 4
of Article 16 to be met, a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
IB.
Artigo 16
Adoção de Relatórios de Grupos Especiais
16.1
A fim de que os Membros disponham de tempo suficiente para examinar os relatórios dos grupos
especiais, tais relatórios não serão examinados para efeito de aceitação pelo OSC até 20 dias após a data
de distribuição aos Membros.
16.2
Os Membros que opuserem alguma objeção ao relatório do grupo especial deverão apresentar por escrito
razões explicativas de suas objeções para serem distribuídas ao menos 10 dias antes da reunião do
OSC na qual o relatório do grupo especial será examinado.
16.3
As partes em controvérsia deverão ter direito de participar plenamente do exame do relatório do grupo
especial feito pelo OSC, e suas opiniões serão integralmente registradas.
16.4
Dentro dos 60 dias seguintes à data de distribuição de um relatório de um grupo especial a seus
Membros, o relatório será adotado em uma reunião do OSC11 a menos que uma das partes na
controvérsia notifique formalmente ao OSC de sua decisão de apelar ou que o OSC decida por
consenso não adotar o relatório. Se uma parte notificar sua decisão de apelar, o relatório do grupo
especial não deverá ser considerado para efeito de adoção pelo OSC até que seja concluído o
11
Se não houver uma reunião do OSC prevista dentro desse período em data que permita cumprimento das disposições dos parágrafos 1 e 4 do Artigo
16, será realizada uma reunião do OSC para tal fim.
90
processo de apelação. O referido procedimento de adoção não prejudicará o direito dos Membros de
expressar suas opiniões sobre o relatório do grupo especial.
IC.
Nenhum comentário.
IV.
1. Efeitos jurídicos da adoção de Relatórios de Painéis
a) “Geral: vinculação apenas às Partes na disputa”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages
II), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS8/AB/R, para. 14
Em Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, o Órgão de Apelação expressou o entendimento de que a adoção do
Relatório de um Painel obriga somente as Partes no litígio, revertendo a posição do Painel de que a
mencionada adoção constituiria prática subsequente num caso específico, sob o pálio do Artigo 31.3(b), da
Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados.
Para. 14. “Article XVI :1 of the WTO Agreement and paragraph 1(b) (iv) of the language of Annex 1A
incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement bring the legal history and experience under the
GATT 1947 into the new realm of the WTO in a way that ensures continuity and consistency in a smooth
transition from the GATT 1947 system. This affirms the importance to the Members of the WTO of the
experience acquired by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 - and acknowledges the
continuing relevance of that experience to the new trading system served by the WTO. Adopted panel reports
are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by subsequent panels. They create
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are
relevant to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute
between the parties to that dispute. In short, their character and their legal status have not been changed by the
coming into force of the WTO Agreement.”
2. Definição de “contexto”, previsto no Artigo 31.2, da Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos
Tratados - não-inclusão de Relatórios do Painel
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
on Certain Products from China (US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)), Demandante:
China, WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 325
Em US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), o Órgão de Apelação assentou que os Relatórios
de Painéis não fazem parte do conceito de “contexto”, para fins do Artigo 31(2), da Convenção de Viena
sobre o Direito dos Tratados.
Para. 325. “We note that the definition of “context” in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention makes no
mention of jurisprudence. Panel reports in previous disputes do not form part of the context of a term or
provision in the sense of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. Rather, the legal interpretation embodied in
adopted panel and Appellate Body reports become part and parcel of the WTO acquis and have to be taken
into account as such”.
91
a) “Conclusões do Painel que não são objeto de Apelação”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada –
Periodicals), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS31/AB/R, nota de rodapé 28
Em Canada – Periodicals, o Órgão de Apelação decidiu que eventual conclusão do Painel que não é incluída
na Apelação não pode ser adotada pelo Órgão de Apelação.
Nota de rodapé 28. “(...) a Panel finding that has not been specifically appealed in a particular case should
not be considered to have been endorsed by the Appellate Body. Such a finding may be examined by the
Appellate Body when the issue is raised properly in a subsequent appeal.”
b) “Relatórios de Painéis sobre o mesmo assunto em disputa paralela por outro demandante”
Relatório do Painel em India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products
(India - Patents), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS79/R, para. 7.30
Em India - Patents (EC), o Painel perfilhou a posição de que não estava vinculado pelo Relatório proferido
por outro Painel ou pelo Órgão de Apelação em um caso paralelo que cuidava do mesmo tema. Entrementes,
o Painel asseverou que levaria em consideração as conclusões e o raciocínio contidos nos Relatórios do
mencionado caso paralelo.
Para. 7.30. “[P]anels are not bound by previous decisions of panels or the Appellate Body even if the subjectmatter is the same. In examining dispute WT/DS79 we are not legally bound by the conclusions of the Panel
in dispute WT/DS50 as modified by the Appellate Body report. However, in the course of “normal dispute
settlement procedures” required under Article 10.4 of the DSU, we will take into account the conclusions and
reasoning in the Panel and Appellate Body reports in WT/DS50. Moreover, in our examination, we believe
that we should give significant weight to both Article 3.2 of the DSU, which stresses the role of the WTO
dispute settlement system in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system, and to the
need to avoid inconsistent rulings (which concern has been referred to by both parties). In our view, these
considerations form the basis of the requirement of the referral to the “original panel” wherever possible
under Article 10.4 of the DSU.”
c) “Conclusões do relatório de um Painel, que são revertidas por razões de ordem
processual/jurisdicional, podem servir como diretrizes em outro processo, desde que sejam
relevantes e persuasivas”
Relatório do Painel em Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from
Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.15
Em Guatemala - Cement II, o Painel aduziu que o Relatório do Painel, emitido em Guatemala - Cement I,
embora reformado pelo Órgão de Apelação, por motivos de cunho processual/jurisdicional, possuía status
similar de Relatórios de Painéis não adotados. Todavia, consignou que as conclusões alinhavadas no Relatório
reformado poderiam atuar como vetores no novo litígio a ser deslindado, se fossem tidas por relevantes e
persuasivas.
Para. 8.15. “We note that the Appellate Body ruled in Guatemala — Cement I that “the dispute was not
properly before the Panel”, and that it therefore could not consider any of the substantive issues raised in the
alternative by Guatemala. In other words, the Appellate Body found that the panel in Guatemala — Cement I
should never have reached the substance of the dispute. We therefore consider that the substantive findings of
92
the panel in Guatemala — Cement I are in this respect similar to those of unadopted panel reports, i.e., while
they have no legal status, they may nevertheless provide useful guidance to the extent that we consider them
relevant and persuasive. We recall in any event Mexico’s assertion that its arguments in this dispute are put
before us independently of their having been supported, or not, by a previous panel.”
d) “Necessidade de se averiguar as semelhanças e diferenças entre os fatos ventilados em processo
anterior e aqueles mencionados no processo em curso”
Relatório do Painel em European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from
Norway (EC - Salmon (Norway)), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.69
Em EC - Salmon (Norway), o Painel reconheceu a necessidade de se comparar os fatos, objeto de processo
anterior, com o então processo em curso. Para tanto, os painelistas entenderam por bem analisar a decisão
emitida pelo Painel anterior.
Para. 7.69. “[T]his very issue, and many of the arguments raised by Norway, have been previously addressed
by other Panels. Norway has not attempted to distinguish the views of those Panels from the circumstances of
this case. While we are not bound by the decisions of other Panels, we nonetheless consider it appropriate to
review those decisions to assess the similarities and differences in the underlying facts, and determine whether
the analysis of those Panels is helpful in our assessment of the arguments in this case.”
e) “Relatórios de Painéis e do Órgão de Apelação como resolução final para a controvérsia”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India)), Demandante: Índia,
WT/DS141/AB/RW, paras. 92-95
Em EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), o Órgão de Apelação explicitou que a adoção do Relatório de um
Painel deve ser encarado, pelas Partes, como uma resolução final para o litígio. Já em US - Shrimp (Article
21.5 - Malaysia) (para. 97), o Órgão de Apelação definiu que a adoção de seus Relatórios, pelo DSB,
igualmente deve ser tida como resolução final para o litígio.
Para. 92. “The issue raised in this appeal is similar to the issue we resolved in US - Shrimp (Article 21.5 Malaysia). In this appeal, however, the original panel’s finding on India’s claim under Article 3.5 relating to
“other factors” was not appealed in the original dispute. Accordingly, the finding of the original panel relating
to that claim was adopted by the DSB as part of a panel report, and, therefore, Article 17.14, which deals with
the adoption of Appellate Body Reports, does not dispose of the issue before us.”
Para. 93. “All the same, in our view, an unappealed finding included in a panel report that is adopted by the
DSB must be treated as a final resolution to a dispute between the parties in respect of the particular claim and
the specific component of a measure that is the subject of that claim. This conclusion is supported by Articles
16.4 and 19.1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21, and Article 22.1 of the DSU. Where a panel concludes that a
measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, that panel shall recommend, according to Article 19.1, that
the Member concerned bring that measure into conformity with that agreement. A panel report, including the
recommendations contained therein, shall be adopted by the DSB within the time period specified in Article
16.4 - unless appealed. Members are to comply with recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB
promptly, or within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21 of the
DSU. A Member that does not comply with the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB within
these time periods must face the consequences set out in Article 22.1, relating to compensation and
suspension of concessions. Thus, a reading of Article 16.4 and 19.1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21, and
93
Article 22.1 of the DSU, taken together, makes it abundantly clear that a panel finding which is not appealed,
and which is included in a panel report adopted by the DSB, must be accepted by the parties as a final
resolution to the dispute between them, in the same way and with the same finality as a finding included in an
Appellate Body Report adopted by the DSB - with respect to the particular claim and the specific component
of the measure that is the subject of the claim. Indeed, the European Communities and India agreed at the oral
hearing that both panel reports and Appellate Body Reports would have the same effect, in this respect, once
adopted by the DSB.”
Para. 94. “On this point, we recall that we resolved the question of the effect of findings adopted by the DSB
as part of a panel report in the same vein in Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 - US). In that implementation
dispute, we relied on Article 3.2 of the DSU, which emphasizes the need for security and predictability in the
trading system, and on Article 3.3 of the DSU, which stresses the necessity for the prompt settlement of
disputes. There, we treated certain findings of the original panel that had not been appealed in the original
proceedings, and that had been adopted by the DSB, as a final resolution to the dispute between the parties in
respect of the particular claim and the specific component of the measure that was the subject of the claim.
We observed there that “Mexico seems to seek to have us revisit the original panel report”, and added that:
(…) the original panel report, regarding the initial measure (SECOFI’s original
determination), has been adopted and that these Article 21.5 proceedings concern a
subsequent measure (SECOFI’s redetermination). We also note that Mexico did not
appeal the original panel’s report, and that Articles 3.2 and 3.3 of the DSU reflect the
importance to the multilateral trading system of security, predictability and the prompt
settlement of disputes. We see no basis for us to examine the original panel’s treatment
of the alleged restraint agreement. (original italics)
Para. 95. “We, therefore, agree with the Panel in this dispute that:
(…) the same principle [as that expressed in Article 17.14] applies to those aspects of
the Panel’s report that are not appealed and are thus not addressed by the Appellate
Body. Thus, the portions of the original Report of the Panel that are not appealed,
together with the Appellate Body report resolving the issues appealed, must, in our
view, be considered as the final resolution of the dispute, and must be treated as such
by the parties, and by us, in this proceeding. (footnote omitted)” (notas de rodapé
removidas).
3. Artigo 16.4
a) “Extensão do prazo de sessenta dias”
(i) Extensão do período, proposta pelas Comunidades Europeias, em relação a três disputas
Minutas do Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias da reunião de 26 de julho de 1999, WT/DSB/M/65, pp.
19 e 20
O DSB, em julho de 1999, acatou a proposta das Comunidades Europeias de ampliação do período de
sessenta dias, previsto no Artigo 16.4. No encontro do DSB, a sugestão das Comunidades Europeias ficou
assim registrada:
Pág. 19. “The representative of the European Communities drew attention to the fact that the time-periods
under Article 16.4 of the DSU in respect of three Reports of Panels in which the EC was a complainant would
expire in August. These Panel Reports were the following: (i) “Chile -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages”
(WT/DS87/R - WT/ DS110/R); (ii) “Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear”
(WT/DS121/R); and (iii) “Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Certain Dairy Products” (WT/DS98/R).
94
In order to comply with the requirements of Article 16.4, the EC would have to request three special DSB
meetings during the month of August. To avoid problems which such meetings could create for the WTO’s
work, the EC would be prepared to accept the postponement of consideration of these Panel Reports and the
extension of the corresponding time-periods for appeal to a future meeting of the DSB at the beginning of
September. He underlined that such extension would be granted by the DSB on the understanding that the
rights of the parties to the disputes with respect to adoption or appeal of these Panel Reports were preserved,
as if such adoption had been requested within the 60-day period specified in Article 16.4 of the DSU. In order
to do so it would be necessary for the DSB to agree by consensus to extend the time-periods in question”.
b) “Ampliação do prazo – termo do Acordo feito pelas Partes”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Export
Subsidies on Sugar), Demandante: Austrália, WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 5
Em EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, o DSB aceitou o pedido conjunto das Partes no sentido do aumento do
período de sessenta dias. Conforme o acordo entre as Partes (WT/DS265/24, WT/DS266/24 e WT/DS283/5):
“1. In order to take account of the end of year period, and to avoid inconveniencing the appeal procedure,
the above parties agree that the 60 day time-period in Article 16.4 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) as applicable to the above disputes will be extended
to 31 January 2005, and that the agreement of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to this extension will be
sought at a meeting of the DSB to be requested for 13 December 2004.
2. This extension is agreed on the understanding that the rights of the parties to the disputes with respect to
adoption or appeal of the panel reports are preserved, as if such adoption or appeal had been requested within
the 60 days specified in Article 16.4 of the DSU.
3. The European Communities (EC) will file its notice of appeal of the panel reports in these disputes on 13
January 2005, provided the DSB agreement set out in paragraph 1 is obtained.
4.
If for any reason the EC does not file its notice of appeal on 13 January 2005, the complainants may,
individually or jointly, request a DSB meeting for adoption of the panel reports within the extended 60 day
period.
5. The parties also agree that the complainants will request a second meeting of the DSB for 14 December
2004 for the adoption of the panel reports within the original 60 day period should this prove necessary, but
that this request will be withdrawn should the DSB agreement set out in paragraph 1 above be obtained”.
c) “Extensão do período de sessenta dias – acordo procedimental entre as Partes”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 6
Em Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, o DSB acolheu outro acordo entre as Partes para estender o prazo contido no
Artigo 16.4 do DSU. Neste caso, o ajuste entre demandante e demandado deu-se assim (WT/DS332/8):
“1. In order to take into account certain scheduling difficulties concerning the appeal procedure, the above
parties agree that the 60 day time-period in Article 16.4 of Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) as applicable to the above dispute will be extended to 20 September 2007,
95
and that a decision of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) on this extension will be sought at a meeting of the
DSB to be requested for 10 August 2007.
2. This extension is agreed on the understanding that the rights of the parties to the dispute with respect to
adoption or appeal of the panel report are preserved, as if such adoption or appeal had been requested within
60 days specified in Article 16.4 of the DSU.
3.
The European Communities (EC) will file its notice of appeal of the panel report in this dispute on 3
September 2007, provided the DSB decision set out in paragraph 1 is obtained.
4. If for any reason the EC does not file its notice of appeal on 3 September 2007, the parties may request a
DSB meeting for adoption of the panel report within the extended period”.
d) “Majoração do período de sessenta dias – carga de trabalho excessiva do Órgão de Apelação”
Em vários lítigios, o período em questão foi majorado por causa de diversas apelações que assoberbavam o
Órgão de Apelação, como sucedeu em Thailand - Cigarettes (Philippines) (WT/DS371/7 e WT/DSB/M/290,
paras. 53-58).
e) “Circunvenção do interstício de sessenta dias”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines (EC Sardines), Demandante: Peru, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 147
Em EC - Sardines, as Comunidades Europeias tinham apresentado uma apelação. Todavia, acabaram
retirando aludida apelação sob a condição de uma outra, que foi ofertada no mesmo dia, ser apreciada. Apesar
do protesto da delegação peruana, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que o comportamento de Bruxelas era
aceitável. Com efeito, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que poderia haver situações que implicariam burla do
interregno de sessenta dias.
Para. 147. “[W]e believe there are circumstances that, although not constituting ‘abusive practices’ would be
in violation of the DSU, and would, thus, compel us to disallow the conditional withdrawal of a notice of
appeal as well as the filing of a replacement notice. For example, if the conditional withdrawal or the filing of
a new notice were to take place after the 60-day deadline in Article 16.4 of the DSU for adoption of panel
reports, this would effectively circumvent the requirement to file appeals within 60 days of circulation of
panel reports. In such circumstances, we would reject the conditional withdrawal and the new notice of
appeal.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 16 do DSU versa acerca da adoção dos Relatórios dos Painéis. Este Artigo, e a criação do Órgão de
Apelação, formam os dois pilares do processo de judicialização do sistema GATT/OMC, o qual almeja
conferir segurança e previsibilidade nas relações comerciais internacionais. Conforme o texto do Artigo:
(…) reversed the consensus principle. The provision requires that a panel report be
adopted unless the Dispute Settlement Body decides by consensus not to adopt the
report. In other words, the report becomes binding unless the winner of the case votes
against its own victory, which is unlikely to occur (…) Article 16 of the DSU
constitutes a further shift from the political and diplomatic conception of GATT/WTO
law towards a legalistic model.
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Na contenda Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou que a adoção do relatório de um
Painel não se consubstancia em prática subsequente, esta prevista no Artigo 31.3(b), da Convenção de Viena
sobre o Direito dos Tratados. Por sinal, este dispositivo específico da convenção em testilha reza que:
together with the context, there shall be taken into account any subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation. This is a most important element in the interpretation of any treaty, and
reference to practice is well established in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.
O entendimento supra esposado pelo Órgão de Apelação denota-se acertado, posto que o art. 31.3(b) em tela
refere-se a “acordo das partes”, coisa que não está presente no relatório do Painel, que tem a finalidade de
colocar término a um litígio. Ademais, a adoção do relatório do Painel obriga somente as partes na disputa e
não os membros da OMC, que são estranhos ao processo deslindado.
O Órgão de Apelação, na controvérsia US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), afirmou que
não estão inseridos na definição de “contexto”, do art. 31(2), da Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos
Tratados, os relatórios dos Painéis. A posição do Órgão de Apelação está correta, na medida em que tãosomente os demandantes estão adstritos aos relatórios dos Painéis e que estes (relatórios) são adotados depois
da conclusão do tratado, enquanto que o art. 31(2), da convenção acima mencionada, reporta-se a “qualquer
acordo relativo ao tratado e feito entre todas as partes por ocasião da conclusão do tratado” ou a “qualquer
instrumento estabelecido por uma ou várias partes por ocasião da conclusão do tratado e aceito pelas outras
partes como instrumento relativo ao tratado”. Estes relatórios de Painéis podem, contudo, fazer parte do
chamado “GATT acquis”, que é o conjunto de textos, entendimentos e práticas, do antigo GATT, sendo,
portanto, vetores na atuação tanto de Painéis instalados após o advento da OMC como do próprio Órgão de
Apelação.
Finalmente, é útil salientar que o período de sessenta dias, inserido no art. 16.4, do DSU, tem, às
vezes, sido objeto de ampliação devido a dois fatores principais: para se evitarem várias reuniões do OSC ou
para se esperar o enxugamento da pauta do Órgão de Apelação, que pode, eventualmente, ter excesso de casos
para julgar.
97
Artigo 17
IA.
Article 17
Appellate Review
Standing Appellate Body
17.1
A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall hear appeals
from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case.
Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in the
working procedures of the Appellate Body.
17.2
The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year term, and each person
may be reappointed once. However, the terms of three of the seven persons appointed immediately
after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall expire at the end of two years, to be determined
by lot. Vacancies shall be filled as they arise. A person appointed to replace a person whose term of
office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of the predecessor's term.
17.3
The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in
law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be
unaffiliated with any government. The Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative of
membership in the WTO. All persons serving on the Appellate Body shall be available at all times
and on short notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities
of the WTO. They shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct
or indirect conflict of interest.
17.4
Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel report. Third parties which have
notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may
make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body.
17.5
As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party to the dispute
formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report. In fixing its
timetable the Appellate Body shall take into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if
relevant. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall
inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within
which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.
17.6
An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel.
17.7
The Appellate Body shall be provided with appropriate administrative and legal support as it requires.
17.8
The expenses of persons serving on the Appellate Body, including travel and subsistence allowance,
shall be met from the WTO budget in accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General Council,
based on recommendations of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
Procedures for Appellate Review
17.9
Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of
the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the Members for their information.
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17.10 The proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be confidential. The reports of the Appellate Body shall
be drafted without the presence of the parties to the dispute and in the light of the information
provided and the statements made.
17.11 Opinions expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals serving on the Appellate Body shall
be anonymous.
17.12 The Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during the
appellate proceeding.
17.13 The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.
Adoption of Appellate Body Reports
17.14 An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to
the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30
days following its circulation to the Members (8).This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the
right of Members to express their views on an Appellate Body report.
Footnote 8: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
IB.
Órgão Permanente de Apelação
17.1
O OSC constituirá um Órgão Permanente de Apelação, que receberá as apelações das decisões
dos grupos especiais. Será composto por sete pessoas, três das quais atuarão em cada caso. Os
integrantes do Órgão de Apelação atuarão em alternância. Tal alternância deverá ser determinada pelos
procedimentos do Órgão de Apelação.
17.2
O OSC nomeará os integrantes do Órgão de Apelação para períodos de quatro anos, e poderá renovar
por uma vez o mandato de cada um dos integrantes. Contudo, os mandatos de três das sete pessoas
nomeadas imediatamente após a entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC, que serão
escolhidas por sorteio, expirará ao final de dois anos. As vagas serão preenchidas à medida que forem
sendo abertas. A pessoa nomeada para substituir outra cujo mandato não tenha expirado exercerá
o cargo durante o período que reste até a conclusão do referido mandato.
17.3
O Órgão de Apelação será composto de pessoas de reconhecida competência, com experiência
comprovada em direito, comércio internacional e nos assuntos tratados pelos acordos abrangidos
em geral. Tais pessoas não deverão ter vínculos com nenhum governo. A composição do Órgão de
Apelação deverá ser largamente representativa da composição da OMC. Todas as pessoas integrantes
do Órgão de Apelação deverão estar disponíveis permanentemente e em breve espaço de tempo, e
deverão manter-se a par das atividades de solução de controvérsias e das demais atividades
pertinentes da OMC. Não deverão participar do exame de quaisquer controvérsias que possam gerar
conflito de interesses direto ou indireto.
17.4
Apenas as partes em controvérsia, excluindo-se terceiros interessados, poderão recorrer do
relatório do grupo especial. Terceiros interessados que tenham notificado o OSC sobre interesse
substancial consoante o parágrafo 2 do Artigo 10 poderão apresentar comunicações escritas ao Órgão
de Apelação e poderão ser por ele ouvidos.
17.5
Como regra geral, o procedimento não deverá exceder 60 dias contados a partir da data em que uma
parte em controvérsia notifique formalmente sua decisão de apelar até a data em que o Órgão de
Apelação distribua seu relatório. Ao determinar seu calendário, o Órgão de Apelação deverá
99
levar em conta as disposições do parágrafo 9 do Artigo 4, se pertinente. Quando o Órgão de Apelação
entender que não poderá apresentar seu relatório em 60 dias, deverá informar por escrito ao OSC das
razões do atraso, juntamente com uma estimativa do prazo dentro do qual poderá concluir o relatório.
Em caso algum o procedimento poderá exceder a 90 dias.
17.6
A apelação deverá limitar-se às questões de direito tratadas pelo relatório do grupo especial e às
interpretações jurídicas por ele formuladas.
17.7
O Órgão de Apelação deverá receber a necessária assistência administrativa e legal.
17.8
As despesas dos integrantes do Órgão de Apelação, incluindo gastos de viagem e diárias, serão
cobertas pelo orçamento da OMC de acordo com critérios a serem adotados pelo Conselho Geral,
baseado em recomendações do Comitê de Orçamento, Finanças e Administração.
Procedimentos do de Apelação
17.9
O Órgão de Apelação, em consulta com o Presidente do OSC e com o Diretor Geral, fixará seus
procedimentos de trabalho e os comunicará aos Membros para informação.
17.10
Os trabalhos do Órgão de Apelação serão confidenciais. Os relatórios do Órgão de Apelação serão
redigidos sem a presença das partes em controvérsia e à luz das informações recebidas e das
declarações apresentadas.
17.11 As opiniões expressas no relatório do Órgão de Apelação por seus integrantes serão
anônimas.
17.12 O Órgão de Apelação examinará cada uma das questões pleiteadas em conformidade com
oparágrafo 6 durante o procedimento de apelação.
17.13 O Órgão de Apelação poderá confirmar, modificar ou revogar as conclusões e decisões jurídicas do
grupo especial.
Adoção do Relatório do Órgão de Apelação
17.14
Os relatórios do Órgão de Apelação serão adotados pelo OSC e aceitos sem restrições pelas partes em
controvérsia a menos que o OSC decida por consenso não adotar o relatório do Órgão de Apelação
dentro do prazo de 30 dias contados a partir da sua distribuição aos Membros 12. Este
procedimento de adoção não prejudicará o direito dos Membros de expor suas opiniões sobre o
relatório do Órgão de Apelação.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
12
Caso não esteja prevista reunião do DSB durante esse perído, será realizada uma reunião do DSB para tal fim.
100

Artigo 18
IA.
Article 18
Communications with the Panel or Appellate Body
18.1
There shall be no ex parte communications with the panel or Appellate Body concerning matters
under consideration by the panel or Appellate Body.
18.2
Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential, but shall be
made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a
dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as
confidential information submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that
Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member,
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could
be disclosed to the public.
IB.
Artigo 18
Comunicações com o Grupo Especial ou o Órgão de Apelação
18.1
Não haverá comunicação ex parte com o grupo especial ou com o Órgão de Apelação com relação a
assuntos submetidos à consideração do grupo especial ou do Órgão de Apelação.
18.2
As comunicações escritas com o grupo especial ou com o Órgão de Apelação deverão ser tratadas
com confidencialidade, mas deverão estar à disposição das partes em controvérsia. Nenhuma das
disposições do presente Entendimento deverá impedir uma das partes em controvérsia de publicar suas
próprias posições. Os Membros deverão considerar confidenciais as informações fornecidas por outro
Membro ao grupo especial ou ao Órgão de Apelação para as quais o referido Membro tenha dado a
classificação de confidencial. Uma parte em controvérsia deverá, a pedido de um Membro, fornecer
um resumo não-confidencial das informações contidas em sua comunicação escrita que possa ser
tornado público.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
101

Artigo 19
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Article 19
Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations
19.1
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered
agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned (9) bring the measure into conformity with
that agreement (10). In addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest
ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations.
Footnote 9: The “Member concerned” is the party to the dispute to which the panel or Appellate Body recommendations are directed.
Footnote 10: With respect to recommendations in cases not involving a violation of GATT 1994 or any other covered agreement, see
Article 26.
IB.
Artigo 19
Recomendações dos Grupos Especiais e do Órgão de Apelação
19.1
Quando um grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação concluir que uma medida é incompatível com um
acordo abrangido, deverá recomendar que o Membro interessado13 (3) torne a medida compatível com
o acordo14. Além de suas recomendações, o grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação poderá sugerir a
maneira pela qual o Membro interessado poderá implementar as recomendações.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
I.C – Comentários sobre a tradução
Nada a observar.
II. Interpretação e aplicação do artigo 19.1
1. “um grupo especial ou o órgão de Apelação...deverá recomendar… poderá sugerir”
(i) norma obrigatória vs. norma permissiva
O “Membro interessado” é a parte em controvérsia à qual serão dirigidas as recomendações do grupo especial ou do Órgão de Apelação.
Com relação às recomendações nos casos em que não haja infração das disposições do GATT 1994 nem de nenhum outro acordo abrangido, vide
Artigo 26.
13
14
102
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – OCTG Sunset (21.5) (Reclamante: Comunidades
Europeias), paras. 173; 182 (WT/DS268/AB/RW)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação esclarece a distinção entre a primeira e a segunda frases do Artigo
19.1, observando que a primeira delas requer dos painéis uma conduta – a recomendação – enquanto a segunda
faculta uma conduta – a sugestão – conferindo um “direito discricionário”.
173. We next address the provisions of the DSU referred to by the Panel and the participants to examine
whether they provide us with contextual guidance. We note that the requirement in Article 19.1, first sentence,
to “bring the measure into conformity” does not indicate that the choice of means of implementation is
confined to withdrawal of the measure that was found to be WTO-inconsistent. Article 19.1, second sentence,
confers authority on panels and the Appellate Body to suggest “ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations”, which implies that several “ways” of implementation may be possible.
(…)
182. The first sentence of Article 19.1 requires panels or the Appellate Body, if they find the challenged
measure to be inconsistent with a provision of the covered agreements, to recommend that the respondent
Member bring its measure into conformity with that agreement. The second sentence confers a discretionary
right, authorizing panels and the Appellate Body to suggest ways in which those recommendations may be
implemented. The Appellate Body has explained that the second sentence of Article 19.1 “does not oblige
panels to make ... a suggestion”.(381)
Footnote 381: Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, para.
189.
(ii) duração da recomendação
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bananas (21.5 II) (Reclamante: Equador), EC – Bananas
(21.5) (Reclamante: EUA), para. 273 (WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que o valor da recomendação efetuada pelo OSC, a partir
dos relatórios do Painel e do Órgão de Apelação, permanence em vigor até que ocorra o cumprimento material
dessa recomendação pela Parte afetada.
273. Furthermore, we consider that the Panel's statement that the “original DSB recommendations and rulings
in this dispute remain operative” was not incorrect. The DSB recommendations and rulings from the original
proceedings remain in effect until the European Communities brings itself into substantive compliance. The
statement by the Panel does not in any way affect the legal status of the DSB recommendations and rulings in
the original dispute. We see no error in the Panel's statement in paragraph 8.13 of the US Panel Report. We
therefore find that the Panel did not err in making findings with respect to a measure that had ceased to exist
subsequent to the establishment of the Panel, but before the Panel issued its Report.
2. “torne a medida compatível com o acordo”
(i) medida em vigor
Relatório do Painel no caso India – Autos (Reclamante: Estados Unidos e Comunidades Europeias),
para. 8.15 (WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R)
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel esclarece o comportamento normalmente exigido dos painéis nos casos usuais,
nos quais uma medida em vigor contraria os acordos. Nesses casos, não é necessário análise material mais
profunda: o Painel recomenda diretamente ao Membro que torne a medida compatível com o acordo violado.
8.15 This provision thus envisages a situation where a violation is in existence. Indeed, this formulation
reflects the usual situation which panels encounter, examining a matter which does not significantly evolve in
the course of the proceedings. It is only natural in such circumstances for a panel, following a finding that a
103
measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, to simply recommend, without the need for any further
substantive analysis, that this measure be brought into conformity with that Agreement.
(ii) Medida não mais em vigor
(21.5) (Reclamante: EUA), paras. 271 (WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação especificou que, embora não possa dazer recomendações em relação
a medidas não mais em vigor, isso não impede o Painel de chegar a conclusões jurídicas sobre essas mesmas
medidas, e incluí-las no relatório.
271. We turn next to the European Communities' allegation that the Panel erred in making a recommendation
with respect to an expired measure. We recall that the Appellate Body has distinguished the question whether
a panel can make a finding concerning an expired measure from the question whether a panel can make a
recommendation relating to an expired measure. In US – Certain EC Products, the Appellate Body reversed
the panel's decision to make a recommendation pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU on the grounds that the
panel had already found that the measure at issue in that dispute had expired.(328) The Appellate Body
confirmed, in US – Upland Cotton, that the fact that a measure has expired may affect what recommendation a
panel may make, but it is not dispositive of the question whether a panel can make findings relating to an
expired measure.(329)
Footnote 328: Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 81.
Footnote 329: Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 272.
(iii) Relevância de fatos ocorridos durante o procedimento
Relatório do Painel no caso India – Autos (Reclamante: Estados Unidos e Comunidades Europeias),
para. 8.27; 8.28 (WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R)
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel, levado pela obrigação de fazer um exame objetivo da controvérsia, considerou
necessário levar em conta os eventos ocorridos durante o curso da controvérsia para decider sobre se deveria
ou não fazer uma recomendação nos termos do Artigo 19.1.
8.27. In the circumstances of the case, the respondent itself has requested that the events which occurred in
the course of the proceedings be taken into account in the context of making the recommendations under
Article 19.1. The complainants, while they had not specifically requested the Panel to consider these issues at
this stage of its analysis, did make requests for findings which called for these subsequent events to be taken
into account, in requesting the Panel to find that the measures had “remained” in violation subsequent to 1
April.
8.28. In light of the foregoing, the Panel felt that it would not be making an “objective assessment of the
matter before it”, or assisting the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the DSU in accordance with
Article 11 of the DSU, had it chosen not to address the impact of events having taken place in the course of the
proceedings, in assessing the appropriateness of making a recommendation under Article 19.1 of the DSU.
2. “o grupo especial ou o órgão de Apelação poderá sugerir a maneira pela qual o Membro interessado poderá
implementar as recomendações.”
(i) Discricionariedade do grupo especial para sugerir maneiras de implementação
104
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – Zeroing (21.5) (Reclamante: Comunidades Europeias),
para 466 (WT/DS294/AB/RW)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou o direito discricionário dos painéis e do Órgão de
Apelação de sugerir aos Membros formas de implementar as recomendações e decisões.
466. The second sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU confers a discretionary right, authorizing panels and the
Appellate Body to suggest ways in which the recommendations and rulings could be implemented. The
Appellate Body observed in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II), that “[s]uggestions made by panels
or the Appellate Body may provide useful guidance and assistance to Members and facilitate implementation
of DSB recommendations and rulings, particularly in complex cases.”(598)
Footnote 598: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III
(Article 21.5 – US), para. 325.
Relatório do Painel no caso US – Softwood Lumber (Reclamante: Canadá), para. 8.6 (WT/DS264/R)
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel concluiu que o direito discricionário de sugerir maneiras de implementar os
acordos inclui o direito de não fazer nenhuma sugestão.
8.6
By virtue of Article 19.1, panels have discretion (“may”) to suggest ways in which a Member could
implement the relevant recommendation. However, a panel is not required to make a suggestion should it not
deem it appropriate to do so. We do not consider it appropriate to make any recommendation to the Dispute
Settlement Body in this regard.
(ii) Escolha pelo membro dos meios de implementação
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – OCTG Sunset (21.5) (Reclamante: Comunidades
Europeias), para. 173 (WT/DS268/AB/RW)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que há uma pluralidade de meios para os Membros de
tornar a medida compatível com os acordos, não é necessária a remoção da medida em questão.
173. We next address the provisions of the DSU referred to by the Panel and the participants to examine
whether they provide us with contextual guidance. We note that the requirement in Article 19.1, first sentence,
to “bring the measure into conformity” does not indicate that the choice of means of implementation is
confined to withdrawal of the measure that was found to be WTO-inconsistent. Article 19.1, second sentence,
confers authority on panels and the Appellate Body to suggest “ways in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations”, which implies that several “ways” of implementation may be possible.(367)
The obligation under Article 21.3 that the Member concerned “inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of
implementation” also suggests that alternative means of implementation may exist and that the choice belongs,
in principle, to the Member. (…)
Footnote 367: We note that Article 3.7 of the DSU states that “the first objective of the dispute settlement
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures” found to be WTO-inconsistent. In our view,
this does not exclude that the inconsistent measure to be withdrawn can be brought into compliance by
modifying or replacing it with a revised measure. See also Panel Report, para. 7.54.
(iii) Valor jurídico das sugestões de implementação
(21.5) (Reclamante: EUA), paras. 321-324 (WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA)
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação determinou o valor jurídico das sugestões feitas pelo Painel ou pelo Órgão
de Apelação nos termos do Artigo 19.1. Em primeiro lugar, essas sugestões não são vinculantes para o
105
Membro, que pode escolher implementar de outra forma a recomendação de tornar suas medidas compatíveis
com os acordos. Em segundo lugar, essas sugestões não são o objeto de análise do painel de implementação,
que se ocupará das medidas concretas adotadas pelo Membro para cumprir os acordos, e não nos meios
utilizados. Em terceiro lugar e como consequência disso, o fato de um Membro declarar ter seguido a sugestão
aprovada pelo OSC não lhe imuniza contra o escrutínio, no momento do painel de implementação, das
medidas concretamente adotadas; e o fato de o Membro ter efetivamente seguido essas sugestões não gera
presunção de cumprimento material dos acordos, cumprimento que deve ser verificado integralmente pelo
painel de implementação independente de ter havido sugestões por parte do painel original.
321. Suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU regarding ways of
implementation form part of panel or Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB in previous proceedings.
The DSU does not expressly address the question of the legal status of suggestions that form part of a report
adopted by the DSB, nor does it specify the legal consequences when a Member chooses to implement DSB
recommendations and rulings by following a suggestion for implementation. A Member may choose whether
or not to follow a suggestion. The use of the term “could” in Article 19.1 clarifies that Members are not
obliged to follow suggestions for implementation.
322. Suggestions made pursuant to Article 19.1 are not in themselves the subject of review by a compliance
panel. Article 21.5 of the DSU only refers to “measures taken to comply with the recommendations and
rulings” and not to measures taken to comply with suggestions issued pursuant to the second sentence of
Article 19.1. (…)
323. We consider that suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may, if correctly and fully
implemented, lead to compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. However, full compliance
with DSB rulings and WTO-consistency of the measures actually taken to comply cannot be presumed simply
because a Member declares that its measures taken to comply conform to a suggestion made under Article
19.1 of the DSU. As pointed out above, Article 21.5 proceedings focus on the measure actually taken to
comply, not the ways in which the Member could implement the recommendations and rulings. Following a
suggestion does not guarantee substantive compliance with the recommendations and rulings by the DSB.
Whether such compliance has been achieved needs to be determined through Article 21.5 proceedings. The
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report by the DSB makes the recommendations and rulings therein
binding upon the parties. As noted earlier, such adoption by the DSB does not make suggestions for
implementation binding upon the parties (especially, where, as in this case, the first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel
made several suggestions); nor does DSB adoption mean that actions taken to implement suggestions must be
presumed to be WTO-consistent or shielded from review in Article 21.5 proceedings.
324. (…) We do not consider that, as a consequence of the DSB adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report
containing a suggestion, the measure implementing such a suggestion can be presumed to be WTOconsistent.(399) In our view, a DSU rule that establishes a legal presumption of conformity should do so in
clear and unambiguous terms.(400) Therefore, we do not see how the terms in Article 19.1, second sentence,
“imply” a legal presumption, particularly as this provision has to be read in the context of Article 21.5, which
entitles Members to the review of implementation measures in compliance proceedings.
Footnote 399: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 90 (Ecuador).
Footnote 400: For example, Article 3.8 of the DSU, which establishes a legal presumption that a breach of
WTO rules constitutes nullification or impairment, does so in clear and unambiguous terms. Similarly, a legal
presumption of conformity with the GATT 1994 is established in clear and unambiguous terms by Article 2.4
of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures for measures conforming to that
Agreement.
(iv) Supervisão da implementação
Relatório do Painel no caso Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (Reclamante: Canadá), para. 7.2-7.3 (WT/DS46/RW)
106
Neste caso, o Painel recusou-se a utilizar o seu direito de fazer uma sugestão nos termos do Artigo 19.1 para
sugerir um procedimento de verificação bilateral do cumprimento dos acordos, alegando que o essa
possibilidade não está claramente dada pelo Artigo 19.1.
7.2.
Canada requests that we suggest, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the parties develop
mechanisms that would allow Canada to verify compliance with the original recommendation of the DSB.
Canada notes that Brazil has a reciprocal interest in verifying Canada's compliance in a parallel dispute,
Canada – Aircraft.(99) Canada emphasises that it is not seeking a continuing role for the Panel in proposing
such verification procedures, nor is it requesting that we impose such procedures. Brazil responds that,
although it does not in principle oppose an agreement with Canada on reciprocal transparency, it does not
consider that it is an appropriate matter for a suggestion under Article 19.1 of the DSU, but is better left to be
agreed by the parties. Brazil notes that any such agreement would have to involve balanced and truly
reciprocal offers of transparency.
7.3.
We note that Article 19.1 provides that “the panel . . . may suggest ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendation”. In our view, Article 19.1 appears to envision suggestions
regarding what could be done to a measure to bring it into conformity or, in case of a recommendation under
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, what could be done to “withdraw” the prohibited subsidy. It is not clear if
Article 19.1 also addresses issues of surveillance of those steps. That said, any agreement that WTO Members
might reach among themselves to improve transparency regarding the implementation of WTO obligations can
only be encouraged.
Footnote 99: First Submission of Canada, para. 45.
III. Comentários
A primeira frase do Artigo 19.1 veicula uma norma obrigatória para os órgãos de adjudicação da OMC. Se
entenderem que há incompatibilidade entre uma medida adotada por um Membro e os acordos da OMC, o
painel e o OA estão obrigados a recomendar que a medida em questão seja tornada compatível com os
acordos. Não lhes cabe, portanto, julgamento de oportunidade. A partir do momento em que uma medida em
vigor for considerada incompatível com os acordos, deverá constar do relatório uma recomendação – genérica
– de que o Membro “torne a medida compatível com o acordo”.
A recomendação genérica produz para o Membro uma obrigação de resultado. Na fase de implementação,
serão consideradas como tendo descumprido as recomendações e decisões do OSC quaisquer medidas que não
tenham levado à compatibilidade das políticas do Membro com os acordos.
A incompatibilidade das medidas em questão deve ser avaliada no momento da elaboração do relatório. Caso a
medida seja alterada em meio ao procedimento, nenhuma recomendação deverá ser feita. Entretanto, diversos
painéis têm considerado que isso não os impede de chegar a decisões/conclusões (“findings”) sobre a
conformidade das medidas com os acordos. Essa interpretação foi chancelada pelo OA em seu relatório no
caso EUA – Algodão.
Além de veicular uma norma obrigatória, o Artigo 19.1 contém em sua segunda frase uma norma permissiva:
os órgãos de adjudicação poderão sugerir uma maneira de implementar as recomendações. Trata-se de um
direito discricionário, de uma maneira de os órgãos em questão assistirem os Membros na implementação dos
relatórios. O painel e o OA, entretanto, permanecem obrigados a motivar sua decisão, considerando
expressamente os argumentos oferecidos pelos Membros ao solicitar uma sugestão.
A eventual sugestão fornecida pelos órgãos de adjudicação não é vinculante para as partes, nem para o painel
de implementação (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em CE – Bananas, 21.5 II). Em outras palavras, nem o
Membro tem obrigatoriamente de seguir a sugestão contida no relatório, nem o fato de o Membro tê-la seguido
107
vincula os órgãos de adjudicação. Um Membro que tenha seguido a sugestão contida no relatório, mas cujas
políticas permaneçam incompatíveis com os acordos ao fim do prazo razoável de tempo, terá descumprido as
decisões e recomendações do OSC e estará sujeito às consequências jurídicas correspondentes.
Por outro lado, ainda que haja a sugestão, a escolha entre os diversos meios de implementar um relatório
permanece sendo dos próprios Membros. Assim, um Membro que adote medidas diferentes daquelas sugeridas
pelo órgão de adjudicação, mas que levem à compatibilidade entre suas políticas e os acordos, será
considerado como tendo cumprido integralmente as decisões e recomendações do OSC.
Para o Artigo 19.2, vejam-se a jurisprudência e os comentários ao Artigo 3.2 do ESC.
1. Artigo 19.1
a) “Um grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação ... deverá recomendar … poderá sugerir”
(i) norma obrigatória vs. norma permissiva
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Measures on
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - OCTG Sunset (21.5)), Demandante: Comunidades
Europeias, WT/DS268/AB/RW, paras. 173 e 182
Nessa controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação esclarece a distinção entre a primeira e a segunda frase do Artigo
19.1, observando que a primeira delas requer dos Painéis uma conduta – a recomendação; enquanto a
segunda faculta uma conduta – a sugestão – conferindo um “direito discricionário”.
Para. 173. “We next address the provisions of the DSU referred to by the Panel and the participants to
examine whether they provide us with contextual guidance. We note that the requirement in Article 19.1, first
sentence, to “bring the measure into conformity” does not indicate that the choice of means of implementation
is confined to withdrawal of the measure that was found to be WTO-inconsistent. Article 19.1, second
sentence, confers authority on panels and the Appellate Body to suggest “ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendations”, which implies that several “ways” of implementation may
be possible.”
Para. 182. “The first sentence of Article 19.1 requires panels or the Appellate Body, if they find the
challenged measure to be inconsistent with a provision of the covered agreements, to recommend that the
respondent Member bring its measure into conformity with that agreement. The second sentence confers a
discretionary right, authorizing panels and the Appellate Body to suggest ways in which those
recommendations may be implemented. The Appellate Body has explained that the second sentence of Article
19.1 “does not oblige panels to make ... a suggestion”. (11)
(ii) duração da recomendação
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas (21.5 II)), Demandantes: Equador e EUA,
WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 27
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que o valor da recomendação efetuada pelo DSB, a
partir dos Relatórios do Painel e do Órgão de Apelação, permanence em vigor até que ocorra o
cumprimento material dessa recomendação pela Parte afetada.
108
Para. 273. “Furthermore, we consider that the Panel's statement that the “original DSB recommendations and
rulings in this dispute remain operative” was not incorrect. The DSB recommendations and rulings from the
original proceedings remain in effect until the European Communities brings itself into substantive
compliance. The statement by the Panel does not in any way affect the legal status of the DSB
recommendations and rulings in the original dispute. We see no error in the Panel's statement in paragraph
8.13 of the US Panel Report. We therefore find that the Panel did not erred in making findings with respect to
a measure that had ceased to exist subsequent to the establishment of the Panel, but before the Panel issued its
Report.”
b) “Torne a medida compatível com o Acordo”
(i) medida em vigor
Relatório do Painel no litígio India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India - Autos),
Demandantes: EUA e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS146/R e WT/DS175/R, para. 8.15
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel esclarece o comportamento normalmente exigido dos Painéis nos casos usuais,
em que uma medida em vigor contraria os Acordos. Nesses casos, não é necessário empreender uma análise
material mais profunda: o Painel recomenda diretamente ao Membro que torne a medida compatível com o
Acordo violado.
Para. 8.15. “This provision thus envisages a situation where a violation is in existence. Indeed, this
formulation reflects the usual situation which panels encounter, examining a matter which does not
significantly evolve in the course of the proceedings. It is only natural in such circumstances for a panel,
following a finding that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, to simply recommend, without
the need for any further substantive analysis, that this measure be brought into conformity with that
Agreement.”
(ii) medida não mais em vigor
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas (21.5 II)) Demandantes: Equador e EUA,
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação especificou que, embora não possa fazer recomendações em
relação às medidas não mais em vigor, isso não impede o Painel de chegar à conclusões jurídicas sobre tais
medidas, e incluí-las no Relatório.
Para. 271. “We turn next to the European Communities' allegation that the Panel erred in making a
recommendation with respect to an expired measure. We recall that the Appellate Body has distinguished the
question whether a panel can make a finding concerning an expired measure from the question whether a
panel can make a recommendation relating to an expired measure. In US - Certain EC Products, the Appellate
Body reversed the panel's decision to make a recommendation pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU on the
grounds that the panel had already found that the measure at issue in that dispute had expired. (12) The
Appellate Body confirmed, in US – Upland Cotton, that the fact that a measure has expired may affect what
recommendation a panel may make, but it is not dispositive of the question whether a panel can make findings
relating to an expired measure.” (13)
c) “Relevância de fatos ocorridos durante o procedimento”
109
Relatório do Painel no litígio India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India - Autos),
Demandantes: EUA e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS146/R e WT/DS175/R, paras. 8.27-8.28
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel, levado pela obrigação de fazer um exame objetivo da controvérsia, considerou
necessário levar em conta os eventos ocorridos durante o curso da controvérsia para decidir sobre se deveria
ou não fazer uma recomendação nos termos do Artigo 19.1.
Para. 8.27. “In the circumstances of the case, the respondent itself has requested that the events which
occurred in the course of the proceedings be taken into account in the context of making the recommendations
under Article 19.1. The complainants, while they had not specifically requested the Panel to consider these
issues at this stage of its analysis, did make requests for findings which called for these subsequent events to
be taken into account, in requesting the Panel to find that the measures had ‘remained’ in violation subsequent
to 1 April.”
Para. 8.28. “In light of the foregoing, the Panel felt that it would not be making an “objective assessment of
the matter before it”, or assisting the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the DSU in accordance
with Article 11 of the DSU, had it chosen not to address the impact of events having taken place in the course
of the proceedings, in assessing the appropriateness of making a recommendation under Article 19.1 of the
DSU.”
d) “O Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação poderá sugerir a maneira pela qual o Membro interessado
implementará as recomendações”
(i) Discricionaridade do Painel para sugerir maneiras de implementação
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumpping Margins (Zeroing)(US - Zeroing (21.5)), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS294/AB/RW, para. 466
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou o direito discricionário dos Painéis e do Órgão de
Apelação de sugerir aos Membros formas de implementar as recomendações e decisões.
Para. 466. “The second sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU confers a discretionary right, authorizing panels
and the Appellate Body to suggest ways in which the recommendations and rulings could be implemented.
The Appellate Body observed in EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5 - Ecuador II), that “[s]uggestions made by
panels or the Appellate Body may provide useful guidance and assistance to Members and facilitate
implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings, particularly in complex cases.” (14)
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from
Canada (US - Softwood Lumber V), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS264/R, para. 8.6
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel concluiu que o direito discricionário de sugerir maneiras de implementar os
Acordos inclui o direito de não fazer nenhuma sugestão.
Para. 8.6. “By virtue of Article 19.1, panels have discretion (“may”) to suggest ways in which a Member
could implement the relevant recommendation. However, a panel is not required to make a suggestion should
it not deem it appropriate to do so. We do not consider it appropriate to make any recommendation to the
Dispute Settlement Body in this regard.”
(ii) Escolha pelo Membro dos meios de implementação
110
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Sunset Review of Anti- Dumping Measures on
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - OCTG Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Comunidades
Europeias, WT/DS268/AB/RW, para. 173
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que há uma pluralidade de meios para os Membros
tornarem a medida compatível com os Acordos, não sendo necessária a remoção da medida em questão.
Para. 173. “We next address the provisions of the DSU referred to by the Panel and the participants to
examine whether they provide us with contextual guidance. We note that the requirement in Article 19.1, first
sentence, to “bring the measure into conformity” does not indicate that the choice of means of implementation
is confined to withdrawal of the measure that was found to be WTO-inconsistent. Article 19.1, second
sentence, confers authority on panels and the Appellate Body to suggest “ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendations”, which implies that several “ways” of implementation may
be possible. (15) The obligation under Article 21.3 that the Member concerned “inform the DSB of its
intentions in respect of implementation” also suggests that alternative means of implementation may exist and
that the choice belongs, in principle, to the Member. (…)”
(iii) Valor jurídico das sugestões de implementação
WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, paras. 321-324
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação determinou o valor jurídico das sugestões feitas pelo Painel ou pelo
Órgão de Apelação, nos termos do Artigo 19.1. Em primeiro lugar, essas sugestões não são vinculantes para
o Membro, que pode escolher implementar de outra forma a recomendação de tornar suas medidas
compatíveis com os Acordos. Em segundo lugar, essas sugestões não são o objeto de análise do Painel de
implementação, que ocuparar-se-á das medidas concretas adotadas pelo Membro para cumprir os Acordos,
e não dos meios utilizados. Em terceiro lugar, e como consequência disso, o fato de um Membro declarar
ter seguido a sugestão aprovada pelo DSB não lhe imuniza contra o escrutínio, no momento do Painel de
implementação, das medidas concretamente adotadas; e o fato de o Membro ter efetivamente seguido essas
sugestões não gera presunção de cumprimento material dos Acordos, cumprimento que deve ser verificado
integralmente pelo Painel de implementação, independente de ter havido sugestões por parte do Painel
original.
Para. 321. “Suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU regarding
ways of implementation form part of panel or Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB in previous
proceedings. The DSU does not expressly address the question of the legal status of suggestions that form part
of a report adopted by the DSB, nor does it specify the legal consequences when a Member chooses to
implement DSB recommendations and rulings by following a suggestion for implementation. A Member may
choose whether or not to follow a suggestion. The use of the term ‘could’ in Article 19.1 clarifies that
Members are not obliged to follow suggestions for implementation.”
Para. 322. “Suggestions made pursuant to Article 19.1 are not in themselves the subject of review by a
compliance panel. Article 21.5 of the DSU only refers to “measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings” and not to measures taken to comply with suggestions issued pursuant to the
second sentence of Article 19.1. (…).”
111
Para. 323. “We consider that suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may, if correctly and fully
implementation binding upon the parties (especially, where, as in this case, the first Ecuador Article 21.5
panel made several suggestions); nor does DSB adoption mean that actions taken to implement suggestions
must be presumed to be WTO-consistent or shielded from review in Article 21.5 proceedings.”
Para. 324. “(…) We do not consider that, as a consequence of the DSB adoption of a panel or Appellate Body
report containing a suggestion, the measure implementing such a suggestion can be presumed to be WTOconsistent. (16) In our view, a DSU rule that establishes a legal presumption of conformity should do so in
clear and unambiguous terms. (17) Therefore, we do not see how the terms in Article 19.1, second sentence,
‘imply’ a legal presumption, particularly as this provision has to be read in the context of Article 21.5, which
entitles Members to the review of implementation measures in compliance proceedings.”
(iv) Supervisão da implementação
Relatório do Painel no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft (21.5)),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/RW, paras. 7.2-7.3
Neste caso, o Painel se recusou a utilizar o seu direito de sugerir, nos termos do Artigo 19.1, um
procedimento de verificação bilateral do cumprimento dos Acordos, alegando que essa possibilidade não
está claramente delineada no Artigo 19.1.
Para. 7.2. “Canada requests that we suggest, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the parties develop
mechanisms that would allow Canada to verify compliance with the original recommendation of the DSB.
Canada notes that Brazil has a reciprocal interest in verifying Canada's compliance in a parallel dispute,
Canada – Aircraft. (18) Canada emphasises that it is not seeking a continuing role for the Panel in proposing
such verification procedures, nor is it requesting that we impose such procedures. Brazil responds that,
although it does not in principle oppose an agreement with Canada on reciprocal transparency, it does not
consider that it is an appropriate matter for a suggestion under Article 19.1 of the DSU, but is better left to be
agreed by the parties. Brazil notes that any such agreement would have to involve balanced and truly
reciprocal offers of transparency.”
Para. 7.3. “We note that Article 19.1 provides that “the panel (…) may suggest ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendation”. In our view, Article 19.1 appears to envision suggestions
regarding what could be done to a measure to bring it into conformity or, in case of a recommendation under
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, what could be done to “withdraw” the prohibited subsidy. It is not clear if
Article 19.1 also addresses issues of surveillance of those steps. That said, any agreement that WTO Members
might reach among themselves to improve transparency regarding the implementation of WTO obligations
can only be encouraged.”
III.
Comentários
112
A primeira frase do Artigo 19.1 veicula uma norma obrigatória para os órgãos de adjudicação da OMC. Se
entenderem que há incompatibilidade entre uma medida adotada por um Membro e os Acordos da OMC, o
Painel e o Órgão de Apelação estão obrigados a recomendar que a medida em questão seja tornada compatível
com os Acordos. Não lhes cabe, portanto, julgamento de oportunidade. A partir do momento em que uma
medida em vigor for considerada incompatível com os Acordos, deverá constar do Relatório uma
recomendação – genérica – de que o Membro “torne a medida compatível com o acordo”.
A recomendação genérica produz para o Membro uma obrigação de resultado. Na fase de implementação,
serão consideradas como tendo descumprido as recomendações e decisões do DSB quaisquer medidas que
não tenham levado à compatibilidade das políticas do Membro com os Acordos. A incompatibilidade das
medidas em questão deve ser avaliada no momento da elaboração do Relatório.
Caso a medida seja alterada, em meio ao procedimento, nenhuma recomendação deverá ser feita. Entretanto,
diversos Painéis têm considerado que isso não os impede de chegar à decisões/conclusões (“findings”) sobre
a conformidade das medidas com os Acordos. Essa interpretação foi chancelada pelo Órgão de Apelação em
seu Relatório no caso US - Upland Cotton. Além de veicular uma norma obrigatória, o Artigo 19.1 contém em
sua segunda frase uma norma permissiva: os órgãos de adjudicação poderão sugerir uma maneira de
implementar as recomendações. Trata-se de um direito discricionário, de uma maneira de os órgãos em
questão assistirem os Membros na implementação dos Relatórios. O Painel e o Órgão de Apelação, entretanto,
permanecem obrigados a motivar a sua decisão, considerando expressamente os argumentos oferecidos pelos
Membros ao solicitar uma sugestão.
A eventual sugestão fornecida pelos órgãos de adjudicação não é vinculante às Partes, nem ao Painel de
implementação (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em EC - Bananas, 21.5 II). Em outras palavras, nem o
Membro tem obrigatoriamente de seguir a sugestão contida no Relatório, nem o fato de o Membro tê-la
seguido vincula os órgãos de adjudicação. Um Membro que tenha seguido a sugestão contida no Relatório,
mas cujas políticas permaneçam incompatíveis com os Acordos ao fim do prazo razoável de tempo, terá
descumprido as decisões e recomendações do DSB e estará sujeito às consequências jurídicas
correspondentes.
Por outro lado, ainda que haja a sugestão, a escolha entre os diversos meios de implementar um Relatório
permanece sendo dos próprios Membros. Assim, um Membro que adote medidas diferentes daquelas
sugeridas pelo órgão de adjudicação, mas que levem à compatibilidade entre suas políticas e os Acordos, será
considerado como tendo cumprido integralmente as decisões e recomendações do DSB.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 11: Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, para. 189.
Footnote 12: Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 81.
Footnote 13: Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, para. 272.
Footnote 14: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 325.
Footnote 15: We note that Article 3.7 of the DSU states that “the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to
secure the withdrawal of the measures” found to be WTO-inconsistent. In our view, this does not exclude that the inconsistent measure
to be withdrawn can be brought into compliance by modifying or replacing it with a revised measure. See also Panel Report, para.
7.54.
Footnote 17: For example, Article 3.8 of the DSU, which establishes a legal presumption that a breach of WTO rules constitutes
nullification or impairment, does so in clear and unambiguous terms. Similarly, a legal presumption of conformity with the GATT
1994 is established in clear and unambiguous terms by Article 2.4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures for measures conforming to that Agreement.
Footnote 18: First Submission of Canada, para. 45.
113

Artigo 20
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Article 20
Time-frame for DSB Decisions
Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties to the dispute, the period from the date of establishment of the panel
by the DSB until the date the DSB considers the panel or appellate report for adoption shall as a general rule
not exceed nine months where the panel report is not appealed or 12 months where the report is appealed.
Where either the panel or the Appellate Body has acted, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 12 or paragraph 5
of Article 17, to extend the time for providing its report, the additional time taken shall be added to the above
periods.
IB.
Artigo 20
Calendário das Decisões do OSC
Salvo acordado diferentemente pelas partes em controvérsia, o período compreendido entre a data de
estabelecimento do grupo especial pelo OSC e a data em que o OSC examinar a adoção do relatório do grupo
especial ou do Órgão de Apelação não deverá, como regra geral, exceder nove meses quando o relatório do
grupo especial não sofrer apelação ou 12 meses quando houver apelação. Se o grupo especial ou o Órgão de
Apelação, com base no parágrafo 9 do Artigo 12 ou parágrafo 5 do Artigo 17, decidirem pela prorrogação do
prazo de entrega de seus relatórios, o prazo adicional será acrescentado aos períodos acima mencionados.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II. Interpretação e aplicação do artigo 20
Relatório do Painel no caso US – Section 301 of the Trade Act (Reclamante: CE), para. 7.31(b), nota646
(WT/DS152/R)
O painel na controvérsia US — Section 301 Trade Act afirmou serem ‘indicativos apenas’ alguns dos limitesde
tempo estabelecidos no DSU, incluído o do Artigo 20:
Article 12.8 refers to six months “as a general rule” for the timeframe between panel composition and issuance
of the final report to the parties. Article 12.9 provides that “[i]n no case should the period from the
establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months” (emphasis
added). Article 17.5 states that “[a]s a general rule, the proceedings [of the Appellate Body] shall not exceed
60 days”. It adds, however, that “[i]n no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days”. However, even this
seemingly compulsory deadline has been passed in three cases so far (United States — Restrictions on Imports
of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear,DS24/AB/R, 91 days; European Communities — Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (“EC — Hormones”), DS26/AB/R and DS48/AB/R, 114
days; and US — Shrimp, op. tit, 91 days). Finally, Article 20 refers to 9 months — 12 months in case of an
appeal — “as a general rule” for the period between panel establishment and adoption of report(s) by the DSB.
III. Comentários
114
O Artigo 20 do DSU estabelece uma meta de tempo total entre o estabelecimento do Painel pelo OSC e o
exame pelo OSC do relatório final do Painel, eventualmente modificado pelo relatório do Órgão de Apelação.
O prazo estabelecido pelo Artigo pode ser estendido pelos próprios órgãos judicantes da OMC. Assim, o
Artigo 20 tem função puramente indicativa, fornecendo um parâmetro que não deveria ser ultrapassado pellos
órgãos judicantes. Pode-se observar que o cumprimento dos prazos mas que não está inteiramente sob o
controle dos painéis e do Órgão de Apelação, uma vez que as partes podem levar tempo acima do esperado
para compor o Painel, assim como suspender o andamento da controvérsia enquanto buscam uma solução
negociada.
115

Artigo 21
Maria de Lourdes Albertini
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Article 21
Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings
21.1
Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.
21.2
Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members
with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement.
21.3
At a DSB meeting held within 30 days (19) after the date of adoption of the panel or Appellate Body
report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the
recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which
to do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:
Footnote 19: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
(a)
the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such period is approved
by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval,
(b)
a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days after the date of
adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such agreement,
(c)
a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date of
adoption of the recommendations and rulings. (20) In such arbitration, a guideline for the
arbitrator (21) should be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate
Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or
Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the
particular circumstances.
Footnote 20: If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within ten days after referring the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator shall be
appointed by the Director-General within ten days, after consulting the parties.
Footnote 21: The expression “arbitrator” shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group.
21.4
Except where the panel or the Appellate Body has extended, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 12 or
paragraph 5 of Article 17, the time of providing its report, the period from the date of establishment of
the panel by the DSB until the date of determination of the reasonable period of time shall not exceed
15 months unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. Where either the panel or the Appellate
Body has acted to extend the time of providing its report, the additional time taken shall be added to
the 15-month period; provided that unless the parties to the dispute agree that there are exceptional
circumstances, the total time shall not exceed 18 months.
21.5
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse
to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel. The
116
panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it. When the
panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in
writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit
its report.
21.6
The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings.
The issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any
Member at any time following their adoption. Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of
implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting
after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time pursuant to
paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB’s agenda until the issue is resolved. At least 10 days prior to
each such DSB meeting, the Member concerned shall provide the DSB with a status report in writing
of its progress in the implementation of the recommendations or rulings.
21.7
If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country Member, the DSB shall consider
what further action it might take which would be appropriate to the circumstances.
21.8
If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in considering what appropriate action
might be taken, the DSB shall take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained
of, but also their impact on the economy of developing country Members concerned.
IB.
21.1
O pronto cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do OSC é fundamental para assegurar a efetiva
solução das controvérsias, em benefício de todos os Membros.
21.2
As questões que envolvam interesses de países em desenvolvimento Membros deverão receber
atenção especial no que tange às medidas que tenham sido objeto da solução de controvérsia.
21.3
Em reunião do OSC celebrada dentro de 30 dias15 após a data de adoção do relatório do grupo
especial ou do Órgão de Apelação, o membro interessado deverá informar ao OSC suas intenções
com relação a implementação das decisões e recomendações do OSC. Se for impossível a aplicação
imediata das recomendações e decisões, o Membro interessado deverá para tanto dispor de prazo
razoável. O prazo razoável deverá ser:
a)
o prazo proposto pelo Membro interessado, desde que tal prazo seja aprovado pelo OSC; ou,
não havendo tal aprovação,
b)
um prazo mutuamente acordado pelas partes em controvérsia dentro de 45 dias a partir da data
de adoção das recomendações e decisões; ou, não havendo tal acordo,
c)
um prazo determinado mediante arbitragem compulsória dentro de 90 dias após a data de
adoção das recomendações e decisões16. Em tal arbitragem, uma diretriz para o árbitro17 será a
de que o prazo razoável para implementar as recomendações do grupo especial ou do Órgão
de Apelação não deverá exceder a 15 meses da data de adoção do relatório do grupo especial
ou do Órgão de Apelação. Contudo, tal prazo poderá ser maior ou menor, dependendo das
circunstâncias particulares.
15
Caso não esteja prevista reunião do OSC durante esse period, será realizada uma reunião do OSC para tal fim.
Caso as partes não cheguem a consenso para indicação de um árbitro nos 10 dias seguintes a submissão da questão a arbitragem, o árbitro será
designado pelo Diretor-Geral em prazo de 10 dias, após consulta com as partes.
17
Entende-se pela expressão “árbitro” tanto uma pessoa quanto um grupo de pessoas.
16
117
21.4
A não ser nos casos em que o grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação tenham prorrogado o prazo de
entrega de seu relatório com base no parágrafo 9 do Artigo 12 ou no parágrafo 5 do Artigo 17, o
período compreendido entre a data de estabelecimento do grupo especial pelo OSC e a data de
determinação do prazo razoável não deverá exceder a 15 meses, salvo se as partes acordarem
diferentemente. Quando um grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação prorrogarem o prazo de entrega
de seu relatório, o prazo adicional deverá ser acrescentado ao período de 15 meses; desde que o prazo
total não seja superior a 18 meses, a menos que as partes em controvérsia convenham em considerar
as circunstâncias excepcionais.
21.5
Em caso de desacordo quanto à existência de medidas destinadas a cumprir as recomendações e
decisões ou quanto à compatibilidade de tais medidas com um acordo abrangido, tal desacordo se
resolverá conforme os presentes procedimentos de solução de controvérsias, com intervenção, sempre
que possível, do grupo especial que tenha atuado inicialmente na questão. O grupo especial deverá
distribuir seu relatório dentro de 90 dias após a data em que a questão lhe for submetida. Quando o
grupo especial considerar que não poderá cumprir tal prazo, deverá informar por escrito ao OSC as
razões para o atraso e fornecer uma nova estimativa de prazo para entrega de seu relatório.
21.6
O OSC deverá manter sob vigilância a aplicação das recomendações e decisões. A questão da
implementação das recomendações e decisões poderá ser arguida por qualquer Membro junto ao OSC
em qualquer momento após sua adoção. Salvo decisão em contrário do OSC, a questão da
implementação das recomendações e decisões deverá ser incluída na agenda da reunião do OSC seis
meses após a data da definição do prazo razoável conforme o parágrafo 3 e deverá permanecer na
agenda do OSC até que seja resolvida. Ao menos 10 dias antes de cada reunião, o Membro
interessado deverá fornecer ao OSC relatório escrito do andamento da implementação das
recomendações e decisões.
21.7 Se a questão tiver sido levantada por país em desenvolvimento Membro, o OSC deverá considerar quais
as outras providências que seriam adequadas às circunstâncias.
21.8
Se o caso tiver sido submetido por país em desenvolvimento Membro, ao considerar a providência
adequada a ser tomada o OSC deverá levar em consideração não apenas o alcance comercial das
medidas em discussão mas também seu impacto na economia dos países em desenvolvimento
Membros interessados.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1. Artigo 21.1
a) “Pronto cumprimento”
O conceito de cumprimento foi melhor definido pelo Painel no caso Argentina - Hides and leather (Article
21.3), o qual interpretou como “cumprimento ou implementação” um conceito técnico de conteúdo específico,
ou seja, a retirada ou motificação de uma medida ou parte de uma medida, o estabelecimento ou aplicação
pelo qual um Membro da OMC violou uma previsão amparada pelo Acordo. Além disso, o árbitro entendeu
que o significado de compliance no DSU é diferente de “remoção ou modificação” das condições econômicas
118
subjecentes/social/outros que podem ter causado a promulgação ou aplicação da medida incompatível com a
OMC.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides
and the Import of Finished Leather (Argentina - Hides and Leather), Demandante: Comunidades
Europeias, WT/DS155/10, para. 41
Para. 41. ”Compliance within the meaning of the DSU is distinguishable from the removal or modification of
the underlying economic or social or other conditions the existence of which might well have caused or
contributed to the enactment or application of the WTO-inconsistent governmental measure in the first place.
Those economic or other conditions might, in certain situations, survive the removal or modification of the
non-conforming measure; nevertheless, the WTO Member concerned will have complied with the DSB
recommendations and rulings and with its obligations under the relevant covered agreement. To my mind, it is
inter alia for the above reason that the need for structural adjustment of the industry or industries in respect of
which the WTO-inconsistent measure was promulgated and applied, has generally been regarded, in prior
arbitrations under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, as not bearing upon the determination of a ‘reasonable period of
time’ for implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings.”
b) “Presteza no cumprimento”
No caso do Chile - Alcoholic Beverages (Article 21.3) o Painel considerou essencial a consideração de um
elemento de flexibilidade em relação ao tempo de cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do DSB, de
forma a assegurar o equilibrio e objetividade na aplicação das decisões, por ser a OMC uma organização
internacional formada por Estados soberanos.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile - Alcoholic
Beverages), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS110/14, para. 38
Para. 38. “The DSU clearly stressed the systemic interest of all WTO Members in the Member concerned
complying ‘immediately’ with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Reading Articles 21.1 and 21.3
together, ‘prompt’ compliance is, in principle, ‘immediate’ compliance. At the same time, however, should
‘immediate’ compliance be ‘impracticable’— it may be noted that the DSU does not use the far more rigorous
term ‘impossible’ — the Member concerned becomes entitled to a ‘reasonable period of time’ to bring itself
into a state of conformity with its WTO obligations. Clearly, a certain element of flexibility in respect of time
is built into the notion of compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. That element would
appear to be essential if ‘prompt’ compliance, in a world of sovereign states, is to be a balanced conception
and objective.”
O mesmo posicionamento apareceu no caso US - 1916 Act quando o árbitro estabeleceu que o Membro, ao
implementar a determinação do DSB, pode razoavelmente levar em consideração e usar toda a flexibilidade
disponível dentre os procedimentos normais legislativos para compatibilizar a prática em questão às normas
da OMC. (Relatório do Painel Arbitral no litígio US - Antidumping Act of 1916, Demandantes: Comunidades
Europeias e Japão, WT/DS136/11 e WT/DS/162/14, para. 39).
c) “Tempo após a adoção do Relatório”
No caso US - Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 21.3), o Painel, além dos entendimentos já firmados
acima, acrescentou que, para os efeitos do “pronto cumprimento”, o Membro precisa usar o tempo depois da
adotação dos Relatórios do Painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação para dar início às recomendações e decisões do
119
DSB. Isto quer dizer que, o prazo para a implementação inicia-se após a efetiva adoção dos Relatórios do
Painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação, e antes de qualquer procedimento de arbitragem.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (US Section 110(5) Copyright Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS/160/12, para. 46
Para. 46. “[A]n implementing Member must use the time after adoption of a panel and/or Appellate Body
report to begin to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Arbitrators will scrutinize very
carefully the actions an implementing Member takes in respect of implementation during the period after
adoption of a panel and/or Appellate Body report and prior to any arbitration proceeding. If it is perceived by
an arbitrator that an implementing Member has not adequately begun implementation after adoption so as to
effect ‘prompt compliance’, it is to be expected that the arbitrator will take this into account in determining
the ‘reasonable period of time’.”
No mesmo sentido, foi o entendimento do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System (Artigo 21.3), ao
considerar que a obrigação do Membro de implementar as recomendações e decisões do DSB é desencadeada
pela aprovação do Relatório em questão e, portanto, um Membro “deve, no mínimo, iniciar rapidamente a
implementação e continuar, passo a passo, promovendo a implementação”.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating
to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/13,
para. 43
Para. 43. “A Member’s obligation to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB is triggered by
the DSB’s adoption of the relevant panel and/or Appellate Body reports. Although Article 21.3 acknowledges
circumstances where immediate implementation is ‘impracticable’, in my view the implementation process
should not be prolonged through a Member’s inaction (or insufficient action) in the first months following
adoption. In other words, whether or not a Member is able to complete implementation promptly, it must at
the very least promptly commence and continue concrete steps towards implementation. Otherwise, inaction
or dilatory conduct by the implementing Member would exacerbate the nullification or impairment of the
rights of other Members caused by the inconsistent measure. It is for this reason that arbitral awards under
Article 21.3(c) calculate ‘reasonable period[s] of time’ as from the date of adoption of panel and/or Appellate
Body reports.”
2. Artigo 21.2
a) “Interesses de países em desenvolvimento Membros”
Esse tema foi reiteradamente analisado pelo DSB em virtude da sua interpretação conjunta com o Artigo 21.3
(c) que ainda será comentado, mas que desde já se antecipa quando o órgão teve de enfrentar disputas que
envolviam a aplicabilidade do chamado “periodo razoável de tempo” para a implementação e cumprimento
das recomendações dos Relatórios. Nesse sentido, se apresentam três leading cases importantes envolvendo as
seguintes situações:
-
país em desenvolvimento versus país desenvolvido
país em desenvolvimento versus país em desenvolvimento
país desenvolvido versus multiplos países em desenvolvimento.
120
O primeiro caso foi Indonesia - Autos, em que o Painel, ao aplicar o Artigo 21.3 (c), relativo ao período
razoável de tempo, levou em consideração não somente o status da Indonésia como um país em
densevolvimento, mas, sobretudo, o fato de que era um país em desenvolvimento que estava constantemente
em “terrível situação econômica e financeira” e que, portanto, período adicional de tempo deveria ser deferido
ao país buscando assim viabilizar a implementação e o cumprimento das decisões do Relatório.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Indonésia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry (Indonesia - Autos), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Japão e EUA, WT/DS54/15,
WT/DS55/14, WT/DS64/12 e WT/DS59/13, para. 24
Para. 24. “Although the language of this provision is rather general and does not provide a great deal of
guidance, it is a provision that forms part of the context for Article 21.3(c) of the DSU and which I believe is
important to take into account here. Indonesia has indicated that in a ‘normal situation’, a measure such as the
one required to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case would become effective
on the date of issuance. However, this is not a ‘normal situation’. Indonesia is not only a developing country;
it is a developing country that is currently in a dire economic and financial situation. Indonesia itself states
that its economy is ‘near collapse’. In these very particular circumstances, I consider it appropriate to give full
weight to matters affecting the interests of Indonesia as a developing country pursuant to the provisions of
Article 21.2 of the DSU. I, therefore, conclude that an additional period of six months over and above the sixmonth period required for the completion of Indonesia’s domestic rule-making process constitutes a
reasonable period of time for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case.”
Em outro momento, no caso Chile - Alcoholic Beverages, o árbitro ressaltou a necessidade de se levar em
consideração a condição de países em desenvolvimento ao determinar o “período razoável de tempo” relativo
ao Artigo 21.3 (c) não deveria fazê-lo de diversas maneiras, verbi: “should not result in different ‘kinds of
considerations that may be taken into account’”. Apesar disso, o árbitro salientou que, em virtude da
determinação do Artigo 21.2 do DSU, esta condição não deve ser simplesmente desconsiderada e que
“utilmente ordena” que o árbitro ao determinar um período razoável de tempo, o faça levando em
consideração as grandes dificuldades que um país em desenvolvimento eventualmente pode, em caso
particular, encontrar ao implementar as recomendações e decisões do DSB.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile - Alcoholic
Beverages), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS11O/14, para. 45
Para. 45. ”It is not necessary to assume that the operation of Article 21.2 will essentially result in the
application of ‘criteria’ for the determination of ‘the reasonable period of time’ — understood as the kinds of
considerations that may be taken into account — that would be ‘qualitatively’ different for developed and for
developing country Members. I do not believe Chile is making such an assumption. Nevertheless, although
cast in quite general terms, because Article 21.2 is in the DSU, it is not simply to be disregarded. As I read it,
Article 21.2, whatever else it may signify, usefully enjoins, inter alia, an arbitrator functioning under Article
21.3(c) to be generally mindful of the great difficulties that a developing country Member may, in a particular
case, face as it proceeds to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”
Contudo, esse tratamento diferenciado compreendido nas decisões anteriores não vigorou quando o Painel
enfrentou um caso em que ambos os países envolvidos eram países em desenvolvimento. Foi o caso Chile Price Band System, em que a outra parte envolvida era a Argentina. Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que não era
o caso de aplicar a conclusão proposta em Chile - Alcoholic beverages, porque ambos, demandante e
demandado, eram Membros em desenvolvimento, e nesse sentido concluiu que dadas as “circunstâncias
incomuns” do caso, daria particular atenção ao critério de “país em desenvolvimento”, não para determinar o
121
período mais curto ou mais longo para a implementação, e sim àquele que fosse efetivamente considerado
como “razoável”, já que a matéria afetaria os interesses de ambos.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem nos litigio Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile - Alcoholic
Beverages), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS110/14, paras. 55-56
Paras. 55-56. ”I agree with the following statement by the arbitrator in Chile — Alcoholic Beverages that ‘an
arbitrator functioning under Article 21.3(c) [must] be generally mindful of the great difficulties that a
developing country Member may, in a particular case, face as it proceeds to implement the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB.’ This arbitration is, however, the first arbitration under Article 21.3(c) to include
developing countries as both complainant and respondent. The period of time for implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case is thus a ‘matter[ ] affecting the interests’ of both
Members: the general difficulties facing Chile as a developing country in revising its longstanding PBS, and
the burden imposed on Argentina as a developing country whose access to the Chilean agricultural market is
impeded by the PBS, contrary to WTO rules.”
Finalmente, o caso US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) abrangeu a terceira hipótese de aplicação combinada
dos Artigos 21.2 e 21.3 (c), em que o Painel teve de enfrentar vários Membros em desenvolvimento como
demandantes, e um Membro desenvolvido como demandado. Nesse caso, entendeu o órgão que o
entendimento vigente acerca do período razoável de tempo deveria ser o menor período possível, dentro do
sistema legal de um Membro, e diante disso o árbitro não conseguiu determinar quais seriam os efeitos deste
menor tempo possível dentro do sistema legal dos EUA para os diversos Membros em desenvolvimento
demandados, verbis:
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Continued and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
(US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, Comunidades Europeias,
Índia, Indonésia, Japão, República da Coréia e Tailândia, WT/DS217/14; e Canadá e México,
WT/DS234/22, para. 81
Para. 81. “I am, furthermore, mindful of my obligation, pursuant to Article 21.2, to pay ‘particular attention
… to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members’. I note that, by its wording, Article 21.2
does not distinguish between situations where the developing country Member concerned is an implementing
or a complaining party. However, I also note that the Complaining Parties have not explained specifically how
developing country Members’ interests should affect my determination of the reasonable period of time for
implementation. It is useful to recall, once again, that the term ‘reasonable period of time’ has been
consistently interpreted to signify the ‘shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member’.
Therefore, I have some difficulty in seeing how the fact that several Complaining Parties are developing
country Members should have an effect on the determination of the shortest period possible within the legal
system of the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case.”
3. Artigo 21.3
a) “Mandato do árbitro”
Essa matéria é abordada nas decisões do DSB apenas para reforçar a função do árbitro escolhido para designar
o período razoável de tempo de implementação dos Relatórios do Painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação. Nesse
sentido, o árbitro salienta que não é de sua competência determinar o modus operandi da implementação, mas
tão somente o prazo. Esse é o entendimento nos casos EC - Hormones e US - Hot-Rolled Steel.
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Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandantes: EUA e Canadá, WT/DS26/5 e WT/DS48/13,
para. 38
Para. 38. ”The Arbitrator defined his mandate in EC - Hormones (Article 21.3) as follows: “It is not within
my mandate under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, to suggest ways or means to the European Communities to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the Appellate Body Report and Panel Reports. My task is to
determine the reasonable period of time within which implementation must be completed. Article 3.7 of the
DSU provides, in relevant part, that ‘the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to
secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of
any of the covered agreements’ (emphasis added). Although withdrawal of an inconsistent measure is the
preferred means of complying with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in a violation case, it is not
necessarily the only means of implementation consistent with the covered agreements. An implementing
Member, therefore, has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of implementation, as long as the
means chosen are consistent with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and with the covered
agreements.”
Relatório do Painel Arbitral no litígio United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS184/13, para.
30
Para. 30. ”In US - Hot-Rolled Steel (Article 21.3), “I do not believe that an arbitrator acting under Article
21.3(c) of the DSU is vested with jurisdiction to make any determination of the proper scope and content of
implementing legislation, and hence do not propose to deal with it. The degree of complexity of the
contemplated implementing legislation may be relevant for the arbitrator, to the extent that such complexity
bears upon the length of time that may reasonably be allocated to the enactment of such legislation. But the
proper scope and content of anticipated legislation are, in principle, left to the implementing WTO Member to
determine”.”
No mesmo sentido os DSB reforçou o entendimento no caso Chile - Price Band System:
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating
to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/138,
para. 37
Para. 37. ”The fact that an Article 21.3(c) arbitration focuses on the period of time for implementation,
however, does not render the substance of the implementation, that is, the precise means or manner of
implementation, immaterial from the perspective of the arbitrator. In fact, the more information that is known
about the details of the implementing measure, the greater the guidance to an arbitrator in selecting a
reasonable period of time, and the more likely that such period of time will fairly balance the legitimate needs
of the implementing Member against those of the complaining Member. Nevertheless, the arbitrator should
still avoid deciding what a Member must do for proper implementation (…).”
b) “Período razoável de tempo”
(i) Disponibilidade do período razoável de tempo
Neste tópico, os Painéis Arbitrais avaliaram o que deveria efetivamente significar o período razoável de
tempo, uma vez não ser um período disponível incondicionalmente. Os Painéis ressaltaram, ademais, que o
princípio geral vigente é o do “pronto cumprimento”, e que somente quando não for possível o imediato
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atendimento da determinação do Painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação, será concedido, a título excepcional, a
prerrogativa de cumprimento durante o período razoável de tempo arbitrado. No caso US - Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment), entendeu o árbitro:
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Continued and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
(US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, Comunidades Europeias,
Índia, indonésia, Japão, República da Coréia, Tailândia, (WT/DS217/14, Canadá e México) e
(WT/DS234/22 - ARB-2003-1/16), para. 40
Para. 40. ”The Arbitrator indicated that Article 21.3 “makes clear that ‘prompt compliance’, in principle,
implies ‘immediate [ ]’ compliance” and, accordingly deduced that a “‘reasonable period of time’ for
implementation is not available unconditionally to an implementing Member. Rather, an implementing
Member is entitled to a reasonable period of time for implementation only where, pursuant to Article 21.3, ‘it
is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings’ of the DSB.”
(ii) Conceito de razoabilidade
Aspecto relevante também é a definição de razoabilidade. A matéria foi analisada pelo Órgão de Apelação no
caso US - Hot-Rolled Steel, não exatamente a partir do Artigo 21.3 (c), mas semelhante à aplicação deste.
Tratou-se de analisar o “período razoável” e o “tempo razoável” definidos no Artigo 6.8 do Acordo AntiDumping e no parágrafo 1 do Anexo II daquele Acordo. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu como
razoável que a questão seja analisada com um grau de flexibilidade, em virtude de todas as circunstâncias que
envolvem o caso em particular. Entendeu, outrossim, que o que é considerado razoável em uma circunstância,
pode não o ser ou ser menos razoável em outra. Logo, o período razoável deve ser interpretado em
consistência com as noções de flexibilidade e de equilíbrio, os quais são inerentes ao princípio da
razoabilidade e às particularidades de cada caso:
Relatório da Arbitragem no litígio United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/13, paras. 25-26
Paras. 25-26. “(…) implies a degree of flexibility that involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a
particular case. What is ‘reasonable’ in one set of circumstances may prove to be less than ‘reasonable’ in
different circumstances. This suggests that what constitutes a reasonable period or a reasonable time under
Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, should be defined on a case-by-case basis, in the
light of the specific circumstances of each investigation. In sum, a ‘reasonable period’ must be interpreted
consistently with the notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of ‘reasonableness’,
and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular circumstances of each case. Although, in
the above excerpt, the Appellate Body dealt with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and not the DSU, the essence
of ‘reasonableness’ so articulated is, in my view, equally pertinent for an arbitrator faced with the task of
determining what constitutes ‘a reasonable period of time’ in the context of the DSU.”
c) “comprimento do período razoável de tempo”
Determina o dispositivo do Artigo 21.3 (c) que o período razoável de tempo não pode exceder 15 meses da
data da adoção do Relatório do Painel ou do Órgão de Apelação. Com efeito, as decisões a seguir reafirmam
tal determinação, como uma diretriz para o árbitro:
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and
para. 25
124
Para. 25. ”The Arbitrator on EC - Hormones (Article 21.3) considered that “the ordinary meaning of the
terms of Article 21.3(c) indicates that 15 months is a ‘guideline for the arbitrator’, and not a rule”.”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
(Canada - Pharmaceutical Products), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS114/13, para. 45
Para. 45. ”In Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3), the Arbitrator noted that “the 15-month period
is a ‘guideline’, and not an average, or usual, period. It is expressed also as a maximum period, subject only to
any ‘particular circumstances’ mentioned in the second sentence”.”
Contudo, no caso EC - Bananas III as Comunidades Europeias requereram um período de 15 meses e uma
semana, em virtude da complexidade e dificuldade em emendar o então regime existente de importação de
bananas. Os árbitros, diante deste pedido entenderam que o período de 15 meses é uma diretriz, mas que pode
ser encurtado ou alongado se assim se fizer necessário, devido a circunstâncias particulares:
Relatório do Painel Arbitral no litígio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e
EUA, WT/DS27/15, para. 18
Para. 18. ”When the ‘reasonable period of time’ is determined through binding arbitration, as provided for
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, this provision states that a ‘guideline’ for the arbitrator should be that the
‘reasonable period of time’ should not exceed 15 months from the date of the adoption of a panel or Appellate
Body report. Article 21.3(c) of the DSU also provides, however, that the ‘reasonable period of time’ may be
shorter or longer than 15 months, depending upon the ‘particular circumstances.”
E, como desdobramento deste entendimento, resta necessário compreender o que seria o período mais curto
possível. O árbitro, no caso EC - Hormones, argumentou que a leitura do “período razoável de tempo” do
Artigo 21.3 (c) deveria ser feita em conjunto com o “pronto cumprimento” determinado no Artigo 21.1, e,
nesse sentido, o período razoável de tempo seria o “período mais curto possível” dentro do sistema legal do
Membro para implementar as recomendações e decisões do DSB, mas ainda menor que 15 meses. Para
reforçar o seu entendimento, trouxe à baila outros dispositivos do DSU que ressaltam o caráter “imediato” da
implementação dos Relatórios do Painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação.
paras. 25-26
Paras. 25-26. ”The Arbitrator held, inter alia, that “when implementation can be effected by administrative
means, the reasonable period of time should be considerably shorter than 15 months”: “The ordinary meaning
of the terms of Article 21.3(c) indicates that 15 months is a ‘guideline for the arbitrator’, and not a rule. This
guideline is stated expressly to be that ‘the reasonable period of time … should not exceed 15 months from the
date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report’ (emphasis added). In other words, the 15-month
guideline is an outer limit or a maximum in the usual case. For example, when implementation can be effected
by administrative means, the reasonable period of time should be considerably shorter than 15 months.
However, the reasonable period of time could be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular
circumstances, as specified in Article 21.3(c). Article 21.3(c) also should be interpreted in its context and in
light of the object and purpose of the DSU. Relevant considerations in this respect include other provisions of
the DSU, including, in particular, Articles 21.1 and 3.3. Article 21.1 stipulates that: ‘Prompt compliance with
recommendations and rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members’ (emphasis added). Article 3.3 states: ‘The prompt settlement of situations in which a
125
Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are
being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO
and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members’ (emphasis added).
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word, ‘prompt’, as meaning ‘a. acting with alacrity; ready. b.
made, done, etc. readily or at once’. Read in context, it is clear that the reasonable period of time, as
determined under Article 21.3(c), should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the
Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In the usual case, this should not be
greater than 15 months, but could also be less.”
d) “Procedimento legislativo normal versus procedimento legislativo extraordinário”
O debate em torno do período razoável de tempo e da aplicação preferencial do período mais curto possível
ainda suscita uma interpretação que deve levar em consideração aspectos internos do processo legislativo dos
Membros. No caso Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, o árbitro entendeu que o período de tempo razoável deveria
ser o período possível dentro do sistema legal do Membro concernente, não devendo ser exigido do Membro a
utilização de procedimentos legislativos extraordinários para cumprir com as recomendações e decisões do
DSB, em detrimento de seus procedimentos legislativos normais.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea - Alcoholic
Beverages), Demandantes: EUA e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS75/16 e WT/DS84/14, para. 42
Para. 42. ”Although the reasonable period of time should be the shortest period possible within the legal
system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, this does not require a
Member, in my view, to utilize an extraordinary legislative procedure, rather than the normal legislative
procedure, in every case. Taking into account all of the circumstances of the present case, I believe that it is
reasonable to allow Korea to follow its normal legislative procedure for the consideration and adoption of a
tax bill with budgetary implications, that is, to submit the proposed amendments to the next regular session of
the National Assembly. For the same reasons, I consider it reasonable that the new tax legislation should be
enacted by the National Assembly in the course of the next regular session, and promulgated by the President
before the end of this year.”
“Outro precedente do DSB acerca do período razoável de tempo”:
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain HotHolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/13, para. 39
Para. 39. ”In US - Hot-Rolled Steel (Article 21.3), the United States referred to the extensions of the
reasonable period of time agreed by the DSB in two previous disputes to take into account the adjournment of
the United States Congress’ legislative session, in order to support its position that the reasonable period of
time should be longer than ten months. The Arbitrator noted that, on both occasions, the complaining parties
had agreed to the extension and therefore did not consider that the actions of the DSB in those cases could
have “any precedential value”: “It appears to me that whether the actions of the DSB in those two instances
have any precedential value in respect of the present arbitration proceedings, is open to substantial debate.
The present proceedings have been precipitated precisely by the failure of the parties to the dispute to reach an
agreement on a reasonable period of time to comply under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU.”
e) “Ônus da prova”
Em alguns casos, o Membro deve demonstrar que o período razoável de tempo determinado não atende às
demandas domésticas para cumprimento. Nesse sentido, nos casos EC - Hormones e Canada -
126
Pharmaceutical Patents o árbitro entendeu que o Membro que deveria implementar as medidas definidas nos
Relatórios suporta o ônus da prova, em uma demonstração de que a duração de qualquer período proposto
para implementação é um “período razoável de tempo”, verbis:
Meat Products (Hormones)(EC - Hormones), Demandantes: EUA e Canadá, WT/DS26/5 e WT/DS48/13,
para. 26
Para. 26. “Based on the wording of Articles 21.3, and on the context provided in Articles 3.3, 21.1 and 21.4
of the DSU, I agree with the arbitrator in European Communities - Hormones that ‘the reasonable period of
time, as determined under Article 21.3(c), should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the
Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
(Canada - Pharmaceutical Products), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS114/13, para. 47
Para. 47. “Moreover, as immediate compliance is clearly the preferred option under Article 21.3, it is, in my
view, for the implementing Member to bear the burden of proof in showing Para. 47. ‘[i]f it is impracticable
to comply immediately’ — that the duration of any proposed period of implementation, including its supposed
component steps, constitutes a ‘reasonable period of time’. And the longer the proposed period of
implementation, the greater this burden will be.”
(i) Exemplos de alteração do período razoável de tempo acordado pelas Partes
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products (Canada - Dairy), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS103/10
Na disputa em questão, o Canadá informou o Presidente do DSU sobre o alcance de acordo com a Nova
Zelândia e com os EUA, durante o período razoável de tempo para a implementação da decisão do DSB.
Minutas da Reunião do OSC (WT/DSB/M/90), no litígio United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign
Sales Corporation (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/11
Com relação à disputa US - FSC, na reunião de 12 de outubro de 2000, o DSB acolheu o requerimento dos
EUA para modificar o período de tempo para o cumprimento.
Minutas da Reunião do DSU (WT/DSB/M/138), no litígio United States - Antidumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão,
WT/DS184/16
Com respeito ao caso US - Hot-Rolled Steel, na reunião de 5 de dezembro de 2002 o DSU acatou o pedido dos
EUA para modificar o period de tempo para o cumprimento.
(ii) Comprimento do “período razoável de tempo, como determinado no Artigo 21.3(c) da
arbitragem”
Nos casos abaixo, aparece o comprimento do “período razoável de tempo”, cuja determinação foi efetuada por
Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 21.3(c):
127
WT/DS Nº
Short Title
Award Circulated
“Reasonable Period
of Time”
DS8 — EC DS10 —
Canada DS11 — US
Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II
15 months
DS18 — Canada
Australia — Salmon
DS26 — US DS48 —
Canada
EC — Hormones
DS27 — Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, US
DS54 — EC DS55 —
Japan DS59 — US
DS64 — Japan
EC — Bananas III
14 February 1997
(WT/DS8/15,
WT/DS10/15,
WT/DS11/13)
23 February 1999
(WT/DS18/9)
29 May 1998
(WT/DS26/15,
WT/DS48/13)
7 January 1998
(WT/DS27/15)
Indonesia — Autos
7 December 1998
(WT/DS54/15,
WT/DS55/14,
WT/DS59/13,
WT/DS64/12)
4 June 1999
(WT/DS75/16,
WT/DS84/14)
DS75 — EC DS84 —
US
Korea — Alcoholic Beverages
DS87 — EC DS110 —
EC 2001
Chile — Alcoholic Beverages
23 May 2000
(WT/DS87/15,
WT/DS110/14)
DS114 — EC
Canada — Pharmaceutical
Patents
18 August 2000
(WT/DS114/13)
DS136 — EC DS162
— Japan
US — 1916 Act
28 February 2001
(WT/DS136/11,
WT/DS162/14)
DS139 — Japan
DS142 — EC
Canada — Autos
4 October 2000
(WT/DS139/12,
WT/DS142/12)
DS155 — EC
Argentina — Hides and Leather
31 August 2001
(WT/DS155/10)
128
8 months from 6
November 1998
15 months from 13
February 1998
From 25 September
1997 to 1 January 1999
12 months from 23
July 1998
11 months and 2
weeks, that is, from 17
February 1999 to 31
January 2000
not more than 14
months and 9 days
from 12 January 2000,
that is to say, until 21
March
6 months from
adoption of report i.e.
expiry date: 7 October
2000
10 months from
adoption of reports i.e.
expiry date: 26 July
2001 Extended: 31
December 2001
8 months from
expiry date: 19
February 2001
Not more than 12
months and 12 days i.e.
expiry date: 28
February 2002
DS160 — EC
US — Section 110 (5)Copyright
Act
15 January 2001
(WT/DS160/12)
DS170 — US
Canada — Patent Term
28 February 2001
(WT/DS170/10)
DS184 — Japan
US — Hot-Rolled Steel
19 February 2002
(WT/DS184/13)
DS202 — Korea
US — Line Pipe
26 July 2002
(WT/DS202/17)
DS207 — Argentina
Chile — Price Band System
17 March 2003
(WT/DS207/13)
DS217 — Australia,
Brazil, Chile, EC,
India, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea and Thailand
DS234 — Canada,
Mexico
DS246 — India
US — Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment)
(WT/DS217/14,
WT/DS234/22)
EC — Tariff Preferences
20 September 2004
(WT/DS246/14)
DS264 — Canada
US — Softwood Lumber V
13 December 2004
(WT/DS264/13)
12 months from
expiry date: 27 July
2001 Extended: 31
December 2001
10 months from
expiry date: 12 August
2001
15 months from 23
August 2001 i.e. expiry
date: 23 November
2002
Parties agreed on RPT
and no award was
issued.
14 months i.e. expiry
date: 23 December
2003
13 June 2003 11
months i.e. expiry date:
27 December 2003
14 months, 11 days i.e.
expiry date: 1 July
2005
Parties agreed on RPT
and no award was
issued
(iii) Período razoável de tempo e aplicação retroativa das medidas atacadas
O Painel no caso US - Section 129 (c)(1) URAA entendeu que os Membros não estão obrigados a suspender a
aplicação da medida ofendida ou prestar socorro a eventuais efeitos passados.
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Section 129(c)(1) of Uruguay Round Agreements Act (US Section 129(c)(1) URAA), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS221/R, paras. 3.90 e 3.93
Para. 3.90. ”Nothing in Article 21.3 suggests that Members are obliged, during the course of the reasonable
period of time, to suspend application of the offending measure, much less to provide relief for past effects.
Rather, in the case of antidumping and countervailing duty measures, entries that take place during the
reasonable period of time may continue to be liable for the payment of duties (…).”
Para. 3.93. “When panels and the Appellate Body have been asked to make recommendations for retroactive
relief, they have rejected those requests, recognizing that a Member’s obligation under the DSU is to provide
prospective relief in the form of withdrawing a measure inconsistent with a WTO agreement, or bringing that
measure into conformity with the agreement by the end of the reasonable period of time. In the six years of
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dispute settlement under the WTO agreements, no panel or the Appellate Body has ever suggested that
bringing a WTO-inconsistent antidumping or countervailing duty measure into conformity with a Member’s
WTO obligations requires the refund of antidumping or countervailing duties collected on merchandise that
entered prior to the date of implementation.”
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (US
- Section 129(c)(1) URAA), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS221/R, para. 3.91
Para. 3.91. “The Panel on US - Section 129(c)(1) URAA also added that Articles 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU
confirm not only that a Member may maintain the WTO-inconsistent measure until the end of the reasonable
period of time for implementation, but also that neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or
other obligations are available to the complaining Member until the conclusion of that reasonable period of
time.”
f) “Exceção: subsídios proibidos”
No litígio Brazil – Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação observou que as disposições do Artigo 21.3 do DSU não são
relevantes na determinação do período de tempo para sanar-se uma incompatibilidade com as disposições
relativas a subsídios proibidos.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 192
Para. 192. ”With respect to implementation of the recommendations or rulings of the DSB in a dispute
brought under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, there is a significant difference between the relevant rules and
procedures of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Article 4.7 of the SCM
Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of Article 21.3 of the DSU are not relevant in determining the period of
time for implementation of a finding of inconsistency with the prohibited subsidies provisions of Part II of the
SCM Agreement. Furthermore, we do not agree with Brazil that Article 4.12 of the SCM Agreement is
applicable in this situation. In our view, the Panel was correct in its reasoning and conclusion on this issue.
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, which is applicable to this case, stipulates a time-period. It states that a
subsidy must be withdrawn ‘without delay’. That is the recommendation the Panel made.”
4. Artigo 21.4
5. Artigo 21.5
I.C – Comentários sobre a tradução
Nada a observar
II. Interpretação e aplicação do Artigo 21.5
1. Geral
(i) Função e escopo do Artigo 21.5
130
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bed Linen (21.5) (Reclamante: Índia), para. 79
(WT/DS141/AB/RW)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirma uma interpretação ampla da função do painel de
implementação. Este não se ocupa apenas de verificar se houve alteração das medidas originais, mas
reexamina integralmente o caso, com o fim de determinar se as as medidas de implementação são ou
não compatíveis com os acordos da OMC.
79.
We addressed the function and scope of Article 21.5 proceedings for the first time in Canada
– Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil). There, we found that Article 21.5 panels are not merely called
upon to assess whether “measures taken to comply” implement specific “recommendations and
rulings” adopted by the DSB in the original dispute.(88) We explained there that the mandate of
Article 21.5 panels is to examine either the “existence” of “measures taken to comply” or, more
frequently, the “consistency with a covered agreement” of implementing measures.(89) This implies
that an Article 21.5 panel is not confined to examining the “measures taken to comply” from the
perspective of the claims, arguments, and factual circumstances relating to the measure that was the
subject of the original proceedings.(90) Moreover, the relevant facts bearing upon the “measure
taken to comply” may be different from the facts relevant to the measure at issue in the original
proceedings. It is to be expected, therefore, that the claims, arguments, and factual circumstances
relating to the “measure taken to comply” will not, necessarily, be the same as those relating to the
measure in the original dispute.(91) Indeed, a complainant in Article 21.5 proceedings may well raise
new claims, arguments, and factual circumstances different from those raised in the original
proceedings, because a “measure taken to comply” may be inconsistent with WTO obligations in
ways different from the original measure. In our view, therefore, an Article 21.5 panel could not
properly carry out its mandate to assess whether a “measure taken to comply” is fully consistent
with WTO obligations if it were precluded from examining claims additional to, and different from,
the claims raised in the original proceedings.(92)
Footnote 88: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 40.
Footnote 89: Ibid., paras. 40-41. The panels in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) (paras. 6.8-6.9) and Australia
– Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) (para. 7.10.9) reached essentially the same conclusion.
Footnote 91: Ibid.
Footnote 92: As we put it in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil):
Indeed, the utility of the review envisaged under Article 21.5 of the DSU would be seriously undermined if a panel were
restricted to examining the new measure from the perspective of the claims, arguments and factual circumstances that
related to the original measure, because an Article 21.5 panel would then be unable to examine fully the “consistency
with a covered agreement of the measures taken to comply”, as required by Article 21.5 of the DSU.
(Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 41) We defined the function of Article 21.5
proceedings in the same vein in our Report in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) (para. 87).
131
(ii) Caráter obrigatório do procedimento do Artigo 21.5
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – Continued Suspension (Reclamante:
Comunidades Europeias), US – Continued Suspension (Reclamante: Canadá), paras 336; 340
(WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou o significado do caráter obrigatório do
procedimento do Artigo 21.5. Diversas possibilidades são oferecidas pelo ESC para solução de uma
controvérsia acerca da compatibilidade com os acordo de medidas tomadas para cumprir um relatório
do OSC. De todas elas, entretanto, apenas o painel do Artigo 21.5 é compulsório, no sentido de
permitir uma decisão vinculante sem a necessidade de consentimento específico do Membro
vinculado.
336. The opening clause of Article 21.5 specifies the types of disputes that fall within the scope of
this provision, that is, those involving a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
The word “shall” in Article 21.5 indicates that such disagreements must be resolved through recourse
to “these dispute settlement procedures”. Read together with the second sentence of Article 21.5,
“these dispute settlement procedures” do not refer generally to all proceedings under the DSU, but
specifically to the panel proceedings envisaged in Article 21.5, in which the original panelists are
preferred for the composition of the panel and in which the time frame of the proceedings is
shortened. In other words, Article 21.5 dictates that panel proceedings pursuant to this provision are
the procedures that must be followed for adjudicating the cause of action as framed in its opening
clause.
(…)
340. Certainly, parties to a dispute are not precluded from pursuing consensual or alternative means
of dispute settlement foreseen in the DSU. Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that “[a] solution
mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly
to be preferred.” To reach a mutually acceptable solution, Members can engage in consultations or
resort to mediation and good offices. Moreover, Article 25 provides for arbitration as an alternative
to panel proceedings for dispute resolution. Consultations, mediation, good offices, and arbitration
are, however, alternatives to compulsory adjudication and require the consent of the parties. In the
absence of such consent, they cannot lead to a binding decision. Thus, it is important to distinguish
between these consensual means of dispute resolution, which are always at the Members' disposal,
and adjudication through panel proceedings, which are compulsory. It is in this sense that Article
21.5 is cast in obligatory language. In this dispute, it is clear that a mutually acceptable solution was
not reached and the European Communities decided to resort to adjudication. In addition, the parties
to this dispute were unable to agree on an arbitration procedure pursuant to Article 25 of the
DSU.(761) The issue before us, therefore, is which procedure must be followed when parties do not
avail themselves of the consensual and alternative means of dispute resolution provided in the DSU,
and the dispute must proceed to the adjudication phase.
Footnote 761: The European Communities alleges that it proposed to the United States to submit the dispute to arbitration
under Article 25 of the DSU, but the United States refused. (European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 62
(iii) Possibilidade de renunciar ao direito de recorrer ao Artigo 21.5
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bananas (21.5 II) (Reclamante: Equador), EC –
Bananas (21.5) (Reclamante: EUA), para. 212 (WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU,
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA)
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Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirma a possibilidade de renúncia ao painel do Artigo 21.5.
Essa renúncia deve estar formulada em linguagem clara e não deriva automaticamente de uma
solução mutuamente acordada. O Órgão de Apelação não determina outros requisitos, nem esclarece
quais seriam os efeitos de uma tal renúncia – se implica, por exemplo, uma renúncia total aos painéis
ou se apenas seria necessário iniciar novo painel, cabendo então novo prazo razoável de tempo para
cumprir o determinado no novo relatório.
212. (…) Similarly, a mutually agreed solution pursuant to Article 3.7 may encompass an agreement
to forego the right to initiate compliance proceedings. Or it may provide for the suspension of the
right of recourse to Article 21.5 until the steps agreed upon in a mutually agreed solution have been
implemented. Yet, this need not always be so. We therefore do not consider that the mere agreement
to a “solution” necessarily implies that parties waive their right to have recourse to the dispute
settlement system in the event of a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with the covered
agreements of a measure taken to comply. Instead, we consider that there must be a clear indication
in the agreement between the parties of a relinquishment of the right to have recourse to Article 21.5.
In our view, the Panel's requirement that the Understandings must constitute a “positive solution and
effective settlement” to the dispute in question to preclude recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings was
not a correct interpretation of what the DSU requires.
2. Momento de recurso ao Artigo 21.5
(i) Necessidade de recurso ao Artigo 21.5 antes do recurso ao Artigo 22.6 (questão do
“sequenciamento” entre os artigos 21.5 e 22.6)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – Certain Products (Reclamante: Comunidades
Européias), para. 83; 90-92 (WT/DS165/AB/R)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação anulou uma afirmação do Painel que solucionava a questão
do “sequenciamento”. Trata-se da incompatibilidade lógica entre a obrigação de solicitar retaliações
rapidamente, 30 dias após a expiração do prazo razoável de tempo, e a necessidade de um
pronunciamento do Artigo 21.5 sobre a compatibilidade das novas medidas, como condição lógica ao
pedido de retaliações. O Painel havia afirmado a possibilidade de os árbitros da retaliação – agindo
nos termos do Artigo 22.6 – determinarem a existência de cumprimento do relatório. Anulando essa
determinação, o Órgão de Apelação devolveu a solução para a possível antinomia aos Membros. Na
ausência de decisão coletiva, a questão vem sendo resolvida desde então com acordos bilaterais ad
hoc, entre demandante e demandado, dispondo sobre o sequenciamento a ser adotado em cada caso
específico.
90.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Panel erred by making the statements in
paragraphs 6.121 to 6.126 of the Panel Report on the mandate of arbitrators appointed under
Article 22.6 of the DSU. Therefore, these statements by the Panel have no legal effect.
91.
In coming to this conclusion, we are cognizant of the important systemic issue of the
relationship between Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU. As the United States correctly points out in
its appellee's submission, the terms of Articles 21.5 and 22 are not a “model of clarity” and the
relationship between these two provisions of the DSU has been the subject of intensive and extensive
133
discussion among Members of the WTO.(58) We note that, on 10 October 2000, eleven Members of
the WTO presented a proposal in the General Council to amend, inter alia, Articles 21 and 22 of the
DSU.(59)
92.
In so noting, we observe that it is certainly not the task of either panels or the Appellate Body
to amend the DSU or to adopt interpretations within the meaning of Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement. Only WTO Members have the authority to amend the DSU or to adopt such
interpretations. Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, the task of panels and the Appellate Body in the
dispute settlement system of the WTO is “to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” (emphasis added) Determining
what the rules and procedures of the DSU ought to be is not our responsibility nor the responsibility
of panels; it is clearly the responsibility solely of the Members of the WTO.
Footnote 58:United States' appellee's submission, para. 39 and footnote 85.
Footnote 59:WT/GC/W/410.
(ii) Possibilidade de recurso ao Artigo 21.5 por qualquer das partes e a qualquer tempo
Comunidades Europeias), US – Continued Suspension (Reclamante: Canadá), paras. 345; 347;
354 (WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que qualquer das partes em uma controvérsia pode,
passado o período razoável de tempo, recorrer ao Artigo 21.5 em busca da solução de uma
controvérsia acerca da ocorrência ou não do cumprimento do relatório inicial. O recurso ao artigo
para solucionar essa controvérsia pode ocorrer inclusive após aplicada a suspensão de concessões
pelo Membro prejudicado pela violação.
345. In sum, we consider that recourse to Article 21.5 panel proceedings is the proper course of
action within the procedural structure of the DSU in cases where, as in this dispute, a Member subject
to the suspension of concessions has taken an implementing measure and a disagreement arises as to
whether “the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed” within
the meaning of Article 22.8.
(…)
347. A “disagreement” as to the consistency with the WTO agreements of a measure taken to comply
arises from the existence of conflicting views: the original complainant's view that such a measure is
inconsistent with the WTO agreements or brings about only partial compliance, and the original
respondent's view that a measure is consistent with the WTO agreements and brings about full
compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. Article 21.5 does not indicate which party
may initiate proceedings under this provision. Rather, the language of the provision is neutral on this
matter, and it is open to either party to refer the matter to an Article 21.5 panel to resolve this
disagreement. The text of Article 21.5, therefore, leaves open the possibility that either party to the
original dispute may initiate the proceedings. Thus, contrary to the European Communities'
argument, the text of Article 21.5 does not preclude an original respondent from initiating
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proceedings under that provision to obtain confirmation of the consistency with the WTO agreements
of its implementing measure.
3. As “medidas destinadas a cumprir”
(i) Conceito de “medidas destinadas a cumprir”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bed Linen (21.5) (Reclamante: Índia), para. 78
(WT/DS141/AB/RW)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a competência dos Painéis (e do próprio Órgão
de Apelação) para determinar, independente das declarações das partes, quais medidas são “medidas
destinadas a cumprir” o relatório original, devendo essas, nos termos do Artigo 21.5 ser
integralmente examinadas pelo painel de implementação.
78.
In examining whether India's claim under Article 3.5 relating to “other factors” was properly
before the Panel, we must first establish the appropriate subject-matter of Article 21.5 proceedings.
(…)
As in original dispute settlement proceedings, the “matter” in Article 21.5 proceedings consists of
two elements: the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint (that is, the
claims).(86) If a claim challenges a measure which is not a “measure taken to comply”, that claim
cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings. We agree with the Panel that it is, ultimately,
for an Article 21.5 panel—and not for the complainant or the respondent—to determine which of the
measures listed in the request for its establishment are “measures taken to comply”.(87) Although the
issue raised by India in this appeal relates primarily to the scope of claims that may be raised in
Article 21.5 proceedings, this issue is intertwined with the question of which measures may be
considered as “measures taken to comply” with the DSB rulings in an original dispute.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – Softwood Lumber IV (21.5) Reclamante:
Canadá), para. 77 (WT/DS257/AB/RW)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou os critérios que devem ser usados no momento do
painel de implementação para determinar se uma medida constitui uma “medida destinada a cumprir”
o relatório anterior. Esses critérios incluem a relação da medida a ser examinada com as “medidas
destinadas a cumprir” declaradas pelo Membro, bem como com as recomendações e decisões do
OSC. Para avaliá-los, o Painel deve examinar essa relação, o que pode exigir análise da natureza,
tempo e efeitos das várias medidas em questão.
77.
Taking account of all of the above, our interpretation of Article 21.5 of the DSU confirms that
a panel's mandate under Article 21.5 of the DSU is not necessarily limited to an examination of an
implementing Member's measure declared to be “taken to comply”. Such a declaration will always
be relevant, but there are additional criteria, identified above, that should be applied by a panel to
determine whether or not it may also examine other measures. Some measures with a particularly
close relationship to the declared “measure taken to comply”, and to the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB, may also be susceptible to review by a panel acting under Article 21.5.
Determining whether this is the case requires a panel to scrutinize these relationships, which may,
depending on the particular facts, call for an examination of the timing, nature, and effects of the
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various measures. This also requires an Article 21.5 panel to examine the factual and legal
background against which a declared “measure taken to comply” is adopted. Only then is a panel in
a position to take a view as to whether there are sufficiently close links for it to characterize such an
other measure as one “taken to comply” and, consequently, to assess its consistency with the covered
agreements in an Article 21.5 proceeding.
Footnote 86: Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 76, interpreting Article 7 of the DSU.
Footnote 87: The Panel stated in paragraph 6.17 of the Panel Report:
To the extent a party may have challenged, in a request for establishment of an Article 21.5 panel, measures which were
not “taken to comply” by the implementing Member, it is our view that a Panel may decline to address claims concerning
such measures. (original boldface)
In paragraphs 6.13 ff of the Panel Report, the Panel refers, in support of this interpretation, to the panel reports in
Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada) (para. 7.10.22) and Australia – Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 – US)
(para. 6.4).
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Aircraft (21.5) (Reclamante: Brasil), para. 36
(WT/DS70/AB/RW)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou as “medidas destinadas a cumprir” como sendo
em princípio distintas das medidas iniciais condenadas. A conclusão lógica dessa interpretação é que
o painel não está restrito em sua análise ao exame nas medidas condenadas pelo painel original.
36.
Proceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the WTO;
rather, Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those “measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings” of the DSB. In our view, the phrase “measures taken to comply”
refers to measures which have been, or which should be, adopted by a Member to bring about
compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In principle, a measure which has
been “taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings” of the DSB will not be the same
measure as the measure which was the subject of the original dispute, so that, in principle, there
would be two separate and distinct measures(34): the original measure which gave rise to the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and the “measures taken to comply” which are – or should
be – adopted to implement those recommendations and rulings. In these Article 21.5 proceedings,
the measure at issue is a new measure, the revised TPC programme, which became effective on
18 November 1999 and which Canada presents as a “measure taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings” of the DSB.
Footnote 34: We recognize that, where it is alleged that there exist no “measures taken to comply”, a panel may find that
there is no new measure.
(ii) Escopo das “medidas destinadas a cumprir”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – FSC (21.5 II) (Reclamante: Comunidades
Europeias), paras 84; 93 (WT/DS108/ASB/RW2)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a possibilidade de diversos procedimentos do
Artigo 21.5 ocorrerem em sequência, até o cumprimento da recomendação inicial. Também
esclareceu a possibilidade de um painel do Artigo 21.5 analisar as “medidas destinadas a cumprir” à
luz de todas as recomenções e decisões anteriores, certificando-se de que foi atingido o total
cumprimento destas.
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84. As a result, if, in an Article 21.5 proceeding, a panel finds that the measure taken to comply with
the Article 4.7 recommendation made in the original proceedings does not achieve full withdrawal
of the prohibited subsidy—either because it leaves the entirety or part of the original prohibited
subsidy in place, or because it replaces that subsidy with another subsidy prohibited under the SCM
Agreement—the implementing Member continues to be under the obligation to achieve full
withdrawal of the subsidy. The obligation to comply with an Article 4.7 recommendation remains in
effect, even if several proceedings under Article 21.5 become necessary, until the prohibited subsidy
is fully withdrawn.
93. (…) The task of an Article 21.5 panel is to determine whether “measures taken to comply”
implement the “recommendations and rulings” adopted by the DSB in the original proceedings.(168)
In doing so, an Article 21.5 panel may examine either the “existence” of measures taken to comply
with DSB recommendations and rulings, or, when such measures exist, the “consistency” of those
measures with the covered agreements, or a combination of both in situations where the measures
taken to comply, through omissions or other deficiencies, may achieve only partial compliance. As
we noted earlier, the text of Article 21.5 expressly links the “measures taken to comply” and the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.(169) The determination of whether “measures taken to
comply” challenged by the complaining party implement fully, or only in part, the DSB
recommendations and rulings requires a panel to examine all of the previous DSB recommendations
and rulings and the entire range of measures covered by them.(170) Hence, in compliance
proceedings, an Article 21.5 panel may have to examine whether the “measures taken to comply”
implement fully, or only partially, the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB.
Footnote 169: See supra, para. 61.
Footnote 170: Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 68.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – “Zeroing” (21.5) (Reclamante: Japão), para. 160
(WT/DS322/AB/RW).
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a interpretação do Painel de que toda a
incompatibilidade entre as políticas do Membro e os acordos deve cessar ao fim do período razoável
de tempo. Isso significa que a medida incompatível não pode mais ser aplicada, independente de os
fatos sobre os quais a medida incide terem ocorrido antes do fim do período razoável de tempo.
160. (…) Thus, the Appellate Body has found that there may be circumstances where a WTO
Member's obligation to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB applies in respect of
conduct relating to imports that entered that Member's territory prior to the expiration of the
reasonable period of time.(419) Irrespective of the date on which the imports entered the territory of
the implementing Member, the WTO-inconsistencies must cease by the end of the reasonable period
of time. There will not be full compliance where the implementing Member fails to take action to
rectify the WTO-inconsistent aspects of a measure that remains in force after the end of the
reasonable period of time. Likewise, actions taken by the implementing Member after the end of the
reasonable period of time must be WTO-consistent, even if those actions are in respect of imports
that entered the Member's territory before the end of the reasonable period of time. Therefore, we
agree with the Panel's statement that, “[i]f a measure found to be WTO-inconsistent is to be applied
after the expiry of the RPT, that measure must have been brought 'into conformity', irrespective of the
date of entry of the imports covered by that measure”.(420) Indeed, any conduct of the implementing
Member that was found to be WTO-inconsistent by the DSB must cease by the end of the reasonable
period of time. Otherwise, that Member would continue to act in a WTO-inconsistent manner after
the end of the reasonable period of time, contrary to Articles 3.7, 19.1, 21.1, 21.3, and 21.5 of the
DSU.
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Footnote 419: We will henceforth refer to the respondent Member subject to the obligation to comply with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings as the “implementing Member”.
Footnote 420: Panel Report, para. 7.148.
4. Objeto do Procedimento do Artigo 21.5
(i) Geral
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bed Linen (21.5) (Reclamante: Índia), paras. 78;
98 (WT/DS141/AB/RW)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirma que medidas que não sejam “medidas destinadas a
cumprir” o relatório não podem ser levadas para análise do painel de implementação. Tampouco
pode, nessa fase, ser revisada uma interpretação adotada pelo OSC no seu relatório inicial.
78.
(…) If a claim challenges a measure which is not a “measure taken to comply”, that claim
cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings.
(…)
98.
The Panel's ruling that India's claim under Article 3.5 relating to “other factors” was not
properly before it is also consistent with the object and purpose of the DSU. Article 3.3 provides that
the prompt settlement of disputes is “essential to the effective functioning of the WTO”.
Article 21.5 advances the purpose of achieving a prompt settlement of disputes by providing an
expeditious procedure to establish whether a Member has fully complied with the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB.(117) For that purpose, an Article 21.5 panel is to complete its work within 90
days, whereas a panel in an original dispute is to complete its work within 9 months of its
establishment, or within 6 months of its composition. It would be incompatible with the function and
purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system if a claim could be reasserted in Article 21.5
proceedings after the original panel or the Appellate Body has made a finding that the challenged
aspect of the original measure is not inconsistent with WTO obligations, and that report has been
adopted by the DSB. At some point, disputes must be viewed as definitely settled by the WTO
dispute settlement system.
(ii) Competência para verificar o cumprimento de decisões do painel original, mesmo quando estas
são desacompanhadas de recomendações por dizerem respeito a uma medida expirada
Relatório do Painel em Thailand – Cigarettes (Reclamante: Filipinas), para. 6.17 (WT/371/R)
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel interpretou a necessidade de uma recomendação para que uma questão
possa ser examinada no procedimento do Artigo 21.5. Na interpretação do Painel, a recomendação
seria desnecessária, visto que cabe, naquele procedimento, examinar tanto recomendações quanto
decisões do relatório original. Assim, uma decisão sobre uma medida já expirada permite que,
passado o período razoável de tempo para a implementação, o painel de implementação examine a
medida que retomar a violação, podendo considerá-la como descumprimento das recomendações e
decisões do painel original. Essa interpretação não foi apelada e faz parte do relatório do OSC.
138
6.17 We do not however find any language in the relevant provisions of Articles 21 and 22 of the
DSU indicating that an implementing Member's compliance obligation arises only from panels'
recommendations. Rather, most of the provisions relating to compliance obligations under Articles
21 and 22 of the DSU refer to both recommendations and rulings.(196) For example, Article 21.1
provides, “prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to
ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members”. In our view, the scope of the
compliance requirement under these provisions is therefore broader than just “recommendations”. In
any event, it is difficult to envision a situation where the Philippines will a priori be precluded from
resorting to the compliance proceedings with respect to any future action taken by Thailand if it can
be shown that such action is related to the Panel's findings on the inconsistency of the concerned
MRSP Notices with Thailand's obligations under Article III:2 of the GATT 1994. As noted in
paragraphs 7.42 and 7.43 of the Interim Panel Report, previous panels considered it necessary and
important to make findings even with respect to measures that have expired at the time of making
such findings in certain situations. Among those are situations where a measure was still impairing
benefits accruing to a complaining Member or situations where there remained the prospect of
reintroduction of the measure, and thus making findings with respect to expired measures would
contribute to resolving a particular dispute. If only recommendations were to guarantee the
complaining Member's right, as granted under the DSU, to seek compliance proceedings, there would
be no meaning in even making findings for expired measures, which has not been the view of the
Appellate Body and previous panels.(197) We also do not believe that such an understanding would
serve the spirit and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Footnote 196: See also Articles 21.3, 21.5, 21.6, and 22.2 of the DSU.
Footnote 197: Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 –
US), paras. 261-273; Panel Report, EC – Commercial Vessels, para. 8.4; Panel Report, Columbia – Ports of Entry, paras.
7.45-7.54.
(iii) Questões diferentes de ou adicionais àquelas invocadas no procedimento original
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – Zeroing (21.5) (Reclamante: Comunidades
Europeias), para. 423-427; 432 (WT/DS294/AB/RW)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação delimita aspectos relevantes da competência do painel do
Artigo 21.5. Este painel pode examinar quaisquer “medidas destinadas a cumprir” o relatório
original. Isso inclui medidas que, já em vigor à época do relatório original, não tenham sido
discutidas nesse relatório, desde que tais medidas tenham sido retomadas e apresentem-se como
componentes da “medida destinada a cumprir” o relatório inicial. O fato de aquelas medidas não
terem sido originalmente discutidas não é impeditivo de seu exame como “medidas destinadas a
cumprir”, nem gera presunção de sua compatibilidade com os acordos.
423. The Panel relied on the panel report in US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC
Products (Article 21.5 – EC) to find that the European Communities was precluded from raising in
these Article 21.5 proceedings claims against an unchanged aspect of the original measure (the
alleged arithmetical error), which the European Communities could have made, but did not make, in
the original proceedings. The panel in US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products
(Article 21.5 – EC) found that allowing a complaining Member to make “a new claim on an aspect of
the original measure that was never challenged and remained unchanged”(559) would jeopardize the
principles of fundamental fairness and due process, and that it would be unfair to expose a
responding Member to the possibility of a finding of violation on an aspect of the original measure
139
that it “was entitled to assume was consistent with its obligations under the relevant agreement given
the absence of a finding of violation in the original report.”(560)
424. We disagree with the notion that a Member may be entitled to assume in Article 21.5
proceedings that an aspect of a measure that was not challenged in the original proceedings is
consistent with that Member's obligations under the covered agreements. In US – Oil Country
Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina), the Appellate Body held that, “[o]n the
basis of the original panel's conclusions [regarding the likelihood-of-dumping determination], the
USDOC could not assume that its findings regarding the alleged decline in the volume of imports
were WTO-consistent”(561), as these concerned a different aspect of the original measure. If certain
claims against aspects of a measure were not decided on the merits in the original proceedings, they
are not covered by the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and, therefore, a Member should not
be entitled to assume that those aspects of the measure are consistent with the covered agreements.
425. We recall that, in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), the Appellate Body found that a
complaining Member that has failed to make a prima facie case in the original proceedings regarding
an element of the measure that remained unchanged after implementation may not re-litigate the
same claim with respect to the unchanged element of the measure in the Article 21.5 proceedings
where this unchanged element is separable from the changed part of the implementation
measure.(562) In US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), the Appellate Body found that a
complaining Member may not reassert the same claim against an unchanged aspect of the measure
that has been found to be WTO-consistent in the original proceedings.(563)
426. Referring to these two cases in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), the Appellate
Body observed that, “[b]ecause adopted panel and Appellate Body reports must be accepted by the
parties to a dispute, allowing a party in an Article 21.5 proceeding to re-argue a claim that has been
decided in adopted reports would indeed provide an unfair 'second chance' to that party.”(564)
However, in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), the Appellate Body distinguished the claims
in
EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) and US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) from those at issue
in that dispute, and found that allowing a complaining Member to make a case that it did not establish
in the original proceedings would not provide it with an unfair “second chance”, nor would it
compromise the finality of the DSB's recommendations and rulings.(565)
427. While claims in Article 21.5 proceedings cannot be used to re-open issues that were decided
on substance in the original proceedings, the unconditional acceptance of the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB by the parties to a dispute does not preclude raising new claims against measures
taken to comply that incorporate unchanged aspects of original measures that could have been made,
but were not made, in the original proceedings. We do not see how allowing such claims in
Article 21.5 proceedings would “jeopardize the principles of fundamental fairness and due
process”(566), or how it would unfairly provide a “second chance”(567) to the complaining Member,
provided these new claims relate to a measure “taken to comply” and do not re-argue claims that
were decided in the original proceedings.
(…)
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432. Thus, if we read the Appellate Body's statement in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil)
together with its statement in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), it excludes, in principle,
(“ordinarily”) from Article 21.5 proceedings new claims that could have been pursued in the original
proceedings, but not new claims against a measure taken to comply—that is, in principle, a new and
different measure. This is so even where such a measure taken to comply incorporates components
of the original measure that are unchanged, but are not separable from other aspects of the measure
taken to comply.
Footnote 559: Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 7.76.
(footnote omitted)
Footnote 561: Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para.
150.
Footnote 562: See Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 86 and 93.
Footnote 563: See Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 96.
Footnote 564: Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 210. (footnote omitted)
Footnote 565: See Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 210.
Footnote 567: See also Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 –
Argentina), para. 150.
(iv) Vinculação do painel do Artigo 21.5 às determinações do painel original
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso US – Softwood Lumber VI (21.5) (Reclamante:
Canadá), para. 102-103 (WT/DS277/AB/RW)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação interpreta o caráter vinculante das decisões do painel original
para o painel de implementação. O painel de interpretação deve levar em conta o raciocínio do painel
original, mas não está vinculado a julgar da mesma forma que este as decisões de um órgão
governamental, se o próprio órgão governamental alterou seu procedimento e suas determinações
como uma medida destinada a cumprir os acordo.s
102. Article 21.5 of the DSU identifies the task of a panel operating pursuant to that provision as
resolving disagreements “as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of a measure
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings” of the DSB. This task cannot be done in
abstraction from the measure that was the subject of the original proceedings.(150) The measure
taken to comply in this case is the Section 129 Determination. Although it is distinct from the
original determination, the Section 129 Determination incorporates by reference many parts of the
analysis in the original determination(151), and retains and relies on much of the evidence collected
in the original investigation. As explained in the Section 129 Determination, the USITC not only
sought “to provide more explanation and reasoning for its decision”, that is, to fill in the gaps that the
original panel had found in the reasoning and explanation in the original injury determination(152);
it also re-opened the record and collected more information and evidence.(153) Furthermore,
Canada's claims under Articles 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.5 and
15.7 of the SCM Agreement required the Panel to review, inter alia, how the investigating authority
treated the totality of the factors and evidence considered, including the new elements. This involved
review of the USITC's analysis of how those factors and the various pieces of evidence interacted. In
141
these circumstances, we do not see why the Panel would be bound by the findings of the original
panel.
103. This does not mean that a panel operating under Article 21.5 of the DSU should not take
account of the reasoning of an investigating authority in an original determination, or of the
reasoning of the original panel. Article 21.5 proceedings do not occur in isolation but are part of a
“continuum of events”.(154) This is a consequence of the mandate of an Article 21.5 panel, namely,
to examine whether recommendations and rulings from the original dispute have been implemented
consistently with the covered agreements. When an investigating authority making a redetermination
provides different explanations of, or draws different inferences from, specific pieces of evidence that
were also before it in the original investigation, this may be relevant to the assessment of whether its
reasoning is adequate and based on positive evidence. Such deviations from prior reasoning may
raise questions about the objectivity of the authority's assessment of the evidence or the credibility of
its explanations. Similarly, doubts could arise about the objective nature of an Article 21.5 panel's
assessment if, on a specific issue, that panel were to deviate from the reasoning in the original panel
report in the absence of any change in the underlying evidence in the record and explanations given
by the investigating authority in a redetermination.(155) These concerns are not, however, based on
the binding effect of the adopted findings of the original panel.
Footnote 150: Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 68; Appellate Body
Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC II), para. 61. The Appellate Body has already recognized certain circumstances in
which the scope of proceedings under Article 21.5 may be limited by the scope of the original proceedings. For example,
a party cannot make the same claim of inconsistency against the same measure (or component of a measure) in an Article
21.5 proceeding if the original panel and Appellate Body found the measure to be consistent with the obligation at issue
(Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 89-99), or if the original panel found that the
complaining party had not made out its claim with respect to the measure (or component of a measure). (Appellate Body
Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 92-93 and 99) Similarly, a party may not, in proceedings under
Article 21.5 of the DSU, seek to have the Appellate Body “revisit the original panel report” when that report was not
appealed. (Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 78)
Footnote 151: At pages 6-7 of the Section 129 Determination, the USITC stated:
We adopt from the original Commission report our prior views and findings in their entirety regarding domestic like
product, domestic industry and related parties, use of publicly available information, conditions of competition, crosscumulation, Maritime Provinces, effects of subsidies or dumping, and consideration of the nature of the subsidy and its
likely trade effects. (footnote omitted)
Footnote 152: Section 129 Determination, pp. 5-6 and footnote 20.
Footnote 153: Ibid., p. 4.
Footnote 154: Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 121.
Footnote 155: We would have concerns, for example, if an Article 21.5 panel were to see no problem in a particular
inference drawn by an investigating authority in a redetermination in circumstances where the original panel found that
such inference lacked proper support and the inference drawn in the redetermination was based on the same evidence and
explained in the same way as in the original determination.
(vi) Valor jurídico das sugestões efetuadas pelo painel original
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bananas (21.5 II) (Reclamante: Equador), EC –
Bananas
(21.5)
(Reclamante:
EUA),
para.
322-325
(WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU,
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação definiu o caráter não vinculante das sugestões do painel
original para o painel de implementação. Para este, importa o resultado da implementação – o
cumprimento material dos acordos – e não os meios utilizados. Assim, sugestões não vinculam o
142
Membro violador, que pode tornar suas medidas compatíveis com os acordos de outras formas além
da sugerida, nem vinculam o painel de implementação, caso seguidas. A tarefa do painel de
implentação permanece sendo o exame da totalidade das “medidas destinadas a cumprir” para
verificação de conformidade com os acordos da OMC.
322. Suggestions made pursuant to Article 19.1 are not in themselves the subject of review by a
compliance panel. Article 21.5 of the DSU only refers to “measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings” and not to measures taken to comply with suggestions issued pursuant
to the second sentence of Article 19.1. This confirms that an Article 21.5 panel's power of review is
limited to the assessment of the existence or consistency with the covered agreements of the
measures taken to comply with recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Thus, what matters in
Article 21.5 proceedings is whether the result of implementation—whatever means are chosen—
brings about substantive compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings. As the Panel
noted, the conformity of the measures taken to comply with the covered agreements will depend on
whether actual implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings has been achieved by the
Member concerned.(398) Therefore, we agree with the Panel that the measures actually taken by a
Member to comply with DSB recommendations and rulings, whether or not they follow the
suggestions for implementation made in previous proceedings, are the subject matter of the challenge
in Article 21.5 proceedings.
323. We consider that suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may, if correctly and fully
implemented, lead to compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. However, full
compliance with DSB rulings and WTO-consistency of the measures actually taken to comply cannot
be presumed simply because a Member declares that its measures taken to comply conform to a
suggestion made under Article 19.1 of the DSU. As pointed out above, Article 21.5 proceedings
focus on the measure actually taken to comply, not the ways in which the Member could implement
the recommendations and rulings. Following a suggestion does not guarantee substantive compliance
with the recommendations and rulings by the DSB. Whether such compliance has been achieved
needs to be determined through Article 21.5 proceedings. The adoption of a panel or Appellate Body
report by the DSB makes the recommendations and rulings therein binding upon the parties. As
noted earlier, such adoption by the DSB does not make suggestions for implementation binding upon
the parties (especially, where, as in this case, the first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel made several
suggestions); nor does DSB adoption mean that actions taken to implement suggestions must be
presumed to be WTO-consistent or shielded from review in Article 21.5 proceedings.
324. We, therefore, agree with the Panel that Ecuador had the right to challenge before an Article
21.5 panel the European Communities' measure taken to comply, whether or not such measure
implemented a suggestion made by an earlier panel or the Appellate Body. The function of Article
21.5 proceedings is to resolve disagreement over compliance. Even if the measure taken to comply
conformed to a suggestion made, this would not bar Ecuador from bringing Article 21.5 proceedings
to determine whether the implementing measure achieves full compliance with the DSB
recommendations and rulings. We do not consider that, as a consequence of the DSB adoption of a
panel or Appellate Body report containing a suggestion, the measure implementing such a suggestion
can be presumed to be WTO-consistent.(399) In our view, a DSU rule that establishes a legal
presumption of conformity should do so in clear and unambiguous terms.(400) Therefore, we do not
see how the terms in Article 19.1, second sentence, “imply” a legal presumption, particularly as this
provision has to be read in the context of Article 21.5, which entitles Members to the review of
implementation measures in compliance proceedings.
143
325. Suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may provide useful guidance and assistance
to Members and facilitate implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings, particularly in
complex cases. However, the fact that a Member has chosen to follow a suggestion does not create a
presumption of compliance in Article 21.5 proceedings. The fact that a Member has chosen to follow
a suggestion is part of the history and background of the measure at issue in Article 21.5 proceedings,
but it should not in itself pre-empt a panel's assessment of compliance under Article 21.5. In our
view, suggestions provide guidance, which is necessarily prospective in nature and cannot, therefore,
take account of all circumstances in which implementation may occur.
Footnote 398: Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.247.
Footnote 400: For example, Article 3.8 of the DSU, which establishes a legal presumption that a breach of WTO rules
constitutes nullification or impairment, does so in clear and unambiguous terms. Similarly, a legal presumption of
conformity with the GATT 1994 is established in clear and unambiguous terms by Article 2.4 of the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures for measures conforming to that Agreement.
5. Ônus da prova
(i) Caso de “defesas afirmativas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Brazil – Aircraft (21.5) (Reclamante: Canadá), para. 66
(WT/DS46/AB/RW)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a existência de “defesas afirmativas”, invocadas
pela parte demandada, após esta ter consentido ou ter sido demonstrado que uma medida é, em
princípio, incompatível com as disposições dos acordos da OMC. Defesas afirmativas constituem
exceções a uma proibição geral, e sua aplicabilidade excluiria a ilicitude da medida. Cabe então à
parte demandada, que invoca a defesa afirmativa, o ônus de provar que suas medidas se encaixam na
exceção prevista.
66. We recall that, before the original panel in Brazil – Aircraft, Brazil conceded that it had the
burden of proof in demonstrating its alleged “defence” under item (k).(76) However, in these Article
21.5 proceedings, Brazil argues that this burden of proof, under item (k), is on Canada.(77) In our
view, the fact that the measure at issue was “taken to comply” with the “recommendations and
rulings” of the DSB does not alter the allocation of the burden of proving Brazil's “defence” under
item (k). In this respect, we note that Brazil concedes that the revised PROEX measure is, in
principle, prohibited under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement; yet Brazil asserts nonetheless that
the PROEX measure is justified, under the first paragraph of item (k). Thus, in our view, Brazil is,
clearly, using item (k) to make an affirmative claim in its defence. In United States – Measure
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, we said: “It is only reasonable that
the burden of establishing [an affirmative] defence should rest on the party asserting it.”(78) As it is
Brazil that is asserting this “defence” using item (k) in these proceedings, we agree with the Article
21.5 Panel that Brazil has the burden of proving that the revised PROEX is justified under the first
paragraph of item (k), including the burden of proving that payments under the revised PROEX are
not “used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms.”
Footnote 76: Original panel report, Brazil – Aircraft, supra, footnote 2, para. 7.17.
Footnote 77: Brazil's appellant's submission, paras. 60-61.
144
Footnote 78: WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, p. 16.
(ii) Impossibilidade de fundamentar decisões baseado em evento futuro
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Aircraft (21.5) (Reclamante: Brasil), para. 38
(WT/DS70/AB/RW)
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que uma frase do Painel, vinculando o
cumprimento à garantia de que uma medida futura não seria contrária aos acordos, não devia ser
tomada literalmente, visto ser impossível garantir os atos futuros de todos os agentes públicos.
38.
We add also that the examination of “measures taken to comply” is based on the relevant
facts proved, by the complainant, to the Article 21.5 panel, during the panel proceedings. Therefore,
the “minimum implementation standard” that the Article 21.5 Panel expressed and which, it said, was
“effectively” agreed between the parties, should be viewed with caution.(37) The Article 21.5 Panel
said that Canada's implementation should “ 'ensure' that future TPC assistance to the Canadian
regional aircraft industry will not be de facto contingent on export performance.”(38) (emphasis
added) The use in this standard of the words “ensure” and “future”, if taken too literally, might be
read to mean that the Panel was seeking a strict guarantee or absolute assurance as to the future
application of the revised TPC programme. A standard which, if so read, would, however, be very
difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy since no one can predict how unknown administrators would
apply, in the unknowable future, even the most conscientiously crafted compliance measure.
Footnote 37: Article 21.5 Panel Report, para. 5.12.
Footnote 38: Ibid.
6. Efeito do recurso ao Artigo 21.5 que verifique o cumprimento dos acordos
Comunidades Europeias), US – Continued Suspension (Reclamante: Canadá), paras. 355; 367
(WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R)
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que uma decisão do Artigo 21.5 que verifique o
cumprimento dos acordos extingue ipso jure o direito à aplicação de contramedidas, visto ser este
derivado de uma decisão anterior do OSC que verificou o descumprimento continuado dos acordos
da OMC. Assim, um Membro que acredite ter cumprido os acordos por meio de uma medida e que
esteja sofrendo suspensão de concessões, em razão de descumprimento anterior, tem interesse em
recorrer ao Artigo 21.5 com o fim de caracterizar o cumprimento e fazer cessar a autorização para
aplicação daquela suspensão.
355. Such an approach is consistent with the requirements of Article 22.8 of the DSU. As noted
above, Article 22.8 provides certain resolutive conditions which, if met, render the suspension of
concessions without legal basis. The suspending Member and the implementing Member share the
responsibility to ensure that the suspension of concessions is applied only insofar as none of the
conditions laid down in Article 22.8 are met. Thus, both Members have an obligation to engage in a
cooperative manner in WTO dispute settlement to establish whether the suspension of concessions
can continue or must be discontinued pursuant to Article 22.8. Irrespective of who initiates the
Article 21.5 panel proceedings, a finding of an Article 21.5 panel that the implementing Member has
removed the inconsistent measure means that one of the resolutive conditions in Article 22.8 is met.
145
This finding, once adopted by the DSB–the same body that authorized the suspension of
concessions–signifies that the inconsistency against which the suspension of concessions was
authorized has now been remedied. Thus, by operation of law (ipso jure), the suspension of
concessions may no longer be applied.
(…)
367. A finding that the implementing Member has achieved substantive compliance means that the
first resolutive condition in Article 22.8 has been met. Such a finding, adopted by the DSB as part of
the Article 21.5 panel (and Appellate Body) report(s), would, by operation of law (ipso jure), result
in the termination of the DSB's authorization to suspend concessions. This result obtains irrespective
of whether the Article 21.5 panel was initiated by the original respondent or by the original
complainant. It does not depend on which party initiates the Article 21.5 panel proceedings. Rather,
the result depends on whether the Article 21.5 panel confirms that the implementing Member has
brought itself into substantive compliance, thereby triggering the obligation to cease applying the
suspension of concessions, as required by Article 22.8 of the DSU.
III. Comentários
O Artigo 21.5 constitui uma das peças-chave do Entendimento sobre Solução de Controvérsias da
OMC. Por meio dele, cria-se um procedimento intermediário, inexistente no mecanismo de solução
de controvérsias do GATT, entre a verificação pelos mecanismos multilaterais de que uma política
viola os acordos e a autorização multilateral para suspender concessões e outras obrigações. Assim,
ao contrário de outros órgãos internacionais de adjudicação de controvérsias, cuja competência se
exaure com a emissão de uma sentença obrigatória, o OSC é competente para solucionar
controvérsias entre os Membros relativas à implementação de suas conclusões e recomendações.
O Artigo 21.5 pode ser acionado a qualquer momento após a passagem do prazo razoável de tempo
para a implementação de um relatório. A pedido de qualquer das partes do procedimento original,
inicia-se novo procedimento perante os órgãos adjudicantes da OMC para examinar se as medidas
tomadas pelo Membro condenado levaram à compatibilidade entre suas políticas e os acordos da
OMC. Caso se verifique que não houve cumprimento do relatório, o Membro vencedor passa a poder
solicitar do violador uma compensação pelo prejuízo sofrido, e, na ausência desta, autorização para
suspender concessões e outras obrigações.
As seguidas interpretações dadas pelo OSC têm sempre reforçado o papel do sistema multilateral na
solução das controvérsias. Desde o relatório em Brasil – Aeronaves, a referência no artigo aos
“presentes procedimentos” tem interpretado como compreendendo a possibilidade de apelação sem
necessidade de acordo entre as partes. Em EUA – Certos Produtos das CE, o Órgão de Apelação
absteve-se de solucionar a questão do sequenciamento entre os Artigos 21.5 e 22.6, anulando a
decisão do painel a respeito. Por outro lado, o OA confirmou que nenhuma medida de suspensão de
concessões ou outras obrigações pode ser tomada com base em declaração unilateral da parte
prejudicada – ainda que vencedora no painel inicial – de que a outra parte permanece descumprindo
os acordos após a passagem do período razoável de tempo. Deve haver uma determinação
multilateral desse descumprimento continuado antes que compensações sejam devidas ou qualquer
medida possa ser tomada pela parte prejudicada.
A presunção se inverte uma vez caracterizado o descumprimento e iniciada a suspensão de
concessões. Passa a valer, na ausência de acordo, a última decisão multilateral – prevalecendo sobre a
presunção de que os Membros cumprem de boa-fé os acordos. Em outras palavras, a mera declaração
unilateral do Membro de que cessou a ilegalidade é insuficiente para obrigar a outra parte a
146
interromper a suspensão de concessões. Havendo desacordo entre as partes, prevalece a última
interpretação obtida de acordo com as regras multilaterais e, conforme decidido pelo Órgão de
Apelação (EUA – Suspensão Continuada), qualquer das partes está habilitada a recorrer ao OSC para
solicitar um novo painel de implementação. Assim que um relatório do Artigo 21.5 verificar que
houve cumprimento, cessa ipso jure o direito da parte inicialmente prejudicada de aplicar suspensão
de concessões contra a parte anteriormente violadora.
No mesmo sentido, de submeter as declarações unilaterais das partes ao controle multilateral, vai a
interpretação do termo “medidas destinadas a cumprir as recomendações e decisões”. As medidas
examinadas na fase de implementação não necessariamente serão as mesmas avaliadas inicialmente,
nem é necessário que haja relação jurídica entre estas e aquelas em direito interno. Tampouco é
conclusiva a declaração do Membro nesse sentido. Cabe aos órgãos adjudicantes, avaliando os
argumentos das partes, as medidas, os fatos iniciais e os termos das conclusões e recomendações do
OSC: (i) determinar quais medidas tomadas pelo Membro, se as houver, constituem “medidas
destinadas a cumprir as decisões e recomendações”; e (ii) verificar se as novas medidas, examinadas
em sua integralidade, são suficientes para produzir a compatibilidade entre as políticas da parte e os
acordos da OMC, e com isso o cumprimento material da recomendação do OSC (Relatórios do OA
em CE – Roupa de Cama; EUA – Madeira de Coníferas do Canadá).
O limite da análise feita pelo painel e pelo OA na fase de implementação é o objeto da controvérsia
inicial. Uma medida que não tenha sido contestada na fase inicial, ou que tenha então sido
considerada compatível com os acordos, não pode ser objeto de exame dos órgãos adjudicantes na
fase de implementação.
Finalmente, é preciso destacar a interpretação feita pelo Órgão de Apelação em CE – Bananas 21.5
II. Ao determinar que, naquele caso específico, as partes não haviam renunciado ao direito de
solicitar um painel de implementação, o OA afirmou a possibilidade de Membros da OMC
renunciarem, por meio de manifestação expressa, à possibilidade de valer-se do Artigo 21.5. Não
foram fornecidos maiores detalhes, entretanto, sobre os requisitos dessa renúncia – se seria necessário
fazê-lo dentro de um procedimento interno à OMC ou se bastaria um acordo posterior de direito
internacional geral – nem sobre seus efeitos. Uma renúncia poderia dizer respeito ao uso do Artigo
21.5 num caso determinado, mas não está claro se ela afetaria o direito do Membro reclamante de
solicitar novo painel tendo por objeto a mesma medida.
5.1. Aspectos Gerais
a) “Função e escopo do Artigo 21.5”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen (21.5)), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/AB/RW,
para. 79
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirma uma interpretação ampla da função do Painel de
implementação. Este não se ocupa apenas de verificar se houve alteração das medidas originais, mas
reexamina integralmente o caso, com o fim de determinar se as medidas de implementação são ou não
compatíveis com os Acordos da OMC.
Para. 79. “We addressed the function and scope of Article 21.5 proceedings for the first time in Canada –
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil). There, we found that Article 21.5 panels are not merely called upon to assess
whether measures taken to comply ‘implement specific ‘recommendations and rulings’ adopted by the DSB
147
in the original dispute. (22) We explained there that the mandate of Article 21.5 panels is to examine either
the ‘existence’ of ‘measures taken to comply’ or, more frequently, the ‘consistency with a covered agreement’
of implementing measures. (23) This implies that an Article 21.5 panel is not confined to examining the
‘measures taken to comply’ from the perspective of the claims, arguments, and factual circumstances relating
to the measure that was the subject of the original proceedings. (24) Moreover, the relevant facts bearing upon
the ‘measure taken to comply’ may be different from the facts relevant to the measure at issue in the original
proceedings. It is to be expected, therefore, that the claims, arguments, and factual circumstances relating to
the ‘measure taken to comply’ will not, necessarily, be the same as those relating to the measure in the
original dispute. (25) Indeed, a complainant in Article 21.5 proceedings may well raise new claims,
arguments, and factual circumstances different from those raised in the original proceedings, because a
‘measure taken to comply ‘may be inconsistent with WTO obligations in ways different from the original
measure. In our view, therefore, an Article 21.5 panel could not properly carry out its mandate to assess
whether a ‘measure taken to comply’ is fully consistent with WTO obligations if it were precluded from
examining claims additional to, and different from, the claims raised in the original proceedings.” (26)
b) “Caráter obrigatório do procedimento arbitral sob o Artigo 21.5”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Continued Supension of Obligations in the ECHormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias e Canadá,
WT/DS320/AB/R e WT/DS321/AB/R, paras. 336 e 340
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou o significado do caráter obrigatório do procedimento do
Artigo 21.5. Diversas possibilidades são oferecidas pelo DSU para a solução de uma controvérsia acerca da
compatibilidade com os Acordos de medidas tomadas para cumprir um Relatório do DSB. De todas elas,
entretanto, apenas o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 21.5 é compulsório, no sentido de permitir uma decisão
vinculante sem a necessidade de consentimento específico do Membro vinculado.
Para. 336. “The opening clause of Article 21.5 specifies the types of disputes that fall within the scope of this
provision, that is, those involving a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement
of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The word ‘shall’ in Article
21.5 indicates that such disagreements must be resolved through recourse to ‘these dispute settlement
procedures’. Read together with the second sentence of Article 21.5, ‘these dispute settlement procedures’ do
not refer generally to all proceedings under the DSU, but specifically to the panel proceedings envisaged in
Article 21.5, in which the original panelists are preferred for the composition of the panel and in which the
time frame of the proceedings is shortened. In other words, Article 21.5 dictates that panel proceedings
pursuant to this provision are the procedures that must be followed for adjudicating the cause of action as
framed in its opening clause.”
Para. 340. “Certainly, parties to a dispute are not precluded from pursuing consensual or alternative means of
dispute settlement foreseen in the DSU. Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that “[a] solution mutually acceptable
to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.” To reach a
mutually acceptable solution, Members can engage in consultations or resort to mediation and good offices.
Moreover, Article 25 provides for arbitration as an alternative to panel proceedings for dispute resolution.
Consultations, mediation, good offices, and arbitration are, however, alternatives to compulsory adjudication
and require the consent of the parties. In the absence of such consent, they cannot lead to a binding decision.
Thus, it is important to distinguish between these consensual means of dispute resolution, which are always at
the Members' disposal, and adjudication through panel proceedings, which are compulsory. It is in this sense
that Article 21.5 is cast in obligatory language. In this dispute, it is clear that a mutually acceptable solution
was not reached and the European Communities decided to resort to adjudication. In addition, the parties to
this dispute were unable to agree on an arbitration procedure pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU. (27) The
issue before us, therefore, is which procedure must be followed when parties do not avail themselves of the
148
consensual and alternative means of dispute resolution provided in the DSU, and the dispute must proceed to
the adjudication phase.”
c) “Possibilidade de renunciar ao direito de recorrer ao Artigo 21.5”
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirma a possibilidade de renúncia ao Painel do Artigo 21.5. Essa
renúncia deve ser formulada em linguagem clara e não deriva automaticamente de uma solução
mutuamente acordada. O Órgão de Apelação não determina outros requisitos, nem esclarece quais seriam
os efeitos de uma tal renúncia – se implica, por exemplo, uma renúncia total aos Painéis ou se apenas seria
necessário iniciar novo Painel, cabendo então novo prazo razoável de tempo para cumprir o determinado no
novo Relatório.
Para. 212. “(…) Similarly, a mutually agreed solution pursuant to Article 3.7 may encompass an agreement
to forego the right to initiate compliance proceedings. Or it may provide for the suspension of the right of
recourse to Article 21.5 until the steps agreed upon in a mutually agreed solution have been implemented.
Yet, this need not always be so. We therefore do not consider that the mere agreement to a “solution”
necessarily implies that parties waive their right to have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the event
of a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with the covered agreements of a measure taken to
comply. Instead, we consider that there must be a clear indication in the agreement between the parties of a
relinquishment of the right to have recourse to Article 21.5. In our view, the Panel's requirement that the
Understandings must constitute a ‘positive solution and effective settlement’ to the dispute in question to
preclude recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings was not a correct interpretation of what the DSU requires.”
5.2. Momento de recurso ao Artigo 21.5
a) “Necessidade de recurso ao Artigo 21.5 antes do recurso ao Artigo 22.6 (questão do
“sequenciamento” entre os Artigos 21.5 e 22.6)”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from the
European Communities (US - Certain Products) Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS165/AB/R, paras. 90-92
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação anulou uma afirmação do Painel que solucionava a questão do
‘sequenciamento’. Trata-se da incompatibilidade lógica entre a obrigação de solicitar retaliações
rapidamente, 30 dias após a expiração do prazo razoável de tempo, e a necessidade de um pronunciamento
sob o Artigo 21.5, a respeito da compatibilidade das novas medidas, como condição lógica ao pedido de
retaliações. O Painel havia afirmado a possibilidade de os árbitros do Painel de Implementação – agindo
nos termos do Artigo 22.6 – determinarem a existência de cumprimento do Relatório. Anulando essa
determinação, o Órgão de Apelação devolveu a solução para a possível antinomia aos Membros. Na
ausência de decisão coletiva, a questão vem sendo resolvida desde então por meio de acordos bilaterais ad
hoc, entre demandante e demandado, dispondo sobre o ‘sequenciamento’ a ser adotado em cada caso
específico.
Para. 90. “For these reasons, we conclude that the Panel erred by making the statements in paragraphs 6.121
to 6.126 of the Panel Report on the mandate of arbitrators appointed under Article 22.6 of the DSU.
Therefore, these statements by the Panel have no legal effect.”
149
Para. 91. “In coming to this conclusion, we are cognizant of the important systemic issue of the relationship
between Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU. As the United States correctly points out in its appellee's
submission, the terms of Articles 21.5 and 22 are not a ‘model of clarity’ and the relationship between these
two provisions of the DSU has been the subject of intensive and extensive discussion among Members of the
WTO. (28) We note that, on 10 October 2000, eleven Members of the WTO presented a proposal in the
General Council to amend, inter alia, Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU.” (29)
Para. 92. “In so noting, we observe that it is certainly not the task of either panels or the Appellate Body to
amend the DSU or to adopt interpretations within the meaning of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement. Only
WTO Members have the authority to amend the DSU or to adopt such interpretations. Pursuant to Article 3.2
of the DSU, the task of panels and the Appellate Body in the dispute settlement system of the WTO is ‘to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law.” (emphasis added) Determining what the rules and procedures of the DSU ought to be is not our
responsibility nor the responsibility of panels; it is clearly the responsibility solely of the Members of the
WTO.”

Sugestão da tradução: neither our responsibility nor / not our responsibility or
b) “Possibilidade de recurso ao Artigo 21.5 por qualquer das Partes e a qualquer tempo”
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que qualquer das Partes em uma controvérsia pode,
passado o período razoável de tempo, recorrer ao Artigo 21.5 em busca da solução de uma controvérsia
acerca da ocorrência ou não do cumprimento do Relatório inicial. O recurso ao Artigo para solucionar essa
controvérsia pode ocorrer inclusive após aplicada a suspensão de concessões pelo Membro prejudicado pela
violação.
Para. 345. “In sum, we consider that recourse to Article 21.5 panel proceedings is the proper course of action
within the procedural structure of the DSU in cases where, as in this dispute, a Member subject to the
suspension of concessions has taken an implementing measure and a disagreement arises as to whether ‘the
measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed’ within the meaning of Article
22.8.”
Para. 347. “A ‘disagreement’ as to the consistency with the WTO agreements of a measure taken to comply
arises from the existence of conflicting views: the original complainant's view that such a measure is
inconsistent with the WTO agreements or brings about only partial compliance, and the original respondent's
view that a measure is consistent with the WTO agreements and brings about full compliance with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings. Article 21.5 does not indicate which party may initiate proceedings under this
provision. Rather, the language of the provision is neutral on this matter, and it is open to either party to refer
the matter to an Article 21.5 panel to resolve this disagreement. The text of Article 21.5, therefore, leaves
open the possibility that either party to the original dispute may initiate the proceedings. Thus, contrary to the
European Communities' argument, the text of Article 21.5 does not preclude an original respondent from
initiating proceedings under that provision to obtain confirmation of the consistency with the WTO
agreements of its implementing measure.”
5.3. As “medidas destinadas a cumprir”
150
a) Conceito de “medidas destinadas a cumprir”
Cotton Type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen (21.5)), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/AB/RW,
para. 78
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a competência dos Painéis (e do próprio Órgão de
Apelação) para determinar, independentemente das declarações das partes, quais medidas são ‘medidas
destinadas a cumprir’ o Relatório original, devendo tais medidas, nos termos do Artigo 21.5, ser
integralmente examinadas pelo Painel de Implementação.
Para. 78. “In examining whether India's claim under Article 3.5 relating to ‘other factors’ was properly before
the Panel, we must first establish the appropriate subject-matter of Article 21.5 proceedings.” (…) As in
original dispute settlement proceedings, the ‘matter’ in Article 21.5 proceedings consists of two elements: the
specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint (that is, the claims). (30) If a claim challenges a
measure which is not a ‘measure taken to comply’, that claim cannot properly be raised in Article 21.5
proceedings. We agree with the Panel that it is, ultimately, for an Article 21.5 panel — and not for the
complainant or the respondent — to determine which of the measures listed in the request for its
establishment are ‘measures taken to comply’. (31) Although the issue raised by India in this appeal relates
primarily to the scope of claims that may be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings, this issue is intertwined with
the question of which measures may be considered as ‘measures taken to comply’ with the DSB rulings in an
original dispute.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber IV (21.5)), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS257/AB/RW,
para. 77
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou os critérios a serem utilizados pelo Painel de
implementação, para determinar se uma medida constitui uma ‘medida destinada a cumprir’ o Relatório
anterior. Esses critérios incluem a relação da medida a ser examinada com as ‘medidas destinadas a
cumprir’ declaradas pelo Membro, bem como com as recomendações e decisões do DSB. Para avaliá-los, o
Painel deve examinar essa relação, o que pode exigir a análise da natureza, tempo e efeitos das várias
medidas em questão.
Para. 77. “Taking account of all of the above, our interpretation of Article 21.5 of the DSU confirms that a
panel's mandate under Article 21.5 of the DSU is not necessarily limited to an examination of an
implementing Member's measure declared to be ‘taken to comply’. Such a declaration will always be relevant,
but there are additional criteria, identified above, that should be applied by a panel to determine whether or
not it may also examine other measures. Some measures with a particularly close relationship to the declared
‘measure taken to comply’, and to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, may also be susceptible to
review by a panel acting under Article 21.5. Determining whether this is the case requires a panel to scrutinize
these relationships, which may, depending on the particular facts, call for an examination of the timing,
nature, and effects of the various measures. This also requires an Article 21.5 panel to examine the factual and
legal background against which a declared ‘measure taken to comply’ is adopted. Only then is a panel in a
position to take a view as to whether there are sufficiently close links for it to characterize such an other
measure as one ‘taken to comply’ and, consequently, to assess its consistency with the covered agreements in
an Article 21.5 proceeding.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft (21.5)), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS70/AB/RW, para. 36
151
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou as ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir’ como sendo, em
princípio, distintas das medidas iniciais condenadas. A conclusão lógica dessa interpretação é que o Painel
não está restrito, em sua análise, ao exame das medidas condenadas pelo Painel original.
Para. 36. “Proceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the WTO; rather,
Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those ‘measures taken to comply with the recommendations and
rulings’ of the DSB. In our view, the phrase ‘measures taken to comply’ refers to measures which have been,
or which should be, adopted by a Member to bring about compliance with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB. In principle, a measure which has been ‘taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings’
of the DSB will not be the same measure as the measure which was the subject of the original dispute, so that,
in principle, there would be two separate and distinct measures (32): the original measure which gave rise to
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and the “measures taken to comply” which are – or should be –
adopted to implement those recommendations and rulings. In these Article 21.5 proceedings, the measure at
issue is a new measure, the revised TPC programme, which became effective on 18 November 1999 and
which Canada presents as a ‘measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings’ of the DSB.”
b) “Escopo das ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir’”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations” (US - FSC (21.5 II)), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/ASB/RW2,
paras 84 e 93
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a possibilidade dos diversos procedimentos abrangidos
pelo Artigo 21.5 ocorrerem em sequência, até o cumprimento da recomendação inicial. Também esclareceu
a possibilidade de um Painel sob o Artigo 21.5 analisar as ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir’, à luz de todas as
recomenções e decisões anteriores, certificando-se de que foi atingido o total cumprimento destas.
Para. 84. “As a result, if, in an Article 21.5 proceeding, a panel finds that the measure taken to comply with
the Article 4.7 recommendation made in the original proceedings does not achieve full withdrawal of the
prohibited subsidy — either because it leaves the entirety or part of the original prohibited subsidy in place, or
because it replaces that subsidy with another subsidy prohibited under the SCM Agreement — the
implementing Member continues to be under the obligation to achieve full withdrawal of the subsidy. The
obligation to comply with an Article 4.7 recommendation remains in effect, even if several proceedings under
Article 21.5 become necessary, until the prohibited subsidy is fully withdrawn.”
Para. 93. “(…) The task of an Article 21.5 panel is to determine whether ‘measures taken to comply’
implement the ‘recommendations and rulings’ adopted by the DSB in the original proceedings. (33) In doing
so, an Article 21.5 panel may examine either the ‘existence’ of measures taken to comply with DSB
recommendations and rulings, or, when such measures exist, the ‘consistency’ of those measures with the
covered agreements, or a combination of both in situations where the measures taken to comply, through
omissions or other deficiencies, may achieve only partial compliance. As we noted earlier, the text of Article
21.5 expressly links the ‘measures taken to comply’ and the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. (34)
The determination of whether ‘measures taken to comply’ challenged by the complaining party implement
fully, or only in part, the DSB recommendations and rulings requires a panel to examine all of the previous
DSB recommendations and rulings and the entire range of measures covered by them. (35) Hence, in
compliance proceedings, an Article 21.5 panel may have to examine whether the ‘measures taken to comply’
implement fully, or only partially, the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB.”
Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing)(US - Zeroing (21.5)), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/AB/RW,
para. 160
152
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a interpretação do Painel de que toda a incompatibilidade
entre as políticas do Membro e os Acordos deve cessar ao fim do período razoável de tempo. Isso significa
que a medida incompatível não pode mais ser aplicada, independentemente de os fatos sobre os quais a
medida incide terem ocorrido antes do fim do período razoável de tempo.
Para. 160. “(…) Thus, the Appellate Body has found that there may be circumstances where a WTO
Member's obligation to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB applies in respect of conduct
relating to imports that entered that Member's territory prior to the expiration of the reasonable period of time.
(36) Irrespective of the date on which the imports entered the territory of the implementing Member, the
WTO-inconsistencies must cease by the end of the reasonable period of time. There will not be full
compliance where the implementing Member fails to take action to rectify the WTO-inconsistent aspects of a
measure that remains in force after the end of the reasonable period of time. Likewise, actions taken by the
implementing Member after the end of the reasonable period of time must be WTO-consistent, even if those
actions are in respect of imports that entered the Member's territory before the end of the reasonable period of
time. Therefore, we agree with the Panel's statement that, “[i]f a measure found to be WTO-inconsistent is to
be applied after the expiry of the RPT, that measure must have been brought 'into conformity', irrespective of
the date of entry of the imports covered by that measure”. (37) Indeed, any conduct of the implementing
Member that was found to be WTO-inconsistent by the DSB must cease by the end of the reasonable period
of time. Otherwise, that Member would continue to act in a WTO-inconsistent manner after the end of the
reasonable period of time, contrary to Articles 3.7, 19.1, 21.1, 21.3, and 21.5 of the DSU.”
5.4. Objeto do procedimento do Artigo 21.5
a) “Geral”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton Type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen (21.5)), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/AB/RW,
paras. 78 e 98
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirma que medidas que não sejam ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir’
o Relatório não podem ser levadas para a análise do Painel de Implementação. Tampouco pode, nessa fase,
ser revisada uma interpretação adotada pelo DSB no seu Relatório inicial.
Para. 78. “(…) If a claim challenges a measure which is not a ‘measure taken to comply’, that claim cannot
properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings.”
Para. 98. “The Panel's ruling that India's claim under Article 3.5 relating to ‘other factors’ was not properly
before it is also consistent with the object and purpose of the DSU. Article 3.3 provides that
the prompt settlement of disputes is ‘essential to the effective functioning of the WTO’. Article 21.5 advances
the purpose of achieving a prompt settlement of disputes by providing an expeditious procedure to establish
whether a Member has fully complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. (38) For that
purpose, an Article 21.5 panel is to complete its work within 90 days, whereas a panel in an original dispute is
to complete its work within 9 months of its establishment, or within 6 months of its composition. It would be
incompatible with the function and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system if a claim could be
reasserted in Article 21.5 proceedings after the original panel or the Appellate Body has made a finding that
the challenged aspect of the original measure is not inconsistent with WTO obligations, and that report has
been adopted by the DSB. At some point, disputes must be viewed as definitely settled by the WTO dispute
settlement system.”
153
b) “Competência para verificar o cumprimento de decisões do Painel original, mesmo quando estas são
desacompanhadas de recomendações por dizerem respeito a uma medida expirada”
Relatório do Painel no litígio Thailand - Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines
(Thailand - Cigarettes), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/371/R, para. 6.17
Nesta controvérsia, o Painel sustentou a inexistência de disposições nos Artigos 21 e 22 do DSU indicando
que a obrigação de cumprir a implementação surge apenas a partir das recomendações dos Paineis, pois a
maioria das disposições relacionadas ao cumprimento de obrigações sob os Artigos 21 e 22 do DSU referese tanto à recomendações quanto à decisões, sendo, portanto, mais amplo o objetivo do requerimento de
cumprimento destes dispositivos, do que apenas as recomendações.
Para. 6.17. “We do not however find any language in the relevant provisions of Articles 21 and 22 of the
DSU indicating that an implementing Member's compliance obligation arises only from panels'
recommendations. Rather, most of the provisions relating to compliance obligations under Articles 21 and 22
of the DSU refer to both recommendations and rulings. (39) For example, Article 21.1 provides, ‘prompt
compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of
disputes to the benefit of all Members”. In our view, the scope of the compliance requirement under these
provisions is therefore broader than just ‘recommendations’. In any event, it is difficult to envision a situation
where the Philippines will a priori be precluded from resorting to the compliance proceedings with respect to
any future action taken by Thailand if it can be shown that such action is related to the Panel's findings on the
inconsistency of the concerned MRSP Notices with Thailand's obligations under Article III:2 of the GATT
1994. As noted in paragraphs 7.42 and 7.43 of the Interim Panel Report, previous panels considered it
necessary and important to make findings even with respect to measures that have expired at the time of
making such findings in certain situations. Among those are situations where a measure was still impairing
benefits accruing to a complaining Member or situations where there remained the prospect of reintroduction
of the measure, and thus making findings with respect to expired measures would contribute to resolving a
particular dispute. If only recommendations were to guarantee the complaining Member's right, as granted
under the DSU, to seek compliance proceedings, there would be no meaning in even making findings for
expired measures, which has not been the view of the Appellate Body and previous panels. (40) We also do
not believe that such an understanding would serve the spirit and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.”
c) “Questões diferentes de, ou adicionais, àquelas invocadas no procedimento original”
Calculating Dumping Margins (US - Zeroing (21.5)), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS294/AB/RW, paras. 423-427 e 432
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação delimita aspectos relevantes da competência do Painel sob o Artigo
21.5. Este Painel pode examinar quaisquer ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir’ o Relatório original. Isso inclui
medidas que, já em vigor à época do Relatório original, não tenham sido discutidas nesse Relatório, desde
que tais medidas tenham sido retomadas e apresentem-se como componentes da ‘medida destinada a
cumprir’ o Relatório inicial. O fato de aquelas medidas não terem sido originalmente discutidas não é
impeditivo de seu exame como ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir’, nem gera presunção de sua compatibilidade
com os Acordos.
Para. 423. “The Panel relied on the panel report in US - Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products
(Article 21.5 - EC) to find that the European Communities was precluded from raising in these Article 21.5
proceedings claims against an unchanged aspect of the original measure (the alleged arithmetical error), which
the European Communities could have made, but did not make, in the original proceedings. The panel in US -
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Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 - EC) found that allowing a complaining
Member to make “a new claim on an aspect of the original measure that was never challenged and remained
unchanged” (41) would jeopardize the principles of fundamental fairness and due process, and that it would
be unfair to expose a responding Member to the possibility of a finding of violation on an aspect of the
original measure that it “was entitled to assume was consistent with its obligations under the relevant
agreement given the absence of a finding of violation in the original report.” (42)
Para. 424. “We disagree with the notion that a Member may be entitled to assume in Article 21.5 proceedings
that an aspect of a measure that was not challenged in the original proceedings is consistent with that
Member's obligations under the covered agreements. In US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews
(Article 21.5 - Argentina), the Appellate Body held that, “[o]n the basis of the original panel's conclusions
[regarding the likelihood-of-dumping determination], the USDOC could not assume that its findings regarding
the alleged decline in the volume of imports were WTO-consistent” (43), as these concerned a different aspect
of the original measure. If certain claims against aspects of a measure were not decided on the merits in the
original proceedings, they are not covered by the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and, therefore, a
Member should not be entitled to assume that those aspects of the measure are consistent with the covered
agreements.”
Para. 425. “We recall that, in EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), the Appellate Body found that a
complaining Member that has failed to make a prima facie case in the original proceedings regarding an
element of the measure that remained unchanged after implementation may not re-litigate the same claim with
respect to the unchanged element of the measure in the Article 21.5 proceedings where this unchanged
element is separable from the changed part of the implementation measure. (44) In US - Shrimp (Article 21.5
– Malaysia), the Appellate Body found that a complaining Member may not reassert the same claim against
an unchanged aspect of the measure that has been found to be WTO-consistent in the original proceedings.”
(45)
Para. 426. “Referring to these two cases in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), the Appellate Body
observed that, “[b]ecause adopted panel and Appellate Body reports must be accepted by the parties to a
dispute, allowing a party in an Article 21.5 proceeding to re-argue a claim that has been decided in adopted
reports would indeed provide an unfair 'second chance' to that party.” (46) However, in US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), the Appellate Body distinguished the claims in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)
and US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) from those at issue in that dispute, and found that allowing a
complaining Member to make a case that it did not establish in the original proceedings would not provide it
with an unfair ‘second chance’, nor would it compromise the finality of the DSB's recommendations and
rulings.” (47)
Para. 427. “While claims in Article 21.5 proceedings cannot be used to re-open issues that were decided on
substance in the original proceedings, the unconditional acceptance of the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB by the parties to a dispute does not preclude raising new claims against measures taken to comply that
incorporate unchanged aspects of original measures that could have been made, but were not made, in the
original proceedings. We do not see how allowing such claims in Article 21.5 proceedings would ‘jeopardize
the principles of fundamental fairness and due process’ (48), or how it would unfairly provide a ‘second
chance’ (49) to the complaining Member, provided these new claims relate to a measure ‘taken to comply’
and do not re-argue claims that were decided in the original proceedings.”
Para. 432. “Thus, if we read the Appellate Body's statement in US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil)
together with its statement in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), it excludes, in principle, (‘ordinarily’)
from Article 21.5 proceedings new claims that could have been pursued in the original proceedings, but not
new claims against a measure taken to comply — that is, in principle, a new and different measure. This is so
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even where such a measure taken to comply incorporates components of the original measure that are
unchanged, but are not separable from other aspects of the measure taken to comply.”
d) “Vinculação do Painel sob o Artigo 21.5 às determinações do Painel original”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI (21.5)), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/AB/RW,
paras. 102-103
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação interpreta o caráter vinculante das decisões do Painel original para o
Painel de Implementação. O Painel de interpretação deve levar em conta o raciocínio do Painel original,
mas não está vinculado a julgar da mesma forma que este as decisões de um órgão governamental, se o
próprio órgão governamental alterou o seu procedimento e as suas determinações, como uma medida
destinada a cumprir os Acordos.
Para. 102. “Article 21.5 of the DSU identifies the task of a panel operating pursuant to that provision as
resolving disagreements “as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of a measure taken to
comply with the recommendations and rulings” of the DSB. This task cannot be done in abstraction from the
measure that was the subject of the original proceedings. (50) The measure taken to comply in this case is the
Section 129 Determination. Although it is distinct from the original determination, the Section 129
Determination incorporates by reference many parts of the analysis in the original determination (51), and
retains and relies on much of the evidence collected in the original investigation. As explained in the Section
129 Determination, the USITC not only sought “to provide more explanation and reasoning for its decision”,
that is, to fill in the gaps that the original panel had found in the reasoning and explanation in the original
injury determination (52); it also re-opened the record and collected more information and evidence. (53)
Furthermore, Canada's claims under Articles 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.5
and 15.7 of the SCM Agreement required the Panel to review, inter alia, how the investigating authority
treated the totality of the factors and evidence considered, including the new elements. This involved review
of the USITC's analysis of how those factors and the various pieces of evidence interacted. In these
circumstances, we do not see why the Panel would be bound by the findings of the original panel.”
Para. 103. “This does not mean that a panel operating under Article 21.5 of the DSU should not take account
of the reasoning of an investigating authority in an original determination, or of the reasoning of the original
panel. Article 21.5 proceedings do not occur in isolation but are part of a ‘continuum of events’. (54) This is a
consequence of the mandate of an Article 21.5 panel, namely, to examine whether recommendations and
rulings from the original dispute have been implemented consistently with the covered agreements. When an
investigating authority making a redetermination provides different explanations of, or draws different
inferences from, specific pieces of evidence that were also before it in the original investigation, this may be
relevant to the assessment of whether its reasoning is adequate and based on positive evidence. Such
deviations from prior reasoning may raise questions about the objectivity of the authority's assessment of the
evidence or the credibility of its explanations. Similarly, doubts could arise about the objective nature of an
Article 21.5 panel's assessment if, on a specific issue, that panel were to deviate from the reasoning in the
original panel report in the absence of any change in the underlying evidence in the record and explanations
given by the investigating authority in a redetermination. (55) These concerns are not, however, based on the
binding effect of the adopted findings of the original panel.”
e) “Valor jurídico das sugestões efetuadas pelo Painel original”
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas (21.5 II), Demandantes: Equador e EUA,
WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, paras. 322-325
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Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação definiu o caráter não vinculante das sugestões do Painel original
para o Painel de implementação. Para este, importa o resultado da implementação – o cumprimento
material dos Acordos – e não os meios utilizados. Assim, sugestões não vinculam o Membro violador, o
qual pode tornar suas medidas compatíveis com os Acordos de outras formas além da sugerida, nem
vinculam o Painel de implementação, caso seguidas. A tarefa do Painel de implentação permanece sendo o
exame da totalidade das ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir’ para a verificação de conformidade com os
Acordos da OMC.
Para. 322. “Suggestions made pursuant to Article 19.1 are not in themselves the subject of review by a
compliance panel. Article 21.5 of the DSU only refers to ‘measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings’ and not to measures taken to comply with suggestions issued pursuant to the
second sentence of Article 19.1. This confirms that an Article 21.5 panel's power of review is limited to the
assessment of the existence or consistency with the covered agreements of the measures taken to comply with
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Thus, what matters in Article 21.5 proceedings is whether the result
of implementation — whatever means are chosen — brings about substantive compliance with the DSB
recommendations and rulings. As the Panel noted, the conformity of the measures taken to comply with the
covered agreements will depend on whether actual implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings
has been achieved by the Member concerned. (56) Therefore, we agree with the Panel that the measures
actually taken by a Member to comply with DSB recommendations and rulings, whether or not they follow
the suggestions for implementation made in previous proceedings, are the subject matter of the challenge in
Article 21.5 proceedings.”
Para. 323. “We consider that suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may, if correctly and fully
implementation binding upon the parties (especially, where, as in this case, the first Ecuador Article 21.5
panel made several suggestions); nor does DSB adoption mean that actions taken to implement suggestions
must be presumed to be WTO-consistent or shielded from review in Article 21.5 proceedings.”
Para. 324. “We, therefore, agree with the Panel that Ecuador had the right to challenge before an Article 21.5
panel the European Communities' measure taken to comply, whether or not such measure implemented a
suggestion made by an earlier panel or the Appellate Body. The function of Article 21.5 proceedings is to
resolve disagreement over compliance. Even if the measure taken to comply conformed to a suggestion made,
this would not bar Ecuador from bringing Article 21.5 proceedings to determine whether the implementing
measure achieves full compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings. We do not consider that, as a
consequence of the DSB adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report containing a suggestion, the measure
implementing such a suggestion can be presumed to be WTO-consistent. (57) In our view, a DSU rule that
establishes a legal presumption of conformity should do so in clear and unambiguous terms. (58) Therefore,
we do not see how the terms in Article 19.1, second sentence, ‘imply’ a legal presumption, particularly as this
provision has to be read in the context of Article 21.5, which entitles Members to the review of
implementation measures in compliance proceedings.”
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Para. 325. “Suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may provide useful guidance and assistance to
Members and facilitate implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings, particularly in complex cases.
However, the fact that a Member has chosen to follow a suggestion does not create a presumption of
compliance in Article 21.5 proceedings. The fact that a Member has chosen to follow a suggestion is part of
the history and background of the measure at issue in Article 21.5 proceedings, but it should not in itself preempt a panel's assessment of compliance under Article 21.5. In our view, suggestions provide guidance,
which is necessarily prospective in nature and cannot, therefore, take account of all circumstances in which
implementation may occur.”
5.5 Ônus da prova
a) Caso de “defesas afirmativas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft (21.5)), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/RW, para. 66
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a existência de ‘defesas afirmativas’, invocadas pela
Parte demandada, após esta ter consentido ou ter sido demonstrado que uma medida é, em princípio,
incompatível com as disposições dos Acordos da OMC. Defesas afirmativas constituem exceções a uma
proibição geral, e a sua aplicabilidade excluiria a ilicitude da medida. Cabe então ao Membro demandado, o
qual invoca a defesa afirmativa, o ônus de provar que suas medidas se encaixam na exceção prevista.
Para. 66. “We recall that, before the original panel in Brazil – Aircraft, Brazil conceded that it had the burden
of proof in demonstrating its alleged ‘defence’ under item (k). (59) However, in these Article 21.5
proceedings, Brazil argues that this burden of proof, under item (k), is on Canada. (60) In our view, the fact
that the measure at issue was ‘taken to comply’ with the ‘recommendations and rulings’ of the DSB does not
alter the allocation of the burden of proving Brazil's ‘defence’ under item (k). In this respect, we note that
Brazil concedes that the revised PROEX measure is, in principle, prohibited under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement; yet Brazil asserts nonetheless that the PROEX measure is justified, under the first paragraph
of item (k). Thus, in our view, Brazil is, clearly, using item (k) to make an affirmative claim in its defence. In
United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, we said: “It is only
reasonable that the burden of establishing [an affirmative] defence should rest on the party asserting it.” (61)
As it is Brazil that is asserting this ‘defence’ using item (k) in these proceedings, we agree with the Article
21.5 Panel that Brazil has the burden of proving that the revised PROEX is justified under the first paragraph
of item (k), including the burden of proving that payments under the revised PROEX are not “used to secure a
material advantage in the field of export credit terms.”
b) “Impossibilidade de fundamentar decisões em evento futuro”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft
(Canada - Aircraft (21.5)), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS70/AB/RW, para. 38
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que uma frase do Painel, vinculando o cumprimento à
garantia de que uma medida futura não seria contrária aos Acordos, não devia ser tomada literalmente, visto
ser impossível garantir os atos futuros de todos os agentes públicos.
Para. 38. “We add also that the examination of ‘measures taken to comply’ is based on the relevant facts
proved, by the complainant, to the Article 21.5 panel, during the panel proceedings. Therefore, the ‘minimum
implementation standard’ that the Article 21.5 Panel expressed and which, it said, was ‘effectively’ agreed
between the parties, should be viewed with caution. (62) The Article 21.5 Panel said that Canada's
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implementation should ‘ensure’ that future TPC assistance to the Canadian regional aircraft industry will not
be de facto contingent on export performance.” (63) (emphasis added) The use in this standard of the words
‘ensure’ and ‘future’, if taken too literally, might be read to mean that the Panel was seeking a strict guarantee
or absolute assurance as to the future application of the revised TPC programme. A standard which, if so
read, would, however, be very difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy since no one can predict how unknown
administrators would apply, in the unknowable future, even the most conscientiously crafted compliance
measure.”
5.6 Efeito do recurso ao Artigo 21.5 que verifique o cumprimento dos Acordos
Neste Relatório, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que uma decisão do Artigo 21.5 que verifique o
cumprimento dos acordos extingue ipso jure o direito à aplicação de contramedidas, visto ser este
derivado de uma decisão anterior do DSB que apurou o descumprimento continuado dos acordos da
OMC. Assim, um Membro que acredite ter cumprido os acordos por meio de uma medida e que esteja
sofrendo suspensão de concessões, em razão de descumprimento anterior, tem interesse em recorrer ao
Artigo 21.5 com o fim de caracterizar o cumprimento e fazer cessar a autorização para aplicação da
suspensão.
Para. 355. “Such an approach is consistent with the requirements of Article 22.8 of the DSU. As noted above,
Article 22.8 provides certain resolutive conditions which, if met, render the suspension of concessions without
legal basis. The suspending Member and the implementing Member share the responsibility to ensure that the
suspension of concessions is applied only insofar as none of the conditions laid down in Article 22.8 are met.
Thus, both Members have an obligation to engage in a cooperative manner in WTO dispute settlement to
establish whether the suspension of concessions can continue or must be discontinued pursuant to Article
22.8. Irrespective of who initiates the Article 21.5 panel proceedings, a finding of an Article 21.5 panel that
the implementing Member has removed the inconsistent measure means that one of the resolutive conditions
in Article 22.8 is met. This finding, once adopted by the DSB – the same body that authorized the suspension
of concessions – signifies that the inconsistency against which the suspension of concessions was authorized
has now been remedied. Thus, by operation of law (ipso jure), the suspension of concessions may no longer
be applied.”
Para. 367. “A finding that the implementing Member has achieved substantive compliance means that the
first resolutive condition in Article 22.8 has been met. Such a finding, adopted by the DSB as part of the
Article 21.5 panel (and Appellate Body) report(s), would, by operation of law (ipso jure), result in the
termination of the DSB's authorization to suspend concessions. This result obtains irrespective of whether the
Article 21.5 panel was initiated by the original respondent or by the original complainant. It does not depend
on which party initiates the Article 21.5 panel proceedings. Rather, the result depends on whether the Article
21.5 panel confirms that the implementing Member has brought itself into substantive compliance, thereby
triggering the obligation to cease applying the suspension of concessions, as required by Article 22.8 of the
DSU.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 21 do DSU regulamentou a implementação e o processo de acompanhamento da implementação
(vigilância) das decisões do DSB. Nesse sentido, buscou estabelecer alguns critérios que atendessem essa
intervenção do órgão na soberania dos Estados, considerando que quando o DSB determina a aplicação de
suas decisões ele interfere diretamente nas normas, procedimentos e atuação do Estado. O seu escopo,
portanto, é garantir a maior eficiência na aplicação, e, por vezes, foi necessário atender às disparidades dos
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sistemas domésticos para a modificação de normas e absorção da norma internacional, sempre ressaltando,
como no caput, a necessidade (como norma de caráter mandatária) de cumprimento das decisões.
Para tanto, o Artigo estabeleceu limites temporais para a implementação, buscando evitar a eternização
(protelação) da implementação das recomendações. Assim, como regra geral, ficou determinado que a Parte
conta com 30 dias, a partir da adoção do Relatório, para informar sobre sua intenção de implementá-lo, ou,
justificar-se, caso não seja possível fazê-lo imediatamente. Esta determinação demonstra a grande dificuldade
do órgão em obter a implementação das decisões em todos os casos julgados e busca, portanto, apoio no
critério do prazo razoável a ser definido pelas Partes ou, na ausência de consenso nesse sentido, por um Painel
Arbitral.
Além disso, como ocorre em quase todo o conjunto de regras da OMC, um waiver é concedido aos Membros
em desenvolvimento, salientando que a jurisprudência não reconheceu o uso desse benefício quando os países
envolvidos nos dois lados da demanda são considerados em desenvolvimento.
Finalmente, muito se discute acerca do que seria um período razoável de tempo, e não se pode dizer que exista
um posicionamento consolidado da jurisprudência. Há sim, uma interpretação a mais casuística possível,
como se percebe da interpretação dada à luz do Acordo sobre Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias (ASMC) e
da determinação do comprimento com base no tipo de medida a ser implementada. Além disso, o respeito aos
trâmites legislativos domésticos também foi objeto de consideração do órgão.
Maiores comentários não se fazem necessários com relação aos incisos VI, VII e VIII, por se tratarem de
regras mandatárias, descritivas, e que não suscitam dúvidas diretas a respeito, mas que podem ser sanadas em
uma análise complessiva das decisões já abordadas nos incisos I, II, III, IV e V.
O Artigo 21.5 constitui uma das peças-chave do DSU. Por meio dele, cria-se um procedimento intermediário,
inexistente no mecanismo de solução de controvérsias do GATT, entre a verificação pelos mecanismos
multilaterais de que uma política viola os acordos e a autorização multilateral para suspender concessões e
outras obrigações. Assim, ao contrário de outros órgãos internacionais de adjudicação de controvérsias, cuja
competência se exaure com a emissão de uma sentença obrigatória, o DSB é competente para solucionar
controvérsias entre os Membros relativas à implementação de suas conclusões e recomendações.
O Artigo 21.5 pode ser acionado a qualquer momento após a passagem do prazo razoável de tempo para a
implementação de um Relatório. A pedido de qualquer das partes do procedimento original, inicia-se novo
procedimento perante os órgãos adjudicantes da OMC para examinar se as medidas tomadas pelo Membro
condenado levaram à compatibilidade entre suas políticas e os acordos da OMC. Caso se verifique que não
houve cumprimento do Relatório, o Membro vencedor passa a poder solicitar do violador uma compensação
pelo prejuízo sofrido, e, na ausência desta, autorização para suspender concessões e outras obrigações.
As seguidas interpretações dadas pelo DSB têm sempre reforçado o papel do sistema multilateral na solução
das controvérsias. Desde o Relatório em Brasil – Aeronaves, a referência no artigo aos ‘presentes
procedimentos’ tem interpretado como compreendendo a possibilidade de apelação sem necessidade de
acordo entre as partes. Em EUA – Certos Produtos das CE, o Órgão de Apelação absteve-se de solucionar a
questão do sequenciamento entre os Artigos 21.5 e 22.6, anulando as recomendações do Painel a respeito.
Por outro lado, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que nenhuma medida de suspensão de concessões ou outras
obrigações pode ser tomada com base em declaração unilateral da parte prejudicada – ainda que vencedora no
Painel inicial – de que a outra parte permanece descumprindo os acordos após a passagem do período razoável
de tempo. Deve haver uma determinação multilateral desse descumprimento continuado antes que
compensações sejam devidas ou qualquer medida possa ser tomada pela parte prejudicada.
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A presunção se inverte uma vez caracterizado o descumprimento e iniciada a suspensão de concessões. Passa
a valer, na ausência de acordo, a última decisão multilateral – prevalecendo sobre a presunção de que os
Membros cumprem de boa-fé os acordos. Em outras palavras, a mera declaração unilateral do Membro de que
cessou a ilegalidade é insuficiente para obrigar a outra parte a interromper a suspensão de concessões.
Havendo desacordo entre as partes, prevalece a última interpretação obtida de acordo com as regras
multilaterais e, conforme decidido pelo Órgão de Apelação (EUA – Suspensão Continuada), qualquer das
partes está habilitada a recorrer ao DSB para solicitar um novo painel de implementação. Assim que um
Relatório do Painel sob o Artigo 21.5 verificar que houve cumprimento, cessa ipso jure o direito da parte
inicialmente prejudicada de aplicar suspensão de concessões contra a parte anteriormente violadora.
No mesmo sentido, de submeter as declarações unilaterais das partes ao controle multilateral, vai a
interpretação do termo ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir as recomendações e decisões’. As medidas examinadas
na fase de implementação não necessariamente serão as mesmas avaliadas inicialmente, nem é necessário que
haja relação jurídica entre estas e aquelas em direito interno. Tampouco é conclusiva a declaração do Membro
nesse sentido. Cabe aos órgãos adjudicantes, avaliando os argumentos das partes, as medidas, os fatos iniciais
e os termos das conclusões e recomendações do DSB: (i) determinar quais medidas tomadas pelo Membro, se
as houver, constituem ‘medidas destinadas a cumprir as decisões e recomendações’; e (ii) verificar se as novas
medidas, examinadas em sua integralidade, são suficientes para produzir a compatibilidade entre as políticas
da parte e os acordos da OMC, e com isso o cumprimento material da recomendação do DSB (Relatórios do
Órgão de Apelação em CE – Roupa de Cama; EUA – Madeira de Coníferas do Canadá). O limite da análise
feita pelo Painel e pelo Órgão de Apelação na fase de implementação é o objeto da controvérsia inicial.
Uma medida que não tenha sido contestada na fase inicial, ou que tenha então sido considerada compatível
com os acordos, não pode ser objeto de exame dos órgãos adjudicantes na fase de implementação. Finalmente,
é preciso destacar a interpretação feita pelo Órgão de Apelação em CE – Bananas 21.5 II. Ao determinar que,
naquele caso específico, as partes não haviam renunciado ao direito de solicitar um Painel de Implementação,
o Órgão de Apelação afirmou a possibilidade de Membros da OMC renunciarem, por meio de manifestação
expressa, à possibilidade de valer-se do Artigo 21.5. Não foram fornecidos maiores detalhes, entretanto, sobre
os requisitos dessa renúncia – se seria necessário fazê-lo dentro de um procedimento interno à OMC ou se
bastaria um acordo posterior de direito internacional geral – nem sobre seus efeitos. Uma renúncia poderia
dizer respeito ao uso do Artigo 21.5 num caso determinado, mas não está claro se ela afetaria o direito do
Membro reclamante de solicitar novo painel tendo por objeto a mesma medida.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 23: Ibid., paras. 40-41. The panels in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) (paras. 6.8-6.9) and Australia – Salmon
(Article 21.5 – Canada) (para. 7.10.9) reached essentially the same conclusion.
Footnote 25: Ibid.
Footnote 26: As we put it in Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil): “Indeed, the utility of the review envisaged under Article 21.5
of the DSU would be seriously undermined if a panel were restricted to examining the new measure from the perspective of the
claims, arguments and factual circumstances that related to the original measure, because an Article 21.5 panel would then be unable
to examine fully the ‘consistency with a covered agreement of the measures taken to comply’, as required by Article 21.5 of the DSU”.
(Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 41) We defined the function of Article 21.5 proceedings in
the same vein in our Report in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) (para. 87).
Footnote 27: The European Communities alleges that it proposed to the United States to submit the dispute to arbitration under Article
25 of the DSU, but the United States refused. (European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 62.
Footnote 28: United States' appellee's submission, para. 39.
Footnote 29: WT/GC/W/410.
Footnote 30: Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 76, interpreting Article 7 of the DSU.
Footnote 31: The Panel stated in paragraph 6.17 of the Panel Report: “To the extent a party may have challenged, in a request for
establishment of an Article 21.5 panel, measures which were not ‘taken to comply’ by the implementing Member, it is our view that a
Panel may decline to address claims concerning such measures. (original boldface)
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In paragraphs 6.13 ff of the Panel Report, the Panel refers, in support of this interpretation, to the panel reports in Australia – Salmon
(Article 21.5 – Canada) (para. 7.10.22) and Australia – Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 – US) (para. 6.4).
Footnote 32: “We recognize that, where it is alleged that there exist no ‘measures taken to comply’, a panel may find that there is no
new measure.”
Footnote 34: See supra, para. 61.
Footnote 35: Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 68.
Footnote 36: “We will henceforth refer to the respondent Member subject to the obligation to comply with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings as the ‘implementing Member’”.
Footnote 39: See also Articles 21.3, 21.5, 21.6, and 22.2 of the DSU.
Footnote 40: Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), paras.
261-273; Panel Report, EC – Commercial Vessels, para. 8.4; Panel Report, Columbia – Ports of Entry, paras. 7.45-7.54.
Footnote 42: Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 7.75. (footnote omitted)
Footnote 43: Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 150.
Footnote 44: See Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 86 and 93.
Footnote 45: See Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 96.
Footnote 46: Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 210. (footnote omitted)
Footnote 47: See Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 210.
Footnote 49: See also Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 150.
Footnote 50: Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 68; Appellate Body Report, US – FSC
(Article 21.5 – EC II), para. 61. The Appellate Body has already recognized certain circumstances in which the scope of proceedings
under Article 21.5 may be limited by the scope of the original proceedings. For example, a party cannot make the same claim of
inconsistency against the same measure (or component of a measure) in an Article 21.5 proceeding if the original panel and Appellate
Body found the measure to be consistent with the obligation at issue (Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia),
paras. 89-99), or if the original panel found that the complaining party had not made out its claim with respect to the measure (or
component of a measure). (Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 92-93 and 99) Similarly, a party may
not, in proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, seek to have the Appellate Body “revisit the original panel report” when that report
was not appealed. (Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 78)
Footnote 51: At pages 6-7 of the Section 129 Determination, the USITC stated: “We adopt from the original Commission report our
prior views and findings in their entirety regarding domestic like product, domestic industry and related parties, use of publicly
available information, conditions of competition, cross-cumulation, Maritime Provinces, effects of subsidies or dumping, and
consideration of the nature of the subsidy and its likely trade effects. (footnote omitted)
Footnote 52: Section 129 Determination, pp. 5-6 and footnote 20.
Footnote 53 Ibid., p. 4.
Footnote 54: Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 121.
Footnote 55: “We would have concerns, for example, if an Article 21.5 panel were to see no problem in a particular inference drawn
by an investigating authority in a redetermination in circumstances where the original panel found that such inference lacked proper
support and the inference drawn in the redetermination was based on the same evidence and explained in the same way as in the
original determination.”
Footnote 56: Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.247.
Footnote 58: For example, Article 3.8 of the DSU, which establishes a legal presumption that a breach of WTO rules constitutes
‘nullification or impairment’, does so in clear and unambiguous terms. Similarly, a legal presumption of conformity with the GATT
1994 is established in clear and unambiguous terms by Article 2.4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures for measures conforming to that Agreement.
Footnote 59: Original panel report, Brazil – Aircraft, supra, footnote 2, para. 7.17.
Footnote 60: Brazil's appellant's submission, paras. 60-61.
Footnote 61: WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, p. 16.
Footnote 62: Article 21.5 Panel Report, para. 5.12.
Footnote 63: Ibid.
162

Artigo 22
IA.
Article 22
Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions
22.1
Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures
available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable
period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations
is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the
covered agreements. Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered
agreements.
22.2
If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement
into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the
reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so
requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with
any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually
acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the
date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement
procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.
22.3
In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the
following principles and procedures:
(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or
other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body
has found a violation or other nullification or impairment;
III. if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other
obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other
obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;
(c)
IV.
if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other
obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances
are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another
covered agreement;
in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account:
(i)
(ii)
the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate
Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance
of such trade to that party;
the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the
broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other
obligations;
163
V. if that party decides to request authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to
subparagraphs (b) or (c), it shall state the reasons therefor in its request. At the same time as the
request is forwarded to the DSB, it also shall be forwarded to the relevant Councils and also, in
the case of a request pursuant to subparagraph (b), the relevant sectoral bodies;
VI. for purposes of this paragraph, “sector” means:
(i) with respect to goods, all goods;
(ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the current “Services Sectoral
Classification List” which identifies such sectors (64);
(iii) with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each of the categories of
intellectual property rights covered in Section 1, or Section 2, or Section 3, or Section 4, or
Section 5, or Section 6, or Section 7 of Part II, or the obligations under Part III, or Part IV of
the Agreement on TRIPS;
(h) for purposes of this paragraph, “agreement” means:
(i) with respect to goods, the agreements listed in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, taken as
a whole as well as the Plurilateral Trade Agreements in so far as the relevant parties to the
dispute are parties to these agreements;
(ii) with respect to services, the GATS;
(iii) with respect to intellectual property rights, the Agreement on TRIPS.
22.4
The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be
equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.
22.5
The DSB shall not authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations if a covered agreement
prohibits such suspension.
22.6
When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall grant authorization
to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of
time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request. However, if the Member concerned
objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in
paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to
arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original panel, if members are available, or by
an arbitrator (65) appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed within 60 days after the
date of expiry of the reasonable period of time. Concessions or other obligations shall not be
suspended during the course of the arbitration.
22.7
The arbitrator (66) acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine the nature of the concessions or
other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. The arbitrator may also determine if the
proposed suspension of concessions or other obligations is allowed under the covered agreement.
However, if the matter referred to arbitration includes a claim that the principles and procedures set
forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed, the arbitrator shall examine that claim. In the event the
arbitrator determines that those principles and procedures have not been followed, the complaining
party shall apply them consistent with paragraph 3. The parties shall accept the arbitrator’s decision as
final and the parties concerned shall not seek a second arbitration. The DSB shall be informed
promptly of the decision of the arbitrator and shall, upon request, grant authorization to suspend
164
concessions or other obligations where the request is consistent with the decision of the arbitrator,
unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.
22.8
The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until
such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the
Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or
impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached. In accordance with paragraph 6
of Article 21, the DSB shall continue to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted
recommendations or rulings, including those cases where compensation has been provided or
concessions or other obligations have been suspended but the recommendations to bring a measure
into conformity with the covered agreements have not been implemented.
22.9
The dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements may be invoked in respect of measures
affecting their observance taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of
a Member. When the DSB has ruled that a provision of a covered agreement has not been observed,
the responsible Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure its
observance. The provisions of the covered agreements and this Understanding relating to
compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been
possible to secure such observance (67).
Footnote 64: The list in document MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies eleven sectors.
Footnote 65: The expression “arbitrator” shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group.
Footnote 66: The expression “arbitrator” shall be interpreted as refering either to an individual or a group or to the Members of the
original panel when serving in the capacity of arbitrator.
Footnote 67: Where the provisions of any covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or
authorities within the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of such
covered agreement shall prevail.
IB.
Artigo 22
Compensação e Suspensão de Concessões
22.1
A compensação e a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações são medidas temporárias
disponíveis no caso de as recomendações e decisões não serem implementadas dentro de prazo
razoável. No entanto, nem a compensação nem a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações é
preferível à total implementação de uma recomendação com o objetivo de adaptar uma medida a um
acordo abrangido. A compensação é voluntária e, se concedida, deverá ser compatível com os acordos
abrangidos.
22.2
Se o membro afetado não adaptar a um acordo abrangido a medida considerada incompatível ou não
cumprir de outro modo as recomendações e decisões adotadas dentro do prazo razoável determinado
conforme o parágrafo 3 do Artigo 21, tal Membro deverá, se assim for solicitado, e em período não
superior à expiração do prazo razoável, entabular negociações com quaisquer das partes que hajam
recorrido ao procedimento de solução de controvérsias, tendo em vista a fixação de compensações
mutuamente satisfatórias. Se dentro dos 20 dias seguintes à data de expiração do prazo razoável não
se houver acordado uma compensação satisfatória, quaisquer das partes que hajam recorrido ao
procedimento de solução de controvérsias poderá solicitar autorização do OSC para suspender a
aplicação de concessões ou de outras obrigações decorrentes dos acordos abrangidos ao Membro
interessado.
22.3
Ao considerar quais concessões ou outras obrigações serão suspensas, a parte reclamante aplicará os
seguintes princípios e procedimentos:
165
(a) o princípio geral é o de que a parte reclamante deverá procurar primeiramente suspender
concessões ou outras obrigações relativas ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(es) em que o grupo especial ou
Órgão de Apelação haja constatado uma infração ou outra anulação ou prejuízo;
(b) se a parte considera impraticável ou ineficaz a suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações
relativas ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(es), poderá procurar suspender concessões ou outras obrigações em
outros setores abarcados pelo mesmo acordo abrangido;
(c) se a parte considera que é impraticável ou ineficaz suspender concessões ou outras obrigações
relativas a outros setores abarcados pelo mesmo acordo abrangido, e que as circunstâncias são
suficientemente graves, poderá procurar suspender concessões ou outras obrigações abarcadas por
outro acordo abrangido;
(d) ao aplicar os princípios acima, a parte deverá levar em consideração:
(i)
o comércio no setor ou regido pelo acordo em que o grupo especial ou Órgão de
Apelação tenha constatado uma violação ou outra anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios,
e a importância que tal comércio tenha para a parte;
(ii)
os elementos econômicos mais gerais relacionados com a anulação ou prejuízo e as
conseqüências econômicas mais gerais da suspensão de concessões ou outras
obrigações;
(e) se a parte decidir solicitar autorização para suspender concessões ou outras obrigações em virtude
do disposto nos subparágrafos (b) ou (c), deverá indicar em seu pedido as razões que a
fundamentam. O pedido deverá ser enviado simultaneamente ao OSC e aos Conselhos
correspondentes e também aos órgãos setoriais correspondentes, em caso de pedido baseado no
subparágrafo (b).
(f) para efeito do presente parágrafo, entende-se por “setor”:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
no que se refere a bens, todos os bens;
no que se refere a serviços, um setor principal dentre os que figuram na versão atual da
“Lista de Classificação Setorial dos Serviços”que identifica tais setores18;
no que concerne a direitos de propriedade intelectual relacionados com o comércio,
quaisquer das categorias de direito de propriedade intelectual compreendidas nas
secções 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ou 7 da Parte II, ou as obrigações da Parte III ou da Parte IV do
Acordo sobre TRIPS;
(g) para efeito do presente parágrafo, entende-se por “acordo”:
(i)
no que se refere a bens, os acordos enumerados no anexo 1A do Acordo Constitutivo da
OMC, tomados em conjunto, bem como os Acordos Comerciais Plurilaterais na medida
em que as partes em controvérsia sejam partes nesses acordos;
(ii) no que concerne a serviços, o GATS;
(iii) no que concerne a direitos de propriedade intelectual, o Acordo sobre TRIPS.
18
Na lista integrante do documento MTN.GNG/W/120 são identificados onze setores.
166
22.4
O grau da suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações autorizado pelo OSC deverá ser equivalente
ao grau de anulação ou prejuízo.
22.5
O OSC não deverá autorizar a suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações se o acordo abrangido
proíbe tal suspensão.
22.6
Quando ocorrer a situação descrita no parágrafo 2, o OSC, a pedido, poderá conceder autorização para
suspender concessões ou outras obrigações dentro de 30 dias seguintes à expiração do prazo razoável,
salvo se o OSC decidir por consenso rejeitar o pedido. No entanto, se o Membro afetado impugnar o
grau da suspensão proposto, ou sustentar que não foram observados os princípios e procedimentos
estabelecidos no parágrafo 3, no caso de uma parte reclamante haver solicitado autorização para
suspender concessões ou outras obrigações com base no disposto nos parágrafos 3 (b) ou 3 (c), a
questão será submetida a arbitragem. A arbitragem deverá ser efetuada pelo grupo especial que
inicialmente tratou do assunto, se os membros estiverem disponíveis, ou por um árbitro19 designado
pelo Diretor-Geral, e deverá ser completada dentro de 60 dias após a data de expiração do prazo
razoável. As concessões e outras obrigações não deverão ser suspensas durante o curso da arbitragem.
22.7
O árbitro20 que atuar conforme o parágrafo 6 não deverá examinar a natureza das concessões ou das
outras obrigações a serem suspensas, mas deverá determinar se o grau de tal suspensão é equivalente
ao grau de anulação ou prejuízo. O árbitro poderá ainda determinar se a proposta de suspensão de
concessões ou outras obrigações é autorizada pelo acordo abrangido. No entanto, se a questão
submetida à arbitragem inclui a reclamação de que não foram observados os princípios e
procedimentos definidos pelo parágrafo 3, o árbitro deverá examinar a reclamação. No caso de o
árbitro determinar que aqueles princípios e procedimentos não foram observados, a parte reclamante
os aplicará conforme o disposto no parágrafo 3. As partes deverão aceitar a decisão do árbitro como
definitiva e as partes envolvidas não deverão procurar uma segunda arbitragem. O OSC deverá ser
prontamente informado da decisão do árbitro e deverá, se solicitado, outorgar autorização para a
suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações quando a solicitação estiver conforme à decisão do
árbitro, salvo se o OSC decidir por consenso rejeitar a solicitação.
22.8
A suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações deverá ser temporária e vigorar até que a medida
considerada incompatível com um acordo abrangido tenha sido suprimida, ou até que o Membro que
deva implementar as recomendações e decisões forneça uma solução para a anulação ou prejuízo dos
benefícios, ou até que uma solução mutuamente satisfatória seja encontrada. De acordo com o
estabelecido no parágrafo 6 do Artigo 21, o OSC deverá manter sob supervisão a implementação das
recomendações e decisões adotadas, incluindo os casos nos quais compensações foram efetuadas ou
concessões ou outras obrigações tenham sido suspensas mas não tenham sido aplicadas as
recomendações de adaptar uma medida aos acordos abrangidos.
22.9
As disposições de solução de controvérsias dos acordos abrangidos poderão ser invocadas com
respeito às medidas que afetem sua observância, tomadas por governos locais ou regionais ou por
autoridades dentro do território de um Membro. Quando o OSC tiver decidido que uma disposição de
um acordo abrangido não foi observada, o Membro responsável deverá tomar as medidas necessárias
que estejam a seu alcance para garantir sua observância. Nos casos em que tal observância não tenha
sido assegurada, serão aplicadas as disposições dos acordos abrangidos e do presente Entendimento
relativas à compensação e à suspensão de concessões e outras obrigações21.
Entende-se pela expressão “árbitro” indistintamente uma pessoa ou um grupo de pessoas.
Entende-se pela expressão “árbitro” indistintamente uma pessoa, um grupo de pessoas ou os membros do grupo especial que inicialmente tratou do
assunto, se atuarem na qualidade de árbitros.
21
Quando as disposições de qualquer acordo abrangido relativas às medidas adotadas pelos governos ou autoridades regionais ou locais dentro do
território de um Membro forem diferentes das enunciadas no presente parágrafo, prevalecerão as disposições do acordo abrangido.
19
20
167
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 22 do ESC
1.
Artigo 22.1
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
2.
“Compensação e suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, por ocasião da não
implementação das recomendações e decisões do OSC, dentro do período razoável de tempo”
- Exceção: subsídios proibidos
“Reclamações em procedimentos de arbitragem ao amparo do Artigo 21.5 do ESC”
“Natureza temporária e finalidade da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”
“Relação entre os Artigos 21.3 e 22.1 do ESC”
Artigo 22.2
(a)
(b)
“Recurso direto ao Artigo 22 do ESC”
“Especificidade no requerimento para suspensão de concessões ou outras Obrigacões”
(i) Critério da “especificidade” constante no Artigo 6.2 do ESC
(ii) Requerimento de “especificidade mínima”
(c)
“Concessões ou outras obrigações sob os acordos abrangidos”
(i) Concessões tarifárias
- Lista de productos
(d)
(e)
(f)
3.
“Suspensão de concessões pelo método carrossel”
“Casos em que a suspensão de obrigações foi requerida”
“Quando as obrigações a serem suspensas devem ser específicas”
Artigo 22.3
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
“Princípio geral: o Membro demandante deve em primeiro lugar buscar suspender concessões
ou outras obrigações com relação ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(es)”
“Objetivo da revisão pelo Painel Arbitral com base no Artigo 22.3 do DSU”
“O Membro demandante deve seguir os princípios e procedimentos da praticidade /
exequibilidade e da efetividade”
- “Praticável” / “exequível” e “efetivo”
“Artigos22.3(b) 22.3(c) do DSU”
(i) Relação entre os Artigos 22.3(a) e 22.3(c) do DSU
4.
Artigo 22.4
(a) “Natureza e finalidade da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”
(b) “O padrão de equivalência”
(i) “A equivalência entre o nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível
da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios”
168
(ii) “Equivalência quantitativa”
(iii) “Equivalência qualitativa”
(c) “As contramedidas no Acordo de Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias (ASMC)”
(i) O conceito de “contramedidas” no dicionário Oxford da língua inglesa
(ii) “Contramedidas apropriadas”
(iii) Padrão de “apropriação (ASMC) e padrão de “equivalência” (DSU)
5.
Artigo 22.5
6
Artigo 22.6
(a) “Regras preliminares”
(b) “Direitos das partes”
7.
Arbitragens sob o Artigo 22.6
(a) “Especificidade no requerimento para a composição do Painel de Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6
do DSU”
(b) “Por meio do Painel original, se os Membros estiverem disponíveis, ou por um árbitro designado
pelo diretor geral
(c) “Ônus da prova”
(d) “Tratamento de dados fornecidos por entidades privadas”
(e) “Procedimento de trabalho nas Arbitragens sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU”
-Texto do procedimento de trabalho em Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU
-Interpretação e aplicação dos procedimentos de trabalho
(i) Admissibilidade e nova evidência
(ii) Admissibilidade e novos argumentos
(iii) Versões confidenciais / não confidenciais das decisões arbitrais
8.
Artigo 22.7
(a) “O Mandato dos árbitros”
(b) “O Árbitro … deve determinar se o nível de tal suspensão é equivalente ao nível de anulacão ou
prejuízo.”
(i) Presunção de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios / não evidência do nível de anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios
(ii) Parâmetros para o cálculo do nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios
****
1.
Artigo 22.1
a)
“Compensação e suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigacões, por ocasião da não
implementação das recomendacões e decisões do OSC dentro do período razoável de tempo”
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States of America - Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Agreements Act (US - Section 129(c)(1)URAA), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS221/R, para.
169
3.91
Em atenção aos Artigos 22.1 e 22.2 do DSU, o Painel confirmou a possibilidade ao Membro interessado
de manter a medida considerada ilícita até o final do período razoável de tempo. Reiterou, ainda, a
possibilidade de negociação de compensações mutuamente aceitáveis ou de aplicação da suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações após o encerramento do período razoável de tempo, caso a medida
ilícita ainda não tenha sido suprimida.
Para. 3.91. “Articles 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU confirm not only that a Member may maintain the
WTO-inconsistent measure until the end of the reasonable period of time for implementation, but also that
neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations are available to the complaining
Member until the conclusion of that reasonable period of time. Thus, the DSU imposes no obligation on
Members to cease application of the WTO-inconsistent measure on entries occurring prior to the end of the
reasonable period of time.”
- Exceção: Subsídios Proibidos
Relatório do Órgao de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircrafts (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 192
No litígio Brazil – Aircraft, o Painel de Arbitragem sob os Artigos 22.6 do DSU e 4.11 do ASMC
retrata a distição atribuída à aplicação da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações no
procedimento geral, regulamentado pelo DSU, e no procedimento considerado especial, regulado pelo
ASMC. Enquanto o Artigo 21.3 do DSU autoriza a concessão de um período razoável de tempo para a
remoção da medida ilícita e cumprimento das demais recomendações, o Artigo 4.7 do ASMC determina
a retirada “sem demora” (without delay) do subídio proibido concedido.
Para. 192. “With respect to implementation of the recommendations or rulings of the DSB in a dispute
brought under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, there is a significant difference between the relevant rules and
procedures of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Article 4.7 of the SCM
Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of Article 21.3 of the DSU are not relevant in determining the period of
time for implementation of a finding of inconsistency with the prohibited subsidies provisions of Part II of the
SCM Agreement. Furthermore, we do not agree with Brazil that Article 4.12 of the SCM Agreement is
applicable in this situation. In our view, the Panel was correct in its reasoning and conclusion on this issue.
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, which is applicable to this case, stipulates a time-period. It states that a
subsidy must be withdrawn ‘without delay’. That is the recommendation the Panel made.”
c) “Reclamações em procedimentos de arbitragem ao amparo do Artigo 21.5 do DSU”
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/RW, paras. 6.52,
6.45, 93 e 98
Em EC - Bed Linen (India), o Órgão de Apelação esclarece que as recomendações e conclusões
estabelecidas no Relatório do Painel, adotadas pelo DSB, mas não objeto de apelação, devem ser
consideradas como resolução final de uma, ou mais questões particulares contidas na reclamação
proposta pelo Membro demandante; da mesma forma e com a mesma finalidade com que são adotadas
as conclusões do Órgão de Apelação pelo DSB. De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, este
posicionamento é amparado nos Artigos 16.4, 19.1, 21.1, 21.3 e 22.1 do DSU, lidos em conjunto. As
recomendações aprovadas pelo DSB, também distinguem as funções exercidas pelo Painel original
170
daquelas exercidas pelo Painel de Implementação sob o Artigo 21.5 do DSU. O Órgão de Apelação
esclarece que a função do Painel original consiste em apurar a existência de uma medida ilícita ou de
prática contrária aos acordos abrangidos, devendo o Painel emitir Relatório de análise no período de 9
meses a contar do seu estabelecimento, ou de 6 meses a partir de sua composição. Por sua vez, o Painel
de Implementação deve apenas verificar o total cumprimento das recomendações e conclusões emitidas
pelo Painel original aprovadas pelo DSB, em um período máximo de 90 dias.
Para. 6.52. “[A]n unappealed finding included in a panel report that is adopted by the DSB must be treated as
a final resolution to a dispute between the parties in respect of the particular claim and the specific
component of a measure that is the subject of that claim. This conclusion is supported by Articles 16.4 and
19.1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21, and Article 22.1 of the DSU. Where a panel concludes that a measure
is inconsistent with a covered agreement, that panel shall recommend, according to Article 19.1, that the
Member concerned bring that measure into conformity with that agreement. A panel report, including the
recommendations contained therein, shall be adopted by the DSB within the time period specified in Article
16.4 — unless appealed. Members are to comply with recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB
promptly, or within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21 of the
DSU. A Member that does not comply with the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB within
these time periods must face the consequences set out in Article 22.1, relating to compensation and
suspension of concessions. Thus, a reading of Articles 16.4 and 19.1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21, and
Article 22.1, taken together, makes it abundantly clear that a panel finding which is not appealed, and which is
included in a panel report adopted by the DSB, must be accepted by the parties as a final resolution to the
dispute between them, in the same way and with the same finality as a finding included in an Appellate Body
Report adopted by the DSB — with respect to the particular claim and the specific component of the measure
that is the subject of the claim.”
Para. 6.45. “The Panel’s ruling that India’s claim under Article 3.5 relating to ‘other factors’ was not properly
before it is also consistent with the object and purpose of the DSU. Article 3.3 provides that the prompt
settlement of disputes is ‘essential to the effective functioning of the WTO’. Article 21.5 advances the
purpose of achieving a prompt settlement of disputes by providing an expeditious procedure to establish
whether a Member has fully complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”
Paras. 93 e 98. “For that purpose, an Article 21.5 panel is to complete its work within 90 days, whereas a
panel in an original dispute is to complete its work within 9 months of its establishment, or within 6 months of
its composition. It would be incompatible with the function and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement
system if a claim could be reasserted in Article 21.5 proceedings after the original panel or the Appellate
Body has made a finding that the challenged aspect of the original measure is not inconsistent with WTO
obligations, and that report has been adopted by the DSB. At some point, disputes must be viewed as
definitely settled by the WTO dispute settlement system.” (68)
c) “Natureza temporária e finalidade da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”
Em EC – Bananas III (US) e US – 1916 Act (EC), o Painel de Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU
confirma a natureza temporária da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, mantida até que
seja efetivamente alcançada a implementação das recomendações e decisões do DSB. O Relatório do
Painel, aprovado pelo DSB, sustenta ser o papel da medida “induzir o cumprimento” das
recomendações e decisões do DSB. Ressalta ainda, a necessidade de haver “equivalência” entre o
montante da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível de anulação ou prejuízo de
benefícios, em conformidade com o Artigo 22:4 do DSU, o que exclui eventual caráter punitivo
atribuído à medida.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale
171
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB, para. 6.3
Para. 6.3. “The Arbitrators confirmed that the authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations is a
temporary measure pending full implementation by the Member concerned. They further agreed with the
United States “that this temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce
compliance”. However, the Arbitrators considered that “this purpose does not mean that the DSB should grant
authorization to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. In
our view, there is nothing in Article 22.1 of the DSU, let alone in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 22, that could
be read as a justification for countermeasures of a punitive nature.”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.4, 5.7 e 5.8
Para. 5.4. The Arbitrators clarified that they were “not called upon to ‘provide a comprehensive list of the
purposes’ of the suspension of concessions or other obligations, or to ‘rank these purposes in some sort of
order of priority’”.
Para. 5.7. “Further to quoting the above awards, the Arbitrators agreed that “a fundamental objective of the
suspension of obligations is to induce compliance”. It emphasized that “[t]he fact that such suspension is
meant to be temporary — as indicated in Article 22.1 — is further evidence of this purpose”.
Para. 5.8. The Arbitrators further indicated that: “We also agree with the critically important point that the
concept of ‘equivalence’, as embodied in Article 22.4, means that obligations cannot be suspended in a
punitive manner. This means that in suspending certain obligations owed to the United States under the GATT
and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the European Communities cannot exceed the level of nullification or
impairment sustained by the European Communities as a result of the 1916 Act. We consider this further
below.”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional
Aircraft (Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees) Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS222/ABR, para. 3.105
Em Canada – Aircraft (Brazil), o Painel de Arbitragem sob os Artigos 22.6 do DSU e 4.11 do ASMC
confirmou a natureza temporária da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, enquanto medida
válida até que o Membro interessado cumpra as recomendações e decisões do DSB. Segundo o Painel
arbitral, o não cumprimento de tais recomendações e decisões configura a única razão a legitimar a
imposição da medida. O Relatório, aprovado pelo DSB, corrobora o entendimento manifestado em EC –
Bananas quanto ao papel de “induzir o cumprimento” exercido pela suspensão de concessões ou de
outras obrigações.
Para. 3.105. “The Arbitrator considered that “Article 22.1 of the DSU is particularly clear as to the temporary
nature of suspensions of concessions or other obligations, pending compliance.” The Arbitrator further stated
that “[u]nder Article 22.1 of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, noncompliance is the very
event justifying the adoption of countermeasures.” Moreover, the Arbitrator noted that “… the EC - Bananas
Arbitrators, referring to [DSU Article 22.1], expressed the view that suspension of concessions or other
obligations was intended to induce compliance because it was temporary”.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
of 2000 (Byrd Amendment) (US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), Demandante: Brasil,
WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras. 6.2 e 6.3
172
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)(Brazil), o Painel de Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU filiase ao entendimento de que a finalidade da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações corresponde
a “induzir o cumprimento”, assim como inicialmente afirmado em EC - Bananas. Contudo, levanta a
dúvida sobre se o montante autorizado pelo DSB à medida exerce influência sobre a implementação,
uma vez que há casos em que um baixo valor autorizado à medida foi capaz de induzir o cumprimento;
enquanto em outros, um valor elevado não foi suficiente para ensejar o cumprimento das
recomendações e decisões do DSB.
Para. 6.2. “[T]he DSU does not expressly explain the purpose behind the authorization of the suspension of
concessions or other obligations. On the one hand, the general obligation to comply with DSB
recommendations and rulings seems to imply that suspension of concessions or other obligations is intended
to induce compliance, as has been acknowledged by previous arbitrators. (69) However, exactly what may
induce compliance is likely to vary in each case, in the light of a number of factors including, but not limited
to, the level of suspension of obligations authorized.” (70)
Para. 6.3. “On the other hand, the requirement that the level of such suspensions remain equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment suffered by the complaining party seems to imply that suspension of
concessions or other obligations is only a means of obtaining some form of temporary compensation, even
when the negotiation of compensations has failed.”
d)
“Relação entre os Artigos 21.3 e 22.1 do DSU”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile – Alcoholic
Beverages), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS110/14, para. 40
Em Chile – Beverages (European Communities), o Painel enfatizou que embora o período razoável de
tempo possa ser concluído sem que a medida ilícita seja efetivamente suprimida, a total e efetiva
implementação das recomendações e decisões do DSB é, sem dúvida, preferível, nos termos do Artigo
22.1 do DSU, à negociação de compensações mutuamente satisfatórias ou à suspensão de concessões ou
de outras obrigações.
Para. 40. “In assessing the duration of the reasonable period, the provisions of Article 22 of the DSU are also
noteworthy. Under Article 22.1, although ‘a reasonable period of time’ may have elapsed without compliance
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, neither compensation nor suspension of concessions or
other obligations is to be ‘preferred to full implementation’, by bringing the measure concerned into
conformity with WTO obligations. Thus, in fixing the reasonable period, I should take account of the fact that
full and effective implementation is ‘preferred’.”
2. Artigo 22.2
a)
“Recurso direto ao Artigo 22 do DSU”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelacão no litígio United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations” (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/12, para. 9
Em US - FSC (European Communities), as partes em litígio concordaram que, na ausência de medidas
adotadas para cumprir por parte do Membro demandado, é lícito ao demandante requerer autorização ao
OSC para suspender concessões com base no Artigo 22.2 do DSU, ou adotar contramedidas legitimadas
no Artigo 4.10 do ASMC em se tratando de subsídios proibidos, sem recorrer anteriormente ao Painel
de Arbitragem sob o Artigo 21.5 do DSU.
173
Para. 9. “Where there exist no measures taken to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings by the
end of the implementation period, the EC may request authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU and to adopt countermeasures pursuant to Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement, without having recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU.”
b)
“Especificidade no requerimento para suspender concessões ou outras obrigacões”
(i) Critério da “especificidade” constante no Artigo 6.2 do DSU
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 20
Em EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), o Painel de Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU entendeu que o
padrão de especificidade disposto no Artigo 6.2 do DSU deve estar presente tanto na solicitação de
aplicação da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, sob o Artigo 22.2 do DSU, quanto no
pedido de instauração da Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU; uma vez que ambos os procedimentos
possuem objetivos semelhantes. No entanto, o padrão de especificidade não deverá ser adotado durante
o procedimento arbitral, uma vez que este segue metodologia distinta para o cálculo do nível de
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios.
Para. 20. “The DSU does not explicitly provide that the specificity requirements, which are stipulated in
Article 6.2 for panel requests, apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration proceedings under Article 22. However,
we believe that requests for suspension under Article 22.2, as well as requests for a referral to arbitration
under Article 22.6, serve similar due process objectives as requests under Article 6.2. First, they give notice to
the other party and enable it to respond to the request for suspension or the request for arbitration,
respectively. Second, a request under Article 22.2 by a complaining party defines the jurisdiction of the DSB
in authorizing suspension by the complaining party. Likewise, a request for arbitration under Article 22.6
defines the terms of reference of the Arbitrators. Accordingly, we consider that the specificity standards,
which are well-established in WTO jurisprudence under Article 6.2, are relevant for requests for authorization
of suspension under Article 22.2, and for requests for referral of such matter to arbitration under Article 22.6,
as the case may be. They do, however, not apply to the document submitted during an arbitration proceeding,
setting out the methodology used for the calculation of the level of nullification or impairment.”
c)
Requerimentos de “especificidade mínima”
As conclusões a seguir demarcam a relevância do nível indicado, quando do requerimento inicial
(Artigo 22.2 do DSU) de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, para compor os termos de
referência e ensejar a autorização do DSB com relação à imposição da medida. Nesse sentido, caso a
suspensão incida sobre concessões tarifárias, apenas os produtos constantes da lista anexada ao
requermento inicial serão suspensos. O entendimento predominante dos Painéis de Arbitragem sob o
Artigo 22.6 consiste na adoção do critério da “especificidade mínima” no requerimento inicial de
aplicação da medida. Sendo assim, tal solicitação deverá informar o nível específico da suspensão de
concessões pleiteada; e, o(s) acordo(s) ou setor(s) em que se pretende a incidência da suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações, em atenção aos Artigos 22.3 e 22.4 do DSU, e aos princípios da
segurança, previsibilidade e da busca por uma solução positiva para a demanda.
Meat Products - Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 16
Para. 16. “The authorization given by the DSB under Article 22.6 of the DSU is an authorization “to suspend
[the application to the Member concerned of] concessions or other obligations [under the covered
174
agreements]” (71) In our view, the limitations linked to this DSB authorisation are those set out in the
proposal made by the requesting Member on the basis of which the authorisation is granted. In the event tariff
concessions are to be suspended, only products that appear on the product list attached to the request for
suspension can be subject to suspension. This follows from the minimum requirements attached to a request to
suspend concessions or other obligations. They are, in our view: (1) the request must set out a specific level of
suspension, i.e. a level equivalent to the nullification and impairment caused by the WTO inconsistent
measure, pursuant to Article 22.4; and (2) the request must specify the agreement and sector(s) under which
concessions or other obligations would be suspended, pursuant to Article 22.3.” (72)
Para. 24. “[T]he level of suspension specified in Ecuador’s request under Article 22.2 is the relevant one and
defines the amount of requested suspension for purposes of this arbitration proceeding. Additional estimates
advanced by Ecuador in its methodology document and submissions were not addressed to the DSB and thus
cannot form part of the DSB’s referral of the matter to arbitration. Belated supplementary requests and
arguments concerning additional amounts of alleged nullification or impairment are, in our view, not
compatible with the minimum specificity requirements for such a request because they were not included in
Ecuador’s request for suspension under Article 22.2 of the DSB.”
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU destacou que os termos de
referência sob a sua apreciação são exatamente aqueles, especificados, quando do requerimento inicial
de autorização para a aplicação de suspensão de concessões (Artigo 22.2 do DSU); o qual contém a
indicação do(s) setor(s) e/ou acordo(s) em relação ao(s) qual(s) pretende-se impor a suspensão de
concessões.
Para. 29. “[T]he terms of reference of arbitrators, acting pursuant to Article 22.6, are limited to those
sector(s) and/or agreement(s) with respect to which suspension is specifically being requested from the DSB.
We thus consider Ecuador’s statement that it ‘reserves the right’ to suspend concessions under the GATT as
not compatible with the minimum requirements for requests under Article 22.2. Therefore, we conclude that
our terms of reference in this arbitration proceeding include only Ecuador’s requests for authorization of
suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to those specific sectors under the GATS and the
TRIPS Agreement that were unconditionally listed in its request under Article 22.2.”
d) “Concessões ou outras obrigações em relação aos acordos abrangidos”
(i) Concessões tarifárias
- Lista de produtos
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem nos litígios European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas (21.5 II)), Demandante: Equador WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU; e (EC - Bananas (21.5)), Demandante: EUA - WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA
Em EC - Hormones (US)(Canada), por sua vez, os EUA e o Canadá não anexaram uma lista, com a
indicação dos produtos, no pedido de autorização para suspender concessões. Ao manifestar-se, as
Comunidades Europeias, ora demandantes, solicitaram aos Painéis Arbitrais que procedessem ao
cálculo do montante da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, para que posteriormente fossem solicitadas
as listas de produtos aos demandados, e, por fim, a avaliação da equivalência pelo Painel. No entanto, os
175
árbitros declararam-se incapazes, devido à ausência de disposições a respeito no DSU, e em atenção ao
critério da “especificidade mínima”, acima descrito. Ademais, o Painel esclareceu que não detém
competência para analisar a natureza das concessões ou de outras obrigações a serem suspensas.
Para. 14. The Arbitrators in both cases declared themselves “unable to follow the EC request” since “[n]o
support for this request can be found in the DSU”. (73)
Para. 23. “d[id] not have jurisdiction to set a definite list of products that can be subject to suspension”. (74)
Paras. 16-19. “The authorization given by the DSB under Article 22.6 of the DSU is an authorization ‘to
suspend [the application to the Member concerned of] concessions or other obligations [under the covered
agreements]’. (75) In our view, the limitations linked to this DSB authorisation are those set out in the
proposal made by the requesting Member on the basis of which the authorisation is granted. In the event tariff
concessions are to be suspended, only products that appear on the product list attached to the request for
suspension can be subject to suspension. This follows from the minimum requirements attached to a request to
suspend concessions or other obligations. They are, in our view: (1) the request must set out a specific level of
suspension, i.e. a level equivalent to the nullification and impairment caused by the WTO inconsistent
measure, pursuant to Article 22.4 (76); and (2) the request must specify the agreement and sector(s) under
which concessions or other obligations would be suspended, pursuant to Article 22.3. (77)
Neither can support for the EC request be found in other provisions of Article 22 … In our view, the
determination of other aspects related to the suspension remain the prerogative of the Member requesting the
suspension. We note, in particular, that the Member in respect of whom concessions or other obligations
would be suspended, can object to ‘the level of suspension proposed’ (78) and that an arbitrator has to
‘determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment’. (79)
Arbitrators are explicitly prohibited from ‘examin[ing] the nature of the concessions or other obligations to be
suspended’. (80)
On these grounds, we cannot require that the US further specify the nature of the proposed suspension. As
agreed by all parties involved in this dispute, in case a proposal for suspension were to target, for example,
only biscuits with a 100 per cent tariff ad valorem, it would not be for the arbitrators to decide that, for
example, cheese and not biscuits should be targeted; that a 150 per cent tariff should be imposed instead of a
100 per cent tariff; or that tariff increases should be levied on a product weight basis, not ad valorem. All of
these are qualitative aspects of the proposed suspension touching upon the ‘nature’ of concessions to be
withdrawn. They fall outside the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.” (81)
of 2000 (Byrd Amendment) (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandante: Brasil,
(WT/DS217/ARB/BRA), para. 5.3
Contrariando o preceito da “especificidade mínima”, o Painel de Arbitragem, em US – Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment)(Brazil), entendeu devida a autorização ao Brasil, Canadá, Japão e Coréia para que
indicássem, em uma “lista final de produtos”, as tarifas adicionais a serem aplicadas à importação. O
Painel concluiu que o Chile deveria notificar, anualmente, os produtos em que a suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações incidiria.
Para. 5.3. The requesting parties (all but Mexico, i.e. Brazil, Canada, Chile, European Communities, India,
Japan and Korea) requested authorization to suspend tariff concessions and to be allowed to impose additional
import duties on a list of products originating in the United States. Since, in the case of the European
Communities’ request, the list of products was not “final”, the Arbitrator noted that the European
Communities “will notify the DSB every year, prior to the entry into force of a new level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations […] the list of products that will be subject to this measure.” (82)
176
e)
“Suspensão de concessões pelo método carrossel”
Meat Products - Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, paras. 22-23
Em EC – Hormones (EUA), embora o Representante Comercial dos EUA tenha declarado serem os
EUA livres para suspender concessões adotando o método “carossel”, os EUA comprometeram-se a não
modificar os produtos e o método seguido para a suspensão de concessões. O Painel manifestou a sua
falta de legitimidade em definir a lista de produtos a serem suspensos, e reafirmou que uma vez
elaborada a lista e definido o método de suspensão pelos EUA, tal lista e método deveriam cobrir o
comércio dos produtos no estrito montante contido na lista, em respeito ao critério da equivalência entre
o nível da suspensão de concessões e o nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios verificado.
Para. 22. “As explained above, In EC - Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), the European Communities
referred to statements made by the United States Trade Representative and submitted that the United States
claimed to be free to resort to a “carousel” type of suspension whereby the concessions and other obligations
subject to suspension would change every now and then, in particular in terms of product coverage. The
European Communities claimed that in so doing the United States would decide not only which concessions
or other obligations would be suspended, but also unilaterally would decide whether the level of such
suspension of concessions or other obligations was equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment
determined by arbitration. Replying to the questions by the Arbitrators, the United States submitted that
although nothing in the DSU prevented future changes to the list of products subject to suspension, the United
States had no intention of making such changes. The Arbitrators decided to “assume that the US — in good
faith and based upon this unilateral promise — will not implement the suspension of concessions in a
‘carousel’ manner” and that “therefore [they] d[id] not need to consider whether such an approach would
require an adjustment in the way in which the effect of an authorized suspension is calculated”.
Para. 23. “As explained above, (83) we do not have jurisdiction to set a definite list of products that can be
subject to suspension. It is for the US to draw up that list. In our view, it has to do so within the bounds of the
product list put before the DSB. We also agree with the EC that once this list is made or once the US has
defined a method of suspension, that list or method necessarily needs to cover trade in an amount not
exceeding (i.e. equivalent to or less than) the nullification and impairment we find. This matter of equivalence
is not one to be determined exclusively by the US. (84) The US has an obligation to ensure equivalence
pursuant to Article 22.4 of the DSU. (85) In its reply to our questions, the US submitted that it ‘will
scrupulously comply with the requirement that the level of suspension of concessions not exceed the level of
nullification or impairment to be found by the Arbitrator’ (86).”
f)
“Litígios em que a suspensão de obrigações foi requerida”
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para.
173
Em Equador – Bananas III (Ecuador), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 esclareceu, com base no
Artigo 22.7 do DSU, que não detém competência para examinar a natureza da suspensão de concessões
ou de outras obrigações, e sim para determinar se o nível da medida é “equivalente” ao grau de anulação
ou prejuízo de benefícios. Recomendou ao Equador a solicitação ao DSB, sob o amparo do Artigo
22.3(a) do DSU, da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações no mesmo setor em que foi
constatada a infração, anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, e orientou sobre a necessidade de envio de
uma lista anexa à solicitação ao DSB, com a indicação dos produtos a serem suspensos. Por fim, o
177
Painel de Arbitragem mencionou a possibilidade da suspensão de concessões incidir em outro(s)
setor(s) abarcado(s) pelo mesmo acordo da OMC, no caso em questão: o GATS; ou ainda, o TRIPS, e
desde que diante de uma circunstância suficientemente grave.
Para. 173. “Consequently, and consistent with past practice in arbitration proceedings under Article 22, (87)
we suggest to Ecuador to submit another request to the DSB for authorization of suspension of concessions or
other obligations consistent with our conclusions set out in the following paragraphs:
(a) Ecuador may request, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 22, and obtain authorization by the DSB to
suspend concessions or other obligations of a level not exceeding US$ 201.6 million per year which we
have estimated to be equivalent within the meaning of Article 22.4 to the level of nullification and
impairment suffered by Ecuador as a result of the WTO-inconsistent aspects of the EC import regime
for bananas.
(b) Ecuador may request, pursuant to subparagraph (a) of Article 22.3, and obtain authorization by the
DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations under the GATT concerning certain categories of
goods in respect of which we have been persuaded that suspension of concessions is effective and
practicable. Notwithstanding the requirement set forth in Article 22.7 that arbitrators “shall not
examine the nature of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended”, we note that in our view
these categories of goods do not include investment goods or primary goods used as inputs in
Ecuadorian manufacturing and processing industries, whereas these categories of goods do include
goods destined for final consumption by end-consumers in Ecuador. (88) In making its request for
suspension of concessions with respect to certain product categories, we note that, consistent with past
practice in arbitration proceedings under Article 22, (89) Ecuador should submit to the DSB a list
identifying the products with respect to which it intends to implement such suspension once it is
authorized.
(c) Ecuador may request, pursuant to subparagraph (a) of Article 22.3, and obtain authorization by the
DSB to suspend commitments under the GATS with respect to “wholesale trade services” (CPC 622)
in the principal sector of distribution services.
(d) To the extent that suspension requested under the GATT and the GATS, in accordance with
subparagraphs (b) and (c) above, is insufficient to reach the level of nullification and impairment
indicated in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, Ecuador may request, pursuant to subparagraph (c) of
Article 22.3, and obtain authorization by the DSB to suspend its obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement with respect to the following sectors of that Agreement:
(i) Section 1: Copyright and related rights, Article 14 on “Protection of performers, producers
of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organisations”;
(ii) Section 3: Geographical indications;
(iii) Section 4: Industrial designs.”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem nos litígios Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil
– Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá - WT/DS46/ARB/R; e Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees
for Regional Aircraft (Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees), Demandante: Brasil,
WT/DS222/ARB/R, para. 4.1
Em Brazil – Aircrafts (Canada), o Painel aceitou tanto a suspensão da de concessões tarifárias quanto a
suspensão de “obrigações”, incluindo, dentre as obrigações, aquelas sob o Acordo de Têxteis e
Vestuário e sob o Acordo sobre Procedimentos para o Licenciamento de Importações, por configurarem
contramedidas apropriadas nos termos do Artigo 4.10 do ASMC. Em Canada - Aircraft Credits and
Guarantees, o Painel também aceitou a suspensão da aplicação de obrigações sob o Acordo sobre
Procedimentos de Licença de Importações.
Para. 4.1. “For the reasons set out above, the Arbitrators decide that, in the matter Brazil – Aircraft, the
suspension by Canada of the application to Brazil of tariff concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994,
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the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures covering trade in
a maximum amount of C$ 344.2 million per year would constitute appropriate countermeasures within the
meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.”
of 2000 (Byrd Amendment)(US - Offset Act of 2000)(Byrd Amendment), Demandante: Canadá,
WT/DS234/ARB/CAN, paras. 1.4 e 5.2
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)(Canada), o México requereu autorização ao DSB para
suspender “obrigações” dos EUA no setor de bens, e obteve a concordância do Painel Arbitral sob o
Artigo 22.6 do DSU, após a constatação por este de que a suspensão a produtos originados dos EUA
cobririam, em uma base anual, o valor total de comércio, calculado com base em metodologia seguida
pelo Painel Arbitral. Contrariando o critério da “equivalência”, o Canadá, ora demandante, foi
autorizado pelo DSB a aplicar medidas adicionais às importações que excedessem os limites
estabelecidos para produtos originários dos EUA, bem como a suspender as “obrigações” sob o Artigo
VI do GATT 1994, Artigos 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 e 12 do Acordo Anti-Dumping e Artigos 11, 12, 15, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21 e 22 do ASMC, com o intuito de determinar que o efeito do dumping ou da concessão de
subsídios aos produtos norte-americanos estava causando ou ameaçando causar dano à indústria
doméstica, ou retardando materialmente o estabelecimento da indústria doméstica.
Para. 1.4. “On 16 January 2004, Mexico requested authorization from the DSB (90), under Article 22.2 of the
DSU, to suspend the application to the United States of obligations in the trade in goods sector.”
Para. 5.2. “Accordingly, we decide that the suspension by Canada of concessions or other obligations in the
form of: (a) the imposition of additional import duties above bound custom duties on products originating in
the United States; and (b) the suspension of the application of the obligations under Article VI of GATT 1994,
Articles 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Articles 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21 and 22 of the SCM Agreement to determine that the effect of dumping or subsidization of products from
the United States is to cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic injury, or is to retard
materially the establishment of a domestic industry; covering, on a yearly basis, a total value of trade not
exceeding, in US dollars, the amount resulting from the following equation: Amount of disbursements under
CDSOA for the most recent year for which data are available relating to anti-dumping or countervailing duties
paid on imports from Canada at that time, as published by the United States' authorities. multiplied by: 0.72
would be consistent with Article 22.4 of the DSU.”
g)
“Quando as obrigações a serem suspensas devem ser específicas”
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 3.7, 3.10-3.14
Em US - 1916 Act (European Communities), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU confirmou que
a opção do demandante por suspender “obrigações” ao invés de concessões tarifárias, não é sujeita à
revisão por este grupo de especialistas. Ao examinar se as Comunidades Europeias haviam especificado
as obrigações a serem suspensas, com fulcro no Artigo 22 do DSU, o Painel concluiu que o Artigo 22
não determina à parte que solicita a suspensão de “obrigações” que indique precisamente quais
“obrigações” busca autorização do DSB para suspender; distintamente da necessidade de especificidade
exigida para os “produtos” em que pretende-se a aplicação da medida. O Painel constatou, que em
solicitações de autorização para suspender concessões tarifárias ou obrigações relacionadas ao GATT
1947, os Árbitros não exigiram a especificação das obrigações relacionadas ao Acordo Geral. O que
demonstra a aceitação, por parte do Painel, de pedidos de suspensão de obrigações não específicas, e a
sua concordância com a escolha das obrigações a serem suspensas posteriormente à autorização do
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DSB. Em sua conclusão, o Painel corroborou o entendimento sobre a imprescindibilidade da
“equivalência” entre o montante da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível da
Para. 3.7. “We agree with the view advanced by both parties that the decision by the European Communities
to seek the suspension of “obligations” rather than tariff “concessions” is not subject to review by the
Arbitrators. (91) However, was the European Communities nevertheless obligated under Article 22 of the
DSU to specify precisely which “obligations” it seeks to suspend?”
Para. 3.10. “In our view, a party seeking to suspend obligations is not required, under Article 22 of the DSU,
to indicate precisely which ‘obligations’ it seeks authorization to suspend. Article 22.2 of the DSU states
simply that a party may request authorization from the DSB ‘to suspend the application to the Member
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.’ There is no requirement that the
requesting party identify exactly which obligations it wishes to suspend.”
Para. 3.11. “Moreover, we note that in previous cases, neither the arbitrators nor the DSB have required
requesting parties to enumerate which concessions or other obligations such Members were seeking to
suspend. For example, in Canada — Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 — Canada), the arbitrator
accepted, and the DSB authorized, the suspension by Brazil, inter alia, of ‘the application of obligations under
the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures relative to licensing requirements on imports from Canada.’
The Brazilian request did not indicate which ‘obligations’ under the Agreement on Import Licensing it wished
to suspend, nor did the arbitrators require such specificity. (92) In Brazil — Aircraft (Article 22.6 — Brazil),
the arbitrators similarly did not object to the suspension by Canada of obligations under ‘the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.’ (93) In EC — Bananas III
(Ecuador) (Article 22.6 — EC), the arbitrators indicated that the complainant could obtain authorization from
the DSB to suspend unspecified obligations ‘under the TRIPS Agreement’ with respect to certain sectors. (94)
Para. 3.12. “Moreover, even for requests seeking the suspension of tariff concessions ‘and related obligations
under the GATT 1994’ the arbitrators did not require specificity as to what these ‘related obligations’ were.”
(95)
Para. 3.13. “Thus, past practice indicates that arbitrators have accepted requests to suspend unspecified
‘obligations’. The DSB has granted authorization to suspend obligations, while allowing the requesting
Member to decide which particular obligations it would select to implement the authorization. We would
emphasize, however, that whatever discretion is granted to such a Member is subject to the requirement that
the level of suspension of obligations cannot exceed the level of nullification or impairment. We return to this
point below.”
Para. 3.14. “Therefore, we do not consider that the European Communities’ request to ‘suspend the
application of the obligations under GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to adopt an
equivalent regulation to the 1916 Act against imports from the United States’ can be considered as deficient
under Article 22 of the DSU for failing to specify which ‘obligations’ it seeks to suspend.”
3.Artigo 22.3
a) “Objetivo da revisão pelo Painel Arbitral com base no Artigo 22.3 do DSB”
Em EC – Bananas III (US), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU pondera que, em regra, o Painel deve
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verificar se a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações foi realizada no mesmo setor cuja infração,
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios foi constatado. Nesse sentido, configura exceção à regra do Artigo 22.3(a),
a incidência da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações em outros setores abarcados pelo mesmo
acordo, ou em setores pertencentes a outros acordos abrangidos. Constitui tarefa do Painel, portanto, examinar
a ineficácia, impossibilidade ou impraticabilidade alegada pelo demandante, para suspender concessões ou
obrigações no(s) mesmo(s) setor(s) ou acordo(s) afetado(s) pela anulação de direitos ou prejuízo de
benefícios; e a consequente aplicação da medida em outro(s) setor ou acordo(s), conforme preconizam os
parágrafos (b) e (c) do Artigo 22.3.
Para. 3.7. “We believe that the basic rationale of these disciplines is to ensure that the suspension of
concessions or other obligations across sectors or across agreements (beyond those sectors or agreements
under which a panel or the Appellate Body has found violations) remains the exception and does not become
the rule. In our view, if Article 22.3 of the DSU is to be given full effect, the authority of Arbitrators to review
upon request whether the principles and procedures of subparagraphs (b) or (c) of that Article have been
followed must imply the Arbitrators’ competence to examine whether a request made under subparagraph (a)
should have been made — in full or in part — under subparagraphs (b) or (c). If the Arbitrators were deprived
of such an implied authority, the principles and procedures of Article 22.3 of the DSU could easily be
circumvented. If there were no review whatsoever with respect to requests for authorization to suspend
concessions made under subparagraph (a), Members might be tempted to always invoke that subparagraph in
order to escape multilateral surveillance of cross-sectoral suspension of concessions or other obligations, and
the disciplines of the other subparagraphs of Article 22.3 of the DSU might fall into disuse altogether.”
b)
“Artigo 22.3(a): Princípio geral - o Membro demandante deve, em primeiro lugar, buscar
suspender concessões ou outras obrigações em relação ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(es)”
and Distribution of Bananas (Equador - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU,
para. 33
O princípio geral disposto no Artigo 22.3(a) do DSU preconiza que a suspensão de concessões ou de
outras obrigações deve ser aplicada no(s) mesmo(s) setor(s) em que foi constatada a violação, a
anulação ou o prejuízo de benefícios.
Para. 33. “[W]e further recall the general principle set forth in Article 22.3(a) that suspension of concessions
or other obligations should be sought first with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or
Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment. Given this principle, it remains the
preferred option under Article 22.3 for Ecuador to request suspension of concessions under the GATT as one
of the same agreements where a violation was found, if it considers that such suspension could be applied in a
practicable and effective manner.”
Em EC - Bananas (EUA), as Comunidades Europeias alegaram que em litígios em que são constatadas
violações ou anulação de benefícios em mais de um setor, ou em mais de um acordo, as solicitações de
autorização para a suspensão de concessões devem ser proporcionais ao número ou ao nível de tais
violações. No entanto, o Painel esclareceu que a regra geral estabelecida no Artigo 22.3(a), dispõe que a
suspensão de concessões deve ocorrer no mesmo setor, ou setores, em que a violação foi verificada,
ficando a escolha a cargo do Membro que solicita a autorização ao DSB.
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Para. 3.10. “We recall that subparagraph (a) of Article 22.3 of the DSU refers to the suspension of
‘concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate
Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment.’ We note that the words ‘same sector(s)’
include both the singular and the plural. The concept of ‘sector(s)’ is defined in subparagraph (f)(i) with
respect to goods as all goods, and in subparagraph (f)(ii) with respect to services as a principal sector
identified in the ‘Services Sectoral Classification List’. We, therefore, conclude that the United States has the
right to request the suspension of concessions in either of these two sectors, or in both, up to the overall level
of nullification or impairment suffered, if the inconsistencies with the EC’s obligations under the GATT and
the GATS found in the original dispute have not been removed fully in the EC’s revision of its regime. In this
case the ‘same sector(s)’ would be ‘all goods’ and the sector of ‘distribution services’, respectively. Our
conclusion, based on the ordinary meaning of Article 22.3(a), is also consistent with the fact that the findings
of violations under the GATT and the GATS in the original dispute were closely related and all concerned a
single import regime in respect of one product, i.e. bananas.”
c)
“Artigo 22.3(b) e (c) - O Membro demandante deve seguir os princípios e procedimentos da
pratocabilidade / exequibilidade e da efetividade”
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras.
68, 70-73 e 76
Em EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), as Comunidades Europeias argumentaram que o Equador não havia
demonstrado a razão pela qual não seria “praticável” ou “efetivo” ao país suspender concessões
inteiramente sob o GATT e/ou sob o GATS, considerados pertencentes ao mesmo setor violado.
Segundo o Painel, o Equador não solicitou a suspensão de concessões integralmente sob estes acordos
porque considerou não ser “praticável” ou “efetivo”, nos termos do Artigo 22.3(b) e (c). O Equador
entendeu que as circunstâncias eram sérias o suficiente no setor comercial de bananas e na sua
economia como um todo, o que justificaria o pedido de suspensão de concessões em outro setor.
Para. 68. “it did not request suspension entirely under the GATT and/or in service sectors under the GATS
other than distribution services because it considered that it would not be practicable or effective in the
meaning of Article 22.3(b) and (c) of the DSU, that circumstances in Ecuador’s bananas trade sector and the
economy on the whole are serious enough to justify suspension under another agreement, and that the
parameters in Article 22.3(d)(i)–(ii) corroborate this conclusion”.
(i) “praticável” / “exequível” e “efetivo”
O Painel Arbitral explicou que o termo “praticável” / “exequível” contém a conotação de
“disponibilidade” e “adequabilidade”, e relaciona-se ao conceito de “efetividade” (*). A
“praticabilidade”, por sua vez, estaria ligada à validade da aplicação prática da suspensão de concessões
alternativa, assim como a sua adequação para ser adotada em um caso específico. O termo “efetivo” é
entendido como: “poder de fato”; “causar uma forte impressão”; “causar um efeito ou resultado. O
Painel sustentou que a imposição da medida per si seria capaz de induzir o cumprimento das
recomendações e decisões do DSB, induzindo a supressão da medida ilícita e/ou o encontro de uma
solução positiva à demanda, dentro do período razoável de tempo. Concluiu, afirmando ser a
“praticabilidade” e o critério da “efetividade” consistentes com o objetivo (reconhecido pela
jurisprudência do DSB) do Artigo 22 do DSU, qual seja, induzir o cumprimento.
Para. 70. “Several of these issues require the party seeking suspension to consider whether an alternative
suspension with respect to the same sectors or agreements under which a violation was found is “not
practicable or effective”. In this regard, we note that the ordinary meaning of “practicable” is “available or
useful in practice; able to be used” or “inclined or suited to action as opposed to speculation etc.” (96) In other
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words, an examination of the “practicability” of an alternative suspension concerns the question whether such
an alternative is available for application in practice as well as suited for being used in a particular case.”
Para. 71. “To give an obvious example, suspension of commitments in service sub-sectors or in respect of
modes of service supply which a particular complaining party has not bound in its GATS Schedule is not
available for application in practice and thus cannot be considered as practicable. But also other case-specific
and country-specific situations may exist where suspension of concessions or other obligations in a particular
trade sector or area of WTO law may not be “practicable”.
Para. 72. “In contrast, the term “effective” connotes “powerful in effect”, “making a strong impression”,
“having an effect or result”. (97) Therefore, the thrust of this criterion empowers the party seeking suspension
to ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and has the desired result, namely to induce compliance
by the Member which fails to bring WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with DSB rulings within a
reasonable period of time.”
Os árbitros questionaram a capacidade da medida de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, uma vez imposta por Membros em desenvolvimento a Membros desenvolvidos -, de induzir tais países
ao cumprimento das recomendações, devido ao grande desequilíbrio em termos de volume de comércio
e de poder econômico entre ambos. Conforme constatou o Painel, em situações em que o demandante é
altamente dependente das importações do Membro que incidiu na prática ilícita, a suspensão de
concessões pode vir a causar prejuízos ainda maiores à parte que a impõe. Constatou ainda, que mesmo
em situações de equilíbrio econômico e de poder entre as partes, a aplicação da suspensão de
concessões sempre causará prejuízos a ambos os litigantes. Nesse sentido, a escolha pelo demandante
do setor e/ou acordo a incidir a medida, poderia significar uma maneira de alcançar a “efetividade”
almejada no Artigo 22.3 do DSU.
Para. 73. “One may ask whether this objective may ever be achieved in a situation where a great imbalance in
terms of trade volume and economic power exists between the complaining party seeking suspension and the
other party which has failed to bring WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with WTO law. In such a
case, and in situations where the complaining party is highly dependent on imports from the other party, it
may happen that the suspension of certain concessions or certain other obligations entails more harmful
effects for the party seeking suspension than for the other party. (98) In these circumstances, a consideration
by the complaining party in which sector or under which agreement suspension may be expected to be least
harmful to itself would seem sufficient for us to find a consideration by the complaining party of the
effectiveness criterion to be consistent with the requirement to follow the principles and procedures set forth
in Article 22.3.”
Para. 76. “Our interpretation of the ‘practicability’ and ‘effectiveness’ criteria is consistent with the object
and purpose of Article 22 which is to induce compliance. If a complaining party seeking the DSB’s
authorization to suspend certain concessions or certain other obligations were required to select the
concessions or other obligations to be suspended in sectors or under agreements where such suspension would
be either not available in practice or would not be powerful in effect, the objective of inducing compliance
could not be accomplished and the enforcement mechanism of the WTO dispute settlement system could not
function properly.”
Em EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), o demandante sustentou ser sua prerrogativa decidir se é “praticável”/
“exequível” ou “efetivo” indicar o mesmo setor, outro setor ou outro acordo para a suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações. No entanto, o Painel Arbitral explicou que o termo “considerar”
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(consider), presente nos subparágrafos “b” e “c” do Artigo 22.3 do DSU, mesmo pressupondo uma certa
margem de apreciação ao demandante, na escolha do setor e/ou acordo a recair a suspensão de
concessões, não exclui a revisão pelos árbitros e a sua autoridade para julgar se o demandante
considerou os fatos necessários objetivamente e se, com base em tais fatos, poderia chegar à conclusão
de que não foi praticável ou efetivo aplicar a suspensão de concessões no mesmo setor e sob o(s)
mesmo(s) acordo(s), ou sob outro acordo, tendo em vista a existência de circunstâncias sérias o
suficiente.
Para. 52. “It follows from the choice of the words ‘if that party considers’ in subparagraphs (b) and (c) that
these subparagraphs leave a certain margin of appreciation to the complaining party concerned in arriving at
its conclusions in respect of an evaluation of certain factual elements, i.e. of the practicability and
effectiveness of suspension within the same sector or under the same agreement and of the seriousness of
circumstances. However, it equally follows from the choice of the words ‘in considering what concessions or
other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures’ in the
chapeau of Article 22.3 that such margin of appreciation by the complaining party concerned is subject to
review by the Arbitrators. In our view, the margin of review by the Arbitrators implies the authority to
broadly judge whether the complaining party in question has considered the necessary facts objectively and
whether, on the basis of these facts, it could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that it was not practicable or
effective to seek suspension within the same sector under the same agreements, or only under another
agreement provided that the circumstances were serious enough.”
d)
“Artigos 22.3 (b) e 22.3 (c) do DSU”
(i)
Relação entre os Artigos 22.3(a) e 22.3(c) do DSU
27, 30-31
Em EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), o demandante, além de solicitar a suspensão de concessões ou de
outras obrigações sob os Acordos GATS e TRIPS, reservou a si o direito de suspender concessões
tarifárias ou outras obrigações sob o GATT 1994 (acordo infringido), em sendo “praticável” e “efetivo”
fazê-lo. Ao avaliar os pedidos, o Painel Arbitral observou uma inconsistência nas solicitações
simultâneas sob os Artigos 22.3(a) e 22.3(c), ainda que realizadas em momentos distintos, pois uma
solicitação de suspensão de concessões com base no Artigo 22.3(c) pressupõe não ser praticável ou
efetivo impor suspensão de concessões ao mesmo setor; e, uma solicitação fundada no Artigo 22.3(a)
subtende ser praticável e efetivo suspender concessões no mesmo setor. Contudo, o Painel não excluiu a
possibilidade de seguir o requerimento do demandante, uma vez apreciado o montante da suspensão de
concessões, e verificado ser “praticável” e “efetivo” suspender parte das concessões ou outras
obrigações no(s) mesmo(s) setor(s) afetado(s); e, o restante das concessões ou obrigações em outro(s)
setor(s) sob o mesmo acordo, ou sob outro acordo. Contrariando tais observações, o Painel Arbitral
entendeu adquado seguir os termos de referência do procedimento arbitral, no qual foi requerida a
suspensão de concessões com base nos itens (b) e (c) do Artigo 22.3, setores estes indicados de forma
incondicional para a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações.
Para. 27. “The Arbitrators noted that Ecuador argued that, in addition to suspending concessions or other
obligations under the GATS and TRIPS Agreement, it “reserves the right to suspend tariff concessions or other
tariff obligations granted in the framework of the GATT 1994 in the event that these may be applied in a
practicable and effective manner”.
Para. 30. “Even if Ecuador’s ‘reservation’ of a request for suspension under the GATT were permissible,
there would be a certain degree of inconsistency between making a request under Article 22.3(c) — implying
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that suspension is not practicable or effective within the same sector under the same agreement or under
another agreement — and simultaneously making a request under Article 22.3(a) — which implies that
suspension is practicable and effective under the same sector. In this respect, we note that, although Ecuador
did not in fact make both requests at the very same point in time, if it were likely that the suspension of
concessions under the GATT could be applied in a practicable and effective manner, doubt would be cast on
Ecuador’s assertion that at present only suspension of obligations under other sectors and/or other agreements
within the meaning of Article 22.3(b-c) is practicable or effective in the case before us.”
Para. 31. “(…) we fail to see how it could be possible to suspend concessions or other obligations for a
particular amount of nullification or impairment under the same sector as that where a violation was found
(which implies that this is practicable and effective) and simultaneously for the same amount in another sector
or under a different agreement (which implies that suspension under the same sector (99) — or under a
different sector under the same agreement — is not practicable or effective). But we do not exclude the
possibility that, once a certain amount of nullification or impairment has been determined by the Arbitrators,
suspension may be practicable and effective under the same sector(s) where a violation has been found only
for part of that amount and that for the rest of this amount of suspension is practicable or effective only in
(an)other sector(s) under the same agreement or even only under another agreement.”
Para. 29. “[T]he terms of reference of arbitrators, acting pursuant to Article 22.6, are limited to those
sector(s) and/or agreement(s) with respect to which suspension is specifically being requested from the DSB.
We thus consider Ecuador’s statement that it ‘reserves the right’ to suspend concessions under the GATT as
not compatible with the minimum requirements for requests under Article 22.2. Therefore, we conclude that
our terms of reference in this arbitration proceeding include only Ecuador’s requests for authorization of
suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to those specific sectors under the GATS and the
TRIPS Agreement that were unconditionally listed in its request under Article 22.2.”
O Panel Arbitral ponderou que o termo “consider”, constante nos subparágrafos (b) e (c) presume uma certa
margem de apreciação. No entanto, nenhuma decisão tomada por um Membro chegou a ser revisada por
Painel Arbitral, no que tange a se o Membro considerou “objetivamente os fatos necessários”.
Para. 52. “It follows from the choice of the words “if that party considers” in subparagraphs (b) and (c) that
these subparagraphs leave a certain margin of appreciation to the complaining party concerned in arriving at
its conclusions in respect of an evaluation of certain factual elements, i.e. of the practicability and
effectiveness of suspension within the same sector or under the same agreement and of the seriousness of
circumstances. However, it equally follows from the choice of the words “in considering what concessions or
other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures” in the
chapeau of Article 22.3 that such margin of appreciation by the complaining party concerned is subject to
review by the Arbitrators. In our view, the margin of review by the Arbitrators implies the authority to
broadly judge whether the complaining party in question has considered the necessary facts objectively and
whether, on the basis of these facts, it could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that it was not practicable or
effective to seek suspension within the same sector under the same agreements, or only under another
agreement provided that the circumstances were serious enough.”
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4. Artigo 22.4
a)
“Objetivo da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o critério da equivalência”
A suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações é descrita no Artigo 22.1 do DSU como uma
medida de natureza temporária, e cuja aplicação pode ser pleiteada ao DSB pelo Membro prejudicado,
diante do não cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do DSB dentro do período razoável de
tempo. Embora o DSU não verse sobre a finalidade da suspensão de concessões, o entendimento
jurisprudencial predominante sustenta ser “induzir o cumprimento”. Para tanto, faz-se necessário que o
nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios seja “equivalente” ao montante da suspensão de concessões,
a fim de que esta não assuma um caráter punitivo.
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB, paras. 6.3 e 76
Para. 6.3. “this temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance”.
However, the Arbitrators considered that “this purpose does not mean that the DSB should grant authorization
to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. In our view,
there is nothing in Article 22.1 of the DSU, let alone in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 22, that could be read as
a justification for countermeasures of a punitive nature.”
Para. 76. “the object and purpose of Article 22 (…) is to induce compliance”.
Aircraft (Canada - Aircraft), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS222/ABR, para. 3.105
Para. 3.105. “Article 22.1 of the DSU is particularly clear as to the temporary nature of suspensions of
concessions or other obligations, pending compliance.” The Arbitrator further stated that “[u]nder Article 22.1
of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, noncompliance is the very event justifying the adoption
of countermeasures.” Moreover, the Arbitrator noted that (…) “the EC - Bananas Arbitrators, referring to
[DSU Article 22.1], expressed the view that suspension of concessions or other obligations was intended to
induce compliance because it was temporary”.
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - Act of
1916), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.4, 5.7 e 5.8
Para. 5.4. “Not called upon to ‘provide a comprehensive list of the purposes’ of the suspension of
concessions or other obligations, or to ‘rank these purposes in some sort of order of priority’.”
Para. 5.7. Further to quoting the above awards, the Arbitrators agreed that “a fundamental objective of the
suspension of obligations is to induce compliance”. It emphasized that “[t]he fact that such suspension is
meant to be temporary — as indicated in Article 22.1 — is further evidence of this purpose.”
Para. 5.8. “We also agree with the critically important point that the concept of ‘equivalence’, as embodied in
Article 22.4, means that obligations cannot be suspended in a punitive manner. This means that in suspending
certain obligations owed to the United States under the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
European Communities cannot exceed the level of nullification or impairment sustained by the European
Communities as a result of the 1916 Act. We consider this further below.”
186
WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, para. 6.3
Para. 6.3. “The concept of ‘inducing compliance’ was first raised in the EC — Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6
— EC) arbitration and has been referred to since in other arbitrations. However, it is not expressly referred to
in any part of the DSU and we are not persuaded that the object and purpose of the DSU — or of the WTO
Agreement — would support an approach where the purpose of suspension of concessions or other
obligations pursuant to Article 22 would be exclusively to induce compliance. Having regard to Articles 3.7
and 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU as part of the context of Articles 22.4 and 22.7, we cannot exclude that inducing
compliance is part of the objectives behind suspension of concessions or other obligations, but at most it can
be only one of a number of purposes in authorizing the suspension of concessions or other obligations. By
relying on ‘inducing compliance’ as the benchmark for the selection of the most appropriate approach we also
run the risk of losing sight of the requirement of Article 22.4 that the level of suspension be equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment.” (100)
b)
“O Padrão de equivalência”
(i) A “equivalência” entre o nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível
da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 4.2 e
4.7-4.9
Em EC – Bananas (EUA), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU definiu a “equivalência”, em seu
sentido ordinário, como: “igual em valor, significado ou sentido, de mesmo efeito”, “de mesma posição
ou função relativa”, “correspondende a”, “igual em valor”, ou mesmo “algo equivalente ou virtualmente
idêntico” (101); e revelou a necessidade de mensurar ambas as variáveis, quais sejam: o nível da
suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, a fim
de verificar-se a equivalência entre ambas.
Para. 4.2. The Arbitrators considered that “this meaning connotes a correspondence, identity or balance
between two related levels, i.e. between the level of the concessions to be suspended, on the one hand, and the
level of the nullification or impairment, on the other”.
Para. 4.7. “In view of these considerations, it is our opinion that the concept of equivalence between the two
levels (i.e. of the proposed suspension and the nullification or impairment) remains a concept devoid of any
meaning if either of the two variables in our comparison between the proposed suspension and the
nullification or impairment would remain unknown. In essence, we would be left with the option to declare
the level of nullification or impairment to be tantamount to the proposed level of suspension, i.e. to equate one
variable in the equation with the other. To do that would mean that any proposed level of suspension would
necessarily be deemed equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment so equated. Or, we could resort to
the option of measuring the level of nullification or impairment on the basis of our findings in the original
dispute, as modified by the Appellate Body and adopted by the DSB. To do that would mean to ignore
altogether the undisputed fact that the European Communities has taken measures to revise its banana import
regime. That is certainly not the mandate that the DSB has entrusted to us.”
Para. 4.8. “Consequently, we cannot fulfil our task to assess the equivalence between the two levels before
we have reached a view on whether the revised EC regime is, in light of our and the Appellate Body’s
findings in the original dispute, fully WTO-consistent. It would be the WTO-inconsistency of the revised EC
regime that would be the root cause of any nullification or impairment suffered by the United States. Since the
level of the proposed suspension of concessions is to be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment,
logic dictates that our examination as Arbitrators focuses on that latter level before we will be in a position to
187
ascertain its equivalence to the level of the suspension of concessions proposed by the United States.” (102)
Para. 4.9. “In arriving at this conclusion, we are mindful of the DSB Chairman’s statement at the meeting of
29 January 1999 when the DSB decided to refer this matter to us in our capacity as Arbitrators: ‘There
remains the problem of how the Panel and the Arbitrators would coordinate their work, but as they will be the
same individuals, the reality is that they will find a logical way forward, in consultation with the parties. In
this way, the dispute settlement mechanisms of the DSU can be employed to resolve all of the remaining
issues in this dispute, while recognizing the right of both parties and respecting the integrity of the DSU.’”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem nos litígios European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and
Meat Products - Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 12
Em EC - Hormones (US), o Painel Arbitral considerou que quando os árbitros determinam que o nível
da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, proposto pelo Membro demandante, não é
equivalente ao atual nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, tais árbitros são obrigados a mensurar
o nível da suspensão de concessões equivalente à tal anulação.
Para. 12. “There is (…) a difference between our task here and the task given to a panel. In the event we
decide that the US proposal is not WTO consistent, i.e. that the suggested amount is too high, we should not
end our examination the way panels do, namely by requesting the DSB to recommend that the measure be
brought into conformity with WTO obligations. Following the approach of the arbitrators in the Bananas case
— where the proposed amount of US$ 520 million was reduced to US$ 191.4 million — we would be called
upon to go further. In pursuit of the basic DSU objectives of prompt and positive settlement of disputes, we
would have to estimate the level of suspension we consider to be equivalent to the impairment suffered. This
is the essential task and responsibility conferred on the arbitrators in order to settle the dispute. In our view,
such approach is implicitly called for in Article 22.7 (…)”. (103)
12-13
De forma semelhante, em EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) o Painel Arbitral procedeu ao recálculo do
montante proposto para a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, com o intuito de encontrar
o padrão de equivalência em relação à anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios decorrente da medida ilícita.
Para. 12. “[W]e note that, if we were to find the proposed amount … not to be equivalen, we would have to
estimate the level of suspension we consider to be equivalent to the nullification or impairment suffered by
Ecuador. This approach is consistent with Article 22.7 of the DSU which emphasizes the finality of the
arbitrators’ decision (…)”.
Para. 13. “We recall that this approach was followed in the US/EC arbitration proceeding in EC - Bananas
III and the arbitration proceedings in EC - Hormones, where the arbitrators did not consider the proposed
amount of suspension as equivalent to the nullification or impairment suffered and recalculated that amount in
order to be able to render a final decision.” (104)
WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras. 4.20-4.21
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU examinou a
possibilidade de estabelecer para o cálculo do nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras
obrigações, uma fórmula econômica a ser preenchida com os valores dos desembolsos anuais,
188
realizados pelo demandado na prática comercial inconsistente com os acordos da OMC. O cálculo, a
partir dos valores fornecidos ano a ano, resultaria em uma variação no nível da suspensão de concessões
autorizada às partes em cada ano de incidência na prática ilícita. Conforme explicou o Painel, o Artigo
22.4 apenas exige que o montante da suspensão de concessões seja “equivalente” ao nível da anulação
ou prejuízo de benefícios, não havendo nenhuma disposição no Artigo 22 do DSU que impeça a adoção
de um montante variável de suspensão de concessões, a ser ajustado caso o nível de anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios varie. Assim, o nível fixo, comumente determinado ao final do período razoável
de tempo, poderia ser substituído por níveis calculados ano a ano, conforme o valor despendido na
prática comercial contrária aos acordos abrangidos.
Para. 4.20. “While we note that Article 22.4 refers to ‘the level’ (singular) of nullification or impairment and
to ‘the level’ (singular) of suspension of concessions or other obligations, we are not persuaded that these
terms impose an obligation to identify a single and enduring level of nullification or impairment. The
requirement of Article 22.4 is simply that the two levels be equivalent. As long as the two levels are
equivalent, we do not see any reason why these levels may not be adjusted from time to time, provided such
adjustments are justified and unpredictability is not increased as a result. In fact, we see no limitation in the
DSU to the possibility of providing for a variable level of suspension if the level of nullification or
impairment also varies.”
Para. 4.21. “Most previous arbitrators have established one single level of nullification or impairment at the
level that existed at the end of the reasonable period of time granted to the responding party to bring its
legislation into conformity. (105) We do not disagree that this approach is, in the large majority of cases, the
most appropriate. However, we do not read anything in Article 22 of the DSU that would preclude us from
following a different path if the circumstances of this case clearly required it.” (106)
Para. 4.24. “In adopting such a decision, the Arbitrator gave particular relevance to the circumstances of that
case, by considering that, under a variable level of suspension system, the respondent party “would control the
levers to make the actual level of suspension of concessions or other obligations go down”. The Arbitrator
remarked that while “in other arbitrations where the level of nullification or impairment was set once and for
all, the responding party could not influence the level of countermeasures applied to its trade, unless the
requesting party agreed to modify it, [i]n this case, the level of suspension of concessions will automatically
depend on the amount of disbursements made under the [WTO-inconsistent measure] in a given year. If this
amount decreases, so will the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that the Requesting
Parties will be entitled to impose. If no disbursements are made, the level of suspension will have to be
‘zero’.” (107)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, paras. 3.57-3.59
Em Brazil – Aircraft (Canada), ao discutir o pedido de autorização do Canadá ao DSB para adotar
contramedidas apropriadas, o Painel Arbitral sob os Artigos 22.6 do DSU e 4.11 do ASMC, explicou
que a relação entre os Artigos 4.11 do ASMC e 22.4 do DSU, arguída pelo Brasil, não é semelhante à
relação entre a medida de suspensão de concessões regulamentada nos Artigos 22.1 e 22.2 do DSU e o
padrão de equivalência constante no Artigo 22.4 do DSU. O Painel caractarizou o Artigo 4.11 do
ASMC como regra especial ou adicional em relação ao DSU; esclareceu que o conceito de anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios não existe nos Artigos 3 e 4 do ASMC; e, que o princípio da efetividade será
contrariado se as contramedidas apropriadas forem necessariamente limitadas pelo nível da anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios causados pelos subsídios proibidos, tal qual ocorre regularmente na relação
obrigatória de equivalência entre o montante da suspensão de concessões e o nível da anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios.
189
Para. 3.57. “We read the provisions of Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement as special or additional rules. In
accordance with the reasoning of the Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement, (108) we must read the
provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules in the SCM Agreement so as to give meaning to all
of them, except if there is a conflict or a difference. While we agree that in practice there may be situations
where countermeasures equivalent to the level of nullification of impairment will be appropriate, we recall
that the concept of nullification or impairment is absent from Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement. In that
framework, there is no legal obligation that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or other
obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.”
Para. 3.58. “On the contrary, requiring that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or
other obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment would be contrary to the principle of
effectiveness by significantly limiting the efficacy of countermeasures in the case of prohibited subsidies.
Indeed, as shown in the present case, (109) other countermeasures than suspension of concessions or
obligations may not always be feasible because of their potential effects on other Members. This would be the
case of a counter-subsidy granted in a sector where other Members than the parties compete with the products
of the parties. In such a case, the Member taking the countermeasure may not be in a position to induce
compliance.”
Para. 3.59. “We are mindful that our interpretation may, at a first glance, seem to cause some risk of
disproportionality in case of multiple complainants. However, in such a case, the arbitrator could allocate the
amount of appropriate countermeasures among the complainants in proportion to their trade in the product
concerned. The ‘inducing’ effect would most probably be very similar.”
(ii) equivalência quantitativa
Meat Products - Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA - WT/DS26/ARB; e Demandante:
Canadá - WT/DS48/ARB, para. 20
Na mesma linha de entendimento, em EC – Hormones (US)(Canada) o Painel Arbitral explicou que é
sua função determinar se o nível da suspensão de concessões é “equivalente” ao nível da anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios verificado. Esclareceu ainda, que os árbitros são expressamente proibidos de
examinar a natureza das concessões ou de outras obrigações a serem suspensas. Na concepção dos
árbitros, o próprio Painel Arbitral deve ser apto a apurar os níveis da suspensão de concessões e da
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, de modo quantitativo, para que a equivalência entre as duas
variáveis possa ser dimencionada com precisão.
Para. 18. In our view, the determination of other aspects related to the suspension remain the prerogative of
the Member requesting the suspension. We note, in particular, that the Member in respect of whom
concessions or other obligations would be suspended, can object to “the level of suspension proposed” (110)
and that an arbitrator has to “determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment”. (111) Arbitrators are explicitly prohibited from “examin[ing] the nature of the
concessions or other obligations to be suspended” (112) (other than under Articles 22.3 and 22.5).
Para. 20. “What we do have to determine, however, is whether the overall proposed level of suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment. This involves a quantitative — not a qualitative —
assessment of the proposed suspension. As noted by the arbitrators in the Bananas case, ‘[i]t is impossible to
ensure correspondence or identity between two levels if one of the two is not clearly defined’. (113)
Therefore, as a prerequisite for ensuring equivalence between the two levels, we have to be able to determine,
not only the ‘level of the nullification and impairment’, but also the ‘level of the suspension of concessions or
other obligations’. To give effect to the obligation of equivalence in Article 22.4, the Member requesting
190
suspension thus has to identify the level of suspension of concessions it proposes in a way that allows us to
determine equivalence.” (114)
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales
Corporations’ (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/ARB, paras. 5.46-5.47
Em US - FSC (European Communities), o Painel Arbitral enfatizou que os elaboradores dos Artigos
22.4 e 22.7 do DSU tinham em mente um padrão quantitativo para mensurar nível da suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações; padrão este que não parece estar muito claro no Artigo 4.10 do
ASMC, para o cálculo das contramedidas.
Paras. 5.46-5.47. “The drafters [of Article 22.4] have explicitly set a quantitative benchmark to the level of
suspension of concessions or other obligations that might be authorized. This is similarly reflected in Article
22.7, which defines the arbitrators’ mandate in such proceedings (…). As we have already noted in our
analysis of the text of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement above, there is, by contrast, no such indication of an
explicit quantitative benchmark in that provision (…).”
(iii) equivalência qualitativa
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.17, 5.20-5.21 e 5.23
Em US - 1916 Act (European Communities), o Painel surpreendeu-se com a solicitação das
Comunidades Européias de autorização para suspender concessões ou outras obrigações
“qualitativamente” equivalentes ao nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, em contraposição à
prática comumente adotada de suspensão concessões ou obrigações definidas em termos quantitativos,
monetários. Com efeito, ainda que tenha representado uma quebra de paradigma, o Painel não
considerou a solicitação inconsistente com o Artigo 22 do DSU. No entanto, reforçou a necessidade de
atenção à equivalência entre ambas as variáveis, explicando que um nível de suspensão de obrigações
igual ou inferior ao nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios será considerado consistente com o
Artigo 22.4 do DSU; enquanto, um nível superior de suspensão de obrigações em relação ao grau de
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios ensejaria uma suspensão punitiva, inconsistente, por sua vez, com o
Artigo 22.4 do DSU.
Para. 5.17. “[T]his is the first case in which a WTO Member has sought to suspend ‘qualitatively equivalent’
obligations. In all previous cases, parties seeking to suspend concessions or other obligations have provided a
quantitative, monetary figure indicating the amount of suspension sought. Indeed, the European Communities
indicated that it was ‘aware that its request for suspension of “qualitatively equivalent” obligations constitutes
a novelty in WTO practice.’”
Para. 5.20. “In cases such as EC - Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), EC - Hormones (Canada) (Article
22.6 - EC) and US - FSC (Article 22.6 — US), where the requested suspension was expressed in quantitative
terms, the arbitrators necessarily had to assess whether there was ‘quantitative equivalence’ between the level
of the nullification or impairment and the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations.”
Para. 5.21. “In the present case, by contrast, the requested suspension has not been stated in quantitative
terms. However, this does not in and of itself render the EC request inconsistent with Article 22. Indeed, it is
not possible to determine the WTO-consistency of a “qualitatively equivalent” Article 22.2 request in the
abstract. Instead, it is necessary to determine how the actual suspension resulting from such “qualitative
equivalence” would be applied. More specifically:
191

If the suspension of obligations were applied in such a manner that it were equal to or below the level
of nullification or impairment sustained by the European Communities, then the suspension would, in
principle, be consistent with DSU Article 22.4. (115)
 If the suspension of obligations were applied in such a manner that it exceeded the level of
nullification or impairment sustained by the European Communities, then the suspension would be
punitive, and would not be consistent with DSU Article 22.4.
(1) “As Contramedidas no Acordo de Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias (ASMC)”

Conceito de “contramedidas” baseado na Proposta de Regulamentação da Responsabilidade
Internacional do Estado
O ASMC denomina de “contramedidas” o remédio jurisdicional que legitima para induzir o
cumprimento. Neste caso, em específico, consistente na supressão do subsídio à exportação proibido,
outorgado em montante superior aos limites autorizados no ASMC e nas listas de compromissos
assinadas pelos Membros. No caso de subsídios proibidos, o critério utilizado é o da “apropriação”, e as
contramedidas são consideradas “apropriadas” quando efetivamente induzem a supressão dos subsídios
proibidos, conforme corrobora a jurisprudência do DSB. Em Canada - Aircraft (Brazil), o Painel
Arbitral assumiu para as “contramedidas” o conceito utilizado no direito internacional geral e no Artigo
47 da Proposta de Regulamentação da Responsabilidade Internacional do Estado, elaborada pela
Comissão de Direito Internacional (CDI) da ONU, a qual concebe as contramedidas como capazes de
induzir o Estado que incidiu no ato ilícito internacional a cumprir com as obrigações descritas nos
Artigos 41 e 46 da proposta. Posicionamento semelhante foi adotado pelo Painel Arbitral, sob o Artigo
22.6, no litígio EC - Bananas (1999).
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, para. 3.44
Para. 3.44. “While the parties have referred to dictionary definitions for the term ‘countermeasures’, we find
it more appropriate to refer to its meaning in general international law (116) and to the work of the
International Law Commission (ILC) on State Responsibility, which addresses the notion of countermeasures.
(117) We note that the ILC work is based on relevant state practice as well as on judicial decisions and
doctrinal writings, which constitute recognized sources of international law. (118) When considering the
definition of ‘countermeasures’ in Article 47 of the Draft Articles (119). We note that countermeasures are
meant to ‘induce [the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act] to comply with its
obligations under articles 41 to 46’. We note in this respect that the Article 22.6 arbitrators in the EC Bananas (1999) arbitration made a similar statement. (120) We conclude that a countermeasure is
‘appropriate’ inter alia if it effectively induces compliance.” (121)

Conceito de “contramedidas” no dicionário Oxford da língua inglesa
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corportations” (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/ARB, paras. 5.4 - 5.7
A definição contida no dicionário Oxford da língua inglesa para as “contramedidas”, em muito
assemelha-se àquele seguido para as medidas de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, uma
vez que atribui às contramedidas a tarefa de contrapor/ opor-se/ retaliar um dano ou tentativa de dano,
neutralizando a ação ou o seu efeito. O Artigo 4 do ASMC define as contramedidas como remédios
jurisdicionais de natureza temporária, a serem utilizados, quando autorizados pelo DSB, para induzir o
cumprimento das recomendações e decisões deste órgão, direcionadas à supressão dos subsídios
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proibidos.
Para. 5.4. “Dictionary definitions of ‘countermeasure’ suggest that a countermeasure is essentially defined by
reference to the wrongful action to which it is intended to respond. The New Oxford Dictionary defines
‘countermeasure’ as ‘an action taken to counteract a danger, threat, etc’ (122). The meaning of ‘counteract’ is
to ‘hinder or defeat by contrary action; neutralize the action or effect of’. (123) Likewise, the term ‘counter’
used as a prefix is defined inter alia as: ‘opposing, retaliatory’. (124) The ordinary meaning of the term thus
suggests that a countermeasure bears a relationship with the action to be counteracted, or with its effects (cf.
‘hinder or defeat by contrary action; neutralize the action or effect of’) (125)”.
Para. 5.5. “In the context of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, the term ‘countermeasures’ is used to define
temporary measures which a prevailing Member may be authorized to take in response to a persisting
violation of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, pending full compliance with the DSB’s recommendations. This
use of the term is in line with its ordinary dictionary meaning as described above: these measures are
authorized to counteract, in this context, a wrongful action in the form of an export subsidy that is prohibited
per se, or the effects thereof.”
Para. 5.6. “It would be consistent with a reading of the plain meaning of the concept of countermeasure to say
that it can be directed either at countering the measure at issue (in this case, at effectively neutralizing the
export subsidy) or at counteracting its effects on the affected party, or both.”
Para. 5.7. “We need, however, to broaden our textual analysis in order to see whether we can find more
precision in how countermeasures are to be construed in this context. We thus turn to an examination of the
expression ‘appropriate’ countermeasures with a view to clarifying what level of countermeasures may be
legitimately authorized.” (126)

“Contramedidas apropriadas”
Corportations” (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/ARB, paras. 5.10-5.12
Em US - FSC (European Communities), o Painel Arbitral sob os Artigos 22.6 do DSU e 4.11 do ASMC
verificou que os Artigos 4.10 e 4.11 do ASMC não esclarecem o significado do termo “apropriado”, não
estabelevem uma fórmula para o cálculo, e nem definem, de modo preciso e exaustivo, as condições
para a aplicação das contramedidas; devendo ser dimencionada caso a caso, com base no objetivo de
neutralizar e suprimir o subsídio à exportação proibido, sem, contudo, causar um prejuízo além do
decorrente da medida ilícita.
Paras. 5.10-5.11. “(…) as far as the amount or level of countermeasures is concerned, the expression
“appropriate” does not in and of itself predefine the precise and exhaustive conditions for the application of
countermeasures. According to them, Articles 4.10 and 4.11 are not designed to lay down a precise formula or
otherwise quantified benchmark or amount of countermeasures which might be legitimately authorized in
each and every instance.”
Para. 5.12. “Based on the plain meaning of the word, this means that countermeasures should be adapted to
the particular case at hand. The term is consistent with an intent not to prejudge what the circumstances might
be in the specific context of dispute settlement in a given case. To that extent, there is an element of
flexibility, in the sense that there is thereby an eschewal of any rigid a priori quantitative formula. But it is
also clear that there is, nevertheless, an objective relationship which must be absolutely respected: the
countermeasures must be suitable or fitting by way of response to the case at hand.”
193
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 3.42-3.43
Em Brazil - Aircraft (Canada), o Painel de Arbitragem empreendeu a investigação do significado do
termo “apropriado”, a partir da análise do Artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena, pois notou que o exame do
significado ordinário da palavra, em um dicionário, não permitiria uma compreensão específica do
termo e sim uma concepção geral, abrangente. De qualquer forma, o Painel observou que é possível
obter uma definição adequada/ apropriada e específica do termo, pois em geral os dicionários indicam a
direção de encontro de um significado mais específico. Corforme constata o Painel, no caso do ASMC a
contramedida é considerada “apropriada” se efetivamente induz o cumprimento, ou seja, se “induz a
retirada do subsídio proibido” sem demora.
Para. 3.42. “In accordance with Article 3.2 of the DSU, we proceed with an analysis of the meaning of the
term ‘appropriate’ based on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.”
Para. 3.43. “Examining only the ordinary meaning of the term ‘appropriate’ does not allow us to reply to the
question before us, since dictionary definitions are insufficiently specific. Indeed, the relevant dictionary
definitions of the word ‘appropriate’ are specially suitable; proper’. (127) However, they point in the direction
of meeting a particular objective.”
Para. 3.45. “In this respect, we recall that the measure in respect of which the right to take countermeasures
has been requested is a prohibited export subsidy falling under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. Article
4.7 of the SCM Agreement provides in this respect that if a measure is found to be a prohibited subsidy, it
shall be withdrawn without delay. In such a case, effectively ‘inducing compliance’ means inducing the
withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy.
Em havendo uma violação a outro acordo abrangido, que não seja o ASMC (por ocasião da concessão
de subsídios proibidos), não haverá a necessidade de supressão da medida ilícita sem demora, segundo o
Acordo de Subsídios. Nos termos do Artigo 3.8 do DSU, em sendo constatada uma infração às normas
de um acordo abrangido, haverá a presunção de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, e a medida ilícita
poderá ser retirada imediatamente ou dentro de um “período razoável de tempo” autorizado pelo DSB.
Como pontua o Painel Arbitral, uma outra distinção entre a regulamentação do DSU para a suspensão
de concessões ou de outras obrigações, e a regulação do ASMC para as contramedidas, vem a ser a
ausências de estipulação no ASMC, em seus Artigos 3 e 4, a respeito da presunção de anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios, em consequência da concessão de subsídios proibidos. O ASMC,
excepcionalmente, propõe a análise dos “efeitos adversos” causados pelos subsídios acionáveis, em seu
Artigo 5.
Para. 3.46. “In contrast, other illegal measures do not have to be withdrawn without delay. As specified in
Article 3.8 of the DSU, if a measure violates a provision of a covered agreement, the measure is considered
prima facie to cause nullification or impairment. However, if the defendant succeeds in rebutting the charge,
no nullification or impairment will be found in spite of the violation. Such a rebuttal may be impossible to
make in a number of cases. Yet, this does not change the fact that the concept of nullification or impairment is
not found in Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement. The Arbitrators are of the view that meaning must be
given to the fact that the negotiators did not include the concept of nullification or impairment in those
articles, whilst it is expressly mentioned in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement, which deals with the adverse
effects of actionable subsidies.”

Padrão de “apropriação” (ASMC) e padrão de “equivalência” (DSU)
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6.4-6.5
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o Painel Arbitral demonstra o quão obsoleto se tornou o parâmetro
utilizado durante o GATT 1947, para a compreensão do “padrão de apropriação” a ser aplicado às
contramedidas. Durante a vigência do Acordo Geral, o Painel, no litígio Netherlands Action under
Article XXIII:2 to Suspend Obligations to the United States, recomendou que as Partes Contratantes
baseassem o cálculo da “apropriação”, na equivalência entre as contramedidas e os prejuízos sofridos
com as restrições impostas pelos EUA. Nesse contexto, as Partes-Contratantes deveriam levar em
consideração: (i) se a suspensão de concessões proposta detinha um caráter apropriado; e, (ii) se a
extensão da restrição quantitativa proposta pelo governo da Holanda era razoável, tendo em vista o dano
sofrido. O Painel Arbitral em EC - Bananas comparou as recomendações empreendidas durante o
GATT 1947 às atuais disposições vigentes nos Artigos 22.4 e 22.7 do DSU, para o cálculo do nível da
suspensão de concessões, e concluiu que os parâmetros do GATT 1947 estão obsoletos em relação à
atual regulamentação. Na visão do Painel Arbiral, o significado ordinário do termo “apropriado” tem a
conotação de adequado, correto, próprio, conveniente, ligado a, ou pertencente a; indicando um certo
grau de relação entre o montante da suspensão de concessões proposto e o nível da anulação ou prejuízo
de benefícios, e não um alto e estrito grau de correspondência ou equivalência entre ambas as variáveis,
tal qual exigido no padrão de equivalência descrito no Artigo 22.4 do DSU.
Para. 6.4. “We are mindful of the fact that the working party on Netherlands Action under Article XXIII:2 to
Suspend Obligations to the United States (128) considered whether the proposed action was ‘appropriate’ and
that the Working Party only had ‘regard’ to the equivalence of the impairment suffered:
‘2
The Working Party was instructed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
investigate the appropriateness of the measure which the Netherlands Government
proposed to take, having regard to the equivalence to the impairment suffered by the
Netherlands as a result of the United States restrictions.
3 The Working Party felt that the appropriateness of the measure envisaged by the
Netherlands Government should be considered from two points of view: in the first
place, whether in the circumstances, the measure proposed was appropriate in
character, and secondly, whether the extent of the quantitative restriction proposed by
the Netherlands Government was reasonable, having regard to the impairment
suffered.’ (emphasis added).
In our view, in light of the explicit reference in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 22 of the
DSU to the need to ensure the equivalence between the level of proposed suspension
and the level of the nullification or impairment suffered, the standard of
appropriateness applied by the 1952 working party has lost its significance as a
benchmark for the authorization of the suspension of concessions under the DSU.
Para. 6.5. However, we note that the ordinary meaning of ‘appropriate’, connoting ‘specially suitable,
proper, fitting, attached or belonging to’, (129) suggests a certain degree of relation between the level of the
proposed suspension and the level of nullification or impairment, where as we stated above, the ordinary
meaning of ‘equivalent’ implies a higher degree of correspondence, identity or stricter balance between the
level of the proposed suspension and the level of nullification or impairment. Therefore, we conclude that the
benchmark of equivalence reflects a stricter standard of review for Arbitrators acting pursuant to Article 22.7
of the WTO’s DSU than the degree of scrutiny that the standard of appropriateness, as applied under the
GATT of 1947 would have suggested.” (130)
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Canada Aircraft), Demandante: Brasil), WT/DS222/ARB, para. 3.51
Da mesma forma, o Painel Arbitral no litígio Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Brazil)
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demonstra a flexibilidade existente na determinação da “apropriação” entre o nível das contramedidas e
o nível do dano causado pelos subsidios à exportação proibidos; o que difere, da rigidez na apreciação
do padrão de equivalência entre o montante da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o
nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, descrita no Artigo 22.4 do DSU.
Para. 3.51. “As noted at the outset, however, Canada admits that in light of its non-compliance with DSB
recommendations Brazil is entitled to impose countermeasures. Canada argues that an appropriate starting
point for calculating the level of such countermeasures is the amount of the subsidy that will be granted on
aircraft not yet delivered as of 20 May 2002, when Canada should have withdrawn the subsidy. Given
Canada's concession and the fact that the two prior arbitrations under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement
have used the amount of the subsidy as the basis for approving proposed countermeasures, we find it proper as
a starting-point to calculate the level of countermeasures in this case based on the amount of the subsidy
methodology, subject to adjustments if necessary to ensure that the level of countermeasures is appropriate. In
this regard, we note that prior Arbitrators that have rejected proposed levels of countermeasures (or
suspensions of concessions) have always proceeded to set levels consistent with the relevant agreements.”
(131)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircrafts), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 3.18, 3.57-3.60
Em Brazil - Aircrafts (Canada), o Painel Arbitral explica que as disposições dos Artigos 4.10 e 4.11 do
ASMC caracterizam-se como regras especiais ou adicionais, prevalecentes sobre as regras gerais
dispostas no Artigo 22 do DSU e Apêndice 2 do DSU. O Painel também chama a atenção para o fato de
que a variável “anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios” não faz parte das regras constantes nos Artigos 3 e 4
do ASMC; não havendo, portanto, a obrigação legal, no contexto das contramedidas, de exame da
existência de equivalência entre o nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o grau da
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios. Os árbitros reforçaram que, quando lidam com subsídios proibidos o
nível das contramedidas deve ser “apropriado” ao nível de tais subsidies.
3.18. “As to our task, we follow the approach adopted by previous arbitrators under Article 22.6 of the DSU.
(132) We will have not only to determine whether Canada’s proposal constitutes “appropriate
countermeasures”, but also to determine the level of countermeasures we consider to be appropriate in case
we find that Canada's level of countermeasures is not appropriate, if necessary by applying our own
methodology.”
Para. 3.57. “We read the provisions of Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement as special or additional rules. In
accordance with the reasoning of the Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement, (133) we must read the
provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules in the SCM Agreement so as to give meaning to all
of them, except if there is a conflict or a difference. While we agree that in practice there may be situations
where countermeasures equivalent to the level of nullification of impairment will be appropriate, we recall
that the concept of nullification or impairment is absent from Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement. In that
framework, there is no legal obligation that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or other
obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.”
Para. 3.58. “On the contrary, requiring that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or
other obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment would be contrary to the principle of
effectiveness by significantly limiting the efficacy of countermeasures in the case of prohibited subsidies.
Indeed, as shown in the present case, (134) other countermeasures than suspension of concessions or
obligations may not always be feasible because of their potential effects on other Members. This would be the
case of a countersubsidy granted in a sector where other Members than the parties compete with the products
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of the parties. In such a case, the Member taking the countermeasure may not be in a position to induce
compliance.”
Para. 3.59. “We are mindful that our interpretation may, at a first glance, seem to cause some risk of
disproportionality in case of multiple compainants. However, in such a case, the arbitrator could allocate the
amount of appropriate countermeasures among the complainants in proportion to their trade in the product
concerned. The “inducing” effect would most probably be very similar.”
Para. 3.60. “For the reasons set out above, we conclude that, when dealing with a prohibited export subsidy,
an amount of countermeasures which corresponds to the total amount of the subsidy is ‘appropriate’”. (135)
Corporations” (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/ARB, para. 2.6
Em US - FSC (European Communities), por sua vez, o Painel Arbitral, analisou o Artigo 30 do ASMC,
e concluiu que o DSU é aplicável aos procedimentos arbitrais envolvendo a concessão de subsídios
proibidos, embora o Artigo 4.11 do ASMC deva prevalecer em caso de conflito entre ambos os acordos.
Os árbitros afirmaram ser “possível”, nos termos do Artigo 1.2 do DSU, que as regras dos Artigos 4.10
e 4.11 do ASMC prevaleçam sobre as normas do Apêndice 2 do DSU, por figurarem as primeiras na
condição de normas especiais ou adicionais.
Para. 2.6. “We also recall the terms of Article 30 of the SCM Agreement, which clarifies that the provisions
of the DSU are applicable to proceedings concerning measures covered by the SCM Agreement. Article 22.6
of the DSU therefore remains relevant to arbitral proceedings under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, as
illustrated by the textual reference made to Article 22.6 of the DSU in that provision. However, the special or
additional rules and procedures of the SCM Agreement, including Articles 4.10 and 4.11, would prevail to the
extent of any difference between them. (136)
Para. 5.47. The Arbitrators recalled that “Article 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement are ‘special or
additional rules’ under Appendix 2 of the DSU, and that in accordance with Article 1.2 of the DSU, it is
possible for such rules or procedures to prevail over those of the DSU. There can be no presumption,
therefore, that the drafters intended the standard under Article 4.10 to be necessarily coextensive with that
under Article 22.4 so that the notion of “appropriate countermeasures” under Article 4.10 would limit such
countermeasures to an amount “equivalent to the level of nullification of impairment” suffered by the
complaining Member. Rather, Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement use distinct language and that
difference must be given meaning.”
5. Artigo 22.5
Não há nenhum caso ainda cuja reclamação se baseia no Artigo 22.5 do DSU.
6. Artigo 22.6
a)
“Regras preliminares”
of 2000 (Emenda Byrd)(US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA,
para. 2.4
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)(Brazil), o Painel Arbitral negou-se a emitir uma conclusão
preliminar, solicitada pelo demandante, pois os esclarecimentos previamente requeridos estariam
intimamente relacionados às questões centrais da arbitragem. Ademais, o Painel ponderou que nenhuma
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disposição do Artigo 22 do DSU menciona a possibilidade de emissão antecipada de uma conclusão nos
procedimentos arbitrais, e não há registro de mencionada prática no passado.
Para. 2.4. “[W]e note that neither paragraph 6 nor paragraph 7 of Article 22 of the DSU provide for the
possibility of a preliminary ruling and there is, strictly speaking, no practice of a preliminary ruling at the
request of a party in past arbitrations.”
b)
“Direitos das terceiras partes”
Em EC - Bananas III e em Brazil - Aircraft, os Painéis Arbitrais sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU negaram os
respectivos pedidos do Equador e da Austrália, de participação nos procedimentos arbitrais na qualidade
de terceiras partes interessadas, devido à ausência de disposições a respeito no Artigo 22 do DSU, e por
acreditarem que os direitos do Equador e da Austrália não seriam afetados em ambos os procedimentos.
Para. 2.8. “On 4 February 1999, Ecuador requested the Arbitrators to accord it third-party status in light of its
special interest in the proceedings. However, in light of the absence of provisions for third-party status under
Article 22 of the DSU and given that we do not believe that Ecuador's rights will be affected by this
proceeding, we declined Ecuador's request. In this regard, we note that our Initial and Final Decisions in this
arbitration fully respect Ecuador's rights under the DSU, and, in particular, Article 22 thereof.”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 2.5-2.6
Para. 2.5. “[W]e informed Australia that we declined its request. Our decision took into account the views
expressed by the parties, the fact that there is no provision in the DSU as regards third party status under
Article 22, and the fact that we do not believe that Australia’s rights would be affected by this proceeding.”
Para. 2.6. “We note in this respect that third party rights were granted in the Article 22.6 arbitrations
concerning European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) and
rejected in the EC - Bananas (1999) Article 22.6 arbitration. We do not consider that Australia in this case is
in the same situation as Canada and the United States in the EC - Hormones arbitrations, nor even in the same
situation as Ecuador in the EC - Bananas (1999) arbitration. Indeed, Australia never initiated dispute
settlement proceedings against Brazil with respect to the export financing programme at issue. Moreover,
Australia (g) List of Article 22.6 arbitration proceedings did not draw the attention of the Arbitrators to any
benefits accruing to it or any rights under the WTO Agreement which might be affected by their decision.
(137)
Canadá - WT/DS48/ARB, para. 7
Em EC - Hormones (US)(Canada), o Painel Arbitral assumiu um posicionamento distinto daqueles em
EC - Bananas III e em Brazil - Aircraft, uma vez que autorizou os EUA e o Canadá a participarem
como terceiras partes interessadas nos procedimentos do Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6. Amparado
na discricionaridade concedida pelo Artigo 12.1 do DSU, para decisões relacionadas a questões
procedimentais não regulamentadas no DSU; na ausência de referência no Artigo 22 do DSU sobre a
participação de terceiras partes nas arbitragens; e, na crença de que os direitos dos EUA e do Canadá
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poderiam ser afetados em ambos os procedimentos, o Painel acolheu os pedidos dos EUA e do Canadá.
“The US and Canada are allowed to attend both arbitration hearings, to make a statement at the end of each
hearing and to receive a copy of the written submissions made in both proceedings. The above ruling was
made on the following grounds.
•
DSU provisions on panel proceedings, referred to by analogy in the arbitrators’working procedures,
give the arbitrators discretion to decide on procedural matters not regulated in the DSU (Article 12.1
of the DSU) in accordance with due process. (138) The DSU does not address the issue of third-party
participation in Article 22 arbitration proceedings.
•
US and Canadian rights may be affected in both arbitration proceedings:
First, the estimates for high quality beef (‘HQB’) exports, foregone because of the hormone ban, are
to be based on a tariff quota that allegedly needs to be shared between Canada and the US. A
determination in one proceeding may thus be decisive for the determination in the other.
Second, several methodologies are proposed to calculate lost export opportunities. Given the fact that
the product scope (HQB and edible bovine offal (‘EBO’)) and relevant trade barriers (hormone ban
and HQB tariff quota) are the same in both proceedings, both arbitration panels (composed of the
same three individuals) may consider it necessary to adopt the same or very similar methodologies.
This is all the more necessary because the arbitrators are called upon to arrive at a specific
determination on the amount of nullification and impairment caused by the ban. (139) They are
therefore not limited, as in most panel proceedings, to ruling only on the consistency of the amounts
proposed by the US and Canada with DSU provisions. Due process thus requires that all three parties
receive the opportunity to comment on the methodologies proposed by each of the parties.
•
In contrast, the EC has not shown how third-party participation would prejudice its rights. No specific
arguments were made demonstrating that third party participation would substantially impair the EC’s
interests or due process rights.”
7. Arbitragens sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU
a) “Especificidade no requerimento para a composição do Painel de Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6
do DSU”
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU entendeu aue o padrão de
especificidade, estabelecido no Artigo 6.2 do DSU, deve estar presente tanto na solicitação de
autorização para aplicar a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, sob o Artigo 22.2 do DSU,
quanto no pedido de instauração da Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU; uma vez que ambos os
procedimentos possuem objetivos semelhantes. No entanto, o padrão de especificidade não deverá ser
adotado durante o procedimento arbitral, pois este segue metodologia distinta para o cálculo do nível de
Para. 20. “The DSU does not explicitly provide that the specificity requirements, which are stipulated in
Article 6.2 for panel requests, apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration proceedings under Article 22. However,
we believe that requests for suspension under Article 22.2, as well as requests for a referral to arbitration
under Article 22.6, serve similar due process objectives as requests under Article 6.2. First, they give notice to
the other party and enable it to respond to the request for suspension or the request for arbitration,
respectively. Second, a request under Article 22.2 by a complaining party defines the jurisdiction of the DSB
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in authorizing suspension by the complaining party. Likewise, a request for arbitration under Article 22.6
defines the terms of reference of the Arbitrators. Accordingly, we consider that the specificity standards,
which are well-established in WTO jurisprudence under Article 6.2, are relevant for requests for authorization
of suspension under Article 22.2, and for requests for referral of such matter to arbitration under Article 22.6,
as the case may be. They do, however, not apply to the document submitted during an arbitration proceeding,
setting out the methodology used for the calculation of the level of nullification or impairment.”
Meat Products - Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, nota de rodapé 16, p.
5
Seguindo o mesmo raciocínio do Painel Arbitral em EC - Bananas III, os árbitros em EC - Hormones
(US) concluíram que, embora não haja o dever constante no DSU, quando do requerimento de
instauração do Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6, de indicar os produtos a serem suspensos, o tipo e o
grau da suspensão; quanto mais precisas forem as informações constantes em tal requerimento, tanto
melhor para segurança e previsibilidade do sistema multilateral de comércio e para o alcance de uma
solução positiva para a demanda. Além de demonstrar a boa-fé dos Membros na busca pela solução da
disputa.
Footnote 16: “The more precise a request for suspension is in terms of product coverage, type and degree of
suspension, etc …, the better. Such precision can only be encouraged in pursuit of the DSU objectives of
‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’ (Article 3.2) and seeking prompt and
positive solutions to disputes (Articles 3.3 and 3.7). It would also be welcome in light of the statement in
Article 3.10 that ‘all Members will engage in [DSU] procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the
dispute’.” (140)
b)
“Por meio do Painel original, se os Membros estiverem disponíveis, ou por um árbitro designado
pelo diretor geral”
Em geral, as Arbitragens sob o Artigo 22.6 são realizadas pelos integrantes do Painel original, com
exceção da instaurada no litígio US - 1916 Act (EC), em que apenas os dois Árbitros do Painel original
participaram, pos o Presidente não estava disponível. (141)
c)
“Ônus da Prova”
Canadá - WT/DS48/ARB, paras. 9-11
Em EC - Hormones (US)(Canada), o Painel Arbitral discutiu a questão do ônus da prova e concluiu,
com base na jurisprudência do DSB, que o fato das Comuniddes Européias questionarem a
conformidade da proposta dos EUA com o Artigo 22.4 do DSU, confere-lhe o ônus de demonstrar, com
argumentos e evidências, ou presunções, que a proposta dos EUA de suspensão de concessões ou de
outras obrigações não era consistente com a exigência de equivalência preconizada pelo Artigo 22.4. O
mesmo ônus da prova é conferido àquele que alega a existência de fato específico, e àquele que requer
suspensão de obrigações e não suspensão de concessões tariáficas, como ocorrido em US - 1916 Act.
Para. 9. “WTO Members, as sovereign entities, can be presumed to act in conformity with their WTO
obligations. A party claiming that a Member has acted inconsistently with WTO rules bears the burden of
proving that inconsistency. The act at issue here is the US proposal to suspend concessions. The WTO rule in
question is Article 22.4 prescribing that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of nullification and
impairment. The EC challenges the conformity of the US proposal with the said WTO rule. It is thus for the
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EC to prove that the US proposal is inconsistent with Article 22.4. Following well-established WTO
jurisprudence, this means that it is for the EC to submit arguments and evidence sufficient to establish a prima
facie case or presumption that the level of suspension proposed by the US is not equivalent to the level of
nullification and impairment caused by the EC hormone ban. Once the EC has done so, however, it is for the
US to submit arguments and evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption. Should all arguments and evidence
remain in equipoise, the EC, as the party bearing the original burden of proof, would lose.”
Para. 10. “The same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged; in this case, for example,
where a party relies on a decrease of beef consumption in the EC or the use of edible beef offal as pet food. It
is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence.”
Para. 11. “The duty that rests on all parties to produce evidence and to collaborate in presenting evidence to
the arbitrators — an issue to be distinguished from the question of who bears the burden of proof — is crucial
in Article 22 arbitration proceedings. The EC is required to submit evidence showing that the proposal is not
equivalent. However, at the same time and as soon as it can, the US is required to come forward with evidence
explaining how it arrived at its proposal and showing why its proposal is equivalent to the trade impairment it
has suffered. Some of the evidence — such as data on trade with third countries, export capabilities and
affected exporters — may, indeed, be in the sole possession of the US, being the party that suffered the trade
impairment.” (142)
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, para. 3.3
Para. 3.3. “the fact that this case relates to the suspension of ‘obligations’, as opposed to the suspension of
tariff concessions, in no way alters the applicable burden of proof.”
d) “Tratamento de dados fornecidos por entidades privadas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, paras. 2.10-2.11
O Painel Arbitral no litígio Brazil - Aircraft (Canada) avaliou a confiabilidade dos dados fornecidos
pelo Brasil, e declarou que não poderia acolher as informações de uma empresa privada, - a Embraer -,
como o faria se fossem provenientes de um sujeito de direito internacional. No caso em questão, no
entanto, o governo brasileiro apenas forneceu informações disponibilizadas pela Embraer. Por essa
razão, o Painel solicitou que tais informações fossem apoiadas em evidências, como artigos ou
declarações reproduzidas na imprensa especializada, Relatórios anuais de empresas, ou qualquer outra
informação autorizada originária da Embraer ou de outras fontes confiáveis. Diante da impossibilidde
de corroborar tais informações com documentos oficiais, os árbitros solicitaram as devidas motivações,
além de declarações por escrito de oficiais autorizados da Embraer.
Para. 2.10. “A related problem faced by the Arbitrators in this case was that, in many instances, the original
data necessary for the calculations or assessments was solely in the hands of Brazil. When this information
originated in the Brazilian government, we assumed good faith and accepted the information and the
supporting evidence provided by Brazil to the extent Canada also accepted it or did not provide sufficient
evidence to put in doubt the accuracy of Brazil’s statements and/or evidence.”
Para. 2.11. “However, since this case relates to subsidies granted for the purchase of aircraft produced by the
Brazilian aircraft manufacturer, Embraer, a large number of data essential for the resolution of our task is only
available to that company. We assumed that Embraer was independent from the Brazilian government and, for
that reason, we could not treat statements from that company as we would have if they had originated from a
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subject of international law. (143) When Brazil only provided statements regarding information available
solely to Embraer, we requested that Brazil support those statements with materials usually regarded as
evidence, such as articles or statements reproduced in the specialized press, company annual reports or any
other certified information originating in Embraer or other reliable sources. When Brazil was not in a position
to provide documentary evidence, we requested a detailed explanation of the reasons why such evidence was
not available and expressed our willingness to consider written declarations from authorised Embraer
officials, if duly certified. We then weighed this evidence against the evidence submitted by Canada.”
e) “Procedimento de trabalho nas Arbitragens sob o Artigo 22.6”
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 4.11
Em EC - Bananas (US), as Comunidades Europeias contestaram a competência do Painel Arbitral sob o
Artigo 22.6 do DSU, para rever a consistência do regime de regras das Comunidades Europeias e as
regras da OMC. Afirmaram ser tal função confiada ao Painel sob o Artigo 21.5 do DSU. No entanto, o
Painel discordou da argumentação da demandada.
Para. 4.11. “[T]he European Communities argues that if we consider the WTO consistency of its banana
regime in an arbitration proceeding under Article 22, we will deprive Article 21.5 of its raison d’être. We
disagree. For those Members that for whatever reasons do not wish to suspend concessions, Article 21.5 will
remain the prime vehicle for challenging implementation measures. However, if we accepted the EC’s
argument, we would in fact read the time-limit foreseen in Article 22.6 out of the DSU since an Article 21.5
proceeding, which in the EC view includes consultations and an appeal, would seldom, if ever, be completed
before the end of the time-limit specified within Article (i.e. thirty days of the expiry of the reasonable period
of time). (144) In this regard it is useful to recall the arbitration award in the Hormones case, in which it is
stated ‘Read in context, it is clear that the reasonable period of time, as determined under Article 21.3(c),
should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.’ (145) We note that in the US view, if it cannot make a request for
authorization to suspend concessions within the Article 22.6 time-period, it loses its right to do so, at least
under circumstances where the negative-consensus rule of Article 22.6 applies.” (146)
- Texto do Procedimento de Trabalho em Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU
Os Painéis Arbitrais sob o Artigo 22.6 do DSU em Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees and US Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), anexaram os procedimentos de trabalho às suas decisões, conforme
ocorrido em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (147).
“The Arbitrator will follow the normal working procedures of the DSU where relevant and as adapted to the
circumstances of the present proceedings, in accordance with the timetable it has adopted. In this regard:
(a) the Arbitrator will meet in closed session;
(b) the deliberations of the Arbitrator and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential.
However, this is without prejudice to the parties’ disclosure of statements of their own positions to the
public, in accordance with Article 18.2 of the DSU;
(c) at any substantive meeting with the parties, the Arbitrator will ask the United States to present
orally its views first, followed by the party(ies) having requested authorization to suspend concessions
or other obligations;
(d) each party shall submit all factual evidence to the Arbitrator no later than in its written submission
to the Arbitrator, except with respect to evidence necessary during the hearing or for answers to
questions. Derogations to this procedure will be granted upon a showing of good cause, in which case
the other party(ies) shall be accorded a period of time for comments, as appropriate;
202
(e) the parties shall provide an electronic copy (on a computer format compatible with the Secretariat’s
programmes) together with the printed version (6 copies) of their submissions, including the
methodology paper, on the due date. All these copies must be filed with the Dispute Settlement
Registrar, […]. Electronic copies may be sent by e-mail to […]. Parties shall provide 6 copies and an
electronic version of their oral statements during any meeting with the Arbitrator or no later than noon
on the day following any such meeting.
(f) except as otherwise indicated in the timetable, submissions should be provided at the latest by 5.00
p.m. on the due date so that there is a possibility to send them to the Arbitrator on that date. As is
customary, distribution of submissions to the other party(ies) shall be made by the parties themselves;
(g) if necessary, and at any time during the proceedings, the Arbitrator may put questions to any party
to clarify any point that is unclear. Whenever appropriate, a right to comment on the responses will be
granted to the other party(ies);
(h) any material submitted shall be concise and limited to questions of relevance in this particular
procedure.
(i) Parties have the right to determine the composition of their own delegations. Delegations may
include, as representatives of the government concerned, private counsel and advisers. Parties shall
have responsibility for all members of their delegations and shall ensure that all members of their
delegations act in accordance with the rules of the DSU and these Working Procedures, particularly in
regard to confidentiality of the proceedings. Parties shall provide a list of the participants of their
delegation prior to, or at the beginning of, any meeting with the Arbitrator.
(j) to facilitate the maintenance of the record of the arbitration, and to maximize the clarity of
submissions and other documents, in particular the references to exhibits submitted by parties, parties
shall sequentially number their exhibits throughout the course of the arbitration.”
- Interpretação e Aplicação dos Procedimentos de Trabalho
(i) Admissibilidade e nova evidência
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft)(Canada), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 2.11-2.14
O Painel Arbitral, sob o Artigo 22.6, neste caso, concluiu, apoiado na jurisprudência do DSB e no item
(d) dos Procedimentos de Trabalho, que as partes devem submeter as evidências factuais no mesmo
momento em que submetem o pedido inicial aos aos árbitros; a não ser que sejam evidências necessárias
para refutar ou responder a questões formuladas durante o procedimento arbitral, ou que seja por uma
boa causa. Com efeito, o Painel acolheu as objeções propostas pelo Canadá e rejeitou as novas eviências
apresentadas pelo Brasil.
Para. 2.11. “We recall that paragraph (d) of our Working Procedures provides that:
‘(d) the parties shall submit all factual evidence to the Arbitrators no later than the first written submissions to
the Arbitrators, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttals or answers to questions.
Exceptions to this procedure will be granted upon a showing of good cause. In such cases, the other party
shall be accorded a period of time for comment, as appropriate;’”
Para. 2.12. “The purpose of paragraph (d), which is also found, mutatis mutandis, in most panel and Article
21.5 DSU compliance panel working procedures, is to ensure that parties are given sufficient opportunities to
comment on any piece of evidence submitted in the course of the proceedings. Paragraph (d) clearly states the
circumstances in which evidence may be submitted after the first written submission. First, additional
evidence may be submitted for the purpose of rebuttals or answers to questions. Second, the Arbitrator may
allow new evidence to be submitted at a later time, upon a showing of good cause. In all events, paragraph (d)
requires that the other party shall be accorded a period of time for comment, as appropriate.”
203
Para. 2.13. “We recall that in Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and
Other Items, (148) the Panel was confronted with a situation of evidence submitted late in the proceedings.
(149) The Panel considered that due process required that it accept the evidence submitted by the United
States on the understanding that Argentina would have a period of time to provide further comments on the
additional pieces of evidence. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s reasoning, confirming that the Panel
enjoyed a certain amount of discretion in its dealing with evidence and stating that Argentina had not
requested more time to comment.” (150)
Para. 2.14. “(…) In this case, Canada requests that the Arbitrator reject the evidence, since Brazil showed no
good cause for submitting late a piece of information that had been available to it for some time. (151) Brazil
responds that Exhibits BRA-76 and 77 were submitted as part of its reply to question No. 2 of the Arbitrator
to both parties. However, nowhere do we find any reference to these exhibits in Brazil’s reply of 1 November
2002. Assuming the evidence was for purposes of rebuttal, we see no particular reason why it could not have
been submitted together with Brazil’s oral statement at our meeting rather than with its closing statement. By
delaying the presentation of this evidence until its closing statement, Brazil’s position as respondent gave it a
procedural advantage since it spoke last, and it was not foreseen in the Working Procedures that Canada could
reply at that point. This makes such a late submission of evidence even less acceptable. Intentionally
submitting evidence at a time where the other party is normally no longer in a position to comment — as in
this case — not only adversely affects the interests of that party, it also affects due process in general and can
generate delays in the work of panels and Arbitrators, thus making it more difficult for them to meet the
deadlines contained in the WTO Agreement. Hence, we felt it more appropriate to exclude such evidence
rather than to allow Canada to respond, the more so as Canada had expressly requested the Arbitrator to reject
such evidence. As a result, we decided not to take into account the evidence submitted by Brazil in Exhibits
BRA-76 and 77.”
(ii) Admissibilidade e novos argumentos
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil –
Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 2.16-2.17
Ainda em Brazil - Aircraft (Canada), o Painel Arbitral deciciu aceitar os novos argumentos
apresentados pelo Brasil ao concluir as suas constatações durante a primeira reunião substantiva, assim
como a submissão adicional do Canadá, em resposta aos argumentos brasileiros. Segundo o Painel, seria
a última opornidade para que as partes expressassem as suas visões.
Para. 2.16. “[Canada’s additional] submission should not be treated as a reply to new evidence, but as a new
submission of arguments which is not foreseen in the Working Procedures. A strict interpretation of our
Working Procedures should lead us to disregard Canada’s additional submission. However, we note that
Brazil developed a rather new line of argumentation in its concluding remarks. It was in the interest of due
process and of the information of the Arbitrator to hear what Canada had to say about it, if it wished to do so.
We also note that, even if Canada decided to reply to Brazil’s arguments, Brazil’s right — as respondent — to
speak last was preserved by the opportunity given to parties to comment on each other’s replies to the
questions of the Arbitrator. We saw no reason to formally intervene in that process as long as due process was
ultimately respected. We also do not believe that our passivity in this respect could lead to an endless
exchange of arguments since the comments on the replies to the questions were the last opportunity for parties
to express their views, as provided by the Arbitrator at its hearing with the parties.”
Para. 2.17. “For these reasons we decide to accept Canada’s comments on Brazil’s concluding statement and
Brazil’s remarks on those comments.”
204
(iii) Versões confidenciais / não confidenciais das decisões arbitrais
Aircraft (Canada - Aircraft Credits and Garanties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS222/ABR, paras. 2.182.19
Em Canada - Aircraft Credits and Garanties, o Painel Arbitral, devido à insistência das partes pela
manutenção da confidencialidade de determinados documentos, entendeu por bem elaborar duas versões
da sua decisão: (i) uma versão confidencial, contendo os pormenores a respeito dos cálculos e
informações que lhe foram confiadas, a ser fornecida exclusivamente às partes, em uma base
confidencial; e, (ii) uma versão não confidencial, para ser circulada a todos os Membros da OMC. Na
sequência, o Painel solicitou aos litigantes que identificássem, na versão confidencial, as informações
comercialmente sensíveis e que deveriam ser removidas da versão pública. O Painel se mostrou
consciente de que a proteção às informações confidenciais contribui, de modo fundamental, para a
ampla cooperação dos Membros e de pessoas particulares no mecanismo de solução de controvérsias da
OMC.
Para. 2.18. “Both parties insisted in the course of the proceedings on the confidentiality of certain documents
provided to the Arbitrator. (152) We were mindful of the serious problems that could be caused by the
disclosure of certain commercial or financial information. Like the Brazil – Aircraft Arbitrator, we were also
aware of the fact that the full cooperation of Members and private persons in the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, which is essential for an objective assessment of the facts, often depends on the appropriate
protection of confidential information.”
Para. 2.19. “This is the reason why we decided to prepare two versions of this report. The first version,
including the details of our calculations and all the information relied upon, was issued exclusively to the
parties on a confidential basis. We also requested the parties to identify the commercially sensitive
information which they considered should be removed from the text of a non-confidential version to be
circulated to Members. (153) While some data is not included in this version, it is nevertheless sufficiently
detailed for all Members to understand the reasoning of the Arbitrator and the methodology applied in
determining whether the countermeasures proposed by Brazil are appropriate. By doing so, the Arbitrator is
of the view that it has respected its obligations under the DSU while appropriately protecting the
confidentiality of certain information, which had been so requested by the parties.”
f) “A tabela a seguir contém as decisões arbitrais e o nível da suspensão de concessões autorizado”
DS nº
Case
DS27
DS27
DS26
DS48
EC – Bananas III
EC – Bananas III
EC – Hormones
EC - Hormones
Member(s)
requesting the
authorization
US
Ecuador
US
Canada
DS46
Brazil – Aircraft
Canada
DS108
US – FSC
EC
205
Applicable
provisions
Level of suspension
authorized
Article 22.6 DSU
Article 22.6 DSU
Article 22.6 DSU
Article 22.6 DSU
US$191.4 million (annual)
CAN$11.3 million
(annual)
CAN$344.2 million
(annual)
Articles 22.6
DSU and 4.10
ASMC
Article 22.6 DSU
e 4.10 ASMC
US$4,043 billion (annual)
DS136
US – 1916 Act
EC
Article 22.6 DSU
DS217,
DS234
US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment)
Brazil, Chile,
EC, India,
Japan e Korea
Article 22.6 DSU
DS222
Canada – Aircraft
Credits and
Guarantees
US - Gambling
Brazil
Articles 22.6
DSU and 4.10
ASMC
Article 22.6 DSU
DS285
DS267
DS267
US – Upland
Cotton (Article
22.6 – US I)
US – Upland
Cotton (Article
22.6 – US II)
Antigua and
Barbuda
Brazil
Brazil
Cumulative monetary
value of any amounts
payable by EC entities
pursuant to final court
judgements, and/or
settlements of claims,
under the 1916 Act
Additional duties on yearly
value of trade equal to
amount of Byrd duties
distributed multiplied by
0.72
US$247,8 million
US$21 million (annual)
Article 22.6 DSU
and 7.10 ASMC
Article 22.6 DSU
and 4.11 ASMC
Fonte: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/dsu_08_e.htm#article22B7d
(It is updated to 30 September 2011)
g)
“Tabela com o período de tempo dos procedimentos do Artigo 22.6 do DSU” (calculado a partir
da date da expiração do período razoável de tempo até a data de circulação do Painel Arbitral sob
o Artigo 22.6 do DSU)
Prescribed Time-Period in Article 22.6
Average to Date
Longest to Date
Shortest to Date
*Average Date Calculated from Commencement of
Article 22.6 Proceeding
* Longest to Date Calculated fromXommencement of
* Shortest to Date Calculated from Commencement of
DS nº
Case
DS27
EC – Bananas III
(Ecuador)
60 days after the expiry of the reasonable
period of time
456 days
1440 days
82 days
164 days
334 days
39 days
Date of
Article
22.6
decision(s)
Days from the expiry
of the reasonable
period of time /
compliance period to
circulation of decision
24 March
2000
82 days
206
*Days from
commencement of
compliance period to
circulation of the Article
22.6 proceeding to decision
circulation of decision (*)
126 days
EC – Bananas III
(US)
EC – Hormones
DS27
DS26,
DS48
DS46
Brazil – Aircraft
US – FSC
DS10
8
DS13
6
US – 1916 Act
US – Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment)
DS21
7,
DS23
4
DS22
2
Canada – Aircraft
Credits and
Guarantees
US – Gambling
DS28
5
US – Upland
Cotton (Article
22.6 – US I) and
US – Upland
Cotton (Article
22.6 – US II)
DS26
7
9 April
1999
12 July
1999
28 August
2000
30 August
2002
24
February
2004
31 August
2004
17
February
2003
21
December
2007
31 August
2009
98 days
70 days
60 days
39 days
284 days
98 days
667 days
213 days
785 days
158 days
248 days
218 days
273 days
238 days
627 days
150 days
1440 days
334 days
Fonte: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/dsu_08_e.htm#article22B7d
(The table is updated to 30 September 2011)
(*) The date of appointment of the Arbitrator is used as the date of commencement of the Article 22.6 proceeding. Where the Article
22.6 arbitration was suspended by agreement of the parties (e.g. to allow for an Article 21.5 proceeding) and then resumed, the date
upon which the Article 22.6 Arbitrator resumed its work is used.
8. Artigo 22.7
a)
“Mandato dos árbitros”
and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB, paras. 3.5-3.6
O Painel Arbitral examinou a possibilidade de revisar a escolha feita pelo Membro demandante, nos
termos do Artigo 22.3; e o fez baseando-se, simultaneamente, nos Artigos 22:6 e 22:7 do DSU.
Para. 3.5. “Article 22.7 of the DSU empowers the Arbitrators to examine claims concerning the principles
and procedures set forth in Article 22.3 of the DSU in its entirety, whereas Article 22.6 of the DSU seems to
limit the competence of Arbitrators to such examination to cases where a request for authorization to suspend
concessions is made under subparagraphs (b) or (c) of Article 22.3 of the DSU. However, we believe that
there is no contradiction between paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22 of the DSU, and that these provisions can
be read together in a harmonious way.”
207
Para. 3.6. “If a panel or Appellate Body report contains findings of WTO-inconsistencies only with respect to
one and the same sector in the meaning of Article 22.3(f) of the DSU, there is little need for a multilateral
review of the choice with respect to goods or services or intellectual property rights, as the case may be,
which a Member has selected for the suspension of concessions subject to the DSB’s authorization. However,
if a Member decides to seek authorization to suspend concessions under another sector, or under another
agreement, outside of the scope of the sectors or agreements to which a Panel’s findings relate, paragraphs
(b)–(d) of Article 22.3 of the DSU provide for a certain degree of discipline such as the requirement to state
reasons why that Member considered the suspension of concessions within the same sector(s) as that where
violations of WTO law were found as not practicable or effective.”
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 concluiu que, dentre as suas
atribuições figuram: (i) determinar se o nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações
solicitado é equivalente ao nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios; e (ii) determinar se os princípios
ou procedimentos relacionados à aplicação da medida foram seguidos.
Para. 11. “[T]he jurisdiction of the Arbitrators includes the power to determine (i) whether the level of
suspension of concessions or other obligations requested is equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment; and (ii) whether the principles or procedures concerning the suspension of concessions or other
obligations across sectors and/or agreements pursuant to Article 22.3 of the DSU have been followed.”
Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US – Act of
1916), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, para. 3.7
Em US - Act of 1916 (European Communities), o Painel Arbitral concluiu que não lhe compete revisar a
escolha do Membro entre pleitear a suspensão de obrigações, e não a suspensão de concessões tarifárias.
Para. 3.7. “The European Communities had requested to suspend obligations instead of tariff concessions. On
that occasion, the Arbitrators considered that: “the decision by the European Communities to seek the
suspension of ‘obligations’ rather than tariff ‘concessions’ is not subject to review by the Arbitrators”.”
of 2000 (Byrd Amendment)(US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Brasil, Canadá, Chile,
Comunidades Europeias, India, Japão, Coréia e México, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, para. 4.11
Em US - Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd Amendment), o Painel Arbitral esclareceu que não configura
atribuição sua recomendar a suspensão de obrigações específicas ou a adoção de medidas específicas ao
Membro demandante.
Para. 4.11. “The Arbitrator stated that it did not “fall within [his] mandate to recommend the suspension of
specific obligations or the adoption of specific measures by ‘the requesting party’”.
of 2000 (Emenda Byrd)(US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Brasil, Canadá, Chile,
Comunidades Europeias, India, Japão, Coréia e México, WT/DS234/ARB/CAN, para. 2.32
Em US - Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd Amendment), o Painel Arbitral explicou que não dispõe de autoridade
para requerer ao demandante maior especificidade com relação as medidas que pretende aplicar para
208
suspender obrigações. Conforme esclareceu, o mandato do Painel restringe-se a determinar se o nível da
suspensão de obrigações é equivalente ao nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios. Portanto, tal
mandato não inclui avaliar se as medidas que irão implementar a suspensão de concessões excederão o
nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios; assim como não inclui discutir ou aprovar a implementação
da suspensão de obrigações proposta. O Painel de Arbitragem, entendeu que a decisão sobre tais
questões compete ao DSB.
Para. 2.32. “The Arbitrator examined Canada’s request for suspension of obligations under a number of
provisions of the GATT 1994, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and the SCM Agreement. The Arbitrator found
that he did not “have authority under our mandate to require Canada to be more specific as to the measures it
intends to apply to suspend its obligations” under those provisions.”
Para. 2.29. “[I]t is necessary to differentiate between the WTO obligation to be suspended and the specific
measures taken to implement such suspensions. We note that our mandate is to determine whether the level of
suspension of WTO obligations is equivalent with the level of nullification or impairment. Article 22.7 of the
DSU does not imply a review of the actual measures, which will implement a suspension, to determine if they
will exceed the level of nullification or impairment, and in our view, the Arbitrator’s mandate does not extend
to addressing or approving the proposed implementation of the suspension of the obligations.”
Para. 2.32. “[I]f the DSB considers that Canada’s request is not acceptable in this respect, it may reject
Canada’s request, pursuant to the last sentence of Article 22.7 of the DSU. Similarly, if the United States were
to consider that the actual suspension of obligations by Canada exceeded the level of nullification or
impairment determined pursuant to this decision, it may have recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism.”
(154)
b) “O árbitro … deve determinar se o nível da suspensão é equivalente ao nível de anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios”
(i) Presunção de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios / não evidência do nível de anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios
O Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 concluiu, neste caso, que a presunção de anulação ou prejuízo de
benefícios contida no Artigo 3.8 do DSU não pode ser tomada como evidência para provar um nível
específico de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, alegadamente sofrida por um Membro que requer
autorização para suspender concessões ou outras obrigações sob o Artigo 22, em um estágio bastante
avançado do procedimento de solução de controvérsias.
Para. 6.10. “The presumption of nullification or impairment in the case of an infringement of a GATT
provision as set forth by Article 3.8 of the DSU cannot in and of itself be taken simultaneously as evidence
proving a particular level of nullification or impairment allegedly suffered by a Member requesting
authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DSU at a much later stage of the WTO dispute
settlement system. The review of the level of nullification or impairment by Arbitrators from the objective
benchmark foreseen by Article 22 of the DSU is a separate process that is independent from the finding of
infringements of WTO rules by a panel or the Appellate Body (…). However, a Member’s legal interest in
compliance by other Members does not, in our view, automatically imply that it is entitled to obtain
authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DSU.”
209
1916), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.48-5.50
Em US - Act of 1916 Act (European Communities), o Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 discordou da
contestação oferecida pelos EUA (demandado) ao nível qualitativo da suspensão de concessões, cuja
autorização foi requerida pelas Comunidades Europeias ao DSB. De acordo com os EUA, um nível não
mensurado em termos quantitativos pelo demandante, deve ser considerado como sendo “zero”. O
Painel, contudo, concluiu que mesmo que o nível da medida não seja indicado em termos quantitativos,
não será, e não poderá ser igual a “zero”.
Para. 5.48. “We do not accept the position of the United States that the level of nullification or impairment in
this case is ‘zero’. As noted by the European Communities, the original Panel in this dispute found, and the
Appellate Body confirmed, that “the 1916 Act nullifies and impairs benefits accruing to the European
Communities.” Therefore, while the level of nullification or impairment has not been specified in quantitative
terms in the EC request under Article 22.2, it clearly is not, and cannot be, ‘zero.’ In our view, this US
position cannot be sustained in light of the adopted Panel and Appellate Body findings.”
Para. 5.49. “The presumption of nullification or impairment in the case of an infringement of a GATT
provision as set forth by Article 3.8 of the DSU cannot in and of itself be taken simultaneously as evidence
proving a particular level of nullification or impairment allegedly suffered by a Member requesting
authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DSU at a much later stage of the WTO dispute
settlement system. The review of the level of nullification or impairment by Arbitrators from the objective
benchmark foreseen by Article 22 of the DSU is a separate process that is independent from the finding of
infringements of WTO rules by a panel or the Appellate Body (…). However, a Member's legal interest in
compliance by other Members does not, in our view, automatically imply that it is entitled to obtain
authorization to suspend concessions under Article 22 of the DSU.” (155)
Para. 5.50. “We agree with the arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) that the presumption
of nullification or impairment, as provided in Article 3.8 of the DSU, by no means provides evidence of the
level of nullification or impairment sustained by the Member requesting authorization to suspend obligations.
However, the fact that the presumption does not automatically translate to a given level does not mean that the
level is ‘zero.’ The original Panel determined that the 1916 Act “nullifies and impairs benefits accruing to the
European Communities.” In light of this conclusion, the level must be something greater than ‘zero’, and it is
a contradiction in terms to suggest otherwise.”
Comunidades Europeias, India, Japão, Coréia e México, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, para. 3.23
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), os demandantes fundaram parte do seu pedido de autorização
para suspender concessões na premissa de que a violação constitui uma forma de anulação ou prejuízo
de benefícios. O Painel Arbitral, no entanto, com base no Artigo 3.8 do DSU, explicou que a violação
gera a “presunção” de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, não constituindo, portanto, uma forma de
Para. 3.23. “If violation was conceptually equated […] to nullification or impairment, there would be no
reason to provide for a possibility to rebut the presumption. The theoretical possibility to rebut the
presumption established by Article 3.8 can only exist because violation and nullification or impairment are
two different concepts.” (156)
c) “Parâmetros para o cálculo do nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios”
210
- Trade effect
of 2000 (Emenda Byrd)(US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Brasil, Canadá, Chile,
Comunidades Europeias, India, Japão, Coréia e México, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras. 3.70-3.71
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), o Painel Arbitral concluiu que a expressão “efeito no comércio”
não consta nem no Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994 e nem no Artigo 22 do DSU, e que as decisões
arbitrais anteriores fundadas no impacto direto no comércio não constituíram precedentes vinculativos.
Entretanto, tal abordagem tem sido utilizada e entendida nas Arbitragens do Artigo 22.6, como a correta
aplicação do Artigo 22 do DSU.
Para. 3.70. “(…) the term ‘trade effect’ is found neither in Article XXIII of GATT 1994, nor in Article 22 of
the DSU. Previous arbitrators' decisions based on direct trade impact are not binding precedents.”
Para. 3.71. “However, as already mentioned, the ‘trade effect’ approach has been regularly applied in other
Article 22.6 arbitrations and seems to be generally accepted by Members as a correct application of Article 22
of the DSU.”
Meat Products (Hormones)(EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, paras. 41 e 77
O Painel Arbitral, em EC - Hormones (US) concluiu que devem ser adotadas estimativas ponderadas
quando da avaliação do nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, e não uma estimativa baseada nas
perdas resultantes das exportações, como sugeriu os EUA.
Para. 77. “(…) even assuming that US marketing efforts would have resumed had the ban been lifted on 13
May 1999, we consider the causal link between the hormone ban and the allegedly lost exports since 13 May
1999 to be too remote. Taking such lost exports into account would, in our view, be too speculative “too
remote” and “too speculative”.
Para. 41. The Arbitrators considered: “The question we thus have to answer here is: what would annual
prospective US exports of hormone-treated beef and beef products to the EC be if the EC had withdrawn the
ban on 13 May 1999? An answer to this question, like any question about future events, can only be a
reasoned estimate. It is necessarily based on certain assumptions. In making those estimates and assumptions,
we need to guard against claims of lost opportunities where the causal link with the inconsistent hormone ban
is less than apparent, i.e. where exports are allegedly foregone not because of the ban but due to other
circumstances.” (157)
1916), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.54 e 5.57
Em US - Act of 1916 Act (European Communities), o Painel de Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22.6 concluiu
que para determinar o nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, necessário se faz contar, sempre que
possível, com informações confiáveis, baseadas em fatos e passíveis de serem verificadas.
Para. 5.54. The Arbitrators referred to the above statements as support to their view that: [“i]n determining
the level of nullification or impairment sustained by the European Communities as a result of the 1916 Act,
we need to rely, as much as possible, on credible, factual, and verifiable information”.
Para. 5.57. The Arbitrators further considered that: “this prudent approach taken by earlier arbitrators is
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appropriate”.
Comunidades Europeias, India, Japão, Coréia e México, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras. 3.22-3.23
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)(Brazil), o Painel de Arbitragem demonstrou certa flexibilidade
ao avaliar o modelo apropriado, dentre aqueles sugeridos pelas partes, para ser utilizado no cálculo do
nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios. Ao examinar o método proposto pelos demandantes,
considerou-o muito agregado e não específico o suficiente para a análise. Por outro lado, avaliou o
modelo sugerido pelo demandado como desagregado, bem específico e portador de dados insuficientes
para uma avaliação com certo grau de precisão da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios. Nesses termos
concluiu pela abordagem de cálculo sugerida pelos demandantes. (158)
Para. 3.22. “A violation generates, pursuant to Article 3.8 of the DSU, a presumption of nullification or
impairment. Article 3.8 does not treat violation as a form of nullification or impairment. Article 3.8 merely
exempts the party having demonstrated the violation from also having to demonstrate nullification or
impairment. It does not modify the fundamental requirement that what is ultimately to be demonstrated is
nullification or impairment.”
Para. 3.23. “This is confirmed by the last sentence of Article 3.8, which provides the opportunity for the
alleged violating party to rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment. If violation was conceptually
equated by Article 3.8 to nullification or impairment, there would be no reason to provide for a possibility to
rebut the presumption. The theoretical possibility to rebut the presumption established by Article 3.8 can only
exist because violation and nullification or impairment are two different concepts.”
III.
Comentários
A medida de “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”, vigente durante o GATT e incorporada no
DSU da OMC, configura um “remédio jurisdicional”, de natureza temporária, oferecido pelo mecanismo de
solução de controvérsias da OMC para auxiliar na fase de cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do
DSB. Conhecida pelo senso comum como ‘retaliação’, ou ‘medida retaliatória’, é frequentemente denominada
de ‘sanção’, ou ‘medida sancionatória’ (159). No âmbito do direito internacional da responsabilidade do
estado, quando há uma violação de normas internacionais, ou a prática de um ato ilícito e um consequente
dano, o Estado responsável incorre na obrigação de realizar a “reparação” integral do dano ou prejuízo
causado (162).
De acordo com a Comissão de Direito Internacional (CDI), um ato será considerado internacionalmente ilícito
e capaz de gerar a responsabilização do Estado que o praticou quando decorrer de uma ação ou omissão
atribuível a este pelo direito internacional, e representar uma quebra na obrigação internacional firmada pelo
Estado (163). Na OMC, por sua vez, não há nenhuma disposição que expressamente estabeleça a obrigação de
“reparar” um dano causado. O primeiro objetivo do Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias, uma vez constatata
a adoção de uma medida ilícita, e a consequente “anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios”, vem a ser a retirada da
medida ilícita, ou a adequação da conduta ilícita às normas da OMC (164).
Conforme sustenta Shadikhodjaev (165), a “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”, legitimada no
Artigo 22 do DSU, também constitui um mecanismo de execução (enforcement) vigente em um sistema de
direito internacional descentralizado, como é a OMC; e a sua imposição decorre da iniciativa unilateral do
Membro prejudicado. No entanto, a medida na OMC é limitada e regulamentada por um sistema de normas e
princípios multilaterais de comércio, fundado em corolários como a “reciprocidade de direitos e obrigações”,
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a “busca pela total implementação das recomendações do DSB”, a “adaptação da prática ilícita às regras dos
acordos abrangidos”, e a “restauração do equilíbrio econômico entre as partes” (166).
Jackson e Vazquez (167) chamam a atenção à relevante distinção entre as “contramedidas” do direito
internacional público e a “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” regulamentada pelo DSU, uma
vez que, as primeiras, por sua própria natureza geral, quando aplicadas possuem efeitos “retroativo” e
“prospectivo”. Já a “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”, quando autorizada pelo DSB, detém
efeito apenas “prospectivo” para a compensação da “anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios”. Conforme
preceituam os Artigos 3:7 e 22:2 combinados, a “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”, na
condição de medida temporária, é oferecida como o último recurso pelo mecanismo de solução de
controvérsias da OMC. Uma vez requerida, e autorizada pelo DSB, poderá ser imposta pelo Membro
prejudicado em face do Membro que incidiu na prática ilícita, e que não cumpriu as recomendações: (i)
imediatamente após autorizado o Relatório do Painel ou do Órgão de Apelação pelo DSB; ou, (ii) dentro do
“período razoável de tempo” concedido pelo DSB (168).
O Painel de Arbitragem, sob o Artigo 22:6 do DSU, no litígio Canada - Aircraft Credits and Garanties (169),
corrobora o entendimento sobre a “natureza temporária” da “suspensão de concessões ou de outras
obrigações”. No mesmo sentido, o Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio EC - Bananas III (170)
confirma a natureza temporária da medida, e explica que a sua finalidade consiste em “induzir o
cumprimento” das recomendações do DSB. Convém destacar o fato de que o Artigo 22 do DSU confere o
direito a uma utilização da “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” stronger than that concedida
pelo Artigo XXIII:2 do GATT; o que retrata um caráter mais adensado e vinculativo da medida na OMC,
claramente observado na jurisprudência do DSB. No Acordo Geral, as Partes-Contratantes poderiam autorizar
(may authorize) a “suspensão de concessões” desde que as circunstâncias fossem “sérias o suficiente” e no
nível considerado ‘apropriado’ (171).
Em contraste, o DSU preconiza, no Artigo 22:6, que após o transcurso do “período razoável de tempo”, o
DSB deve conceder autorização (shall grant authorization) à “suspensão de concessões ou de outras
obrigações”; assegurando à medida um caráter mandatório e suprimindo a discricionaridade ao DSB de
resistir à concessão de autorização quando a situação não se revelar “séria o suficiente” e “apropriada”. Na
realidade, o DSU substituiu tais exigências pela necessidade de “equivalência” entre a “suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações” e o nível da “anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios” verificado (172).
Certifica-se, ainda, que a “suspensão de concessões”, denominada por Pauwelyn e Bown (173) de
“retaliação”, diferencia-se do instituto adotado durante a vigência do GATT 1947, em especial, devido ao
critério do “consenso positivo” exigido pelo GATT, para a sua adoção, que consistia na necessidade de
aceitação unânime, incluindo a adesão do Membro vencido, para a adoção da “suspensão de concessões”. Na
OMC, a contrario sensu, a autorização do DSB decorre de “consenso negativo” ou “invertido”, sendo quase
automática, pois depende exclusivamente da demonstração pelo Membro prejudicado da “anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios” assegurados nos acordos da OMC, e da não retirada da medida ilícita pelo Membro
interessado após o período de tempo estipulado (174).
Cumpre consignar, que a finalidade imediata do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias é provocar a retirada
da medida considerada ilícita, ou a adaptação da prática comercial ilegal às normas dos acordos da OMC.
Vencido o “período razoável de tempo”, e não implementadas as recomendações, há, ainda, a possibilidade de
oferecimento de “compensações” (175). Uma vez expirado o “período razoável de tempo”, e não negociada
“compensações mutuamente satisfatórias” entre os litigantes, durante os 20 dias seguintes à expiração
daquele, o Artigo 22:2 do DSU legitima qualquer das partes a requerer autorização ao DSB para “suspender a
aplicação de concessões ou de outras obrigações” decorrentes dos acordos abrangidos, em face do Membro
vencido.
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No entanto, o Entendimento é claro ao enfatizar que a adoção de medidas compensatórias e da “suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações” não é preferível e nem substitui a implementação integral das
recomendações e conclusões do DSB, e, principalmente, a supressão da medida ilícita ou a adaptação da
prática comercial controvertida às regras da OMC (176). Nesta linha, concluiu o Painel de Arbitragem, sob o
Artigo 22:6 do DSU, no caso Chile – Alcoholic Beverages (177). A jurisprudência tem, a cada novo litígio,
esclarecido pontos obscuros e preenchido lacunas do Entendimento sobre a definição e objetivo(s) da
“suspensão de concessões”; o que, sem dúvida, tem facilitado a compreensão e utilização da medida pelos
Membros. Como exemplo, o Painel de Arbitragem sob o Artigo 22:6 do DSU, no caso US - Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (178), considerou que o DSU não é claro acerca do objetivo da “suspensão de concessões”; o
qual admitiu ser “induzir o cumprimento”, por ser pressuposto a partir da obrigação geral de cumprir com as
recomendações e decisões do DSB.
Por outro lado, o Painel Arbitral expôs a dúvida sobre o que, de fato, induz o cumprimento; pois um valor
elevado da “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” pode não levar à implementação em
determinado caso, enquanto um nível baixo pode alcançá-la em outro. A finalidade da medida de “induzir o
cumprimento das recomendações” foi, pela primeira vez, expressa no litígio EC - Bananas III. A partir desta
decisão, diversas arbitragens futuras seguiram tal posicionamento. No entanto, em determinados litígios os
árbitros consideraram que a “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” pode conter diferentes
finalidades, que não apenas a de “induzir o cumprimento”, como no litígio US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment),
questionado originalmente pelo Brasil (179).
O Artigo 22 do DSU dedica nove incisos às regras para a adoção da “suspensão de concessões”. O que inclui:
(i) o cálculo do montante pelo Painel de Implementação; (ii) a possibilidade de verificação, por um Painel de
Arbitragem, da conformidade entre a providência adotada pelo Membro vencido e a recomendação oferecida
pelo DSB; e, (iii) os requisitos para a aplicação da “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”, em
uma relação exemplificativa. Demonstra, assim, claramente, a atribuição conferida pelo sistema de solução de
controvérsias ao DSB, na condição de “lei especial”, para regulamentar, definir os pormenores e delimitar o
modo de cálculo do montante relativo à medida.
O Entendimento também inova, em relação ao GATT 1947, ao permitir a escolha pelos litigantes da forma em
que serão implementadas as sugestões do Painel e do Órgão de Apelação, permitindo, inclusive, que o
Membro indique o prazo que entende razoável para o cumprimento das recomendações. Caso o tempo
sugerido pelo Membro vencido para a implementação não seja considerado razoável, será legítimo ao
demandante solicitar a instauração de Arbitragem, sob o Artigo 21:3 do DSB, para que seja estipulado o prazo
máximo para o cumprimento de tais recomendações.
A única exceção nas regras da OMC, que determina a obrigatoriedade de retirada imediata da medida ilícita
pelo Membro interessado, consta no ASMC, em seu Artigo 4:7, aplicável à ‘retirada imediata de subsídios
proibidos’. A regra seguida, foi objeto de deliberação do Painel no litígio US – Section 129(c)(1) URAA (180).
A exceção, por sua vez, decorreu de interpretação aposta no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação do caso Brazil –
Aircrafts (181). De acordo com o Relatório, quando tratar-se de subsídios proibidos, definidos no Artigo 4 do
ASMC, há a obrigatoriedade de retirada imediata das medidas ilícitas, e não apenas após o decurso do período
razoável de tempo. Uma vez autorizada pelo DSB a adoção de “suspensão de concessões ou de outras
obrigações”, o Membro considerado vencedor deve amparar-se na ordem oferecida pelo Artigo 22:3 do DSU
para a escolha de quais concessões ou outras obrigações serão suspensas.
Como regra geral, na ordem de prioridades, a “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” deve dirigirse ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(es) em que o Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação tenha verificado a ocorrência de dano,
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios (182). Nesse sentido, posicionou-se o Painel de Arbitragem no caso
Equador - Bananas III (183) ao examinar o pedido de “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” do
Equador nas áreas do Acordo de Serviços e do Acordo TRIPS. Em segundo lugar, diante da impraticabilidade
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ou ineficácia de aplicação da referida suspensão ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(es), o demandante poderá impô-la a
outros setores pertencentes ou regidos pelo mesmo acordo da OMC em questão (184). No entanto, caso o
Membro ofendido entenda ser impraticável ou ineficaz aplicar a suspensão a outros setores abarcados pelo
mesmo acordo, e as circunstâncias forem graves o suficiente, haverá ainda a opção de suspender concessões
ou outras obrigações condizentes a outro acordo abrangido (185).
Qualquer que seja a opção seguida pelo demandante, deverá levar em consideração na aplicação do remédio:
(a) a situação do comércio no setor, ou regulamentado pelo acordo em que o Painel ou Órgão de Apelação
tenha apurado a violação, anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, e a relevância de tal setor comercial para o
demandante; (b) os elementos econômicos mais amplos ou gerais ligados a anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios
do demandante; e (c) as consequências econômicas mais amplas ou gerais advindas da aplicação da
“suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” (186).
O Painel de Arbitragem, no caso Equador - Bananas III (187), explicou que a prerrogativa conferida ao
demandante, nos itens ‘b’ e ‘c’ do Artigo 22:3, de decidir se é praticável ou efetivo escolher o mesmo setor,
outro setor, ou outro acordo para suspender concessões ou outras obrigações, confere-lhe certa margem na
apreciação. No entanto, considerou que essa escolha pode vir a ser revisada pelos árbitros, tendo em vista a
análise objetiva dos fatos necessários realizada pelo demandante.
Ainda no litígio Equador – Bananas III, as Comunidades Europeias questionaram a razão pela qual o Equador
não demonstrou ser impraticável ou não efetivo “suspender concessões” sob o GATT, ou compromissos nos
setores de serviços sob o GATS, antes de pleitear a suspensão nos setores de distribuição de serviços, como o
fez na prática. O Equador explicou que as circunstâncias no setor do comércio de bananas e em sua economia
como um todo eram “sérias o suficiente” para justificar o referido pedido de suspensão em outro acordo, e que
os parâmetros constantes do Artigo 22:3(d), alíneas ‘i’ e ‘ii’ corroboravam a sua escolha.
No mesmo Relatório, o termo “praticável” foi definido como “disponibilidade” e “adequação”; e a busca pela
“efetividade”, como a escolha da área certa, com base na qual a “suspensão de concessões ou de outras
obrigações” deve buscar assegurar a efetiva indução ao cumprimento das recomendações do DSB pelo
Membro vencido, no período razoável de tempo (188). O Painel de Arbitragem em US - Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (189), - em que foi requerida a “suspensão de obrigações” sob o GATT 1994 e sob o Acordo
Anti-Dumping, para a adoção de regulamentação equivalente à do Ato de 1916 -, esclareceu que a escolha de
aplicar este tipo de suspensão, sob tais acordos, pertence ao Membro que decide adotar o remédio, não sendo
sujeita à revisão do Painel.
Os árbitros explicaram ainda, que não há nenhuma disposição no Artigo 22 do DSU prevendo que o
demandante, ao solicitar autorização para impor “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”, deva
indicar precisamente quais são as obrigações que pretende suspender. Por fim, esclareceram que em nenhum
momento foi fixada a necessidade, nem pelo DSB nem pelo Painel de Arbitragem, de especificação precisa
das obrigações a serem suspensas, havendo apenas a indicação no Artigo 22:2 ao demandante, para que
requeira autorização para suspendê-las com base nos acordos abrangidos; e que, qualquer que seja o nível de
suspensão de obrigações requerido, este não pode exceder o nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios
causado (190).
O Relatório do Painel Arbitral no litígio EC - Bananas III (191), diante do entendimento dos EUA de que os
árbitros apenas poderiam examinar o pedido de “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” em
questão, com base no item ‘a’ do Artigo 22:3 do DSU (uma vez que o pedido havia sido baseado neste item
do Artigo 22:3), esclareceu que a racionalidade da revisão realizada pelo Painel sob o Artigo 22:3, com o fim
de assegurar que a suspensão seja aplicada aos setores ou acordos abrangidos violados, permanece sendo a
exceção e não a regra. O Painel de Arbitragem demonstrou que devido ao compromisso fixado pelo Artigo
22:3 do DSU, mesmo diante de um pedido sob a alinea ‘a’ do Artigo (de proceder à “suspensão de concessões
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ou de outras obrigações” no mesmo setor, em que haja sido constatada a infração, ou a anulação ou prejuízo
de benefícios), faz-se necessário que a revisão a ser efetuada tome por base também os princípios e
procedimentos constantes das alineas ‘b’ e ‘c’; a fim de que os princípios e procedimentos gerais do Artigo
22:3 sejam respeitados, e não ludibriados, ou relegados ao desuso, para escapar da fiscalização intersetorial na
aplicação da suspensão.” (192)
O Artigo 22:3 determina que se a parte decidir pleitear autorização para suspender concessões ou outras
obrigações com base nas situações descritas nas alíneas ‘b’ ou ‘c’, ou seja, em outros setores regulados pelo
mesmo acordo, ou, em outros acordos abrangidos, quando diante de circunstâncias “suficientemente graves”,
deverá fazê-lo indicando “em seu pedido as razões que a fundamentam” (193). O Artigo 22:4, por sua vez,
traz a ideia da necessidade de equivalência entre o nível da “suspensão de concessões” e o grau da anulação
ou prejuízo de benefícios causado, a ser avaliada pelo Painel Arbitral sob o Artigo 22.6 para a autorização da
medida (194) Nesse aspecto, a jurisprudência evoluiu de um padrão de equivalência “quantitativa” para uma
equivalência “qualitativa”.
Inicialmente, o Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio EC - Bananas III (195), em meio à controvérsia
sobre o significado do termo “equivalência”, pronunciou-se fundamentando as suas considerações no
dicionário Oxford da língua inglesa. Esclareceu, assim, que o termo significa, traduzido para o português,
“igual em valor, importância ou significado”, “ter o mesmo efeito”, “ter a mesma posição relativa ou função”,
“correspondente a”, “algo de igual valor ou no valor”, ou “algo equivalente ou virtualmente idêntico” (196).
O Relatório do litígio dispõe, justamente, sobre o sentido de correspondência ou equilíbrio entre o nível da
“suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” a ser adotada, e o nível da anulação ou prejuízo de
benefícios verificado. Inicialmente, o consenso caminhou no sentido da determinação da equivalência em
termos quantitativos, conforme no Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio EC – Hormones (197). Apoiase no Relatório do caso EC - Bananas III, a respeito da essencialidade do conhecimento sobre os dois
elementos a serem comparados, sob pena de ser impossível arbitrar uma correspondência quando apenas um
dos elementos estiver claramente definido (198).
O Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio EC - Bananas III (199), por sua vez, chama a atenção à
dificuldade em se alcançar uma condição de comparação entre o nível da “suspensão de concessões ou de
outras obrigações” e o nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios quando o Painel não tem acesso a ao menos
uma das variáveis. Cumpre consignar que, cabe ao Membro que deseja propor a suspensão de concessões o
papel de informar ao Painel sobre o montante relativo a medida que tem a intenção de aplicar; sendo tarefa do
Painel, examinar a reclamação e determinar o nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios ocorrido (200).
No que diz respeito ao cálculo do nível da suspensão, os árbitros, no Relatório do Painel do caso US - Offset
Act (Byrd Amendment) (201), concluíram que não há nenhuma disposição no Artigo 22 do DSU que proíba a
adoção de um nível variável de “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” se a circunstância do caso
examinado assim requerer. Consonante o Painel, o Artigo 22:4 do DSU determina apenas a necessidade de
equivalência entre os dois níveis; e, uma vez verificada tal equivalência, não há limitação no DSU à
estipulação de um nível variável de suspensão, quando o nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios também
apresentar variações previsíveis e a possibilidade de ajuste entre as duas variáveis com o tempo (202).
Posteriormente, as Arbitragens sob o Artigo 22:6 do DSU passaram a considerar a viabilidade de autorizar a
equivalência qualitativa entre o nível da “suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações” e o nível relativo
à anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios; e o fizeram, pela primeira vez, no caso US - 1916 Act (203), tendo sido
considerado uma novidade ao que a jurisprudência vinha tradicionalmente entendendo.
Devido à dificuldade inicial em se mensurar uma correspondência qualitativa entre as variáveis, o Painel
determinou como diretrizes que: (i) caso o montante da suspensão indicado seja inferior ao nível constatado
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na anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, aquele deve conformar-se aos termos do Artigo 22:4 do DSU; mas, (ii)
se a suspensão de concessões for aplicada em um patamar superior ao nível avaliado de anulação ou prejuízo
de benefícios, tal remédio jurisdicional não deve ser considerado consistente com o Artigo 22:4, assumindo
um caráter punitivo, o que não condiz com a função da “suspensão de concessões”. Conforme a avaliação
arbitral, a equivalência entre a “suspensão de concessões” e a anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios pode ser
demencionada a partir dos efeitos da medida ilícita no comércio ou na economia do demandante, em termos
numéricos ou monetários (204).
Notamos, portanto, que, o “padrão de equivalência” (benchmark of equivalence), presente no Artigo 22:7 do
DSU, vem, segundo corrobora a jurisprudência, justamente indicar a necessidade de haver uma
correpondência entre o nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, e o nível da suspensão de concessões ou
de outras obrigações adotada. Por não deter natureza punitiva, qualquer desconformidade na aplicação da
suspensão de concessões, enseja a ilegitimidade da medida.
O padrão de equivalência corresponde a um parâmetro distinto e inovador oferecido pelo DSU, em seu Artigo
22:7, se comparado ao padrão adotado pelo GATT 1947, em seu Artigo XXIII:2, para o cálculo da suspensão
de concessões ou de outras obrigações. O padrão de apropriação (standard of appropriateness) presente no
Artigo XXIII:2 do GATT 1947, condicionava a aplicação da suspensão a um certo grau de relação com a
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios. Com a entrada em vigor da OMC, o Artigo 22:7 do DSU substituiu o
padrão de apropriação pelo padrão de equivalência entre os dois elementos, e o novo parâmetro utilizado
passou a implicar um alto grau de correspondência, identidade ou estrito equilíbrio entre ambas as variáveis
(205).
Com efeito, as denominadas contramedidas apropriadas, descritas no Artigo 4:10 do ASMC (206), não
seguem o padrão de equivalência determinado no DSU, e sim o padrão de apropriação (appropriatennes
standard) estabelecido no ASMC. Para os subsídios acionáveis, o padrão de apropriação deve levar em
consideração a relação entre os efeitos danosos causados por tais subsídios, consistentes em três elementos: (i)
o dano à indústria nacional de outro Membro; (ii) a anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios resultante para outros
Membros do GATT 1994, em especial os benefícios nas concessões consolidadas sob o Artigo II do GATT
1994, direta ou indiretamente; e (iii) o grave dano aos interesses de outro Membro (207).
Os subsídios proibidos, por sua vez, regulamentados nos Artigos 3 e 4 do ASMC, quando verificados, deverão
ser retirados ‘sem demora’ (208); e caso não o sejam, o DSB poderá autorizar o Membro ofendido a adotar
contramedidas apropriadas, ou seja, contramedidas não desproporcionais (209). No sistema de normas da
OMC, o ASMC apresenta-se como norma especial em relação ao DSB, considerado a regra geral. Por essa
razão, nos litígios envolvendo a concessão de subsídios à produção e/ou à exportação de bens industrializados
ou a produtos agrícolas, as disposições e critérios do ASMC deverão prevalecer na investigação e aplicação de
contramedidas. Nos litígios envolvendo o ASMC, as contramedidas manifestam-se por meio da retirada do
subsídio proibido.
O Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem, sob o Artigo 22:6, no litígio Brazil – Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft (Brazil–Aircraft) (210), rejeitou o argumento do Brasil de que as contramedidas deveriam ser
equivalentes ao nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios causados por subsídios proibidos, conforme
preconizado no Artigo 22:4 do DSU. O Relatório esclareceu que o padrão de equivalência e o nível de
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios são instrumentos utilizados pelo DSU para mensurar a “suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações”, que é a forma escolhida pelo DSU para aplicar a “suspensão de
concessões”. Não configuram, portanto, elementos necessários para a ponderação das contramedidas a serem
adotadas com base no ASMC, para a indução à retirada sem demora dos subsídios proibidos ou acionáveis
(211).
217
O Relatório do Painel Arbitragem no litígio US – FSC (212) aborda o caráter especial do ASMC, em relação à
regra geral costante do DSU. Examina também, o fato das disposições do Entendimento não se tornarem
inaplicáveis ou redundantes diante da prevalência dos Artigos 4:10 e 4:11 do ASMC sobre o Artigo 22:4 do
DSB na regulamentação das contramedidas utilizadas para induzir a retirada sem demora dos subsídios
proibidos. Com o diferencial de que o DSU permite, diante da impossibilidade de retirada da medida ilícita
imediatamente, e desde que autorizado pelo DSB, que tal retirada ou adequação da prática ilícita aos acordos
abrangidos seja realizada em um período razoável de tempo, acordado entre os Membros em litígio ou
definido em Arbitragem sob o Artigo 21:3 do DSU (213).
A partir da análise da doutrina e da jurisprudência do DSB, entretanto, é lícito supor, que o objetivo imediato
de ambos os remédios jurisdicionais, - seja da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações (DSU), ou das
contramedidas (ASMC) -, consiste na retirada da medida ilícita (214). Cumpre-nos asseverar ainda, que a
razão que permeia a atitude do Membro vencido, diante da aplicação destes remédios jurisdicionais, a
implementar ou não as recomendações ou decisões, é, por vezes, desconhecida; refletindo, não raro, a sua
condição econômica interna, a estrutura de políticas comerciais, a capacitade de modificação da sua legislação
a curto, médio ou a longo prazo, e, particularmente, os interesses econômicos, políticos e comerciais do setor
em que incide a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, em um rol apenas exemplificativo.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 68: Appellate Body Report on EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5), paras. 93 and 98.
Footnote 69: EC – Bananas III, para. 6.3.
Footnote 70: “While the value of the suspension or concessions or other obligations easily comes to mind as a relevant factor in
inducing compliance, it must also be acknowledged that the actual role of the value of such suspension in securing compliance or not
may vary from one case to the next. In some cases, even a very high amount of countermeasures may not achieve compliance, whereas
in some others a limited amount may)” (Decision by the Arbitrator on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Brazil), US
— Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Canada), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Chile), US — Offset
Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — EC), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — India), US — Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Japan), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Korea), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)
(Article 22.6 — Mexico), para. 6.2.
Footnote 71: Article 22.6 of the DSU. Bracketed text added is from Article 22.2 of the DSU.
Footnote 72: The more precise a request for suspension is in terms of product coverage, type and degree of suspension, etc…, the
better. Such precision can only be encouraged in pursuit of the DSU objectives of “providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system” (Article 3.2) and seeking prompt and positive solutions to disputes (Articles 3.3 and 3.7). It would also be
welcome in light of the statement in Article 3.10 that “all Members will engage in [DSU] procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve
the dispute”.
Footnote 73: Decisions by the Arbitrators on EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC) and EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6
— EC), para. 14.
Footnote 74: Decision by the Arbitrator on EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), para. 23.
Footnote 75: Article 22.6 of the DSU. Bracketed text added is from Article 22.2 of the DSU.
Footnote 76: In respect of the first requirement see further paragraph 21.
Footnote 77: Idem à nota de rodapé 4.
Footnote 78: Article 22.6.
Footnote 79: Article 22.7.
Footnote 80: other than under Articles 22.3 and 22.5.
Footnote 81: Decisions by the Arbitrators on EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC) and EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6
— EC), paras. 16–19.
Footnote 82: The authorization to suspend concessions of Brazil, India, Japan and Korea expressly indicated that the additional import
duties were to be applied on a” final list of products”. The authorization to the European Communities did not mention the term
“final”, and hence the remark made by the Arbitrator. The European Communities had committed itself, however (as had the four
Members mentioned above) not to change the list of products (see para. 1.6 of the decisions concerning these Members). A similar
situation concerned Chile’s request, who would notify each year the products where the suspension of concessions was to be applied;
the decision concerning Chile did not indicate whether or not the Member had committed itself not to change the products. Finally, in
Canada’s request there is no reference to “final” list, nor is there a remark regarding the possibility of altering the products on a yearly
basis.
Footnote 83: See paragraphs 18–19.
Footnote 84: See paragraphs 20–21.
Footnote 85: Article 4 of the DSU.
218
Footnote 86: US answers to arbitrators’ Questions 1, 2, 4, 9, 10 and 11, Introduction, p. 1.
Footnote 87: Recourse by the United States to Article 22.7 of the DSU in reaction to the Arbitrators' Decision in the US/EC Bananas
III arbitration proceeding, dated 9 April 1999 (WT/DS27/49). Recourse by the United States to Article 22.7 of the DSU in reaction to
the Arbitrators' Decision in the US/EC Hormones arbitration proceeding, dated 15 July 1999 (WT/DS26/21). Recourse by Canada to
Article 22.7 of the DSU in reaction to the Arbitrators' Decision in the Canada/EC Hormones arbitration proceeding, dated 15 July
1999 (WT/DS48/19).
Footnote 88: We would expect that a request by Ecuador under subparagraph (a) of Article 22.3 for suspension of concessions under
the GATT with respect to the product categories just mentioned would be at least of the amount identified in paragraph 99 above.
Footnote 89: Decision by the Arbitrators in European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) Original Complaint by the United States - Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU
(WT/DS26/ARB, dated 12 July 1999), paras. 18-23. Decision by the Arbitrators in European Communities - Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) - Original Complaint by Canada - Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under
Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS48/ARB, dated 12 July 1999), paras. 18-21.
Footnote 90: WT/DS234/26 and WT/DS234/26/Corr.1*.
Footnote 91: The European Communities argues that: “Article 22.2 of the DSU (and Article XXIII:2 GATT) offers to the Member
which is suffering from nullification and impairment the possibility to request the suspension of concessions or other obligations or
both. This choice falls within the Member's discretion which escapes a review by the arbitrators by virtue of Article 22.7 of the DSU.”
Written Submission of the European Communities, 3 November 2003, paragraph 8. (Original emphasis) Although the United States
objected to the EC request on other grounds, it did not challenge the EC choice to seek the suspension of “obligations”: “[T]he choice
of whether to suspend “concessions” or “other obligations” would appear to be the choice of the complaining party, and there is
nothing in the DSU that would indicate a basis for an arbitrator to find that the choice had been exercised inappropriately, other than
the procedures under Article 22.3. At the same time, the distinction would appear to make little difference since the two terms are used
interchangeably in Article 22. The United States is not raising a claim in this proceeding that requires distinguishing between a
‘concession’ and an ‘other obligation’.” Answers of the United States to the Arbitrator's Questions to the Parties, 20 November 2003,
paragraph 2.
Footnote 92: Canada — Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 — Canada), paragraph 4.1.
Footnote 93: Brazil — Aircraft (Article 22.6 — Brazil), paragraph 4.1. Although both Canada — Aircraft Credits and Guarantees and
Brazil — Aircraft primarily involved requests for “appropriate countermeasures” under the SCM Agreement, in both disputes the
requests for countermeasures also cited DSU Article 22.2).
Footnote 94: EC — Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 — EC), paragraph 173.
Footnote 95: EC — Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), paragraph 8.1; EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), paragraph 84;
EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 — EC), paragraph 73.
(*) A doutrina brasileira diverge com relação à equivalência dos significados dos termos “eficácia” e “efetividade”, sobretudo, tendo
em vista os estudos empreendidos sobre o tema durante o período de vigência do direito internacional público clássico, e atualmente,
na Ordem Jurídica Internacional Contemporânea. Relevante se faz esclarecer que a palavra “efetividade”, quando traduzida para o
inglês: “effectiveness”, é considerada sinônimo de “efficacy” (ou eficácia, no português), que por sua vez corresponde à capacidade de
produzir os resultados almejados, assim como o poder ou capacidade de produzir efeitos sobre a realidade. Conforme dispõem o
dicionário OXFORD: “producing the result that is wanted or intended; producing a sucessful result”; e o dicionário CAMBRIDGE:
“successful or achieving the results that you want”. In: CAMBRIDGE Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. Third Edition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 2008. p. 449; OXFORD Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. Eighth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University, 2010. p.
486; COLLINS. Paperback English Thesaurus. Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2000. p. 194; LONGMAN. Dictionary of
Contemporary English. 3.ed. Essex: Longman Dictionaries, 1995. p. 442.
Footnote 96: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (“Oxford English Dictionary”), Oxford (1993), p. 2317.
Footnote 97: Oxford English Dictionary, p. 786.
Footnote 98: Of course, suspension of concessions or other obligations is always likely to be harmful to a certain, limited extent also
for the complaining party requesting authorization by the DSB.
Footnote 99: We note that within a sector, suspension may be possible with respect to certain types of products, while it is not
practicable or effective with respect to other categories of products.
Footnote 100: Decision by the Arbitrator on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Brazil), US — Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 22.6 — EC), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — India), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)
(Article 22.6 — Japan), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Korea), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6
— Mexico), para. 3.74, US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Canada), para. 3.72, US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)
(Article 22.6 — Chile), para. 3.69.
Footnote 103: The New Shorter Oxford English Dicionary on Historic Principles, 1993, page. 843.
Footnote 104: In this connection, we note that Article 23.2(a) of the DSU provides that Members shall make any determination to the
effect that a violation has occurred or that benefits have been nullified or impaired “consistent with the findings contained in the panel
or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding” (emphasis added). This by
implication suggests that issues of violation and nullification or impairment can be determined by arbitration.
Footnote 105: Decision by the Arbitrators on EC - Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 - EC), para. 12.
Footnote 106: Decision by the Arbitrators on EC - Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 - EC), paras. 12–13. See also Decision by the
Arbitrators on US - 1916 Act (Article 22.6 - US), para. 4.7. Decision by the Arbitrators, US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article
22.6 - Brazil), Decision by the Arbitrators, US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Canada), US - Offset Act (Byrd
219
Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Chile), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - EC), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article
22.6 - India), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Japan), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 Korea), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Mexico), paras. 4.20-4.21.
Footnote 107: See, e.g., EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 - EC), para. 37; Brazil - Aircraft (Article 22.6 - Brazil), paras. 3.63–
3.65; US - FSC (Article 22.6 - US), paras. 2.12–2.15; Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 - Canada), paras. 3.67–
3.73. Decision by the Arbitrators, US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Brazil), Decision by the Arbitrators, US - Offset
Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Canada), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Chile), US - Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 22.6 - EC), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - India), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article
22.6 - Japan), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Korea), US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 - Mexico),
para. 4.24.
Footnote 108: Decision by the Arbitrators in US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Brazil), US — Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Canada), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Chile), US — Offset Act (Byrd
— Mexico), paras. 4.20–4.21.
Footnote 109: Decision by the Arbitrator in US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Brazil), US — Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Canada), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Chile), US — Offset Act (Byrd
— Mexico), para. 4.24.
Footnote 110: Appellate Body on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 65.
Footnote 111: Canada mentioned that it could have applied a counter-subsidy but refrained from doing so for a number of reasons.
Footnote 112: Artigo 22.6
Footnote 113: Artigo 22.7
Footnote 114: Article 22.7
Footnote 115: WT/DS/ARB, para. 4.2
Footnote 116: Decisions by the Arbitrators on EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC) and EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article
22.6 — EC), para. 20.
Footnote 117: We recall that we asked the United States if “reciprocal or ‘mirror’ retaliation – suspension of the same obligations
which have been breached by the Member which is the object of the retaliation – is in principle permissible under the DSU provided
that the level of suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.” The United States indicated in its reply that it
“agrees that the suspension of the same obligations is, in principle, permissible under the DSU provided that the level of suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.” Answers of the United States to the Arbitrator's Questions to the Parties,
20 November 2003, paragraph 38. (Original emphasis).
Footnote 118: See, e.g., the Naulilaa arbitral award (1928), UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, p. 1028 and Case
Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (France v. United States of America) (1978) International Law Reports,
Vol. 54 (1979), p. 338. See also, inter alia, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility With Commentaries Thereto Adopted by the
International Law Commission on First Reading (January 1997), hereinafter the “Draft Articles” and the draft Articles provisionally
adopted by the Drafting Committee on second reading, A/CN.4/L 600, 11 August 2000. Even though the latter modify a number of
provisions of the Draft Articles, they do not affect the terms to which we refer in this report.
Footnote 119: We also note that, on the basis of the definition of “countermeasures” in the Draft Articles, the notion of “appropriate
countermeasures” would be more general than the term “equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment”. It would basically
include it. Limiting its meaning to that given to the term “equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment” would be contrary to
the principle of effectiveness in interpretation of treaties.
Footnote 120: See Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.
Footnote 121: We note that Canada objects to us using the Draft Articles in this interpretation process. Canada argues that the Draft
Articles are not “relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations between the parties” within the meaning of Article
31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention. As already mentioned, we use the Draft Articles as an indication of the agreed meaning of certain
terms in general international law.
Footnote 122: Op. cit., para. 6.3. In that case, the arbitrators had to determine the level of nullification or impairment. Since the
Article 22.6 arbitrators in the EC — Bananas case considered that measures equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment can
induce compliance, it could be argued that in the present case too, countermeasures equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment should be sufficient to induce compliance. However, the arbitrators in EC — Bananas were instructed by Article 22.7 to
determine whether the proposed measures were equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.
Footnote 123: Decision by the Arbitrators on Brazil — Aircraft (Article 22.6 — Brazil), para. 3.44.
Footnote 124: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993.
Footnote 126: Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1994.
Footnote 128: Decision by the Arbitrator on US — FSC (Article 22.6 — US), paras. 5.4–5.7.
Footnote 129: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993, p. 103; Webster's New Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1994, p. 48.
Footnote 130: Report of the working party on Netherlands Action under Article XXIII:2 to Suspend Obligations to the United States,
220
adopted on 8 November 1952, BISD 1S/62.
Footnote 131: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historic Principles, 1993, page 103.
Footnote 132: Decision by the Arbitrators on EC - Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), paras. 6.4–6.5. In EC - Hormones (US)
(Article 22.6 — EC) and EC - Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 — EC), the Arbitrators followed this approach and considered that
they “would have to estimate the level of suspension we consider to be equivalent to the impairment suffered” (emphasis added), para.
12.
Footnote 133: Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada — Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 — Canada), para. 3.51 (footnote
omitted). See also Decision by the Arbitrators on US — 1916 Act (Article 22.6 — US), paras. 4.8 and 4.9.
Footnote 134: See Article 22.6 arbitrations in EC – Hormones, Op. Cit., para. 12.
Footnote 135: op. cit., para. 65.
Footnote 136: Canada mentioned that it could have applied a counter-subsidy but refrained from doing so for a number of reasons.
Footnote 137: The Arbitrators also reviewed the arguments and evidence submitted by the parties concerning the approach based on
the level of nullification or impairment suffered by Canada. They note that this approach implied — as any counterfactual — many
more assumptions than the approach based on the amount of the subsidy. The Arbitrators were of the view that, if the calculation of
appropriate countermeasures based on the amount of the subsidy were compatible with Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, it would
be preferable to follow this approach since it could lead to a more objective result.).
Footnote 138: On the notion of “difference”, see Report of the Appellate Body on Guatemala — Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (“Guatemala — Cement I”), WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998, DSR 1998:IX,
paras. 65- 66”.
Footnote 139: Our decision may have been different if Australia had demonstrated that the countermeasures which Canada plans to
adopt may affect Australia’s rights or benefits under the WTO Agreement)”.
Footnote 140: In this respect see footnote 138 in the Appellate Body Report on EC — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), adopted on 13 February 1998, WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13: “[T]he DSU, and in particular its Appendix 3, leave panels a
margin of discretion to deal, always in accordance with due process, with specific situations that may arise in a particular case and that
are not explicitly regulated. Within this context, an appellant requesting the Appellate Body to reverse a panel’s ruling on matters of
procedure must demonstrate the prejudice generated by such legal ruling.” We note that the arbitrators in EC — Bananas III
(Ecuador) (Article 22.6 — EC) also quoted this statement. EC — Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 — EC), footnote 12
Footnote 141: See paragraph 12.
Footnote 142: EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), footnote 16. We note that the arbitrators in EC — Bananas III (Ecuador)
(Article 22.6 — EC) also quoted this statement. EC — Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 — EC), footnote 12.
Footnote 143: WT/DS136/17.
Footnote 144: See also Decision by the Arbitrators, EC — Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 — EC), paras. 37–38; Decision by the
Arbitrators, Brazil — Aircraft (Article 22.6 — Brazil), para. 2.8 and footnote 12; Decision by the Arbitrator, US — FSC (Article 22.6
— US), paras. 2.10 and footnote 18; Decision by the Arbitrators in US — 1916 Act (Article 22.6 — US), para. 3.2 and 3.5.
Footnote 145: See preceding paragraph, where we apply a presumption of good faith to statements and evidence originating in
subjects of international law (on production and appraisal of evidence, see, inter alia, International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) judgement
of 9 April 1949 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 32; ICJ judgement of 11 September 1992 Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras, Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports 1992, p. 399, para. 63; ICJ judgement on merits
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 40, para.
60.
Footnote 146: As we noted in our Initial Decision, Arbitrators pursuant to Article 22 of the DSU are neither in a position to influence
the point in time when parties to the original dispute initiate such a procedure, nor when original parties initiate a procedure under
Article 21.5 of the DSU, nor when the DSB is in a position to deal with such requests, nor when the DSB establishes a reconvened
panel, nor when the DSB refers a matter to arbitration. We recall, on the one hand, that Article 21.5 of the DSU requires reconvened
panels to complete their work in principle within 90 days as of the referral of the matter to them, but without specifying when such a
proceeding should be initiated. The express wording of Article 21.5 of the DSU does not exclude the possibility of initiating such a
proceeding before or after the expiry of the reasonable period of time for implementation of panel and/or Appellate Body reports
adopted by the DSB. On the other hand, we recall that, pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU, Arbitrators shall complete their work
within 60 days as of the expiry of the reasonable period of time. If a proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU is initiated close to the
end of the reasonable period, or after it has expired, the 90 day period of Article 21.5 and the 60 day period of Article 22.6 become
irreconcilable. In any event, our terms of reference as Arbitrators are limited to those foreseen in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 22 of
the DSU. We note that the relationship of Articles 21.5 and 22 is now under discussion in the ongoing review of the DSU).
Footnote 147: Arbitration Award under Article 21.3(c) in EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/15 & WT/DS48/13, paragraph 26, 29 May 1998.
Footnote 148: Decision by the Arbitrators on EC — Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), para. 4.11.
Footnote 149: The text of these working procedures is similar to that of the earlier working procedures in Canada — Aircraft Credits
and Guarantees (Article 22.6–Canada), although further developed.
Footnote 150: Panel Report, Argentina — Textiles and Apparel, para. 6.55.
Footnote 151: In that case, evidence had been submitted by the United States a few days before the second hearing of the panel.
Footnote 152: Appellate Body Report, Argentina — Textiles and Apparel, paras. 80–81.
Footnote 153: Exhibits BRA –76 and 77 are respectively dated 10 July 2001 and 19 October 2002.
221
Footnote 154: See EC - Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 - EC), para. 71, US - 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 - US), para. 7.9. At our
request, the parties consented that we could have access to the file of the Arbitrator in Brazil - Aircraft, provided we respected the
confidentiality of the information contained therein. We made that request in light of the parties' extensive references to the record of
that arbitration.
Footnote 155: Canada submitted proposals for redaction on 6 January 2003. On 13 January 2003, Brazil objected to a number of
redactions proposed by Canada. In a response dated 22 January 2003, Canada agreed that the redactions objected to by Brazil were not
necessary. Thus, the text of the version circulated to Members is identical to the text of the confidential version issued to the parties,
with the exception of the information which the Arbitrator, having regard to the comments of the parties, considered to be confidential.
This information is replaced by “xxx”.
Footnote 156: See EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 — EC), para. 71, US — 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 — US), para. 7.9.
Footnote 157: EC – Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), paragraph 6.10, quoted in the Written Submission of the United States, 20
October 2003, paragraph 27. In support of this position, the EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC) arbitrators quoted from EC —
Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 — EC): “We are of the view that the benchmark for the calculation of nullification or impairment of
US trade flows should be losses in US exports of goods to the European Communities and losses by US service suppliers in services
supply in or to the European Communities. However, we are of the opinion that losses of US exports in goods or services between the
US and third countries do not constitute nullification or impairment of even indirect benefits accruing to the US under the GATT or
the GATS for which the European Communities could face suspension of concessions.”
Footnote 158: Decision by the Arbitrator in US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Brazil), para. 3.23, US — Offset Act
(Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — EC), US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — India), para. 3.23, US — Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Japan), para. 3.23, US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Korea), para. 3.23, US — Offset
Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Mexico), paras. 3.70–3.71, US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Canada),
paras. 3.68–3.69, US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Chile), paras. 3.65–3.66.
Footnote 159: Decision by the Arbitrators in EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), para. 41. In support of this position, the EC
— Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC) arbitrators quoted from EC — Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 — EC): ”We are of the view that
the benchmark for the calculation of nullification or impairment of US trade flows should be losses in US exports of goods to the
European Communities and losses by US service suppliers in services supply in or to the European Communities. However, we are of
the opinion that losses of US exports in goods or services between the US and third countries do not constitute nullification or
impairment of even indirect benefits accruing to the US under the GATT or the GATS for which the European Communities could
face suspension of concessions.” Decision by the Arbitrators in EC — Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6 — EC), para. 6.12.
Footnote 160: Decision by the Arbitrator in US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Brazil), US — Offset Act (Byrd
— Mexico), paras 3.22–3.23, US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Canada), paras 3.20–3.21, US — Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment) (Article 22.6 — Chile), paras 3.19–3.20.
Footnote 161: CHARNOVITZ, Steve. Rethinking WTO trade sanctions. American Journal of International Law 95, 2001. p. 794; e WTO Secretariat.
A Handbook on the WTO dispute settlement system. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Footnote 162: Artigo 31:1 do Draft de 2001, da CDI da ONU: “The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury
caused by the internationally wrongful act.”
Footnote 163: Nos termos do Artigo 2 do Draft de 2001, da CDI da ONU: “There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct
consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attibutable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an intenational obligation of
the State.” A quebra de uma obrigação internacional é regulamentada no artigo 12 do Draft de 2001, e decorre da não conformidade de um ato práticado
por um Estado com a obrigação firmada: “There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with
what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.”
Footnote 164: Artigos 3:7 e 19:1 do DSU.
Footnote 165: SHADIKHODJAEV, Sherzod. Retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system. Holanda: Kluwer Law International BV, 2009. p. 27.
Footnote 166: Vide Artigos 3:3, 3:4 e 22:1 do DSU.
Footnote 167: VAZQUEZ, Carlos M.; JACKSON, John H. Some reflections on compliance with WTO dispute settlement decisions. Law and Policy
in International Business 33, 2002. p. 561.
Footnote 168: Artigo 22:1 do DSU.
Footnote 169: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem, sob o Artigo 22:6, no litígio Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft
(Canada – Aircraft Credits and Garanties). Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement,
WT/DS222/ABR, para. 3.105.
Footnote 170: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem, sob o Artigo 22:6, no litígio European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III). Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22:6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB,
para. 6.3.
Footnote 171: Artigo XXIII:2 do GATT 1947.
Footnote 172: Artigo 22:4 do DSU; de acordo com Pauwelyn: “(...) Article XXIII:2 permitted suspensions only if ‘the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action’. In contrast, whenever a WTO member wins a dispute and the other party does not implemente in time, the complainant
has an automatic right to equivalent retaliation, even if, somehow, the circumstances were not ‘serious enough’. In sum, retaliation in the WTO is
allowed more often (no need for ‘serious circumstances’), but, at least based on the text alone, at a lower level (‘equivalent’ as opposed to
‘appropriate’). In: PAUWELYN, Joost. Calculation and design of trade retaliation. BOWN, Chad P.; PAUWELYN, Joost (Edictors). The law,
economics and politics of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010. p. 44, nota. 25.
Footnote 173: BOWN, Chad P.; PAUWELYN, Joost. Introduction: trade retaliation in WTO dispute settlement: a multidisciplinary analysis. In: The
law, economics and politics of retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement.Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 2.
222
Footnote 175: Importante observar que o Painel, no litígio United States of America – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US Gasoline), entendeu que o pedido de “cessação” da adoção de uma medida inconsistente com a OMC será legítimo, desde que a medida em questão
tenha um “caráter contínuo”, ao menos no período em que os “termos de referência” tenham sido fixados. In: United States of America – Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), WT/DS2/R, May 20, 1996, para. 6.19.
Footnote 177: Painel de Arbitragem, sob o Artigo 22:6 do DSU, no litígio Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile –Alcoholic Beverages),
(WT/DS87/15)(WT/DS110/14), para. 40.
Footnote 178: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd
Amendment) (US – Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), WT/DS217/14 e WT/DS234/22, para. 6.2.
Footnote 179: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US –
Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment). Original Complaint by Brazil. Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras. 3.69 e 6.2.
Footnote 180: Relatório do Painel no caso United States of America - Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (US –
Section 129(c)(1) URAA), WT/DS221/R, para. 3.91.
Footnote 181: Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil – Aircrafts),
WT/DS46/AB/R, para 192.
Footnote 182: Artigo 22:3(a) do DSU.
Footnote 183: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (Equador – Bananas III). Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 33.
Footnote 184: Artigo 22:3(b) do DSU.
Footnote 185: Artigo 22:3(c) do DSU.
Footnote 186: Artigo 22:3(d), (i) e (ii), do DSU.
Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III). Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 52.
Footnote 188: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem do litígio European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 70-73 e 76.
Footnote 189: Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. (US –
Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment). Original Complaint by Brazil. Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA.
Footnote 190: Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000.
Original Complaint by Brazil (US – Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment). Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of
the DSU, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras. 3.7 e 3.10-3.14.
WT/DS27/ARB.
WT/DS27/ARB, para. 3.7.
Footnote 193: Artigo 22:3(e) do DSU.
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 4.2.
Footnote 196: The New Shorter Oxford English Dicionary on Historic Principles (1993), p. 843.
Footnote 197: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem nos litígios European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products
(EC — Hormones). Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU e European Communities –
Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones). Recourse to Abitration by the European Communities under Article
22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB e WT/DS48/ARB.
Footnote 198: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem nos litígios European Communities – Measures concerning Meat and
Meat Products (EC — Hormones). Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU e European
Communities – Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones). Recourse to Abitration by the European
Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB e WT/DS48/ARB, para. 20.
Footnote 199: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale
andDistribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III). Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU.
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 4.7-4.9.
223
Footnote 201: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (US–Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment). Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS217/ARB/BRA.
Footnote 202: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000 (US–Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment). Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras. 4.20-4.21.
Footnote 203: Relatório de Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US – Antidumping Act of
1916). Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS136/ARB.
Footnote 204: Relatório de Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US – Antidumping Act of
1916). Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.17 e 5.20-5.21.
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 6.4-6.5.
Footnote 206: Artigo 4:10 do ASMC.
Footnote 207: Artigo 5 do ASMC.
Footnote 210: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil – Aircraft).
Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB.
Footnote 211: Relatório do Painel de Arbitragem no litígio Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil –Aircraft).
Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 3.473.48.
Footnote 212: Relatório do Painel Arbitragem no litígio United States of America – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (US – FSC).
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS108/ARB, paras. 5.475.50.
224

Artigo 23
Luiz Eduardo R. Salles
Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira
Rodrigo de Oliveira Franco
IA.
Article 23
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
23.1
When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of
benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this
Understanding.
23.2
In such cases, Members shall:
(a)
not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has
been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the
findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration
award rendered under this Understanding;
(b)
follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the
Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings;
and
(c)
IB.
follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those
procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements
in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and
rulings within that reasonable period of time.
Artigo 23
Fortalecimento do Sistema Multilateral
23.1
Ao procurar reparar o não-cumprimento de obrigações ou outro tipo de anulação ou prejuízo de
benefícios resultantes de acordos abrangidos ou um impedimento à obtenção de quaisquer dos
objetivos de um acordo abrangido, os Membros deverão recorrer e acatar as normas e procedimentos
do presente Entendimento.
23.2
Em tais casos, os Membros deverão:
(a) não fazer determinação de que tenha ocorrido infração, de que benefícios tenham sido
anulados ou prejudicados ou de que o cumprimento de quaisquer dos objetivos de um acordo
abrangido tenha sido dificultado, salvo através do exercício da solução de controvérsias
segundo as normas e procedimentos do presente Entendimento, e deverão fazer tal
225
determinação consoante as conclusões contidas no relatório do grupo especial ou do Órgão de
Apelação adotado pelo OSC ou em um laudo arbitral elaborado segundo este Entendimento;
(b) seguir os procedimentos definidos no Artigo 21 para determinar o prazo razoável para que o
Membro interessado implemente as recomendações e decisões;
e
(c) observar os procedimentos definidos no Artigo 22 para determinar o grau de suspensão de
concessões ou outras obrigações e obter autorização do OSC, conforme aqueles
procedimentos, antes de suspender concessões ou outras obrigações resultantes dos acordos
abrangidos como resposta à não implementação, por parte do Membro interessado, das
recomendações e decisões dentro daquele prazo razoável.
IC.
Sugere-se, a seguinte tradução para o português do trecho inicial do artigo 23:1. “When Members seek the
redress of a violation of obligations …”: “Quando os Membros buscam a reparação da violação de obrigações
…”.
II.
1
Artigo 23.1
(a) “Condutas restritas e/ou proibidas”
(b) “Ações unilaterais”
(c) “Buscando a reparação”
2
Artigo 23.2
(a) “Em tais casos os Membros devem”
(b) “Condutas proibidas”
3
Artigo 23.2 (a)
(a) “Determinação”
(b) “Discursos no Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias”
4
Relações entre Artigos e alíneas
(a) “Artigos 23.1 e 23.2”
(b) “Artigos 22.8 e 23”
(c) “Artigos 23.2(a), 23.1 e 21.5”
1.
Artigo 23.1
a)
“Condutas restritas e/ou proibidas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação nos litígios United States - Continued Supension of Obligations in the
EC – Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias -
226
WT/320/ABR; e Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (US Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias – WT/321/ABR, para. 371
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a noção de que o Artigo 23.1 do DSU obriga o recurso às
regras e procedimentos do Acordo para a solução de controvérsias resultantes de violações alegadas aos
acordos abrangidos, (i) estabelecendo que o DSB é o foro exclusivo para a resolução dessas
controvérsias, e (ii) proibindo ações unilaterais pelos Membros da OMC.
Para. 371. “As the Appellate Body has explained, Article 23.1 lays down the fundamental obligation of WTO
Members to have recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU when seeking redress of a violation of the
covered agreements (nota omitida). Article 23 restricts WTO Members' conduct in two respects. First, Article
23.1 establishes the WTO dispute settlement system as the exclusive forum for the resolution of such disputes
and requires adherence to the rules of the DSU. Secondly, Article 23.2 prohibits certain unilateral action by a
WTO Member. Thus, a Member cannot unilaterally: (i) determine that a violation has occurred, benefits have
been nullified or impaired, or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been
impeded; (ii) determine the duration of the reasonable period of time for implementation; or (iii) decide to
suspend concessions and determine the level thereof.”
b)
“ações unilaterais”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Imports Mesures on Certain Products from the
EC (US - Certain EC Products), WT/DS165/ABR, para. 111
Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a noção de que o Artigo 23.1 proíbe ações unilaterais para
remediar alegadas violações aos acordos abrangidos. O Atigo 23.2 exemplifica algumas dessas ações
unilaterais, contrárias ao princípio enunciado no artigo 23.1.
Para. 111. “Article 23.1 of the DSU imposes a general obligation of Members to redress a violation of
obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements only by recourse to
the rules and procedures of the DSU, and not through unilateral action. Subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
Article 23.2 articulate specific and clearly-defined forms of prohibited unilateral action contrary to Article
23.1 of the DSU. There is a close relationship between the obligations set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article
23. They all concern the obligation of Members of the WTO not to have recourse to unilateral action.”
EC - Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias WT/320/ABR); Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (Canada Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias - WT/321/ABR, paras. 371, 375 e 378
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que o Artigo 23.1 do DSU é aplicável mesmo após a
autorização do DSB para a suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações. Ou seja, o Artigo 23.1 deve
ser lido como estabelecendo obrigação contínua.
Para. 371. “As the Appellate Body has explained, Article 23.1 lays down the fundamental obligation of WTO
Members to have recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU when seeking redress of a violation of the
covered agreements (nota omitida) Article 23 restricts WTO Members' conduct in two respects. First, Article
23.1 establishes the WTO dispute settlement system as the exclusive forum for the resolution of such disputes
and requires adherence to the rules of the DSU. Secondly, Article 23.2 prohibits certain unilateral action by a
WTO Member. Thus, a Member cannot unilaterally: (i) determine that a violation has occurred, benefits have
been nullified or impaired, or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been
227
impeded; (ii) determine the duration of the reasonable period of time for implementation; or (iii) decide to
suspend concessions and determine the level thereof.”
Para. 375. “This does not mean that Article 23.1 ceases to apply once the suspension of concessions has been
authorized by the DSB. Article 23.2(c) specifically refers to Article 22 of the DSU. Paragraph 8 of this
provision states that the suspension of concessions shall only be applied until the inconsistent measure has
been removed or one of the other two conditions in Article 22.8 is met. Thus, if the Member subject to the
suspension of concessions takes an implementing measure and that measure is found in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings to bring this Member into substantive compliance, the suspension of concessions
would no longer be consistent with Article 22.8 of the DSU, and, as a result, would become a unilateral action
prohibited by Articles 23.1 and 23.2. In other words, the requirements in Article 22.8 and Article 23 apply and
must be read together in the post-suspension stage of a dispute. Therefore, Article 23 must be seen as
containing an ongoing obligation and continues to apply even after the suspension of concessions has been
duly authorized by the DSB.”
(ii)
buscando a reparação
EC - Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias WT/320/ABR); Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (Canada Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias - WT/321/ABR, paras. 373-374 e 388-389
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que a suspensão de concessões autorizada pelo DSB não
representará violação ao DSU, desde que seja e permaneça consistente com as outras regras do DSU. Na
situação em discussão, os EUA e o Canadá mantinham a suspensão de obrigações em face da União
Europeia, a despeito da alegação da União Europeia de que a medida violadora havia sido removida.
Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, em casos que não haja acordo sobre se o Membro violador removeu a
medida violadora, o desentendimento deverá ser resolvido por meio do procedimento previsto no Artigo
21.5 do DSU.
Para. 373. “Seeking the redress of a violation is of course not by itself prohibited by Article 23.1 of the
DSU. Rather, to be in breach of Article 23.1, a Member must be seeking redress without having recourse to,
or abiding by, the rules of the DSU.”
Para. 374. “An initial question that arises in this case is whether the continued application of a previously
authorized suspension of concessions can be said to constitute the seeking of redress. On the one hand, the
authorization to suspend concessions can be said to be the result of a previous act of seeking redress that
involved initiating a dispute. On the other hand, the continued application of the suspension of concessions
can be said to reflect a continuous act of seeking redress for a violation found by the DSB that has not yet
been rectified. In any event, the suspension of concessions that has been duly authorized by the DSB will not
constitute a violation of Article 23.1, as long as it is consistent with other rules of the DSU, including
paragraphs 2 through 8 of Article 22, even if the continued application of the suspension of concessions is
regarded as an action or part of a process of ‘seeking the redress’. This is because, before obtaining the DSB's
authorization to suspend concessions, a Member must initiate a dispute settlement process in which it
challenges the consistency with the covered agreements of a measure taken by another Member. The Member
initiating the process will only be authorized to suspend concessions when the measure is found by the panel
(and the Appellate Body, if appealed) to be inconsistent with the covered agreements and the Member taking
the measure fails to implement the panel's (or Appellate Body's) findings within a reasonable period of time
or, if it takes a measure to comply, that measure is found by the panel (and the Appellate Body) in compliance
proceedings not to have brought the Member concerned into compliance. In other words, the Member will
228
only be able to suspend concessions pursuant to the DSB's authorization after having had extensive recourse
to, and abided by, the rules and procedures of the DSU, consistent with the requirements of Article 23.1.”
Para. 388. “The Panel rejected the arguments by the United States and Canada that they were authorized to
suspend concessions and that this authorization has not been revoked (nota omitida). The Panel stated that the
DSB's authorization to suspend concessions is ‘only an authorization, not an obligation’ (nota omitida).
According to the Panel, this meant that the United States and Canada were ‘free to apply’ the suspension of
concessions or not, and the fact that they did not lift the suspension after the notification of Directive
2003/74/EC indicated their intention to seek redress of a violation arising from Directive 2003/74/EC (nota
omitida). We fail to see the relevance of the distinction between an authorization and an obligation to suspend
concessions for purposes of analyzing whether the United States and Canada are seeking the redress of a
violation concerning Directive 2003/74/EC. The relevant question before the Panel was whether the
authorization to suspend concessions had lapsed because one of three conditions in Article 22.8 has been met.
In the absence of a finding in WTO dispute settlement that the first condition in Article 22.8 had been met, the
authorization to suspend concessions did not cease to be legally valid.”
Para. 389. “In addition, the Panel observed that “[i]n none of the circumstances foreseen by [the first
sentence of] Article 22.8 does this provision require a decision of the DSB” (nota omitida). We agree that,
under the first sentence of Article 22.8, a decision of the DSB is not required if Members reach a mutually
agreed solution. Similarly, a DSB decision is not required if the suspending Member does not dispute that the
measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed. However, where a
disagreement arises as to whether the measure found to be inconsistent has indeed been removed, this
disagreement must be resolved through Article 21.5 proceedings to determine whether the suspension of
concessions is still applied consistently with the objective conditions under Article 22.8 or must be
terminated. Under such circumstances, DSB decisions are required for the dispute to proceed pursuant to the
rules of the DSU, including the decision to establish a panel and the adoption of the panel or Appellate Body
reports examining the implementing measure. Moreover, the second sentence of Article 22.8 requires the DSB
to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations and rulings in cases where
concessions have been suspended. Article 22.8 therefore clearly contemplates an ongoing role of the DSB in
reviewing the implementation of recommendation and rulings, thus confirming that a dispute concerning
implementation should be subject to multilateral resolution and not be decided on the basis of a unilateral
declaration of compliance or non-compliance.”
2. Artigo 23.2
a)
“Em tais casos os Membros devem”
EC - Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias WT/320/ABR); Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (Canada Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias - WT/321/ABR, para. 372
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que o Artigo 23.2 contém uma lista ilustrativa de ações
unilaterais proibidas.
Para. 372. “The phrase “[i]n such cases, Members shall” with which Article 23.2 begins refers back to the
situation described in Article 23.1, namely, when a Member is seeking the redress of, inter alia, a violation of
obligations under the covered agreements. We share the view of the panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act that
the terms “[i]n such cases, Members shall” used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 make clear that Article 23.2 is
“explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1” (nota omitida). Therefore,
the specific prohibitions of unilateral actions in Article 23.2 must be understood in the context of the
229
overarching provision of Article 23.1. In other words, the unilateral actions prohibited by Article 23.2 are
those taken by a Member with a view to seeking redress of a violation. Moreover, the phrase “[i]n such cases,
Members shall” at the beginning of Article 23.2 indicates that the specific obligations set forth in its
subparagraphs clarify and illustrate the scope of the general and ongoing obligation in Article 23.1. This does
not mean, however, that the scope of Article 23.1 is exhausted by the situations described in Article 23.2 (nota
omitida).”
b)
“Condutas restritas”
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a noção de que o Artigo 23.1 do DSU obriga o recurso às
regras e procedimentos do Acordo para a solução de controvérsias resultantes de violações alegadas aos
acordos abrangidos, (i) estabelecendo que o DSB é o foro exclusivo para a resolução dessas
controvérsias e (ii) proibindo ações unilaterais pelos Membros da OMC.
Para. 371. “As the Appellate Body has explained, Article 23.1 lays down the fundamental obligation of
WTO Members to have recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU when seeking redress of a violation
of the covered agreements (nota omitida). Article 23 restricts WTO Members' conduct in two respects. First,
Article 23.1 establishes the WTO dispute settlement system as the exclusive forum for the resolution of such
disputes and requires adherence to the rules of the DSU. Secondly, Article 23.2 prohibits certain unilateral
action by a WTO Member. Thus, a Member cannot unilaterally: (i) determine that a violation has occurred,
benefits have been nullified or impaired, or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has
been impeded; (ii) determine the duration of the reasonable period of time for implementation; or (iii) decide
to suspend concessions and determine the level thereof.”
3. Artigo 23.2 (a)
a)
“Determinação”
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que o sentido do termo ‘determination’ no Artigo 23.2(a)
do DSU implica um alto grau de imutabilidade e que declarações em encontros no DSB não constituem
determinações no sentido do Artigo 23.2(a) do DSU.
Para. 396. “We share the view of the panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act that a ‘determination’ within the
meaning of Article 23.2(a) “implies a high degree of firmness or immutability, i.e. a more or less final
decision by a Member in respect of the WTO consistency of a measure taken by another Member” (nota
omitida). Moreover, preliminary opinions or views expressed without a clear intention to seek redress are not
covered by Article 23.2(a) (nota omitida). The statements made by delegates of the United States and Canada,
on which the Panel focused its attention, were made shortly after the European Communities notified
Directive 2003/74/EC to the DSB. The statements were made at the two DSB meetings held, respectively, two
weeks and five weeks from the DSB meeting at which Directive 2003/74/EC was notified by the European
Communities (nota omitida). These statements, therefore, seem no more than initial reactions to the European
230
Communities' self-proclaimed compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in EC – Hormones.
Considering the complexity of the issues that arise with respect to the consistency of Directive 2003/74/EC
(as demonstrated in sections VI and VII of the Report), it is reasonable to assume that the United States and
Canada needed some time before forming a definitive view regarding whether the European Communities had
brought itself into compliance. We thus share the United States' and Canada's view that the statements at the
DSB meetings lack sufficient amount of ‘firmness or immutability’ for them to constitute a determination
within the meaning of Article 23.2(a).” (nota omitida).
b)
“Discursos no Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias”
EC - Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias WT/320/ABR); Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (Canada Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias - WT/321/ABR, paras. 398-399
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que declarações em encontros no DSB não constituem
determinações no sentido do Artigo 23.2(a) do DSU.
Para. 398. “Moreover, DSB statements are not intended to have legal effects and do not have the legal status
of a definitive determination in themselves. Rather, they are views expressed by Members and should not be
considered to prejudice Members' position in the context of a dispute. As the United States rightly points out,
“[s]tatements made by Members at DSB meetings, especially those expressing a view as to the WTO
consistency of another Member's measures or actions, are generally diplomatic or political in nature” and
“generally have no legal effect or status in and of themselves (nota omitida).”
Para. 399. “The Panel's finding that DSB statements could constitute a definitive determination concerning
the WTO-inconsistency of a Member's measure could adversely affect WTO Members' ability to freely
express their views on the potential compatibility with the covered agreements of measures adopted by other
Members (nota omitida). This would result in a ‘chilling’ effect on those statements (nota omitida), because
Members would refrain from expressing their views at DSB meetings regarding the WTO-inconsistency of
other Members' measures least such statements be found to constitute a violation of Article 23. If this were the
case, the DSB would be inhibited from properly carrying out its function, pursuant to Article 21.6 of the DSU,
to keep under surveillance the implementation of its recommendations and rulings.”
4. Relações entre Artigos e alíneas
a) “Relação entre os parágrafos 1 e 2”
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que as proibições específicas no Artigo 23.2 devem ser
lidas no contexto da proibição geral a respeito de ações unilaterais, estipulada no Artigo 23.1. Além
disso, segundo o Órgão de Apelação, a lista do Artigo 23.2 a respeito das ações unilaterais proibidas é
ilustrativa.
Para. 372. “The phrase “[i]n such cases, Members shall” with which Article 23.2 begins refers back to the
situation described in Article 23.1, namely, when a Member is seeking the redress of, inter alia, a violation of
obligations under the covered agreements. We share the view of the panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act that
231
the terms “[i]n such cases, Members shall” used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 make clear that Article 23.2 is
“explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1”(nota omitida). Therefore,
the specific prohibitions of unilateral actions in Article 23.2 must be understood in the context of the
overarching provision of Article 23.1. In other words, the unilateral actions prohibited by Article 23.2 are
those taken by a Member with a view to seeking redress of a violation. Moreover, the phrase “[i]n such cases,
Members shall” at the beginning of Article 23.2 indicates that the specific obligations set forth in its
subparagraphs clarify and illustrate the scope of the general and ongoing obligation in Article 23.1. This does
not mean, however, that the scope of Article 23.1 is exhausted by the situations described in Article 23.2 (nota
omitida).”
b) “Relação entre os Artigos 22.8 e 23”
EC - Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias WT/320/ABR); Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (Canada Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias - WT/321/ABR, paras. 375 e 378
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou o princípio de que os requisitos dos Artigos 22.8 e 23 são
aplicáveis e devem ser lidos em conjunto na fase após a suspensão de obrigações. Na situação em
discussão, os EUA e o Canadá mantinham a suspensão de obrigações em face da União Europeia, a
despeito da alegação desta de que a medida violadora havia sido removida. Segundo o Órgão de
Apelação, neste caso, o Painel deveria ter avaliado, inicialmente, se a suspensão de concessões era
aplicada de forma inconsistente com o Artigo 22.8, para então questionar se a suspensão contrariava o
disposto no Artigo 23.2 do DSU.
Para. 375. “This does not mean that Article 23.1 ceases to apply once the suspension of concessions has been
authorized by the DSB. Article 23.2(c) specifically refers to Article 22 of the DSU. Paragraph 8 of this
provision states that the suspension of concessions shall only be applied until the inconsistent measure has
been removed or one of the other two conditions in Article 22.8 is met. Thus, if the Member subject to the
suspension of concessions takes an implementing measure and that measure is found in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings to bring this Member into substantive compliance, the suspension of concessions
would no longer be consistent with Article 22.8 of the DSU, and, as a result, would become a unilateral action
prohibited by Articles 23.1 and 23.2. In other words, the requirements in Article 22.8 and Article 23 apply and
must be read together in the post-suspension stage of a dispute. Therefore, Article 23 must be seen as
containing an ongoing obligation and continues to apply even after the suspension of concessions has been
duly authorized by the DSB.”
Para. 378. “We note that the suspension of concessions maintained by the United States and Canada were
duly authorized by the DSB subsequent to its adoption of the recommendations and rulings in EC – Hormones
and an arbitration award resulting from proceedings under Article 22.6 regarding the level of the suspension
of concessions (nota omitida). As discussed above, where the suspension of concessions has been duly
authorized by the DSB and is applied consistently with the rules of the DSU, including Article 22.8, it does
not constitute a violation of Article 23.1, because it is not imposed without recourse to or without abiding by
the DSU. The requirements in Article 22 and those in Article 23 must be read together, in the post-suspension
stage of the dispute, to determine the legality of the continued suspension when an implementing measure has
been taken. Thus, we share the view of the United States and Canada that, in order to determine whether they
acted inconsistently with Article 23 by continuing the suspension of concessions subsequent to the
notification of Directive 2003/74/EC, the Panel had to first determine whether the suspension of concessions
was being applied consistently with Article 22.8 of the DSU.”
c) “Relação entre os Artigos 23.2(a), 23.1 e 21.5”
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EC - Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias WT/320/ABR); Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute (Canada Continued Suspention), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias - WT/321/ABR, paras. 383-384
Nestes casos, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que a suspensão de concessões autorizada pelo DSB não
representará violação ao DSU, desde que seja e permaneça consistente com outras regras do DSU. As
partes em uma controvérsia possuem uma responsabilidade compartilhada em assegurar que a
suspensão de concessões seja consistente com o requerido no Artigo 22.8 do DSU e, portanto, devem
participar ativamente dos procedimentos sobre a legalidade da suspensão de concessões, sob pena de
violação à proibição de ações unilaterais, no contexto do Artigo 23.1.
Para. 383. “In sum, the suspension of concessions maintained by the United States and Canada has been duly
authorized by the DSB and was obtained through recourse to the relevant rules and procedures of the DSU,
consistently with Article 23.1 of the DSU. Pursuant to Article 22.8, the legality of the continued suspension
of concessions depends on whether the measure found to be inconsistent in EC – Hormones has been
removed, and this requires substantive compliance. We therefore find that the Panel erred in considering that
the European Communities' claims under Articles 23.2(a), 23.1, and 21.5 may be examined ‘completely
separately’ from whether the European Communities implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings in
EC– Hormones (nota omitida).”
Para. 384. “The DSB's authorization does not mean that Article 23 becomes irrelevant. Rather, as Article
23.2(c) specifies, the suspension of concessions is subject to Article 22, including the requirement in Article
22.8 that it shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with the covered
agreements has been removed. Therefore, the suspension of concessions by the United States and Canada
would be in breach of Article 23.2(c), and consequently Article 23.1, if it were established in WTO dispute
settlement that the inconsistent measure has indeed been removed within the meaning of Article 22.8 and the
suspension is not immediately terminated. Article 22.8 thus provides relevant context for the analysis of the
issues appealed under Article 23. Moreover, the application of DSB-authorized suspension of concessions is
temporary and subject to the objective conditions laid down in Article 22.8. The United States, Canada, as
well as the European Communities, have the shared responsibility to ensure that the suspension of
concessions is not applied beyond the time foreseen in Article 22.8. Consequently, the United States and
Canada have a duty to engage actively in dispute settlement proceedings concerning whether the suspension
of concessions is applied consistently with such conditions. Failing to do so could be contrary to the
overarching principle in Article 23.1 prohibiting Members from seeking redress without having recourse to, or
abiding by the rules of, the DSU. Nonetheless, this is not currently the case, because both the United States
and Canada are actively engaged in these proceedings initiated by the European Communities to determine
whether the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement in EC – Hormones has been removed
within the meaning of Article 22.8.”
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 23 do DSU consubstancia uma parte essencial do acordo pelo fim das ações unilaterais de retaliação
dos EUA a outros países, durante parte do período do antigo GATT, em troca da proibição aos vetos em
relação ao estabelecimento e conclusões de Painéis do GATT, principalmente pelas Comunidades Europeias e
Japão (ver, por exemplo, os Artigos 6 e 16 do DSU). Esse foi o grande acordo subjacente ao DSU,
viabilizando o Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC, considerado como um dos principais resultados
da Rodada do Uruguai.
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Nesse sentido, e respeitando o acordo histórico que levou à proibição do unilateralismo, a jurisprudência do
Órgão de Apelação tem sido clara quanto à proibição de ‘ações unilaterais’, ou seja, eventuais determinações
de um membro da OMC a respeito de alegadas violações às regras dos acordos abrangidos. Em resumo, a
‘justiça privada’ é claramente condenada em uma linha consistente de decisões relacionadas ao Artigo 23 do
DSU.
No caso EC - Commercial Vessels, a violação relativa ao Artigo 23.1 foi reconhecida em virtude de as
Comunidades Europeias terem adotado o mecanismo defensivo temporal para a construção naval
(‘Regulamento relativo ao MDT’) prevendo subsídios para a construção de certos navios, em resposta à
concorrência de um estaleiro coreano que supostamente estaria recebendo subsídios da Coréia em desacordo
com as regras do ASMC. Considerou-se, portanto, que as Comunidades Europeias teriam procurado reparar
unilateralmente o eventual não-cumprimento de uma obrigação pela Coréia, violando, assim, o Artigo 23.1 do
DSU.
O Painel ampliou o campo de incidência do Artigo 23.1 mediante a interpretação de que, como preceito
independente, o Artigo 23.1 não consubstanciaria apenas uma simples ‘cláusula de jurisdição exclusiva’, mas
incluiria também a proibição geral de ações unilaterais além daquelas expressamente previstas no Artigo 23.2
do DSU. O Painel, portanto, ampliou o campo de ação do Artigo 23.1 para abranger quaisquer medidas que
possam constituir uma ação unilateral para buscar a reparação de algum dano proveniente do nãocumprimento de obrigações da OMC por outros países membros. Para tanto, é necessária a demonstração
clara do nexo causal entre a adoção da medida e a conduta tida como contrária às regras da OMC.
No caso concreto, apesar de o Regulamento relativo ao MDT não mencionar o programa de subsídios
coreanos, o Painel entendeu caracterizado o nexo causal em razão de declarações públicas feitas pela
Comissão Europeia, no sentido de que a propositura do Regulamento MDT teve origem nos resultados de uma
investigação a qual concluíra pela existência de subsídios concedidos a embarcações coreanas de forma
contrária ao ASMC. Como se pode observar, a análise da matéria de fato é de fundamental relevância para
efeito do enquadramento do Artigo 23.1 do DSU. Para a caracterização da ofensa relativa a ‘procurar reparar
o não-cumprimento de obrigações da OMC’ de forma unilateral, sem recorrer ao DSU, é necessário que se
verifique se a medida questionada foi criada em resposta a alguma outra ação tida como contrária às normas
da OMC e, em caso afirmativo, se a medida teve por finalidade alcançar unilateralmente o reequilíbrio dos
efeitos adversos que tal ação teria causado no país atingido.
No caso EC - Continued Suspension, o enquadramento jurídico dos fatos foi fundamental para a aplicação e
interpretação do Artigo 23.1 do DSU. É de se notar que, neste caso, a análise feita pelo Painel foi reformada
pelo Órgão de Apelação. No caso concreto, o Painel entendeu que o Canadá e os EUA, ao continuarem com a
suspensão de concessões após as Comunidades Europeias terem notificado a implementação da decisão no
caso EC - Hormones mediante a nova Diretiva 2003/74/EC, teriam buscado reparar uma violação sem
recorrer ao procedimento previsto do DSU, o que ofenderia o Artigo 23.1 do DSU.
Segundo o Painel, tratava-se, no caso, de uma nova medida, a Diretiva 2003/74/EC, que nunca havia sido
questionada perante o DSU e, que, embora também proibisse a importação de carne, não era a proibição em si
que havia sido julgada inconsistente no caso CE - Hormônios, mas sim a justificativa para tal proibição que
fora considerada insuficiente. Dessa maneira, na visão do Painel, o Canadá e os EUA teriam que começar um
novo caso contra a nova medida perante o DSB da OMC. No entanto, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou o
Artigo 23.1 de forma diversa e reformou a decisão do Painel. O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Painel não
considerara se a nova Diretiva 2003/74/EC configuraria ou não uma implementação substancial da decisão do
caso CE - Hormônios.
Nessa linha, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou que os EUA e o Canadá poderiam continuar suspendendo
concessões até que o Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC estabelecesse que a medida tida por
234
inconsistente no caso CE - Hormônios tivesse efetivamente sido removida, como determina o Artigo 22.8 do
DSU. O Órgão de Apelação considerou errônea a abordagem feita pelo Painel no sentido de analisar o Artigo
23.1 sem observar em conjunto os requisitos do Artigo 22.8. O Órgão de Apelação esclareceu então que, na
hipótese de haver discordância sobre se uma decisão do DSB foi devidamente implementada ou não, a
controvérsia deve ser decidida por meio do procedimento do Artigo 21.5 do DSU. Dessa forma, a autorização
aos EUA e Canadá para suspender concessões continuava válida e, não havendo uma solução mutuamente
satisfatória, só poderia ser revogada mediante o procedimento do Artigo 21.5 do DSU. Portanto, o Órgão de
Apelação afastou, nesse caso, a interpretação dada ao Artigo 23.1 do DSU pelo Painel.
Outro ponto importante, ainda carente de definição jurisprudencial e que não parece ter sido objeto de
deliberação durante as negociações que levaram ao DSU, diz respeito à possibilidade de derrogações do
Artigo 23 do DSU por subgrupos de Membros da OMC. Note-se que o Artigo XXIV do GATT permite,
mediante certas condições, a formação de áreas de livre comércio e uniões aduaneiras.
Além disso, regras costumeiras do direito internacional, codificadas na Convenção de Viena sobre Direito dos
Tratados, permitem a suspensão e a modificação de disposições de acordos multilaterais por subgrupos de
Estados partes de acordos multilaterais. Nessa linha, dezenas de acordos multilaterais de comércio, entre eles
o MERCOSUL, possuem cláusulas de escolha e preempção de foro para a solução de controvérsias de
natureza comercial.
Entretanto, caso a obrigação de recurso às regras e procedimentos do DSU, consubstanciada no Artigo 23,
seja interpretada como uma obrigação absoluta, impassível de alteração, cláusulas de eleição de foro e
preempção não poderão ser reconhecidas no contexto de controvérsias perante a OMC. Embora alguns casos
importantes tenham tangenciado essa questão, por razões técnicas, ela ainda não foi objeto de apreciação por
Painéis ou pelo Órgão de Apelação. Por exemplo, no caso Argentina - Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, o
Protocolo de Olivos ainda não havia entrado em vigor e não se aplicava à controvérsias solucionadas com
fundamento no Protocolo de Brasília.
Por essa razão, a cláusula de preempção do Protocolo de Olivos não foi considerada como aplicável. No caso
Mexico - Taxes on Soft Drinks, o México não levantou argumentos baseados nas cláusulas de eleição de foro e
preempção do NAFTA e no caso US - Tuna II (Mexico), ainda em andamento, os EUA também não
levantaram, perante o Painel, a questão da justaposição de competências do NAFTA e da OMC.
Tendo em vista a enorme multiplicação de acordos preferenciais de comércio e de cláusulas de eleição de foro
e preempção no contexto daqueles acordos, a questão ainda deverá ser objeto de análise pelos órgãos
adjudicatários da OMC. Enquanto isso, porém, o efeito da existência de outros foros para a solução de
controvérsias comerciais no sistema da OMC permanecerá indefinido.
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
Artigo 24
IA.
Article 24
Special Procedures Involving Least-Developed Country Members
24.1
At all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute settlement procedures
involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration shall be given to the special
situation of least-developed country Members. In this regard, Members shall exercise due restraint in
raising matters under these procedures involving a least-developed country Member. If nullification or
impairment is found to result from a measure taken by a least-developed country Member,
complaining parties shall exercise due restraint in asking for compensation or seeking authorization to
suspend the application of concessions or other obligations pursuant to these procedures.
24.2
In dispute settlement cases involving a least-developed country Member, where a satisfactory solution
has not been found in the course of consultations the Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB
shall, upon request by a least-developed country Member offer their good offices, conciliation and
mediation with a view to assisting the parties to settle the dispute, before a request for a panel is made.
The Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB, in providing the above assistance, may consult any
source which either deems appropriate.
IB.
Artigo 24
Procedimento Especial para Casos Envolvendo Países de Menor Desenvolvimento
Relativo Membros
24.1
Em todas as etapas da determinação das causas de uma controvérsia ou dos procedimentos de uma
solução de controvérsias de casos que envolvam um país de menor desenvolvimento relativo
Membro, deverá ser dada atenção especial à situação particular do país de menor desenvolvimento
relativo Membro. Neste sentido, os Membros exercerão a devida moderação ao submeter a estes
procedimentos matérias envolvendo um país de menor desenvolvimento relativo Membro. Se for
verificada anulação ou prejuízo em conseqüência de medida adotada por país de menor
desenvolvimento relativo Membro, as partes reclamantes deverão exercer a devida moderação ao
pleitear compensações ou solicitar autorização para suspensão da aplicação de concessões ou outras
obrigações nos termos destes procedimentos.
24.2
Quando, nos casos de solução de controvérsias que envolvam um país de menor
desenvolvimento relativo Membro, não for encontrada solução satisfatória no correr das consultas
realizadas, o Diretor-Geral ou o Presidente do OSC deverão, a pedido do país de menor
desenvolvimento Membro, oferecer seus bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação com o objetivo de
auxiliar as partes a solucionar a controvérsia antes do estabelecimento de um grupo especial. Para
prestar a assistência mencionada, o Diretor-Geral ou o Presidente do OSC poderão consultar qualquer
fonte que considerem apropriada.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1. Artigo 24.1
236
a) “A função do Painel em considerar a situação especial dos países menos desenvolvidos”
Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Cotton), WT/DS267/R,
Demandante: Brasil, paras. 7.1410 e 7.1414-7.1415
O Brasil requisitou o estabelecimento de um Painel em relação aos subsidies destinados a produtores, usuários
e exportadores de algodão dos EUA, os quais alegam ser inadequados de acordo com o DSU. Dois países
membros menos desenvolvidos (Benin e Chad) participam do processo como terceiros e o Painel interpreta o
DSU como uma diretriz ao considerar a situação dos países menos desenvolvidos.
Para. 7.1410. “While this provision seems to us primarily to address a situation where a least-developed
country Member would be the Member complained against in a particular WTO dispute settlement
proceeding, the first sentence of the provision is sufficiently generally worded to encompass the situation
where least-developed country Members are involved as third parties in a Panel proceeding. This requires that
at all stages of the dispute settlement procedures, which includes this Panel process, particular consideration
shall be given to the situation of least-developed countries. We understand this direction, contained in the
DSU, to address the procedural aspects of the dispute settlement process, rather than our substantive
examination under the covered agreements.”
Para. 7.1414. “For these reasons, in examining Brazil's allegations under Part III of the SCM Agreement that it
has suffered serious prejudice to its interests within the meaning of Article 5(c), we take full account of the
interest of all Members – including those of least-developed Members – in these dispute settlement
proceedings in accordance with the rights and obligations provided for in Part III of the SCM Agreement.
Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, we are called upon to clarify the rights and obligations in this covered
agreement through application of customary principles of interpretation of public international law.”
Para. 7.1415. “Therefore, we have taken into account serious prejudice allegations of other Members to the
extent these constitute evidentiary support of the effect of the subsidy borne by Brazil as a Member whose
producers are involved in the production and trade in upland cotton in the world market. However, we have
not based our decision on any alleged serious prejudice caused to them.”
III.
Comentários
No caso US – Cotton, o texto do Artigo 24 do DSU foi aplicado para que o Painel pudesse interpretar as
alegações das partes reclamantes de forma moderada no que possa afetar os países menos desenvolvidos.
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
Artigo 25
IA.
Article 25
Arbitration
25.1
Expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement can facilitate the
solution of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by both parties.
25.2
Except as otherwise provided in this Understanding, resort to arbitration shall be subject to mutual
agreement of the parties which shall agree on the procedures to be followed. Agreements to resort to
arbitration shall be notified to all Members sufficiently in advance of the actual commencement of the
arbitration process.
25.3
Other Members may become party to an arbitration proceeding only upon the agreement of the parties
which have agreed to have recourse to arbitration. The parties to the proceeding shall agree to abide
by the arbitration award. Arbitration awards shall be notified to the DSB and the Council or
Committee of any relevant agreement where any Member may raise any point relating thereto.
25.4
Articles 21 and 22 of this Understanding shall apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration awards.
IB.
Artigo 25
Arbitragem
25.1
Um procedimento rápido de arbitragem na OMC como meio alternativo de solução de
controvérsias pode facilitar a resolução de algumas controvérsias que tenham por objeto questões
claramente definidas por ambas as partes.
25.2
Salvo disposição em contrário deste Entendimento, o recurso à arbitragem estará sujeito a acordo
mútuo entre as partes, que acordarão quanto ao procedimento a ser seguido. Os acordos de recurso a
arbitragem deverão ser notificados a todos os Membros com suficiente antecedência ao efetivo
início do processo de arbitragem.
25.3
25.4
Outros Membros poderão ser parte no procedimento de arbitragem somente com o
consentimento das partes que tenham convencionado recorrer à arbitragem. As partes acordarão
submeter-se ao laudo arbitral. Os laudos arbitrais serão comunicados ao OSC e ao Conselho ou
Comitê dos acordos pertinentes, onde qualquer Membro poderá questionar qualquer assunto a eles
relacionados.
Os Artigos 21 e 22 do presente Entendimento serão aplicados mutatis mutantis aos laudos arbitrais.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
238
239

Artigo 26
Alice Borges Pereira Fernandes
IA.
Article 26
1. Non-Violation Complaints of the Type Described in Paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994
Where the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable to a covered
agreement, a panel or the Appellate Body may only make rulings and recommendations where a party to the
dispute considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the relevant covered agreement is
being nullified or impaired or the attainment of any objective of that Agreement is being impeded as a result
of the application by a Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of that
Agreement. Where and to the extent that such party considers and a panel or the Appellate Body determines
that a case concerns a measure that does not conflict with the provisions of a covered agreement to which the
provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable, the procedures in this
Understanding shall apply, subject to the following:
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to
a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement;
(b) where a measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits under, or impede the attainment of
objectives, of the relevant covered agreement without violation thereof, there is no obligation to
withdraw the measure. However, in such cases, the panel or the Appellate Body shall recommend
that the Member concerned make a mutually satisfactory adjustment;
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21, the arbitration provided for in paragraph 3 of
Article 21, upon request of either party, may include a determination of the level of benefits
which have been nullified or impaired, and may also suggest ways and means of reaching a
mutually satisfactory adjustment; such suggestions shall not be binding upon the parties to the
dispute;
(d) notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 22, compensation may be part of a
mutually satisfactory adjustment as final settlement of the dispute.
2. Complaints of the Type Described in Paragraph 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994
Where the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable to a covered
agreement, a panel may only make rulings and recommendations where a party considers that any benefit
accruing to it directly or indirectly under the relevant covered agreement is being nullified or impaired or the
attainment of any objective of that Agreement is being impeded as a result of the existence of any situation
other than those to which the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are
applicable. Where and to the extent that such party considers and a panel determines that the matter is covered
by this paragraph, the procedures of this Understanding shall apply only up to and including the point in the
proceedings where the panel report has been circulated to the Members. The dispute settlement rules and
procedures contained in the Decision of 12 April 1989 (BISD 36S/61-67) shall apply to consideration for
adoption, and surveillance and implementation of recommendations and rulings. The following shall also
apply:
240
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any argument made with
respect to issues covered under this paragraph;
(b) in cases involving matters covered by this paragraph, if a panel finds that cases also involve
dispute settlement matters other than those covered by this paragraph, the panel shall circulate a
report to the DSB addressing any such matters and a separate report on matters falling under this
paragraph.
IB.
Artigo 26
1. Reclamações de Não-Violação do Tipo Descrito no Parágrafo 1 (b) do Artigo XXIII do GATT
Quando as disposições do parágrafo 1(b) do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994 forem aplicáveis a um acordo
abrangido, os grupos especiais ou o Órgão de Apelação somente poderão decidir ou fazer recomendações se
uma das partes em controvérsia considera que um benefício resultante direta ou indiretamente do acordo
abrangido pertinente está sendo anulado ou prejudicado ou que o cumprimento de um dos objetivos do
Acordo está sendo dificultado em conseqüência da aplicação de alguma medida por um Membro, ocorrendo ou
não conflito com as disposições daquele Acordo. Quando e na medida em que tal parte considere, e um
grupo especial ou Órgão de Apelação determine, que um caso trate de medida que não seja contraditória com
as disposições de um acordo abrangido ao qual as disposições do parágrafo 1(b) do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994
sejam aplicáveis, deverão ser aplicados os procedimentos previstos no presente Entendimento,
observando-se o seguinte:
(a) a parte reclamante deverá apresentar justificativa detalhada em apoio a qualquer
reclamação relativa a medida que não seja conflitante com o acordo abrangido relevante;
(b)
quando se considerar que uma medida anula ou restringe benefícios resultantes do acordo
abrangido pertinente, ou que compromete a realização dos objetivos de tal acordo, sem
infração de suas disposições, não haverá obrigação de revogar essa medida. No entanto, em tais
casos, o grupo especial ou Órgão de Apelação deverá recomendar que o Membro
interessado faça um ajuste mutuamente satisfatório;
(c) não obstante o disposto no Artigo 21, a arbitragem prevista no parágrafo 3 do Artigo 21 poderá
incluir, a pedido de qualquer das partes, a determinação do grau dos benefícios anulados ou
prejudicados e poderá também sugerir meios e maneiras de se atingir um ajuste mutuamente
satisfatório; tais sugestões não deverão ser compulsórias para as parte em controvérsia;
(d) não obstante o disposto no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 22, a compensação poderá fazer parte de um ajuste
mutuamente satisfatório como solução final para a controvérsia.
2. Reclamações do Tipo Descrito no Parágrafo 1(c) do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994
Quando as disposições do parágrafo 1(c) do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994 forem aplicáveis a um
acordo abrangido, o grupo especial apenas poderá formular recomendações e decisões quando uma parte
considerar que um benefício resultante direta ou indiretamente do acordo abrangido pertinente tenha
sido anulado ou prejudicado ou que o cumprimento de um dos objetivos de tal acordo tenha sido
comprometido em conseqüência de uma situação diferente daquelas às quais são aplicáveis as disposições
dos parágrafos 1(a) e 1(b) do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994. Quando e na medida em que essa parte
241
considere, e um grupo especial determine, que a questão inclui-se neste parágrafo, os procedimentos deste
Entendimento serão aplicados unicamente até o momento do processo em que o relatório do grupo
especial seja distribuído aos Membros. Serão aplicáveis as normas e procedimentos de solução de
controvérsias contidos na Decisão de 12 de abril de 1989 (BISD 36S/61-67) quando da consideração
para adoção e supervisão e implementação de recomendações e decisões. Será também aplicável o
seguinte:
(a) a parte reclamante deverá apresentar justificativa detalhada como base de qualquer
argumentação a respeito de questões tratadas no presente parágrafo;
(b) nos casos que envolvam questões tratadas pelo presente parágrafo, se um grupo especial decidir
que tais casos também se referem a outras questões relativas à solução de
controvérsias além daquelas previstas neste parágrafo, o grupo especial deverá fornecer ao
OSC um relatório encaminhando tais questões e um relatório separado sobre os assuntos
compreendidos no âmbito de aplicação do presente parágrafo.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1. Artigo 26.1
a) “Artigo 26.1(b) ‘não-violação’”
Chemical Products (India – Patent), WT/DS50/AB/R, Demandante: EUA, para. 41
O Painel foi estabelecido para considerar as reclamações dos EUA contra a negligência da Índia na
observância da proteção de patentes de medicamentos e químicos agrícolas de acordo com o Artigo 27 do
TRIPS. O Órgão de Apelação declarou que, nas reclamações relacionadas à não-violação, o objetivo não é
retirar a medida, mas alcançar um ajuste mutuamente satisfatório.
Para. 41. “The doctrine of protecting the “reasonable expectations” of contracting parties developed in the
context of “non-violation” complaints brought under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1947. Some of the rules
and procedures concerning “non-violation” cases have been codified in Article 26.1 of the DSU. “Nonviolation” complaints are rooted in the GATT's origins as an agreement intended to protect the reciprocal tariff
concessions negotiated among the contracting parties under Article II.28 In the absence of substantive legal
rules in many areas relating to international trade, the “non-violation” provision of Article XXIII:1(b) was
aimed at preventing contracting parties from using non-tariff barriers or other policy measures to negate the
benefits of negotiated tariff concessions. Under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994, a Member can bring a
“non-violation” complaint when the negotiated balance of concessions between Members is upset by the
application of a measure, whether or not this measure is inconsistent with the provisions of the covered
agreement. The ultimate goal is not the withdrawal of the measure concerned, but rather achieving a mutually
satisfactory adjustment, usually by means of compensation.”
Relatório, do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (EU - Asbestos) WT/DS135/AB/R, Demandante: Canadá, para. 185.
242
O Painel foi estabelecido para considerar as alegações do Canadá quanto a um Decreto francês de nº 96-1133,
que trata de asbestos e produtos contendo asbestos. O Painel e o Órgão de Apelação rejeitaram o argumento da
União Europeia de que as regras de não-violação, nulidade e restrição não devem ser aplicadas às medidas
justificadas pelo Artigo XX do GATT 1994.
Para. 185. “This appeal is our first occasion to examine Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994. For this
reason, before turning to the appeal by the European Communities, it seems to us useful to make certain
preliminary observations about the relationship between Articles XXIII:1(a) and XXIII:1(b) of the GATT
1994. Article XXIII:1(a) sets forth a cause of action for a claim that a Member has failed to carry out one or
more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A claim under Article XXIII:1(a), therefore, lies when a
Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with a provision of the GATT 1994. Article XXIII:1(b) sets
forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the application of a measure, a Member has “nullified
or impaired” “benefits” accruing to another Member, “whether or not that measure conflicts with the
provisions” of the GATT 1994. Thus, it is not necessary, under Article XXIII:1(b), to establish that the
measure involved is inconsistent with, or violates, a provision of the GATT 1994. Cases under Article
XXIII:1(b) are, for this reason, sometimes described as “non-violation” cases; we note, though, that the word
“non-violation” does not appear in this provision. This appeal is our first occasion to examine Article
XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994. For this reason, before turning to the appeal by the European Communities, it
seems to us useful to make certain preliminary observations about the relationship between Articles XXIII:1(a)
and XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Article XXIII:1(a) sets forth a cause of action for a claim that a Member
has failed to carry out one or more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A claim under Article XXIII:1(a),
therefore, lies when a Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with a provision of the GATT 1994.
Article XXIII:1(b) sets forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the application of a measure, a
Member has “nullified or impaired” “benefits” accruing to another Member, “whether or not that measure
conflicts with the provisions” of the GATT 1994. Thus, it is not necessary, under Article XXIII:1(b), to
establish that the measure involved is inconsistent with, or violates, a provision of the GATT 1994. Cases
under Article XXIII:1(b) are, for this reason, sometimes described as “non-violation” cases; we note, though,
that the word “non-violation” does not appear in this provision. This appeal is our first occasion to examine
Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994. For this reason, before turning to the appeal by the European
Communities, it seems to us useful to make certain preliminary observations about the relationship between
Articles XXIII:1(a) and XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Article XXIII:1(a) sets forth a cause of action for a
claim that a Member has failed to carry out one or more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A claim
under Article XXIII:1(a), therefore, lies when a Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with a
provision of the GATT 1994. Article XXIII:1(b) sets forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through
the application of a measure, a Member has “nullified or impaired” “benefits” accruing to another Member,
“whether or not that measure conflicts with the provisions” of the GATT 1994. Thus, it is not necessary, under
Article XXIII:1(b), to establish that the measure involved is inconsistent with, or violates, a provision of the
GATT 1994. Cases under Article XXIII:1(b) are, for this reason, sometimes described as “non-violation”
cases; we note, though, that the word “non-violation” does not appear in this provision.”
and Betting Services (US - Gambling), WT/DS285/R, Demandante: Antigua e Barbuda, para. 6.17
Antigua e Barbuda reclamam das medidas de autoridades dos EUA que afetam o suprimento no cruzamento de
fronteira para serviços de jogos e apostas. Devido a essas medidas, que entendem ser inconsistentes com as
obrigações desse país em relação aos Artigos II, VI, VIII, XI, XVI e XVII do GATS, Antigua e Barbuda
pedem o estabelecimento de um painel. O Painel explicou que a adequação, nos casos que envolvam medidas
inconsistentes com os acordos, requer uma mudança que elimina a inconsistência relacionada a esse Acordo.
Para. 6.17. “The wider context in the DSU confirms this interpretation. Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that if
243
measures are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements, in the absence of a
mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure “the
withdrawal of the measures” concerned. In a similar vein, Article 22.8 of the DSU provides that the
suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such time as
the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement “has been removed”. Both of these provisions
contemplate that compliance with the standard recommendation applicable in a so-called “violation” case will
require a change regarding the measure found inconsistent with a covered agreement. (3)
2. Article 26.2
a) “reclamações do tipo descrito no parágrafo 1(c) do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994”
and Betting Services (US - Gambling), Demandante: Antigua e Barbuda, WT/DS285/R, para. 6.50.
O Painel contrastou a situação comparando o sistema de solução de controvérsias sob a égide da OMC com a
prática anterior do GATT, no qual o membro era capaz de impedir a adoção do Relatório do Painel.
Para. 6.50. “The verb “accept” is used with the modal verb “shall” which indicates that, in this context,
acceptance is an obligation. The phrase “shall accept” is used in the same sense in Article 22.7 of the DSU.
The phrase “shall be accepted” is also used in Article XII:5(e) of the GATS, as is “shall accept” in Article
XV:2 of GATT 1994, in the same sense, although in a different context. This phrase can be contrasted with the
words “mutually acceptable” in Articles 3.7 and 22.2 of the DSU, where parties do not have an obligation to
accept a particular solution or compensation. This obligation can also be contrasted with the prior GATT
practice according to which Members were able to block adoption of panel reports.” (4)
III.
Comentários
O Artigo 26.1(b) do DSU esteve presente em algumas decisões do DSB. Esse Artigo foi analisado no
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio India – Patents, o entendimento é que o objetivo desse dispositivo
não é retirar a medida, mas alcançar um acordo que satisfaça ambas as partes. No Relatório do Painel no
litígio US – Gambling, o Painel declarou que a adequação, nos casos que envolvam medidas inconsistentes
com os acordos, requer uma mudança cujo foco seja a eliminação dessa inconsistência.
Este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSBs da OMC.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 3: This can be contrasted with a recommendation that the Member concerned make a “mutually satisfactory adjustment”,
applicable in so-called “non-violation” cases under Article 26.1(b) of the DSU. In such cases, there is no obligation to make any
change to bring the measure at issue into conformity with the Member's obligations because the measure is already in conformity, or
consistent, with those obligations.”
Footnote 4: The previous GATT practice was to adopt panel reports by consensus, without prejudice to the GATT provisions on
decision-making: see the Decision of 12 April 1989 on improvements to the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures, para. G.3
(BISD 36S/61-67). This practice remains applicable to so-called “situation complaints” under Article 26.2 of the DSU.”
244

Artigo 27
IA.
Article 27
Responsibilities of the Secretariat
27.1
The Secretariat shall have the responsibility of assisting panels, especially on the legal, historical and
procedural aspects of the matters dealt with, and of providing secretarial and technical support.
27.2
While the Secretariat assists Members in respect of dispute settlement at their request, there may also
be a need to provide additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute settlement to
developing country Members. To this end, the Secretariat shall make available a qualified legal expert
from the WTO technical cooperation services to any developing country Member which so requests.
This expert shall assist the developing country Member in a manner ensuring the continued
impartiality of the Secretariat.
27.3
The Secretariat shall conduct special training courses for interested Members concerning these dispute
settlement procedures and practices so as to enable Members' experts to be better informed in this
regard.
IB.
27.1
O Secretariado terá a responsabilidade de prestar assistência aos grupos especiais, em especial nos
aspectos jurídicos, históricos e de procedimento dos assuntos tratados, e de fornecer apoio
técnico e de secretaria.
27.2
Ainda que o Secretariado preste assistência com relação à solução de controvérsias aos
Membros que assim o solicitem, poderá ser também necessário fornecer assessoria e assistência
jurídicas adicionais com relação à solução de controvérsias aos países em desenvolvimento Membros.
Para tal fim, o Secretariado colocará à disposição de qualquer país em desenvolvimento Membro que
assim o solicitar um perito legal qualificado dos serviços de cooperação técnica da OMC. Este perito
deverá auxiliar o país em desenvolvimento Membro de maneira a garantir a constante imparcialidade
do Secretariado.
27.3
O Secretariado deverá organizar, para os Membros interessados, cursos especiais de
treinamento sobre estes procedimentos e práticas de solução de controvérsias a fim de que os
especialistas dos Membros estejam melhor informados sobre o assunto.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
245
APPENDIX 1
AGREEMENTS COVERED BY THE UNDERSTANDING
(a)
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(b)
Multilateral Trade Agreements
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(c)
Plurilateral Trade Agreements
Annex 4: Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft
Agreement on Government Procurement
International Dairy Agreement
International Bovine Meat Agreement
The applicability of this Understanding to the Plurilateral Trade Agreements shall be subject to the adoption
of a decision by the parties to each agreement setting out the terms for the application of the Understanding to
the individual agreement, including any special or additional rules or procedures for inclusion in Appendix 2,
as notified to the DSB.
246
APÊNDICE
ACORDOS ABRANGIDOS PELO ENTENDIMENTO
(b)
Acordo Constitutivo da Organização Mundial do Comércio
(c)
Acordos Comerciais Multilaterais
Anexo 1A: Acordos Multilaterais sobre o Comércio de Mercadorias
Anexo 1B: Acordo Geral sobre o Comércio de Serviços
Anexo 1C: Acordo sobre Aspectos de Direito de Propriedade Intelectual Relacionados com o Comércio
Anexo 2: Entendimento Relativo às Normas e Procedimentos sobre Solução de Controvérsias
(d)
Acordos Comerciais Plurilaterais
Anexo 4: Acordo sobre o Comércio de Aeronaves Civis
Acordo sobre Compras Governamentais
Acordo Internacional de Produtos Lácteos
Acordo Internacional de Carne Bovina
A aplicação do presente Entendimento aos Acordos Comerciais Plurilaterais dependerá da adoção, pelas
partes do acordo em questão, de uma decisão na qual se estabeleçam as condições de aplicação do
Entendimento ao referido acordo, com inclusão das possíveis normas ou procedimentos especiais ou adicionais
para fins de sua inclusão no Apêndice 2, conforme notificado ao OSC.
247
APPENDIX 2
SPECIAL OR ADDITIONAL RULES AND PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN THE COVERED
AGREEMENTS
Agreement
Rules and Procedures
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures
11.2
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
2.14, 2.21, 4.4, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11,
8.1 through 8.12
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
14.2 through 14.4, Annex 2
Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of GATT 1994
17.4 through 17.7
Agreement on Implementation of Article
VII of GATT 1994
19.3 through 19.5, Annex
II.2(f), 3, 9, 21
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
4.2 through 4.12, 6.6, 7.10 through 7.10,
8.5, footnote 35, 24.4, 27.7, Annex V
General Agreement on Trade in Services
XXII:3, XXIII:3
Annex on Financial Services
4
Annex on Air Transport Services
4
Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement
Procedures for the GATS
1 through 5
The list of rules and procedures in this Appendix includes provisions where only a part of the provision may
be relevant in this context.
Any special or additional rules or procedures in the Plurilateral Trade Agreements as determined by the
competent bodies of each agreement and as notified to the DSB.
248
APÊNDICE 2
NORMAS E PROCEDIMENTOS ESPECIAIS OU ADICIONAIS CONTIDOS NOS
ACORDOS ABRANGIDOS
Acordo
Normas e Procedimentos
Acordo sobre a Aplicação de Medidas
Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias
11.2
Acordo sobre Têxteis e Vestuário
2.14, 2.21, 4.4, 5.2,
5.4, 5.6, 6.9, 6.10,
6.11, 8.1 a 8.12
Acordo sobre Barreiras Técnicas
ao Comércio
14.2 a 14.4, Anexo 2
Acordo sobre a Implementação do
Artigo VI do GATT 1994
17.4 a 17.7
Acordo sobre a Implementação do
Artigo VII do GATT 1994
19.3 a 19.5,
Anexo II.2(f)
3, 9, 21
Acordo sobre Subsídios e Medidas
Compensatórias
4.2 a 4.12, 6.6, 7.2 a
7.10, 8.5, nota 35,
24.4, 27.7, Anexo V
Acordo Geral sobre o Comércio
de Serviços
XXII:3, XXIII:3
Anexo sobre Serviços Financeiros
4
Anexo sobre Serviços de
Transporte Aéreo
4
Decisão Relativa a Certos Procedimentos
de Solução de Controvérsias para o GATS
1a5
A lista de normas e procedimentos deste Apêndice inclui disposições das quais apenas uma parte pode ser
pertinente a este contexto.
Quaisquer regras ou procedimentos especiais ou adicionais dos Acordos Comerciais Plurilaterais conforme
determinado pelos órgãos competentes de cada acordo e notificado ao OSC.
249
APPENDIX 3
WORKING PROCEDURES
1
In its proceedings the panel shall follow the relevant provisions of this Understanding. In addition, the
following working procedures shall apply.
2
The panel shall meet in closed session. The parties to the dispute, and interested parties, shall be
present at the meetings only when invited by the panel to appear before it.
3
The deliberations of the panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept confidential. Nothing in
this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions
to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted by another Member to the
panel which that Member has designated as confidential. Where a party to a dispute submits a
confidential version of its written submissions to the panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member,
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its submissions that could be
disclosed to the public.
4
Before the first substantive meeting of the panel with the parties, the parties to the dispute shall
transmit to the panel written submissions in which they present the facts of the case and their
arguments.
5
At its first substantive meeting with the parties, the panel shall ask the party which has brought the
complaint to present its case. Subsequently, and still at the same meeting, the party against which the
complaint has been brought shall be asked to present its point of view.
6
All third parties which have notified their interest in the dispute to the DSB shall be invited in writing
to present their views during a session of the first substantive meeting of the panel set aside for that
purpose. All such third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.
7
Formal rebuttals shall be made at a second substantive meeting of the panel. The party complained
against shall have the right to take the floor first to be followed by the complaining party. The parties
shall submit, prior to that meeting, written rebuttals to the panel.
8
The panel may at any time put questions to the parties and ask them for explanations either in the
course of a meeting with the parties or in writing.
9
The parties to the dispute and any third party invited to present its views in accordance with Article 10
shall make available to the panel a written version of their oral statements.
10
In the interest of full transparency, the presentations, rebuttals and statements referred to in
paragraphs 5 to 9 shall be made in the presence of the parties. Moreover, each party's written
submissions, including any comments on the descriptive part of the report and responses to questions
put by the panel, shall be made available to the other party or parties.
11
Any additional procedures specific to the panel.
250
12
Proposed timetable for panel work:
(a) Receipt of first written submissions of the parties:
(1) complaining Party
3-6weeks
2-3 weeks
(2) Party complained against
(b)Date, time and place of first substantive meeting
with the parties; third party session
1-2 weeks
(c) Receipt of written rebuttals of the parties
2-3 weeks
(d) Date, time and place of second substantive
meeting with the parties:
1-2 weeks
(e) Issuance of descriptive part of the report to the parties:
2-4 weeks
(f) Receipt of comments by the parties on the descriptive part
of the report:
(g) Issuance of the interim report, including the findings and conclusions, to the parties:
2-4 weeks
1 week
(h) Deadline for party to request review of part(s) of report:
2 weeks
(i) Period of review by panel, including possible additional meeting with parties:
(j) Issuance of final report to parties to dispute:
2 weeks
(k) Circulation of the final report to the Members:
3 weeks
The above calendar may be changed in the light of unforeseen developments. Additional meetings with the
parties shall be scheduled if required.
251
APÊNDICE 3
PROCEDIMENTOS DE TRABALHO
1
Em seus procedimentos os grupos especiais deverão observar as disposições pertinentes do presente
Entendimento. Ademais, deverão ser aplicados os seguintes procedimentos.
2
O grupo especial deverá deliberar em reuniões fechadas. As partes em controvérsia e as partes
interessadas deverão estar presentes às reuniões apenas quando convidadas a comparecer pelo grupo
especial.
3
As deliberações do grupo especial e os documentos submetidos à sua consideração deverão ter caráter
confidencial. Nenhuma das disposições do presente Entendimento deverá impedir a uma parte em
controvérsia de tornar públicas as suas posições. Os Membros deverão considerar confidencial a
informação fornecida ao grupo especial por outro Membro quando este a houver considerado como
tal. Quando uma parte em controvérsia fornecer uma versão confidencial de suas argumentações
escritas ao grupo especial, também deverá fornecer, a pedido de um Membro, um resumo nãoconfidencial da informação contida nessas argumentações que possa ser tornado público.
4
Antes da primeira reunião substantive do grupo especial com as partes, estas deverão apresentar ao
grupo especial argumentações escritas nas quais relatem os fatos em questão e seus respectivos
argumentos.
5
Na primeira reunião substantive com as partes, o grupo especial deverá solicitar à parte que interpôs a
reclamação que apresente suas argumentações. Em seguida, ainda na mesma reunião, a parte contrária
deverá expor suas posições.
6
Todas as terceiras partes interessadas que tenham notificado ao OSC seu interesse na controvérsia
deverão ser convidadas por escrito a apresentar suas opiniões durante a primeira reunião substantiva
em sessão especial destinada a essa finalidade. Todas as terceiras partes poderão estar presentes à
totalidade desta sessão.
7
As réplicas formais deverão ser apresentadas emu ma segunda reunião substantiva do grupo especial.
A parte demandada deverá ter direito à palavra em primeiro lugar, sendo seguida pela parte
reclamante. Antes da reunião, as partes deverão fornecer ao grupo especial suas réplicas por escrito.
8
O grupo especial poderá a todo momento formular perguntas às partes e pedir-lhes explicações, seja
durante uma reunião com elas, seja por escrito.
9
As partes em controvérsia e qualquer terceira parte convidada a export suas opiniões de acordo com o
Artigo 10 deverá colocar à disposição do grupo especial uma versão escrita de suas argumentações
orais.
10
No interesse de total transparência, as exposições, replicas e argumentações citadas nos parágrafos 5 a
9 deverão ser feitas em presença das partes. Além disso, cada comunicação escrita das partes,
inclusive quaisquer comentários sobre aspectos expositivos do relatório e as respostas às questões do
grupo especial, deverão ser colocadas à disposição da outra parte ou partes.
252
11
Quaisquer procedimentos adicionais específicos do grupo especial.
12
Proposta de calendário para os trabalhos do grupo especial:
(a) Recebimento das primeiras argumentações escritas das partes:
(1) da parte reclamante
3 a 6 semanas
(2) da parte demandada
2 a 3 semanas
(b) Data, hora e local da primeira reunião
substantiva com as partes; sessão destinada
a terceiras partes:
1 a 2 semanas
(c) Recebimento das replicas escritas
2 a 3 semanas
(d) Data, hora e local da segunda
reunião substantiva com as partes
1 a 2 semanas
(e) Distribuição da parte expositiva
do relatório às partes
2 a 4 semanas
(iii)
Recebimento de comentários das
partes sobre a parte expositive do relatório
2 semanas
(iv) Distribuição às partes de relatório provisório,
inclusive verificações e decisões
2 a 4 semanas
(v) Prazo final para a parte solicitor exame de
parte(s) do relatório
1 semana
(vi) Período de revisão pelo grupo especial, inclusive
possível nova reunião com as partes
2 semanas
(vii)
Distribuição do relatório definitive às partes
em controvérsia
(viii) Distribuição do relatório
definitivo aos Membros
2 semanas
3 semanas
O calendário acima poderá ser alterado à luz de acontecimentos imprevistos. Se necessário, deverão
ser programadas reuniões adicionais com as partes.
253
APPENDIX 4
EXPERT REVIEW GROUPS
The following rules and procedures shall apply to expert review groups established in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 13.
1
Expert review groups are under the panel's authority. Their terms of reference and detailed working
procedures shall be decided by the panel, and they shall report to the panel.
2
Participation in expert review groups shall be restricted to persons of professional standing and
experience in the field in question.
3
Citizens of parties to the dispute shall not serve on an expert review group without the joint agreement
of the parties to the dispute, except in exceptional circumstances when the panel considers that the
need for specialized scientific expertise cannot be fulfilled otherwise. Government officials of parties
to the dispute shall not serve on an expert review group. Members of expert review groups shall serve
in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any
organization. Governments or organizations shall therefore not give them instructions with regard to
matters before an expert review group.
4
Expert review groups may consult and seek information and technical advice from any source they
deem appropriate. Before an expert review group seeks such information or advice from a source
within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall inform the government of that Member. Any Member
shall respond promptly and fully to any request by an expert review group for such information as the
expert review group considers necessary and appropriate.
5
The parties to a dispute shall have access to all relevant information provided to an expert review
group, unless it is of a confidential nature. Confidential information provided to the expert review
group shall not be released without formal authorization from the government, organization or person
providing the information. Where such information is requested from the expert review group but
release of such information by the expert review group is not authorized, a non-confidential summary
of the information will be provided by the government, organization or person supplying the
information.
6
The expert review group shall submit a draft report to the parties to the dispute with a view to
obtaining their comments, and taking them into account, as appropriate, in the final report, which shall
also be issued to the parties to the dispute when it is submitted to the panel. The final report of the
expert review group shall be advisory only.
254
APÊNDICE 4
GRUPO CONSULTIVO DE PERITOS
As regras e procedimentos seguintes serão aplicados aos grupos consultivos de peritos estabelecidos
consoante as disposições do parágrafo 2 do Artigo 13.
1
Os grupos consultivos de peritos estão sob a autoridade de um grupo especial, ao qual deverão se
reportar. Os termos de referência e os pormenores do procedimento de trabalho dos grupos
consultivos serão decididos pelo grupo especial.
2
A participação nos grupos consultivos de peritos deverá ser exclusiva das pessoas de destaque
profissional e experiência no assunto tratado.
3
Cidadãos dos países partes em uma controvérsia não deverão integrar um grupo consultivo de peritos
sem a anuência conjunta das partes em controvérsia, salvo em situações excepcionais em que o grupo
especial considere impossível atender de outro modo à necessidade de conhecimentos científicos
especializados. Não poderão integrar um grupo consultivo de peritos os funcionários governamentais
das partes em controvérsia. Os Membros de um grupo consultivo de peritos deverão atuar a título de
suas capacidades individuais e não como representantes de governo ou de qualquer organização.
Portanto, governos e organizações não deverão dar-lhes instruções com relação aos assuntos
submetidos ao grupo consultivo de peritos.
4
Os grupos consultivos de peritos poderão fazer consultas e buscar informações e assessoramento
técnico em qualquer fonte que considerem apropriada. Antes de buscar informação ou assessoria de
fonte submetida à jurisdição de um Membro, deverão informar ao governo de tal Membro. Todo
Membro deverá atender imediata e completamente a qualquer solicitação de informação que um
grupo consultivo de peritos considere necessária e apropriada.
5
As partes em controvérsia deverão ter acesso a toda informação pertinente fornecida a um grupo
consultivo de peritos, a menos que tenha caráter confidencial. Informação confidencial fornecida ao
grupo consultivo de peritos não deverá ser divulgada sem autorização do governo, organização ou
pessoa que a forneceu. Quando tal informação for solicitada pelo grupo consultivo de peritos e este
não seja autorizado a divulgá-la, um resumo não-confidencial da informação será fornecido pelo
governo, organização ou pessoa que a forneceu.
6
O grupo consultivo de peritos fornecerá um relatório provisório às partes em controvérsia, com vistas
a recolher seus comentários e a levá-los em consideração, se pertinentes, no relatório final, que deverá
ser divulgado às partes em controvérsia quando for apresentado ao grupo especial. O relatório final do
grupo consultivo de peritos deverá ter caráter meramente consultivo.
255

Dispute Settlement Understanding

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