The Messenger Bias - Center for Decision Research

Transcrição

The Messenger Bias
Running head:
The Messenger Bias
The Messenger Bias: A relational model of knowledge valuation
Tanya Menon
The University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business
1101 E. 58th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
[email protected]
Sally Blount
New York University
Leonard N. Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
[email protected]
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The Messenger Bias: A relational model of knowledge valuation
Abstract
How do managers value the knowledge they encounter in organizations? A rational
perspective assumes that managers carefully and accurately cull the best knowledge from their
environments, while a random model situates managers in an organization that resembles a
garbage can, filled with preferences and solutions that are temporally matched. This paper
develops a third view, a relational perspective, which describes how social relationships between
knowledge messengers and knowledge receivers affect the way that managers evaluate new
knowledge. We begin with the premise that individuals possess multiple roles at work and that
each of these roles involves the actor in a variety of relationships. We then identify and describe
six common relationship types that can be perceived between knowledge messengers and
receivers at work: colleagues, deviants, rivals, advisors, intruders, and enemies. We examine
how each of these relationship types evokes a corresponding relational schema which colors how
new knowledge is evaluated. Our goal is to reveal how, holding knowledge content constant,
managers’ evaluations of new knowledge are often biased by their relational perceptions of the
messengers who convey that knowledge. While network research demonstrates that relationships
affect whether managers are exposed to new knowledge or not, our work demonstrates that the
nature of managers’ different relationships can moderate how they evaluate the knowledge that
they see.
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Emerson once said that “if a man writes a better book, preaches a better sermon, or makes
a better mousetrap than his neighbor, though he builds his house in the woods, the world will
make a beaten path to his door (cited in Yule & Keane, 1889).” Despite Emerson’s optimism
about the inherent value of a good idea, people in modern work organizations often come to
discover truth in the reverse: frequently it is the good ideas—rather than the paths towards
them—that get beaten down. Subordinates complain that rather than valuing their good ideas,
their managers instead ignore them, actively resist them, or sink them in the mire of
organizational politics (Smith & Alexander, 1988; Morrison, 1966). Similarly, outside
consultants observe that even though clients initially prize their ideas, they often don’t
implement them (Maister, Green, & Galford, 2000; O’Shea & Madigan, 1997).
In addition to failing to leverage good ideas, sometimes managers embrace bad ideas.
Consider, only recently, how corporate managers over-invested in dot.com ventures (Czernich &
Heath, 2002), and how top-tier stock analysts admired and applauded Enron’s financial practices.
In each of these situations, organizational actors faced with ideas of uncertain value made
investment decisions based on their evaluation of these ideas, and their organizations suffered
tremendous losses as a result.
These images of decision makers confusing good knowledge with bad and bad
knowledge with good call into question rational models of knowledge transfer, in which
managers carefully evaluate each piece of new knowledge that they encounter. Yet, the garbage
can model (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972) veers to the other extreme. This model eliminates the
notion of managers as rational decision makers and replaces it with a time-dependent matching
process, in which actors, problems, and solutions happen to conve rge in time and space. We
posit that while knowledge evaluation is not rational, neither is it random. Instead, it is a
complex process, where well-recognized, social psychological forces converge to determine the
fate of new ideas. Specifically, we propose a “relational model of knowledge valuation,”
whereby the relationships between actors communicating knowledge and actors receiving those
communications produce social psychological forces that moderate how a new piece of
knowledge is evaluated.
We start from the premise that organizational actors possess multiple roles at work and
that each of these roles involves the actor in a variety of relationships with other actors (Kahn,
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1998). We then model how the nature of a person’s different relationships affects how new
knowledge that is conveyed is evaluated (Snyder & Stukas, 1999). Our objective is to use social
psychological research to demonstrate that predictable differences in knowledge valuation often
occur in organizations independent of the actual content of the knowledge that is conveyed.
A Workplace Example
To motivate our approach, we offer the following example drawn from our own
workplaces: evaluating the knowledge that we receive about newly minted Ph.D. students on the
academic job market. When evaluating job candidates, the knowledge that we receive is
abundant, confusing, and ambiguous. While, as professors, we care deeply about the content
domain (the candidate could be our future colleague, after all!), our time and energy resources
are scarce – given the many and conflicting demands on them. In evaluating each candidate, we
cannot claim that the process is perfectly rational, but neither is it random. Instead, it is heavily
influenced by the nature of the relationships that surround us.
For example, if we receive a positive letter from a chaired professor at a well- regarded
department, we weight that piece of knowledge quite heavily in our decision making, perhaps
more heavily than a positive letter from an assistant professor at a less-respected department –
even though we may know the assistant professor better than the chaired professor. Further, if a
rival within our field whom we don’t trust writes a positive letter for his student, we confess that
we are prone to heuristically dismiss that rival’s knowledge. Additionally, if we hear from a
well-regarded professor at a competitor school that her group is interested in a particular
candidate, we are prone to automatically assume that that our competitor’s knowledge is of high
quality. We then may use it to push that candidate onto our “short list,” even if we have not taken
the time to carefully read the file.
As this example illustrates, when we receive knowledge about a job candidate, we
associate it with the messenger who conveys it, and that relational context affects how the
knowledge is evaluated. It is in this manner that relationships influence knowledge valuation.
Perceptions of relational similarity, esteem, rivalry and reputation affect how managers evaluate
what other people tell them. Our goal in writing this paper is to elaborate these processes – to
examine the mechanisms by which perceptions of relationships systematically bias knowledge
valuation.
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Our Approach
We begin by defining our core construct, knowledge, which can be distinguished from
data (discrete, objective facts about events) and information (data which informs, shapes, and
makes a difference to the recipient). Knowledge is “framed experience, values, contextual
information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluation and incorporation of
new experience and information (Davenport & Prusak, 1998: p. 5).” As this definition implies,
knowledge is subjective and complex (Brown & Druid, 2000; Argote & Ingram, 2000). It is
framed by the va lues and context that surrounds its creators and its evaluators (Polyani, 1958).
Because knowledge is subjective and complex, the process of evaluating knowledge is
nuanced. In organizational settings, it is important to point out that managers evaluate knowledge
not only for its content quality (i.e., whether the knowledge is perceived to be creative,
insightful, logical, relevant, and accurate). They must also often take into account the feasibility
of the knowledge (i.e., the degree to which it is timely, appropriate, viable, and politically
practical; e.g., Zmud, 1978; Borgatti & Cross, 2002). While managers will value knowledge
most highly if they judge both its content quality and feasibility positively, those judgments do
not always coincide. Sometimes, managers might value the quality of a piece of knowledge but
consider it infeasible, or appreciate the feasibility of a piece of knowledge but not its content.
Further, whether evaluating content quality or feasibility, psychological research finds
that people are not consistent in how they process knowledge. Specifically, research in social
cognition finds that people can process knowledge in two very different ways: systematic and
heuristic (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999, for a review). Systematic processing most closely
approximates the rational model. It engages the cognitive capacities and capabilities of the
receiver. It entails a “relatively analytic and comprehensive treatment” of knowledge, which is
responsive to the actual content of the knowledge (Chen & Chaiken, 1999, p. 74). In contrast,
heuristic processing makes minimal cognitive demands on a person. It entails the activation and
application of judgmental shortcuts and “heuristics” that are triggered by cues associated with
the knowledge (such as the way that the messenger presents the knowledge), rather than the
actual content of the knowledge. Under heuristic processing, people process knowledge using a
“peripheral route” where they react to the positive or negative cues that they automatically
associate with the knowledge (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Goldman, Cacioppo, 1981).
Under systematic processing, people process knowledge on the “central route,” by exerting more
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mental effort to carefully and diligently assess the attributes of the knowledge (Petty, Goldman,
Cacioppo, 1981).
Our task in this paper, therefore, is to examine the complex and contextually nuanced
ways in which people assess both the content quality and feasibility of new knowledge in
organizational settings. We do this by considering how different relational contexts trigger
heuristic versus systematic processing, and in turn, how these processing tendencies influence
evaluation. In doing this, we control for motivational differences. That is, we assume that the
actors being exposed to new knowledge have the capacity to absorb it (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990), and are motivated to acquire it (Zahra & George, 2002).
Tying this point to our example, our goal is to show why it is that if the same
recommendation letter were written by two different professors, the two letters could be
evaluated quite differently. To do this, we first develop a model of how relationships influence
the processing of new knowledge. Then, we apply this model to explaining how relationships
affect knowledge valuation in organizations.
RELATIONAL MODEL OF EVALUATION
We begin with the relationships that exist between actors communicating knowledge
(“knowledge messengers”) and actors receiving those communications (“knowledge receivers”)
– focusing on the nature of each relationship as perceived by the knowledge receiver (Krone,
Jablin, & Putnam, 1987; Davenport & Prusak, 1998). We adopt the term “relational schemas”
from Baldwin (1992) to represent the receiver’s perception and construal of his or her
relationships with different knowledge messengers. As Baldwin notes, “people develop working
models of their relationships that function as cognitive maps to help them navigate their social
world (p. 462).” These schemas have motivational, cognitive, affective, and behavioral
implications for how a person, in this case a knowledge receiver, processes and responds to
information conveyed within each relational context (Baldwin, 1992; Berscheid, 1994; A. Fiske,
1991; Snyder & Stukas, 1999; Berk & Andersen, 2000).
Further, we take a categorical approach to characterizing the receiver’s different
relationships with knowledge messengers. We use the work of Fiske and Haslam to provide the
foundation for this approach (for a review, see A. Fiske & Haslam, 1996; also A. Fiske, 1991;
Haslam, 1994). Specifically, Fiske and Haslam find that people naturally perceive their
relationships with others in terms of a small number of categories, as compared to a more
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complex multi-dimensional approach in which they view their relationships along a number of
intersecting continuums (e.g., Kiesler, 1983). Thus, their work suggests that people often
categorize their relationships into types, rather than carefully individuating each one.
To date, Fiske and Haslam have identified four broad categories of social relationships
(e.g. communal and market-price based). However, to say something meaningful about
differences in evaluation within organizational settings, a more fine-grained set of categories is
needed. To create such a taxonomy, we draw from recent psychological findings on social and
relational identities (see Andersen & S. Chen, in press, for a review) to isolate three aspects
social perception that are particularly relevant to how knowledge is evaluated: groupidentification, personal appraisal and status. We begin by briefly reviewing each element.
Building off these elements of social perception, we then identify six general types of
relationships that we posit often exist between knowledge messengers and receivers in work
organizations. We label these colleagues, deviants, rivals, enemies, intruders and advisors (see
Figure 1 for a summary). We suggest that each relationship type triggers a corresponding
relational schema, which affects how knowledge is evaluated in that relational context.
Social Perception
Group identification. Group identification reflects a perception of social similarity
between the self and another person – that is, a perception of oneness or belongingness with a
common human aggregate (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Ashforth & Mael,
1989). Research has long found that people perceive other people based on social categories
(Allport, 1954; S. Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000), and evaluate them
based on their categorical similarity or dissimilarity with the self (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Brewer &
Gardner, 1996). People make categorical distinctions at work based on many dimensions, such
as demographic similarity (e.g., we’re all women), shared functional expertise (e.g., we’re both
in finance), shared product line or organizational affiliations (e.g., we both work for the Saturn
division), or shared educational background (e.g., we both have MBAs from Harvard) (Kramer,
1991; Baron & Pfeffer, 1994).
Across different settings, perceptions of a person’s social identity may shift as different
aspects of social identity become salient. For example, in a meeting about maternity policy, a
woman may feel most closely identified with the other women in the room. In another meeting
about how to allocate capital expenditures across functional departments within her company,
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she may feel most closely identified with the other marketing executives in the room who are
both male and female. Thus, as an actor’s perception of his or her social identity shifts across
situations, the perception of whether another actor is an in- or out-group member may also
change (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996).
The perception of group identification is integral to our taxonomy of relational schema,
because psychologists have consistently found that people tend to evaluate knowledge differently
when it is conveyed by in- versus out-group members. Specifically, laboratory research finds that
knowledge communicated by ingroup members tends to be evaluated more positively (e.g.,
Festinger, 1954; Merton, 1957; Siegel & Siegel, 1957; Goethals & Nelson, 1973, Insko, Smith,
Alicke, Wade, & Taylor, 1985; Mackie, 1987). This line of research demonstrates that “in-group
favoritism” often occurs unconsciously and heuristically – thus, people automatically favor ingroup knowledge, without analyzing it deeply (Asch, 1951; Moscovici, 1980; for review see
Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002). Further, laboratory research has found that to the extent that
people do engage in the systematic processing of information, they are more likely to do it when
an ingroup, rather than out-group, member communicates the knowledge (e.g., Mackie, Worth
& Asuncion, 1990; for reviews see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Mackie & Smith, 1998).
Personal appraisal. The second aspect of social perception that we draw from in building
our taxonomy involves personal appraisal. In addition to perceiving the degree to which another
actor is similar or different from themselves based on group membership, people also assign trait
characteristics to others (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). In the process, they make cognitive and
affective judgments regarding the differences that they perceive between themselves and others
(S. Fiske, 1982; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer & Carlston, 1994; Andersen, Glassman & Gold,
1998; Andersen & S. Chen, in press). People do this to resolve the uncertainty they feel about
the motives, intentions, and behaviors of other people (Kramer, 1999).
We use the term personal appraisal to capture this judgment. Is the other evaluated
positively or negatively; is he to be trusted or not; is she perceived as a friend or foe? We can
interpret this appraisal to incorporate whether a knowledge receiver perceives a knowledge
messenger within a promotion (approach) or prevention (avoid) regulatory focus (see Higgins,
1997 for a review). Alternatively, within a social utility approach, this evaluation reflects
whether one’s own outcomes are experienced negatively (competitor), neutrally, or positively
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(trusted friend) relative to the other actor’s (Messick & Sentis, 1985; Loewenstein, Thompson &
Bazerman, 1989).
Existing research suggests that people base personal appraisals on a variety of factors
including their stereotypes associated with group membership differences, personal trait
differences they infer (Pavelchak, 1989; Smith & Zarate, 1992), or even transference; that is, if a
messenger reminds the receiver of a family member or someone that they used to know
(Andersen & Baum, 1994; Berk & Andersen, 2000). Focusing on work contexts, if a person
views an actor as a competitor for scarce resources (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) or a threat to
personal welfare (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), that assessment can also trigger a negative
appraisal. The key point is that in forming a judgment about another actor, a person typically
generates an overall judgment regarding the meaning of that actor to self based on complex
motivational, cognitive, and affective judgments (Kramer, 1999).
Personal appraisals are important to our taxonomy of relational schemas, because existing
research predicts that both heuristic and systematic processing of knowledge valuation will be
colored by how the knowledge receiver appraises the messenger who communicated it. If a
receiver likes a messenger, or considers her trustworthy or attractive, research on source effects
predicts that the receiver will tend to automatically evaluate that messenger’s arguments more
favorably (for reviews, see Chaiken, 1987; McGuire, 1985). Even when a receiver seeks to
carefully and objectively consider the new knowledge of a liked colleague, existing
psychological research suggests that a positivity bias will persist (Kunda, 1990; Chaiken &
Maheswaran, 1994).
Status perceptions. The third element of social perception that we draw from in
developing a relational model of knowledge valuation is that of status. Status is central to how
people perceive social relationships (see for example, Jones & Pittman, 1982; Kiesler, 1983;
Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2002), particularly in organizational settings where the
hierarchical structures and merit-based cultures naturally elicit perceptions of differential
standing among people (Lee & Tiedens, 2001).
Status can be defined as the degree of social esteem that is accorded to one actor by
another actor (S. Fiske, 1993; Ridgeway, 1997; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2002). An actor
has high status if others judge him or her to be comparatively superior to others in some
important domain. The domains that typically determine status include, first, an actor’s position
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in a formal or informal hierarchy, such as an executive vice president or the administrative
person in charge allocating scare resources, such as office space; or alternatively, an actor’s
relationships with other actors who hold formal or informal power, such as the wife of the CEO.
Second, status can be gained due to an actor’s unique expertise, or demonstrated competence in a
situationally- relevant task domain; such as recognized IT, finance, or administrative capabilities.
Third, status is sometimes based on an actor’s ranking on social dominance measures, such as
age, wealth, education, or physical attractiveness (see for a review, Y. Chen, Blount, & SanchezBurks, in press). When considering the role of status in relational perception, it is important to
note that status perceptions can a) be both absolute and comparative (relative to the self) and b)
function at both the interpersonal level and the inter-group level (see Keltner et al., 2002;
Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton & Hume, 2001 for reviews).
Here, we use the term status, therefore, as a general construct to represent an actor’s or a
group’s augmented social standing, which can result from a variety of social processes, including
power, respect and authority, among others. We use the labels of high (and low) status to refer to
the enhanced (or diminished) social standing that some people or groups have based on: their
performance-based competencies (or perceived performance weaknesses), their high (or low)
positions in the formal or informal organizational structures, and their social attributes which
may engender submission (or dominance) from others.
Status, as we define it, is important to consider in examining how relationships affect
knowledge transfer, because psychological research consistently finds that status perceptions
moderate how people evaluate other people’s ideas and knowledge. Across all relational types,
psychological research on source effects predicts that receivers will positively evaluate
knowledge communicated by high status messengers and messengers from high status in- groups
(see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for a review). Further, if knowledge receivers are themselves
members of high status in- groups, they will tend to value their own group members’ knowledge
quite highly. In contrast, if they are members of low-status in-groups, they may derogate the
knowledge of their own group members (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000) and be
biased against internally generated knowledge (Boldry & Kashy, 1999).
Taxonomy of Relationship Types at Work
We now turn to our taxonomy of relationship types at work (see Table 1), which builds
off the social perception research that we have just reviewed. As Table 1 shows, our types are
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most easily conveyed by conceptually crossing perceptions of group identification (rows) and
personal appraisal (columns) to create six categories. We label these colleague, rival, deviant,
enemy, intruder and advisor. We incorporate our third conceptual element, status perceptions, by
considering its effects within each of the six categories. As Table 1 shows, the label “colleague”
applies to knowledge messengers whom the receiver perceives as ingroup members and friends.
They are positively appraised. The label “rival” applies to messengers whom the receiver
perceives as ingroup members, but who threaten personal outcomes. They are competitors for
resources (structurally equivalent actors, e.g., Burt, 1992) or perhaps threats to personal safety
(someone who has been known to sabotage the self). “Deviants” are similar to rivals because
they are ingroup members whom a receiver perceives as threatening to the self. However, the
threat of deviants comes through their meaning to the group. Deviants are “black sheep,”
unusual ingroup members who threaten the group’s solidarity and hence, threaten the
messenger’s welfare as a member of that group. Both deviants and rivals are negatively
appraised ingroup members.
The label “enemy” applies to messengers whom the receiver perceives to be a member of
another group, and whose existence threatens the welfare of the ingroup. This category is
typified by members of a competitor firm, for example, that is considered predatory in its
practices; or another organizational group vying with the ingroup for scarce organizational
resources. The label “intruder” is similar, but applies to members of out- groups who are
evaluated neutrally relative to the ingroup, but whom the receiver finds personally threatening.
This category is exemplified by an outside management consultant who gives advice that could
threaten the receiver’s welfare (e.g., the employee fears being downsized based on the
consultant’s report!). Finally, the label “advisor” refers to out-group members who have positive
relationships with the receiver. Thus, the receiver perceives the advisor’s group as neutral or
allied with the receiver’s in-group, and regards the advisor positively at a personal level. An
example here is a trusted counselor (Maister, Green & Galford, 2000), such as an executive
coach or legal counsel. Alternatively, this category would include well- respected executives in
other companies who are known for their expertise; e.g., Jack Welch in the 1990’s.
In the next two sections, we draw from psychological research to examine these six
relationship types, and the corresponding relational schema that each evokes, in detail. We begin
by examining the interactive effects of group identification and personal appraisal that typify
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each relational type, and then consider the motivational and cognitive effects of status
perceptions. Our goal is to develop a relational perspective on how knowledge travels through
organizations. To do this, we focus on how the nature of the relationship between a knowledge
messenger and a knowledge receiver moderates how knowledge that is communicated is
evaluated.
Table 1 here
RELATIONAL SCHEMAS: INSIDERS
With this theoretical framework in- hand, we now examine how the relational schemas
associated with the different relationship types differentially shape knowledge valuation in work
organizations. In doing so, we consider the interactive effects that group identification, personal
appraisal and status perceptions have on knowledge valuation. We posit that each relational
schema evokes an array of motivational and cognitive consequences that affect how knowledge
receivers evaluate the new knowledge tha t they encounter. These consequences tend to enhance
knowledge valuation for some of the relational schemas (e.g. colleagues, enemies, and advisors)
and inhibit knowledge valuation for others (e.g. deviants, rivals, and intruders). However, each
relational schema also contains more nuanced dynamics that attenuate these general
predispositions. We begin with ingroup schemas: colleagues, rivals, and deviants.
Colleagues
Colleagues share strong ingroup identification, and evoke little or no personal threat. As
positively regarded acquaintances, close friends, and trusted co-workers, colleagues collaborate
together on shared goals. In the process, strong affiliations form, and well-documented groupbased motivations to protect and preserve the group’s identity emerge. These motivations make
knowledge from colleagues appear more attractive, as we have already discussed. However,
when we examine collegial relationships outside of the laboratory in field settings, we also find
more subtle dynamics that undermine knowledge valuation. The physical proximity of
colleagues and the taken- for-granted nature of their knowledge can reduce the degree to which
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receivers value it. Below, we examine how these contradictory forces affect the way in which
receivers evaluate the knowledge that their colleagues convey.
Factors enhancing valuation of the quality of a colleague’s knowledge. Colleagues often
come to see each other’s knowledge as superior to that possessed by outsiders. This is
particularly likely to be the case when colleagues are part of a highly cohesive ingroup (see
Hewstone et al., 2002). Cohesion develops when groups are long-standing (Katz & Allen, 1982)
and physically remote from the rest of the organization or from groups performing similar tasks.
When a highly cohesive, committed team works in isolation, an “us against the world mentality”
often emerges (Levy, 2001). Such closely-knit groups groups are prone to groupthink (Janis,
1972), whereby group members fail to scrutinize each other’s opinions, and instead confirm
them heuristically, in the interests of getting along and keeping group interactions fluid (S. Chen,
Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996). Relatedly, they suffer from the “not-invented-here” (NIH)
syndrome, where group members systematically see the knowledge that comes from insiders as
superior to knowledge that comes from outsiders (Katz & Allen, 1982). Such beliefs about the
value of an ingroup member’s knowledge serve to create positive group distinctiveness, affirm
ingroup membership, and denigrate the out-group by placing it at a social distance (Bourhis,
Turner, & Gagnon, 1987).
The preference toward insider knowledge becomes even more acute if, in addition to
group cohesion, members of the ingroup regard their group as particularly high status or
distinctive due to their members’ unique skills or competence (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman,
1981; Chaiken, 1987; Boldry & Kashy, 1999; Bettencourt et al. 2001). This often happens
among members of elite consulting and accounting firms or within well-regarded practice groups
in a specific industry. At American Express, for example, there is a long-held cultural belief that
American Express is better than any of its competitors at marketing. Employees report a strong
preference toward insider perspectives on marketing, such that it is extremely difficult for a
senior outside marketing hire to gain credibility within the organization (personal
communication, September 2002). Kahn (1998) reports a similar situation at a consulting firm,
where partners gave greater weight to the perspectives of insider consultants who were relatively
junior, but trained at the firm, than they did to more experienced consultants hired from the
outside. Thus, being perceived as a “true insider” is a source of personal status within many
groups that augments the perceived value of colleagues’ knowledge.
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This is not true in low-status groups, where members often derogate insider knowledge
(Jost & Burgess, 2000; Boldry & Kashy, 1999). However, even within low-status in-groups,
receivers will value knowledge from a colleague with high personal status (perhaps based on
external reputation) (Mills & Harvey, 1972). In fact, the benefits of high personal status are
augmented in groups with low status. Consider the example of winning a Nobel prize in
economics. Winning the prize as a faculty member at the University of Chicago, where there are
already five professors who hold this honor, will not gain a person as much within- group esteem
as it might if one were a faculty member at a less prestigious school, where there are no prior
award winners on faculty. Low-status groups are particularly likely to revere and bask in the
reflected glory of their high status members who have been externally validated (Blau, 1986).
Factors enhancing valuation of the feasibility of a colleague’s knowledge. Even if
managers don’t hold implicit or explicit beliefs regarding the superior content quality of their
colleagues’ knowledge, they often value it for its feasibility. This may be true within both highand low-status groups. Knowledge from colleagues is local and hence easily available (Cyert &
March, 1963; O’Reilly, 1982). Thus, managers might not think that it is the best knowledge
based on its content, but it is good enough, and they value its feasibility (March & Simon, 1958).
The logic of satisficing—which favors local, readily accessible knowledge—is particularly likely
to operate when a knowledge receiver is under high levels of time pressure, given that time
pressure induces a drive toward closure (de Dreu, Koole & Oldersma, 1999; Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996) and more heuristic processing (see Svenson & Maule, 1993; for a review).
Second, a colleague’s knowledge may appear more relevant, appropriate, and hence more
feasible, because the colleague shares a common background and similar taken- for- granted
cultural assumptions. Knowledge receivers expect that colleagues are more aware of
surrounding operational, cultural and political contexts; including, for example, standard
operating procedures, power dynamics, and cultural values. Thus, a receiver may assume that a
colleague’s knowledge is particularly relevant, because it incorporates an understanding of
context.
Third, a colleague’s knowledge might also be judged as more feasible when the ingroup
develops procedures that enable it to efficiently share knowledge with each other. People in
groups often develop transactive memory systems whereby members supplement their individual
memories (which are often unreliable and subject to natural limits) with other group members as
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external aids (Wegner, 1987). Because individual group members share implicit knowledge
about who knows what in the group, they do not attempt to become experts in all content areas.
As a result of their mutual dependence, members in such groups are more willing to defer to
others for knowledge, and might be prone to heuristically enhance their valuations of colleagues’
knowledge.
As a final point, a receiver’s perceptions of the feasibility of a colleagues’ knowledge
will be positively correlated with the messenger’s power- or authority-based status – in both an
absolute and comparative sense (that is, the messenger’s status compared to the receiver’s).
Whenever actors have high absolute status, others value their ideas (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993,
for a review). Further, as a messenger’s comparative power- or authority-based status in the
organization increases, receivers defer to their knowledge (Lee & Tiedens, 2001), and assume
that their peers will too. Thus, social conformity pressures elevate the perceived feasibility of
high-status actors’ knowledge. For these reasons, receivers might publicly affirm the knowledge
of a high-status messenger because they recognize its feasibility, while privately devaluing its
content quality.
Factors reducing valuation. Despite the robust psychological finding that receivers
consistently overvalue knowledge from colleagues, organizational evidence shows that internal
knowledge is not always highly valued, and that managers often struggle to transfer it (Szulanski,
1996; Von Hippel, 1994). In order to explain these findings, we question the assumption that
identification breeds respect, and describe some reasons why people in organizations do not
necessarily value knowledge that comes from those with whom they identify.
First of all, although proximity and close contact allow insiders to develop strong
identifications with one another (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950) and make internal
knowledge readily accessible (March & Simon, 1958; O’Reilly, 1982), the same factors also
enable receivers to more readily see the errors and imperfections of colleagues’ ideas (Menon &
Pfeffer, 2001; Strickland, 1958). As Strickland notes, the subordinate in close proximity to a
boss receives a lower performance evaluation than a subordinate who is more physically
removed. Further, whereas managers see both the colleagues’ successes and failures, as with
most negative pieces of information (Pratto & John, 1991), failures are likely to be more salient.
Managers are also likely to attribute these failures to their colleagues’ competence, rather than to
a variety of external causal factors (such as bad luck, lack of resources, etc.; e.g., Ross, 1977;
The Messenger Bias
16
Mitchell & Wood, 1980). Finally, managers experience spillover, a tendency to extend unrelated
negative information about colleagues across domains (deficiencies in interpersonal skills or
personal disorganization, for example). Such close-up scrutiny, and the attributional and recall
biases that follow from it, are particularly problematic when evaluating colleagues’ new ideas,
which naturally contain flaws.
A quote from an FBI agent in the months following the World Trade Center attacks
illustrates how such attributional biases make it easy to dismiss a colleague, when people knew
him at a personal level, with all his quirks and flaws. “If a confidential memorandum comes
from a guy out in say, Phoenix, the first things that goes up the line, is ‘That’s Harry again. He’s
like a broken clock twice a day,’ . . . (Hirsh & Isikoff, 2002: 30).” The result is that colleagues
are subject to an ambivalent reaction (Glick & S. Fiske, 1996): while people regard them as wellliked friends and acquaintances, they do not necessarily see them as sources of valuable, new
knowledge.
Salience is another barrier that inhibits receivers from valuing the knowledge that
colleagues communicate. When internal knowledge is abundant, managers can become
distracted, and fail to identify useful and relevant kernels of knowledge. This problem is
widespread in legal and management consulting firms where dispersed teams of professionals
generate large amounts of knowledge on an on-going basis. The key constraints in such an
environment do not lie in generating the knowledge, but in retaining and tracking it for others to
use (Hansen & Haas, 2001; Ocasio, 1997). Note that this salience problem does not reflect the
negative valuation of colleagues’ knowledge, but the tendency to de facto devalue it by losing
track of it.
To illustrate this point, again we consider intelligence gathering operations in the U.S.
government prior to the 9/11/01 attacks. FBI and CIA agents all over the country had noticed
alarming hints about the impending attacks and had independently issued a variety of warnings
and reports. However, many of these reports were dismissed as “chatter,” and none of this
knowledge was combined and connected (Hirsh & Isikoff, 2002; Bazerman, 2002).
Integration. Receivers are particularly likely to value knowledge from their colleagues
for many well-documented psychological reasons. The strong identification that develops
between colleagues increases perceptions of the quality of their knowledge, and the accessibility
of their knowledge promotes perceptions of its feasibility. However, more subtle dynamics
The Messenger Bias
17
arising from the accessibility of collegial knowledge can also undermine its valuation.
Accessible knowledge is often so abundant that it lacks salience, and its flaws are readily
scrutinized as well. The strength of the motivation to perceive insiders favorably determines
which dynamic prevails. Members of well-regarded, cohesive groups come to identify with their
colleagues and over-value their knowledge (Katz & Allen, 1982), while less cohesive or
prestigious groups often derogate their own knowledge by subjecting it to excessive scrutiny or
failing to attend to it (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Menon & Pfeffer, 2002). Within both high- and lowstatus groups, the personal status of a collegial messenger (whether it derives from expertise,
power, or authority) often strengthens the motivation to evaluate that messenger’s knowledge
favorably.
Table 2 here
Deviants
We now consider deviants, those ingroup members who other group members perceive
as threats to the group’s identity. They might threaten the status of a group because they are
poor performers, and hence poor exemplars of the group; or they might destabilize the group by
questio ning or ignoring group norms. They stimulate group conflict by holding unusual positions
that do not correspond to the taken- for- granted assumptions of the group, or they foster ill- will
by alienating group members with their non-normative behaviors in group meetings. Whether
conscious of their actions or not, deviants disrupt group balance and evoke strong negative
reactions from other group members (Phillips, 2000; Heider, 1946).
Consider the example of a whistle-blower at TAP drugs, a pharmaceutical company
which eventually paid a $875 million fine for conspiring with doctors to cheat the government.
When the whistle-blower sought to reform the company’s unfair practices he found that, “Most
of what I did there was resisted, undermined (Haddad & Barrett, 2002: 128).” Co-workers at the
company countered the threat he posed to their group identity by rejecting his ideas, telling him
he didn’t understand the company culture, excluding him from top marketing and sales meetings,
The Messenger Bias
18
and even hinting that he could become a convenient scapegoat for the company if they were
caught.
As this example suggests, the robustness of the ingroup favoritism effect depends on the
characteristics of the ingroup member in question. Cohesive groups allow relatively little
deviance from group norms among their members, and shun insiders who deviate. In- group
members dislike black sheep, insiders who they perceive as deviant, more than they dislike outgroup members (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998). People also display horizontal hostility,
evaluating in-group members who are closer to the mainstream more negatively than more
distant outsiders (White & Langer, 1999). Finally, itinerants, those who leave their in- groups
and then return to them, find that their boundary spanning behaviors blur their identities as ingroup members and increase the degree to which other group members treat them like black
sheep. Although itinerants produce more unique ideas, their in- groups see them as more
argumentative and are less likely to value and use their ideas (Gruenfeld, Martorana, & Fan,
2000). The net result is strong affective, negative reactions against deviants, which lead people
to heuristically devalue the knowledge they communicate.
As with colleagues, receivers are well aware of the deviant’s flaws because of their close
proximity. However, receivers possess the additional motivation to find the deviant’s flaws in
order to preserve group identity, a motivation that is intensified in cohesive groups. Thus, while
receivers try to maintain an “illusion of objectivity,” they are particularly motivated to arrive at a
negative evaluation of the deviant’s knowledge. Even if receivers systematically process it, they
often scrutinize the knowledge more carefully as they search for evidence to support their desired
conclusions (Kunda, 1990).
One factor that can moderate the bias against the deviant’s knowledge is the degree to
which ingroup members respect the deviant’s unique content expertise – our exemplar being the
deviant genius. Here, group members tolerate deviance because the black sheep compensates for
it through some extraordinary contribution to the group within a specific task domain. Corporate
lore is full of stories of rogue programmers and deal makers, whose brilliance made their
eccentricities tolerable. We posit that group members more positively evaluate knowledge
communicated by these “genius” deviants, but only if it lies within the deviant’s recognized
domain of expertise.
The Messenger Bias
19
Thus, despite the deviant’s potential role as an internal innovator and stimulus for change
(Sutton, 2001), we predict that even when deviants convey potentially valuable knowledge,
others scrutinize it more carefully than when a well- respected colleague conveys the same
knowledge. Before accepting a deviant’s knowledge, receivers carefully look for flaws, since
they anticipate that their colleagues will do the same.
Table 3 here
Rivals
Rivals are ingroup members who, like deviants, are negatively evaluated by receivers.
They may be competitors for resources (such as customers or promotions) or perhaps threats to
personal safety (someone who has been known to sabotage the receiver). In either case, in
contrast to deviants, they threaten the receiver, although other in-group members may regard
them as colleagues or friends. Thus, while the receiver’s colleagues may be inclined to favor the
rival messenger’s knowledge, because they are motivated to bolster their group’s identity, the
receiver’s reaction is more ambivalent.
Factors reducing valuation. Although receivers are motivated to monitor the knowledge
of their rivals as a tool for managing the uncertainties implicit in competition (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Ruscher & S. Fiske, 1990), they are less motivated to actually value and use that
knowledge because of the potential threat that it poses to their own status. When a receiver
values the knowledge of a rival, they face a painful upward social comparison, which increases
their sense of inferiority and insecurity, and constitutes a “loss of uniqueness (Brickman &
Bulman, 1977: p.179).” These pangs of jealousy are particularly intense when the target is an ingroup member rather than a less directly threatening out-group member (Tesser, Millar, &
Moore, 1988).
The threats of social comparison do not only occur in privacy, they also occur on the
public stage of the organization. As a result, the pains of social comparison do not simply
involve private insecurities and emotional heartache—one’s reputation, social standing within
the group, and even more tangible financial rewards and promotions are also at stake. Because
The Messenger Bias
20
status accrues to those who can cope with the critical problems of the organization (Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1982), if a receiver evaluates a rival’s knowledge positively, they essentially legitimate a
direct competitor for rewards and status in the group, and undermine their own position. The
threats that a rival evokes are exacerbated when the surrounding organizational culture fosters
internal contests for status and reward (Menon & Pfeffer, 2002).
In order to devalue the knowledge of their rivals, receivers often invoke the façade of
objective evaluation and rationality. Their peers lack the motivation to devalue their rivals’
knowledge, so receivers must justify their objections carefully. Furthermore, receivers have a
wealth of evidence from which to scrutinize and criticize their rivals, given that they are often
privy to a similar close-up view of their rivals that ingroup members enjoy. Thus, even if
receivers intend to be even-handed and methodical evaluating their rivals, the negative
conclusions that they hope to reach will often color evaluation (Kunda, 1990).
Factors enhancing valuation. Whereas an equal status rival is seen as an intensely
threatening direct competitor and a lower-status rival does not inspire vigilance (Fiske, 1993),
receivers both notice high power rivals’ knowledge and evaluate it positively. The high power
rival’s knowledge is salient, because the receiver with lower standing is hyper-vigilant, and
carefully monitors communications from them (S. Fiske, 1993; Kramer, 1998). Further, the
receiver pragmatically embraces the high status rival’s knowledge, because if they do not, they
experience evaluation apprehension or a fear of displaying disrespect to someone with
organizational power (Blau, 1955; Lee, 1997). Further, if receivers expect the high-status rival
to construe help-seeking as flattery (Jones & Pittman, 1982), they publicly extol the knowledge,
whether they value its content or not, to further ingratiate themselves and diffuse any competitive
threat.
Second, receivers are likely to elevate their valuation of a rival’s knowledge if the rival’s
status derives from content expertise in a domain that is not relevant to the receiver’s selfconcept (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988). As an example, a rival’s unique accounting
knowledge does not threaten a receiver who sees herself as a marketing expert. Further, if the
rival succeeds in a domain that the receiver does not perceive as threatening, the receiver can
even recategorize the rival as a colleague, and bask in the reflected glory.
Finally, the opportunity to appropriate credit for a rival’s idea also enhances a receiver’s
valuation of it. While managers like getting credit for good ideas, they like it even more when,
The Messenger Bias
21
by appropriating credit for an idea, they block a rival from gaining status and appropriate the
status for themselves. Thus, if a rival is well-known throughout the organization as the champion
of a particular idea, receivers are less likely to value and use that idea than if they could fluidly
appropriate the credit for having created it (Prusak & Cohen, 1996). This is most likely to
happen with respect to low-status rivals, where the receiver has comparatively more power and
thus more opportunity to get away with appropriation. These dynamics famously occurred
between Maurice Wilkins and Rosalind Franklin, two rival scientists at King’s College in
England who were attempting to uncover the structure of DNA. Franklin, the lone female
scientist in the group, was the first person to produce photographs that depicted the double helix
structure of DNA. Without Franklin’s permission, Wilkins illicitly appropriated and shared that
knowledge with two other scientists at Cambridge University, James Watson and Francis Crick,
providing them with the critical piece of knowledge necessary for their path-breaking
discoveries. Franklin died four years before the othe r three shared the Nobel Prize for medicine,
and never received the credit she deserved for her contribution (Watson, 1980).
Integration. In sum, receivers are prone to devalue knowledge communicated by rival
messengers because of their self-serving motiva tions. In the process, the knowledge of rival
messengers tends to be heuristically dismissed, or over-scrutinized to expose its flaws. The
primary factor that moderates this negative valuation is if the messenger has high power- or
expertise-based status. In managing the status threats implicit in the act of valuing a rival’s
knowledge, receivers are concerned both with how that act reflects upon their own competence
and how others in the organization make attributions about it. They ask themselves, does this
display my incompetence? Does it confirm the superiority of my direct competitor? Is my
superior complimented when I use their knowledge or insulted? And what will the ever-present
audience of my peers around me think? The answers to these questions determine how receivers
privately assess rivals’ knowledge, and how they publicly respond to it as well.
Table 4 here
The Messenger Bias
22
RELATIONAL SCHEMAS: OUTSIDERS
We now move to the relational schemas associated with out-group members, and
examine the affective, motivational and cognitive factors that affect receivers’ valuations of their
knowledge. While the finding of ingroup favoritism is one of social psychology’s most robust
(see Hewstone et. al. 2002 and Mackie & Smith, 1998 for reviews on intergroup bias), the
interesting observation from organizational settings is that managers often value external
knowledge, sometimes to the point of over- valuation (consider the popularity of management
gurus). Yet, at other times, as psychological theory would predict, managers shun the intrusion of
outsiders into their affairs.
To make sense of these counterintuitive and seemingly contradictory observations, we
begin our analysis with enemies and int ruders, who like rivals and deviants are negatively
evaluated. Enemies threaten the receiver’s in-group by competing with it for customers in the
external marketplace or for scarce resources within the intra-organizational marketplace. In
contrast, intruders pose a self- threat to the receiver. Receivers do not evaluate them negatively
to preserve their group’s identity: they perceive the intruder’s group as neutral or allied with their
own in-group. However, they perceive intruders as personally threatening (e.g., a consultant in
conflict with internal managers in an organization).
We argue that competition between outsiders motivates learning if those outsiders pose
group- rather than self-threats. Competitors learn from each other, because learning enables
them to anticipate competitive uncertainties, and they can do so without the social comparison
processes and status threats that discourage learning from rivals. In contrast, because intruders
enter a receiver’s personal domain and threaten personal interests, managers respond to intruders
as they respond to rivals: in their efforts to defeat them, they avoid affirming the knowledge that
they carry.
Enemies
Enemies are members of groups that threaten the receiver’s ingroup. They may compete
for customers in the external marketplace or for scarce resources within the intra-organizational
marketplace. In either form, they introduce an interesting nuance for the knowledge receiver.
Rather than derogating an enemy’s knowledge, because the enemy is the member of an outgroup, people in organizations often heuristically embrace it. Consider the meticulous care with
which corporations have been found pursue enemy knowledge -- using wiretaps, bribery, and
The Messenger Bias
23
computer hacking to illegally obtain it. Oracle even recently admitted that its detectives had
hired janitors to go through Microsoft’s trash (Lavelle, 2001).
Factors enhancing valuation. Why do receivers so readily value enemy knowledge as
compared to knowledge from deviants, rivals, or even colleagues? Enemy relationships are a
threat, and as popular wisdom notes, a good scare is often worth more than good advice.
Managers sometimes seek to manage that threat by monitoring, learning, and acquiring
knowledge about the enemy’s strategies (Williamson, 1975). Rather than stereotyping enemies
(Sherif, 1966), people often pay a great deal of attention to them and form individuated, highly
elaborated impressions of them (Ruscher & S. Fiske, 1990). In the process, group members
carefully scan their environments to locate enemy knowledge, which makes enemy knowledge
highly salient.
On the other hand, while the fear of falling behind a competitor sometimes mobilizes
action, it also elicits threat rigidity (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Even though threat
rigidity increases the degree to which managers perceive competitors heuristically, they still pay
attention to them and often simplify their perceptions of their enemies by exaggerating their
competence and automatically valuing, or even overvaluing, their knowledge. A recent analysis
of the threat that China’s high-tech sector posed for the Silicon Valley illustrates how people
respond to a threatening enemy by emphasizing their competence and heightening the fear they
evoke. An American venture capitalist predicted that China would become “a ferociously
formidable competitor for companies that run the entire length of the technology food chain.” A
Chinese executive describes Fudan University as the next Stanford or Berkley, and another
threateningly states, “We are not as sophisticated as Lucent, Ericsson, or Cisco, but the gap has
shrunk a lot. We will have the ability to exceed them in 3-5 years (Einhorn, 2002: 84).” This
dramatic characterization of an apparently invincible new enemy remarkably parallels
descriptions of the Japanese as an economic powerhouse in the late 1980s (Thurow, 1993). As a
result of their positive assessments of Japanese corporations, managers blindly pursued Japanese
management practices in the late 1980s as they sought to match that enemy’s achievements—
even when idea appropriation involved large costs (Thurow, 1987). In hindsight, Japan was
viewed through a simplified lens—albeit one that exaggerated rather than derogated its
knowledge. Thus, although managers oft en carefully scan the environment to find enemy
The Messenger Bias
24
knowledge (Ruscher and S. Fiske, 1990), they also experience rigidity that makes them simplify
their competitive landscape by accepting too willingly the enemy knowledge that they find.
An important questio n is why receivers meet an enemy’s threat with knowledge valuation
while confronting a rival’s threat by valuing that knowledge less (Menon, Thompson, and Choi,
2002). There are several dimensions along which the threats from organizational and market
competitors differ. First of all, although enemies induce vigilance on the group level just as
rivals induce vigilance on the individual- level, when managers perceive an external threat, they
do not have the luxury of ignoring or pondering it (Cyert & March, 1963). Threats from enemies
seem urgent—more urgent than the potential opportunities that internal knowledge represents.
Managers often feel time pressure to respond in kind, which induces more heuristic processing
and mindless imitation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993).
Second, receivers are more likely to approach enemy knowledge with a promotion focus,
rather than the prevention focus associated with the knowledge of rivals (Higgins, Rholes, &
Jones, 1977; Higgins, Roney, Crowe & Hymes, 1994) because enemies pose a threat to the
receiver’s group rather than the self, and their knowledge has few negative implications for a
receiver’s status. Indeed, when receivers locate important enemy knowledge, they even accrue
status within their in- groups. By providing scarce knowledge about how to cope with threats to
the in-group, they can help the group to neutralize some of their competitor’s fire (Tushman,
1977; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Thus, receivers have self-serving motivations to see the enemy
knowledge that they encounter as valuable.
Finally, in contrast to rival’s knowledge which is readily available within the
organization, the scarcity of enemy knowledge, which is closely guarded behind the enemy's
walls, also heuristically increases its perceived value (Cialdini, 2001). Enemy messengers often
don’t want to part with their knowledge while colleagues or rivals readily share and sometimes
even market their knowledge. Further, when managers expend considerable effort and financial
resources to obtain enemy knowledge, they escalate their psychological commitment to
perceiving it as valuable (Staw, 1981).
Factors reducing valuation. When a receiver’s group has higher status than an enemy’s
group, the receiver may engage in out- group derogation, and heuristically dismiss enemy
knowledge. This will be particularly true if the enemy messenger’s personal status is also low.
(As we have discussed earlier, low personal status is associated with the heuristic devaluation of
The Messenger Bias
25
one’s knowledge.) Dominant firms have the luxury of such inertia. Rather than reacting to or
learning from their less powerful competitors, they can control them by locking them into
exchange relations on their own terms (Burt 1992). It is the firms with less power, status, size,
and profitability that must vigilantly respond to their larger, higher status competitors (Haveman,
1993).
However, if receivers attend more to enemy knowledge communicated by messengers
from groups of equal or higher status, they can be blindsided when a small stealth competitor
emerges into their competitive landscape. Thus, receivers sometimes pay attention to the
knowledge of their low-status enemy groups, particularly when they are perceived to have
expertise in a domain of competitive interest (such as new product technology or operational
practices). The television, for example, was originally invented by an eccentric independent
inventor named Philo Farnsworth, based on work he did as a fourteen year-old. Several years
later, David Sarnoff, vice president of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), managed to
appropriate most of the technology, credit, and profits from the idea (Schwartz, 2002). More
recently, Microsoft has reportedly used its status and financial might to respond aggressively to
the competitive challenges of lower status firms – either by surreptitiously appropriating their
knowledge or directly acquiring them.
Finally, even when the enemy is a respected, higher status competitor, they still often
perceive the enemy ambivalently (Glick & Fiske, 1996). The receiver might highly value the
enemy’s knowledge and even copy and appropriate it, but might derogate the enemy on a
different dimension. For example, although managers considered the Japanese to be formidable
competitors with useful production knowledge, they often disparaged the Japanese for their
creativity. This ambivalence enables the receiver to simultaneously gain the benefits of learning
from the enemy, while also gaining the psychological benefits of derogating a potential threat.
Integration. In sum, receivers are prone to automatically over-value the knowledge that
enemies communicate due to competitive uncertainties, its status-enhancing cachet within the
receiver’s ingroup, and its perceived scarcity. Even when receivers deeply process enemy
knowledge, their competitive motivations to “keep up with the enemy” implicitly elevates the
value of the knowledge. This tendency is mitigated if the enemy is a lower status actor within a
competitor group or the enemy messenger represents a lower status group. In these cases, the
The Messenger Bias
26
automatic tendencies toward devaluing lower-status actors and out- groups will lead to out-group
derogation and the heuristic devaluation of knowledge.
Table 5 here
Intruders
We move now to intruders, who on the surface appear to be important sources of new
knowledge for the organization. These are consultants (either internal or external), accountants,
legal counsel, executive coaches and trainers, and other outsiders who potentia lly offer new ideas
to the organization. Actors in these roles do not threaten the receiver at a group level—instead,
they are often brought in to collaborate with the ingroup to improve performance. However, in
contrast to enemies, they intrude into the group boundary, and in the process, threaten the
receiver’s turf (e.g., power, access to resources, or their sense of autonomy at work). When an
out- group member generates a personal threat, they invoke many of the dynamics that are
present in relations hips between rivals. However, because they are outsiders whose relationships
are not governed by group norms, the negative consequences for knowledge valuation are more
devastating than between rivals.
Factors reducing valuation. When intruders offer kno wledge to ingroup members, they
find that receivers often respond with the vigor of a parent whose child has been criticized by a
stranger. Even if that stranger has valuable insights and intends to be helpful, a parent is unlikely
to appreciate an intrus ion into their own sphere of jurisdiction. Similarly, managers question the
right of intruders to comment on their own areas of expertise. As a result, even when the
intruder has expertise-based status, which typically heightens the perceived quality and
credibility of knowledge in the other relational schemas (Lee & Tiedens, 2001), that expertise
personally threatens the receiver’s sense of autonomy and competence.
Receivers often denigrate the intruders’ expertise and the intruder’s out- group in order to
justify denigrating their knowledge (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). For example, they charge
consultants with “repackaging what we already knew,” being out of touch with the “realities of
running a business,” and being paid “yes- men” (O’Shea & Madigan, 1997) -- sentiments that so
The Messenger Bias
27
many Dilbert cartoons rely upon in order to ridicule consultants. Further, receivers question the
feasibility and relevance of the knowledge that intruders carry, since they lack the in-depth
insider view of the organization and its circumstances. And while intruders wear the taint of
being an outsider, they actually have the disadvantages of being an insider as well. Because
intruders have entered the organizational boundary, receivers have the opportunity to scrutinize
them at close range, and thereby strip their knowledge of its scarcity and uniqueness. Thus,
unlike relations between enemies where group threat inspires knowledge valuation, when
intruders provoke personal threats, receivers respond by devaluing their groups and their
knowledge.
Factors enhancing valuation. Receivers are more likely to value the knowledge of
intruders when they individuate them, and perceive them as only loosely associated with their
out- groups, rather than as an exemplar of the group (Depret & S. Fiske, 1993). This process
lessens the tendency toward automatic out-group derogation associated with a threat response,
and explains the conventional wisdom that personal relationships are key to the effectiveness of
professional service providers (Block, 1999). By building personal relationships with their
clients, clients can come to see intruders as individuals, who can be trusted, rather than as
members of a feared and consequently maligned out-group (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).
Such relationships can even enable consultants to reduce the threats that they might have
otherwise posed, and ultimately shed their intruder status. Andersen’s accountants, for example,
reduced their threatening status as an intruder at Enron by establishing a cozy rela tionship with
insiders. McKinsey consultants, too, turned a blind eye to problems at Enron in order to preserve
a lucrative relationship. In one consultant’s words, “When you have a mega-client, ‘This is what
the client should hear,’ is twisted into, ‘This is what is going to let us stay at the boardroom level
(Byrne, 2002: 71).’”
In addition to building a direct personal relationship with the receiver, the intruder’s
network of relationships with other actors who surround the receiver can mitigate the receiver’s
tendency to devalue the intruder’s knowledge (Krackhardt, 1992). For example, if the intruder is
known to have a close relationship with a high stakes organizational member, such as the CEO
or the receiver’s direct supervisor, the intruder’s knowledge will be more systematically
processed. With that relationship, the intruder may implicitly be accorded the standing of a high-
The Messenger Bias
28
status insider (by association), which can lead the intruder’s knowledge to be more positively
evaluated, particularly regarding feasibility.
Alternatively, if the intruder is known to be working closely with the members of an
internal or external competitor group, the intruder’s knowledge may be seen as a form
competitive intelligence, and be heuristically viewed as more valuable. The same would be true
if the intruder were perceived to be working closely with a rival. In each case, the receiver may
modify the relational schema that is applied to a well-connected intruder, because the intruder’s
allies trigger other group- or self-protective motivations. These motivations, in turn, become
associated with the intruder and his or her knowledge. In each case, the receiver is more vigilant
in scanning for knowledge and less prone to automatically devalue the intruder’s knowledge. In
general, the presence of outside alliances can lead a receiver to process an intruder’s knowledge
in a manner that more closely resembles the careful monitoring and evaluation of a rival’s or
enemy’s knowledge.
Integration. In sum, because intruders evoke a sense of personal threat, receivers are
motivated to derogate them, their groups and their knowledge. Receivers lack the statusenhancement motive that they have with enemies’ to embrace their knowledge (Burt, 1992;
Tushman, 1977). Instead, receivers respond as they do to rivals: they avoid affirming the
knowledge that they carry. The intruder’s network of relationships is the main factor that can
moderate this tendency. If the intruder is allied with powerful others within the group, or with
members of competitor groups or rivals, the receiver will attend to the intruder’s knowledge
more carefully, and be less prone to heuristically devalue it.
Table 6 here
Advisors
Finally, we turn to the category of advisors. They are members of out-groups that the
receiver perceives as neutral or allied with their ingroup. This category includes professional
service providers such as consultants, accountants, legal counsel, executive coaches, and trainers.
The Messenger Bias
29
Actors in these roles do not threaten the receiver either at the group- or individual- level—
instead, they are trusted for their wisdom, insight, discussion, support, and advice.
As a result, advisors’ knowledge is often prized – sometimes to a point which seems
absurd. Consider research on management fads which portrays managers as actively seeking out
and embracing ideas of dubious quality from guru advisors (Abrahamson, 1996, Meyer, 1996;
Staw & Epstein, 2000; Zbaracki, 1998) or looking to charismatic outsiders as corporate saviors
(Khurana, 2002). Similarly, as business school professors, we are all familiar with the
experience of inviting an outside business speaker into the classroom whose knowledge the
students enthusiastically receive as novel and insightful. Yet, the students were somewhat less
excited when they heard the same ideas from their professor a week before – and the professor is
a person with whom they have a closer relationship and more frequent communication.
Factors enhancing valuation. Why do people sometimes so readily embrace the ideas of
outsiders – independent of the ideas’ uniqueness and content? The most obvious answer is the
high expertise-based status that people naturally accord to advisors, and the automatic way in
which they consequently overvalue such knowledge (Cialdini, 2001; Hewstone et al. 2002;
Mackie & Smith, 1998). Given that the legitimacy of consulting companies derives from their
expertise, it is unsurprising that they hire only the brightest stars from the most selective business
schools to their ranks and preach a “talent mindset” to their clients (Gladwell, 2002).
A second answer involves the complicated ways in which power and status are obtained
in organizations. Although, as outsiders, advisors lack the inducements of positive ingroup
identification or out-group competition that promotes the positive valuation of knowledge,
advisors’ knowledge is often valued precisely because of their lack of relationship to the firm.
As a result of their independence, advisors evade the thorny entanglements of identification and
rivalry -- remaining seemingly objective, impartial, and detached when advocating controversial
views. In contrast, people often assume that insiders who advocate controversial views are
politically motivated. As a result, Ralph Larsen, former CEO of Johnson & Johnson notes,
“McKinsey is expensive. But what they provide is a fresh look at our thinking and a certain
detachment (Byrne, 2002:76).” In cognitive terms, this means that the advisor’s out- group status
can become a positive attribute associated with their knowledge, which in turn enhances its
evaluation.
The Messenger Bias
30
A third reason why managers positively value the knowledge of advisors links back to the
problem of salience which, as we noted before, makes knowledge from colleagues particularly
difficult to value. Organizations and their environments overflow with a vast array of problems
and ideas (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). In fact, there is so much congestion (Gergen, 1991)
that the manager has difficulty discerning the good ideas from the bad. A trusted advisor
performs a sorting function for the manager – highlighting what they believe to be the good ideas
and justifying those choices based on content expertise. Here, managers embrace the advisor’s
knowledge as a satisficing strategy (March & Simon, 1958). The receiver, who lacks the time or
ability to attend to all the ideas in the environment, assumes that the advisor is a thorough
information processor, uses them as a decision making aid, and accepts their knowledge
heuristically rather than systematically (see Svenson & Maule, 1993; Chaiken & Trope, 1999 for
reviews).
A fourth reason why receivers value an advisor’s knowledge relates back to business
competition, social comparison, and the monitoring of one’s enemies. Managers fall prey to
embracing faddish and ill- conceived ideas that circulate in the marketplace (Abrahamson, 1996;
O’Shea & Madigan, 1997) in a “mindless” effort to defend against competitive threats (Staw,
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). If managers believe that their competitors are evaluating the most
recent fad favorably, they heuristically embrace that knowledge in an effort to stay abreast of
their competitors. They do not value this knowledge because they have carefully evaluated it.
Thus, a manager may seek to reduce the uncertainty of their competitive environment by seeking
fashionable ideas that serve symbolic and emotional functions, rather than rational functions
(Abrahamson 1996; Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001).
A fifth motivation for receivers to embrace an advisors’ knowledge stems from the status
contests within the firm. Managers can enhance their status by becoming knowledge collectors
(Brown & Duguid, 2000), who pursue knowledge from multiple sources in order to display their
intelligence and social connections (Feldman & March, 1981). Citing a well-respected advisor’s
knowledge can legitimate one’s decisions to others (Sabatier, 1978). For example, “You heard
BCG tell us that this is the best course of action.” Further, in contrast to cheap and plentiful
knowledge from colleagues, managers often pay large sums of money for the assistance of the
advisor, which escalates their commitment (Cialdini, 2001; Staw, 1981). These practices provide
little technical benefit to the organization, but have personal benefits for the members of
The Messenger Bias
31
management teams that implement them by increasing their reputation and compensation (Staw
& Epstein, 2000).
Factors reducing valuation. If managers respect advisors based on the presumed
expertise and objectivity of their knowledge, they doubt its feasibility for those same reasons.
While consultants are often effective brokers of new knowledge, carrying ideas across
companies and industries (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997), they can also be seen as out-of-touch
editors who disregard the political context, and the financial and cultural feasibility of their
advice (Sahlin- Andersson, 1996). Any exposure which calls into question the advisor’s true
expertise in this manner, threatens the advisor’s status – moving the advisor from admired, highstatus sage to disregarded, low-status charlatan.
Another issue is the kind of knowledge that people seek from advisors. According to
research in social psychology (e.g., Goethals & Nelson, 1972), similar others are more influential
with respect to values, and dissimilar others are more influential regarding beliefs. People prefer
to compare the appropriateness of their feelings, values, and attitudes to those who are similar
(Festinger, 1954; Darley & Aronson, 1966), but, according to attribution theory, find the
consensus of dissimilar others more convincing when they evaluate the truth of beliefs or
judgments (Kelley, 1973). As a result, receivers may find a consultant’s consensus on the latest
trends in the marketplace (a belief) more convincing than an insider’s opinion, but look to their
colleagues for norms on the most appropriate ways to prioritize work and family commitments (a
value).
Finally, advisors often walk a tightrope between encouraging change that feels safe
versus change that feels threatening. Once perceived as threatening, the receiver’s perception of
the advisor can shift from a promotion to a prevention focus (Higgins, 1997). They may
recategorize the advisor as an intruder, thus activating the predictable patterns of out-group and
personal derogation.
Integration. In sum, advisors are often seen as content experts, who thoughtfully filter
through the multitude of knowledge flows that pervade the external environment and produce
creative insights from their unique vantage points. They can inject “objective” perspectives into
politically-charged work settings and protect a group against competitive threats. Thus, advisors’
knowledge tends to be highly prized by the managers who employ them – just as long as they
don’t espouse a position or behave in a manner that evokes a personal threat.
The Messenger Bias
32
Table 7 here
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We began this paper with the premise that organizational actors possess multiple roles at
work and that each of these roles involves the actor in a variety of relationships with other actors
(Kahn, 1998). We then identified six relationship types, which we argued are common to work
settings: colleagues, deviants, rivals, enemies, intruders, and advisors. We examined how each
evokes a relational schema, which can differentially affect how a knowledge receiver evaluates
new knowledge. These schemas elucidate the nuanced, interactive ways that group
identification, personal appraisals and status perceptions affect knowledge valuation. Tables 2-7
summarize our observations.
In general, a manager’s identification with colleagues increases the degree to which their
knowledge is valued; however, the close contact and availability that fosters identification can
decrease salience and the visibility of flaws. In contrast, managers seek to monitor deviants,
rivals, and intruders because of the competitive threats they pose. These messengers present
threats to group and personal identities, and receivers resist valuing their knowledge as a result.
However, when enemies such as competitor firms pose threats to group identity, people monitor
and value their scarce knowledge. Their in- groups often reward them for doing so. Finally, if
managers attribute low-status to advisors, they are likely to deem them irrelevant and ignore
them. However, if they see advisors as high-status experts who are capable of objective
detachment, they value their knowledge. These social psychological dynamics demonstrate that
the tendency to confuse good knowledge with bad and bad knowledge with good in
organizations is not simply the result of randomness. Instead, there are discernable relational
patterns present in knowledge valuation.
In applying our framework, it is important to note that an actor’s location within a
specific category is not static. Relational perceptions are dynamic. In- and out- group perceptions
change from situation to situation, as do personal appraisals of threat versus safety. The same
actor can occupy different categories over the course of time. A consultant originally seen as an
intruder can become a trusted advisor; a rival can become a colleague; a colleague can become a
The Messenger Bias
33
deviant or even an enemy. These categories portray general patterns of evaluation that research
suggests are common to knowledge receivers depending upon how they categorize a particular
messenger at a particular point in time
Role of Relational Schemas in Knowledge Valuation
In examining the six relational schemas, several patterns emerge that illuminate the
mechanisms by which perceptions of relationships moderate knowledge valuation. You may
recall that we began with the premise that people tend to perceive their relationships
categorically. We then suggested that each relationship category triggers an associated relational
schema, which provides motivations, goals, and incentives to evaluate knowledge in particular
ways. Through this process, we posit that relationships serve four psychological functions in
knowledge valuation: as motivators, cues for processing, knowledge attributes, and frequency
regulators. Below we elaborate each of these four functions.
Relationships as motivators. Relationships color how we view ourselves (Andersen & S.
Chen, in press). In that process, they influence a receiver’s motivations, goals, and incentives
regarding the knowledge that they encounter. For example, the needs to preserve a positive
group identity, to prevent threats to the self, and to preserve one’s status are examples of motives
that differ across the six relational schema. Self-enhancing motives make the positive valuation
of a rival’s knowledge appear costly, in contrast to the group-enhancing motives that make the
positive valuation of a colleague’s knowledge almost automatic. Thus, as relational contexts
vary, so do the goals of the receiver in evaluating new knowledge. In contrast to a rational actor
model, which assumes that all that matters to evaluation is the content of the knowledge, our
work illuminates the situated nature of social cognition (Lant, 1999), and specifically, how
knowledge valuation is intimately tied to social context (Katz & Allen, 1982; Phillips, 2000).
Relationships as cues for processing. Relatio nships also direct the cognitive processes
that managers use to evaluate knowledge. By shifting goals and incentives, relationships lead
managers to apply different kinds of cognitive procedures, rules, and standards in the process of
evaluating knowledge. The nature of the relationship between two actors determines whether
receivers heuristically or deeply evaluate the knowledge that messengers convey (Chaiken &
Trope, 1999). It also determines whether the knowledge receiver brings a positive or negative
bias when initiating a more systematic evaluation. A manager’s desired conclusions guide them
The Messenger Bias
34
to positively assess knowledge from colleagues and sharply critique knowledge from rivals –
even if they try to be objective (Kunda, 1990).
Relationships as knowledge attributes. Relationships can become implicit characteristics
associated with the knowledge that messengers carry. When the quality of knowledge is
ambiguous, receivers rely on their more elaborated knowledge of their relationships with
messengers to appraise the quality of knowledge. The relationship becomes an attribute
associated with the knowledge. As a result, managers see knowledge as more valuable if it
carries an association with a valued colleague, or the objectivity implicit in a trusted advisor’s
perspective (Katz and Allen, 1982, Janis, 1972). In this sense, feelings about relationships can
often substitute for information about the quality of knowledge.
Relationships as frequency regulators. Relationships are the channels through which
knowledge is encountered and which determine how readily or scarcely knowledge flows. Much
research has suggested that the strength of network ties affects how knowledge is transferred and
used. For example, rich channels of communication enable messengers to transfer and use tacit
knowledge (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Hansen, 1999). However, the richness and density of the
channel between a knowledge messenger and receiver also shapes the subjective valuation of the
knowledge. When weak ties exist between actors such as enemies, they allow limited quantities
of knowledge to travel between messengers and receivers, so that receivers prize the scarce
kernels of knowledge that they gain. On the other hand, strong ties among colleagues enable
receivers to see abundant quantities of knowledge, and hence, given its abundance, receivers
value it less. Thus, relationships determine the frequency of contact between messengers and
receivers, and hence the quantity and quality of our “knowledge about knowledge.”
Integration. In sum, relationships matter to knowledge valuation because they trigger
relational schemas. These schemas have motivational, cognitive, and affective implications for
how a knowledge receiver evaluates knowledge within a specific relationship. Relational
schemas provide motivations and incentives, which affect whether new knowledge is
heuristically or systematically processed. They also trigger cognitive heuristics, including the
assignment of relationship-based cues which color how the knowledge that a messenger carries
is evaluated. As the conduits of knowledge, relationships regulate the flow of knowledge, the
scarcity or abundance of which also affects how a piece of knowledge is valued.
The Messenger Bias
35
Rationality, Randomness and Relationships
At the start of this paper, we argued that while knowledge evaluation is not rational,
neither is it random. Instead, it is a complex process, where well-recognized, social
psychological forces converge to determine the fate of new ideas. Above, we articulated four
mechanisms through which relationships predictably moderate knowledge valuation. Here, we
move up one level of analysis to enrich that perspective by suggesting that rational, random, and
relational processes can be most usefully viewed as three distinct forms of managerial decision
making that exist in organizations. Indeed, we suggest that the role of each in knowledge
valuation depends upon the degree and type of uncertainty present within the specific knowledge
evaluation context, as well as the manager’s own motivations and capabilities regarding the
content domain of the knowledge.
We start with situations where knowledge quality is relatively unambiguous – that is,
decision makers have extensive knowledge about a subject, clear criteria for choice, and
adequate time with which to decide. The content domain of the knowledge also has motivational
valence for the receiver – it captures the manager’s attention and engages cognitive resources. In
these contexts, relationships exert little influence on valuation, and managers approximate
rational methods of evaluation. Here, the manager knows how to read a customer report, evaluate
a policy paper, or assess a candidate’s analytical capabilities. The manager knows how to
identify the relevant decision criteria and weight them accordingly, and the knowledge content
domain engages the manager and naturally motivates him to do so.
On the other end of the continuum, there are situations in which there is a high degree of
ambiguity about both the quality of knowledge and the relational context in which it is
embedded. These are contexts in which decision makers have little knowledge, confused criteria,
and a desire to limit their search costs – plus they are not well-acquainted with the knowledge
messengers. The ma nager does not know how to evaluate certain types of business risks, or has
never worked with an ad agency before. Here, a more random model of evaluation is likely to
apply, because even if the manager seeks to be rational, contextual constraints preclude it. The
manager does not have expertise in the relevant content area, and does not have access to a social
network that does either. Plus, due to either money, time or one’s own cognitive limitations, the
manager does not possess a motivation to engage in more elaborated processing.
The Messenger Bias
36
In middle of this continuum are situations in which knowledge quality is ambiguous, as
are the manager’s motivations regarding engagement and effort. But in these settings, the
relational context is clear. Amid the complexity and ambiguity of the work environment, the
manager decides to trust her “intuitions” regarding the people surrounding her. As a result,
attributes of the messenger and the characteristics of the relationship between the messenger and
the receiver naturally influence valuation in the ways we have illustrated. Here, the manager uses
the relational context to guide his evaluations.
Thus, our point is not to argue that rationality and randomness do not exist in
organizations, but to suggest that a relatio nal perspective provides a third, quite important, force
driving the evaluative process within organizations. As many of our examples throughout this
paper illustrate, it is not just the presence of relationships that matters to knowledge valuation,
but also the nature and quality of those relationships. Perceptions of similarity, interpersonal
trust, rivalry and reputation matter to how managers evaluate what other people say. In many
instances, they can drive knowledge valuation -- depending upon the degree and type of
uncertainty present within the specific knowledge evaluation context, as well as the manager’s
own motivations and capabilities regarding the content domain of the knowledge.
Implications for Organizational Learning
It is important to understand how managers evaluate knowledge in organizations because
knowledge valuation is often a primary mediator between knowledge exposure and use.
According to Hansen (1999), network models have emphasized the ways in which relationships
predict exposure and access to new kno wledge (e.g., Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973).
Knowledge use, on the other hand, concerns the actual dissemination, transfer, and
implementation of knowledge (Argote, 1999; Bardach, 1977; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000; Pressman
& Wildavsky, 1984), and is related to concepts such as negotiation, coalition building (Pfeffer,
1992), and organizational change (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997). It involves selling ideas and
generating buy-in among key stakeholders.
In this paper, we have sought to elucidate the psychological processes that occur after
knowledge exposure and prior to knowledge use (Argote & Ingram, 2000), with the
understanding that when people value knowledge more highly, they are often more likely to use
it. In the process, we have provided a framework for linking these complex and highly- nuanced,
micro- level dynamics to organizational- level outcomes. Specifically, our relational perspective
The Messenger Bias
37
incorporates an understanding of how social identification, personal appraisals, and status
perceptions combine to affect organizational learning – through their effect on knowledge
valuation. However, our research also hints at the complex nature of the relationship between
knowledge valuation and organizational learning. Whereas people are often more likely to use
knowledge when they value it more highly, at other times they value knowledge without using it
(e.g. the knowledge of competitors or consultants that is scarce and therefore difficult to acquire
and implement). Or, they might use knowledge even though they fail to value it (e.g. abundant
knowledge from colleagues which is taken- for- granted or used simply because it is conveniently
available). Our research suggests the specific ways in which knowledge valuation mediates
knowledge use, as well as the prospect that valuation sometimes does not mediate use at all.
Conclusion
Theories of networks suggest that relationships affect what you see, because connections
provide access and exposure to knowledge. Our work proposes that networks also color how you
evaluate what you see. That is because evaluation often mediates the relationship between
exposure and use, and relationships moderate how receivers evaluate knowledge.
Relational ties shape the perceptual experience of knowledge receivers through several
mechanisms. Relationships shape the goals relevant to knowledge valuation, direct cognitive
processing in evaluation, become attributes associated with knowledge, and provide the channels
through which knowledge is either frequently or scantly conveyed. As such, they intimately
affect the process of knowledge valuation and transfer in organizations.
Although we have emphasized the several prominent deviations from rationality that
relationships produce (e.g. the isolating choices of the not- invented- here syndrome; the tendency
to reject worthy ideas from deviants, rivals, and intruders; and the costly chase for scarce,
externally sourced knowledge), relationships also enable managers to adapt to the complex and
confusing task of making a decision. For example, although the managers who are subject to the
NIH syndrome isolate themselves, their preferences are often adaptive, because they conserve
time and money that might have otherwise been wasted on more costly knowledge that is more
difficult to implement (Hansen, 1999). And while managers can become overly dependent on
consultants (O’Shea & Madigan, 1997), they also gain the more varied, generalizable knowledge
from an outside perspective (Ingram & Baum, 1997).
The Messenger Bias
38
Thus, while organizations are sometimes rational, and at times random -- they are also
driven by relationships, which both help and hinder the transfer of knowledge. An understanding
of relationships, how they are perceived, and how those perceptions influence the evaluation of
the knowledge can help us understand why bad ideas are sometimes heuristically assumed to be
good, and why good ideas are sometimes dismissed as bad. In this paper we have taken an
important first step toward amelioration by identifying and labeling discernable patterns in how
the messengers who communicate knowledge bias the receivers who evaluate that knowledge.
The Messenger Bias
39
Table 1: Typology of relationships
Personal Appraisal
Positive/neutral appraisal
(no threat)
Negative appraisal
(self-threat)
Negative appraisal
(group-threat)
Colleague:
An insider who is liked or
perceived neutrally by the
knowledge receiver
Rival
An insider who threatens
the knowledge receiver’s
pursuit of personal
rewards or sense of
safety at work
Deviant
An insider who is
viewed as diverse or
unusual by group
members and threatens
the group’s identity
Example: A friend in
another area of the
organization or a fellow
work group member
Example: A co-worker
competing for a
promotion or bonus with
the knowledge receiver
Example: A “black
sheep” or outcast within
the group
Advisor:
An outsider with a
collaborative relationship
with the knowledge
receiver
Intruder
An outsider who
threatens the knowledge
receiver’s personal status
or sense of safety at work
Enemy
An outsider who is a
member of a group that
competes with the
knowledge receiver’s
group.
Example: A consultant,
coach, investment banker or
management guru
Example: A consultant or
newly hired manager
whose is believed to be
hired to “downsize” the
organization
Example: A member of
a competitor firm in the
marketplace or of a
competing group within
the organization
Group Identification
In-group
Out-group
The Messenger Bias
Table 2: Summary of Factors Enhancing and Inhibiting the Valuation of Knowledge from
Colleagues
Enhancing Valuation
• Identification with in-groups leads to
ingroup favoritism (NIH, groupthink,
social identity)
•
Group cohesion increases
identification and ingroup bias
•
Isolation from other groups increases
identification and ingroup bias
•
Tenure increases identification and ingroup bias
•
In- group status and distinctiveness,
and the high status of the specific
colleague who carries the knowledge
increase valuation
•
Availability raises valuations of
feasibility
•
Transactive memory systems develop
between ingroup members and
facilitate their reliance on each other’s
knowledge
Power increases public affirmations of
the value of knowledge
•
Inhibiting Valuation
• Information overload causes
attentional difficulties, and good ideas
lack salience
•
Availability subjects knowledge to
excessive scrutiny and makes people
take internal knowledge for granted
40
The Messenger Bias
41
Deviants
Enhancing Valuation
• Deviant “genius” is tolerated as a
content expert
• Deviants threaten group identity and are
disliked
• Insiders seek balance from each other
rather than change and new knowledge
• Deviants are insiders, so the receiver is
privy to a close up view of their flaws.
• Motivated reasoning is used to justify
objections to deviant’s knowledge
The Messenger Bias
42
Table 4: Summary of Factors Enhancing and Inhibiting the Valuation of Knowledge from Rivals
Enhancing Valuation
• Receivers are hyper-vigilant about high
status rivals
• The fluidity of appropriating credit for
the rival’s ideas makes learning less
threatening
• Social comparison between rivals poses
a painful psychological threat
• Competition for organizational rewards
threatens rivals with status loss if they
learn from each other
• Rivals are insiders, so the receiver is
privy to a close up view of their flaws
• Motivated reasoning is used to justify
objections to rival’s knowledge
• If the messenger’s knowledge is in a
domain that is relevant to the receiver’s
self-concept, their knowledge is
particularly threatening
The Messenger Bias
43
Enemies
Enhancing Valuation
• Competition increases motivations to
monitor threats
•
Status can be gained by bringing
outsider knowledge into the ingroup
•
Motivation to steal advantage from the
competitor
High status of the enemy increases their
potential danger and the importance of
their knowledge
The scarcity of competitor knowledge
makes it seem more novel and unique,
and increases commitment to affirming
its value
•
•
• Lower status enemies are ignored,
unless their knowledge can be easily
appropriated
• Enemies are ambivalently perceived.
Certain aspects of their knowledge may
be valued but other aspects may be
derogated
The Messenger Bias
44
Intruders
Enhancing Valuation
• The intruder’s network of relationships
with insiders and competitors reduces
tendencies to automatically reject their
knowledge
• The intruder derives status from
expertise, which threatens autonomy of
insiders
•
•
•
The intruder does not threaten the
receiver’s group, which eliminates the
status gains of using their knowledge
The availability of the intruder’s
knowledge increases the receiver’s
ability to scrutinize it
The receiver’s lack of identification
with the intruder reduces their
perceptions of the quality and
feasibility of their knowledge
The Messenger Bias
45
Advisors
Enhancing Valuation
• Advisors with status are valued for
their expertise
• By not threatening or identifying with
receivers, the advisor gains an aura of
political independence and impartiality
• Independence is important for
triangulating beliefs
• Advisors perform a sorting function for
managers seeking to identify good
knowledge in complex environments
• Advisors provide faddish knowledge
that managers under competition
heuristically embrace
• Advisors legitimate managers and
increase their status in the organization.
• Independence makes knowledge appear
less feasible and relevant
• Independence reduces valuation of
knowledge that verifies values
The Messenger Bias
46
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APPENDIX IV PROPERTY VALUATION