Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)

Transcrição

ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS
CENTRO DO COMÉRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO
Coordenadoras
Vera Thorstensen
Luciana Maria de Oliveira
RELEITURA DOS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO ÓRGÃO DE APELAÇÃO:
Efeitos na aplicação das regras do comércio internacional
Dispute Settlement Understanding
Organizadores
Alberto do Amaral Júnior
Autores
Alessandra Deliberato Thoenen
Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins
Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira
Carla Junqueira Canero
Felipe Herzog
Geraldo Vidigal Neto
Luiz Eduardo Salles
Maria Angela Jardim Oliveira
Maria de Lourdes Albertini
Rodrigo de Oliveira Franco
Túlio Di Giácomo Toledo
1
INTRODUÇÃO
Análise da jurisprudência consolidada relativa ao sistema de solução de controvérsias vigente durante o
Acordo Geral de Tarifas e Comércio 1947 (GATT 1947) e a partir da entrada em vigor da Organização
Mundial do Comércio (OMC), por meio da releitura e interpretação do Dipute Settlement Understanding
(DSU).
ACORDO GERAL SOBRE TARIFAS E COMÉRCIO DE 1947 (GATT 1947)
Felipe Herzog

Artigo XXII do GATT 1947
IA.
Texto do Artigo em Inglês
Article XXII
Consultation
1
Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting
party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any
contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a
satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
IB.
Texto do Artigo em Português
Artigo XXII
Consultas
1
Cada Parte Contratante examinará com compreensão as representações que lhe sejam encaminhadas
por qualquer outra Parte Contratante e deverá se prestar a consultas a respeito daquelas
representações, desde que elas digam respeito a questões relativas à aplicação do presente Acordo.
2
As Partes Contratantes poderão, a pedido de uma das Partes Contratantes, entrar em entendimentos
com uma ou várias Partes Contratantes sobre questões para as quais a solução satisfatória não poderia
ser alcançada através das consultas previstas no parágrafo primeiro.
(Decreto nº 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)
IC.
Comentários sobre a Tradução
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXII
Este artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.
III.
Comentários
Nada a observar, uma vez que este artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.
2

Artigo XXIII
Alessandra Deliberato Thoenen
Geraldo Vidigal Neto
IA.
Article XXIII
Nullification or Impairment
23.1
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this
Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is
being impeded as the result of
(a)
the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or
(b)
the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with
the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c)
the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory
adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting
party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached
shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
23.2
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a
reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the
matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to
the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as
appropriate. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental
organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING
PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may
authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or
parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or
other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days
after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties
of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the
sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.
IB.
Artigo XXIII
Proteção de Concessões e Vantagens
23.1
No caso de uma Parte Contratante considerar que uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta
ou indiretamente, do presente Acordo, está sendo anulada ou reduzida, ou que um dos objetivos do
Acordo está sendo dificultado, em consequência:
a)
do não cumprimento por outra das Partes Contratantes dos compromissos pela mesma
assumidos em virtude do presente Acordo;
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23.2
b)
da aplicação por outra das Partes Contratantes de uma medida, contrária ou não às
disposições do presente Acordo; ou
c)
da existência de qualquer outra situação, dita Parte Contratante, a fim de obter solução
satisfatória para a questão, poderá dirigir representações ou propostas por escrito à outra ou
outras Partes Contratantes que lhe parecerem interessadas. Qualquer Parte Contratante, por
essa forma interpelada, examinará, com boa vontade, as representações ou propostas que lhe
tenham sido dirigidas.
Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas não chegarem a um Acordo satisfatório dentro de um prazo
razoável, ou se a dificuldade for uma das previstas no § 1 (c) deste Artigo, a questão poderá ser
submetida às Partes Contratantes. As Partes Contratantes iniciarão, sem demora, uma investigação
sobre qualquer assunto que lhes seja submetido e, se julgarem conveniente, dirigirão recomendações
especiais e apropriadas às partes Contratantes que julguem interessadas, ou baixarão normas sobre a
questão. As Partes Contratantes, quando acharem necessário, poderão efetuar consultas com as outras
Partes Contratantes, com o Conselho Econômico e Social das Nações Unidas e com qualquer outra
organização intergovernamental competente. Se as Partes Contratantes acharem que as circunstâncias
são suficientemente graves para justificar tal medida, poderão autorizar a uma ou a várias Partes
Contratantes a suspensão, relativamente a tal ou a tais Partes Contratantes, da aplicação de qualquer
obrigação ou concessão resultante do presente Acordo. Se, a observância de uma obrigação ou o
benefício de uma concessão em favor de uma Parte Contratante for suspenso efetivamente, essa Parte
Contratante poderá dentro de um prazo de sessenta dias a contar da data da aplicação da medida,
notificar o Secretário Geral das Nações Unidas por escrito, de sua intenção de denunciar este Acordo
e tal denúncia terá efeito, expirado o prazo de sessenta dias a contar da data em que o Secretário
Geral das Nações Unidas receba notificação escrita da denúncia.
IC.
O título originalmente conferido (versão oficial em inglês) ao artigo XXIII pelo GATT 1947 e,
subsequentemente, pelo GATT 1994, refere-se à “anulação ou prejuízo” enquanto conceitos imprescindíveis
para a apresentação de uma demanda perante o DSB com base no artigo XXIII GATT. O conceito de
“anulação ou prejuízo” a benefícios decorrentes do Acordo é requisito essencial aplicável a qualquer um dos
tipos de demanda previstas nos incisos do artigo XXIII, quais sejam, (a) “violação”; (b) “não-violação” e; (c)
“situação”. O próprio sistema de solução de controvérsias acabou por confirmar, em inúmeras oportunidades
(1), que qualquer violação a um dos acordos da OMC configuraria uma “anulação ou prejuízo prima facie”
(2) a benefícios decorrentes dos acordos.
A tradução para a língua portuguesa adotada pelo Decreto nº 1355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994, em
contrapartida, não reflete este mesmo espírito, mas restringe o título conferido ao mesmo artigo XXIII à
finalidade de um dos seus mecanismos (demandas fundadas em casos de “não-violação”), qual seja, a
proteção de concessões tarifárias recíprocas da utilização de medidas que acabem por anular ou reduzir
benefícios previstos nos Acordos da OMC.
Ainda que o título do artigo XXIII, da forma como incorporado ao sistema legal brasileiro, acabe por
restringir o verdadeiro alcance do mencionado artigo, suas provisões legais parecem ter sido traduzidas em
observância à versão original publicada em inglês, francês e espanhol, de forma a evitar qualquer efeito
distorsivo na aplicação global do mencionado dispositivo legal.
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II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXIII
1.
Artigo XXIII:1
a) “uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta ou indiretamente, do presente acordo, está
sendo anulada ou reduzida”
O painel aponta para a necessidade de especificação, pelo demandante, sobre o que de fato estaria cansando a
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, para que seja efetivamente autorizada a aplicação da suspensão de
concessões, nos termos do artigo XXIII do GATT 1994. Segundo o painel, o artigo XXIII:1 prevê três causas
distintas para legitimar uma reclamação: a violação; não-violação; e as situações de reclamações fundadas
nos parágrafos (a), (b) e (c) do artigo em questão. Com efeito, o conceito de “expectativas razoáveis”,
mencionado pelo painel como “expectativas legítimas”,é um conceito desenvolvido no contexto de
reclamações de não-violação.
Relatório do painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD
11S/95, para. 14
Para. 14. “(...) The Panel thought it essential to have a clear idea as to what would constitute a nullification
or impairment. In its view impairment and nullification in the sense of Article XXIII does not arise merely
because of the existence of any measures; the nullification or impairment must relate to benefits accruing to
the contracting party ‘under the General Agreement’.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United Kingdon - Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS67/AB/R, para. 80
Para. 80. “We disagree with the Panel's conclusion that the meaning of a tariff concession in a Member's
Schedule may be determined in the light of the “legitimate expectations” of an exporting Member. First, we
fail to see the relevance of the EEC - Oilseeds panel report with respect to the interpretation of a Member's
Schedule in the context of a violation complaint made under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994. The EEC
- Oilseeds panel report dealt with a non-violation complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994, and
is not legally relevant to the case before us. Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 provides for three legallydistinct causes of action on which a Member may base a complaint; it distinguishes between so-called
violation complaints, non-violation complaints and situation complaints under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). The
concept of “reasonable expectations”, which the Panel refers to as “legitimate expectations”, is a concept that
was developed in the context of non-violation complaints. (3) As we stated in India - Patents, for the Panel to
use this concept in the context of a violation complaint “melds the legally-distinct bases for ‘violation’ and
‘non-violation’ complaints under Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 into one uniform cause of action” (4), and
is not in accordance with established GATT practice.”
2.
Artigo XXIII:1(a)
a) “do não cumprimento por outra das Partes Contratantes dos compromissos pela mesma assumidos
em virtude do presente acordo”
Relatório do painel no caso Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de novembro de 1962
Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 15
Neste relatório, o painel do GATT fixou a presunção de que uma medida em contradição com as normas do
GATT ocasiona anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios.
5
Para. 15. “(...) In cases where there is a clear infringement of the provisions of the General Agreement, or in
other words, where measures are applied in conflict with the provisions of GATT and are not permitted under
the terms of the relevant protocol under which the GATT is applied by the contracting party, the action
would, prima facie, constitute a case of nullification or impairment and would ipso facto require
consideration of whether the circumstances are serious enough to justify the authorization of suspension of
concessions or obligations.”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
adotado em 17 de junho de 1987, Demandante: Canadá, L/6175, BISD 34S/136, paras. 5.1.4-5.1.6
Nesta controvérsia, o painel do GATT consolidou a presunção de que qualquer medida contrária às regras do
GATT causa anulação ou prejuízo. Não há, portanto, possibilidade de refutar a anulação ou prejuízo, por
exemplo, com uma demonstração de que a medida não gera efeitos sobre o comércio do demandante.
Para. 5.1.4. “(...) the practice of the Contracting Parties is to make recommendations or rulings on measures
found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement independent of the impact of such measures (...).”
Para. 5.1.5. “[Citing paragraph 5 of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding:] “Thus, the 1979 Understand¬ing
does not refer to the adverse impact of a measure, and the possibility of a rebuttal, in connection with the
power of the Contracting Parties to make recommendations or give rulings on measures inconsistent with the
General Agreement; it does so only in connection with the authorization of compensatory action. This, in the
view of the Panel, supports the conclusion that the impact of a measure inconsistent with the General
Agreement is not relevant for a determination of nullification or impairment by the Contracting Parties.”
Para. 5.1.6. “The Panel examined how the Contracting Parties have reacted in previous cases to claims that a
measure inconsistent with the General Agreement had no adverse impact and therefore did not nullify or
impair benefits accruing under the General Agreement to the contracting party that had brought the
complaint. The Panel noted such claims had been made in a number of cases but that there was no case in the
history of the GATT in which a contracting party had successfully rebutted the presumption that a measure
infringing obligations causes nullification and impairment (...).”
3.
Artigo XXIII:1(b)
a) “Visão Geral da reclamação de não-violação”
Relatório GATT Working Party no caso The Australian Subsidy on ammonium Sulphate, adotado em 03
de abril de 1950, Partes: Austrália e Chile, GATT/CP.4/39, BISD II/188, para. 12
Nesta controvérsia, uma das primeiras do GATT, o painel do GATT determinou que a reclamação de nãoviolação é procedente quando a parte demandante poderia razoavelmente esperar da parte demandada a
adoção de determinada conduta, e a parte demandada contraria com suas medidas a conduta esperada.
Para. 12. “The working party next considered whether the injury that the Government of Chile said it had
suffered represented a nullification or impairment. (...) It was agreed that such impairment would exist if the
action of the Australian Government which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship between sodium
nitrate and ammonium sulphate could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Chilean Government,
taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances and the provisions of the General Agreement, at the time
it negotiated for the duty-free binding on sodium nitrate. The working party concluded that the Government
of Chile had reason to assume, during these negotiations, that the war-time fertilizer subsidy would not be
6
removed from sodium nitrate before it was removed from ammonium sulphate. In reaching this conclusion,
the working party was influenced in particular by the combination of the circumstances that:
(a) The two types of fertilizer were closely related;
(b) Both had been subsidized and distributed through the same agency and sold at the
same price;
(c) Neither had been subsidized before the war, and the war-time system of
subsidization and distribution had been introduced in respect of both at the same time
and under the same war powers of the Australian Government;
(d) This system was still maintained in respect of both fertilizers at the time of the
1947 tariff negotiations.
For these reasons, the working party also concluded that the Australian action should be considered as
relating to a benefit accruing to Chile under the Agreement, and that it was therefore subject to the provisions
of Article XXIII. (...) The inequality created and the treatment Chile could have expected at the time of the
negotiation, after taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances, including the circumstances
mentioned above, and the provisions of the General Agreement, were important elements in the working
party’s conclusions.
The situation in this case is different from that which would have arisen from the granting of a new subsidy
on one of the two competing products. In such a case, given the freedom under the General Agreement of the
Australian Government to impose subsidies and to select the products on which a subsidy would be granted,
it would be more difficult to say that the Chilean Government had reasonably relied on the continuation of the
same treatment for the two products. In the present case, however, the Australian Government, in granting a
subsidy on account of the war-time fertilizer shortage and continuing it in the post-war period, had grouped
the two fertilizers together and treated them uniformly. In such circumstances it would seem that the Chilean
Government could reasonably assume that the subsidy would remain applicable to both fertilizers so long as
there remained a local nitrogenous fertilizer shortage.”
Relatório do painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds
and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de janeiro de 1990, Demandante:
EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, paras. 147-148
Neste relatório, o painel do GATT entendeu que, no caso de reclamações de não-violação, não cabe uma
recomendação para que a medida questionada seja removida, mas apenas para que se reequilibrem as
vantagens negociadas, pela via da suspensão de concessões se necessário.
Para. 147. “(...) The Panel examined whether it was reasonable for the United States to expect that the
Community would not introduce subsidy schemes systematically counteracting the price effect of the tariff
concessions. (...) The essential argument of the Community in this respect was that it is not legitimate to
expect the absence of production subsidies even after the grant of a tariff concession because Articles III:8(b)
and XVI:1 explicitly recognize the right of contracting parties to grant production subsidies. This right would
be effectively eliminated if its exercise were assumed to impair tariff concessions.”
Para. 148. “The Panel (...) found the following: (…) At issue in the case before it are product-specific
subsidies that protect producers completely from the movement of prices for imports and thereby prevent
tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic and imported
oilseeds. The Panel considered that the main value of a tariff concession is that it provides an assurance of
better market access through improved price competition. Contracting parties negotiate tariff concessions
primarily to obtain that advantage. They must therefore be assumed to base their tariff negotiations on the
expectation that the price effect of the tariff concessions will not be systematically offset. If no right of
7
redress were given to them in such a case they would be reluctant to make tariff concessions and the General
Agreement would no longer be useful as a legal framework for incorporating the results of trade negotiations.
The Panel does not share the view of the Community that the recognition of the legitimacy of such
expectations would amount to a re writing of the rules of the General Agreement. The contracting parties
have decided that a finding of impairment does not authorize them to request the impairing contracting party
to remove a measure not inconsistent with the General Agreement; such a finding merely allows the
contracting party frustrated in its expectation to request, in accordance with Article XXIII:2, an authorization
to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations under the General Agreement. The recognition
of the legitimacy of an expectation thus essentially means the recognition of the legitimacy of such a request.
The recognition of the legitimacy of an expectation relating to the use of production subsidies therefore in no
way prevents a contracting party from using production subsidies consistently with the General Agreement; it
merely delineates the scope of the protection of a negotiated balance of concessions. For these reasons the
Panel found that the United States may be assumed not to have anticipated the introduction of subsidies
which protect Community producers of oilseeds completely from the movement of prices for imports and
thereby prevent tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic
and imported oilseeds, and which have as one consequence that all domestically produced oilseeds are
disposed of in the internal market notwithstanding the availability of imports.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities -Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 186
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que a reclamação de não-violação deve ficar restrita a
casos excepcionais, uma vez que permite o questionamento perante os órgãos da OMC de medidas que não
foram proibidas nos acordos negociados pelos membros.
Para. 186. “Like the Panel in Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (“Japan Film”), we consider that the remedy in Article XXIII:1(b) “should be approached with caution and should
remain an exceptional remedy”. That Panel stated:
Although the non-violation remedy is an important and accepted tool of WTO/GATT
dispute settlement and has been ‘on the books’ for almost 50 years, we note that there
have only been eight cases in which panels or working parties have substantively
considered Article XXIII:1(b) claims. (5) This suggests that both the GATT
contracting parties and WTO Members have approached this remedy with caution and,
indeed, have treated it as an exceptional instrument of dispute settlement. We note in
this regard that both the European Communities and the United States in the EEC Oilseeds case, and the two parties in this case, have confirmed that the non-violation
nullification or impairment remedy should be approached with caution and treated as
an exceptional concept. (6) The reason for this caution is straightforward. Members
negotiate the rules that they agree to follow and only exceptionally would expect to be
challenged for actions not in contravention of those rules.” (7)
(i) Finalidade
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and
Grani from (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de janeiro de 1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD
37S/86, para. 144
Nesta controvérsia, o painel do GATT determinou que o objetivo das disposições legais do GATT é proteger
as expectativas legítimas das partes, quanto às oportunidades competitivas que obterão com uma concessão
tarifária. É protegida a expectativa das partes, ainda que não haja conflito da medida que frustra essa
expectativa com as disposições do GATT.
8
Para. 144. “(...) The Panel noted that these provisions, as conceived by the drafters and applied by the
contracting parties, serve mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions. The idea underlying them is that
the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff concession can be
frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also by measures consistent with
that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore be
given a right of redress when a reciprocal concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of
the application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement.”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar - containing Products
applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Heanote in Schedule of Tariff Concessions BISD 37S/228,
adotado em 07 de novembro de 1990, Demandante: CEE, L/6631, BISD 37S/228, para. 5.21
Nesta controvérsia, o painel do GATT determinou a obrigação à parte que realiza uma reclamação de nãoviolação, de apresentar uma justificativa detalhada de sua reclamação.
Para. 5.21. “According to the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, a contracting party bringing a
complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) is ‘called upon to provide a detailed justification’ ... The Panel noted that
Article XXIII:1(b), as conceived by the drafters and applied by the Contracting Parties, serves mainly to
protect the balance of tariff concessions ... The party bringing a complaint under that provision would
therefore normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have
been nullified or impaired. (...)”
Relatório do painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan
– Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.50
Neste relatório, o painel reforçou o objetivo da reclamação de não-violação, de proteger o equilíbrio de
concessões, fornecendo um meio de lidar com medidas governamentais não reguladas pelo GATT, mas que
causem anulação ou prejuízo às expectativas legítimas dos membros.
Para. 10.50. “[The purpose of Article XXIII:1(b)] is to protect the balance of concessions under GATT by
providing a means to redress government actions not otherwise regulated by GATT rules that nonetheless
nullify or impair a Member’s legitimate expectations of benefits from tariff negotiations. (8)”
(ii) Alcance
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA,
WTO/DS90/AB/R, paras. 87-88
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a possibilidade de uso do artigo XXIII para questionar
medidas relacionadas à balança de pagamentos dos membros.
Para. 87. “Any doubts that may have existed in the past as to whether the dispute settlement procedures
under Article XXIII were available for disputes relating to balance-of-payments restrictions have been
removed by the second sentence of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, which reads:
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters
arising from the application of restrictive import measures taken for balance-ofpayments purposes. (emphasis added)
9
Para. 88. “In our opinion, this provision makes it clear that the dispute settlement procedures under Article
XXIII, as elaborated and applied by the DSU, are available for disputes relating to any matters concerning
balance-of-payments restrictions.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 187-189
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação especificou que a reclamação de não-violação pode ser impetrada,
inclusive, em relação a medidas que sejam reguladas pelo GATT 1994.
Para. 187. “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that provision arises when a ‘benefit’
is being ‘nullified or impaired’ through the ‘application … of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with
the provisions of this Agreement ‘. (emphasis added) The wording of the provision, therefore, clearly states
that a claim may succeed, under Article XXIII:1(b), even if the measure ‘conflicts’ with some substantive
provisions of the GATT 1994. It follows that a measure may, at one and the same time, be inconsistent with,
or in breach of, a provision of the GATT 1994 and, nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under Article
XXIII:1(b). Of course, if a measure ‘conflicts’ with a provision of the GATT 1994, that measure must
actually fall within the scope of application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We agree with the Panel that
this reading of Article XXIII:1(b) is consistent with the panel reports in Japan - Film and EEC - Oilseeds,
which both support the view that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which simultaneously fall within the
scope of application of other provisions of the GATT 1994. Accordingly, we decline the European
Communities’ first ground of appeal under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”
Para. 188. “[W]e look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that ‘the application by another
Member of any measure’ may give rise to a cause of action under that provision. The use of the word ‘any’
suggests that measures of all types may give rise to such a cause of action. The text does not distinguish
between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts
the European Communities’ argument that certain types of measure, namely, those with health objectives, are
excluded from the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b).”
Para. 189. “In any event, an attempt to draw the distinction suggested by the European Communities
between so-called health and commercial measures would be very difficult in practice. By definition,
measures which affect trade in goods, and which are subject to the disciplines of the GATT 1994, have a
commercial impact. At the same time, the health objectives of many measures may be attainable only by
means of commercial regulation. Thus, in practice, clear distinctions between health and commercial
measures may be very difficult to establish. Nor do we see merit in the argument that, previously, only
‘commercial’ measures have been the subject of Article XXIII:1(b) claims, as that does not establish that a
claim cannot be made under Article XXIII:1(b) regarding a ‘noncommercial’ measure.”
b) “Teste nos termos do artigo XXIII:1(b)”
- Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.41
Nesta controvérsia, o painel determinou os elementos que um membro precisa demonstrar para ingressar com
uma reclamação de não-violação.
Para. 10.41. “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) establishes three elements that a complaining party must
demonstrate in order to make out a cognizable claim under Article XXIII:1(b): (1) application of a measure
by a WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and (3) nullification or impairment
of the benefit as the result of the application of the measure.”
10
c) “Ônus da prova”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar –
containing Products Applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote in Schedule of of Tariff
Concessions (US - Sugar Waiver), adotado em 07 de novembro de 1990, Demandante: CEE, L/6631,
BISD 37S/228, paras. 5.20-5.21 e 5.23
Neste relatório, o painel do GATT observou que é necessário ao demandante demonstrar as razões de sua
reclamação de não-violação.
Para. 5.20. “(...) The Panel ... concluded that the fact that the restrictions found to be inconsistent with
Article XI:1 conform to the terms of the Waiver does not prevent the EEC from bringing a complaint under
Article XXIII:1(b) of the General Agreement but it is up to the EEC to demonstrate that a nullification or
impairment of benefits accruing to it under the General Agreement has resulted from these restrictions.”
Para. 5.21. “According to the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, a contracting party bringing a
complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) is ‘called upon to provide a detailed justification’ (...) The Panel noted
that Article XXIII:1(b), as conceived by the drafters and applied by the Contracting Parties, serves mainly to
protect the balance of tariff concessions (...) The party bringing a complaint under that provision would
therefore normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have
been nullified or impaired. (...) the Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b) applies whether or not the measure at
issue conflicts with the General Agreement and that, therefore, the question of whether a measure
inconsistent with Article XI:1 remains inconsistent with the General Agreement even if covered by a waiver
cannot, by itself, determine whether it nullifies or impairs benefits accruing under the General Agreement
within the meaning of that provision. A complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) must therefore be supported by a
justification that goes beyond a mere characterization of the measure at issue as inconsistent with the General
Agreement (...).”
Para. 5.23. “For the reasons indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel did not examine the case before
it in the light of Article XXIII:1(b). The Panel would however like to stress that nothing in this report is
meant to preclude the EEC from bringing a complaint under that provision with the required detailed
justification.”
Relatório do painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film na Paper (Japan Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.32
Neste relatório, o painel observou que o ónus da prova nas reclamações de não-violação cabe ao demandante.
Para. 10.32. “Consistent with the explicit terms of the DSU and established WTO/GATT jurisprudence, and
recalling the Appellate Body ruling that ‘precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be
required to establish (…) a presumption [that what is claimed is true] will necessarily vary from (…)
provision to provision’, we thus consider that the United States, with respect to its claim of non-violation
nullification or impairment under Article XXIII:1(b), bears the burden of providing a detailed justification for
its claim in order to establish a presumption that what is claimed is true. It will be for Japan to rebut any such
presumption.”
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products
Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.280-8.282 e 8.292
11
Neste relatório, o painel observou que o ônus da prova do demandante sobre a sua expectativa aplica-se
inclusive a medidas distantes no tempo, de forma que cabe ao demandante provar que ele possuía uma
expectativa de que a regulamentação de um produto não seria alterada com o passar do tempo.
Para. 8.280. “We do not consider that Canada has correctly interpreted the Panel report in Japan - Film. First
of all, the presumption to which the Panel refers is that, if it is shown that a measure has been introduced after
the conclusion of the tariff negotiations in question, then the complainant should not be considered as having
anticipated that measure, which is only one of the tests applied by the Panel. Moreover, if the interpretation of
the burden of proof suggested by Canada were followed, the obligation to present a detailed justification for
which Article 26.1(a) provides might in certain cases be evaded. Accordingly, we do not follow the
interpretation proposed by Canada but the rule laid down in Japan - Film.”
Para. 8.281. “Furthermore, in the light of our reasoning in paragraph 8.272 above, we consider that the
special situation of measures justified under Article XX, insofar as they concern non-commercial interests
whose importance has been recognized a priori by Members, requires special treatment. By creating the right
to invoke exceptions in certain circumstances, Members have recognized a priori the possibility that the
benefits they derive from certain concessions may eventually be nullified or impaired at some future time for
reasons recognized as being of overriding importance. This situation is different from that in which a Member
takes a measure of a commercial or economic nature such as, for example, a subsidy or a decision organizing
a sector of its economy, from which it expects a purely economic benefit. In this latter case, the measure
remains within the field of international trade. Moreover, the nature and importance of certain measures
falling under Article XX can also justify their being taken at any time, which militates in favour of a stricter
treatment of actions brought against them on the basis of Article XXIII:1(b).”
Para. 8.282. “Consequently, the Panel concludes that because of the importance conferred on them a priori
by the GATT 1994, as compared with the rules governing international trade, situations that fall under Article
XX justify a stricter burden of proof being applied in this context to the party invoking Article XXIII:1(b),
particularly with regard to the existence of legitimate expectations and whether or not the initial Decree could
be reasonably anticipated.”
Para. 8.292. “[W]e consider that in view of the time that elapsed between those concessions and the adoption
of the Decree (between 50 and 35 years), Canada could not assume that, over such a long period, there would
not be advances in medical knowledge with the risk that one day a product would be banned on health
grounds. For this reason, too, we also consider that the presumption applied in Japan - Film cannot be applied
to the concessions granted in 1947 and 1962. Any other interpretation would extend the scope of the concept
of non-violation nullification well beyond that envisaged by the Panel in Japan - Film. On the contrary, it is
for Canada to present detailed evidence showing why it could legitimately expect the 1947 and 1962
concessions not to be affected and could not reasonably anticipate that France might adopt measures
restricting the use of all asbestos products 50 and 35 years, respectively, after the negotiation of the
concessions concerned. In the present case, the burden of proof must be all the heavier inasmuch as the
intervening period has been so long. Indeed, it is very difficult to anticipate what a Member will do in 50
years time. It would therefore be easy for a Member to establish that he could not reasonably anticipate the
adoption of a measure if the burden of proof were not made heavier.”
d) “Medida”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Canned Fruit (US - Canned Fruit), adotado em 20 de
fevereiro de 1985, Demandante: EUA, L/5778, para. 51
12
Neste relatório, o painel do GATT observou que a anulação ou prejuízo ocorrido em relação a medidas que
não podiam ser antecipadas pela parte demandante, afeta as condições competitivas de produtos importados.
Para. 51. “The Panel considered the definition given to 'nullification or impairment' of tariff concessions in
past GATT Panel reports which had examined “non-violation complaints” in respect of tariff concessions
(BISD II/193; 1S/58). It agreed with the findings in these reports that nullification or impairment of tariff
concessions would exist if the measure in question: (1) could not have reasonably been anticipated by the
party bringing the complaint at the time of negotiation of the tariff concessions and (2) the measure resulted
in the upsetting of the competitive position of the imported products concerned. In the present case, this
meant that nullification or impairment of the tariff concessions would exist if the introduction or increase of
the EEC production aids could not have been reasonably anticipated by the United States at the time of the
negotiations for the tariff concessions on those products (below under b) and the aid systems had upset the
competitive position of imported canned peaches, canned pears, canned fruit cocktail and dried grapes on the
EC market (below under c).”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar –
containing Products applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote in Schedule of Tariff
Concessions (US - Sugar Waiver), adotado em 07 de novembro de 1990, Demandante: CEE, L/6631,
BISD 37S/228, para. 5.21
Neste relatório, o painel do GATT determinou que mesmo uma medida coberta por uma derrogação pode
causar anulação ou prejuízo.
Para. 5.21. “(...) The EEC has not claimed that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession made by the
United States in accordance with Article II have been nullified or impaired as a result of measures taken
under the Waiver. The main justification for its claim of nullification or impairment that the EEC presented to
the Panel was that the restrictions, in spite of the Waiver, have remained inconsistent with the General
Agreement. The Panel recognized that Article XXIII:1(b) does not exclude claims of nullification or
impairment based on provisions of the General Agreement other than Article II. However, the Panel noted
that Article XXIII:1(b) applies whether or not the measure at issue conflicts with the General Agreement and
that, therefore, the question of whether a measure inconsistent with Article XI:1 remains inconsistent with the
General Agreement even if covered by a waiver cannot, by itself, determine whether it nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing under the General Agreement within the meaning of that provision. A complaint under
Article XXIII:1(b) must therefore be supported by a justification that goes beyond a mere characterization of
the measure at issue as inconsistent with the General Agreement.”
Relatório do painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film na Paper (Japan Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.49, 10.52 e 10.57-10.59
Neste relatório, o painel determinou que mesmo medidas não-obrigatórias podem causar anulação ou
prejuízo, mas que é necessário que as medidas sejam medidas governamentais e que sejam aplicadas no
momento da demanda. Medidas antigas que continuam produzindo efeitos também podem ser questionadas,
mas cabe ao demandante demonstrar que a anulação ou prejuízo é fruto dessas medidas.
Para. 10.49. “[A] government policy or action need not necessarily have a substantially binding or
compulsory nature for it to entail a likelihood of compliance by private actors in a way so as to nullify or
impair legitimately expected benefits within the purview of Article XXIII:1(b). Indeed, it is clear that nonbinding actions, which include sufficient incentives or disincentives for private parties to act in a particular
manner, can potentially have adverse effects on competitive conditions of market access. For example, a
number of non-violation cases have involved subsidies, receipt of which requires only voluntary compliance
with eligibility criteria.”
13
Para. 10.52. “As the WTO Agreement is an international agreement, in respect of which only national
governments and separate customs territories are directly subject to obligations, it follows by implication that
the term measure in Article XXIII:1(b) and Article 26.1 of the DSU, as elsewhere in the WTO Agreement,
refers only to policies or actions of governments, not those of private parties.”
Para. 10.57. “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) is written in the present tense, viz. ‘If any Member should
consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired (…) as the result of (…) (b) the application by another Member of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement’. It thus stands to reason that, given that the text contemplates
nullification or impairment in the present tense, caused by application of a measure, ‘whether or not it
conflicts’ (also in the present tense), the ordinary meaning of this provision limits the non-violation remedy to
measures that are currently being applied.”
Para. 10.58. “Moreover, GATT/WTO precedent in other areas, including in respect of virtually all panel
cases under Article XXIII:1(a), confirms that it is not the practice of GATT/WTO panels to rule on measures
which have expired or which have been repealed or withdrawn. (9) In only a very small number of cases,
involving very particular situations, have panels proceeded to adjudicate claims involving measures which no
longer exist or which are no longer being applied. In those cases, the measures typically had been applied in
the very recent past.” (10)
Para. 10.59. “[W]e do not rule out the possibility that old ‘measures’ that were never officially revoked may
continue to be applied through continuing administrative guidance. Similarly, even if measures were
officially revoked, the underlying policies may continue to be applied through continuing administrative
guidance. However, the burden is on the United States to demonstrate clearly that such guidance does in fact
exist and that it is currently nullifying or impairing benefits.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: CE, WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 187-188
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que as reclamações de não-violação são cabíveis em
qualquer caso de anulação ou prejuízo, ainda que a medida em questão possa também ser contestada como
incompatível com as regras do GATT, e ainda que não se trate de uma medida classificada pela parte que a
toma como “comercial”.
Para. 187. “Against this background, we turn now to the European Communities' argument that Article
XXIII:1(b) does not apply to measures that fall within the scope of application of other provisions of the
GATT 1994. The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that provision arises when a
“benefit” is being “nullified or impaired” through the “application (…) of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement “. (emphasis added) The wording of the provision, therefore,
clearly states that a claim may succeed, under Article XXIII:1(b), even if the measure “conflicts” with some
substantive provisions of the GATT 1994. It follows that a measure may, at one and the same time, be
inconsistent with, or in breach of, a provision of the GATT 1994 and, nonetheless, give rise to a cause of
action under Article XXIII:1(b). Of course, if a measure “conflicts” with a provision of the GATT 1994, that
measure must actually fall within the scope of application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We agree with
the Panel that this reading of Article XXIII:1(b) is consistent with the panel reports in Japan – Film and EEC
– Oilseeds, which both support the view that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which simultaneously
fall within the scope of application of other provisions of the GATT 1994. 189 Accordingly, we decline the
European Communities' first ground of appeal under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”
Para. 188. “The European Communities also contends that the Panel erred in finding that Article XXIII:1(b)
applies to measures which pursue health, rather than commercial, objectives and which can, therefore, be
justified under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. Once again, we look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b),
14
which provides that “the application by another Member of any measure” may give rise to a cause of action
under that provision. The use of the word “any” suggests that measures of all types may give rise to such a
cause of action. The text does not distinguish between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly,
therefore, the text of Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts the European Communities' argument that certain types of
measure, namely, those with health objectives, are excluded from the scope of application of Article
XXIII:1(b).”
e) “Vantagem”
EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, paras. 150-152
Nesta controvérsia, o painel do GATT determinou que a “vantagem” protegida pelos Acordos da OMC não
consiste em determinadas quantidades exportadas, mas em condições de concorrência dos produtos. Por isso,
não é relevante para o resultado da controvérsia que não tenha havido redução das exportações, bastando-se
demonstrar a alteração nas condições de concorrência.
Para. 150. “In the past Article XXIII:1(b) cases, the CONTRACTING PARTIES have adopted the same
approach: their findings of nullification or impairment were based on a finding that the products for which a
tariff concession had been granted were subjected to an adverse change in competitive conditions. In none of
these cases did they consider the trade impact of the change in competitive conditions to be determining. In
one case they specifically rejected the relevance of statistics on trade flows for a finding on nullification and
impairment. It is of course true that, in the tariff negotiations in the framework of GATT, contracting parties
seek tariff concessions in the hope of expanding their exports, but the commitments they exchange in such
negotiations are commitments on conditions of competition for trade, not on volumes of trade.”
Para. 151. “The approach of the CONTRACTING PARTIES reflects the fact that governments can often not
predict with precision what the impact of their interventions on import volumes will be. If a finding of
nullification or impairment depended not only on whether an adverse change in competitive conditions took
place but also on whether that change resulted in a decline in imports, the exposure of the contracting parties
to claims under Article XXIII:1(b) would depend on factors they do not control; the rules on nullification and
impairment could consequently no longer guide government policies. Moreover, the contracting parties
facing an adverse change in policies could make a claim of nullification or impairment only after that change
has produced effects. Such claims could consequently not be made to prevent adverse effects; they could only
be made to obtain redress ex post. If Article II were considered to be protecting expectations on trade flows it
would be necessary for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to determine what export volumes a contracting
party can reasonably expect after having obtained a tariff concession. The Panel is not aware of any criteria or
principles that could be applied to make such a determination. The Panel further noted that changes in trade
volumes result not only from government policies but also other factors, and that, in most circumstances, it is
not possible to determine whether a decline in imports following a change in policies is attributable to that
change or to other factors. The provisions of Article XXIII:1(b) could therefore in practice hardly be applied
if a contracting party claiming nullification or impairment had to demonstrate not only that an adverse change
in competition has taken place but also that the change has resulted in a decline in imports.”
Para. 152. “For these reasons the Panel found that benefits accruing to the United States under Article II of
the General Agreement in respect of the zero tariff bindings for oilseeds in the Community Schedule of
Concessions were impaired as a result of subsidy schemes which operate to protect Community producers of
oilseeds completely from the movement of prices of imports and thereby prevent the oilseeds tariff
concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic and imported
oilseeds.”
15
- Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.64-10.66
Nesta controvérsia, o painel estabeleceu que as expectativas legítimas são geradas a cada rodada de
negociações e, portanto, expectativas geradas por concessões tarifárias da época do GATT 1947 podem servir
de base para reclamações de não-violação na OMC.
Para. 10.64. “GATT 1994 incorporates both ‘protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions’ under
paragraph 1(b)(i) and ‘the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994’ under paragraph 1(d). The ordinary meaning
of the text of paragraphs 1(b)(i) and 1(d) of GATT 1994, read together, clearly suggests that all protocols
relating to tariff concessions, both those predating the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT
1994, are incorporated into GATT 1994 and continue to have legal existence under the WTO Agreement.”
Para. 10.65. “Where tariff concessions have been progressively improved, the benefits — expectations of
improved market access - accruing directly or indirectly under different tariff concession protocols
incorporated in GATT 1994 can be read in harmony. This approach is in accordance with general principles
of legal interpretation which, as the Appellate Body reiterated in US - Gasoline, teach that one should
endeavour to give legal effect to all elements of a treaty and not reduce them to redundancy or inutility.”
Para. 10.66. “The conclusion that benefits accruing from concessions granted during successive rounds of
tariff negotiations may separately give rise to reasonable expectations of improved market access is consistent
with past panel reports. (11) The panel in EEC - Canned Fruit found that the United States had a reasonable
expectation arising from the EEC’s 1974 tariff concessions pursuant to Article XXIV:6 negotiations and 1979
Tokyo Round tariff concessions (even though the panel separately found that the United States could have
anticipated certain subsidies in respect of the Tokyo Round tariff concessions). (12) And the EEC - Oilseeds
panel found that the United States had a reasonable expectation arising from the EEC’s 1962 Dillon Round
tariff concessions. (13) As the United States points out, these findings would not have been possible if
subsequent multilateral tariff agreements or enlargement agreements were deemed to extinguish wholesale
the tariff concessions in prior tariff schedules.”
f) “Expectativas legítimas”
- Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.76-10.77, 10.79-10.80
Neste relatório, o painel formulou diretrizes para a determinação do que são expectativas legítimas e do que
pode razoavelmente ser antecipado pelos membros na conclusão de uma negociação tarifária. Cabe ao
membro demandante provar que não podia, no momento da negociaçãom, antecipar a medida questionada.
Para. 10.76. “As suggested by the 1961 report (14), in order for expectations of a benefit to be legitimate, the
challenged measures must not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the tariff concession was
negotiated. If the measures were anticipated, a Member could not have had a legitimate expectation of
improved market access to the extent of the impairment caused by these measures.”
Para. 10.77. “Thus, under Article XXIII:1(b), the United States may only claim impairment of benefits
related to improved market access conditions flowing from relevant tariff concessions by Japan to the extent
that the United States could not have reasonably anticipated that such benefits would be offset by the
subsequent application of a measure by the Government of Japan.”
Para. 10.79. “We consider that the issue of reasonable anticipation should be approached in respect of
specific ‘measures’ in light of the following guidelines. First, in the case of measures shown by the United
States to have been introduced subsequent to the conclusion of the tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view
16
that the United States has raised a presumption that it should not be held to have anticipated these measures
and it is then for Japan to rebut that presumption. Such a rebuttal might be made, for example, by establishing
that the measure at issue is so clearly contemplated in an earlier measure that the United States should be held
to have anticipated it. However, there must be a clear connection shown. In our view, it is not sufficient to
claim that a specific measure should have been anticipated because it is consistent with or a continuation of a
past general government policy. As in the EEC - Oilseeds case (15), we do not believe that it would be
appropriate to charge the United States with having reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent measures,
such as ‘measures’ to improve what Japan describes as the inefficient Japanese distribution sector. Indeed, if
a Member were held to anticipate all GATT-consistent measures, a non-violation claim would not be
possible. Nor do we consider that as a general rule the United States should have reasonably anticipated
Japanese measures that are similar to measures in other Members’ markets. In each such instance, the issue of
reasonable anticipation needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”
Para. 10.80. “[I]n the case of measures shown by Japan to have been introduced prior to the conclusion of the
tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view that Japan has raised a presumption that the United States should be
held to have anticipated those measures and it is for the United States to rebut that presumption. In this
connection, it is our view that the United States is charged with knowledge of Japanese government measures
as of the date of their publication. We realize that knowledge of a measure’s existence is not equivalent to
understanding the impact of the measure on a specific product market. For example, a vague measure could
be given substance through enforcement policies that are initially unexpected or later changed significantly.
However, where the United States claims that it did not know of a measure’s relevance to market access
conditions in respect of film or paper, we would expect the United States to clearly demonstrate why initially
it could not have reasonably anticipated the effect of an existing measure on the film or paper market and
when it did realize the effect. Such a showing will need to be tied to the relevant points in time (i.e., the
conclusions of the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds) in order to assess the extent of the United States’
legitimate expectations of benefits from these three Rounds. A simple statement that a Member’s measures
were so opaque and informal that their impact could not be assessed is not sufficient. While it is true that in
most past non-violation cases, one could easily discern a clear link between a product-specific action and the
effect on the tariff concession that it allegedly impaired, one can also discern a link between general measures
affecting the internal sale and distribution of products, such as rules on advertising and premiums, and tariff
concessions on products in general.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 42 e 45
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação corrigiu a confusão feita pelo painel entre reclamações de violação e de
não-violação, observando que expectativas legítimas que não estão previstas no tratado não podem ser causa
de violação.
Para. 42. “The meaning of this provision is clear: the only cause of action permitted under the TRIPS
Agreement during the first five years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement is a “violation”
complaint under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994. This case involves allegations of violation of
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. However, the Panel's invocation of the “legitimate expectations” of
Members relating to conditions of competition melds the legally-distinct bases for “violation” and “nonviolation” complaints under Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 into one uniform cause of action. This is not
consistent with either Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 or Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement (…).”
Para. 45. “The Panel misapplies Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Panel misunderstands the concept
of legitimate expectations in the context of the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty itself. The duty
of a treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of the parties. This
17
should be done in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention. But these principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of
words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended.”
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products
Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.291, 8.295-8.298
Nesta controvérsia, o painel rejeitou a alegação do Canadá de que não poderia ter antecipado a proibição da
comercialização e uso do amianto, dadas as diversas indicações sobre a periculosidade da substância já
existentes à época da negociação tarifária.
Para. 8.291. “[P]revious panels found that a number of elements were not relevant. We consider it necessary
to assess their applicability in relation to the circumstances of the present case.
(a) First of all, we note that the reports in Japan — Film and EEC — Oilseeds
concluded that a specific measure could not be considered foreseeable solely because it
was consistent with or a continuation of a past general government policy. However,
we note that, in contrast to the two cases mentioned above, France had already
developed a specific policy in response to the health problems created by asbestos
before the adoption of the Decree. This factor must certainly be taken into account in
our analysis.
(b) The Panel in Japan — Film, also concluded that it would not be appropriate to
charge the United States with having reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent
measures. Consequently, we do not consider that Canada reasonably anticipated all
GATT-consistent measures, or even possible measures justifiable under Article XX.
(c) Finally, insofar as the Decree postdates the most recent tariff negotiations, we
could apply the presumption applied by the Panel in Japan — Film, according to which
normally Canada should not be considered to have anticipated a measure introduced
after the tariff concession had been negotiated. However, we do not consider such a
presumption to be consistent with the standard of proof that we found to be applicable
in paragraph 8.272 above in the case of an allegation of non-violation nullification
concerning measures falling under Article XX of the GATT 1994.”
Para. 8.295. “As we have found (…) the presumption applied by the Panel in Japan - Film cannot be applied
to the present case. (16) Unlike Canada, which claims that no recent scientific development could have made
the measure foreseeable, we consider that there is evidence to show that regulations restricting the use of
asbestos could have been anticipated. First of all, the hazardous nature of chrysotile has long been known
(…).”
Para. 8.296. “Moreover, in the light of the information submitted by the parties and the experts, we consider
that the study of the diseases associated with the inhalation of asbestos is a field of science in which any
possible conclusion would appear to be based on the observation of pathological cases day by day (…).”
Para. 8.297. “On the other hand, the accumulation of international and Community decisions concerning the
use of asbestos, even if it did not necessarily make it certain that the use of asbestos would be banned by
France, could not do other than create a climate which should have led Canada to anticipate a change in the
attitude of the importing countries, especially in view of the long-established trend towards ever tighter
restrictions on the use of asbestos. We also note that the use of chrysotile asbestos was banned by Members
of the WTO well before it was banned by France. Admittedly, in Japan - Film the Panel considered that the
adoption in other Members’ markets of measures similar to the measures in question could not make the latter
foreseeable. However, here again it was a question of commercial measures. We consider that in the present
case the situation is different since it concerns public health and the competent international organizations
have already taken a position on the question. The adoption, in an already restrictive context, of public health
measures by other States, faced with a social and economic situation similar to that in France, creates an
environment in which the adoption of similar measures by France, is no longer unforeseeable.”
18
Para. 8.298. “Moreover, as noted above, at the end of the Uruguay Round France already had in place a
number of measures regulating the use of asbestos. These included, in particular, measures relating to the
exposure of workers taken after asbestos was recognized as a carcinogen by the IARC (Decree 77-949 of 17
August 1977) and the adoption of ILO Convention 162, as well as for the purpose of implementing
Community directives applicable. The Panel also notes that Decree 88-466 of 28 April 1988 on products
containing asbestos had prohibited the use of chrysotile asbestos in the manufacture of certain products.” (17)
Relatório do painel no caso Korea - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products (Korea - Procurement), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS163/R, para. 7.75
Neste relatório, o painel apontou que as expectativas legítimas devem ser examinadas à luz do conhecimento
disponível sobre as intenções comuns, não apenas das partes na controvérsia como também de todas as partes
na negociação.
Para. 7.75. “At the outset of our analysis of this issue, we must address some relevant issues relating to use
of negotiating history which arose in the European Communities - Computer Equipment dispute. In that
dispute, the Appellate Body specifically found that the standard of reasonable expectation or legitimate
expectation existing with respect to non-violation cases had no role in reviewing negotiating history in order
to aid in resolving the issues pertaining to a violation case. One of the reasons is that in a non-violation case
the relevant question is what was the reasonable expectation of the complaining party. However, if it is
necessary to go beyond the text in a violation case, the relevant question is to assess the objective evidence of
the mutual understanding of the negotiating parties. (18) This involves not just the complaining and
responding parties, but also involves possibly other parties to the negotiations. It is also important to note that
there is a difference in perspectives of the reasonable expectations of one party as opposed to the mutual
understanding of all the parties. The information available at the time of the negotiations may be available to
some parties but not all. In other words, the evidence before the panel may be different in the two analyses
and the weighting and probative value may also differ.”
g) “Anulada ou reduzida”
- Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.82, 10.84-10.88
Nesta controvérsia, o painel estabeleceu a divisão do ônus da prova, determinando que a parte demandante
deve demonstrar uma clara correlação entre as medidas questionadas e os efeitos adversos causados às
condições de concorrência de seus produtos.
Para. 10.82. “[I]t must be demonstrated that the competitive position of the imported products subject to and
benefitting from a relevant market access (tariff) concession is being upset by (‘nullified or impaired (…) as
the result of’) the application of a measure not reasonably anticipated. The equation of ‘nullification or
impairment’ with ‘upsetting the competitive relationship’ established between domestic and imported
products as a result of tariff concessions has been consistently used by GATT panels examining non-violation
complaints. For example, the EEC - Oilseeds panel, in describing its findings, stated that it had ‘found (…)
that the subsidies concerned had impaired the tariff concession because they upset the competitive
relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds, not because of any effect on trade flows’. (19) The
same language was used in the Australian Subsidy and Germany - Sardines cases. Thus, in this case, it is up
to the United States to prove that the governmental measures that it cites have upset the competitive
relationship between domestic and imported photographic film and paper in Japan to the detriment of
imports. In other words, the United States must show a clear correlation between the measures and the
adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationships.”
19
Para. 10.84. “As to the first issue (…) Japan should be responsible for what is caused by measures
attributable to the Japanese Government as opposed, for example, to what is caused by restrictive business
conduct attributable to private economic actors. At this stage of the proceeding, the issue is whether such a
measure has caused nullification or impairment, i.e., whether it has made more than a de minimis contribution
to nullification or impairment.”
Para. 10.85. “In respect of the second issue (…) even in the absence of de jure discrimination (measures
which on their face discriminate as to origin), it may be possible for the United States to show de facto
discrimination (measures which have a disparate impact on imports). However, in such circumstances, the
complaining party is called upon to make a detailed showing of any claimed disproportionate impact on
imports resulting from the origin-neutral measure. And, the burden of demonstrating such impact may be
significantly more difficult where the relationship between the measure and the product is questionable.”
Para. 10.86. “We note that WTO/GATT case law on the issue of de facto discrimination is reasonably welldeveloped, both in regard to the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment under GATT Article I (20) and
in regard to that of national treatment under GATT Article II (21) (…) We consider that despite the fact that
these past cases dealt with GATT provisions other than Article XXIII:1(b), the reasoning contained therein
appears to be equally applicable in addressing the question of de facto discrimination with respect to claims
of non-violation nullification or impairment, subject, of course, to the caveat, that in an Article XXIII:1(b)
case the issue is not whether equality of competitive conditions exists but whether the relative conditions of
competition which existed between domestic and foreign products as a consequence of the relevant tariff
concessions have been upset.”
Para. 10.87. “The third issue is the relevance of intent to causality (…). We note (…) that Article XXIII:1(b)
does not require a proof of intent of nullification or impairment of benefits by a government adopting a
measure. What matters for purposes of establishing causality is the impact of a measure, i.e. whether it upsets
competitive relationships. Nonetheless, intent may not be irrelevant. In our view, if a measure that appears on
its face to be origin-neutral in its effect on domestic and imported products is nevertheless shown to have
been intended to restrict imports, we may be more inclined to find a causal relationship in specific cases,
bearing in mind that intent is not determinative where it in fact exists.”
Para. 10.88. “Finally, as for the US position that the Panel should examine the impact of the measures in
combination as well as individually (a position contested by Japan), we do not reject the possibility of such an
impact. It is not without logic that a measure, when analyzed in isolation, may have only very limited impact
on competitive conditions in a market, but may have a more significant impact on such conditions when seen
in the context of - in combination with - a larger set of measures. Notwithstanding the logic of this theoretical
argument, however, we are sensitive to the fact that the technique of engaging in a combined assessment of
measures so as to determine causation is subject to potential abuse and therefore must be approached with
caution and circumscribed as necessary.”
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle,
Swine and Grain from Canada (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, para. 8.289
Neste relatório, o painel observou que a proibição de importações claramente afeta de modo negativo as
condições de concorrência de importados. Nesse caso, a questão relevante é se a proibição poderia ter sido
antecipada razoavelmente pelo governo demandante.
Para. 8.289. “[T]he Panel finds it appropriate to consider that in view of the type of measure in question the
‘upsetting of the competitive relationship’ can be assumed. By its very nature, an import ban constitutes a
denial of any opportunity for competition, whatever the import volume that existed before the introduction of
the ban. We will therefore concentrate on the question of whether the measure could reasonably have been
20
anticipated by the Canadian Government at the time that it was negotiating the various tariff concessions
covering the products concerned.”
h) “Reclamação de não-violação com relação ao Acordo de Compras Governamentais”
Relatório do painel no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement (Korea Procurement), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS163/R, paras. 7.93 e 7.101
Nesta controvérsia, o painel posicionou-se no sentido de que é preciso verificar a anulação ou prejuízo não
apenas observando o cumprimento da letra do tratado, mas também o que foi negociado.
Para. 7.93. “[T]he non-violation remedy as it has developed in GATT/ WTO jurisprudence should not be
viewed in isolation from general principles of customary international law. As noted above, the basic premise
is that Members should not take actions, even those consistent with the letter of the treaty, which might serve
to undermine the reasonable expectations of negotiating partners. This has traditionally arisen in the context
of actions which might undermine the value of negotiated tariff concessions. In our view, this is a further
development of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the context of Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1947
and disputes that arose thereunder, and subsequently in the WTO Agreements, particularly in Article 26 of
the DSU. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention (22) in the
following manner:
‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith.’”
Para. 7.101. “[W]e will review the claim of nullification or impairment raised by the United States within the
framework of principles of international law which are generally applicable not only to performance of
treaties but also to treaty negotiation. (23) To do otherwise potentially would leave a gap in the applicability
of the law generally to WTO disputes and we see no evidence in the language of the WTO Agreements that
such a gap was intended. If the non-violation remedy were deemed not to provide a relief for such problems
as have arisen in the present case regarding good faith and error in the negotiation of GPA commitments (and
one might add, in tariff and services commitments under other WTO Agreements), then nothing could be
done about them within the framework of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism if general rules of
customary international law on good faith and error in treaty negotiations were ruled not to be applicable. As
was argued above, that would not be in conformity with the normal relationship between international law
and treaty law or with the WTO Agreements.”
4.
Relação entre Artigo XXIII:1(a) e Artigo XXIII:1(b)
EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, para. 142
Nesta controvérsia, o painel do GATT confirmou a possibilidade de exame de uma reclamação de nãoviolação mesmo no caso de uma alegação de violação,pois pode haver violação em relação a determinados
agentes econômicos e anulação ou prejuízo em relação a outros agentes econômicos.
Para. 142. “(...) The Panel (...) examined whether its finding that the payments to the processors are
inconsistent with the General Agreement might make an examination of the question of the nullification or
impairment of the tariff concessions unnecessary. The Panel noted that this would be the case if compliance
by the Community with the finding on Article III:4 would necessarily remove the basis of the United States
claim of nullification or impairment. The Panel noted that the subsidies the Community presently grants to
producers of oilseeds result from the maintenance of producer prices at levels generally exceeding the price
21
of competing imports through payments to processors conditional upon the purchase or transformation of
domestic oilseeds. The finding of the Panel under Article III:4 does not relate to the benefits accruing to the
Community producers under the Community subsidy schemes but only to the benefits accruing to processors.
The Panel further noted that the Community could comply with the Panel’s finding on Article III and still
make available in the Community market oilseeds produced with the benefit of producer prices maintained at
levels exceeding the price of competing imports. Compliance with the finding on Article III thus could, but
would not necessarily, eliminate the basis of the United States complaint that the benefits accruing to the
Community producers of oilseeds impair the Community’s tariff concessions for oilseeds. The Panel
therefore decided that it had to examine that complaint as well.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Afecting Asbestos and
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação citou um relatório de painel do GATT descrevendo o objetivo das
reclamações de não-violação como sendo a proteção de oportunidades competitivas que possam
legitimamente ser esperadas em virtude das concessões tarifárias realizadas.
Para. 185. “Article XXIII:1(a) sets forth a cause of action for a claim that a Member has failed to carry out
one or more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A claim under Article XXIII:1(a), therefore, lies when a
Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with a provision of the GATT 1994. Article XXIII:1(b) sets
forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the application of a measure, a Member has ‘nullified
or impaired’ ‘benefits’ accruing to another Member, ‘whether or not that measure conflicts with the
provisions’ of the GATT 1994. Thus, it is not necessary, under Article XXIII:1(b), to establish that the
measure involved is inconsistent with, or violates, a provision of the GATT 1994. Cases under Article
XXIII:1(b) are, for this reason, sometimes described as ‘non-violation’ cases; we note, though, that the word
‘non-violation’ does not appear in this provision. The purpose of this rather unusual remedy was described by
the panel in European Economic Community - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of
Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins (…) in the following terms:
The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII:1(b)] is that the improved
competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff concession
can be frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also
by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties
to make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a right of redress when a
reciprocal concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of the
application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement.’
(24) (emphasis added)
5.
Artigo XXIII:2
a) “Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas não chegarem a um acordo satisfatório”
Relatório do painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de novembro de 1962,
Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 10
Este painel do GATT chancelou a exigência, hoje codificada no DSU, de que uma tentativa de solução
negociada (consultas) preceda o ingresso com uma reclamação perante os órgãos de adjudicação.
Para. 10. “Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII provides that the Contracting Parties shall promptly investigate any
matter referred to them under that paragraph. From the context it is obvious, however, that before a ‘matter’
can be so referred to the Contracting Parties it must have been the subject of representations or proposals
made pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Article which have not resulted in a ‘satisfactory adjustment’ (unless the
difficulty is of the type referred to in paragraph 1(c) of the Article).” (25)
22
b) “as Partes Contratantes ... dirigirão recomendações especiais e apropriadas ... ou baixarão normas
sobre a questão”
Relatório do painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de novembro de 1962,
Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, paras. 11-12 e 20
Neste relatório, o painel do GATT explicitou a distinção entre recomendação e decisão: a primeira cabe
sempre que necessário para levar a uma solução satisfatória do caso; a segunda quando houver uma questão
controversa acerca do direito ou dos fatos. Caso se determine que uma medida é contrária às regras do GATT,
o painel deve recomendar que esta seja removida.
Para. 11. “Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII provides, apart from promptly investigating any matter so referred to
them, for two kinds of action by the Contracting Parties, namely:
(i) they shall make appropriate recommendations or give a ruling on the matter;
(ii) they may authorize the suspension of concessions or obligations.
The action stated under (i) is obligatory and must be taken in all cases where there can
be an ‘appropriate’ recommendation or ruling. The action under (ii) is to be taken at
the discretion of the Contracting Parties in defined circumstances.”
Para. 12. “The paragraph states that the Contracting Parties ‘shall make appropriate recommenda¬tions to the
contracting parties which they consider to be concerned or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate’. Whilst
a ‘ruling’ is called for only when there is a point of contention on fact or law, ‘recommendations’ should
always be appropriate whenever, in the view of the Contracting Parties, they would lead to a satisfactory
adjustment of the matter.”
Para. 20. “Where a measure affecting imports is maintained clearly in contradiction with the provisions of
the General Agreement (and is not covered by the ‘existing legislation’ clause of a Protocol), the Panel has in
all cases recommended that the measure in question be removed.”
c) “Recomendações com relação a reclamações de violação segundo artigo XXIII:1(a)”
Relatório do painel no caso Norway Trondheim Toll Ring, adotado em 13 de maio de 1992,
Demandante: EUA, GPR.DS2/R, BISD 40S/319, para. 4.21
Neste relatório, o painel do GATT consolidou o entendimento, hoje codificado no DSU, de que a
compensação deve ser adotada somente se a remoção da medida for impraticável. A compensação deve ser
adotada temporariamente, até que a medida incompatível com as regras multilaterais seja removida.
Para. 4.21. “Moreover, the Panel observed that, under the GATT, it was customary for panels to make
findings regarding conformity with the General Agreement and to recommend that any measures found
inconsistent with the General Agreement be terminated or brought into conformity from the time that the
recommendation was adopted. The provision of compensation had been resorted to only if the immediate
withdrawal of the measure was impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the
measures which were inconsistent with the General Agreement (BISD, 26S/216). Questions relating to
compensation or withdrawal of benefits had been dealt with in a stage of the dispute settlement procedure
subsequent to the adoption of panel reports.”
d) “Recomendações com relação a reclamações de não-violação segundo artigo XXIII:1(b)”
Relatório do painel no caso EEC - Canned Fruit, adotado em 20 de fevereiro de 1985, Demandante:
EUA, L/5778, para. 82
23
Nesta controvérsia, o painel do GATT observou que a recomendação, em casos de não-violação, deve ser
para que o membro - cuja medida causou anulação ou prejuízo - considere maneiras de remover a
desigualdade de concorrência causada pela medida. Esta recomendação não gera uma obrigação jurídica de
remoção da medida e não prevalece sobre outras maneiras de solucionar a controvérsia.
Para. 82. “Having established the existence of nullification and impairment of tariff concessions with respect
to canned peaches, canned pears, and canned fruit mixtures, the Panel considered what suggestions it could
make so as to assist CONTRACTING PARTIES in their task of formulating recommendations to achieve a
satisfactory settlement of the matter. The Panel noted that in past “non-violation” complaints of nullification
or impairment of tariff concessions (BISD II/195; 1S/30, 31, 59) the CONTRACTING PARTIES had
recommended that the party against which the finding had been made consider ways and means to remove the
competitive inequality brought about by the measure at issue. The Panel was aware of the finding of the
Working Party Report on the Australian subsidy on ammonium sulphate that “there is nothing in Article
XXIII which would empower the CONTRACTING PARTIES to require a contracting party to withdraw or
reduce a consumption subsidy” (...) and that the “ultimate power of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under
Article XXIII is that of authorizing an affected contracting party to suspend the application of appropriate
obligations or concessions under the General Agreement” (BISD II/195, para. 16). In making the following
draft recommendation, the Panel also wishes to emphasize that the recommendation cannot constitute a legal
obligation for the EEC to remove or reduce its domestic production subsidies and does not preclude other
modes of settling the dispute such as granting of compensation or, in the last resort, a request for
authorization of suspension of concessions. The Panel also wishes to emphasize that this recommendation
cannot detract from the rights of contracting parties under Article XXIV:6 of the General Agreement.”
Relatório do painel no caso EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples - Complaint by Chile (II),
(EEC - Dessert Apples), adotado em 22 de junho de 1989, Demandante: Chile, L/6491, BISD 36S/93,
paras. 12.35-12.36
Nesta controvérsia, o painel do GATT manifestou o entendimento, hoje consolidado no DSU, de que a
recomendação no caso de medidas incompatíveis com os acordos deve ser para a remoção da medida. Não há
obrigação da parte de oferecer compensação, a qual é voluntária. A compensação, portanto, deve ser
negociada pelas partes, não cabendo ao painel emitir uma recomendação nesse sentido.
Para. 12.35. “The Panel observed that it was customary for a panel examining complaints under paragraph 2
of Article XXIII to make a finding regarding nullification or impairment of benefits and to recommend the
termination of measures found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement. It noted that there was no
provision in the General Agreement obliging contracting parties to provide compensation, and that the Annex
to the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance
indicated that:
(...) The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate
withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the
withdrawal of the measures which are inconsistent with the General Agreement.
The Panel further recalled that a 1965 Secretariat note discussed this issue in relation to residual quantitative
restrictions affecting developing countries. This note indicated:
(...) Where a proposal for compensation has been made, it would appear that it is open
to the Contracting Parties to make an assessment of the loss sustained (...) and to make
a recommendation that pending elimination of these restrictions the country applying
such restrictions should consider the establishment of other appropriate concessions
which would serve to compensate this loss. There are, however, two points which need
to be noted in this connection. Firstly, any such recommendation under the provisions
24
of the present Article XXIII can be implemented only to the extent that it proves
acceptable to the contracting party to whom it is addressed. If such contracting party is
not in a position to accept the recommendation, the final sanction must remain the
authority for withdrawing equivalent obligations as provided in paragraph 2 of Article
XXIII.
Secondly, the nature of the compensatory concessions and the items on which these are
offered would have to be determined by the contracting party to whom the
recommendation is directed and would have to be a matter of agreement between the
parties concerned. It would not be possible for a panel or other body set up by the
Contracting Parties to adjudicate on the specific compensations that should be offered
(...).
Para. 12.36. “The Panel endorsed the views contained in this note. It recognized that it would be possible for
the EEC and Chile to negotiate compensation consistent with the provisions of the General Agreement;
however the Panel did not consider that it would be appropriate for it to make a recommendation on this
matter.”
e) “As circunstâncias suficientemente graves para justificar suspensão da aplicação de qualquer
obrigação ou concessão”
Relatório do painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962,
Demandante: EUA, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, paras. 13 e 20-21
Nesta controvérsia, o painel do GATT formalizou o procedimento, hoje codificado no DSU, em duas fases.
Na primeira fase, o painel determina a incompatibilidade da medida com as regras do sistema multilateral de
comércio e recomenda que a medida seja removida. Caso a medida não seja removida, o painel passa à
segunda fase – o ‘último recurso’ –, na qual recomenda às Partes Contratantes (hoje, ao DSB) que autorize a
suspensão de concessões e outras obrigações devidas pelo membro violador ao membro prejudicado.
Para. 13. “The latter part of paragraph 2 of Article XXIII states that “if the CONTRACTING PARTIES
consider the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party
or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other
obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances”. In the view of
the Panel the requirement that the situation must be serious enough limits the applicability of the provision to
cases where there is nullification or impairment; it would at any rate be difficult to conceive a situation in
which the suspension of concessions or obligations could be appropriate where nullification or impairment
was not involved.”
Para. 20. “Where the Panel finds that there is prima facie nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to
Uruguay under the Agreement, it has proposed recommendations based on that finding. Where a measure
affecting imports is maintained clearly in contradiction with the provisions of the General Agreement (and is
not covered by the “existing legislation” clause of a Protocol), the Panel has in all cases recommended that
the measure in question be removed. Reference is made in these recommendations based on nullification or
impairment to the possibility of further action, in the event of non-fulfillment, by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES under paragraph 2 of Article XXIII. In respect of these particular cases the Panel proposes the
following procedure for adoption by the CONTRACTING PARTIES: The contracting parties concerned be
asked to report on their action taken to comply with the CONTRACTING PARTIES' Recommendations or
any other satisfactory adjustment (such as the provision of suitable concessions acceptable to Uruguay) by 1
March 1963. If by that date the Recommendations are not carried out and no satisfactory adjustment is made,
the circumstances shall be deemed to be “serious enough” to justify action under the penultimate sentence of
Article XXIII:2 and Uruguay shall be entitled immediately to ask for the authorization of suspension of
25
concessions or obligations. The CONTRACTING PARTIES should make arrangements for prompt
determination as to what concessions or obligations the suspension of which should be authorized.”
Para. 21. “In recommending this two-stage procedure, the Panel had principally in mind, once again, the
requirement stated in Article XXIII:2 that the situation must be “serious enough” before suspension should be
authorized. It noted, as a report of the ninth session (BISD, Third Supplement, pages 250-251) had made it
clear, the action of authorization of suspension of concessions or obligations should never be taken except as
a last resort; it also noted that the aim of Uruguay at this stage was to seek the prompt removal of the
measures in question.”
III.
Comentários
Ainda sob a égide do antigo GATT e, portanto, previamente à criação da OMC, o artigo XXIII do GATT
definiu as linhas gerais do sistema de solução de controvérsias, bem como os seus respectivos instrumentos
(“violation”, “non-violation” e “situation complaints”). Diferentemente da maioria dos acordos
internacionais, as disposições relativas à solução de disputas no GATT não fazem qualquer menção a
“direitos e obrigações das Partes Contratantes”, à “violação de obrigações decorrentes do tratado” e,
tampouco, a “controvérsias legais sobre interpretação do tratado ou qualquer questão de direito
internacional”. (26)
Ao contrário, adotou-se no artigo XXIII do GATT o “conceito chave” de “anulação ou redução de uma
vantagem decorrente direta ou indiretamente do Acordo” (27) (“nullification or impairment of any benefit ...
accruing under this Agreement”) cuja aplicação foi referendada tanto pela jurisprudência desenvolvida no
antigo sistema do GATT, bem como pelos relatórios do atual sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC.
Até mesmo casos nos quais foi alegada violação a obrigações do acordo (conforme disposto no artigo
XXIII:1(a) do GATT), reconheceu-se a “anulação ou redução de vantagem prima facie”. (28) Muitos dos
conceitos incorporados pelo artigo XXIII do GATT, no entanto, carecem de precisão jurídica: conceitos como
“anulação ou redução”; “qualquer vantagem”; “qualquer objetivo” e “qualquer situação” jamais foram objeto
de análise e definição, seja pelo próprio GATT, seja pelos sistemas de solução de controvérsias do GATT 47
e da OMC.
Tendo como origem tratados bilaterais de comércio, negociados nos anos 20 e 30, o conceito de “anulação ou
redução” foi concebido para evitar que concessões tarifárias fossem enfraquecidas por barreiras não-tarifárias
ou medidas governamentais sem caráter comercial. Buscava-se, portanto, impedir que medidas em
conformidade com os termos dos tratados pudessem ter, em contrapartida, o efeito de anular ou reduzir os
objetivos e obrigações assumidas sob os mesmos. A evolução jurisprudencial confirma, no entanto, que a
falta de segurança jurídica dos conceitos adotados pelo artigo XXIII, principalmente em relação aos casos de
“não-violação”, acabou por inibir a utilização do mencionado instrumento pelos membros da OMC: dos 15
casos em que o artigo XXIII:1(b) foi utilizado como argumento jurídico principal, apenas 6 tiveram seus
respectivos pedidos acolhidos (29) (todos, ressalte-se, durante a existência do GATT). Em contrapartida, dos
4 casos em que demandas de “não-violação” foram analisadas pelo DSB da OMC (30), todos tiveram seus
pedidos rejeitados.
Relatórios de painéis da época do GATT, adotados pelas Partes Contratantes, ressaltaram que o termo
“anulação ou redução de vantagens” não se refere a danos ao comércio, mas sim a mudanças imprevisíveis
nas condições de competitividade dos produtos importados em relação aos produtos domésticos. Não seria
necessária, portanto, a prova do dano para que se reconhecesse a “anulação ou redução” de um benefício.
Questiona-se, no entanto, se a “proteção do equilíbrio dos interesses das Partes Contratantes”, finalidade
almejada quando da elaboração do artigo XXIII, ainda estaria apta a fornecer parâmetros para a revisão de
medidas questionáveis perante os acordos da OMC. A própria teoria das “expectativas legítimas” foi muito
pouco explorada com relação a demandas de “não-violação” para se permitir o uso efetivo do Artigo em
26
questão. Ademais, não há qualquer parâmetro desenvolvido jurisprudencialmente que permita a utilização do
artigo XXIII:1(c) (“situation complaints”) como cláusula de escape para impedir que mudanças nas
circunstâncias acabem por prejudicar o gozo de benefícios acordados sob a égide da OMC a um determinado
membro.
Embora muito tenha sido desenvolvido através do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias, existem ainda
muitas lacunas a serem preenchidas na interpretação dos instrumentos previstos pelo artigo XXIII. Em alguns
dos poucos casos de “não-violação” (31) analisados ainda na época do GATT 1947, os termos “vantagens
resultantes ... deste acordo” foram aplicados também a outros benefícios – sem caráter tarifário - decorrentes
do GATT. Não ficou clara, no entanto, a extensão da aplicabilidade do artigo XXIII para se determinar, por
exemplo, quais outros benefícios – além dos não-tarifários – seriam acionáveis sob os artigos XXIII:1(b) e
(c). Tampouco foi possível definir, através da jurisprudência, a precisa relação entre as “demandas de
violação” e a proteção suplementar oferecida pelo uso de alegações de “não-violação”.
FOOTENOTES:
Footnote 1: EC - Commercial Vessels, para. 8.2; EC - Biotech Products, para. 8.15; EEC - Bananas II, para. 8.4 etc.
Footnote 2: Artigo 3.8 DSU: “In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the
action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption
that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up
to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge.”
Footnote 3: Appellate Body Report, India - Patents, adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 36 and 41.
Footnote 4: Adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 42.
Footnote 5: Original footnote: Report of the Working Party on Australia - Ammonium Sulphate; Panel Report on Germany Sardines; [Panel Report on] Uruguay - Recourse to Article XXIII; Panel Report on EC - Citrus; Panel Report on EEC - Canned Fruit;
[Panel Report on] Japan - Semi-Conductors; EEC - Oilseeds I; [Panel Report on] US - Sugar Waiver.
Footnote 6: Original footnote: In EEC - Oilseeds I, the United States stated that it “concurred in the proposition that non-violation
nullification or impairment should remain an exceptional concept. Although this concept had been in the text of Article XXIII of the
General Agreement from the outset, a cautious approach should continue to be taken in applying the concept”. EEC - Oilseeds I, para.
114. The EEC in that case stated that “recourse to the ‘non-violation’ concept under Article XXIII:1(b) should remain exceptional,
since otherwise the trading world would be plunged into a state of precariousness and uncertainty”. Ibid, para. 113.
Footnote 7: Original footnote: Panel Report on Japan - Film, para. 10.36.
Footnote 8: Original footnote: GATT Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, para. 144.
Footnote 9: Original footnote: See Panel Report on US - Gasoline, para. 6.19, where the panel observed that “it had not been the
usual practice of a panel established under the General Agreement to rule on measures that, at the time the panel’s terms of reference
were fixed, were not and would not become effective”. See also Panel Report on Argentina - Footwear, Textiles and Apparel, pp. 8486
Footnote 10: Original footnote: See, e.g., Panel Report on US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, where the panel ruled on a measure that
was revoked after the interim review but before issuance of the final report to the parties; Panel Report on EEC - Measure on Animal
Feed Proteins, where the panel ruled on a discontinued measure, but one that had terminated after the terms of reference of the panel
had already been agreed; Panel Report on United States - Prohibitions on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, para. 4.3.,
where the panel ruled on the GATT consistency of a withdrawn measure but only in light of the two parties’ agreement to this
procedure; Panel Report on EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, where the panel ruled on a measure which had
terminated before agreement on the panel’s terms of reference but where the terms of reference specifically included the terminated
measure and, given its seasonal nature, there remained the prospect of its reintroduction.
Footnote 11: Original footnote: See Panel Reports on EEC - Canned Fruit; and EEC - Oilseeds I.
Footnote 12: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Canned Fruit, para. 54.
Footnote 13: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, paras. 144-146.
Footnote 14: Original footnote: The “1961 report” referenced to is the GATT Panel Report on Operation of the Provisions of Article
XVI, adopted on 21 November 1961, BISD 10S/201.
Footnote 15: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, paras. 147 and 148.
Footnote 16: Original footnote: Even if it were applicable, we consider that the EC rebutted this presumption by their references to
the systems established at international and Community level concerning the use of asbestos.
Footnote 17: Original footnote: See Annex II, reply of the European Communities to the Panel’s question No. 4 at the Second
Meeting with the Parties, paras. 254 to 261.
Footnote 18: Original footnote: Appellate Body Report on EC - Computer Equipment at paragraphs 81-84, 93.
Footnote 19: Original footnote: Follow-up on the GATT Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds, BISD 39S/91, para. 77 (emphasis added).
27
Footnote 20: Original footnote: See, e.g., Panel Report on European Economic Community - Imports of Beef from Canada, paras.
4.2, 4.3.
Footnote 21: Original footnote: See Panel Reports on US - Section 337, para. 5.11; Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, paras. 5.12-5.14 and 5.30-5.31; US - Malt Beverages, para. 5.30; and Panel
Reports on US - Gasoline, para. 6.10; Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.33; and EC - Bananas III, paras. 7.179-7.180.
Footnote 22: Original footnote: A reference to the rule of pacta sunt servanda also appears in the preamble to the Vienna Convention.
Footnote 23: Original footnote: “We note that DSU Article 7.1 requires that the relevant covered agreement be cited in the request for
a panel and reflected in the terms of reference of a panel. That is not a bar to a broader analysis of the type we are following here, for
the GPA would be the referenced covered agreement and, in our view, we are merely fully examining the issue of non-violation raised
by the United States. We are merely doing it within the broader context of customary international law rather than limiting it to the
traditional analysis that accords with the extended concept of pacta sunt servanda. The purpose of the terms of reference is to properly
identify the claims of the party and therefore the scope of a panel’s review. We do not see any basis for arguing that the terms of
reference are meant to exclude reference to the broader rules of customary international law in interpreting a claim properly before the
Panel.”
Footnote 24: Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, para. 144.
Footnote 25: Original footnote: “However, at least in respect of quantitative import restrictions applied inconsistently with the
General Agreement, it has been agreed by the Contracting Parties that the holding of a consultation under paragraph 1 of Article XXII
would fulfil the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article XXIII (see BISD, Ninth Supplement, pages 19-20).”
Footnote 26: O Artigo 36 do Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça, por seu turno, menciona em seu parágrafo segundo que: “2.
Os Estados, partes do presente Estatuto, poderão, em qualquer momento, declarar que reconhecem como obrigatória, ipso facto e sem
acordos especial, em relação a qualquer outro Estado que aceite a mesma obrigação, a jurisdição da Corte em todas as controvérsias
de ordem jurídica que tenham por objeto: a) a interpretação de um tratado; b) qualquer ponto de direito internacional; c) a existência
de qualquer fato que, se verificado, constituiria violação de um compromisso internacional; d) a natureza ou extensão da reparação
devida pela ruptura de um compromisso internacional.”
(<http://www.mp.ma.gov.br/site/centrosapoio/DirHumanos/EstatCorteInternacional.htm>).
Footnote 27: Artigo XXIII:1: “No caso de uma Parte Contratante considerar que uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta ou
indiretamente, do presente Acordo, está sendo anulada ou reduzida, ou que um dos objetivos do Acordo está sendo dificultado (...).”
Footnote 28: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, para. ; EEC Bananas II, paras. 456-477; EC - Biotech Products, para. 8.15.
Footnote 29: EC - Citrus; EEC - Oilseeds I; EEC - Oilseeds II; EC - Canned Fruit; Australia Subsidies e Germany Sardines.
Footnote 30: Japan - Film; EC Asbestos; EC Poultry e Korea Procurement.
Footnote 31: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII; EEC - Citrus; Japan – Nullification or Impairment of the Benefits Accruing to
the EEC under the General Agreement and Impediment to the Attainment of GATT Objectives; US - Nicaragua Trade; e Japan Semi-Conductors.
28
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)

Artigo 1
Felipe Herzog
IA.
Article 1
Coverage and Application
1.1
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this
Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the “covered agreements”). The rules and
procedures of this Understanding shall also apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes
between Members concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in this Understanding as the “WTO
Agreement”) and of this Understanding taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered
agreement.
1.2
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional rules
and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in
Appendix 2 to this Understanding. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and
procedures of this Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in
Appendix 2, the special or additional rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall prevail. In disputes
involving rules and procedures under more than one covered agreement, if there is a conflict between
special or additional rules and procedures of such agreements under review, and where the parties to
the dispute cannot agree on rules and procedures within 20 days of the establishment of the panel, the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2 (referred to in this
Understanding as the “DSB”), in consultation with the parties to the dispute, shall determine the rules
and procedures to be followed within 10 days after a request by either Member. The Chairman shall
be guided by the principle that special or additional rules and procedures should be used where
possible, and the rules and procedures set out in this Understanding should be used to the extent
necessary to avoid conflict.
IB.
Artigo 1
Âmbito e Aplicação
1.1
As regras e procedimentos do presente Entendimento se aplicam às controvérsias pleiteadas conforme
as disposições sobre consultas e solução de controvérsias dos acordos enumerados no Apêndice 1 do
presente Entendimento (denominados no presente Entendimento “acordos abrangidos”). As regras e
procedimentos deste Entendimento se aplicam igualmente às consultas e solução de controvérsias
entre Membros relativas a seus direitos ou obrigações ao amparo do Acordo Constitutivo da
Organização Mundial do Comércio (denominada no presente Entendimento “Acordo Constitutivo da
OMC”) e do presente Entendimento, considerados isoladamente ou em conjunto com quaisquer dos
acordos abrangidos.
1.2
As regras e procedimentos do presente Entendimento se aplicam sem prejuízo das regras e
procedimentos especiais ou adicionais sobre solução de controvérsias contidos nos acordos
abrangidos, conforme identificadas no Apêndice 2 do presente Entendimento. Havendo discrepância
29
entre as regras e procedimentos do presente Entendimento e as regras e procedimentos especiais ou
adicionais constantes do Apêndice 2, prevalecerão as regras e procedimentos especiais ou adicionais
constantes do Apêndice 2. Nas controvérsias relativas a normas e procedimentos de mais de um
acordo abrangido, caso haja conflito entre as regras e procedimentos especiais ou adicionais dos
acordos em questão, e se as partes em controvérsia não chegarem a acordo sobre as normas e
procedimentos dentro dos 20 dias seguintes ao estabelecimento do grupo especial, o Presidente do
Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias previsto no parágrafo 1 do artigo 2 (denominado no presente
Entendimento de “OSC”), em consulta com as partes envolvidas na controvérsia, determinará, no
prazo de 10 dias contatos da solicitação de um dos Membros, as normas e os procedimentos a serem
aplicados. O Presidente seguirá o princípio de que normas e procedimentos especiais ou adicionais
devem ser aplicados quando possível, e de que normas e procedimentos definidos neste Entendimento
devem ser aplicados na medida necessária para evitar conflito de normas.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 1
III.
Comentários
30

Artigo 2
IA.
Article 2
Administration
2.1
The Dispute Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures and,
except as otherwise provided in a covered agreement, the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements. Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to establish
panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings
and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the
covered agreements. With respect to disputes arising under a covered agreement which is a
Plurilateral Trade Agreement, the term “Member” as used herein shall refer only to those Members
that are parties to the relevant Plurilateral Trade Agreement. Where the DSB administers the dispute
settlement provisions of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement, only those Members that are parties to that
Agreement may participate in decisions or actions taken by the DSB with respect to that dispute.
2.2
The DSB shall inform the relevant WTO Councils and Committees of any developments in disputes
related to provisions of the respective covered agreements.
2.3
The DSB shall meet as often as necessary to carry out its functions within the time-frames provided in
this Understanding.
2.4
Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a decision, it shall
do so by consensus (32).
Footnote 32: The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member,
present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.
IB.
Artigo 2
Administração
2.1
Pelo presente Entendimento estabelece-se o Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias para aplicar as
presentes normas e procedimentos e as disposições em matéria de consultas e solução de
controvérsias dos acordos abrangidos, salvo disposição em contrário de um desses acordos.
Consequentemente, o OSC tem competência para estabelecer grupos especiais, acatar Relatórios dos
grupos especiais e do Órgão de Apelação, supervisionar a aplicação das decisões e recomendações e
autorizar a suspensão de concessões e de outras obrigações determinadas pelos acordos abrangidos.
Com relação às controvérsias que surjam no âmbito de um acordo dentre os Acordos Comerciais
Plurilaterais, entender-se-á que o termo “Membro” utilizado no presente Entendimento se refere
apenas aos Membros integrantes do Acordo Comercial Plurilateral em questão. Quando o OSC aplicar
as disposições sobre solução de controvérsias de um Acordo Comercial Plurilateral, somente poderão
participar das decisões ou medidas adotadas pelo OSC aqueles Membros que sejam partes do Acordo
em questão.
2.2
O OSC deverá informar os pertinentes Conselhos e Comitês da OMC do andamento das controvérsias
relacionadas com disposições de seus respectivos acordos.
31
2.3
O OSC se reunirá com a frequência necessária para o desempenho de suas funções dentro dos prazos
estabelecidos pelo presente Entendimento.
2.4
Nos casos em que as normas e procedimentos do presente Entendimento estabeleçam que o OSC deve
tomar uma decisão tal procedimento sera por consenso.1
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Aspectos Gerais
a) “Efeitos legais das declarações dos membros nas reuniões do DSB”
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services (US - Gambling), Demandante: Antigua e Barbuda, WT/DS285/R, para. 6.161
Nesse caso, o painel sugeriu que os EUA estavam legalmente vinculados a certas declarações que seus
representantes haviam feito na reunião do DSB.
Para. 6.161. “During two successive DSB meetings, the United States stated that a prohibition on the “crossborder supply of gambling and betting services under US laws” exists in the United States. (33) The panel’s
decision in US - Section 301 Trade Act appears to support the view that the United States should be bound by
these statements. (34) The statements were made by representatives of the United States to express their
understanding of US law. They were made in the context of a formal WTO meeting for the record. The United
States has not argued that the representatives were acting outside the authority bestowed upon them in making
these statements.” The statements were made by representatives of the United States to express their
understanding of US law. They were made in the context of a formal WTO meeting for the record. The United
States has not argued that the representatives were acting outside the authority bestowed upon them in making
these statements.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Regime for the importation, sale and
distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e
EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, paras. 216 e 222
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que as declarações dos membros nas reuniões do DSB somente
poderiam ser levadas em consideração quando a interpretação das regras do acordo não fosse clara em sua
linguagem e contexto. Sendo claro o texto do acordo, as declarações dos membros deveriam ter um efeito legal
limitado. O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o painel, no caso US - Gambling, equivocou-se, ao atribuir
vinculação legal às declarações dos membros nas reuniões do DSB e que essas apenas teriam o limitado efeito de
confirmar a interpretação da regra, que deve ser realizada pelo painel.
Paras. 216 e 222. “[W]e conclude that the Panel erred in placing the relevance it did on the conflicting
statements of the parties at the meeting of the DSB, because, what the Panel was required to do was to provide
1
Considerar-se-á que o OSC decidiu por consenso material submetida a sua consideração quando nenhum Membro presente à reunião
do OSC na qual a decisão foi adotada a ela se opuser formalmente.
32
an interpretation of the text of the Understandings. Only once it had done so, could it then consider conflicting
statements to the DSB for the limited purpose of either seeking confirmation of the Panel’s interpretation, or
determining the meaning because the textual interpretation left the meaning ambiguous or led to manifestly
absurd results.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States/Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations
in the EC - Hormones Dispute (US/Canada - Continued Suspension), Demandante: CE, WT/DS320/AB/R
e WT/DS321/AB/R, paras. 398-399
O Órgão de Apelação, nesse caso, reverteu a decisão do painel que havia considerado as declarações dos EUA e
do Canadá nas reuniões do DSB como determinações legais definitivas.
Para. 398. “DSB statements are not intended to have legal effects and do not have the legal status of a definitive
determination in themselves. Rather, they are views expressed by Members and should not be considered to
prejudice Members’ position in the context of a dispute. As the United States rightly points out, “[statements
made by Members at DSB meetings, especially those expressing a view as to the WTO consistency of another
Member’s measures or actions, are generally diplomatic or political in nature” and “generally have no legal
effect or status in and of themselves”.”
Para. 399. “The Panel’s finding that DSB statements could constitute a definitive determination concerning the
WTO-inconsistency of a Member’s measure could adversely affect WTO Members’ ability to freely express
their views on the potential compatibility with the covered agreements of measures adopted by other Members.
(35) This would result in a “chilling” effect on those statements, because Members would refrain from
expressing their views at DSB meetings regarding the WTO-inconsistency of other Members’ measures lest
such statements be found to constitute a violation of Article 23. If this were the case, the DSB would be inhibited
from properly carrying out its function, pursuant to Article 21.6 of the DSU, to keep under surveillance the
implementation of its recommendations and rulings.”
2.
Artigo 2.1
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless
Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB, para. 156
O Órgão de Apelação, nesse caso, esclareceu a função do termo “accordingly” no contexto da segunda frase do
artigo 11 do DSU, estabelecendo um paralelo com a função do termo “accordingly” prevista na segunda frase do
artigo 2.1 do DSU. Ambas promovem um link entre a primeira e segunda senteça dos dois artigos.
Para. 156 e footnote 307. “Mexico stated at the oral hearing that its claim focuses on the first sentence of
Article 11 of the DSU. However, we observe that the second sentence of Article 11 begins with the term
“accordingly”. This term creates a link between the first and the second sentence of Article 11 (36); it ties the
second sentence to the general description contained in the first sentence. The second sentence enunciates two
specific “functions” of panels, namely, the duty “to make an objective assessment of the matter before it” and
“to make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings”
under the covered agreements.”
3.
Artigo 2.4
a) “Tipos de decisões sujeitas à regra do consenso”
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) (US - Large Civil
Aircraft), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS353/R, para. 7.21
33
Nesse caso, as CE solicitaram ao painel que determinasse que o procedimento previsto no anexo V do ASMC,
uma vez iniciado, obrigava os EUA a responder a certos questionamentos. As CE argumentavam que o início do
procedimento previsto no anexo V não seria uma decisão do DSB, nos termos do artigo 2.4 do DSU, que não
deveria ser tomada por consenso, mas sim por meio de um mero “ato” que não estaria sujeito à regra do consenso
prevista no artigo 2.4 e que ocorre automaticamente se solicitado, ao menos que ocorra o consenso negativo dos
membros. O painel rejeitou os argumentos das CE, sem, no entanto, manifestar-se expressamente se o início do
procedimento do anexo V seria ou não uma “decisão” sujeita à regra do consenso, nos termos do artigo 2.4.
Para. 7.21. “The Panel is not convinced by the European Communities’ argument. It may well be that the
initiation of an Annex V procedure is not a “decision” that is subject to consensus within the meaning of Article
2.4 of the DSU. However, it does not follow that the initiation of an Annex V procedure “occurs automatically”
in the absence of any action by the DSB to initiate the procedure. We see no basis for such an interpretation in
the text of paragraph 2 of Annex V, which states that “the DSB shall, upon request, initiate the procedure”
envisaged in Annex V. The term “initiate” means “[b]egin, introduce, set going, originate”. The ordinary
meaning of the term “initiate”, used in the immediate context of a positive duty formulated in the active voice
(“the DSB shall … initiate”), implies that some form of action is required on the part of the DSB. Furthermore,
the European Communities’ interpretation of paragraph 2 of Annex V would effectively remove the DSB from
having any role in the initiation of an Annex V procedure, which seems inconsistent with the ordinary meaning
of the terms of that provision. Finally, accepting the European Communities’ argument that there are certain socalled DSB “actions” that may be deemed to “occur automatically” in the absence of any indication of
agreement or actual action by the DSB could have far-reaching and potentially surprising systemic consequences
that would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of providing “security and predictability” to the
multilateral trading system. For these reasons, we conclude that, even though it may well be that the initiation of
an Annex V procedure is not subject to consensus, the initiation of an Annex V procedure does not “occur
automatically” upon request, in the absence of any action by the DSB to initiate the procedure.”
III.
Comentários
A interpretação do artigo 2 traz alguns esclarecimentos importantes sobre os efeitos e a dinâmica das reuniões
no DSB em relação às disputas. Nesse artigo é possível observar a relação direta entre o comitê e os órgãos
adjudicantes desse comitê e como essas duas esferas se relacionam.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 33: WT/DSB/M/151, para. 47 (24 June 2003); WT/DSB/M/153, para. 47 (21-23 July 2003).
Footnote 34 Panel Report on US - Section 301 Trade Act, paras. 7.118-7.125.
Footnote 35: We note the United States’ concern that “[t]he Panel has thereby made the bold and novel move of transforming the
minutes of DSB, other WTO committee meetings, and even Trade Policy Review meetings into a fertile source of comments that…
could constitute ‘determinations’ actionable under Article 23.2(a).” (Ibid., para. 94)
Footnote 36: See also Panel Report, Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, para. 7.40, where the Panel found that the term
“export credits” was “readily understandable” in the context of a dispute under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.
34

Artigo 3
IA.
Article 3
General Provisions
3.1
Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied
under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and
modified herein.
3.2
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability
to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.
3.3
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it
directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another
Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance
between the rights and obligations of Members.
3.4
Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of
the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the
covered agreements.
3.5
All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the
covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with those agreements and shall
not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the
attainment of any objective of those agreements.
3.6
Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and
Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating thereto.
3.7
Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these
procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the
covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first
objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.
The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure
is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is
inconsistent with a covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to the
Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the
other Member, subject to authorization by the DSB of such measures.
35
3.8
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the
action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that
there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members
parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the
complaint has been brought to rebut the charge.
3.9
The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek
authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the
WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement.
3.10
It is understood that requests for conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement procedures should
not be intended or considered as contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, all Members will engage
in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute. It is also understood that
complaints and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not be linked.
3.11
This Understanding shall be applied only with respect to new requests for consultations under the
consultation provisions of the covered agreements made on or after the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement. With respect to disputes for which the request for consultations was made under
GATT 1947 or under any other predecessor agreement to the covered agreements before the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the relevant dispute settlement rules and procedures in effect
immediately prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall continue to apply. (37)
3.12
Notwithstanding paragraph 11, if a complaint based on any of the covered agreements is brought by a
developing country Member against a developed country Member, the complaining party shall have
the right to invoke, as an alternative to the provisions contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 of this
Understanding, the corresponding provisions of the Decision of 5 April 1966 (BISD 14S/18), except
that where the Panel considers that the time-frame provided for in paragraph 7 of that Decision is
insufficient to provide its report and with the agreement of the complaining party, that time-frame
may be extended. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of
Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 and the corresponding rules and procedures of the Decision, the latter shall
prevail.
Footnote 37: This paragraph shall also be applied to disputes on which panel reports have not been adopted or fully implemented.
IB.
Artigo 3
Disposições Gerais
3.1
Os Membros afirmam sua adesão aos princípios de solução de controvérsias aplicados até o momento
com base nos Artigos 22 e 23 do GATT 1947 e ao procedimento elaborado e modificado pelo
presente instrumento.
3.2
O sistema de solução de controvérsia da OMC é elemento essencial para trazer segurança e
previsibilidade ao sistema multilateral de comércio. Os Membros reconhecem que esse sistema é útil
para preservar direitos e obrigações dos Membros dentro dos parâmetros dos acordos abrangidos e
para esclarecer as disposições vigentes dos referidos acordos em conformidade com as normas
correntes de interpretação do direito internacional público. As recomendações e decisões do OSC não
poderão promover o aumento ou a diminuição dos direitos e obrigações definidos nos acordos
abrangidos.
36
3.3
É essencial para o funcionamento eficaz da OMC e para a manutenção de equilíbrio adequado entre
os direitos e as obrigações dos Membros a pronta solução das situações em que um Membro
considere que quaisquer benefícios resultantes, direta ou indiretamente, dos acordos abrangidos
tenham sofrido restrições por medidas adotadas por outro Membro.
3.4
As recomendações ou decisões formuladas pelo OSC terão por objetivo encontrar solução satisfatória
para a matéria em questão, de acordo com os direitos e obrigações emanados pelo presente
Entendimento e pelos acordos abrangidos.
3.5
Todas as soluções das questões formalmente pleiteadas ao amparo das disposições sobre consultas e
solução de controvérsias, incluindo os laudos arbitrais, deverão ser compatíveis com aqueles acordos
e não deverão anular ou prejudicar os benefícios de qualquer Membro em virtude daqueles acordos,
nem impedir a consecução de qualquer objetivo daqueles acordos.
3.6
As soluções mutuamente acordadas das questões formalmente pleiteadas ao amparo das disposições
sobre consultas e solução de controvérsias dos acordos abrangidos serão notificadas ao OSC e aos
Conselhos e Comitês correspondentes, onde qualquer Membro poderá levantar tópicos a elas
relacionadas.
3.7
Antes de apresentar uma reclamação, os Membros avaliarão a utilidade de atuar com base nos
presentes procedimentos. O objetivo do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias é garantir uma
solução positiva para as controvérsias. Deverá ser sempre dada preferência à solução mutuamente
aceitável para as partes em controvérsia e que esteja em conformidade com os acordos abrangidos. Na
impossibilidade de uma solução mutuamente acordada, o primeiro objetivo do mecanismo de solução
de controvérsias será geralmente o de conseguir a supressão das medidas de que se trata, caso se
verifique que estas são incompatíveis com as disposições de qualquer dos acordos abrangidos. Não se
deverá recorrer à compensação a não ser nos casos em que não seja factível a supressão imediata das
medidas incompatíveis com o acordo abrangido e como solução provisória até a supressão dessas
medidas. O último recurso previsto no presente Entendimento para o Membro que invoque os
procedimentos de solução de controvérsias é a possibilidade de suspender, de maneira discriminatória
contra o outro Membro, a aplicação de concessões ou o cumprimento de outras obrigações no âmbito
dos acordos abrangidos, caso o OSC autorize a adoção de tais medidas.
3.8
Nos casos de não-cumprimento de obrigações contraídas em virtude de um acordo abrangido,
presume-se que a medida constitua um caso de anulação ou de restrição. Isso significa que
normalmente existe a presunção de que toda transgressão das normas produz efeitos desfavoráveis
para outros Membros que sejam partes do acordo abrangido, e em tais casos a prova em contrário
caberá ao Membro contra o qual foi apresentada a reclamação.
3.9
As disposições do presente Entendimento não prejudicarão o direito dos Membros de buscar
interpretação autorizada das disposições de um acordo abrangido através das decisões adotadas em
conformidade com o Acordo Constitutivo da OMC ou um acordo abrangido que seja um Acordo
Comercial Plurilateral.
3.10
Fica entendido que as solicitações de conciliação e a utilização dos procedimentos de solução de
controvérsias não deverão ser intentados nem considerados como ações contenciosas e que, ao surgir
uma controvérsia, todos os Membros participarão do processo com boa-fé e esforçando-se para
resolvê-la. Fica ainda entendido que não deverá haver vinculação entre reclamações e contrareclamações relativas a assuntos diferentes.
37
3.11
O presente Entendimento se aplicará unicamente às novas solicitações de consultas apresentadas
conforme as disposições sobre consulta dos acordos abrangidos na data da entrada em vigor do
Acordo Constitutivo da OMC ou posteriormente a essa data. Com relação às controvérsias cujas
solicitações de consultas tenham sido feitas baseadas no GATT 1947 ou em qualquer outro acordo
anterior aos acordos abrangidos antes da data de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC,
continuarão sendo aplicadas as normas e procedimentos de solução de controvérsias vigentes
imediatamente antes da data de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC2.
3.12
Sem prejuízo das disposições do parágrafo 11, se um país em desenvolvimento Membro apresenta
contra um país desenvolvido Membro uma reclamação baseada em qualquer dos acordos abrangidos,
a parte reclamante terá o direito de se valer das disposições correspondentes da Decisão de 5 de abril
de 1966 (BISD 14S/20), como alternativa às disposições contidas nos Artigos 4, 5, 6 e 12 do presente
Entendimento, com a exceção de que, quando o Grupo Especial julgar que o prazo previsto no
parágrafo 7 da referida Decisão for insuficiente para elaboração de seu Relatório e com aprovação da
parte reclamante, esse prazo poderá ser prorrogado. Quando houver diferenças entre normas e
procedimentos dos Artigos 4, 5, 6 e 12 e as normas e procedimentos correspondentes da Decisão,
prevalecerão estes últimos.
IC.
O artigo 3:11 do DSU contém um erro de mesóclise na expressão “se aplicará”, passível de ser sanado por
meio da substituição pela expressão “aplicar-se-á”. Sugere-se, entretanto, a tradução do termo em inglês shall
be applied, para ‘deve ser aplicado’, em função da natureza do modal verb (shall).
II.
1.
Artigo 3.1
a) “Legislação de juris e de facto”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),
Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 61
O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que a legislação interna dos membros pode ser questionada no DSB em tese
“de jure” e não apenas após ter sido aplicada “de facto”. O Órgão de Apelação fundamentou essa conclusão na
prática do GATT e no artigo 3.1.
Para. 61. “Thus, that a Contracting Party could challenge legislation as such before a panel was well-settled
under the GATT 1947. We consider that the case law articulating and applying this practice forms part of the
GATT acquis which, under Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement, provides guidance to the WTO and,
therefore, to panels and the Appellate Body. Furthermore, in Article 3.1 of the DSU, Members affirm “their
adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII
of GATT 1947.”
2.
Artigo 3.2
2
Este parágrafo será igualmente aplicado às controvérsias cujos Relatórios dos Painéis não tenham sido adotados ou aplicados
plenamente.
38
(a)
(b)
(c)
“segurança e previsibilidade”
“esclarecer as disposições vigentes”
“normas correntes de interpretação do direito internacional público”
(i)
Regra geral de interpretação
(ii) Prática subsequente
(iii) Meios suplementares de interpretação
(iv) Boa fé
(v) Principio da efetividade
(vi) Expectativas legítimas
a) “segurança e previsibilidade”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverges (Japan - Alcoholic
Beverages II), Demandante: CE, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R e WT/DS11/AB/R, para. 31
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que as regras costumeiras de direito internacional público sobre
interpretação estavam consolidadas na Convenção de Viena, e que a interpretação dos acordos da OMC
segundo essas regras é um elemento de segurança e previsibilidade jurídica, fundamental ao sistema.
Para. 31. “Our interpretation of Article III is faithful to the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public
international law’. WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules are not so rigid or so
inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and
flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will serve the multilateral trading system best if they are
interpreted with that in mind. In that way, we will achieve the ‘security and predictability’ sought for the
multilateral trading system by the Members of the WTO through the establishment of the dispute settlement
system.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen
Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/AB/R, para. 249
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou o método do “objeto e finalidade” para a interpretação do tratado e
afirmou que o ponto inicial da análise seria o tratado como um todo, embora o artigo 31:1 da Convenção de
Viena não excluísse a consideração de termos específicos do tratado, se isso auxiliasse na interpretação do
tratado em seu conjunto. Desse modo, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o critério de “preservação no longo
prazo”, estabelecido pelas CE, poderia levar a incertezas em relação à concessão contida na posição 02.10 da
lista de compromissos das CE, o que poderia atingir o objeto e finalidade de segurança e previsibilidade,
estabelecidos tanto no acordo da OMC quanto no GATT 1994.
Para. 249. “In the light of these considerations, we see no reason to disturb the Panel's finding, in paragraph
7.328 of the Panel Reports, that ‘the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion of long-term
preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule [...] could undermine
the object and purpose of security and predictability, which [underlie] both the WTO Agreement and the GATT
1994.”
b) “esclarecer as disposições vigentes”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: India, WT/DS33/AB/R, pág.
19
39
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o artigo 3.2 do DSU estabelece que o objetivo do mecanismo de
solução de controvérsias é assegurar uma solução positiva para a disputa, devendo preservar os direitos e
obrigações dos membros negociados por meio dos acordos e esclarecer as disposições dos tratados, de acordo
com as normas costumeiras de interpretação do direito internacional público. Para cumprir as suas
responsabilidades junto aos membros da OMC, o Órgão de Apelação não pode criar novas regras.
“As India emphasizes, Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the Members of the WTO ‘recognize’ that the dispute
settlement system “serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and
to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law” (emphasis added). Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU,
“we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to
‘make law’ by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular
dispute. A panel need only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue
in the dispute.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation
of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 135
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o artigo 11 do DSU prevê que a obrigação dos painéis e do
Órgão de Apelação é realizar uma avaliação objetiva da aplicabilidade dos acordos invocados pelo membro
demandante e de sua compatibilidade com a medida adotada pelo membro demandado. Nada no artigo
estabelece que o painel deva examinar todas as questões trazidas para análise ou se limitar às questões
levantadas pelas partes.
Para. 135. “In United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, we
stated that nothing in Article 11 “or in previous GATT practice requires a panel to examine all legal claims
made by the complaining party”, and that “[a] panel need only address those claims which must be addressed
in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.” Just as a panel has the discretion to address only those
claims which must be addressed in order to dispose of the matter at issue in a dispute, so too does a panel have
the discretion to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a particular claim. So long as it is
clear in a panel report that a panel has reasonably considered a claim, the fact that a particular argument
relating to that claim is not specifically addressed in the ‘Findings’ section of a panel report will not, in and of
itself, lead to the conclusion that panel has failed to make the ‘objective assessment of the matter before it’
required by Article 11 of the DSU.”
c) “normas correntes de interpretação do direito internacional público”
(i) Regra geral de interpretação
Nesses casos, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que as regras costumeiras de direito internacional público sobre
interpretação estavam consolidadas na Convenção de Viena.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, pág. 17
“The ‘general rule of interpretation’ set out above has been relied upon by all of the participants and third
participants, although not always in relation to the same issue. That general rule of interpretation has attained
the status of a rule of customary or general international law. As such, it forms part of the ‘customary rules of
interpretation of public international law’ which the Appellate Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of the
DSU, to apply in seeking to clarify the provisions of the General Agreement and the other ‘covered
40
agreements’ of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the ‘WTO
Agreement’). That direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in
clinical isolation from public international law.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/AB/R, para. 84
Para. 84. “A Schedule is […] an integral part of the GATT 1994 […]. Therefore, the concessions provided
for in that schedule are part of the terms of the treaty. As such, the only rules which may be applied in
interpreting the meaning of a concession are the general rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna
Convention.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic
Beverages II), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R e
WT/DS11/AB/R, pág. 11
Nesses casos, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena estabelece como base de
interpretação o sentido ordinário (ou comum) dos termos do tratado, o contexto, em consonância com o seu
objeto e finalidade.
“Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the
interpretive process: “interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty”. The provisions of the
treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be
taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions. A fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation
flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis
valeat quam pereat). In United States of America - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we
noted that “[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that
interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a
reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility”.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 45
Para. 45. “The duty of a treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of
the parties. This should be done in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31
of the Vienna Convention. But these principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation
into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended…
These rules must be respected and applied in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement or any other covered
agreements… Both panels and the Appellate Body must be guided by the rules of treaty interpretation set out
in the Vienna Convention, and must not add to or diminish rights and obligations provided in the WTO
Agreement.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products - Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R e WT/DS48/AB/R,
para. 181
Para. 181. “[…] The fundamental rule of treaty interpretation requires a treaty interpreter to read and interpret
the words actually used by the agreement under examination, and not words which the interpreter may feel
should have been used.”
41
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain CorrosionResistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany (US - Carbon Steel), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS213/ABR, para. 61
Para. 61. “At the outset of our analysis, we recall that Article 3.2 of the DSU recognizes that interpretative
issues arising in WTO dispute settlement are to be resolved through the application of customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. It is well settled in WTO case law that the principles codified in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the ‘Vienna Convention’) are such
customary rules. Article 31(1) provides in relevant part that: A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.”
(ii) Prática subsequente
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o artigo 31(3)(b) estabelece como critérios de interpretação a
prática subsequente das partes; os acordos subsequentes sobre a mesma matéria; e ainda, qualquer outra regra
pertinente de direito internacional público que possa ser parte do processo interpretativo.
WT/DS11/AB/R, pp. 12-13
“Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention states that ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’ is to be ‘taken into account together
with the context’ in interpreting the terms of the treaty. Generally, in international law, the essence of
subsequent practice in interpreting a treaty has been recognized as a ‘concordant, common and consistent’,
sequence of acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern implying the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. An isolated act is generally not sufficient to establish
subsequent practice; it is a sequence of acts establishing the agreement of the parties that is relevant.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Service (US - Gambling), Demandante: Antigua e Barbuda, WT/DS285/AB/R,
para. 192
Para. 192. “(...) (i) there must be a common, consistent, discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and
(ii) those acts or pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant provision.”
Para. 259. “We share the Panel's view that not each and every party must have engaged in a particular
practice for it to qualify as a ‘common’ and ‘concordant’ practice. Nevertheless, practice by some, but not
all parties is obviously not of the same order as practice by only one or very few parties. To our mind, it
would be difficult to establish a ‘concordant, common and discernible pattern’ on the basis of acts or
pronouncements of one, or very few parties to a multilateral treaty, such as the WTO Agreement. We
acknowledge, however, that, if only some WTO Members have actually traded or classified products under a
given heading, this circumstance may reduce the availability of such ‘acts and pronouncements’ for purposes
of determining the existence of ‘subsequent practice’ within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b).”
(iii) Meios suplementares de interpretação
42
Nesses casos, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o artigo 32 da Convenção de Viena estabelece que outras
formas suplementares de interpretação poderão ser adotadas, como os trabalhos preparatórios do tratado e as
circunstâncias de sua conclusão, quando a utilização das regras previstas no artigo 31 deixarem o sentido
buscado ambíguo ou obscuro, ou ainda quando for atingido um resultado que é manifestamente absurdo ou
desarrazoado.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/AB/R, para. 92
Para. 92. “In the light of our observation on ‘the circumstances of [the] conclusion’ of a treaty as a
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, we consider that the
classification practice in the European Communities during the Uruguay Round is part of ‘the circumstances
of [the] conclusion’ of the WTO Agreement and may be used as a supplementary means of interpretation
within the meaning of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation
of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 83
Para. 83. “The Oilseeds Agreement may serve as a supplementary means of interpretations of Schedule
LXXX pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, as it is part of the historical background of the
concessions of the European Communities from frozen poultry meat.”
Para. 291. “In our view, the relevance of a circumstance for interpretation should be determined on the basis
of objective factors, and not subjective intent. We can conceive of a number of objective factors that may be
useful in determining the degree of relevance of particular circumstances for interpreting a specific treaty
provision. These include the type of event, document, or instrument and its legal nature; temporal relation of
the circumstance to the conclusion of the treaty; actual knowledge or mere access to a published act or
instrument; subject matter of the document, instrument, or event in relation to the treaty provision to be
interpreted; and whether or how it was used or influenced the negotiations of the treaty.”
(iv) Boa-fé
O ponto de partida do método interpretativo do Órgão de Apelação passou a ser, então, a determinação, de
boa-fé, do significado ordinário das palavras utilizadas, com referência ao contexto e à luz do objeto e do
propósito do tratado, nos termos exatos do artigo 31.1 da Convenção de Viena.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS/58/AB/R,
para. 158
Para. 158. “The Chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith. This
principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise
of rights by States. One application of the general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of
abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a
right ‘impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must exercised bona fide, that is to say,
reasonably. An abusive rights of the other Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the
Member so acting. Having said this, our task here is to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking
additional interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of international law.”
43
(v) Princípio da efetividade
Nesses casos, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o princípio da efetividade da interpretação estava contido na
regra geral de interpretação prevista no artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, pág. 23
“One of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation
must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that
would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.”
WT/DS11/AB/R, pág. 11
“A fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31
is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat).”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear
(Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 81
Para. 81. “[A] treaty interpreter must read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to
all of them, harmoniously. And, an appropriate reading of this ‘inseparable package of rights and disciplines’
must, accordingly, be one that gives meaning to all relevant provisions of these two equally binding
agreements.”
(vi) Expectativas legítimas
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, (WT/DS50/AB/R), para. 41
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação utilizou o método interpretativo baseado nas expectativas legítimas dos
membros.
Para. 41. “The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty
itself.”
3.
Artigo 3.3
a) “Pronta solução às situações”
O Órgão de Apelação e os painéis mencionaram o princípio da pronta solução das situações.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que a prática de “completar a análise era fundamental para dar uma
solução para as disputas”.
44
Para. 78. “[i]n previous appeals, we have, on occasion, completed the legal analysis with a view to
facilitating the prompt settlement of the dispute, pursuant to Article 3.3 of the DSU.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)), Demandantes Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia,
Japão, República da Coréia / Canadá e México, WT/DS217/AB/R e WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 311
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação mencionou o princípio da “pronta solução” às disputas para justificar o
direito de separar os relatórios de painéis, no caso de painéis múltiplos.
Para. 311 “Having made these observations, we note that Article 9.2 must not be read in isolation from other
provisions of the DSU, and without taking into account the overall object and purpose of that Agreement. The
overall object and purpose of the DSU is expressed in Article 3.3 of that Agreement which provides,
relevantly, that the “prompt settlement” of disputes is “essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.” If
the right to a separate panel report under Article 9.2 were “unqualified”, this would mean that a panel would
have the obligation to submit a separate panel report, pursuant to the request of a party to the dispute, at any
time during the panel proceedings. Moreover, a request for such a report could be made for whatever reason
— or indeed, without any reason — even on the day that immediately precedes the day the panel report is due
to be circulated to WTO Members at large. Such an interpretation would clearly undermine the overall object
and purpose of the DSU to ensure the “prompt settlement” of disputes.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 246
Na mesma linha, o Órgão de Apelação decidiu que requerer que o membro inicie uma nova disputa
paraquestionar os mesmos subsídios seria contraria o princípio da “pronta solução” para as disputas.
Para. 246. “[requiring a WTO Member to initiate new proceedings to challenge the same type of recurrent
subsidies that were found to result in adverse effects, simply because the subsidies were provided subsequent
to the original proceedings, does not promote ‘prompt settlement’ nor ‘prompt compliance’.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 177
O Órgão de Apelação fez referência à relação entre o Artigo 3.3 do DSU e os Artigos 17.3 e 17.4 do Acordo
Antidumping, para estabelecer quais as questões do Acordo Antidumping que seriam sujeitas à apreciação do
DSB.
Para. 177. “Closely resembling Article 3.3 of the DSU, Article 17.3 provides that,” [i]f any Member
considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under [the Anti-Dumping Agreement] is being
nullified or impaired … by another Member or Members, it may, with a view to reaching a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the matter, request in writing consultations with the Member or Members in
question.” Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement further specifies that a Member may refer a matter to
the DSB if it considers that the consultations have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution “and if final
action has been taken by the administering authorities of the importing Member to”, inter alia, “levy definitive
anti-dumping duties”.”
4.
Artigo 3.4
45
Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandantes: Brasil e Tailândia, WT/DS269/AB/R, para.
161
Para. 161. “Brazil and Thailand also refer to Articles 3.4 and 3.7 of the DSU and argue that the principle of
“satisfactory settlement of the matter” and of “secur[ing] a positive solution to the dispute” supports the
inclusion of the two subsequent measures in the Panel’s terms of reference in this case. We agree that a
positive and effective resolution of a dispute is one of the key objectives of the WTO dispute settlement
system. However, this objective cannot be pursued at the expense of complying with the specific requirements
and obligations of Article 6.2. Moreover, in this case, we believe that the non-inclusion of the two subsequent
measures in the Panel’s terms of reference would not hinder a positive resolution of this dispute.” (38)
5.
Artigo 3.7
a) “Os Membros avaliarão a utilidade de atuar com base nos presentes procedimentos”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e
EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 135
Para. 135 “A member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding whether any such action would be
‘fruitful’.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio México - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States) (México –
Corn Syrup), WT/DS132/AB/RW, para. 74
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou se a falha de um membro em observar a primeira senteça do
artigo 3.7 impediria o painel de resolver a questão sub judice. O Órgão de Apelação primeiramente indicou
que a primeira senteça do artigo reflete o princípio básico segundo o qual os membros devem recorrer ao DSB
da OMC com boa fé e que, portanto, o painel não era obrigado a examinar a questão colocada em juízo com
frivolidade.
Para. 74. “Given the ‘largely self-regulating’ nature of the requirement in the first sentence of Article 3.7,
panels and the Appellate Body must presume, whenever a Member submits a request for establishment of a
panel, that such Member does so in good faith, having duly exercised its judgement as to whether recourse to
that panel would be ‘fruitful’. Article 3.7 neither requires nor authorizes a panel to look behind that Member’s
decision and to question its exercise of judgement. Therefore, the Panel was not obliged to consider this issue
on its own motion.”
b) “assegurar uma solução positiva para as disputas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS33/AB/R, pág.
19
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC tem como
objetivo assegurar uma solução positiva para as controvérsias.
“The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.”
c) “Efeitos legais das soluções mutuamente acordadas”
46
EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, paras. 211-212
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou se o Acordo sobre Bananas, firmado entre as CE, EUA e Equador,
proibiria os membros de iniciar os procedimentos previstos no artigo 21.5 do DSU em relação ao regime de
importação de bananas, estabelecido pela Regulação (EC) nº 1964/2005.
Para. 211. “[N]othing in Article 3.7 establishes a condition under which a party would be prevented from
initiating compliance proceedings or, indeed, dictates that the only kind of settlement envisaged in that
provision is one that bars recourse to compliance proceedings under Article 21.5. Article 3.7 is not
prescriptive as to the content of a mutually agreed solution, save that it must be consistent with the covered
agreements. The only express limitation referred to in Article 3.7 is that ‘a Member shall exercise its
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful’. The Appellate Body has interpreted
this phrase to indicate that a Member is “expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding whether any such
action would be ‘fruitful’”. (39) This is also borne out by Article 3.3, which provides that the prompt
settlement of situations in which a Member, in its own judgement, considers that a benefit accruing to it under
the covered agreements is being impaired by a measure taken by another Member is essential to the effective
functioning of the WTO.”
Ainda nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação examinou o conceito de “solução” do artigo 3.7 e descreveu como
sendo o “o ato de resolver um problema”. Na opinião do Órgão de Apelação, um mero acordo sobre uma
“solução” não necessariamene significa que as partes abriram mão do seu direito de recorrer aos
procedimentos do painel. O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a interpretação do painel de que o acordo entre
as partes constituiria uma “solução positiva” para a disputa e precluia o recurso ao artigo 21.5, não era uma
interpretação correta.
Para 212. “The term “solution” employed in Article 3.7 refers to the “act of solving a problem”. There are
usually different ways of solving any given problem. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, when a panel or the
Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that
the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. Accordingly, it is, in principle,
within the Member’s discretion to choose the means of implementation and to decide in which way it will
seek to achieve compliance. The DSU thus recognizes that a solution leading to compliance can be
implemented in various ways. Similarly, a mutually agreed solution pursuant to Article 3.7 may encompass an
agreement to forego the right to initiate compliance proceedings. Or it may provide for the suspension of the
right of recourse to Article 21.5 until the steps agreed upon in a mutually agreed solution have been
implemented. Yet, this need not always be so. We therefore do not consider that the mere agreement to a
“solution” necessarily implies that parties waive their right to have recourse to the dispute settlement system
in the event of a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with the covered agreements of a measure
taken to comply. Instead, we consider that there must be a clear indication in the agreement between the
parties of a relinquishment of the right to have recourse to Article 21.5. In our view, the Panel’s requirement
that the Understandings must constitute a “positive solution and effective settlement” to the dispute in
question to preclude recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings was not a correct interpretation of what the DSU
requires.”
d) “Interesse legal em levar uma disputa ao DSB da OMC”
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o membro tem ampla discricionariedade para decidir trazer ou
47
não um caso contra outro membro, nos termos do DSU.
Para. 132. “We agree with the Panel that ’neither Article 3.3 nor 3.7 of the DSU nor any other provision of
the DSU contain any explicit requirement that a Member must have a ‘legal interest’ as a prerequisite for
requesting a panel’. We do not accept that the need for a ‘legal interest’ is implied in the DSU or in any other
provision of the WTO Agreement. It is true that under Article 4.11 of the DSU, a Member wishing to join in
multiple consultations must have ‘a substantial trade interest’, and that under Article 10.2 of the DSU, a third
party must have ‘a substantial interest’ in the matter before a panel. But neither of these provisions in the
DSU, nor anything else in the WTO Agreement, provides a basis for asserting that parties to the dispute have
to meet any similar standard. Yet, we do not believe that this is dispositive of whether, in this case, the United
States has ‘standing’ to bring claims under the GATT 1994.”
6.
Artigo 3.8
a) “Presunção de anulação ou de restrição”
Nesse caso, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o artigo 3.8 do DSU atribui o ônus de rebater a presunção de
anulação ou de restrição para a parte demandada.
Para 250. “[W]e note that the two issues of nullification or impairment and of the standing of the United
States are closely related [T]wo points are made that the Panel may well have had in mind in reaching its
conclusions on nullification or impairment. One is that the United States is a producer of bananas and that a
potential export interest by the United States cannot be excluded; the other is that the internal market of the
United States for bananas could be affected by the EC bananas regime and by its effects on world supplies and
world prices of bananas. They are … relevant to the question whether the European Communities has rebutted
the presumption of nullification or impairment.”
7.
Artigo 3.10
a) “Caráter não contencioso das disputas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures
on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners), Demandante: China WT/DS397/AB/R,
fn. 205
O Órgão de Apelação seguiu o mesmo entendimento de casos anteriores ao afirmar o caráter não contencioso
que as disputas no órgão de solução de controvérsias devem ter.
Fn. 205. “[t]he procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement are designed to promote, not the development of
litigation techniques, but simply the fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade disputes”, and also found
that Article 3.10 of the DSU was inconsistent with “inappropriate legal manoeuvres to avoid dispute
settlement.”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 3.2 do DSU estabelece que o sistema de solução de controvérsias é um elemento central para
promover segurança e previsibilidade ao sistema multilateral de comércio. O artigo 3.7 estabelece que o
objetivo do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias é assegurar uma solução positiva para a disputa. Além
disso, o DSU determina que este sistema deve preservar os direitos e obrigações dos membros, negociados
48
por meio dos acordos, e esclarecer as disposições dos tratados de acordo com as normas costumeiras de
interpretação do direito internacional público. Portanto, o mandato que os membros da OMC outorgaram por
meio do DSU ao Órgão de Apelação foi cumprir a sua função de interpretar os acordos da OMC de acordo
com as regras costumeiras de interpretação do direito internacional público.
Observa-se, pela análise dos litígios citados, que a Convenção de Viena ainda tem sido plenamente utilizada
pelo Órgão de Apelação como a materialização das regras consuetudinárias de interpretação dos acordos da
OMC, mesmo quando envolve membros que não são partes da referida convenção, como é o caso dos EUA.
Essa prática permanece atual e fornece um guia para a coerência entre as decisões.
Desde o primeiro caso submetido à sua apreciação, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o artigo 31 da
Convenção de Viena havia alcançado o status de regra costumeira de interpretação do direito internacional. O
artigo 31.1 da Convenção de Viena estabelece que um tratado deve ser interpretado de boa-fé, de acordo com
o significado ordinário das palavras em seu contexto e à luz do objeto e propósito do tratado. Essa regra de
interpretação sugere um critério de interpretação baseado principalmente no texto.
O Órgão de Apelação entendeu e continua afirmando que a função interpretativa deve, acima de tudo, estar
baseada no texto. As decisões demonstram que o Órgão de Apelação não se submete aos aspectos políticos da
OMC. Para cumprir as suas responsabilidades junto aos membros da OMC, o Órgão de Apelação ainda adota
o texto dos acordos e se atém ao mandato específico dos membros de utilizar a interpretação segundo as
regras da Convenção de Viena. Por outro lado, o Órgão de Apelação não pode deixar de analisar nenhuma
questão legal que lhe é submetida à apreciação.
Ou seja, o Órgão de Apelação não pode deixar de julgar quando o acordo é ambíguo ou quando existam
lacunas. Não há referência no DSU que autorize o Órgão de Apelação a não julgar um caso quando o texto
não é claro e específico. Ao contrário, o artigo 3.7 estabelece a obrigação de encontrar uma solução positiva
para a disputa. De qualquer forma, uma análise atual dos casos aponta para uma interpretação restritiva dos
acordos. O Órgão de Apelação parece cumprir a função de não criar regras.
Percebe-se o apego do Órgão de Apelação ao significado ordinário do texto, para fins de cumprimento do
mandato estabelecido pelo artigo 3.2. Para cumprir esse propósito, o Órgão de Apelação ainda faz uso
frequente dos dicionários, nos três idiomas oficiais da OMC: o inglês, o francês e o espanhol. Essa prática
procura delimitar a margem de interpretação a ser realizada, por meio da utilização de critérios objetivos para
a definição do conteúdo das palavras adotadas. O recurso ao dicionário é apenas uma etapa da técnica
interpretativa.
Para cumprir o artigo 3.2 do DSU, o Órgão de Apelação se refere ao texto e quando o texto não é claro o
suficiente ou determinado termo possui mais do que um significado, entende necessário utilizar os outros
critérios de interpretação da Convenção de Viena, para esclarecer o significado ordinário do texto, em seu
contexto e à luz do propósito e objeto do tratado. O Órgão de Apelação parece evitar o risco sistêmico da
utilização de outros métodos interpretativos, justamente pelo fato de o DSU estabelecer que o sistema de
solução de controvérsias não pode aumentar e nem reduzir os direitos negociados nos acordos.
Com relação ao artigo 3.7, parece ter ficado claro para o Órgão de Apelação que o membro tem ampla
discricionariedade para levar uma questão à apreciação do DSB, bastando para tanto, auto-regular-se com
boa-fé. Nocões como “interesse legal” e “interesse econômico”, amplamente difundidas no direito processual
pátrio de vários membros não parecem ser conceitos válidos para o Órgão de Apelação.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 38: Appellate Body Report, EC - Chicken Cuts, para. 161.
Footnote 39: Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas III, para. 135.
49

Artigo 4
Felipe Herzog
IA.
Article 4
Consultations
4.1
Members affirm their resolve to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation
procedures employed by Members.
4.2
Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting
the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former. (40)
4.3
If a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement, the Member to which the
request is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the request within 10 days after the
date of its receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faith within a period of no more than 30
days after the date of receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. If
the Member does not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request, or does not enter
into consultations within a period of no more than 30 days, or a period otherwise mutually agreed,
after the date of receipt of the request, then the Member that requested the holding of consultations
may proceed directly to request the establishment of a panel.
4.4
All such requests for consultations shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and
Committees by the Member which requests consultations. Any request for consultations shall be
submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the request, including identification of the
measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint.
4.5
In the course of consultations in accordance with the provisions of a covered agreement, before
resorting to further action under this Understanding, Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory
adjustment of the matter.
4.6
Consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further
proceedings.
4.7
If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the request for
consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. The complaining party
may request a panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that
consultations have failed to settle the dispute.
4.8
In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, Members shall enter into
consultations within a period of no more than 10 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the
consultations have failed to settle the dispute within a period of 20 days after the date of receipt of the
request, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.
4.9
In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, the parties to the dispute, panels
and the Appellate Body shall make every effort to accelerate the proceedings to the greatest extent
possible.
50
4.10
During consultations Members should give special attention to the particular problems and interests of
developing country Members.
4.11
Whenever a Member other than the consulting Members considers that it has a substantial trade
interest in consultations being held pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article XXII of GATT 1994, paragraph
1 of Article XXII of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements (41), such
Member may notify the consulting Members and the DSB, within 10 days after the date of the
circulation of the request for consultations under said Article, of its desire to be joined in the
consultations. Such Member shall be joined in the consultations, provided that the Member to which
the request for consultations was addressed agrees that the claim of substantial interest is wellfounded. In that event they shall so inform the DSB. If the request to be joined in the consultations is
not accepted, the applicant Member shall be free to request consultations under paragraph 1 of Article
XXII or paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of Article XXII or paragraph 1 of
Article XXIII of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements.
Footnote 40: Where the provisions of any other covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or
authorities within the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of such
other covered agreement shall prevail.
Footnote 41: The corresponding consultation provisions in the covered agreements are listed hereunder: Agreement on Agriculture,
Article 19; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, paragraph 1 of Article 11; Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing, paragraph 4 of Article 8; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, paragraph 1 of Article 14; Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures, Article 8; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, paragraph 2 of Article 17;
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994, paragraph 2 of Article 19; Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Article
7; Agreement on Rules of Origin, Article 7; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Article 6; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Article 30; Agreement on Safeguards, Article 14; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Article 64.1; and any corresponding consultation provisions in Plurilateral Trade Agreements as determined by the
competent bodies of each Agreement and as notified to the DSB.
IB.
Artigo 4
Consultas
4.1
Os Membros afirmam sua determinação de fortelecer e aperfeiçoar a eficácia dos procedimentos de
consulta utilizados pelos Membros.
4.2
Cada Membro se compromete a examinar com compreensãoo a argumentação apresentada por outro
Membro e a conceder oportunidade adequada para consulta com relação a medidas adotadas dentro de
seu território que afetem o funcionamento de qualquer acordo abrangido2.
4.3
Quando a solicitação de consultas for formulada com base em um acordo abrangido, o Membro ao
qual a solicitação for dirigida deverá respondê-la, salvo se mutuamente acordado de outro modo,
dentro de um prazo de 10 dias contados a partir da data de recebimento da solicitação, e deverá de
boa-fé proceder a consultas dentro de um prazo não superior a 30 dias contatos a partir da data de
recebimento da solicitação, com o objetivo de chegar a uma solução mutuamente satisfatória. Se o
Membro não responder dentro do prazo de 10 dias contatos a partir da data de recebimento da
solicitação, ou não proceder às consultas dentro de prazo não superior a 30 dias, ou dentro de outro
prazo mutuamente acordado contado a partir da data de recebimento da solicitação, o Membro que
houver solicitado as consultas poderá proceder diretamente a solicitação de estabelecimento de um
grupo especial.
2
Quando as disposições de qualquer outro acordo abrangido relativos a medidas adotadas por governos ou autoridades regionais ou
locais dentro do território de um Membro forem diferentes dos previstos neste parágrafo, prevalecerão as disposições do acordo
abrangido.
51
4.4
Todas as solicitações de consultas deverão ser notificadas ao OSC e aos Conselhos e Comitês
pertinentes pelo Membro que as solicite. Todas as solicitações de consultas deverão ser apresentadas.
4.5
Durante as consultas realizadas em conformidade com as disposições de um acordo abrangido, os
Membros procurarão obter uma solução satisfatória da questão antes de recorrer a outras medidas
previsas no presente Entendimento.
4.6
As consultas deverão ser confidenciais e sem prejuízo dos direitos de qualquer Membro em quaisquer
procedimentos posteriores.
4.7
Se as consultas não produzirem a solução de uma controvérsia no prazo de 60 dias contados a partir da
data de recebimento da solicitação, a parte reclamante poderá requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo
especial. A parte reclamante poderá requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo especial dentro do
referido prazo de 60 dias se as partes envolvidas na consulta considerarem conjuntamente que as
consultas não produziram solução da controvérsia.
4.8
Nos casos de urgência, incluindo aqueles que envolvem bens perecíveis, os Membros iniciarão as
consultas dentro de prazo não superior a 10 dias contatos da data de recebimento da solicitação. Se as
consultas não produzirem solução da controvérsia dentro de prazo não superior a 20 dias contatos da
data de recebimento da solicitação, a parte reclamante poderá requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo
especial.
4.9
Em casos de urgência, incluindo aqueles que envolvem bens perecíveis, as partes em controvérsia, os
grupos especiais e o Órgão de Apelação deverão envidar todos os esforços possíveis para acelerar ao
máximo os procedimentos.
4.10
Durante as consultas os Membros deverão dar atenção especial aos problemas e interesses específicos
dos países em desenvolvimento Membros.
4.11
Quando um Membro não participante das consultas considerar que tem interesse comercial substancial
nas consultas baseadas no parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXII do GATT 1994, parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXII do
GATS, ou nas disposições pertinentes de outros acordos abrangidos3, tal Membro poderá notificar os
Membros participantes da consulta e o OSC, dentro de um prazo de 10 dias contados da data da
distribuição da solicitação de consultas baseadas em tal Artigo, de seu desejo de integrar-se às
mesmas. Tal Membro deverá associar-se às consultas desde que o Membro ao qual a solicitação de
consultas foi encaminhada entenda que a pretensão de interesse substancial tenha fundamento. Nesse
caso, o OSC deverá ser devidamente informado. Se a requisição para participação das consultas não
for aceita, o Membro requerente poderá solicitar consultas com base no parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXII ou
parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994, parágrafo 1 do Artigo XXII ou parágrafo 1 do Artigo
XXIII do GATS, ou nas disposições pertinentes dos acordos abrangidos.
3
Enumeram-se, a seguir, as disposições pertinentes em matéria de consultas de acordos abrangidos: Acordo sobre Agricultura, Artigo
19; Acordo sobre Aplicação de Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias, parágrafo 1 do Artigo 11; Acordo sobre Têxteis e Vestuário,
parágrafo 4 do Artigo 8; Acordo sobre Barreiras Técnicas ao Comércio, parágrafo 1 do Artigo 14; Acordo sobre Medidas de
Investimento Relacionadas com o Comércio, Artigo 8; Acordo sobre a Implementação do Artigo VI do GATT 1994, parágrafo 2 do
Artigo 17; Acordo sobre a Implementação do Artigo VII do GATT 1994, parágrafo 2 do Artigo 19; Acordo sobre Inspeção PréEmbarque, Artigo 7; Acordo sobre Regras de Origem, Artigo 7; Acordo sobre Licenças de Importação, Artigo 6; Acordo sobre
Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias, Artigo 30; Acordo sobre Salvaguardas, Artigo 14; Acordo sobre Aspectos de Direito de
Propriedade Intelectual Relacionados com o Comércio, parágrafo 1 do Artigo 64; e as disposições pertinentes em matéria de consultas
dos Acordos Comerciais Plurilaterais que os órgãos pertinentes de cada acordo determinem e notifiquem ao OSC.
52
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Geral
a) “Objetivo da fase de consulta”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (21.5 - US) (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/AB, paras. 54-55
Nos termos do entendimento do Órgão de Apelação, a fase de consultas é muito importante e serve para as
partes trocarem informações, avaliarem os pontos fracos e fortes de seus respectivos pleitos e, muitas vezes,
chegarem a um acordo. No caso, se não se chegarem a um denominador comum, a fase de consultas
proporcionará a delimitação do escopo do conflito.
Para. 54. “Through consultations, parties exchange information, assess the strengths and weaknesses of their
respective cases, narrow the scope of the differences between them and, in many cases, reach a mutually
agreed solution in accordance with the explicit preference expressed in Article 3.7 of the DSU. Moreover,
even where no such agreed solution is reached, consultations provide the parties an opportunity to define and
delimit the scope of the dispute between them. Clearly, consultations afford many benefits to complaining and
responding parties, as well as to third parties and to the dispute settlement system as a whole.
Para. 55. “The practice of GATT contracting parties in regularly holding consultations is testimony to the
important role of consultations in dispute settlement. (…)”
b) “Dever dos membros de consultar”
Relatório do painel no litígio Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Brazil - Desiccated
Coconut), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS22/R, para. 287
O painel reforçou a importância das consultas no processo de solução de controvérsias e indicou que o dever
dos membros de consultar é “absoluto”, e não pode estar sujeito à imposição prévia de quaisquer termos e
condições por um membro.
Para. 287. “The Philippine’s request concerns a matter which this Panel views with the utmost seriousness.
Compliance with the fundamental obligation of WTO Members to enter into consultations where a request is
made under the DSU is vital to the operation of the dispute settlement system. Article 4.2 of the DSU provides
that ‘Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the
operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former’. Moreover, pursuant to Article 4.6
of the DSU, consultations are ‘without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further proceedings’. In
our view, these provisions make clear that Members’ duty to consult is absolute, and is not susceptible to the
prior imposition of any terms and conditions by a Member.”
c) “Dever dos membros de divulgar informações durante a fase de consulta”
53
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 94
O Órgão de Apelação sustentou que as partes envolvidas em uma disputa devem disponibilizar livremente os
fatos relacionados ao pleito.
Para. 94. “All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully forthcoming from the very
beginning both as to the claims involved in a dispute and as to the facts relating to those claims. Claims must
be stated clearly. Facts must be disclosed freely. This must be so in consultations as well as in the more formal
setting of panel proceedings. In fact, the demands of due process that are implicit in the DSU make this
especially necessary during consultations. For the claims that are made and the facts that are established during
consultations do much to shape the substance and the scope of subsequent panel proceedings. If, in the
aftermath of consultations, any party believes that all the pertinent facts relating to a claim are, for any reason,
not before the panel, then that party should ask the panel in that case to engage in additional fact-finding.”
d) “Fase de consultas como pré-requisito da fase de painel”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil –
Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 131. (Veja também Relatório do Órgão de
Apelação em US - Continued Zeroing, para. 222; e US - Upland Cotton)
Para. 131. “Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, as well as paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, set
forth a process by which a complaining party must request consultations, and consultations must be held,
before a matter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel.”
e) “Identidade entre o pedido de consultas e estabelecimento de painel”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil –
Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, paras. 131-132
O Órgão de Apelação sustentou que, enquanto o membro demandante não ampliasse o escopo da disputa, não
haveria a necessidade de se exigir identidade precisa e exata entre as medidas específicas, as quais foram
objeto das consultas, e das medidas identificadas no pedido de estabelecimento de painel.
Para. 131. “In our view, Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, as well as paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of the SCM
Agreement, set forth a process by which a complaining party must request consultations, and consultations
must be held, before a matter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel. Under Article 4.3 of
the SCM Agreement, moreover, the purpose of consultations is ‘to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive
at a mutually agreed solution’.”
Para. 132. “We do not believe, however, that Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, or paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 4 of
the SCM Agreement, require a precise and exact identity between the specific measures that were the subject
of consultations and the specific measures identified in the request for the establishment of a panel. As stated
by the Panel, ‘[o]ne purpose of consultations, as set forth in Article 4.3 of the SCM Agreement, is to ‘clarify
the facts of the situation’, and it can be expected that information obtained during the course of consultations
may enable the complainant to focus the scope of the matter with respect to which it seeks establishment of a
panel’ (…).”
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267AB/R, para. 293
54
Para. 293. “We emphasize that consultations are but the first step in the WTO dispute settlement process.
They are intended to “provide the parties an opportunity to define and delimit the scope of the dispute between
them”. We also note that Article 4.2 of the DSU calls on a WTO Member that receives a request for
consultations to “accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation
regarding any representations made by another Member”. As long as the complaining party does not expand
the scope of the dispute, we hesitate to impose too rigid a standard for the “precise and exact identity” between
the scope of consultations and the request for the establishment of a panel, as this would substitute the request
for consultations for the panel request. According to Article 7 of the DSU, it is the request for the
establishment of a panel that governs its terms of reference, unless the parties agree otherwise.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice
(Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295AB/R, para. 138
Para. 138. “[A] complaining party may learn of additional information during consultations — for example, a
better understanding of the operation of a challenged measure — that could warrant revising the list of treaty
provisions with which the measure is alleged to be inconsistent. Such a revision may lead to a narrowing of the
complaint, or to a reformulation of the complaint that takes into account new information such that additional
provisions of the covered agreements become relevant. The claims set out in a panel request may thus be
expected to be shaped by, and thereby constitute a natural evolution of, the consultation process. Reading the
DSU, as Mexico does, to limit the legal basis set out in the panel request to what was indicated in the request
for consultations, would ignore an important rationale behind the requirement to hold consultations — namely,
the exchange of information necessary to refine the contours of the dispute, which are subsequently set out in
the panel request. In this light, we consider that it is not necessary that the provisions referred to in the request
for consultations be identical to those set out in the panel request, provided that the ‘legal basis’ in the panel
request may reasonably be said to have evolved from the ‘legal basis’ that formed the subject of consultations.
In other words, the addition of provisions must not have the effect of changing the essence of the complaint.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise
Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties (US - Customs Bond Directive), Demandante: Índia,
WT/DS345AB/R, para. 293
O Órgão de Apelação fez referência aos seus pronunciamentos anteriores e enfatizou a necessidade de uma
análise caso a caso.
Para. 293. “[a]s long as the complaining party does not expand the scope of the dispute, [it would] hesitate to
impose too rigid a standard for the ‘precise and exact identity’ between the scope of the consultations and the
request for the establishment of a panel, as this would substitute the request for consultations for the panel
request”.(…) [a] ‘precise and exact identity’ of measures between the two requests is not necessary, ‘provided
that the ‘essence’ of the challenged measures had not changed.’ ‘[e]xpand[ed] the scope of the dispute’ or
changed the ‘essence’ of the dispute through the inclusion of a measure in its panel request that was not part of
its consultations request must be determined on a case-by-case basis.”
f) “Escopo da consulta limitado por pedido escrito”
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267AB/R, para. 293
O Órgão de Apelação firmou entendimento de que não há determinação expressa de que o pedido de consulta
seja escrito.
55
Para. 293. “We believe that the Panel should have limited its analysis to the request for consultations because
we are inclined to agree with the panel in Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, which stated that “the only
requirement under the DSU is that consultations were in fact held … [w]hat takes place in those consultations
is not the concern of a panel”. Examining what took place in the consultations would seem contrary to Article
4.6 of the DSU, which provides that “consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of
any Member in any further proceedings.” Moreover, it would seem at odds with the requirements in Article
4.4 of the DSU that the request for consultations be made in writing and that it be notified to the DSB. In
addition, there is no public record of what actually transpires during consultations and parties will often
disagree about what, precisely, was discussed.”
g) “Efeito da extensão da duração das medidas identificadas após consultas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207AB/R,
paras. 7.116–7.120
O painel analisou a questão da extensão da duração das medidas após as consultas.
Paras. 7.116–7.120. “Chile raises two different objections regarding the Panel’s jurisdiction with respect to
the definitive safeguard measures and the extension of their duration: first, the definitive safeguard measures
had ‘expired before the request for establishment was made; second, the ‘extension measures’ were not
formally included in the request for consultations. We cannot accept either of those objections, for one and the
same reason. Both of Chile’s objections are based on the proposition that the extension of the period of
application results in a measure distinct from the definitive safeguard measure. We disagree with this
proposition. In our view, Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards makes it clear that what is at issue is not an
extension ‘of the safeguard measure’, but, rather, an extension ‘of the period of application of the safeguard
measure’ or of ‘the duration of the safeguard measure’. Article 7 is entitled ‘Duration and Review of
Safeguard Measures’. (...)
This language is sufficiently clear for us as to conclude that the ‘extensions’ are not distinct measures, but
merely continuations in time of the definitive safeguard measures. As a result, we consider that the definitive
safeguard measures were not terminated before the request for establishment, but, rather, that their duration
was simply extended at that time. Thus, we need not further consider Chile’s argument that we lack the
authority to make findings in respect of the definitive measures on the grounds that they have expired. For the
same reason, we also consider the fact that the extension was not mentioned in the request for consultations
irrelevant for the determination of our jurisdiction: pursuant to Article 4.4 of the DSU, Argentina had to, and
did, identify the definitive safeguard measures in its request for consultations. The fact that the duration of the
identified measures was extended by Chile after the request for consultations cannot affect Argentina’s
compliance with Article 4.4 of the DSU.
We note, moreover, that the ‘extension’ did not in any way amend the content of the safeguard measures and
that there were, in fact, exchanges between Argentina and Chile during the period of consultations regarding
the ‘extension’. Chile must therefore have been fully informed about Argentina’s intention to challenge the
safeguard measures, as extended in time. Thus, even if the ‘extension’ were to be considered a separate
measure, quod non, Chile’s due process rights would not have been impinged upon.”
h) “Pedido de consultas aditado”
56
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea (US - Countervailing Duty Investigation on
DRAMs), Demandante: República da Corea, WT/DS296AB/R, para. 100
O Órgão de Apelação manteve a decisão do painel ao considerar que a “totalidade” do disposto no pedido
inicial para consultas e no adendo estabeleceu uma indicação suficiente de base legal para o pleito, nos termos
do artigo 4.4.
Para. 100. “The Addendum expressly refers to the initial request for consultations. It is clear that the
Addendum was intended to be read together with the original request for consultations; indeed, that is the very
nature of an addendum. Moreover, we recall that Korea explains that, under United States law, ‘the [CVD]
order is wholly dependent on the administrative determinations and is effectively a ministerial function
without discretion’. According to Korea, ‘it follows that the legal claims of the underlying determinations are
identical to the legal claims with respect to the [CVD] order.’ … In these circumstances, it should have been
apparent that the allegations of Inconsistency, set forth by Korea in the original request for consultations and
in the Addendum in relation to the USDOC’s subsidy determination and the USITC’s injury determination,
applied also to the CVD order. Nor can it be said that the United States was expected ‘to guess which
provision(s) applied to the [CVD] order’. Accordingly, we find that it was reasonable for the Panel to conclude
that the ‘totality’ of the provisions in Korea’s initial request for consultations and in the Addendum provides,
with respect to the USDOC’s CVD order, a sufficient indication of the legal basis for the complaint within the
meaning of Article 4.4.”
2.
Artigo 4.2
a) “Medidas expiradas no escopo do pedido de consultas”
Cotton), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267AB/R, paras. 260–263
O Órgão de Apelação manteve a recomendação do painel, sustentando que o artigo 4.2 do DSU não exclui
medidas expiradas do escopo do pedido de consultas, quando estas continuam afetando os direitos de
determinado membro.
Para. 260. “It is clear from Article 4.2 that, although a requested Member is under an obligation to engage in
“consultation” on “any” representations made by another Member, such representations must pertain to
“measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement (…).”
Para. 261. “We agree with the Panel that the word “affecting” refers primarily to “the way in which measures
relate to a covered agreement”. As the Appellate Body stated in EC - Bananas III, “the ordinary meaning of
the word ‘affecting’ implies a measure that has ‘an effect on’” Something else. At the same time, we also
concur with the United States that the ordinary meaning of the word “affecting” suggests a temporal
connotation. As the United States submits, the present tense of the phrase “affecting the operation of any
covered agreement” denotes that the effects of such measures must relate to the present impact of those
measures on the operation of a covered agreement. It is not sufficient that a Member alleges that challenged
measures affected the operation of a covered agreement in the past; the representations of the Member
requesting consultations must indicate that the effects are occurring in the present.”
Para. 262. “Whether or not a measure is still in force is not dispositive of whether that Measure is currently
affecting the operation of any covered agreement. Therefore, we disagree with the United States’ argument
that measures whose legislative basis has expired are incapable of affecting the operation of a covered
57
agreement in the present and that; accordingly, expired measures cannot be the subject of consultations under
the DSU. In our view, the question of whether measures whose legislative basis has expired affect the
operation of a covered agreement currently is an issue that must be resolved on the facts of each case. The
outcome of such an analysis cannot be prejudged by excluding it from consultations and dispute settlement
proceedings altogether.”
Para. 263. “We consider that requesting Members should enjoy a degree of discretion to identify, in their
request for consultations under Article 4.2, matters relating to the covered agreements for discussion in
consultations. As the Appellate Body observed in Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 - US), consultations
present an opportunity for clarifying factual and legal issues, and for narrowing the scope of a dispute, and for
resolving differences between WTO Members. We do not think it would advance the purpose of consultations
if Article 4.2 were interpreted as excluding a priori measures whose legislative basis may have expired, but
whose effects are alleged to be impairing the benefits accruing to the requesting Member under a covered
agreement. Nor, indeed, do we find textual support in the provision itself for doing so. Thus, we do not read
Article 4.2 of the DSU as precluding a Member from making representations on measures whose legislative
basis has expired, where that Member has reason to believe that such measures are still ‘affecting’ the
operation of a covered agreement.”
3.
Artigo 4.3
a) “General”
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (21.5 - US) (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/AB, paras. 58-59 e 62-64
O Órgão de Apelação se referiu ao artigo 4.3, constatando que a falta de consultas prévias não seja um defeito
que prive necessariamente um painel de jurisdição em relação a uma questão.
Para. 58. “As a general matter, consultations is a prerequisite to panel proceedings. However, this general
proposition is subject to certain limitations (…).”
Para. 59. “Article 4.3 of the DSU relates the responding party’s conduct towards consultations to the
complaining party’s right to request the establishment of a panel. When the responding party does not respond
to a request for consultations, or declines to enter into consultations, the Complaining party may dispense with
consultations and proceed to request the establishment of a panel. In such a case, the responding party, by its
own conduct, relinquishes the potential benefits that could be derived from those consultations.”
Para. 62. “In addition (…) [the requirement in Article 6.2 of the DSU to indicate] whether consultations were
held (…).” (…) “may be satisfied by an express statement that no consultations were held. In other words,
Article 6.2 also envisages the possibility that a panel may be validly established without Being preceded by
consultations.”
Para. 63. “Thus, the DSU explicitly recognizes circumstances where the absence of consultations would not
deprive the panel of its authority to consider the matter referred to it by the DSB. In our view, it follows that
where the responding party does not object, explicitly and in a timely manner, to the failure of the complaining
party to request or engage in consultations, the responding party may be deemed to have consented to the lack
of consultations and, thereby, to have relinquished whatever right to consult it may have had.”
58
Para. 64. “As a result, we find that the lack of prior consultations is not a defect that, by its very nature,
deprives a panel of its authority to deal with and dispose of a matter, and that, accordingly, such a defect is not
one which a panel must examine even if both parties to the dispute remain silent thereon.”
b) “Boa-fé no pedido de consulta”
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones
Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), Demandante: CE, WT/DS320/R, para. 313. (Veja também o
relatório do painel no litígio European Communities - Bed Linen, Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R,
paras. 6.32–6.35
O Órgão de Apelação sustentou que os membros devem agir de boa fé ao iníciar um conflito e em sua conduta
durante o processo de solução de controvérsias.
Para. 313. “The DSU makes reference to “good faith” in two provisions, namely, Article 4.3, which relates to
consultations, and Article 3.10, which provides that, “if a dispute arises, all Members will engage in these
procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute.” These provisions Require Members to act in good
faith with respect to the initiation of a dispute and in their conduct during dispute settlement proceedings.”
4.
Artigo 4.4
a) “Base jurídica do pedido de consultas”
Relatório do painel no litígio European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron
or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners)(China), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R, para. 7.207.
(Vide também: relatório do painel no litígio US - Poultry (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS392/R,
paras. 7.30–7.34 e 7.43)
O painel sustentou que o pedido de consultas, nos termos do artigo 4.4 do DSU, é menos rigoroso que o para
estabelecimento de um painel, nos termos do artigo 6.2, sendo que aquele poderá ser satisfeito em um caso
particular com a lista de artigos supostamente violados.
Para. 7.207. “While the Appellate Body has indicated that a mere listing of legal provisions alleged to be
violated may not be sufficient to provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to
present the problem clearly in the context of a panel request, it is not clear to us that a similar approach should
be taken with respect to a request for consultations. Unlike Article 6.2 of the DSU, which requires that a panel
request provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly,
Article 4.4 of the DSU requires only that a request for consultations contain “an indication of the legal basis
for the complaint”. In our view, this is a lesser requirement than that of Article 6.2, and may well be satisfied
in a particular case by listing the Articles allegedly violated.”
5.
Artigo 4.6
a) “Confidencialidade do pedido de consultas”
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China
(US - Poultry) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS392/R, paras. 7.35 e 7.36. (Vide também: relatório
do Painel em Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/R, para. 5.6)
O Painel enfatizou a “natureza confidencial” do pedido de consultas.
59
Para. 7.35. “The Panel is aware that in making its analysis of whether a particular claim was included in the
consultations request, it should not inquire as to what actually occurred during consultations. The panel in
Korea - Alcoholic Beverages correctly noted that ‘the only requirement under the DSU is that consultations
were in fact held … what takes place in those consultations is not the concern of a panel’. (…) Finally, the
Appellate Body noted that, there is no public record of what actually transpires during consultations and
parties will often disagree about what, precisely, was discussed.”
Para. 7.36. “Therefore, the Panel will inquire whether China indicated the SPS Agreement as a legal basis for
its complaint in its consultations request and in doing so will look at that consultations request as a whole and
in light of the attendant circumstances. However, the Panel will not use as a basis for its determination what
either party alleges took place during consultations. Therefore, while we will consider the exchange of letters
in April 2009 - which are precisely about the scope of China’s consultations request - we will not consider any
questions posed or answers given during the consultations.”
b) “Uso de informação obtida na fase de consulta, no pedido de estabelecimento de painel”
Relatório do painel no litígio Korea, Republic of - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (US - Poultry)(China),
Demandante: China, WT/DS392/R, para. 10.23
O painel sustentou que o artigo 4.6 do DSU exige confidencialidade entre as partes em uma disputa, sendo que
a confidencialidade é essencial para que haja engajamento entre elas. No entanto, entendeu que esta
confidencialidade estende-se, apenas, na medida em que proibe às partes envolvidas nas consultas de divulgar
quaisquer informações obtidas àquelas que não estavam envolvidas.
Para. 10.23. “We note that Article 4.6 of the DSU requires confidentiality in the consultations between parties
to a dispute. This is essential if the parties are to be free to engage in meaningful consultations. However, it is
our view that this confidentiality extends only as far as requiring the parties to the consultations not to disclose
any information obtained in the consultations to any parties that were not involved in those consultations. We
are mindful of the fact that the panel proceedings between the parties remain confidential, and parties do not
thereby breach any confidentiality by disclosing in those proceedings information acquired during the
consultations. Indeed, in our view, the very essence of consultations is to enable the parties gather correct and
relevant information, for purposes of assisting them in arriving at a mutually agreed solution, or failing which,
to assist them in presenting accurate information to the panel. It would seriously hamper the dispute settlement
process if the information acquired during consultations could not subsequently be used by any party in the
ensuing proceedings. We find therefore, that there has been no breach of confidentiality by the complainants in
this case in respect of information that they became aware of during the consultations with Korea on this
matter.”
c) “Uso de informação obtida na fase de consulta, no pedido de estabelecimento de painel”
Relatório do painel no litígio Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather (Austrália - Automotive Leather II), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS126/R, para. 9.34
O painel entendeu que não há problema em utilizar informação obtida em primeira consulta, considerando-se
que as partes e a disputa são as mesmas.
Para. 9.34. “Given that, in this case, the parties and the dispute are the same, no panel was actually composed
or considered the dispute in the first-requested proceeding, and there are no third parties involved in either
proceeding who might have learned information in the course of consultations, we cannot see any reason to
exclude the United States Exhibit 2 from our consideration, merely because it was developed in the course of
60
the consultations held pursuant to the first request (…) Australia has failed to specify what other, if any, facts
might have been derived by the United States from the earlier consultations, and so there is no basis for us to
exclude any such facts.”
Relatório do painel no litígio Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)
from the United States (21.5 - US) (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.41
O painel entendeu que a obrigação de manter a confidencialidade das consultas, não é violada simplesmente
pela inclusão das informações obtidas na apresentação por escrito das partes, a um terceiro, na fase de painel,
mesmo se este terceiro não participou das consultas.
Para. 7.41. “[I]t would seriously hamper the dispute settlement process if a party could not use information
obtained in the consultations in subsequent panel proceedings merely because a third party which did not
participate in the consultations chooses to participate in the panel proceedings. (…) As Mexico points out,
third party participation in the panel proceedings cannot be vetoed by the parties to the proceeding. In our
view, it would be anomalous if the decision of a Member to participate in a panel proceeding as a third party
when it did not, or could not, participate as a third party in the underlying consultations had the effect of
limiting the evidence that could be relied upon in the panel proceeding by precluding the introduction of
information obtained during the consultations. Third parties are subject to the same requirement to maintain
the confidentiality of panel proceedings as are parties. We therefore conclude that the requirement to maintain
the confidentiality of consultations is not violated by the inclusion of information obtained during
consultations in the written submission of a party provided to a third party in the subsequent panel proceeding
even if that third party did not participate in the consultations.”
6.
Artigo 4.7
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (21.5 - US)(Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/AB, paras. 63-64
O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que, a falta de consultas prévias não é um “defeito” que, necessariamente,
priva um painel de sua autoridade para tratar e dispor sobre determinado assunto, e, que, portanto, tal “defeito”
não deve ser examinado, ainda mais quando as partes envolvidas na disputa sequer se manifestaram a respeito.
Paras. 63-64. “Thus, the DSU explicitly recognizes circumstances where the absence of consultations would
not deprive the panel of its authority to consider the matter referred to it by the DSB. In our view, it follows
that where the responding party does not object, explicitly and in a timely manner, to the failure of the
complaining party to request or engage in consultations, the responding party may be deemed to have
consented to the lack of consultations and, thereby, to have relinquished whatever right to consult it may have
had. As a result, we find that the lack of prior consultations is not a defect that, by its very nature, deprives a
panel of its authority to deal with and dispose of a matter, and that, accordingly, such a defect is not one which
a panel must examine even if both parties to the dispute remain silent thereon. We recall that, in this case,
Mexico neither pursued the potential benefits of consultations nor objected that the United States had deprived
it of such benefits.”
7.
Artigo 4.11
Relatório do painel no litígio Korea, Republic of - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: CE, WT/DS98/R, para. 7.13
61
O painel, fazendo referência ao relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC - Bananas, sustentou que a
necessidade de um “interesse jurídico” não pode ser implícita no DSU ou em quaisquer outras disposições dos
acordos da OMC, como um pré-requisito para solicitar um painel.
Para. 7.13. “In EC - Bananas, the Appellate Body stated that the need for a ‘legal interest’ could not be
implied in the DSU or in any other provisions of the WTO Agreement and that Members were expected to be
largely self-regulating in deciding whether any DSU procedure would be ‘fruitful’. We cannot read in the DSU
any requirement for an ‘economic interest’. We also note the provisions of Article 3.8 of the DSU, pursuant to
which nullification and impairment is presumed once violation is established.”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 4 do DSU trata especificamente da fase de consulta, abordando, mas não se limitando, aos
procedimentos e prazos.
A fase de consulta é muito importante e serve para as partes trocarem informação, avaliarem os pontos fracos e
fortes de seus respectivos pleitos e, muitas vezes, chegarem a um acordo. Quando não for possível o acordo, a
fase de consulta possibilitará que as partes delimitem o escopo do conflito, sendo que não se exige identidade
precisa e exata entre as medidas objeto de consulta, e àquelas a serem objeto de estabelecimento de painel.
A fase de consulta exige, contudo, que os membros atuem de boa fé ao iniciar um conflito, e em sua consulta
durante o processo de solução de controvérsias, assim como exige confidencialidade entre as partes em uma
disputa.
62

Artigo 5
Felipe Herzog
IA.
Article 5
Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation
5.1
Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily if the parties
to the dispute so agree.
5.2
Proceedings involving good offices, conciliation and mediation, and in particular positions taken by
the parties to the dispute during these proceedings, shall be confidential, and without prejudice to the
rights of either party in any further proceedings under these procedures.
5.3
Good offices, conciliation or mediation may be requested at any time by any party to a dispute. They
may begin at any time and be terminated at any time. Once procedures for good offices, conciliation or
mediation are terminated, a complaining party may then proceed with a request for the establishment
of a panel.
5.4
When good offices, conciliation or mediation are entered into within 60 days after the date of receipt
of a request for consultations, the complaining party must allow a period of 60 days after the date of
receipt of the request for consultations before requesting the establishment of a panel. The
complaining party may request the establishment of a panel during the 60-day period if the parties to
the dispute jointly consider that the good offices, conciliation or mediation process has failed to settle
the dispute.
5.5
If the parties to a dispute agree, procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation may continue
while the panel process proceeds.
5.6
The Director-General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices, conciliation or
mediation with the view to assisting Members to settle a dispute.
IB.
Artigo 5
Bons Ofícios, Conciliação e Mediação
5.1
Bons ofícios, conciliação e mediação são procedimentos adotados voluntariamente se as partes na
controvérsia assim acordarem.
5.2
As diligências relativas aos bons ofícios, à conciliação e à mediação, e em especial as posições
adotadas durante as mesmas pelas partes envolvidas nas controvérsias, deverão ser confidenciais e
sem prejuízo dos direitos de quaisquer das partes em diligências posteriores baseadas nestes
procedimentos.
5.3
Bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação poderão ser solicitados a qualquer tempo por qualquer das
partes envolvidas na controvérsia. Poderão iniciar-se ou encerrar-se a qualquer tempo. Uma vez
terminados os procedimentos de bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação, a parte reclamante poderá
requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo especial.
63
5.4
Quando bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação se iniciarem dentro de 60 dias contados da data de
recebimento da solicitação, a parte reclamante poderá requerer o estabelecimento de um grupo
especial antes de transcorrido o prazo de 60 dias a partir da data de recebimento da solicitação de
consultas. A parte reclamante poderá solicitar o estabelecimento de um grupo especial no correr do
prazo de 60 dias se as partes envolvidas na controvérsia considerarem de comum acordo que os bons
ofícios, a conciliação e a mediação não foram suficientes para solucionar a controvérsia.
5.5
Se as partes envolvidas na controvérsia concordarem, os procedimentos para bons ofícios, conciliação
e mediação poderão continuar enquanto prosseguirem os procedimentos do grupo especial.
5.6
O Diretor-Geral, atuando ex officio, poderá oferecer seus bons ofícios, conciliação ou mediação com o
objetivo de auxiliar os Membros a resolver uma controvérsia.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Geral
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), Demandante: CE, WT/320/AB, para. 340
O Órgão de Apelação expôs que consultas, mediação, bons ofícios e arbitragem são alternativas à adjudicação
compulsória e necessitam do consentimento das partes. Na ausência de tal consentimento, não se pode obter
uma decisão vinculante.
Para. 340. “Certainly, parties to a dispute are not precluded from pursuing consensual or alternative means of
dispute settlement foreseen in the DSU. Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that “[a] solution mutually acceptable
to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.” To reach a
mutually acceptable solution, Members can engage in consultations or resort to mediation and good offices.
Moreover, Article 25 provides for arbitration as an alternative to panel proceedings for dispute resolution.
Consultations, mediation, good offices, and arbitration are, however, alternatives to compulsory adjudication
and require the consent of the parties. In the absence of such consent, they cannot lead to a binding decision.
Thus, it is important to distinguish between these consensual means of dispute resolution, which are always at
the Members’ disposal, and adjudication through panel proceedings, which are compulsory (…).”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 5 do DSU trata do “Bons ofícios, conciliação e mediação”. Estes são procedimentos adotados
voluntariamente pelas partes na controvérsia, podendo ser iniciado ou encerrado a qualquer tempo. Conforme,
explicação do próprio DSB, são alternativas à adjudicação compulsória e necessitam do consentimento das
partes.
64

Artigo 6
IA.
Article 6
Establishment of Panels
6.1
If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting
following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless at that
meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel. (42)
6.2
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate whether
consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the
legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In case the applicant requests the
establishment of a panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall include
the proposed text of special terms of reference.
Footnote 42: In the case where customs unions or common markets are parties to a dispute, this provision applies to citizens of all
member countries of the customs unions or common markets.
IB.
Artigo 6
Estabelecimento de Grupos Especiais
6.1.1
Se a parte reclamante assim o solicitar, um grupo especial será estabelecido no mais tardar na reunião
do OSC seguinte àquela em que a solicitação aparece pela primeira vez como item da agenda do
OSC, a menos que nessa reunião o OSC decida por consenso não estabelecer o grupo especial.4
6.2
Os pedidos de estabelecimento de grupo especial deverão ser formulados por escrito. Deverão indicar
se foram realizadas consultas, identificar as medidas em controvérsia e fornecer uma breve exposição
do embasamento legal da reclamação, suficiente para apresentar o problema com clareza. Caso a parte
reclamante solicite o estabelecimento do grupo especial com termos de referência diferentes dos
termos padrão, o pedido escrito deverá incluir sugestão de texto para os termos de referência
especiais.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
4
Se a parte reclamante assim solicitar, do OSC será convocada com tal objetivo dentro dos quinze dias seguintes ao pedido, sempre
que se dê aviso com antecedencia minima de 10 dias.
65

Artigo 7
IA.
Article 7
Terms of Reference of Panels
7.1
Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise
within 20 days from the establishment of the panel:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered
agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB
by (name of party) in document ... and to make such findings as will assist the
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
that/those agreement(s).
7.2
Panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the
parties to the dispute.
7.3
In establishing a panel, the DSB may authorize its Chairman to draw up the terms of reference of the
panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1. The
terms of reference thus drawn up shall be circulated to all Members. If other than standard terms of
reference are agreed upon, any Member may raise any point relating thereto in the DSB.
IB.
Artigo 7
Termos de Referência dos Grupos Especiais
7.1
Os termos de referência dos grupos especiais serão os seguintes, a menos que as partes envolvidas na
controvérsia acordem diferentemente dentro do prazo de 20 dias a partir da data de estabelecimento
do grupo especial:
Examinar, à luz das disposições pertinentes no (indicar o(s) acordo(s)
abrangido(s) citado(s) pelas partes em controvérsias), a questão submetida ao
OSC por (nome da parte) no documento (...) e estabelecer conclusões que
auxiliem o OSC a fazer recomendações ou emitir decisões previstas naquele(s)
acordo(s).
7.2
Os grupos especiais deverão considerar as disposições relevantes de todo acordo ou acordos
abrangidos invocados pelas partes envolvidas na controvérsia.
7.3
Ao estabelecer um grupo especial, o OSC poderá autorizar seu Presidente a redigir os termos de
referência do grupo especial com a colaboração das partes envolvidadas na controvérsia, de acordo
com as disposições do parágrafo 1. Os termos de referência assim redigidos serão distribuídos a todos
os Membros. Caso os termos de referência sejam diferentes do padrão, qualquer Membro poderá
levantar qualquer ponto a ele relativo no OSC.
66
IC.
No artigo 7.2, a expressão ‘considerar’ deve ser entendida como ‘examinar’. Não basta que o painel declare ter
levado em conta todos os argumentos jurídicos das partes; é preciso que estes sejam examinados
explicitamente no relatório.
II.
1.
Geral
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 87-89
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que o pedido de painel condiciona os termos de referência
dos painéis, os quais são a base de sua jurisdição e fornecem às partes e terceiras partes informação sobre os
pedidos em questão em uma determinada disputa. Embora não seja necessário ao demandante apresentar todos
os argumentos no pedido de painel, os pedidos ali contidos condicionam os termos de referência do painel, e,
portanto, delimitam a sua jurisdição.
Para. 87. “In United States - Shirts and Blouses, we said that “[a] panel need only address those claims which
must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute”. This means that a panel has the
discretion to determine the claims it must address in order to resolve the dispute between the parties - provided
that those claims are within that panel's terms of reference. We have stressed, on more than one occasion, the
fundamental importance of a panel's terms of reference. In European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (“European Communities - Bananas”), we found that “[i]t is
the panel's terms of reference, governed by Article 7 of the DSU, which set out the claims of the complaining
parties relating to the matter referred to the DSB”.70 In Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut
(“Brazil - Desiccated Coconut”), we stated:
A panel's terms of reference are important for two reasons. First, terms of reference
fulfil an important due process objective - they give the parties and third parties
sufficient information concerning the claims at issue in the dispute in order to allow
them an opportunity to respond to the complainant's case. Second, they establish the
jurisdiction of the panel by defining the precise claims at issue in the dispute.
Para. 88. “We stated also in Brazil - Desiccated Coconut that all claims must be included in the request for
establishment of a panel in order to come within the panel's terms of reference, based on the practice of panels
under the GATT 1947 and the Tokyo Round Codes. That past practice required that a claim had to be included
in the documents referred to, or contained in, the terms of reference in order to form part of the “matter”
referred to a panel for consideration. Following both this past practice and the provisions of the DSU, in
European Communities - Bananas, we observed that there is a significant difference between the claims
identified in the request for the establishment of a panel, which establish the panel's terms of reference under
Article 7 of the DSU, and the arguments supporting those claims, which are set out and progressively clarified
in the first written submissions, the rebuttal submissions, and the first and second panel meetings with the
parties as a case proceeds. There we said:
Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that the claims, but not the arguments, must all be
specified sufficiently in the request for the establishment of a panel in order to allow the
defending party and any third parties to know the legal basis of the complaint. If a claim
is not specified in the request for the establishment of a panel, then a faulty request
cannot be subsequently “cured” by a complaining party's argumentation in its first
67
written submission to the panel or in any other submission or statement made later in
the panel proceeding.”
Para. 89. “Thus, a claim must be included in the request for establishment of a panel in order to come within a
panel’s terms of reference in a given case.”
2.
Artigo 7.1
a) “Significado do termo ‘questão’”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland
Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 72
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou o significado do termo ‘questão’, esclarecendo que este inclui
tanto as medidas contestadas, quanto a base jurídica da demanda ou dos pedidos efetuados.
Para. 72. “The word “matter” appears in Article 7 of the DSU, which provides the standard terms of reference
for panels. Under this provision, the task of a panel is to examine “the matter referred to the DSB”. These
words closely echo those of Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and, in view of the integrated nature
of the dispute settlement system, form part of the context of that provision. Article 7 of the DSU itself does not
shed any further light on the meaning of the term “matter”. However, when that provision is read together with
Article 6.2 of the DSU, the precise meaning of the term “matter” becomes clear. Article 6.2 specifies the
requirements under which a complaining Member may refer a “matter” to the DSB: in order to establish a
panel to hear its complaint, a Member must make, in writing, a “request for the establishment of a panel” (a
“panel request”). In addition to being the document which enables the DSB to establish a panel, the panel
request is also usually identified in the panel's terms of reference as the document setting out “the matter
referred to the DSB”. Thus, “the matter referred to the DSB” for the purposes of Article 7 of the DSU and
Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement must be the “matter” identified in the request for the
establishment of a panel under Article 6.2 of the DSU. That provision requires the complaining Member, in a
panel request, to “identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.” (emphasis added) The “matter referred to the DSB”,
therefore, consists of two elements: the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint (or the
claims).”
b) “Delimitação da jurisdição do painel”
Chemical Products (EC - Large Civil Aircraft), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 639-640 e 786
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que a ‘questão’ referida ao DSB, e em análise pelos
painéis, é determinada pelo pedido de painel, estando fora da jurisdição deste órgão o exame de medidas não
incluídas no pedido de painel.
Para. 639. “Two requirements under Article 6.2 are central to establishing a panel's jurisdiction — namely the
identification of the specific measures at issue, and the provision of a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. Together these elements comprise the “matter referred to
the DSB”, which forms the basis for a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU. (43) The
Appellate Body has previously noted that the panel request serves two essential purposes. First, it defines the
scope of the dispute. Second, it serves the due process objective of notifying the respondent and third parties
of the nature of the complainant's case.” (44)
68
Para. 640. “In our view, the requirement that a complainant identify in its panel request the specific measures
at issue thus assists in determining the scope of the dispute in respect of those measures, and, consequently,
establishes and delimits the jurisdiction of the panel. In so doing, the panel request fulfils the objective of
providing notice to the respondent and the third parties regarding the nature of the dispute. This due process
objective is not constitutive of, but rather follows from, the proper establishment of a panel's jurisdiction. The
principal task of the adjudicator is therefore to assess what the panel's terms of reference encompass, and
whether a particular measure or claim falls within the panel's remit.”
Para. 786. “As discussed above, two requirements under Article 6.2 of the DSU are central to establishing a
panel's jurisdiction — namely the identification of the specific measures at issue, and the provision of a brief
summary of the legal basis of the complaint. Together, specific measures and claims comprise the “matter
referred to the DSB”, which forms the basis for a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU. The
panel request thus functions to establish and delimit the jurisdiction of the panel in a dispute and it serves the
due process objective of notifying the respondent and third parties of the nature of the dispute. The clear
identification of the specific measures in the panel request is therefore central to define the scope of the
dispute to be addressed by a panel.”
Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 91-94
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que um pedido adicional, realizado após a solicitação de
instauração do painel, está fora dos termos de referência deste órgão e, portanto, fora de sua jurisdição.
Embora o painel tenha liberdade para organizar o próprio procedimento, não pode ampliar o escopo da própria
jurisdição.
Para. 91. “In European Communities - Bananas, we accepted the view of the panel in that case that it was
“sufficient for the Complaining Parties to list the provisions of the specific agreements alleged to have been
violated without setting out detailed arguments as to which specific aspects of the measures at issue relate to
which specific provisions of those agreements”, and we also agreed with the panel that the request in that case
was sufficiently specific to comply with the “minimum standards” established by Article 6.2 of the DSU.75 In
this case, in contrast, there is a failure to identify a specific provision of an agreement that is alleged to have
been violated. This falls below the “minimum standards” that we were willing to accept in European
Communities - Bananas.”
Para. 92. “We note also the Panel's statement that it “ruled, at the outset of the first substantive meeting held
on 15 April 1997, that all legal claims would be considered if they were made prior to the end of that meeting;
and this ruling was accepted by both parties”. We do not find this statement at all persuasive in advancing the
argument made by the United States on this issue. Nor do we find this statement consistent with the letter and
the spirit of the DSU. Although panels enjoy some discretion in establishing their own working procedures,
this discretion does not extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the DSU. To be sure, Article 12.1 of
the DSU says: “Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise
after consulting the parties to the dispute”. Yet that is all that it says. Nothing in the DSU gives a panel the
authority either to disregard or to modify other explicit provisions of the DSU. The jurisdiction of a panel is
established by that panel's terms of reference, which are governed by Article 7 of the DSU. A panel may
consider only those claims that it has the authority to consider under its terms of reference. A panel cannot
assume jurisdiction that it does not have. In this case, Article 63 was not within the Panel's jurisdiction, as
defined by its terms of reference. Therefore, the Panel had no authority to consider the alternative claim by the
United States under Article 63.”
69
Para. 93. “(…) All that said, there is, nevertheless, no basis in the DSU for a complaining party to make an
additional claim, outside of the scope of a panel's terms of reference, at the first substantive meeting of the
panel with the parties. A panel is bound by its terms of reference.”
consultations do much to shape the substance and the scope of subsequent panel proceedings. If, in the
aftermath of consultations, any party believes that all the pertinent facts relating to a claim are, for any reason,
not before the panel, then that party should ask the panel in that case to engage in additional fact-finding. But
this additional fact-finding cannot alter the claims that are before the panel - because it cannot alter the panel's
terms of reference. And, in the absence of the inclusion of a claim in the terms of reference, a panel must
neither be expected nor permitted to modify rules in the DSU.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas)(21.5 II), Demandante: Equador; (EC - Bananas)(21.5),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 270
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que a expiração de uma medida após a elaboração dos
termos de referência, não impede o painel de se pronunciar sobre a conformidade da medida com os acordos
da OMC. Está dentro da discricionariedade dos painéis, portanto, proceder ao exame de medidas expiradas
após a sua formação.
Para. 270. “(…). The terms of reference for a panel pursuant to Article 7 define the scope of the dispute and
the mandate of the panel. In the present case, the panel request identified, inter alia, EC Regulation 1964/2005,
and the DSB established the Panel on that basis with standard terms of reference. The European Communities
and the United States both agreed at the outset of the proceedings that this Regulation was the measure at issue
included in the Panel's terms of reference. The parties agreed that this measure was within the jurisdiction of
the Panel. The DSU nowhere provides that the jurisdiction of a panel terminates or is limited by the expiry of
the measure at issue. On the contrary, when the DSU provides for limitations on the authority of the panel in
other instances, it does so in express terms. Article 12.12 of the DSU, for example, provides that a panel's
authority lapses if the work of the panel has been suspended for more than 12 months. The absence of a
similar limitation, with respect to changes to the scope of the panel's jurisdiction after the panel has been
established and the terms of reference have been determined by the DSB, lends further support to our
interpretation that, once a panel has been established and the terms of reference for the panel have been set, the
panel has the competence to make findings with respect to the measures covered by its terms of reference. We
thus consider it to be within the discretion of the panel to decide how it takes into account subsequent
modifications or a repeal of the measure at issue. Accordingly, panels have made findings on expired measures
in some cases and declined to do so in others, depending on the particularities of the disputes before them.327
In the present case, the European Communities has advanced no reason, nor do we see a reason, for interfering
with the Panel's exercise of that discretion.”
3.
Artigo 7.2
a)
“Obrigação do painel de examinar”
(i) ‘deverão considerar’
70
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Soft Drinks), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/AB/RW,
paras. 49 e 62-63
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação notou que o artigo 7 produz para os painéis a obrigação de examinar as
disposições relevantes dos acordos da OMC citadas pelas partes na controvérsia.
Para. 49. “The second paragraph of Article 7 further stipulates that “[p]anels shall address the relevant
provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.” The use of the words
“shall address” in Article 7.2 indicates, in our view, that panels are required to address the relevant provisions
in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute. (45)
(ii) ‘acordo ou acordos abrangidos’
Relatório do painel sob o artigo 22.6, no caso European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 50
Nesta controvérsia, o painelista observou que o termo ‘acordo ou acordos da OMC’ não deve ser interpretado
de forma a incluir na jurisdição do painel acordos que não sejam acordos da OMC.
Para. 50. “The autonomous quota rights claimed by the US - irrespective of their legal status and consistency
with WTO rules - are not rights under any of the WTO agreements covered by the DSU. The rights thus
alleged are derived from bilateral agreements that cannot be properly enforced on their own in WTO dispute
settlement.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup) (21.5), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/AB/RW, paras. 49 e 62-63
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação notou que o painel não estava na obrigação de refutar explicitamente
argumentos levantados extemporaneamente.
Para. 49. “However, had we been satisfied that Mexico did, in fact, explicitly raise its objections before the
Panel, then the Panel may well have been required to “address” those objections, whether by virtue of Articles
7.2 and 12.7 of the DSU, or the requirements of due process. In such circumstances, however, the Panel could
have satisfied that duty simply by stating in its Report that it declined to examine or rule on Mexico's
“objections” due to the untimely manner in which they were raised. We note, in this regard that Mexico was
aware of all the facts on which it now relies in arguing that the Panel had no authority to deal with and dispose
of the matter as soon as the United States submitted its communication seeking recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU on 12 October 2000. Yet Mexico mentioned these alleged deficiencies, for the first time, more than four
months later, at the meeting with the Panel on 20 February 2000. Mexico did not take advantage of the
opportunities it had to raise the issues at the DSB meeting of 23 October 2000, or in either of its written
submissions to the Panel.”
Para. 62. “In addition, as we discuss in more detail below, pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, one of the
requirements for requests for establishment of a panel is that such requests must “indicate whether
consultations were held”. The phrase “whether consultations were held” shows that this requirement in Article
6.2 may be satisfied by an express statement that no consultations were held. In other words, Article 6.2 also
envisages the possibility that a panel may be validly established without being preceded by consultations.”
71
Para. 63. “Thus, the DSU explicitly recognizes circumstances where the absence of consultations would not
deprive the panel of its authority to consider the matter referred to it by the DSB. In our view, it follows that
where the responding party does not object, explicitly and in a timely manner, to the failure of the complaining
party to request or engage in consultations, the responding party may be deemed to have consented to the lack
of consultations and, thereby, to have relinquished whatever right to consult it may have had.”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 7 dispõe sobre os ‘termos de referência’ dos painéis, os quais fornecem os limites da competência de
um painel, provendo a base para o exercício de sua jurisdição. Um painel que formule conclusões jurídicas ou
faça recomendações fora dos termos de referência age além de sua competência; nesses casos, o Órgão de
Apelação revogará as conclusões e recomendações desse órgão.
O artigo 7.1 prevê termos de referência padrão para os painéis, envolvendo um exame da ‘questão’ submetida
ao exame do DSB pelo membro demandante. A ‘questão’ constitui o objeto da controvérsia, isto é, a medida
cuja legalidade à luz das regras da OMC é contestada pelo demandante. Não se deve, entretanto, compreender
‘medida’ como uma única norma em direito interno. A ‘medida’ em questão pode ser constituída por um
conjunto de normas, uma norma que seja substituída por normas sucessivas ou mesmo uma prática, que do
ponto de vista do direito internacional constituem a conduta a ser examinada.
O artigo 7.2 determina que os painéis devem examinar todas as disposições dos acordos da OMC invocadas
pelas partes na controvérsia. Esse exame precisa ser explicitado no relatório do painel, e não pode deixar de
levar em consideração um argumento jurídico de uma das partes. Não é necessário, entretanto, que o painel
examine a substância de cada argumento. É permitida a ‘economia judicial’, regra que possibilita ao órgão
judicante deixar de examinar matéria invocada pela parte, caso considere-a desnecessária para a solução da
controvérsia. Contudo, essa economia deve ser realizada de maneira explícita, com a descrição dos argumentos
invocados pela parte, seguida da decisão explicitada e motivada do painel, de não examinar esses argumentos.
O artigo 7.3 permite ao DSB autorizar o Presidente do painel a elaborar termos de referência diferentes, em
conjunto com as partes da controvérsia. Dado que a decisão do DSB deve ser tomada por consenso positivo,
dificilmente isso ocorrerá em casos em que as partes não tenham já concordado, nos termos do artigo 7.1, com
a elaboração de termos de referência específicos. Isso ocorreu no caso Brazil -– Desiccated Coconut, em que
Filipinas e Brasil acordaram, após autorização do DSB, adotar termos de referência levando em conta não
apenas o pedido de painel, mas a posição sobre o caso expressa pelo Brasil e as discussões relevantes ocorridas
no DSB.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 43: See Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 73; Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para.
125; Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 160; Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan),
para. 107; and Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 416.
Footnote 44: See Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 73; Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para.
125; Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 160; Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan),
para. 107; and Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 416. See Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 126
(referring to Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, p. 22, DSR 1997:I, 167, at 186). See also Appellate Body Report,
EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 155; and Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para. 108.
Footnote 45: In this regard, we further note the Appellate Body's statement that, “as a matter of due process, and the proper exercise of
the judicial function, panels are required to address issues that are put before them by the parties to a dispute.” (Appellate Body Report,
Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), para. 36).
72

Artigo 8
IA.
Article 8
Composition of Panels
8.1
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals,
including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a
Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee
of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on
international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
8.2
Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a
sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience.
8.3
Citizens of Members whose governments (46) are parties to the dispute or third parties as defined in
paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to
the dispute agree otherwise.
8.4
To assist in the selection of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an indicative list of governmental
and non-governmental individuals possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph 1, from which
panelists may be drawn as appropriate. That list shall include the roster of non-governmental panelists
established on 30 November 1984 (BISD 31S/9), and other rosters and indicative lists established
under any of the covered agreements, and shall retain the names of persons on those rosters and
indicative lists at the time of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Members may periodically
suggest names of governmental and non-governmental individuals for inclusion on the indicative list,
providing relevant information on their knowledge of international trade and of the sectors or subject
matter of the covered agreements, and those names shall be added to the list upon approval by the
DSB. For each of the individuals on the list, the list shall indicate specific areas of experience or
expertise of the individuals in the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements.
8.5
Panels shall be composed of three panelists unless the parties to the dispute agree, within 10 days
from the establishment of the panel, to a panel composed of five panelists. Members shall be
informed promptly of the composition of the panel.
8.6
The Secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel to the parties to the dispute. The parties to the
dispute shall not oppose nominations except for compelling reasons.
8.7
If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the establishment of a panel,
at the request of either party, the Director-General, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and
the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, shall determine the composition of the panel by
appointing the panelists whom the Director-General considers most appropriate in accordance with
any relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or covered agreements
which are at issue in the dispute, after consulting with the parties to the dispute. The Chairman of the
DSB shall inform the Members of the composition of the panel thus formed no later than 10 days
after the date the Chairman receives such a request.
8.8
Members shall undertake, as a general rule, to permit their officials to serve as panelists.
73
8.9
Panelists shall serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as
representatives of any organization. Members shall therefore not give them instructions nor seek to
influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a panel.
8.10
When a dispute is between a developing country Member and a developed country Member the panel
shall, if the developing country Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a developing
country Member.
8.11
Panelists' expenses, including travel and subsistence allowance, shall be met from the WTO budget in
accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General Council, based on recommendations of the
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
Footnote 46: In the case where customs unions or common markets are parties to a dispute, this provision applies to citizens of all
member countries of the customs unions or common markets.
IB.
Artigo 8
Composição dos Grupos Especiais
8.1
Os grupos especiais serão compostos por pessoas qualificadas, funcionários governamentais ou não,
incluindo aquelas que tenham integrado um grupo especial ou a ele apresentado uma argumentação,
que tenham atuado como representantes de um Membro ou de uma parte contratante do GATT 1947
ou como representante no Conselho ou Comitê de qualquer acordo abrangido ou do respectivo acordo
precedente, ou que tenha atuado no Secretariado, exercido atividade docente ou publicado trabalhos
sobre direito ou política comercial internacional, ou que tenha sido alto funcionário na área de política
comercial de um dos Membros.
8.2
Os membros dos grupos especiais deverão ser escolhidos de modo a assegurar a independência dos
membros, suficiente diversidade de formações e largo espectro de experiências.
8.3
Os nacionais de Membros cujos governos5 sejam parte na controvérsia ou terceiras partes, conforme
definido no parágrafo 2 do Artigo 10, não atuarão no grupo especial que trate dessa controvérsia, a
menos que as partes acordem diferentemente.
8.4
Para auxiliar na escolha dos integrantes dos grupos especiais, o Secretariado manterá uma lista
indicativa de pessoas, funcionários governamentais ou não, que reúnem as condições indicadas no
parágrafo 1, da qual os integrantes dos grupos especiais poderão ser selecionados adequadamente.
Esta lista incluirá a relação de peritos não-governamentais elaborada em 30 de novembro de 1984
(BISD 31S/9), e outras relações ou listas indicativas elaboradas em virtude de qualquer acordo
abrangido, e manterá os nomes dos peritos que figurem naquelas relações e listas indicativas na data
de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC. Os Membros poderão periodicamente sugerir
nomes de pessoas, funcionários governamentais ou não, a serem incluídos na lista indicativa,
fornecendo informação substantiva sobre seu conhecimento de comércio internacional e dos setores
ou temas dos acordos abrangidos, e tais nomes serão acrescentados à lista após aprovação pelo OSC.
Para cada pessoa que figure na lista, serão indicadas suas áreas específicas de experiência ou
competência técnica nos setores ou temas dos acordos abrangidos.
5
Caso uma união aduaneira ou um Mercado comum seja parte emu ma controvérsia, esta disposição se aplicará aos nacionais de todos
os países membros da união aduaneira ou do Mercado comum.
74
8.5
Os grupos especiais serão compostos por três integrantes a menos que, dentro do prazo de 10 dias a
partir de seu estabelecimento, as partes em controvérsia concordem em compor um grupo especial
com cinco integrantes. Os Membros deverão ser prontamente informados da composição do grupo
especial.
8.6
O Secretariado proporá às partes em controvérsia candidatos a integrantes do grupo especial. As
partes não deverão se opor a tais candidaturas a não ser por motivos imperiosos.
8.7
Se não houver acordo quanto aos integrantes do grupo especial dentro de 20 dias após seu
estabelecimento, o Diretor-Geral, a pedido de qualquer das partes, em consulta com o Presidente do
OSC e o Presidente do Conselho ou Comitê pertinente, determinará a composição do grupo especial, e
nomeará os integrantes mais apropriados segundo as normas e procedimentos especiais ou adicionais
do acordo abrangido ou dos acordos abrangidos de que trate a controvérsia, após consulta com as
partes em controvérsia.
8.8
Os Membros deverão comprometer-se, como regra geral, a permitir que seus funcionários integrem os
grupos especiais.
8.9
Os integrantes dos grupos especiais deverão atuar a título pessoal e não como representantes de
governos ou de uma organização. Assim sendo, os Membros não lhes fornecerão instruções nem
procurarão influenciá-los com relação aos assuntos submetidos ao grupo especial.
8.10
Quando a controvérsia envolver um país em desenvolvimento Membro e um país desenvolvido
Membro, o grupo especial deverá, se o país em desenvolvimento Membro solicitar, incluir ao menos
um integrante de um país em desenvolvimento Membro.
8.11
As despesas dos integrantes dos grupos especiais, incluindo viagens e diárias, serão cobertas pelo
orçamento da OMC, de acordo com critérios a serem adotados pelo Conselho Geral, baseados nas
recomendações do Comitê de Orçamento, Finanças e Administração.
IC.
A tradução omitiu a parte final do artigo 8.7, que no original lê-se: “The Chairman of the DSB shall inform the
Members of the composition of the panel thus formed no later than 10 days after the date the Chairman
receives such a request.”
II.
1.
Artigo 8.1
a)
“restrições quanto à composição dos grupos especiais”
Relatório do painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain
Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Branding System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, nota de
rodapé 559
Nesta controvérsia, o painel autorizou a utilização de teleconferência em seus procedimentos, como
consequência de dificuldades práticas impostas pelas restrições contidas no artigo 8.1.
75
Nota de rodapé: “(…) Regarding the use of teleconference, this was not the first time this has been used in
panel proceedings and is related to the constraints imposed by Article 8.1 of the DSU as regards the
individuals eligible to serve as panelists, who, given their required seniority or expertise, may be expected to
face scheduling conflicts more than once.”
2.
Artigo 8.3
a) “nacionais de membros cujos governos sejam parte na controvérsia ou terceiras partes”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses
from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS33/R, para. 7.19
No caso US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, o painel traçou um paralelo entre o papel e as funções do Órgão de
Monitoramento de Têxteis, relativo ao Acordo sobre Têxteis e Vestuário, com o papel e as funções dos painéis
regulados pelo DSU.
Para. 7.19. “[A Textiles Monitoring Board (TMB)] member appointed by a WTO Member involved in a
dispute before the TMB, participates in the TMB’s deliberations, although such TMB member cannot block a
consensus (Article 8.2 of the ATC). On the contrary, panelists under the DSU are not selected on the basis of
constituencies and the citizens of any party to a dispute under the DSU cannot participate as panelists, absent
agreement of the parties (Article 8.3 of the DSU).”
3.
Artigo 8.7
a) “impugnação à composição realizada pelo Diretor-Geral”
Relatório do painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from
Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, para. 8.11
No caso Guatemala - Cement II, o Diretor-Geral determinou a composição do painel de acordo com o artigo
8.7 do DSU. A representação da Guatemala arguiu que a composição do Painel estaria em desacordo com os
princípios da OMC e do direito internacional e, portanto, o painel não teria competência para analisar a
questão em litígio. A alegação estava fundamentada no fato de que um dos membros do painel também fez
parte do painel que analisou o caso Guatemala - Cement I. O painel concluiu que nem o artigo 8, tampouco
qualquer outro dispositivo do DSU, autorizava-o a analisar o processo de sua composição. Desse modo, não
caberia a este órgão analisar o mérito da questão levantada pela Guatemala.
Para. 8.11. “(…) 1.4 In order to determine whether the substance of Guatemala’s preliminary objection is an
issue that is susceptible of a ruling by the Panel, we have carefully analysed the provisions of the DSU
governing panel composition. It is clear that Article 8.6 of the DSU imposes primary responsibility for panel
composition on the parties to the dispute. In cases where the parties are unable to agree on the composition of
a panel, such as this one, Article 8.7 of the DSU imposes responsibility for panel composition on the Director
General. According to Article 8 of the DSU, therefore, the composition of a panel is determined by the parties
to the dispute and, in certain circumstances, by the Director General. Neither Article 8 nor any other provision
of the DSU prescribes any role for the panel in the panel composition process. For this reason, we find that we
are unable to rule on the substance of the issue raised by Guatemala.
1.5 Should Guatemala persist with its substantive concerns regarding the composition of the Panel, Guatemala
may avail itself of the procedure provided for in the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.”
76
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland
Cement from Mexico (US - Zeroing) (EC) (Article 21.5, EC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS156/R, para. 172
Na disputa US - Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 - EC), o Órgão de Apelação confirmou o entendimento do painel
de que não cabia ao mesmo analisar questões envolvendo a sua composição.
Para. 172. “On the substance of the European Communities' appeal, we note that, on 28 November 2007, the
Director-General was requested to determine the composition of the compliance panel under Article 8.7 of the
DSU. In our view, Article 8.7 confers on the Director-General the discretion to compose panels, which was
properly exercised in this case. We therefore find that the Panel did not err in refraining, in paragraphs 8.17
and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report, from making a finding on whether it was improperly composed. In the light of
this conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to address the other arguments made by the parties on this
matter.”
Relatório do painel, sob o artigo 21.5, no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland
Cotton) (Article 21.5, Brazil), Demandante: Brasil, para. 8.28
Na controvérsia US - Upland Cotton (Article 21.5, Brazil), as CE, como terceira parte, apresentou objeções à
composição do painel, nos termos artigo 8.7 do DSU. O painel concluiu que não poderia analisar uma questão
levantada por uma terceira parte e que se relaciona com a aplicação dos dispositivos do DSU pelo DiretorGeral da OMC.
Para. 8.28. “The Panel considers it is not within its authority under the DSU to make a “finding or ruling” on
an issue that has not been raised by any of the parties to the dispute and which concerns the application by the
WTO Director-General of the DSU provisions regarding panel composition. (47) The Panel fails to see how
the “finding or ruling” requested by the European Communities would contribute to a positive solution to this
dispute within the meaning of Article 3.7 of the DSU.”
III.
Comentários
O DSB da OMC mantém uma lista de possíveis membros para os painéis, atualizada a cada dois anos,
contendo a indicação da área de expertise de cada um. Ao contrário do caso dos membros do Órgão de
Apelação, não há uma exigência específica quanto à necessidade de profundo e destacado conhecimento de
direito do comércio internacional e direito da OMC. Geralmente, os integrantes dos painéis são oficiais de
governos (muitos dos quais diplomatas) de membros da OMC, com algum treinamento jurídico.
A “suficiente diversidade de formações” (artigo 8.2 do DSU), principalmente envolvendo áreas técnicas da
controvérsia, costumam ser características priorizadas no momento da composição de um painel. No caso
Mexico - Telecoms, o painel ressaltou a importância da variedade do background de seus membros para a
análise da controvérsia marcada pela sua complexidade legal e técnica.
Em razão da restrição imposta pelo artigo 8.3 do DSU, nacionais de membros que não se encontram entre os
maiores litigantes dentro do sistema solução de controvérsias da OMC costumam ser, com maior frequência,
escolhidos para compor os painéis. Ainda que não seja comum, em alguns casos, as partes têm concordado em
apontar um ou mais membros que sejam nacionais de um dos litigantes.
O artigo 8.7 do DSU é omisso quanto aos casos de renúncia de um membro do painel já nomeado, e/ou de
impossibilidade do membro em conduzir as suas atividades. No caso US - Tuna II (Mexico), por exemplo, um
dos membros do painel faleceu no curso dos procedimentos. Na oportunidade, as partes acordaram indicar um
novo membro. Já na controvérsia EC - Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, um dos membros do painel
77
renunciou, e um novo membro foi apontado pelo Diretor-Geral, com base no artigo 8.7 do DSU. Da mesma
forma, o artigo 8.7 do DSU não dispõe sobre eventual impossibilidade de o Diretor-Geral da OMC determinar
a composição de painéis. Nesse sentido, painéis já foram integrados pelo Diretor-Geral Adjunto, atuando em
nome do Diretor-Geral, como ocorreu na controvérsia US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint).
Em que pese a previsão contida no artigo 8.5 do DSU, nenhum painel até hoje foi composto por cinco
membros, conforme informações disponibilizadas no site oficial da OMC até 17 de março de 2013. Ainda de
acordo com o site oficial, até 30 de setembro de 2011, o tempo médio entre a data de estabelecimento do
painel e a data de sua composição (artigo 8.7 do DSU) foi de 73 dias, sendo o período mais curto de 12 dias e
o mais longo de 234 dias. Este artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 47: While the European Communities asserts that there is precedent in WTO dispute settlement practice that supports its
position that the Panel has the authority to rule on the propriety of its own composition, and that the Panel is under a duty to address
this issue because “it is of fundamental importance for the correct interpretation of the DSU and for the smooth and equitable operation
of the WTO dispute settlement system” (EC Third Party Submission, paras. 28-29), the Panel finds the arguments of the European
Communities in this regard unpersuasive.
78

Artigo 9
IA.
Article 9
Procedures for Multiple Complainants
9.1
Where more than one Member requests the establishment of a panel related to the same matter, a
single panel may be established to examine these complaints taking into account the rights of all
Members concerned. A single panel should be established to examine such complaints whenever
feasible.
9.2
The single panel shall organize its examination and present its findings to the DSB in such a manner
that the rights which the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed had separate panels examined the
complaints are in no way impaired. If one of the parties to the dispute so requests, the panel shall
submit separate reports on the dispute concerned. The written submissions by each of the
complainants shall be made available to the other complainants, and each complainant shall have the
right to be present when any one of the other complainants presents its views to the panel.
9.3
If more than one panel is established to examine the complaints related to the same matter, to the
greatest extent possible the same persons shall serve as panelists on each of the separate panels and
the timetable for the panel process in such disputes shall be harmonized.
IB.
Artigo 9
Procedimento para Pluralidade de Partes Reclamantes
9.1
Quando mais de um Membro solicitar o estabelecimento de um grupo especial com relação a uma
mesma questão, um único grupo especial deverá ser estabelecido para examinar as reclamações,
levando em conta os direitos de todos os Membros interessados. Sempre que possível, um único
grupo especial deverá ser estabelecido para examinar tais reclamações.
9.2
O grupo especial único deverá proceder a seus exames da questão e apresentar suas conclusões ao
OSC de maneira a não prejudicar os direitos que caberiam às partes em controvérsias se as
reclamações tivessem sido examinadas por vários grupos especiais. Se houver solicitação de uma das
partes, o grupo especial deverá apresentar Relatórios separados sobre a controvérsia examinada. As
comunicações escritas de cada parte reclamante deverão estar à disposição das outras partes, e cada
parte reclamante deverá ter direito de estar preente quando qualquer outra parte apresentar sua
argumentação ao grupo especial.
9.3
No caso de ser estabelecido mais de um grupo especial para examinar reclamações relativas ao
mesmo tema, na medida do possível as mesmas pessoas integrarão cada um dos grupos especiais e os
calendários dos trabalhos dos grupos especiais que tratam dessas controvérsias deverão ser
harmonizados.
IC.
No artigo 9.1, a tradução mais aproximada para ‘may be established’ é ‘poderá ser estabelecido’. No artigo
9.3, a tradução correta para ‘matter’ é ‘questão’.
79
II.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo
1.
Artigo 9.1
a) “Sempre que possível, um único painel deverá ser estabelecido”
Relatório do painel no caso India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products (India - Patents) (EC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS79/R, paras. 7.14-7.15
Neste caso, a Índia solicitou que o painel descartasse a reclamação das CE, pois, sendo “possível” unir esta
reclamação àquela dos EUA, WT/DS50, as CE seriam obrigadas a fazê-lo. Contudo, o painel rechaçou a
alegação da Índia, concluindo que o artigo 9.1 não tem como objeto a limitação dos direitos dos membros da
OMC, não possuindo natureza de obrigação compulsória.
Para. 7.14. “Given their ordinary meaning, the terms of Article 9.1 are directory or recommendatory, not
mandatory. They direct that a single panel should (not “shall”) be established, and that direction is limited to
cases where it is feasible. We disagree with India that the addressee of Article 9.1 is not clear. Article 9.1 is
clearly a code of conduct for the DSB because its provisions pertain to the establishment of a panel, the
authority for which is exclusively reserved for the DSB. As such, Article 9.1 should not affect substantive and
procedural rights and obligations of individual Members under the DSU.”
Para. 7.15. “Indeed, the text of Article 9.1, as well as the text of Article 9.2, which is part of the context of
Article 9.1, make it clear that Article 9 is not intended to limit the rights of WTO Members. In our view, one
of those rights is the freedom to determine whether and when to pursue a complaint under the DSU. According
to Article 3.7 of the DSU, “[t]he aim of dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements
is clearly to be preferred”. It would be inconsistent with this aim of the dispute settlement mechanism to
attempt to force Members to take decisions earlier than they wish on whether to request a panel in a dispute, or
to continue consultations aimed at securing a mutually acceptable solution.”
2.
Artigo 9.2
a) “momento de solicitação de relatório separado”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia,
Japão, República da Coreia, República da Tailândia, WT/DS217/AB/R e WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 310311
Nesta controvérsia, os EUA requereram a emissão de um relatório separado para a disputa trazida pelo
México, a qual foi rejeitada pelo painel sob o argumento de que o pedido foi realizado em momento posterior
à fase inicial dos procedimentos (dois meses após a emissão da parte descritiva). Na ocasião, o painel ressaltou
a necessidade de a requisição ser feita em um momento oportuno, uma vez que tais pedidos afetam a maneira
pela qual este órgão organiza os procedimentos. Os EUA apelaram da decisão, contudo as conclusões do
painel foram ratificadas pelo Órgão de Apelação, e este considerou que, muito embora não haja uma limitação
temporal no artigo 9.2 do DSU, isso não quer dizer que a solicitação de relatório separado possa ser feita a
qualquer momento.
Para. 310. “By its terms, Article 9.2 accords to the requesting party a broad right to request a separate report.
The text of Article 9.2 does not make this right dependent on any conditions. Rather, Article 9.2 explicitly
80
provides that a panel “shall” submit separate reports “if one of the parties to the dispute so requests”. Thus the
text of Article 9.2 of the DSU contains no requirement for the request for a separate panel report to be made by
a certain time. We observe, however, that the text does not explicitly provide that such requests may be made
at any time.”
Para. 311. “Having made these observations, we note that Article 9.2 must not be read in isolation from other
provisions of the DSU, and without taking into account the overall object and purpose of that Agreement. The
overall object and purpose of the DSU is expressed in Article 3.3 of that Agreement which provides,
relevantly, that the “prompt settlement” of disputes is “essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.” If
the right to a separate panel report under Article 9.2 were “unqualified”, this would mean that a panel would
have the obligation to submit a separate panel report, pursuant to the request of a party to the dispute, at any
time during the panel proceedings. Moreover, a request for such a report could be made for whatever reason
— or indeed, without any reason — even on the day that immediately precedes the day the panel report is due
to be circulated to WTO Members at large. Such an interpretation would clearly undermine the overall object
and purpose of the DSU to ensure the “prompt settlement” of disputes.”
3.
Artigo 9.3
a) “na medida do possível (...) os calendários dos trabalhos dos painéis que tratam dessas
controvérsias deverão ser harmonizados”
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III) (Article 21.5, Ecuador II)(Article 21.5, US), Demandantes:
Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA,
paras. 192-194
No caso EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, Ecuador II) (Article 21.5, US), as CE defenderam que o painel, ao
utilizar calendários dos trabalhos distintos para os procedimentos do artigo 21.5 do DSU entre as CE e o
Equador e entre as CE e os EUA, agiu de forma inconsistente com o texto do artigo 9.3 do DSU. O Órgão de
Apelação, porém, considerou que a expressão “harmonizados” não implica que os calendários dos trabalhos
devam ser idênticos, como sugeriram as CE.
Para. 192. “Article 9.3 may appear to be cast in the way of an obligation, but the word “harmony” is defined
as the combination or adaptation of parts, so as to form a “consistent and orderly whole”. (48) Quite distinct
from “synchrony”, “harmony” does not require that elements coincide exactly in time. Therefore, we consider
that the use of the word “harmonized” rather than “synchronized” in Article 9.3 confers to panels a judgement
of degree and practicality. It rests with panels to organize the steps of the proceedings in a way that will ensure
that they form a consistent and orderly whole. Whereas the use of the word “shall” ordinarily connotes an
obligation, here, while the panel must seek to harmonize, the extent to which that is possible lies within its
power. We do not consider that “harmonization” requires adoption of identical timetables in multiple
proceedings. As we see it, this provision addresses a practical concern that each timetable must be framed in
the light of the other.”
Para. 193. “The phrase “to the greatest extent possible” in Article 9.3 lends further support to our
interpretation. This phrase introduces the main clause of the sentence. The phrase “to the greatest extent
possible” qualifies both elements of the main clause — the selection of the same persons as panelists and the
harmonization of the panel processes — and thus qualifies what the panel must do to harmonize the
timetables. We therefore disagree with the European Communities' reading that Article 9.3 “does not allow
panels any discretion in deciding whether the timetables should be harmonized”.” (49)
81
O Órgão de Apelação salientou que os artigos 12.1 e 12.2 do DSU conferem uma margem de
discriocionariedade e flexibilidade aos painéis para delimitar os seus procedimentos de trabalho. Desse modo,
o artigo 9.3 do DSU a ser analisado à luz dos artigos citados.
Para. 194. “Furthermore, we note that Articles 12.1 and 12.2 of the DSU confer a margin of discretion on
panels to draw up their working procedures. Article 12.1 authorizes panels to establish their own working
procedures in the event that the panel decides, after consulting the parties, not to follow the Working
Procedures for panels set out in Appendix 3 to the DSU. Pursuant to Article 12.2, panel procedures should
provide “sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel
process”. By virtue of this provision, panels are vested with a degree of discretion and flexibility to take the
necessary procedural decisions to strike a balance between providing “high-quality panel reports” and
avoiding delays in the panel process. The panel’s margin of discretion, in turn, informs our standard of review
of the panels’ application of its obligations under Article 9.3.”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 9 dispõe sobre os procedimentos especiais envolvendo uma pluralidade de partes. Tais procedimentos
têm por objetivo maior preservar a celeridade no processo de solução de controvérsias da OMC.
Essencialmente, o artigo 9.1 dispõe que, sempre que possível, reclamações envolvendo uma mesma questão
devem ser analisadas de forma conjunta, por meio de um único painel, ressalvado, contudo, a necessidade das
diferentes controvérsias serem apreciadas como se as reclamações tivessem sido examinadas por vários
painéis.
O artigo 9.2, por sua vez, faculta às partes requerer que o relatório do painel seja apresentado individualmente,
visando principalmente à garantia do direito de defesa e ao devido processo legal. Muitas vezes, tal
requerimento pode implicar em um resultado pouco prático. O artigo 9 não dispõe a respeito de qualquer
critério prático sobre como os relatórios envolvendo uma mesma questão devem ser individualizados,
estruturados ou apresentados. No caso US - Steel Safeguards, o painel apresentou seus relatórios na forma de
um documento constituído por oito relatórios, substancialmente idênticos à exceção das conclusões que foram
individualizadas.
O Órgão de Apelação agiu de modo semelhante, ao apresentar relatórios idênticos para cada uma das
reclamações envolvendo uma mesma questão, alterando somente as conclusões de cada disputa, nos casos US
- Shrimp (Thailand), US - Customs Bond Directive, US/Canada - Continued Suspension e China - Auto Parts.
O artigo 9.2 tampouco prevê qualquer limitação temporal sobre o momento em que a solicitação deve ser feita.
Porém, tal omissão não significa que as partes detém o direito de proceder com o pleito a qualquer momento
dos procedimentos. A solicitação, à qual o artigo 9.2 refere-se, deve ser encaminhada ainda nas fases iniciais
dos procedimentos, com o fim de evitar eventuais abusos que possam impor um retardamento desnecessário
aos procedimentos conduzidos pelo painel.
O artigo 9.3 reforça a ideia de preservar a celeridade dos procedimentos envolvendo uma pluralidade de partes
reclamantes, prevendo que, no caso de estabelecimento de mais de um painel visando a análise da mesma
questão, cada um dos painéis deve preferencialmente ser compostos pelos mesmos integrantes, e os
calendários dos trabalhos devem ser harmonizados. Entretanto, tal disposição deve ser analisada de acordo
com os artigos 12.1 e 12.2 do DSU, os quais conferem discricionariedade e flexibilidade aos painéis na
condução dos procedimentos.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 48: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson. oxford University Press, 2002, Vol. 1, p.1200.
Footnote 49: European Communities' appellant's submissions, para. 21 (Ecuador), para. 20 (US).
82

Artigo 10
IA.
Article 10
Third Parties
10.1
The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members under a covered agreement at
issue in the dispute shall be fully taken into account during the panel process.
10.2
Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to
the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as a “third party”) shall have an opportunity to be heard by
the panel and to make written submissions to the panel. These submissions shall also be given to the
parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the panel report.
10.3
Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the
panel.
10.4
If a third party considers that a measure already the subject of a panel proceeding nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing to it under any covered agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal
dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding. Such a dispute shall be referred to the
original panel wherever possible.
IB.
Artigo 10
Terceiros
10.1
Os interesses das partes em controvérsia e os dos demais Membros decorrentes do acordo abrangido
ao qual se refira a controvérsia deverão ser integralmente levados em consideração no correr dos
trabalhos dos grupos especiais.
10.2
Todo Membro que tenha interesse concreto em um assunto submetido a um grupo especial e que
tenha notificado esse interesse ao OSC (denominado no persente Entendimento “terceiro”) terá
oportunidade de ser ouvido pelo grupo especial e de apresentar-lhe comunicações escritas. Estas
comunicações serão também fornecidas às partes em controvérsia e constarão do Relatório do grupo
especial.
10.3
Os terceiros receberão as comunicações das partes em controvérsia apresentadas ao grupo especial em
sua primeira reunião.
10.4
Se um terceiro considerar que uma medida já tratada por um grupo especial anula ou prejudica
benefícios a ele advindos de qualquer acordo abrangido, o referido Membro poderá recorrer aos
procedimentos normais de solução de controvérsias definidos no presente Entendimento. Tal
controvérsia deverá, onde possível, ser submetida ao grupo especial que tenha inicialmente tratado do
assunto.
83
IC.
A expressão “denominado no presente Entendimento terceiro”, constante do parágrafo 2, ficaria melhor como
“denominado no presente Entendimento um terceiro”, pois, em inglês, foi adicionado o artigo indefinido “a”.
Além disso, “um terceiro” realça mais a possibilidade de haver mais de um terceiro.
No parágrafo 4, a expressão “prejudica benefícios a ele advindos” poderia ser modificada para “prejudica-lhe
benefícios”. Por uma questão de estilo, é melhor não se separar o adjunto adnominal “advindos” do
substantivo “benefícios”.
II.
1.
Artigo 10.1
a) “Consideração dos interesses dos demais membros da OMC”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”
(US - FSC) (Article 21.5, CE), Demandante: CE, WT/DS108/AB/RW, para. 249
Em US - FSC, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que não somente os interesses das partes no litígio devem ser
levados em consideração, mas também os dos demais membros da OMC.
Para. 249. “Our interpretation of Article 10.3 is also consistent with the context of that provision. Article 10.1
directs panels “fully” to take into account the interests of Members other than the parties to the dispute, and
Article 10.2 requires panels to grant to third parties “an opportunity to be heard”. Article 10.3 ensures that, up
to a defined stage in the panel proceedings, third parties can participate fully in the proceedings, on the basis of
the same written submissions as the parties themselves. Article 10.3 thereby seeks to guarantee that the third
parties can participate at a session of the first meeting with the panel in a full and meaningful fashion that
would not be possible if the third parties were denied written submissions made to the panel before that
meeting. Moreover, panels themselves will thereby benefit more from the contributions made by third parties
and will, therefore, be better able “fully” to take into account the interests of Members, as directed by Article
10.1 of the DSU.”
b) “Mais consideração dos interesses de certos membros do que os dos demais membros –
inviabilidade”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brazil, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.1411
Em US - Upland Cotton, o painel consignou que os interesses de certos membros não podem ser mais tidos em
consideração do que os dos outros membros.
Para. 7.1411. “As we have already observed, by the terms of Article 10.1 of the DSU, we are already bound to
take the interest of all WTO Members - naturally including least-developed country Members - fully into
account in our substantive examination under Part III of the SCM Agreement. In taking such full account of all
Members’ interests, we do not view it as conceptually or practically possible to take certain Members’
interests more fully into account than those of other Members.”
2.
Artigo 10.2
a) “Interesse concreto” (“ substantial interest”)
84
(i) A dicção do artigo 10.2 não impõe a condição de “interesse jurídico” (“legal interest”) para o
pedido de um painel
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and
EUA, DS27/AB/R, para. 132
Em EC - Bananas III, o Órgão de Apelação expressou que a redação do artigo 10.2 não significa que um
membro, para efetuar o pedido de estabelecimento de um painel tenha que ter interesse jurídico no processo
que está propondo.
Para. 132. “We agree with the Panel that ‘neither Article 3.3 nor 3.7 of the DSU nor any other provision of
the DSU contain any explicit requirement that a Member must have a ‘legal interest’ as a prerequisite for
requesting a panel’. We do not accept that the need for a ‘legal interest’ is implied in the DSU or in any other
provision of the WTO Agreement. It is true that under Article 4.11 of the DSU, a Member wishing to join in
multiple consultations must have ‘a substantial trade interest’, and that under Article 10.2 of the DSU, a third
party must have ‘a substantial interest’ in the matter before a panel. But neither of these provisions in the
DSU, nor anything else in the WTO Agreement, provides a basis for asserting that parties to the dispute have to
meet any similar standard.”
(ii) Interesse concreto (“substantial interest”) no assunto submetido ao painel
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R, para.
101
Em US - Shrimp, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou que somente membros que tenham um interesse concreto
(“substantial interest”) na questão submetida ao painel podem se tornar terceiros no processo conduzido por
este.
Para. 101. “Only Members may become parties to a dispute of which a panel may be seized, and only
Members “having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel” may become third parties in the proceedings
before that panel.”
b) “Se o membro notificou o DSB acerca do seu interesse em participar do processo como terceiro: o
momento da notificação”
(i) Pedidos de participação como terceiro - 28 e 68 dias após o estabelecimento do painel aceitação
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Export Subsidies
on Sugar), Demandante: Austrália, WT/DS265/R, paras. 2.2-2.4
Em EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, o painel acabou aceitando os pleitos de Quênia e Costa do Marfim, feitos
28 e 68 dias após o estabelecimento do painel, para atuarem como terceiras partes. O painel entendeu que tinha
discricionariedade para resolver questões que não foram especificamente reguladas. Levou em consideração,
que a sua seleção e composição não haviam sido afetadas e que o processo não havia sido prejudicado.
Para. 2.2. “Article 10 of the DSU is silent on when Members need to notify to the DSB their interest in
participating in any specific dispute as third parties. All parties referred to the GATT Council Chairman's
85
Statement of June 1994, providing for a ten-day notification period. The status of that Chairman's Statement
had been discussed on several occasions at the DSB and the timing of third-party notifications was the subject
of proposals in the context of the DSU negotiations.”
Para. 2.3. The Panel recalled, inter alia, the Appellate Body's decision in EC – Hormones, which stated that
“the DSU leaves panels a margin of discretion to deal, always in accordance with due process, with specific
situations that may arise in a particular case and that are not explicitly regulated.” (50) In addition, with regard
to the two requests at issue, the Panel noted that in this particular dispute:
(a) the selection and composition of the Panel did not appear to have been adversely
affected; and
(b) the Panel process had not been hampered.
Para. 2.4. “On the basis of these considerations, the Panel therefore decided, in its ruling dated 16 January
2004, to accept as third parties all Members that had expressed a third-party interest and saw no reason to treat
them differently. In doing so, the Panel emphasized that its decision was specific to this dispute and was not
intended to offer a legal interpretation of the ten-day notification period referred to in the GATT Council
Chairman's Statement.”
c) “Prazo de dez dias para a notificação”
(i) Discurso do Diretor do Conselho Geral do GATT: Third Party Participation in Panels,
Statement by the Chairman of the Council, C/COM/3 of 27 June 1994, page 1
No encontro do Conselho Geral do GATT, ocorrido em junho de 1994, o então Diretor do aludido Conselho
propôs que a notificação para manifestar interesse em ser terceiro na disputa deveria ser feita em dez dias.
“At the February 1994 Council meeting, the United States raised the question of third-party participation in
panels. The late notification by a contracting party of its intention to participate in a panel may create
difficulties, for example in relation to the determination of the panel’s composition. Another problem that has
occurred relates to the reception by third parties, in good time, of the submissions of the parties to the dispute
to the first meeting of a panel.
After consultations, and in order to avoid such difficulties, I propose that the Council agree to the following
practices in future, without prejudice to the rights of contracting parties under established dispute settlement
procedures:
1. Delegations in a position to do so, should indicate their intention to participate as a third party in a panel
proceeding at the Council session which establishes the panel. Others who wish to indicate a third party
interest should do so within the next ten days.
2. Further to paragraph F(e) (3) of the Decision of 12 April 1989 (BISD 36S/61) and to the Decision of 22
February 1994 (L/7416), it is the understanding of the Council that third parties shall receive the submissions
of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of a panel established by the Council.”
d) “Parte principal atuando como terceiro em outra demanda – possibilidade”
Relatório do painel em European Communities and its Member States - Tariff Treatment of Certain
Information Technology Products (EC - IT Products), Demandante: Taipei Chinesa, WT/DS377/R, para.
7.75
86
Em EC - IT Products, EUA, Japão e Taipei Chinesa manifestaram interesse em ser terceiros nas reclamações
de cada um. O painel acatou os pedidos nos seguintes termos:
Para. 7.75. “Despite the length of delay and the fact that this Panel had already been composed, we see no
reason why accepting the complainants’ requests would affect the “independence of the members” of this
Panel or otherwise hamper the Panel process. The members of this Panel had been selected taking into
consideration the participation of the complainants as main parties. We do not see how the additional
participation of the complainants as third parties would have compromised the initial selection of these
panellists; nor has the European Communities made any such allegation. Given the foregoing, we confirm our
acceptance of the complainants’ request to participate as third parties to this dispute.”
e) “Apesar de não ter notificado o DSB, nos termos do artigo 10.2, ainda assim um membro pode
apresentar um arrazoado”
Relatório do painel na controvérsia European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines (EC Sardines), Demandante: Peru, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 165
Em EC - Sardines, Marrocos, embora não tendo notificado o seu interesse em atuar como terceiro, apresentou
um arrazoado como amicus curiae na fase de apelação. O demandante não aceitou tal procedimento, alegando
que isto implicaria burlar a sistemática do DSU. Entretanto, o Órgão de Apelação discordou do Peru
(demandante).
Para. 165. “None of the participants in this appeal has pointed to any provision of the DSU that can be
understood as prohibiting WTO Members from participating in panel or appellate proceedings as an amicus
curiae. Nor has any participant in this appeal demonstrated how such participation would contravene the DSU.
Peru states only that the DSU provides that participation as a third party is governed by Articles 10.2 and 17.4,
and appears to draw from this a negative inference such that Members may participate pursuant to those rules,
or not at all. We have examined Articles 10.2 and 17.4, and we do not share Peru’s view. Just because those
provisions stipulate when a Member may participate in a dispute settlement proceeding as a third party or third
participant, does not, in our view, lead inevitably to the conclusion that participation by a Member as an
amicus curiae is prohibited.”
3.
Artigo 10.4
a) “A expressão “grupo especial que tenha inicialmente tratado do assunto” não se limita a um painel
que ainda não tenha emitido seu relatório final”
Relatório do painel na demanda India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products (India - Patents) (EC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS79/R, paras. 7.20-7.21
Em India - Patents (EC), o painel rejeitou o argumento da delegação indiana de que o painel original, ao qual
se refere o artigo 10.4, limitar-se-ia a um painel que ainda não tenha emitido seu relatório final.
Paras. 7.20. “We do not see that this limitation flows from the ordinary meaning of the text. We also note that,
the phrase “original panel” is used elsewhere in the DSU (Article 21.5 and Article 22.6), where it is clear that
the reference is to a panel the final report of which has already been issued and adopted. The text of Article
10.4, read in this context, does not support the Indian view.”
Para. 7.21. “Thus, in our view, the terms of Article 10.4 have been complied with in the present case. The EC,
which was a third party in the proceeding initiated by the United States in respect of the same Indian measures,
87
decided to have recourse to a panel under the DSU. This is precisely what Article 10.4 permits. The two
members of the Panel in WT/DS50 were reappointed, while the Panel chairman, who was no longer available,
was replaced. We therefore find that India’s claim regarding a violation of Article 10.4 lacks both factual and
legal basis.”
4.
Direitos adicionais de terceiros
a) “Geral”
(i) Dispositivos do DSU que enunciam os direitos de terceiros
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),
Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 145
Em US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou quais os dispositivos do DSU enunciam os direitos de
terceiros: artigos 10.2, 10.3 e parágrafo 6 do apêndice 3. Isto acabou sendo confirmado no litígio US - FSC
(Article 21.5, EC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, para. 243.
Para. 145. “[u]nder the DSU, as it currently stands, third parties are only entitled to the participatory rights
provided for in Articles 10.2 and 10.3 and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3.”
b) “Para membros que não são demandantes em processos paralelos”
(i) Ampliação dos direitos de terceiros
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA,
WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.8
Em EC - Bananas III, o painel concordou em outorgar aos terceiros mais direitos do que aqueles previstos no
DSU. Nesta mesma linha, os painéis em EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, US), para. 1.5, e EC - Bananas III
(Article 21.5, Ecuador II), para. 7.722, concederam aos terceiros os seguintes direitos: a) direito de estar
presente durante a audiência com as partes e de formular questões na audiência; e b) direito de receber todas as
manifestações, incluindo respostas às questões.
Para. 7.8. “We thereafter ruled as follows:
(a) The Panel has decided, after consultations with the parties in conformity with DSU
Article 12.1, that members of governments of third parties will be permitted to observe
the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties. The Panel envisages that
the observers will have the opportunity also to make a brief statement at a suitable
moment during the second meeting. The Panel does not expect them to submit
additional written material beyond responses to the questions already posed during the
first meeting.
(b) the Panel based its decision, inter alia, on the following considerations:
(i) the economic effect of the disputed EC banana regime on certain third parties
appeared to be very large;
(ii) the economic benefits to certain third parties from the EC banana regime were
claimed to derive from an international treaty between them and the EC;
(iii) past practice in panel proceedings involving the banana regimes of the EC and
its member States; and
(iv) the parties to the dispute could not agree on the issue.
88
As a consequence of our ruling, the third parties in these proceedings enjoyed broader
participatory rights than are granted to third parties under the DSU”.
c) “Acesso às afirmações orais das partes na audiência e direito de tecer comentários às respostas das
partes – impossibilidade”
Relatório do painel em United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton), Demandante:
Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, Annex L – 1.7, paras. 6 e 12
Em US - Upland Cotton, o painel denegou os seguintes direitos adicionais de terceiros pedidos pelas CE: a)
acesso às afirmações orais das partes na primeira sessão da primeira audiência substantiva; e b) oportunidade
de comentar as respostas das partes às questões do painel ou àquelas feitas pelas partes umas às outras.
Annex L – 1.7, paras. 6 e 12. “In our view, written versions of the parties’ oral statements and the parties’
responses to the Panel’s questions do not form part of “the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first
meeting of the Panel”, as provided for in Article 10.3 of the DSU. Articles 10.2 and 12.6 and the working
procedure in paragraph 3 of Appendix 3 use the terms “written submissions” and “submissions”
interchangeably. Appendix 3 distinguishes between “written submissions” in paragraphs 3, 4 and 10 and “a
written version of… oral statements” in paragraph 9. Under the standard panel working procedures set out in
Appendix 3 of the DSU, third parties may only attend the third party session and are not present during the rest
of the panel’s meetings. The granting of access by the Panel to written versions of the parties’ oral statements
would run counter to the standard practice under the DSU of holding the sessions at which those statements
are made in the absence of the third parties.
[T] the Panel has already taken into account, to a certain extent, the systemic implications of this dispute and
the issues now raised by the EC. The Panel has posed a large number of questions to third parties, including 39
questions addressed specifically to the EC. Through the third parties’ responses to these questions, the Panel
hopes to receive their views on the merits and systemic considerations presently at issue in this dispute, which
it will take into account in its assessment of the matter before it. The questions are detailed precisely to ensure
that third parties’ views are fully taken into account in what is a complex case. The Panel believes that,
through the questions that it has posed to the parties to the dispute and to third parties, it has ensured that it
will benefit from third parties’ input and that nothing prevents them from participating in a full and
meaningful fashion.”
d) “Direitos adicionais a países ACP”
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Export Subsidies on
Sugar), Demandante: Austrália, WT/DS265/R, para. 2.6
Em EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, as Ilhas Maurício, em nome de quatorze países ACP (África, Caribe e
Pacífico), requereram direitos adicionais na qualidade de terceiros. O painel concedeu estes direitos nos
seguintes termos:
Para. 2.6. “(a) ‘the third parties will receive a copy of the written questions to the parties posed in the context
of the first substantive meeting of the Panel; (b) the third parties will receive the written rebuttals of the parties
to the second meeting of the Panel and the parties’ replies to the questions mentioned in (i) above; (c) the third
parties may attend the second substantive meeting of the Panel to take place on 11 and 12 May 2004, as
observers (but it is not envisaged that the third parties will provide any further written submissions or make an
oral statement to the Panel during that second meeting); and (d) the third parties will review the summary of
their respective arguments in the draft descriptive part of the Panel report.’”
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e) “Negativa de concessão de direitos adicionais de terceiro ao Brasil”
Relatório do painel em United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft - Second
Complaint (US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)), Demandante: CE, WT/DS353/R, paras. 7.14-7.17
Em US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), o painel denegou o pedido da delegação brasileira de outorgar
direitos adicionais na qualidade de terceiro. Vale frisar, ainda, que o painel enunciou as razões pelas quais os
painéis em geral concedem direitos adicionais de terceiro. Entretanto, o painel da disputa em apreço
considerou que os motivos, os quais normalmente justificam a extensão dos direitos de terceiros, não foram
demonstrados pelo Brasil.
Paras. 7.14. “On 21 December 2006, Brazil requested the Panel to grant it certain “enhanced” third party
rights in this proceeding, including the right: (1) “to attend the entirety of all substantive meetings of the Panel
with the parties”; (2) “to present oral statements and oral observations at the substantive meetings of the Panel
with the parties”; (3) “to receive copies of all submissions to the Panel, including answers to the questions
posed by the Panel or the parties”; and (4) “to review and comment on the interim Panel Report, in particular
the summary of Brazil’s arguments in the draft descriptive part of the Panel report”. Brazil submits that it has a
significant economic interest in the aircraft sector, and that any findings concerning the relevant provisions of
the SCM Agreement in relation to the aircraft sector are necessarily of direct and substantial economic interest
to Brazil. According to Brazil, granting its request would not lead to any blurring of the distinction between
the rights of parties and those of third parties. On 22 December 2006, Canada requested the Panel to grant it
any enhanced third party rights granted to Brazil. On 9 February 2007, the Panel received comments from both
parties, opposing the requests for enhanced third party rights.”
Para. 7.15. “On 23 February 2007, the Panel informed the parties and third parties that it had decided not to
grant enhanced third party rights to any third party in this proceeding. The Panel indicated that it would issue
its reasons in due course. The Panel’s reasons for declining Brazil’s request, and the conditional request of
Canada, are as follows.”
Para. 7.16. “The DSU establishes the rights of third parties in panel proceedings in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Article 10 of the DSU and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 to the DSU. Under these provisions, third parties have
the right to receive the submissions made by the parties up to the first meeting of the panel, to make
submissions to the panel, to present their views during a session of the first substantive meeting of the panel
set aside for that purpose, and to be present during the entirety of such a session. It is well-established that
panels have the discretion to grant additional rights to third parties, subject to the requirements of due process
and the need to guard against an inappropriate blurring of the distinction drawn in the DSU between the rights
of parties and those of third parties. However, all third parties in a panel proceeding may be presumed to have
a “substantial interest” in the matter before the panel, and additional third party rights have so far been granted
in panel proceedings for specific reasons only. Previous panels have granted enhanced third party rights on the
basis of, inter alia, the significant economic effect of the measures at issue on certain third parties, the
importance of trade in the product at issue to certain third parties, the significant trade policy impact that the
outcome of the case could have on third parties maintaining measures similar to the measures at issue, at least
one of the parties agreeing that enhanced third party rights should be granted, claims that the measures at issue
derived from an international treaty to which certain third parties were parties, third parties having previously
been granted enhanced rights in related panel proceedings, and certain practical considerations arising from a
third party’s involvement as a party in a parallel panel proceeding.”
Para. 7.17. “In this case, Brazil has not presented the Panel with any similar reasons in support of its request
for enhanced third party rights. While the Panel accepts that Brazil has a substantial interest in the aircraft
sector, the Panel considers that Brazil’s interest in “the aircraft sector” as a whole constitutes an insufficient
basis for granting Brazil enhanced third party rights. Brazil has not claimed that it produces large civil aircraft,
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or that it has any trade interests in large civil aircraft, for instance as a supplier to producers of large civil
aircraft. Brazil has not claimed that regional aircraft produced in Brazil compete with large civil aircraft.
Brazil has not claimed that it maintains any measures similar to those at issue in this dispute; to the contrary,
Brazil claims that it does not confer subsidies for the development and production of new aircraft products.
While Brazil has been involved as a party in a number of WTO disputes involving the aircraft sector, these
disputes involved products (i.e. regional aircraft) and measures (e.g. export credits on the sale of such aircraft)
that are not at issue in this dispute. Brazil has not explained how, in the light of the foregoing, the measures at
issue have a significant economic or trade policy effect on Brazil. While we accept that Brazil has a general
systemic interest in the interpretation of the SCM Agreement, this does not differentiate Brazil from any other
WTO Member. Finally, both parties agree that enhanced third party rights are not warranted in this case.
We therefore decline Brazil’s request for “enhanced” third party rights in these proceedings” (notas de rodapé
omitidas).
f) “Atraso no cronograma do painel”
Relatório do painel no caso China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China
- Raw Materials), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS394/R, para. 1.7
Em China - Raw Materials, o painel não acolheu o pleito de extensão de direitos de terceiro sob o argumento
de que poderia haver atraso no calendário do painel.
Para. 1.7. “In a letter dated 24 September 2010, the Panel informed Japan and Canada that it had declined to
accept their requests. The Panel informed these third parties that, inter alia, granting enhanced third-party
rights at this stage of the proceedings would lead to delays and would have an important impact on the Panel's
timetable.”
g) “Demandantes em processos paralelos”
(i) Possibilidade de participar de encontro com peritos
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R, paras. 152-153
Em EC - Hormones, as CE apelaram da decisão do painel que outorgou alguns direitos adicionais de terceiro
tanto ao Canadá como aos EUA, em especial a possibilidade de participar de uma reunião com peritos. O
Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a pretensão de Bruxelas.
Paras. 152. “We consider the explanation of the Panel quite reasonable, and its decision to hold a joint
meeting with the scientific experts consistent with the letter and spirit of Article 9.3 of the DSU. Clearly, it
would bean uneconomical use of time and resources to force the Panel to hold two successive but separate
meetings gathering the same group of experts twice, expressing their views twice regarding the same scientific
and technical matters related to the same contested European Communities measures. We do not believe that
the Panel has erred by addressing the European Communities procedural objections only where the European
Communities could make a precise claim of prejudice. It is evident to us that a procedural objection raised by
a party to a dispute should be sufficiently specific to enable the panel to address it.”
Para. 153. “Having access to a common pool of information enables the panel and the parties to save time by
avoiding duplication of the compilation and analysis of information already presented in the other proceeding.
Article 3.3 of the DSU recognizes the importance of avoiding unnecessary delays in the dispute settlement
process and states that the prompt settlement of a dispute is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.
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In this particular case, the Panel tried to avoid unnecessary delays, making an effort to comply with the letter
and spirit of Article 9.3 of the DSU.”
(ii) Acesso a todas as informações
Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 153
Em EC - Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação aceitou a decisão do painel de conferir aos EUA acesso a todas as
informações no processo iniciado pelo Canadá e, no outro caso em que os EUA foram demandantes, o mesmo
em relação ao Canadá.
Para. 153. “The decision of the Panel to use and provide all information to the parties in both disputes was
taken in view of its previous decision to hold a joint meeting with the experts. The European Communities
asserts that it cannot see how providing information in one of the proceedings to a party in the other helps to
harmonize timetables. We can see a relation between timetable harmonization within the meaning of Article
9.3 of the DSU and economy of effort. In disputes where the evaluation of scientific data and opinions plays a
significant role, the panel that is established later can benefit from the information gathered in the context of
the proceedings of the panel established earlier. Having access to a common pool of information enables the
panel and the parties to save time by avoiding duplication of the compilation and analysis of information
already presented in the other proceeding. Article 3.3 of the DSU recognizes the importance of avoiding
unnecessary delays in the dispute settlement process and states that the prompt settlement of a dispute is
essential to the effective functioning of the WTO. In this particular case, the Panel tried to avoid unnecessary
delays, making an effort to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 9.3 of the DSU. Indeed, as noted earlier,
despite the fact that the Canadian proceeding was initiated several months later than that of the United States,
the Panel managed to finish both Panel Reports at the same time.”
h) “Discricionariedade do painel para conceder direitos adicionais de terceiros”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act),
Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 140, 144-147 e 149-150
Em US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que o painel possui discricionariedade para outorgar
direitos adicionais a terceiros.
Paras. 140. “The rules relating to the participation of third parties in panel proceedings are set out in Article
10 of the DSU, and, in particular, paragraphs 2 and 3 there of, and in paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 to the DSU.”
Para. 144. “Although the European Communities and Japan invoke Article 9 of the DSU, and, in particular,
Article 9.3, in support of their position, we note that Article 9 of the DSU, which concerns procedures for
multiple complaints related to the same matter, does not address the issue of the rights of third parties in such
procedures.”
Para. 145. “Under the DSU, as it currently stands, third parties are only entitled to the participatory rights
provided for in Articles 10.2 and 10.3 and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3.”
Para. 146. “(…) Pursuant to Article 12.1, a panel is required to follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3,
unless it decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute.”
Para. 147. “In support of their argument that the Panel should have granted them “enhanced” third party
rights, the European Communities and Japan refer to the considerations that led the panel in European
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Communities - Hormones to grant third parties “enhanced” participatory rights, and stress the similarity
between European Communities - Hormones and the present cases.”
Para. 149. “In our Report in European Communities - Hormones, we stated:
Although Article 12.1 and Appendix 3 of the DSU do not specifically require the Panel
to grant … [“enhanced” third party rights] to the United States, we believe that this
decision falls within the sound discretion and authority of the Panel, particularly if the
Panel considers it necessary for ensuring to all parties due process of law.”
Para. 150. “A panel’s decision whether to grant “enhanced” participatory rights to third parties is thus a matter
that falls within the discretionary authority of that panel. Such discretionary authority is, of course, not
unlimited and is circumscribed, for example, by the requirements of due process. In the present cases,
however, the European Communities and Japan have not shown that the Panel exceeded the limits of its
discretionary authority. We, therefore, consider that there is no legal basis for concluding that the Panel erred
in refusing to grant “enhanced” third party rights to Japan or the European Communities” (nota de rodapé
omitida).
i) “Rejeição da ampliação de direitos de terceiros, mas garantia da participação nos processos quando
apropriado”
Relatório do painel em United States - Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to AntiDumping/Countervailing Duties (US - Customs Bond Directive), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS345/R,
paras. 7.3-7.4
Em US - Shrimp (Thailand) e US - Customs Bond Directive, o DSB estabeleceu dois painéis, compostos por
painelistas idênticos. Um dos painéis, então, não acolheu o pedido de ampliar os direitos de terceiros, mas
permitiu que estes terceiros, igualmente partes, tivessem participação efetiva nos processos.
Paras. 7.3-7.4. “[The Panel] intends to conduct both proceedings so as to ensure that the parties who are also
third parties in each other’s proceedings, have adequate opportunity and ability to participate to the fullest
extent in a manner which is compatible with the provisions of the DSU. To this end, after having heard the
parties’ views, the Panel intends to take the following steps:
(i) holding consolidated substantive meetings with the parties (Thailand, India and US);
(ii) allowing the complainants during the joint meetings to comment on each others’
argumentation, provided they limit themselves to those claims they have in common;
(iii) holding separate Third-Party Sessions, starting with DS343 and asking the
Members which are not third-parties to DS345 (i.e., Chile, Mexico, Korea and Viet
Nam) to leave the meeting room once the Third-Party Session for DS343 is over. Note
that since Thailand and India are third parties to each other’s cases, and parties in their
own, they would be in the room during the entirety of the joint meetings, including third
party sessions;
(iv) not allowing submissions in one case to be deemed to be submitted in the other
case. The parties could however attach to their third party submissions, their
submissions made as parties in the case in which they are complaining party;
(v) issuing separate reports;
(vi) allowing all parties to respond to all questions posed by the Panel in writing.”
j) “Alcance das manifestações de terceiros”
(i) Se não foi objeto da demanda, a argumentação de terceiro não pode aproveitar às partes
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Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/R,
para. 163
Em Chile - Price Band System, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o painel errou ao considerar que houve
violação a um dispositivo em relação ao qual a Argentina, então demandante, não havia feito queixa.
Para. 163. “Argentina contends also that two third parties — the United States and the European Communities
— “provided argumentation regarding the second sentence of Article II: 1 (b).” In support of this contention,
Argentina cites those third parties’ responses to Question 3 posed by the Panel. However, even if these
responses could be interpreted in the way Argentina would have us do — an issue which we need not decide in
this appeal — these responses could not, in any event, assist Argentina in making a claim under the second
sentence of Article II:1 (b). These are the statements of third parties to this dispute. Third parties to a dispute
cannot make claims. It was for Argentina, as the claimant, to make its claim; Argentina cannot rely on third
parties to do so on its behalf. Moreover, we note that Argentina did not adopt these arguments of the third
parties in subsequent proceedings.”
(ii) Solicitação, por terceiro, de recomendação fundada no artigo 19.1 do DSU - rejeição
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (EC - Trademarks and Geographical Indications), Demandantes:
Austrália (WT/DS290/R, para. 7.86) e EUA (WT/DS174/R, para. 7.35)
Em EC - Trademarks and Geographical Indications, o México, terceiro no litígio, requereu ao painel uma
recomendação com lastro no artigo 19.1 do DSU. O painel apreciou a solicitação mexicana com base no artigo
10.4 do DSU, e acabou denegando o pleito.
Para. 7.86. “The Panel takes note of Mexico’s request. The issue of the product coverage of the Regulation is
not challenged by the claims in this dispute and is therefore outside the Panel’s terms of reference. However,
Mexico’s attention is drawn to Article 10.4 of the DSU.”
(iii) Ônus probatório do demandante não pode ser suprido por informação fornecida por terceiro
Brasil, WT/DS267/RW, para. 6.54
Em US - Upland Cotton, o painel assentou que a informação, eventualmente fornecida por terceiro, não tem o
condão de aliviar o ônus probatório do demandante, embora possa ser usada como suporte para as alegações
desse terceiro.
Para. 6.54. “Neither party suggests that evidence provided by a third party may alleviate the complainant’s
burden to establish a prima facie case. We agree entirely. Information supplied by third parties in support of
their allegations may constitute evidence, in terms of additional context and support, that we may take into
account in conducting an objective assessment of the matter before us.”
(iv) Manifestações de terceiro a embasar perguntas do painel aos peritos – possibilidade
Relatório do painel no caso Australia - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand
(Australia - Apples), Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS367/R, paras. 7.76-7.78
94
Em Australia - Apples, o painel afastou o argumento da delegação australiana de que as manifestações de
terceiros não poderiam ser utilizadas para embasar as perguntas dos painelistas aos peritos.
Para. 7.76. “[O]nce a claim is properly put before a panel and the complaining party has submitted its
arguments and articulated its complaint, the panel has broad powers of investigation in order to make an
objective assessment of the matter. At that point, a panel is not limited by the arguments made by the parties to
a dispute; it may develop its own arguments, and it can certainly consider the arguments made by third parties.
Australia’s proposition that a panel is precluded from considering information put forward by a third party is
contrary to the panel’s duty to make an objective assessment of the matter. It would also constitute a breach of
the rights granted under the DSU to third parties in WTO dispute settlement. Article 10.2 of the DSU provides
that third parties “shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the
panel”. The Appellate Body has noted in this respect that, not only have third parties the right to make
submissions in a dispute, but panels have the legal obligation to consider them. (…)”
Para. 7.77. “In other words, the rights of a third party to make submissions to a panel and the duty of a panel
to take into account relevant information provided by a third party in its submission are two sides of the same
coin. If panels were prevented from considering information provided by a third party, including arguments
and evidence, then third party rights under the DSU would be illusory.”
Para. 7.78. “As noted above, under the Panel’s Working Procedures, the Panel was ultimately responsible for
deciding on the questions that it would pose to the experts. Nothing prevented the Panel from using
information, including arguments and evidence, provided in the submission of a Third Party. Nothing would
subsequently prevent the Panel from using such information for the purpose of performing its objective
assessment of the matter. Nor would the Panel be prevented from using information provided by the experts in
response to the Panel’s questions, or in response to questions posed by the Parties themselves during the
meeting with the experts, as long as this information is relevant to the matter that is within the Panel’s terms of
reference.”
l) “Terceiro em diferentes fases dos processos de solução de controvérsias”
(i) Direitos de terceiro em decisões preliminares
* Terceiros podem participar da etapa preliminar do processo
Relatório do painel em Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain
(Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.6
Em Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, o painel entendeu que terceiros deveriam participar da etapa
preliminar do processo (posição mantida pelo painel em US - Upland Cotton (WT/DS267/RW, para. 3)), tendo
sido concedidos os seguintes direitos aos eventuais terceiros:
Para. 6.6. “(a) third parties shall receive the preliminary written submissions of the parties to the dispute; b)
third parties shall have an opportunity to make preliminary written submissions to the Panel for purposes of
commenting on the parties’ preliminary written submissions; and (c) third parties shall have an opportunity to
be heard by the Panel on the issues raised in the parties’ preliminary written submissions” (nota de rodapé
omitida).
(ii) Direitos de terceiros nos procedimentos do artigo 21.5 do DSU
* Sendo realizado apenas um encontro com as partes, incluindo terceiros, estes recebem apenas a primeira
manifestação das partes
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Relatório do painel em Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather
(Australia - Automotive Leather II) (Article 21.5, US), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS126/RW, para. 3.9
Em Australia - Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5, US), o painel, tendo agendado apenas uma audiência com
as partes, incluindo terceiros, repeliu a pretensão das CE de receber todos os arrazoados das partes,
consignando que terceiros receberiam somente os primeiros arrazoados. Idêntico tratamento foi seguido pelo
painel no litígio Australia - Salmon (Article 21.5, Canada), WT/DS18/RW, paras. 7.5-7.6.
Para. 3.9. “[T]he Panel indicated that it had decided not to change the existing working procedures which
provide for third parties to receive the first written submissions of the parties, but not the rebuttals. The Panel
stated that if it had decided to hold two meetings with the parties, as is the normal situation envisioned in
Appendix 3 of the DSU, third parties would have received only the written submissions made prior to the first
meeting, but not rebuttals or other submissions made subsequently. Thus, in the more usual case, third parties
would be in the same position as they were in this case with respect to their ability to present views to the
panel. In the view of the Panel, the procedure it had established conformed more closely with the usual
practice than would be the case if third parties received the rebuttals, and was in keeping with Article 10.3 of
the DSU in a case where the Panel holds only one meeting.”
(iii) Direito de acesso dos terceiros ao segundo arrazoado das partes
Relatório do painel no caso Canada - Measures Affecting Dairy Exports (Canada - Dairy) (Article 21.5,
New Zealand and US), Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS113/RW, para. 2.34
Em Canada - Dairy (Article 21.5, New Zealand and US), o painel decidiu que terceiros poderiam ter acesso ao
segundo arrazoado das partes.
Para. 2.34. “In the Panel’s view, the object and purpose of Article 10.3 of the DSU is to allow third parties to
participate in an informed and, hence, meaningful, manner in a session of the meeting with the parties
specifically set aside for that purpose. Third parties can only do so if they have received all the information
exchanged between the parties before that session. Otherwise, third parties might find themselves in a situation
where their oral statements at the meeting become partially or totally irrelevant or moot in the light of second
submissions by the parties to which third parties did not have access. Without access to all the submissions by
the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel, uninformed third party submissions could unduly
delay panel proceedings and, as rightly emphasised by the EC and supported by Mexico, could prevent the
Panel from receiving ‘the benefit of a useful contribution by third parties which could help the Panel to make
the objective assessment that it is required to make under Article 11 of the DSU.”
A posição acima foi igualmente adotada pelo Órgão de Apelação em United States - Tax Treatment for
“Foreign Sales Corporations” (US - FSC) (Article 21.5, EC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, para. 245.
Para. 245. “Article 10.3 of the DSU is couched in mandatory language. By its terms, third parties ‘shall’
receive ‘the submissions of the parties to the first meeting of the panels’, (emphasis added) Article 10.3 does
not say that third parties shall receive ‘the first submissions’ of the parties, but rather that they shall receive
’the submissions’ of the parties, (emphasis added) The number of submissions that third parties are entitled to
receive is not stated. Rather, Article 10.3 defines the submissions that third parties are entitled to receive by
reference to a specific step in the proceedings - the first meeting of the panel. It follows, in our view, that,
under this provision, third parties must be given all of the submissions that have been made by the parties to
the panel up to the first meeting of the panel, irrespective of the number of such submissions which are made,
including any rebuttal submissions filed in advance of the first meeting.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)
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(iv) Direitos de terceiros nas arbitragens, sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU
* Concessão de direitos de terceiros na fase do artigo 22.6 do DSU
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) (EC - Hormones) (US) (Article 22.6, EC) e (EC - Hormones) (Canada) (Article 22.6, EC),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 7
Em EC - Hormones (US) (Article 22.6, EC) e em EC - Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6, EC), os painelistas
entenderam que terceiros podem participar da fase de painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU. Para tanto, levaram em
consideração três fatores: a) a discricionariedade dos árbitros para decidir acerca de temas não contidos
expressamente no artigo 22.6 do DSU; b) o fato de terceiros poderem ter os seus interesses afetados pela
decisão a ser emitida no laudo da arbitragem; e c) a ausência de prejuízo às partes.
Para. 7. “The US and Canada are allowed to attend both arbitration hearings, to make a statement at the end of
each hearing and to receive a copy of the written submissions made in both proceedings.
The above ruling was made on the following grounds.
 DSU provisions on panel proceedings, referred to by analogy in the arbitrators’ working procedures, give
the arbitrators discretion to decide on procedural matters not regulated in the DSU (Article 12.1 of the DSU) in
accordance with due process. The DSU does not address the issue of third-party participation in Article 22
arbitration proceedings.
 US and Canadian rights may be affected in both arbitration proceedings:
First, the estimates for high quality beef (‘HQB’) exports, foregone because of the hormone ban, are to be
based on a tariff quota that allegedly needs to be shared between Canada and the US. A determination in one
proceeding may thus be decisive for the determination in the other.
Second, several methodologies are proposed to calculate lost export opportunities. Given the fact that the
product scope (HQB and edible bovine offal (‘EBO’)) and relevant trade barriers (hormone ban and HQB
tariff quota) are the same in both proceedings, both arbitration panels (composed of the same three individuals)
may consider it necessary to adopt the same or very similar methodologies. This is all the more necessary
because the arbitrators are called upon to arrive at a specific determination on the amount of nullification and
impairment caused by the ban. They are therefore not limited, as in most panel proceedings, to ruling only on
the consistency of the amounts proposed by the US and Canada with DSU provisions. Due process thus
requires that all three parties receive the opportunity to comment on the methodologies proposed by each of
the parties.
In contrast, the EC has not shown how third-party participation would prejudice its rights. No specific
arguments were made demonstrating that third party participation would substantially impair the EC’s
interests or due process rights.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)
(v) Inviabilidade da participação de terceiros na etapa do artigo 22.6 do DSU
Relatório do painel no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft) (Article
22.6, Brazil), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 2.5-2.6
Em Brazil - Aircraft (Article 22.6, Brazil), o painelista entendeu que não seria recomendável a participação da
delegação australiana na qualidade de terceiro. O painel levou em consideração os seguintes aspectos: a) a
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ausência de previsão específica no artigo 22 do DSU; b) a opinião das partes; e c) o fato de os interesses
australianos não serem afetados pela decisão a ser tomada pelo painel. Os aspectos mencionados em “a”, “b” e
“c”, também foram considerados no caso US - Gambling (Article 22.6, US), para. 2.31. Já no caso EC Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6, EC), para. 2.8, foram analisados apenas os fatores citados em “a” e “c”.
Paras. 2.5. “[W]e informed Australia that we declined its request. Our decision took into account the views
expressed by the parties, the fact that there is no provision in the DSU as regards third party status under
Article 22,and the fact that we do not believe that Australia’s rights would be affected by this proceeding.”
Para. 2.6. “We note in this respect that third party rights were granted in the Article 22.6 arbitrations
concerning European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) and rejected
in the EC - Bananas (1999) Article 22.6 arbitration. We do not consider that Australia in this case is in the
same situation as Canada and the United States in the EC - Hormones arbitrations, nor even in the same
situation as Ecuador in the EC - Bananas (1999) arbitration. Indeed, Australia never initiated dispute
settlement proceedings against Brazil with respect to the export financing programme at issue. Moreover,
Australia did not draw the attention of the Arbitrators to any benefits accruing to it or any rights under the
WTO Agreement which might be affected by their decision.” (51)
(vi) Questões diversas
* Painel não pode exigir que um membro da OMC seja um terceiro no litígio
Relatório do painel em Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey Textiles), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/R, para. 9.5
Em Turkey - Textiles, o painel concluiu que não detinha competência para determinar que um membro da
OMC assumisse a posição de terceiro no caso.
Para. 9.5. “In the absence of any relevant provision in the DSU, in light of international practice, and noting
the position of the EC to this point, we consider that we do not have the authority to direct that a WTO
Member be made third-party or that it otherwise participate throughout the panel process.” (nota de rodapé
retirada)
* Partes essenciais
Relatório do painel em Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey Textiles), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/R, para. 9.10
Em Turkey - Textiles, o painel, analisando o conceito de “partes essenciais”, entendeu que, de acordo com a
jurisprudência da CIJ, se a decisão entre os litigantes pode ser proferida sem que seja necessária uma
averiguação da posição de um terceiro Estado (na hipótese da OMC, um membro), o órgão julgador deve
exercer a sua jurisdição entre as partes.
Para. 9.10. “The practice of the ICJ indicates that if a decision between the parties to the case can be reached
without an examination of the position of the third state (i.e. in the WTO context, a Member) the ICJ will
exercise its jurisdiction as between the parties. In the present dispute, there are no claims against the European
Communities before us that would need to be determined in order for the Panel to assess the compatibility of
the Turkish measures with the WTO Agreement.”
Em Turkey - Textiles (WT/DS34/R, paras. 9.11-9.12), o painel sustentou que inexiste, na OMC, o conceito de
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“partes essenciais”.
Paras. 9.11. “[T]here is no WTO concept of ‘essential parties’. Based on our terms of reference and the fact
that we have decided (as further discussed hereafter) not to examine the GATT/WTO compatibility of the
Turkey-EC customs union, we consider that the European Communities was not an essential party to this
dispute; the European Communities, had it so wished, could have availed itself of the provisions of the DSU,
which we note have been interpreted with a degree of flexibility by previous panels, in order to represent its
interests. We recall in this context that Panel and Appellate Body reports are binding on the parties only.”
Para. 9.12. “Under WTO rules, the European Communities and Turkey are Members with equal and
independent rights and obligations. For Turkey, it is not at all inconceivable that it adopted the measures in
question in order to have its own policy coincide with that of the European Communities. However, in doing
so, it should have been aware, in respect of the measures it has chosen, that its circumstances were different
from those of the European Communities in relation to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (‘ATC’) and
thus could reasonably have been anticipated to give rise to responses which focussed on that distinction.”
(notas de rodapé retiradas)
(vii) Distinção entre terceiros e amicus curiae
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
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Em US - Shrimp, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que somente os membros da OMC, que participam como
terceiros no processo, com base no artigo 10 do DSU, detém direitos que outros não.
Para. 101. “[A]ccess to the dispute settlement process of the WTO is limited to Members of the WTO. This
access is not available, under the WTO Agreement and the covered agreements as they currently exist, to
individuals or international organizations, whether governmental or nongovernmental. Only Members may
become parties to a dispute of which a panel may be seized, and only Members “having a substantial interest
in a matter before a panel” may become third parties in the proceedings before that panel. Thus, under the
DSU, only Members who are parties to a dispute, or who have notified their interest in becoming third parties
in such a dispute to the DSB, have a legal right to make submissions to, and have a legal right to have those
submissions considered by a panel. Correctively, a panel is obliged in law to accept and give due consideration
only to submissions made by the parties and the third parties in a panel proceeding.”
(viii) Confidencialidade
* Manutenção de confidencialidade por parte de terceiro
Relatório do painel em Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from
the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.41
Em Mexico - Corn Syrup, o painel asseverou que terceiros também estão submetidos à obrigação de manter a
confidencialidade do processo, assim como as partes.
Para. 7.41. “Third parties are subject to the same requirement to maintain the confidentiality of panel
proceedings as are parties. We therefore conclude that the requirement to maintain the confidentiality of
consultations is not violated by the inclusion of information obtained during consultations in the written
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submission of a party provided to a third party in the subsequent panel proceeding even if that third party did
not participate in the consultations.”
* Omissão de informações empresariais confidenciais no relatório do painel – necessidade de preservação
dos direitos de terceiros
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Japan - Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories
from Korea (Japan - DRAMs) (Korea), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS336/AB/R, para. 279
Em Japan - DRAMs (Korea), o Órgão de Apelação definiu que o painel, se decidir remover informações
empresariais confidenciais do seu relatório, deve agir de modo a resguardar os direitos de terceiros no
processo.
Para. 279. “We note that several passages have been omitted from the public version of the Panel Report on
the basis that Japan and Korea indicated that those passages contained business confidential information
(“BCI”). The European Communities has complained that, while BCI must be respected, the Panel has dealt
with it in such a sweeping manner that the Panel Report has become unintelligible for third parties, and as a
result its rights as a third party have been affected. While a panel must not disclose information which is by its
nature confidential, a panel, in deciding to redact such information from its report at the request of one or both
of the parties, should bear in mind the rights of third parties and other WTO Members under various
provisions of the DSU, such as Articles 12.7 and 16. Accordingly, a panel must make efforts to ensure that the
public version of its report circulated to all Members of the WTO is understandable. On appeal, Japan and
Korea have designated certain information contained in their written submissions as BCI. We have found it
possible to render our Report without disclosing any BCI, designated as such.” (notas de rodapé eliminadas)
III.
Comentários
O DSU tem tido um papel fundamental na solidificação da segurança e previsibilidade do sistema multilateral
de comércio. Tendo em vista os interesses dos membros da OMC, o referido acordo contempla a importância
da participação de terceiros nos litígios levados até ao DSB. Estes terceiros, por seu turno, pretendem não
somente prestar informações complementares ao órgão julgador, mas influir no resultado final da demanda:
By reserving rights, third parties clearly wish to influence the outcome of dispute
settlement. The belief that their participation does, in fact, matter explains why third
parties participated in 64 percent of WTO disputes through 2002. (52)
Para que seja viável a participação de um terceiro no litígio, é requisito que este terceiro notifique o DSB
acerca de sua intenção de ingressar no processo. Entretanto, o momento da notificação é importante. Em geral,
pode-se afirmar que é reconhecida discricionariedade aos painéis para decidir sobre se a notificação foi
efetivada em momento oportuno. Para tanto, tem-se levado em consideração o fato do processo não ser
prejudicado e a seleção e composição do painel não sofrerem problemas.
Como o DSU não foi expresso ao estipular o prazo da notificação do membro interessado ao DSB, poder-se-ia
invocar o interstício de dez dias, mencionado pelo então Diretor do Conselho Geral do GATT, em junho de
1994 (C/COM/3 of 27 June 1994, page 1). Neste discurso, o aludido Diretor realçou a necessidade da fixação
de um prazo certo, tendo em vista o problema do recebimento, pelo terceiro, dos arrazoados das partes antes
do primeiro encontro com o painel. Ocorre que, tal interregno não tem sido muito observado pela prática dos
painéis. Assim, nota-se que o mesmo não pode ser caracterizado como costume, por lhe faltar as duas
condições para tanto: a prática reiterada e a consciência de obrigatoriedade.
No tocante à concessão de direitos adicionais a terceiros, os painéis podem permitir tal extensão, desde que
esteja presente pelo menos uma das condições a seguir: (i) efeito econômico significativo das medidas em
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discussão na causa dos terceiros; (ii) importância do comércio do produto objeto do litígio em relação aos
terceiros; (iii) eventual impacto relevante da política comercial que o desfecho do caso poderia ter nos
terceiros, se estes mantivessem medidas similares às medidas em discussão; (iv) concordância de pelo menos
uma das partes na ampliação destes direitos; as medidas impugnadas na controvérsia derivarem de um tratado
do qual o terceiro é signatário; (v) o terceiro já ter sido beneficiado com direitos adicionais em outro processo;
ou (vi) considerações de ordem prática oriundas do envolvimento de terceiro como parte num processo
paralelo.
Como se pode notar dos requisitos mencionados no parágrafo antecedente, é insuficiente que o membro,
pretendente ao status de terceiro, alegue possuir interesse em certa indústria ou ramo de comércio, se o
produto, cujas medidas são impugnadas, for específico. Tal sucedeu no caso US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd
complaint), no qual o Brasil, sob a ótica do painel, havia alegado interesse apenas na indústria de aeronaves,
enquanto as medidas, objeto do litígio, diziam respeito à indústria de aeronaves de grande porte.
Em US - Upland Cotton, o painel denegou os direitos adicionais de terceiros pedidos pelas CE com arrimo
numa exegese literal do DSU. Com base na análise das explanações do painel, nota-se que as condições
usualmente aceitas pela jurisprudência da OMC para a extensão dos direitos adicionais a terceiros foi relegada
a um segundo plano. Em Australia - Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5, US) e em Australia - Salmon (Article
21.5, Canada), o painel, na etapa do artigo 21.5 do DSU, tendo agendado apenas uma audiência com as partes,
incluindo terceiros, repeliu a pretensão de terceiros receberem todos os arrazoados das partes, consignando que
estes receberiam somente os primeiros arrazoados. Outra situação, menos frequente, tem sido a exegese literal
da arbitragem prevista no artigo 22.6 do DSU. Nesta última hipótese, no entanto, os árbitros têm considerado
outros fatores, além da literalidade do texto, para deslindar a participação de terceiros, como a opinião das
partes e o fato de os interesses dos terceiros não serem afetados pela decisão a ser tomada na arbitragem.
Lamenta-se que, nas referidas oportunidades, tenha imperado o método literal de interpretação, que é, muitas
vezes, o mais limitado de todos. Ademais, a escolha exegética dos painéis colide com o espírito do artigo 10.1
do DSU, que estipula que os interesses de terceiros “deverão ser integralmente levados em consideração no
correr dos trabalhos dos grupos especiais”.
Questão interessante, diz respeito ao alcance do artigo 10.4 do DSU. No caso EC - Trademarks and
Geographical Indications, o painel apreciou o pedido de recomendação feito por um terceiro, com base no
artigo 19.1 do DSU. O painel indeferiu a pretensão. A justificativa para o conhecimento do mérito do pedido
foi o artigo 10.4 do DSU. Diante do ocorrido, fica a questão de se saber se este mesmo terceiro poderia
submeter o pedido em questão a um novo painel, também com lastro no aludido artigo 10.4. Haveria coisa
julgada sobre o assunto decidido anteriormente? Entende-se que não existiria res judicata, posto que esta está
ligada ao devido processo legal e às partes no feito. O terceiro num litígio tem uma participação limitada,
sendo seu poder de produção de prova restrito. Somente em um novo processo, em que for parte o então
terceiro poderá exercer plenamente os seus direitos processuais.
Apesar do terceiro ter direito a participar de audiência com o painel ou o Órgão de Apelação, e a manifestar
suas razões, ele não pode suprir o ônus probatório das partes, em especial o do demandante. Neste diapasão, o
Painel asseverou, em US - Upland Cotton, que os dados, fornecidos por terceiro, não aliviam o ônus
probatório do demandante. Acontece que, neste caso, o painel, ao referir-se ao aludido ônus, utilizou a
expressão “prima facie case”.
O significado do termo “prima facie case” pode comportar duas acepções. A primeira, refere-se a um ônus
leve da parte que faz a alegação, ou seja, a prova apresentada não necessita ser contundente. Já a segunda
acepção, está ligada à ideia de um ônus severo em relação àquele que faz a afirmação, devendo a prova
coligida ser robusta. Dependendo da adoção de uma ou outra noção de “prima facie case”, as consequências
processuais podem ser diferentes:
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A panel might understand the AB’s prima facie case concept to require a much too
overwhelming level of proof from the claimant; since, after all, such a case seems to
have serious consequences for what is required of the respondent in rebuttal. On the
other hand, a different panel might allow a rather weak claimant’s case to meet the
prima facie requirement and then effectively reason that the full burden of proof is
shifted to the respondent. These effects might even occur inside the panel’s conference
room without being expressed in its published decision or otherwise coming to light.
(53)
Tem-se, então, que, numa concepção de ônus leve para o demandante, eventuais subsídios probatórios
indicados por terceiros poderiam lhe aproveitar mais facilmente, enquanto que, prevalecendo uma ideia de
ônus excessivo para o proponente da ação, as informações prestadas por terceiros somente lhe trariam
vantagens efetivas se se desincumbisse do ônus em referência.
Finalmente, é preciso asseverar que apenas os membros da OMC podem atuar como terceiros. Assim, inferese que o amicus curiae difere-se daquele que é terceiro. O amicus curiae pode ser definido da seguinte
maneira:
De origem latina, a expressão amicus curiae significa “amigo da cúria”, comumente
traduzido como “amigo da corte” na doutrina da Organização Mundial do Comércio
(OMC). Seria, então, um aliado da justiça em sentido amplo. O conceito de amicus
curiae brief consubstancia-se na apresentação, por um indívíduo ou entidade, de um
Relatório (brief) que não tenha sido solicitado por integrantes de uma determinada
corte. (54)
Na esteira da jurisprudência da OMC, os arrazoados apresentados pelo amicus curiae somente serão
apreciados pelo painel ou Órgão de Apelação se as partes incorporarem ditos arrazoados às suas
manifestações. (55) Todavia, uma exceção ocorre quando o amicus curiae é membro da OMC, como no caso
EC - Sardines, em que o Órgão de Apelação aceitou a manifestação do Marrocos, apesar da posição contrária
do demandante. Neste litígio, o país integrante da OMC não havia notificado o DSB acerca da sua intenção de
ser terceiro.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 50: Appellate Body Report on EC - Hormones.
Footnote 51: Our decision may have been different if Australia had demonstrated that the countermeasures which Canada plans to
adopt may affect Australia’s rights or benefits under the WTO Agreement.
Footnote 52: BUSCH, Marc L.; REINHARDT, Eric. Three´s a Crowd. Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement. World Politics 58
(April 2006), pp. 446-77.
Footnote 53: BARCELÓ III, James John. Burden of Proof, Prima Facie Case and Presumption in WTO Dispute Settlement. Cornell
International Law Journal, vol. 42, nº 1, p. 30, nov. 2008.
Footnote 54: LEONHARDT, Roberta Danelon; BASTOS-TIGRE, Maria Pia. A figura do amicus curiae na OMC. In: LIMA, Maria
Lúcia L. M. Pádua; ROSENBERG, Bárbara (coord.). Solução de controvérsias: o Brasil e o contencioso na OMC. São Paulo:
Saraiva, 2009, tomo I, p. 149.
Footnote 55: Panel Reports, US - COOL, para. 2.10; US - Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.2; Thailand - Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 2.5;
EC - Salmon (Norway), para. 1.13; US - Zeroing (EC), para. 1.7; US – Softwood Lumber IV, nota de rodapé 75; e Canada – Renewable
Energy, para. 1.13.
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
Artigo 11
IA.
Article 11
Function of Panels
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding
and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before
it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult
regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory
solution.
IB.
Artigo 11
Função dos Grupos Especiais
A função de um grupo especial é auxiliar o OSC a desempenhar as obrigações que lhe são atribuídas
por este Entendimento e pelos acordos abrangidos. Consequentemente, um grupo especial deverá fazer uma
avaliação objetiva do assunto que lhe seja submetido, incluindo uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos, da
aplicabilidade e concordância com os acordos abrangidos pertinentes, e formular conclusões que auxiliem o
OSC a fazer recomendações ou emitir decisões previstas nos acordos abrangidos. Os grupos especiais deverão
regularmente realizar consultas com as partes envolvidas na controvérsia e propiciar-lhes oportunidade para
encontrar solução mutuamente satisfatória.
IC.
A expressão “incluindo uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos, da aplicabilidade e concordância com os acordos
abrangidos pertinentes” deve ser refeita da seguinte maneira: “incluindo uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos do
caso e da aplicabilidade dos acordos abrangidos pertinentes, assim como da concordância com estes últimos”.
A expressão “uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos” deve ser substituída por “uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos do
caso”, já que, em inglês, consta a expressão “of the case”.
Por seu turno, a vírgula imediatamente anterior a “da aplicabilidade” deve ser trocada pela conjunção aditiva
“e”. Esta tinha sido substituída pela vírgula em razão de um suposto paralelismo de “an objective assessment
of the facts”, “applicability” e “conformity”, o que é equivocado.
Por fim, como inexiste o paralelismo apontado acima, deve-se trocar “aplicabilidade e concordância com os
acordos abrangidos pertinentes” por “aplicabilidade dos acordos abrangidos pertinentes, assim como da
concordância com estes últimos”.
II.
Aplicação e Interpretação do Artigo
1.
Geral
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a) “Um grupo especial ‘deverá’ fazer uma avaliação objetiva”
(i) Acepções do termo ‘deverá’
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada
– Aircraft), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS70/AB/R, para. 187
Em Canada – Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação abordou os possíveis significados do termo “deverá” (“should”
em inglês). Ver, ainda, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks (WT/DS308/AB/R, para. 51).
Para. 187. “Although the word “should” is often used colloquially to imply an exhortation, or to state a
preference, it is not always used in those ways. It can also be used “to express a duty [or] obligation”. The
word “should” has, for instance, previously been interpreted by us as expressing a “duty” of panels in the
context of Article 11 of the DSU. Similarly, we are of the view that the word “should” in the third sentence of
Article 13.1 is, in the context of the whole of Article 13, used in a normative, rather than a merely exhortative,
sense.” (nota de rodapé removida)
b) “Avaliação objetiva do assunto que lhe seja submetido”
(i) Obrigação de fazer uma avaliação imparcial
* Avaliação objetiva dos fatos – razões do órgão julgador – dispositivos citados nas reclamações dos
litigantes
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina Footwear) (EC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 74
Em Argentina - Footwear (EC), o Órgão de Apelação expressou que não via como um painel poderia fazer
uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos se pudesse apenas se referir nas suas razões aos dispositivos específicos
mencionados pelos litigantes em suas queixas.
Para. 74. “We note that the very terms of Article 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards expressly incorporate
the provisions of Article 3. Thus, we find it difficult to see how a panel could examine whether a Member had
complied with Article 4.2(c) without also referring to the provisions of Article 3 of the Agreement on
Safeguards. More particularly, given the express language of Article 4.2(c), we do not see how a panel could
ignore the publication requirement set out in Article 3.1 when examining the publication requirement in
Article 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. And, generally, we fail to see how the Panel could have
interpreted the requirements of Article 4.2(c) without taking into account in some way the provisions of
Article 3. What is more, we fail to see how any panel could be expected to make an ‘objective assessment of
the matter’, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, if it could only refer in its reasoning to the specific
provisions cited by the parties in their claims.”
c) “Argumentos das partes não limitam a interpretação do painel”
(Australia - Automotive Leather II) (Article 21.5 - US), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS126/RW, para. 6.19
Em Australia - Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 - US), o painel salientou que a sua interpretação acerca de
um acordo da OMC não pode ficar limitada aos argumentos das partes.
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Para. 6.19. “That neither party has argued a particular interpretation before us, and indeed, that both have
argued that we should not reach issues of interpretation that they have not raised, cannot, in our view, preclude
us from considering such issues if we find this to be necessary to resolve the dispute that is before us. A
panel’s interpretation of the text of a relevant WTO Agreement cannot be limited by the particular arguments
of the parties to a dispute.”
d) “Não apresentação de contra-argumentos”
Relatório do painel em Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (Mexico - Taxes on
Soft Drinks), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS308/R, para. 8.20
Em Mexico - Taxes on Soft Drinks, a delegação mexicana não apresentou contra-argumentos contra a queixa
dos EUA lastreada no artigo III do GATT 1994. Assim, o painel aduziu que estaria ciente da análise sucinta
realizada pelos painéis em US - Shrimp e Turkey - Textiles.
Para. 8.20. “(...) while, at the same time, being mindful of the relatively succinct analytical approach adopted
by the panels in US - Shrimp and Turkey - Textiles in the absence of any counter-arguments by the
respondent.”
e) “Ausência de contestação – necessidade de demonstração de violação prima facie”
Relatório do painel em United States - Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador (US - Shrimp)
(Ecuador), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS335/R, paras. 7.1-7.6 e 8.1-8.2
Em US - Shrimp (Ecuador), os EUA (demandado) não contestaram as reclamações da demandante. Entretanto,
como os litigantes não consideraram as suas opiniões em comum, acerca da questão substantiva posta ao
painel como uma “solução mutuamente acordada”, o painel entendeu que a terceira parte do artigo 12.7 do
DSU não se aplicava. Portanto, para que o pedido do demandante fosse julgado procedente, deveria o Equador
(autor) comprovar que houve uma violação prima facie das normas da OMC. Vide, igualmente, US – Shrimp
(Thailand) (WT/DS345/R, para. 7.21) e US - Poultry (China) (WT/DS392/R, paras. 7.445-7.446).
Para. 7.1. “The dispute before us is unusual in that, as mentioned above, the responding party, the United
States, does not contest any of the complaining party’s claims. The parties have not, however, characterized
their shared view of the substantive aspects of the dispute as a “mutually agreed solution”, and thus Article
12.7 does not apply. We therefore start by considering whether the lack of substantive disagreement between
the parties affects our responsibilities as a Panel.”
Para. 7.2. “In this regard, we consider that we must be guided in this dispute, as we would be in any other
dispute subject to the DSU, by the provisions in Article 11 of the DSU, “Function of Panels”, which provides:
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this
Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate
opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.” (emphasis added)
Para. 7.3. “Given that, notwithstanding their common view as to how the dispute should be resolved, the
parties have not reached a mutually agreed solution (which would require us only to “report[ ] that a solution
has been reached”), we understand that our responsibility is as set forth in Article 11 DSU, i.e., to make an
105
“objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving
the rulings provided for in the covered agreements”.”
Para. 7.4. “We note that the parties and third parties share this view. For instance, Ecuador and the United
States, in their (identical) response to a question from the Panel addressing this issue, 18 indicate that they:
[consider] that the role of a Panel in a case like this one, where there is no substantive
disagreement between the Parties as to the inconsistency of a measure with one or more
cited provisions of a covered Agreement, is nevertheless to make an objective
assessment of the matter, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements. The matter before this Panel is a narrow one – whether
Commerce’s calculation of the weighted average to weighted average margins of
dumping for the two separately investigated Ecuadoran exporters and for “all other”
exporters breaches the first sentence of Article 2.4.2. Therefore, the Parties are not
asking the Panel to “sanction” their Agreement, but rather, to consider that the
Agreement facilitates the Panel’s assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability and conformity of the measures with the covered agreements.
Nevertheless, it is correct to say that they are seeking a decision that would allow the
rest of the provisions of the Agreement to be implemented.”
Para. 7.5. “A number of third parties formulate similar views on the issue. For instance, the European
Communities submit that:
Article 11 of the DSU does not expressly refer to a panel “sanctioning the mutual
understanding of the parties”. Rather it refers to a panel making an “objective
assessment” and making “findings”. Such an “objective assessment” and such
“findings” are always made by a panel “on its own”, in the sense that the panel takes
sole responsibility for them, and is not compelled to follow the opinion of one or both
Parties.”
Para. 7.6. “India indicates that, in its view,
the panel's obligation under Article 11 of the DSU to examine and resolve the claim put
forward by Ecuador is not affected by the fact that the United States has indicated that it
will not contest Ecuador's claim. Even though the United States is not contesting the
claim, the panel must still examine whether Ecuador has made a prima facie case that
the use of zeroing in the measure at issue was inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 and make a
finding on that issue.”
2. Burden of proof
Para. 7.1. “Because of its singularity, this dispute raises in a particularly acute fashion the issue of the burden
of proof.”
Para. 7.2. “The burden of proof lies, in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, with the party that asserts the
affirmative of a particular claim or defence. Ecuador, as the complaining party, must therefore make a prima
facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO agreements. The burden would then shift
to the responding party (here the United States), to adduce evidence to rebut the presumption that Ecuador's
assertions are true. In this context, we recall that “a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective
refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining
party presenting the prima facie case.”
106
Para. 7.3. “In our view, the issue of the burden of proof is of particular importance in this case. This is
because Ecuador has made factual and legal claims before the Panel which the United States does not contest.
Yet, the fact that the United States does not contest Ecuador's claims is not a sufficient basis for us to
summarily conclude that Ecuador's claims are well-founded. Rather, we can only rule in favour of Ecuador if
we are satisfied that Ecuador has made a prima facie case. We take note in this regard that the Appellate Body
has cautioned panels against ruling on a claim before the party bearing the burden of proof has made a prima
facie case. (…)”
Para. 7.5. “Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not seeking to refute Ecuador's claims, we
must satisfy ourselves that Ecuador has established a prima facie case of violation, and notably that it has
presented “evidence and argument (...) sufficient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import,
identify the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and explain the basis for the claimed
inconsistency of the measure with that provision”.”
Para. 8.1. “In light of the above findings, we conclude that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2
in its final and amended final affirmative determinations of sales at less than fair value (dumping) with respect
to certain frozen warmwater shrimp from Ecuador, and in its final antidumping duty order.”
Para. 8.2. “Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that, to the extent the United States
has acted inconsistently with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it has nullified or impaired
benefits accruing to Ecuador under that Agreement. We therefore recommend that the Dispute Settlement
Body request the United States to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the AntiDumping Agreement.”
18 The Panel asked the parties and third parties to provide their views on the following question: “What does
your delegation consider is the role of a Panel in a case like this one, where there is no substantive
disagreement between the Parties as to the inconsistency of a measure with one or more cited provisions of a
covered Agreement? Can the Panel limit itself to sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parties, or must
the Panel, on its own, determine whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions?”
(demais notas de rodapé retiradas)
f) “Idêntica posição dos litigantes no que tange a uma questão específica não vincula o painel”
Relatório do painel em China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China - Publication and Audiovisual Products),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/R, para. 6.46
Em China - Publication and Audiovisual Products, o painel entendeu que, se as partes possuem uma mesma
avaliação no tocante a uma questão específica, isto não vincula o painel.
Para. 6.46. “(...) the function of panels is to make an ‘objective assessment’ of the matter before them.
Consequently, the parties’ common assessment in relation to a particular issue is, therefore, not in and of itself
dispositive.”
g) “Definição de ‘produto subsidiado’ não é ônus do demandante”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (EC and certain member States - Large Civil Aircraft), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS316/AB/R,
para. 1128
107
Em EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação observou que o painel errou
ao ter entendido que cabia ao demandante a definição de “produto subsidiado”.
Para. 1128. “[T]he Panel committed legal error by failing to adjudicate properly the United States’ subsidized
product allegations and refusing to make its own independent assessment of whether all Airbus LCA compete
in the same market or not. As noted above, the United States’ claims of serious prejudice were premised on its
assertion that there is only one subsidized product at issue in this dispute, consisting of all models of Airbus
LCA. The European Communities objected to the United States’ definition of the “subsidized product”,
arguing that the Panel was required to make its own assessment of whether the “identified universe of
allegedly subsidized products should be treated as a single subsidized product, or multiple subsidized
products.” However, in its analysis, the Panel deferred to the United States’ subsidized product allegations
rather than making its own independent assessment of whether all Airbus LCA should be treated as a single
subsidized product. In so doing, the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter, including the
“applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, as required under Article 11 of the
DSU”.”
2.
Avaliação independente do significado de direito doméstico
a) “Direito local como prova de fatos ou da prática de um Estado, assim como de prova da observância
ou não de obrigações internacionais”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (India - Patents) (US), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 65-67
Em India - Patents (US), o Órgão de Apelação asseverou que o direito local pode servir de prova de fatos ou
da prática de um membro, assim como de prova da observância ou não de obrigações internacionais.
Para. 65. “In public international law, an international tribunal may treat municipal law in several ways.
Municipal law may serve as evidence of facts and may provide evidence of state practice. However, municipal
law may also constitute evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations. For
example, in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of International Justice
observed:
‘It might be asked whether a difficulty does not arise from the fact that the Court would
have to deal with the Polish law of July 14th, 1920. This, however, does not appear to
be the case. From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its
organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the
activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions and administrative
measures. The Court is certainly not called upon to interpret the Polish law as such; but
there is nothing to prevent the Courts giving judgment on the question whether or not,
in applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations towards
Germany under the Geneva Convention (emphasis added)’
Para. 66. “(…) It is clear that an examination of the relevant aspects of Indian municipal law and, in
particular, the relevant provisions of the Patents Act as they relate to the ‘administrative instructions’ is
essential to determining whether India has complied with its obligations under Article 70.8 (a). There was
simply no way for the Panel to make this determination without engaging in an examination of Indian law.
But, as in the case cited above before the Permanent Court of International Justice, in this case, the Panel was
not interpreting Indian law ‘as such’; rather, the Panel was examining Indian law solely for the purpose of
determining whether India had met its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. To say that the Panel should
have done otherwise would be to say that only India can assess whether Indian law is consistent with India’s
obligations under the WTO Agreement. This, clearly, cannot be so.”
108
Para. 67. “Previous GATT/WTO panels also have conducted a detailed examination of the domestic law of a
Member in assessing the conformity of that domestic law with the relevant GATT/WTO obligations. For
example, in United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the panel conducted a detailed examination
of the relevant United States’ legislation and practice, including the remedies available under Section 337 as
well as the differences between patent-based Section 337 proceedings and federal district court proceedings, in
order to determine whether Section 337 was inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1947. This seems to
us to be a comparable case.” (nota de rodapé removida)
b) “Seções 301-310 como elementos factuais”
Relatório do painel em United States - Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974 (US – Section 301 Trade
Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS152/R, para. 7.18
Em US - Section 301 Trade Act, o painel esclareceu que a sua tarefa seria a de estabelecer o significado das
seções 301-310 como elementos factuais e checar se estes elementos consubstanciariam conduta dos EUA
colidente com as obrigações deste país relativas à OMC.
Para. 7.18. “Our mandate is to examine Sections 301-310 solely for the purpose of determining whether the
US meets its WTO obligations. In doing so, we do not, as noted by the Appellate Body in India — Patents
(US), interpret US law ‘as such’ the way we would, say, interpret provisions of the covered agreements. We
are, instead, called upon to establish the meaning of Sections 301-310 as factual elements and to check
whether these factual elements constitute conduct by the US contrary to its WTO obligations. The rules on
burden of proof for the establishment of facts referred to above also apply in this respect. (…)
We note, finally, that terms used both in Sections 301-310 and in WTO provisions, do
not necessarily have the same meaning. For example, the word ‘determination’ need not
always have the same meaning in Sections 304 and 306 as it has in Article 23.2(a) of the
DSU. Thus, conduct not meeting, say, the threshold of a ‘determination’ under Sections
304 and 306, is not by this fact alone precluded from meeting the threshold of a
‘determination’ under Article 23.2(a) of the DSU. By contrast, the fact that a certain act
is characterized as a ‘determination’ under domestic legislation, does not necessarily
mean that it must be construed as a determination under the covered agreements.” (nota
de rodapé suprimida)
c) “Direito doméstico do reclamado – liberdade do painel para decidir a seu respeito”
Relatório do painel em United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act) (EC), Demandante: CE,
WT/DS136/R, para. 6.51
Em US - 1916 Act (EC), o painel salientou que não estava obrigado a aceitar a caracterização que o
demandado atribui ao seu direito.
Para. 6.51. “[O]ur understanding of the term ‘examination’ as used by the Appellate Body is that panels need
not accept at face value the characterisation that the respondent attaches to its law. A panel may analyse the
operation of the domestic legislation and determine whether the description of the functioning of the law, as
made by the respondent, is consistent with the legal structure of that Member. This way, it will be able to
determine whether or not the law as applied is in conformity with the obligations of the Member concerned
under the WTO Agreement.” (nota de rodapé omitida)
d) “Jurisprudência doméstica de um dos litigantes dividida ou incerta – possibilidade de o órgão
julgador sopesá-la”
109
Em US - 1916 Act (EC), o painel obtemperou que inexistia, no texto do DSU, ou na prática do Órgão de
Apelação, obstáculo que o impedisse de sopesar a jurisprudência dos tribunais dos EUA se esta estivesse
incerta ou dividida.
Para. 6.53. “We recall that the International Court of Justice, in the Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) case,
referred to the judgement of the Permanent Court of International Justice (56) in the Brazilian Loans case —
to which the United States also refers in its submissions — and noted that:
‘Where the determination of a question of municipal law is essential to the Court’s
decision in a case, the Court will have to weigh the jurisprudence of the municipal
courts, and ‘If this is uncertain or divided, it will rest with the Court to select the
interpretation which it considers most in conformity with the law’ (Brazilian Loans,
PCIJ, Series A, Nos. 20/21, p. 124).’ (57)
We are fully aware that our role is to clarify the existing provisions of the covered
agreements so as to determine the compatibility of a domestic law with those
agreements. We are also aware that, in the Brazilian Loans case, the PCIJ was asked to
apply domestic legislation to a given case. We are nevertheless of the view that there is
nothing in the text of the DSU, nor in the practice of the Appellate Body, that prevents
us from ‘weighting the jurisprudence of municipal [US] courts’ if it is ‘uncertain or
divided’. This would not require us to develop our own independent interpretation of
US law, but simply to select among the relevant judgements the interpretation most in
conformity with the US law, as necessary in order to resolve the matter before us.” (58)
e) “Análise da evolução legislativa para se determinar a finalidade atual de uma lei doméstica –
eventual consideração de afirmações de funcionários de uma das partes”
Em US - 1916 Act (EC), o painel investigou a história legislativa para determinar qual era a intenção do
congresso norte-americano, a fim de poder verificar a aplicação do 1916 Act, assim como a sua finalidade
atual. Neste procedimento, o painel levou em conta declarações públicas de diversos funcionários dos EUA.
Para. 6.63. “[W]e should determine whether they could actually generate legal obligations for the United
States under international law. For instance, since they are subsequent to the notification by the United States
of its ‘grandfathered’ legislation under the GATT 1947, it might be argued that they implicitly modified that
notification by stating that the 1916 Act was ‘grandfathered’. We recall that the International Court of Justice
has developed, inter alia in its judgement in the Nuclear Tests case, criteria on when a statement by a
representative of a State could generate international obligations for that State. In the present case, we are
reluctant to consider the statements made by senior US officials in testimonies or letters to the US Congress or
to members thereof as generating international obligations for the United States. First, we recall that the
constitution of the United States provides for a strict separation of the judicial and executive branches. With
the exception of criminal prosecutions, the application of the 1916 Act falls within the exclusive responsibility
of the federal courts. Under those circumstances, a statement by the executive branch of government in a
domestic forum can only be of limited value. Second, with the possible exception of the statement of US Trade
Representative Clayton Yeutter, they were not made at a sufficiently high level compared with the statements
considered by the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Tests case, where essentially declarations by a
head of State and of members of the French government were at issue. Moreover, the statements referred to in
the present case were not directly addressed to the general public. Finally, they were not made on behalf of the
110
United States, but - at best - on behalf of the executive branch of government. This aspect would not be
essential if the statements had been made in an international forum, where the executive branch represents the
State. However, in the present case, the statements were addressed to the US legislative branch. Therefore, we
cannot consider them as creating obligations for the United States under international law.” (notas de rodapé
retiradas)
f) “Consideração de eventual resultado final de um processo tramitando no judiciário de uma das
partes – exercício de especulação – inviabilidade”
Products (US – Shrimp) (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia,
WT/DS58/AB/RW, para. 95
Em US - Shrimp (Article 21.5, Malaysia), o painel averiguou uma lei doméstica dos EUA, levando em
consideração o status que esta lei tinha quando de sua análise. A Malásia pretendia que o painel considerasse o
resultado de eventual desfecho de um processo, então tramitando no judiciário norte-americano e tendo como
objeto a lei examinada pelo painel. O Órgão de Apelação consignou que teria sido um exercício de
especulação a tentativa de previsão do referido processo.
Para. 95. “There is no way of knowing or predicting when or how that particular legal proceeding will
conclude in the United States. The Turtle Island case has been appealed and could conceivably go as far as the
Supreme Court of the United States. It would have been an exercise in speculation on the part of the Panel to
predict either when or how that case may be concluded, or to assume that injunctive relief ultimately would be
granted and that the United States Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States eventually
would compel the Department of State to modify the Revised Guidelines. The Panel was correct not to indulge
in such speculation, which would have been contrary to the duty of the Panel, under Article 11 of the DSU, to
make “an objective assessment of the matter … including an objective assessment of the facts of the case”.”
g) “Interpretação da legislação interna - prova para demonstrá-la”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Thailand - Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the
Philippines (Thailand - Cigarettes) (Philippines), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS371/AB/R, nota de
rodapé 253
Em Thailand - Cigarettes (Philippines), o Órgão de Apelação decidiu que, embora um membro normalmente
esteja em boa posição para explicar o significado de sua própria lei, isto não o desobriga a produzir prova que
sustente a sua exegese.
Nota de rodapé 253. “In our view, the panel in correctly recognized that, “objectively, a Member is normally
well-placed to explain the meaning of its own law”, but that this does not relieve a party of its burden to
adduce arguments and evidence necessary to sustain its proposed interpretation. (Panel Report, para. 7.28)
Further, a panel’s duties under Article 11 of the DSU require it to conduct an objective assessment of all such
arguments and evidence. In this dispute, the Panel observed, in the context of its Article III:4 analysis, that
“Thailand should normally be in a position to explain the nature” of obligations under Thai law but that, to the
extent that the parties disagree on the content of such obligations, the Panel was “required to objectively
examine the question at issue based on the text of the concerned provision[s] as well as on the evidence before
[the Panel]”. (Panel Report, para. 7.684(footnote omitted)) We see no error in the Panel’s approach.”
3.
Apreciação de uma queixa que não é feita pelo demandante
111
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products (Chile – Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/R,
para. 173
Em Chile - Price Band System, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que o painel errou ao ter apreciado uma queixa
que não tinha sido feita pelo demandante.
Para. 173. “In this case, the Panel made a finding on a claim that was not made by Argentina. Having
determined that the duties resulting from Chile’s price band system could not be assessed under the first
sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, the Panel then proceeded to examine the measure under the
second sentence of that provision. In so doing, the Panel assessed a provision that was not a part ‘of the matter
before it’. As we have explained, the terms of reference were broad enough to have included a claim under the
second sentence of Article II:1(b). However, Argentina did not articulate a claim under that sentence; nor did
Argentina submit any arguments on the consistency of Chile’s price band system with the second sentence.
Therefore, as with our finding in US - Certain EC Products, the second sentence of Article II:1(b) was not the
subject of a claim before the Panel. Because it made a finding on a provision that was not before it, the Panel,
therefore, did not make an objective assessment of the matter before it, as required by Article 11. Rather, the
Panel made a finding on a matter that was not before it. In doing so, the Panel acted ultra petita and
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.” (nota de rodapé removida)
4.
Avaliação objetiva dos fatos do caso
a) “Ônus da prova: Princípios gerais”
(i) Regral geral: o ônus da prova recai sobre a parte que faz a afirmação na reclamação, na defesa,
ou sobre fato
* Ônus da prova recai sobre aquele que faz a alegação
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS33/AB/R, para. 14
Em US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, o Órgão de Apelação asseverou que o ônus da prova recai sobre a parte,
seja demandante ou demandado, que faz a afirmação numa queixa ou defesa. Ver, também, Turkey Textiles
(WT/DS34/R, para. 9.57), Argentina - Textiles and Apparel (WT/DS56/R, paras. 6.34/6.40) e EC - Hormones
(WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 98).
Para. 14. “[W]e find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it
incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly
surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and
consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the
respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in
civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether
complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces
evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party,
who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. In the context of the GATT 1994
and the WTO Agreement, precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish
such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.”
(notas de rodapé retiradas)
(ii) Princípios concernentes ao ônus da prova
112
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples (Japan Apples), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS245/AB/R, para. 157
Em Japan - Apples, o Órgão de Apelação enfatizou a distinção entre os princípios relativos ao ônus da prova.
Para. 157. “It is important to distinguish, on the one hand, the principle that the complainant must establish a
prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of a covered agreement from, on the other hand, the
principle that the party that asserts a fact is responsible for providing proof thereof. In fact, the principles are
distinct.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)
* Padrões jurídicos internacionais ínsitos ao ônus da prova – aplicação nos litígios na OMC
Complaint (US - Large Civil Aircraft) (2nd complaint), Demandante: CE, WT/DS353/AB/R, para. 7.13
Em US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), o Órgão de Apelação expressou que os padrões jurídicos
internacionais afetos ao ônus da prova incidem nos procedimentos de solução de controvérsias da OMC.
Para. 7.13. “We have also kept in mind that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective
refutation by the other party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the party presenting the
prima facie case. Finally, we recall that the Appellate Body has also stated that “{a} complaining party may
not simply submit evidence and expect the panel to divine from it a claim of WTO-inconsistency. Nor may a
complaining party simply allege facts without relating them to its legal arguments”. The normal international
legal standards governing the discharge of the burden of proof unquestionably apply to the WTO dispute
settlement procedures as an important element of its functions concerning dispute resolution under the rule of
law and due process.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)
* Quando provas e argumentos estão em estado de equilíbrio (“equipoise”)
Relatório do painel em United States - Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974 (US - Section 301 Trade
Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS152/R, para. 7.14
Em US - Section 301 Trade Act, o painel consignou que, havendo um estado de equilíbrio entre todas as
provas e argumentos (“equipoise”), a dúvida beneficiaria a parte reclamada. Ver ainda: Panel Reports, US 1916 Act (EC), paras. 6.38 e 6.58; US - 1916 Act (Japan), paras. 6.25 e 6.57; Guatemala - Cement II, paras.
1.38 e 8.196; Argentina - Hides and Leather, para. 11.2; US - Shrimp (Article 21.5 - Malaysia), para. 5.19; US
- Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 8.18; EC - Sardines, para. 7.49; e US - Textiles Rules of Origin, para.
6.17.
Para. 7.14. “Since, in this case, both parties have submitted extensive facts and arguments in respect of the EC
claims, our task will essentially be to balance all evidence on record and decide whether the EC, as party
bearing the original burden of proof, has convinced us of the validity of its claims. In case of uncertainty, i.e.
in case all the evidence and arguments remain in equipoise, we have to give the benefit of the doubt to the US
as defending party.”
* Estabelecimento de um caso ‘prima facie’
113
Em EC - Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação especificou quando há um caso prima facie. Tal entendimento foi
esposado também pelo aludido órgão julgador em Japan - Agricultural Products II, paras. 98 e 136, e Japan Apples, para. 159.
Para. 104. “It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services (US - Gambling), Demandante: Antígua e Barbuda, WT/DS285/R, paras.
140-141
Em US - Gambling, o Órgão de Apelação observou que um painel erra se julgar a favor do demandante
quando este não lograr demonstrar que o caso é prima facie. Ver, igualmente, US - Zeroing (EC)
(WT/DS294/AB/R, para. 217).
Paras. 140. “A prima facie case must be based on “evidence and legal argument” put forward by the
complaining party in relation to each of the elements of the claim. A complaining party may not simply submit
evidence and expect the panel to divine from it a claim of WTO-inconsistency. Nor may a complaining party
simply allege facts without relating them to its legal arguments.”
Para. 141. “In the context of the sufficiency of panel requests under Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Appellate
Body has found that a panel request:
(…) must plainly connect the challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) of the
covered agreements claimed to have been infringed, so that the respondent party is
aware of the basis for the alleged nullification or impairment of the complaining party’s
benefits.
Given that such a requirement applies to panel requests at the outset of a panel
proceeding, we are of the view that a prima facie case — made in the course of
submissions to the panel — demands no less of the complaining party. The evidence
and arguments underlying a prima facie case, therefore, must be sufficient to identify
the challenged measure and its basic import, identify the relevant WTO provision and
obligation contained therein, and explain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the
measure with that provision.”
(iii) Fontes de prova para o estabelecimento de um caso prima facie
* Litígio prima facie – demonstração casuística
Blouses from India (US – Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS33/AB/R, para. 217
Em US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, Órgão de Apelação decidiu que a prova para a demonstração de um litígio
prima facie deve ser averiguada casuisticamente.
Para. 217. “… will vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.”
* O julgador deve examinar todas as provas que lhe são submetidas
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Korea Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy
Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: CE, WT/DS98/AB/R, paras. 137-138
114
Em Korea – Dairy, a delegação da República da Coreia do Sul aduziu que o painel deveria, ao verificar se a
demandante, CE, tinha conseguido estabelecer um caso prima facie, ter se limitado a examinar apenas as
provas da demandante. O Órgão de Apelação discordou, afirmando que o julgador deve perscrutar todas as
provas que lhe são submetidas.
Paras. 137. “Korea appears to suggest that the Panel, in evaluating Korea’s actions leading up to the adoption
of its safeguard measure, should have looked solely to the evidence submitted by the European Communities
as complaining party. We do not agree with Korea in this respect. It is, of course, true that the European
Communities has the onus of establishing its claim that Korea’s safeguard measure is inconsistent with the
requirements of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. However, under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel is
charged with the mandate to determine the facts of the case and to arrive at factual findings. In carrying out
this mandate, a panel has the duty to examine and consider all the evidence before it, not just the evidence
submitted by one or the other party, and to evaluate the relevance and probative force of each piece thereof. …
The determination of the significance and weight properly pertaining to the evidence presented by one party is
a function of a panel’s appreciation of the probative value of all the evidence submitted by both parties
considered together.”
Para. 138. “We note that in examining the [Report of the Korean Authority], the Panel did not do anything out
of the ordinary. The European Communities’ claim was that Korea had disregarded certain requirements of
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards in its actions preceding and accompanying the adoption of its
safeguard measure. The [Report of the Korean Authority] was issued by the Korean authorities which, inter
alia, investigated and evaluated the assertions of serious injury to the domestic industry involved. Thus, that
Report was clearly relevant to the task of the Panel to determine the facts, and the Panel was within its
discretionary authority in deciding whether or not, or to what extent, it should rely upon the Report in
ascertaining the facts relating to Korea’s injury determination.”
* Estabelecimento de um caso prima facie como medida inevitável
Em EC - Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou que o painel errou ao considerar que os demandantes não
teriam de provar que se cuidava de um litígio prima facie e inverter o ônus da prova para o reclamado. Vide,
igualmente, Japan - Agricultural Products II (WT/DS76/AB/R, paras. 122 e 130).
Para. 109. “In accordance with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, the Panel should have begun
the analysis of each legal provision by examining whether the United States and Canada had presented
evidence and legal arguments sufficient to demonstrate that the EC measures were inconsistent with the
obligations assumed by the European Communities under each Article of the SPS Agreement addressed by the
Panel … Only after such a prima facie determination had been made by the Panel may the onus be shifted to
the European Communities to bring forward evidence and arguments to disprove the complaining party’s
claim.”
* Artigo 13, do DSU, e caso ‘prima facie’
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan Agricultural Products II), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS76/AB/R, paras. 127-130
Em Japan – Agricultural Products II, o Órgão de Apelação definiu que, embora o painel tenha amplo direito à
busca de informação, com base no artigo 13 do DSU, isto não significa que o demandante fique desincumbido
115
de provar que se trata de um litígio prima facie.
Paras. 127. “Article 13 of the DSU allows a panel to seek information from any relevant source and to
consult individual experts or expert bodies to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter before it. In
our Report in United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (‘United States —
Shrimp’), we noted the ‘comprehensive nature’ of this authority, and stated that this authority is ‘indispensably
necessary’ to enable a panel to discharge its duty imposed by Article 11 of the DSU to “make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements …’.”
Para. 128. “Furthermore, we note that the present dispute is a dispute under the SPS Agreement. Article 11.2
of the SPS Agreement explicitly instructs panels in disputes under this Agreement involving scientific and
technical issues to ‘seek advice from experts’.”
Para. 129. “Article 13 of the DSU and Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement suggest that panels have a
significant investigative authority. However, this authority cannot be used by a panel to rule in favour of a
complaining party which has not established a prima facie case of inconsistency based on specific legal claims
asserted by it. A panel is entitled to seek information and advice from experts and from any other relevant
source it chooses, pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU and, in an SPS case, Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement,
to help it to understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments made by the parties, but not to
make the case for a complaining party.”
Para. 130. “In the present case, the Panel was correct to seek information and advice from experts to help it to
understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments made by the United States and Japan with
regard to the alleged violation of Article 5.6. The Panel erred, however, when it used that expert information
and advice as the basis for a finding of inconsistency with Article 5.6, since the United States did not establish
a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 5.6 based on claims relating to the ‘determination of sorption
levels’. The United States did not even argue that the ‘determination of sorption levels’ is an alternative
measure which meets the three elements under Article 5.6.”
(iv) Estabelecimento de presunções
Relatório do painel em Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey –
Textiles), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/R, para. 6.39
Em Turkey - Textiles, o painel assentou que é viável o estabelecimento, nos julgamentos em tribunais
internacionais, de premissas a partir de fatos relevantes, quando não se consegue coligir provas diretas. Ver,
também: Canada – Aircraft (WT/DS70/AB/R, para. 198).
Para. 6.39. “For international disputes it seems normal that tribunals, in evaluating claims, are given
considerable flexibility. Inference (or judicial presumption) is a useful means at the disposal of international
tribunals for evaluating claims. In situations where direct evidence is not available, relying on inferences
drawn from relevant facts of each case facilitates the duty of international tribunals in determining whether or
not the burden of proof has been met. It would therefore appear to be the prerogative of an international
tribunal, in each given case, to determine whether applicable and unrebutted inferences are sufficient for
satisfying the burden of proof. In this respect, the International Court of Justice, in some cases, found it
difficult to assert stringent rules of evidence.”
* Presunções adversas
116
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat
Gluten from the European Communities (US - Wheat Gluten), Demandante: CE, WT/DS166/AB/R, paras.
173-176
Em US - Wheat Gluten, a demandante, em sede de apelação, alegou que o painel cometeu um erro ao não ter
estabelecido uma presunção adversa ao demandado, tendo se recusado a apresentar a informação requerida
pela parte contrária. O Órgão de Apelação não acolheu a tese da demandante. Ver ainda: Canada - Aircraft
(WT/DS70/AB/R, paras. 202-203 e 205).
Para. 173. “We … characterized the drawing of inferences as a ‘discretionary’ task falling within a panel’s
duties under Article 11 of the DSU. In Canada - Aircraft, which involved a similar factual situation, the panel
did not draw any inferences ‘adverse’ to Canada’s position. On appeal, we held that there was no basis to find
that the panel had improperly exercised its discretion since ‘the full ensemble of the facts on the record’
supported the panel’s conclusion.”
Para. 174. “In its appeal, the European Communities places considerable emphasis on the failure of the Panel
to draw ‘adverse’ inferences from the refusal of the United States to provide information requested by the
Panel. As we emphasized in Canada - Aircraft, under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel must draw inferences on
the basis of all of the facts of record relevant to the particular determination to be made. Where a party refuses
to provide information requested by a panel under Article 13.1 of the DSU, that refusal will be one of the
relevant facts of record, and indeed an important fact, to be taken into account in determining the appropriate
inference to be drawn. However, if a panel were to ignore or disregard other relevant facts, it would fail to
make an ‘objective assessment’ under Article 11 of the DSU. In this case, as the Panel observed, there were
other facts of record that the Panel was required to include in its ‘objective assessment’. Accordingly, we
reject the European Communities’ arguments to the extent that they suggest that the Panel erred in not drawing
‘adverse’ inferences simply from the refusal of the United States to provide certain information requested from
it by the Panel under Article 13.1 of the DSU.”
Para. 175. “In reviewing the inferences the Panel drew from the facts of record, our task on appeal is not to
redo afresh the Panel’s assessment of those facts, and decide for ourselves what inferences we would draw
from them. Rather, we must determine whether the Panel improperly exercised its discretion, under Article 11,
by failing to draw certain inferences from the facts before it. In asking us to conduct such a review, an
appellant must indicate clearly the manner in which a panel has improperly exercised its discretion. Taking
into account the full ensemble of the facts, the appellant should, at least: identify the facts on the record from
which the Panel should have drawn inferences; indicate the factual or legal inferences that the panel should
have drawn from those facts; and, finally, explain why the failure of the panel to exercise its discretion by
drawing these inferences amounts to an error of law under Article 11 of the DSU.”
Para. 176. “In this appeal, the European Communities makes, what we regard to be, broad and general
statements that the Panel erred by not drawing ‘adverse’ inferences from the facts. Besides the fact that the
United States refused to provide certain information requested by the Panel under Article 13.1 of the DSU, the
European Communities does not identify, in any specific manner, which facts supported a particular inference.
Nor does the European Communities identify what inferences the Panel should have drawn from those facts,
other than that the inferences should have been favourable to the European Communities. Besides the simple
refusal of the United States to provide information requested by the Panel, which we have already addressed,
the European Communities does not offer any other specific reasons why the Panel’s failure to exercise its
discretion by drawing the inferences identified by the European Communities amounts to an error of law under
Article 11 of the DSU. Therefore, we decline this ground of appeal.” (notas de rodapé retiradas)
* Presunções adversas e aplicação de regras ordinárias acerca do ônus da prova
117
Complaint (US - Large Civl Aircraft) (2nd complaint), Demandante: CE, WT/DS353/R, para. 7.38
Em US - Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), as CE desejavam que o painel estabelecesse presunções
contrárias aos EUA, por não terem os EUA cooperado na divulgação de certos dados relativos à quantia de
supostos subsídios. O painel, então, alegou que seria desnecessária a aplicação de presunções, já que seria
possível deslindar a questão debatida mediante recurso às regras ordinárias acerca do ônus da prova.
Para. 7.38. “For each of the challenged measures, the European Communities has presented the Panel with
evidence and arguments in support of its estimate of the amount of the subsidy allegedly provided to Boeing.
Where the United States disputes the European Communities’ estimate of the amount of an alleged subsidy, it
has provided the Panel with its own evidence and/or arguments to support its own, generally lower, estimate.
If the Panel were to consider the evidence and/or arguments advanced by the United States to be insufficient to
rebut the evidence and arguments presented by the European Communities, then the Panel would accept the
European Communities’ estimate. In such a situation, the Panel would accept the European Communities’
estimate not by virtue of United States “non-cooperation”, and not as a matter of drawing “adverse
inferences”, but simply by virtue of the operation of the normal principles regarding the burden of proof in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Likewise, if the Panel were to consider the evidence and/or arguments
advanced by the United States to be sufficient to rebut the evidence and arguments presented by the European
Communities, then the Panel would accept the United States’ estimate not by virtue of United States
“cooperation”, but simply by virtue of the operation of the normal principles regarding the burden of proof in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings.”
(v) Ônus impossível da prova
* Desnecessidade de se estabelecer um caso prima facie de violação de paralelismo
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular
Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante: Coreia do Sul,
WT/DS202/AB/R, para. 187
Em US - Line Pipe, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o painel errou ao impor um ônus impossível de prova à
Coreia do Sul, no que tange a um item específico do litígio.
Para. 187. “In our view, Korea has demonstrated that the USITC considered imports from all sources in its
investigation. Korea has also shown that exports from Canada and Mexico were excluded from the safeguard
measure at issue. And, in our view, this is enough to have made a prima facie case of the absence of
parallelism in the line pipe measure. Contrary to what the Panel stated, we do not consider that it was
necessary for Korea to address the information set out in the USITC Report, or in particular, in footnote 168 in
order to establish a prima facie case of violation of parallelism. Moreover, to require Korea to rebut the
information in the USITC Report, and in particular, in footnote 168, would impose an impossible burden on
Korea because, as the exporting country, Korea would not have had any of the relevant data to conduct its own
analysis of the imports.”
* Exceções gerais do GATT 1994 e do GATS
Gambling and Betting Services (US - Gambling), Demandante: Antígua e Bermuda, WT/DS285/AB/R,
para. 309
118
Em US - Gambling, o Órgão de Apelação decidiu que as exceções gerais do GATT 1994 e do GATS não
podem ser interpretadas a ponto de acarretar um ônus da prova impossível à parte que invoca a exceção.
Para. 309. “[T]he responding party must show that its measure is ‘necessary’ to achieve objectives relating to
public morals or public order. In our view, however, it is not the responding party’s burden to show, in the first
instance, that there are no reasonably available alternatives to achieve its objectives. In particular, a responding
party need not identify the universe of less trade-restrictive alternative measures and then show that none of
those measures achieves the desired objective. The WTO agreements do not contemplate such an
impracticable and, indeed, often impossible burden.”
* Impossibilidade de prova de fato negativo
1) Fato negativo não se prova
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan Agricultural Products II), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 137
Em Japan - Agricultural Products II, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que a prova de fato negativo equivale a
um ônus impossível da prova. No mesmo sentido, ver Guatemala - Cement II (WT/DS156/R, para. 8.196) e
US - Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 - Canada) (WT/DS257/AB/RW, para. 130).
Para. 137. “[W]e disagree with the United States that the Panel imposed on the United States an impossible
and, therefore, erroneous burden of proof by requiring it to prove a negative, namely, that there are no relevant
studies and reports which support Japan’s varietal testing requirement. In our view, it would have been
sufficient for the United States to raise a presumption that there are no relevant studies or reports. Raising a
presumption that there are no relevant studies or reports is not an impossible burden. The United States could
have requested Japan, pursuant to Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement, to provide “an explanation of the reasons”
for its varietal testing requirement, in particular, as it applies to apricots, pears, plums and quince. Japan
would, in that case, be obliged to provide such explanation. The failure of Japan to bring forward scientific
studies or reports in support of its varietal testing requirement as it applies to apricots, pears, plums and
quince, would have been a strong indication that there are no such studies or reports. The United States could
also have asked the Panel’s experts specific questions as to the existence of relevant scientific studies or
reports or it could have submitted to the Panel the opinion of experts consulted by it on this issue. The United
States, however, did not submit any evidence relating to apricots, pears, plums and quince.”
2) Exigência de prova de fato negativo - TRIPS
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada Pharmaceutical Patents), Demandante: CE, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.60
Em Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents, o painel entendeu que um dos requisitos para a exceção prevista no
artigo 30 do TRIPS, envolve a prova de fato negativo.
Para. 7.60. “The third condition of Article 30 is the requirement that the proposed exception must not
“unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate
interests of third parties”. Although Canada, as the party asserting the exception provided for in Article 30,
bears the burden of proving compliance with the conditions of that exception, the order of proof is complicated
by the fact that the condition involves proving a negative. One cannot demonstrate that no legitimate interest
of the patent owner has been prejudiced until one knows what claims of legitimate interest can be made.
Likewise, the weight of legitimate third party interests cannot be fully appraised until the legitimacy and
119
weight of the patent owner’s legitimate interests, if any, are defined. Accordingly, without disturbing the
ultimate burden of proof, the Panel chose to analyse the issues presented by the third condition of Article 30
according to the logical sequence in which those issues became defined.”
* Dificuldade na coleta de informações e ônus da prova
1) Obtenção de prova e demonstração das alegações da parte
Relatório do painel em Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of
Finished Leather (Argentina – Hides and Leather), Demandante: CE, WT/DS155/R, para. 11.51
Em Argentina – Hides and Leather, o painel concluiu que, embora a obtenção da prova possa ser difícil para a
parte, não fica esta desobrigada de demonstrar prova suficiente das suas alegações.
Para. 11.51. “... [i]t may be the case that it will be difficult for one Member to prove that there is a cartel
operating within the jurisdiction of another Member. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the need for sufficient
proof of a party’s allegations simply because obtaining such proof is difficult.”
2) Alocação do ônus da prova
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines (EC Sardines), Demandante: Peru, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 281
Em EC - Sardines, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que não há, no sistema de solução de controvérsias da
OMC, regra acerca da alocação de ônus da prova com base na comparação entre as dificuldades que
eventualmente são encontradas pelas partes ao coletarem dados para provar as suas argumentações. Entretanto,
em US/Canada - Continued Suspension (WT/DS321/R, para. 361), o Órgão de Apelação discorreu acerca da
alocação do ônus da prova em queixas feitas sob o artigo 22.8 do DSU.
Para. 281. “The degree of difficulty in substantiating a claim or a defence may vary according to the facts of
the case and the provision at issue. For example, on the one hand, it may be relatively straightforward for a
complainant to show that a particular measure has a text that establishes an explicit and formal discrimination
between like products and is, therefore, inconsistent with the national treatment obligation in Article III of the
GATT 1994. On the other hand, it may be more difficult for a complainant to substantiate a claim of a
violation of Article III of the GATT 1994 if the discrimination does not flow from the letter of the legal text of
the measure, but rather is a result of the administrative practice of the domestic authorities of the respondent in
applying that measure. But, in both of those situations, the complainant must prove its claim. There is nothing
in the WTO dispute settlement system to support the notion that the allocation of the burden of proof should
be decided on the basis of a comparison between the respective difficulties that may possibly be encountered
by the complainant and the respondent in collecting information to prove a case.”
(vi) Colaboração devida entre as partes
Relatório do painel em Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other
Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, paras. 6.40 e 6.58
Em Argentina - Textiles and Apparel, o painel discorreu acerca do ônus da prova e do compromisso de
colaboração dos litigantes em apresentar fatos e prova ao órgão julgador.
120
Paras. 6.40. “Another incidental rule to the burden of proof is the requirement for collaboration of the parties
in the presentation of the facts and evidence to the panel and especially the role of the respondent in that
process. It is often said that the idea of peaceful settlement of disputes before international tribunals is largely
based on the premise of co-operation of the litigating parties. In this context the most important result of the
rule of collaboration appears to be that the adversary is obligated to provide the tribunal with relevant
documents which are in its sole possession. This obligation does not arise until the claimant has done its best
to secure evidence and has actually produced some prima facie evidence in support of its case. It should be
stressed, however, that “discovery’ of documents, in its common-law system sense, is not available in
international procedures’.”
Para. 6.58. “(…) Before an international tribunal, parties do have a duty to collaborate in doing their best to
submit to the adjudicatory body all the evidence in their possession.”
(vii) Ônus da prova e sua aplicação a situações específicas
* Ônus da prova no que se refere a questões do Direito da OMC
1) Ônus da prova – questões de Direito e interpretação jurídica
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS246/AB/R,
para. 105
Em EC - Tariff Preferences, o Órgão de Apelação observou que o ônus da prova não é aplicável a questões de
direito ou a interpretação jurídica. Vide, igualmente: EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar (WT/DS266/R, para.
7.121 e nota de rodapé 437) e US - Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 - Japan) (WT/DS322/RW, para. 7.8).
Para. 105. “Consistent with the principle of jura novit curia, it is not the responsibility of the European
Communities to provide us with the legal interpretation to be given to a particular provision in the Enabling
Clause; instead, the burden of the European Communities is to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate its
assertion that the Drug Arrangements comply with the requirements of the Enabling Clause.”
2) Definição de jura novit curia
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS246/AB/R,
nota de rodapé 220
Em EC - Tariff Preferences, o Órgão de Apelação mencionou a definição de jura novit curia dada pela CIJ.
Nota de rodapé 220. “It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply the relevant law in the given
circumstances of the case, the burden of establishing or proving rules of international law cannot be imposed
upon any of the parties, for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court”.
* Ônus da prova e significado do Direito doméstico
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany (US - Carbon Steel), Demandante: CE, WT/DS213/AB/R,
para. 157
121
Em US - Carbon Steel, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que aquele que alega que o direito doméstico da outra
parte colide com obrigações contraídas em tratados, deve produzir prova da finalidade e significado de tal
direito.
Para. 157. “The party asserting that another party’s municipal law, as such, is inconsistent with relevant treaty
obligations bears the burden of introducing evidence as to the scope and meaning of such law to substantiate
that assertion. Such evidence will typically be produced in the form of the text of the relevant legislation or
legal instruments, which may be supported, as appropriate, by evidence of the consistent application of such
laws, the pronouncements of domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the opinions of legal experts and
the writings of recognized scholars. The nature and extent of the evidence required to satisfy the burden of
proof will vary from case to case.”
* Ônus da prova nos painéis sob o artigo 21.3(c) do DSU
1) Redução do prazo de quinze meses previsto no artigo 21.3(c) do DSU – ônus das partes de convencer o
painelista
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas (EC - Bananas III) (Article 21.3(c)), Demandantes: Equador, EUA, Guatemala, Honduras e
México, WT/DS27/15, paras. 18-19
Em EC - Bananas III (Article 21.3(c)), o painel entendeu que caberia às partes convencê-lo de que haveria
circunstâncias particulares no caso, a fim de justificar um período mais curto do que aquele estipulado na
diretriz do artigo 21.3(c) do DSU (quinze meses). Ver também: relatório do painel em Australia - Salmon
(Article 21.3(c)) (para. 30); Canada - Autos (Article 21.3)(c), para. 39; US - 1916 Act (Article 21.3)(c), paras.
38-39; e Chile - Price Band System (Article 21.3)(c), para. 38.
Para. 18. “When the ‘reasonable period of time’ is determined through binding arbitration, as provided for
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, this provision states that a ‘guideline’ for the arbitrator should be that the
‘reasonable period of time’ should not exceed 15 months from the date of the adoption of a panel or Appellate
Body report. Article 21.3(c) of the DSU also provides, however, that the ‘reasonable period of time’ may be
shorter or longer than 15 months, depending upon the ‘particular circumstances’.”
Para. 19. “The Complaining Parties have not persuaded me that there are ‘particular circumstances’ in this
case to justify a shorter period of time than stipulated by the guideline in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. At the
same time, the complexity of the implementation process, demonstrated by the European Communities, would
suggest adherence to the guideline, with a slight modification, so that the ‘reasonable period’ of time for
implementation would expire by 1 January 1999.”
2) Alteração do prazo de quinze meses previsto no artigo 21.3(c) do DSU – ônus da parte que aduz a
existência de circunstâncias particulares
(Hormones) (EC - Hormones) (Article 21.3)(c), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/15, para. 27
Em EC - Hormones (Article 21.3)(c), o painelista entendeu que cabe à parte que alega a existência de
circunstâncias particulares, no caso o ônus da prova, justificar a redução ou o aumento do prazo de quinze
meses previsto no artigo 21.3(c) do DSU.
122
Para. 27. “In my view, the party seeking to prove that there are ‘particular circumstances’ justifying a shorter
or a longer time has the burden of proof under Article 21.3(c). In this arbitration, therefore, the onus is on the
European Communities to demonstrate that there are particular circumstances which call for a reasonable
period of time of 39 months, and it is likewise up to the United States and Canada to demonstrate that there are
particular circumstances which lead to the conclusion that 10 months is reasonable.”
* Impugnação ao prazo sugerido pela outra parte
Relatório do painel em Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Colombia - Ports
of Entry) (Article 21.3)(c), Demandante: Panamá, WT/DS366/13, para. 67
Em Colombia - Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), o painel basicamente seguiu a decisão do painelista em EC Hormones (Article 21.3)(c), WT/DS26/15, para. 27. Todavia, acrescentou que também cabe à parte que não
aquela incumbida de implementar a medida, a produção de prova acerca da alegação de que o período
proposto pela outra parte não é razoável.
Para. 67. “I am guided by previous arbitrators' awards that place the burden on the implementing Member to
demonstrate that, if immediate compliance is impracticable, the period of time it proposes constitutes a
“reasonable period of time”. However, this does not absolve the other Member from producing evidence in
support of its contention that the period of time requested by the implementing Member is not “reasonable”,
and a shorter period of time for implementation is warranted.” (nota de rodapé removida)
* Ônus da prova e procedimentos sob o abrigo do artigo 21.5 do DSU
Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System) (Article 21.5 - Argentina), Demandante:
Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/RW, para. 136
Em Chile - Price Band System (Article 21.5 - Argentina), foi assentado pelo Órgão de Apelação que as regras
gerais acerca do ônus da prova incidem nos procedimentos sob o artigo 21.5 do DSU.
Para. 136. “Neither Chile nor Argentina suggests that the general rules on burden of proof, which imply that a
responding party’s measure will be treated as WTO-consistent unless proven otherwise, do not apply in
proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU. We observe, in this regard, that Article 21.5 proceedings do not
occur in isolation from the original proceedings, but that both proceedings form part of a continuum of events.
The text of Article 21.5 expressly links the “measures taken to comply” with the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB concerning the original measure. A panel’s examination of a measure taken to comply cannot,
therefore, be undertaken in abstraction from the findings by the original panel and the Appellate Body adopted
by the DSB. Such findings identify the WTO-inconsistency with respect to the original measure, and a panel’s
examination of a measure taken to comply must be conducted with due cognizance of this background. Thus,
the adopted findings from the original proceedings may well figure prominently in proceedings under Article
21.5, especially where the measure taken to comply is alleged to be inconsistent with WTO law in ways
similar to the original measure. In our view, these considerations may influence the way in which the
complaining party presents its case, and they may also be relevant to the manner in which an Article 21.5
panel determines whether that party has discharged its burden of proof and established a prima facie case.”
* Ônus da prova e painel (artigo 22.6 do DSU)
1) Geral
123
Relatório do painel sob o artigo 22.6, no caso European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones) (US) (EC) e (EC - Hormones) (Canada) (EC), Demandantes:
EUA e Canadá, WT/DS26/ARB e WT/DS48/ARB, paras. 9-11
Em EC - Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 - EC) e EC - Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 - EC), ficou decidido,
pelos painelistas, que caberia às CE a prova de que a proposta norte-americana era incompatível com o artigo
22.4 do DSU, uma vez que era Bruxelas que estava alegando a desconformidade da proposta de Washington.
Ver ainda: a decisão dos painelistas em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 - EC) (paras. 37-38); Brazi
l- Aircraft (Article 22.6 - Brazil) (para. 2.8 e nota de rodapé 12); US - FSC (Article 22.6 - US) (para. 2.10 e
nota de rodapé 18); e US - 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 - US) (paras. 3.2, 3.3 e 3.5).
Para. 9. “WTO Members, as sovereign entities, can be presumed to act in conformity with their WTO
obligations. A party claiming that a Member has acted inconsistently with WTO rules bears the burden of
proving that inconsistency. The act at issue here is the US proposal to suspend concessions. The WTO rule in
question is Article 22.4 prescribing that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of nullification and
impairment. The EC challenges the conformity of the US proposal with the said WTO rule. It is thus for the
EC to prove that the US proposal is inconsistent with Article 22.4. Following well-established WTO
jurisprudence, this means that it is for the EC to submit arguments and evidence sufficient to establish a prima
facie case or presumption that the level of suspension proposed by the US is not equivalent to the level of
nullification and impairment caused by the EC hormone ban. Once the EC has done so, however, it is for the
US to submit arguments and evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption. Should all arguments and evidence
remain in equipoise, the EC, as the party bearing the original burden of proof, would lose.”
Para. 10. “The same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged; in this case, for example,
where a party relies on a decrease of beef consumption in the EC or the use of edible beef offal as pet food. It
is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence.”
Para. 11. “The duty that rests on all parties to produce evidence and to collaborate in presenting evidence to
the arbitrators — an issue to be distinguished from the question of who bears the burden of proof — is crucial
in Article 22 arbitration proceedings. The EC is required to submit evidence showing that the proposal is not
equivalent. However, at the same time and as soon as it can, the US is required to come forward with evidence
explaining how it arrived at its proposal and showing why its proposal is equivalent to the trade impairment it
has suffered. Some of the evidence — such as data on trade with third countries, export capabilities and
affected exporters —may, indeed, be in the sole possession of the US, being the party that suffered the trade
impairment.”
* Ônus da prova e painel sob o artigo 4.11 do Acordo de Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias
1) Princípios gerais do ônus da prova - Aplicação
Relatório do painel no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft) (Article
22.6 - Brazil), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, para. 2.8
Em Brazil - Aircraft (Article 22.6 - Brazil), os painelistas entenderam que os princípios gerais do ônus da
prova também se aplicam nos painéis do artigo 4.11 do ASMC.
Para. 2.8. “In application of the well-established WTO practice on the burden of proof in dispute resolution, it
is for the Member claiming that another has acted inconsistently with the WTO rules to prove that
inconsistency … Brazil challenges the conformity of this proposal [from Canada] with Article 22 of the DSU
and Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. It is therefore up to Brazil to submit evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie case or ‘presumption’ that the countermeasures that Canada proposes to take are not ‘appropriate’.
124
Once Brazil has done so, it is for Canada to submit evidence sufficient to rebut that ‘presumption’. Should the
evidence remain in equipoise on a particular claim, the Arbitrators would conclude that the claim has not been
established. Should all evidence remain in equipoise, Brazil, as the party bearing the original burden of proof,
would lose the case.” (nota de rodapé retirada)
2) Normas de ônus da prova - Resumo
Relatório dos painéis em Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft (Canada Aircraft Credits and Guarantees) (Article 22.6 - Canada), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS222/ARB, paras.
2.6-2.8
O painel sob o artigo 22.6, em Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, resumiu as normas de ônus da prova
na hipótese de painel sob o artigo 4.11 do ASMC.
Para. 2.6. “We recall that the general principles applicable to burden of proof, as stated by the Appellate
Body, require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement by another Member must
assert and prove its claim. We find these principles to be also of relevance to arbitration proceedings under
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement. In this procedure, we thus agree that it is for Canada, which has
challenged the consistency of Brazil’s proposed level of counter-measures under Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement, to bear the burden of proving that the proposed amount is not consistent with that provision. It is
therefore up to Canada to submit evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case or ‘presumption’ that the
countermeasures that Brazil proposes taking are not ‘appropriate’. Once Canada has done so, it is for Brazil to
submit evidence sufficient to rebut that ‘presumption’. Should the evidence remain in equipoise on a particular
claim, the Arbitrator would conclude that the claim has not been established.”
Para. 2.7. “We note, however, that it is generally for each party asserting a fact, whether complainant or
respondent, to provide proof thereof. In this respect, therefore, it is also for Brazil to provide evidence for the
facts which it asserts.”
Para. 2.8. “Finally, both parties have claimed that, in respect of certain issues, the other party is in sole
possession of the information necessary to establish the appropriateness of the proposed level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations. In this regard, we recall that both parties generally have a duty to cooperate
in these arbitral proceedings in order to assist us in fulfilling our mandate, through the provision of relevant
information. This is why, even though Canada bears the original burden of proof, we also requested Brazil to
submit a ‘methodology paper’ describing how it arrived at the level of countermeasures it proposes. Later, we
asked it to come forward with evidence supporting various factual assertions made in its ‘methodology paper”
(notas de rodapé suprimidas)
b) “Padrão de revisão”
(i) Padrão de revisão aplicado pelos painéis quando da revisão de conclusões fáticas das
autoridades nacionais no âmbito de acordos específicos
* Acordo de Salvaguardas
Vide: artigo 14 do aludido acordo.
* Medida provisória de salvaguarda sob o Acordo de Têxteis e Vestuário
Vide: artigo 8.3 do mencionado acordo.
* Acordo de Subsídios
125
Vide: artigo 30 do acordo em questão.
* Acordo Antidumping
Vide: artigo 17.6 do referido acordo.
* Acordo sobre Aplicação de Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias
Vide: artigos 2.2, 5, 5.5 e 5.7 e anexo A(4) do acordo em questão.
* Acordo de Valoração Aduaneira
Vide: artigo 19 do acordo em apreço.
(ii) Padrão de revisão aplicado pelo Órgão de Apelação ao rever as conclusões fáticas de um
painel
* Pronunciamentos anteriores do Órgão de Apelação
para. 1.317
Em EC and certain member States - Large Civil Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação fez um apanhado geral de
pronunciamentos anteriores.
Para. 1317. “The Appellate Body has repeatedly emphasized that Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to
“consider all the evidence presented to it, assess its credibility, determine its weight, and ensure that its factual
findings have a proper basis in that evidence.” Within these parameters, “it is generally within the discretion of
the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings”, and panels “are not required to
accord to factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the parties”. In this regard, the
Appellate Body has stated that it will not “interfere lightly” with a panel’s fact-finding authority, and has also
emphasized that it “cannot base a finding of inconsistency under Article 11 simply on the conclusion that {it}
might have reached a different factual finding from the one the panel reached”. Instead, for a claim under
Article 11 to succeed, the Appellate Body must be satisfied that the panel has exceeded its authority as the trier
of facts. As an initial trier of facts, a panel must provide “reasoned and adequate explanations and coherent
reasoning”. It has to base its findings on a sufficient evidentiary basis on the Record, may not apply a double
standard of proof, and a panel’s treatment of the evidence must not “lack even-handedness”.” (notas de rodapé
omitidas)
* Distinção entre um erro na aplicação do Direito e um fracasso ao se fazer uma avaliação objetiva
1) Erro na aplicação do Direito – equívoco na avaliação objetiva
Aircraft (EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS316/AB/R,
para. 872
Em EC and certain member States - Large Civil Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação fez um paralelo entre erro na
aplicação do direito e fracasso ao se fazer uma avaliação objetiva.
126
Para. 872. “[A] failure to make a claim under Article 11 of the DSU on an issue that the Appellate Body
determines to concern a factual assessment may have serious consequences for the appellant. An appellant
may thus feel safer putting forward both a claim that the Panel erred in the application of a legal provision and
a claim that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts under Article 11 of the DSU. In most
cases, however, an issue will either be one of application of the law to the facts or an issue of the objective
assessment of facts, and not both.”
2) Dever de examinar todas as provas
Em EC - Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação observou que o dever de fazer uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos
compreende a apreciação das provas apresentadas e a elaboração de conclusões factuais com base nessas
provas. Ver, ainda os seguintes relatórios do Órgão de Apelação: Japan - Apples, para. 221; EC - Asbestos,
para. 161; Australia - Salmon, para. 266; EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), paras. 170, 177 e 181; EC Sardines, para. 299; EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 125; Japan - Agricultural Products II, paras. 141 e 142;
Korea - Dairy, para. 138; Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, paras. 161 e 162; US - Oil Country Tubular Goods
Sunset Reviews, para. 313; US - Gambling, para. 363; EC - Selected Customs Matters, para. 258; US - Carbon
Steel, para. 142; e Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, para. 185.
Para. 133. “... [t]he duty to make an objective assessment of the facts is, among other things, an obligation to
consider the evidence presented to a panel and to make factual findings on the basis of that evidence. The
deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the evidence submitted to a panel is incompatible with a panel’s
duty to make an objective assessment of the facts ... [t]he wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence
put before a panel is similarly inconsistent with an objective assessment of the facts.”
(iii) Discricionariedade do painel como julgador e avaliador dos fatos
* Discricionariedade do painel - provas
Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R, paras. 132, 135 e 138
Em EC - Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o peso e a credibilidade a serem dados às provas estão
inseridos na discricionariedade que o painel possui como julgador dos fatos. Vide também: US - Wheat Gluten
(WT/DS166/AB/R, para. 299); US - Carbon Steel (WT/DS213/AB/R, para. 142) e Japan - Apples
(WT/DS245/AB/R, paras. 221-222).
Paras. 132. “(...) [determination of the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to (that is, the
appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and parcel of the fact finding process and is, in principle, left
to the discretion of a panel as the trier of facts. (...)”
Para. 135. “It is generally within the discretion of the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in
making findings. (...)”
Para. 138. “[T]he Panel cannot realistically refer to all statements made by the experts advising it and should
be allowed a substantial margin of discretion as to which statements are useful to refer to explicitly.” (notas de
rodapé removidas)
127
* A discricionariedade do painel não é ilimitada
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea - Alcoholic Beverages),
Demandante: CE, WT/DS75/AB/R, paras. 161-162
Em Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a discricionariedade do painel ao sopesar
as provas não é ilimitada. Vide também: India - Quantitative Restrictions.
Para. 161. “The Panel’s examination and weighing of the evidence submitted fall, in principle, within the
scope of the Panel’s discretion as the trier of facts and, accordingly, outside the scope of appellate review. This
is true, for instance, with respect to the Panel’s treatment of the Dodwell Study, the Sofres Report and the
Nielsen Study. We cannot second-guess the Panel in appreciating either the evidentiary value of such studies
or the consequences, if any, of alleged defects in those studies. Similarly, it is not for us to review the relative
weight ascribed to evidence on such matters as marketing studies, methods of production, taste, colour, places
of consumption, consumption with ‘meals’ or with ‘snacks’ and prices.”
Para. 162. “A panel’s discretion as trier of facts is not, of course, unlimited. That discretion is always subject
to, and is circumscribed by, among other things, the panel’s duty to render an objective assessment of the
matter before it.”
* Fatos invocados – erro jurídico – não-caracterização
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,
para. 186
Em Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a decisão do painel de não
se apoiar em alguns dos fatos invocados por um dos litigantes não constitui, per se, um erro jurídico.
Para. 186. “As we said earlier, the Appellate Body has previously held that ‘it is generally within the
discretion of the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings’. Accordingly, the
Panel’s decision not to rely on some of the facts that the United States claims to have submitted would not, by
itself, constitute legal error. To succeed in its claim that the Panel disregarded the evidence submitted to it, the
United States would have to demonstrate that the Panel exceeded its discretion and that the Panel made, in
effect, an ‘egregious error’.” (notas de rodapé retiradas)
* Erro grosseiro – boa-fé de um painel
Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R, paras. 132-133, 135 e 138
Em EC – Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação definiu que ignorar, distorcer ou deturpar a análise de uma prova,
implica não somente um erro de julgamento na apreciação da prova, mas também erro grosseiro que põe em
cheque a boa-fé do painel. Ver, ainda: Japan - Apples (para. 222); Korea - Alcoholic Beverages (para. 164);
Japan - Agricultural Products II (paras. 141-142) e EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India) (para. 177).
Para. 132. “Whether or not a panel has made an objective assessment of the facts before it, as required by
Article 11 of the DSU, is also a legal question which, if properly raised on appeal, would fall within the scope
of appellate review.”
128
Para. 133. “The question which then arises is this: when may a panel be regarded as having failed to discharge
its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the facts before it? Clearly, not every
error in the appreciation of the evidence (although it may give rise to a question of law) may be characterized
as a failure to make an objective assessment of the facts. In the present appeal, the European Communities
repeatedly claims that the Panel disregarded or distorted or misrepresented the evidence submitted by the
European Communities and even the opinions expressed by the Panel’s own expert advisors. The duty to make
an objective assessment of the facts is, among other things, an obligation to consider the evidence presented to
a panel and to make factual findings on the basis of that evidence. The deliberate disregard of, or refusal to
consider, the evidence submitted to a panel is incompatible with a panel’s duty to make an objective
assessment of the facts. The wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence put before a panel is
similarly inconsistent with an objective assessment of the facts. ‘Disregard’ and ‘distortion’ and
‘misrepresentation’ of the evidence, in their ordinary signification in judicial and quasi-judicial processes,
imply not simply an error of judgment in the appreciation of evidence but rather an egregious error that calls
into question the good faith of a panel. A claim that a panel disregarded or distorted the evidence submitted to
it is, in effect, a claim that the panel, to a greater or lesser degree, denied the party submitting the evidence
fundamental fairness, or what in many jurisdictions is known as due process of law or natural justice.”
Para. 135. “[I]t is generally within the discretion of the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in
making findings.”
Para. 138. “The Panel cannot realistically refer to all statements made by the experts advising it and should be
allowed a substantial margin of discretion as to which statements are useful to refer to explicitly.”
* Obediência ao devido processo
1) Julgamento – queixa não feita – devido processo
para. 176
Em Chile - Price Band System, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o painel violou o artigo 11 do DSU ao
decidir sobre uma queixa que não tinha sido feita pelo demandante.
Para. 176. “Article 11 imposes duties on panels that extend beyond the requirement to assess evidence
objectively and in good faith … This requirement is, of course, an indispensable aspect of a panel’s task.
However, in making “an objective assessment of the matter before it”, a panel is also duty bound to ensure that
due process is respected. Due process is an obligation inherent in the WTO dispute settlement system. A panel
will fail in the duty to respect due process if it makes a finding on a matter that is not before it, because it will
thereby fail to accord to a party a fair right of response. In this case, because the Panel did not give Chile a fair
right of response on this issue, we find that the Panel failed to accord to Chile the due process rights to which
it is entitled under the DSU.”
c) “Questões específicas”
(i) Momento da apresentação das provas
* Prova fornecida dois dias antes da audiência - possibilidade
129
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,
Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textile and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56AB/R, paras.
79-81
Em Argentina - Textile and Apparel, a Argentina aduziu que o painel violou o artigo 11 do DSU ao permitir
que os EUA apresentássem prova dois dias antes do segundo encontro substantivo do painel com as partes. O
Órgão de Apelação, ao investigar os Procedimentos de Trabalho do painel, decidiu que inexistiu ofensa ao
citado artigo 11.
Para. 79. “Article 11 of the DSU does not establish time limits for the submission of evidence to a panel.
Article 12.1 of the DSU directs a panel to follow the Working Procedures set out in Appendix 3 of the DSU,
but at the same time authorizes a panel to do otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute. The Working
Procedures in Appendix 3 also do not establish precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence by a party to
the dispute. It is true that the Working Procedures “do not prohibit” submission of additional evidence after the
first substantive meeting of a panel with the parties. It is also true, however, that the Working Procedures in
Appendix 3 do contemplate two distinguishable stages in a proceeding before a panel. (…)
Under the Working Procedures in Appendix 3, the complaining party should set out its case in chief, including
a full presentation of the facts on the basis of submission of supporting evidence, during the first stage. The
second stage is generally designed to permit ‘rebuttals’ by each party of the arguments and evidence submitted
by the other parties.”
Para. 80. “As noted above, however, the Working Procedures in their present form do not constrain panels
with hard and fast rules on deadlines for submitting evidence. The Panel could have refused to admit the
additional documentary evidence of the United States as unseasonably submitted. The Panel chose, instead, to
admit that evidence, at the same time allowing Argentina two weeks to respond to it. Argentina drew attention
to the difficulties it would face in tracing and verifying the manually processed customs documents and in
responding to them, since identifying names, customs identification numbers and, in some cases, descriptions
of the products had been blacked out. The Panel could well have granted Argentina more than two weeks to
respond to the additional evidence. However, there is no indication in the panel record that Argentina
explicitly requested from the Panel, at that time or at any later time, a longer period within which to respond to
the additional documentary evidence of the United States. Argentina also did not submit any countering
documents or comments in respect of any of the additional documents of the United States.”
Para. 81. “(…) [W]hile another panel could well have exercised its discretion differently, we do not believe
that the Panel here committed an abuse of discretion amounting to a failure to render an objective assessment
of the matter as mandated by Article 11 of the DSU.” (nota de rodapé suprimida)
* Estudo apresentado no segundo encontro substantivo com as Partes - viabilidade
Relatório do painel em Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea - Alcoholic Beverages),
Demandante: CE, WT/DS75/R, paras. 5.24-5.25
Em Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, Seul requereu ao painel que, em caráter preliminar, não aceitasse uma prova
produzida por Bruxelas. In casu, as CE apresentaram, no segundo encontro substantivo com o painel, um
estudo em resposta a um outro estudo anteriormente fornecido por Seul. Esta, então, alegou que teria os seus
direitos afrontados em razão do oferecimento tardio daquela prova. O painel rejeitou o pleito sul-coreano,
argumentando que: a) Bruxelas apresentou o estudo na primeira oportunidade que teve, qual seja, a segunda
audiência substantiva com o painel; b) foi dado prazo razoável para manifestação acerca do novo documento
(uma semana); c) o estudo ofertado não era complexo; e d) o mesmo servia apenas como prova complementar
àquilo já produzido nos autos.
130
Para. 5.24. “Korea complains that its rights of defense were violated by the late submission of a market study
(the Trendscope survey) by the European Communities. Korea had submitted a study done by the AC Nielsen
Company as part of its responses to questions arising from the first substantive meeting of the Panel. The
European Communities responded to this with, among other things, the Trendscope survey presented at the
Second Meeting of the Panel. The Panel gave Korea a week to respond to this and critique the results,
methodology and questions used in the Trendscope survey. Korea argues that this time was insufficient, that it
did not have copies in Korean of all the questions asked, and that it did not have time to provide further
questions or comments based upon the answers.”
Para. 5.25. “We do not consider that Korea’s rights under the DSU were violated. The European Communities
submitted its rebuttal survey at the next available opportunity after receiving Korea’s Nielsen survey. Had
Korea chosen to submit its survey at the first substantive meeting and the European Communities failed to
respond at the next opportunity (in such a case, it would have been in the rebuttal submission), there obviously
would have been more merit to the claim because then the European Communities, it could have been argued,
delayed submitting their evidence. As it transpired, the European Communities submitted a new piece of
evidence at the next available opportunity which Korea then was able to examine for a week in order to
provide comments. The survey was not of a particularly complex type and, in our view, Korea had adequate
time to respond given the nature of the evidence. The Trendscope survey is not critical evidence to the
complainants’ case; it serves as a supplement to arguments already made. If we considered that it represented
critical evidence, Korea’s request for further time for comment would have been given greater weight. While
all parties to litigation might prefer open-ended potential for rebutting the other side’s submissions, we believe
that for practical reasons submissions must be cut-off at some point and such a point was reached in this case.
Thus, neither the timing nor the importance of the evidence in question support a finding that Korea’s rights
have been violated in this instance.”
* Possibilidade de produção de provas após a primeira audiência substantiva
Relatório do painel em Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada - Aircraft),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS70/R, paras. 9.73-9.74
Em Canada - Aircraft, o Canadá requereu ao painel que este não aceitasse provas produzidas pelo demandante
após o primeiro encontro substantivo com as partes. O painel desacolheu a pretensão canadense, mencionando
que não havia base legal para tal pedido e que poderiam surgir situações em que o demandante teria de
produzir novas provas após o aludido encontro.
Para. 9.73. “[A]n absolute rule excluding the submission of evidence by a complaining party after the first
substantive meeting would be inappropriate, since there may be circumstances in which a complaining party is
required to adduce new evidence in order to address rebuttal arguments made by the respondent. Furthermore,
there may be instances, as in the present case, (59) where a party is required to submit new evidence at the
request of the panel. For these reasons, we rejected Canada’s request for a preliminary ruling that the Panel
should not accept new evidence submitted by Brazil after the first substantive meeting.”
Para. 9.74. “[W]e are not bound to exclude the submission of new allegations after the first substantive
meeting. We can see nothing in the DSU, or in the Appendix 3 Working Procedures, that would require the
submission of new allegations to be treated any differently than the submission of new evidence. Indeed, one
could envisage situations in which the respondent might present information to a panel during the first
substantive meeting that could reasonably be used as a basis for a new allegation by the complaining party.
Provided the new allegation falls within the panel’s terms of reference, and provided the respondent party’s
due process rights of defence are respected, we can see no reason why any such new allegation should
necessarily be rejected by the panel as a matter of course, simply because it is submitted after the first
substantive meeting with the parties. We consider that this approach is consistent with the Appellate Body’s
131
ruling in European Communities - Bananas that ‘[t]here is no requirement in the DSU or in GATT practice for
arguments on all claims relating to the matter referred to the DSB to be set out in a complaining party’s first
written submission to the panel. It is the panel’s terms of reference, governed by Article 7 of the DSU, which
set out the claims of the complaining parties relating to the matter referred to the DSB.” (nota de rodapé
omitida)
(ii) Etapa intermediária de exame
Em EC - Sardines, o Órgão de Apelação decidiu que a etapa intermediária de exame, prevista no artigo 15 do
DSU, não é adequada para a produção de prova.
Para. 301. “The interim review stage is not an appropriate time to introduce new evidence. We recall that
Article 15 of the DSU governs the interim review. Article 15 permits parties, during that stage of the
proceedings, to submit comments on the draft report issued by the panel, and to make requests ‘for the panel to
review precise aspects of the interim report’. At that time, the panel process is all but completed; it is only - in
the words of Article 15 - ‘precise aspects’ of the report that must be verified during the interim review. And
this, in our view, cannot properly include an assessment of new and unanswered evidence. Therefore, we are
of the view that the Panel acted properly in refusing to take into account the new evidence during the interim
review, and did not thereby act inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.” (notas de rodapé retiradas)
* Prova disponível após o estabelecimento do painel
Relatório do painel em Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples (Japan - Apples),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS245/R, paras. 8.49 e 8.56
Em Japan - Apples, o painel aceitou a prova que ficou disponível apenas depois do estabelecimento do painel,
tendo sido assegurada à outra parte a chance de se pronunciar sobre a mesma.
Para. 8.49. “A related question is whether the Panel should consider evidence that became available only after
the establishment of the Panel. Our approach in this regard should be pragmatic. Besides the situation
contemplated in paragraph 11 of our Working Procedures, we decided not to reject evidence submitted by a
party on which the other party had had an opportunity to comment, whether it took advantage of such an
opportunity or not. This is without prejudice to the admissibility of such evidence on other grounds or the
weight that we might eventually give to such evidence.”
Para. 8.56. “(…) We are of the view that our obligation, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, to make an
objective assessment of the matter before us, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case,
imposes on us an obligation not to exclude a priori any evidence submitted in due time by any party.
However, the fact that we accepted the evidence at issue as a matter of principle is, as stated in the latter
above, without prejudice to the weight that we will ultimately give to these exhibits in our discussion of the
substance of this case. We also note that, consistent with the practice of panels, we provided Japan with the
opportunity to comment on the substance of these documents.”
(iii) Finalidade temporal da revisão
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Selected Customs Matters (EC - Selected
Customs Matters), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS315/AB/R, para. 188
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Em EC - Selected Customs Matters, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que um painel não está impedido de
avaliar uma prova somente porque ela é anterior ou posterior ao seu estabelecimento.
Para. 188. “[l]t is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the measures at issue and, on the other
hand, acts of administration that have been presented as evidence to substantiate the claim that the measures at
issue are administered in a manner inconsistent with Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. The Panel failed to
make the distinction between measures and pieces of evidence. While there are temporal limitations on the
measures that may be within a panel’s terms of reference, such limitations do not apply in the same way to
evidence. Evidence in support of a claim challenging measures that are within a panel’s terms of reference
may pre-date or post-date the establishment of the panel. A panel is not precluded from assessing a piece of
evidence for the mere reason that it pre-dates or post-dates its establishment. In this case, the United States
was not precluded from presenting evidence relating to acts of administration before and after the date of Panel
establishment. A panel enjoys a certain discretion to determine the relevance and probative value of a piece of
evidence that pre-dates or post-dates its establishment.” (nota de rodapé removida)
* Conclusões fáticas feitas em litígios anteriores
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: CE, WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 190
Em US - Continued Zeroing, o Órgão de Apelação frisou que eventual prova produzida em processo anterior
pode ser novamente apresentada em outro processo.
Para. 190. “Factual findings made in prior disputes do not determine facts in another dispute. Evidence
adduced in one proceeding, and admissions made in respect of the same factual question about the operation of
an aspect of municipal law, may be submitted as evidence in another proceeding. The finders of fact are of
course obliged to make their own determination afresh and on the basis of all the evidence before them. But if
the critical evidence is the same and the factual question about the operation of domestic law is the same, it is
likely that the finder of facts would reach similar findings in the two proceedings. Nonetheless, the factual
findings adopted by the DSB in prior cases regarding the existence of the zeroing methodology, as a rule or
norm, are not binding in another dispute. In themselves, they do not establish that zeroing was used in all the
successive proceedings in each of the 18 cases listed in the European Communities’ panel request.”
* Admissibilidade de prova e valor conferido à mesma
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed
Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: India, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.32-6.34
Em EC - Bed Linen, o painel entendeu que os tribunais internacionais são, em geral, livres para admitir e
avaliar qualquer tipo de prova. O painel afirmou, ainda, que as informações obtidas na fase de consultas
podem ser apresentadas nas fases seguintes do contencioso.
Para. 6.32. “(…) [l]t seems that the evidence concerning the consultations is at best unnecessary, and may be
irrelevant. That said, however, merely because the evidence is unnecessary or irrelevant does not require us to
exclude it.”
Para. 6.33. “(…) we consider that it is not necessary to limit the facts and arguments India may present, even
if we might consider those facts or arguments to be irrelevant or not probative on the issues before us. In our
view, there is a significant and substantive difference between questions concerning the admissibility of
evidence, and the weight to be accorded evidence in making our decisions. That is, we may choose to allow
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parties to present evidence, but subsequently not consider that evidence, because it is not relevant or necessary
to our determinations or is not probative on the issues before it. In our view, there is little to be gained by
expending our time and effort in ruling on points of “admissibility” of evidence vel non.”
Para. 6.34. “In addition, we note that, under Article 13.2 of the DSU, Panels have a general right to seek
information “from any relevant source”. In this context, we consider that, as a general rule, panels have wide
latitude in admitting evidence in WTO dispute settlement. The DSU contains no rule that might restrict the
forms of evidence that panels may consider. Moreover, international tribunals are generally free to admit and
evaluate evidence of every kind, and to ascribe to it the weight that they see fit. As one legal scholar has noted:
‘The inherent flexibility of the international procedure, and its tendency to be free from
technical rules of evidence applied in municipal law, provide the “evidence” with a
wider scope in international proceedings … . Generally speaking, international tribunals
have not committed themselves to the restrictive rules of evidence in municipal law.
They have found it justified to receive every kind and form of evidence, and have
attached to them the probative value they deserve under the circumstances of a given
case’.
It has clearly been held in the WTO that information obtained in consultations may be presented in subsequent
panel proceedings.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)
1) Prova circunstancial e prova direta - Inferências e conclusões fáticas
- Aircraft), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS70/AB/R, para. 198
Em Canada - Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que é usual aos julgadores apoiarem-se em inferências
relativas a conclusões fáticas.
Para. 198. “The DSU does not purport to state in what detailed circumstances inferences, adverse or
otherwise, may be drawn by panels from infinitely varying combinations of facts. Yet, in all cases, in carrying
out their mandate and seeking to achieve the “objective assessment of the facts” required by Article 11 of the
DSU, panels routinely draw inferences from the facts placed on the record. The inferences drawn may be
inferences of fact: that is, from fact A and fact B, it is reasonable to infer the existence of fact C. Or the
inferences derived may be inferences of law: for example, the ensemble of facts found to exist warrants the
characterization of a “subsidy” or a “subsidy contingent … in fact … upon export performance”. The facts
must, of course, rationally support the inferences made, but inferences may be drawn whether or not the facts
already on the record deserve the qualification of a prima facie case. The drawing of inferences is, in other
words, an inherent and unavoidable aspect of a panel’s basic task of finding and characterizing the facts
making up a dispute”.
2) Provas circunstanciais isoladas - Significação
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea (US - Countervailing Duty Investigation
on DRAMS), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS296/AB/R, paras. 150 e 154
Em US - Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, discutiu-se como se deveria averiguar a imposição de
uma medida compensatória pela autoridade administrativa norte-americana. O Órgão de Apelação entendeu
que provas circunstanciais isoladas dificilmente são convincentes. No entanto, se vistas em conjunto com
outras provas, as provas circunstanciais então isoladas podem passar a ter mais significado.
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Para. 150. “In our view, having accepted an investigating authority’s approach, a panel normally should
examine the probative value of a piece of evidence in a similar manner to that followed by the investigating
authority. Moreover, if, as here, an investigating authority relies on individual pieces of circumstantial
evidence viewed together as support for a finding of entrustment or direction, a panel reviewing such a
determination normally should consider that evidence in its totality, rather than individually, in order to assess
its probative value with respect to the agency’s determination. Indeed, requiring that each piece of
circumstantial evidence, on its own, establish entrustment or direction effectively precludes an agency from
finding entrustment or direction on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Individual pieces of circumstantial
evidence, by their very nature, are not likely to establish a proposition, unless and until viewed in conjunction
with other pieces of evidence.”
Para. 154. “(…) what is absent from the Panel’s “global” assessment, in our view, is a consideration of the
inferences that might reasonably have been drawn by the USDOC on the basis of the totality of the evidence.
As we have already observed, individual pieces of circumstantial evidence are unlikely to establish
entrustment or direction; the significance of individual pieces of evidence may become clear only when
viewed together with other evidence. In other words, a piece of evidence that may initially appear to be of little
or no probative value, when viewed in isolation, could, when placed beside another piece of evidence of the
same nature, form part of an overall picture that gives rise to a reasonable inference of entrustment or
direction.” (nota de rodapé imitida)
3) Inexistência de prova direta – erro do painel
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: CE, WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 357
Em US - Continued Zeroing, o Órgão de Apelação censurou o painel por não ter acolhido uma queixa sob o
argumento de inexistência de prova direta.
Para. 357. “The fact that there is no direct evidence establishing the use of simple zeroing does not absolve a
panel from examining submitted evidence in its totality. We, however, come to this question not as the original
reviewer of that evidence, but against the standard of whether the factual findings and uncontested facts on the
Panel record adequately support completion. On that basis, we decide not to complete the analysis to reach a
finding that the United States applied simple zeroing in these two periodic reviews. We emphasize that the
nature and scope of the evidence that might be reasonably expected by an adjudicator in order to establish a
fact or claim in a particular case will depend on a range of factors, including the type of evidence that is made
available by a Member’s regulating authority. Because the design and operation of national regulatory systems
will vary, we believe that, in a specific case, a panel may have a sufficient basis to reach an affirmative finding
regarding a particular fact or claim on the basis of inferences that can be reasonably drawn from circumstantial
rather than direct evidence.”
(v) Declarações públicas de executivos de empresas ou funcionários do governo
* Declarações – auto-interesse
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (EC
and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS316/R, para. 7.1919
Em EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft, o painel, ao analisar o valor de algumas
declarações emitidas por executivos de empresas e funcionários públicos, notou que estas declarações podem
envolver um certo grau de auto-interesse.
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Para. 7.1919. “In considering the above evidence, we recognize that the public statements of Airbus or
participant company executives and public officials as to the need for LA/MSF in order to launch a given
aircraft may involve a degree of self-interest. For example, comments attributed to Sir Austin Pearce appear to
have been made in the midst of efforts by British Aerospace to lobby the government of the United Kingdom
for additional support. In these circumstances, it may well have been in the interest of the company to suggest
that its participation in the A320 project would come to a halt without further commitment from the UK
government. Having committed public monies, it is also possible that public officials would be inclined to
describe government participation in Airbus projects as essential. However, we note that the Decision letter of
the European Commission seems to us to be in the nature of a quasi-judicial evaluation and finding, rather
than mere statements by public officials, and therefore the same concerns do not arise in evaluating that
decision. In any event, we consider it appropriate to take this evidence into account, making our own
judgements as to its weight and probative value, together with other evidence in our evaluation of the United
States claims.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)
* Declarações de funcionários do governo – requisitos a serem observados na valoração das mesmas
(Australia - Automotive Leather II), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS126/R, nota de rodapé 210
Em Australia - Automotive Leather II, o painel, ao perscrutar certas afirmações de funcionários do governo
australiano, argumentou que levaria em consideração as circunstâncias nas quais referidas afirmações foram
efetuadas, a fonte das mesmas, e se elas foram corroboradas por alguma outra prova ou se foi ofertada prova
em contrário.
Nota de rodapé 210. “A commentator on the International Court of Justice’s consideration of evidence and
proof of facts has stated:
It appears to be the case that press reports, when significant but not denied by the
responsible state, or when reporting other events such as official statements by
responsible officials and agencies of that state, are accepted; {footnote omitted} but
when they are uncorroborated or do not otherwise contain material with an independent
title of credibility and persuasiveness, the tendency of the Court is to discount them
almost entirely.
Highet, Evidence and Proof of Facts, in Damrosch, The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, 1987.
Similarly, we take into account the circumstances in which the reported remarks were made, the source, and
whether the information is corroborated elsewhere or contrary evidence is offered, in assessing the value of
these Exhibits as evidence.”
d) “e formular conclusões que auxiliem o DSB a fazer recomendações ou emitir decisões previstas nos
acordos abrangidos”
(i) Economia processual
* Base legal para a aplicação da economia processual
1) Explicação do princípio da economia processual – postura já empregada no antigo GATT
Blouses from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS33/AB/R, pp. 18-19
Em US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a faculdade do painel de exercer a
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economia processual, isto é, de não analisar todos os argumentos ventilados pelo demandante, mas somente
aqueles necessários para a resolução da disputa. O Órgão de Apelação aduziu que o princípio da economia
processual já era prática adotada por painéis no antigo GATT e explicou a base legal para o uso de tal
princípio. Vide também: India - Patents.
pp. 18-19. “The function of panels is expressly defined in Article 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
‘The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements …
(emphasis added).’
Nothing in this provision or in previous GATT practice requires a panel to examine all
legal claims made by the complaining party. Previous GATT 1947 and WTO panels
have frequently addressed only those issues that such panels considered necessary for
the resolution of the matter between the parties, and have declined to decide other
issues. Thus, if a panel found that a measure was inconsistent with a particular provision
of the GATT 1947, it generally did not go on to examine whether the measure was also
inconsistent with other GATT provisions that a complaining party may have argued
were violated. In recent WTO practice, panels likewise have refrained from examining
each and every claim made by the complaining party and have made findings only on
those claims that such panels concluded were necessary to resolve the particular matter.
Although a few GATT 1947 and WTO panels did make broader rulings, by considering
and deciding issues that were not absolutely necessary to dispose of the particular
dispute, there is nothing anywhere in the DSU that requires panels to do so.” (notas de
rodapé removidas)
* Acepção de “economia judicial”
1) Utilização da economia processual não é obrigatória
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of
Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R,
para. 133
Em Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que o órgão julgador não
está compelido a adotar o princípio da economia processual.
Para. 133. “The practice of judicial economy, which was first employed by a number of GATT panels, allows
a panel to refrain from making multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent with various provisions
when a single, or a certain number of findings of inconsistency, would suffice to resolve the dispute. Although
the doctrine of judicial economy allows a panel to refrain from addressing claims beyond those necessary to
resolve the dispute, it does not compel a panel to exercise such restraint.”
2) Necessidade de inconsistência com a malha normativa da OMC
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil Retreaded Tyres), Demandante: CE, WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 257
Em Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, ficou explicitado pelo Órgão de Apelação que, para que a economia processual
incida, é mister que seja reconhecida a inconsistência da medida/lei do demandado com a legislação da OMC.
137
Para. 257. “[W]e observe that it might have been appropriate for the Panel to address the European
Communities’ separate claims that the MERCOSUR exemption was inconsistent with Article I:1 and Article
XIII:1. We have previously indicated that the principle of judicial economy “allows a panel to refrain from
making multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent with various provisions when a single, or a
certain number of findings of inconsistency, would suffice to resolve the dispute”, and it seems that the Panel
assumed this to be the case in the present dispute. However, the Panel found that the MERCOSUR exemption
resulted in the Import Ban being applied consistently with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. In
view of this finding, we must acknowledge that we have difficulty seeing how the Panel could have been
justified in not addressing the separate claims of inconsistency under Article 1:1 and Article XIII: 1 directed at
the MERCOSUR exemption.”
3) Contexto da relevância da economia processual
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners) (China), Demandante: China,
Em EC - Fasteners (China), o Órgão de Apelação observou que a discussão acerca da economia judicial
somente é relevante em relação à maneira pela qual um painel lida com a reclamação de uma parte.
Para. 511. “The above review of China’s arguments before the Panel indicates that China did not raise a
separate claim under the last sentence of Article 2.4, but referred to that sentence in support of its claim that
the Commission acted inconsistently with the obligation to conduct a fair comparison under Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. On appeal, China has also characterized its allegation under the last sentence of
Article 2.4 as an “argument put forward by China”. Thus, we disagree with China’s view that the Panel’s
failure to address this argument constitutes “a false exercise of judicial economy”, because the issue of judicial
economy is only relevant to the manner in which a panel deals with a party’s claims. Moreover, as the
Appellate Body has found, a panel has the discretion “to address only those arguments it deems necessary to
resolve a particular claim” and “the fact that a particular argument relating to that claim is not specifically
addressed in the ‘Findings’ section of a panel report will not, in and of itself, lead to the conclusion that that
panel has failed to make the ‘objective assessment of the matter before it’ required by Article 11 of the DSU.”
(notas de rodapé omitidas)
* Relevância da ordem da análise para a economia processual
Relatório do painel em India - Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector
(India - Autos), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS175/R, para. 7.161
Em India - Autos, o painel salientou que a ordem da análise das reclamações pode vir a ter um impacto no
potencial para se exercer a economia processual. No caso vertente, foi exercida economia processual no
tocante às queixas fundadas no Acordo sobre Medidas de Investimento Relacionadas ao Comércio (TRIMS).
Para. 7.161. “The order selected for examination of the claims may also have an impact on the potential to
apply judicial economy. It seems that an examination of the GATT provisions in this case would be likely to
make it unnecessary to address the TRIMs claims, but not vice-versa. If a violation of the GATT claims was
found, it would be justifiable to refrain from examining the TRIMs claims under the principle of judicial
economy. Even if no violation was found under the GATT claims, that also seems an efficient starting point
since it would be difficult to imagine that if no violation has been found of Articles III or XI, a violation could
be found of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, which refers to the same provisions. Conversely, if no
violation of the TRIMs Agreement were found, this would not necessarily preclude the existence of a violation
of GATT Articles III:4 or XI:1 because the scope of the GATT provisions is arguably broader if India’s
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argument was accepted that there is a need to prove that a measure is an investment measure and its assertion
that this is not the case with the measures before this Panel.”
* Necessidade do painel afirmar que está exercendo economia processual
1) Afirmação explícita de economia processual
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry
(Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS139/AB/R, paras. 116-117
Em Canada - Autos, o painel foi repreendido pelo Órgão de Apelação por não ter, de maneira explícita,
avisado que estava exercendo economia processual quando não abordou uma reclamação específica.
Para. 116. “In our view, it was not necessary for the Panel to make a determination on the European
Communities’ alternative claim relating to the CVA requirements under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement
in order ‘to secure a positive solution’ to this dispute. The Panel had already found that the CVA requirements
violated both Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article XVII of the GATS. Having made these findings, the
Panel, in our view, exercising the discretion implicit in the principle of judicial economy, could properly
decide not to examine the alternative claim of the European Communities that the CVA requirements are
inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.”
Para. 117. “We are bound to add that, for purposes of transparency and fairness to the parties, a panel should,
however, in all cases, address expressly those claims which it declines to examine and rule upon for reasons of
judicial economy. Silence does not suffice for these purposes.”
2) Ausência de menção direta à economia processual
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, para. 718
Em US - Upland Cotton, o Órgão de Apelação endossou a utilização de economia processual pelo painel. No
litígio em apreço, o painel não fez referência direta ao princípio da economia processual, tendo se limitado a
afirmar que não achava necessário proceder a análises adicionais.
Para. 718. “The Appellate Body has stated that panels may exercise judicial economy and refrain from
addressing claims beyond those necessary to resolve the dispute. In this case, the Panel did not expressly state
it was exercising judicial economy. (60) We agree with the United States, however, that the Panel’s approach
can be properly characterized as an exercise of judicial economy. Moreover, we believe that the Panel was
within its discretion in refraining from making additional findings and it was not improper for the Panel to
have exercised judicial economy given that its finding of actual circumvention resolved the matter.” (demais
notas de rodapé suprimidas)
* “Falsa” economia processual
1) Solução parcial da controvérsia como “falsa” economia processual
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia Salmon), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 223
Em Australia - Salmon, o Órgão de Apelação frisou que a economia processual não deve ter lugar quando
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resultar em apenas uma solução parcial da disputa. Neste caso, se exercida, haveria uma “falsa” economia
processual. Ver, ainda, os seguintes relatórios do Órgão de Apelação: US - Upland Cotton, para. 732, e Japan
- Agricultural Products II, para. 111. No mesmo sentido, os seguintes relatórios de painéis: EC - Sardines,
paras. 7.148-7.152; US - Steel Safeguards, para. 10.703, e EC - Commercial Vessels, para. 7.225.
Para. 223. “The principle of judicial economy has to be applied keeping in mind the aim of the dispute
settlement system. This aim is to resolve the matter at issue and ‘to secure a positive solution to a dispute’. To
provide only a partial resolution of the matter at issue would be false judicial economy. A panel has to address
those claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise
recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations
and rulings ‘in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members’.”
2) Artigo 3 do Acordo de Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias (ASMC) – subsídio proibido
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Export
Subsidies on Sugar), Demandante: Tailândia, WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 335
Em EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, o Órgão de Apelação observou que o ASMC possui regras especiais e
procedimentos adicionais acerca de resolução de controvérsias envolvendo subsídios proibido, regulamentado
no artigo 3 do acordo. Diante disso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o painel tinha exercido uma “falsa”
economia processual.
Para. 335. “In this case, the Panel’s findings under Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture were not
sufficient to “fully resolve” the dispute. This is because, in declining to rule on the Complaining Parties’
claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel precluded the possibility of a remedy being made
available to the Complaining Parties, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, in the event of the Panel
finding in favour of the Complaining Parties with respect to their claims under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement. Moreover, in declining to rule on the Complaining Parties’ claims under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement, the Panel failed to discharge its obligation under Article 11 of the DSU by failing to make “such
other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
the covered agreements”, namely, a recommendation or ruling by the DSB pursuant to Article 4.7. This
constitutes false judicial economy and legal error.” (nota de rodapé retirada)
* Uso de suposições “arguendo” (afirmações “ad argumentandum”)
1) Artigos 6.2 e 21.5 do DSU
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup) (Article 21.5 - US), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/AB/RW, paras. 52-53 e 67
Em Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 - US), o Órgão de Apelação fez algumas conclusões, ad
argumentandum, no sentido da aplicação do artigo 6.2 nos procedimentos do artigo 21.5, ambos do DSU.
Para. 52. “Mexico and the European Communities seem to argue that the Panel was required to address the
issue of consultations because consultations are an indispensable element of proceedings under Article 21.5 of
the DSU. They interpret the phrase “these dispute settlement procedures” in Article 21.5 of the DSU as
referring to all procedures contained in the DSU, including the provisions concerning consultations under
Article 4 of the DSU and the provisions concerning establishment of a panel under Article 6. The United
States, on the other hand, believes that the phrase refers to something less than all procedures contained in the
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DSU and, in particular, that the only prerequisite set forth in Article 21.5 is that there exist a disagreement as
to whether a Member has implemented the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”
Para. 53. “We do not consider that we need to examine these differences of interpretation between the
participants in order to decide the issues on appeal. As we have said, our task is simply to determine whether
the “objections” that Mexico now raises before us are of such a nature that they could have deprived the Panel
of its authority to deal with and dispose of the matter. If so, then the Panel was bound to address them on its
own motion. To fulfill this task we will assume, arguendo, that the same procedures apply in Article 21.5
proceedings as in original panel proceedings. If, even on our assumption, we find that the lack of consultations
was not a defect of such a nature as to deprive the Panel of its authority to deal with and dispose of the dispute,
then we need not consider the participants' arguments on the interpretation of Article 21.5 of the DSU.”
Para. 67. “For purposes of our analysis of this issue we again assume, arguendo, that the same procedures
apply in Article 21.5 proceedings as in original panel proceedings. If, on this assumption, we find that the
failure of the United States' communication to indicate whether consultations were held would not deprive a
panel of its authority to deal with and dispose of the matter before it, then we need not inquire further into the
procedures that are actually required in proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU.”
2) “Prática” de uma agência estatal – determinação de probabilidade em “sunset reviews”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante:
Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, para. 220
Em US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu, ad argumentandum que
uma “prática” poderia ser tida como uma “medida” numa solução de disputas na OMC. Concluiu que as
provas dos autos não permitiriam completar a análise da apelação condicional da Argentina, no que tange à
“prática” da agência norte-americana sobre a determinação de probabilidade em sunset reviews.
Para. 220. “[E]ven assuming arguendo that a “practice” may be challenged as a “measure” in WTO dispute
settlement — an issue on which we express no view here-we find that the record does not allow us to complete
the analysis of Argentina’s conditional appeal with respect to the “practice” of the USDOC regarding the
likelihood determination in sunset reviews.”
3) Artigos 11 e 12.7 – sugestão de retirada de medida com base no Artigo 19.1
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews) (Article 21.5 Argentina), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, para. 183
Em US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 - Argentina), o Órgão de Apelação
mencionou, ad argumentandum, a incidência dos artigos 11 e 12.7, quando da consideração de um painel
acerca de um pedido de realização de uma sugestão com fundamento no artigo 19.1 do DSU.
Para. 183. “The Panel’s explanation is brief, but it is sufficient to convey that the Panel considered
Argentina’s request and that, in the light of the discretionary nature of the authority to make a suggestion, the
Panel declined to exercise that discretion. The discretionary nature of the authority to make a suggestion under
Article 19.1 must be kept in mind when examining the sufficiency of a panel’s decision not to exercise such
authority. However, it should not relieve a panel from engaging with the arguments put forward by a party in
support of such a request. In the present case, Argentina offered several reasons in support of its request for a
suggestion. Although it would have been advisable for the Panel to articulate more clearly the reasons why it
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declined to exercise its discretion to make a suggestion, this does not mean that Panel’s exercise of its
discretion was improper, and, thus, even assuming arguendo that Articles 11 and 12.7 were applicable to a
request for suggestion, we do not consider that, in the circumstances of this case, the Panel failed to fulfil its
duties under those provisions.” (nota de rodapé retirada)
4) Artigo XX(d), do GATT/94, como linha de defesa
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação nos casos United States - Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand
(US - Shrimp) (Thailand) e United States - Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to AntiDumping/Countervailing Duties (US - Customs Bond Directive), Demandantes: Tailândia e Índia,
WT/DS343/AB/R e WT/DS345/AB/R, paras. 310 e 319
Em US - Shrimp (Thailand) e US - Customs Bond Directive, debruçou-se sobre se seria necessário deslindar a
questão de se o Artigo XX(d) do GATT 1994, poderia ser adotado como linha de defesa para justificar uma
medida considerada “ação específica contra dumping”, fundada no artigo 18.1 do Acordo Antidumping. O
Órgão de Apelação observou, ad argumentandum, que se tal defesa estivesse disponível para os EUA, aludida
medida não seria “necessária”, nos termos do artigo XX(d) do GATT 1994.
Para. 310. “India's appeal raises systemic issues about the availability of a defence under Article XX(d) to
justify a measure found to constitute “specific action against dumping” under Article 18.1 of the AntiDumping Agreement, and not to be in accordance with the Ad Note to Article VI:2 and 3 of the GATT 1994,
as well as Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Assuming, arguendo, that such a defence is available
to the United States, we proceed to consider the United States' appeal of the Panel's finding that the EBR, as
applied to subject shrimp, is “necessary” to secure compliance with certain United States laws and regulations
within the meaning of Article XX(d). We examine the Panel's finding on this issue of “necessity” before we
return to the question of availability of a defence under Article XX(d).”
Para. 319. “In view of this conclusion that the EBR, as applied to subject shrimp, is not “necessary” within
the meaning of Article XX(d), we do not express a view on the question of whether a defence under Article
XX(d) of the GATT 1994 was available to the United States.” (nota de rodapé removida)
5) O uso de suposições “arguendo” pode, eventualmente, ser complicado
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China - Publications and
Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 213
Em China - Publications and Audiovisual Products, o Órgão de Apelação enfatizou que o recurso à técnica
ad argumentandum pode ser problemática em algumas hipóteses, como, por exemplo, naquelas que dizem
respeito à jurisdição de um painel ou às preliminares das quais a substância de uma análise subsequente é
dependente.
Para. 213. “We observe that reliance upon an assumption arguendo is a legal technique that an adjudicator
may use in order to enhance simplicity and efficiency in decision-making. Although panels and the Appellate
Body may choose to employ this technique in particular circumstances, it may not always provide a solid
foundation upon which to rest legal conclusions. Use of the technique may detract from a clear enunciation of
the relevant WTO law and create difficulties for implementation. Recourse to this technique may also be
problematic for certain types of legal issues, for example, issues that go to the jurisdiction of a panel or
preliminary questions on which the substance of a subsequent analysis depends. The purpose of WTO dispute
settlement is to resolve disputes in a manner that preserves the rights and obligations of WTO Members and
clarifies existing provisions of the covered agreements in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation
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of public international law. In doing so, panels and the Appellate Body are not bound to favour the most
expedient approach or that suggested by one or more of the parties to the dispute. Rather, panels and the
Appellate Body must adopt an analytical methodology or structure appropriate for resolution of the matters
before them, and which enables them to make an objective assessment of the relevant matters and make such
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the
covered agreements.”
6) Princípio do estoppel
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
(EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS316/R, nota de rodapé
1914
Em EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft, o painel, fazendo menção aos Relatórios dos painéis
em Argentina - Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties e Guatemala - Cement II entendeu que estes painéis expressaram
que, ad argumentandum, caso o princípio do estoppel pudesse ser, em tese, aplicado aos contenciosos levados
à OMC, ele não poderia incidir sobre aqueles litígios.
Nota de rodapé 1914. “Citing the panel reports in Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, para. 7.38 and
Guatemala - Cement II, para. 7.71-7.72. In our view, these panels did not establish that the principle of
estoppel applies in WTO dispute settlement proceedings; rather, the respective panels proceeded on the basis
that, even if arguendo a principle of estoppel in the terms contended for did exist, it was not established on the
specific facts of the case.”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 11 do DSU enuncia as funções do painel, direcionadas ao auxílio do DSB da OMC no deslinde das
demandas apresentadas pelos membros. A primeira função consiste em proceder a uma avaliação objetiva do
caso que lhe é submetido. Nesta função, diversos tópicos vêm sendo desenvolvidos pelos painéis, tais como a
análise do direito doméstico dos litigantes, ônus da prova, uso de presunções, momento de apresentação das
provas e economia processual, inter alia. Já a segunda missão dos painéis, consiste na conciliação e está
prevista na parte final do artigo em apreço.
A tentativa de um acordo é assunto relevante nos contenciosos da OMC, pois uma composição amigável é
vantajosa para todos os envolvidos no conflito, poupando recursos financeiros e tempo não apenas dos
litigantes, como também da própria OMC. Pode-se, enfim, afirmar que o artigo 11 “further supports the
competence of panels to examine WTO claims, even if non-WTO rules are of crucial and even higher
importance in the context of the wider dispute”. (61)
Na tarefa da realizar uma avaliação objetiva do caso que lhe é apresentado, o painel deve agir de forma
imparcial. Nessa toada, o debate acerca de eventual ativismo dos painéis ganha destaque. Consoante Jackson:
This question obviously relates to the standard of review, but there are others concepts
and ideas that are involved, including how far an international body should “push the
envelope” of interpreting ambiguous clauses to suit certain policy preferences, possibly
preferences of the panel alone, or possibly policy preferences that the panel detects that
the negotiators, or currently the governments, have … What does it mean? Arguably it
resonates in the direction of a caution to the panels to use “judicial restraint,” and not to
be too activist. (62)
Assim, o painel deve evitar fazer apenas menção aos dispositivos invocados por demandante e demandado;
deve ir mais além, enunciando fundamentadamente as razões de decidir (Argentina – Footwear) (EC). Nessa
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esteira, insta frisar que as alegações dos litigantes não limitam a exegese que o painel vier a efetuar para
solucionar a desavença (Australia - Automotive Leather II) (Article 21.5 - US), nem mesmo se demandante e
demandado tiverem a mesma posição no que concerne a um ponto específico da disputa (China - Publication
and Audiovisual Products). Ainda no dever de atuação imparcial do painel, se o réu não oferecer defesa à
reclamação interposta, a queixa do autor não será, inexoravelmente, procedente, posto que, incumbe a este a
comprovação de que houve uma violação prima facie dos acordos da OMC (US – Shrimp) (Ecuador), sendo
que tal tipo de violação é aquela semelhante à fumaça do bom direito (fumus boni juris), própria das tutelas de
urgência conhecidas no direito adjetivo civil brasileiro.
Importante à realização de uma avaliação objetiva do caso, pelo painel, é a investigação do significado do
direito local, isto é, do direito doméstico dos litigantes. Com efeito, o direito local pode servir como prova de
fatos ou da prática de um Estado, bem como de demonstração da observância ou não de obrigações na ordem
internacional (India – Patents) (US), tendo o painel plena liberdade para decidir a respeito do direito interno de
qualquer das partes (US - 1916 Act) (EC), ainda que a jurisprudência interna esteja dividida ou incerta (US 1916 Act) (EC), ou seja, de rigor uma análise da evolução legislativa para se saber a finalidade atual de uma lei
doméstica (US - 1916 Act) (EC).
Ainda na esfera da avaliação objetiva da demanda, há uma análise objetiva dos fatos do caso. O tópico
principal, refere-se ao ônus da prova, tendo-se como regra geral a de que o ônus recai sobre a parte que faz a
afirmação na queixa, na defesa ou sobre fato (US – Wool Shirts and Blouses).
Apesar de levar-se em consideração o princípio de que o ônus da prova cabe a quem alega, pode acontecer de
as provas coligidas nos autos, por ambas as partes, encontrarem-se em um estado de equilíbrio, denominado
“equipoise”, e gerarem um tormento aos julgadores no momento de examinar o caso. Nessa hipótese, tem-se
preferido perfilhar o entendimento, assentado no âmbito penal, de que, na dúvida, isto é, não se logrando
estabelecer qual dos conjuntos probatórios apresentados no curso do processo é mais incisivo, deve-se
beneficiar o demandado. Em suma, sendo reconhecido o estado de “equipoise”, o autor perderá a demanda
(US – Section 301 Trade Act), ou, consoante sustenta Barceló III, “the benefit of the doubt goes to the
opponent of the party bearing the persuasion burden - i.e., to the respondent on the claimant's basic claim.
Thus, the claimant bears the risk of failing to move the adjudicator past the point of equipoise”. (63)
Ao conseguir convencer os julgadores de que houve uma afronta prima facie a algum dos tratados da
legislação da OMC, há a inversão do ônus da prova, devendo o demandado, então, produzir a contraprova
necessária para afastar a prova anteriormente fornecida pelo demandante. Nesse sentido, é importante deixar
consignado que, quanto às fontes de prova para o estabelecimento de um caso prima facie, a demonstração
deve ser casuística (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), devendo o painel perscrutar todas as provas que lhe são
oferecidas (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses).
Na sua missão de decidir uma demanda, o painel tem amplo direito de busca à informação, como preconizado
no artigo 13 do DSU. Ao painel, é lícito valer-se da opinião de peritos sobre certo tema ou socorrer-se do
assessoramento técnico de qualquer entidade que repute relevante. Entretanto, esta busca do painel por dados
para lhe ajudar a resolver a disputa, não implica afastamento do ônus ao demandante, de comprovar a violação
prima facie de norma da OMC, como quedou assentado em Japan - Agricultural Products II.
É comum o emprego, pelos painéis, de presunções para deslindar certos tópicos (Turkey - Textiles), geralmente
espinhosos, objetos do processo. Presunções são recursos utilizados para provar fatos inferidos indiretamente,
a partir de fatos anteriores. Não há a prova do fato, tido por existente somente via presunção. Por exemplo: o
demandante alega o fato B para a defesa do seu direito. Acontece que este fato não é comprovado por qualquer
evidência direta coligida no processo. Todavia, outro fato - fato A - resta demonstrado. O painel, então, deduz
a ocorrência do fato B, ventilado pelo autor, em virtude da caracterização do fato A.
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Outro ponto digno de realce é o ônus impossível da prova, ou seja, quando a demonstração da prova for
impraticável para quem alega. Nesse sentido, deve-se mencionar que tanto o GATT 1994 quanto o TRIPS
prevêem regras de exceção aptas a, eventualmente, serem suscitadas pelo demandante. Estas regras de exceção
não podem ser objeto de uma exegese extremamente rígida que implique um ônus impossível da prova, isto é,
aquele que invoca a exceção não fica incumbido de mostrar, num primeiro momento, que inexistem
alternativas razoáveis disponíveis para atingir os seus objetivos relativos à moral ou ordem pública (US –
Gambling).
Assunto problemático, diz respeito à dificuldade na coleta de informações e à colaboração devida entre as
partes no transcorrer do processo. No tocante à primeira questão, apesar da coleta de provas ser difícil para a
parte, esta não fica desonerada das comprovações de suas alegações (Argentina - Hides and Leather). Já em
relação ao dever de colaboração entre os litigantes, este não deve ser interpretado exageradamente, tendo sido
explicitado que a consequência deste dever significa que a parte deve enviar ao DSB os documentos que
possui em seu poder somente após a parte contrária ter demonstrado que houve uma violação prima facie aos
acordos da OMC (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel).
Ainda na seara do ônus da prova, uma última observação é válida. Assim, o ônus não se aplica a questões de
direito ou tampouco à interpretação jurídica (EC - Tariff Preferences), na medida em que cabe ao julgador o
conhecimento do direito a incidir no caso, atendendo-se, pois, ao princípio do jura novit curia.
Assunto delicado no julgamento dos painéis é o padrão de revisão que eles podem exercer quando analisam as
conclusões a que chegaram os órgãos nacionais. Este padrão de revisão pode ser:
(...) conventionally understood as a level of scrutiny that is applied by a superior body (a
court or a higher administrative authority) over a decision taken by a lower body that is
subject to review (…)
On the international level, (…) it determines, alongside the substantive obligations, the
distribution of powers between national governments and international bodies. De novo
review transfers a power to international level at the expense of prerogatives of
domestic governments. A deferential standard of review has an opposite effect,
empowering national bodies and limiting the competences of international authorities”.
(64)
Na esfera da avaliação dos fatos, cuja prova foi coligida no processo, o Órgão de Apelação tem reiterado a
posição de que o painel detém discricionariedade para julgar e sopesar os elementos factuais do feito (EC Hormones). Entretanto, esta discricionariedade não é ilimitada (Korea - Alcoholic Beverages). Como se
poderia aferir, portanto, o limite da aludida discricionariedade? Entende-se que fórmulas apriorísticas não são
as mais apropriadas, devendo ser efetuada uma análise casuística, atenta às especificidades da demanda
apresentada ao painel e ao princípio da razoabilidade, devendo-se, também, notar que:
(…) since the WTO dispute resolution system is a semi-judicial process, there is no
doubt that the adjudicating body cannot simply accept or respect all determinations
made by the national authority, otherwise the dispute settlement system would be
rendered ineffective. (65)
A lide, como conflito de interesses que lhe caracteriza, deve ser solucionada o mais breve possível. Mesmo
levando em conta tal desiderato, deve-se dar às partes a oportunidade de produzir as provas que lhe sejam as
mais adequadas. Ocorre que, o processo, como um elo de cadeias coordenadas com a finalidade de solução da
controvérsia, possui os seus prazos, notadamente aqueles ínsitos às provas.
Particularmente, no que tange à oferta de prova após os primeiros arrazoados dos litigantes, devem ser
acatados os seguintes requisitos (Korea - Alcoholic Beverages), a saber: a) a prova apresentada na primeira
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oportunidade, como, por exemplo, na audiência; b) o prazo razoável concedido para manifestação acerca do
novo documento; e, c) a não complexidade da prova ofertada.
Em geral, vigora o princípio da persuasão racional do painelista, ou seja, este detém poder para admitir
qualquer tipo de prova, assim como para avaliá-la, como assentado em EC - Bed Linen. Portanto, os tribunais
internacionais não possuem as restrições que as cortes domésticas frequentemente têm no que se refere à
admissibilidade das provas.
As declarações públicas de executivos de empresas ou de funcionários do governo podem influir no resultado
da demanda. Embora já se tenha reconhecido que ditas declarações podem estar revestidas de autointeresse
(EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft), atentando-se aos seguintes fatores elas podem ser
consideradas: as circunstâncias nas quais referidas afirmações foram efetuadas; a fonte delas; e, se elas foram
corroboradas por alguma outra prova ou se foi ofertada prova em contrário (Australia - Automotive Leather II).
Às vezes, pode acontecer de o painel entender ser despicienda a análise de todas as questões levantadas pelos
litigantes. Tal postura encontra guarida na racionalidade dos trabalhos levados a cabo pelo painel. Somente os
pontos necessários ventilados pelas partes devem ser objeto da investigação do órgão julgador. Isto configura
o chamado princípio da economia processual, que já era adotado por painéis ainda no sistema do antigo GATT
(US - Wool Shirts and Blouses).
Para que um painel opte por exercer a economia processual, é fundamental que ele detecte uma inconsistência
da lei ou medida interna de alguma das partes com os acordos da OMC (Brazil - Retreaded Tyres).
Reconhecida esta inconsistência, o painel deve afirmar, explicitamente, que está aplicando a economia
processual (Canada - Autos), a fim de possibilitar ao autor e réu saberem quais pontos não foram decididos.
Em atenção ao princípio da eventualidade, demandante e demandado podem valer-se de suposições
“arguendo”, também conhecidas como afirmações “ad argumentandum”. Estas suposições são empregadas
normalmente quando se considera que a tese ou ponto principal de um tema pode vir a ser desfavorável a uma
das partes. Esta, assim, tece uma argumentação alternativa que implica no julgamento desvantajoso da tese ou
ponto principal do tema discutido. Por exemplo: o demandante aduz que a ajuda conferida a uma das empresas
nacionais do setor privado não caracteriza auxílio financeiro. Todavia, “ad argumentandum”, se o auxílio for
tido como financeiro, a parte alega que o mesmo não é específico, não havendo, portanto, subsídio indevido.
Apesar de poder ser utilizada, a suposição “arguendo” pode ensejar complicações quando, inter alia, referir-se
à jurisdição de um painel ou a preliminares das quais a substância de uma análise subsequente é dependente
(China - Publications and Audiovisual Products).
Na linha das suposições “arguendo”, o princípio do estoppel já foi mencionado algumas vezes (Argentina Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties e Guatemala - Cement II). A CIJ, por seu turno, já teve a chance de expressar o
conteúdo do aludido princípio no caso Temple of Preah Vihear:
(...) estoppel operates to prevent a state contesting before a court a situation contrary to
a clear and unequivocal representation previously made by it to another state, either
expressly or impliedly, on which representation the other state was, in the
circumstances, entitled to rely and in fact did rely, and as a result that the other state has
been prejudiced or the state making it has secured some benefit or advantage for itself.
(66)
A questão de se saber se o princípio em apreço pode incidir nas controvérsias no seio da OMC foi cogitada
tão-somente “ad argumentandum”. Em EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft, o painel, citando
os dois precedentes do parágrafo anterior, perfilhou o entendimento de que os painéis destes casos, admitindose, abstratamente, que o princípio do estoppel poderia ser uma ferramenta a ser empregada pelo julgador, não
consideraram relevante o uso do princípio em tela para a situação enfrentada naqueles dois casos.
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Finalmente, muito se tem debatido sobre a composição dos painéis na sua empreitada de auxiliar o DSB a
deslindar os litígios que batem na porta da OMC. De um lado, alguns propõem que haja uma lista permanente
de pessoas especializadas que poderiam atuar como Painelistas, garantindo uma constância no padrão dos
julgamentos. Por outro lado, há quem defenda a proposição de que os Painelistas deveriam ser indicados de
forma ad hoc. O melhor caminho está no meio termo, conforme indicado por Jackson: “but clearly, a firstlevel roster proposal need not be all or nothing. A roster just large enough to provide at least one roaster
person for each panel, could capture the benefits of both the roster system and the ad hoc current system”.
(67)
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 56: Hereinafter “PCIJ”.
Footnote 57: ICJ, Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15, at
p.47, para. 62.
Footnote 58: We do not consider that this would be engaging into interpreting US law, with the risks highlighted by the United States
in its submissions. Our approach is in line with the reasoning of the PCIJ in the Brazilian Loans case, which, even though it had to
apply domestic law, was prudent in its approach of the domestic case law:
“It follows that the Court must pay the utmost regard to the decisions of the municipal courts of a country, for it is with the aid of their
jurisprudence that it will be enabled to decide what are the rules which, in actual fact, are applied in the country the law of which is
recognized as applicable in a given case” (PCIJ, Series A, Nos. 20/21, p. 124).
Footnote 59: At the time of the second substantive meeting, we asked the parties a series of questions that could have led to the
submission of new evidence or arguments. In order to ensure due process, we allowed each party 18 days (i.e., equivalent to the time
between the deadline for the respondent’s first submission and the deadline for rebuttal submissions) in which to comment on any new
evidence or arguments adduced by the other party in response to our questions.
Footnote 60: The Panel stated that it did not believe it “necessary to conduct any additional examination”. (Panel Report, footnote
1061 to para. 7.882).
Footnote 61: PAUWELYN, Joost. Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of
International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 451.
Footnote 62: JACKSON, John H. Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement,
Appraisal and Prospects. In: KRUEGER, Anne (ed.). The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1998, p. 172.
Footnote 63: BARCELÓ, John J. Burden of Proof, Prima Facie Case and Presumption in WTO Dispute Settlement. Cornell
International Law Journal, vol. 42, 2009, p. 27 (42 Cornell Int'l L.J. 26 2009).
Footnote 64: GRUSZCZYNSKI, Lukasz Adam. Standard of Review of Health and Environmental Regulations by WTO Panels. In:
CALSTER, Geert Van; PRÉVOST, Denise (eds.). Research Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2012. Disponível em SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1979884, p. 2. Acesso em: 17/jun./2013.
Footnote 65: CHEN, Tsai-fang. What Exactly is the Panel Reviewing: The First Step in the Standard of Review Analysis in the WTO
Dispute Resolutions. Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy, vol. 4, 2009, pp. 467-520. Disponível em:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649673, p. 474. Acesso em: 14/jun./2013.
Footnote 66: ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 6 at 143-144.
Footnote 67: JACKSON, John H. Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006, p. 203.
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
Artigo 12
IA.
Article 12
Panel Procedures
12.1
Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise after
consulting the parties to the dispute.
12.2
Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while
not unduly delaying the panel process.
12.3
After consulting the parties to the dispute, the panelists shall, as soon as practicable and whenever
possible within one week after the composition and terms of reference of the panel have been agreed
upon, fix the timetable for the panel process, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of
Article 4, if relevant.
12.4
In determining the timetable for the panel process, the panel shall provide sufficient time for the
parties to the dispute to prepare their submissions.
12.5
Panels should set precise deadlines for written submissions by the parties and the parties should
respect those deadlines.
12.6
Each party to the dispute shall deposit its written submissions with the Secretariat for immediate
transmission to the panel and to the other party or parties to the dispute. The complaining party shall
submit its first submission in advance of the responding party's first submission unless the panel
decides, in fixing the timetable referred to in paragraph 3 and after consultations with the parties to
the dispute, that the parties should submit their first submissions simultaneously. When there are
sequential arrangements for the deposit of first submissions, the panel shall establish a firm timeperiod for receipt of the responding party's submission. Any subsequent written submissions shall be
submitted simultaneously.
12.7
Where the parties to the dispute have failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, the panel shall
submit its findings in the form of a written report to the DSB. In such cases, the report of a panel shall
set out the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any
findings and recommendations that it makes. Where a settlement of the matter among the parties to
the dispute has been found, the report of the panel shall be confined to a brief description of the case
and to reporting that a solution has been reached.
12.8
In order to make the procedures more efficient, the period in which the panel shall conduct its
examination, from the date that the composition and terms of reference of the panel have been agreed
upon until the date the final report is issued to the parties to the dispute, shall, as a general rule, not
exceed six months. In cases of urgency, including those relating to perishable goods, the panel shall
aim to issue its report to the parties to the dispute within three months.
12.9
When the panel considers that it cannot issue its report within six months, or within three months in
cases of urgency, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an
estimate of the period within which it will issue its report. In no case should the period from the
establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months.
148
12.10 In the context of consultations involving a measure taken by a developing country Member, the
parties may agree to extend the periods established in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 4. If, after the
relevant period has elapsed, the consulting parties cannot agree that the consultations have concluded,
the Chairman of the DSB shall decide, after consultation with the parties, whether to extend the
relevant period and, if so, for how long. In addition, in examining a complaint against a developing
country Member, the panel shall accord sufficient time for the developing country Member to prepare
and present its argumentation. The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 20 and paragraph 4 of Article
21 are not affected by any action pursuant to this paragraph.
12.11 Where one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, the panel's report shall explicitly
indicate the form in which account has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and morefavourable treatment for developing country Members that form part of the covered agreements which
have been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement
procedures.
12.12 The panel may suspend its work at any time at the request of the complaining party for a period not to
exceed 12 months. In the event of such a suspension, the time-frames set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 of
this Article, paragraph 1 of Article 20, and paragraph 4 of Article 21 shall be extended by the amount
of time that the work was suspended. If the work of the panel has been suspended for more than 12
months, the authority for establishment of the panel shall lapse.
IB.
Artigo 12
Procedimento dos Grupos Especiais
12.1
Os grupos especiais seguirão os Procedimentos de Trabalho do Apêndice 3, salvo decisão em
contrário do grupo especial após consulta com as partes em controvérsia.
12.2
Os procedimentos do grupo especial deverão ser suficientemente flexíveis para assegurar a qualidade
de seus Relatórios, sem atrasar indevidamente os trabalhos do grupo especial.
12.3
Os integrantes do grupo especial deverão, após consultar as partes em controvérsia, o quanto antes e
se possível dentro da semana seguinte em que sejam acordados a composição e os termos de
referência do grupo especial, estabelecer um calendário para seus trabalhos, considerando as
disposições do parágrafo 9 do Artigo 4, se pertinente.
12.4
Ao determinar o calendário para seus trabalhos, o grupo especial deverá estipular prazos suficientes
para que as partes em controvérsia preparem suas argumentações escritas.
12.5
Os grupos especiais deverão definir prazos exatos para que as partes apresentem suas argumentações
escritas e as partes deverão respeitar tais prazos.
12.6
Cada parte em controvérsia deverá consignar suas argumentações escritas ao Secretariado para
transmissão imediata ao grupo especial e à outra parte ou às outras partes em controvérsia. A parte
reclamante deverá apresentar sua primeira argumentação antes da primeira argumentação da parte
demandada, salvo se o grupo especial decidir, ao estabelecer o calendário previsto no parágrafo 3 e
após consultar as partes em controvérsia, que as partes deverão apresentar suas argumentações
simultaneamente. Quando se houver decidido pela consignação sucessiva das primeiras
argumentações, o grupo especial deverá fixar um prazo rígido para recebimento das argumentações da
parte demandada. Quaisquer argumentações escritas posteriores deverão ser apresentadas
simultaneamente.
149
12.7
Nos casos em que as partes envolvidas na controvérsia não consigam encontrar uma solução
mutuamente satisfatória, o grupo especial deverá apresentar suas conclusões em forma de Relatório
escrito ao OSC. Em tais casos, o Relatório do grupo especial deverá expor as verificações de fatos, a
aplicabilidade de disposições pertinentes e o arrazoado em que se baseiam suas decisões e
recomendações. Quando se chegar a uma solução da questão controversa entre as partes, o Relatório
do grupo especial se limitará a uma breve descrição do caso, com indicação de que a solução foi
encontrada.
12.8
Com o objetivo de tornar o procedimento mais eficaz, o prazo para o trabalho do grupo especial,
desde a data na qual seu estabelecimento e termos de referência tenham sido acordados até a data em
que seu Relatório final tenha sido divulgado para as partes em controvérsia, não deverá, como regra
geral, exceder a seis meses. Em casos de urgência, incluídos aqueles que tratem de bens perecíveis, o
grupo especial deverá procurar divulgar seu Relatório para as partes em controvérsia dentro de três
meses.
12.9
Quando o grupo especial considerar que não poderá divulgar seu Relatório dentro de seis meses, ou
dentro de três meses em casos de urgência, deverá informar por escrito ao OSC as razões do atraso
juntamente com uma estimativa do prazo em que procederá à divulgação do Relatório. O período de
tempo entre o estabelecimento do grupo especial e a divulgação do Relatório para os Membros não
poderá, em caso algum, exceder a nove meses.
12.10 No âmbito de consultas envolvendo medidas tomadas por um país em desenvolvimento Membro, as
partes poderão acordar a extensão dos prazos definidos nos parágrafos 7 e 8 do Artigo 4. Se, após
expiração do prazo concernente, as partes em consulta não acordarem com a sua conclusão, o
Presidente do OSC deverá decidir, após consultar as partes, se o prazo concernente será prorrogado e,
em caso positivo, por quanto tempo. Ademais, ao examinar uma reclamaçãoo contra um país em
desenvolvimento Membro, o grupo especial deverá proporcionar tempo bastante para que o país em
desenvolvimento Membro prepare e apresente sua argumentação. As disposições do parágrafo 1 do
Artigo 20 e parágrafo 4 do Artigo 21 não serão afetadas por nenhuma ação decorrente deste parágrafo.
12.11 Quando uma ou mais das partes for um país em desenvolvimento Membro, o Relatório do grupo
especial indicará explicitamente a maneira pela qual foram levadas em conta as disposições
pertinentes ao tratamento diferenciado e mais favorável para países em desenvolvimento Membros
que façam parte dos acordos abrangidos invocados pelo país em desenvolvimento Membros no curso
dos trabalhos de solução de controvérsias.
12.12 O grupo especial poderá suspender seu trabalho a qualquer tempo a pedido da parte reclamante por
período não superior a doze meses. Ocorrendo tal suspensão, os prazos fixados nos parágrafos 8 e 9
deste Artigo, parágrafo 1 do Artigo 20, e parágrafo 4 do Artigo 21 deverão ser prorrogados pela
mesma extensão de tempo em que forem suspensos os trabalhos. Se o trabalho do grupo especial tiver
sido suspenso por mais de 12 meses, a autoridade para estabelecer o grupo especial caducará.
IC.
No parágrafo 2, deve-se colocar o adjetivo “alta” antes da expressão “qualidade de seus relatórios”.
No parágrafo 3, devem ser feitas as seguintes alterações: a) a expressão “o quanto antes” por “o mais
rapidamente dentro dos limites do praticável”, já que o texto em inglês utiliza a palavra “practicable”; b) o
primeiro “se” por “quando”, uma vez que, na versão original, consta a palavra “whenever”; e c) “dentro da
semana seguinte em que sejam” por “dentro do prazo de uma semana após serem”, posto que, na versão em
150
inglês, usa-se a expressão “one week” (“dentro da semana seguinte em que sejam” pode implicar mais de sete
dias, como, por exemplo, a composição e os termos de referência do painel serem acordados numa segundafeira e o painel fixar o seu calendário na quinta-feira da semana seguinte).
No parágrafo 4, troca-se a expressão “argumentações escritas” por somente “argumentações”, pois, em inglês,
empregou-se somente “submissions”.
Finalmente, no parágrafo 8, “o procedimento mais eficaz” por “os procedimentos mais eficazes”, posto que, no
original, consta “procedures”.
II.
Aplicação e Interpretação do Artigo 12
1.
Geral: Discricionariedade do painel no tocante a questões procedimentais
a) “Situações não explicitamente reguladas – discricionariedade do painel para discipliná-las”
Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R, nota de rodapé 138
Em EC - Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o painel possui certa margem de discricionariedade
para regrar situações que não estão explicitamente previstas, devendo o interessado demonstrar o prejuízo
sofrido com a decisão do painel, a fim de que a mesma seja revertida.
Nota de rodapé 138. “[T]he DSU, and in particular its Appendix 3, leave panels a margin of discretion to
deal, always in accordance with due process, with specific situations that may arise in a particular case and
that are not explicitly regulated. Within this context, an appellant requesting the Appellate Body to reverse a
panel’s ruling on matters of procedure must demonstrate the prejudice generated by such legal ruling.”
b) “Autoridade do painel para conduzir o processo”
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS246/R, para. 7.8
Em EC - Tariff Preferences, o painel concluiu que tem autoridade para conduzir o processo de forma a garantir
a integridade do sistema de solução de controvérsias.
Para. 7.8. “(…) flowing from its terms of reference and from the requirement … pursuant to Article 12 of the
DSU, to determine and administer its Working Procedures, the Panel has the inherent authority — and, indeed,
the duty — to manage the proceeding in a manner guaranteeing due process to all parties involved in the
proceeding and to maintain the integrity of the dispute settlement system.”
c) “Devido Processo”
(i) Devido processo e sistema de julgamento
Philippines (Thailand - Cigarettes) (Philippines), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS371/AB/R, para. 147
Em Thailand - Cigarettes (Philippines), o Órgão de Apelação realçou a relevância do due process para a
legitimidade e eficácia de um sistema de julgamento.
151
Para. 147. “We note that Thailand couches its claim under Article 11 of the DSU as a “due process claim”.
Due process is a fundamental principle of WTO dispute settlement. It informs and finds reflection in the
provisions of the DSU. In conducting an objective assessment of a matter, a panel is “bound to ensure that due
process is respected”. Due process is intrinsically connected to notions of fairness, impartiality, and the rights
of parties to be heard and to be afforded an adequate opportunity to pursue their claims, make out their
defences, and establish the facts in the context of proceedings conducted in a balanced and orderly manner,
according to established rules. The protection of due process is thus a crucial means of guaranteeing the
legitimacy and efficacy of a rules-based system of adjudication.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)
(ii) Procedimentos padrão de trabalho do painel como forma de assegurar o devido processo
Philippines (Thailand - Cigarettes) (Philippines), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS371/AB/R, paras. 148149
Em Thailand - Cigarettes (Philippines), o Órgão de Apelação definiu que se o painel adotar um procedimento
padrão de trabalho, isto pode garantir a idoneidade e proteção do due process. Tal entendimento também foi
externado em EC - Bananas III (WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 144), India - Patents (US) (WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 95)
e Argentina - Textiles and Apparel (WT/DS56/AB/R, nota de rodapé 68).
Para. 148. “Panel working procedures should both embody and reinforce due process. Article 12.1 of the DSU
states that panels “shall” follow the working procedures set out in Appendix 3 to the DSU “unless the panel
decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute”. The working procedures adopted by a panel must
conform to the DSU. As the Appellate Body has previously observed, the use by panels of detailed,
standardized working procedures promotes fairness and the protection of due process. The inclusion by a panel
in its working procedures of a rule that is inconsistent with due process would be a clear sign that such panel
has failed to ensure the protection of due process. At the same time, even when the working procedures are
themselves sound, a panel’s failure to adhere to those procedures may be pertinent to, albeit not necessarily
determinative of, the issue of whether such panel has failed to ensure the protection of due process in a given
instance.”
Para. 149. “We also recall that panel proceedings consist of two main stages, the first of which involves each
party setting out its “case in chief, including a full presentation of the facts on the basis of submission of
supporting evidence”, and the second designed to permit the rebuttal by each party of the arguments and
evidence submitted by the other parties. Nonetheless, the submission of evidence may not always fall neatly
into one or the other of these categories, in particular when panels themselves, in the exercise of their fact
finding authority, seek to pursue specific lines of inquiry in their questioning of the parties. In this respect, we
wish to reiterate that due process will best be served by working procedures that provide “for appropriate
factual discovery at an early stage in panel proceedings”, and that “[d]ue process may be of particular concern
in cases where a party raises new facts at a late stage of the panel proceedings.” Furthermore, when the
particular circumstances of specific disputes present situations that are not explicitly regulated by their
working procedures, panels, in the exercise of their control over the proceedings, and subject to the constraints
of due process and the DSU, enjoy a margin of discretion to deal with such situations” (notas de rodapé
omitidas)
(iii) Requisitos do devido processo
* Queixas claras e devida exposição dos fatos
Chemical Products (India - Patents) (US), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 94
152
Em India - Patents (US), o Órgão de Apelação definiu que o devido processo impõe que as queixas sejam
feitas de maneira clara e que haja a devida exposição dos fatos. O mesmo restou confirmado em Chile - Price
Band System (WT/DS207/AB/R, para. 164).
consultations do much to shape the substance and the scope of subsequent panel proceedings.”
* Emenda a medida contestada
para. 144
Em Chile - Price Band System, ficou entendido que o due process exige que o demandante não tenha de fazer
ajustes no decorrer do processo com a finalidade de lidar com uma medida como um “alvo móvel”. No litígio
em apreço, discutiu-se se uma emenda a uma medida contestada, posterior ao pedido de estabelecimento de
um painel, poderia ser tida como integrante da medida em questão.
Para. 144. “We emphasize that we do not mean to condone a practice of amending measures during dispute
settlement proceedings if such changes are made with a view to shielding a measure from scrutiny by a panel
or by us. We do not suggest that this occurred in this case. However, generally speaking, the demands of due
process are such that a complaining party should not have to adjust its pleadings throughout dispute settlement
proceedings in order to deal with a disputed measure as a “moving target”. If the terms of reference in a
dispute are broad enough to include amendments to a measure - as they are in this case - and if it is necessary
to consider an amendment in order to secure a positive solution to the dispute - as it is here - then it is
appropriate to consider the measure as amended in coming to a decision in a dispute.”
(iv) Direito de resposta
* Conclusão de julgamento lastreada em queixa não proposta pela parte contrária – violação ao devido
processo
paras. 174-176
Em Chile - Price Band System, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que a conclusão do painel baseou-se em uma
queixa que não fora apresentada pela Argentina. O Órgão de Apelação concordou com a alegação do
demandado, de não ter tido o devido direito de resposta.
Para. 174. “There is, furthermore, the requirement of due process. As Argentina made no claim under the
second sentence of Article 11:1 (b) of the GATT 1994, Chile was entitled to assume that the second sentence
was not in issue in the dispute, and that there was no need to offer a defence against a claim under that
sentence. We agree with Chile that, by making a finding on the second sentence - a claim that was neither
made nor argued - the Panel deprived Chile of a ‘fair right of response’.”
153
Para. 175. “As we said in India - Patents, ‘… the demands of due process … are implicit in the DSU’. And,
as we said in Australia - Salmon on the right of response, ‘[a] fundamental tenet of due process is that a party
be provided with an opportunity to respond to claims made against it’. Chile contends that this fundamental
tenet of due process was not observed on this issue.”
Para. 176. “As we said earlier, Article 11 imposes duties on panels that extend beyond the requirement to
assess evidence objectively and in good faith, as suggested by Argentina. This requirement is, of course, an
indispensable aspect of a panel’s task. However, in making ‘an objective assessment of the matter before it’. a
panel is also duty bound to ensure that due process is respected. Due process is an obligation inherent in the
WTO dispute settlement system. A panel will fail in the duty to respect due process if it makes a finding on a
matter that is not before it, because it will thereby fail to accord to a party a fair right of response. In this case,
because the Panel did not give Chile a fair right of response on this issue, we find that the Panel failed to
accord to Chile the due process rights to which it is entitled under the DSU.” (notas de rodapé retiradas)
* Alegação de violação ao devido processo – relevância do direito de resposta
Philippines (Thailand - Cigarettes) (Philippines), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS371/AB/R, paras. 150 e
155
Em Thailand - Cigarettes (Philippines), a Tailândia reclamou que o painel desrespeitou o due process ao se
apoiar em prova apresentada pelo demandante e não conceder ao demandado o direito de se manifestar a
respeito. No seu julgamento, o Órgão de Apelação enfatizou a importância do direito de resposta.
Para. 150. “As a general rule, due process requires that each party be afforded a meaningful opportunity to
comment on the arguments and evidence adduced by the other party. This was expressly acknowledged by the
Appellate Body in Australia - Salmon when it stated that “[a] fundamental tenet of due process is that a party
be provided with an opportunity to respond to claims made against it”. At the same time, due process may also
require a panel to take appropriate account of the need to safeguard other interests, such as an aggrieved
party’s right to have recourse to an adjudicative process in which it can seek redress in a timely manner, and
the need for proceedings to be brought to a close. These interests find reflection in the provisions of the DSU,
including Article 3.3, which calls for “[t]he prompt settlement” of WTO disputes, as this is “essential to the
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations
of Members”. Likewise, Article 12.2 of the DSU provides that “[p]anel procedures should provide sufficient
flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process”.
Furthermore, “in the interests of due process, parties should bring alleged procedural deficiencies to the
attention of a panel at the earliest possible opportunity.” Accordingly, ensuring due process requires a
balancing of various interests, including systemic interests as well as those of the parties, and both general and
case specific considerations. In our view, panels are best situated to determine how this balance should be
struck in any given proceeding, provided that they are vigilant in the protection of due process and remain
within the bounds of their duties under Article 11 of the DSU.”
Para. 155. “(…) As set out above, due process generally demands that each party be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to comment on evidence adduced by the other party. At the same time, a number of different
considerations will need to be factored into a panel’s effort to protect due process in a particular dispute, and
these may include the need for a panel, in pursuing prompt resolution of the dispute, to exercise control over
the proceedings in order to bring an end to the back and forth exchange of competing evidence by the parties.
In the context of this dispute, there are several considerations that are germane to our assessment of Thailand’s
claim under Article 11 of the DSU. These include: the conduct of the parties; the legal issue to which the
evidence related and the circumstances surrounding the submission of the evidence relating to that issue; and
154
the discretion afforded under the DSU to panels in their handling of the proceedings and appreciation of the
evidence.” (notas de rodapé removidas)
* Prova e informação em arrazoado de amicus curiae – oitiva dos demandantes
Relatório do painel em United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products (US - Tuna II) (Mexico), Demandante: México, WT/DS381/R, para. 7.9
Em US - Tuna II (Mexico), o painel considerou relevante ouvir as partes após avaliar a informação e as provas
contidas em um arrazoado de um amicus curiae.
Para. 7.9. “The Panel therefore considers that it has the authority to consider the information contained in the
submission filed by Humane Society International and American University's Washington College of Law,
and has done so to the extent that it deemed it relevant to the examination of the claim before it. Where the
Panel considered the information presented in and the evidence attached to the amicus curiae brief relevant, it
has sought the views of the parties in accordance with the requirements of due process. In addition, to the
extent that one of the parties has cited the amicus curiae brief or crossreferenced to the exhibits presented with
such brief in its reasoning or responses to questions, as described in paragraph 7.3 above, these elements form
part of the submissions of that party in these proceedings and the Panel deems appropriate refer to such
information in its findings.”
2.
Artigo 12.1
a) “Discricionariedade do painel”
* Provisões substantivas do DSU – impossibilidade de mudança pelo painel
Chemical Products (India - Patents) (US), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 92
Em India - Patents (US), o Órgão de Apelação reconheceu que o painel possui certa discricionariedade para
estabelecer os seus procedimentos de trabalho, não podendo, contudo, alterar os dispositivos substantivos do
DSU.
Para. 92. “Although panels enjoy some discretion in establishing their own working procedures, this
discretion does not extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the DSU. To be sure, Article 12.1 of the
DSU says: “Panels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise
after consulting the parties to the dispute.” Yet that is all that it says. Nothing in the DSU gives a panel the
authority either to disregard or to modify other explicit provisions of the DSU.”
* Encontro com peritos válido para duas controvérsias paralelas
Em EC - Hormones, o painel decidiu fazer um encontro com os peritos para duas disputas paralelas iniciadas
pelos EUA e Canadá, medida que o Órgão de Apelação julgou razoável.
Para. 154. “Although Article 12.1 and Appendix 3 of the DSU do not specifically require the Panel to grant
this opportunity to the United States, we believe that this decision falls within the sound discretion and
155
authority of the Panel, particularly if the Panel considers it necessary for ensuring to all parties due process of
law. In this regard, we note that in European Communities - Bananas, the panel considered that particular
circumstances justified the grant to third parties of rights somewhat broader than those explicitly envisaged in
Article 10 and Appendix 3 of the DSU.”
* Aceitação de briefs de amicus curiae que não foram pedidos
Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia, WT/DS58/AB/R, paras.
105-106
Em US - Shrimp, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o painel detém poder para aceitar arrazoados de amicus
curiae que não foram solicitados.
Para. 105. “It is also pertinent to note that Article 12.1 of the DSU authorizes panels to depart from, or to add
to, the Working Procedures set forth in Appendix 3 of the DSU, and in effect to develop their own Working
Procedures, after consultation with the parties to the dispute. Article 12.2 goes on to direct that “[p]anel
procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports while not unduly
delaying the panel process.” (emphasis added)
Para. 106. “The thrust of Articles 12 and 13, taken together, is that the DSU accords to a panel established by
the DSB, and engaged in a dispute settlement proceeding, ample and extensive authority to undertake and to
control the process by which it informs itself both of the relevant facts of the dispute and of the legal norms
and principles applicable to such facts. That authority, and the breadth thereof, is indispensably necessary to
enable a panel to discharge its duty imposed by Article 11 of the DSU to “make an objective assessment of the
matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements.” (emphasis added)
* Apêndice 3, do DSU – liberdade do painel para escolher seu ponto de partida
Relatório do painel em Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute
(US/Canada - Continued Suspension), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS321/R, para. 7.44
Em US/Canada - Continued Suspension, o painel explicitou que pode partir de qualquer dispositivo do
apêndice 3 do DSU, desde que antes consulte as partes.
Para. 7.44. “Article 12.1 of the DSU provides that “[p]anels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix
3 unless the panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute.” In other words, the Panel has
the possibility to depart from any provision of Appendix 3, its only obligation being to consult the parties to
the dispute first.”
b) “Procedimentos adicionais para proteção de informações empresariais confidenciais (business
confidential information BCI)”
Obs: Vide jurisprudência acerca do assunto no artigo 18 do DSU.
c) “Procedimentos adicionais para audiências públicas”
Relatório do painel em Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute
(US/Canada - Continued Suspension), Demandante: CE, WT/DS321/R, para. 7.45
156
Em US/Canada - Continued Suspension, o painel, que foi o primeiro a tornar pública a sua audiência, aduziu
que, consoante o artigo 12.1, pode realizar seus trabalhos com as adaptações inseridas no apêndice 3 do DSU.
Posteriormente, outros painéis igualmente realizaram audiências abertas ao público (vide jurisprudência no
artigo 18 do DSU).
Para. 7.45. “The Panel thus is of the view that Article 12.1 entitles it to proceed with any adaptation of the
working procedures contained in Appendix 3, as long as such an adaptation is not expressly prohibited by any
provision of the DSU. Therefore, we need to examine whether there is any DSU provision that would
explicitly prohibit the opening of panel meetings to public observation.”
d) “Procedimentos adicionais para terceiros”
Obs: Vide jurisprudência acerca do tema no artigo 10 do DSU.
e) “Metodologia no tocante à ordem das questões a serem analisadas”
Brasil, WT/DS267/R, para. 7.5
Em US - Upland Cotton, o painel mencionou, inter alia, o artigo 12.1 ao decidir acerca de qual metodologia
seguiria quanto à ordem das questões a serem analisadas no caso vertente.
Para. 7.5. “(...) We next turn to the issue of how we should structure our procedures to consider the matter
before us. As we have concluded above, this issue is subject to the DSU but not otherwise affected by the
covered agreements. In this regard, within the overall parameters set by the DSU of prompt and efficient
dispute resolution, we must exercise our discretion as to how best to organize our procedures. Our discretion
must be guided by the instructions given to us by the DSU. Pursuant to Article 12.1 of the DSU, “[p]anels shall
follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties
to the dispute”. Moreover, Article 12.2 provides: “Panel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as
to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process. (…)
Given the potential complexity of the claims before us, the conditional nature of certain
of these claims and the volume of evidence which may be introduced by the parties in
support of their claims and arguments, and in order to organize our proceedings in an
orderly, effective and efficient manner which serves to facilitate an objective assessment
of the matter before us, and optimizes use of our resources, we have adopted the
following modifications to our procedures (as indicated in the attached timetable):
(…) We recognize that we may need to revisit certain aspects of our timetable and
working procedures in light of developments during the course of the Panel procedures.
Related amendments to the working procedures may also be made, if necessary. We
have been mindful of due process considerations in revising our timetable and will
continue to ensure that the parties have reasonable time to prepare for any subsequent
stages of the dispute, as appropriate.” (notas de rodapé expungidas)
3.
Artigo 12.2: flexibilidade e atraso indevido
a) “Procedimento dos painéis – flexibilidade – necessidade de respeito ao due process”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia Salmon), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 272
Em Australia - Salmon, o Órgão de Apelação observou que, apesar de os procedimentos dos painéis poderem
157
ter flexibilidade, deve ser cumprido o devido processo.
Para. 272. “We note that Article 12.2 of the DSU provides that ‘[p]anel procedures should provide sufficient
flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process.’ However, a
panel must also be careful to observe due process, which entails providing the parties adequate opportunity to
respond to the evidence submitted.”
b) “Anexação in totum das petições dos litigantes no relatório do painel – inviabilidade”
Relatório do painel em United States - Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from
Pakistan (US - Cotton Yarn), Demandante: Paquistão, WT/DS192/R, para. 7.10
Em US - Cotton Yarn, o painel não acolheu o pleito dos EUA de anexar, integralmente, as petições das partes
no seu relatório, o que provocaria retardo injustificado no andamento do processo (vide: EC – Tube or Pipe
Fittings, WT/DS219/R, para. 7.53).
Para. 7.10. “In the present dispute, this Panel at the outset declined to follow the attachment method. Using
the attachment method would increase the Descriptive Part of the Report to approximately 400 single-spaced
pages from the approximately 70 it now is. We do not consider this to be a viable approach. We are aware that
the WTO dispute settlement system is struggling under the burden of massive translation requirements arising
from the multi-hundred page Reports that result from the attachment method Using such a method here would
also result in significant delays in issuing the Final Report. We take note of Article 12.2 of the DSU, which
provides that “[p]anel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality panel
reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process”. Furthermore, while our responsibility is to decide the
case before us, we also feel constrained not to take steps that would damage the dispute settlement system as a
whole.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)
4.
Artigo 12.3: calendário do painel
a) “Adaptações do cronograma inicialmente elaborado pelo painel”
Relatório do painel em United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel
Products (US - Steel Safeguards), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS259/R, para. 5.3
Em US - Steel Safeguards, o painel explicou que as partes ficariam sobrecarregadas para apresentar as suas
petições dentro dos prazos previstos no calendário do painel. Assim, consignou que faria o possível, dentro do
razoável, para atender às preocupações e pedidos dos litigantes acerca dos interstícios contidos no cronograma,
podendo este sofrer eventual mudança.
Para. 5.3. “The Panel notes at the outset that this case is likely to impose a heavy burden on parties in terms of
their obligations to make submissions as set out in the timetable for the proceedings, a copy of which is
attached. As is noted at the end of the timetable, the Panel would like to emphasize that the calendar may be
changed during the panel process. The Panel would also like to assure parties that it will do its utmost, within
reason, to accommodate the parties’ concerns and requests in relation to the dead lines set out in the timetable.
Some of the requests that have been made by the parties in this respect are already reflected in the attached
timetable.”
5.
Artigo 12.6
a) “Direito de ter a petição apreciada pelo painel”
158
101
Em US - Shrimp, o Órgão de Apelação deixou assentado que tão-somente aqueles que são membros da OMC
possuem o direito de ter as suas petições examinadas pelo painel. No caso em tela, discutia-se se os painéis
podiam aceitar arrazoados de amicus curiae (vide também: US - Lead and Bismuth II).
Para. 101. “[U]nder the DSU, only Members who are parties to a dispute, or who have notified their interest
in becoming third parties in such a dispute to the DSB, have a legal right to make submissions to, and have a
legal right to have those submissions considered by, a panel. Correctively, a panel is obliged in law to accept
and give due consideration only to submissions made by the parties and the third parties in a panel proceeding.
These are basic legal propositions; they do not, however, dispose of the issue here presented by the appellant’s
first claim of error. We believe this interpretative issue is most appropriately addressed by examining what a
panel is authorized to do under the DSU.”
b) Significado do termo “rebuttal submissions”
Relatório do painel em United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel
Products (US - Steel Safeguards), Demandante: CE, WT/DS248/R, para. 5.3
Em US - Steel Safeguards, os EUA pediram a substituição da expressão rebuttal submissions, constante do
parágrafo 11, dos Procedimentos de Trabalho do painel, pela palavra “rebuttals”. O parágrafo em comento
dizia respeito ao momento de envio de provas de fato. Os EUA alegaram que a palavra “submission” refere-se,
comumente, a arrazoados escritos. Consequentemente, a expressão “rebuttal submissions” estaria reduzida a
réplicas feitas por escrito, não abrangendo, portanto, réplicas efetuadas oralmente. O demandante alegou, em
resposta, que a sugestão permitiria novos argumentos e provas produzidas na forma oral durante a segunda
audiência substantiva com o painel. O painel discordou e enfatizou que redigiu o aludido parágrafo 11, a fim
de assegurar o devido processo e que nova prova não fosse coligida no estágio final do processo, ao mesmo
tempo em que os litigantes e o próprio painel estivessem a par de toda prova relevante.
Para. 5.3. “On 31 July 2002, the Panel sent a letter to all parties containing a series of preliminary rulings on
organizational matters which are set out below:
(...) The United States has also requested the replacement of the reference to “rebuttal
submissions” in paragraph 11 of the Working Procedures with the word “rebuttals”. In
support of this proposal, the United States makes the argument that the Word
“submission” is ordinarily taken to mean written submissions. Hence, the reference to
“rebuttal submissions” in paragraph 11 would restrict the application of the qualification
in that paragraph to rebuttals that have been made in writing and would not extend to
rebuttals made orally. The complainants argue in response that the suggested
amendment would allow, for example, new arguments and evidence to be adduced
orally at the Panel's second substantive meeting.
We recall the comments made by the Appellate Body in the case Argentina – Textiles
and Apparel121 relating to what parties may argue and submit in preparation for and
during the second substantive meeting:
It is true that the Working Procedures “do not prohibit” submission of additional
evidence after the first substantive meeting of a panel with the parties. It is also true,
however, that the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 do contemplate two
distinguishable stages in a proceeding before a panel. … Under the Working Procedures
in Appendix 3, the complaining party should set out its case in chief, including a full
presentation of the facts on the basis of submission of supporting evidence, during the
first stage. The second stage is generally designed to permit “rebuttals” by each party of
the arguments and evidence submitted by the other parties.
159
We have, therefore, drafted paragraph 11 to ensure due process and to ensure that new
evidence is not adduced at a late stage in the panel process, while simultaneously
ensuring that all parties and the Panel are fully informed of all relevant evidence. (…)”
c) “Argumentações escritas posteriores”
Relatório do painel em United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (US - FSC)
(Article 21.5, EC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS108/RW, para. 6.6
Em US - FSC (Article 21.5, EC), o painel rejeitou o pedido dos EUA de ajustar o calendário do painel com
respeito ao prazo para apresentar as segundas argumentações escritas.
Para. 6.6. “We recall that we adopted our working procedures after having heard the views of the parties,
including their views on the issue of the timing of the filing of their rebuttal submissions. We do not believe
that any development or consideration has since arisen that would require us to reconsider this aspect of our
working procedures, particularly given the current advanced stage of the proceedings and the difficulties
inherent in adjusting other aspects of the Panel’s schedule that such a change would necessitate.
We therefore deny this request by the United States to change the Panel’s schedule with respect to the timing
for filing the parties’ second written submissions. We note that the United States, as well as the European
Communities, if they wish, would be able to respond to, or comment on, the other party’s rebuttals in their oral
statements at the substantive meeting.”
6.
Artigo 12.7
a) “Fundamentação básica das decisões e recomendações”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup) (Article 21.5, US), Demandante: EUA,
WT/DS132/ABRW, paras. 106-109, 124 e 126
Em Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5, US), o Órgão de Apelação definiu que o artigo 12.7 impõe um padrão
mínimo para a fundamentação que os painéis devem adotar em sua decisão, mesmo no caso de um painel
estabelecido sob o artigo 21.5. No entanto, o Órgão de Apelação não considerou apropriado determinar, em
abstrato, este padrão mínimo. Ainda no sentido de que o painel conseguiu fornecer a fundamentação mínima
exigida pelo artigo 12.7, vide: Chile - Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS87/AB/R, para. 78), Argentina - Footwear
(EC) (WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 149), Korea - Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS75/AB/R, paras. 166 e 168) e US Steel Safeguards (WT/DS259/AB/R, paras. 503-504).
Para. 106. “In considering the scope of the duties imposed on panels under Article 12.7, we turn first to the
dictionary meaning of ‘basic’. which includes both ‘fundamental; essential’ and ‘constituting a minimum … at
the lowest acceptable level’. ‘Rationale’ means both ‘a reasoned exposition of principles; an explanation or
statement of reasons’ and ‘the fundamental or underlying reason for or basis of a thing; a justification’. The
‘basic rationale’ which a panel must provide is directly linked, by the wording of Article 12.7, to the ‘findings
and recommendations’ made by a panel. We, therefore, consider that Article 12.7 establishes a minimum
standard for the reasoning that panels must provide in support of their findings and recommendations. Panels
must set forth explanations and reasons sufficient to disclose the essential, or fundamental, justification for
those findings and recommendations.”
Para. 107. “In our view, the duty of panels under Article 12.7 of the DSU to provide a ‘basic rationale’
reflects and conforms with the principles of fundamental fairness and due process that underlie and inform the
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provisions of the DSU. In particular, in cases where a Member has been found to have acted inconsistently
with its obligations under the covered agreements, that Member is entitled to know the reasons for such
finding as a matter of due process. In addition, the requirement to set out a ‘basic rationale’ in the panel report
assists such Member to understand the nature of its obligations and to make informed decisions about: (i) what
must be done in order to implement the eventual rulings and recommendations made by the DSB; and (ii)
whether and what to appeal. Article 12.7 also furthers the objectives, expressed in Article 3.2 of the DSU, of
promoting security and predictability in the multilateral trading system and of clarifying the existing
provisions of the covered agreements, because the requirement to provide ‘basic’ reasons contributes to other
WTO Members’ understanding of the nature and scope of the rights and obligations in the covered
agreements.”
Para. 108. “We do not believe that it is either possible or desirable to determine, in the abstract, the minimum
standard of reasoning that will constitute a ‘basic rationale’ for the findings and recommendations made by a
panel. Whether a panel has articulated adequately the ‘basic rationale’ for its findings and recommendations
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of the case, the specific legal
provisions at issue, and the particular findings and recommendations made by a panel. Panels must identify the
relevant facts and the applicable legal norms. In applying those legal norms to the relevant facts, the reasoning
of the panel must reveal how and why the law applies to the facts. In this way, panels will, in their reports,
disclose the essential or fundamental justification for their findings and recommendations.”
Para. 109. “This does not, however, necessarily imply that Article 12.7 requires panels to expound at length
on the reasons for their findings and recommendations. We can, for example, envisage cases in which a
panel’s ‘basic rationale’ might be found in reasoning that is set out in other documents, such as in previous
panel or Appellate Body reports — provided that such reasoning is quoted or, at a minimum, incorporated by
reference. Indeed, a panel acting pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU would be expected to refer to the initial
panel report, particularly in cases where the implementing measure is closely related to the original measure,
and where the claims made in the proceeding under Article 21.5 closely resemble the claims made in the initial
panel proceedings.”
Para. 124. “Having regard to these circumstances, we are of the view that the Panel Report, read together with
the original panel report, leaves no doubt about the reasons for the Panel’s additional finding under Article 3.1
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. We, therefore, find that the Panel did not fail to provide a “basic rationale”
for that finding.”
Para. 126. “We wish to add that for purposes of transparency and fairness to the parties, even a panel
proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU should strive to present the essential justification for its findings and
recommendations in its own report. In this case, in particular, we consider that the Panel’s finding under
Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement would have been better supported by a direct quotation from or, at
least, an explicit reference to, the relevant reasoning set out in the original panel report” (notas de rodapé
suprimidas)
b) “Emissão de breve relatório quando as partes chegarem a um acordo”
(i) Ausência de contestação – inexistência de acordo entre os litigantes – painel não pode se
limitar a uma breve descrição do caso
Relatório do painel em United States - Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador (US - Shrimp)
(Ecuador), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS335/R, paras. 7.1-7.9, 7.11, 7.28 e 8.1-8.2
Em US - Shrimp (Ecuador), os EUA (demandado) não contestaram as reclamações do demandante. Entretanto,
como ambos os membros não consideraram as suas opiniões em comum acerca da questão substantiva posta
161
ao painel, em meio a uma “solução mutuamente acordada”, o painel entendeu que a terceira parte do artigo
12.7 do DSU não se aplicava. Portanto, para que o pedido do demandante fosse julgado procedente, o
demandante deveria comprovar que houve uma violação prima facie de regra da OMC.
Paras. 7.1-7.9, 7.11, 7.28, 8.1 e 8.2. “The dispute before us is unusual in that, as mentioned above, the
responding party, the United States, does not contest any of the complaining party’s claims. The parties have
not, however, characterized their shared view of the substantive aspects of the dispute as a “mutually agreed
solution”, and thus Article 12.7 does not apply. We therefore start by considering whether the lack of
substantive disagreement between the parties affects our responsibilities as a Panel.
In this regard, we consider that we must be guided in this dispute, as we would be in any other dispute subject
to the DSU, by the provisions in Article 11 of the DSU, “Function of Panels”, which provides:
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate
opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution. (emphasis added)
Given that, notwithstanding their common view as to how the dispute should be resolved, the parties have not
reached a mutually agreed solution (which would require us only to “report[ ] that a solution has been
reached”), we understand that our responsibility is as set forth in Article 11 DSU, i.e., to make an “objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving
the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.”
“We note that the parties and third parties share this view. For instance, Ecuador and the United States, in their
(identical) response to a question from the Panel addressing this issue, 18 indicate that they:
[consider] that the role of a Panel in a case like this one, where there is no substantive
disagreement between the Parties as to the inconsistency of a measure with one or more
cited provisions of a covered Agreement, is nevertheless to make an objective
assessment of the matter, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements. The matter before this Panel is a narrow one – whether
Commerce’s calculation of the weighted average to weighted average margins of
dumping for the two separately investigated Ecuadoran exporters and for “all other”
exporters breaches the first sentence of Article 2.4.2. Therefore, the Parties are not
asking the Panel to “sanction” their Agreement, but rather, to consider that the
Agreement facilitates the Panel’s assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability and conformity of the measures with the covered agreements.
Nevertheless, it is correct to say that they are seeking a decision that would allow the
rest of the provisions of the Agreement to be implemented.
A number of third parties formulate similar views on the issue. For instance, the European Communities
submit that:
Article 11 of the DSU does not expressly refer to a panel “sanctioning the mutual
understanding of the parties”. Rather it refers to a panel making an “objective
assessment” and making “findings”. Such an “objective assessment” and such
“findings” are always made by a panel “on its own”, in the sense that the panel takes
sole responsibility for them, and is not compelled to follow the opinion of one or both
Parties.
162
India indicates that, in its view,
the panel's obligation under Article 11 of the DSU to examine and resolve the claim put
forward by Ecuador is not affected by the fact that the United States has indicated that it
will not contest Ecuador's claim. Even though the United States is not contesting the
claim, the panel must still examine whether Ecuador has made a prima facie case that
the use of zeroing in the measure at issue was inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 and make a
finding on that issue.”
(ii) Burden of proof
Because of its singularity, this dispute raises in a particularly acute fashion the issue of the burden of proof.
The burden of proof lies, in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, with the party that asserts the affirmative of
a particular claim or defence. Ecuador, as the complaining party, must therefore make a prima facie case of
violation of the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO agreements. The burden would then shift to the
responding party (here the United States), to adduce evidence to rebut the presumption that Ecuador's
assertions are true. In this context, we recall that “a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective
In our view, the issue of the burden of proof is of particular importance in this case. This is because Ecuador
has made factual and legal claims before the Panel which the United States does not contest. Yet, the fact that
the United States does not contest Ecuador's claims is not a sufficient basis for us to summarily conclude that
Ecuador's claims are well-founded. Rather, we can only rule in favour of Ecuador if we are satisfied that
Ecuador has made a prima facie case. We take note in this regard that the Appellate Body has cautioned panels
against ruling on a claim before the party bearing the burden of proof has made a prima facie case. (…)
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not seeking to refute Ecuador's claims, we must satisfy
ourselves that Ecuador has established a prima facie case of violation, and notably that it has presented
“evidence and argument (...) sufficient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, identify the
relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and explain the basis for the claimed inconsistency
of the measure with that provision.”
In light of the above findings, we conclude that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 in its final
and amended final affirmative determinations of sales at less than fair value (dumping) with respect to certain
frozen warmwater shrimp from Ecuador, and in its final antidumping duty order.
Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a
covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of
benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that, to the extent the United States has acted
inconsistently with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it has nullified or impaired benefits
accruing to Ecuador under that Agreement. We therefore recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request
the United States to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
18 The Panel asked the parties and third parties to provide their views on the following question: “What does
your delegation consider is the role of a Panel in a case like this one, where there is no substantive
disagreement between the Parties as to the inconsistency of a measure with one or more cited provisions of a
covered Agreement? Can the Panel limit itself to sanctioning the mutual understanding of the parties, or must
163
the Panel, on its own, determine whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with the cited provisions?.”
(demais notas de rodapé retiradas)
(iii) Inexistência de contestação à queixa do demandante – alegação das partes de que não
chegaram a um acordo – não-aplicação do artigo 12.7
Relatório do painel em United States - Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from
Korea (US - Zeroing) (Korea), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS402/R, paras. 7.13-7.14
Em US - Zeroing (Korea), diante da ausência de contestação à demanda, as partes consideraram que não houve
disputa e nem uma “solução mutuamente acordada”. Diante disto, o painel afastou a incidência da terceira
parte do artigo 12.7 do DSU.
Para. 7.13. “Although the United States does not contest Korea's claim, the United States submits that, under
Article 11 of the DSU, the Panel is required to make its own objective assessment of the matter before it,
including its own objective assessment of the facts, and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreements. In its third party submission, the European Union suggests that the Panel could limit its
finding to a conclusion that the parties agree there is no dispute, accompanied by a recommendation that the
measures be brought into conformity.”
Para. 7.14. “While the United States does not contest Korea's claim, in our view the parties do not “agree that
there is no dispute”, as suggested by the European Union, nor have the parties characterized their shared views
as a “mutually agreed solution”. Therefore, although when a mutually agreed solution is reached, Article 12.7
of the DSU provides that a panel's report shall be “confined to a brief description of the case and to reporting
that a solution has been reached”, in the Panel's view this does not apply in the circumstances of this dispute.”
(notas de rodapé removidas)
c) “Informações empresariais confidenciais”
Obs: Vide, acerca de informações empresariais confidenciais (business confidential information - BCI), a
jurisprudência pertinente ao artigo 18 do DSU.
7.
Artigos 12.8 e 12.9: prazos para o trabalho dos painéis
a) “A natureza dos prazos é indicativa”
Relatório do painel em United States - Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974 (US - Section 301 Trade
Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS152/R, para. 7.31/nota de rodapé 646
Em US - Section 301 Trade Act, o painel consignou que os prazos dispostos nos artigos 12.8 e 12.9 são
meramente indicativos. Na prática, a maior parte dos painéis não consegue respeitar os intertícios contidos nos
artigos em comento.
Nota de rodapé 646. “Article 12.8 refers to six months “as a general rule” for the timeframe between panel
composition and issuance of the final report to the parties. Article 12.9 provides that “[i]n no case should the
period from the establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months”
(emphasis added). Article 17.5 states that “[a]s a general rule, the proceedings [of the Appellate Body] shall
not exceed 60 days”. It adds, however, that “[i]n no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days”. However,
even this seemingly compulsory deadline has been passed in three cases so far (United States -Restrictions on
Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, DS24/AB/R, 91 days; European Communities Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), DS26/AB/R and DS48/AB/R,
114 days; and US - Shrimp, op. cit., 91 days). Finally, Article 20 refers to 9 months — 12 months in case of an
164
appeal — “as a general rule” for the period between panel establishment and adoption of report(s) by the
DSB.”
b) “Linguagem dos artigos 12.8, 12.9 e 21.5”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III) (Article 21.5, Ecuador II); (EC - Bananas III) (Article 21.5,
US), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA e
WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, para. 195
Em EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, Ecuador II); EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, US), o Órgão de Apelação
traçou um paralelo entre a linguagem do artigo 21.5 e aquela dos artigos 12.8 e 12.9.
Para. 195. “Article 21.5 provides that a panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral
of the matter to it. If an Article 21.5 panel considers that it cannot provide its report within that timeframe, it
must notify the DSB, specifying the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which
it will issue its report. By contrast, Articles 12.8 and 12.9 of the DSU prescribe that original panel proceedings
“shall, as a general rule, not exceed six months” and “should” in no case exceed nine months.”
8.
Artigo 12.10
a) “O painel deverá proporcionar tempo bastante para que o país em desenvolvimento membro prepare
e apresente sua argumentação”
(i) Prorrogação do prazo em decorrência de reorganização administrativa no país
Relatório do painel em India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial
Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/R, para. 5.10
Em India - Quantitative Restrictions, o painel aceitou o pedido indiano e concedeu dez dias extras para que a
Índia apresentasse o seu primeiro arrazoado escrito em virtude da reorganização administrativa que acontecia
naquele país.
Para. 5.10. “On 15 April 1998 we ruled as follows:
The Panel has carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties. The Panel notes that
India could have raised several of the reasons mentioned in its letter during the
organizational meeting held on 27 February 1998. However, pursuant to Article 12.10
of the DSU, “in examining a complaint against a developing country Member, the panel
shall accord sufficient time for the developing country Member to prepare and present
its argumentation.” In light of this provision, and considering the administrative
reorganization taking place in India as a result of the recent change in government, the
Panel has decided to grant an additional period of time to India to prepare its
submission. However, bearing in mind also the need to respect the time frames of the
DSU and in light of the difficulties of rescheduling the meeting of 7 and 8 May, the
Panel considers that an additional period of ten days would represent “sufficient time”
within the meaning of Article 12.10 of the DSU. India is therefore granted until 1 May
1998 (5 p.m.) to submit its first written submission to the Panel. The original date of the
first meeting remains unchanged as 7 and 8 May.
(ii) Reconhecimento de status de país em desenvolvimento
Relatório do painel no caso Turkey - Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice (Turkey - Rice),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS334/R, paras. 7.304-7.305
165
Em Turkey - Rice, o painel explanou que, ao elaborar o seu cronograma, levou em consideração o fato da
Turquia ser um país em desenvolvimento (PED), fato que não foi contestado pelo demandante. Ainda no
mesmo sentido, vide Philippines - Distilled Spirits (WT/DS403/R, paras. 7.190-7.191).
Paras. 7.304. “(…) during the Panel proceedings, the Panel took into account the respondent’s status as a
developing country Member, a fact not contested by the complainant, when preparing and revising the
timetable for the process.”
Para. 7.305. “Em seguida, o Painel acrescentou que ele tinha “attempted, inter alia, to accommodate, to the
extent possible, Turkey’s requests for extensions of deadlines to submit responses to the questions posed by
the Panel both after the first and second substantive meetings, as well as Turkey’s request for time to submit
comments on the United States comments to the Panel’s interim report.”
9.
Artigo 12.11
a) “Indicação explícita no relatório do painel de como dispositivos pertinentes ao tratamento especial
e diferenciado foram tidos em consideração”
(i) Artigo 12.11 como base para análise de dispositivo que concedia tratamento especial e
diferenciado a país em desenvolvimento
Relatório do painel em India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial
Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/R, para. 5.157
Em India - Quantitative Restrictions, o painel invocou o artigo 12.11 do DSU, para abordar dispositivo que
concedia tratamento especial e diferenciado aos PEDs.
Para. 5.157. “Article 12.11 of the DSU requires us to indicate explicitly the form in which account was taken
of relevant provisions on special and differential treatment for developing country Members that form part of
the covered agreements which have been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the dispute
settlement procedures. In this instance, we have noted that Article XVIII:B as a whole, on which our analysis
throughout this section is based, embodies the principle of special and differential treatment in relation to
measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes. This entire part G therefore reflects our consideration of
relevant provisions on special and differential treatment, as does Section VII of our report (suggestions for
implementation).”
(ii) Não-invocação, no pleito de criação de painel, de dispositivo que confere tratamento especial
a país em desenvolvimento – possibilidade de incidência do mesmo com arrimo no artigo 12.11
do DSU
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia, Japão,
Coréia do Sul e Tailândia, WT/DS234/R, para. 7.87
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), o painel observou que, apesar de o artigo 15 do Acordo Antidumping
(tratamento diferenciado a PEDs), não ter sido ventilado no pedido de estabelecimento de painel, o artigo em
apreço poderia ser invocado pelo painel, tendo como justificativa o artigo 12.11 do DSU.
Para. 7.87. “We note that there is no reference to AD Article 15 in the various requests for establishment of
this Panel. Generally, therefore, AD Article 15 would not fall within our terms of reference. However, we note
that DSU Article 12.11 requires panels to “explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken of
relevant provisions on differential and more-favourable treatment for developing country Members that form
166
part of the covered agreements which have been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the
dispute settlement procedures”. Since we consider AD Article 15 to be relevant, and since that provision has
been raised by developing country Members in the present proceedings, we are bound to consider that
provision, even though it was not referred to in the various requests for establishment. In doing so, we note
that certain developing country Members attach importance to price undertakings as a “constructive”
alternative to anti-dumping duties.” (nota de rodapé omitida)
(iii) Acordo de Serviços – tratamento mais favorável a país em vias de desenvolvimento
Relatório do painel em Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico - Telecoms),
Em Mexico - Telecoms, o painel explicou como levou em consideração, na sua decisão, as disposições mais
importantes do Acordo sobre Serviços que outorgam tratamento especial a país em vias de desenvolvimento.
Para. 8.3. “The Panel notes that, pursuant to Article 12.11 of the DSU, it has taken into account in its findings
GATS provisions on differential and more-favourable treatment for developing country Members. In
particular, the Panel has examined Mexico’s arguments that commitments of such Members have to be
interpreted in the light of Article IV of the GATS, paragraph 5 of the preamble to the GATS, and paragraph
5(g) of the Annex on Telecommunications. The Panel emphasizes that its findings in no way prevent Mexico
from actively pursuing the development objectives referred to in these provisions by extending
telecommunications networks and services at affordable prices in a manner consistent with its GATS
commitments.”
(iv) Tratamento especial a país em desenvolvimento – desnecessidade de aplicação de provisões
que o concedem
Relatório do painel em Turkey -Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice (Turkey - Rice), Demandante:
EUA, WT/DS334/R, para. 7.304
Em Turkey - Rice, o painel entendeu que eventuais dispositivos outorgantes de tratamento diferenciado a PEDs
não eram importantes para o deslinde do caso.
Para. 7.304. “The Panel notes that, in the course of these Panel proceedings Turkey did not raise any specific
provisions on differential and more-favourable treatment for developing country Members that require
particular consideration, nor do we find these specialized provisions relevant for the resolution of the specific
matter brought before this Panel.”
III.
Comentários
O atual sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC inova em relação ao antigo GATT, na medida em que é
mais institucionalizado, prevendo o duplo grau de jurisdição e um maior detalhamento dos órgãos julgadores.
Nesse sentido, o artigo 12 do DSU contém as principais disciplinas para o trabalho dos painéis, que são
incumbidos do julgamento em primeira instância. É digno de se realçar que, ainda no antigo GATT, os painéis
já desempenhavam papel de destaque:
Estes panels se converteram numa instância independente – num tertius como diria
Bobbio, entre e acima das partes, incumbidos de dar uma opinião com base em standard
terms of reference que definiam a sua “jurisdição”. Esta opinião era uma vis directiva e
não uma sentença com vis cogendi. Era, para novamente recorrer a Bobbio, um
conselho e não um comando. Este conselho era dirigido às Partes Contratantes e por
este motivo, como aponta Pierre Pescatore, os textos emanados dos panels eram
documentos persuasivos e não prescritivos. (68)
167
O artigo 12.1 estipula que os painéis devem, em princípio, seguir as orientações constantes do apêndice 3 do
DSU, que versa sobre os procedimentos de trabalho dos painéis. Entrementes, podem surgir ocasiões não
previstas no artigo 12, no apêndice 3 ou no próprio procedimento de trabalho do painel. Nestas hipóteses, a
jurisprudência da OMC tem reconhecido que o painel está revestido de discricionariedade para disciplinar o
problema com o qual se depara, como ficou decidido em EC - Hormones, devendo a parte insatisfeita com a
decisão demonstrar o prejuízo que sofreu para que o decisum seja revertido.
Entende-se que o poder de discricionariedade do painel para deslindar estas questões não diretamente
previstas, encontra-se também na parte final do parágrafo 12, do apêndice 3, do DSU (“o calendário acima
poderá ser alterado à luz de acontecimentos imprevistos. Se necessário, deverão ser programadas reuniões
adicionais com as partes”), como no parágrafo 8, do apêndice 3, do DSU (“o grupo especial poderá a todo
momento formular perguntas às partes e pedir-lhes explicações, seja durante uma reunião com elas, seja por
escrito”); neste último dispositivo, o poder de discricionariedade deflui do poder conferido ao painel de buscar
a verdade dos fatos e esclarecimentos em qualquer fase processual, já que se emprega a expressão “a todo
momento”.
A exigência da comprovação do prejuízo experimentado revela-se adequada, eis que se segue a regra geral do
direito processual de pas de nullité sans grief, isto é, o ato inquinado de ilegal somente pode ser
revertido/desconsiderado se ensejar dano a alguma das partes. Ademais, obedece-se ao princípio do devido
processo legal, que é um dos pilares de qualquer sistema de solução de controvérsias tido como sério.
No trâmite do processo em primeira instância, a jurisprudência da OMC realça a importância do princípio do
devido processo (due process), que permite aos litigantes a efetiva participação na demanda. Com efeito,
pode-se afirmar que:
The principle of ‘due process’ (also called ‘fundamental fairness’, ‘procedural fairness’
or ‘natural justice’) broadly requires administrative and judicial proceedings to be fair.
Administrative and judicial systems attempt to achieve due process by exercising their
discretion in a fair manner and by developing procedural or evidentiary rules explaining
how rights, duties, powers and liabilities are administered. (69)
Se o painel tiver um procedimento padrão de trabalho (Thailand - Cigarettes) (Philippines), EC - Bananas III,
India - Patents (US) e Argentina - Textiles and Apparel, as queixas forem claras e houver a devida exposição
dos fatos (India - Patents) (US) e (Chile - Price Band System), haverá obediência ao princípio do devido
processo.
Assunto pertinente ao princípio do devido processo é se a lei ou medida administrativa, que é objeto de
impugnação no processo, for alterada no transcorrer deste (Chile - Price Band System). O sistema de solução
de litígios exige estabilidade e segurança. Logo, não se espera que a lei ou ato administrativo contestado sofra
alteração. Esta poderia ocorrer somente em caráter de excepcionalidade, devendo o órgão julgador averiguar a
boa-fé da parte que a promove. Aí, então, poderia aparecer o problema da aferição da boa-fé. Deve-se entender
que esta, como norteadora das relações internacionais, precisa ser analisada apenas no caso concreto, evitandose a adoção de um padrão abstrato apriorístico, o que poderia conduzir a eventual inequidade.
Corolário do princípio do due process é o direito de resposta. Neste estão incluídos não-somente o direito de
se pronunciar acerca dos arrazoados escritos da parte contrária, como também o de se manifestar sobre as
afirmações orais e provas produzidas pelo outro demandante. É certo que existem diversos interesses em jogo
no curso do processo, como a expectativa das partes a um célero julgamento e eventual intenção de apelar da
decisão prolatada pelo painel. Ao conduzir o feito, o painel deve levar em consideração estes interesses, sem,
no entanto, descuidar do efetivo direito de resposta, como asseverou o Órgão de Apelação em Thailand Cigarettes (Philippines).
168
A jurisprudência da OMC tem aceitado a tese de que os painéis possuem uma margem de discricionariedade
para conduzir os seus trabalhos. Nesta esteira, já se quedou acertado o encontro do painel com peritos
direcionado para duas controvérsias paralelas (EC - Hormones), assim como o poder dos painéis para aceitar
arrazoados de amicus curiae que não foram solicitados (US - Shrimp). Todavia, esta discricionariedade não
pode implicar mudança de provisões substantivas do DSU (India - Patents) (US).
O fator tempo é muito importante para a credibilidade de um sistema de solução de conflitos, tal como o é
aquele previsto no DSU. Os membros de um painel, ao estabelecer o seu cronograma, têm em mente este ideal
de rapidez no desate da lide. Assim, é importante consignar que:
Outra mudança de grande magnitude consistiu na definição clara de prazos para todas as
etapas do procedimento de solução de controvérsias. Abreviou-se, com isso, o tempo de
duração do procedimento, providência salutar para impedir que um caso se arrastasse
por anos a fio sem qualquer solução.” (70)
Nesta linha, o parágrafo 12, do apêndice 3, do DSU, faz uma proposta temporal para o curso dos trabalhos do
painel. Entretanto, os prazos para a conclusão das tarefas do painel, previstos nos artigos 12.8 e 12.9, não são
mandatórios, ou seja, a natureza dos mesmos é somente de orientação (US - Section 301 Trade Act).
O painel possui flexibilidade para a condução das suas atividades, devendo, contudo, zelar para evitar atrasos
indevidos, nos termos do artigo 12.2 do DSU, como consignado em Australia - Salmon (US). Por conseguinte,
pedidos desarrazoados dos litigantes, como a inclusão do conteúdo de suas petições nos relatórios dos painéis,
deve ser indeferido, como sucedeu em US - Cotton Yarn.
Não sendo possível às partes alcançar um acordo, deve o painel deslindar o caso. (71) Nesta sua função, deve
motivar suficientemente sua decisão para permitir aos litigantes saber com exatidão as razões determinantes
das suas conclusões e recomendações. Neste diapasão, consoante observado em Mexico - Corn Syrup, o artigo
12.7 impõe um dever de fundamentação mínima ao julgador do processo, devendo ser considerados pelo
painel as verificações de fatos, a aplicabilidade de disposições pertinentes e o arrazoado em que se apóia. Este
dever de fundamentação mínima deve ser averiguado caso a caso, evitando-se, pois, os perigos que uma
redução apriorística poderia ocasionar.
A parte final do artigo 12.7 reza que, existindo avença entre autor e réu, o painel limitar-se-á a uma breve
descrição do caso, mencionando o acordo celebrado. Acontece que um painel pode-se defrontar com a situação
de, mesmo não havendo contestação, a parte reclamada não aquiescer com a reivindicação do reclamante (US Shrimp) (Ecuador), (US - Zeroing) (Korea). Aqui, discute-se sobre a consequência desta postura do
demandado: inexoravelmente, deve o painel acolher o pleito do autor e julgá-lo vencedor?
No processo civil brasileiro, salvo exceções, não oferecendo o réu contestação, deve o juiz decretar a revelia e
julgar procedente o pedido. No direito processual da OMC, o cenário é diverso. Mesmo quedando inerte a
parte adversa, o demandante é obrigado a comprovar que houve uma violação prima facie de algum
dispositivo da legislação da OMC (US - Shrimp) (Ecuador), o que seria semelhante à fumaça do bom direito
exigido para a concessão de liminares ou antecipações de tutela no direito adjetivo civil pátrio.
Ao negociarem a Rodada Uruguai, que culminou com o advento da OMC e todos os seus tratados, os Estados
participantes reconheceram que os membros em desenvolvimento necessitavam de tutela específica para
usufruírem dos benefícios de um sistema comercial multilateral que tem como escopo a redução dos
obstáculos ao livre fluxo de mercadorias e serviços. Nesta senda, alguns dispositivos do ordenamento da OMC
outorgam tratamento diferenciado a membros seus que estejam ainda em vias desenvolvimento, como o faz o
artigo 12.10 do DSU. Assim, em hipóteses que justificam a prorrogação de prazos, tal como a reforma
169
administrativa de um governo em curso no trâmite do processo (India - Quantitative Restrictions), o
tratamento diferenciado é legítimo.
Podendo basear as suas decisões em provisões relativas a tratamento especial a membro em desenvolvimento,
o painel deve mencionar, expressamente, quais dispositivos foram utilizados para beneficiar referido país,
segundo consigna o artigo 12.11. Isto nada mais é do que respeito ao devido processo, que sinaliza no sentido
de que os litigantes têm o direito de saber aquilo que influenciou no veredicto dos painelistas, sendo, também,
um desdobramento do dever de fundamentação mínima, previsto no artigo 12.7, como explanado parágrafo
acima.
Com fulcro no artigo 12.11, já se teve a oportunidade de decidir que uma disposição não ventilada no pedido
de criação de painel e que concede regime mais favorável a país em desenvolvimento pode ser aplicada, não
havendo ofensa ao due process (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment). No caso aventado, cuidava-se do artigo
15, do Acordo Antidumping. Mas e se a provisão, invocada tão-somente depois do pedido de estabelecimento
de painel, pelo membro em vias de desenvolvimento, não conferir regime especial? Nessa circunstância,
entende-se que o Estado que requer a aplicação da norma não pode ser beneficiado pela mesma, se esta não
fizer parte dos termos de referência do painel.
Apesar de a criação de painéis, ainda sob a égide do antigo GATT, ter tido a sua relevância, alguns obstáculos
dificultavam a sua operacionalização tais como “delays in the formation of panels and the panel process,
blocking of the adoption of panel reports in the GATT Council and delays in the implementation of Council
recommendations”. (72) Analisando-se a jurisprudência do artigo 12 do DSU, percebe-se, felizmente, que boa
parte dos problemas que rodeavam o funcionamento dos painéis foi resolvida, dando-se, portanto, maior
credibilidade ao sistema de solução de controvérsias e à OMC como um todo.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 68: LAFER, Celso. A OMC e a regulamentação do comércio internacional: uma visão brasileira. Porto Alegre: Livraria do
Advogado, 1998, p. 142.
Footnote 69: MITCHELL, Andrew. Due process in WTO disputes. In YERXA, Rufus e WILSON, Bruce (ed.). Key Issues in WTO
Dispute Settlement. The First Ten Years. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 144.
Footnote 70: AMARAL JÚNIOR, Alberto do. A solução de controvérsias na OMC e a aplicação do direito internacional. Tese
apresentada para o concurso de provas e títulos para provimento do cargo de professor titular do Departamento de Direito Internacional
– área de direito internacional público – da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo. São Paulo, 2006, p. 215.
Footnote 71: Há quem entenda que a ênfase na função de julgar do Painel pode comprometer o outro papel do mesmo: a conciliação.
Neste sentido: “In some cases it may actually hamper the achievement of a resolution to the dispute in that countries lock themselves in a legal battle
in which any form of compromise or willingness to negotiate may be seen as an admission. Moreover, strong democracies have the tendency to dig
themselves in, making it increasingly difficult to reach a settlement because of high audience costs at home” (PAUWELYN, J. Limits of Litigation:
“Americanization” and Negotiation in the Settlement of WTO Disputes. Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, vol. 19, 1, 2003, p. 127.
Footnote 72: MATSUSHITA, Mitsuo; SCHOENBAUM, Thomas J. e MAVROIDIS, Petros C. The World Trade Organization: Law,
Practice, and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2ª ed., 2006. p. 107.
170

Artigo 13
IA.
Article 13
Right to Seek Information
13.1
Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body
which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such information or advice from any
individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that Member.
A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such information as the
panel considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential information which is provided shall not be
revealed without formal authorization from the individual, body, or authorities of the Member
providing the information.
13.2
Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion
on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other
technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing from
an expert review group. Rules for the establishment of such a group and its procedures are set forth in
Appendix 4.
IB.
Artigo 13
Direito à Busca de Informação
13.1
Todo grupo especial terá direito de recorrer à informação e ao assessoramento técnico de qualquer
pessoa ou entidade que considere conveniente. Contudo, antes de procurar informação ou
assessoramento técnico de pessoa ou entidade submetida à jurisdição de um Membro o grupo
especial deverá informar as autoridades de tal Membro. O Membro deverá dar resposta rápida e
completa a toda solicitação de informação que um grupo especial considere necessária e pertinente.
A informação confidencial fornecida não será divulgada sem autorização formal da pessoa, entidade
ou autoridade que a proporcionou.
13.2
Os grupos especiais poderão buscar informação em qualquer fonte relevante e poderão consultar
peritos para obter sua opinião sobre determinados aspectos de uma questão. Com relação a um
aspecto concreto de uma questão de caráter científico ou técnico trazido à controvérsia por uma parte,
o grupo especial poderá requerer um Relatório escrito a um grupo consultivo de peritos. As normas
para estabelecimento de tal grupo e seus procedimentos constam do Apêndice 4.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
171

Artigo 14
IA.
Article 14
Confidentiality
14.1
Panel deliberations shall be confidential.
14.2
The reports of panels shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the dispute in the light of
the information provided and the statements made.
14.3
Opinions expressed in the panel report by individual panelists shall be anonymous.
IB.
Artigo 14
Confidencialidade
14.1
As deliberações do grupo especial serão confidenciais.
14.2
Os Relatórios dos grupos especiais serão redigidos sem a presença das partes em controvérsia, à luz
das informações fornecidas e das argumentações apresentadas.
14.3
As opiniões individuais dos integrantes do grupo especial consignadas em seu Relatório serão
anônimas.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
III.
Comentários
172

Artigo 15
Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira
IA.
Article 15
Interim Review Stage
15.1
Following the consideration of rebuttal submissions and oral arguments, the panel shall issue the
descriptive (factual and argument) sections of its draft report to the parties to the dispute. Within a
period of time set by the panel, the parties shall submit their comments in writing.
15.2
Following the expiration of the set period of time for receipt of comments from the parties to the
dispute, the panel shall issue an interim report to the parties, including both the descriptive sections
and the panel's findings and conclusions. Within a period of time set by the panel, a party may submit
a written request for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of the
final report to the Members. At the request of a party, the panel shall hold a further meeting with the
parties on the issues identified in the written comments. If no comments are received from any party
within the comment period, the interim report shall be considered the final panel report and circulated
promptly to the Members.
15.3
The findings of the final panel report shall include a discussion of the arguments made at the interim
review stage. The interim review stage shall be conducted within the time-period set out in paragraph
8 of Article 12.
IB.
Artigo 15
Etapa Intermediária de Exame
15.1
Após consideração das réplicas e apresenteções orais, o grupo especial distribuirá os capítulos
expositivos (fatos e argumentações) de esboço de seu Relatório para as partes em controvérsia. Dentro
de um prazo fixado pelo grupo especial, as partes apresentarão seus comentários por escrito.
15.2
Expirado o prazo estabelecido para recebimento dos comentários das partes, o grupo especial
distribuirá às partes um Relatório provisório, nele incluindo tanto os capítulos descritivos quanto as
determinações e conclusões do grupo especial. Dentro de um prazo fixado pelo grupo especial,
qualquer das partes poderá apresentar por escrito solicitação para que o grupo especial reveja aspectos
específicos do Relatório provisório antes da distribuição do Relatório definitivo aos Membros. A
pedido de uma parte, o grupo especial poderá reunir-se novamente com as partes para tratar de itens
apontados nos comentários escritos. No caso de não serem recebidos comentários de nenhuma das
partes dentro do prazo previsto para tal fim, o Relatório provisório será considerado Relatório final e
será prontamente distribuído aos Membros.
15.3
As conclusões do Relatório final do grupo especial incluirão uma análise dos argumentos
apresentados na etapa intermediária de exame. Esta etapa deverá ocorrer dentro do prazo estabelecido
no parágrafo 8 do Artigo 12.
173
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Artigo 15.1
a) “A ‘prática normal’ dos terceiros na revisão dos seus argumentos”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (US - Aircraft), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS353/AB/R, para. 8
A UE submeteu ao painel reclamação relativa a várias medidas dos EUA que afetavam o comércio de
aeronaves. Argumentou que os EUA subsidiavam os produtores Boeing Company e a McDonell Douglas
Corporation, atos proibidos pelo ASMC. Neste caso, o direito dos terceiros não limitou-se a revisar o relatório
intermediário, os argumentos do Brasil na parte descritiva do relatório preliminar do painel para “destacar” os
direitos de terceiros foram declinados.
Para. 8. “During the course of the Panel proceedings, the Panel adopted additional procedures for the
protection of business confidential information (“BCI”) and highly sensitive business information (“HSBI”),
and issued a number of rulings relating to these procedures and other issues.” (73)
2.
Artigo 15.2
a) “Requerimento para identificar ‘aspectos precisos’ do relatório intermediário”
Relatório do painel no litígio Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia - Salmon),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS18/R, para. 7.3
O Canadá reclamou da proibição da Austrália de importação de salmão fresco, resfriado e congelado. O painel
declinou o pedido da Austrália de uma “revisão de todo o relatório” e restringiu os comentários com
conclusões relacionadas aos “aspectos precisos” do relatório intermediário.
Para. 7.3. “Australia requested a “whole of report review” of the interim report. In so doing, it referred to
Article 11 of the DSU setting out the function of a panel and requiring that it “should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Australia argued that a large part of
the legal reasoning of the interim report was not based on an objective assessment of the matter before the
Panel and submitted that the interim report contained a number of factual inaccuracies and assertions not
supported by evidence before the Panel. At the interim review meeting, Canada objected to Australia's request
for “a whole of report review”. Canada referred to Article 15.2 of the DSU which provides an opportunity for
parties to request the panel to “review precise aspects of the interim report”. According to Canada, it is not
open to the Panel to consider anything other than comments dealing with “precise aspects” of the interim
report. We agree with Canada and have therefore only reviewed our interim report in light of the comments
made by the parties which relate to “precise aspects” of the interim report”.”
Relatório do painel no litígio Japan - Measures Affecting The Importation of Apples (Japan - Apples),
174
O painel fez declarações em relação à reclamação dos EUA sobre as medidas adotadas pelo Japão, que
proibiu a importação de maçãs dos EUA. Concluiu que as medidas fitosanitárias são desproporcionais, de
acordo com as evidências disponibilizadas, e declarou que, de acordo com o artigo 2.2 do Acordo SPS, a
medida do Japão foi mantida sem uma evidência científica suficiente. O painel revisou os comentários feitos
ao relatório preliminar pelas partes. Japão e EUA requisitaram que o painel revisasse aspectos precisos do
relatório intermediário.
Para. 7.1. “The Panel issued the draft descriptive sections of its report (factual and arguments) to the parties
on 6 February 2003, in accordance with Article 15.1 of the DSU. Both parties offered written comments on
the draft descriptive sections on 24 February 2003. The Panel noted all these comments and amended the draft
descriptive part where appropriate. The Panel issued its interim report to the parties on 20 March 2003, in
accordance with Article 15.2 of the DSU. In communications dated 3 April 2003, both Japan and the United
States requested that the Panel review precise aspects of the interim report. Neither of the parties requested an
interim review meeting. On 11 April 2003, Japan and the United States provided written comments on each
other's comments on the interim report, as permitted by the Panel's working procedures. The Panel carefully
reviewed the arguments made. They are discussed in this section and, to the extent necessary, are reflected in
the findings section below, in accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU.”
b) “O uso da revisão intermediária para re-argumentar um caso”
Relatório do painel no litígio Japan - Countervailling Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from
Korea (Japan - DRAMs), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS336//R, para. 6.2
Em 2006, o governo da República da Coreia requisitou consultas a respeito do governo japonês sobre os
artigos 4 do DSU, 30 do ASCM e XXII do GATT 1994, em decorrência da imposição de tarifas à importação
de certos Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAM’s). A demandante trouxe de volta à discussão pontos
relatados anteriormente.
Para. 6.2. “In addressing Korea's comments, we note that Korea has sought to re-argue many of the points
that it made during its submissions. This is not necessarily the purpose of the interim review mechanism set
forth at Article 15.2 of the DSU. In particular, we do not consider that Article 15.2 of the DSU requires us to
provide a defence of our findings at the Interim Review stage.”
c) “Novas evidências durante a revisão”
Relatório do painel no litígio European Communities - Selected Customs Matters (EU - Customs),
Os EUA solicitaram o estabelecimento de painel, com base no artigo X:1 do GATT 1994. Alegaram que a UE
administra suas leis e regulamentos de maneira não-uniforme para avaliação e classificação de produtos para
propósitos alfandegários, os quais devem obedecer ao artigo X:3 do GATT 1994. O painel considerou que “os
termos do artigo 15.2 não permitem que se considere a evidência que não se reflete no relatório
intermediário”, e, por isso, não consideraram determinadas evidências novas submetidas pela UE.
Para. 6.3. “In its comments on the Interim Report, the European Communities referred to a number of
exhibits that it had not relied upon previously in the Panel proceedings. In particular, the European
Communities referred to: (a) Commission Regulation (EC) nº 2171/2005 concerning the tariff classification of
certain LCD monitors (Exhibit EC-167); (b) Dutch Ministry of Finance, Telefaxbericht BCPP 2006/389 M
(Exhibit EC-168); (c) an extract from the EBTI database concerning expired BTI DE M/2975/05-1 (Exhibit
EC-169); (d) replies of customs authorities of member States concerning the alleged requirement of prior
175
approval for valuation on a basis other than the last sale (Exhibit EC-170); (e) Greek Presidential decree nº
203 (Exhibit EC-171); and (f) Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ concerning accession to the WTO (Exhibit EC-172).”
Relatório do painel no litígio European Communities and its Member States - Tariff Treatment of Certain
Information Technology Products (EU - TI), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R e
WT/DS377/R para. 6.48
A disputa é relacionada aos casos em que alguns produtos tenham concessões tarifárias dadas pela UE,
conforme o Acordo de Tecnologia da Informação (ITA). A UE submeteu dois documentos que demonstravam
as medidas relacionadas foram modificadas e, outra, inteiramente repelida. A UE requisitou que, com base
nesses documentos, o painel impedisse que fosse feita qualquer recomendação em relação a taiss medidas. O
painel rejeitou o pedido da UE.
Para. 6.48. “We note that the documents in Attachment 1 and 2 were published in November 2009, long after
the record had closed. At no time between November 2009 and the issuance of the Interim Reports did the
European Communities seek leave of the Panel to provide this additional information. Article 15.2 of the
DSU, which provides for the Interim Review process, was considered by the Appellate Body in EC –
Sardines. It clarified that this provision does not permit parties to “introduce new evidence”, and is availabe
only “for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report”. Consistent with the Appellate Body's
approach and in the interest of protecting the due process rights of the complainants, who had no opportunity
to make submissions for the record on the documents provided, we decline to consider further the documents
attached by the European Communities to its request for interim review. The Panel also declines to make
adjustments to the Interim Reports to exclude the measures in question from the Panel's recommendation and
to add text about the European Communities' confirmation that certain measures have been repealed, as
requested by the European Communities.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (US - Aircraft) Demandante: UE, WT/DS353/AB/R, para. 1.137
O Órgão de Apelação não considerou algumas evidências submetidas pela UE na fase da revisão
intermediária.
Para. 1137 “The first of the European Union's arguments in support of its due process claim is that the Panel
introduced the “predominance” approach for the first time in paragraph 7.1701 of its Final Report, thereby
depriving the European Communities of any meaningful opportunity to comment on such a “novel theory”.”
(74)
d) “Reunião adicional de revisão”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute (Canada - Hormones), Demandante: UE, WT/DS321/AB/R, para. 6.2
A UE alegou que o Canadá manteve a suspensão das concessões e de outras obrigações contidas nos artigos
XXII:1 do GATT 1994 e 4 do DSU, depois que a UE adotou a Diretiva 2003/74/EC, em 2003, emendando a
Diretiva 96/22/CE relacionada à proibição de ação hormonal. Uma reunião de revisão intermediária adicional
foi requerida em relação a vários procedimentos. O painel explicou que o membro é que deveria decidir
quando uma reunião de revisão intermediária adicional é necessária.
Para. 6.2. “The European Communities and Canada separately requested an interim review by the Panel of
certain aspects of the interim report issued to the Parties on 31 July 2007. The European Communities stated
176
that it stood ready to attend an interim review hearing to discuss the issues raised in its letter, “should the
Panel consider it useful”. The Panel notes that it is not for it to decide whether holding an interim review
hearing would be useful. Article 15.2 of the DSU provides that it is “[a]t the request of a party [that] the panel
shall hold a further meeting with the parties on the issues identified in the written comments.” The Panel does
not understand the EC statement above as a request by the European Communities for the Panel to hold an
additional meeting with the parties. Furthermore, the Panel notes that Canada did not request such a meeting.
As a result, the Panel did not hold an interim review meeting.”
3.
Artigo 15.3
a) “Novos argumentos e novas decisões jurisdicionais”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - Act 1916)
Demandante: UE, WT/DS162/R, WT/DS136/AB/R e WT/DS162/AB/R, para. 54
O painel foi estabelecido para considerar reclamações da UE em relação ao Ato de 1916 dos EUA, que
argumentaram ser inconsistentes com as obrigações dos EUA, segundo os acordos da OMC. O painel
considerou que os EUA não agiram em um momento apropriado para suscitar um argumento jurisdicional. Os
argumentos apresentados pelos EUA, na fase de revisão intermediária, no entanto, foram rejeitados pelo
painel.
Para. 54. “We agree with the Panel that the interim review was not an appropriate stage in the Panel's
proceedings to raise objections to the Panel's jurisdiction for the first time. An objection to jurisdiction should
be raised as early as possible and panels must ensure that the requirements of due process are met. However,
we also agree with the Panel's consideration that “some issues of jurisdiction may be of such a nature that they
have to be addressed by the Panel at any time.” We do not share the European Communities' view that
objections to the jurisdiction of a panel are appropriately regarded as simply “procedural objections”. The
vesting of jurisdiction in a panel is a fundamental prerequisite for lawful panel proceedings. We, therefore, see
no reason to accept the European Communities' argument that we must reject the United States' appeal
because the United States did not raise its jurisdictional objection before the Panel in a timely manner.”
b) “revisão intermediária”
Relatório do painel no litígio Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones
Dispute (Canada - Hormones), Demandante: UE, WT/DS321/R, para. 6.1
A revisão intermediária é parte das declarações do painel e isso foi concluído para esclarecer a função do
artigo 15.3 do DSU.
Para. 6.1. “Pursuant to Article 15.3 of the DSU, the findings of the final panel report shall include a
discussion of the arguments made by the parties at the interim review stage. This section of the Panel report
provides such a discussion. As is clear from Article 15.3, this Section is part of the Panel’s findings.”
IV.
Comentários
O artigo 15 do DSU foi discutido em algumas decisões do DSB da OMC. O artigo 15.1 do DSU foi
comentado para salientar como os terceiros podem se manifestar e quais são as suas limitações em participar
da revisão intermediária.
De acordo com as decisões do painel, o artigo 15.2 do DSU determina que sejam relatados aspectos precisos.
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Apenas aqueles aspectos em que as partes entendam que seja necessária a revisão intermediária devem ser
submetidos ao painel. Para o painel, também é importante destacar-se que existe uma função específica na
fase de revisão intermediária, em que não devem ser introduzidas novas evidências.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 73: BCI and HSBI procedures were adopted by the Panel on 19 February 2007, at the request of, and following consultations
with, the parties. The procedures were modified several times over the course of the proceedings and the Panel issued a number of
rulings in connection with them. The final version of these procedures is attached to the Panel Report as Annex D. (Panel Report,
para. 1.11) On 21 December 2006, Brazil requested the Panel to grant it certain enhanced third party rights, and on 22 December 2006,
Canada requested the Panel to grant it any enhanced third party rights granted to Brazil. Both parties to the dispute submitted
comments and opposed the requests. On 23 February 2007, the Panel informed the parties and third parties that it had decided not to
grant enhanced third party rights to any third party in the proceedings. (Panel Report, paras. 1.14, 7.14 and 7.15).
Footnote 74: European Union's appellant's submission, para. 258. The European Union clarified at the oral hearing that its claim
concerning the Panel's finding in paragraph 7.1701 of the Final Report relates exclusively to whether the Panel violated due process,
and not whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 15 of the DSU.
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
Artigo 16
IA.
Article 16
Adoption of Panel Reports
16.1
In order to provide sufficient time for the Members to consider panel reports, the reports shall not be
considered for adoption by the DSB until 20 days after the date they have been circulated to the
Members.
16.2
Members having objections to a panel report shall give written reasons to explain their objections for
circulation at least 10 days prior to the DSB meeting at which the panel report will be considered.
16.3
The parties to a dispute shall have the right to participate fully in the consideration of the panel report
by the DSB, and their views shall be fully recorded.
16.4
Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be
adopted at a DSB meeting (75) unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision
to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. If a party has notified its decision
to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after
completion of the appeal. This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to
express their views on a panel report.
Footnote 75: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled within this period at a time that enables the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 4
of Article 16 to be met, a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
IB.
Artigo 16
Adoção de Relatórios de Grupos Especiais
16.1
A fim de que os Membros disponham de tempo suficiente para examinar os Relatórios dos grupos
especiais, tais Relatórios não serão examinados para efeito de aceitação pelo OSC até 20 dias após a data
de distribuição aos Membros.
16.2
Os Membros que opuserem alguma objeção ao Relatório do grupo especial deverão apresentar por
escrito razões explicativas de suas objeções para serem distribuídas ao menos 10 dias antes da reunião
do OSC na qual o Relatório do grupo especial será examinado.
16.3
As partes em controvérsia deverão ter direito de participar plenamente do exame do Relatório do grupo
especial feito pelo OSC, e suas opiniões serão integralmente registradas.
16.4
Dentro dos 60 dias seguintes à data de distribuição de um Relatório de um grupo especial a seus
Membros, o Relatório será adotado em uma reunião do OSC6 a menos que uma das partes na
controvérsia notifique formalmente ao OSC de sua decisão de apelar ou que o OSC decida por
consenso não adotar o Relatório. Se uma parte notificar sua decisão de apelar, o Relatório do grupo
especial não deverá ser considerado para efeito de adoção pelo OSC até que seja concluído o
6
Se não houver uma reunião do OSC prevista dentro desse período em data que permita cumprimento das disposições dos parágrafos 1
e 4 do Artigo 16, será realizada uma reunião do OSC para tal fim.
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processo de apelação. O referido procedimento de adoção não prejudicará o direito dos Membros de
expressar suas opiniões sobre o Relatório do grupo especial.
IC.
Nenhum comentário.
II.
1.
Efeitos jurídicos da adoção de relatórios de painéis
a) “Geral: vinculação apenas às partes na disputa”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages
II), Demandante: CE, WT/DS8/AB/R, para. 14
Em Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, o Órgão de Apelação definiu que a adoção do relatório de um painel não
obriga somente as partes no litígio, revertendo a posição de painel que tratou to tema anteriormente.
Para. 14. “Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement and paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the language of Annex 1A
incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement bring the legal history and experience under the
GATT 1947 into the new realm of the WTO in a way that ensures continuity and consistency in a smooth
transition from the GATT 1947 system. This affirms the importance to the Members of the WTO of the
experience acquired by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 - and acknowledges the
continuing relevance of that experience to the new trading system served by the WTO. Adopted panel reports
are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by subsequent panels. They create
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are
relevant to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute
between the parties to that dispute. In short, their character and their legal status have not been changed by the
coming into force of the WTO Agreement.”
2.
Definição de “contexto”, previsto no artigo 31.2, da Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos
Tratados - não-inclusão de relatórios do painel
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
on Certain Products from China (US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)), Demandante:
China, WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 325
Em US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), o Órgão de Apelação assentou que os relatórios
de painéis não fazem parte do conceito de “contexto”, para fins do artigo 31.2, da Convenção de Viena sobre
o Direito dos Tratados.
Para. 325. “We note that the definition of “context” in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention makes no
mention of jurisprudence. Panel reports in previous disputes do not form part of the context of a term or
provision in the sense of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. Rather, the legal interpretation embodied in
adopted panel and Appellate Body reports become part and parcel of the WTO acquis and have to be taken
into account as such.”
180
a) “Conclusões do painel que não são objeto de apelação”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada –
Periodicals), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS31/AB/R, nota de rodapé 28
Em Canada - Periodicals, o Órgão de Apelação explicou que uma conclusão do painel que não é incluída na
Apelação não pode ser adotada pelo Órgão de Apelação.
Nota de rodapé 28. “(...) a Panel finding that has not been specifically appealed in a particular case should
not be considered to have been endorsed by the Appellate Body. Such a finding may be examined by the
Appellate Body when the issue is raised properly in a subsequent appeal.”
b) “Relatórios de painéis sobre o mesmo assunto em disputa paralela por outro demandante”
Relatório do painel em India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products
(India - Patents), Demandante: CE, WT/DS79/R, para. 7.30
Em India - Patents (EC), o painel concluiu que a sua posição não estava vinculada pelo relatório de outro
painel ou do Órgão de Apelação, mas que levaria em consideração as conclusões e o raciocínio contidos nas
decisões de caso anterior sobre a mesma questão.
Para. 7.30. “[P]anels are not bound by previous decisions of panels or the Appellate Body even if the subjectmatter is the same. In examining dispute WT/DS79 we are not legally bound by the conclusions of the Panel
in dispute WT/DS50 as modified by the Appellate Body report. However, in the course of “normal dispute
settlement procedures” required under Article 10.4 of the DSU, we will take into account the conclusions and
reasoning in the Panel and Appellate Body reports in WT/DS50. Moreover, in our examination, we believe
that we should give significant weight to both Article 3.2 of the DSU, which stresses the role of the WTO
dispute settlement system in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system, and to the
need to avoid inconsistent rulings (which concern has been referred to by both parties). In our view, these
considerations form the basis of the requirement of the referral to the “original panel” wherever possible
under Article 10.4 of the DSU.”
c) “Conclusões do relatório de um painel, que são revertidas por razões de ordem
processual/jurisdicional, podem servir como diretrizes em outro processo, desde que sejam relevantes
e persuasivas”
Relatório do painel em Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from
Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.15
Em Guatemala - Cement II, o painel aduziu que o relatório do painel, emitido em Guatemala - Cement I,
embora reformado pelo Órgão de Apelação, por motivos de cunho processual/jurisdicional, possuía status
similar de relatórios de painéis não adotados. Todavia, consignou que as conclusões alinhavadas no relatório
reformado poderiam atuar como vetores no novo litígio a ser deslindado, se fossem tidas por relevantes e
persuasivas.
Para. 8.15. “We note that the Appellate Body ruled in Guatemala - Cement I that “the dispute was not
properly before the Panel”, and that it therefore could not consider any of the substantive issues raised in the
alternative by Guatemala. In other words, the Appellate Body found that the panel in Guatemala - Cement I
should never have reached the substance of the dispute. We therefore consider that the substantive findings of
the panel in Guatemala - Cement I are in this respect similar to those of unadopted panel reports, i.e., while
181
they have no legal status, they may nevertheless provide useful guidance to the extent that we consider them
relevant and persuasive. We recall in any event Mexico’s assertion that its arguments in this dispute are put
before us independently of their having been supported, or not, by a previous panel.”
d) “Necessidade de se averiguar as semelhanças e diferenças entre os fatos ventilados em processo
anterior e aqueles mencionados no processo em curso”
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from
Norway (EC – Salmon) (Norway), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.69
Em EC - Salmon (Norway), o painel reconheceu a necessidade de se comparar os fatos, objeto de processo
anterior, com o então processo em curso. Para tanto, os painelistas entenderam por bem analisar a decisão
emitida pelo painel anterior.
Para. 7.69. “[T]his very issue, and many of the arguments raised by Norway, have been previously addressed
by other Panels. Norway has not attempted to distinguish the views of those Panels from the circumstances of
this case. While we are not bound by the decisions of other Panels, we nonetheless consider it appropriate to
review those decisions to assess the similarities and differences in the underlying facts, and determine whether
the analysis of those Panels is helpful in our assessment of the arguments in this case.”
e) “Relatórios de painéis e do Órgão de Apelação como resolução final para a controvérsia”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen) (Article 21.5 - India), Demandante: Índia,
WT/DS141/AB/RW, paras. 92-95
Em EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), o Órgão de Apelação explicitou que a adoção do relatório de um
painel deve ser encarada, pelas partes, como uma resolução final para o litígio. Já em US - Shrimp (Article
21.5 - Malaysia) (para. 97), o Órgão de Apelação definiu que a adoção de seus relatórios, pelo DSB,
igualmente deve ser tida como resolução final para o litígio.
Para. 92. “The issue raised in this appeal is similar to the issue we resolved in US - Shrimp (Article 21.5 Malaysia). In this appeal, however, the original panel’s finding on India’s claim under Article 3.5 relating to
“other factors” was not appealed in the original dispute. Accordingly, the finding of the original panel relating
to that claim was adopted by the DSB as part of a panel report, and, therefore, Article 17.14, which deals with
the adoption of Appellate Body Reports, does not dispose of the issue before us.”
Para. 93. “All the same, in our view, an unappealed finding included in a panel report that is adopted by the
DSB must be treated as a final resolution to a dispute between the parties in respect of the particular claim and
the specific component of a measure that is the subject of that claim. This conclusion is supported by Articles
16.4 and 19.1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21, and Article 22.1 of the DSU. Where a panel concludes that a
measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, that panel shall recommend, according to Article 19.1, that
the Member concerned bring that measure into conformity with that agreement. A panel report, including the
recommendations contained therein, shall be adopted by the DSB within the time period specified in Article
16.4 - unless appealed. Members are to comply with recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB
promptly, or within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21 of the
DSU. A Member that does not comply with the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB within
these time periods must face the consequences set out in Article 22.1, relating to compensation and
suspension of concessions. Thus, a reading of Article 16.4 and 19.1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21, and
Article 22.1 of the DSU, taken together, makes it abundantly clear that a panel finding which is not appealed,
182
and which is included in a panel report adopted by the DSB, must be accepted by the parties as a final
resolution to the dispute between them, in the same way and with the same finality as a finding included in an
Appellate Body Report adopted by the DSB - with respect to the particular claim and the specific component
of the measure that is the subject of the claim. Indeed, the European Communities and India agreed at the oral
hearing that both panel reports and Appellate Body Reports would have the same effect, in this respect, once
adopted by the DSB.”
Para. 94. “On this point, we recall that we resolved the question of the effect of findings adopted by the DSB
as part of a panel report in the same vein in Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 - US). In that implementation
dispute, we relied on Article 3.2 of the DSU, which emphasizes the need for security and predictability in the
trading system, and on Article 3.3 of the DSU, which stresses the necessity for the prompt settlement of
disputes. There, we treated certain findings of the original panel that had not been appealed in the original
proceedings, and that had been adopted by the DSB, as a final resolution to the dispute between the parties in
respect of the particular claim and the specific component of the measure that was the subject of the claim.
We observed there that “Mexico seems to seek to have us revisit the original panel report”, and added that:
(…) the original panel report, regarding the initial measure (SECOFI’s original
determination), has been adopted and that these Article 21.5 proceedings concern a
subsequent measure (SECOFI’s redetermination). We also note that Mexico did not
appeal the original panel’s report, and that Articles 3.2 and 3.3 of the DSU reflect the
importance to the multilateral trading system of security, predictability and the prompt
settlement of disputes. We see no basis for us to examine the original panel’s treatment
of the alleged restraint agreement.” (original italics)
Para. 95. “We, therefore, agree with the Panel in this dispute that:
(…) the same principle [as that expressed in Article 17.14] applies to those aspects of
the Panel’s report that are not appealed and are thus not addressed by the Appellate
Body. Thus, the portions of the original Report of the Panel that are not appealed,
together with the Appellate Body report resolving the issues appealed, must, in our
view, be considered as the final resolution of the dispute, and must be treated as such
by the parties, and by us, in this proceeding. (footnote omitted)” (notas de rodapé
removidas)
3.
Artigo 16.4
a) “Extensão do prazo de sessenta dias”
(i) Extensão do período, proposta pelas CE, em relação a três disputas
* Minutas do Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias da reunião de 26 de julho de 1999, WT/DSB/M/65, pp. 19 e
20
O DSB, em julho de 1999, acatou a proposta das CE de ampliação do período de sessenta dias, previsto no
artigo 16.4. No encontro do DSB, a sugestão das CE ficou assim registrada:
Pág. 19. “The representative of the European Communities drew attention to the fact that the time-periods
under Article 16.4 of the DSU in respect of three Reports of Panels in which the EC was a complainant would
expire in August. These Panel Reports were the following: (i) “Chile -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages”
(WT/DS87/R - WT/ DS110/R); (ii) “Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear”
(WT/DS121/R); and (iii) “Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Certain Dairy Products” (WT/DS98/R).
In order to comply with the requirements of Article 16.4, the EC would have to request three special DSB
meetings during the month of August. To avoid problems which such meetings could create for the WTO’s
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work, the EC would be prepared to accept the postponement of consideration of these Panel Reports and the
extension of the corresponding time-periods for appeal to a future meeting of the DSB at the beginning of
September. He underlined that such extension would be granted by the DSB on the understanding that the
rights of the parties to the disputes with respect to adoption or appeal of these Panel Reports were preserved,
as if such adoption had been requested within the 60-day period specified in Article 16.4 of the DSU. In order
to do so it would be necessary for the DSB to agree by consensus to extend the time-periods in question.”
b) “Ampliação do prazo – termo do acordo feito pelas partes”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Export
Subsidies on Sugar), Demandante: Austrália, WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 5
Em EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, o DSB aceitou o pedido conjunto das partes no sentido do aumento do
período de sessenta dias. Conforme o acordo entre as partes (WT/DS265/24, WT/DS266/24 e WT/DS283/5).
“1. In order to take account of the end of year period, and to avoid inconveniencing the appeal procedure,
the above parties agree that the 60 day time-period in Article 16.4 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) as applicable to the above disputes will be extended
to 31 January 2005, and that the agreement of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to this extension will be
sought at a meeting of the DSB to be requested for 13 December 2004.
2. This extension is agreed on the understanding that the rights of the parties to the disputes with respect to
adoption or appeal of the panel reports are preserved, as if such adoption or appeal had been requested within
the 60 days specified in Article 16.4 of the DSU.
3. The European Communities (EC) will file its notice of appeal of the panel reports in these disputes on 13
January 2005, provided the DSB agreement set out in paragraph 1 is obtained.
4.
If for any reason the EC does not file its notice of appeal on 13 January 2005, the complainants may,
individually or jointly, request a DSB meeting for adoption of the panel reports within the extended 60 day
period.
5. The parties also agree that the complainants will request a second meeting of the DSB for 14 December
2004 for the adoption of the panel reports within the original 60 day period should this prove necessary, but
that this request will be withdrawn should the DSB agreement set out in paragraph 1 above be obtained.”
c) “Extensão do período de sessenta dias – acordo procedimental entre as partes”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres), Demandante: CE, WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 6
Em Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, o DSB acolheu outro acordo entre as partes para estender o prazo contido no
artigo 16.4 do DSU.
“1. In order to take into account certain scheduling difficulties concerning the appeal procedure, the above
parties agree that the 60 day time-period in Article 16.4 of Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) as applicable to the above dispute will be extended to 20 September 2007,
and that a decision of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) on this extension will be sought at a meeting of the
DSB to be requested for 10 August 2007.
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2. This extension is agreed on the understanding that the rights of the parties to the dispute with respect to
adoption or appeal of the panel report are preserved, as if such adoption or appeal had been requested within
60 days specified in Article 16.4 of the DSU.
3.
The European Communities (EC) will file its notice of appeal of the panel report in this dispute on 3
September 2007, provided the DSB decision set out in paragraph 1 is obtained.
4. If for any reason the EC does not file its notice of appeal on 3 September 2007, the parties may request a
DSB meeting for adoption of the panel report within the extended period.”
d) “Majoração do período de sessenta dias – carga de trabalho excessiva do Órgão de Apelação”
Em vários lítigios, o período em questão foi majorado por causa de diversas apelações que assoberbavam o
Órgão de Apelação, como sucedeu em Thailand - Cigarettes (Philippines) (WT/DS371/7 e WT/DSB/M/290,
paras. 53-58).
e) “Circunvenção do interstício de sessenta dias”
Em EC - Sardines, as CE substituíram a apelação apresentada por outra, ofertada na mesma data. Apesar do
protesto da delegação peruana, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que o comportamento de Bruxelas era
aceitável. Com efeito, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que poderia haver situações que implicariam burla do
interregno de sessenta dias.
Para. 147. “[W]e believe there are circumstances that, although not constituting ‘abusive practices’ would be
in violation of the DSU, and would, thus, compel us to disallow the conditional withdrawal of a notice of
appeal as well as the filing of a replacement notice. For example, if the conditional withdrawal or the filing of
a new notice were to take place after the 60-day deadline in Article 16.4 of the DSU for adoption of panel
reports, this would effectively circumvent the requirement to file appeals within 60 days of circulation of
panel reports. In such circumstances, we would reject the conditional withdrawal and the new notice of
appeal.”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 16 do DSU versa acerca da adoção dos relatórios dos painéis. Este artigo, e a criação do Órgão de
Apelação formam os dois pilares do processo de judicialização do sistema GATT/OMC, o qual almeja
conferir segurança e previsibilidade nas relações comerciais internacionais. Conforme o texto do artigo:
(…) reversed the consensus principle. The provision requires that a panel report be
adopted unless the Dispute Settlement Body decides by consensus not to adopt the
report. In other words, the report becomes binding unless the winner of the case votes
against its own victory, which is unlikely to occur (…) Article 16 of the DSU
constitutes a further shift from the political and diplomatic conception of GATT/WTO
law towards a legalistic model.
Na contenda Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, o Órgão de Apelação explicitou que a adoção do relatório de um
painel não se consubstancia em prática subsequente, prevista no artigo 31.3(b), da Convenção de Viena sobre
o Direito dos Tratados. Por sinal, este dispositivo específico da convenção estabelece o quanto segue:
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together with the context, there shall be taken into account any subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation. This is a most important element in the interpretation of any treaty, and
reference to practice is well established in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.
Este entendimento do Órgão de Apelação denota-se acertado, pois o artigo 31.3(b) refere-se a “acordo das
partes”, o que não está presente no relatório do painel. Ademais, a adoção do relatório do painel obriga
somente as partes na disputa e não os membros da OMC, que são estranhos ao processo deslindado.
O Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), afirmou que não estão
inseridos na definição de “contexto”, do artigo 31.2 da Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados, os
relatórios dos painéis. A posição do Órgão de Apelação está correta, na medida em que tão-somente os
demandantes estão adstritos aos relatórios dos painéis, e que estes relatórios são adotados após a conclusão do
tratado; enquanto que o artigo 31.2 da convenção acima mencionada, reporta-se a “qualquer acordo relativo
ao tratado e feito entre todas as partes por ocasião da conclusão do tratado” ou a “qualquer instrumento
estabelecido por uma ou várias partes, por ocasião da conclusão do tratado e aceito pelas outras partes como
instrumento relativo ao tratado”. Estes relatórios de painéis podem, contudo, fazer parte do chamado “GATT
acquis”, que é o conjunto de textos, entendimentos e práticas, do antigo GATT, sendo, portanto, vetores na
atuação tanto de painéis instalados após o advento da OMC como do próprio Órgão de Apelação.
Finalmente, é útil salientar que o período de sessenta dias, inserido no artigo 16.4 do DSU, tem, às vezes, sido
objeto de ampliação, devido a dois fatores principais: evitar um número vasto de reuniões do DSB ou esperar
o enxugamento da pauta do Órgão de Apelação, que pode, eventualmente, ter excesso de casos para julgar.
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
Artigo 17
IA.
Article 17
Appellate Review
Standing Appellate Body
17.1
A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall hear appeals
from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case.
Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in the
working procedures of the Appellate Body.
17.2
The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year term, and each person
may be reappointed once. However, the terms of three of the seven persons appointed immediately
after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall expire at the end of two years, to be determined
by lot. Vacancies shall be filled as they arise. A person appointed to replace a person whose term of
office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of the predecessor's term.
17.3
The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in
law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They shall be
unaffiliated with any government. The Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative of
membership in the WTO. All persons serving on the Appellate Body shall be available at all times
and on short notice, and shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities
of the WTO. They shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct
or indirect conflict of interest.
17.4
Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel report. Third parties which have
notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may
make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body.
17.5
As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party to the dispute
formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report. In fixing its
timetable the Appellate Body shall take into account the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if
relevant. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall
inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within
which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.
17.6
An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel.
17.7
The Appellate Body shall be provided with appropriate administrative and legal support as it requires.
17.8
The expenses of persons serving on the Appellate Body, including travel and subsistence allowance,
shall be met from the WTO budget in accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General Council,
based on recommendations of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration.
Procedures for Appellate Review
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17.9
Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of
the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the Members for their information.
17.10 The proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be confidential. The reports of the Appellate Body shall
be drafted without the presence of the parties to the dispute and in the light of the information
provided and the statements made.
17.11 Opinions expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals serving on the Appellate Body shall
be anonymous.
17.12 The Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during the
appellate proceeding.
17.13 The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.
Adoption of Appellate Body Reports
17.14 An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to
the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30
days following its circulation to the Members (76).This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the
right of Members to express their views on an Appellate Body report.
Footnote 76: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
IB.
Artigo 17
Órgão Permanente de Apelação
17.1
O OSC constituirá um Órgão Permanente de Apelação, que receberá as apelações das decisões
dos grupos especiais. Será composto por sete pessoas, três das quais atuarão em cada caso. Os
integrantes do Órgão de Apelação atuarão em alternância. Tal alternância deverá ser determinada pelos
procedimentos do Órgão de Apelação.
17.2
O OSC nomeará os integrantes do Órgão de Apelação para períodos de quatro anos, e poderá renovar
por uma vez o mandato de cada um dos integrantes. Contudo, os mandatos de três das sete pessoas
nomeadas imediatamente após a entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC, que serão
escolhidas por sorteio, expirará ao final de dois anos. As vagas serão preenchidas à medida que forem
sendo abertas. A pessoa nomeada para substituir outra cujo mandato não tenha expirado exercerá
o cargo durante o período que reste até a conclusão do referido mandato.
17.3
O Órgão de Apelação será composto de pessoas de reconhecida competência, com experiência
comprovada em direito, comércio internacional e nos assuntos tratados pelos acordos abrangidos
em geral. Tais pessoas não deverão ter vínculos com nenhum governo. A composição do Órgão de
Apelação deverá ser largamente representativa da composição da OMC. Todas as pessoas integrantes
do Órgão de Apelação deverão estar disponíveis permanentemente e em breve espaço de tempo, e
deverão manter-se a par das atividades de solução de controvérsias e das demais atividades
pertinentes da OMC. Não deverão participar do exame de quaisquer controvérsias que possam gerar
conflito de interesses direto ou indireto.
17.4
Apenas as partes em controvérsia, excluindo-se terceiros interessados, poderão recorrer do
Relatório do grupo especial. Terceiros interessados que tenham notificado o OSC sobre interesse
substancial consoante o parágrafo 2 do Artigo 10 poderão apresentar comunicações escritas ao Órgão
de Apelação e poderão ser por ele ouvidos.
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17.5
Como regra geral, o procedimento não deverá exceder 60 dias contados a partir da data em que uma
parte em controvérsia notifique formalmente sua decisão de apelar até a data em que o Órgão de
Apelação distribua seu Relatório. Ao determinar seu calendário, o Órgão de Apelação deverá
levar em conta as disposições do parágrafo 9 do Artigo 4, se pertinente. Quando o Órgão de Apelação
entender que não poderá apresentar seu Relatório em 60 dias, deverá informar por escrito ao OSC das
razões do atraso, juntamente com uma estimativa do prazo dentro do qual poderá concluir o Relatório.
Em caso algum o procedimento poderá exceder a 90 dias.
17.6
A apelação deverá limitar-se às questões de direito tratadas pelo Relatório do grupo especial e às
interpretações jurídicas por ele formuladas.
17.7
O Órgão de Apelação deverá receber a necessária assistência administrativa e legal.
17.8
As despesas dos integrantes do Órgão de Apelação, incluindo gastos de viagem e diárias, serão
cobertas pelo orçamento da OMC de acordo com critérios a serem adotados pelo Conselho Geral,
baseado em recomendações do Comitê de Orçamento, Finanças e Administração.
Procedimentos do de Apelação
17.9
O Órgão de Apelação, em consulta com o Presidente do OSC e com o Diretor Geral, fixará seus
procedimentos de trabalho e os comunicará aos Membros para informação.
17.10
Os trabalhos do Órgão de Apelação serão confidenciais. Os Relatórios do Órgão de Apelação serão
redigidos sem a presença das partes em controvérsia e à luz das informações recebidas e das
declarações apresentadas.
17.11 As opiniões expressas no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação por seus integrantes serão
anônimas.
17.12 O Órgão de Apelação examinará cada uma das questões pleiteadas em conformidade com
oparágrafo 6 durante o procedimento de apelação.
17.13 O Órgão de Apelação poderá confirmar, modificar ou revogar as conclusões e decisões jurídicas do
grupo especial.
Adoção do Relatório do Órgão de Apelação
17.14
Os Relatórios do Órgão de Apelação serão adotados pelo OSC e aceitos sem restrições pelas partes
em controvérsia a menos que o OSC decida por consenso não adotar o Relatório do Órgão de
Apelação dentro do prazo de 30 dias contados a partir da sua distribuição aos Membros 7. Este
procedimento de adoção não prejudicará o direito dos Membros de expor suas opiniões sobre o
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação.
IC.
No parágrafo 1, deve ser acrescentada a expressão “de trabalho” após “procedimentos”, já que, em inglês,
consta a a expressão “working procedures”.
No parágrafo 2, por seu turno, sugere-se a alteração do verbo “expirará” para o plural “expirarão”, pois se
refere a “mandatos”.
7
Caso não esteja prevista reunião do DSB durante esse perído, será realizada uma reunião do DSB para tal fim.
189
Já no parágrafo 4, deve ser adicionada a expressão “na questão” a “interesse substancial”(“interesse
substancial na questão”), posto que, na versão original, nota-se “substantial interest in the matter”.
As expressões “o procedimento não deverá” e “o procedimento poderá”, no parágrafo 5, devem ser mudadas
para “os procedimentos não deverão” e “os procedimentos poderão” respectivamente, uma vez que, na versão
em inglês, está registrado “the proceedings”.
No parágrafo 7, sugere-se seja acrescentada no fim a expressão “assim que o requerer”, porque, no original, lêse “as it requires”.
No parágrafo 9, a palavra “destes” deve ser adicionada no final, porquanto consta a expressão “for their
information” na versão em língua inglesa. Finalmente, o título do parágrafo 14 deve ser “Adoção dos
Relatórios do Órgão de Apelação”, na medida em que o susbtantivo “report” está no plural (“Adoption of
Appellate Body Reports”).
II.
1.
Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo
Geral
a) “Papel do Órgão de Apelação”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from
Mexico (US - Stainless Steel) (Mexico), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 161
Em US - Stainless Steel (Mexico), o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que a sua criação, pelos membros da OMC,
realçou a importância da consistência e estabilidade na interpretação dos direitos e obrigações dos membros,
previstos nos acordos da OMC.
Para. 161. “In the hierarchical structure contemplated in the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body have
distinct roles to play. In order to strengthen dispute settlement in the multilateral trading system, the Uruguay
Round established the Appellate Body as a standing body. Pursuant to Article 17.6 of the DSU, the Appellate
Body is vested with the authority to review “issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel”. Accordingly, Article 17.13 provides that the Appellate Body may “uphold, modify or
reverse” the legal findings and conclusions of panels. The creation of the Appellate Body by WTO Members
to review legal interpretations developed by panels shows that Members recognized the importance of
consistency and stability in the interpretation of their rights and obligations under the covered agreements.
This is essential to promote “security and predictability” in the dispute settlement system, and to ensure the
“prompt settlement” of disputes”.”
2.
Artigo 17.6
a) “Questões de direito … e interpretações jurídicas”
(i) Conclusões fáticas e conclusões jurídicas
* Limites do mandato
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada Periodicals), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS31/AB/R, para. 22
Em Canada - Periodicals, o Órgão de Apelação fez menção aos limites do seu mandato estabelecidos nos
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parágrafos 6 e 13, do artigo 17.
Para. 22. “We are mindful of the limitation of our mandate in Articles 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU. According
to Article 17.6, an appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal interpretations
developed by the Panel. The determination of whether imported and domestic products are ‘like products’ is a
process by which legal rules have to be applied to facts. In any analysis of Article III:2, first sentence, this
process is particularly delicate, since ‘likeness’ must be construed narrowly and on a case-by-case basis.”
* Diferenciação entre conclusões fáticas e jurídicas
Em EC - Hormones, o Órgão de Apelação teceu considerações acerca da distinção entre conclusões jurídicas e
fáticas e afirmou que estas últimas não estão, em princípio, sujeitas à revisão. Exemplos de conclusões fáticas
das quais o Órgão de Apelação absteve-se de rever podem ser encontrados em: EC - Bananas III, paras. 206,
237 e 239; Australia - Salmon, paras. 259-261; Japan - Agricultural Products II, para. 98; e India Quantitative Restrictions, paras. 143-144.
Para. 132. “Under Article 17.6 of the DSU, appellate review is limited to appeals on questions of law covered
in a panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. Findings of fact, as distinguished from legal
interpretations or legal conclusions, by a panel are, in principle, not subject to review by the Appellate Body.
The determination of whether or not a certain event did occur in time and space is typically a question of fact;
for example, the question of whether or not Codex has adopted an international standard, guideline or
recommendation on [one of the growth hormones at issue] is a factual question (…). The consistency or
inconsistency of a given fact or set of facts with the requirements of a given treaty provision is, however, a
legal characterization issue. It is a legal question.”
* Avaliação objetiva dos fatos realizada pelo painel é questão jurídica
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat
Gluten from the European Communities (US - Wheat Gluten), Demandante: CE, WT/DS166/AB/R, paras.
150-151
Em US - Wheat Gluten, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos pelo painel é uma
questão jurídica, estando, portanto, sujeita à apelação. Para consideração do painel como julgador dos fatos e
de que a análise de matéria fática está fora do âmbito da apelação, ver relatório do Órgão de Apelação em:
Australia – Salmon, para. 261 e Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, para. 161.
Para. 150. “[W]e recall that, in previous appeals, we have emphasized that the role of the Appellate Body
differs from the role of panels. Under Article 17.6 of the DSU, appeals are ‘limited to issues of law covered in
the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel’, (emphasis added) By contrast, we have
previously stated that, under Article 11 of the DSU, panels are:
(…) charged with the mandate to determine the facts of the case and to arrive at factual
findings. In carrying out this mandate, a panel has the duty to examine and consider all
the evidence before it, not just the evidence submitted by one or the other party, and to
evaluate the relevance and probative force of each piece thereof. (emphasis added)”
Para. 151. “We have also stated previously that, although the task of panels under Article 11 relates, in part, to
its assessment of the facts, the question whether a panel has made an ‘objective assessment’ of the facts is a
191
legal one, that may be the subject of an appeal. (emphasis added) However, in view of the distinction between
the respective roles of the Appellate Body and panels, we have taken care to emphasize that a panel’s
appreciation of the evidence falls, in principle, ‘within the scope of the panel’s discretion as the trier of
facts’.” (emphasis added) (notas de rodapé removidas)
* Exame de direito doméstico
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (US
– Section 211 Appropriations Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS176/AB/R, para. 105
Em US - Section 211 Appropriations Act, o Órgão de Apelação definiu como uma questão jurídica passível de
apelação, a investigação pelo painel do direito doméstico de um membro da OMC para saber se este está
cumprindo com as obrigações previstas na legislação da OMC.
Para. 105. “[T]he municipal law of WTO Members may serve not only as evidence of facts, but also as
evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations. Under the DSU, a panel may
examine the municipal law of a WTO Member for the purpose of determining whether that Member has
complied with its obligations under the WTO Agreement. Such an assessment is a legal characterization by a
panel. And, therefore, a panel’s assessment of municipal law as to its consistency with WTO obligations is
subject to appellate review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.”
* Autoridade administrativa – investigação - imparcialidade
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber
from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber V), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS264/AB/R, para. 163
Em US - Softwood Lumber V, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que a questão da abordagem específica de uma
autoridade administrativa doméstica ser ou não imparcial é, em última análise, um problema de
“caracterização jurídica” de fatos e, como tal, uma questão jurídica.
Para. 163. “Whether a particular approach of an investigating authority is, or is not, even-handed is,
ultimately, a matter of the ‘legal characterization’ of facts and, as such, a matter of law.” (nota de rodapé
retirada)
* Questão fática e questão que envolve pontos fáticos e de direito
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton)
(Article 21.5, Brazil), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, para. 385
Em US - Upland Cotton (Article 21.5, Brazil), o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a fronteira entre uma
questão unicamente fática e uma que envolve pontos fáticos e de direito é geralmente difícil de ser
estabelecida.
Para. 385. “The United States has characterized its appeal under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement as one
relating to the Panel's application of the law to the facts, although it has also brought some claims under
Article 11 of the DSU that challenge the objectivity of the Panel's assessment of the facts. We recognize that
the boundary between an issue that is purely factual and one that involves mixed issues of law and fact is often
difficult to draw. However, we consider that many of the United States' claims against the Panel's evaluation
of the elements supporting its finding of significant price suppression are primarily directed at the Panel's
appreciation and weighing of the evidence, and the inferences that the Panel drew from the evidence, both of
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which fall within its authority that is recognized under Article 11 of the DSU. Therefore, we shall review those
claims and arguments raised by the United States concerning the application of the law to the facts under the
legal standard of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement, and those claims and arguments concerning the Panel's
appreciation and weighing of the evidence under Article 11 of the DSU.”
* Avaliação da consistência de um fato às regras previstas nos tratados – sujeição à apelação
para. 224
Em Chile - Price Band System, o Órgão de Apelação observou que, se um painel entender que uma conclusão
à qual chegou é de natureza fática, isto não significa que a questão não possa ser revisada em sede de apelação,
pois a avaliação da consistência ou não de um fato ou conjunto de fatos com as obrigações previstas num
tratado é uma questão de caracterização jurídica.
Para. 224. “[T]he Panel’s characterization of its finding ‘as a factual matter’ does not mean that the issue
whether Chile’s price band system is a border measure similar to a variable import levy or a minimum import
price is shielded from appellate review. This is a question of law, and not of fact, and thus is clearly within our
jurisdiction under Article 17.6 of the DSU. As we said in our Report in EC - Hormones, the assessment of the
consistency or inconsistency of a given fact or set of facts with the requirements of a given treaty provision is
an issue of legal characterization. The mere assertion by a panel that its conclusion is a ‘factual matter’ does
not make it so. (…) All the same, in reviewing the Panel’s assessment of Chile’s price band system, we are
mindful of the need to give due deference to the discretion of the Panel, as the ‘trier of fact’, to weigh the
evidence before it.” (nota de rodapé suprimida)
(ii) Análise de prova nova
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000
(US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Canadá e México, WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 222
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), o Órgão de Apelação definiu que não pode apreciar prova nova em
apelação (vide também: US - Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5, EC), WT/DS294/AB/RW, para. 171).
Para. 222. “Article 17.6 is clear in limiting our jurisdiction to issues of law covered in panel reports and legal
interpretations developed by panels. We have no authority to consider new facts on appeal. The fact that the
documents are “available on the public record” does not excuse us from the limitations imposed by Article
17.6. We note that the other participants have not had an opportunity to comment on those documents and, in
order to do so, may feel required to adduce yet more evidence. We would also be precluded from considering
such evidence.”
(iii) Análise de novos argumentos
- Aircraft), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS70/AB/R, para. 211
Em Canada – Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que novos argumentos não são, per se, excluídos de
apreciação em apelação pelo simples fato de serem novos. Vide, ainda, EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar,
WT/DS283/AB/R, paras. 240-242.
193
Para. 211. “In our view, this new argument raised by Brazil is beyond the scope of appellate review. Article
17.6 of the DSU provides that ‘[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and
legal interpretations developed by the panel’. In principle, new arguments are not per se excluded from the
scope of appellate review, simply because they are new. However, for us to rule on Brazil’s new argument, we
would have to solicit, receive and review new facts that were not before the Panel, and were not considered by
it. In our view, Article 17.6 of the DSU manifestly precludes us from engaging in any such enterprise.”
b) “Complementação da análise efetuada pelo painel”
(i) Produtos similares – artigo III:2, segunda sentença, do GATT 1994
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada
Periodicals), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS31/AB/R, paras. 24-26
Em Canada - Periodicals, o Órgão de Apelação reverteu as conclusões do painel sobre a expressão “produtos
similares”, prevista no artigo III:2 do GATT 1994. O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que podia completar a
análise do painel com a finalidade de saber se os bens em questão eram “diretamente competitivos ou
substituíveis”, na acepção do artigo III:2, segunda sentença do GATT 1994.
Paras. 24-26. “We are mindful of the limitation of our mandate in Articles 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU.
According to Article 17.6, an appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal
interpretations developed by the Panel. The determination of whether imported and domestic products are ‘like
products’ is a process by which legal rules have to be applied to facts. In any analysis of Article III:2, first
sentence, this process is particularly delicate, since ‘likeness’ must be construed narrowly and on a case-bycase basis. We note that, due to the absence of adequate analysis in the Panel Report in this respect, it is not
possible to proceed to a determination of like products.
(…) We believe the Appellate Body can, and should, complete the analysis of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994
in this case by examining the measure with reference to its consistency with the second sentence of Article
III:2, provided that there is a sufficient basis in the Panel Report to allow us to do so. The first and second
sentences of Article III:2 are closely related. The link between the two sentences is apparent from the wording
of the second sentence, which begins with the word ‘moreover’. It is also emphasized in Ad Article III,
paragraph 2, which provides: ‘A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would
be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases where …’. An
examination of the consistency of Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act with Article III:2, second sentence, is
therefore part of a logical continuum.
The Appellate Body found itself in a similar situation in United States - Gasoline. Having reversed the Panel’s
conclusions on the first part of Article XX(g) and having completed the Article XX(g) analysis in that case, the
Appellate Body then examined the measure’s consistency with the provisions of the chapeau of Article XX,
based on the legal findings contained in the Panel Report.
As the legal obligations in the first and second sentences are two closely-linked steps in determining the
consistency of an internal tax measure with the national treatment obligations of Article III:2, the Appellate
Body would be remiss in not completing the analysis of Article III:2. In the case at hand, the Panel made legal
findings and conclusions concerning the first sentence of Article III:2, and because we reverse one of those
findings, we need to develop our analysis based on the Panel Report in order to issue legal conclusions with
respect to Article III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994.” (nota de rodapé omitida)
(ii) Complementação da análise realizada pelo painel – citação de precedentes
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Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia Salmon), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS18/AB/R, paras. 117-118
Em Australia – Salmon, o Órgão de Apelação explicou que quando se reverte uma conclusão do painel sobre
uma questão jurídica, pode-se ter de examinar e decidir uma questão que não foi especificamente abordada
pelo painel, a fim de se completar a análise jurídica e deslindar o caso. Ver, também, os relatórios do Órgão de
Apelação em: US – Gasoline (paras. 22-29); EC – Hormones (para. 222); Korea – Dairy (para. 92); US –
Section 211 Appropriations Act (paras. 343 e 352); US – Softwood Lumber IV (para. 118); e EC – Export
Subsidies on Sugar (paras. 338-340).
Paras. 117. “In certain appeals, when we reverse a panel’s finding on a legal issue, we may examine and
decide an issue that was not specifically addressed by the panel, in order to complete the legal analysis and
resolve the dispute between the parties. This occurred, for example, in the appeals in United States - Gasoline,
Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, European Communities - Measures Affecting the
Importation of Certain Poultry Products (‘European Communities - Poultry’), and United States - Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.
Para. 118. “As we have reversed the Panel’s finding that the SPS measure at issue, erroneously identified as
the heat-treatment requirement, is not based on a risk assessment, we believe that-to the extent possible on the
basis of the factual findings of the Panel and/or of undisputed facts in the Panel record — we should complete
the legal analysis and determine whether the actual SPS measure at issue, i.e., Australia’s import prohibition
on fresh, chilled or frozen ocean-caught Pacific salmon, is based on a risk assessment.”
(iii) Requisitos para a complementação da análise do painel
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing
Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 78-81
Em EC - Asbestos, o Órgão de Apelação definiu que somente poderia completar a análise do painel se
houvessem conclusões fáticas suficientes por parte deste órgão, e se a análise a ser efetuada estivesse
intimamente relacionada com as conclusões do painel.
Para. 78. “As we have reached a different conclusion from the Panel’s regarding the applicability of the TBT
Agreement to the measure, we now consider whether it is appropriate for us to rule on the claims made by
Canada relating to the TBT Agreement. In previous appeals, we have, on occasion, completed the legal
analysis with a view to facilitating the prompt settlement of the dispute, pursuant to Article 3.3 of the DSU.
However, we have insisted that we can do so only if the factual findings of the panel and the undisputed facts
in the panel record provide us with a sufficient basis for our own analysis. If that has not been the case, we
have not completed the analysis.”
Para. 79. “The need for sufficient facts is not the only limit on our ability to complete the legal analysis in any
given case. In Canada - Periodicals, we reversed the panel’s conclusion that the measure at issue was
inconsistent with Article III:2, first sentence, of the GATT 1994, and we then proceeded to examine the United
States’ claims under Article III:2, second sentence, which the panel had not examined at all. However, in
embarking there on an analysis of a provision that the panel had not considered, we emphasized that ‘the first
and second sentences of Article III:2 are closely related’ and that those two sentences are “part of a logical
continuum.” (emphasis added)
Para. 80. “In this appeal, Canada’s outstanding claims were made under Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.8 of the
TBT Agreement. We observe that, although the TBT Agreement is intended to “further the objectives of GATT
1994”, it does so through a specialized legal regime that applies solely to a limited class of measures. For these
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measures, the TBT Agreement imposes obligations on Members that seem to be different from, and additional
to, the obligations imposed on Members under the GATT 1994.”
Para. 81. “As the Panel decided not to examine Canada’s four claims under the TBT Agreement, it made no
findings, at all, regarding any of these claims. Moreover, the meaning of the different obligations in the TBT
Agreement has not previously been the subject of any interpretation or application by either panels or the
Appellate Body. Similarly, the provisions of the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
which preceded the TBT Agreement and which contained obligations similar to those in the TBT Agreement,
were also never the subject of even a single ruling by a panel.” (notas de rodapé expungidas)
(iv) Análise, pelo painel, além daquilo que entender como o necessário para a solução da disputa
– postura salutar na hipótese de complementação de suas análises pela instância superior
Gambling and Betting Services (US - Gambling), Demandante: Antigua e Bermudas, WT/DS285/AB/R,
para. 344
Em US - Gambling, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou que, se um painel decidir além do estritamente necessário e
realizar conclusões fáticas além daquelas pertinentes, tal postura poderá eventualmente auxiliar o Órgão de
Apelação, caso este tenha de completar a análise do painel.
Para. 344. “Provided that it complies with its duty to assess a matter objectively, a panel enjoys the freedom
to decide which legal issues it must address in order to resolve a dispute. Moreover, in some instances, a
panel’s decision to continue its legal analysis and to make factual findings beyond those that are strictly
necessary to resolve the dispute may assist the Appellate Body should it later be called upon to complete the
analysis, as, for example, in this case”(notas de rodapé retiradas).
3.
Artigo 17.9
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain HotRolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (US - Lead and
Bismuth II), Demandante: CE, WT/DS138/AB/R, para. 39
Em US - Lead and Bismuth II, o Órgão de Apelação, ao analisar se poderia aceitar arrazoados de amicus
curiae, confirmou a sua autoridade para adotar regras procedimentais.
Para. 39. “[Article 17.9 of the DSU] makes clear that the Appellate Body has broad authority to adopt
procedural rules which do not conflict with any rules and procedures in the DSU or the covered agreements.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that as long as we act consistently with the provisions of the DSU and the
covered agreements, we have the legal authority to decide whether or not to accept and consider any
information that we believe is pertinent and useful in an appeal.” (nota de rodapé removida)
4.
Artigo 17.10
a) “Obrigação de confidencialidade”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 121
Em Brazil - Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação debruçou-se sobre a obrigação de confidencialidade por parte dos
196
membros do Órgão de Apelação e sua equipe, assim como dos membros da OMC como um todo. Nesta
análise, o Órgão de Apelação enfatizou o significado comum da palavra “trabalhos” (“proceedings” em
inglês), prevista na primeira frase do artigo 17.10 do DSU.
Para. 121. “With respect to appellate proceedings, in particular, the provisions of the DSU impose an
obligation of confidentiality which applies to WTO Members generally as well as to Appellate Body Members
and staff. In this respect, Article 17.10 of the DSU states, without qualification, that “[t]he proceedings of the
Appellate Body shall be confidential.” (emphasis added) The word “proceeding” has been defined as follows:
In a general sense, the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court
or judicial officer. Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible
steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment. (emphasis
added)
More broadly, the word “proceedings” has been defined as “the business transacted by a
court”. In its ordinary meaning, we take “proceedings” to include, in an appellate
proceeding, any written submissions, legal memoranda, written responses to questions,
and oral statements by the participants and the third participants; the conduct of the oral
hearing before the Appellate Body, including any transcripts or tapes of that hearing;
and the deliberations, the exchange of views and internal workings of the Appellate
Body.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)
b) “Regras de Conduta – confidencialidade”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, paras. 123-124
Em Brazil - Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação lembrou que a obrigação de confidencialidade dos membros da
OMC também está prevista no artigo VII:1 das Regras de Conduta.
Para. 123. “Article 18.2 of the DSU also contains rules protecting the confidentiality of written submissions
and information submitted to the Appellate Body:
Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential,
but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding
shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the
public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted by another Member
to the panel or the Appellate Body which that Member has designated as confidential. A
party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential
summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed
to the public. (emphasis added)
Para. 124. “Finally, we wish to recall that Members of the Appellate Body and its staff are covered by Article
VII:1 of the Rules of Conduct, which provides:
Each covered person shall at all times maintain the confidentiality of dispute settlement
deliberations and proceedings together with any information identified by a party as
confidential, (emphasis added)
c) “Audiência pública”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Australia - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New
Zealand (Australia - Apples), Demandante: Nova Zelândia, WT/DS245/AB/R, anexo III, para. 4
Em Australia - Apples, o Órgão de Apelação optou por realizar uma audiência aberta ao público. Nas suas
razões de decidir, invocou o artigo 17.10 do DSU.
197
Anexo III, para. 4. “We recall that requests to allow public observation of the oral hearing have been made,
and have been authorized, in five previous appeals. In its rulings, the Appellate Body has held that it has the
power to authorize such requests by the participants, provided that this does not affect the confidentiality in the
relationship between the third participants and the Appellate Body, or impair the integrity of the appellate
process. The Appellate Body has reasoned that:
(a) The confidentiality rule in the first sentence of Article 17.10 of the DSU must be
read in the light of its context, particularly Article 18.2 of the DSU, which does not
preclude a participant from foregoing confidentiality and, instead, disclosing statements
of its own positions to the public. The third sentence of Article 18.2 states that
“Members shall treat as confidential information submitted by another Member to the
panel or the Appellate Body which that Member has designated as confidential.” This
provision would be redundant if Article 17.10 were interpreted to require absolute
confidentiality in respect of all elements of appellate proceedings, and thus suggests that
the confidentiality rule in Article 17.10 has limits.
(b) The confidentiality requirement in Article 17.10 operates in a relational manner.
Different sets of relationships are implicated in appellate proceedings, including: (i) a
relationship between the participants and the Appellate Body; and (ii) a relationship
between the third participants and the Appellate Body. The requirement that the
proceedings of the Appellate Body be confidential affords protection to these separate
relationships and is intended to safeguard the interests of the participants and third
participants, as well as the adjudicative function of the Appellate Body, so as to foster
the system of dispute settlement under conditions of fairness, impartiality, independence
and integrity. When participants request to forego confidentiality protection for their
communications with the Appellate Body at the oral hearing, the right to confidentiality
of third participants vis-à-vis the Appellate Body is not implicated, because such request
does not extend to any communications, nor touch upon the relationship, between the
third participants and the Appellate Body.
(c)
Pursuant to Rule 27 of the Working Procedures, the Appellate Body has the
power to exercise control over the conduct of the oral hearing, including authorizing the
lifting of confidentiality at the request of the participants provided that this does not
adversely affect the rights and interests of the third participants or the integrity of the
appellate process. The active participation of third participants in oral hearings has been
fostered in the Working Procedures and in practice; yet the rights of third participants
are distinct from those of the participants in an appellate proceeding.
(d)
Although certain elements of confidentiality are incapable of derogation, the
confidentiality of statements by participants at an oral hearing in an appeal is not of
such a nature. (nota de rodapé omitida)
5.
Artigo 17.12
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton),
Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/AB/R, paras. 510-511
Em US - Upland Cotton, o Órgão de Apelação observou que o artigo 17.12 não o impede de exercer economia
judicial.
Para. 510. “Nor do we believe that it is necessary to make a finding on the interpretation of the phrase “world
market share” in Article 6.3(d) of the SCM Agreement. We recall that Article 17.12 of the DSU requires that
the “Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 [of Article 17]
during the appellate proceeding”. … For its part, Article 3.4 of the DSU provides that “[r]ecommendations or
rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter”. Similarly,
Article 3.7 states that “[t]he aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute.
198
With this in mind, we observe that although an interpretation by the Appellate Body, in the abstract, of the
meaning of the phrase “world market share” in Article 6.3(d) of the SCM Agreement might offer at best some
degree of “guidance” on that issue, it would not affect the resolution of this particular dispute. Indeed,
irrespective of whether we were to uphold or reverse the Panel’s finding on this issue, upon adoption of the
recommendations and rulings by the DSB, the United States would be under no additional obligation regarding
implementation. Thus, although we recognize that there may be cases in which it would be useful for us to
review an issue, despite the fact that our ruling would not result in rulings and recommendations by the DSB,
we find no compelling reason for doing so in this case.”
Para. 511. “Accordingly, we believe that an interpretation of the phrase “world market share” in Article 6.3(d)
of the SCM Agreement is unnecessary for purposes of resolving this dispute. We emphasize that we neither
uphold nor reverse the Panel’s findings on the interpretation of the phrase “world market share” in Article
6.3(d) of the SCM Agreement.”
6.
Artigo 17.13
a) “Conclusão do painel tida como sem efeito”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação entre Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil –
Aircraft) (Article 21.5, Canada), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/RW, para. 78
O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que, em determinadas situações, poderá definir que uma conclusão do painel é
sem efeito, ao invés de confirmar, modificar ou revogar a aludida conclusão, como se pode notar em Brazil Aircraft (Article 21.5, Canada. Vide também: US - Certain EC Products e US - Cotton Yarn.
Para. 78. “As Brazil has failed to prove one of the elements necessary to prove that payments made under the
revised PROEX are justified by item (k), we do not believe it is necessary to examine the issue of whether
export subsidies under the revised PROEX are “the payment [by governments] of all or part of the costs
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits” within the meaning of the first paragraph of
item (k). Therefore, we do not address the Article 21.5 Panel’s findings on this issue. These findings of the
Article 21.5 Panel are moot, and, thus, of no legal effect.”
b) “Não-apreciação de conclusão do painel”
Blouses from India (US - Wool Shirts and Blouses), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS33/AB/R, para. 17
Em US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, ao invés de apreciar uma afirmação específica feita pelo painel, o Órgão de
Apelação anotou que tal afirmação não era uma conclusão jurídica, mas um comentário de caráter descritivo e
gratuito.
Para. 17. “India appealed the following statement relating to Article 6.10 of the ATC at paragraph 7.20 of the
Panel Report:
‘During the review process, the TMB is not limited to the initial information submitted
by the importing Member as parties may submit additional and other information in
support of their positions, which, we understand, may relate to subsequent events.’
(emphasis added)
In our view, this statement by the Panel is purely a descriptive and gratuitous comment
providing background concerning the Panel’s understanding of how the TMB functions.
We do not consider this comment by the Panel to be ‘a legal finding or conclusion’
which the Appellate Body ‘may uphold, modify or reverse’.” (nota de rodapé
expungida)
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7.
Artigo 17.14
a) “Relatórios do Órgão de Apelação – GATT acquis”
Products (US - Shrimp) (Article 21.5, Malaysia), Demandantes: Índia, Malásia, Paquistão e Tailândia,
Em US - Shrimp (Article 21.5, Malaysia), o Órgão de Apelação enfatizou que os seus relatórios adotados são
uma importante parte do GATT acquis, por criarem expectativas legítimas entre os membros da OMC.
Para. 108. “[W]e note that in our Report in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, we stated that:
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often
considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO
Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any
dispute.”
Para. 109. “This reasoning applies to adopted Appellate Body Reports as well. Thus, in taking into account
the reasoning in an adopted Appellate Body Report-a Report, moreover, that was directly relevant to the
Panel’s disposition of the issues before it - the Panel did not err. The Panel was correct in using our findings as
a tool for its own reasoning. Further, we see no indication that, in doing so, the Panel limited itself merely to
examining the new measure from the perspective of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”
b) “Conclusões do painel que não são objeto de recurso”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cottontype Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/AB/R, para. 93
Em EC - Bed Linen, o Órgão de Apelação frisou que as conclusões do painel que não são objeto de apelação
devem ser consideradas como uma resolução final para a disputa.
Para. 93. “…an unappealed finding included in a panel report that is adopted by the DSB must be treated as a
final resolution to a dispute between the parties in respect of the particular claim and the specific component
of a measure that is the subject of that claim”.
c) “Desvio da jurisprudência do Órgão de Apelação”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from
Mexico (US - Stainless Steel) (Mexico), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, paras. 158-162
Em US - Stainless Steel (Mexico), o painel discordou da jurisprudência do Órgão de Apelação sobre se a
prática do zeroing seria vedada no cálculo de margens antidumping. Entretanto, quando julgou a apelação, o
Órgão de Apelação expressou que estava “profundamente preocupado” pelo fato de a decisão do painel ter se
desviado da jurisprudência do Órgão de Apelação.
Para. 158. “It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the
particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are free to
disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that
have been adopted by the DSB. (…)”
Para. 159. “In US-Shrimp (Article 21.5-Malaysia), the Appellate Body clarified that this reasoning applies to
adopted Appellate Body reports as well. In US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, the Appellate
200
Body held that “following the Appellate Body’s conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, but is
what would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same.”
Para. 160. “Dispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO Members attach significance to reasoning
provided in previous panel and Appellate Body reports. Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often
cited by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels
and the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition, when enacting or modifying laws and national
regulations pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members take into account the legal interpretation
of the covered agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. Thus, the legal
interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports becomes part and parcel of the acquis of
the WTO dispute settlement system. Ensuring “security and predictability” in the dispute settlement system, as
contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve
the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.”
Para. 161. “In the hierarchical structure contemplated in the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body have
distinct roles to play. In order to strengthen dispute settlement in the multilateral trading system, the Uruguay
Round established the Appellate Body as a standing body. Pursuant to Article 17.6 of the DSU, the Appellate
Body is vested with the authority to review “issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel”. Accordingly, Article 17.13 provides that the Appellate Body may “uphold, modify or
reverse” the legal findings and conclusions of panels. The creation of the Appellate Body by WTO Members
to review legal interpretations developed by panels shows that Members recognized the importance of
consistency and stability in the interpretation of their rights and obligations under the covered agreements.
This is essential to promote “security and predictability” in the dispute settlement system, and to ensure the
“prompt settlement” of disputes. The Panel’s failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports
addressing the same issues undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence
clarifying Members’ rights and obligations under the covered agreements as contemplated under the DSU.
Clarification, as envisaged in Article 3.2 of the DSU, elucidates the scope and meaning of the provisions of the
covered agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. While the
application of a provision may be regarded as confined to the context in which it takes place, the relevance of
clarification contained in adopted Appellate Body reports is not limited to the application of a particular
provision in a specific case.”
Para. 162. “We are deeply concerned about the Panel’s decision to depart from well-established Appellate
Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel’s approach has serious
implications for the proper functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system, as explained above.
Nevertheless, we consider that the Panel’s failure flowed, in essence, from its misguided understanding of the
legal provisions at issue. Since we have corrected the Panel’s erroneous legal interpretation and have reversed
all of the Panel’s findings and conclusions that have been appealed, we do not, in this case, make an additional
finding that the Panel also failed to discharge its duties under Article 11 of the DSU.” (nota de rodapé retirada)
III.
Comentários
O artigo 17 do DSU cuida da apelação, recurso oferecido contra o conteúdo dos relatórios dos painéis. Com
uma maior institucionalização das regras do comércio internacional, decorrente do fim da Rodada Uruguai, a
legislação do GATT/OMC previu a possibilidade de um meio de impugnação contra as decisões dos painéis
que, no fundo, faz parte de um sistema de freios e contrapesos. No antigo GATT, a mera manifestação de
vontade do membro vencido era suficiente para bloquear a adoção do relatório do painel. No entanto, com a
criação da OMC, passou a vigorar a regra do consenso negativo, segundo a qual o relatório do painel ou do
Órgão de Apelação somente deixa de ser aplicado se todos os membros optarem por rechaçar o relatório em
comento. Esta nova regra claramente concede mais importância à decisão do painel. Sucede que, para
assegurar uma maior segurança aos procedimentos de solução de controvérsias, os negociadores da Rodada
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Uruguai entenderam por bem estabelecer uma instância revisora dos relatórios dos painéis, o que se deu com o
recurso de apelação e a criação do Órgão de Apelação. Com efeito, pode-se reconhecer que:
Não restam dúvidas, portanto, acerca da adoção do princípio do duplo grau de
jurisdição pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias, já que foi criada verdadeira “Corte
de Apelação” na OMC, órgão inexistente no mecanismo anterior do GATT, o qual
possui caráter permanente e jurisdicional, bem como foram também estabelecidos
procedimentos detalhados para a interposição de recurso perante esse órgão. (77)
Consoante estipula o artigo 3.2 do DSU, “o sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC é elemento essencial
para trazer segurança e previsibilidade ao sistema multilateral de comércio”. Nessa esteira, o próprio Órgão de
Apelação, em US - Stainless Steel (Mexico), deixou claro que o advento de uma instância revisora contribui
para a desejada estabilidade na exegese dos direitos e deveres dos integrantes da OMC.
Ponto nevrálgico em relação à apelação é o artigo 17.6 do DSU, que dispõe que “a apelação deverá limitar-se
às questões de direito tratadas pelo relatório do Painel e às interpretações jurídicas por ele formuladas”. Em
razão do conteúdo do dispositivo em apreço, é útil consignar que:
Como o recurso ao Órgão de Apelação se limita a questões de direito tratadas no
Relatório do panel ou a interpretações jurídicas desenvolvidas pelo panel, a segunda
instância reforça, pela sua função, o componente de juridicidade do sistema de
controvérsias da OMC. (78)
Aqui, é importante destacar os dois tipos de conclusões do painel: fáticas e jurídicas. As primeiras dizem
respeito à ocorrência ou não de um acontecimento no tempo ou espaço, enquanto que as segundas se referem à
adequação de um fato ou conjunto de fatos aos preceitos de um tratado (questão de direito) ou sobre como um
dispositivo de um tratado deve ser entendido (interpretação jurídica). Entretanto, somente as conclusões
jurídicas podem ser objeto de apelação, consoante assentado em EC – Hormones; Australia – Salmon; Japan –
Agricultural Products II e India – Quantitative Restrictions.
O painel, como auxiliar do DSB, deve efetuar uma avaliação objetiva dos fatos, nos termos do artigo 11 do
DSU. Esta avaliação, segundo já consignado pelo Órgão de Apelação, em US - Wheat Gluten, deve ser
considerada uma questão de direito, tendo o painel certa margem de discricionariedade para atribuir o peso
necessário aos fatos demonstrados no processo.
Às vezes, é possível haver, no processo, uma questão fática e outra que envolve pontos fáticos e também de
direito, podendo ser complicada a distinção dos limites entre uma e outra (US - Upland Cotton) (Article 21.5,
Brazil). Diante desta dúvida, a parte que apelar pode invocar tanto o artigo 11 (inexistência de avaliação
objetiva dos fatos pelo painel), quanto o artigo 17.6, ambos do DSU.
Ao proceder à apreciação da irresignação de um dos litigantes manifestada pela apelação, o Órgão de
Apelação não pode realizar análise de prova nova US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) e US - Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5, EC), pois isto poderia implicar supressão de instância (painel) e alongamento desnecessário do
feito, contrariando o espírito do artigo 3.3 do DSU, que reza que “é essencial para o funcionamento eficaz da
OMC e para a manutenção de equilíbrio adequado entre os direitos e as obrigações dos membros a pronta
solução das situações em que um membro considere que quaisquer benefícios resultantes direta ou
indiretamente dos acordos abrangidos tenham sofrido restrições por medidas adotadas por outro membro”.
Poderia, ainda, existir desrespeito ao princípio da boa-fé, na medida em se espera da parte contrária à produção
de todas as provas que lhe interessam perante o painel.
Já a apresentação de novos argumentos, em sede de apelação, não é tida, per se, como impeditiva pelo Órgão
de Apelação, desde que não implique apreciação de fatos novos não considerados pelo painel (Canada –
Aircraft). Mesmo se tendo em mente que a segunda instância julgadora deve se ater a questões de direito ou de
interpretação (artigo 17.6 do DSU), não se concorda com a postura do Órgão de Apelação, posto que o painel
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é incumbido da análise de todos os argumentos que podem ser suscitados pelos litigantes, podendo haver
indevida supressão de instância e afronta ao princípio da boa-fé. Apenas a caracterização de fato superveniente
poderia justificar a alegação de novos argumentos, semelhantemente do que sucede com o artigo 462, do nosso
Código de Processo Civil.
Eventualmente, o Órgão de Apelação pode complementar a análise levada a cabo pelo painel. Todavia, isto
será viável apenas se houver a devida suficiência de fatos, ou seja, se a nova análise puder ser feita com arrimo
nas conclusões fáticas do painel e/ou nos fatos incontroversos no registro do painel (Australia - Salmon).
Ademais, é mister que a análise complementar esteja umbilicalmente relacionada com as conclusões tecidas
pelo pinel (EC – Asbestos). Se o painel, porventura, julgar alguns pontos além daqueles que considera como
necessários para o deslinde da demanda, tal postura poderá ajudar o Órgão de Apelação, se uma
complementação da análise do painel for imperiosa (US – Gambling).
Um último tópico relevante, refere-se à hipótese de o painel não seguir a jurisprudência dominante do Órgão
de Apelação ou de outros painéis. Embora a liberdade do julgador seja um valor que, sem dúvida, merece
destaque, outros valores não são menos relevantes, como a segurança e previsibilidade nas relações comerciais
internacionais, aí compreendida a maneira como são resolvidas as disputas na OMC. É digno de nota que os
membros da OMC, quando apresentam os seus arrazoados perante a instância julgadora, mencionam
precedentes jurisprudenciais. Além disso, os membros também podem alterar a sua legislação interna com
base naquilo que foi decidido no seio do sistema de solução de controvérsias. Nesta toada, revela-se acertado o
sinal de preocupação, externado pelo Órgão de Apelação, em US - Stainless Steel (Mexico), quando percebeu
que o painel daquele caso havia se desnorteado da jurisprudência prevalecente, posto que “panels and the
Appellate Body closely examine precedents when dealing with a dispute and try not to deviate from the
interpretations established by the precedents”. (79)
A avaliação que se pode fazer da atuação do Órgão de Apelação até o momento é positiva. Apesar de serem
válidas algumas críticas no que tange a pontos específicos, a jurisprudência da instância julgadora em tela tem
servido para trazer segurança e previsibilidade jurídicas, fortalecendo o sistema multilateral de comércio.
Nesse sentido, não se deve olvidar que a função de julgar não é fácil, devendo os membros do Órgão de
Apelação levar sempre em consideração as “deficiencies of the political process, weaknesses and lacunae of
agreements and seek rebalancing, where appropriate, within their rulings in order to accommodate the
sensitivities of Members and their public opinion”. (80)
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 77: CRETELLA NETO, José. Direito processual na Organização Mundial do Comércio, OMC: casuística de interesse para
o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2003, p. 224.
Footnote 78: LAFER, Celso. A OMC e a regulamentação do comércio internacional: uma visão brasileira. Porto Alegre: Livraria do
advogado, 1998, p. 149.
Footnote 79: MATSUSHITA, Mitsuo; SCHOENBAUM, Thomas J.; MAVROIDIS, Petros C. The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and
Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 112.
Footnote 80: COTTIER, Thomas; MAVROIDIS, Petros C. Concluding Remarks. In: COTTIER, Thomas; MAVROIDIS, Petros C
(editors); BLATTER, Patrick (associate editor). The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience and Lessons for
the WTO. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003, p. 350.
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
Artigo 18
IA.
Article 18
Communications with the Panel or Appellate Body
18.1
There shall be no ex parte communications with the panel or Appellate Body concerning matters
under consideration by the panel or Appellate Body.
18.2
Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential, but shall be
made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a
dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as
confidential information submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that
Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member,
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could
be disclosed to the public.
IB.
Artigo 18
Comunicações com o Grupo Especial ou o Órgão de Apelação
18.1
Não haverá comunicação ex parte com o grupo especial ou com o Órgão de Apelação com relação a
assuntos submetidos à consideração do grupo especial ou do Órgão de Apelação.
18.2
As comunicações escritas com o grupo especial ou com o Órgão de Apelação deverão ser tratadas
com confidencialidade, mas deverão estar à disposição das partes em controvérsia. Nenhuma das
disposições do presente Entendimento deverá impedir uma das partes em controvérsia de publicar suas
próprias posições. Os Membros deverão considerar confidenciais as informações fornecidas por outro
Membro ao grupo especial ou ao Órgão de Apelação para as quais o referido Membro tenha dado a
classificação de confidencial. Uma parte em controvérsia deverá, a pedido de um Membro, fornecer
um resumo não-confidencial das informações contidas em sua comunicação escrita que possa ser
tornado público.
IC.
No que tange ao título do artigo, a preposição “com” é necessária antes de “o Órgão de Apelação”, para
clarificar o título, pois, no parágrafo 1, repete-se a preposição em comento antes do Órgão de Apelação. Nos
parágrafos 1 e 2, a palavra “órgão” começa com letra minúscula. Tanto em inglês como no título do Artigo em
português, o substantivo “órgão” inicia-se com letra maiúscula. Assim, no decorrer dos parágrafos 1 e 2, devese alterar “órgão” para “Órgão”.
No parágrafo 2, sugere-se a substituição da frase “nenhuma das disposições do presente Entendimento deverá
impedir uma das partes em controvérsia de publicar suas próprias posições” por “nenhuma das disposições do
presente Entendimento deverá impedir uma das partes em controvérsia de declarar suas próprias posições
publicamente”, já que “declarar” abrange qualquer forma (escrita, oral, Internet etc).
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À expressão “uma parte em controvérsia deverá, a pedido de um membro”, sugere-se o acréscimo da palavra
“também”, posto que omissa na versão em português (“uma parte em controvérsia deverá também, a pedido de
um Membro”).
Finalmente, sugere-se a modificação da expressão “sua comunicação escrita”, inserida na última sentença do
parágrafo 2, para “suas comunicações escritas”, eis que, na versão em língua inglesa, impera a forma plural
(“suas comunicações escritas”).
II.
1.
Artigo 18.1
a) “Regras com o intuito de disciplinar a obtenção de informações empresariais confidenciais
[business confidential information (BCI)]”
Bananas (EC - Bananas III) (US) (Article 22.6, EC), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,
México e EUA, WT/DS27/ARB, para. 2.6
Em EC - Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6, EC), o painel estabeleceu regras procedimentais para a colheita de
informações empresariais confidenciais (BCI). As CE se insurgiram contra tais regras, alegando afronta ao
artigo 18.1 do DSU. O painel, no entanto, repeliu a recusa de Bruxelas.
Para. 2.6. “Since we are of the view that the procedures are reasonable in the circumstances 5, we do not
accept the EC argument that its decision not to receive information under the rules we have established means
that the United States may not submit the information. Acceptance of the EC argument would mean that a
party’s refusal to participate in a proceeding would effectively prevent the proceeding from going forward”.
5 As noted above, similar procedures had previously been adopted by three different panels in cases involving
export subsidies. In one of those cases, a Member refused to supply BCI on the grounds that the procedures
were inadequate and that super BCI procedures were necessary. If anything, this suggests that the BCI
procedures adopted in this arbitration are not excessively restrictive.”
b) “Acesso, à parte adversa, de informações empresariais confidenciais - ausência de consenso entre as
partes quanto às regras para obtenção destas informações propostas pelo painel”
Relatório do painel em United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from
the European Communities (US - Wheat Gluten), Demandante: CE, WT/DS166/R, para. 8.10
Em US - Wheat Gluten, a delegação norte-americana informou que os seus produtores domésticos estavam
dispostos a fornecer algumas informações empresariais confidenciais, desde que ditas informações não fossem
repassadas às CE. Estas, por seu turno, aduziram que, se os painelistas obtivessem referidas informações,
haveria desrespeito ao artigo 18.1 do DSU. Devido ao impasse entre os litigantes acerca das disciplinas
sugeridas pelo painel, no tocante ao acesso a estes dados confidenciais, o próprio painel acabou por não adotar
tais disciplinas.
Para. 8.10. “On 1 March 2000, the Panel communicated the following ruling to the parties with respect to the
information requested by the Panel:
In its communication to the Panel of 8 February 2000, the United States indicated that
the various domestic producers would grant permission for release of all the information
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the Panel had requested if the Panel amended its Procedures Governing Private
Confidential Information as follows:
(…) the procedures should be amended to make clear that: 1) the Panel will review the
CBI exclusively in camera; and 2) any Panel member, or WTO employee, who views or
hears such information shall be under an obligation not to disclose the information, or
allow it to be disclosed, to any person. For the reasons set out in the WGIC letter, the
companies concerned are not prepared to grant permission for the CBI to be divulged to
EC representatives.”
In its communication to the Panel of 11 February 2000, the European Community
stated, inter alia:
The course of action suggested by the United States … would irreparably damage the
fairness of this dispute settlement procedure, since the Panellists and the officials of the
WTO Secretariat assisting the Panel would have access to ex parte communications, in
flagrant breach of Article 18.1 of the DSU and of the Rules of Conduct on the
appointment of Panellists.
Article 18.1 of the DSU states:
There shall be no ex parte communications with the panel or Appellate Body
concerning matters under consideration by the panel or Appellate Body.
The Panel considered that, in light of Article 18.1 of the DSU and the position
expressed by the European Community in this case, it should not view the requested
information under the conditions outlined by the United States.
On 24 February 2000, the Panel proposed further procedures to the parties for viewing
the requested information, as follows:
No more than two representatives of the United States would bring the requested
information to a designated location at the premises of the WTO in Geneva on Thursday
2 March 2000. The Panel, two professional staff of the WTO Secretariat, and no more
than two representatives of the European Communities would review the information
exclusively in camera. These individuals would be under an obligation not to disclose
the information, or to allow it to be disclosed, to any person. No photocopies of the
information would be permitted. The Panel, the two professional staff of the WTO
Secretariat, and the representatives of the European Communities may take written
summary notes of the information for the sole purpose of the Panel process. Any such
notes would be destroyed at the conclusion of the Panel. While the Panel would be
under an obligation not to disclose the information in its report, it could make
statements of conclusion drawn from such information.
In light of the communications received from the parties concerning these proposed
procedures, the Panel has decided not to adopt the proposed procedures.
ccordingly, the Panel has decided to proceed with its examinatio n on the basis of the
record as it currently stands.
c) “Envio de informação ao painel sem a expedição da respectiva cópia à outra Parte”
Relatório do painel em Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft (Canada Aircraft Credits and Guarantees), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS222/R, para. 7.135
Em Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, a delegação canadense respondeu ao painel acerca dos termos
e condições da transação que o Canadá celebrou com a Air Wisconsin, sem, contudo, enviar uma cópia da sua
resposta ao Brasil. Num primeiro momento, o painel devolveu a resposta canadense, afirmando que a postura
do Canadá violava os Procedimentos de Trabalho do painel. Entretanto, na primeira audiência com as partes,
como o Canadá alegou que não pretendia fazer uma comunicação ex parte com o painel e nem criar regra
alguma sobre o tratamento de informações empresariais confidenciais, a aludida resposta da delegação
canadense quedou inserida nos registros do painel.
206
Para. 7.135. “Having reviewed the parties’ first written submissions, on 20 June 2001 the Panel asked Brazil
“to provide full details of the terms and conditions of Embraer’s offer of financing to Air Wisconsin”, and
Canada “to provide full details of the terms and conditions of its Air Wisconsin transaction”. Both parties
responded to this request on 25 June 2001. Canada failed to provide a copy of the information to Brazil on that
date. Instead, Canada “ask [ed] the Panel to require that when this information is provided to Brazil, its
disclosure be restricted to officials of the Government of Brazil and private legal counsel retained and paid for
by the Government of Brazil who are directly involved in this dispute settlement proceeding”. In a letter to
Canada dated 26 June 2001, the Panel noted that Canada’s letter of 25 June 2001 “was not copied to Brazil,
contrary to paragraph 10 of the Panel’s Working Procedures”. The Panel further “note[d] that, with the limited
exception of paragraph 16, its Working Procedures do not provide for any special procedures regarding the
treatment of business confidential information. The Panel does not consider it appropriate to introduce such
procedures under the present circumstances, i.e., on the basis of an ex parte request, and without an
opportunity to consult with Brazil”. For those reasons, the Panel returned Canada’s submission of 25 June
2001. At the first substantive meeting, Canada informed the Panel that it had not intended to make an ex parte
communication, and that it was not seeking to introduce any special procedures for the treatment of business
confidential information. On that basis, its letter of 25 June 2001 was entered in the record”.”
d) “Remoção de dados sigilosos de documentos – desconsideração destes dados pelo painel”
Relatório do painel em Korea - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia (Korea Certain Paper), Demandante: Indonésia, WT/DS312/RW, para. 7.17
Em Korea - Certain Paper, a Coreia do Sul, em seu segundo arrazoado, asseverou que continuaria a enviar
informações sigilosas à Indonésia apenas se tais dados fossem divulgados somente aos funcionários indonésios
e aos conselheiros jurídicos que aquiescessem em manter a confidencialidade de mencionadas informações.
Diante da negativa de Jacarta, a Coreia do Sul requereu à outra parte que esta procedesse à devolução dos
arrazoados de ordem sigilosa que lhe tinham sido entregues. Diante da nova postura de Seul, o painel entendeu
que as informações confidenciais retiradas dos documentos não seriam mais consideradas pelo painel.
Para. 7.17. “In respect of Korea’s proposal to withdraw its existing submissions and submit non-confidential
versions of those submissions to Indonesia, considering the fact that Article 18.1 of the DSU precludes ex
parte communications between the Panel and a party, we stated that while we would entertain any request by
Korea to withdraw its submissions or to redact from them certain information, in such a case the submissions
withdrawn or information redacted would no longer be before the Panel. We further stated that we were fully
conscious of the obligations placed on Members by Article 6.5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, and remain
prepared to work with the parties to design ways to protect any information treated as confidential by the
investigating authorities in the underlying investigation. Korea, however, failed to request such procedures.”
e) “Impossibilidade de envio de informação apenas ao painel ou ao Secretariado da OMC”
Relatório do painel em Turkey - Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice (Turkey - Rice),
Em Turkey - Rice, a Turquia recusou-se a fornecer uma informação solicitada pelo painel, obtemperando que
tal dado somente poderia ser repassado ao Secretariado da OMC e ao painel. Este decidiu não aceitar o
argumento da Turquia, sob pena de desrespeito ao artigo 18.1 do DSU.
Para. 7.100. “The Panel was explicit in the documents it requested from Turkey, both after the first and after
the second substantive meeting with the parties. As noted above, in response to the Panel’s requests, Turkey
expressed that its “officials involved in this Panel proceeding [did] not feel comfortable in risking information
leaks and possible criminal accusations of violation of Turkish law on confidentiality”. Turkey offered to
207
provide “‘blacked-out’ copies of [some] Certificates of Control only to the Panel and after a clear
understanding… that these documents would not be made available to the United States nor to any other entity
beside the Panel and the WTO Secretariat”. However, the Panel cannot accept such an offer from Turkey,
which is one of the parties to this dispute. Indeed, the evidence requested by the Panel, as well as all
submissions under the proceedings at issue, fall under the provision contained in Article 18.1 of the DSU
(…).”
2.
Artigo 18.2
a) “Divulgação de ‘comunicações escritas’”
(i) Diferença entre “comunicações” (“submissions”) e “afirmações” (“statements”)
* Enfoque formalista
Relatório do painel em Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.14
Em Argentina - Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, Brasília deu ciência ao painel de que pretendia publicar a sua
primeira comunicação escrita, dando oportunidade à Argentina de indicar quais dados seriam sigilosos.
Buenos Aires alegou que o artigo 18.2 do DSU diferencia claramente entre “comunicações escritas” (“written
submissions”) e afirmações (“statements”) de tomada de posição. Todavia, o painel rechaçou o raciocínio
argentino alegando que o mesmo seria formalista.
Para. 7.14. “On substance, we agree with Canada that Argentina’s interpretation of Article 18.2 of the DSU
results in a formalistic distinction between the terms “written submission” and “statement”. In doing so,
Argentina negates that a party’s written submissions to a panel necessarily contain statements of that party’s
positions. In our view, the first two sentences of Article 18.2 of the DSU should not be read in formalistic
isolation of one another. Read together, and in context of one another, the first two sentences of Article 18.2 of
the DSU mean that while one party shall not disclose the submissions of another party, each party is entitled to
disclose statements of its own positions, subject to the confidentiality requirement set forth in the third
sentence of Article 18.2 of the DSU. We recall that a party’s written submissions to a panel necessarily contain
statements of that party’s positions. In our view, therefore, disclosing submissions to a panel is one way for a
party to disclose statements of its positions. If a party chooses to make public the totality of the statements of
its own position contained in its written submission, it is entitled to do so, provided the confidentiality
requirement of the third sentence of Article 18.2 of the DSU is respected. Since Argentina has not argued that
Brazil violated its confidentiality obligation, we do not consider that Brazil’s decision to disclose the entirety
of the statements of position contained in its first written submission to the Panel (excluding exhibits) was
inconsistent with Article 18.2 of the DSU.” (nota de rodapé omitida)
(ii) Momento da divulgação
* O Artigo 18.2 não impõe restrição ao momento da divulgação da informação
Relatório do painel em Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.15
Em Argentina - Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties, o painel entendeu que a parte que desejar divulgar informações
poderá fazê-lo a qualquer instante, posto que o artigo 18.2 do DSU não impõe qualquer restrição de ordem
temporal.
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Para. 7.15. “Furthermore, we note that, by the time of our first substantive meeting with the parties, Argentina
was no longer arguing that Brazil was not entitled to make the entirety of its written submissions to the Panel
available to the public during the Panel proceedings. Implicitly, therefore, Argentina ultimately agreed that
Brazil was entitled to make its written submission available to the public pursuant to Article 18.2 of the DSU.
Although Argentina argued that Brazil should not have done so until after publication of the Panel’s report, we
find no basis for this argument in Article 18.2 of the DSU. Article 18.2 sets no temporal limits on Members’
rights and obligations under that provision. Nor do we find any basis for this argument in paragraph 11 of the
Panel’s Working Procedures, which concerns the preparation of the descriptive part of the Panel’s report. We
see nothing in this provision which would impose any limits on rights accruing to Members under Article 18.2
of the DSU.”
b) “Alegação de quebra de confidencialidade”
(i) Não-conhecimento de brief de amicus curiae
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of
Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia,
Em Thailand - H-Beams, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou o arrazoado de uma associação industrial na qualidade
de amicus curiae, sob o argumento de que tal associação recebeu informações sigilosas que a Tailândia havia
colocado na sua apelação.
Para. 74. “The terms of Article 17.10 of the DSU are clear and unequivocal: ‘[t]he proceedings of the
Appellate Body shall be confidential’. Like all obligations under the DSU, this is an obligation that all
Members of the WTO, as well as the Appellate Body and its staff, must respect. WTO Members who are
participants and third participants in an appeal are fully responsible under the DSU and the other covered
agreements for any acts of their officials as well as their representatives, counsel or consultants. We
emphasized this in Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, para. 145,
where we stated that:
(…) the provisions of Articles 17.10 and 18.2 apply to all Members of the WTO, and
oblige them to maintain the confidentiality of any submissions or information
submitted, or received, in an Appellate Body proceeding. Moreover, those provisions
oblige Members to ensure that such confidentiality is fully respected by any person that
a Member selects to act as its representative, counsel or consultant. (emphasis added)
We note that Poland has made substantial efforts to investigate this matter, and to gather
information from its legal counsel, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P. We note as well the
responses from the third participants, the European Communities, Japan and the United
States. Furthermore, Poland has accepted the proposal made by Hogan & Hartson
L.L.P. to withdraw as Poland’s legal counsel in this appeal. On the basis of the
responses we have received from Poland and from the third participants, and on the
basis of our own examination of the facts on the record in this appeal, we believe that
there is prima facie evidence that CITAC received, or had access to, Thailand’s
appellant’s submission in this appeal.
We see no reason to accept the written brief submitted by CITAC in this appeal.
Accordingly, we have returned this brief to CITAC.
(ii) Entrega, por um litigante, de cópia de afirmações orais da outra parte a pessoas que não
integravam a delegação daquele litigante – inocorrência de quebra de sigilo
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Relatório do painel em Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft) (Article 21.5,
Canada II), WT/DS46/RW2, paras. 3.6-3.10
Em Brazil - Aircraft (Article 21.5, Canada II), o painel não aceitou o argumento do Brasil, de que o Canadá
havia afrontado o DSU ou os procedimentos de trabalho do painel, ao ter providenciado uma cópia escrita das
afirmações orais do Brasil a pessoas não participantes da sua delegação.
Para. 3.6. “In our view, it emerges from [Article 18.2 of the DSU] that Canada must keep confidential all
information submitted to this Panel by Brazil. However, as the Appellate Body has noted, “a Member’s
obligation to maintain the confidentiality of […] proceedings extends also to the individuals whom that
Member selects to act as its representatives, counsel and consultants.” Thus, the Appellate Body clearly
assumed that Members may provide confidential information also to non-government advisors.”
Para. 3.7. “We see nothing in Article 18.2 of the DSU, or any other provision of the DSU, to suggest that
Members may share such confidential information with non-government advisors only if those advisors are
members of an official delegation at a panel meeting. Indeed, paragraph 13 of this Panel’s Working
Procedures expressly provides that:
The parties and third parties to this proceeding have the right to determine the
composition of their own delegations. Delegations may include, as representatives of
the government concerned, private counsel and advisers. The parties and third parties
shall have responsibility for all members of their delegations and shall ensure that all
members of their delegations, as well as any other advisors consulted by a party or third
party, act in accordance with the rules of the DSU and the working procedures of this
Panel, particularly in regard to confidentiality of the proceedings. Parties shall provide a
list of the participants of their delegation before or at the beginning of the meeting with
the Panel.” (emphasis added)
Para. 3.8. “It is apparent from the second and third sentences of paragraph 13 of the Working Procedures that
the “other advisors” referred to are advisors who are not part of a Member’s delegation at a panel meeting. It is
equally clear to us that paragraph 13 is based on the premise that parties to panel proceedings may give their
“other advisors” access to confidential information submitted by the other party. Were it otherwise, there
would be no point in requiring parties to safeguard the confidentiality of panel proceedings in respect of such
“other advisors”.”
Para. 3.9. “On the basis of the foregoing, we are unable to accept Brazil’s argument that Canada acted
inconsistently with the requirements of the DSU or this Panel’s Working Procedures by giving advisors not
designated as members of its delegation access to information submitted to this Panel by Brazil.”
Para. 3.10. “In reaching this conclusion, we note, however, that, pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Working
Procedures, Canada must ensure that any advisors who were not members of its official delegation respect the
confidentiality of the present proceedings” (notas de rodapé removidas)
(iii) Acordo de confidencialidade entre escritório de advocacia e governo
Relatório do painel em Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft) (Article 21.5,
Canada II), WT/DS46/RW2, paras. 3.11-3.12 e 3.15
Em Brazil - Aircraft (Article 21.5, Canada II), o painel asseverou que não via motivos para pôr em dúvida um
acordo de confidencialidade entre um escritório de advocacia e o governo do Canadá. Apesar de reconhecer
que o mencionado escritório estava numa posição delicada, por também ter como cliente um fabricante
canadense de aeronaves regionais, o painel enfatizou que as regras atinentes à confidencialidade não têm o
210
condão de “sufocar” a comunicação entre os países e seus conselheiros, desde que asseguradas as devidas
salvaguardas.
Para. 3.11. “We note Canada’s statement that the members of the law firm which have had access to Brazil’s
submissions have been part of its litigation team and have served as “advisors” to the Government of Canada.
Since no members of a private law firm were part of Canada’s delegation to the meeting of the Panel with the
parties, the private lawyers Canada says were advising it fall within the “other advisors” category within the
meaning of paragraph 13 of the Panel’s Working Procedures. It was (and is), therefore, the responsibility of
Canada to ensure that those private lawyers maintain the confidentiality of the documents submitted by
Brazil.”
Para. 3.12. “Based on Canada’s representations, we also understand that the law firm in question has an
attorney-client relationship with a Canadian regional aircraft manufacturer. We think that the dual role
performed by the law firm-as advisor to the Government of Canada and attorney for a Canadian regional
aircraft manufacturer-places the law firm in a particularly delicate position as far as the protection of Brazil’s
submissions, statements and exhibits is concerned. In our view, it is crucial, in such circumstances, that
Canada put in place appropriate safeguards to ensure non-disclosure of confidential information.”
Para. 3.15. “We agree that maintaining confidentiality in accordance with the obligations of the DSU is
important. On the other hand, in applying the rules on confidentiality we must be careful not to stifle necessary
communication between Member governments and their advisors, as long as appropriate safeguards are in
place. In the absence of arguments and evidence to the contrary, we have no basis for questioning Canada’s
representation that the relevant private lawyers are subject to a confidentiality agreement with the Government
of Canada.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)
(iv) Informação sigilosa em brief de amicus curiae
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC - Export Subsidies on
Sugar), Demandante: Tailândia, WT/DS283/R, paras. 7.98-7.99
Em EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, o painel entendeu que sucedeu quebra de sigilo, pois uma associação
representando produtores alemães de açúcar apresentou um arrazoado, na qualidade de amicus curiae,
contendo informação confidencial do Brasil. O painel pediu à referida associação que identificasse a fonte da
informação confidencial. Todavia, esta apresentou a aludida fonte. Sobre o episódio, as CE não se
pronunciaram, e o painel acabou reportando o incidente ao DSB.
Para. 7.98. “The Panel has come to the conclusion that a breach of confidentiality did occur in the framework
of these proceedings. The Panel is therefore concerned and deeply deplores this breach of confidentiality and
the disregard of a requirement imposed by the DSU and the Panel’s Working Procedures. (…)”
Para. 7.99. “The Panel hereby reports the incident to the Dispute Settlement Body.”
(v) Quebra de sigilo – troca de acusações – não-identificação do responsável pela quebra
Brasil, WT/DS267/R, para. 6.5
Em US - Upland Cotton, os EUA alegaram que o Brasil havia praticado quebra de confidencialidade em
relação ao relatório provisório do painel. O Brasil, por sua vez, negou a acusação e rebateu aduzindo que
certos relatos, publicados pela imprensa, poderiam ter sido obtidos de funcionários norte-americanos ou
211
pessoas não vinculadas ao Brasil. O painel lamentou a quebra de sigilo nos seguintes termos:
Para. 6.5. “Indeed, pursuant to Article 18.2 of the DSU, all panel proceedings remain confidential until the
Panel Report is circulated to WTO Members. Over and above the binding treaty obligation of confidentiality
in the DSU, the confidentiality of our Panel proceedings was reflected in our working procedures adopted
pursuant to Article 12.1 of the DSU. Therefore, we are profoundly concerned to observe that the
confidentiality has not been respected and that aspects of the Panel’s interim report were disclosed, as
evidenced in various press reports brought to our attention by the parties. We consider this lack of respect for
confidentiality unacceptable.”
c) “Procedimentos adicionais a fim de proteger dados empresariais confidenciais [business
confidential information (BCI)]”
(i) Geral
* Não-adoção de procedimentos adicionais pelo Órgão de Apelação
- Aircraft) e Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft), Demandantes: Brasil
(WT/DS70/AB/R, paras. 145 e 147) e Canadá (WT/DS46/AB/R, paras. 123 e 125)
Em Brazil - Aircraft e Canada - Aircraft, tendo em vista pedido dos litigantes, os painéis adotaram
procedimentos especiais, que iam além da tutela oferecida pelo artigo 18.2, com o intuito de resguardar BCI.
Entretanto, o Órgão de Apelação considerou desnecessários tais procedimentos.
Paras. 145 (e 123). “[T]he provisions of Articles 17.10 and 18.2 apply to all Members of the WTO, and oblige
them to maintain the confidentiality of any submissions or information submitted, or received, in an Appellate
Body proceeding. Moreover, those provisions oblige Members to ensure that such confidentiality is fully
respected by any person that a Member selects to act as its representative, counsel or consultant.”
Para. 147 (e 125). “For these reasons, we do not consider that it is necessary, under all the circumstances of
this case, to adopt additional procedures for the protection of business confidential information in these
appellate proceedings.”
* Adoção de procedimentos especiais pelo Órgão de Apelação
Annex III, para. 26
Em EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação, ao contrário do que
aconteceu em Brazil - Aircraft e Canada - Aircraft, resolveu estabelecer procedimentos extras com o escopo
de resguardar BCI.
Para. 26. “[W]e recognize that, in Brazil - Aircraft and Canada - Aircraft, the Appellate Body did not
consider it necessary, in the circumstances of those appeals, to adopt additional procedures to protect
information deemed sensitive by the participants. In doing so, however, the Appellate Body did not suggest
that the DSU, the other covered agreements, or the Working Procedures precluded the adoption of procedures
providing additional protection; rather, the Appellate Body did not consider that such additional protection
was necessary in the particular circumstances of those appeals.” (nota de rodapé retirada)
212
(ii) Versão pública do relatório do painel em caso de BCI
* A versão do relatório do painel divulgada aos integrantes da OMC deve ser inteligível
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Japan - Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories
from Korea (Japan - DRAMs) (Korea), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS336/AB/R, para. 279
É usual que os painéis decidam retirar BCI da versão de seus relatórios que é repassada aos membros da OMC
e ao público. Em Japan - DRAMs (Korea), o Órgão de Apelação mencionou que, caso o painel opte por
remover BCI da versão pública de seu relatório, deve-se ter o cuidado de que esta versão seja inteligível, não
prejudicando direitos de terceiros.
Para. 279. “While a panel must not disclose information which is by its nature confidential, a panel, in
deciding to redact such information from its report at the request of one or both of the parties, should bear in
mind the rights of third parties and other WTO Members under various provisions of the DSU, such as
Articles 12.7 and 16. Accordingly, a panel must make efforts to ensure that the public version of its report
circulated to all Members of the WTO is understandable.” (nota de rodapé suprimida)
d) “Audiências públicas de painéis”
* Audiências públicas não afrontam o artigo 18.2 do DSU
Relatório do painel em United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC - Hormones Dispute
(US/Canada - Continued Suspension), Demandante: CE, WT/DS320/R, para. 7.48
Em US/Canada - Continued Suspension houve uma audiência pública conduzida por um painel pela primeira
vez na história do sistema GATT/OMC. Em seu relatório, o painel aduziu que a condução de uma audiência
pública não afronta o conteúdo do artigo 18.2 do DSU. Após a audiência pioneira, outros casos registraram a
ocorrência de audiência, em sua integralidade ou apenas parcialmente, como em EC - Bananas III (Article
21.5, US), US - Continued Zeroing, Australia - Apples e EC - IT Products.
Para. 7.48. “Regarding the requirement contained in Article 18.2 of the DSU that “[w]ritten submissions to
the panel … shall be treated as confidential”, we note that, by opening its hearings to public observation, the
Panel did not disclose to the public the content of the parties’ written submissions. By making statements to
which the public could listen, the parties themselves exercised their right under Article 18.2 to “disclos[e]
statements of [their] own positions to the public”. The Panel is mindful that, by asking questions or seeking
clarifications during the hearings with respect to written submissions of the parties, it may have itself
“disclosed” the content of such submissions. However, the Panel notes that at all times the parties retained the
right to request that specific statements of theirs not be broadcasted so as to remain confidential and that, in
this case, the parties had made their written submissions public. The Panel notes also that Article 18.2 provides
that “Members shall treat as confidential information submitted by another Member to the Panel or the
Appellate Body which that Member has designated as confidential.” We consider that this sentence clarifies
the scope of the confidentiality requirement which applies to the Panel and to Members, and that panels have
to keep confidential only the information that has been designated as confidential or which has otherwise not
been disclosed to the public. Any other interpretation would imply a double standard, whereby panels would
have to treat as confidential information which a WTO Member does not have to treat as confidential. The
Panel also notes that, by requesting that the Panel hold hearings open to public observation, the parties to this
dispute have implicitly accepted that their arguments be public, with the exception of those they would
identify as confidential.”
e) “Fase do artigo 22.6 do DSU”
213
(i) O disposto no artigo 18.2 aplica-se na fase do artigo 22.6 do DSU
Relatório do painel em United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US - Upland Cotton) (Article 22.6, US
I), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS267/ARB/1, para. 1.33
Em US - Upland Cotton (Article 22.6, US I), o painel consignou que o conteúdo do artigo 18.2 também deve
ser aplicado na fase de painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU.
Para. 1.33. “Article 18.2 of the DSU provides “Members shall treat as confidential information submitted by
another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that Member has designated as confidential.” The
Arbitrator considers that the same rule also applies to these arbitration proceedings. Therefore Members shall
treat the information designated by the United States as confidential, and are under an obligation not to
disclose it to anyone not involved in the proceedings. The Arbitrator is also under an obligation not to disclose
such confidential information in its Decisions.”
f) “Escritório de advocacia representante tanto de uma parte como de um terceiro – necessidade de
preservação de sigilo”
Relatório do painel em European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS246/R, para. 7.16
Em EC - Tariff Preferences, o painel, ao abordar a questão relativa a se um escritório de advocacia,
representante de uma das partes e de um terceiro, romperia as regras de confidencialidade previstas no DSU,
decidiu que as disposições do artigo 18.2, relativas ao sigilo, aplicam-se ao escritório de advocacia que
representa um terceiro no litígio.
Para. 7.16. “As a general matter, the Panel considers that Members involved in the dispute settlement process
have the obligation of ensuring confidentiality, as required by Article 18.2, Article 14.1 and the Working
Procedures, regardless of who serves as their legal counsel. Needless to say, this obligation of Members
involved in the dispute settlement process must be respected by all of their representatives, including legal
counsel. In addition, as a general professional discipline, it is the responsibility of counsel to maintain the
confidentiality of all communications between it and the party (or third party) it represents. In this regard, the
Panel again notes that bar associations in many jurisdictions have elaborated rules of conduct dealing
explicitly with confidentiality between clients and their legal counsel.” (nota de rodapé retirada)
III.
Comentários
O artigo 18 do DSU regulamenta as comunicações com o painel ou o Órgão de Apelação. O parágrafo 1, do
artigo em comento, veda a chamada comunicação ex parte, ou seja, o fato de uma das partes ou terceiro
encontrar-se com os painelistas ou membros do Órgão de Apelação sem o conhecimento da parte contrária. Já
o parágrafo 2 determina que as comunicações escritas com o órgão julgador terão o caráter de
confidencialidade.
Numa análise superficial, a primeira sentença do parágrafo 2 poderia dar a impressão de que as informações
contidas nas comunicações escritas de uma parte com o órgão julgador não poderiam ser tornadas públicas, o
que colidiria com a segunda sentença do mesmo parágrafo. Sucede que, nas suas comunicações escritas, a
parte necessariamente faz manifestações das suas próprias posições. Logo, poderia esta parte publicar suas
posições, resguardadas as informações reputadas como sigilosas pela parte adversa. Para tanto, deve-se abrir
oportunidade para que esta última indique quais dados são confidenciais. Quedando inerte à parte contrária, a
outra prte poderá publicar in totum as suas comunicações escritas, como salientou o painel em Argentina Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties.
214
Alguns casos registraram a ocorrência de audiências públicas. Pode-se indagar se estas audiências não
afrontariam o requisito de confidencialidade, preconizado pelo parágrafo 2. A resposta é negativa, na medida
em que o sigilo de dados não é absoluto. Quando houve audiências, as partes envolvidas na disputa
aquiesceram com que elas fossem realizadas publicamente. Embora possa se argumentar que os julgadores, ao
fazerem perguntas às prtes sobre algum ponto específico das suas comunicações escritas, estariam tornando
pública alguma informação inserida nas aludidas comunicações, isto, na realidade, não procede, pois as prtes
podem apontar quais dados constantes destas comunicações são tidos como confidenciais, resguardando,
assim, os seus interesses, como bem anotou o painel em US/Canada - Continued Suspension.
O artigo 18 limita-se a se referir a painel ou Órgão de Apelação, não prevendo a sua aplicação na fase de
arbitragem, que é mencionada nos artigos 21.3(c), 22 e 25, todos do DSU. Em US - Upland Cotton (Article
22.6, US I), ficou consignada a possibilidade de o conteúdo do artigo 18 igualmente incidir sobre o
procedimento da arbitragem, o que se revela acertado, posto que não faria sentido o DSU proteger as
informações confidenciais na fase de processo de conhecimento (painel ou Órgão de Apelação), que é a mais
importante, e não as tutelar na fase de execução (arbitragem) daquilo que ficou decidido anteriormente. Posto
isso, denota-se interessante à inserção da figura do árbitro no artigo 18, como na proposta de revisão do
parágrafo 1, do artigo em apreço, feita pelos EUA, a saber:
Paragraph 1 of Article 18 is amended by deleting “panel or Appellate Body” and
inserting in its place “panel, Appellate Body, or arbitrator,” both places that it occurs
and by inserting the following footnote after the first appearance of the term
“arbitrator”:
(1) As used in this Article, the expression “arbitrator” means any arbitrator under
paragraph 3(c) of Article 21, Article 22, or Article 25. [NOTE: this list is intended to
include all arbitration proceedings under the DSU and the references would need to be
updated to reflect any amendments to the DSU.] (81) (destaque nosso)
O ponto mais polêmico do artigo 18 é, certamente, a sua aplicação às informações empresariais confidenciais
[business confidential information (BCI)]. Quando uma controvérsia é levada às portas do DSB, os interesses
de setores nevrálgicos de uma economia nacional estão em jogo. Estes setores dispõem de informações que, se
transmitidas aos concorrentes internacionais, podem vir a comprometer o seu desempenho. Surge, então, o
impasse:
O caso de informações confidenciais do setor privado coloca um novo dilema diante do
sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC: como proteger as informações
comercialmente relevantes de determinados setores ou empresas de seus competidores
internacionais quando essas informações são importantes para a análise e decisão do
contencioso levado ao OSC? (82)
Para tentar equilibrar a necessidade de deslindar o litígio, de um lado, e de resguardar os dados confidenciais
repassados por empresas aos seus governos, de outro lado, o órgão julgador, às vezes, estabelece ou sugere
regras especiais para disciplinar o acesso a ditos dados.
Mesmo com a oferta de regramentos rígidos, como no caso US - Wheat Gluten, em que se propôs que somente
dois funcionários do Secretariado da OMC, dois funcionários da parte que obteria as informações e os
painelistas poderiam acessar as informações sigilosas exclusivamente in camera; que tais pessoas teriam a
obrigação de não divulgar os dados colhidos; que não seria autorizada fotocópia das informações; que
mencionados indivíduos poderiam tomar breves notas dos dados em tela unicamente para aproveitamento no
processo; e que, finda a controvérsia, as notas seriam inutilizadas; já houve registro de pelo menos três
disputas nas quais aconteceu quebra do sigilo de dados: Thailand - H-Beams, EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar
e US - Upland Cotton.
215
Outra situação, a qual realça o receio de transmissão indevida de informações confidenciais, é a eventual
postura que os escritórios de advocacia que atuam nas demandas podem ter, apesar de, segundo o
entendimento atual dos órgão julgadores, os causídicos terem o dever de preservação da confidencialidade. Na
jurisprudência ínsita ao artigo 18, percebe-se que houve um caso Brazil - Aircraft (Article 21.5, Canada II) em
que uma firma de advogados tinha como clientes o Canadá e um fabricante canadense de aeronaves regionais.
Em outra ocasião, o escritório de advogados representava os interesses de uma das partes e de um terceiro (EC
- Tariff Preferences).
No momento da divulgação do relatório do painel, costuma-se retirar as informações sigilosas da versão do
documento que é tornada pública. Todavia, na hipótese de uma das partes não concordar com o
estabelecimento de regras especiais que disciplinam o acesso a dados confidenciais, o painel ou Órgão de
Apelação deparam-se com o problema de como desvendar o litígio. Se as informações puderem ser
dispensadas, inexistem maiores problemas. Piora o cenário quando elemento confidencial for essencial. Neste
choque de valores, deve prevalecer o princípio de acesso aos dados sigilosos, que é o que viabilizará o fim da
disputa, desde que asseguradas regras protetoras dos elementos a serem divulgados secretamente.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 81: Further contribution of the United States to the improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO
related to transparency – revised legal drafting, TN/DS/W/86, 21 abr.2006.
Footnote 82: SANCHEZ, Michelle Ratton. Informações confidenciais privadas. In: LIMA, Maria Lúcia L. M. Padua; ROSENBERG,
Barbara (coords.). O Brasil e o contensioso na OMC: tomo I. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2009. p. 176.
216

Artigo 19
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Article 19
Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations
19.1
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered
agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned (83) bring the measure into conformity
with that agreement (84). In addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may
suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations.
Footnote 83: The “Member concerned” is the party to the dispute to which the panel or Appellate Body recommendations are
directed.
Footnote 84: With respect to recommendations in cases not involving a violation of GATT 1994 or any other covered agreement, see
Article 26.
IB.
Artigo 19
Recomendações dos Grupos Especiais e do Órgão de Apelação
19.1
Quando um grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação concluir que uma medida é incompatível com um
acordo abrangido, deverá recomendar que o Membro interessado8 torne a medida compatível com o
acordo9. Além de suas recomendações, o grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação poderá sugerir a
maneira pela qual o Membro interessado poderá implementar as recomendações.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Artigo 19.1
a) “um painel ou o Órgão de Apelação ... deverá recomendar … poderá sugerir”
(i) norma obrigatória vs. norma permissiva
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - OCTG Sunset) (21.5), Demandante: CE,
WT/DS268/AB/RW, paras. 173 e 182
8
O “Membro interessado” é a parte em controvérsia à qual serão dirigidas as recomendações do grupo especial ou do Órgão de
Apelação.
9
Com relação às recomendações nos casos em que não haja infração das disposições do GATT 1994 nem de nenhum outro acordo
abrangido, vide artigo 26.
217
O Órgão de Apelação explicou a distinção entre a primeira e a segunda frases do artigo 19.1, observando que a
primeira delas determina aos painéis uma conduta – a recomendação –, enquanto a segunda faculta uma
conduta – a sugestão –, conferindo um “direito discricionário”.
Para. 173. “We next address the provisions of the DSU referred to by the Panel and the participants to
examine whether they provide us with contextual guidance. We note that the requirement in Article 19.1, first
sentence, to “bring the measure into conformity” does not indicate that the choice of means of implementation
is confined to withdrawal of the measure that was found to be WTO-inconsistent. Article 19.1, second
sentence, confers authority on panels and the Appellate Body to suggest “ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendations”, which implies that several “ways” of implementation may
be possible.”
Para. 182. “The first sentence of Article 19.1 requires panels or the Appellate Body, if they find the
challenged measure to be inconsistent with a provision of the covered agreements, to recommend that the
respondent Member bring its measure into conformity with that agreement. The second sentence confers a
discretionary right, authorizing panels and the Appellate Body to suggest ways in which those
recommendations may be implemented. The Appellate Body has explained that the second sentence of Article
19.1 “does not oblige panels to make ... a suggestion”.” (85)
(ii) duração da recomendação
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas) (21.5 II), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU; e
EC - Bananas (21.5), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 273
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou que o valor da recomendação adotada pelo DSB, nos
relatórios do painel e do Órgão de Apelação, permanecem em vigor até que ocorra o cumprimento material
dessa recomendação pela parte afetada.
Para. 273. “Furthermore, we consider that the Panel's statement that the “original DSB recommendations and
rulings in this dispute remain operative” was not incorrect. The DSB recommendations and rulings from the
original proceedings remain in effect until the European Communities brings itself into substantive
compliance. The statement by the Panel does not in any way affect the legal status of the DSB
recommendations and rulings in the original dispute. We see no error in the Panel's statement in paragraph
8.13 of the US Panel Report. We therefore find that the Panel did not err in making findings with respect to a
measure that had ceased to exist subsequent to the establishment of the Panel, but before the Panel issued its
Report.”
b) “torne a medida compatível com o acordo”
(i) medida em vigor
Relatório do painel no caso India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India - Autos),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS146/R; e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS175/R, para. 8.15
Nesta controvérsia, o painel esclarece o comportamento normalmente exigido dos painéis nos casos usuais, em
que uma medida em vigor contraria os acordos. Nesses casos, não é necessário uma análise material mais
profunda: o painel recomenda diretamente ao membro que torne a medida compatível com o acordo violado.
218
Para. 8.15. “This provision thus envisages a situation where a violation is in existence. Indeed, this
formulation reflects the usual situation which panels encounter, examining a matter which does not
significantly evolve in the course of the proceedings. It is only natural in such circumstances for a panel,
following a finding that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, to simply recommend, without
the need for any further substantive analysis, that this measure be brought into conformity with that
Agreement.”
(ii) Medida não mais em vigor
(EC - Bananas) (21.5), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 271
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação especificou que, embora não possa fazer recomendações em relação
a medidas não mais em vigor, isso não impede o painel de chegar a conclusões jurídicas sobre essas mesmas
medidas, e incluí-las no relatório.
Para. 271. “We turn next to the European Communities' allegation that the Panel erred in making a
recommendation with respect to an expired measure. We recall that the Appellate Body has distinguished the
question whether a panel can make a finding concerning an expired measure from the question whether a panel
can make a recommendation relating to an expired measure. In US - Certain EC Products, the Appellate Body
reversed the panel's decision to make a recommendation pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU on the grounds
that the panel had already found that the measure at issue in that dispute had expired. (86) The Appellate Body
confirmed, in US - Upland Cotton, that the fact that a measure has expired may affect what recommendation a
panel may make, but it is not dispositive of the question whether a panel can make findings relating to an
expired measure. (87)
(iii) Relevância de fatos ocorridos durante o procedimento
Relatório do painel no caso India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India - Autos),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS146/R; e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS175/R, paras. 8.27-8.28
Nesta controvérsia, o painel, levado pela obrigação de fazer um exame objetivo da controvérsia, considerou
necessário dar atenção aos eventos ocorridos durante o curso da controvérsia, para decidir sobre se deveria ou
não fazer uma recomendação, nos termos do artigo 19.1.
Para. 8.27. “In the circumstances of the case, the respondent itself has requested that the events which
occurred in the course of the proceedings be taken into account in the context of making the recommendations
under Article 19.1. The complainants, while they had not specifically requested the Panel to consider these
issues at this stage of its analysis, did make requests for findings which called for these subsequent events to
be taken into account, in requesting the Panel to find that the measures had “remained” in violation subsequent
to 1 April.”
Para. 8.28. “In light of the foregoing, the Panel felt that it would not be making an “objective assessment of
the matter before it”, or assisting the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the DSU in accordance with
Article 11 of the DSU, had it chosen not to address the impact of events having taken place in the course of the
proceedings, in assessing the appropriateness of making a recommendation under Article 19.1 of the DSU.”
c) “o grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação poderá sugerir a maneira pela qual o membro
interessado poderá implementar as recomendações”
219
(i) Discricionariedade do grupo especial para sugerir maneiras de implementação
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing) (US - Zeroing) (21.5), Demandante: CE, WT/DS294/AB/RW,
para. 466
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou o direito discricionário dos painéis e do Órgão de
Apelação de sugerir aos membros formas de implementar as recomendações e decisões.
Para. 466. “The second sentence of Article 19.1 of the DSU confers a discretionary right, authorizing panels
and the Appellate Body to suggest ways in which the recommendations and rulings could be implemented.
The Appellate Body observed in EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, Ecuador II), that “[s]uggestions made by
panels or the Appellate Body may provide useful guidance and assistance to Members and facilitate
implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings, particularly in complex cases.” (88)
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from
Canada (US - Softwood Lumber), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS264/R, para. 8.6
Nesta controvérsia, o painel concluiu que o direito discricionário de sugerir maneiras de implementar os
acordos inclui o direito de não fazer nenhuma sugestão.
Para. 8.6. “By virtue of Article 19.1, panels have discretion (“may”) to suggest ways in which a Member
could implement the relevant recommendation. However, a panel is not required to make a suggestion should
it not deem it appropriate to do so. We do not consider it appropriate to make any recommendation to the
Dispute Settlement Body in this regard.”
(ii) Escolha pelo membro dos meios de implementação
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - OCTG Sunset) (21.5), Demandante: Comunidades
Europeias, WT/DS268/AB/RW, para. 173
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que há uma pluralidade de meios para os membros
tornarem a medida compatível com os acordos, não sendo necessária a remoção da medida em questão.
Para. 173. “We next address the provisions of the DSU referred to by the Panel and the participants to
examine whether they provide us with contextual guidance. We note that the requirement in Article 19.1, first
sentence, to “bring the measure into conformity” does not indicate that the choice of means of implementation
is confined to withdrawal of the measure that was found to be WTO-inconsistent. Article 19.1, second
sentence, confers authority on panels and the Appellate Body to suggest “ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendations”, which implies that several “ways” of implementation may
be possible. (89) The obligation under Article 21.3 that the Member concerned “inform the DSB of its
intentions in respect of implementation” also suggests that alternative means of implementation may exist and
that the choice belongs, in principle, to the Member. (…)”
(iii) Valor jurídico das sugestões de implementação
(EC - Bananas) (21.5), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, paras. 321-324
220
Neste trecho, o Órgão de Apelação determinou o valor jurídico das sugestões feitas pelo painel ou pelo Órgão
de Apelação, nos termos do artigo 19.1. Em primeiro lugar, essas sugestões não são vinculantes para o
membro, o qual pode escolher implementar de outra forma a recomendação de tornar as suas medidas
compatíveis com os acordos. Em segundo lugar, essas sugestões não são o objeto de análise do painel de
implementação, que se ocupará das medidas concretas adotadas pelo membro para cumprir os acordos, e não
nos meios utilizados. Em terceiro lugar, e como consequência disso, o fato de um membro declarar ter seguido
a sugestão aprovada pelo DSB não lhe imuniza contra o escrutínio no momento do painel de implementação,
das medidas concretamente adotadas; e o fato de o membro ter efetivamente seguido essas sugestões não gera
presunção de cumprimento material dos acordos, cumprimento que deve ser verificado integralmente pelo
painel de implementação, independente de ter havido sugestões por parte do painel original.
Para. 321. “Suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU regarding
ways of implementation form part of panel or Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB in previous
proceedings. The DSU does not expressly address the question of the legal status of suggestions that form part
of a report adopted by the DSB, nor does it specify the legal consequences when a Member chooses to
implement DSB recommendations and rulings by following a suggestion for implementation. A Member may
choose whether or not to follow a suggestion. The use of the term “could” in Article 19.1 clarifies that
Members are not obliged to follow suggestions for implementation.”
Para. 322. “Suggestions made pursuant to Article 19.1 are not in themselves the subject of review by a
compliance panel. Article 21.5 of the DSU only refers to “measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings” and not to measures taken to comply with suggestions issued pursuant to the
second sentence of Article 19.1. (…)”
Para. 323. “We consider that suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may, if correctly and fully
implemented, lead to compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. However, full compliance
with DSB rulings and WTO-consistency of the measures actually taken to comply cannot be presumed simply
because a Member declares that its measures taken to comply conform to a suggestion made under Article
19.1 of the DSU. As pointed out above, Article 21.5 proceedings focus on the measure actually taken to
comply, not the ways in which the Member could implement the recommendations and rulings. Following a
suggestion does not guarantee substantive compliance with the recommendations and rulings by the DSB.
Whether such compliance has been achieved needs to be determined through Article 21.5 proceedings. The
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report by the DSB makes the recommendations and rulings therein
binding upon the parties. As noted earlier, such adoption by the DSB does not make suggestions for
implementation binding upon the parties (especially, where, as in this case, the first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel
made several suggestions); nor does DSB adoption mean that actions taken to implement suggestions must be
presumed to be WTO-consistent or shielded from review in Article 21.5 proceedings.”
Para. 324. “(…) We do not consider that, as a consequence of the DSB adoption of a panel or Appellate Body
report containing a suggestion, the measure implementing such a suggestion can be presumed to be WTOconsistent. (90) In our view, a DSU rule that establishes a legal presumption of conformity should do so in
clear and unambiguous terms. (91) Therefore, we do not see how the terms in Article 19.1, second sentence,
“imply” a legal presumption, particularly as this provision has to be read in the context of Article 21.5, which
entitles Members to the review of implementation measures in compliance proceedings.”
(vi) “Supervisão da implementação”
Relatório do painel no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft) (21.5),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/RW, paras. 7.2-7.3
221
Neste caso, o painel recusou-se a utilizar o seu direito de fazer uma sugestão, nos termos do artigo 19.1, com
relação ao procedimento de verificação bilateral do cumprimento dos acordos, alegando que esta possibilidade
não está claramente descrita no artigo 19.1.
Para. 7.2. “Canada requests that we suggest, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the parties develop
mechanisms that would allow Canada to verify compliance with the original recommendation of the DSB.
Canada notes that Brazil has a reciprocal interest in verifying Canada's compliance in a parallel dispute,
Canada - Aircraft. (92) Canada emphasises that it is not seeking a continuing role for the Panel in proposing
such verification procedures, nor is it requesting that we impose such procedures. Brazil responds that,
although it does not in principle oppose an agreement with Canada on reciprocal transparency, it does not
consider that it is an appropriate matter for a suggestion under Article 19.1 of the DSU, but is better left to be
agreed by the parties. Brazil notes that any such agreement would have to involve balanced and truly
reciprocal offers of transparency.”
Para. 7.3. “We note that Article 19.1 provides that “the panel (…) may suggest ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendation”. In our view, Article 19.1 appears to envision suggestions
regarding what could be done to a measure to bring it into conformity or, in case of a recommendation under
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, what could be done to “withdraw” the prohibited subsidy. It is not clear if
Article 19.1 also addresses issues of surveillance of those steps. That said, any agreement that WTO Members
might reach among themselves to improve transparency regarding the implementation of WTO obligations can
only be encouraged.”
III.
Comentários
A primeira frase do artigo 19.1 veicula uma norma obrigatória para os órgãos de adjudicação da OMC. Se
entenderem que há incompatibilidade entre uma medida adotada por um membro e os acordos da OMC, o
painel e o Órgão de Apelação estão obrigados a recomendar que a medida em questão seja tornada compatível
com os acordos. Não lhes cabe, portanto, julgamento de oportunidade. A partir do momento em que uma
medida em vigor for considerada incompatível com os acordos, deverá constar do relatório uma recomendação
– genérica – de que o Membro “torne a medida compatível com o acordo”.
A recomendação genérica produz para o membro uma obrigação de resultado. Na fase de implementação,
serão consideradas como tendo descumprido as recomendações e decisões do DSB quaisquer medidas que não
tenham levado à compatibilidade das políticas do membro com os acordos.
A incompatibilidade das medidas em questão deve ser avaliada no momento da elaboração do relatório. Caso a
medida seja alterada em meio ao procedimento, nenhuma recomendação deverá ser feita. Entretanto, diversos
painéis têm considerado que isso não os impede de chegar a decisões/conclusões (“findings”) sobre a
conformidade das medidas com os acordos. Essa interpretação foi chancelada pelo Órgão de Apelação, no
caso US - Upland Cotton.
Além de veicular uma norma obrigatória, o artigo 19.1 contém em sua segunda frase uma norma permissiva:
os órgãos de adjudicação poderão sugerir uma maneira de implementar as recomendações. Trata-se de um
direito discricionário, de uma maneira de os órgãos em questão assistirem os membros na implementação dos
relatórios. O painel e o Órgão de Apelação, entretanto, permanecem obrigados a motivar a sua decisão,
considerando expressamente os argumentos oferecidos pelos membros ao solicitar uma sugestão.
A eventual sugestão fornecida pelos órgãos de adjudicação não é vinculante para as partes, nem para o painel
de implementação (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em EC - Bananas, 21.5 II). Em outras palavras, nem o
membro tem obrigatoriamente de seguir a sugestão contida no relatório, nem o fato de o membro tê-la seguido
vincula os órgãos de adjudicação. Um membro que tenha seguido a sugestão contida no relatório, mas cujas
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políticas permaneçam incompatíveis com os acordos ao fim do prazo razoável de tempo, terá descumprido as
decisões e recomendações do DSB e estará sujeito às consequências jurídicas correspondentes.
Por outro lado, ainda que haja a sugestão, a escolha entre os diversos meios de implementar um relatório
permanece sendo dos próprios membros. Assim, um membro que adote medidas diferentes daquelas sugeridas
pelo órgão de adjudicação, mas que levem à compatibilidade entre as suas políticas comerciais e os acordos,
será considerado como tendo cumprido integralmente as decisões e recomendações do DSB.
Para o artigo 19.2, vejam-se a jurisprudência e os comentários ao artigo 3.2 do DSU.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 85: Appellate Body Report, US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, para. 189.
Footnote 86: Appellate Body Report, US - Certain EC Products, para. 81.
Footnote 87: Appellate Body Report, US - Upland Cotton, para. 272.
Footnote 88: Appellate Body Reports, EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, Ecuador II) / EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, US), para. 325.
Footnote 89: We note that Article 3.7 of the DSU states that “the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to
secure the withdrawal of the measures” found to be WTO-inconsistent. In our view, this does not exclude that the inconsistent measure
to be withdrawn can be brought into compliance by modifying or replacing it with a revised measure. See also Panel Report, para. 7.54.
Footnote 90: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 90 (Ecuador).
Footnote 91: For example, Article 3.8 of the DSU, which establishes a legal presumption that a breach of WTO rules constitutes
nullification or impairment, does so in clear and unambiguous terms. Similarly, a legal presumption of conformity with the GATT
1994 is established in clear and unambiguous terms by Article 2.4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures for measures conforming to that Agreement.
Footnote 92: First Submission of Canada, para. 45.
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
Artigo 20
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Article 20
Time-frame for DSB Decisions
Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties to the dispute, the period from the date of establishment of
the panel by the DSB until the date the DSB considers the panel or appellate report for adoption shall as a
general rule not exceed nine months where the panel report is not appealed or 12 months where the report is
appealed. Where either the panel or the Appellate Body has acted, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 12 or
paragraph 5 of Article 17, to extend the time for providing its report, the additional time taken shall be added
to the above periods.
IB.
Artigo 20
Calendário das Decisões do OSC
Salvo acordado diferentemente pelas partes em controvérsia, o período compreendido entre a data de
estabelecimento do grupo especial pelo OSC e a data em que o OSC examinar a adoção do Relatório do
grupo especial ou do Órgão de Apelação não deverá, como regra geral, exceder nove meses quando o
Relatório do grupo especial não sofrer apelação ou 12 meses quando houver apelação. Se o grupo especial ou o
Órgão de Apelação, com base no parágrafo 9 do Artigo 12 ou parágrafo 5 do Artigo 17, decidirem pela
prorrogação do prazo de entrega de seus Relatórios, o prazo adicional será acrescentado aos períodos acima
mencionados.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Sections 301 - 310 of the Trade Act 1974 (US - Section 301 of
the Trade Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS152/R, para. 7.31(b), nota 646
O painel, na controvérsia US - Section 301 Trade Act, afirmou serem ‘indicativos apenas’ alguns dos limites
de tempo estabelecidos no DSU, incluído o do artigo 20.
Para. 7.31(b), nota 646. “Article 12.8 refers to six months “as a general rule” for the timeframe between panel
composition and issuance of the final report to the parties. Article 12.9 provides that “[i]n no case should the
period from the establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months”
(emphasis added). Article 17.5 states that “[a]s a general rule, the proceedings [of the Appellate Body] shall
not exceed 60 days”. It adds, however, that “[i]n no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days”. However,
even this seemingly compulsory deadline has been passed in three cases so far (United States - Restrictions on
Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, DS24/AB/R, 91 days; European Communities Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (“EC - Hormones”), DS26/AB/R and
DS48/AB/R, 114 days; and US - Shrimp, op. tit, 91 days). Finally, Article 20 refers to 9 months - 12 months in
224
case of an appeal - “as a general rule” for the period between panel establishment and adoption of report(s) by
the DSB.”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 20 do DSU estabelece uma meta de tempo total entre o estabelecimento do painel pelo DSB e o
exame pelo DSB do relatório final do painel, eventualmente modificado pelo relatório do Órgão de Apelação.
O prazo estabelecido pelo artigo pode ser estendido pelos próprios órgãos judicantes da OMC.
Assim, o artigo 20 tem função puramente indicativa, fornecendo um parâmetro que não deveria ser
ultrapassado pelos órgãos judicantes. Pode-se observar que o cumprimento dos prazos não está inteiramente
sob o controle dos painéis e do Órgão de Apelação, uma vez que as partes podem levar tempo acima do
esperado para compor o painel, assim como suspender o andamento da controvérsia enquanto buscam uma
solução negociada.
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
Artigo 21
Maria de Lourdes Albertini
Geraldo Vidigal
IA.
Article 21
Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings
21.1
Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.
21.2
Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members
with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement.
21.3
At a DSB meeting held within 30 days (93) after the date of adoption of the panel or Appellate Body
report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the
recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which
to do so. The reasonable period of time shall be:
Footnote 93: If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
(a)
the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such period is approved
by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval,
(b)
a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days after the date of
adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such agreement,
(c)
a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date of
adoption of the recommendations and rulings. (94) In such arbitration, a guideline for the
arbitrator (95) should be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate
Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or
Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the
particular circumstances.
Footnote 94: If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within ten days after referring the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator shall be
appointed by the Director-General within ten days, after consulting the parties.
Footnote 95: The expression “arbitrator” shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group.
21.4
Except where the panel or the Appellate Body has extended, pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 12 or
paragraph 5 of Article 17, the time of providing its report, the period from the date of establishment of
the panel by the DSB until the date of determination of the reasonable period of time shall not exceed
15 months unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. Where either the panel or the Appellate
Body has acted to extend the time of providing its report, the additional time taken shall be added to
the 15-month period; provided that unless the parties to the dispute agree that there are exceptional
circumstances, the total time shall not exceed 18 months.
21.5
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse
to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel. The
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panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it. When the
panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB in
writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit
its report.
21.6
The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings.
The issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any
Member at any time following their adoption. Unless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of
implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting
after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time pursuant to
paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB’s agenda until the issue is resolved. At least 10 days prior to
each such DSB meeting, the Member concerned shall provide the DSB with a status report in writing
of its progress in the implementation of the recommendations or rulings.
21.7
If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country Member, the DSB shall consider
what further action it might take which would be appropriate to the circumstances.
21.8
If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in considering what appropriate action
might be taken, the DSB shall take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained
of, but also their impact on the economy of developing country Members concerned.
IB.
Artigo 21
Fiscalização da Implementação das Recomendações e Decisões
21.1
O pronto cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do OSC é fundamental para assegurar a efetiva
solução das controvérsias, em benefício de todos os Membros.
21.2
As questões que envolvam interesses de países em desenvolvimento Membros deverão receber
atenção especial no que tange às medidas que tenham sido objeto da solução de controvérsia.
21.3
Em reunião do OSC celebrada dentro de 30 dias10 após a data de adoção do Relatório do grupo
especial ou do Órgão de Apelação, o membro interessado deverá informar ao OSC suas intenções
com relação a implementação das decisões e recomendações do OSC. Se for impossível a aplicação
imediata das recomendações e decisões, o Membro interessado deverá para tanto dispor de prazo
razoável. O prazo razoável deverá ser:
a)
o prazo proposto pelo Membro interessado, desde que tal prazo seja aprovado pelo OSC; ou,
não havendo tal aprovação,
b)
um prazo mutuamente acordado pelas partes em controvérsia dentro de 45 dias a partir da data
de adoção das recomendações e decisões; ou, não havendo tal acordo,
c)
um prazo determinado mediante arbitragem compulsória dentro de 90 dias após a data de
adoção das recomendações e decisões11. Em tal arbitragem, uma diretriz para o árbitro12 será a
de que o prazo razoável para implementar as recomendações do grupo especial ou do Órgão
10
Caso não esteja prevista reunião do OSC durante esse period, será realizada uma reunião do OSC para tal fim.
Caso as partes não cheguem a consenso para indicação de um árbitro nos 10 dias seguintes a submissão da questão a arbitragem, o
árbitro será designado pelo Diretor-Geral em prazo de 10 dias, após consulta com as partes.
12
Entende-se pela expressão “árbitro” tanto uma pessoa quanto um grupo de pessoas.
11
227
de Apelação não deverá exceder a 15 meses da data de adoção do Relatório do grupo especial
ou do Órgão de Apelação. Contudo, tal prazo poderá ser maior ou menor, dependendo das
circunstâncias particulares.
21.4
A não ser nos casos em que o grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação tenham prorrogado o prazo de
entrega de seu Relatório com base no parágrafo 9 do Artigo 12 ou no parágrafo 5 do Artigo 17, o
período compreendido entre a data de estabelecimento do grupo especial pelo OSC e a data de
determinação do prazo razoável não deverá exceder a 15 meses, salvo se as partes acordarem
diferentemente. Quando um grupo especial ou o Órgão de Apelação prorrogarem o prazo de entrega
de seu Relatório, o prazo adicional deverá ser acrescentado ao período de 15 meses; desde que o
prazo total não seja superior a 18 meses, a menos que as partes em controvérsia convenham em
considerar as circunstâncias excepcionais.
21.5
Em caso de desacordo quanto à existência de medidas destinadas a cumprir as recomendações e
decisões ou quanto à compatibilidade de tais medidas com um acordo abrangido, tal desacordo se
resolverá conforme os presentes procedimentos de solução de controvérsias, com intervenção, sempre
que possível, do grupo especial que tenha atuado inicialmente na questão. O grupo especial deverá
distribuir seu Relatório dentro de 90 dias após a data em que a questão lhe for submetida. Quando o
grupo especial considerar que não poderá cumprir tal prazo, deverá informar por escrito ao OSC as
razões para o atraso e fornecer uma nova estimativa de prazo para entrega de seu Relatório.
21.6
O OSC deverá manter sob vigilância a aplicação das recomendações e decisões. A questão da
implementação das recomendações e decisões poderá ser arguida por qualquer Membro junto ao OSC
em qualquer momento após sua adoção. Salvo decisão em contrário do OSC, a questão da
implementação das recomendações e decisões deverá ser incluída na agenda da reunião do OSC seis
meses após a data da definição do prazo razoável conforme o parágrafo 3 e deverá permanecer na
agenda do OSC até que seja resolvida. Ao menos 10 dias antes de cada reunião, o Membro
interessado deverá fornecer ao OSC Relatório escrito do andamento da implementação das
recomendações e decisões.
21.7 Se a questão tiver sido levantada por país em desenvolvimento Membro, o OSC deverá considerar quais
as outras providências que seriam adequadas às circunstâncias.
21.8
Se o caso tiver sido submetido por país em desenvolvimento Membro, ao considerar a providência
adequada a ser tomada o OSC deverá levar em consideração não apenas o alcance comercial das
medidas em discussão mas também seu impacto na economia dos países em desenvolvimento
Membros interessados.
IC.
Nada a observar.
II.
1.
Artigo 21.1
a) “Pronto cumprimento”
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O conceito de cumprimento foi melhor definido pelo painel, no caso Argentina - Hides and leather (Article
21.3), que interpretou como “cumprimento ou implementação” um conceito técnico de conteúdo específico,
ou seja, a retirada ou motificação de uma medida ou parte de uma medida, o estabelecimento ou aplicação
pelo qual um membro da OMC violou uma previsão amparada pelo acordo. Além disso, o árbitro entendeu
que o significado de compliance no DSU é diferente de “remoção ou modificação” das condições econômicas
subjecentes que podem ter causado a promulgação ou aplicação da medida incompatível com a OMC.
Relatório do painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of
Finished Leather (Argentina - Hides and Leather), Demandante: CE, WT/DS155/10, para. 41
Para. 41. ”Compliance within the meaning of the DSU is distinguishable from the removal or modification of
the underlying economic or social or other conditions the existence of which might well have caused or
contributed to the enactment or application of the WTO-inconsistent governmental measure in the first place.
Those economic or other conditions might, in certain situations, survive the removal or modification of the
non-conforming measure; nevertheless, the WTO Member concerned will have complied with the DSB
recommendations and rulings and with its obligations under the relevant covered agreement. To my mind, it is
inter alia for the above reason that the need for structural adjustment of the industry or industries in respect of
which the WTO-inconsistent measure was promulgated and applied, has generally been regarded, in prior
arbitrations under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, as not bearing upon the determination of a ‘reasonable period of
time’ for implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings.”
b) “Presteza no cumprimento”
No caso do Chile - Alcoholic Beverages (Article 21.3), o painel considerou essencial o exame de um elemento
de flexibilidade em relação ao tempo de cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do DSB, de forma a
assegurar o equilíbrio e a objetividade na aplicação das decisões.
Relatório do painel no caso Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile - Alcoholic Beverages),
Demandante: CE, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS110/14, para. 38
Para. 38. “The DSU clearly stressed the systemic interest of all WTO Members in the Member concerned
complying ‘immediately’ with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Reading Articles 21.1 and 21.3
together, ‘prompt’ compliance is, in principle, ‘immediate’ compliance. At the same time, however, should
‘immediate’ compliance be ‘impracticable’— it may be noted that the DSU does not use the far more rigorous
term ‘impossible’ — the Member concerned becomes entitled to a ‘reasonable period of time’ to bring itself
into a state of conformity with its WTO obligations. Clearly, a certain element of flexibility in respect of time
is built into the notion of compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. That element would
appear to be essential if ‘prompt’ compliance, in a world of sovereign states, is to be a balanced conception
and objective.”
Posicionamento idêntico foi adotado no caso US - 1916 Act, quando o árbitro estabeleceu que o membro, ao
implementar a determinação do DSB, pode razoavelmente levar em consideração e usar toda a flexibilidade
disponível dentre os procedimentos normais legislativos para compatibilizar a prática em questão às normas
da OMC. (relatório do painel no litígio US - Antidumping Act of 1916, Demandantes: CE e Japão).
c) “Tempo após a adoção do relatório”
No caso US - Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 21.3), o painel, além dos entendimentos já firmados
acima, acrescentou que, para efeito do “pronto cumprimento”, o membro precisa usar o período de tempo
após a adotação do relatório do painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação, para dar início ao cumprimento das
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recomendações e decisões do DSB. Isto significa, que o prazo para a implementação tem início após a efetiva
adoção dos relatórios do painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação, e antes de qualquer procedimento de arbitragem.
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (US - Section 110(5)
Copyright Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS/160/12, para. 46
Para. 46. “[A]n implementing Member must use the time after adoption of a panel and/or Appellate Body
report to begin to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Arbitrators will scrutinize very
carefully the actions an implementing Member takes in respect of implementation during the period after
adoption of a panel and/or Appellate Body report and prior to any arbitration proceeding. If it is perceived by
an arbitrator that an implementing Member has not adequately begun implementation after adoption so as to
effect ‘prompt compliance’, it is to be expected that the arbitrator will take this into account in determining
the ‘reasonable period of time’.”
No mesmo sentido, foi o entendimento do painel no caso Chile - Price Band System (Article 21.3), ao
considerar que a obrigação do membro de implementar as recomendações e decisões do DSB é desencadeada
pela aprovação do relatório em questão e, portanto, um membro “deve, no mínimo, iniciar rapidamente a
implementação e continuar, passo a passo, promovendo a implementação”.
Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/13, para. 43
Para. 43. “A Member’s obligation to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB is triggered by
the DSB’s adoption of the relevant panel and/or Appellate Body reports. Although Article 21.3 acknowledges
circumstances where immediate implementation is ‘impracticable’, in my view the implementation process
should not be prolonged through a Member’s inaction (or insufficient action) in the first months following
adoption. In other words, whether or not a Member is able to complete implementation promptly, it must at
the very least promptly commence and continue concrete steps towards implementation. Otherwise, inaction
or dilatory conduct by the implementing Member would exacerbate the nullification or impairment of the
rights of other Members caused by the inconsistent measure. It is for this reason that arbitral awards under
Article 21.3(c) calculate ‘reasonable period[s] of time’ as from the date of adoption of panel and/or Appellate
Body reports.”
2.
Artigo 21.2
a) “Interesses de países em desenvolvimento membros”
Esse tema foi reiteradamente analisado pelo DSB, em virtude da sua interpretação conjunta com o artigo 21.3
(c). Neste caso, o DSB enfrentou disputas que envolviam a aplicabilidade do chamado “periodo razoável de
tempo” para a implementação e cumprimento das recomendações dos relatórios. Nesse sentido, se apresentam
três leading cases importantes envolvendo as seguintes situações:
-
país em desenvolvimento versus país desenvolvido
país em desenvolvimento versus país em desenvolvimento
país desenvolvido versus múltiplos países em desenvolvimento.
O primeiro caso foi Indonesia - Autos, em que o painel, ao aplicar o artigo 21.3 (c), relativo ao período
razoável de tempo, levou em consideração não somente o status da Indonésia como um país em
densevolvimento, mas, sobretudo, o fato de que era um país em desenvolvimento que estava constantemente
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em “terrível situação econômica e financeira” e que, portanto, um período adicional de tempo deveria ser
deferido ao país, para viabilizar a implementação e o cumprimento das recomendações do relatório.
Relatório do painel no caso Indonésia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesia Autos), Demandantes: CE, Japão e EUA, WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS64/12 e WT/DS59/13,
para. 24
Para. 24. “Although the language of this provision is rather general and does not provide a great deal of
guidance, it is a provision that forms part of the context for Article 21.3(c) of the DSU and which I believe is
important to take into account here. Indonesia has indicated that in a ‘normal situation’, a measure such as the
one required to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case would become effective
on the date of issuance. However, this is not a ‘normal situation’. Indonesia is not only a developing country;
it is a developing country that is currently in a dire economic and financial situation. Indonesia itself states
that its economy is ‘near collapse’. In these very particular circumstances, I consider it appropriate to give full
weight to matters affecting the interests of Indonesia as a developing country pursuant to the provisions of
Article 21.2 of the DSU. I, therefore, conclude that an additional period of six months over and above the sixmonth period required for the completion of Indonesia’s domestic rule-making process constitutes a
reasonable period of time for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case.”
Em outro momento, no caso Chile - Alcoholic Beverages, o painel ressaltou que a necessidade de se levar em
consideração a condição de país em desenvolvimento, ao determinar o “período razoável de tempo”, não
deveria ser feita de diversas maneiras, verbi: “should not result in different ‘kinds of considerations that may
be taken into account’”. Apesar disso, o árbitro salientou que, em virtude da determinação do artigo 21.2 do
DSU, esta condição não deve ser simplesmente desconsiderada e que “utilmente ordena” que o árbitro, ao
determinar um período razoável de tempo, o faça levando em consideração as grandes dificuldades que um
país em desenvolvimento eventualmente possa, em caso particular, encontrar ao implementar as
recomendações e decisões do DSB.
Demandante: CE, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS11O/14, para. 45
Para. 45. “It is not necessary to assume that the operation of Article 21.2 will essentially result in the
application of ‘criteria’ for the determination of ‘the reasonable period of time’ — understood as the kinds of
considerations that may be taken into account — that would be ‘qualitatively’ different for developed and for
developing country Members. I do not believe Chile is making such an assumption. Nevertheless, although
cast in quite general terms, because Article 21.2 is in the DSU, it is not simply to be disregarded. As I read it,
Article 21.2, whatever else it may signify, usefully enjoins, inter alia, an arbitrator functioning under Article
21.3(c) to be generally mindful of the great difficulties that a developing country Member may, in a particular
case, face as it proceeds to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”
Contudo, esse tratamento diferenciado compreendido nas decisões anteriores não vigorou quando o painel
enfrentou um caso em que ambos os países envolvidos eram países em desenvolvimento. Foi o caso Chile Price Band System, em que a outra parte envolvida era a Argentina. Neste caso, o painel entendeu que não era
devida a aplição da conclusão proposta em Chile - Alcoholic beverages, pois ambos, demandante e
demandado, eram membros em desenvolvimento e, nesse sentido, concluiu que dadas as “circunstâncias
incomuns” do caso, daria particular atenção ao critério de “país em desenvolvimento”, não para determinar o
período mais curto ou mais longo para a implementação, e sim ao que fosse efetivamente considerado como
“razoável”, tendo em vista que a matéria afetaria os interesses de ambos.
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Relatório do painel nos caso Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile - Alcoholic Beverages),
Demandante: CE, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS110/14, paras. 55-56
Paras. 55-56. “I agree with the following statement by the arbitrator in Chile - Alcoholic Beverages that ‘an
arbitrator functioning under Article 21.3(c) [must] be generally mindful of the great difficulties that a
developing country Member may, in a particular case, face as it proceeds to implement the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB.’ This arbitration is, however, the first arbitration under Article 21.3(c) to include
developing countries as both complainant and respondent. The period of time for implementation of the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case is thus a ‘matter [ ] affecting the interests’ of both
Members: the general difficulties facing Chile as a developing country in revising its longstanding PBS, and
the burden imposed on Argentina as a developing country whose access to the Chilean agricultural market is
impeded by the PBS, contrary to WTO rules.”
Finalmente, o caso US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) abrangeu a terceira hipótese de aplicação combinada
dos artigos 21.2 e 21.3(c), em que o painel teve de enfrentar vários membros em desenvolvimento como
demandantes, e um membro desenvolvido como demandado. Nesse caso, o painel concluiu que o período
razoável de tempo deveria ser o menor período possível, dentro do sistema legal de um membro e, diante
disso, o painelista não conseguiu determinar quais seriam os efeitos deste menor tempo possível no sistema
legal dos EUA, para os diversos membros em desenvolvimento demandados.
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Continued and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US - Offset Act)
(Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, República da
Coreia e Tailândia, WT/DS217/14; e Demandantes: Canadá e México, WT/DS234/22, para. 81
Para. 81. “I am, furthermore, mindful of my obligation, pursuant to Article 21.2, to pay ‘particular attention
… to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members’. I note that, by its wording, Article 21.2
does not distinguish between situations where the developing country Member concerned is an implementing
or a complaining party. However, I also note that the Complaining Parties have not explained specifically how
developing country Members’ interests should affect my determination of the reasonable period of time for
implementation. It is useful to recall, once again, that the term ‘reasonable period of time’ has been
consistently interpreted to signify the ‘shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member’.
Therefore, I have some difficulty in seeing how the fact that several Complaining Parties are developing
country Members should have an effect on the determination of the shortest period possible within the legal
system of the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case.”
3.
Artigo 21.3
a) “Mandato do painelista”
A matéria é abordada nas decisões do DSB, apenas para reforçar a função do painelista para designar o
período razoável de tempo na implementação dos relatórios do painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação. Nesse
sentido, o painelista salientou que não é de sua competência determinar o modus operandi da implementação,
mas tão somente o prazo. Esse é o entendimento nos casos EC - Hormones e US - Hot-Rolled Steel.
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/5; e Canadá, WT/DS48/13, para. 38
Para. 38. “The Arbitrator defined his mandate in EC - Hormones (Article 21.3) as follows: “It is not within
my mandate under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, to suggest ways or means to the European Communities to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the Appellate Body Report and Panel Reports. My task is to
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determine the reasonable period of time within which implementation must be completed. Article 3.7 of the
DSU provides, in relevant part, that ‘the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to
secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of
any of the covered agreements’ (emphasis added). Although withdrawal of an inconsistent measure is the
preferred means of complying with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in a violation case, it is not
necessarily the only means of implementation consistent with the covered agreements. An implementing
Member, therefore, has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of implementation, as long as the
means chosen are consistent with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and with the covered
agreements.”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products
from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS184/13, para. 30
Para. 30. “In US - Hot-Rolled Steel (Article 21.3), “I do not believe that an arbitrator acting under Article
21.3(c) of the DSU is vested with jurisdiction to make any determination of the proper scope and content of
implementing legislation, and hence do not propose to deal with it. The degree of complexity of the
contemplated implementing legislation may be relevant for the arbitrator, to the extent that such complexity
bears upon the length of time that may reasonably be allocated to the enactment of such legislation. But the
proper scope and content of anticipated legislation are, in principle, left to the implementing WTO Member to
determine”.”
No mesmo sentido, o DSB reforçou o entendimento no caso Chile - Price Band System.
Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/138, para. 37
Para. 37. “The fact that an Article 21.3(c) arbitration focuses on the period of time for implementation,
however, does not render the substance of the implementation, that is, the precise means or manner of
implementation, immaterial from the perspective of the arbitrator. In fact, the more information that is known
about the details of the implementing measure, the greater the guidance to an arbitrator in selecting a
reasonable period of time, and the more likely that such period of time will fairly balance the legitimate needs
of the implementing Member against those of the complaining Member. Nevertheless, the arbitrator should
still avoid deciding what a Member must do for proper implementation (…).”
b) “Período razoável de tempo”
(i) Disponibilidade do período razoável de tempo
Neste tópico, os painéis avaliaram o que deveria efetivamente significar o “período razoável de tempo”, uma
vez não ser um período disponível incondicionalmente. Os painéis ressaltaram, ademais, que o princípio geral
vigente é o do “pronto cumprimento”, e que somente quando não for possível o imediato atendimento da
determinação do painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação, será concedido, a título excepcional, a prerrogativa de
cumprimento durante o período razoável de tempo arbitrado.
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Continued and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US - Offset Act)
(Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, indonésia, Japão, República da
Coreia, Tailândia, WT/DS217/14; e Demandantes: Canadá e México, WT/DS234/22 - ARB-2003-1/16,
para. 40
233
Para. 40. “The Arbitrator indicated that Article 21.3 “makes clear that ‘prompt compliance’, in principle,
implies ‘immediate [ ]’ compliance” and, accordingly deduced that a “‘reasonable period of time’ for
implementation is not available unconditionally to an implementing Member. Rather, an implementing
Member is entitled to a reasonable period of time for implementation only where, pursuant to Article 21.3, ‘it
is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings’ of the DSB.”
(ii) Conceito de razoabilidade
O Órgão de Apelação, em US - Hot-Rolled Steel, definiu o conceito de “razoabilidade”, não exatamente com
base no artigo 21.3(c), mas de modo semelhante à aplicação deste. O Órgão de Apelação analisou o “período
razoável” e o “tempo razoável”, definidos no artigo 6.8 do Acordo Antidumping e no parágrafo 1 do anexo II
daquele acordo. O Órgão de Apelação entendeu como razoável que a questão fosse examinada com um grau
de flexibilidade, em virtude de todas as circunstâncias que envolvem o caso em particular. Entendeu,
outrossim, que o que é considerado razoável em uma circunstância, pode não o ser ou ser menos razoável em
outra. Logo, o período razoável deve ser interpretado em consonância com as noções de flexibilidade e de
equilíbrio, inerentes ao princípio da razoabilidade e às particularidades de cada caso concreto.
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products
from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/13, paras. 25-26
Paras. 25-26. “(…) implies a degree of flexibility that involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a
particular case. What is ‘reasonable’ in one set of circumstances may prove to be less than ‘reasonable’ in
different circumstances. This suggests that what constitutes a reasonable period or a reasonable time under
Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, should be defined on a case-by-case basis, in the
light of the specific circumstances of each investigation. In sum, a ‘reasonable period’ must be interpreted
consistently with the notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of ‘reasonableness’,
and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular circumstances of each case. Although, in
the above excerpt, the Appellate Body dealt with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and not the DSU, the essence
of ‘reasonableness’ so articulated is, in my view, equally pertinent for an arbitrator faced with the task of
determining what constitutes ‘a reasonable period of time’ in the context of the DSU.”
c) “comprimento do período razoável de tempo”
Determina o dispositivo do artigo 21.3 (c) que o “período razoável de tempo” não pode exceder 15 meses da
data da adoção do relatório do painel ou do Órgão de Apelação. Com efeito, as decisões a seguir reafirmam tal
determinação:
(Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/5; e Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS48/13,
para. 25
Para. 25. “The Arbitrator on EC - Hormones (Article 21.3) considered that “the ordinary meaning of the
terms of Article 21.3(c) indicates that 15 months is a ‘guideline for the arbitrator’, and not a rule”.”
Relatório do painel no caso Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada Pharmaceutical Products), Demandante: CE, WT/DS114/13, para. 45
Para. 45. “In Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents (Article 21.3), the Arbitrator noted that “the 15-month period
is a ‘guideline’, and not an average, or usual, period. It is expressed also as a maximum period, subject only to
any ‘particular circumstances’ mentioned in the second sentence”.”
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Contudo, no caso EC - Bananas III, as CE solicitaram um período de 15 meses e uma semana, em virtude da
complexidade e dificuldade em emendar o então regime existente de importação de bananas. Os painelistas,
diante deste pedido entenderam que o período de 15 meses é uma diretriz, mas que pode ser encurtado ou
alongado se assim se fizer necessário, devido a circunstâncias particulares.
Relatório do painel caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/15,
para. 18
Para. 18. “When the ‘reasonable period of time’ is determined through binding arbitration, as provided for
under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, this provision states that a ‘guideline’ for the arbitrator should be that the
‘reasonable period of time’ should not exceed 15 months from the date of the adoption of a panel or Appellate
Body report. Article 21.3(c) of the DSU also provides, however, that the ‘reasonable period of time’ may be
shorter or longer than 15 months, depending upon the ‘particular circumstances.”
No caso EC - Hormones, o painel argumentou que a leitura do “período razoável de tempo”, contido no artigo
21.3(c), deveria ser feita em conjunto com o “pronto cumprimento”, determinado no artigo 21.1, e, nesse
sentido, o período razoável de tempo seria o “período mais curto possível” dentro do sistema legal do membro
para implementar as recomendações e decisões do DSB, mas ainda menor que 15 meses. Para reforçar o seu
entendimento, trouxe à baila outros dispositivos do DSU que ressaltam o caráter “imediato” da
implementação dos relatórios do painel e/ou do Órgão de Apelação.
(Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/5; e Demandante: e Canadá, WT/DS48/13,
paras. 25-26
Paras. 25-26. “The Arbitrator held, inter alia, that “when implementation can be effected by administrative
means, the reasonable period of time should be considerably shorter than 15 months”: “The ordinary meaning
of the terms of Article 21.3(c) indicates that 15 months is a ‘guideline for the arbitrator’, and not a rule. This
guideline is stated expressly to be that ‘the reasonable period of time … should not exceed 15 months from the
date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report’ (emphasis added). In other words, the 15-month
guideline is an outer limit or a maximum in the usual case. For example, when implementation can be effected
by administrative means, the reasonable period of time should be considerably shorter than 15 months.
However, the reasonable period of time could be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular
circumstances, as specified in Article 21.3(c). Article 21.3(c) also should be interpreted in its context and in
light of the object and purpose of the DSU. Relevant considerations in this respect include other provisions of
the DSU, including, in particular, Articles 21.1 and 3.3. Article 21.1 stipulates that: ‘Prompt compliance with
recommendations and rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members’ (emphasis added). Article 3.3 states: ‘The prompt settlement of situations in which a
Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are
being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO
and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members’ (emphasis added).
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word, ‘prompt’, as meaning ‘a. acting with alacrity; ready. b.
made, done, etc. readily or at once’. Read in context, it is clear that the reasonable period of time, as
determined under Article 21.3(c), should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the
Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. In the usual case, this should not be
greater than 15 months, but could also be less.”
d) “Procedimento legislativo normal versus procedimento legislativo extraordinário”
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O debate em torno do período razoável de tempo e da aplicação preferencial do período mais curto possível
ainda suscita uma interpretação que deve levar em consideração aspectos internos do processo legislativo dos
membros. No caso Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, o painel entendeu que o período de tempo razoável deveria
ser o período possível dentro do sistema legal do membro concernente, não devendo ser exigido do membro a
utilização de procedimentos legislativos extraordinários para cumprir com as recomendações e decisões do
DSB, em detrimento de seus procedimentos legislativos normais.
Relatório do painel no caso Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea - Alcoholic Beverages),
Demandante: EUA, WT/DS75/16; e CE, WT/DS84/14, para. 42
Para. 42. “Although the reasonable period of time should be the shortest period possible within the legal
system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, this does not require a
Member, in my view, to utilize an extraordinary legislative procedure, rather than the normal legislative
procedure, in every case. Taking into account all of the circumstances of the present case, I believe that it is
reasonable to allow Korea to follow its normal legislative procedure for the consideration and adoption of a
tax bill with budgetary implications, that is, to submit the proposed amendments to the next regular session of
the National Assembly. For the same reasons, I consider it reasonable that the new tax legislation should be
enacted by the National Assembly in the course of the next regular session, and promulgated by the President
before the end of this year.”
“Outro precedente do DSB acerca do período razoável de tempo”:
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Holled Steel Products
from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/13, para. 39
Para. 39. “In US - Hot-Rolled Steel (Article 21.3), the United States referred to the extensions of the
reasonable period of time agreed by the DSB in two previous disputes to take into account the adjournment of
the United States Congress’ legislative session, in order to support its position that the reasonable period of
time should be longer than ten months. The Arbitrator noted that, on both occasions, the complaining parties
had agreed to the extension and therefore did not consider that the actions of the DSB in those cases could
have “any precedential value”: “It appears to me that whether the actions of the DSB in those two instances
have any precedential value in respect of the present arbitration proceedings, is open to substantial debate.
The present proceedings have been precipitated precisely by the failure of the parties to the dispute to reach an
agreement on a reasonable period of time to comply under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU.”
e) “Ônus da prova”
Em alguns casos, o membro deve demonstrar que o “período razoável de tempo determinado” não atende às
demandas domésticas para cumprimento. Nos casos EC - Hormones e Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents, o
painel entendeu que o membro encarregado de implementar as medidas definidas nos relatórios, deve suportar
o ônus da prova, em uma demonstração de que a duração de qualquer período proposto para a implementação
é um “período razoável de tempo”.
(Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandantes: EUA, WT/DS26/5; e Canadá, WT/DS48/13, para. 26
Para. 26. “Based on the wording of Articles 21.3, and on the context provided in Articles 3.3, 21.1 and 21.4
of the DSU, I agree with the arbitrator in European Communities - Hormones that ‘the reasonable period of
time, as determined under Article 21.3(c), should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the
Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”
236
Relatório do painel no litígio Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada Pharmaceutical Products), Demandante: CE, WT/DS114/13, para. 47
Para. 47. “Moreover, as immediate compliance is clearly the preferred option under Article 21.3, it is, in my
view, for the implementing Member to bear the burden of proof in showing Para. 47. ‘[i]f it is impracticable
to comply immediately’ - that the duration of any proposed period of implementation, including its supposed
component steps, constitutes a ‘reasonable period of time’. And the longer the proposed period of
implementation, the greater this burden will be.”
(i) Exemplos de alteração do “período razoável de tempo” acordado pelas partes
Relatório do Painel no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of
Dairy Products (Canada - Dairy), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS103/10
Na disputa em questão, o Canadá informou ao Presidente do DSU sobre o alcance de acordo com a Nova
Zelândia e com os EUA, durante o período razoável de tempo para a implementação da decisão do DSB.
Minutas da Reunião do DSB (WT/DSB/M/90), no litígio United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign
Sales Corporation (US - FSC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS108/11
Com relação à disputa US - FSC, na reunião de 12 de outubro de 2000, o DSB acolheu o requerimento dos
EUA para modificar o período de tempo para o cumprimento.
Minutas da Reunião do DSU (WT/DSB/M/138), no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão,
WT/DS184/16
Com respeito ao caso US - Hot-Rolled Steel, na reunião de 5 de dezembro de 2002, o DSU acatou o pedido
dos EUA para modificar o periodo de tempo para o cumprimento.
(ii) Comprimento do “período razoável de tempo”, como determinado no artigo 21.3(c) da
arbitragem
Nos casos abaixo, aparece o comprimento do “período razoável de tempo”, cuja determinação foi efetuada
pelo painel sob o artigo 21.3(c):
WT/DS Nº
Short Title
Award Circulated
“Reasonable Period of
Time”
DS8 — EC DS10 —
Canada DS11 — US
Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II
15 months
DS18 — Canada
Australia — Salmon
DS26 — US DS48 —
Canada
EC — Hormones
DS27 — Ecuador,
EC — Bananas III
14 February 1997
(WT/DS8/15,
WT/DS10/15,
WT/DS11/13)
23 February 1999
(WT/DS18/9)
29 May 1998
(WT/DS26/15,
WT/DS48/13)
7 January 1998
237
8 months from 6
November 1998
15 months from 13
February 1998
From 25 September 1997
Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, US
DS54 — EC DS55 —
Japan DS59 — US DS64
— Japan
(WT/DS27/15)
to 1 January 1999
Indonesia — Autos
7 December 1998
12 months from 23 July
(WT/DS54/15,
1998
WT/DS55/14,
WT/DS59/13,
WT/DS64/12)
DS75 — EC DS84 — US
Korea — Alcoholic Beverages
4 June 1999 (WT/DS75/16, 11 months and 2 weeks,
WT/DS84/14)
that is, from 17 February
1999 to 31 January 2000
DS87 — EC DS110 —
Chile — Alcoholic Beverages
23 May 2000
not more than 14 months
EC 2001
(WT/DS87/15,
and 9 days from 12
WT/DS110/14)
January 2000, that is to
say, until 21 March
DS114 — EC
Canada — Pharmaceutical Patents
18 August 2000
6 months from adoption
(WT/DS114/13)
of report i.e. expiry date:
7 October 2000
DS136 — EC DS162 —
US — 1916 Act
28 February 2001
Japan
(WT/DS136/11,
of reports i.e. expiry date:
WT/DS162/14)
26 July 2001 Extended:
31 December 2001
DS139 — Japan DS142
Canada — Autos
4 October 2000
— EC
(WT/DS139/12,
WT/DS142/12)
19 February 2001
DS155 — EC
Argentina — Hides and Leather
31 August 2001
Not more than 12 months
(WT/DS155/10)
and 12 days i.e. expiry
date: 28 February 2002
DS160 — EC
US — Section 110 (5)Copyright Act
15 January 2001
(WT/DS160/12)
27 July 2001 Extended:
31 December 2001
DS170 — US
Canada — Patent Term
28 February 2001
(WT/DS170/10)
12 August 2001
DS184 — Japan
US — Hot-Rolled Steel
19 February 2002
15 months from 23
(WT/DS184/13)
August 2001 i.e. expiry
date: 23 November 2002
DS202 — Korea
US — Line Pipe
26 July 2002
Parties agreed on RPT
(WT/DS202/17)
and no award was issued.
DS207 — Argentina
Chile — Price Band System
17 March 2003
14 months i.e. expiry
(WT/DS207/13)
date: 23 December 2003
DS217 — Australia,
US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)
(WT/DS217/14,
13 June 2003 11 months
Brazil, Chile, EC, India,
WT/DS234/22)
i.e. expiry date: 27
Indonesia, Japan, Korea
December 2003
and Thailand DS234 —
Canada, Mexico
DS246 — India
EC — Tariff Preferences
20 September 2004
14 months, 11 days i.e.
(WT/DS246/14)
expiry date: 1 July 2005
DS264 — Canada
US — Softwood Lumber V
13 December 2004
Parties agreed on RPT
(WT/DS264/13)
and no award was issued
(iii) “Período razoável de tempo” e aplicação retroativa das medidas atacadas
238
O painel, no caso US - Section 129 (c)(1) URAA, entendeu que os membros não estão obrigados a suspender a
aplicação da medida ofendida ou prestar socorro a eventuais efeitos passados.
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Section 129(c)(1) of Uruguay Round Agreements Act (US Section 129(c)(1) URAA), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS221/R, paras. 3.90 e 3.93
Para. 3.90. “Nothing in Article 21.3 suggests that Members are obliged, during the course of the reasonable
period of time, to suspend application of the offending measure, much less to provide relief for past effects.
Rather, in the case of antidumping and countervailing duty measures, entries that take place during the
reasonable period of time may continue to be liable for the payment of duties (…).”
Para. 3.93. “When panels and the Appellate Body have been asked to make recommendations for retroactive
relief, they have rejected those requests, recognizing that a Member’s obligation under the DSU is to provide
prospective relief in the form of withdrawing a measure inconsistent with a WTO agreement, or bringing that
measure into conformity with the agreement by the end of the reasonable period of time. In the six years of
dispute settlement under the WTO agreements, no panel or the Appellate Body has ever suggested that
bringing a WTO-inconsistent antidumping or countervailing duty measure into conformity with a Member’s
WTO obligations requires the refund of antidumping or countervailing duties collected on merchandise that
entered prior to the date of implementation.”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (US Section 129(c)(1) URAA), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS221/R, para. 3.91
Para. 3.91. “The Panel on US - Section 129(c)(1) URAA also added that Articles 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU
confirm not only that a Member may maintain the WTO-inconsistent measure until the end of the reasonable
period of time for implementation, but also that neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or
other obligations are available to the complaining Member until the conclusion of that reasonable period of
time.”
f) “Exceção: subsídios proibidos”
No caso Brazil - Aircraft, o Órgão de Apelação definiu que as disposições do artigo 21.3 do DSU não são
relevantes na determinação do período de tempo, para sanar-se uma incompatibilidade com as disposições
relativas a subsídios proibidos.
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 192
Para. 192. “With respect to implementation of the recommendations or rulings of the DSB in a dispute
brought under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, there is a significant difference between the relevant rules and
procedures of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Article 4.7 of the SCM
Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of Article 21.3 of the DSU are not relevant in determining the period of
time for implementation of a finding of inconsistency with the prohibited subsidies provisions of Part II of the
SCM Agreement. Furthermore, we do not agree with Brazil that Article 4.12 of the SCM Agreement is
applicable in this situation. In our view, the Panel was correct in its reasoning and conclusion on this issue.
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, which is applicable to this case, stipulates a time-period. It states that a
subsidy must be withdrawn ‘without delay’. That is the recommendation the Panel made.”
4.
Artigo 21.5
239
a) “Geral”
(i) Função e escopo do artigo 21.5
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen) (21.5), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/AB/RW,
para. 79
O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o painel de implementação não se ocupa apenas de verificar se houve
alteração das medidas originais, mas reexamina integralmente o caso, com o fim de determinar se as medidas
de implementação são ou não compatíveis com os acordos da OMC.
Para. 79. “We addressed the function and scope of Article 21.5 proceedings for the first time in Canada Aircraft (Article 21.5, Brazil). There, we found that Article 21.5 panels are not merely called upon to assess
whether “measures taken to comply” implement specific “recommendations and rulings” adopted by the DSB
in the original dispute. (96) We explained there that the mandate of Article 21.5 panels is to examine either the
“existence” of “measures taken to comply” or, more frequently, the “consistency with a covered agreement” of
implementing measures. (97) This implies that an Article 21.5 panel is not confined to examining the
“measures taken to comply” from the perspective of the claims, arguments, and factual circumstances relating
to the measure that was the subject of the original proceedings. (98) Moreover, the relevant facts bearing upon
the “measure taken to comply” may be different from the facts relevant to the measure at issue in the original
proceedings. It is to be expected, therefore, that the claims, arguments, and factual circumstances relating to
the “measure taken to comply” will not, necessarily, be the same as those relating to the measure in the
original dispute. (99) Indeed, a complainant in Article 21.5 proceedings may well raise new claims, arguments,
and factual circumstances different from those raised in the original proceedings, because a “measure taken to
comply” may be inconsistent with WTO obligations in ways different from the original measure. In our view,
therefore, an Article 21.5 panel could not properly carry out its mandate to assess whether a “measure taken to
comply” is fully consistent with WTO obligations if it were precluded from examining claims additional to,
and different from, the claims raised in the original proceedings. (100)
(ii) Caráter obrigatório do procedimento do artigo 21.5
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), Demandante: CE, WT/DS320/AB/R; e Demandante:
Canadá, WT/DS321/AB/R, paras. 336 e 340
O Órgão de Apelação determinou o significado do caráter obrigatório do dispositivo do artigo 21.5. Diversas
possibilidades são oferecidas pelo DSU para a solução de uma controvérsia acerca da compatibilidade com os
acordos de medidas adotadas para cumprir um relatório do DSB. De todas elas, entretanto, apenas o painel do
artigo 21.5 é compulsório, no sentido de permitir uma decisão vinculante, sem a necessidade de consentimento
específico do membro vinculado.
Para. 336. “The opening clause of Article 21.5 specifies the types of disputes that fall within the scope of this
provision, that is, those involving a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement
of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The word “shall” in Article
21.5 indicates that such disagreements must be resolved through recourse to “these dispute settlement
procedures”. Read together with the second sentence of Article 21.5, “these dispute settlement procedures” do
not refer generally to all proceedings under the DSU, but specifically to the panel proceedings envisaged in
Article 21.5, in which the original panelists are preferred for the composition of the panel and in which the
time frame of the proceedings is shortened. In other words, Article 21.5 dictates that panel proceedings
240
pursuant to this provision are the procedures that must be followed for adjudicating the cause of action as
framed in its opening clause.”
Para. 340. “Certainly, parties to a dispute are not precluded from pursuing consensual or alternative means of
dispute settlement foreseen in the DSU. Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that “[a] solution mutually acceptable
to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.” To reach a
mutually acceptable solution, Members can engage in consultations or resort to mediation and good offices.
Moreover, Article 25 provides for arbitration as an alternative to panel proceedings for dispute resolution.
Consultations, mediation, good offices, and arbitration are, however, alternatives to compulsory adjudication
and require the consent of the parties. In the absence of such consent, they cannot lead to a binding decision.
Thus, it is important to distinguish between these consensual means of dispute resolution, which are always at
the Members' disposal, and adjudication through panel proceedings, which are compulsory. It is in this sense
that Article 21.5 is cast in obligatory language. In this dispute, it is clear that a mutually acceptable solution
was not reached and the European Communities decided to resort to adjudication. In addition, the parties to
this dispute were unable to agree on an arbitration procedure pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU. (101) The
issue before us, therefore, is which procedure must be followed when parties do not avail themselves of the
consensual and alternative means of dispute resolution provided in the DSU, and the dispute must proceed to
the adjudication phase.”
(iii) Possibilidade de renunciar ao direito de recorrer ao artigo 21.5
(EC - Bananas) (21.5), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 212
O Órgão de Apelação confirmou a possibilidade de renúncia ao painel sob o artigo 21.5, devendo esta ser
formulada em linguagem clara e não derivar automaticamente de uma solução mutuamente acordada. O Órgão
de Apelação não determinou outros requisitos, nem esclareceu quais seriam os efeitos de uma tal renúncia – se
implicaria, por exemplo, uma renúncia total aos painéis ou se apenas seria necessário iniciar novo painel,
cabendo então novo prazo razoável de tempo para cumprir o conteúdo do novo relatório.
Para. 212. “(…) Similarly, a mutually agreed solution pursuant to Article 3.7 may encompass an agreement
to forego the right to initiate compliance proceedings. Or it may provide for the suspension of the right of
recourse to Article 21.5 until the steps agreed upon in a mutually agreed solution have been implemented.
Yet, this need not always be so. We therefore do not consider that the mere agreement to a “solution”
necessarily implies that parties waive their right to have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the event
of a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with the covered agreements of a measure taken to
comply. Instead, we consider that there must be a clear indication in the agreement between the parties of a
relinquishment of the right to have recourse to Article 21.5. In our view, the Panel's requirement that the
Understandings must constitute a “positive solution and effective settlement” to the dispute in question to
preclude recourse to Article 21.5 proceedings was not a correct interpretation of what the DSU requires.”
b) “Momento de recurso ao artigo 21.5”
(i) Necessidade de recurso ao artigo 21.5 antes do recurso ao artigo 22.6 (questão do
“sequenciamento” entre os artigos 21.5 e 22.6)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from the
European Communities (US - Certain Products), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS165/AB/R, paras. 83 e 90-92
241
O Órgão de Apelação anulou uma afirmação do painel que solucionava a questão do “sequenciamento”. Tratase da incompatibilidade lógica entre a obrigação de solicitar retaliações rapidamente, 30 dias após a expiração
do prazo razoável de tempo, e a necessidade de um pronunciamento do painel sob o artigo 21.5, a respeito da
compatibilidade das novas medidas, como condição lógica ao pedido de retaliação. O painel havia afirmado a
possibilidade de o painel da retaliação – agindo nos termos do artigo 22.6 – determinar a existência de
cumprimento do relatório. Anulando essa determinação, o Órgão de Apelação devolveu a solução para a
possível antinomia aos membros. Na ausência de decisão coletiva, a questão vem sendo resolvida desde então
com acordos bilaterais ad hoc, entre demandante e demandado, dispondo sobre o sequenciamento a ser
adotado em cada caso específico.
Para. 90. “For these reasons, we conclude that the Panel erred by making the statements in paragraphs 6.121
to 6.126 of the Panel Report on the mandate of arbitrators appointed under Article 22.6 of the DSU.
Therefore, these statements by the Panel have no legal effect.”
Para. 91. “In coming to this conclusion, we are cognizant of the important systemic issue of the relationship
between Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU. As the United States correctly points out in its appellee's
submission, the terms of Articles 21.5 and 22 are not a “model of clarity” and the relationship between these
two provisions of the DSU has been the subject of intensive and extensive discussion among Members of the
WTO. (102) We note that, on 10 October 2000, eleven Members of the WTO presented a proposal in the
General Council to amend, inter alia, Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU.” (103)
Para. 92. “In so noting, we observe that it is certainly not the task of either panels or the Appellate Body to
amend the DSU or to adopt interpretations within the meaning of Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement. Only
WTO Members have the authority to amend the DSU or to adopt such interpretations. Pursuant to Article 3.2
of the DSU, the task of panels and the Appellate Body in the dispute settlement system of the WTO is “to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law.” (emphasis added) Determining what the rules and procedures of the DSU ought to be is not our
responsibility nor the responsibility of panels; it is clearly the responsibility solely of the Members of the
WTO.”
(ii) Possibilidade de recurso ao artigo 21.5 por qualquer das partes e a qualquer tempo
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS320/AB/R; e Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS321/AB/R, paras. 345 e 347
O Órgão de Apelação determinou que qualquer das partes em uma controvérsia pode, passado o “período
razoável de tempo”, recorrer ao painel sob o artigo 21.5 em busca da solução de uma controvérsia acerca da
ocorrência ou não do cumprimento do relatório inicial. O recurso ao artigo para solucionar essa controvérsia
pode ocorrer, inclusive, após aplicada a suspensão de concessões pelo membro prejudicado em razão da
violação.
Para. 345. “In sum, we consider that recourse to Article 21.5 panel proceedings is the proper course of action
within the procedural structure of the DSU in cases where, as in this dispute, a Member subject to the
suspension of concessions has taken an implementing measure and a disagreement arises as to whether “the
measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed” within the meaning of Article
22.8.”
242
Para. 347. “A disagreement as to the consistency with the WTO agreements of a measure taken to comply
arises from the existence of conflicting views: the original complainant's view that such a measure is
inconsistent with the WTO agreements or brings about only partial compliance, and the original respondent's
view that a measure is consistent with the WTO agreements and brings about full compliance with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings. Article 21.5 does not indicate which party may initiate proceedings under this
provision. Rather, the language of the provision is neutral on this matter, and it is open to either party to refer
the matter to an Article 21.5 panel to resolve this disagreement. The text of Article 21.5, therefore, leaves open
the possibility that either party to the original dispute may initiate the proceedings. Thus, contrary to the
European Communities' argument, the text of Article 21.5 does not preclude an original respondent from
initiating proceedings under that provision to obtain confirmation of the consistency with the WTO
agreements of its implementing measure.”
c) “As medidas destinadas a cumprir”
(i) Conceito de “medidas destinadas a cumprir”
para. 78
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a competência dos painéis (e do próprio Órgão de
Apelação) para estabelecer, independente das declarações das partes, quais medidas são “medidas destinadas a
cumprir” o relatório original, devendo essas, nos termos do artigo 21.5 serem integralmente examinadas pelo
painel de implementação.
Para. 78. “In examining whether India's claim under Article 3.5 relating to “other factors” was properly before
the Panel, we must first establish the appropriate subject-matter of Article 21.5 proceedings.”
“As in original dispute settlement proceedings, the “matter” in Article 21.5 proceedings consists of two
elements: the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint (that is, the claims). (104) If a
claim challenges a measure which is not a “measure taken to comply”, that claim cannot properly be raised in
Article 21.5 proceedings. We agree with the Panel that it is, ultimately, for an Article 21.5 panel - and not for
the complainant or the respondent - to determine which of the measures listed in the request for its
establishment are “measures taken to comply”. (105) Although the issue raised by India in this appeal relates
primarily to the scope of claims that may be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings, this issue is intertwined with
the question of which measures may be considered as “measures taken to comply” with the DSB rulings in
an original dispute.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
respect to certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber IV) (21.5), Demandante:
Canadá, WT/DS257/AB/RW, para. 77
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou os critérios a serem utilizados no momento do painel de
implementação para determinar se uma medida constitui uma “medida destinada a cumprir” o relatório
anterior. Esses critérios incluem a relação da medida a ser examinada com as “medidas destinadas a cumprir”
declaradas pelo membro, assim como com as recomendações e decisões do DSB. Para avaliá-los, o painel
deve examinar essa relação, o que pode exigir análise da natureza, tempo e efeitos das várias medidas em
questão.
243
Para. 77. “Taking account of all of the above, our interpretation of Article 21.5 of the DSU confirms that a
panel's mandate under Article 21.5 of the DSU is not necessarily limited to an examination of an implementing
Member's measure declared to be “taken to comply”. Such a declaration will always be relevant, but there are
additional criteria, identified above, that should be applied by a panel to determine whether or not it may also
examine other measures. Some measures with a particularly close relationship to the declared “measure taken
to comply”, and to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, may also be susceptible to review by a panel
acting under Article 21.5. Determining whether this is the case requires a panel to scrutinize these
relationships, which may, depending on the particular facts, call for an examination of the timing, nature, and
effects of the various measures. This also requires an Article 21.5 panel to examine the factual and legal
background against which a declared “measure taken to comply” is adopted. Only then is a panel in a position
to take a view as to whether there are sufficiently close links for it to characterize such an other measure as one
“taken to comply” and, consequently, to assess its consistency with the covered agreements in an Article 21.5
proceeding.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft
(Canada - Aircraft) (21.5), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS70/AB/RW, para. 36
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou as “medidas destinadas a cumprir” como sendo, em
princípio, distintas das medidas iniciais condenadas. A conclusão lógica dessa interpretação é que o painel não
está restrito em sua análise ao exame nas medidas condenadas pelo painel original.
Para. 36. “Proceedings under Article 21.5 do not concern just any measure of a Member of the WTO; rather,
Article 21.5 proceedings are limited to those “measures taken to comply with the recommendations and
rulings” of the DSB. In our view, the phrase “measures taken to comply” refers to measures which have been,
or which should be, adopted by a Member to bring about compliance with the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB. In principle, a measure which has been “taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings” of
the DSB will not be the same measure as the measure which was the subject of the original dispute, so that, in
principle, there would be two separate and distinct measures (106): the original measure which gave rise to the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and the “measures taken to comply” which are – or should be –
adopted to implement those recommendations and rulings. In these Article 21.5 proceedings, the measure at
issue is a new measure, the revised TPC programme, which became effective on 18 November 1999 and
which Canada presents as a “measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings” of the DSB.”
(ii) Escopo das “medidas destinadas a cumprir”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”
(US - FSC) (21.5 II), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/ASB/RW2, paras. 84 e 93
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a possibilidade de diversos procedimentos sob o artigo 21.5
ocorrerem em sequência, até o cumprimento da recomendação inicial. Também esclareceu sobre a
possibilidade do painel sob o artigo 21.5 analisar as “medidas destinadas a cumprir”, à luz de todas as
recomendações e decisões anteriores, certificando-se de que foi atingido o total cumprimento destas.
Para. 84. “As a result, if, in an Article 21.5 proceeding, a panel finds that the measure taken to comply with
the Article 4.7 recommendation made in the original proceedings does not achieve full withdrawal of the
prohibited subsidy - either because it leaves the entirety or part of the original prohibited subsidy in place, or
because it replaces that subsidy with another subsidy prohibited under the SCM Agreement - the implementing
Member continues to be under the obligation to achieve full withdrawal of the subsidy. The obligation to
comply with an Article 4.7 recommendation remains in effect, even if several proceedings under Article 21.5
become necessary, until the prohibited subsidy is fully withdrawn.”
244
Para. 93. “(…) The task of an Article 21.5 panel is to determine whether “measures taken to comply”
implement the “recommendations and rulings” adopted by the DSB in the original proceedings. (107) In doing
so, an Article 21.5 panel may examine either the “existence” of measures taken to comply with DSB
recommendations and rulings, or, when such measures exist, the “consistency” of those measures with the
covered agreements, or a combination of both in situations where the measures taken to comply, through
omissions or other deficiencies, may achieve only partial compliance. As we noted earlier, the text of Article
21.5 expressly links the “measures taken to comply” and the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. (108)
The determination of whether “measures taken to comply” challenged by the complaining party implement
fully, or only in part, the DSB recommendations and rulings requires a panel to examine all of the previous
DSB recommendations and rulings and the entire range of measures covered by them. (109) Hence, in
compliance proceedings, an Article 21.5 panel may have to examine whether the “measures taken to comply”
implement fully, or only partially, the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB.”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews
(US - Zeroing) (21.5), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/AB/RW, para. 160
No relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a interpretação do painel, de que toda a incompatibilidade entre
as políticas do membro e os Acordos deve cessar ao fim do “período razoável de tempo”. Isso significa que a
medida incompatível não pode mais ser aplicada, independente de os fatos sobre os quais a medida incide
terem ocorrido antes do fim do “período razoável de tempo”.
Para. 160. “(…) Thus, the Appellate Body has found that there may be circumstances where a WTO
Member's obligation to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB applies in respect of conduct
relating to imports that entered that Member's territory prior to the expiration of the reasonable period of time.
(110) Irrespective of the date on which the imports entered the territory of the implementing Member, the
WTO-inconsistencies must cease by the end of the reasonable period of time. There will not be full
compliance where the implementing Member fails to take action to rectify the WTO-inconsistent aspects of a
measure that remains in force after the end of the reasonable period of time. Likewise, actions taken by the
implementing Member after the end of the reasonable period of time must be WTO-consistent, even if those
actions are in respect of imports that entered the Member's territory before the end of the reasonable period of
time. Therefore, we agree with the Panel's statement that, “[i]f a measure found to be WTO-inconsistent is to
be applied after the expiry of the RPT, that measure must have been brought 'into conformity', irrespective of
the date of entry of the imports covered by that measure”. (111) Indeed, any conduct of the implementing
Member that was found to be WTO-inconsistent by the DSB must cease by the end of the reasonable period of
time. Otherwise, that Member would continue to act in a WTO-inconsistent manner after the end of the
reasonable period of time, contrary to Articles 3.7, 19.1, 21.1, 21.3, and 21.5 of the DSU.”
d) “Objeto do procedimento do artigo 21.5”
(i) Geral
paras. 78 e 98
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação confirma que medidas que não sejam “medidas destinadas a cumprir” o
relatório, não podem ser levadas para análise do painel de implementação. Também não é permitida, nessa
fase, a revisão de uma interpretação adotada pelo DSB no seu relatório inicial.
245
Para. 78. “(…) If a claim challenges a measure which is not a “measure taken to comply”, that claim cannot
properly be raised in Article 21.5 proceedings.”
Para. 98. “The Panel's ruling that India's claim under Article 3.5 relating to “other factors” was not properly
before it is also consistent with the object and purpose of the DSU. Article 3.3 provides that the
prompt settlement of disputes is “essential to the effective functioning of the WTO”. Article 21.5 advances the
purpose of achieving a prompt settlement of disputes by providing an expeditious procedure to establish
whether a Member has fully complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. (112) For that
purpose, an Article 21.5 panel is to complete its work within 90 days, whereas a panel in an origi112nal
dispute is to complete its work within 9 months of its establishment, or within 6 months of its composition. It
would be incompatible with the function and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system if a claim could
be reasserted in Article 21.5 proceedings after the original panel or the Appellate Body has made a finding that
the challenged aspect of the original measure is not inconsistent with WTO obligations, and that report has
been adopted by the DSB. At some point, disputes must be viewed as definitely settled by the WTO dispute
settlement system.”
(ii) Competência para verificar o cumprimento de decisões do painel original, mesmo quando
estas são desacompanhadas de recomendações, por dizerem respeito a uma medida expirada
Relatório do painel em Thailand - Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines
(Thailand - Cigarettes), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/371/R, para. 6.17
Nesta controvérsia, o painel interpretou a necessidade de uma recomendação para que uma questão possa ser
examinada no procedimento do artigo 21.5. Na interpretação do painel de implementação, a recomendação
seria desnecessária, visto que cabe, no pocedimento, examinar tanto recomendações quanto decisões do
relatório original. Assim, uma decisão sobre uma medida já expirada permite que, passado o período razoável
de tempo para a implementação, o painel de implementação examine a medida que retomar a violação,
podendo considerá-la como descumprimento das recomendações e decisões do painel original. Essa
interpretação não foi apelada e faz parte do relatório do DSB.
Para. 6.17. “We do not however find any language in the relevant provisions of Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU
indicating that an implementing Member's compliance obligation arises only from panels' recommendations.
Rather, most of the provisions relating to compliance obligations under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU refer to
both recommendations and rulings. (113) For example, Article 21.1 provides, “prompt compliance with
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members”. In our view, the scope of the compliance requirement under these provisions is
therefore broader than just “recommendations”. In any event, it is difficult to envision a situation where the
Philippines will a priori be precluded from resorting to the compliance proceedings with respect to any future
action taken by Thailand if it can be shown that such action is related to the Panel's findings on the
inconsistency of the concerned MRSP Notices with Thailand's obligations under Article III:2 of the GATT
1994. As noted in paragraphs 7.42 and 7.43 of the Interim Panel Report, previous panels considered it
necessary and important to make findings even with respect to measures that have expired at the time of
making such findings in certain situations. Among those are situations where a measure was still impairing
benefits accruing to a complaining Member or situations where there remained the prospect of reintroduction
of the measure, and thus making findings with respect to expired measures would contribute to resolving a
particular dispute. If only recommendations were to guarantee the complaining Member's right, as granted
under the DSU, to seek compliance proceedings, there would be no meaning in even making findings for
expired measures, which has not been the view of the Appellate Body and previous panels. (114) We also do
not believe that such an understanding would serve the spirit and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.”
246
(iii) Questões diferentes de ou adicionais àquelas invocadas no procedimento original
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing) (US - Zeroing) (21.5), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS294/AB/RW, paras. 423-427 e 432
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação delimita aspectos relevantes da competência do painel sob o artigo 21.5.
Este painel, portanto, pode examinar quaisquer “medidas destinadas a cumprir” o relatório original. Isso inclui
medidas que, já em vigor à época do relatório original, não tenham sido discutidas nesse relatório, desde que
tais medidas tenham sido retomadas e apresentem-se como componentes da “medida destinada a cumprir” o
relatório inicial. O fato de aquelas medidas não terem sido originalmente discutidas, não é impeditivo ao seu
exame como “medidas destinadas a cumprir”, nem gera presunção de sua compatibilidade com os acordos.
Para. 423. “The Panel relied on the panel report in US - Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products
(Article 21.5, EC) to find that the European Communities was precluded from raising in these Article 21.5
proceedings claims against an unchanged aspect of the original measure (the alleged arithmetical error), which
the European Communities could have made, but did not make, in the original proceedings. The panel in US Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5, EC) found that allowing a complaining
Member to make “a new claim on an aspect of the original measure that was never challenged and remained
unchanged” (115) would jeopardize the principles of fundamental fairness and due process, and that it would
be unfair to expose a responding Member to the possibility of a finding of violation on an aspect of the
original measure that it “was entitled to assume was consistent with its obligations under the relevant
agreement given the absence of a finding of violation in the original report.” (116)
Para. 424. “We disagree with the notion that a Member may be entitled to assume in Article 21.5 proceedings
that an aspect of a measure that was not challenged in the original proceedings is consistent with that
Member's obligations under the covered agreements. In US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews
(Article 21.5, Argentina), the Appellate Body held that, “[o]n the basis of the original panel's conclusions
[regarding the likelihood-of-dumping determination], the USDOC could not assume that its findings regarding
the alleged decline in the volume of imports were WTO-consistent” (117), as these concerned a different
aspect of the original measure. If certain claims against aspects of a measure were not decided on the merits in
the original proceedings, they are not covered by the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and, therefore,
a Member should not be entitled to assume that those aspects of the measure are consistent with the covered
agreements.”
Para. 425. “We recall that, in EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5, India), the Appellate Body found that a
complaining Member that has failed to make a prima facie case in the original proceedings regarding an
element of the measure that remained unchanged after implementation may not re-litigate the same claim with
respect to the unchanged element of the measure in the Article 21.5 proceedings where this unchanged element
is separable from the changed part of the implementation measure. (118) In US - Shrimp (Article 21.5,
Malaysia), the Appellate Body found that a complaining Member may not reassert the same claim against an
unchanged aspect of the measure that has been found to be WTO-consistent in the original proceedings.” (119)
Para. 426. “Referring to these two cases in US - Upland Cotton (Article 21.5, Brazil), the Appellate Body
observed that, “[b]ecause adopted panel and Appellate Body reports must be accepted by the parties to a
dispute, allowing a party in an Article 21.5 proceeding to re-argue a claim that has been decided in adopted
reports would indeed provide an unfair 'second chance' to that party.” (120) However, in US - Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5,
Brazil),
the
Appellate
Body
distinguished
the
claims
in
EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5, India) and US - Shrimp (Article 21.5, Malaysia) from those at issue in that
dispute, and found that allowing a complaining Member to make a case that it did not establish in the original
247
proceedings would not provide it with an unfair “second chance”, nor would it compromise the finality of the
DSB's recommendations and rulings.” (121)
Para. 427. “While claims in Article 21.5 proceedings cannot be used to re-open issues that were decided on
substance in the original proceedings, the unconditional acceptance of the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB by the parties to a dispute does not preclude raising new claims against measures taken to comply that
incorporate unchanged aspects of original measures that could have been made, but were not made, in the
original proceedings. We do not see how allowing such claims in Article 21.5 proceedings would “jeopardize
the principles of fundamental fairness and due process” (122), or how it would unfairly provide a “second
chance” (123) to the complaining Member, provided these new claims relate to a measure “taken to comply”
and do not re-argue claims that were decided in the original proceedings.”
Para. 432. “Thus, if we read the Appellate Body's statement in US - Upland Cotton (Article 21.5, Brazil)
together with its statement in Canada - Aircraft (Article 21.5, Brazil), it excludes, in principle, (“ordinarily”)
from Article 21.5 proceedings new claims that could have been pursued in the original proceedings, but not
new claims against a measure taken to comply - that is, in principle, a new and different measure. This is so
even where such a measure taken to comply incorporates components of the original measure that are
unchanged, but are not separable from other aspects of the measure taken to comply.”
(iv) Vinculação do painel sob o artigo 21.5 às determinações do painel original
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Investigation of the International Trade
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI) (21.5), Demandante: Canadá,
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação interpreta o caráter vinculante das decisões do painel original para o
painel de implementação. Este deve levar em conta o raciocínio do painel original, mas não está vinculado a
julgar da mesma forma as decisões de um órgão governamental, se o próprio órgão governamental alterou o
seu procedimento e as suas determinações, como uma medida destinada a cumprir os acordos.
Para. 102. “Article 21.5 of the DSU identifies the task of a panel operating pursuant to that provision as
resolving disagreements “as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of a measure taken to
comply with the recommendations and rulings” of the DSB. This task cannot be done in abstraction from the
measure that was the subject of the original proceedings. (124) The measure taken to comply in this case is the
Section 129 Determination. Although it is distinct from the original determination, the Section 129
Determination incorporates by reference many parts of the analysis in the original determination (125), and
retains and relies on much of the evidence collected in the original investigation. As explained in the Section
129 Determination, the USITC not only sought “to provide more explanation and reasoning for its decision”,
that is, to fill in the gaps that the original panel had found in the reasoning and explanation in the original
injury determination (126); it also re-opened the record and collected more information and evidence. (127)
Furthermore, Canada's claims under Articles 3.5 and 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.5
and 15.7 of the SCM Agreement required the Panel to review, inter alia, how the investigating authority
treated the totality of the factors and evidence considered, including the new elements. This involved review of
the USITC's analysis of how those factors and the various pieces of evidence interacted. In these
circumstances, we do not see why the Panel would be bound by the findings of the original panel.”
Para. 103. “This does not mean that a panel operating under Article 21.5 of the DSU should not take account
of the reasoning of an investigating authority in an original determination, or of the reasoning of the original
panel. Article 21.5 proceedings do not occur in isolation but are part of a “continuum of events”. (128) This is
a consequence of the mandate of an Article 21.5 panel, namely, to examine whether recommendations and
rulings from the original dispute have been implemented consistently with the covered agreements. When an
248
investigating authority making a redetermination provides different explanations of, or draws different
inferences from, specific pieces of evidence that were also before it in the original investigation, this may be
relevant to the assessment of whether its reasoning is adequate and based on positive evidence. Such
deviations from prior reasoning may raise questions about the objectivity of the authority's assessment of the
evidence or the credibility of its explanations. Similarly, doubts could arise about the objective nature of an
Article 21.5 panel's assessment if, on a specific issue, that panel were to deviate from the reasoning in the
original panel report in the absence of any change in the underlying evidence in the record and explanations
given by the investigating authority in a redetermination. (129) These concerns are not, however, based on the
binding effect of the adopted findings of the original panel.”
(v) Valor jurídico das sugestões efetuadas pelo painel original
Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas) (21.5 II), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU; (EC
- Bananas) (21.5), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, paras. 322-325
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação definiu o caráter não vinculante das sugestões do painel original para
o painel de implementação. Para este, importa o resultado da implementação - o cumprimento material dos
acordos – e não os meios utilizados. Assim, sugestões não vinculam o membro violador, - o qual pode tornar
suas medidas compatíveis com os acordos de outras formas além da sugerida -, nem vinculam o painel de
implementação, caso seguidas. A tarefa do painel de implentação permanece sendo o exame da totalidade das
“medidas destinadas a cumprir” para a verificação da conformidade com os acordos da OMC.
Para. 322. “Suggestions made pursuant to Article 19.1 are not in themselves the subject of review by a
compliance panel. Article 21.5 of the DSU only refers to “measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings” and not to measures taken to comply with suggestions issued pursuant to the
second sentence of Article 19.1. This confirms that an Article 21.5 panel's power of review is limited to the
assessment of the existence or consistency with the covered agreements of the measures taken to comply with
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Thus, what matters in Article 21.5 proceedings is whether the result
of implementation - whatever means are chosen - brings about substantive compliance with the DSB
recommendations and rulings. As the Panel noted, the conformity of the measures taken to comply with the
covered agreements will depend on whether actual implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings
has been achieved by the Member concerned. (130) Therefore, we agree with the Panel that the measures
actually taken by a Member to comply with DSB recommendations and rulings, whether or not they follow the
suggestions for implementation made in previous proceedings, are the subject matter of the challenge in
Article 21.5 proceedings.”
Para. 323. “We consider that suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may, if correctly and fully
implemented, lead to compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings. However, full compliance
with DSB rulings and WTO-consistency of the measures actually taken to comply cannot be presumed simply
because a Member declares that its measures taken to comply conform to a suggestion made under Article
19.1 of the DSU. As pointed out above, Article 21.5 proceedings focus on the measure actually taken to
comply, not the ways in which the Member could implement the recommendations and rulings. Following a
suggestion does not guarantee substantive compliance with the recommendations and rulings by the DSB.
Whether such compliance has been achieved needs to be determined through Article 21.5 proceedings. The
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report by the DSB makes the recommendations and rulings therein
binding upon the parties. As noted earlier, such adoption by the DSB does not make suggestions for
implementation binding upon the parties (especially, where, as in this case, the first Ecuador Article 21.5 panel
made several suggestions); nor does DSB adoption mean that actions taken to implement suggestions must be
presumed to be WTO-consistent or shielded from review in Article 21.5 proceedings.”
249
Para. 324. “We, therefore, agree with the Panel that Ecuador had the right to challenge before an Article 21.5
panel the European Communities' measure taken to comply, whether or not such measure implemented a
suggestion made by an earlier panel or the Appellate Body. The function of Article 21.5 proceedings is to
resolve disagreement over compliance. Even if the measure taken to comply conformed to a suggestion made,
this would not bar Ecuador from bringing Article 21.5 proceedings to determine whether the implementing
measure achieves full compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings. We do not consider that, as a
consequence of the DSB adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report containing a suggestion, the measure
implementing such a suggestion can be presumed to be WTO-consistent. (131) In our view, a DSU rule that
establishes a legal presumption of conformity should do so in clear and unambiguous terms. (132) Therefore,
we do not see how the terms in Article 19.1, second sentence, “imply” a legal presumption, particularly as this
provision has to be read in the context of Article 21.5, which entitles Members to the review of
implementation measures in compliance proceedings.”
Para. 325. “Suggestions made by panels or the Appellate Body may provide useful guidance and assistance to
Members and facilitate implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings, particularly in complex cases.
However, the fact that a Member has chosen to follow a suggestion does not create a presumption of
compliance in Article 21.5 proceedings. The fact that a Member has chosen to follow a suggestion is part of
the history and background of the measure at issue in Article 21.5 proceedings, but it should not in itself preempt a panel's assessment of compliance under Article 21.5. In our view, suggestions provide guidance, which
is necessarily prospective in nature and cannot, therefore, take account of all circumstances in which
implementation may occur.”
(v) Ônus da prova
* Caso de “defesas afirmativas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft) (21.5), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/RW, para. 66
Neste relatório, o Órgão de Apelação determinou a existência de “defesas afirmativas”, invocadas pela parte
demandada, após esta ter consentido ou ter sido demonstrado que uma medida é, em princípio, incompatível
com as disposições dos acordos da OMC. Defesas afirmativas constituem exceções a uma proibição geral, e
sua aplicabilidade exclui a ilicitude da medida. Cabe então ao demandado, que invoca a defesa afirmativa, o
ônus de provar que suas medidas se encaixam na exceção prevista.
Para . 66. “We recall that, before the original panel in Brazil - Aircraft, Brazil conceded that it had the burden
of proof in demonstrating its alleged “defence” under item (k). (133) However, in these Article 21.5
proceedings, Brazil argues that this burden of proof, under item (k), is on Canada. (134) In our view, the fact
that the measure at issue was “taken to comply” with the “recommendations and rulings” of the DSB does not
alter the allocation of the burden of proving Brazil's “defence” under item (k). In this respect, we note that
Brazil concedes that the revised PROEX measure is, in principle, prohibited under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement; yet Brazil asserts nonetheless that the PROEX measure is justified, under the first paragraph
of item (k). Thus, in our view, Brazil is, clearly, using item (k) to make an affirmative claim in its defence. In
United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, we said: “It is only
reasonable that the burden of establishing [an affirmative] defence should rest on the party asserting it.” (135)
As it is Brazil that is asserting this “defence” using item (k) in these proceedings, we agree with the Article
21.5 Panel that Brazil has the burden of proving that the revised PROEX is justified under the first paragraph
of item (k), including the burden of proving that payments under the revised PROEX are not ”used to secure a
material advantage in the field of export credit terms.”
* Impossibilidade de fundamentar decisões baseadas em evento futuro
250
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft
(Canada - Aircraft) (21.5), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS70/AB/RW, para. 38
Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação determinou que uma frase do painel, vinculando o cumprimento à
garantia de que uma medida futura não seria contrária aos acordos, não devia ser tomada literalmente, visto ser
impossível garantir os atos futuros de todos os agentes públicos.
Para. 38. “We add also that the examination of “measures taken to comply” is based on the relevant facts
proved, by the complainant, to the Article 21.5 panel, during the panel proceedings. Therefore, the “minimum
implementation standard” that the Article 21.5 Panel expressed and which, it said, was “effectively” agreed
between the parties, should be viewed with caution. (136) The Article 21.5 Panel said that Canada's
implementation should “'ensure' that future TPC assistance to the Canadian regional aircraft industry will not
be de facto contingent on export performance.” (137) (emphasis added) The use in this standard of the words
“ensure” and “future”, if taken too literally, might be read to mean that the Panel was seeking a strict guarantee
or absolute assurance as to the future application of the revised TPC programme. A standard which, if so read,
would, however, be very difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy since no one can predict how unknown
administrators would apply, in the unknowable future, even the most conscientiously crafted compliance
measure.”
(vi) Efeito do recurso ao artigo 21.5 que verifique o cumprimento dos acordos
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC Hormones Dispute (US - Continued Suspension), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,
WT/DS320/AB/R; (US - Continued Suspension), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS321/AB/R, paras. 355 e
367
O Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que uma decisão do painel, sob o artigo 21.5, que verifique o cumprimento
dos acordos, extingue ipso jure o direito à aplicação de contramedidas, visto ser este derivado de uma decisão
anterior do DSB, que verificou o descumprimento continuado dos acordos da OMC. Assim, um membro que
acredite ter cumprido os acordos por meio de uma medida, e que esteja sofrendo suspensão de concessões, em
razão de descumprimento anterior, tem interesse em recorrer ao artigo 21.5 com o fim de caracterizar o
cumprimento e fazer cessar a autorização para aplicação daquela suspensão.
Para. 355. “Such an approach is consistent with the requirements of Article 22.8 of the DSU. As noted above,
Article 22.8 provides certain resolutive conditions which, if met, render the suspension of concessions without
legal basis. The suspending Member and the implementing Member share the responsibility to ensure that the
suspension of concessions is applied only insofar as none of the conditions laid down in Article 22.8 are met.
Thus, both Members have an obligation to engage in a cooperative manner in WTO dispute settlement to
establish whether the suspension of concessions can continue or must be discontinued pursuant to Article 22.8.
Irrespective of who initiates the Article 21.5 panel proceedings, a finding of an Article 21.5 panel that the
implementing Member has removed the inconsistent measure means that one of the resolutive conditions in
Article 22.8 is met. This finding, once adopted by the DSB – the same body that authorized the suspension of
concessions – signifies that the inconsistency against which the suspension of concessions was authorized has
now been remedied. Thus, by operation of law (ipso jure), the suspension of concessions may no longer be
applied.”
Para. 367. “A finding that the implementing Member has achieved substantive compliance means that the first
resolutive condition in Article 22.8 has been met. Such a finding, adopted by the DSB as part of the Article
21.5 panel (and Appellate Body) report(s), would, by operation of law (ipso jure), result in the termination of
the DSB's authorization to suspend concessions. This result obtains irrespective of whether the Article 21.5
panel was initiated by the original respondent or by the original complainant. It does not depend on which
251
party initiates the Article 21.5 panel proceedings. Rather, the result depends on whether the Article 21.5 panel
confirms that the implementing Member has brought itself into substantive compliance, thereby triggering the
obligation to cease applying the suspension of concessions, as required by Article 22.8 of the DSU.”
III.
Comentários
O artigo 21.5 constitui uma das peças-chave do DSU. Por meio dele, cria-se um procedimento intermediário,
inexistente no mecanismo de solução de controvérsias do GATT, entre a verificação, pelos mecanismos
multilaterais, de que uma política viola os acordos e a autorização multilateral para suspender concessões e
outras obrigações. Assim, ao contrário de outros órgãos internacionais de adjudicação de controvérsias, cuja
competência se exaure com a emissão de uma sentença obrigatória, o DSU é competente para solucionar
controvérsias entre os membros relativas à implementação de suas conclusões e recomendações.
O artigo 21.5 pode ser acionado a qualquer momento após a passagem do prazo razoável de tempo para a
implementação de um relatório. A pedido de qualquer das partes do procedimento original, inicia-se novo
procedimento perante os órgãos adjudicantes da OMC, para examinar se as medidas tomadas pelo membro
condenado levaram à compatibilidade entre suas políticas e os acordos da OMC. Caso se verifique que não
houve cumprimento do relatório, o membro vencedor passa a poder solicitar do violador uma compensação
pelo prejuízo sofrido, e, na ausência desta, uma autorização para suspender concessões ou outras obrigações.
As seguidas interpretações dadas pelo DSB têm sempre reforçado o papel do sistema multilateral na solução
das controvérsias. Desde o relatório em Brazil - Aircraft, a referência aos “presentes procedimentos” tem
interpretado como compreendendo à possibilidade de apelação sem necessidade de acordo entre as partes. Em
US - Certos Produtos das CE, o Órgão de Apelação absteve-se de solucionar a questão do sequenciamento
entre os artigos 21.5 e 22.6, anulando a decisão do painel a respeito. Por outro lado, o Órgão de Apelação
confirmou que nenhuma medida de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações pode ser tomada com
base em declaração unilateral da parte prejudicada – ainda que vencedora no painel inicial – de que a outra
parte permanece descumprindo os acordos após a passagem do período razoável de tempo. Deve haver uma
determinação multilateral desse descumprimento continuado antes que compensações sejam devidas ou
qualquer medida possa ser tomada pela parte prejudicada.
A presunção se inverte uma vez caracterizado o descumprimento e iniciada a suspensão de concessões. Passa a
valer, na ausência de acordo, a última decisão multilateral - prevalecendo sobre a presunção de que os
membros cumprem de boa-fé os acordos. Em outras palavras, a mera declaração unilateral do membro de que
cessou a ilegalidade é insuficiente para obrigar a outra parte a interromper a suspensão de concessões.
Havendo desacordo entre as partes, prevalece a última interpretação obtida de acordo com as regras
multilaterais e, conforme decidido pelo Órgão de Apelação (EUA - Suspensão Continuada), qualquer das
partes está habilitada a recorrer ao DSB para solicitar um novo painel de implementação. Assim que um
relatório do painel sob o artigo 21.5 verificar que houve cumprimento, cessa ipso jure o direito da parte
inicialmente prejudicada de aplicar suspensão de concessões contra a Parte anteriormente violadora.
No mesmo sentido, de submeter as declarações unilaterais das partes ao controle multilateral, dá-se a
interpretação do termo “medidas destinadas a cumprir as recomendações e decisões”. As medidas examinadas
na fase de implementação não necessariamente serão as mesmas avaliadas inicialmente, nem é necessário que
haja relação jurídica entre estas e àquelas em direito interno. Tampouco, é conclusiva a declaração do membro
nesse sentido. Cabe aos órgãos adjudicantes, a partir da avaliação dos argumentos das partes; das medidas; dos
fatos iniciais; e dos termos das conclusões e recomendações do DSB: (i) determinar quais medidas tomadas
pelo membro, se as houver, constituem “medidas destinadas a cumprir as decisões e recomendações”; e (ii)
verificar se as novas medidas, examinadas em sua integralidade, são suficientes para produzir a
compatibilidade entre as políticas da parte e os acordos da OMC, e com isso o cumprimento material da
recomendação do DSB (relatórios do Órgão de Apelação em CE - Roupa de Cama e EUA - Madeira de
Coníferas do Canadá).
252
O limite da análise feita pelo painel e pelo Órgão de Apelação na fase de implementação é o objeto da
controvérsia inicial. Uma medida que não tenha sido contestada na fase inicial, ou que tenha então sido
considerada compatível com os acordos, não pode ser objeto de exame dos órgãos adjudicantes na fase de
implementação.
Finalmente, é preciso destacar a interpretação feita pelo Órgão de Apelação em CE - Bananas (21.5 II). Ao
determinar que, naquele caso específico, as partes não haviam renunciado ao direito de solicitar um painel de
implementação, o Órgão de Apelação afirmou a possibilidade de membros da OMC renunciarem, por meio de
manifestação expressa, à possibilidade de valer-se do artigo 21.5. Não foram fornecidos maiores detalhes,
entretanto, sobre os requisitos dessa renúncia – se seria necessário fazê-lo dentro de um procedimento interno
à OMC ou se bastaria um acordo posterior de direito internacional geral – nem sobre os seus efeitos. Uma
renúncia poderia dizer respeito ao uso do artigo 21.5 nums situação determinada, mas não está claro se ela
afetaria o direito do membro demandante de solicitar novo painel tendo por objeto a mesma medida.
FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 96: Appellate Body Report, Canada - Aircraft (Article 21.5, Brazil), para. 40.
Footnote 97: Ibid., paras. 40-41. The panels in EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, Ecuador), paras. 6.8-6.9 and Australia – Salmon
(Article 21.5, Canada), para. 7.10.9, reached essentially the same conclusion.
Footnote 98 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Aircraft (Article 21.5, Brazil), para. 41.
Footnote 99: Ibid.
Footnote 100: As we put it in Canada - Aircraft (Article 21.5, Brazil):
Indeed, the utility of the review envisaged under Article 21.5 of the DSU would be seriously undermined if a panel were restricted to
examining the new measure from the perspective of the claims, arguments and factual circumstances that related to the original
measure, because an Article 21.5 panel would then be unable to examine fully the “consistency with a covered agreement of the
measures taken to comply”, as required by Article 21.5 of the DSU. (Appellate Body Report, Canada - Aircraft (Article 21.5, Brazil),
para. 41. We defined the function of Article 21.5 proceedings in the same vein in our Report in US - Shrimp (Article 21.5, Malaysia)
para. 87.
Footnote 101: The European Communities alleges that it proposed to the United States to submit the dispute to arbitration under
Article 25 of the DSU, but the United States refused. (European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 62.
Footnote 102: United States' appellee's submission, para. 39 and footnote 85.
Footnote 103: WT/GC/W/410.
Footnote 104: Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, paras. 72 and 76, interpreting Article 7 of the DSU.
Footnote 105: The Panel stated in paragraph 6.17 of the Panel Report:
To the extent a party may have challenged, in a request for establishment of an Article 21.5 panel, measures which were not “taken to
comply” by the implementing Member, it is our view that a Panel may decline to address claims concerning such measures. (original
boldface)
In paragraphs 6.13 ff of the Panel Report, the Panel refers, in support of this interpretation, to the panel reports in Australia - Salmon
(Article 21.5, Canada), para. 7.10.22 and Australia - Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5, US), para. 6.4.
Footnote 106: We recognize that, where it is alleged that there exist no “measures taken to comply”, a panel may find that there is no
new measure.
Footnote 107: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5, Brazil), para. 40.
Footnote 108: See supra, para. 61.
Footnote 109: Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5, Canada), para. 68.
Footnote 110: We will henceforth refer to the respondent Member subject to the obligation to comply with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings as the “implementing Member”.
Footnote 111: Panel Report, para. 7.148.
Footnote 112: Panel Report, para. 6.45.
Footnote 113: See also Articles 21.3, 21.5, 21.6, and 22.2 of the DSU.
Footnote 114: Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, Ecuador II)/ EC - Bananas III (Article 21.5, US), paras. 261273; Panel Report, EC - Commercial Vessels, para. 8.4; Panel Report, Columbia - Ports of Entry, paras. 7.45-7.54.
Footnote 115: Panel Report, US - Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5, EC), para. 7.76.
Footnote 116: Panel Report, US - Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5, EC), para. 7.75. (footnote omitted)
Footnote 117: Appellate Body Report, US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5, Argentina), para. 150.
Footnote 118: See Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5, India), paras. 86 and 93.
Footnote 119: See Appellate Body Report, US - Shrimp (Article 21.5, Malaysia), para. 96.
Footnote 120: Appellate Body Report, US - Upland Cotton (Article 21.5, Brazil), para. 210. (footnote omitted)
Footnote 121: See Appellate Body Report, US - Upland Cotton (Article 21.5, Brazil), para. 210.
253
Footnote 122: Panel Report, US - Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5, EC), para. 7.75.
Footnote 123: See also Appellate Body Report, US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5, Argentina), para. 150.
Footnote 124: Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5, Canada), para. 68; Appellate Body Report, US – FSC
(Article 21.5, EC II), para. 61. The Appellate Body has already recognized certain circumstances in which the scope of proceedings
under Article 21.5 may be limited by the scope of the original proceedings. For example, a party cannot make the same claim of
inconsistency against the same measure (or component of a measure) in an Article 21.5 proceeding if the original panel and Appellate
Body found the measure to be consistent with the obligation at issue (Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5, Malaysia),
paras. 89-99), or if the original panel found that the complaining party had not made out its claim with respect to the measure (or
component of a measure). (Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5, India), paras. 92-93 and 99) Similarly, a party may
not, in proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, seek to have the Appellate Body “revisit the original panel report” when that report
was not appealed. (Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5, US), para. 78)
Footnote 125: At pages 6-7 of the Section 129 Determination, the USITC stated:
We adopt from the original Commission report our prior views and findings in their entirety regarding domestic like product, domestic
industry and related parties, use of publicly available information, conditions of competition, cross-cumulation, Maritime Provinces,
effects of subsidies or dumping, and consideration of the nature of the subsidy and its likely trade effects. (footnote omitted)
Footnote 126: Section 129 Determination, pp. 5-6 and footnote 20.
Footnote 127: Ibid., p. 4.
Footnote 128: Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5, US), para. 121.
Footnote 129: We would have concerns, for example, if an Article 21.5 panel were to see no problem in a particular inference drawn
by an investigating authority in a redetermination in circumstances where the original panel found that such inference lacked proper
support and the inference drawn in the redetermination was based on the same evidence and explained in the same way as in the
original determination.
Footnote 130: Ecuador Panel Report, para. 7.247.
Footnote 131: European Communities' appellant's submission, para. 90 (Ecuador).
Footnote 132: For example, Article 3.8 of the DSU, which establishes a legal presumption that a breach of WTO rules constitutes
nullification or impairment, does so in clear and unambiguous terms. Similarly, a legal presumption of conformity with the GATT
1994 is established in clear and unambiguous terms by Article 2.4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures for measures conforming to that Agreement.
Footnote 133: Original panel report, Brazil - Aircraft, supra, footnote 2, para. 7.17.
Footnote 134: Brazil's appellant's submission, paras. 60-61.
Footnote 135: WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, p. 16.
Footnote 136: Article 21.5 Panel Report, para. 5.12.
Footnote 137: Ibid.
254

Artigo 22
IA.
Article 22
Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions
22.1
Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures
available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable
period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations
is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the
covered agreements. Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered
agreements.
22.2
If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement
into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the
reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so
requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with
any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually
acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the
date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement
procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.
22.3
In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the
following principles and procedures:
(a)
the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or
other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate
Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment;
(b)
if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other
obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other
obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;
(c)
if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other
obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances
are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another
covered agreement;
(d)
in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account:
(i)
(ii)
the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate
Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance
of such trade to that party;
the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the
broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other
obligations;
255
(e)
if that party decides to request authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations
pursuant to subparagraphs (b) or (c), it shall state the reasons therefor in its request. At the
same time as the request is forwarded to the DSB, it also shall be forwarded to the relevant
Councils and also, in the case of a request pursuant to subparagraph (b), the relevant sectoral
bodies;
(f)
for purposes of this paragraph, “sector” means:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(g)
with respect to goods, all goods;
with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the current “Services
Sectoral Classification List” which identifies such sectors (138);
with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each of the categories of
intellectual property rights covered in Section 1, or Section 2, or Section 3, or
Section 4, or Section 5, or Section 6, or Section 7 of Part II, or the obligations under
Part III, or Part IV of the Agreement on TRIPS;
for purposes of this paragraph, “agreement” means:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
with respect to goods, the agreements listed in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement,
taken as a whole as well as the Plurilateral Trade Agreements in so far as the relevant
parties to the dispute are parties to these agreements;
with respect to services, the GATS;
with respect to intellectual property rights, the Agreement on TRIPS.
22.4
The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be
equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.
22.5
The DSB shall not authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations if a covered agreement
prohibits such suspension.
22.6
When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon request, shall grant authorization
to suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of
time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request. However, if the Member concerned
objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in
paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to
arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original panel, if members are available, or by
an arbitrator (139) appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed within 60 days after the
date of expiry of the reasonable period of time. Concessions or other obligations shall not be
suspended during the course of the arbitration.
22.7
The arbitrator (140) acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine the nature of the concessions or
other obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. The arbitrator may also determine if the
proposed suspension of concessions or other obligations is allowed under the covered agreement.
However, if the matter referred to arbitration includes a claim that the principles and procedures set
forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed, the arbitrator shall examine that claim. In the event the
arbitrator determines that those principles and procedures have not been followed, the complaining
party shall apply them consistent with paragraph 3. The parties shall accept the arbitrator’s decision as
final and the parties concerned shall not seek a second arbitration. The DSB shall be informed
promptly of the decision of the arbitrator and shall, upon request, grant authorization to suspend
256
concessions or other obligations where the request is consistent with the decision of the arbitrator,
unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.
22.8
The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until
such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the
Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or
impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached. In accordance with paragraph 6
of Article 21, the DSB shall continue to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted
recommendations or rulings, including those cases where compensation has been provided or
concessions or other obligations have been suspended but the recommendations to bring a measure
into conformity with the covered agreements have not been implemented.
22.9
The dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements may be invoked in respect of measures
affecting their observance taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of
a Member. When the DSB has ruled that a provision of a covered agreement has not been observed,
the responsible Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure its
observance. The provisions of the covered agreements and this Understanding relating to
compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been
possible to secure such observance. (141)
Footnote 138: The list in document MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies eleven sectors.
Footnote 139: The expression “arbitrator” shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group.
Footnote 140: The expression “arbitrator” shall be interpreted as refering either to an individual or a group or to the Members of the
original panel when serving in the capacity of arbitrator.
Footnote 141: Where the provisions of any covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local governments or
authorities within the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of such
covered agreement shall prevail.
IB.
Artigo 22
Compensação e Suspensão de Concessões
22.1
A compensação e a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações são medidas temporárias
disponíveis no caso de as recomendações e decisões não serem implementadas dentro de prazo
razoável. No entanto, nem a compensação nem a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações é
preferível à total implementação de uma recomendação com o objetivo de adaptar uma medida a um
acordo abrangido. A compensação é voluntária e, se concedida, deverá ser compatível com os acordos
abrangidos.
22.2
Se o membro afetado não adaptar a um acordo abrangido a medida considerada incompatível ou não
cumprir de outro modo as recomendações e decisões adotadas dentro do prazo razoável determinado
conforme o parágrafo 3 do Artigo 21, tal Membro deverá, se assim for solicitado, e em período não
superior à expiração do prazo razoável, entabular negociações com quaisquer das partes que hajam
recorrido ao procedimento de solução de controvérsias, tendo em vista a fixação de compensações
mutuamente satisfatórias. Se dentro dos 20 dias seguintes à data de expiração do prazo razoável não
se houver acordado uma compensação satisfatória, quaisquer das partes que hajam recorrido ao
procedimento de solução de controvérsias poderá solicitar autorização do OSC para suspender a
aplicação de concessões ou de outras obrigações decorrentes dos acordos abrangidos ao Membro
interessado.
22.3
Ao considerar quais concessões ou outras obrigações serão suspensas, a parte reclamante aplicará os
seguintes princípios e procedimentos:
257
(a)
o princípio geral é o de que a parte reclamante deverá procurar primeiramente suspender
concessões ou outras obrigações relativas ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(es) em que o grupo especial
ou Órgão de Apelação haja constatado uma infração ou outra anulação ou prejuízo;
(b)
se a parte considera impraticável ou ineficaz a suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações
relativas ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(es), poderá procurar suspender concessões ou outras
obrigações em outros setores abarcados pelo mesmo acordo abrangido;
(c)
se a parte considera que é impraticável ou ineficaz suspender concessões ou outras obrigações
relativas a outros setores abarcados pelo mesmo acordo abrangido, e que as circunstâncias são
suficientemente graves, poderá procurar suspender concessões ou outras obrigações
abarcadas por outro acordo abrangido;
(d)
ao aplicar os princípios acima, a parte deverá levar em consideração:
(i)
(ii)
(e)
se a parte decidir solicitar autorização para suspender concessões ou outras obrigações em
virtude do disposto nos subparágrafos (b) ou (c), deverá indicar em seu pedido as razões que a
fundamentam. O pedido deverá ser enviado simultaneamente ao OSC e aos Conselhos
correspondentes e também aos órgãos setoriais correspondentes, em caso de pedido baseado
no subparágrafo (b).
(f)
para efeito do presente parágrafo, entende-se por “setor”:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(g)
(ii)
(iii)
13
no que se refere a bens, todos os bens;
no que se refere a serviços, um setor principal dentre os que figuram na versão atual
da “Lista de Classificação Setorial dos Serviços”que identifica tais setores13;
no que concerne a direitos de propriedade intelectual relacionados com o comércio,
quaisquer das categorias de direito de propriedade intelectual compreendidas nas
secções 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ou 7 da Parte II, ou as obrigações da Parte III ou da Parte IV do
Acordo sobre TRIPS;
para efeito do presente parágrafo, entende-se por “acordo”:
(i)
22.4
o comércio no setor ou regido pelo acordo em que o grupo especial ou Órgão de
Apelação tenha constatado uma violação ou outra anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios,
e a importância que tal comércio tenha para a parte;
os elementos econômicos mais gerais relacionados com a anulação ou prejuízo e as
conseqüências econômicas mais gerais da suspensão de concessões ou outras
obrigações;
no que se refere a bens, os acordos enumerados no anexo 1A do Acordo Constitutivo
da OMC, tomados em conjunto, bem como os Acordos Comerciais Plurilaterais na
medida em que as partes em controvérsia sejam partes nesses acordos;
no que concerne a serviços, o GATS;
no que concerne a direitos de propriedade intelectual, o Acordo sobre TRIPS.
O grau da suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações autorizado pelo OSC deverá ser equivalente
ao grau de anulação ou prejuízo.
Na lista integrante do documento MTN.GNG/W/120 são identificados onze setores.
258
22.5
O OSC não deverá autorizar a suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações se o acordo abrangido
proíbe tal suspensão.
22.6
Quando ocorrer a situação descrita no parágrafo 2, o OSC, a pedido, poderá conceder autorização para
suspender concessões ou outras obrigações dentro de 30 dias seguintes à expiração do prazo razoável,
salvo se o OSC decidir por consenso rejeitar o pedido. No entanto, se o Membro afetado impugnar o
grau da suspensão proposto, ou sustentar que não foram observados os princípios e procedimentos
estabelecidos no parágrafo 3, no caso de uma parte reclamante haver solicitado autorização para
suspender concessões ou outras obrigações com base no disposto nos parágrafos 3 (b) ou 3 (c), a
questão será submetida a arbitragem. A arbitragem deverá ser efetuada pelo grupo especial que
inicialmente tratou do assunto, se os membros estiverem disponíveis, ou por um árbitro14 designado
pelo Diretor-Geral, e deverá ser completada dentro de 60 dias após a data de expiração do prazo
razoável. As concessões e outras obrigações não deverão ser suspensas durante o curso da arbitragem.
22.7
O árbitro15 que atuar conforme o parágrafo 6 não deverá examinar a natureza das concessões ou das
outras obrigações a serem suspensas, mas deverá determinar se o grau de tal suspensão é equivalente
ao grau de anulação ou prejuízo. O árbitro poderá ainda determinar se a proposta de suspensão de
concessões ou outras obrigações é autorizada pelo acordo abrangido. No entanto, se a questão
submetida à arbitragem inclui a reclamação de que não foram observados os princípios e
procedimentos definidos pelo parágrafo 3, o árbitro deverá examinar a reclamação. No caso de o
árbitro determinar que aqueles princípios e procedimentos não foram observados, a parte reclamante
os aplicará conforme o disposto no parágrafo 3. As partes deverão aceitar a decisão do árbitro como
definitiva e as partes envolvidas não deverão procurar uma segunda arbitragem. O OSC deverá ser
prontamente informado da decisão do árbitro e deverá, se solicitado, outorgar autorização para a
suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações quando a solicitação estiver conforme à decisão do
árbitro, salvo se o OSC decidir por consenso rejeitar a solicitação.
22.8
A suspensão de concessões ou outras obrigações deverá ser temporária e vigorar até que a medida
considerada incompatível com um acordo abrangido tenha sido suprimida, ou até que o Membro que
deva implementar as recomendações e decisões forneça uma solução para a anulação ou prejuízo dos
benefícios, ou até que uma solução mutuamente satisfatória seja encontrada. De acordo com o
estabelecido no parágrafo 6 do Artigo 21, o OSC deverá manter sob supervisão a implementação das
recomendações e decisões adotadas, incluindo os casos nos quais compensações foram efetuadas ou
concessões ou outras obrigações tenham sido suspensas mas não tenham sido aplicadas as
recomendações de adaptar uma medida aos acordos abrangidos.
22.9
As disposições de solução de controvérsias dos acordos abrangidos poderão ser invocadas com
respeito às medidas que afetem sua observância, tomadas por governos locais ou regionais ou por
autoridades dentro do território de um Membro. Quando o OSC tiver decidido que uma disposição de
um acordo abrangido não foi observada, o Membro responsável deverá tomar as medidas necessárias
que estejam a seu alcance para garantir sua observância. Nos casos em que tal observância não tenha
sido assegurada, serão aplicadas as disposições dos acordos abrangidos e do presente Entendimento
relativas à compensação e à suspensão de concessões e outras obrigações16.
14
Entende-se pela expressão “árbitro” indistintamente uma pessoa ou um grupo de pessoas.
Entende-se pela expressão “árbitro” indistintamente uma pessoa, um grupo de pessoas ou os membros do grupo especial que
inicialmente tratou do assunto, se atuarem na qualidade de árbitros.
16
Quando as disposições de qualquer acordo abrangido relativas às medidas adotadas pelos governos ou autoridades regionais ou
locais dentro do território de um Membro forem diferentes das enunciadas no presente parágrafo, prevalecerão as disposições do
acordo abrangido.
15
259
IC.
Nada a observar.
1.
Artigo 22.1
a) “Compensação e suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigacões, por ocasião da não
implementação das recomendacões e decisões do DSB dentro do período razoável de tempo”
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Agreements Act (US - Section 129(c)(1)URAA), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS221/R, para. 3.91
Em atenção aos artigos 22.1 e 22.2 do DSU, o painel confirmou a possibilidade ao membro interessado de
manter a medida considerada ilícita até o final do período razoável de tempo. Reiterou, ainda, a possibilidade
de negociação de compensações mutuamente aceitáveis ou de aplicação da suspensão de concessões ou de
outras obrigações após o encerramento do período razoável de tempo, caso a medida ilícita ainda não tenha
sido suprimida.
Para. 3.91. “Articles 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU confirm not only that a Member may maintain the
WTO-inconsistent measure until the end of the reasonable period of time for implementation, but also that
neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations are available to the complaining
Member until the conclusion of that reasonable period of time. Thus, the DSU imposes no obligation on
Members to cease application of the WTO-inconsistent measure on entries occurring prior to the end of the
reasonable period of time.”
- Exceção: Subsídios Proibidos
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircrafts (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 192
No litígio Brazil - Aircraft, o painel sob os artigos 22.6 do DSU e 4.11 do ASMC retrata a distição atribuída à
aplicação da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações no procedimento geral, regulamentado pelo
DSU, e no procedimento considerado especial, regulado pelo ASMC. Enquanto o artigo 21.3 do DSU autoriza
a concessão de um período razoável de tempo para a remoção da medida ilícita e cumprimento das demais
recomendações, o artigo 4.7 do ASMC determina a retirada “sem demora” (without delay) do subídio proibido
concedido.
Para. 192. “With respect to implementation of the recommendations or rulings of the DSB in a dispute
brought under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, there is a significant difference between the relevant rules and
procedures of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Article 4.7 of the SCM
Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of Article 21.3 of the DSU are not relevant in determining the period of
time for implementation of a finding of inconsistency with the prohibited subsidies provisions of Part II of the
SCM Agreement. Furthermore, we do not agree with Brazil that Article 4.12 of the SCM Agreement is
applicable in this situation. In our view, the Panel was correct in its reasoning and conclusion on this issue.
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, which is applicable to this case, stipulates a time-period. It states that a
subsidy must be withdrawn ‘without delay’. That is the recommendation the Panel made.”
b) “Reclamações em procedimentos de arbitragem ao amparo do artigo 21.5 do DSU”
260
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/RW, paras. 6.52,
6.45, 93 e 98
Em EC - Bed Linen (India), o Órgão de Apelação esclarece que as recomendações e conclusões estabelecidas
no relatório do painel, adotadas pelo DSB, mas não objeto de apelação, devem ser consideradas como
resolução final de uma, ou mais questões particulares contidas na reclamação proposta; da mesma forma e com
idêntica finalidade com que são adotadas as conclusões do Órgão de Apelação pelo DSB. De acordo com o
Órgão de Apelação, este posicionamento é amparado nos artigos 16.4, 19.1, 21.1, 21.3 e 22.1 do DSU, lidos
em conjunto. As recomendações aprovadas pelo DSB, também distinguem as funções exercidas pelo painel
original daquelas exercidas pelo painel de implementação sob o artigo 21.5 do DSU. O Órgão de Apelação
esclarece que a função do painel original consiste em apurar a existência de uma medida ilícita ou de prática
contrária aos acordos abrangidos, devendo o painel emitir relatório de análise no período de 9 meses a contar
do seu estabelecimento, ou de 6 meses a partir de sua composição. Por sua vez, o painel de implementação
deve apenas verificar o total cumprimento das recomendações e conclusões emitidas pelo painel original
aprovadas pelo DSB, em um período máximo de 90 dias.
Para. 6.52. “[A]n unappealed finding included in a panel report that is adopted by the DSB must be treated as
a final resolution to a dispute between the parties in respect of the particular claim and the specific
component of a measure that is the subject of that claim. This conclusion is supported by Articles 16.4 and
19.1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21, and Article 22.1 of the DSU. Where a panel concludes that a measure
is inconsistent with a covered agreement, that panel shall recommend, according to Article 19.1, that the
Member concerned bring that measure into conformity with that agreement. A panel report, including the
recommendations contained therein, shall be adopted by the DSB within the time period specified in Article
16.4 - unless appealed. Members are to comply with recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB
promptly, or within a reasonable period of time, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21 of the
DSU. A Member that does not comply with the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB within
these time periods must face the consequences set out in Article 22.1, relating to compensation and
suspension of concessions. Thus, a reading of Articles 16.4 and 19.1, paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 21, and
Article 22.1, taken together, makes it abundantly clear that a panel finding which is not appealed, and which is
included in a panel report adopted by the DSB, must be accepted by the parties as a final resolution to the
dispute between them, in the same way and with the same finality as a finding included in an Appellate Body
Report adopted by the DSB - with respect to the particular claim and the specific component of the measure
that is the subject of the claim.”
Para. 6.45. “The Panel’s ruling that India’s claim under Article 3.5 relating to ‘other factors’ was not properly
before it is also consistent with the object and purpose of the DSU. Article 3.3 provides that the prompt
settlement of disputes is ‘essential to the effective functioning of the WTO’. Article 21.5 advances the
purpose of achieving a prompt settlement of disputes by providing an expeditious procedure to establish
whether a Member has fully complied with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.”
Paras. 93 e 98. “For that purpose, an Article 21.5 panel is to complete its work within 90 days, whereas a
panel in an original dispute is to complete its work within 9 months of its establishment, or within 6 months of
its composition. It would be incompatible with the function and purpose of the WTO dispute settlement
system if a claim could be reasserted in Article 21.5 proceedings after the original panel or the Appellate
Body has made a finding that the challenged aspect of the original measure is not inconsistent with WTO
obligations, and that report has been adopted by the DSB. At some point, disputes must be viewed as
definitely settled by the WTO dispute settlement system.” (142)
c) “Natureza temporária e finalidade da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações”
261
Em EC - Bananas III (US) e US - 1916 Act (EC), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU confirma a natureza
temporária da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, mantida até que seja efetivamente alcançada a
implementação das recomendações e decisões do DSB. O painel sustentou que o papel da medida é “induzir o
cumprimento” das recomendações e decisões do DSB. Ressaltou ainda, a necessidade de haver “equivalência”
entre o montante da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível de anulação ou prejuízo de
benefícios, em conformidade com o artigo 22.4 do DSU, o que exclui eventual caráter punitivo atribuído à
medida.
Relatório do painel no litígio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB, para. 6.3
Para. 6.3. “The Arbitrators confirmed that the authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations is a
temporary measure pending full implementation by the Member concerned. They further agreed with the
United States “that this temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce
compliance”. However, the Arbitrators considered that “this purpose does not mean that the DSB should grant
authorization to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. In
our view, there is nothing in Article 22.1 of the DSU, let alone in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 22, that could
be read as a justification for countermeasures of a punitive nature.”
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante:
Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.4, 5.7 e 5.8
Para. 5.4. “The Arbitrators clarified that they were “not called upon to ‘provide a comprehensive list of the
purposes’ of the suspension of concessions or other obligations, or to ‘rank these purposes in some sort of
order of priority’.”
Para. 5.7. “Further to quoting the above awards, the Arbitrators agreed that “a fundamental objective of the
suspension of obligations is to induce compliance”. It emphasized that “[t]he fact that such suspension is
meant to be temporary - as indicated in Article 22.1 - is further evidence of this purpose”.”
Para. 5.8. “The Arbitrators further indicated that: “We also agree with the critically important point that the
concept of ‘equivalence’, as embodied in Article 22.4, means that obligations cannot be suspended in a
punitive manner. This means that in suspending certain obligations owed to the United States under the GATT
and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the European Communities cannot exceed the level of nullification or
impairment sustained by the European Communities as a result of the 1916 Act. We consider this further
below.”
Relatório do painel no litígio Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft
(Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees) Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS222/ABR, para. 3.105
Em Canada - Aircraft (Brazil), o painel sob os artigos 22.6 do DSU e 4.11 do ASMC confirmou a natureza
temporária da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, enquanto medida válida até que o membro
interessado cumpra as recomendações e decisões do DSB. Segundo o painel, o não cumprimento de tais
recomendações e decisões configura a única razão a legitimar a imposição da medida. O relatório, aprovado
pelo DSB, corrobora o entendimento manifestado em EC - Bananas quanto ao papel de “induzir o
cumprimento” exercido pela suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações.
Para. 3.105. “The Arbitrator considered that “Article 22.1 of the DSU is particularly clear as to the temporary
nature of suspensions of concessions or other obligations, pending compliance.” The Arbitrator further stated
that “[u]nder Article 22.1 of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, noncompliance is the very
262
event justifying the adoption of countermeasures.” Moreover, the Arbitrator noted that “(…) the EC Bananas Arbitrators, referring to [DSU Article 22.1], expressed the view that suspension of concessions or
other obligations was intended to induce compliance because it was temporary”.”
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd
Amendment) (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras.
6.2-6.3
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Brazil), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU filia-se ao entendimento de
que a finalidade da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações corresponde a “induzir o cumprimento”,
assim como inicialmente afirmado em EC - Bananas. Contudo, levanta a dúvida sobre se o montante
autorizado pelo DSB à medida exerce influência sobre a implementação, uma vez que há casos em que um
baixo valor autorizado à medida foi capaz de induzir o cumprimento; enquanto em outros, um valor elevado
não foi suficiente para ensejar o cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do DSB.
Para. 6.2. “[T]he DSU does not expressly explain the purpose behind the authorization of the suspension of
concessions or other obligations. On the one hand, the general obligation to comply with DSB
recommendations and rulings seems to imply that suspension of concessions or other obligations is intended
to induce compliance, as has been acknowledged by previous arbitrators. (143) However, exactly what may
induce compliance is likely to vary in each case, in the light of a number of factors including, but not limited
to, the level of suspension of obligations authorized.” (144)
Para. 6.3. “On the other hand, the requirement that the level of such suspensions remain equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment suffered by the complaining party seems to imply that suspension of
concessions or other obligations is only a means of obtaining some form of temporary compensation, even
when the negotiation of compensations has failed.”
d) “Relação entre os artigos 21.3 e 22.1 do DSU”
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS87/15 e WT/DS110/14, para. 40
Em Chile - Beverages (EC), o painel enfatizou que, embora o período razoável de tempo possa ser concluído
sem que a medida ilícita seja efetivamente suprimida, a total e efetiva implementação das recomendações e
decisões do DSB é, sem dúvida, preferível, nos termos do artigo 22.1 do DSU, à negociação de compensações
mutuamente satisfatórias ou à suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações.
Para. 40. “In assessing the duration of the reasonable period, the provisions of Article 22 of the DSU are also
noteworthy. Under Article 22.1, although ‘a reasonable period of time’ may have elapsed without compliance
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, neither compensation nor suspension of concessions or
other obligations is to be ‘preferred to full implementation’, by bringing the measure concerned into
conformity with WTO obligations. Thus, in fixing the reasonable period, I should take account of the fact that
full and effective implementation is ‘preferred’.”
2.
Artigo 22.2
a) “Recurso direto ao artigo 22 do DSU”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelacão no litígio United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations” (US - FSC), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/12, para. 9
263
Em US - FSC (European Communities), as partes em litígio concordaram que, na ausência de medidas
adotadas para cumprir, por parte do membro demandado, é lícito ao demandante requerer autorização ao DSB
para suspender concessões com base no artigo 22.2 do DSU, ou adotar contramedidas legitimadas no artigo
4.10 do ASMC, em se tratando de subsídios proibidos, sem recorrer anteriormente ao painel de arbitragem sob
o artigo 21.5 do DSU.
Para. 9. “Where there exist no measures taken to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings by the
end of the implementation period, the EC may request authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU and to adopt countermeasures pursuant to Article 4.10 of the
SCM Agreement, without having recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU.”
b) “Especificidade no requerimento para suspender concessões ou outras obrigacões”
(i) Critério da “especificidade” constante no artigo 6.2 do DSU
of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 20
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU entendeu que o padrão de especificidade
disposto no artigo 6.2 do DSU deve estar presente tanto na solicitação de aplicação da suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações, sob o artigo 22.2 do DSU, quanto no pedido de instauração do painel sob
o artigo 22.6 do DSU; uma vez que ambos os procedimentos possuem objetivos semelhantes. No entanto, o
padrão de especificidade não deverá ser adotado durante o procedimento arbitral, uma vez que este segue
metodologia distinta para o cálculo do nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios.
Para. 20. “The DSU does not explicitly provide that the specificity requirements, which are stipulated in
Article 6.2 for panel requests, apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration proceedings under Article 22. However,
we believe that requests for suspension under Article 22.2, as well as requests for a referral to arbitration
under Article 22.6, serve similar due process objectives as requests under Article 6.2. First, they give notice to
the other party and enable it to respond to the request for suspension or the request for arbitration,
respectively. Second, a request under Article 22.2 by a complaining party defines the jurisdiction of the DSB
in authorizing suspension by the complaining party. Likewise, a request for arbitration under Article 22.6
defines the terms of reference of the Arbitrators. Accordingly, we consider that the specificity standards,
which are well-established in WTO jurisprudence under Article 6.2, are relevant for requests for authorization
of suspension under Article 22.2, and for requests for referral of such matter to arbitration under Article 22.6,
as the case may be. They do, however, not apply to the document submitted during an arbitration proceeding,
setting out the methodology used for the calculation of the level of nullification or impairment.”
c) “Requerimentos de especificidade mínima”
As conclusões a seguir demarcam a relevância do nível indicado, quando do requerimento inicial (artigo 22.2
do DSU) de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, para compor os termos de referência e ensejar a
autorização do DSB com relação à imposição da medida. Nesse sentido, caso a suspensão incida sobre
concessões tarifárias, apenas os produtos constantes da lista anexada ao requermento inicial serão suspensos.
O entendimento predominante dos painéis sob o artigo 22.6 consiste na adoção do critério da “especificidade
mínima” no requerimento inicial de aplicação da medida. Sendo assim, tal solicitação deverá informar o nível
específico da suspensão de concessões pleiteada; e, o(s) acordo(s) ou setor(s) em que se pretende a incidência
da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, em atenção aos artigos 22.3 e 22.4 do DSU, e aos
princípios da segurança, previsibilidade e da busca por uma solução positiva para a demanda.
Relatório do painel no litígio European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products -
264
Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 16
Para. 16. “The authorization given by the DSB under Article 22.6 of the DSU is an authorization “to suspend
[the application to the Member concerned of] concessions or other obligations [under the covered
agreements]” (145) In our view, the limitations linked to this DSB authorisation are those set out in the
proposal made by the requesting Member on the basis of which the authorisation is granted. In the event tariff
concessions are to be suspended, only products that appear on the product list attached to the request for
suspension can be subject to suspension. This follows from the minimum requirements attached to a request to
suspend concessions or other obligations. They are, in our view: (1) the request must set out a specific level of
suspension, i.e. a level equivalent to the nullification and impairment caused by the WTO inconsistent
measure, pursuant to Article 22.4; and (2) the request must specify the agreement and sector(s) under which
concessions or other obligations would be suspended, pursuant to Article 22.3.” (146)
Para. 24. “[T]he level of suspension specified in Ecuador’s request under Article 22.2 is the relevant one and
defines the amount of requested suspension for purposes of this arbitration proceeding. Additional estimates
advanced by Ecuador in its methodology document and submissions were not addressed to the DSB and thus
cannot form part of the DSB’s referral of the matter to arbitration. Belated supplementary requests and
arguments concerning additional amounts of alleged nullification or impairment are, in our view, not
compatible with the minimum specificity requirements for such a request because they were not included in
Ecuador’s request for suspension under Article 22.2 of the DSB.”
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU destacou que os termos de referência sob a
sua apreciação são exatamente aqueles, especificados, quando do requerimento inicial de autorização para a
aplicação de suspensão de concessões (artigo 22.2 do DSU); o qual contém a indicação do(s) setor(s) e/ou
acordo(s) em relação ao(s) qual(s) pretende-se impor a suspensão de concessões.
Para. 29. “[T]he terms of reference of arbitrators, acting pursuant to Article 22.6, are limited to those
sector(s) and/or agreement(s) with respect to which suspension is specifically being requested from the DSB.
We thus consider Ecuador’s statement that it ‘reserves the right’ to suspend concessions under the GATT as
not compatible with the minimum requirements for requests under Article 22.2. Therefore, we conclude that
our terms of reference in this arbitration proceeding include only Ecuador’s requests for authorization of
suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to those specific sectors under the GATS and the
TRIPS Agreement that were unconditionally listed in its request under Article 22.2.”
d) “Concessões ou outras obrigações em relação aos acordos abrangidos”
(i) Concessões tarifárias
* Lista de produtos
Relatório do painel nos litígios European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
(EC - Bananas) (21.5), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, paras. 14, 23 e 16-19
Em EC - Hormones (US) (Canada), por sua vez, os EUA e o Canadá não anexaram uma lista, com a indicação
265
dos produtos, no pedido de autorização para suspender concessões. Ao manifestar-se, as CE, ora demandantes,
solicitaram aos painéis que procedessem ao cálculo do montante da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, para
que posteriormente fossem solicitadas as listas de produtos aos demandados, e, por fim, a avaliação da
equivalência pelo painel. No entanto, os árbitros declararam-se incapazes, devido à ausência de disposições a
respeito no DSU, e em atenção ao critério da “especificidade mínima”, acima descrito. Ademais, o painel
esclareceu que não detém competência para analisar a natureza das concessões ou de outras obrigações a
serem suspensas.
Para. 14. “The Arbitrators in both cases declared themselves “unable to follow the EC request” since “[n]o
support for this request can be found in the DSU”.” (147)
Para. 23. “d[id] not have jurisdiction to set a definite list of products that can be subject to suspension.” (148)
Paras. 16-19. “The authorization given by the DSB under Article 22.6 of the DSU is an authorization ‘to
suspend [the application to the Member concerned of] concessions or other obligations [under the covered
agreements]’. (149) In our view, the limitations linked to this DSB authorisation are those set out in the
proposal made by the requesting Member on the basis of which the authorisation is granted. In the event tariff
concessions are to be suspended, only products that appear on the product list attached to the request for
suspension can be subject to suspension. This follows from the minimum requirements attached to a request to
suspend concessions or other obligations. They are, in our view: (1) the request must set out a specific level of
suspension, i.e. a level equivalent to the nullification and impairment caused by the WTO inconsistent
measure, pursuant to Article 22.4 (150); and (2) the request must specify the agreement and sector(s) under
which concessions or other obligations would be suspended, pursuant to Article 22.3. (151)
Neither can support for the EC request be found in other provisions of Article 22 (…) In our view, the
determination of other aspects related to the suspension remain the prerogative of the Member requesting the
suspension. We note, in particular, that the Member in respect of whom concessions or other obligations
would be suspended, can object to ‘the level of suspension proposed’ (152) and that an arbitrator has to
‘determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment’.
(153) Arbitrators are explicitly prohibited from ‘examin[ing] the nature of the concessions or other
obligations to be suspended’. (154)
On these grounds, we cannot require that the US further specify the nature of the proposed suspension. As
agreed by all parties involved in this dispute, in case a proposal for suspension were to target, for example,
only biscuits with a 100 per cent tariff ad valorem, it would not be for the arbitrators to decide that, for
example, cheese and not biscuits should be targeted; that a 150 per cent tariff should be imposed instead of a
100 per cent tariff; or that tariff increases should be levied on a product weight basis, not ad valorem. All of
these are qualitative aspects of the proposed suspension touching upon the ‘nature’ of concessions to be
withdrawn. They fall outside the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.” (155)
Amendment) (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, para. 5.3
Contrariando o preceito da “especificidade mínima”, o painel em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Brazil),
entendeu ser devida a autorização ao Brasil, Canadá, Japão e República da Coreia para que indicassem, em
uma “lista final de produtos”, as tarifas adicionais a serem aplicadas à importação. O painel concluiu que o
Chile deveria notificar, anualmente, os produtos em que a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações
incidiria.
Para. 5.3. “The requesting parties (all but Mexico, i.e. Brazil, Canada, Chile, European Communities, India,
Japan and Korea) requested authorization to suspend tariff concessions and to be allowed to impose additional
266
import duties on a list of products originating in the United States. Since, in the case of the European
Communities’ request, the list of products was not “final”, the Arbitrator noted that the European
Communities “will notify the DSB every year, prior to the entry into force of a new level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations […] the list of products that will be subject to this measure.” (156)
e) “Suspensão de concessões pelo método carrossel”
Relatório do painel no litígio European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, paras. 22-23
Em EC - Hormones (US), embora o Representante Comercial dos EUA tenha declarado serem os EUA livres
para suspender concessões adotando o método “carossel”, os EUA comprometeram-se a não modificar os
produtos e o método seguido para a suspensão de concessões. O painel manifestou a sua falta de legitimidade
em definir a lista de produtos a serem suspensos, e reafirmou que, uma vez elaborada a lista e definido o
método de suspensão pelos EUA, tal lista e método deveriam cobrir o comércio dos produtos, no estrito
montante contido na lista, em respeito ao critério da equivalência entre o nível da suspensão de concessões e o
nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios verificado.
Para. 22. “As explained above, In EC - Hormones (US) (Article 22.6, EC), the European Communities
referred to statements made by the United States Trade Representative and submitted that the United States
claimed to be free to resort to a “carousel” type of suspension whereby the concessions and other obligations
subject to suspension would change every now and then, in particular in terms of product coverage. The
European Communities claimed that in so doing the United States would decide not only which concessions
or other obligations would be suspended, but also unilaterally would decide whether the level of such
suspension of concessions or other obligations was equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment
determined by arbitration. Replying to the questions by the Arbitrators, the United States submitted that
although nothing in the DSU prevented future changes to the list of products subject to suspension, the United
States had no intention of making such changes. The Arbitrators decided to “assume that the US - in good
faith and based upon this unilateral promise - will not implement the suspension of concessions in a ‘carousel’
manner” and that “therefore [they] d[id] not need to consider whether such an approach would require an
adjustment in the way in which the effect of an authorized suspension is calculated”.
Para. 23. “As explained above, (157) we do not have jurisdiction to set a definite list of products that can be
subject to suspension. It is for the US to draw up that list. In our view, it has to do so within the bounds of the
product list put before the DSB. We also agree with the EC that once this list is made or once the US has
defined a method of suspension, that list or method necessarily needs to cover trade in an amount not
exceeding (i.e. equivalent to or less than) the nullification and impairment we find. This matter of equivalence
is not one to be determined exclusively by the US. (158) The US has an obligation to ensure equivalence
pursuant to Article 22.4 of the DSU. (159) In its reply to our questions, the US submitted that it ‘will
scrupulously comply with the requirement that the level of suspension of concessions not exceed the level of
nullification or impairment to be found by the Arbitrator’ (160).”
f) “Litígios em que a suspensão de obrigações foi requerida”
Em Equador - Bananas III (Ecuador), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 esclareceu, com base no artigo 22.7 do DSU,
que não detém competência para examinar a natureza da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, e
sim para determinar se o nível da medida é “equivalente” ao grau de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios.
Recomendou ao Equador a solicitação ao DSB, sob o amparo do artigo 22.3(a) do DSU, da suspensão de
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concessões ou de outras obrigações, no mesmo setor em que foi constatada a infração, anulação ou prejuízo de
benefícios, e orientou sobre a necessidade de envio de uma lista anexa à solicitação ao DSB, com a indicação
dos produtos a serem suspensos. Por fim, o painel mencionou a possibilidade da suspensão de concessões
incidir em outro(s) setor(s) abarcado(s) pelo mesmo acordo da OMC, no caso em questão: o GATS; ou ainda,
o TRIPS, e desde que diante de uma circunstância suficientemente grave.
Para. 173. “Consequently, and consistent with past practice in arbitration proceedings under Article 22, (161)
we suggest to Ecuador to submit another request to the DSB for authorization of suspension of concessions or
other obligations consistent with our conclusions set out in the following paragraphs:
(a) Ecuador may request, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 22, and obtain
authorization by the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations of a level not
exceeding US$ 201.6 million per year which we have estimated to be equivalent within
the meaning of Article 22.4 to the level of nullification and impairment suffered by
Ecuador as a result of the WTO-inconsistent aspects of the EC import regime for
bananas.
(b) Ecuador may request, pursuant to subparagraph (a) of Article 22.3, and obtain
authorization by the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations under the GATT
concerning certain categories of goods in respect of which we have been persuaded that
suspension of concessions is effective and practicable. Notwithstanding the
requirement set forth in Article 22.7 that arbitrators “shall not examine the nature of the
concessions or other obligations to be suspended”, we note that in our view these
categories of goods do not include investment goods or primary goods used as inputs in
Ecuadorian manufacturing and processing industries, whereas these categories of goods
do include goods destined for final consumption by end-consumers in Ecuador. (162)
In making its request for suspension of concessions with respect to certain product
categories, we note that, consistent with past practice in arbitration proceedings under
Article 22, (163) Ecuador should submit to the DSB a list identifying the products with
respect to which it intends to implement such suspension once it is authorized.
(c) Ecuador may request, pursuant to subparagraph (a) of Article 22.3, and obtain
authorization by the DSB to suspend commitments under the GATS with respect to
“wholesale trade services” (CPC 622) in the principal sector of distribution services.
(d) To the extent that suspension requested under the GATT and the GATS, in
accordance with subparagraphs (b) and (c) above, is insufficient to reach the level of
nullification and impairment indicated in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, Ecuador
may request, pursuant to subparagraph (c) of Article 22.3, and obtain authorization by
the DSB to suspend its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement with respect to the
following sectors of that Agreement:
(i) Section 1: Copyright and related rights, Article 14 on “Protection of
performers, producers of phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting
organisations”;
(ii) Section 3: Geographical indications;
(iii) Section 4: Industrial designs.
Relatório do painel nos casos Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB/R; e Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional
Aircraft (Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS222/ARB/R, para. 4.1
Em Brazil - Aircrafts (Canada), o painel aceitou tanto a suspensão da de concessões tarifárias quanto a
suspensão de “obrigações”, incluindo, dentre as obrigações, aquelas sob o Acordo de Têxteis e Vestuário e sob
o Acordo sobre Procedimentos para o Licenciamento de Importações, por configurarem contramedidas
apropriadas, nos termos do artigo 4.10 do ASMC. Em Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees, o painel
também aceitou a suspensão da aplicação de obrigações sob o Acordo sobre Procedimentos de Licença de
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Importações.
Para. 4.1. “For the reasons set out above, the Arbitrators decide that, in the matter Brazil – Aircraft, the
suspension by Canada of the application to Brazil of tariff concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994,
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures covering trade in
a maximum amount of C$ 344.2 million per year would constitute appropriate countermeasures within the
meaning of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement.”
Amendment) (US - Offset Act of 2000) (Byrd Amendment), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS234/ARB/CAN,
paras. 1.4 e 5.2
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Canada), o México solicitou autorização ao DSB para suspender
“obrigações” dos EUA no setor de bens, e obteve a concordância do painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU, após a
constatação por este de que a suspensão a produtos originados dos EUA cobriria, em uma base anual, o valor
total de comércio, calculado com base em metodologia seguida pelo painel. Contrariando o critério da
“equivalência”, o Canadá, ora demandante, foi autorizado pelo DSB a aplicar medidas adicionais às
importações que excedessem os limites estabelecidos para produtos originários dos EUA, bem como a
suspender as “obrigações” sob o artigo VI do GATT 1994, artigos 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 e 12 do Acordo AntiDumping e artigos 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 e 22 do ASMC, com o intuito de determinar que o efeito do
dumping ou da concessão de subsídios a produtos norte-americanos estava causando ou ameaçando causar
dano à indústria doméstica, ou retardando materialmente o estabelecimento da indústria doméstica.
Para. 1.4. “On 16 January 2004, Mexico requested authorization from the DSB (164), under Article 22.2 of
the DSU, to suspend the application to the United States of obligations in the trade in goods sector.”
Para. 5.2. “Accordingly, we decide that the suspension by Canada of concessions or other obligations in the
form of: (a) the imposition of additional import duties above bound custom duties on products originating in
the United States; and (b) the suspension of the application of the obligations under Article VI of GATT 1994,
Articles 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Articles 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21 and 22 of the SCM Agreement to determine that the effect of dumping or subsidization of products from
the United States is to cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic injury, or is to retard
materially the establishment of a domestic industry; covering, on a yearly basis, a total value of trade not
exceeding, in US dollars, the amount resulting from the following equation: Amount of disbursements under
CDSOA for the most recent year for which data are available relating to anti-dumping or countervailing duties
paid on imports from Canada at that time, as published by the United States' authorities. multiplied by: 0.72
would be consistent with Article 22.4 of the DSU.”
g) “Quando as obrigações a serem suspensas devem ser específicas”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante:
Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 3.7 e 3.10-3.14
Em US - 1916 Act (European Communities), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU confirmou que a opção do
demandante por suspender “obrigações” ao invés de concessões tarifárias, não é sujeita à revisão por este
grupo de especialistas. Ao examinar se as CE haviam especificado as obrigações a serem suspensas, com
fulcro no artigo 22 do DSU, o painel concluiu que o artigo 22 não determina à parte solicitante da suspensão
de “obrigações”, que indique precisamente quais “obrigações” busca autorização do DSB para suspender;
distintamente da necessidade de especificidade exigida para os “produtos” em que pretende-se a aplicação da
medida. O painel constatou que, em solicitações de autorização para suspender concessões tarifárias ou
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obrigações relacionadas ao GATT 1947, os árbitros não exigiram a especificação das obrigações relacionadas
ao Acordo Geral. O que demonstra a aceitação, por parte do painel, de pedidos de suspensão de obrigações não
específicas, e a sua concordância com a escolha das obrigações a serem suspensas posteriormente à
autorização do DSB. Em sua conclusão, o painel corroborou o entendimento sobre a imprescindibilidade da
“equivalência” entre o montante da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível da anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios.
Para. 3.7. “We agree with the view advanced by both parties that the decision by the European Communities
to seek the suspension of “obligations” rather than tariff “concessions” is not subject to review by the
Arbitrators. (165) However, was the European Communities nevertheless obligated under Article 22 of the
DSU to specify precisely which “obligations” it seeks to suspend?”
Para. 3.10. “In our view, a party seeking to suspend obligations is not required, under Article 22 of the DSU,
to indicate precisely which ‘obligations’ it seeks authorization to suspend. Article 22.2 of the DSU states
simply that a party may request authorization from the DSB ‘to suspend the application to the Member
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.’ There is no requirement that the
requesting party identify exactly which obligations it wishes to suspend.”
Para. 3.11. “Moreover, we note that in previous cases, neither the arbitrators nor the DSB have required
requesting parties to enumerate which concessions or other obligations such Members were seeking to
suspend. For example, in Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6, Canada), the arbitrator
accepted, and the DSB authorized, the suspension by Brazil, inter alia, of ‘the application of obligations under
the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures relative to licensing requirements on imports from Canada.’
The Brazilian request did not indicate which ‘obligations’ under the Agreement on Import Licensing it wished
to suspend, nor did the arbitrators require such specificity. (166) In Brazil - Aircraft (Article 22.6, Brazil), the
arbitrators similarly did not object to the suspension by Canada of obligations under ‘the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.’ (167) In EC - Bananas III
(Ecuador) (Article 22.6, EC), the arbitrators indicated that the complainant could obtain authorization from
the DSB to suspend unspecified obligations ‘under the TRIPS Agreement’ with respect to certain sectors.”
(168)
Para. 3.12. “Moreover, even for requests seeking the suspension of tariff concessions ‘and related obligations
under the GATT 1994’ the arbitrators did not require specificity as to what these ‘related obligations’ were.”
(169)
Para. 3.13. “Thus, past practice indicates that arbitrators have accepted requests to suspend unspecified
‘obligations’. The DSB has granted authorization to suspend obligations, while allowing the requesting
Member to decide which particular obligations it would select to implement the authorization. We would
emphasize, however, that whatever discretion is granted to such a Member is subject to the requirement that
the level of suspension of obligations cannot exceed the level of nullification or impairment. We return to this
point below.”
Para. 3.14. “Therefore, we do not consider that the European Communities’ request to ‘suspend the
application of the obligations under GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to adopt an
equivalent regulation to the 1916 Act against imports from the United States’ can be considered as deficient
under Article 22 of the DSU for failing to specify which ‘obligations’ it seeks to suspend.”
3. Artigo 22.3
a) “Objetivo da revisão pelo painel com base no artigo 22.3 do DSB”
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Em EC - Bananas III (US), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU pondera que, em regra, o painel deve verificar
se a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações foi realizada no mesmo setor cuja infração, anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios foi constatado. Nesse sentido, configura exceção à regra do artigo 22.3(a), a incidência
da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações em outros setores abarcados pelo mesmo acordo, ou em
setores pertencentes a outros acordos abrangidos. Constitui tarefa do painel, portanto, examinar a ineficácia,
impossibilidade ou impraticabilidade alegada pelo demandante, para suspender concessões ou obrigações
no(s) mesmo(s) setor(s) ou acordo(s) afetado(s) pela anulação de direitos ou prejuízo de benefícios; e a
consequente aplicação da medida em outro(s) setor ou acordo(s), conforme preconizam os parágrafos (b) e (c)
do artigo 22.3.
Para. 3.7. “We believe that the basic rationale of these disciplines is to ensure that the suspension of
concessions or other obligations across sectors or across agreements (beyond those sectors or agreements
under which a panel or the Appellate Body has found violations) remains the exception and does not become
the rule. In our view, if Article 22.3 of the DSU is to be given full effect, the authority of Arbitrators to review
upon request whether the principles and procedures of subparagraphs (b) or (c) of that Article have been
followed must imply the Arbitrators’ competence to examine whether a request made under subparagraph (a)
should have been made — in full or in part — under subparagraphs (b) or (c). If the Arbitrators were deprived
of such an implied authority, the principles and procedures of Article 22.3 of the DSU could easily be
circumvented. If there were no review whatsoever with respect to requests for authorization to suspend
concessions made under subparagraph (a), Members might be tempted to always invoke that subparagraph in
order to escape multilateral surveillance of cross-sectoral suspension of concessions or other obligations, and
the disciplines of the other subparagraphs of Article 22.3 of the DSU might fall into disuse altogether.”
b) “Artigo 22.3(a): Princípio geral - o membro demandante deve, em primeiro lugar, buscar
suspender concessões ou outras obrigações em relação ao(s) mesmo(s) setor(s)”
Bananas (Equador - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 33
O princípio geral, disposto no artigo 22.3(a) do DSU, preconiza que a suspensão de concessões ou de outras
obrigações deve ser aplicada no(s) mesmo(s) setor(s) em que foi constatada a violação, anulação ou prejuízo
de benefícios.
Para. 33. “[W]e further recall the general principle set forth in Article 22.3(a) that suspension of concessions
or other obligations should be sought first with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or
Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment. Given this principle, it remains the
preferred option under Article 22.3 for Ecuador to request suspension of concessions under the GATT as one
of the same agreements where a violation was found, if it considers that such suspension could be applied in a
practicable and effective manner.”
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB, para. 3.10
Em EC - Bananas (US), as CE alegaram que, em litígios em que são constatadas violações ou anulação de
benefícios em mais de um setor, ou em mais de um acordo, as solicitações de autorização para a suspensão de
concessões devem ser proporcionais ao número ou ao nível de tais violações. No entanto, o painel esclareceu
que a regra geral estabelecida no artigo 22.3(a) dispõe que a suspensão de concessões deve ocorrer no mesmo
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setor, ou setores, em que a violação foi verificada, ficando a escolha a cargo do membro que solicita a
autorização ao DSB.
Para. 3.10. “We recall that subparagraph (a) of Article 22.3 of the DSU refers to the suspension of
‘concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate
Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment.’ We note that the words ‘same sector(s)’
include both the singular and the plural. The concept of ‘sector(s)’ is defined in subparagraph (f)(i) with
respect to goods as all goods, and in subparagraph (f)(ii) with respect to services as a principal sector
identified in the ‘Services Sectoral Classification List’. We, therefore, conclude that the United States has the
right to request the suspension of concessions in either of these two sectors, or in both, up to the overall level
of nullification or impairment suffered, if the inconsistencies with the EC’s obligations under the GATT and
the GATS found in the original dispute have not been removed fully in the EC’s revision of its regime. In this
case the ‘same sector(s)’ would be ‘all goods’ and the sector of ‘distribution services’, respectively. Our
conclusion, based on the ordinary meaning of Article 22.3(a), is also consistent with the fact that the findings
of violations under the GATT and the GATS in the original dispute were closely related and all concerned a
single import regime in respect of one product, i.e. bananas.”
c) “Artigo 22.3(b) e (c) - O membro demandante deve seguir os princípios e procedimentos da
praticabilidade / exequibilidade e da efetividade”
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 68, 70-73 e 76
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), as CE argumentaram que o Equador não havia demonstrado a razão pela qual
não seria “praticável” ou “efetivo” ao país suspender concessões inteiramente sob o GATT e/ou sob o GATS,
considerados pertencentes ao mesmo setor violado. Segundo o painel, o Equador não solicitou a suspensão de
concessões integralmente sob estes acordos, porque considerou não ser “praticável” ou “efetivo”, nos termos
do artigo 22.3(b) e (c). O Equador entendeu que as circunstâncias eram sérias o suficiente no setor comercial
de bananas e na sua economia como um todo, o que justificaria o pedido de suspensão de concessões em outro
setor.
Para. 68. “it did not request suspension entirely under the GATT and/or in service sectors under the GATS
other than distribution services because it considered that it would not be practicable or effective in the
meaning of Article 22.3(b) and (c) of the DSU, that circumstances in Ecuador’s bananas trade sector and the
economy on the whole are serious enough to justify suspension under another agreement, and that the
parameters in Article 22.3(d)(i)–(ii) corroborate this conclusion.”
(i) “praticável” / “exequível” e “efetivo”
O painel explicou que o termo “praticável” / “exequível” contém a conotação de “disponibilidade” e
“adequabilidade”, e relaciona-se ao conceito de “efetividade” (*). A “praticabilidade”, por sua vez, estaria
ligada à validade da aplicação prática da suspensão de concessões alternativa, assim como a sua adequação
para ser adotada em um caso específico. O termo “efetivo” é entendido como: “poder de fato”; “causar uma
forte impressão”; “causar um efeito ou resultado”. O painel sustentou que a imposição da medida per si seria
capaz de induzir o cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do DSB, induzindo a supressão da medida
ilícita e/ou o encontro de uma solução positiva à demanda, dentro do período razoável de tempo. Concluiu,
afirmando ser a “praticabilidade” e o critério da “efetividade” consistentes com o objetivo do artigo 22 do
DSU (reconhecido pela jurisprudência do DSB), consistente na indução ao cumprimento.
Para. 70. “Several of these issues require the party seeking suspension to consider whether an alternative
suspension with respect to the same sectors or agreements under which a violation was found is “not
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practicable or effective”. In this regard, we note that the ordinary meaning of “practicable” is “available or
useful in practice; able to be used” or “inclined or suited to action as opposed to speculation etc.” (170) In
other words, an examination of the “practicability” of an alternative suspension concerns the question whether
such an alternative is available for application in practice as well as suited for being used in a particular case.”
Para. 71. “To give an obvious example, suspension of commitments in service sub-sectors or in respect of
modes of service supply which a particular complaining party has not bound in its GATS Schedule is not
available for application in practice and thus cannot be considered as practicable. But also other case-specific
and country-specific situations may exist where suspension of concessions or other obligations in a particular
trade sector or area of WTO law may not be “practicable”.”
Para. 72. “In contrast, the term “effective” connotes “powerful in effect”, “making a strong impression”,
“having an effect or result”. (171) Therefore, the thrust of this criterion empowers the party seeking
suspension to ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and has the desired result, namely to induce
compliance by the Member which fails to bring WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with DSB
rulings within a reasonable period of time.”
O painel questionou a capacidade da medida de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, - uma vez
imposta por membros em desenvolvimento a membros desenvolvidos -, de induzir tais países ao cumprimento
das recomendações, devido ao grande desequilíbrio em termos de volume de comércio e de poder econômico
entre ambos. Conforme constatou o painel, em situações em que o demandante é altamente dependente das
importações do membro que incidiu na prática ilícita, a suspensão de concessões pode vir a causar prejuízos
ainda maiores à parte que a impõe. Constatou ainda, que mesmo em situações de equilíbrio econômico e de
poder entre as partes, a aplicação da suspensão de concessões sempre causará prejuízos a ambos os litigantes.
Nesse sentido, a escolha pelo demandante do setor e/ou acordo a incidir a medida, poderia significar uma
maneira de alcançar a “efetividade” almejada no artigo 22.3 do DSU.
Para. 73. “One may ask whether this objective may ever be achieved in a situation where a great imbalance in
terms of trade volume and economic power exists between the complaining party seeking suspension and the
other party which has failed to bring WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with WTO law. In such a
case, and in situations where the complaining party is highly dependent on imports from the other party, it
may happen that the suspension of certain concessions or certain other obligations entails more harmful
effects for the party seeking suspension than for the other party. (172) In these circumstances, a consideration
by the complaining party in which sector or under which agreement suspension may be expected to be least
harmful to itself would seem sufficient for us to find a consideration by the complaining party of the
effectiveness criterion to be consistent with the requirement to follow the principles and procedures set forth
in Article 22.3.”
Para. 76. “Our interpretation of the ‘practicability’ and ‘effectiveness’ criteria is consistent with the object
and purpose of Article 22 which is to induce compliance. If a complaining party seeking the DSB’s
authorization to suspend certain concessions or certain other obligations were required to select the
concessions or other obligations to be suspended in sectors or under agreements where such suspension would
be either not available in practice or would not be powerful in effect, the objective of inducing compliance
could not be accomplished and the enforcement mechanism of the WTO dispute settlement system could not
function properly.”
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 52
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o demandante sustentou ser sua prerrogativa decidir se é “praticável”/
“exequível” ou “efetivo” indicar o mesmo setor, outro setor ou outro acordo para a suspensão de concessões
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ou de outras obrigações. No entanto, o painel explicou que o termo “considerar” (consider), presente nos
subparágrafos “b” e “c” do artigo 22.3 do DSU, mesmo pressupondo uma certa margem de apreciação ao
demandante, na escolha do setor e/ou acordo a recair a suspensão de concessões, não exclui a revisão pelos
árbitros e a sua autoridade para julgar se o demandante considerou os fatos necessários objetivamente e se,
com base em tais fatos, poderia chegar à conclusão de que não foi praticável ou efetivo aplicar a suspensão de
concessões no mesmo setor e sob o(s) mesmo(s) acordo(s), ou sob outro acordo, tendo em vista a existência de
circunstâncias sérias o suficiente.
Para. 52. “It follows from the choice of the words ‘if that party considers’ in subparagraphs (b) and (c) that
these subparagraphs leave a certain margin of appreciation to the complaining party concerned in arriving at
its conclusions in respect of an evaluation of certain factual elements, i.e. of the practicability and
effectiveness of suspension within the same sector or under the same agreement and of the seriousness of
circumstances. However, it equally follows from the choice of the words ‘in considering what concessions or
other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures’ in the
chapeau of Article 22.3 that such margin of appreciation by the complaining party concerned is subject to
review by the Arbitrators. In our view, the margin of review by the Arbitrators implies the authority to
broadly judge whether the complaining party in question has considered the necessary facts objectively and
whether, on the basis of these facts, it could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that it was not practicable or
effective to seek suspension within the same sector under the same agreements, or only under another
agreement provided that the circumstances were serious enough.”
d) “Artigos 22.3 (b) e 22.3 (c) do DSU”
(i) Relação entre os artigos 22.3(a) e 22.3(c) do DSU
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 27, 30-31
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o demandante, além de solicitar a suspensão de concessões ou de outras
obrigações, sob os Acordos GATS e TRIPS, reservou a si o direito de suspender concessões tarifárias ou
outras obrigações sob o GATT 1994 (acordo infringido), em sendo “praticável” e “efetivo” fazê-lo. Ao avaliar
os pedidos, o painel observou uma inconsistência nas solicitações simultâneas sob os artigos 22.3(a) e 2.3(c),
ainda que realizadas em momentos distintos, pois uma solicitação de suspensão de concessões com base no
artigo 22.3(c) pressupõe não ser praticável ou efetivo impor suspensão de concessões ao mesmo setor; e, uma
solicitação fundada no artigo 22.3(a) subtende ser praticável e efetivo suspender concessões no mesmo setor.
Contudo, o painel não excluiu a possibilidade de seguir o requerimento do demandante, uma vez apreciado o
montante da suspensão de concessões, e verificado ser “praticável” e “efetivo” suspender parte das concessões
ou outras obrigações no(s) mesmo(s) setor(s) afetado(s); e, o restante das concessões ou obrigações em
outro(s) setor(s) sob o mesmo acordo, ou sob outro acordo. Contrariando tais observações, o painel arbitral
entendeu adquado seguir os termos de referência do procedimento arbitral, no qual foi requerida a suspensão
de concessões com base nos itens (b) e (c) do artigo 22.3, setores estes indicados de forma incondicional para a
suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações.
Para. 27. “The Arbitrators noted that Ecuador argued that, in addition to suspending concessions or other
obligations under the GATS and TRIPS Agreement, it “reserves the right to suspend tariff concessions or other
tariff obligations granted in the framework of the GATT 1994 in the event that these may be applied in a
practicable and effective manner”.”
Para. 30. “Even if Ecuador’s ‘reservation’ of a request for suspension under the GATT were permissible,
there would be a certain degree of inconsistency between making a request under Article 22.3(c) — implying
that suspension is not practicable or effective within the same sector under the same agreement or under
274
another agreement — and simultaneously making a request under Article 22.3(a) — which implies that
suspension is practicable and effective under the same sector. In this respect, we note that, although Ecuador
did not in fact make both requests at the very same point in time, if it were likely that the suspension of
concessions under the GATT could be applied in a practicable and effective manner, doubt would be cast on
Ecuador’s assertion that at present only suspension of obligations under other sectors and/or other agreements
within the meaning of Article 22.3(b-c) is practicable or effective in the case before us.”
Para. 31. “(…) we fail to see how it could be possible to suspend concessions or other obligations for a
particular amount of nullification or impairment under the same sector as that where a violation was found
(which implies that this is practicable and effective) and simultaneously for the same amount in another sector
or under a different agreement (which implies that suspension under the same sector (173) — or under a
different sector under the same agreement — is not practicable or effective). But we do not exclude the
possibility that, once a certain amount of nullification or impairment has been determined by the Arbitrators,
suspension may be practicable and effective under the same sector(s) where a violation has been found only
for part of that amount and that for the rest of this amount of suspension is practicable or effective only in
(an)other sector(s) under the same agreement or even only under another agreement.”
Para. 29. “[T]he terms of reference of arbitrators, acting pursuant to Article 22.6, are limited to those
sector(s) and/or agreement(s) with respect to which suspension is specifically being requested from the DSB.
We thus consider Ecuador’s statement that it ‘reserves the right’ to suspend concessions under the GATT as
not compatible with the minimum requirements for requests under Article 22.2. Therefore, we conclude that
our terms of reference in this arbitration proceeding include only Ecuador’s requests for authorization of
suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to those specific sectors under the GATS and the
TRIPS Agreement that were unconditionally listed in its request under Article 22.2.”
O panel ponderou que o termo “consider”, constante nos subparágrafos (b) e (c) presume uma certa margem
de apreciação. No entanto, nenhuma decisão tomada por um membro chegou a ser revisada por painel, para
apurar se o membro considerou “objetivamente os fatos necessários”.
Para. 52. “It follows from the choice of the words “if that party considers” in subparagraphs (b) and (c) that
these subparagraphs leave a certain margin of appreciation to the complaining party concerned in arriving at
its conclusions in respect of an evaluation of certain factual elements, i.e. of the practicability and
effectiveness of suspension within the same sector or under the same agreement and of the seriousness of
circumstances. However, it equally follows from the choice of the words “in considering what concessions or
other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures” in the
chapeau of Article 22.3 that such margin of appreciation by the complaining party concerned is subject to
review by the Arbitrators. In our view, the margin of review by the Arbitrators implies the authority to
broadly judge whether the complaining party in question has considered the necessary facts objectively and
whether, on the basis of these facts, it could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that it was not practicable or
effective to seek suspension within the same sector under the same agreements, or only under another
agreement provided that the circumstances were serious enough.”
275
4.
Artigo 22.4
a) “Objetivo da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o critério da equivalência”
A suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações é descrita no artigo 22.1 do DSU como uma medida de
natureza temporária, e cuja aplicação pode ser pleiteada ao DSB pelo membro prejudicado, diante do não
cumprimento das recomendações e decisões do DSB, dentro do período razoável de tempo. Embora o DSU
não verse sobre a finalidade da suspensão de concessões, o entendimento jurisprudencial predominante
sustenta ser “induzir o cumprimento”. Para tanto, faz-se necessário que o nível de anulação ou prejuízo de
benefícios seja “equivalente” ao montante da suspensão de concessões, a fim de que esta não assuma um
caráter punitivo.
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB, paras. 6.3 e 76
Para. 6.3. “this temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance”.
However, the Arbitrators considered that “this purpose does not mean that the DSB should grant authorization
to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. In our view,
there is nothing in Article 22.1 of the DSU, let alone in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 22, that could be read as
a justification for countermeasures of a punitive nature.”
Para. 76. “the object and purpose of Article 22 (…) is to induce compliance.”
Relatório do painel no caso Canada - Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft (Canada
- Aircraft), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS222/ABR, para. 3.105
Para. 3.105. “Article 22.1 of the DSU is particularly clear as to the temporary nature of suspensions of
concessions or other obligations, pending compliance.” The Arbitrator further stated that “[u]nder Article 22.1
of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, noncompliance is the very event justifying the adoption
of countermeasures.” Moreover, the Arbitrator noted that (…) “the EC - Bananas Arbitrators, referring to
[DSU Article 22.1], expressed the view that suspension of concessions or other obligations was intended to
induce compliance because it was temporary”.”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - Act of 1916), Demandante:
Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.4, 5.7 e 5.8
Para. 5.4. “Not called upon to ‘provide a comprehensive list of the purposes’ of the suspension of
concessions or other obligations, or to ‘rank these purposes in some sort of order of priority’.”
Para. 5.7. Further to quoting the above awards, the Arbitrators agreed that “a fundamental objective of the
suspension of obligations is to induce compliance”. It emphasized that “[t]he fact that such suspension is
meant to be temporary — as indicated in Article 22.1 — is further evidence of this purpose.”
Para. 5.8. “We also agree with the critically important point that the concept of ‘equivalence’, as embodied in
Article 22.4, means that obligations cannot be suspended in a punitive manner. This means that in suspending
certain obligations owed to the United States under the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the
European Communities cannot exceed the level of nullification or impairment sustained by the European
Communities as a result of the 1916 Act. We consider this further below.”
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd
Amendment) (US - Offset Act), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, para. 6.3
276
Para. 6.3. “The concept of ‘inducing compliance’ was first raised in the EC - Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6
— EC) arbitration and has been referred to since in other arbitrations. However, it is not expressly referred to
in any part of the DSU and we are not persuaded that the object and purpose of the DSU — or of the WTO
Agreement — would support an approach where the purpose of suspension of concessions or other
obligations pursuant to Article 22 would be exclusively to induce compliance. Having regard to Articles 3.7
and 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU as part of the context of Articles 22.4 and 22.7, we cannot exclude that inducing
compliance is part of the objectives behind suspension of concessions or other obligations, but at most it can
be only one of a number of purposes in authorizing the suspension of concessions or other obligations. By
relying on ‘inducing compliance’ as the benchmark for the selection of the most appropriate approach we also
run the risk of losing sight of the requirement of Article 22.4 that the level of suspension be equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment.” (174)
b) “O padrão de equivalência”
(i) A “equivalência” entre o nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível
da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 4.2 e 4.7-4.9
Em EC - Bananas (EUA), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU definiu a “equivalência”, em seu sentido
ordinário, como: “igual em valor, significado ou sentido, de mesmo efeito”, “de mesma posição ou função
relativa”, “correspondende a”, “igual em valor”, ou mesmo “algo equivalente ou virtualmente idêntico” (175);
e revelou a necessidade de mensurar ambas as variáveis, quais sejam: o nível da suspensão de concessões ou
de outras obrigações e o nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, a fim de verificar-se a equivalência entre
ambas.
Para. 4.2. “The Arbitrators considered that “this meaning connotes a correspondence, identity or balance
between two related levels, i.e. between the level of the concessions to be suspended, on the one hand, and the
level of the nullification or impairment, on the other.”
Para. 4.7. “In view of these considerations, it is our opinion that the concept of equivalence between the two
levels (i.e. of the proposed suspension and the nullification or impairment) remains a concept devoid of any
meaning if either of the two variables in our comparison between the proposed suspension and the
nullification or impairment would remain unknown. In essence, we would be left with the option to declare
the level of nullification or impairment to be tantamount to the proposed level of suspension, i.e. to equate one
variable in the equation with the other. To do that would mean that any proposed level of suspension would
necessarily be deemed equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment so equated. Or, we could resort to
the option of measuring the level of nullification or impairment on the basis of our findings in the original
dispute, as modified by the Appellate Body and adopted by the DSB. To do that would mean to ignore
altogether the undisputed fact that the European Communities has taken measures to revise its banana import
regime. That is certainly not the mandate that the DSB has entrusted to us.”
Para. 4.8. “Consequently, we cannot fulfil our task to assess the equivalence between the two levels before
we have reached a view on whether the revised EC regime is, in light of our and the Appellate Body’s
findings in the original dispute, fully WTO-consistent. It would be the WTO-inconsistency of the revised EC
regime that would be the root cause of any nullification or impairment suffered by the United States. Since the
level of the proposed suspension of concessions is to be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment,
logic dictates that our examination as Arbitrators focuses on that latter level before we will be in a position to
ascertain its equivalence to the level of the suspension of concessions proposed by the United States.” (176)
277
Para. 4.9. “In arriving at this conclusion, we are mindful of the DSB Chairman’s statement at the meeting of
29 January 1999 when the DSB decided to refer this matter to us in our capacity as Arbitrators: ‘There
remains the problem of how the Panel and the Arbitrators would coordinate their work, but as they will be the
same individuals, the reality is that they will find a logical way forward, in consultation with the parties. In
this way, the dispute settlement mechanisms of the DSU can be employed to resolve all of the remaining
issues in this dispute, while recognizing the right of both parties and respecting the integrity of the DSU.’”
Relatório do painel nos casos European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, para. 12
Em EC - Hormones (US), o painel considerou que quando os árbitros determinam que o nível da suspensão de
concessões ou de outras obrigações, proposto pelo demandante, não é equivalente ao atual nível de anulação
ou prejuízo de benefícios, tais painelistas são obrigados a mensurar o nível da suspensão de concessões
equivalente à tal anulação.
Para. 12. “There is (…) a difference between our task here and the task given to a panel. In the event we
decide that the US proposal is not WTO consistent, i.e. that the suggested amount is too high, we should not
end our examination the way panels do, namely by requesting the DSB to recommend that the measure be
brought into conformity with WTO obligations. Following the approach of the arbitrators in the Bananas case
— where the proposed amount of US$ 520 million was reduced to US$ 191.4 million — we would be called
upon to go further. In pursuit of the basic DSU objectives of prompt and positive settlement of disputes, we
would have to estimate the level of suspension we consider to be equivalent to the impairment suffered. This
is the essential task and responsibility conferred on the arbitrators in order to settle the dispute. In our view,
such approach is implicitly called for in Article 22.7 (…).” (177)
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 12-13
De forma semelhante, em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o painel procedeu ao recálculo do montante proposto
para a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, com o intuito de encontrar o padrão de equivalência
em relação à anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios decorrente da medida ilícita.
Para. 12. “[W]e note that, if we were to find the proposed amount … not to be equivalen, we would have to
estimate the level of suspension we consider to be equivalent to the nullification or impairment suffered by
Ecuador. This approach is consistent with Article 22.7 of the DSU which emphasizes the finality of the
arbitrators’ decision (…).”
Para. 13. “We recall that this approach was followed in the US/EC arbitration proceeding in EC - Bananas
III and the arbitration proceedings in EC - Hormones, where the arbitrators did not consider the proposed
amount of suspension as equivalent to the nullification or impairment suffered and recalculated that amount in
order to be able to render a final decision.” (178)
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd
Amendment) (US - Offset Act), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, paras. 4.20-4.21 e 4.24
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU examinou a possibilidade de
estabelecer para o cálculo do nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, uma fórmula
econômica a ser preenchida com os valores dos desembolsos anuais, realizados pelo demandado na prática
comercial inconsistente com os acordos da OMC. O cálculo, a partir dos valores fornecidos ano a ano,
resultaria em uma variação no nível da suspensão de concessões autorizada às partes em cada ano de
incidência na prática ilícita. Conforme explicou o painel, o artigo 22.4 apenas exige que o montante da
278
suspensão de concessões seja “equivalente” ao nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, não havendo
nenhuma disposição no artigo 22 do DSU que impeça a adoção de um montante variável de suspensão de
concessões, a ser ajustado caso o nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios varie. Assim, o nível fixo,
comumente determinado ao final do período razoável de tempo, poderia ser substituído por níveis calculados
ano a ano, conforme o valor despendido na prática comercial contrária aos acordos abrangidos.
Para. 4.20. “While we note that Article 22.4 refers to ‘the level’ (singular) of nullification or impairment and
to ‘the level’ (singular) of suspension of concessions or other obligations, we are not persuaded that these
terms impose an obligation to identify a single and enduring level of nullification or impairment. The
requirement of Article 22.4 is simply that the two levels be equivalent. As long as the two levels are
equivalent, we do not see any reason why these levels may not be adjusted from time to time, provided such
adjustments are justified and unpredictability is not increased as a result. In fact, we see no limitation in the
DSU to the possibility of providing for a variable level of suspension if the level of nullification or
impairment also varies.”
Para. 4.21. “Most previous arbitrators have established one single level of nullification or impairment at the
level that existed at the end of the reasonable period of time granted to the responding party to bring its
legislation into conformity. (179) We do not disagree that this approach is, in the large majority of cases, the
most appropriate. However, we do not read anything in Article 22 of the DSU that would preclude us from
following a different path if the circumstances of this case clearly required it.” (180)
Para. 4.24. “In adopting such a decision, the Arbitrator gave particular relevance to the circumstances of that
case, by considering that, under a variable level of suspension system, the respondent party “would control the
levers to make the actual level of suspension of concessions or other obligations go down”. The Arbitrator
remarked that while “in other arbitrations where the level of nullification or impairment was set once and for
all, the responding party could not influence the level of countermeasures applied to its trade, unless the
requesting party agreed to modify it, [i]n this case, the level of suspension of concessions will automatically
depend on the amount of disbursements made under the [WTO-inconsistent measure] in a given year. If this
amount decreases, so will the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that the Requesting
Parties will be entitled to impose. If no disbursements are made, the level of suspension will have to be
‘zero’.” (181)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, paras. 3.57-3.59
Em Brazil - Aircraft (Canada), ao discutir o pedido de autorização do Canadá ao DSB para adotar
contramedidas apropriadas, o painel sob os artigos 22.6 do DSU e 4.11 do ASMC, explicou que a relação entre
os artigos 4.11 do ASMC e 22.4 do DSU, questionada pelo Brasil, não é semelhante à relação entre a medida
de suspensão de concessões regulamentada nos artigos 22.1 e 22.2 do DSU e o padrão de equivalência
constante no artigo 22.4 do DSU. O painel caractarizou o artigo 4.11 do ASMC como regra especial ou
adicional em relação ao DSU. Esclareceu ainda, que o conceito de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios não
existe nos artigos 3 e 4 do ASMC, e que o princípio da efetividade será contrariado se as contramedidas
apropriadas forem necessariamente limitadas pelo nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios causados pelos
subsídios proibidos, tal qual ocorre regularmente na relação obrigatória de equivalência entre o montante da
suspensão de concessões e o nível da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios.
Para. 3.57. “We read the provisions of Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement as special or additional rules. In
accordance with the reasoning of the Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement, (182) we must read the
provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules in the SCM Agreement so as to give meaning to all
of them, except if there is a conflict or a difference. While we agree that in practice there may be situations
where countermeasures equivalent to the level of nullification of impairment will be appropriate, we recall
279
that the concept of nullification or impairment is absent from Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement. In that
framework, there is no legal obligation that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or other
obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.”
Para. 3.58. “On the contrary, requiring that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or
other obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment would be contrary to the principle of
effectiveness by significantly limiting the efficacy of countermeasures in the case of prohibited subsidies.
Indeed, as shown in the present case, (183) other countermeasures than suspension of concessions or
obligations may not always be feasible because of their potential effects on other Members. This would be the
case of a counter-subsidy granted in a sector where other Members than the parties compete with the products
of the parties. In such a case, the Member taking the countermeasure may not be in a position to induce
compliance.”
Para. 3.59. “We are mindful that our interpretation may, at a first glance, seem to cause some risk of
disproportionality in case of multiple complainants. However, in such a case, the arbitrator could allocate the
amount of appropriate countermeasures among the complainants in proportion to their trade in the product
concerned. The ‘inducing’ effect would most probably be very similar.”
(ii) equivalência quantitativa
Relatório do painel nos casos European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB; e Demandante: Canadá,
WT/DS48/ARB, paras. 18 e 20
Na mesma linha de entendimento, em EC - Hormones (US)(Canada), o painel explicou que é sua função
determinar se o nível da suspensão de concessões é “equivalente” ao nível da anulação ou prejuízo de
benefícios verificado. Esclareceu ainda, que o painel está expressamente proibido de examinar a natureza das
concessões ou de outras obrigações a serem suspensas. Na concepção dos painelistas, o próprio painel deve ser
apto a apurar os níveis da suspensão de concessões e anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, de modo quantitativo,
para que a equivalência entre as duas variáveis possa ser dimencionada com precisão.
Para. 18. “In our view, the determination of other aspects related to the suspension remain the prerogative of
the Member requesting the suspension. We note, in particular, that the Member in respect of whom
concessions or other obligations would be suspended, can object to “the level of suspension proposed” (184)
and that an arbitrator has to “determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment”. (185) Arbitrators are explicitly prohibited from “examin[ing] the nature of the
concessions or other obligations to be suspended” (186) (other than under Articles 22.3 and 22.5).
Para. 20. “What we do have to determine, however, is whether the overall proposed level of suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment. This involves a quantitative — not a qualitative —
assessment of the proposed suspension. As noted by the arbitrators in the Bananas case, ‘[i]t is impossible to
ensure correspondence or identity between two levels if one of the two is not clearly defined’. (187)
Therefore, as a prerequisite for ensuring equivalence between the two levels, we have to be able to determine,
not only the ‘level of the nullification and impairment’, but also the ‘level of the suspension of concessions or
other obligations’. To give effect to the obligation of equivalence in Article 22.4, the Member requesting
suspension thus has to identify the level of suspension of concessions it proposes in a way that allows us to
determine equivalence.” (188)
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ (US - FSC),
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/ARB, paras. 5.46-5.47
280
Em US - FSC (European Communities), o painel enfatizou que os elaboradores dos artigos 22.4 e 22.7 do
DSU tinham em mente um padrão quantitativo para mensurar nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras
obrigações; padrão este que não parece estar muito claro no artigo 4.10 do ASMC, para o cálculo das
contramedidas.
Para. 5.46. “The drafters [of Article 22.4] have explicitly set a quantitative benchmark to the level of
suspension of concessions or other obligations that might be authorized. This is similarly reflected in Article
22.7, which defines the arbitrators’ mandate in such proceedings (…).”
Para. 5.47. “As we have already noted in our analysis of the text of Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement
above, there is, by contrast, no such indication of an explicit quantitative benchmark in that provision (…).”
(iii) equivalência qualitativa
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante:
Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, paras. 5.17, 5.20-5.21 e 5.23
Em US - 1916 Act (EC), o painel surpreendeu-se com a solicitação das Comunidades Europeias de autorização
para suspender concessões ou outras obrigações “qualitativamente” equivalentes ao nível de anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios, em contraposição à prática comumente adotada de suspensão concessões ou obrigações
definidas em termos quantitativos, monetários. Com efeito, ainda que tenha representado uma quebra de
paradigma, o painel não considerou a solicitação inconsistente com o artigo 22 do DSU. No entanto, reforçou
a necessidade de atenção à equivalência entre ambas as variáveis, explicando que um nível de suspensão de
obrigações igual ou inferior ao nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios será considerado consistente com o
artigo 22.4 do DSU; enquanto, um nível superior de suspensão de obrigações em relação ao grau de anulação
ou prejuízo de benefícios ensejaria uma suspensão punitiva, inconsistente, por sua vez, com o artigo 22.4 do
DSU.
Para. 5.17. “[T]his is the first case in which a WTO Member has sought to suspend ‘qualitatively equivalent’
obligations. In all previous cases, parties seeking to suspend concessions or other obligations have provided a
quantitative, monetary figure indicating the amount of suspension sought. Indeed, the European Communities
indicated that it was ‘aware that its request for suspension of “qualitatively equivalent” obligations constitutes
a novelty in WTO practice.’”
Para. 5.20. “In cases such as EC - Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 - EC), EC - Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6
- EC) and US - FSC (Article 22.6 - US), where the requested suspension was expressed in quantitative terms,
the arbitrators necessarily had to assess whether there was ‘quantitative equivalence’ between the level of the
nullification or impairment and the level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations.”
Para. 5.21. “In the present case, by contrast, the requested suspension has not been stated in quantitative
terms. However, this does not in and of itself render the EC request inconsistent with Article 22. Indeed, it is
not possible to determine the WTO-consistency of a “qualitatively equivalent” Article 22.2 request in the
abstract. Instead, it is necessary to determine how the actual suspension resulting from such “qualitative
equivalence” would be applied. More specifically:
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
If the suspension of obligations were applied in such a manner that it were equal to or below the level
of nullification or impairment sustained by the European Communities, then the suspension would, in
principle, be consistent with DSU Article 22.4. (189)
 If the suspension of obligations were applied in such a manner that it exceeded the level of
nullification or impairment sustained by the European Communities, then the suspension would be
punitive, and would not be consistent with DSU Article 22.4.
(1) “As Contramedidas no Acordo de Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias (ASMC)”
* Conceito de “contramedidas” baseado na Proposta de Regulamentação da Responsabilidade Internacional
do Estado
O ASMC denomina de “contramedidas” o remédio jurisdicional que legitima para induzir o cumprimento.
Neste caso, em específico, consistente na supressão do subsídio à exportação proibido, outorgado em montante
superior aos limites autorizados no ASMC e nas listas de compromissos assinadas pelos membros. No caso de
subsídios proibidos, o critério utilizado é o da “apropriação”, e as contramedidas são consideradas
“apropriadas” quando efetivamente induzem à supressão dos subsídios proibidos, conforme corrobora a
jurisprudência do DSB. Em Canada - Aircraft (Brazil), o painel assumiu para as “contramedidas” o conceito
utilizado no direito internacional geral e no artigo 47 da Proposta de Regulamentação da Responsabilidade
Internacional do Estado, elaborada pela Comissão de Direito Internacional (CDI) da ONU, a qual concebe as
contramedidas como capazes de induzir o Estado que incidiu no ato ilícito internacional a cumprir com as
obrigações descritas nos artigos 41 e 46 da proposta. Posicionamento semelhante foi adotado pelo painel, sob
o artigo 22.6, no litígio EC - Bananas (1999).
Relatório do painel no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, para. 3.44
Para. 3.44. “While the parties have referred to dictionary definitions for the term ‘countermeasures’, we find
it more appropriate to refer to its meaning in general international law (190) and to the work of the
International Law Commission (ILC) on State Responsibility, which addresses the notion of countermeasures.
(191) We note that the ILC work is based on relevant state practice as well as on judicial decisions and
doctrinal writings, which constitute recognized sources of international law. (192) When considering the
definition of ‘countermeasures’ in Article 47 of the Draft Articles (193). We note that countermeasures are
meant to ‘induce [the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act] to comply with its
obligations under articles 41 to 46’. We note in this respect that the Article 22.6 arbitrators in the EC Bananas (1999) arbitration made a similar statement. (194) We conclude that a countermeasure is
‘appropriate’ inter alia if it effectively induces compliance.” (195)
* Conceito de “contramedidas” no dicionário Oxford da língua inglesa
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corportations” (US - FSC),
A definição contida no dicionário Oxford da língua inglesa para as “contramedidas”, em muito se assemelha
àquele seguido para as medidas de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, uma vez que atribui às
contramedidas a tarefa de contrapôr/ opôr-se/ retaliar um dano ou tentativa de dano, neutralizando a ação ou o
seu efeito. O artigo 4 do ASMC define as contramedidas como remédios jurisdicionais de natureza temporária,
a serem utilizados, quando autorizados pelo DSB, para induzir o cumprimento das recomendações e decisões
deste órgão, direcionadas à supressão dos subsídios proibidos.
282
Para. 5.4. “Dictionary definitions of ‘countermeasure’ suggest that a countermeasure is essentially defined by
reference to the wrongful action to which it is intended to respond. The New Oxford Dictionary defines
‘countermeasure’ as ‘an action taken to counteract a danger, threat, etc’ (196). The meaning of ‘counteract’ is
to ‘hinder or defeat by contrary action; neutralize the action or effect of’. (197) Likewise, the term ‘counter’
used as a prefix is defined inter alia as: ‘opposing, retaliatory’. (198) The ordinary meaning of the term thus
suggests that a countermeasure bears a relationship with the action to be counteracted, or with its effects (cf.
‘hinder or defeat by contrary action; neutralize the action or effect of’).” (199)
Para. 5.5. “In the context of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, the term ‘countermeasures’ is used to define
temporary measures which a prevailing Member may be authorized to take in response to a persisting
violation of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, pending full compliance with the DSB’s recommendations. This
use of the term is in line with its ordinary dictionary meaning as described above: these measures are
authorized to counteract, in this context, a wrongful action in the form of an export subsidy that is prohibited
per se, or the effects thereof.”
Para. 5.6. “It would be consistent with a reading of the plain meaning of the concept of countermeasure to say
that it can be directed either at countering the measure at issue (in this case, at effectively neutralizing the
export subsidy) or at counteracting its effects on the affected party, or both.”
Para. 5.7. “We need, however, to broaden our textual analysis in order to see whether we can find more
precision in how countermeasures are to be construed in this context. We thus turn to an examination of the
expression ‘appropriate’ countermeasures with a view to clarifying what level of countermeasures may be
legitimately authorized.” (200)
* Contramedidas apropriadas
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corportations” (US - FSC),
Em US - FSC (EC) o painel sob os artigos 22.6 do DSU e 4.11 do ASMC verificou que os artigos 4.10 e 4.11
do ASMC não esclarecem o significado do termo “apropriado”, não estabelevem uma fórmula para o cálculo,
e nem definem, de modo preciso e exaustivo, as condições para a aplicação das contramedidas; devendo ser
dimencionada caso a caso, com base no objetivo de neutralizar e suprimir o subsídio à exportação proibido,
sem, contudo, causar um prejuízo além do decorrente da medida ilícita.
Paras. 5.10-5.11. “(…) as far as the amount or level of countermeasures is concerned, the expression
“appropriate” does not in and of itself predefine the precise and exhaustive conditions for the application of
countermeasures. According to them, Articles 4.10 and 4.11 are not designed to lay down a precise formula or
otherwise quantified benchmark or amount of countermeasures which might be legitimately authorized in
each and every instance.”
Para. 5.12. “Based on the plain meaning of the word, this means that countermeasures should be adapted to
the particular case at hand. The term is consistent with an intent not to prejudge what the circumstances might
be in the specific context of dispute settlement in a given case. To that extent, there is an element of
flexibility, in the sense that there is thereby an eschewal of any rigid a priori quantitative formula. But it is
also clear that there is, nevertheless, an objective relationship which must be absolutely respected: the
countermeasures must be suitable or fitting by way of response to the case at hand.”
Relatório do painel no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 3.42-3.43 e 3.45-3.46
283
Em Brazil - Aircraft (Canada), o painel empreendeu a investigação do significado do termo “apropriado”, a
partir da análise do artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena, pois notou que o exame do significado ordinário da
palavra, em um dicionário, não permitiria uma compreensão específica do termo e sim uma concepção geral,
abrangente. De qualquer forma, o painel observou que é possível obter uma definição adequada/ apropriada e
específica do termo, pois, em geral, os dicionários indicam a direção de encontro de um significado mais
específico. Corforme constata o painel, no caso do ASMC, a contramedida é considerada “apropriada” se
efetivamente induz o cumprimento, ou seja, se “induz a retirada do subsídio proibido” sem demora.
Para. 3.42. “In accordance with Article 3.2 of the DSU, we proceed with an analysis of the meaning of the
term ‘appropriate’ based on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.”
Para. 3.43. “Examining only the ordinary meaning of the term ‘appropriate’ does not allow us to reply to the
question before us, since dictionary definitions are insufficiently specific. Indeed, the relevant dictionary
definitions of the word ‘appropriate’ are specially suitable; proper’. (201) However, they point in the direction
of meeting a particular objective.”
Para. 3.45. “In this respect, we recall that the measure in respect of which the right to take countermeasures
has been requested is a prohibited export subsidy falling under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. Article
4.7 of the SCM Agreement provides in this respect that if a measure is found to be a prohibited subsidy, it
shall be withdrawn without delay. In such a case, effectively ‘inducing compliance’ means inducing the
withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy.”
Em havendo uma violação a outro acordo abrangido, que não seja o ASMC (por ocasião da concessão de
subsídios proibidos), não haverá a necessidade de supressão da medida ilícita sem demora, segundo o Acordo
de Subsídios. Nos termos do artigo 3.8 do DSU, em sendo constatada uma infração às normas de um acordo
abrangido, haverá a presunção de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, e a medida ilícita poderá ser retirada
imediatamente ou dentro de um “período razoável de tempo” autorizado pelo DSB. Como pontua o painel,
uma outra distinção entre a regulamentação do DSU para a suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, e
a regulação do ASMC para as contramedidas, vem a ser a ausências de estipulação no ASMC, em seus artigos
3 e 4, a respeito da presunção de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, em consequência da concessão de
subsídios proibidos. O ASMC, excepcionalmente, propõe a análise dos “efeitos adversos” causados pelos
subsídios acionáveis, em seu artigo 5.
Para. 3.46. “In contrast, other illegal measures do not have to be withdrawn without delay. As specified in
Article 3.8 of the DSU, if a measure violates a provision of a covered agreement, the measure is considered
prima facie to cause nullification or impairment. However, if the defendant succeeds in rebutting the charge,
no nullification or impairment will be found in spite of the violation. Such a rebuttal may be impossible to
make in a number of cases. Yet, this does not change the fact that the concept of nullification or impairment is
not found in Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement. The Arbitrators are of the view that meaning must be
given to the fact that the negotiators did not include the concept of nullification or impairment in those
articles, whilst it is expressly mentioned in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement, which deals with the adverse
effects of actionable subsidies.”
* Padrão de “apropriação” (ASMC) e padrão de “equivalência” (DSU)
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, paras. 6.4-6.5
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o painel demonstra o quão obsoleto se tornou o parâmetro utilizado durante o
GATT 1947, para a compreensão do “padrão de apropriação” a ser aplicado às contramedidas. Durante a
vigência do Acordo Geral, o painel, no litígio Netherlands Action under Article XXIII:2 to Suspend
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Obligations to the United States, recomendou que as Partes Contratantes baseassem o cálculo da
“apropriação”, na equivalência entre as contramedidas e os prejuízos sofridos com as restrições impostas pelos
EUA. Nesse contexto, as Partes Contratantes deveriam levar em consideração: (i) se a suspensão de
concessões proposta detinha um caráter apropriado; e, (ii) se a extensão da restrição quantitativa proposta pelo
governo da Holanda era razoável, tendo em vista o dano sofrido. O painel em EC - Bananas comparou as
recomendações empreendidas durante o GATT 1947 às atuais disposições vigentes nos artigos 22.4 e 22.7 do
DSU, para o cálculo do nível da suspensão de concessões, e concluiu que os parâmetros do GATT 1947 estão
obsoletos em relação à atual regulamentação. Na visão do painel, o significado ordinário do termo
“apropriado” tem a conotação de adequado, correto, próprio, conveniente, ligado a, ou pertencente a;
indicando um certo grau de relação entre o montante da suspensão de concessões proposto e o nível da
anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, e não um alto e estrito grau de correspondência ou equivalência entre
ambas as variáveis, tal qual exigido no padrão de equivalência descrito no artigo 22.4 do DSU.
Para. 6.4. “We are mindful of the fact that the working party on Netherlands Action under Article XXIII:2 to
Suspend Obligations to the United States (202) considered whether the proposed action was ‘appropriate’ and
that the Working Party only had ‘regard’ to the equivalence of the impairment suffered:
‘2
The Working Party was instructed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
investigate the appropriateness of the measure which the Netherlands Government
proposed to take, having regard to the equivalence to the impairment suffered by the
Netherlands as a result of the United States restrictions.
3 The Working Party felt that the appropriateness of the measure envisaged by the
Netherlands Government should be considered from two points of view: in the first
place, whether in the circumstances, the measure proposed was appropriate in
character, and secondly, whether the extent of the quantitative restriction proposed by
the Netherlands Government was reasonable, having regard to the impairment
suffered.’ (emphasis added).
In our view, in light of the explicit reference in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 22 of the
DSU to the need to ensure the equivalence between the level of proposed suspension
and the level of the nullification or impairment suffered, the standard of
appropriateness applied by the 1952 working party has lost its significance as a
benchmark for the authorization of the suspension of concessions under the DSU.
Para. 6.5. However, we note that the ordinary meaning of ‘appropriate’, connoting ‘specially suitable,
proper, fitting, attached or belonging to’, (203) suggests a certain degree of relation between the level of the
proposed suspension and the level of nullification or impairment, where as we stated above, the ordinary
meaning of ‘equivalent’ implies a higher degree of correspondence, identity or stricter balance between the
level of the proposed suspension and the level of nullification or impairment. Therefore, we conclude that the
benchmark of equivalence reflects a stricter standard of review for Arbitrators acting pursuant to Article 22.7
of the WTO’s DSU than the degree of scrutiny that the standard of appropriateness, as applied under the
GATT of 1947 would have suggested.” (204)
Relatório do painel no caso Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Canada - Aircraft), Demandante:
Brasil), WT/DS222/ARB, para. 3.51
Da mesma forma, o painel no litígio Canada - Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Brazil) demonstra a
flexibilidade existente na determinação da “apropriação” entre o nível das contramedidas e o nível do dano
causado pelos subsidios à exportação (proibidos); o que difere da rigidez na apreciação do padrão de
equivalência entre o montante da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o nível da anulação ou
prejuízo de benefícios, descrita no artigo 22.4 do DSU.
Para. 3.51. “As noted at the outset, however, Canada admits that in light of its non-compliance with DSB
recommendations Brazil is entitled to impose countermeasures. Canada argues that an appropriate starting
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point for calculating the level of such countermeasures is the amount of the subsidy that will be granted on
aircraft not yet delivered as of 20 May 2002, when Canada should have withdrawn the subsidy. Given
Canada's concession and the fact that the two prior arbitrations under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement
have used the amount of the subsidy as the basis for approving proposed countermeasures, we find it proper as
a starting-point to calculate the level of countermeasures in this case based on the amount of the subsidy
methodology, subject to adjustments if necessary to ensure that the level of countermeasures is appropriate. In
this regard, we note that prior Arbitrators that have rejected proposed levels of countermeasures (or
suspensions of concessions) have always proceeded to set levels consistent with the relevant agreements.”
(205)
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircrafts), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 3.18, 3.57-3.60
Em Brazil - Aircrafts (Canada), o painel explica que as disposições dos artigos 4.10 e 4.11 do ASMC
caracterizam-se como regras especiais ou adicionais, prevalecentes sobre as regras gerais dispostas no artigo
22 do DSU e Apêndice 2 do DSU. O painel também chama a atenção para o fato de que a variável “anulação
ou prejuízo de benefícios” não faz parte das regras constantes nos artigos 3 e 4 do ASMC; não havendo,
portanto, a obrigação legal, no contexto das contramedidas, de exame da existência de equivalência entre o
nível da suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações e o grau da anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios. Os
árbitros reforçaram que, quando lidam com subsídios proibidos o nível das contramedidas deve ser
“apropriado” ao nível de tais subsídios.
3.18. “As to our task, we follow the approach adopted by previous arbitrators under Article 22.6 of the DSU.
(206) We will have not only to determine whether Canada’s proposal constitutes “appropriate
countermeasures”, but also to determine the level of countermeasures we consider to be appropriate in case
we find that Canada's level of countermeasures is not appropriate, if necessary by applying our own
methodology.”
Para. 3.57. “We read the provisions of Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement as special or additional rules. In
accordance with the reasoning of the Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement, (207) we must read the
provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules in the SCM Agreement so as to give meaning to all
of them, except if there is a conflict or a difference. While we agree that in practice there may be situations
where countermeasures equivalent to the level of nullification of impairment will be appropriate, we recall
that the concept of nullification or impairment is absent from Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement. In that
framework, there is no legal obligation that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or other
obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.”
Para. 3.58. “On the contrary, requiring that countermeasures in the form of suspension of concessions or
other obligations be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment would be contrary to the principle of
effectiveness by significantly limiting the efficacy of countermeasures in the case of prohibited subsidies.
Indeed, as shown in the present case, (208) other countermeasures than suspension of concessions or
obligations may not always be feasible because of their potential effects on other Members. This would be the
case of a countersubsidy granted in a sector where other Members than the parties compete with the products
of the parties. In such a case, the Member taking the countermeasure may not be in a position to induce
compliance.”
Para. 3.59. “We are mindful that our interpretation may, at a first glance, seem to cause some risk of
disproportionality in case of multiple compainants. However, in such a case, the arbitrator could allocate the
amount of appropriate countermeasures among the complainants in proportion to their trade in the product
concerned. The “inducing” effect would most probably be very similar.”
286
Para. 3.60. “For the reasons set out above, we conclude that, when dealing with a prohibited export subsidy,
an amount of countermeasures which corresponds to the total amount of the subsidy is ‘appropriate’”. (209)
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (US - FSC),
Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS108/ARB, paras. 2.6 e 5.47
Em US - FSC (European Communities), por sua vez, o painel analisou o artigo 30 do ASMC e concluiu que o
DSU é aplicável aos procedimentos arbitrais envolvendo a concessão de subsídios proibidos, embora o artigo
4.11 do ASMC deva prevalecer em caso de conflito entre ambos os acordos. Os árbitros afirmaram ser
“possível”, nos termos do artigo 1.2 do DSU, que as regras dos artigos 4.10 e 4.11 do ASMC prevaleçam
sobre as normas do Apêndice 2 do DSU, por figurarem as primeiras na condição de normas especiais ou
adicionais.
Para. 2.6. “We also recall the terms of Article 30 of the SCM Agreement, which clarifies that the provisions
of the DSU are applicable to proceedings concerning measures covered by the SCM Agreement. Article 22.6
of the DSU therefore remains relevant to arbitral proceedings under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, as
illustrated by the textual reference made to Article 22.6 of the DSU in that provision. However, the special or
additional rules and procedures of the SCM Agreement, including Articles 4.10 and 4.11, would prevail to the
extent of any difference between them.” (210)
Para. 5.47. “The Arbitrators recalled that “Article 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement are ‘special or
additional rules’ under Appendix 2 of the DSU, and that in accordance with Article 1.2 of the DSU, it is
possible for such rules or procedures to prevail over those of the DSU. There can be no presumption,
therefore, that the drafters intended the standard under Article 4.10 to be necessarily coextensive with that
under Article 22.4 so that the notion of “appropriate countermeasures” under Article 4.10 would limit such
countermeasures to an amount “equivalent to the level of nullification of impairment” suffered by the
complaining Member. Rather, Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement use distinct language and that
difference must be given meaning.”
5.
Artigo 22.6
a) “Regras preliminares”
Relatório do painel no litígio United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Emenda
Byrd)(US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, para. 2.4
Em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Brazil), o painel negou-se a emitir uma conclusão preliminar,
solicitada pelo demandante, pois os esclarecimentos previamente requeridos estariam intimamente
relacionados às questões centrais da arbitragem. Ademais, o painel ponderou que nenhuma disposição do
artigo 22 do DSU menciona a possibilidade de emissão antecipada de uma conclusão nos procedimentos
arbitrais, e não há registro de tal prática no passado.
Para. 2.4. “[W]e note that neither paragraph 6 nor paragraph 7 of Article 22 of the DSU provide for the
possibility of a preliminary ruling and there is, strictly speaking, no practice of a preliminary ruling at the
request of a party in past arbitrations.”
b) “Direitos das terceiras partes”
Em EC - Bananas III e em Brazil - Aircraft, os painéis sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU negaram os respectivos
pedidos do Equador e da Austrália, de participação nos procedimentos arbitrais na qualidade de terceiras
partes interessadas, devido à ausência de disposições a respeito no artigo 22 do DSU, e por acreditarem que os
287
direitos do Equador e da Austrália não seriam afetados em ambos os procedimentos.
Para. 2.8. “On 4 February 1999, Ecuador requested the Arbitrators to accord it third-party status in light of its
special interest in the proceedings. However, in light of the absence of provisions for third-party status under
Article 22 of the DSU and given that we do not believe that Ecuador's rights will be affected by this
proceeding, we declined Ecuador's request. In this regard, we note that our Initial and Final Decisions in this
arbitration fully respect Ecuador's rights under the DSU, and, in particular, Article 22 thereof.”
Relatório do painel no litígio Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil - Aircraft),
Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/ARB, paras. 2.5-2.6
Para. 2.5. “[W]e informed Australia that we declined its request. Our decision took into account the views
expressed by the parties, the fact that there is no provision in the DSU as regards third party status under
Article 22, and the fact that we do not believe that Australia’s rights would be affected by this proceeding.”
Para. 2.6. “We note in this respect that third party rights were granted in the Article 22.6 arbitrations
concerning European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) and
rejected in the EC - Bananas (1999) Article 22.6 arbitration. We do not consider that Australia in this case is
in the same situation as Canada and the United States in the EC - Hormones arbitrations, nor even in the same
situation as Ecuador in the EC - Bananas (1999) arbitration. Indeed, Australia never initiated dispute
settlement proceedings against Brazil with respect to the export financing programme at issue. Moreover,
Australia (g) List of Article 22.6 arbitration proceedings did not draw the attention of the Arbitrators to any
benefits accruing to it or any rights under the WTO Agreement which might be affected by their decision.”
(211)
Relatório do painel nos litígios European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA - WT/DS26/ARB; e Demandante: Canadá WT/DS48/ARB, para. 7
Em EC - Hormones (US) (Canada), o painel assumiu um posicionamento distinto daqueles em EC - Bananas
III e em Brazil - Aircraft, uma vez que autorizou os EUA e o Canadá a participarem como terceiras partes
interessadas nos procedimentos do painel sob o artigo 22.6. Amparado na discricionaridade concedida pelo
artigo 12.1 do DSU, para decisões relacionadas a questões procedimentais não regulamentadas no DSU; na
ausência de referência no artigo 22 do DSU sobre a participação de terceiras partes nas arbitragens; e, na
crença de que os direitos dos EUA e do Canadá poderiam ser afetados em ambos os procedimentos, o painel
acolheu os pedidos dos EUA e do Canadá.
“The US and Canada are allowed to attend both arbitration hearings, to make a statement at the end of each
hearing and to receive a copy of the written submissions made in both proceedings. The above ruling was
made on the following grounds.
•
DSU provisions on panel proceedings, referred to by analogy in the arbitrators’working procedures,
give the arbitrators discretion to decide on procedural matters not regulated in the DSU (Article 12.1
of the DSU) in accordance with due process. (212) The DSU does not address the issue of third-party
participation in Article 22 arbitration proceedings.
•
US and Canadian rights may be affected in both arbitration proceedings:
First, the estimates for high quality beef (‘HQB’) exports, foregone because of the hormone ban, are
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to be based on a tariff quota that allegedly needs to be shared between Canada and the US. A
determination in one proceeding may thus be decisive for the determination in the other. Second,
several methodologies are proposed to calculate lost export opportunities. Given the fact that the
product scope (HQB and edible bovine offal (‘EBO’)) and relevant trade barriers (hormone ban and
HQB tariff quota) are the same in both proceedings, both arbitration panels (composed of the same
three individuals) may consider it necessary to adopt the same or very similar methodologies. This is
all the more necessary because the arbitrators are called upon to arrive at a specific determination on
the amount of nullification and impairment caused by the ban. (213) They are therefore not limited, as
in most panel proceedings, to ruling only on the consistency of the amounts proposed by the US and
Canada with DSU provisions. Due process thus requires that all three parties receive the opportunity
to comment on the methodologies proposed by each of the parties.
•
In contrast, the EC has not shown how third-party participation would prejudice its rights. No specific
arguments were made demonstrating that third party participation would substantially impair the EC’s
interests or due process rights.”
6.
Painéis sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU
a) “Especificidade no requerimento para a composição do painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU”
Em EC - Bananas III (Ecuador), o painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU entendeu que o padrão de especificidade,
estabelecido no artigo 6.2 do DSU, deve estar presente tanto na solicitação de autorização para aplicar a
suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações, sob o artigo 22.2 do DSU, quanto no pedido de instauração
sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU; uma vez que ambos os procedimentos possuem objetivos semelhantes. No entanto,
o padrão de especificidade não deverá ser adotado durante o procedimento arbitral, pois este segue
metodologia distinta para o cálculo do nível de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios.
Para. 20. “The DSU does not explicitly provide that the specificity requirements, which are stipulated in
Article 6.2 for panel requests, apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration proceedings under Article 22. However,
we believe that requests for suspension under Article 22.2, as well as requests for a referral to arbitration
under Article 22.6, serve similar due process objectives as requests under Article 6.2. First, they give notice to
the other party and enable it to respond to the request for suspension or the request for arbitration,
respectively. Second, a request under Article 22.2 by a complaining party defines the jurisdiction of the DSB
in authorizing suspension by the complaining party. Likewise, a request for arbitration under Article 22.6
defines the terms of reference of the Arbitrators. Accordingly, we consider that the specificity standards,
which are well-established in WTO jurisprudence under Article 6.2, are relevant for requests for authorization
of suspension under Article 22.2, and for requests for referral of such matter to arbitration under Article 22.6,
as the case may be. They do, however, not apply to the document submitted during an arbitration proceeding,
setting out the methodology used for the calculation of the level of nullification or impairment.”
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB, nota de rodapé 16, p. 5
Seguindo o mesmo raciocínio do painel em EC - Bananas III, o painel em EC - Hormones (US) concluíram
que, embora não haja o dever constante no DSU, quando do requerimento de instauração do painel sob o
artigo 22.6, de indicar os produtos a serem suspensos, o tipo e o grau da suspensão; quanto mais precisas
forem as informações constantes em tal requerimento, tanto melhor para segurança e previsibilidade do
sistema multilateral de comércio e para o alcance de uma solução positiva para a demanda. Além de
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demonstrar a boa-fé dos membros na busca pela solução da disputa.
Nota 16, p. 5: “The more precise a request for suspension is in terms of product coverage, type and degree of
suspension, etc …, the better. Such precision can only be encouraged in pursuit of the DSU objectives of
‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’ (Article 3.2) and seeking prompt and
positive solutions to disputes (Articles 3.3 and 3.7). It would also be welcome in light of the statement in
Article 3.10 that ‘all Members will engage in [DSU] procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the
dispute’.” (214)
b) “Por meio do painel original, se os membros estiverem disponíveis, ou por um árbitro designado
pelo diretor geral”
Em geral, os painéis sob o artigo 22.6 são realizadas pelos integrantes do painel original, com exceção da
instaurada no litígio US - 1916 Act (EC), em que apenas os dois árbitros do painel original participaram, pois o
Presidente não estava disponível. (215)
c) “Ônus da prova”
Relatório do painel no caso European Communities - Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products Hormones (EC - Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/ARB; e Demandante: Canadá,
WT/DS48/ARB, paras. 9-11
Em EC - Hormones (US) (Canada), o painel discutiu a questão do ônus da prova e concluiu, com base na
jurisprudência do DSB, que o fato das CE questionarem a conformidade da proposta dos EUA com o artigo
22.4 do DSU, confere-lhe o ônus de demonstrar, com argumentos e evidências, ou presunções, que a proposta
dos EUA de suspensão de concessões ou de outras obrigações não era consistente com a exigência de
equivalência preconizada pelo artigo 22.4. O mesmo ônus da prova é conferido àquele que alega a existência
de fato específico, e àquele que requer suspensão de obrigações e não suspensão de concessões tarifárias,
como ocorrido em US - 1916 Act.
Para. 9. “WTO Members, as sovereign entities, can be presumed to act in conformity with their WTO
obligations. A party claiming that a Member has acted inconsistently with WTO rules bears the burden of
proving that inconsistency. The act at issue here is the US proposal to suspend concessions. The WTO rule in
question is Article 22.4 prescribing that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of nullification and
impairment. The EC challenges the conformity of the US proposal with the said WTO rule. It is thus for the
EC to prove that the US proposal is inconsistent with Article 22.4. Following well-established WTO
jurisprudence, this means that it is for the EC to submit arguments and evidence sufficient to establish a prima
facie case or presumption that the level of suspension proposed by the US is not equivalent to the level of
nullification and impairment caused by the EC hormone ban. Once the EC has done so, however, it is for the
US to submit arguments and evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption. Should all arguments and evidence
remain in equipoise, the EC, as the party bearing the original burden of proof, would lose.”
Para. 10. “The same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged; in this case, for example,
where a party relies on a decrease of beef consumption in the EC or the use of edible beef offal as pet food. It
is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence.”
Para. 11. “The duty that rests on all parties to produce evidence and to collaborate in presenting evidence to
the arbitrators — an issue to be distinguished from the question of who bears the burden of proof — is crucial
in Article 22 arbitration proceedings. The EC is required to submit evidence showing that the proposal is not
equivalent. However, at the same time and as soon as it can, the US is required to come forward with evidence
explaining how it arrived at its proposal and showing why its proposal is equivalent to the trade impairment it
290
has suffered. Some of the evidence - such as data on trade with third countries, export capabilities and
affected exporters - may, indeed, be in the sole possession of the US, being the party that suffered the trade
impairment.” (216)
Relatório do painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante:
Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/ARB, para. 3.3
Para. 3.3. “the fact that this case relates to the suspension of ‘obligations’, as opposed to the suspension of
tariff concessions, in no way alters the applicable burden of proof.”
d) “Tratamento de dados fornecidos por entidades privadas”
Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil Aircraft), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS46/AB/R, paras. 2.10-2.11
O Órgão de Apelação, no caso Brazil - Aircraft (Canada), avaliou a confiabilidade dos dados fornecidos pelo
Brasil, e declarou que não poderia acolher as informações de uma empresa privada, - a Embraer -, como o
faria se fossem provenientes de um sujeito de direito internacional. No caso em questão, no entanto, o governo
brasileiro apenas forneceu informações disponibilizadas pela Embraer. Por essa razão, o painel solicitou que
tais informações fossem apoiadas em evidências, como artigos ou declarações reproduzidas na imprensa
especializada, relatórios anuais de empresas, ou qualquer outra informação autorizada originária da Embraer
ou de outras fontes confiáveis. Diante da impossibilidde de corroborar tais informações com documentos
oficiais, os árbitros solicitaram as devidas motivações, além de declarações por escrito de oficiais autorizados
da Embraer.
Para. 2.10. “A related problem faced by the Arbitrators in this case was that, in many instances, the original
data necessary for the calculations or assessments was solely in the hands of Brazil. When this information
originated in the Brazilian government, we assumed good faith and accepted the information and the
supporting evidence provided by Brazil to the extent Canada also accepted it or did not provide sufficient
evidence to put in doubt the accuracy of Brazil’s statements and/or evidence.”
Para. 2.11. “However, since this case relates to subsidies granted for the purchase of aircraft produced by the
Brazilian aircraft manufacturer, Embraer, a large number of data essential for the resolution of our task is only
available to that company. We assumed that Embraer was independent from the Brazilian government and, for
that reason, we could not treat statements from that company as we would have if they had originated from a
subject of international law. (217) When Brazil only provided statements regarding information available
solely to Embraer, we requested that Brazil support those statements with materials usually regarded as
evidence, such as articles or statements reproduced in the specialized press, company annual reports or any
other certified information originating in Embraer or other reliable sources. When Brazil was not in a position
to provide documentary evidence, we requested a detailed explanation of the reasons why such evidence was
not available and expressed our willingness to consider written declarations from authorised Embraer
officials, if duly certified. We then weighed this evidence against the evidence submitted by Canada.”
e) “Procedimento de trabalho nos painéis sob o artigo 22.6”
Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para. 4.11
Em EC - Bananas (US), as CE contestaram a competência do painel sob o artigo 22.6 do DSU, para rever a
consistência do regime de regras das CE e as regras da OMC. Afirmaram ser tal função confiada ao painel sob
o artigo 21.5 do DSU. No entanto, o painel discordou da argumentação da demandada.
291
Para. 4.11. “[T]he European Communities argues that if we consider the WTO consistency of its banana
regime in an arbitration proceeding under Article 22, we will deprive Article 21.5 of its raison d’être. We
disagree. For those Members that for whatever reasons do not wish to suspend concessions, Article 21.5 will

Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)

Transcrição

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