Plaintiff`s Third Amended Petition
Transcrição
Plaintiff`s Third Amended Petition
No. 017-217971-06 ROGERK. PARSONS, INDIVIDUALLY ANDAS THEINDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR FORTHE ESTATEOF ESTHERANN KARTSOTIS PARSONS, COURT IN THEDISTRICT 5r,,,r''rr\ Plaintiff, E*--g,' E**.I {:1 .., ...-:l $ t l; \::.'^ {q" # 'a*filr' *,*,I*tot *tls-\ {-;,.'+ {j '# .Hl' I .;"9" *;;w E"f1 fT t *,i',so {,i}l* *i'-s F **\ "*\ F., VS. fn) ""8] F] flJ fl"ffi r"3 _,-"1 {i''} ****, Ergi. ," ROBERTM. GREENBERG; LEGALSERVNCES P.C., ROBERTM. GREENBERG, ATTORNEY; j$ ;]p"e" .a*; #*i .-**|} ct.@ 5*r ts*d f-gfT-' l' L ! s #A'.tt ip}&i*a* {*"S f-## i;# -jf, -d.fl1 f* a t*.*E t"d#{t ill'{ ROBERTE. MOTSENBOCKER; SHAFER,DAVIS,O'LEARY& STOKER, lNC.flVaSHAFER, DAVIS,MCCOLLUM, ASHLEY,O'LEARY& STOKER,INC.; *. f t .,"p Ed #i r'' n'r''U''trtli : TARRANTCOUNTY,T'EXAS THE ESTATEOF FREDERilCK M. BARON(DECEASED) ANDBARON& BUDD,P.C.; E. I- DU PONTDE NEMOURS AND CON/TPANY; CONOCOPHILLIFS flklaCONOCO, [NC.; RON{ALD WINDLETURLEY;AND [-AWCFFICES OF WINDLETURLEY, P.C.,alWaTURLEYLAWFIRM,P.C.; Defendants, 17thJUDICIALDISTRICT PLAINTIFF'STI-IIRDAMENDED PETITION TO THE HONORABLE FREDW. DAVIS, TARRANTCOUNTYDISTRICT JUDGE: ROGER K. PARSONS, Ih{DIVIDUALLY AND AS THE INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR. FOR THE ESTATEOF ESTHERANN KARTSOTISPARSONS ("Parsons"or "Plaintiff'),files this amended petition complainingof ROBERT M. PLAINIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 1 ATTORNEY; GREENBERG;LEGAL SERVICESP.C., ROBERTM. GREENBERG, ROBERTE. MOTSENBOCKER; AND SHAFERDAVIS,O'LEARY& STOKER,lNC. flkla SHAFER, DAVIS, MCCOLLUM,ASHLEY, O'LEARY & STOKER, lNC.; FREDERICKM. BARON;AND BARON& BUDD, P.C.; and E. l. DU PONT DE NEMOURSAND COMPANY;and CONOCOPHILLIPS f/k/aCONOCO,lNC. RONALD WNDLE TURLEY;AND l.AW OFFICESOF WINDLETURLEY,P.C.,akla TURLEY I-AWFIRM,P.C.,Defendantsherein,and wouldrespectfully showthe Courtas follows: I. DISCOVERYCONTROL PLAN 1.01 Pursuantto the provisionsof TexasRuleof CivilProcedure190.3,Plaintiff proposesto conduct discoveryaccordingto DiscoveryControl Plan Level 3, and therefore,requeststhis Courtto enter the agreedschedulingorderwhich includesa discoverydeadlinedate. 1.02 Plaintiffherebystipulatesthat no hearingsbe set or conductedin the next (60)daysand requeststhat all partiesexchangean agreedschedulingorderduringthat time frame, and that the Agreed SchedulingOrder be submittedto the Courl within ninety(90) days-In the absenceof an AgreedSchedulingOrder,the Plaintiffpraysthe Courtentera DiscoveryControlPlanno laterthan March31, 2009. II. PARTIESAND SERVIGE 2.01 Roger K. Parsons("Parsons")is an indivldualresidentof Dallas,Dallas County, Texas. He is the IndependentAdrninristnator of the Estate of Esther Ann KartsotisParsons(?nn Parsons"). 2.02 DefendantRobertM. Greenberg("Greenberg") is an individualresidentof Texasand is befonethis courtfor all purposes. PLAlf,nTlFF'S Tl-{ilRD AMENDEDPETITION- Page2 2.03 DefendantLegal ServicesP.C. Robert M. Greenberg,Attorney("Legal Services")is a professionalcorporationformed and operatingunder the laws of the Stateof Texasand is beforethis courtfor all purposes. 2.04 DefendantRobert E. Motsenbocker("Motsenbocker") is an individual residentof Texasand is beforethis courtfor all purposes. 2.05 DefendantShafer Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Inc. f/k/a Shafer, Davis, Mccollum,Ashley, O'Leary& Stoker, Inc. ("SDO&S")is a professionalcorporation formedand operatingunderthe lawsof the Stateof Texasand is beforethis courtfor all purposes. 2.06 Defendant,Estateof FrederickM. Baron("Baron")is duly createdin the Stateof Texasand Plaintiffrequeststhat it be servedwith processherein. 2.07 DefendantBaron & Budd, P.C. ("B&8") is a professionalcorporation formedand operatingunderthe laws of the Stateof Texasand Plaintiffrequeststhat it be served with citation and process herein on Brian M. Ledji, Baron & Budd, a Professional Corporation 3102Oak LawnAve Ste. 1100,Dallas,Texas752194283 2.08 DefendantE. l. du Pontde Nemoursand Company("DuPont")is a foreign corporationlicensedto do businessin Texasand Plaintiffrequeststhat it be servedwith citationand processhereinon CT Corporation,RegisteredAgentfor E. l. du Pontde Nemoursand Company,350 N. St. PaulStreet,Dallas,Texas75201. 2.Og DefendantConocoPhillips("Conoco")is a foreign corporationthat is licensedto do businessin Texasand Plaintiffrequeststhat it be servedwith citationand process herein on United States CorporationGompany, RegisteredAgent for ConocoPhillips Company,701BrazosStreet,Suite1050,Austin,Texas78701. PLAINTIFF'S THilRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 3 2.10 DefendantRonald\Mndle Turley ("Turley")is an individualresidentof Texas and Plaintiff requeststhat citation and process herein be served on Windle Turley,6440N. CentralExprwy.1000UniversityTower,Dallas,Texas752064127. 2.11 DefendantLaw Officesof \MndleTurley,P.C. ("LOWT")aMa TurleyLaw Firm, P.C., is a professionalcorporationformedand operatingunderthe laws of the State of Texas and Plaintiffrequeststhat it be servedwith citationand processherein on the \Mndle Turley RegisteredAgent for Turley Law Firm, P.C. 6440 N. Central Expway,1000UniversityTower,Dallas,Texas752064127. III.JURISDICTION ANDVENUE 3.01 This courthas jurisdictionover this dispute,the amountin questionbeing in excessof the jurisdictional minimumof this Court. Venueis properin TarrantCounty becauseit is the countywhereLegalServicesP.G.,RobertM. Greenberg, Attorneyhad its principalofficeat timesrelevantto this complaint. IV. FACTS 4.O1 In September1991,Ann Parsonsdied in the crashof a corporatejet that was owned by DuPont;operatedby Conoco,a DuPontsubsidiaryand the Parsons' employer;and pilotedby KennethR. Fox ("Fox"),a DuPontemployeewho was under contnactto and the supervisionof the jet operator,Conoco.Collectively, the Parsons servedConocoas management-professionals years. for morethan hnrenty-five A. The investisationin anticipationof the Parsonsv, Iurrey litisation 4.O2 In July 1996,on Baron'sreferraland recommendation,Parsonshired ts&BcorporatecounselGreenbergto investigateand prosecuteclaimsof fraud,bneach of dutyandtrust,and legalnegligenceand grossnegligenceagainstTurleyfor allegedly PLAIhilTIFF:S ThIIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 4 colludingwith Gardere& \A/ynne,LLP ("G&W') partnerMantinE. Rose ("Rose"),in fraudsagainstParsons,and the federaland statecourtsin whichTurleyand Rosehad chosento adjudicateParsons'legal claims arisingfrom the wrongfuldeath of Ann Turleyand his firm for fraud and Farsons.ParsonsinstructedGreenbeng to pnosecute collusionthat had causedFarsonsto lose Parsonsv. DuPonf and Parsonsv. Conocoz - two casesthat Turleyhandledas Parsons'attorneyfrom November1992untilJune 't997. 4.03 ParsonsacceptedGreenberg'strecommendations that Parsonscontract SDO&SmernberMotsenbocker as Greenberg'sco-counseland Corporatelntelligence, lnc. investigatorF. Glifton Cameron ("Cameron")for investigationservices that Greenhergand Motsenbocker neededto developall of Parsons'legalclaims. 4.04 Turley's pleadings[n Parsons v. DuPont and Parsons v. Conoco,and negotiationswith Lynn, lead Greenheng's in extnajudicial subsequentrepresentations in Parsonsto believethat the fraudand collnsionFradlost him $29 million(1998-dollars) unrecovereddarnagesplead by Turley/LOWTin Parsons v. DuPonf and Parsonsv. t On February18, 1992,TurleyfiledPI.AIN1flFFS'ORlGIf'lANPETITION ANDJURYDEMANDin Roger K. Parsons, lndividually and as Administntor of the Esfafe of Esther Ann Kartsofi.sParsong deceased, and Vasilios and Sofia Karfsofis, lndividually v. E. I. du Pont de Nemoursand Company (Causetlo. 92-004801) in the 189hDistrictCourtof HarrisCounty,Texas.The casewas removedunder divensityjurisdictionto the l,.i.S.DistrictCourtfor the Soutl"rern Districtof Texas,hloustonDlvlslon(Givil Action No. H-92-788)and assignedto U.S. DistrictCourt Chief Judge NonmanW. Black ("BlacK). Pansonsunsuccessfullyappealedtwo trial court decisionsin Parsonsv. DuPontto the t!.S. Court of Appealsfor the FifthCircuit.Manrdate was issuedon July 18, '[996;and in the firstappeal([rlo.94-20756) mandatein the secondappeal(No.98-20219) 31, 1998. was issuedon Decemher 2 On September 2, 1993,Turleyflled FLAINTIFFS' ORIGINALPETITIONAND JURYDEMAT{D in Roger K. Parsons,lndividuallyand as Administratorof the Esfafe of EstherAnn Kartsofi.sPatsons, deceased,and Vasiliosand Sofia Kartsotis,lndividually v. Linda L. Fox, as Execufni of the Estateaf KennethR. Fox, dereased;Linda L. Johnston,as Executrixof the Esfafe of Gary Gene Johnston, deceased;and Conoco,/nc (CauseNo. 93-046091)in the 80b DlstrictCourt of HanrisCounty,Texas. judgmentin Parsonsv. Conocoto the Courtof Appealsfor the Parsonsappealedthe trial courtsumrnany FourteenthDistrictof Texasat l-{onston(14-95-0098a-CV); however,becauseTurleyhad failedto file a 27, 1995. timelynoticeof appeal,thisappealwas dismissedand rnandate was issuedon Novernber - Page5 PLAINITIFF'S THIRDAMENDED PETITION Conoco,and that werecoveredundera $100nnillionaviationliabilitypolicyDuPontand ('AlG).3 Conoco had purchasedfrorn Amerlcan InternationalGroup, Incorponated Furthermore,Parsons'professionalnegligenceand gross negligenceclaims against policythat AIG had sold Turley/LOWT werecoveredby a $5 millionprofessional liabilihT to Turley.a 4.05 Betweenlate 1996 and late 1997, Gneenbergand Cameronidentified severalwitnessesknownto Turleywho statedthe managementof DuPontand Conoco had had actualsubjectiveawa!'enessbeforethe jet crashaboutthe dangersin ordering Fox to plan and fNythe complexnineteen-dayaround-the-world trip that endedtragically in Malaysiaon September4, 1991.The testirnonyof thesewitnessesand corroborating evidencethatwas avaihbb but not usedby Turley/[-OWT lncludedthe following. (1) The testimonyAllen Duane Catterson("Caftersotr"), ? contractphysician (servant)of Conoco,who had conducteda thoroughmedicalexaminationof DuPont employee-pilot(servant)Fox a few weeks beforeFox left l-loustonon the fatal aroundt In his pleadingslfurley explicitlystated the amountsof damagesParsonswas justlfied in - $19 millionin compensatory demanding fromthe defendantcompanies damages,and $10 millioneacFt (severaily)in punitivedamages.lFheliabllityand dannages claimsTurleypleadagainstthe defendant companies was withinthe termsand limltsof the $100nnillion avlationliabilitypolicyissuedand brokered to DuPont and Conoco by two wholly owned subsidiarlesof AIG - National|,.!nionFire Insurance Companyof Pittsbungh Pennsylvania and AIG Aviation,Inc., hereincollectivelyreferredto hereinas "AIG'.AIG assignedthe insurers'retainedcounselRoseto defendthe companiesunderthe AIG policy againstPansons' claims. a On March4, 1992,shortlyafterfilingthe originalcomplaintin Parsonsv. DuPont,Turleyentered into a professionalliabili$ insurancecontractwith A[G. AIG renewedTunley'sso-called"claims-nnade' policyeach year untiflApril 27, 1997,when Turley switchedto Caro]lnaCasualtylnsuranceGornpany (CCIC) after learning Baron had recomrnendedthat Farsons to hire Gneenbergto investigateand prosecuteTurley'sfraudsand colluslonagainstParsons.To obtainthe new CCIC c0airns-made policy, Turleyknowiurgly misnepresented on the CCIC policyapplicationform that he had no reasonsto believe that Parsonswould file claims againstTurley within the CCIC policy periodthat arose ffom enors or onnissions thatoccurredpniorto the beginningof CCICpolicyperiodon Apnil27, 1997. On Ju0y2'X,1998, wh[[e aftendingan extrajudicialnegotiationmeetingthat had been set-up by Greenbergand l-ynn, Pansonslearnedfor the first time that Lynn knew she was being paid to defendTurley/LOWTundera policythat Tunleyhadobtainedthnoughll-urfley's CCICclainns-made to CCIC. fraudulentnepresentations PI-AINTIFF'S THIRDAMNENDED PETITION- Page 6 of Fox's bloodtest that the-worldtrip and had providedConocoand Fox the resuNts showedthat Fox sufferedfrom "alcoholism"as the term was defined by the 1991 Federa!AviationRegulations("FAR")and, as a matterof federalregulationsthat had effect of law,sFox could not legallyoperateany aircraftwhen he flew his jet into the ground[n Malaysiakillinghimselfand the otherelevenpeopleon Septernber4, 1991. The knowledge the companies' servants, Catterson and Fox, regarding Fox's alcoholismis imputedto the servants'masters,Conocoand DuPontrespectively. (2) The testimonyof Frankl. Cardamone("Cardamone"). retiredseniorDuPontConococheckpilot,who had writtennurnerousleftersin the two (2) yearspriorto the jet crash in Malaysiato the companies'senior managers,includingDuPontChairman Edgar S. Wooland,Jr. ("Woolard"),stating that unless DuPont or Conoco senior managers took immediate action to correct the gross mismanagementof the companies'aviationoperations,employeesand their familieswould be killed in a jet crash. predictable 4.06 Otherevidenceshowedthatthe companieshad coveredup the underlying causesfor the jet crash in Malaysiaby destroying(1) al! of Fox's remainsrecovered fromthe crashs[teby the RoyalMalaysianPolice;(2) the originalcockpitvoicerecorder ('CVR")recordingrecoveredfrom the crashsite by the MalaysianDepartmentof Givil Aviation;and (3) the parts of Fox's rnedicalfile containingthe report by Caftenson showlngthat by August 1991,Fox's long-termexcessiveconsumptionof alcoholhad pursuantto the 1991 causedmeasureable darnageto Fox'sliver,therebyestablishing, s As definedby the 1991FederalAviationRegulations, Part67, SubpantA, 567.13(dXlXiXc), "As used inrthis section,"alcohrolism" nneansa conditionin and $67.17(d)(1)(i)(c): 567.15(d)(1)(i)(c), or social which a person'sintakeof alcohoN is gneatenoughrto damagephysicalhealthor pensona0 functioning, orwhenalcoholhasbecomea prerequisite to nonna[functioning." - Page7 PLAIhITIFF'S Tl-llRDAMENDEDPETITION FAR, that Fox sufferedfrom alcoholismand was prohibitedas a matter of law from legallyoperatingany aircraft. 4.O7 AlthoughDefendantsTurley and LOWT knew that the companieshad engaged in discoveryfraud, Turley never filed pleadingsin Parsonsv. DuPont or Parsonsv. Conocoseekingeither(1) a spoliationinstruction,or (2) a findingof fraud upon the court to have the judgment the notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV")in Parsonsv. DuPontset aside. 4.08 In December1996,files maintainedon Parsons'cases by Turley/LOWT were turnedover to Parcons.The evidencediscoveredthereinshowedthat Turleyhad willfullyavoidedusing the evidenceshowingthe companies'spoliationand fraud in Parsons'cases. 4.09 On October29, 1997,encouragedby this evidencethat was unearthed, Greenbergfiled a motionto perpetuatethe testimonyof four fact witnessesthat Turley had knownaboutbut had avoideddeposingin Parsons'cases,Palsonsv. DuPontand Parsonsv. Conoco.6 4.10 By January 13, 1998, Barbara M. G. Lynn ("Lynn"),a partner in Carrington,Coleman,Sloman& Blurnenthal, L.L.P.("CCS&B"),notifiedGreenbergthat she would representTurley and LOWT in the ancillarylitigationthat Greenberghad initiatedin anticipation of filinga suit againstTurleyand LOWT. In Februaryand March 1998,Greenbergtook the four depositionsthat he had been authorizedto take; and Lynnrepresented Turleyand LOWTin thesedepositions. 6 On October29, 1997,Greenberg filedVERIFIEDPETITIONFORAN ORDERAUTHORIZING DEPOSITIONSTO PERPETUATETESTIMONYin ln Re: Roger K. Parcons,lndividuallyand as Administrator of the Esfafeof EstherAnn Kartsofi.s Parsons,dereased(CauseNo. 97-9749-M)in the 298* DistrictCourtof DaltasCounty,Texas- DistrictJudgeAdolphP. Ganales,presiding. - Page8 PLAII.ITIFF'S THIRDAMENDED PETITION 4.11 By May 1998,when Lynnannouncedher appearanceas Greenberg's cocounselin the TexasFourthCourtof Appealsrnandamusactiondiscussedbelowin the footnoterelatingto the B&B MemoScandal;7Lynnknewthat Greenberg'sinvestigation 7 B&E NlenroScandal \NhileParsonswas payingGreenbergto prepareParsons'lawsuitagainstTurley,Greenbergwas ernbnoiled in doingdamagecontrolin a scandalforB&8. The "Baron& BuddMemoScandal'shallrefer to the allegationsarising from the discoverythat Baron and B&B offlcers had conspiredto defraud defendantconnpanies and the courtsoverseeingts&Bprosecutionof its cllents'asbestospersonalinjury clairnsagainstthe defendantcompaniesthroughthe suhornationof falsetestimonyfrom B&Bclients.The B&B MennoScandalfirst carne to the attentionof the non-lawyerpublicthrougha series of anticNes palblishedby the DallasObseruer,including,but not linritedto: "The controlfteak"on August'!3, 1998; "ToxicJustice"on August 13, 1998;.No-energyinvestigatlon"on September3, 1998;and "Horneftyin' with FredBanon"on March29,2001.Accordingto thesearticles,and the pleadingsandjudicialfindings in the litigationthat these articles reference,on August 27, 1997, a B&B client, \Mllie Roy Reathy ("Reathy"),appearedto give his depositionfor a case pendingin Nuee,es Gounty,Texas.Counselfonone of the defendantsasked Reathyabout the documentsthat were beforehirn at the deposition.Reathy answened that he broughtthe documentsfrom his home.Whenthe attorneyaskedwhethershe couldsee the documents,Reathy'sB&B attorneyhandedthe documentsto her. The documenthandedto the defendant'sattorneywas entitled'Preparingfor YounDeposition/Attorney WorkProducfl('B&B Merno') The defendantcornpaniessuspectedthat the B&ts Memo was evidencethat Banon,in his capacityas Presidentof E&8, had implementeda corporatepolicyand/orbusinessstrategyto cneate fralsememoriesin and/orillicitfalsetestirnonyfforn ts&Bclientsto unjustlyenrichBanonand B&Bthrough the '40% contingencyfee that B&B extractedfrom the defendants'paymentson the settlementor judgmentdebtsthatweretherebyfraudulentlyobtainedby B&Bin the namesof B&B'sunwittingclients. the defendantconnpanies inrB&Bcasesin CauseNo. 93-10952 {cting uponon theirsuspicions, in the 98"' DistrictCourtof TravisCoun$ beforeDlstrictJudgeK. DieE ("Dietz"and in CauseNlo.94-Cl10078inrthe 285s DishictCourtof Bexir Coung Distnict.lri'dge MlchaelP. Peden('Peden')movedfor temporaryiniunctionsto preventB&Band theirclientsfromdestroyingany materialsexchangedbetween thernand to staythe discoveryin all B&Bcasesexe,eptfor discoveryrelatingto the B&tsMenno.DieE and Pedengrantedthe defendanrt connpanies' motionsfindingtFrattheir argurnentsthat the B&tsMemofell within the cnirne-fraud exceptionto the attorney-clientprivilegerule that would otherwiseailow B&B to witFthold the rnaterialsexchangedbetweenB&Banrdthe firms'clientsas attorneywork-produc{ becauseit was evidenceof a scherneto commita fraud. On October13, 1997, Earon and Greenbergpetitionedthe Texas 'll'hirdCourt of Appealsat Austinfor rnandamusrelieffrom DieE'srulings;and on January8, '!998,Greenbergand CCS&Blawyens petitionedthe Texas FourthCourt of Appealsat San Antoniofor rnandarnusrelieffnomPeden'sorder. The ThirdCourtof Appealsat Austinconditionally grantedBaronand Greenburg'spetitionfonmandamus relieffronnDieE'sorderin Causehlumben03-97-00609-CV styledln re BeveflyJeanBrown,et al. (Cause No.93-109521; ln re KennethShiriey,et al.; ln re Jimmy LeonSmathers,ef al. on Apil 30, 1998. By February1998; Baron'scounterattacksagainstthe defendants'irnmediatevictoriesin tFre lfravisCountyand tsexanCountycourtswere extendedto the flingsof motionsseekingsanctionsagalnst an officerof one of the defendantcbrnpaniesfor crimflna! or punitivecontemptin twelveB&Bcasesbefore lfexas'tr16hDistrictCourt Judge frnartinE. Richten("nicfitefl in Dallasbounty,wheneBaron'slarge political contnibutionshad long establishedBaron's influencewith alrnost all politician-judgesand politician-justlces in the courts of Texas Fifth JudicialDistrict.On April 30, 1998, Richtergrantedthe PLAINTIFF'STFIilRD AVIENDEDPETITION- Page 9 7, 1999,the TexasFifthCountof Appealsof Dallasdeniedthe petitionfor B&B'snnotion.On Septennber rnandamusrelieffrom Richte/sorderin Causehlo.05-9841965-CV,styledIn Re JarnesF. Cobbarising from twelvecasesbeforeRichter:GauseNos. 94-04691,94-05172,96-06046,96-00932,94-04685,97and94-05119. 96-06853, 96-11832,96-10846,94-07869, 08803,96-07554, In Februany 1998,Texas14b DistrictCourtJudgeJohnM. Marshall,appalledby Baron's askedDallasCountyDistrictAftorney.iohnVance('Vance")to investigateBaronand B&B.ln response, Banonand Baron'slawyersat CCS&Busedits politicalinfluencewith Vanceto haveCCS&BpartnerLuke Madole-- "...a bnlghtyoungattomeywho had recentlyjoined JohnVance'sstaff aftera very successful careerwith a large law fitrm..."- assignedas the assistantdistrictattorneyto "handle'the grandiury's that"...he of the grandjury thatMadoleclainned investdgation. At Madole'sfirstmeetingwiththe mernbers wantingto knowwhat..."the grandjury was contactfrom Baron& tsuddrepresentatives had considerabie on May 20, 1998,was cancelledand the the grandjury's scheduledfor meetflng doing.Subsequently, grand jury term was allowed to expire on June 30, 1998, despite Madole'srepresentationsto the menrbersof the grandjury that the case would requirethat the term be extendedfor an additional90 days.The day the grandjury was scheduledto meet;Lynnannouncedher appearanceas Greenberg's co-counselin the TexasFourthCourtof Appealsrnandamusactionarisingfromthe B&BMernoscandal. that in February'!998,Baronhad a complaintagainstMarchallfiled lFheDatlasObseryerreported with the TexasCommissionon .JudicialConduct.The DallasObserveralso reportedtfiat Baronused his had boughthimwith the trialjudgesand the influencethat generouspoliticalcontdbutions considerable appellatejusticesof the TexasFifthJudicialDistrictto blockthe defendantcompanies'attemptsto make the B&tsMernoa fraud issue in the B&tscases beingadjudicatedin DallasCoun$ courts.The Texas FifthCountof Appealsat Dallasdenieddefendantspetitionfor mandamusreliefon April 1, 1999from an order by Texas68h DistrictCourt JudgeGary Hall ("|-{all')findingthat the crirne-fraudexceptionto the privilegeruledid not applyto the discoveryof the docunrentsrelatedto the B&BMerno.In attorney-client Re All Plaintiffsin AsbestosLitigationwith PendingSanctionsMotionsagainstF. Cobb(CaseNo. 05-9900400-CV)was the mandarnusactionagainstHall in seventy-onecases.ApparentlyBaronneededLynn to leverageCCS&B'sinfluencewith the'll-exasThirdand FourthJudicialDistrfctsto gainfavorablerulings there,and soon after Banonhad quashedthe criminalinvestigationand the civil actionsarisingfronnthe in havingthe B&B MemoScandalin the TexasFifth Countof Appeals,Greenbergand Lynn sue,ceeded the defendant blocking grant nequlest B&B's mandamus Texas Third and Fourth Courts of Appeals prove and B&Bwere Baron that to be used any evidence that could companiesfromuneanthing additional engaging0na fraud. The TexasThirdand FourthCourtsof Appealsruledthat becausetherewas no evidencethat the that the attomey-clientprivilegewas a bar to the B&E clientshad knowledgeof the B&B conspinacy, defendantcornpanlesusing the B&B Mernoand the relateddocurnentsin their cases.The appellate justlceswritingthe opinionsmake no mentionthat the purposeof the aftorney+lientprivilege0sprotect the clients'interests,not the lawyers'interestsin concealingfromtheirclientsthe lawyers'liabllityfor legal rnalpnactice, fraud and breachof fiduciaryduty.Althoughthe appellatejustices'eroneous opinioncould Courtof Texas,the defendantcornpanies'lawyercchoose havebeenreversedby appealto the Suprenne to use the treat of an appealto the SupremeCourtof Texasto extort Baronand B&B into inducingthe B&Bclientsintosigningbelowfair-valuesettlementagreementsfor theirlega!clairns. The defendantconnpanies, Baronand B&B had enteredinto a conspiracyto use B&tspositionof settlementagreementsthat unjustlyenriched trustto fraudulentlyinduceB&Bclientsinto belowfiair-value payrnent of a falr-valuefonthe injuriesthey had caused,and B&B, the defendantcornpanies,by evading by threextractionof the B&B40% contlngencyfee fiom the firnn'sclients'low-bailseftlements.The B&B MennoScandalhad initiallyonly createdpotentiallegal malpracticeclainrsagainstB&E hy a few of the agreernents ts&Bclientsinto lowbailsettlennent finm'sclients,but the conspiracyto fraudulentlyinrdr.rce gave rise to new legal clainrsof conspinacyto comnritfraud and breachof flduciarydultythat no B&B clientshaveyet asserted. PETITION- Page '[0 PLAINITIFF'S Thil[RDAh/1ENDED had unearthedevidencethat DuPontand Conocohad receivedactualwrittennoticeof Fox's alcoholismwell beforethe jet crash in Malaysia,and that the companieshad Althor.rgh the DallasObserverand other legal professionalmediaoutletsreportedon the legal controversyarisingfromthe B&BMenno,the reportingfocusedon the impactthatthe B&BMemoScandal had on the businessand career interestsof the defendantcompanies,celebrityplaintiffs'lawyerslike Baron and/orTexas politician-judges that Baron had allegedlysucceededor failed in influencingwith pronnisesof politicalcontributionslaunderedthrough ts&B and other Texas law finns contnolledby lawyers whose interests were allgned with Baron's interests.At the time, few of the Judges or Justices in the Fifth Judicial District faeed oppositionrin electionsfor their political-judicialoffices. Consequently, there was no legitimateuse for the tens of thousandsof dollarsin politicalcontributions that flowed to these Justices.In Texas, neitherlaw academicsnor practitionerscornmentedpubllcally about Baron'sand B&B's breach of the firrn's fiduciaryduty to its clients to seek the firms' clients' infornnedconsentfor B&B to continuingto representthern in cases that had been darnagedby the revelationsof the B&B MemoScandal,and to advisethem that it rnaybe in the clients'best intereststo retiainnew lawyersto pursuefair-valuerecoveryon theirlegalclaims. By the beginning of 2001,Batron's, Greenberg's and Lynn'seffortsto keepB&Bclientsignorantof theinlegalclairnsagainstB&Bhad beenvery successful- exceptfor two casesthat threatenedto expose evidencethat Baron had been extortedby the defenrdantcompaniesinto fiaudulentlyinducingB&B clientsinto acceptingthe defendantcompanies'lowballsettlementoffers.The firct case, G-l Holdingsv. Baron was filed by one of the defendantcompaniesthat had been ftnanciallyexhaustedthroughthe inationalrulingsof Texas' politiclan-judges who appearedto be more concernedwith Baron'sbusiness inteneststhan they were with the lnterestsof the ll-exascitizenswho had electedthem to administer justice purcuantto the law in Texas. G{ Holdingsbroughtclaims underthe RacketeerInfluencedand CorruptOa"ganizations Act ("R|CO")(18 U.S.C.S1961),in federalcourtin NewYorkthatcontinuesto this day. One of the Defendantsin the Texasasbestoslitigationfiled on .Ianuary10, 2001 the Gl-Holdings, lnc. v. Banon & Budd,ef al (CaseNo. 01-CV-0216)in the UnitedStatesDistrictCountfor the Southenn Districtof NewYork at NewYork City.The case is pendingin the UnitedStatesCourtof Appealsfor the SecondCircuit(GaseNo 06-0174-CV).In Texas,Baronfoughtassociatedlegalskirmishesin attemptsto blockGl-Holdings' investigatlon of the fraudclaimsassented by the companyin Gl Holdingsv. Baron& Budd,et a!- see Baron& Budd,P.C. KrollAssocrafes, and MistyHflf.s(CauseNo. lnc. , Linda Butterfield, 01-00852-G/K)in the 134'n/192no .iudicialDistrictsof DallasCounty,Texasand Baron & Budd,P.C. v Kroll Associafes, in the UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfor the NorthernDistnictof Texasat Dallas(CauseNo. 3-01-CV-0239-D). The secondcase filed by KarinJacobs, PatriaJacobsand JoeAnn Frostv. Wliam Tapscottv. Barcn& Budd,(Jacobs v Baron& Budd) was filed by threeB&Bclientswho realizedthey had been inducedinto signing releasesfor their clairnsfor an amount that was far less than ts&E had representedto them they would neceive.[n this case, Greenbergand MotsenbockerdefendedB&B againsttFreseclainns.The case was assignedto l"f.S. DistrictJudge SidneyA. FiEwaterand it was assignedCauseNo. 3:04-cv-01968. rnotionfonsummaryjudgnnent JudgeFiEwatergranteddefundant's on the Plalntiffs'claims of negligen@,gross negligence,nnisrepresentiation, hreach of contractand of the 40% attorneys'fees,leavingonlythe Plaintiffs'claimsof breachof fiduciaryduty and disgorgernent contingencyfee that had beenextractedby B&8. Thejury awarded$129,000,in damageson the breach The appealto of fiduciarydutyclairns,but JudgeFiEwatergrantedthe J0tlOVmotionflled by Defendants. (No.07-10588)(nnandate issuedon June the L.l.S.Courtof Appealsfor the FifthCircuitwas unsuccessful 2, 2008).The UraitedStatesSuprenne Courtdenieda writ of certlorari(No, 080160)on October6, 2008. polltica!ally of Baronand Greenbeng. Like Lynn, FiEwatenhad been a long-t0nre FiEwatergnantedthe judgrnenton most of the Jacobs'claims ratherthan lettingthe jury decidethose nnotionfor sumnnany cfiaims;and aftenthe jury found tfrat B&B lawyer\Mlliam K. Tapscott,Jn. had lied to the Jacobsand caused them $129,000[n dannageson the Plaintiffs'remainingclainns,Judge F[Ewatergranted the Greenberg'sand Motsenbocke/snnotionfor a judgnnentnotwithstanding the vendict,therebynullifiTing jury'svendict. - Page11 PLAII{TIFF'S lfFllRDAMENDED PETITION concealedall evidencethat could have been usedto provethat Fox'salcoholismwas the probableproximatecausefor the fatal jet crash in which Ann Parsonshad died. l-lowever,Greenberg,Motsenbockernor Baronever advisedParsonsaboutthe conflict of interestcreatedby Baron'shiringLynnand CCS&Bto work on defeatingthe lawsuits arisingout of the B&BMemoScandal. 4.12 In February1999, after Parsonshad reviewedthe professionalliability insurance contracts that Turley had produced in Parsons y. Tudey, Parsons told Greenbergand Motsenbockerthat the insurancecontractsbetweenTurleyand AIG that were in effect between1992 and 1997,was evidenceof a conflictof interestbetween Turley and AlG, and the motive for Turley and Roes colludingin the derailingof Parsons'legal claims againstthe $100 millionAIG aviationliabilitypolicy. Parsons instructedGreenbergand Motsenbockerthat he wantedTurley'sconflictof interestwith AIG pleadin Parsonsv. Turleyas the probablemotivefor Turleycolludingwith Roseto defraudthe federal court of knowledgeof evidencethat the lawyersknew the federal court neededto know about to equitablydecidethe meritsof Parsons'legal claims againstthe companiesand to decidethe quantumof damagesthat the companies'and Turley'sinsurer,AlG, owedParsonsas judgmentdebton Parsonslegalclaims. 4.13 Lynn representedTurley and the LOWT in the depositionstaken in anticipationof filingsuit againstTurleyundera CCICprofessional liabilitypolicyTurley that obtainedin April 1997,after Turley/LOWTlearnedParsonshad hiredGreenberg and Gameron. 4.14 Turley had made material misrepresentations on the CCIC policy applicationform to obtain the CCIC policy.Turley stated that he had no reasonto PLAIhilT!FF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page '12 suspectthat a legalclaimwould be filed againstthe CCIC policywithinthe proposed coverageperiod(April 1997to April 1998)for errors or omissionsthat had occurred beforethe coverageperiodbeganwhichwas false. A.nS Baron, Baron's lawyers,Greenbergand Lynn, knew that Lynn was representingTurley under a CCIC insurancecontractthat Turley obtainedthrough fraud.s B. The Parsons v, Turlev litiqation 4.16 On June 12, 1998, Greenbergfiled the originalpetitionin Parsonsv. Turleythat had been anticipatedby the ancillaryactionto perpetuatethe testimonyof witnessesin which Lynn had been defendingTurleysince February1998.The same day, Greenbergfaxed a file-stampedcopy of the complaintto Lynn with a cover letter statingthat GreenbergwouldwithholdservingTurleywith citationif Turley,Lynnand a representative from each of Turley'sinsurers,includingexcessinsurers,coveringany fegafcfaimpleadin the originalpetitionin Parsonsv. Turleywouldmeetwith Parsons, Greenbergand Motsenbocker to discussthe case. 4.17 Greenbergtold Parsonsthat becauseParsonsv. Turleyhad beentimely filedthat therewas no harmin participating in attendingthe meeting.In the eightyears advisedParsons that Parsonsemployedthem, neitherGreenbergnor Motsenbocker that even under the circumstancesin Parsonsv. Turleywhere Turley's lawyer in the ancillarylitigationconductedin anticipationof filing the lawsuit had acknowledged receiptof a copyof the timelyfiled complaintagainsther client,that Texaslaw required or, that havean that Turleyalsobe servedwith a citationwithinthe statuteof limitations; PLAIhJTIFF'S T[-IIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page '!3 enforceableagneement,pursuantto Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Greenbergdid not procurea Rule 11 letterfrom Lynnstatilngthat on behalfof Turley and [-OWT,Lynn was agreeingto forego the assertionof a linritationsdefensefor the late serviceof citationuponTurley,[n exchangefor a Parsonsmeetingwith Turleyand his lnsurersto discussan earlysettlementof Parsons'clalrnsagainstTurleybeforethe farnouspersonalinjurylawyerhad sufferedadversepublicity. 4.18 The case was assignedto Texas 116thDlstrictCourt of DatlasGounty ulnderRlchterratherthan the Texas 101"tDistrictCourtof DallasCounS underJudge AdolphF. Canales("Canales") that had handledthe ancillarylitigationin anticipatlon of filing suit and that shouldhave retainedcontrolof the resultingcase,Parsonsv. Tufley. However,GreenbergassuredParsonsthat becauseLynn preferredRichter'scourt anrd ts&B had obtainedfavorahlenesultsfnom Richter in Baron'sefforts to gain contempt sanctionsagainstdefendants[n B&B asbestoscases before Richter'scourt, Farsons wouldbe well servedby the transferof his caseto Richter'scourt.e I Also LOWT|hwyer Michael G. Sawickitestifiedin his depositionfor this case (Parsonsv. Greenberg,et al.l that Turleyhad told him beforethe Parsonsv. DuPonttrial in July 1994,that Tunley expectedthat ParsonswouldsuleTurleyand his firm for legalrnalpractice. o judgmentin a longParsonswould laterleam that Richterhad also grantedBanona surnnnary running battle with an out-of-statelawyer over refenralfees that Baron had refused to pay her. Greenberg'srepresentations lead Parsonsto believethat to Richter,Baronand Greenberg,wetre"friends of the court." Pansons wouldalso laterlearnthat reciprocityfonRichter'sfiavorable ruling0nBaron'scases nnaybe tracedto the Iargepoliticalcontributionsthat Richterneceivedeitfrerdirectlyftorn E&B or ftom nnembersof the large networkof pollticallyinrfluential lawyerswho were alignedwith Baron'sbusiness intenests.In what was liketya rewardfor helpingBaronand Greenhergwith damagecontrolinrthe B&B MemoScandal,Baronursedhis politicalinfluenceto helpl-ynngainthe nomination as a federaljudgeon the U.S. DistrictCourt for the Nlorthrem Districtof Texas at Dallas.However,becauseshe would be scrutinlzedhy a Republican-controlled Senate JudiciaryCommitteethat would un@ver her knowing participation in and benefrtingfromTurley'sfnaudagainstCCIC,"Baronalso neededto provide[-ynnwith an exit from her responslbilities [n Parsons'anticipatedsuit agalnstTurley,Parconsv. Turley.To provide fonLynn'sexit, Banonused his controlof his corponatecounselGneenberg to createwhat Banon,l-ynn and Greenhergbelievedwould be a viable lirnitationsdefensefor Lynn to use in rnotionfor sumrnary judgmentthat shewouldfile in Parsonsv. Turley. PI.AINTIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Pagetr4 4.19 On February 19, 1998, Sidney K- Powell with Powell & Associates ("Powell")who servedas Parsons'federalappellatecounselin bothappealsof Parsons v. DuPont,filed a noticeof appeal in the second appeal in Parsonsv. DuPonf.\Mile workingon the secondappealin Parsonsv. DuPonf,becauseof her familiaritywith the underlyingcases, Parsons also had Powell do legal researchon the statute of limitationsfor legal malpractice,breach of fiduciaryduty and fraud. Based on her extensivelegal research,PowelladvisedGreenbergand Motsenbockerthat to protect Parsons'legalrightsto timelysue Turleyfor all of Parsons'anticipatedclaims,Parsons v. Turleyhad to be perfectedon or beforeJuly 18, 1998. 4.20 The fraud defendantsBaron and Greenbergknew that Parsonswas ignonantof the detailsof Texaslaw and that he wouldrely on theiradvice. Specifically he wouldnot knowthat to perfect,timely,a lawsuitunderTexaslaw (1) that suit hadto be timely filed and the defendantstirnely served with citation;and (2) that any agreementbetweenthe parties'lawyersto waivetimelyserviceof citationcouldnot rely upon the rnandateby the SupremeCourt of Texas throughthe Texas LawyensCreed ("Myword is my bond.")and wouldbe enforceableonly if it was memorialized in writing and filed with the court in accondance with Texas Rulesof Givil Procedure,Rule 11. Baron and Greenbergintentionallyand knowinglyused Parsons'ignoranceof this pecu[iarityof Texas law to give Lynnrthe statuteof limitationsdefenseshe neededfor her motionfor summaryjudgmentthat wouldassertthat noneof Parsonsclairnsagainst Turleyhad beentimelyfiled.1o 10DespiteLynn's tactlcof inducingParsonsto delayserviceof citationuponTurleyaftersuitwas filed, Greenbergand Motsenbocken did not assert on appeal that Turley and !-ynn had engagedin fraudulentlnducement to gainthe limitations defensethattheywouldlaterrelyon. - Page15 PLAINTIFF'S T!-|[RD AMENDED PETITION 4.21 Baronhad usedhis controlover Greenbergand Motsenbocker to createa limitationsdefense based upon Greenberg'sgiving Lynn the predicateinactionfor Lynn's summaryjudgmentmotion in Parsonsv. Turley.GreenberginformedParsons to a meetingand that Lynnhad agreedto bringTurleyand his insurers'representatives that Greenbergwould not serveTurleywith citationuntilthe meeting,Lynn'srepeqted postponement of the meetingto accommodate Lynn's"busyschedule"was intendedto get Parsonsnot to serve Turleywith citationuntil after July 18, 1998,when Baron, Greenberg,Motsenbockerand Lynn believedthat a limitationsdefense had been created for Turley based upon a two-year statute of limitationsfor Parsons' legal malpracticeclaims beginningon the day mandatewas issuedin the first of the two did not appeafsin Parconsv. DuPonf,on July 18, 1996. Greenbergand Motsenbocker ever advise Parsonsthat il was necessaryto get service of the lawsuit promptlyon Turley. In the alternative,Greenbergand Motsenbocker were negligentin accepting Lynn'sdelayswithoutprotectingtheirclients'interests. 4.22 Parsonswas lead to believeby Greenbergthat Parsons'willingnessto participatein the meetingwith Turleyand to consideran early settlementbeforeany adversepublicitywould cause Richterto look "favorably"upon Parsons'legal claims. silenceregardingLynn's Greenberg'srepresentations to this effectand Motsenbocker's apparentmotives,leadParsonsto believethat his legalrightshad beensecuredby the timefyfifing of the originalpetitionin Parsonsv. Turtey. Parsonswas lead to believe that the meetingwith Turley and his insurerswas being conductedunder Richte/s supervisionas part of the officialproceedings!n Parsonsv. Turtey. PLAINTIF'F'S TI-{ilRD AMENDEDPETITION- Page 16 4.23 Afterrepeatedde|ays,the meetingtook placeon July21, 1998;threedays after Lynnll believedthat she had secureda limitationsdefensefor Tunley.Lynnfailed to hring her client, Turley, or any one else with settlennentauthorityas she had promised,and Lynnfailedto bring any representative from Turley'sexcessinsurance carrier.After Greenbergpresenteda summaryof the basis for the fraud, breach of fiduciaryduty, misrepresentations, negligenceand gross negligenceclairnsagainst Turley, Lynn stated that she would need tinre to consultwith Turley beforeshe could respond.When Lynn failed to respondto Greenhergor accept service of citationon behalfof her client,Greenbergrequestedissuanceof citationagainstTurleyon August 13, 1998. However,Turley evaded service until September22, 1998, and was effectivelyservedonly afterthe courthad grantedsubst[tuteservice. 4.24 On March17, 1999,Lynnfiled a motionfor summaryjudgmentarguing that Parsons'legalclaimsfor legalmalpractice were barredby the statuteof llmitations. [-ynnarguedthat (1) FarsonsfiredTunleywhen he hriredPowel!on December5, 1994, 11 In D"c"rber 1998,Texas24s CongressionalDistrictRepresentative J. MartinFrost,a friend judge L!.S.DistrictCourtfor on the of bothBaronand Gneenberg, recommended for nomination as Lynn the NorthernDistrictof Texas.Frost'sdecisionwas apparentlyan emergencymove,becauseFrosthad alreadyneconnrnended that U.S.Attonneyfor the NorthemDistrictof TexasPaulCogginsbe the nornlnee. Neventheless, Cogginsnarnewas withrdnawn and Lynn'snarnewas substituted.("Themanwho wouldbe judge' in the DallasObserverDecember31, 1998.)On March25, 1999,PresidentClintonnominated '!7, 1999,the SenateconfinnedLynn Lynnas a federaljudgeas Frosthad recommended. On lrlovember judge as a on the U.S. DistrictCourt for the NonthemDistrictof Texas at Dailas.Baronnext used his influencewith Richterto get Lynn'smotionfor summaryjudgmentgnanted. . officeas a On July 9, 1999,Ricfrterannouncedhis intentionto seek a higherpolitical-judlcial justlceon the Courtof Appealsfor the Fifth.iudicialDistrictof Texas,alongsidehis friend.JustlceDavidL. Bridges("Bridges")who would write the opinlonssustainingRichtedsordengrantingthe summary judgmentin Parconsv. Turley.However,onrSeptemher18, 2000,the reslgningTexasgovernor,George W Bush, appointedRichtento the political-judicial office for which Richer had plannedto run -unopposed. GovernorBushappointedCarlosLopez("Lopez")as districtjudgeon the 116'' DistrictCount of DallasCounty,Texas who, on February9, 2001, would grant Greenberg'snnotionfon sumrnary judgmenton Baron'sbehalfin Woodrowv. Baron.On March28, 2003,BaronwouldglveLopeza job as "SpecialCounsel"at B&8. PLAINITIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 'tr7 to work on the first appeal in Parsonsv. DuPonf,and that the two-yearslimitationson Parsonslegal malpracticeclaimsthereforeexpiredon December5, 1997.lMurphyv. Campbell,964S.W.2d265 (Tex. 1996)l;or in the alternative,(2) Parsonsv. DuPont endedwith the issuanceof mandatein the first federalappealon July 18, 1996,and that the two-yearlimitationson Parsons'legal malpracticeclaimsthereforeexpiredon July 18, 1998.12 lHughesv. Mahaney& Higgins,8218.W.2d154(Tex. 1991)l 4.25 Lynn argued that Parsonswould have had to have sued and served Turleyno laterthan July 18, 1998,and that althoughsuit againstTurleywas filed on June 12, 1998,Turleywas not serveduntilSeptember22,1998.Lynn's34-pagemotion and supportingbrief beginswith an introductionfalselyassertingthat Parsonsv. Turley ts a "...time-banedmalpracticeaction...", and nowhereprovidesany argumentto justiff incorporating Parsons'claimsagainstTurleyfor fraudand breachof duty claimsinto a summaryjudgmentbased upon the two-yearstatute of limitationsthat she argued shouldbe appliedto Parsons'legalmalpractice claimsagainstTurley. 4.26 On August 16, 1999, Richter,without a wriftenexplanation,issuedhis ordergrantingLynn'smotionfor summaryjudgmenton all claimsthat were assertedin Parsonsv. Turley,includingParsons'fraudand breachof fiduciarydutyclaims.Parsons appealedto the Courtof Appealsfor the FifthJudicialDistrictof Texasat Dallas. 4.27 On August 11, 2000, Bridgesissued an opinion in Parsonsv. Tufley sustainingRichter'ssummaryjudgmentin favorof Turleyin Parsonsv. Turley.Parsons t' LynnknewfnomtakingParsons'deposition in Parsonsv. Turley,on February1, '!999,thatthe secondappealin Parconsv. DuPontwas pendingbeforethe UnitedStatesCourtof Appealsfonthe Fifth JndicialCircuituntilmandatewas issuedon Decernber 31, 1998. - Page18 PLAINTIFF'S THIRDAMENDED PETITION appeatedto the SupremeCourt of Texas, arguingthat in Texas Hugheswas the law controllingthe tollingof the statuteof limitationsln legalrnalpracticecases. C, Huohesv. Mahanev& Hiooins and Apex Towiinq Co. v. Tolin 4.28 On Jrlne 19, 2001, the SuprerneCourt of Texas issued its opinionin Parsonsv. Turley,109S.W.3d804 (Tex.App.: Dallas2003,pet. den.)and remanded the case back to the Texas Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Districtwith instructionsto follow the bnight-linerule establishedtn Hughesv. Mahaney& Higgins, 821 S.W.2d154 (Tex. 1991)and reassertedin ApexTowingCo. v. Tolin,41 S.W.3d '!18 (Tex. 2001).The so-calledHughes rule states that the statuteof limitationson a legalmalpracticeclaimis tolleduntil all appealson the underlyingcase are exhausted or the litigationis otherwiseconcluded.In Apex,the SuprerneCourtof Texasinstructed lowercourtsas follows. "We concludethat Murphydid not modiff the rule we announcedin Hughes, in the and todaywe reaffirmthat rule: When an aftorneycommitsnnalpractice prosecutionor defenseof a claim that resurltsin litigation,the statute of lirnitationson a rnalpracticeclaim aga[nstthat attorneyis tolled until all appealson the underlyingclaim are exhaustedor the litigat[onis otherwise finailyconcluded." "We continueto believe,however,that in the area of limitations,bright-lines rullesgenerallyrepresentthe better approach,and that the policy reasolls concernsof balancethe connpeting underlyingthe Hughesrule appnopriately the needto bar staleclaimsand avoidprejudiceto defendantsyet preservea clairns." to pursuelegitirnate fonplaintfrtfs opportunity reasonabfle "flA{itFrout re-examiningwhethenthe policy reasonshehindthe tollfingrule case matchingthe Hughesparadigm,courts applyin each legal-malpractice shouildsimply apply the Hughes tollinrgrule to the category of legalmalpracticecasesencompassedwithinits definition." 4.29 In late February2003,morethantwenty-onemonthsaftertsridgesopinion in Parsonsv. TurleysustainingRichter'sorder grantingTurleysutnrnaryjuldgrnentin PLAINTIFF'ST[-|[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page'!9 Parsonsv. Turleywas overturnedby the SuprenneGourtof Texasand remandedback to the Texas Fifth DistrictCourtof Appeals,at Parsonsnequest,Greenbergcalledthe clerk's office fon the Texas Fifth DistrictCourt of Appealsto ask about the status of Farsons'case.An assistantclerk told Greenbergthat for some reasonunknownher, review. Parsonsv. Tufleywasneversubrnittedto the appellatepanelforpost-remand 4.30 The next day, the Texas Fifth DistrictCourt of Appealsdocket sheet for Parsonsv. Turteyindicatedthat the case had been resubmittedon September11, 2003 - obviouslyan erroneousentry since it was not even June 2003. Subsequently, the docket sheet nrodifiedagain, this time to falsely lndicatethat Pansonsv. Tufley had opinion beensubmiftedon Septennben 11,2001.Bridgesfinallyissuedhis post-remand in Parsonsv. Tudeyon June23, 2003. 4.31 In tsridges'opinionon remand,he recitesthe factsin the casebeforehim as follows(underlineemphasisadded). "[n appealingthe federalcourt'sjudgment,Parsonsanguedthe evidencewas sufficientto supportthe jury's gross negligencefinding.On Jurne12, 1996.the Unlted States Court of Appealsfor the F[fth Circuit affirmedthe federal court's judgment.and ." mand "Sr.rbgquen'!!y, at DuPont'snequest,Turleysent a letterto DuPont'scounsel intereston the calculatingthe principal,prejudgmentlnterest,and post-judgment in fedenaljudgment agalnstDuPont.Parsonsdisagreedwith Turley'scalculations that they failedto compoundpnejudgrnent intenest.Parsons'counselsuhmitted differentcalculat[onsto DuPont. DuPonrtrefused to compoundpnejudgment interest,and the federal count also denied Parsons' request to compound prejudgrnent interest.Parsonsappealedand the Fifth Cincuitagainaffinmedthe federalcourt." 4.32 AlthoughBridgesrecitesthe fact that the secondappealin the underlying litigatlonoccurredsometfime afterthe datethat mandatewas issuedin the finstappealin the undenlying litigationon June '!2, 1996,Bridgesfails to statethe date most relevant PLAIhNTIFF'S T[-{IRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 20 to the legal issuethat the SuprerneCourtof Texas instructedhim to resolve- the date that mandatewas issuedin the secondandfinalappeal,Decernber31, 1998. 4.33 Bridgesrecitesthe law that SupremeGourt of Texas instructedhim to base his post-rernandreconsideration of the linritationsdefense that Richter had acceptedas the basisfor grantingTurleytotal summaryjudgmentin Parsonsv. Turtey. ExctudingBnidges'cites to legalauthoritynot directlyrelatedto the remandinstructions givenhim by the SuprerneCourtof Texas,Brldgeswritesas follows. "When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on the affirrnative defenseof limitations,he assulnesthe burdenof showingas a rnatterof law that "Thequestlonof whena causeof actionaccrues the suit is barredby lirnitations." is a questionof law for the court.""Wlen reviewinga summaryjudgnnent, we take as true evidencefavorableto the nonmovantand indulgeeveryreasonable "Wren, as here,a inferenceand resolveany doubtsin favorof the nonmovant." judgment defendantmoves for summary on more than one ground,and the judgrnentdoes not speciffthe groundsuponwhichthe trial courtrelied,we must determineif any of the theoriesadvancedby the parties!s meritorious." 'A cause of actionfor legal rnalpracticeis in the natureof a tort and, tFrus,is governedby the two-yearllmitationsstatute.""Lirnitations generallybeginto run when the cause of action accrues:when facts have come into existencethat authorizesa claimantto seek a judicial nennedy.Apex TowingCo. v. Tolin,41 S.W.3d118, 120 Oex. 2001).However,when an attorneycomrnitsmalpractice in the prosecutionr or defenseof a claim that results[n litigation,the staturteof nirnitations on a malpracticeclaimagainstthat attorneyis tolleduntil all appeals on the underlyingclainnare exhaustedor the litigationis othenlrbefinalfly concluded. /d-at '!'19. "AIl appealson this claimwere not exhausteduntil July 18, 1996;thus, under ApexTowing,the statuteof limitationson Pansons'malpracticeclairnswas toiled until that date. See Apex Towing,41 S.W.3dat'!19. We sustainFansons' argumentthat the accnualof his clairnsfor legalmalpracticewas tolileduntil all appealswereexhaustedin the underlyinglitigation. 4.34 The first sentenceof the last quoted paragraphahove is the kerne!of Bridges'misnepnesentatlon [n to the SupremeCourtof Texas.Bnidges'representations previousparagraphsshow that Bridgesunderstoodthe facts in the case and the law PI.AINTIFF'S Thil[RDAMENDEDPETITION. Page21 that the SupremeCourtof Texashad told him to applyto the facts.Bridgesaddedthe italicizedemphasisin "AIl appeals"demonstratingthat he knew that there was a subseguentappeal in the underlyinglitigationthat had only been concludedby the mandateissuedon December31, 1998- morethan two monthsafterthe Parconsv. Turleylitigationhad been perfectedby serviceof citationupon TurleythroughTurley's lawyer,Lynn. 4.35 Bridgesmisrepresents to the SupremeGourtof Texasthat Turleywas not timefyservedon September22,1998,becausethis datewas morethantwo yearsafter mandatewas issuedin the first [of the tvvo(2) appeals]in underlyingwrongfuldeath cases. Bridgeswillfullyconcealedfrom the SupremeCourt of Texasthat Turley had been timelyservedon September22, 1998,becausethat date was more than three monthsbefore limitationshad even had even begunto run on December31, 1998, whenmandatewas issuedin the secondof the two appealsin the underlyinglitigation. 4.36 Bridges'misrepresentations, uponwhichhe knewthat the SupremeCourt of Texaswould rely,were broughtto Bridges'attentionthroughParsons'motionfor a rehearing,Bridgesdenied Parsons'motion(Exhibit# 10) withoutconsultingwith the otherjusticeson the appellatepanel.r3 D. Baron & Budd and Gardere& Wvnne PoliticalContributionsto Bridqes 4.37 Bridges'CampaignContributionand Expenditurefilingswith the Texas EthicsCommissionshowthat priorto Parsonsv. Turleybeingremandedbackto him, PLAINTfFF'S T[-|[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page22 tsridgesneverreceivedany campaigncontributions. Furthernore,prionto 2008election cycle,tsridgesneverfacedany oppositionin his bidsfor electionor reelection.However, on June 25,2001, Bridgesaccepteda $2,500politicalcontributionfrorn B&8, and on .iune 28, 2001, Brldges accepted $5,000 political contributionfrom G&W. The two politicalcontributions made up morethan half of the $14,300in the first reportof any pollticalcontributionsever made to Bridgessince he began reportingto the Texas EthicsComrnission in 1996 4.38 Bridges' July through December 2007, neportto the Texas Ethics The Commiss[on,showsthat Bridgesneceived$46,900in total politicalcontributions. reportalso showsthat Bridgesspentthe rnoneyto pay for personalexpenses,suchas gasoline,Cinemarkand Targetgift cards,restaurants, and mobiletelephonebills. E. Investioationin anticipationof filinq an independentaction in federalcourt aqainst DuPontand Gonocofor fraud upon a federalcourt in Parsonsv. DuPonf 4.39 \Mrile Parsons v. Turteywas on appeal, Greenbergand Motsenbocker advised Farsons that the evidence that had been uncoveredin Parsons v. Tudey of the showingthat DuPontand Conocohad willfullydestroyedevidencein anticipation Parsons v. DuPonf litlgation,gave rise to new legal clailmsseekingthe recoveryof afmostthe sarne damagesthat Parsonshad assertedwere lost in Parsonsv. Turtey throughTurley'sand Rose'scollusion. tt In the opinionon remandauthoned Bridgeson or about.trune23, 2003,he inrcludes two hy footnotes.Footnote1: "JusticeEd Kinkeadeparticipatedin the oniginalsubrnlssionof this case. Since submission JusticeKinkeadehas retiredfnonn this Court.ChiefJusticeLindaThomashas reviewedthe recondand the briefsin this case."Footnote2: "JusticeJohn Roachparticipatedin the origlnalsubmission of this case. Since suhrnission,Justice Floachhas retiredfrom this Court. Justice Molly Francishas reviewedthe recordand the briefsin this case.' However,there is no evidencethat any otherjustices actualflyneadParsonsAugust8, 2003,nnotionfonrehearingbefoneBridgesdeniedit on August15,2003. - Page23 PLAINITIFF'S lfHlRDAMENDEDPETITION 4.40 Greenbergand MotsenhokeradvisedParsonsthat FederalRule of Civil FrocedureRule60(b)providedParsonsa legalremedythroughan independent action in a federa!court for the frauds upon the federalcourt that had been carriedout in Parsonsv. DuPonfby DuPontand Conoco,using Turley and Rose help, to gain a favorahlejudgmentfor DuPontand Conoco.la 4.41 Greenberg and Motsenboker recommendedthat Parsons formally investigatethe anticipatedfraud upon a federalcourt claims by filing a motionin a Texas district court to perpetuatethe testimony of some key witnesses. Parsons followedhis lawyetrs'recommendation; and on June 6, 2000, filed PETITIONFOR RU[-E202 ORDERin /n re: RogerK. Parsons,lndividuallyand as Administratorof the Estateof EstherAnn KartsotisParsons,Deceased("ln re: RogerK. Parsons) in the 101"tDistrictCourtof DallasCounty,Texas,(CauseNo. 004180-E). 4.42 The case was transferredto the 289t1'DistrictCourt of DallasCounty, Texas,(CauseNo. 004180-M).Becauseln re: RogerK. Parsonswas ancillarylitigation in anticipationof filinga fraudupona federalcourtactionagainstDuPontand Conoco, GreenbergnotifiedDuPontand Conocoof the legalactionby U.S.CertifiedMailon July 14,2000. 4.43 On August2, 2000,Rose,who had resignedfrom Garderein July 1999,to form Rose.Walker,L.L.P.,filed a responseon behalfof DuPontand Conocoto the 1aAn 'independentactionfor ftaud upon a federalcourt"refersto a legalactionin federalcourt for reliefffomjudgmentor onder,pursuantto FederalRuleof CivilProcedureRule60(b),becauseof '(b) ... ...Fraud,Etc.On motionand uponsuchtenrnsas are just, the courtmay relievea partyor a parly's legal representrative from a final judgment,order,or proceedingfor the foilowingreasons:... (3) fraud (whetherheretoforedenominatedintrinsicor extnflnsic), or other rnisconductof an misrepresentation, adverseparly... Th[srule does not linrnit the powerof a courtto entertainan independentactionto relleve a partyfrom a judgnnent, otrder,or proceeding... ...or to set asidea judgrnentfor frauduponthe court. judgment action." for ohtalnlnganyrelieffroma shallbe... ...by an independent flhe procedune -Page24 PLAINTIFF'S T[-|[RD AMENDED PETITION compfaintin ln re: RogerK. Parsons.lsBecauseRose was a key fact witnessto the allegedfraud against a federal court being investigatedin ln re: RogerK. Parsons, Parsonstold Greenbergand Motsenbocker that he believedthat Rosewouldonlywant to defendDuPontand ConocoagainstParsons'fraud allegationsso he wouldbe in a position to deflect the obvious subsidiaryallegationsthat Rose and Turley had in or at leasthad guiltyknowledgeof the fraudsagainstthe federalcourtin collaborated Parsonsv. DuPont.16 4.44 On August4,2000, the judge in In re: RogerK. ParconsgrantedParsons' motionto takethe depositionsof LieutenantColonelStephenW. Bross,legalcounselat the Officeof the Armed ForcesMedicalExaminer,Armed Forceslnstituteof Pathology ("AF|P")and ColonelWilliamT. Gormleywith the AFIPwho had headedthe 12-person federalgovernmentforensicteam that was sent to Malaysiaat Conoco'srequestand expenseten days afterthe jet crash. 4.45 From responsesto the subpoenaducestecumand testimonyobtainedin the depositionsof Bross and Gormley;the managerof the DuPont'sand Conoco's aviationoperations,DuPontVice PresidentFrank E. Petersen,Jr. (Petersen"),and Parsonshad testimony Conoco'scontractphysicianLyndonE. Laminack("Laminack"); and documentaryevidencefor the first time showingthat DuPontand Conocohad gainedcontnolof Fox's remainson the morningof September10, 1991,when Fox's remainswere removedfrom the site of the jet crashby the RoyalMalaysianPoliceand 15 In Parsons v. Turley, Rose representedConoco Presidentand DuPonrtExecutiveVice . diedon August23, PresidentConstantine S. Nicandrosin delayingNlcandros' depositionuntilNicandros 1999.fn Parsonsv. Greenberg,et al., Rose representedConocoSeniorCounselWalter L. tsrignonin Brignon'sdeposition on December16,2008. PLAIINTIFF'S TFIIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page25 deliveredto the Kota KinabaNu QueenElizabethHospitalinto the custodyof Laminack, who was repontingto Conoco IndonesiaMce FresidentSidneyS. Snrith("Snnith")l7 and/orConocoIndonesiaGeneralCounselWalterL. Brignon(""Brignon"). 4.46 Farsonsalso learnedthat by September15, 1991,when Gorrnely'steam arrivedon the scene,Conocorepresentatives who controlledwhichremainsGormely's tearn could see, concealedthe two bags of remainsthat had been deliveredto the hospltalmorgue on September10, 1991.18In his capaciff as DuPont'scorporate representativein the Parsonsv. DuPonflitigation,Petersenhad lied under oath about his knowledgeof the whereaboutsof Fox's remainsand had concealedin the Parsons v. DuPantlitigationthe writtenwarningsDuPonthad receivedfrom Cardamonepriorto the jet crash warningof the life-threateningsafety problemsthat had been createdby DuPontand Conocoseniormanagement's failureto do anythingaboutthe practiceof pilotsto fly connplex overseasmissions. usingunhealthyand undertrained 4.47 Based upon the informationthat the Malaysian CID provided the Malaysianmedicalexamineron numberof torsos that the MalaysianCID team had recoveredfrom the crash site and deliveredto the Kota KinabaluHospital,the 16Federalcourt necords for Rose'scases show that Rose continuedto work for AIG and AIG subsidianies afterhe left Gardere. 17In his depositiontaken by Gneenberg in Parsonsv. TurleyonAugust3, '!999,Petersentestified Snnithwas responsiblefor securingthe jet crash victinn'sremainsincludingFox's, but that Srnithwas untrustworthy becausehe sufferedfromalcoholism. Q. Okay.You mentioneda littlebit ago that you wantedto haveas littleas possibleto do with Sid Srnith.Wtrywas that? A. He'san alcoholic. was a problemwith Conocoennployees? Q. So alcoFrolisrn A. No. lt was a prohlemwith Smith.And he was interferingwith rny investigation, so I rnadeit a pointto avoidhirnas muchas posslble. tu On the fnonnthe secondof his two trips to Malayslaon Parsons'behalf,Camenondetennnined nnorguepersonnelthat the finsttwo body-hags,labeled"M-1' and "M-2"by the CriminalInvestigation Division('ClD")tearnof the RoyalMalaysianPolice,weighedapproximately 50 kilognanns apiece. - Page26 PLAINTIF'F'S lfH[RDAMENDEDPETITION Malaysianmedicalexaminerissued twelve death certificates,one for each of the individualsthat the Conoco and DuPont representativessent to Malaysia had representedto her were on the jet, includingone for Fox. Fox'sdeath certificateshows that Foxwas boughtin deadto the hospitalrnorgueand had diedof multipleblurnt-fonce injuriessustainedin the jet crash.le 4.48 The new evidenceand the evidenceshowingthat Conocoand/orDuPont had destroyedthe originalcockpitvoice recorder("CVR")recordingand the key portions of Fox's rnedicalrecordslndicatedto Greenbergand Motsenbockerthat Parsonshad tt In hesdeposition Turley by in Parsonsv. DuPontonAugust19, 1992,Petersentestified: Q. Okay. h0ow,was thereany drugtestingconductedon the remainsof the crewmembers. A. lfhat I'nnnot awareof. I can'tanswerthat question. Q. lt is ordinarypolicyat Du Pont,is it not, that any time there is an industrialaccidentthat the pantiesinvolvedanedrug{ested? A. !t's not only a policybut also in any accidentinvestigation- | sadly must informyou, sir, the bodiesof the pilot,the co-pilotand the cnewchiefwere not ree,overed. Q. l.lo portionsof the rernains? A. As I understandit, there was a portionof the crew chief. I do not knowthe specificsof quantitythatwas recovered. Q. l-{adyou requestedthat drugtestingbe doneif therewas sufficientrecovery? A. Yes, I had requestedassistancefforn several sources to do drug testing, body identification.But that is also a part of any forma!accidentinvestigationthat would have beent SafetyBoard. conductedby boththe MalaysianGovernmentand the NationalTransportation Q. Butyou specificallyhad intendedto havethat doneif theycouldpossiblydo it? A. Oh,absolutely. ln his depositionby Greenbergin Parsonsv. Turleyon August3, 1999,Petersentestified: Q. Well,you were in chargeof the envestigation? A. lfhat'strue. Q. And there'sa teamof pathologist fnonn the military......thatarriveson the scene,andyou knownothlngabouthow- why they'retheneor howconnetheygot there? A. The scope- to answeryou question,yes, that is correct.The scopeof my investigation was to determinethe cause of the accident.Anythingassociatedwith body recoveryor body identification, I had ahsolutelynothingto do with that. Q. Wro was in chargeof that? A. I haveno idea. of aviationat DuPontwasn'tin chargeof that? Q. So as fanas you know,the departnnent A. We were not - as Njust stiated,we were not in chargeof anythinghavingto do witit body identification. And in pointof fact,I thinkSid Srnithwas chargedwith that responslbility. Q. Okay. My questionto you is, is one of the first thingsthat you tried to investlgatein an airplanecrashis the toxicological conditionsof the pibts? A. Yes. Q. Wasthat donein this case? A. No. - Page27 PLAINITI FF'STl-iIRDAMENDEDPETITION viableclaimsagainstDuPontand Conocofor the companies'fraudupona federalcourt in Parsonsv. DuPonf,pursuantto Rule 60(b)or the FederalRulesof Civil Procedure. Greenbergand Motsenbockerrecommendedthat Parsonsemploy additionallawyers who had experiencehandlingcomplexcasesagainstlargecorporations to assistthem in prosecutingParsonsnewclaimsagainstDuPontand Conoco. 4.49 Parsons accepted his lawyers' recommendation.Greenbergcontacted severallawyersin Texas,NewYork and Washington,D.C.in ac0ordance with Parson's instructions. According to Greenberg, none of these lawyers had any interests. ParsonsinstructedGreenbergto ask Baron if he knew of a lawyerwho would help. Farsonsneverheardbackfrom Greenberg. 4.50 On January14,2005,afier not hearingfrom Greenbergor Motsenbocker for more than two months, Parsons asked that the files that Greenbergand Motsenbocker had maintainedon his casesbe turnedover to him.After pickingup the files from Greenberg'sofficesin Arlington,Texason January24,2005, Parsonsnever heard from Greenbergor Motsenbockeragain until they respondedthrough their attorneysto Parsonslawsuitin the currentlitigation. V. NilISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD 5.01 Plaintiffincorporates the foregoinghereinas if copiedverbatimat length. 5.O2 Defendants Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker,one or more, representedto Plaintiff,as more specificallyset out herein, that cornpetentlegal serviceswould be renderedto Plaintiff. The misrepresentations of these defendantsto Flaintiffwere materialbecausesuch misrepresentations inducedPlaintiffto hire, retain and continueto paythesedefendantsenormousamountsof legalfees. PLAINITIF'F'S ThI[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 28 5.03 The representations to Plaintiffby Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker were false. Moreover,such representations were a false promiseof futureperformance to Plaintiff. and suchconductamountedto falserepresentations 5.04 Defendants Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbockermade the false were made, representationsknowingthey were false. At the time the representations these defendants owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. Baron, Greenberg and and in fact, Motsenbocker intendedfor Plaintiffto rely upon the false representations when acquiescingin the failure to Plaintiff relied upon the false representations immediatelyserve Turley and LOWT,and to file suit in an independentaction in a federalcourtassertingParsons'claimsagainstDuPontand Conocofor the companies' fraud uponthe federalcourtin Parsonsv. DuPont. of Baron, 5.05 Additionally,Plaintiffrelied upon the fraudulentrepresentations Greenbergand Motsenbocker that Parsons'legal rightswould be protectedalthough thesedefendantsactedto (1) only serveTurleyin Parsonsv. Turleyafterthey believed that the inactionhad createda limitationsdefensefor Turley in Parsonsv. Tufle1;(2) excludefrom post-remandpleadingsin Parsonsv. Turleythe statementof fact that the basisfor Parsons'victoryin Parsonsv. Tudeybeforethe SupremeCourtof Texaswas the fimitations-tolling second appeal in Parsonsv. DuPonf and (3) delay filing suit againstDuPontand Conocofor Parsons'frauduponthe federalcourtclaimsuntilmore than four years after Parsonshad discoveredevidencethat the claimswere viablein the T.R.G.P.Rule202deposition of Col.\MlliamT. Gormley. PLAITilTIFF'S ThIIRDAMBNDEDPETITION- Page 29 5.06 The false misrepresentations by Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker directlyand proximatelycausedinjuriesto Plaintiff,which resultedin Plaintiffsclaims againstTurleyand LOWT,and DuPontand Conocobeingtime barred. 5.07 tsy delayingserviceupon Turley, Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker failedto disclosethat the statuteof limitationsmightlaterbar PlaintifPs claimsand failed to act diligentlyto obtainserviceon Turley. 5.08 Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker,likewise,failed to disclosethat therewas no enforceableRule 11 agreementbetweencounselrelatedto this issueand, in fact, none had even been requested. Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerby delayingserviceuponTurley,deprivedPlaintiffof his legalrightand remediesand a trial bviury. 5.09 After failing to disclosethat the statute of limitationsmight later bar Plaintiffsclaimsand or take appropriateactionto obtainserviceupon Turley,Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockercontinuedto intentionallymisrepresentto Plaintiff, throughfour yearsof appeals,that they had exerciseddue diligence,whereas a mafter of lawthey had not.Thismisrepresentation was material. 5.10 Plaintiffwill demonstrate1) defendantsmade representations to the Plaintiff;2) those representations were material;3) those representations were false;4) when the defendants made the representations,the defendants knew the were false or made their representationsrecklesslyas a positive repnesentations assertionwithoutknowledgeof the truth; 5) the defendantsmadethe representations with the intentthat the plaintitfrely on it; 6) Plaintiffreliedon the representations; 7) the representations causedthe Plaintiffinjury.Thus, Plaintiffseeks unliquidateddamages P!-AINTIFF'S T[-|[RDAIVIBNDED PETITION- Page30 withinthe jurisdictionallimitsof this court arisingout of this conductfor commonlaw fraud. VI, BREACHOF FIDUCIARYDUTY 6.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporatesthe allegations made in the above paragraphs, as if fullyset out at lengthherein. 6.02 Duringthis period of time, Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbockerowed Plaintiffa fiduciaryduty. Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker owed Plaintiffa duty of candor,loyalty,trust,fidelityand full disclosure.The duty is one that is imposedby the special relationshipof trust and confidence. As such, PlaintiffentrustedBaron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerwith the at issue legal matters,includingspecifically, legalrnattersinvolvingthe claimsagainstTurleyand LOWT,and DuPontand Conoco. 6.03 A special relationship existed in which Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker held themselvesout as professionals in the area of law in which they practiced.Plaintiffreliedupontheir representations and counsel.Thereforea fiduciary relationshipand a resultingfiduciaryduty existed between Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker,as attorneys,and Plaintiff as their client. Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker had the duty to act fairly,honestlyand equitablywith regardto Plaintiff. However,the Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerbreachedtheir fiduciaryduty to Plaintiff,proximately causingdamages,resultingin the Plaintiffsdamages. 6.04 At no time during this peniod of time did Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker denythat they had a fiduciarydutyto Plaintiff.At no timeduringthistime perioddid Greenberg,Motsenbocker and Barontakethe positionthat they did not have an attorney/clientrelationshipwith Plaintiff. At no tirne did Baron, Greenbergand PLAIhXTIFF'S ThIIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page31 Motsenbockertake the positionthat they were not assistingor were unableto assiston any of the legal mattersor renderadvice regardingParsons'clainrsand/or litigation againstTurleyand LOWT,or DuPontand Conoco. To the contrary,duringthis period of time, Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerrepresentedto Plaintiffthat they were qualified,that they were representingthe Plaintiff,that they had an attorney/client relationship with Plaintiff,that theywerecontentand happyto work uponPlaintiffslegal rnatters,that they were able to do so, and that they had an ongoing attorney/client relationship with Plaintiffinvolvingthe claimsand/orlitigationagainstTurleyand LOWT, and DuPontand Conoco. The total billingof Defendants,includingthe recommended consultants, expertsand investigators approximated $1,000,000.00.Plaintiffpaidthose surnsas requested. 6.05 The conductof Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker constitutesa hreach of fiduciaryduty,whichconductproximatelycauseddamagesto Plaintiff.In particular, Plaintiffassertsthe followingnon-exclusive conductwas a breachof the fiduciaryduty owedto Plaintiff: a. Elaron,Greenbergand Motsenbockerbneachedtheir duty of undivided loyaltyto the client by being loyal to personsother than the client in connectionwith the legalrnattersat issue; b. put their financialinterestaheadof Banon,Greenbergand Motsenbocker the c[ient; A 1,.r. d" Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerbneachedtheir duty of undivided loyal$ owedto the clientby not makinga full explanationof all of the risks and impllcationsof the actions and/or inactions that they were contemplatingin connectionwith the case, and in connectionwith the Turieylitigationandthe DuPontand Conocolitigation; Baron,Gneenberg and Motsenbocken fai[edin their duty of full disclosure in connectionwith the Tur|eylitigation,in that they did not fullydiscloseto the client al! of the risks, consequencesand implicationsof the PI-AINTIFF'S TFIIRDAI/nENDED PETITION- Page 32 nor did they disclosewhat the actionsfinactions they were conternplating, risks and options were for the client in connection with their actions/!nactions; e. Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerfailed to disclosethe conflictsof interest presented,includingbut not limited to the actual conflict of pursuingan appealcausedby Greenberg'sand Motsenbocker's failureto procure tinnely citationsand serveTurleyand LOWT,and by employing Turley'slawyer,Lynn,to serve Baron'sinterestsin the litigationarising fromthe B&tsMemoScandal;and f. Greenhergand Motsenbockencontinuedto bill Plaintiff and accept paymentsfrom Plaintiffafter not timely servingthe Turley and LOWT in the Turleylitigation. As a resultof such breachof fiduciaryduty, Plaintiffhas been harmed. Also,just as significantly,Greenbergand Motsenbockerare not entitled to any compensation previouslypaid becausethey breachedthe fiduciaryduty owedto Plaintiffand they did not properlyperformthe legalservicescontemplated. 6.06 Plaintiffwill dennonstrate that 1) there was a fiduciaryrelationshipwith Defendants,2) the conductcomplainedof was a clearand seriousbreachof fiduciary duty, 3) that the breachresultedin injuryto the Plaintiffand benefitto the Defendants (whichconstitutesconstructive wl'richare considerations fnaud)to be weighedin viewing the remedies,inclurding disgorgernent that shouldbe appliedin this case. VII.UNJUSTENRICHME]TT 7.01 Al[ previousparagraphshereinare herebyre-allegedfor all purposesand incorporatedby referenceas if set out in full. 7.02 Inconporating the above paragraphs,Plaintiffwould show that funds, assetsand/orclaimswhichwere rightfullydue him were wrongfullylost becauseof tl"re breachof a specialtnust,fiduciaryrelationship, and/oractuailfraudby Baron,Greenberg and Motsenbocker, one or more. Retentionof Plaintiffsfunds,assetsand/orclaims PLAINTIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 33 would be unconscionable, thus Plaintiffassertsthat DuPontand Conoco,and Turley were unjustlyenrichedthroughthe breach of a specialtrust, fiduciaryrelationship, and/oractual fraud of Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker, and Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon those entitiesthat have benefitedfrom the breachesof a specialtrust, fiduciaryrelationship,and/oractualfraud by Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker. 7.03 A constructive trust on the funds,assetsand/orclaimsin questionis the only remedy that will adequatelycompensatethe Plaintiffand preventthe unjust enrichmentof DuPontand Conoco,and Turley,one or more,at the Plaintiffsexpense. 7.04 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the funds,assetsand/orclaimswithinany Defendant's care,custodyand control,as well as the care, custodyand controlof otherentitiesand/orperson(s)that have benefitedfrom the breachesof a specialtrust, fiduciaryrelationship,and/oractualfrauds by Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker. These funds, assetsand/orclaimsshouldhave been rightfullypaid to Plaintiffto the extent of Plaintiffsdamages.To avoid furthenunjust enrichmentof the DuPontand Conoco,and Turley,or suchotherentityor person(s)that Plaintiffmay demonstrateat trial, a constructivetnustshouldbe imposedupon those defendantsor such other entity or person(s)that Plaintiffmay demonstratethat benefitedfronr threbreachesof a specialtrust, fiduciaryrelationship,and/or actual fraudsof Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker.A constructivetrust on these funds, assetsand/orclaimsis the only remedythat will adequatelycompensatePlaintiffand preventany furtherunjustenrichmentof Defendantsat Plaintiffsexpense. PLAINNTIFF'S ThIilRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 34 7.O5 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the funds, assetsand/orclaimswithin DuPont'scare, custodyand controlin an amount DuPontwas unjustlyenrichedby avoidingpaymenton the judgmentdebt that would havebeenaccessedin the anticipatedfrauduponthe courtactionagainstDuPont,but for the breachesof a specialtrust,fiduciaryrelationship, and/oractualfraudsof Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker. 7.06 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the funds, assetsand/orclaimswithin Conoco'scare, custodyand controlin an amount DuPontwas unjustlyenrichedby avoidingpaymenton the judgmentdebt that would havebeenaccessedin the anticipatedfrauduponthe courtactionagainstConoco,but for the breachesof a specialtrust,fiduciaryrelationship, and/oractualfraudsof Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker. 7.07 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the funds, assets and/or claimswithin Turley'scare, custodyand control in an amount DuPontwas unjustlyenrichedby avoidingpaymenton the judgmentdebt that would have been accessedin Parsonsy. TufleyagainstTurley,but for the breachesof a special trust, fiduciaryrelationship,and/or actual frauds of Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker. 7.08 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the funds, assets and/or claimswithin LOWT'scare, custodyand controlin an arnount LOWTwas unjustlyenrichedby avoidingpaymenton the judgmentdebt that woulld have been accessedin Parsons v. Tufley against LOWT, but for the breachesof a PLAINTIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 35 special trust, fiduciary relationship,and/or actual frauds of Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker. VIII.NEGLIGENCE 8.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporatesthe allegations made in the above paragraphs, as if fullyset out at lengthherein. 8.02 The individualBaron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerwere attorneys practicinglaw within the State of Texas at all relevanttimes herein. Each was an attorneyfor Plaintiff. At all times relevanthereto,Plaintiffand Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbockermaintainedan attorney-clientrelationship.Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were negligentin the courseof the performance of their legalservicesto their client,Roger K. Parsons,individually,and as IndependentAdministratorof the Estateof EstherAnn KartsotisParsons. 8.03 Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbockersolelycontrolledthe timing of the citationand petitionuponTurleyand failedto exercisediligencewhendelayingsame. 8.04 Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker owed Plaintiffthe duty to exercise the level of care that other aftorneyspracticingin the same localityand in the same or similar circumstanceswould have exercised. However, Baron, Greenbergand of Plaintiffdid not Motsenbocker actions/inactions in the courseof their representation meet the standard of care as required by their profession,and thereby Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker breachedthelr duty of careto Plaintiff.Evenin the post remandbriefingGreenbergand Motsenbocker failedto brief availableargumentsthat the statuteof limitationswas not a defenseto the Turley lawsuit. These actionsor inactionsamountto legalnegligence. PLAIhITIFF'S Thl[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 36 8.05 Due to Greenbergand Motsenbocker'slack of diligenceand neglect, Parsonslosthis claimsagainstTurleywhichinclude,but are not limitedto: a. Turley's failure to use reasonableeffort to obtain an award of adequatecompensatory damages; b. Turley'sfailureto developand/oruse sufficientevidenceof gross negligencein orderto havesecuredan exemplarydamagesaward; c. breach of contractclaim relatedto the attorney/clientagreement; and d. breachof the fiduciarydutiesowedto Parsons. Turley'sactions/inactions werebelowthe standardof care,causingPlaintiffdamages. 8.OO As direct and proximateresultof these acts of negligence,Plaintiffhas sufferedactualdamages,in an amountof the compensatory damagesPlaintiffwould have recovered in excess of the jury verdict if Turley had properly prepared and presented the trial evidence against DuPont, in an amount of the additional cornpensatory damagesand the exennplary damagesPlaintiffwould have receivedin the DuPontlitigation,in an amountof compensatory and exemplarydamagesPlaintiff wouldhave receivedagainstConoco,in an amountto compensatePlaintifffor Turley's breach of the employmentcontractbetween P|aintiffand Turley, the forfeitureof the approximate$1,500,000.00fee paid by Parsonsto Turley,the amountof any prejudgmentand post-judgment interestas a resultof those lost exemplarydamages,in duringthe additionto the aftorney'sfees Plaintiffpaid Greenbergand Motsenbocker courseof their representation, all of which Plaintiffnow seeksjudgmentas against jointlyand severally. Defendants, 8.07 There is a standardof care requiredfor lawyerspracticinglaw withinthe Stateof Texas. Thereis a stanrdard of care that requiresa lawyerto be reasonableand PLAINXTIFF'S T[-I[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 37 prudent,i.e., not negligent,with the respectto the handlingof affairsto which he is entrusted. There is also a standard of care that requires an attorneyto act as a fiduciaryand complywith his fiduciarydutyto the clientat alltimes. In this case,Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker breachedthe standardof care applicableto aftorneys. The acts and omissionsof Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker were negligentand in violationof fiduciarydutiesowedto Plaintiff. In particular,Plaintiffwouldsay that the followingnon-exclusiveconductfell below the standardof care requiredfor Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker, separatelyor as a groupbecauseBaron,Greenbergand Motsenbockerneglecteda legalmatterthat was entrustedto them, becausein doingall of the actionsthat are complainedof herein,withoutnoticeto the clientor withoutan adequateexplanationto the client,and withoutthe informedconsentof the client,they showeda consciousdisregardfor the responsibilities thattheyowedto the client. 8.08 In the underlingcases againstConocoand DuPont,Turley and LOWT breachedthe standard of care applicableto attorneys. The acts and omissionsof Turleyand LOWTwerein violationof fiduciarydutiesowedto Plaintiffandfraud. 8.09 All of this conductwas a breachof the dutiesthat were owedto Plaintiff. This conductconstitutedunreasonableconduct,which was negligentas that term is definedin law andwhichis a proximatecauseof damageto the Plaintiff. IX. GROSSNEGLIGENCE 9.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporatesthe allegations nrade in the above paragraphs, as if fullyset at lengthherein. 9.02 The acts of Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker constitutea departure from that which a personof ordinaryprudencewould do underthe same or similar "[-hN[RD PLAIhXTIFF'S AMENDEDPETITION- Page38 circumstances. As such, Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbockerare liable for negllgence,negligenceper se, gross negligenceand gross negligenceper se. In particular,Plaintiffwouldshowthat Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker were negligent and/orbreachedtheirfiduciarydutyin connectionwith one otrrnoreof the followingnonexclusiveparticulars: a. Failingto properlyhandleFlaintiffslegalmattensregardingthe Turleyand !-OWTlitigation,and the DuPontand Conocolit[gation; b. Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerin general have been trying to promotetheirown economicself-interest ratherthantheirclient; c. Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockeractuallyabandonedthe client by failingto timelyserve\MndleTunleyand his lawfirm,and therefore,should forfeit all of the fees and/or economicbenefitsand/or items of economic substancethatthey received; d. Earon,Greenbergand Motsenbocker failedto adviseand counselPlaintiff, point in time, of the legal risks and consequencesinvolvingtheir any actionsand/orinactions. 9.03 Al[ of these items are negligent,grosslynegligentand violationof the fiduciarydutythat Baron,Greenhergand Motsenbocker owe to its client. Theseactions either have been taken hy Defendantsand/ortaken by its partners,agents,employees or other entitiesover whom it has control. Further,when these actionshave been brought to the attention of Baron, Greenbergand Motsenhocker,they were totaily callousand in a blatantdisregardof any rightsor considerations the clientrnighthave. All of thls is negligent,grosslynegtrigenrt, a breachof fiduciarydutyand is fraudor, rnore specifically,a constructivefraud. A breach of fiduciaryduty is a form of constnuctive fraud. All of thesetontsare a proximatecauseof darnagesto the Plaintiff. 9.04 Each of the above and fonegoingacts of Baron, Greenberg and causeof Motsenbocker constitutednegligence,negligenceper se and werea pnoximate - Page39 PLAINITIFF'S lfH[RDAMENDEDPETITION damageto Plaintiff. Therefore,for all of such actions,Plaintiffherebyrequestsactual damagesas appropriateunderlaw. Nothingthe Plaintiffdid or failedto do in any way causedor contributed to the injuriescomplainedof herein. 9.05 Further, the conduct of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbockerwas intentional, willful,grosslynegligentand in totaldisregardfor the rightsof Plaintiff.More specifically,the conduct of Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerwas consciously indifferentand/orgrosslynegligent,towardsPlaintiff,in that they knewthe importance, and the monetaryvalueof providingcompetentlegalserviceson behalfof the Plaintiff, as well as Plaintiffs immediatedesire and need to have competentlegal seruices regardingthe Turley litigation. Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker,with such knowledge,failed to protectthe interestsof Plaintiffand, in fact, put their interests before the interestsof the Plaintiff. The conductwas of the kind and characterthat warrantsthe impositionof punitivedamagesin orderto compelrespectfor the law and the rights of others,and to deter Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerand others similarlysituatedfrom similar conduct in the future. Plaintiffis entitledto recover punitivedamagesin an amountin excessof the minimumjurisdictionallimits of the Court. 9.06 Plaintiffwould show that there are no applicablebars to his case based uponany statuteof limitations.Flrst,Plaintiffwouldshowthat the statuteof limitations has not run on the causesof actionassertedherein. Plaintiffwouldshowthat eitherthe causesof actionhave not accrued,or have accruedwithinthe last tro years. Plaintiff also allegesthat Plaintiffhas two (2) yeansfrom the date that the acts complainedof were knownto Plaintiff. Plaintiffwould also pleadthe benefitof any tollingstatuteof PLAIhJTIFF'S ThflIRD AMENDEDPETITION- Page40 limitations,includingany tollingof statuteof limitationsregardingthe time periodduring whichany Defendants wereout of the Stateof Texas. 9.07 ln addition,Plaintiffwould showthat any statuteof limitationswould be that relationship tolledduringthe peniodof time that defendantshad an attorney/client was ongoingwith Plaintiffbecausethe discoveryrule appliesto toll the statute of llmitations for claimsof breachesof fiduciaryduty. 9.08 Plaintiffwouldshowthat manyof the allegationsreferredto hereinas acts of malpracticeon the part of Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker,occurredwithintwo (2) years of the date the conduct of Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerbecame knownto Plaintiffand, therefore,are not barred by the statuteof limitations. Further, Plaintiffwould also plead the effect of any tolling statute regardingamendedor pleadingsarisingout of the transactionor occurrenceas relatingbackto supplemental the dateof the originalfiling. 9.09 Plaintiffwouldask the Courtto takejudicialnoticeof the datethe original to filingin this casetook placeand alsojudicialnoticeof the datethat any amendments the petitionare filed. 9.10 Plaintiffwould ask the court to applythe discoveryrule to all applicable claims. Additionally,Plaintiffherebypleadsthe Hughesrule, as cited by the Texas SupremeCourtin Hughesv. Mahaney& Higgins,821 S.W.2d154(Tex.1991)and the Apex rule,as cited by TexasSupremeGourt,is Apex TowingCo. v. Tolin,41 S.W.3D 118 (Tex. 2001). Underthe Hughesand Apex doctrines,the statuteof limitationsis tolled until Plaintiffhas exhaustedall litigationand appeals. Until then, the causeof actlondoesnot accrue. Plaintiffthereforeassertseachof theseexceptionsto the tolling PLAIhITIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page41 of the statuteof limitationsto supportthe timelyfilingof the Plaintiffsoriginalpetitionin this matter. X. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 10.01 Plaintiffincorporates the provisionsof the aboveparagraphs.Pursuantto judgment Tex. Civ. Prac.& Rem.CodeSS37.001,et seq.,Plaintiffseeksa declaratory that: a. Evidencethat the pilot suffered from alcoholismshould have been discoveredand utilizedby Turley; b. and Plaintiffwouldhavesatisfiedthe Texasstandardfor grossnegligence, thus would have been granted an exemplarydamagesaward, if the evidencethat the pilot sufferedfrom alcoholismhad been discovered, and not utilized alongwith the otherevidencediscoveredby Defendants, by Turley; c. Turley's failure to use the Cardamoneletters and the testimonyof. Cardamoneat the DuPont trial would have satisfiedthe subjective awarenessprongof a grossnegligence finding; d. Flaintiffwas damagedby virtueof the breachof suchduties; e. Flaintiffsdamageswere proximatelycausedby the breachof suchduties by Defendants; The discoveryrule appliesto toll the statuteof limitationsfor the claimsof breachof fiduciarydutiesmadeherein;and g. DefendantsConocoand DuPontare vicariouslyliablefor the fraudulent SDO&S;Baron;B&B; acts of Greenberg;LegalServices;Motsenbocker; Turley;and LOWT; h. Defendants Conocoand DuPont,andTurleywereunjustlyenrichedby the actionsof Greenberg;LegalServices;Motsenbocker; SDO&S;Baronand B&B;and Flalntiffis entitledto a returnof all fees and expensespaidto Greenberg, Legal Services, Motsenbocker, SDO&S and these defendants' recommended consultantsand experts. PLAIhITIFF'S THIRDAIVIENDED PETITION- Page42 XI. VrcI.ATIONSOF TEXASDECEPTIVETRADEPRACTICESACT 11.01 Flaintiff hereby incorporatesthe allegations made in the above paragraphs, as if fullyset out at lengthherein. 11.02Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerwere and are in violationof the TexasDeceptiveTradePracticesAct. Defendantsengagedin false,mislead[ng, and/or deceptiveacts or practicesthat Plaintiffreliedon his detriment.Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbockerhave violatedthe provisionsof the Texas DeceptiveTrade PracticesConsumerProtectionAct (the "DTPA') by failing to disclosecertain informationto Plaintiff.Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerand/or its agents, employees,and servantsactingwithin the courseand scope of their employmentengagedin false, misleading,deceptive and unconscionableconduct. Specifically,the wrongful, unconscionable,and culpable conduct of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker includes,but is not necessarily limitedto, the following: a. representingthat goods or services have sponsorship,approval, characteristics, ingredients,uses,benefitsor quantitleswhichthey do not have,Tex.Bus.& Com.CodeAnn.$17.46(bX5); b. repnesenting that goodsor servicesare of a particularstandardonquality, whenthey are or another,Tex. Bus.& Gorn.GodeAnn.$17.46(bX7); G. representingthat an agreementconfersor involvesrights,rernedies,or obligationswhich it does not have or involveor which are prohihitedby law,Tex.tsus.& Com.CodeAnn.$17.46(b)(12); d. whichwas the failureto discloseinformationconcerninggoodsor senvices known at the tirne of the transactionif such failure to disclosesuch infonrnation was intendedto indurcethe consumerinto a transactioninto which the consumerwould not have enteredhad the informationbeen and disclosed,Tex.Bus.& Com.CodeAnn.$17.46(bX24): e. engagingin unconscionable conduct,actionsand coursesof action,Tex. tsus.& Conn.CodeAnn.$17.50(aX3). PI-AIIUTIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 43 11.03 Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerengaged in deceptiveconduct intentionallyand knowingly. Defendantshave actual awarenessof the falsity, deception,or unfaimessof the act or practice and acted with a specific intent that Plaintiffact in detrimentalrelianceon the falsityor deceptionor in detrimentalignorance of the unfairness. 11.04 Because Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockeracted knowinglyand intentionally,Plaintiffis entitledto recoveractual damages,damagesfor emotional distress,aftorney'sfees and additionalstatutorydamages. Furthermore,Plaintiffis entitled to such damages because Plaintiff has complied with the statutory notice requirementof the DTPA by issuing a timely demand on Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker. XII.ATTORNEYS'FEES 12.01 Plaintiffincorporatesthe provisionsof the above paragraphsand would showthe Courtthat pursuantto the termsof the contract,the DTPAand Section38.001 et seq., of the Civil Practices& RemediesCode,Plaintiffis entitledto recoverof and from Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbockera sum representingPlaintiffsreasonable and necessaryattorneys'fees, which sum is a reasonablechargefor the services renderedin bringingthis suit. In the eventof Baron's,Greenberg'sor Motsenbocker's, one or more, unsuccessfulappealto the court of appeals,Plaintiffwould be further entitledto a reasonableattorney'sfee; and in the event of Baron's,Greenberg'sor Motsenbocker's unsuccessfulappealto the Texas SupremeCourt,Plaintiffwould be entitledto an additionalreasonableattorneys'fee. PLAINTIFF'S THflRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 44 XIII.RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 13.01 Motsenbockerwas in the course and scope of his employmentwith SDO&Sduringthe time periodthattheywere representing the Plaintiff.Further,he was in the courseand scopeof his law practiceat all timesthereafterwhen he madelegal decisionsregardingthe representation of Plaintiff.Accordingly,SDO&Sis responsible for the actions of Motsenbocker. Motsenbockerwas an agent of the firm of Shafer Davis, either as vice-principal,principal,partner,employee,or as express,implied, ostensibleor apparentagent. SDO&Sis both directlyresponsiblefor beingnegligent, and for its agent'snegligence,and for a breachof fiduciaryduty. In addition,SDO&Sis vicariouslyresponsible for the actionsof Motsenbocker. 13.02 ln addition, SDO&S should have had policies, procedures,rules, regulationsand codes of conductthat would have preventedthis sort of outcome. To the extentthat SDO&Sdid not have such policies,procedures,rules, regulationsor codes of conduct in place, then SDO&S is negligentin not operatingits firm ,in accordancewith standardsthat wouldcomportwith the minimumstandardsrequiredof attorneyswho are practicinglaw in the State of Texas and dischargingrights and obligationto theirclients. 13.03 Greenbergwas in the course and scope of his employmentwith B&B and/orBaronduringthe time periodthat they were representing the Plaintiff. Further, he was in the courseand scopeof his law practiceat alltimesthereafterwhenhe made legaldecisionsregardingthe representation of Plaintiff.Accordingly,B&Band/orBaron is responsiblefor the actionsof Greenberg. Greenbergwas an agentof B&B and/or Baron,either as vice-principal,principal,partner,employee,or as express,implied, PTAINTIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page ,45 ostensibleor apparentagent.B&B and/orBaronis both directlyresponsiblefor being negligent,and for its agent'snegligence,and for a breachof fiduciaryduty. In addition, B&Band/orBaronis vicariouslyresponsible for the actionsof Greenberg. 13.04 In addition,B&B and/or Baron should have had policies,procedures, rules,regulationsand codesof conductthat wouldhavepreventedthis sort of outcome. To the extentthat B&B and/or Baron did not have such policies,procedures,rules, regulationsor codes of conductin place,then B&B and/or Baronis negligentin not operatingits firm in accordancewith standardsthat would comportwith the minimum standards required of aftorneyswho are practicinglaw in the State of Texas and dischargingrightsand obligationto theirclients. XIV. DISCIPLINARY RULES 14.01The DisciplinaryRulesof the State Bar of Texas (sometimescalledthe DR's)provideguidanceto courtsin evaluatingthe conductof attorneys.The rulescan be consideredby the court, or by the trier of fact, as evidenceof a violationof existing duty of care when consideringclaimsfor legal malpracticeor breachof fiduciaryduty. Giventhis, it is appropriateto pointout to the courtthat Plaintiffis allegingviolationsof the followingTexasRulesof Disciplinary Conduct: a. to a legalmatter 1.01(a lawyershall not neglector show inattentiveness that is entrustedto him); b. 1.03 (a lawyershouldmake full disclosureto a clientand keep a client reasonablyinformed); c. 2.O1(a lawyershouldhaveundividedloyaltyto his clients); d. 5.01 (a lawyer is responsibleif he orders, encouragesor knowingly permitsconductthat is improper). PI-AINTIF'F'S THflRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 4.6 whetheror not the 14.02All of suchdisciplinaryrulesare relevantin determining Baron,Greenbergor Motsenbocker havebreachedthe standardof carethat is required. CONCEALMENT RULE )$/. DISCOVERY RULE'FRAUDULENT 15.01 Plaintiff incorporatesthe provisions of the above paragraphsand affirmativelypleadsthe discoveryrule and/orthe fraudulentconcealmentrule where applicable. PRAYER and WHEREFORE, PREMISESCONSIDERED, RogerK. Parsons,individually, as IndependentAdministratorof the Estateof EstherAnn KartsotisPersonsrespectfully praysthat on finaltrial,Defendantsbe heldliableas follows: 1. Judgmentagainst Defendants,jointly and severally,for the actual and special damagessuffered by Plaintiffas a result of the Defendants' limitsof the court; conductin an amountwithinthe jurisdictional Forfeitureof all attorneys'fees or interestsreceivedby or conveyedto the plusinterest; Defendants, judgmentas requestedherein; For declaratory Reasonableand necessaryattorneys'fees; Exemplarydamages; Statutorypenalties; Costsof suit; by law;and Pre-judgment interestas pnovided and post-judgment Suchotherand furtherreliefat law or in equity,to whichPlaintiffmay be justlyentitled. PLAINNTIFF'S ThIIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 47 Respectfullysubrnltted, Roger KP.M.B.188 6850 NorthShilohRd Garlatrd,Texas75044 (214) 649-8059 (972')295-2776(FAX) PROSE FORPIAINTIFF ROGERK. PARSONS, ANDAS INDEPENDENT INDIVIDUALLY, OF THE ESTATEOF ADMINISTRATOR ESTHERANN KARTSOTISPARSONS PLffNJIFF'STN-NIRD AMENDEDPFT|TI9N- Fage48 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby@rtfy that I havefonrvarded a true and conectcopyof the aboveand for_qgoing instrumentvia telecopyand by certifiedmail,retumreceiptrequested,on this 22Ndayof Deember,2008to: GharlaAfdous,Esg. zsos ceo#f,nblHSlt zoo suire Dallas,Texas75201 Attorneyfor DefendantLegafServices,P.C.,and RobertM. Greenberg,Attorney R. H. Wallace,Esq. MonikaCooper,Esg. Shannon,Gracey,Ratliff& Miller,L.L,P. 777 MainStreet,Suite3800 FortWorth,Texas76102 Attomeyfor DefendantRobertE. Motsenbocker, and Shafer,Davis,O'Leary& Stoker,Inc, Lisa Blue,Esq. Baronand Blue 5956Sherryl-ane,Suite1616 Dallas,Texas75225 RogerK. Pansons PlSlNTlFF'sTHIRDAMFNDEDpETfrfohl - page49