Plaintiff`s Third Amended Petition

Transcrição

Plaintiff`s Third Amended Petition
No. 017-217971-06
ROGERK. PARSONS,
INDIVIDUALLY
ANDAS THEINDEPENDENT
ADMINISTRATOR
FORTHE ESTATEOF
ESTHERANN KARTSOTIS
PARSONS,
COURT
IN THEDISTRICT
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ROBERTM. GREENBERG;
LEGALSERVNCES
P.C.,
ROBERTM. GREENBERG,
ATTORNEY;
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ROBERTE. MOTSENBOCKER;
SHAFER,DAVIS,O'LEARY& STOKER,
lNC.flVaSHAFER,
DAVIS,MCCOLLUM,
ASHLEY,O'LEARY& STOKER,INC.;
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TARRANTCOUNTY,T'EXAS
THE ESTATEOF
FREDERilCK
M. BARON(DECEASED)
ANDBARON& BUDD,P.C.;
E. I- DU PONTDE NEMOURS
AND
CON/TPANY;
CONOCOPHILLIFS
flklaCONOCO,
[NC.;
RON{ALD
WINDLETURLEY;AND
[-AWCFFICES
OF WINDLETURLEY,
P.C.,alWaTURLEYLAWFIRM,P.C.;
Defendants,
17thJUDICIALDISTRICT
PLAINTIFF'STI-IIRDAMENDED PETITION
TO THE HONORABLE
FREDW. DAVIS,
TARRANTCOUNTYDISTRICT
JUDGE:
ROGER K. PARSONS, Ih{DIVIDUALLY
AND AS THE INDEPENDENT
ADMINISTRATOR.
FOR THE ESTATEOF ESTHERANN KARTSOTISPARSONS
("Parsons"or "Plaintiff'),files this amended petition complainingof ROBERT M.
PLAINIFF'S THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 1
ATTORNEY;
GREENBERG;LEGAL SERVICESP.C., ROBERTM. GREENBERG,
ROBERTE. MOTSENBOCKER;
AND SHAFERDAVIS,O'LEARY& STOKER,lNC.
flkla SHAFER, DAVIS, MCCOLLUM,ASHLEY, O'LEARY & STOKER, lNC.;
FREDERICKM. BARON;AND BARON& BUDD, P.C.; and E. l. DU PONT DE
NEMOURSAND COMPANY;and CONOCOPHILLIPS
f/k/aCONOCO,lNC. RONALD
WNDLE TURLEY;AND l.AW OFFICESOF WINDLETURLEY,P.C.,akla TURLEY
I-AWFIRM,P.C.,Defendantsherein,and wouldrespectfully
showthe Courtas follows:
I. DISCOVERYCONTROL PLAN
1.01 Pursuantto the provisionsof TexasRuleof CivilProcedure190.3,Plaintiff
proposesto conduct discoveryaccordingto DiscoveryControl Plan Level 3, and
therefore,requeststhis Courtto enter the agreedschedulingorderwhich includesa
discoverydeadlinedate.
1.02 Plaintiffherebystipulatesthat no hearingsbe set or conductedin the next
(60)daysand requeststhat all partiesexchangean agreedschedulingorderduringthat
time frame, and that the Agreed SchedulingOrder be submittedto the Courl within
ninety(90) days-In the absenceof an AgreedSchedulingOrder,the Plaintiffpraysthe
Courtentera DiscoveryControlPlanno laterthan March31, 2009.
II. PARTIESAND SERVIGE
2.01 Roger K. Parsons("Parsons")is an indivldualresidentof Dallas,Dallas
County, Texas. He is the IndependentAdrninristnator
of the Estate of Esther Ann
KartsotisParsons(?nn Parsons").
2.02 DefendantRobertM. Greenberg("Greenberg")
is an individualresidentof
Texasand is befonethis courtfor all purposes.
PLAlf,nTlFF'S
Tl-{ilRD
AMENDEDPETITION- Page2
2.03 DefendantLegal ServicesP.C. Robert M. Greenberg,Attorney("Legal
Services")is a professionalcorporationformed and operatingunder the laws of the
Stateof Texasand is beforethis courtfor all purposes.
2.04 DefendantRobert E. Motsenbocker("Motsenbocker")
is an individual
residentof Texasand is beforethis courtfor all purposes.
2.05 DefendantShafer Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Inc. f/k/a Shafer, Davis,
Mccollum,Ashley, O'Leary& Stoker, Inc. ("SDO&S")is a professionalcorporation
formedand operatingunderthe lawsof the Stateof Texasand is beforethis courtfor all
purposes.
2.06 Defendant,Estateof FrederickM. Baron("Baron")is duly createdin the
Stateof Texasand Plaintiffrequeststhat it be servedwith processherein.
2.07 DefendantBaron & Budd, P.C. ("B&8") is a professionalcorporation
formedand operatingunderthe laws of the Stateof Texasand Plaintiffrequeststhat it
be served with citation and process herein on Brian M. Ledji, Baron & Budd, a
Professional
Corporation
3102Oak LawnAve Ste. 1100,Dallas,Texas752194283
2.08 DefendantE. l. du Pontde Nemoursand Company("DuPont")is a foreign
corporationlicensedto do businessin Texasand Plaintiffrequeststhat it be servedwith
citationand processhereinon CT Corporation,RegisteredAgentfor E. l. du Pontde
Nemoursand Company,350 N. St. PaulStreet,Dallas,Texas75201.
2.Og DefendantConocoPhillips("Conoco")is a foreign corporationthat is
licensedto do businessin Texasand Plaintiffrequeststhat it be servedwith citationand
process herein on United States CorporationGompany, RegisteredAgent for
ConocoPhillips
Company,701BrazosStreet,Suite1050,Austin,Texas78701.
PLAINTIFF'S
THilRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 3
2.10 DefendantRonald\Mndle Turley ("Turley")is an individualresidentof
Texas and Plaintiff requeststhat citation and process herein be served on Windle
Turley,6440N. CentralExprwy.1000UniversityTower,Dallas,Texas752064127.
2.11 DefendantLaw Officesof \MndleTurley,P.C. ("LOWT")aMa TurleyLaw
Firm, P.C., is a professionalcorporationformedand operatingunderthe laws of the
State of Texas and Plaintiffrequeststhat it be servedwith citationand processherein
on the \Mndle Turley RegisteredAgent for Turley Law Firm, P.C. 6440 N. Central
Expway,1000UniversityTower,Dallas,Texas752064127.
III.JURISDICTION
ANDVENUE
3.01 This courthas jurisdictionover this dispute,the amountin questionbeing
in excessof the jurisdictional
minimumof this Court. Venueis properin TarrantCounty
becauseit is the countywhereLegalServicesP.G.,RobertM. Greenberg,
Attorneyhad
its principalofficeat timesrelevantto this complaint.
IV. FACTS
4.O1 In September1991,Ann Parsonsdied in the crashof a corporatejet that
was owned by DuPont;operatedby Conoco,a DuPontsubsidiaryand the Parsons'
employer;and pilotedby KennethR. Fox ("Fox"),a DuPontemployeewho was under
contnactto and the supervisionof the jet operator,Conoco.Collectively,
the Parsons
servedConocoas management-professionals
years.
for morethan hnrenty-five
A. The investisationin anticipationof the Parsonsv, Iurrey litisation
4.O2 In July 1996,on Baron'sreferraland recommendation,Parsonshired
ts&BcorporatecounselGreenbergto investigateand prosecuteclaimsof fraud,bneach
of dutyandtrust,and legalnegligenceand grossnegligenceagainstTurleyfor allegedly
PLAIhilTIFF:S
ThIIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 4
colludingwith Gardere& \A/ynne,LLP ("G&W') partnerMantinE. Rose ("Rose"),in
fraudsagainstParsons,and the federaland statecourtsin whichTurleyand Rosehad
chosento adjudicateParsons'legal claims arisingfrom the wrongfuldeath of Ann
Turleyand his firm for fraud and
Farsons.ParsonsinstructedGreenbeng
to pnosecute
collusionthat had causedFarsonsto lose Parsonsv. DuPonf and Parsonsv. Conocoz
- two casesthat Turleyhandledas Parsons'attorneyfrom November1992untilJune
't997.
4.03 ParsonsacceptedGreenberg'strecommendations
that Parsonscontract
SDO&SmernberMotsenbocker
as Greenberg'sco-counseland Corporatelntelligence,
lnc. investigatorF. Glifton Cameron ("Cameron")for investigationservices that
Greenhergand Motsenbocker
neededto developall of Parsons'legalclaims.
4.04 Turley's pleadings[n Parsons v. DuPont and Parsons v. Conoco,and
negotiationswith Lynn, lead
Greenheng's
in extnajudicial
subsequentrepresentations
in
Parsonsto believethat the fraudand collnsionFradlost him $29 million(1998-dollars)
unrecovereddarnagesplead by Turley/LOWTin Parsons v. DuPonf and Parsonsv.
t On February18, 1992,TurleyfiledPI.AIN1flFFS'ORlGIf'lANPETITION
ANDJURYDEMANDin
Roger K. Parsons, lndividually and as Administntor of the Esfafe of Esther Ann Kartsofi.sParsong
deceased, and Vasilios and Sofia Karfsofis, lndividually v. E. I. du Pont de Nemoursand Company
(Causetlo. 92-004801)
in the 189hDistrictCourtof HarrisCounty,Texas.The casewas removedunder
divensityjurisdictionto the l,.i.S.DistrictCourtfor the Soutl"rern
Districtof Texas,hloustonDlvlslon(Givil
Action No. H-92-788)and assignedto U.S. DistrictCourt Chief Judge NonmanW. Black ("BlacK).
Pansonsunsuccessfullyappealedtwo trial court decisionsin Parsonsv. DuPontto the t!.S. Court of
Appealsfor the FifthCircuit.Manrdate
was issuedon July 18, '[996;and
in the firstappeal([rlo.94-20756)
mandatein the secondappeal(No.98-20219)
31, 1998.
was issuedon Decemher
2 On September
2, 1993,Turleyflled FLAINTIFFS'
ORIGINALPETITIONAND JURYDEMAT{D
in Roger K. Parsons,lndividuallyand as Administratorof the Esfafe of EstherAnn Kartsofi.sPatsons,
deceased,and Vasiliosand Sofia Kartsotis,lndividually v. Linda L. Fox, as Execufni of the Estateaf
KennethR. Fox, dereased;Linda L. Johnston,as Executrixof the Esfafe of Gary Gene Johnston,
deceased;and Conoco,/nc (CauseNo. 93-046091)in the 80b DlstrictCourt of HanrisCounty,Texas.
judgmentin Parsonsv. Conocoto the Courtof Appealsfor the
Parsonsappealedthe trial courtsumrnany
FourteenthDistrictof Texasat l-{onston(14-95-0098a-CV);
however,becauseTurleyhad failedto file a
27, 1995.
timelynoticeof appeal,thisappealwas dismissedand rnandate
was issuedon Novernber
- Page5
PLAINITIFF'S
THIRDAMENDED
PETITION
Conoco,and that werecoveredundera $100nnillionaviationliabilitypolicyDuPontand
('AlG).3
Conoco had purchasedfrorn Amerlcan InternationalGroup, Incorponated
Furthermore,Parsons'professionalnegligenceand gross negligenceclaims against
policythat AIG had sold
Turley/LOWT
werecoveredby a $5 millionprofessional
liabilihT
to Turley.a
4.05 Betweenlate 1996 and late 1997, Gneenbergand Cameronidentified
severalwitnessesknownto Turleywho statedthe managementof DuPontand Conoco
had had actualsubjectiveawa!'enessbeforethe jet crashaboutthe dangersin ordering
Fox to plan and fNythe complexnineteen-dayaround-the-world
trip that endedtragically
in Malaysiaon September4, 1991.The testirnonyof thesewitnessesand corroborating
evidencethatwas avaihbb but not usedby Turley/[-OWT
lncludedthe following.
(1) The testimonyAllen Duane Catterson("Caftersotr"),
? contractphysician
(servant)of Conoco,who had conducteda thoroughmedicalexaminationof DuPont
employee-pilot(servant)Fox a few weeks beforeFox left l-loustonon the fatal aroundt In his pleadingslfurley
explicitlystated the amountsof damagesParsonswas justlfied in
- $19 millionin compensatory
demanding
fromthe defendantcompanies
damages,and $10 millioneacFt
(severaily)in punitivedamages.lFheliabllityand dannages
claimsTurleypleadagainstthe defendant
companies
was withinthe termsand limltsof the $100nnillion
avlationliabilitypolicyissuedand brokered
to DuPont and Conoco by two wholly owned subsidiarlesof AIG - National|,.!nionFire Insurance
Companyof Pittsbungh
Pennsylvania
and AIG Aviation,Inc., hereincollectivelyreferredto hereinas
"AIG'.AIG assignedthe insurers'retainedcounselRoseto defendthe companiesunderthe AIG policy
againstPansons'
claims.
a
On March4, 1992,shortlyafterfilingthe originalcomplaintin Parsonsv. DuPont,Turleyentered
into a professionalliabili$ insurancecontractwith A[G. AIG renewedTunley'sso-called"claims-nnade'
policyeach year untiflApril 27, 1997,when Turley switchedto Caro]lnaCasualtylnsuranceGornpany
(CCIC) after learning Baron had recomrnendedthat Farsons to hire Gneenbergto investigateand
prosecuteTurley'sfraudsand colluslonagainstParsons.To obtainthe new CCIC c0airns-made
policy,
Turleyknowiurgly
misnepresented
on the CCIC policyapplicationform that he had no reasonsto believe
that Parsonswould file claims againstTurley within the CCIC policy periodthat arose ffom enors or
onnissions
thatoccurredpniorto the beginningof CCICpolicyperiodon Apnil27, 1997. On Ju0y2'X,1998,
wh[[e aftendingan extrajudicialnegotiationmeetingthat had been set-up by Greenbergand l-ynn,
Pansonslearnedfor the first time that Lynn knew she was being paid to defendTurley/LOWTundera
policythat Tunleyhadobtainedthnoughll-urfley's
CCICclainns-made
to CCIC.
fraudulentnepresentations
PI-AINTIFF'S
THIRDAMNENDED
PETITION- Page 6
of Fox's bloodtest that
the-worldtrip and had providedConocoand Fox the resuNts
showedthat Fox sufferedfrom "alcoholism"as the term was defined by the 1991
Federa!AviationRegulations("FAR")and, as a matterof federalregulationsthat had
effect of law,sFox could not legallyoperateany aircraftwhen he flew his jet into the
ground[n Malaysiakillinghimselfand the otherelevenpeopleon Septernber4, 1991.
The knowledge the companies' servants, Catterson and Fox, regarding Fox's
alcoholismis imputedto the servants'masters,Conocoand DuPontrespectively.
(2) The testimonyof Frankl. Cardamone("Cardamone").
retiredseniorDuPontConococheckpilot,who had writtennurnerousleftersin the two (2) yearspriorto the jet
crash in Malaysiato the companies'senior managers,includingDuPontChairman
Edgar S. Wooland,Jr. ("Woolard"),stating that unless DuPont or Conoco senior
managers took immediate action to correct the gross mismanagementof the
companies'aviationoperations,employeesand their familieswould be killed in a
jet crash.
predictable
4.06 Otherevidenceshowedthatthe companieshad coveredup the underlying
causesfor the jet crash in Malaysiaby destroying(1) al! of Fox's remainsrecovered
fromthe crashs[teby the RoyalMalaysianPolice;(2) the originalcockpitvoicerecorder
('CVR")recordingrecoveredfrom the crashsite by the MalaysianDepartmentof Givil
Aviation;and (3) the parts of Fox's rnedicalfile containingthe report by Caftenson
showlngthat by August 1991,Fox's long-termexcessiveconsumptionof alcoholhad
pursuantto the 1991
causedmeasureable
darnageto Fox'sliver,therebyestablishing,
s As definedby the 1991FederalAviationRegulations,
Part67, SubpantA, 567.13(dXlXiXc),
"As used inrthis section,"alcohrolism"
nneansa conditionin
and $67.17(d)(1)(i)(c):
567.15(d)(1)(i)(c),
or social
which a person'sintakeof alcohoN
is gneatenoughrto damagephysicalhealthor pensona0
functioning,
orwhenalcoholhasbecomea prerequisite
to nonna[functioning."
- Page7
PLAIhITIFF'S
Tl-llRDAMENDEDPETITION
FAR, that Fox sufferedfrom alcoholismand was prohibitedas a matter of law from
legallyoperatingany aircraft.
4.O7 AlthoughDefendantsTurley and LOWT knew that the companieshad
engaged in discoveryfraud, Turley never filed pleadingsin Parsonsv. DuPont or
Parsonsv. Conocoseekingeither(1) a spoliationinstruction,or (2) a findingof fraud
upon the court to have the judgment the notwithstanding
the verdict ("JNOV")in
Parsonsv. DuPontset aside.
4.08 In December1996,files maintainedon Parsons'cases by Turley/LOWT
were turnedover to Parcons.The evidencediscoveredthereinshowedthat Turleyhad
willfullyavoidedusing the evidenceshowingthe companies'spoliationand fraud in
Parsons'cases.
4.09 On October29, 1997,encouragedby this evidencethat was unearthed,
Greenbergfiled a motionto perpetuatethe testimonyof four fact witnessesthat Turley
had knownaboutbut had avoideddeposingin Parsons'cases,Palsonsv. DuPontand
Parsonsv. Conoco.6
4.10 By January 13, 1998, Barbara M. G. Lynn ("Lynn"),a partner in
Carrington,Coleman,Sloman& Blurnenthal,
L.L.P.("CCS&B"),notifiedGreenbergthat
she would representTurley and LOWT in the ancillarylitigationthat Greenberghad
initiatedin anticipation
of filinga suit againstTurleyand LOWT. In Februaryand March
1998,Greenbergtook the four depositionsthat he had been authorizedto take; and
Lynnrepresented
Turleyand LOWTin thesedepositions.
6 On October29, 1997,Greenberg
filedVERIFIEDPETITIONFORAN ORDERAUTHORIZING
DEPOSITIONSTO PERPETUATETESTIMONYin ln Re: Roger K. Parcons,lndividuallyand as
Administrator
of the Esfafeof EstherAnn Kartsofi.s
Parsons,dereased(CauseNo. 97-9749-M)in the
298* DistrictCourtof DaltasCounty,Texas- DistrictJudgeAdolphP. Ganales,presiding.
- Page8
PLAII.ITIFF'S
THIRDAMENDED
PETITION
4.11 By May 1998,when Lynnannouncedher appearanceas Greenberg's
cocounselin the TexasFourthCourtof Appealsrnandamusactiondiscussedbelowin the
footnoterelatingto the B&B MemoScandal;7Lynnknewthat Greenberg'sinvestigation
7 B&E NlenroScandal
\NhileParsonswas payingGreenbergto prepareParsons'lawsuitagainstTurley,Greenbergwas
ernbnoiled
in doingdamagecontrolin a scandalforB&8. The "Baron& BuddMemoScandal'shallrefer
to the allegationsarising from the discoverythat Baron and B&B offlcers had conspiredto defraud
defendantconnpanies
and the courtsoverseeingts&Bprosecutionof its cllents'asbestospersonalinjury
clairnsagainstthe defendantcompaniesthroughthe suhornationof falsetestimonyfrom B&Bclients.The
B&B MennoScandalfirst carne to the attentionof the non-lawyerpublicthrougha series of anticNes
palblishedby the DallasObseruer,including,but not linritedto: "The controlfteak"on August'!3, 1998;
"ToxicJustice"on August 13, 1998;.No-energyinvestigatlon"on September3, 1998;and "Horneftyin'
with FredBanon"on March29,2001.Accordingto thesearticles,and the pleadingsandjudicialfindings
in the litigationthat these articles reference,on August 27, 1997, a B&B client, \Mllie Roy Reathy
("Reathy"),appearedto give his depositionfor a case pendingin Nuee,es
Gounty,Texas.Counselfonone
of the defendantsasked Reathyabout the documentsthat were beforehirn at the deposition.Reathy
answened
that he broughtthe documentsfrom his home.Whenthe attorneyaskedwhethershe couldsee
the documents,Reathy'sB&B attorneyhandedthe documentsto her. The documenthandedto the
defendant'sattorneywas entitled'Preparingfor YounDeposition/Attorney
WorkProducfl('B&B Merno')
The defendantcornpaniessuspectedthat the B&ts Memo was evidencethat Banon,in his
capacityas Presidentof E&8, had implementeda corporatepolicyand/orbusinessstrategyto cneate
fralsememoriesin and/orillicitfalsetestirnonyfforn ts&Bclientsto unjustlyenrichBanonand B&Bthrough
the '40% contingencyfee that B&B extractedfrom the defendants'paymentson the settlementor
judgmentdebtsthatweretherebyfraudulentlyobtainedby B&Bin the namesof B&B'sunwittingclients.
the defendantconnpanies
inrB&Bcasesin CauseNo. 93-10952
{cting uponon theirsuspicions,
in the 98"' DistrictCourtof TravisCoun$ beforeDlstrictJudgeK. DieE ("Dietz"and in CauseNlo.94-Cl10078inrthe 285s DishictCourtof Bexir Coung Distnict.lri'dge
MlchaelP. Peden('Peden')movedfor
temporaryiniunctionsto preventB&Band theirclientsfromdestroyingany materialsexchangedbetween
thernand to staythe discoveryin all B&Bcasesexe,eptfor discoveryrelatingto the B&tsMenno.DieE and
Pedengrantedthe defendanrt
connpanies'
motionsfindingtFrattheir argurnentsthat the B&tsMemofell
within the cnirne-fraud
exceptionto the attorney-clientprivilegerule that would otherwiseailow B&B to
witFthold
the rnaterialsexchangedbetweenB&Banrdthe firms'clientsas attorneywork-produc{
becauseit
was evidenceof a scherneto commita fraud.
On October13, 1997, Earon and Greenbergpetitionedthe Texas 'll'hirdCourt of Appealsat
Austinfor rnandamusrelieffrom DieE'srulings;and on January8, '!998,Greenbergand CCS&Blawyens
petitionedthe Texas FourthCourt of Appealsat San Antoniofor rnandarnusrelieffnomPeden'sorder.
The ThirdCourtof Appealsat Austinconditionally
grantedBaronand Greenburg'spetitionfonmandamus
relieffronnDieE'sorderin Causehlumben03-97-00609-CV
styledln re BeveflyJeanBrown,et al. (Cause
No.93-109521;
ln re KennethShiriey,et al.; ln re Jimmy LeonSmathers,ef al. on Apil 30, 1998.
By February1998; Baron'scounterattacksagainstthe defendants'irnmediatevictoriesin tFre
lfravisCountyand tsexanCountycourtswere extendedto the flingsof motionsseekingsanctionsagalnst
an officerof one of the defendantcbrnpaniesfor crimflna!
or punitivecontemptin twelveB&Bcasesbefore
lfexas'tr16hDistrictCourt Judge frnartinE. Richten("nicfitefl in Dallasbounty,wheneBaron'slarge
political contnibutionshad long establishedBaron's influencewith alrnost all politician-judgesand
politician-justlces
in the courts of Texas Fifth JudicialDistrict.On April 30, 1998, Richtergrantedthe
PLAINTIFF'STFIilRD
AVIENDEDPETITION- Page 9
7, 1999,the TexasFifthCountof Appealsof Dallasdeniedthe petitionfor
B&B'snnotion.On Septennber
rnandamusrelieffrom Richte/sorderin Causehlo.05-9841965-CV,styledIn Re JarnesF. Cobbarising
from twelvecasesbeforeRichter:GauseNos. 94-04691,94-05172,96-06046,96-00932,94-04685,97and94-05119.
96-06853,
96-11832,96-10846,94-07869,
08803,96-07554,
In Februany
1998,Texas14b DistrictCourtJudgeJohnM. Marshall,appalledby Baron's
askedDallasCountyDistrictAftorney.iohnVance('Vance")to investigateBaronand B&B.ln response,
Banonand Baron'slawyersat CCS&Busedits politicalinfluencewith Vanceto haveCCS&BpartnerLuke
Madole-- "...a bnlghtyoungattomeywho had recentlyjoined JohnVance'sstaff aftera very successful
careerwith a large law fitrm..."- assignedas the assistantdistrictattorneyto "handle'the grandiury's
that"...he
of the grandjury thatMadoleclainned
investdgation.
At Madole'sfirstmeetingwiththe mernbers
wantingto knowwhat..."the grandjury was
contactfrom Baron& tsuddrepresentatives
had considerabie
on May 20, 1998,was cancelledand the
the grandjury's scheduledfor meetflng
doing.Subsequently,
grand jury term was allowed to expire on June 30, 1998, despite Madole'srepresentationsto the
menrbersof the grandjury that the case would requirethat the term be extendedfor an additional90
days.The day the grandjury was scheduledto meet;Lynnannouncedher appearanceas Greenberg's
co-counselin the TexasFourthCourtof Appealsrnandamusactionarisingfromthe B&BMernoscandal.
that in February'!998,Baronhad a complaintagainstMarchallfiled
lFheDatlasObseryerreported
with the TexasCommissionon .JudicialConduct.The DallasObserveralso reportedtfiat Baronused his
had boughthimwith the trialjudgesand the
influencethat generouspoliticalcontdbutions
considerable
appellatejusticesof the TexasFifthJudicialDistrictto blockthe defendantcompanies'attemptsto make
the B&tsMernoa fraud issue in the B&tscases beingadjudicatedin DallasCoun$ courts.The Texas
FifthCountof Appealsat Dallasdenieddefendantspetitionfor mandamusreliefon April 1, 1999from an
order by Texas68h DistrictCourt JudgeGary Hall ("|-{all')findingthat the crirne-fraudexceptionto the
privilegeruledid not applyto the discoveryof the docunrentsrelatedto the B&BMerno.In
attorney-client
Re All Plaintiffsin AsbestosLitigationwith PendingSanctionsMotionsagainstF. Cobb(CaseNo. 05-9900400-CV)was the mandarnusactionagainstHall in seventy-onecases.ApparentlyBaronneededLynn
to leverageCCS&B'sinfluencewith the'll-exasThirdand FourthJudicialDistrfctsto gainfavorablerulings
there,and soon after Banonhad quashedthe criminalinvestigationand the civil actionsarisingfronnthe
in havingthe
B&B MemoScandalin the TexasFifth Countof Appeals,Greenbergand Lynn sue,ceeded
the
defendant
blocking
grant
nequlest
B&B's mandamus
Texas Third and Fourth Courts of Appeals
prove
and
B&Bwere
Baron
that
to
be
used
any
evidence
that
could
companiesfromuneanthing additional
engaging0na fraud.
The TexasThirdand FourthCourtsof Appealsruledthat becausetherewas no evidencethat the
that the attomey-clientprivilegewas a bar to the
B&E clientshad knowledgeof the B&B conspinacy,
defendantcornpanlesusing the B&B Mernoand the relateddocurnentsin their cases.The appellate
justlceswritingthe opinionsmake no mentionthat the purposeof the aftorney+lientprivilege0sprotect
the clients'interests,not the lawyers'interestsin concealingfromtheirclientsthe lawyers'liabllityfor legal
rnalpnactice,
fraud and breachof fiduciaryduty.Althoughthe appellatejustices'eroneous opinioncould
Courtof Texas,the defendantcornpanies'lawyercchoose
havebeenreversedby appealto the Suprenne
to use the treat of an appealto the SupremeCourtof Texasto extort Baronand B&B into inducingthe
B&Bclientsintosigningbelowfair-valuesettlementagreementsfor theirlega!clairns.
The defendantconnpanies,
Baronand B&B had enteredinto a conspiracyto use B&tspositionof
settlementagreementsthat unjustlyenriched
trustto fraudulentlyinduceB&Bclientsinto belowfiair-value
payrnent
of a falr-valuefonthe injuriesthey had caused,and B&B,
the defendantcornpanies,by evading
by threextractionof the B&B40% contlngencyfee fiom the firnn'sclients'low-bailseftlements.The B&B
MennoScandalhad initiallyonly createdpotentiallegal malpracticeclainrsagainstB&E hy a few of the
agreernents
ts&Bclientsinto lowbailsettlennent
finm'sclients,but the conspiracyto fraudulentlyinrdr.rce
gave rise to new legal clainrsof conspinacyto comnritfraud and breachof flduciarydultythat no B&B
clientshaveyet asserted.
PETITION- Page '[0
PLAINITIFF'S
Thil[RDAh/1ENDED
had unearthedevidencethat DuPontand Conocohad receivedactualwrittennoticeof
Fox's alcoholismwell beforethe jet crash in Malaysia,and that the companieshad
Althor.rgh
the DallasObserverand other legal professionalmediaoutletsreportedon the legal
controversyarisingfromthe B&BMenno,the reportingfocusedon the impactthatthe B&BMemoScandal
had on the businessand career interestsof the defendantcompanies,celebrityplaintiffs'lawyerslike
Baron and/orTexas politician-judges
that Baron had allegedlysucceededor failed in influencingwith
pronnisesof politicalcontributionslaunderedthrough ts&B and other Texas law finns contnolledby
lawyers whose interests were allgned with Baron's interests.At the time, few of the Judges or
Justices in the Fifth Judicial District faeed oppositionrin electionsfor their political-judicialoffices.
Consequently,
there was no legitimateuse for the tens of thousandsof dollarsin politicalcontributions
that flowed to these Justices.In Texas, neitherlaw academicsnor practitionerscornmentedpubllcally
about Baron'sand B&B's breach of the firrn's fiduciaryduty to its clients to seek the firms' clients'
infornnedconsentfor B&B to continuingto representthern in cases that had been darnagedby the
revelationsof the B&B MemoScandal,and to advisethem that it rnaybe in the clients'best intereststo
retiainnew lawyersto pursuefair-valuerecoveryon theirlegalclaims.
By the beginning
of 2001,Batron's,
Greenberg's
and Lynn'seffortsto keepB&Bclientsignorantof
theinlegalclairnsagainstB&Bhad beenvery successful- exceptfor two casesthat threatenedto expose
evidencethat Baron had been extortedby the defenrdantcompaniesinto fiaudulentlyinducingB&B
clientsinto acceptingthe defendantcompanies'lowballsettlementoffers.The firct case, G-l Holdingsv.
Baron was filed by one of the defendantcompaniesthat had been ftnanciallyexhaustedthroughthe
inationalrulingsof Texas' politiclan-judges
who appearedto be more concernedwith Baron'sbusiness
inteneststhan they were with the lnterestsof the ll-exascitizenswho had electedthem to administer
justice purcuantto the law in Texas. G{ Holdingsbroughtclaims underthe RacketeerInfluencedand
CorruptOa"ganizations
Act ("R|CO")(18 U.S.C.S1961),in federalcourtin NewYorkthatcontinuesto this
day. One of the Defendantsin the Texasasbestoslitigationfiled on .Ianuary10, 2001 the Gl-Holdings,
lnc. v. Banon & Budd,ef al (CaseNo. 01-CV-0216)in the UnitedStatesDistrictCountfor the Southenn
Districtof NewYork at NewYork City.The case is pendingin the UnitedStatesCourtof Appealsfor the
SecondCircuit(GaseNo 06-0174-CV).In Texas,Baronfoughtassociatedlegalskirmishesin attemptsto
blockGl-Holdings'
investigatlon
of the fraudclaimsassented
by the companyin Gl Holdingsv. Baron&
Budd,et a!- see Baron& Budd,P.C. KrollAssocrafes,
and MistyHflf.s(CauseNo.
lnc. , Linda Butterfield,
01-00852-G/K)in the 134'n/192no
.iudicialDistrictsof DallasCounty,Texasand Baron & Budd,P.C. v
Kroll Associafes,
in the UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfor the NorthernDistnictof Texasat Dallas(CauseNo.
3-01-CV-0239-D).
The secondcase filed by KarinJacobs, PatriaJacobsand JoeAnn Frostv. Wliam
Tapscottv. Barcn& Budd,(Jacobs
v Baron& Budd) was filed by threeB&Bclientswho realizedthey had
been inducedinto signing releasesfor their clairnsfor an amount that was far less than ts&E had
representedto them they would neceive.[n this case, Greenbergand MotsenbockerdefendedB&B
againsttFreseclainns.The case was assignedto l"f.S. DistrictJudge SidneyA. FiEwaterand it was
assignedCauseNo. 3:04-cv-01968.
rnotionfonsummaryjudgnnent
JudgeFiEwatergranteddefundant's
on the Plalntiffs'claims of negligen@,gross negligence,nnisrepresentiation,
hreach of contractand
of the 40%
attorneys'fees,leavingonlythe Plaintiffs'claimsof breachof fiduciaryduty and disgorgernent
contingencyfee that had beenextractedby B&8. Thejury awarded$129,000,in damageson the breach
The appealto
of fiduciarydutyclairns,but JudgeFiEwatergrantedthe J0tlOVmotionflled by Defendants.
(No.07-10588)(nnandate
issuedon June
the L.l.S.Courtof Appealsfor the FifthCircuitwas unsuccessful
2, 2008).The UraitedStatesSuprenne
Courtdenieda writ of certlorari(No, 080160)on October6, 2008.
polltica!ally of Baronand Greenbeng.
Like Lynn, FiEwatenhad been a long-t0nre
FiEwatergnantedthe
judgrnenton most of the Jacobs'claims ratherthan lettingthe jury decidethose
nnotionfor sumnnany
cfiaims;and aftenthe jury found tfrat B&B lawyer\Mlliam K. Tapscott,Jn. had lied to the Jacobsand
caused them $129,000[n dannageson the Plaintiffs'remainingclainns,Judge F[Ewatergranted
the
Greenberg'sand Motsenbocke/snnotionfor a judgnnentnotwithstanding
the vendict,therebynullifiTing
jury'svendict.
- Page11
PLAII{TIFF'S
lfFllRDAMENDED
PETITION
concealedall evidencethat could have been usedto provethat Fox'salcoholismwas
the probableproximatecausefor the fatal jet crash in which Ann Parsonshad died.
l-lowever,Greenberg,Motsenbockernor Baronever advisedParsonsaboutthe conflict
of interestcreatedby Baron'shiringLynnand CCS&Bto work on defeatingthe lawsuits
arisingout of the B&BMemoScandal.
4.12 In February1999, after Parsonshad reviewedthe professionalliability
insurance contracts that Turley had produced in Parsons y. Tudey, Parsons told
Greenbergand Motsenbockerthat the insurancecontractsbetweenTurleyand AIG that
were in effect between1992 and 1997,was evidenceof a conflictof interestbetween
Turley and AlG, and the motive for Turley and Roes colludingin the derailingof
Parsons'legal claims againstthe $100 millionAIG aviationliabilitypolicy. Parsons
instructedGreenbergand Motsenbockerthat he wantedTurley'sconflictof interestwith
AIG pleadin Parsonsv. Turleyas the probablemotivefor Turleycolludingwith Roseto
defraudthe federal court of knowledgeof evidencethat the lawyersknew the federal
court neededto know about to equitablydecidethe meritsof Parsons'legal claims
againstthe companiesand to decidethe quantumof damagesthat the companies'and
Turley'sinsurer,AlG, owedParsonsas judgmentdebton Parsonslegalclaims.
4.13 Lynn representedTurley and the LOWT in the depositionstaken in
anticipationof filingsuit againstTurleyundera CCICprofessional
liabilitypolicyTurley
that obtainedin April 1997,after Turley/LOWTlearnedParsonshad hiredGreenberg
and Gameron.
4.14 Turley had made material misrepresentations
on the CCIC policy
applicationform to obtain the CCIC policy.Turley stated that he had no reasonto
PLAIhilT!FF'S
THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page '12
suspectthat a legalclaimwould be filed againstthe CCIC policywithinthe proposed
coverageperiod(April 1997to April 1998)for errors or omissionsthat had occurred
beforethe coverageperiodbeganwhichwas false.
A.nS Baron, Baron's lawyers,Greenbergand Lynn, knew that Lynn was
representingTurley under a CCIC insurancecontractthat Turley obtainedthrough
fraud.s
B. The Parsons v, Turlev litiqation
4.16 On June 12, 1998, Greenbergfiled the originalpetitionin Parsonsv.
Turleythat had been anticipatedby the ancillaryactionto perpetuatethe testimonyof
witnessesin which Lynn had been defendingTurleysince February1998.The same
day, Greenbergfaxed a file-stampedcopy of the complaintto Lynn with a cover letter
statingthat GreenbergwouldwithholdservingTurleywith citationif Turley,Lynnand a
representative
from each of Turley'sinsurers,includingexcessinsurers,coveringany
fegafcfaimpleadin the originalpetitionin Parsonsv. Turleywouldmeetwith Parsons,
Greenbergand Motsenbocker
to discussthe case.
4.17 Greenbergtold Parsonsthat becauseParsonsv. Turleyhad beentimely
filedthat therewas no harmin participating
in attendingthe meeting.In the eightyears
advisedParsons
that Parsonsemployedthem, neitherGreenbergnor Motsenbocker
that even under the circumstancesin Parsonsv. Turleywhere Turley's lawyer in the
ancillarylitigationconductedin anticipationof filing the lawsuit had acknowledged
receiptof a copyof the timelyfiled complaintagainsther client,that Texaslaw required
or, that havean
that Turleyalsobe servedwith a citationwithinthe statuteof limitations;
PLAIhJTIFF'S
T[-IIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page '!3
enforceableagneement,pursuantto Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Greenbergdid not procurea Rule 11 letterfrom Lynnstatilngthat on behalfof Turley
and [-OWT,Lynn was agreeingto forego the assertionof a linritationsdefensefor the
late serviceof citationuponTurley,[n exchangefor a Parsonsmeetingwith Turleyand
his lnsurersto discussan earlysettlementof Parsons'clalrnsagainstTurleybeforethe
farnouspersonalinjurylawyerhad sufferedadversepublicity.
4.18 The case was assignedto Texas 116thDlstrictCourt of DatlasGounty
ulnderRlchterratherthan the Texas 101"tDistrictCourtof DallasCounS underJudge
AdolphF. Canales("Canales")
that had handledthe ancillarylitigationin anticipatlon
of
filing suit and that shouldhave retainedcontrolof the resultingcase,Parsonsv. Tufley.
However,GreenbergassuredParsonsthat becauseLynn preferredRichter'scourt anrd
ts&B had obtainedfavorahlenesultsfnom Richter in Baron'sefforts to gain contempt
sanctionsagainstdefendants[n B&B asbestoscases before Richter'scourt, Farsons
wouldbe well servedby the transferof his caseto Richter'scourt.e
I Also LOWT|hwyer Michael
G. Sawickitestifiedin his depositionfor this case (Parsonsv.
Greenberg,et al.l that Turleyhad told him beforethe Parsonsv. DuPonttrial in July 1994,that Tunley
expectedthat ParsonswouldsuleTurleyand his firm for legalrnalpractice.
o
judgmentin a longParsonswould laterleam that Richterhad also grantedBanona surnnnary
running battle with an out-of-statelawyer over refenralfees that Baron had refused to pay her.
Greenberg'srepresentations
lead Parsonsto believethat to Richter,Baronand Greenberg,wetre"friends
of the court." Pansons
wouldalso laterlearnthat reciprocityfonRichter'sfiavorable
ruling0nBaron'scases
nnaybe tracedto the Iargepoliticalcontributionsthat Richterneceivedeitfrerdirectlyftorn E&B or ftom
nnembersof the large networkof pollticallyinrfluential
lawyerswho were alignedwith Baron'sbusiness
intenests.In what was liketya rewardfor helpingBaronand Greenhergwith damagecontrolinrthe B&B
MemoScandal,Baronursedhis politicalinfluenceto helpl-ynngainthe nomination
as a federaljudgeon
the U.S. DistrictCourt for the Nlorthrem
Districtof Texas at Dallas.However,becauseshe would be
scrutinlzedhy a Republican-controlled
Senate JudiciaryCommitteethat would un@ver her knowing
participation
in and benefrtingfromTurley'sfnaudagainstCCIC,"Baronalso neededto provide[-ynnwith
an exit from her responslbilities
[n Parsons'anticipatedsuit agalnstTurley,Parconsv. Turley.To provide
fonLynn'sexit, Banonused his controlof his corponatecounselGneenberg
to createwhat Banon,l-ynn
and Greenhergbelievedwould be a viable lirnitationsdefensefor Lynn to use in rnotionfor sumrnary
judgmentthat shewouldfile in Parsonsv. Turley.
PI.AINTIFF'S
THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Pagetr4
4.19 On February 19, 1998, Sidney K- Powell with Powell & Associates
("Powell")who servedas Parsons'federalappellatecounselin bothappealsof Parsons
v. DuPont,filed a noticeof appeal in the second appeal in Parsonsv. DuPonf.\Mile
workingon the secondappealin Parsonsv. DuPonf,becauseof her familiaritywith the
underlyingcases, Parsons also had Powell do legal researchon the statute of
limitationsfor legal malpractice,breach of fiduciaryduty and fraud. Based on her
extensivelegal research,PowelladvisedGreenbergand Motsenbockerthat to protect
Parsons'legalrightsto timelysue Turleyfor all of Parsons'anticipatedclaims,Parsons
v. Turleyhad to be perfectedon or beforeJuly 18, 1998.
4.20 The fraud defendantsBaron and Greenbergknew that Parsonswas
ignonantof the detailsof Texaslaw and that he wouldrely on theiradvice. Specifically
he wouldnot knowthat to perfect,timely,a lawsuitunderTexaslaw (1) that suit hadto
be timely filed and the defendantstirnely served with citation;and (2) that any
agreementbetweenthe parties'lawyersto waivetimelyserviceof citationcouldnot rely
upon the rnandateby the SupremeCourt of Texas throughthe Texas LawyensCreed
("Myword is my bond.")and wouldbe enforceableonly if it was memorialized
in writing
and filed with the court in accondance
with Texas Rulesof Givil Procedure,Rule 11.
Baron and Greenbergintentionallyand knowinglyused Parsons'ignoranceof this
pecu[iarityof Texas law to give Lynnrthe statuteof limitationsdefenseshe neededfor
her motionfor summaryjudgmentthat wouldassertthat noneof Parsonsclairnsagainst
Turleyhad beentimelyfiled.1o
10DespiteLynn's
tactlcof inducingParsonsto delayserviceof citationuponTurleyaftersuitwas
filed, Greenbergand Motsenbocken
did not assert on appeal that Turley and !-ynn had engagedin
fraudulentlnducement
to gainthe limitations
defensethattheywouldlaterrelyon.
- Page15
PLAINTIFF'S
T!-|[RD
AMENDED
PETITION
4.21 Baronhad usedhis controlover Greenbergand Motsenbocker
to createa
limitationsdefense based upon Greenberg'sgiving Lynn the predicateinactionfor
Lynn's summaryjudgmentmotion in Parsonsv. Turley.GreenberginformedParsons
to a meetingand
that Lynnhad agreedto bringTurleyand his insurers'representatives
that Greenbergwould not serveTurleywith citationuntilthe meeting,Lynn'srepeqted
postponement
of the meetingto accommodate
Lynn's"busyschedule"was intendedto
get Parsonsnot to serve Turleywith citationuntil after July 18, 1998,when Baron,
Greenberg,Motsenbockerand Lynn believedthat a limitationsdefense had been
created for Turley based upon a two-year statute of limitationsfor Parsons' legal
malpracticeclaims beginningon the day mandatewas issuedin the first of the two
did not
appeafsin Parconsv. DuPonf,on July 18, 1996. Greenbergand Motsenbocker
ever advise Parsonsthat il was necessaryto get service of the lawsuit promptlyon
Turley. In the alternative,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
were negligentin accepting
Lynn'sdelayswithoutprotectingtheirclients'interests.
4.22 Parsonswas lead to believeby Greenbergthat Parsons'willingnessto
participatein the meetingwith Turleyand to consideran early settlementbeforeany
adversepublicitywould cause Richterto look "favorably"upon Parsons'legal claims.
silenceregardingLynn's
Greenberg'srepresentations
to this effectand Motsenbocker's
apparentmotives,leadParsonsto believethat his legalrightshad beensecuredby the
timefyfifing of the originalpetitionin Parsonsv. Turtey. Parsonswas lead to believe
that the meetingwith Turley and his insurerswas being conductedunder Richte/s
supervisionas part of the officialproceedings!n Parsonsv. Turtey.
PLAINTIF'F'S
TI-{ilRD
AMENDEDPETITION- Page 16
4.23 Afterrepeatedde|ays,the meetingtook placeon July21, 1998;threedays
after Lynnll believedthat she had secureda limitationsdefensefor Tunley.Lynnfailed
to hring her client, Turley, or any one else with settlennentauthorityas she had
promised,and Lynnfailedto bring any representative
from Turley'sexcessinsurance
carrier.After Greenbergpresenteda summaryof the basis for the fraud, breach of
fiduciaryduty, misrepresentations,
negligenceand gross negligenceclairnsagainst
Turley, Lynn stated that she would need tinre to consultwith Turley beforeshe could
respond.When Lynn failed to respondto Greenhergor accept service of citationon
behalfof her client,Greenbergrequestedissuanceof citationagainstTurleyon August
13, 1998. However,Turley evaded service until September22, 1998, and was
effectivelyservedonly afterthe courthad grantedsubst[tuteservice.
4.24 On March17, 1999,Lynnfiled a motionfor summaryjudgmentarguing
that Parsons'legalclaimsfor legalmalpractice
were barredby the statuteof llmitations.
[-ynnarguedthat (1) FarsonsfiredTunleywhen he hriredPowel!on December5, 1994,
11
In D"c"rber 1998,Texas24s CongressionalDistrictRepresentative
J. MartinFrost,a friend
judge
L!.S.DistrictCourtfor
on
the
of bothBaronand Gneenberg,
recommended
for
nomination
as
Lynn
the NorthernDistrictof Texas.Frost'sdecisionwas apparentlyan emergencymove,becauseFrosthad
alreadyneconnrnended
that U.S.Attonneyfor the NorthemDistrictof TexasPaulCogginsbe the nornlnee.
Neventheless,
Cogginsnarnewas withrdnawn
and Lynn'snarnewas substituted.("Themanwho wouldbe
judge' in the DallasObserverDecember31, 1998.)On March25, 1999,PresidentClintonnominated
'!7, 1999,the SenateconfinnedLynn
Lynnas a federaljudgeas Frosthad recommended.
On lrlovember
judge
as a
on the U.S. DistrictCourt for the NonthemDistrictof Texas at Dailas.Baronnext used his
influencewith Richterto get Lynn'smotionfor summaryjudgmentgnanted.
.
officeas a
On July 9, 1999,Ricfrterannouncedhis intentionto seek a higherpolitical-judlcial
justlceon the Courtof Appealsfor the Fifth.iudicialDistrictof Texas,alongsidehis friend.JustlceDavidL.
Bridges("Bridges")who would write the opinlonssustainingRichtedsordengrantingthe summary
judgmentin Parconsv. Turley.However,onrSeptemher18, 2000,the reslgningTexasgovernor,George
W Bush, appointedRichtento the political-judicial
office for which Richer had plannedto run -unopposed.
GovernorBushappointedCarlosLopez("Lopez")as districtjudgeon the 116'' DistrictCount
of DallasCounty,Texas who, on February9, 2001, would grant Greenberg'snnotionfon sumrnary
judgmenton Baron'sbehalfin Woodrowv. Baron.On March28, 2003,BaronwouldglveLopeza job as
"SpecialCounsel"at B&8.
PLAINITIFF'S
THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 'tr7
to work on the first appeal in Parsonsv. DuPonf,and that the two-yearslimitationson
Parsonslegal malpracticeclaimsthereforeexpiredon December5, 1997.lMurphyv.
Campbell,964S.W.2d265 (Tex. 1996)l;or in the alternative,(2) Parsonsv. DuPont
endedwith the issuanceof mandatein the first federalappealon July 18, 1996,and
that the two-yearlimitationson Parsons'legal malpracticeclaimsthereforeexpiredon
July 18, 1998.12
lHughesv. Mahaney& Higgins,8218.W.2d154(Tex. 1991)l
4.25 Lynn argued that Parsonswould have had to have sued and served
Turleyno laterthan July 18, 1998,and that althoughsuit againstTurleywas filed on
June 12, 1998,Turleywas not serveduntilSeptember22,1998.Lynn's34-pagemotion
and supportingbrief beginswith an introductionfalselyassertingthat Parsonsv. Turley
ts a "...time-banedmalpracticeaction...", and nowhereprovidesany argumentto justiff
incorporating
Parsons'claimsagainstTurleyfor fraudand breachof duty claimsinto a
summaryjudgmentbased upon the two-yearstatute of limitationsthat she argued
shouldbe appliedto Parsons'legalmalpractice
claimsagainstTurley.
4.26 On August 16, 1999, Richter,without a wriftenexplanation,issuedhis
ordergrantingLynn'smotionfor summaryjudgmenton all claimsthat were assertedin
Parsonsv. Turley,includingParsons'fraudand breachof fiduciarydutyclaims.Parsons
appealedto the Courtof Appealsfor the FifthJudicialDistrictof Texasat Dallas.
4.27 On August 11, 2000, Bridgesissued an opinion in Parsonsv. Tufley
sustainingRichter'ssummaryjudgmentin favorof Turleyin Parsonsv. Turley.Parsons
t' LynnknewfnomtakingParsons'deposition
in Parsonsv. Turley,on February1, '!999,thatthe
secondappealin Parconsv. DuPontwas pendingbeforethe UnitedStatesCourtof Appealsfonthe Fifth
JndicialCircuituntilmandatewas issuedon Decernber
31, 1998.
- Page18
PLAINTIFF'S
THIRDAMENDED
PETITION
appeatedto the SupremeCourt of Texas, arguingthat in Texas Hugheswas the law
controllingthe tollingof the statuteof limitationsln legalrnalpracticecases.
C, Huohesv. Mahanev& Hiooins and Apex Towiinq Co. v. Tolin
4.28 On Jrlne 19, 2001, the SuprerneCourt of Texas issued its opinionin
Parsonsv. Turley,109S.W.3d804 (Tex.App.: Dallas2003,pet. den.)and remanded
the case back to the Texas Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Districtwith
instructionsto follow the bnight-linerule establishedtn Hughesv. Mahaney& Higgins,
821 S.W.2d154 (Tex. 1991)and reassertedin ApexTowingCo. v. Tolin,41 S.W.3d
'!18 (Tex. 2001).The so-calledHughes rule states that the statuteof limitationson a
legalmalpracticeclaimis tolleduntil all appealson the underlyingcase are exhausted
or the litigationis otherwiseconcluded.In Apex,the SuprerneCourtof Texasinstructed
lowercourtsas follows.
"We concludethat Murphydid not modiff the rule we announcedin Hughes,
in the
and todaywe reaffirmthat rule: When an aftorneycommitsnnalpractice
prosecutionor defenseof a claim that resurltsin litigation,the statute of
lirnitationson a rnalpracticeclaim aga[nstthat attorneyis tolled until all
appealson the underlyingclaim are exhaustedor the litigat[onis otherwise
finailyconcluded."
"We continueto believe,however,that in the area of limitations,bright-lines
rullesgenerallyrepresentthe better approach,and that the policy reasolls
concernsof
balancethe connpeting
underlyingthe Hughesrule appnopriately
the needto bar staleclaimsand avoidprejudiceto defendantsyet preservea
clairns."
to pursuelegitirnate
fonplaintfrtfs
opportunity
reasonabfle
"flA{itFrout
re-examiningwhethenthe policy reasonshehindthe tollfingrule
case matchingthe Hughesparadigm,courts
applyin each legal-malpractice
shouildsimply apply the Hughes tollinrgrule to the category of legalmalpracticecasesencompassedwithinits definition."
4.29 In late February2003,morethantwenty-onemonthsaftertsridgesopinion
in Parsonsv. TurleysustainingRichter'sorder grantingTurleysutnrnaryjuldgrnentin
PLAINTIFF'ST[-|[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page'!9
Parsonsv. Turleywas overturnedby the SuprenneGourtof Texasand remandedback
to the Texas Fifth DistrictCourtof Appeals,at Parsonsnequest,Greenbergcalledthe
clerk's office fon the Texas Fifth DistrictCourt of Appealsto ask about the status of
Farsons'case.An assistantclerk told Greenbergthat for some reasonunknownher,
review.
Parsonsv. Tufleywasneversubrnittedto the appellatepanelforpost-remand
4.30 The next day, the Texas Fifth DistrictCourt of Appealsdocket sheet for
Parsonsv. Turteyindicatedthat the case had been resubmittedon September11, 2003
- obviouslyan erroneousentry since it was not even June 2003. Subsequently,
the
docket sheet nrodifiedagain, this time to falsely lndicatethat Pansonsv. Tufley had
opinion
beensubmiftedon Septennben
11,2001.Bridgesfinallyissuedhis post-remand
in Parsonsv. Tudeyon June23, 2003.
4.31 In tsridges'opinionon remand,he recitesthe factsin the casebeforehim
as follows(underlineemphasisadded).
"[n appealingthe federalcourt'sjudgment,Parsonsanguedthe evidencewas
sufficientto supportthe jury's gross negligencefinding.On Jurne12, 1996.the
Unlted States Court of Appealsfor the F[fth Circuit affirmedthe federal court's
judgment.and
."
mand
"Sr.rbgquen'!!y,
at DuPont'snequest,Turleysent a letterto DuPont'scounsel
intereston the
calculatingthe principal,prejudgmentlnterest,and post-judgment
in
fedenaljudgment
agalnstDuPont.Parsonsdisagreedwith Turley'scalculations
that they failedto compoundpnejudgrnent
intenest.Parsons'counselsuhmitted
differentcalculat[onsto DuPont. DuPonrtrefused to compoundpnejudgment
interest,and the federal count also denied Parsons' request to compound
prejudgrnent
interest.Parsonsappealedand the Fifth Cincuitagainaffinmedthe
federalcourt."
4.32 AlthoughBridgesrecitesthe fact that the secondappealin the underlying
litigatlonoccurredsometfime
afterthe datethat mandatewas issuedin the finstappealin
the undenlying
litigationon June '!2, 1996,Bridgesfails to statethe date most relevant
PLAIhNTIFF'S
T[-{IRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 20
to the legal issuethat the SuprerneCourtof Texas instructedhim to resolve- the date
that mandatewas issuedin the secondandfinalappeal,Decernber31, 1998.
4.33 Bridgesrecitesthe law that SupremeGourt of Texas instructedhim to
base his post-rernandreconsideration
of the linritationsdefense that Richter had
acceptedas the basisfor grantingTurleytotal summaryjudgmentin Parsonsv. Turtey.
ExctudingBnidges'cites to legalauthoritynot directlyrelatedto the remandinstructions
givenhim by the SuprerneCourtof Texas,Brldgeswritesas follows.
"When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on the affirrnative
defenseof limitations,he assulnesthe burdenof showingas a rnatterof law that
"Thequestlonof whena causeof actionaccrues
the suit is barredby lirnitations."
is a questionof law for the court.""Wlen reviewinga summaryjudgnnent,
we
take as true evidencefavorableto the nonmovantand indulgeeveryreasonable
"Wren, as here,a
inferenceand resolveany doubtsin favorof the nonmovant."
judgment
defendantmoves for summary
on more than one ground,and the
judgrnentdoes not speciffthe groundsuponwhichthe trial courtrelied,we must
determineif any of the theoriesadvancedby the parties!s meritorious."
'A cause of actionfor legal rnalpracticeis in the natureof a tort and, tFrus,is
governedby the two-yearllmitationsstatute.""Lirnitations
generallybeginto run
when the cause of action accrues:when facts have come into existencethat
authorizesa claimantto seek a judicial nennedy.Apex TowingCo. v. Tolin,41
S.W.3d118, 120 Oex. 2001).However,when an attorneycomrnitsmalpractice
in the prosecutionr
or defenseof a claim that results[n litigation,the staturteof
nirnitations
on a malpracticeclaimagainstthat attorneyis tolleduntil all appeals
on the underlyingclainnare exhaustedor the litigationis othenlrbefinalfly
concluded.
/d-at '!'19.
"AIl appealson this claimwere not exhausteduntil July 18, 1996;thus, under
ApexTowing,the statuteof limitationson Pansons'malpracticeclairnswas toiled
until that date. See Apex Towing,41 S.W.3dat'!19. We sustainFansons'
argumentthat the accnualof his clairnsfor legalmalpracticewas tolileduntil all
appealswereexhaustedin the underlyinglitigation.
4.34 The first sentenceof the last quoted paragraphahove is the kerne!of
Bridges'misnepnesentatlon
[n
to the SupremeCourtof Texas.Bnidges'representations
previousparagraphsshow that Bridgesunderstoodthe facts in the case and the law
PI.AINTIFF'S
Thil[RDAMENDEDPETITION. Page21
that the SupremeCourtof Texashad told him to applyto the facts.Bridgesaddedthe
italicizedemphasisin "AIl appeals"demonstratingthat he knew that there was a
subseguentappeal in the underlyinglitigationthat had only been concludedby the
mandateissuedon December31, 1998- morethan two monthsafterthe Parconsv.
Turleylitigationhad been perfectedby serviceof citationupon TurleythroughTurley's
lawyer,Lynn.
4.35 Bridgesmisrepresents
to the SupremeGourtof Texasthat Turleywas not
timefyservedon September22,1998,becausethis datewas morethantwo yearsafter
mandatewas issuedin the first [of the tvvo(2) appeals]in underlyingwrongfuldeath
cases. Bridgeswillfullyconcealedfrom the SupremeCourt of Texasthat Turley had
been timelyservedon September22, 1998,becausethat date was more than three
monthsbefore limitationshad even had even begunto run on December31, 1998,
whenmandatewas issuedin the secondof the two appealsin the underlyinglitigation.
4.36 Bridges'misrepresentations,
uponwhichhe knewthat the SupremeCourt
of Texaswould rely,were broughtto Bridges'attentionthroughParsons'motionfor a
rehearing,Bridgesdenied Parsons'motion(Exhibit# 10) withoutconsultingwith the
otherjusticeson the appellatepanel.r3
D. Baron & Budd and Gardere& Wvnne PoliticalContributionsto Bridqes
4.37 Bridges'CampaignContributionand Expenditurefilingswith the Texas
EthicsCommissionshowthat priorto Parsonsv. Turleybeingremandedbackto him,
PLAINTfFF'S T[-|[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page22
tsridgesneverreceivedany campaigncontributions.
Furthernore,prionto 2008election
cycle,tsridgesneverfacedany oppositionin his bidsfor electionor reelection.However,
on June 25,2001, Bridgesaccepteda $2,500politicalcontributionfrorn B&8, and on
.iune 28, 2001, Brldges accepted $5,000 political contributionfrom G&W. The two
politicalcontributions
made up morethan half of the $14,300in the first reportof any
pollticalcontributionsever made to Bridgessince he began reportingto the Texas
EthicsComrnission
in 1996
4.38 Bridges' July through December 2007, neportto the Texas Ethics
The
Commiss[on,showsthat Bridgesneceived$46,900in total politicalcontributions.
reportalso showsthat Bridgesspentthe rnoneyto pay for personalexpenses,suchas
gasoline,Cinemarkand Targetgift cards,restaurants,
and mobiletelephonebills.
E. Investioationin anticipationof filinq an independentaction in federalcourt
aqainst DuPontand Gonocofor fraud upon a federalcourt in Parsonsv. DuPonf
4.39 \Mrile Parsons v. Turteywas on appeal, Greenbergand Motsenbocker
advised Farsons that the evidence that had been uncoveredin Parsons v. Tudey
of the
showingthat DuPontand Conocohad willfullydestroyedevidencein anticipation
Parsons v. DuPonf litlgation,gave rise to new legal clailmsseekingthe recoveryof
afmostthe sarne damagesthat Parsonshad assertedwere lost in Parsonsv. Turtey
throughTurley'sand Rose'scollusion.
tt In the opinionon remandauthoned Bridgeson or about.trune23, 2003,he inrcludes
two
hy
footnotes.Footnote1: "JusticeEd Kinkeadeparticipatedin the oniginalsubrnlssionof this case. Since
submission
JusticeKinkeadehas retiredfnonn
this Court.ChiefJusticeLindaThomashas reviewedthe
recondand the briefsin this case."Footnote2: "JusticeJohn Roachparticipatedin the origlnalsubmission
of this case. Since suhrnission,Justice Floachhas retiredfrom this Court. Justice Molly Francishas
reviewedthe recordand the briefsin this case.' However,there is no evidencethat any otherjustices
actualflyneadParsonsAugust8, 2003,nnotionfonrehearingbefoneBridgesdeniedit on August15,2003.
- Page23
PLAINITIFF'S
lfHlRDAMENDEDPETITION
4.40 Greenbergand MotsenhokeradvisedParsonsthat FederalRule of Civil
FrocedureRule60(b)providedParsonsa legalremedythroughan independent
action
in a federa!court for the frauds upon the federalcourt that had been carriedout in
Parsonsv. DuPonfby DuPontand Conoco,using Turley and Rose help, to gain a
favorahlejudgmentfor DuPontand Conoco.la
4.41 Greenberg and Motsenboker recommendedthat Parsons formally
investigatethe anticipatedfraud upon a federalcourt claims by filing a motionin a
Texas district court to perpetuatethe testimony of some key witnesses. Parsons
followedhis lawyetrs'recommendation;
and on June 6, 2000, filed PETITIONFOR
RU[-E202 ORDERin /n re: RogerK. Parsons,lndividuallyand as Administratorof the
Estateof EstherAnn KartsotisParsons,Deceased("ln re: RogerK. Parsons) in the
101"tDistrictCourtof DallasCounty,Texas,(CauseNo. 004180-E).
4.42 The case was transferredto the 289t1'DistrictCourt of DallasCounty,
Texas,(CauseNo. 004180-M).Becauseln re: RogerK. Parsonswas ancillarylitigation
in anticipationof filinga fraudupona federalcourtactionagainstDuPontand Conoco,
GreenbergnotifiedDuPontand Conocoof the legalactionby U.S.CertifiedMailon July
14,2000.
4.43 On August2, 2000,Rose,who had resignedfrom Garderein July 1999,to
form Rose.Walker,L.L.P.,filed a responseon behalfof DuPontand Conocoto the
1aAn 'independentactionfor ftaud upon a federalcourt"refersto a legalactionin federalcourt
for reliefffomjudgmentor onder,pursuantto FederalRuleof CivilProcedureRule60(b),becauseof '(b)
... ...Fraud,Etc.On motionand uponsuchtenrnsas are just, the courtmay relievea partyor a parly's
legal representrative
from a final judgment,order,or proceedingfor the foilowingreasons:... (3) fraud
(whetherheretoforedenominatedintrinsicor extnflnsic),
or other rnisconductof an
misrepresentation,
adverseparly... Th[srule does not linrnit
the powerof a courtto entertainan independentactionto relleve
a partyfrom a judgnnent,
otrder,or proceeding...
...or to set asidea judgrnentfor frauduponthe court.
judgment
action."
for ohtalnlnganyrelieffroma
shallbe... ...by an independent
flhe procedune
-Page24
PLAINTIFF'S
T[-|[RD
AMENDED
PETITION
compfaintin ln re: RogerK. Parsons.lsBecauseRose was a key fact witnessto the
allegedfraud against a federal court being investigatedin ln re: RogerK. Parsons,
Parsonstold Greenbergand Motsenbocker
that he believedthat Rosewouldonlywant
to defendDuPontand ConocoagainstParsons'fraud allegationsso he wouldbe in a
position to deflect the obvious subsidiaryallegationsthat Rose and Turley had
in or at leasthad guiltyknowledgeof the fraudsagainstthe federalcourtin
collaborated
Parsonsv. DuPont.16
4.44 On August4,2000, the judge in In re: RogerK. ParconsgrantedParsons'
motionto takethe depositionsof LieutenantColonelStephenW. Bross,legalcounselat
the Officeof the Armed ForcesMedicalExaminer,Armed Forceslnstituteof Pathology
("AF|P")and ColonelWilliamT. Gormleywith the AFIPwho had headedthe 12-person
federalgovernmentforensicteam that was sent to Malaysiaat Conoco'srequestand
expenseten days afterthe jet crash.
4.45 From responsesto the subpoenaducestecumand testimonyobtainedin
the depositionsof Bross and Gormley;the managerof the DuPont'sand Conoco's
aviationoperations,DuPontVice PresidentFrank E. Petersen,Jr. (Petersen"),and
Parsonshad testimony
Conoco'scontractphysicianLyndonE. Laminack("Laminack");
and documentaryevidencefor the first time showingthat DuPontand Conocohad
gainedcontnolof Fox's remainson the morningof September10, 1991,when Fox's
remainswere removedfrom the site of the jet crashby the RoyalMalaysianPoliceand
15 In Parsons v. Turley, Rose representedConoco Presidentand DuPonrtExecutiveVice
.
diedon August23,
PresidentConstantine
S. Nicandrosin delayingNlcandros'
depositionuntilNicandros
1999.fn Parsonsv. Greenberg,et al., Rose representedConocoSeniorCounselWalter L. tsrignonin
Brignon'sdeposition
on December16,2008.
PLAIINTIFF'S
TFIIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page25
deliveredto the Kota KinabaNu
QueenElizabethHospitalinto the custodyof Laminack,
who was repontingto Conoco IndonesiaMce FresidentSidneyS. Snrith("Snnith")l7
and/orConocoIndonesiaGeneralCounselWalterL. Brignon(""Brignon").
4.46 Farsonsalso learnedthat by September15, 1991,when Gorrnely'steam
arrivedon the scene,Conocorepresentatives
who controlledwhichremainsGormely's
tearn could see, concealedthe two bags of remainsthat had been deliveredto the
hospltalmorgue on September10, 1991.18In his capaciff as DuPont'scorporate
representativein the Parsonsv. DuPonflitigation,Petersenhad lied under oath about
his knowledgeof the whereaboutsof Fox's remainsand had concealedin the Parsons
v. DuPantlitigationthe writtenwarningsDuPonthad receivedfrom Cardamonepriorto
the jet crash warningof the life-threateningsafety problemsthat had been createdby
DuPontand Conocoseniormanagement's
failureto do anythingaboutthe practiceof
pilotsto fly connplex
overseasmissions.
usingunhealthyand undertrained
4.47 Based upon the informationthat the Malaysian CID provided the
Malaysianmedicalexamineron numberof torsos that the MalaysianCID team had
recoveredfrom the crash site and deliveredto the Kota KinabaluHospital,the
16Federalcourt necords
for Rose'scases show that Rose continuedto work for AIG and AIG
subsidianies
afterhe left Gardere.
17In his depositiontaken
by Gneenberg
in Parsonsv. TurleyonAugust3, '!999,Petersentestified
Snnithwas responsiblefor securingthe jet crash victinn'sremainsincludingFox's, but that Srnithwas
untrustworthy
becausehe sufferedfromalcoholism.
Q. Okay.You mentioneda littlebit ago that you wantedto haveas littleas possibleto do with
Sid Srnith.Wtrywas that?
A. He'san alcoholic.
was a problemwith Conocoennployees?
Q. So alcoFrolisrn
A. No. lt was a prohlemwith Smith.And he was interferingwith rny investigation,
so I rnadeit
a pointto avoidhirnas muchas posslble.
tu On the
fnonnthe
secondof his two trips to Malayslaon Parsons'behalf,Camenondetennnined
nnorguepersonnelthat the finsttwo body-hags,labeled"M-1' and "M-2"by the CriminalInvestigation
Division('ClD")tearnof the RoyalMalaysianPolice,weighedapproximately
50 kilognanns
apiece.
- Page26
PLAINTIF'F'S
lfH[RDAMENDEDPETITION
Malaysianmedicalexaminerissued twelve death certificates,one for each of the
individualsthat the Conoco and DuPont representativessent to Malaysia had
representedto her were on the jet, includingone for Fox. Fox'sdeath certificateshows
that Foxwas boughtin deadto the hospitalrnorgueand had diedof multipleblurnt-fonce
injuriessustainedin the jet crash.le
4.48 The new evidenceand the evidenceshowingthat Conocoand/orDuPont
had destroyedthe originalcockpitvoice recorder("CVR")recordingand the key portions
of Fox's rnedicalrecordslndicatedto Greenbergand Motsenbockerthat Parsonshad
tt In hesdeposition Turley
by
in Parsonsv. DuPontonAugust19, 1992,Petersentestified:
Q. Okay. h0ow,was thereany drugtestingconductedon the remainsof the crewmembers.
A. lfhat I'nnnot awareof. I can'tanswerthat question.
Q. lt is ordinarypolicyat Du Pont,is it not, that any time there is an industrialaccidentthat
the pantiesinvolvedanedrug{ested?
A. !t's not only a policybut also in any accidentinvestigation- | sadly must informyou, sir,
the bodiesof the pilot,the co-pilotand the cnewchiefwere not ree,overed.
Q. l.lo portionsof the rernains?
A. As I understandit, there was a portionof the crew chief. I do not knowthe specificsof
quantitythatwas recovered.
Q. l-{adyou requestedthat drugtestingbe doneif therewas sufficientrecovery?
A. Yes, I had requestedassistancefforn several sources to do drug testing, body
identification.But that is also a part of any forma!accidentinvestigationthat would have beent
SafetyBoard.
conductedby boththe MalaysianGovernmentand the NationalTransportation
Q. Butyou specificallyhad intendedto havethat doneif theycouldpossiblydo it?
A. Oh,absolutely.
ln his depositionby Greenbergin Parsonsv. Turleyon August3, 1999,Petersentestified:
Q. Well,you were in chargeof the envestigation?
A. lfhat'strue.
Q. And there'sa teamof pathologist
fnonn
the military......thatarriveson the scene,andyou
knownothlngabouthow- why they'retheneor howconnetheygot there?
A. The scope- to answeryou question,yes, that is correct.The scopeof my investigation
was to determinethe cause of the accident.Anythingassociatedwith body recoveryor body
identification,
I had ahsolutelynothingto do with that.
Q. Wro was in chargeof that?
A. I haveno idea.
of aviationat DuPontwasn'tin chargeof that?
Q. So as fanas you know,the departnnent
A. We were not - as Njust stiated,we were not in chargeof anythinghavingto do witit body
identification.
And in pointof fact,I thinkSid Srnithwas chargedwith that responslbility.
Q. Okay. My questionto you is, is one of the first thingsthat you tried to investlgatein an
airplanecrashis the toxicological
conditionsof the pibts?
A. Yes.
Q. Wasthat donein this case?
A. No.
- Page27
PLAINITI
FF'STl-iIRDAMENDEDPETITION
viableclaimsagainstDuPontand Conocofor the companies'fraudupona federalcourt
in Parsonsv. DuPonf,pursuantto Rule 60(b)or the FederalRulesof Civil Procedure.
Greenbergand Motsenbockerrecommendedthat Parsonsemploy additionallawyers
who had experiencehandlingcomplexcasesagainstlargecorporations
to assistthem
in prosecutingParsonsnewclaimsagainstDuPontand Conoco.
4.49 Parsons accepted his lawyers' recommendation.Greenbergcontacted
severallawyersin Texas,NewYork and Washington,D.C.in ac0ordance
with Parson's
instructions. According to Greenberg, none of these lawyers had any interests.
ParsonsinstructedGreenbergto ask Baron if he knew of a lawyerwho would help.
Farsonsneverheardbackfrom Greenberg.
4.50 On January14,2005,afier not hearingfrom Greenbergor Motsenbocker
for more than two months, Parsons asked that the files that Greenbergand
Motsenbocker
had maintainedon his casesbe turnedover to him.After pickingup the
files from Greenberg'sofficesin Arlington,Texason January24,2005, Parsonsnever
heard from Greenbergor Motsenbockeragain until they respondedthrough their
attorneysto Parsonslawsuitin the currentlitigation.
V. NilISREPRESENTATION
AND FRAUD
5.01 Plaintiffincorporates
the foregoinghereinas if copiedverbatimat length.
5.O2 Defendants Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker,one or more,
representedto Plaintiff,as more specificallyset out herein, that cornpetentlegal
serviceswould be renderedto Plaintiff. The misrepresentations
of these defendantsto
Flaintiffwere materialbecausesuch misrepresentations
inducedPlaintiffto hire, retain
and continueto paythesedefendantsenormousamountsof legalfees.
PLAINITIF'F'S
ThI[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 28
5.03 The representations
to Plaintiffby Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
were false. Moreover,such representations
were a false promiseof futureperformance
to Plaintiff.
and suchconductamountedto falserepresentations
5.04 Defendants Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbockermade the false
were made,
representationsknowingthey were false. At the time the representations
these defendants owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. Baron, Greenberg and
and in fact,
Motsenbocker
intendedfor Plaintiffto rely upon the false representations
when acquiescingin the failure to
Plaintiff relied upon the false representations
immediatelyserve Turley and LOWT,and to file suit in an independentaction in a
federalcourtassertingParsons'claimsagainstDuPontand Conocofor the companies'
fraud uponthe federalcourtin Parsonsv. DuPont.
of Baron,
5.05 Additionally,Plaintiffrelied upon the fraudulentrepresentations
Greenbergand Motsenbocker
that Parsons'legal rightswould be protectedalthough
thesedefendantsactedto (1) only serveTurleyin Parsonsv. Turleyafterthey believed
that the inactionhad createda limitationsdefensefor Turley in Parsonsv. Tufle1;(2)
excludefrom post-remandpleadingsin Parsonsv. Turleythe statementof fact that the
basisfor Parsons'victoryin Parsonsv. Tudeybeforethe SupremeCourtof Texaswas
the fimitations-tolling
second appeal in Parsonsv. DuPonf and (3) delay filing suit
againstDuPontand Conocofor Parsons'frauduponthe federalcourtclaimsuntilmore
than four years after Parsonshad discoveredevidencethat the claimswere viablein
the T.R.G.P.Rule202deposition
of Col.\MlliamT. Gormley.
PLAITilTIFF'S
ThIIRDAMBNDEDPETITION- Page 29
5.06 The false misrepresentations
by Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker
directlyand proximatelycausedinjuriesto Plaintiff,which resultedin Plaintiffsclaims
againstTurleyand LOWT,and DuPontand Conocobeingtime barred.
5.07 tsy delayingserviceupon Turley, Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
failedto disclosethat the statuteof limitationsmightlaterbar PlaintifPs
claimsand failed
to act diligentlyto obtainserviceon Turley.
5.08 Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker,likewise,failed to disclosethat
therewas no enforceableRule 11 agreementbetweencounselrelatedto this issueand,
in fact, none had even been requested. Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerby
delayingserviceuponTurley,deprivedPlaintiffof his legalrightand remediesand a trial
bviury.
5.09 After failing to disclosethat the statute of limitationsmight later bar
Plaintiffsclaimsand or take appropriateactionto obtainserviceupon Turley,Baron,
Greenbergand Motsenbockercontinuedto intentionallymisrepresentto Plaintiff,
throughfour yearsof appeals,that they had exerciseddue diligence,whereas a mafter
of lawthey had not.Thismisrepresentation
was material.
5.10
Plaintiffwill demonstrate1) defendantsmade representations
to the
Plaintiff;2) those representations
were material;3) those representations
were false;4)
when the defendants made the representations,the defendants knew the
were false or made their representationsrecklesslyas a positive
repnesentations
assertionwithoutknowledgeof the truth; 5) the defendantsmadethe representations
with the intentthat the plaintitfrely on it; 6) Plaintiffreliedon the representations;
7) the
representations
causedthe Plaintiffinjury.Thus, Plaintiffseeks unliquidateddamages
P!-AINTIFF'S
T[-|[RDAIVIBNDED
PETITION- Page30
withinthe jurisdictionallimitsof this court arisingout of this conductfor commonlaw
fraud.
VI, BREACHOF FIDUCIARYDUTY
6.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporatesthe allegations made in the above
paragraphs,
as if fullyset out at lengthherein.
6.02 Duringthis period of time, Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbockerowed
Plaintiffa fiduciaryduty. Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
owed Plaintiffa duty of
candor,loyalty,trust,fidelityand full disclosure.The duty is one that is imposedby the
special relationshipof trust and confidence. As such, PlaintiffentrustedBaron,
Greenbergand Motsenbockerwith the at issue legal matters,includingspecifically,
legalrnattersinvolvingthe claimsagainstTurleyand LOWT,and DuPontand Conoco.
6.03 A special relationship existed in which Baron, Greenberg and
Motsenbocker
held themselvesout as professionals
in the area of law in which they
practiced.Plaintiffreliedupontheir representations
and counsel.Thereforea fiduciary
relationshipand a resultingfiduciaryduty existed between Baron, Greenbergand
Motsenbocker,as attorneys,and Plaintiff as their client. Baron, Greenbergand
Motsenbocker
had the duty to act fairly,honestlyand equitablywith regardto Plaintiff.
However,the Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerbreachedtheir fiduciaryduty to
Plaintiff,proximately
causingdamages,resultingin the Plaintiffsdamages.
6.04 At no time during this peniod of time did Baron, Greenbergand
Motsenbocker
denythat they had a fiduciarydutyto Plaintiff.At no timeduringthistime
perioddid Greenberg,Motsenbocker
and Barontakethe positionthat they did not have
an attorney/clientrelationshipwith Plaintiff. At no tirne did Baron, Greenbergand
PLAIhXTIFF'S
ThIIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page31
Motsenbockertake the positionthat they were not assistingor were unableto assiston
any of the legal mattersor renderadvice regardingParsons'clainrsand/or litigation
againstTurleyand LOWT,or DuPontand Conoco. To the contrary,duringthis period
of time, Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerrepresentedto Plaintiffthat they were
qualified,that they were representingthe Plaintiff,that they had an attorney/client
relationship
with Plaintiff,that theywerecontentand happyto work uponPlaintiffslegal
rnatters,that they were able to do so, and that they had an ongoing attorney/client
relationship
with Plaintiffinvolvingthe claimsand/orlitigationagainstTurleyand LOWT,
and DuPontand Conoco. The total billingof Defendants,includingthe recommended
consultants,
expertsand investigators
approximated
$1,000,000.00.Plaintiffpaidthose
surnsas requested.
6.05 The conductof Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
constitutesa hreach
of fiduciaryduty,whichconductproximatelycauseddamagesto Plaintiff.In particular,
Plaintiffassertsthe followingnon-exclusive
conductwas a breachof the fiduciaryduty
owedto Plaintiff:
a.
Elaron,Greenbergand Motsenbockerbneachedtheir duty of undivided
loyaltyto the client by being loyal to personsother than the client in
connectionwith the legalrnattersat issue;
b.
put their financialinterestaheadof
Banon,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
the c[ient;
A
1,.r.
d"
Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerbneachedtheir duty of undivided
loyal$ owedto the clientby not makinga full explanationof all of the risks
and impllcationsof the actions and/or inactions that they were
contemplatingin connectionwith the case, and in connectionwith the
Turieylitigationandthe DuPontand Conocolitigation;
Baron,Gneenberg
and Motsenbocken
fai[edin their duty of full disclosure
in connectionwith the Tur|eylitigation,in that they did not fullydiscloseto
the client al! of the risks, consequencesand implicationsof the
PI-AINTIFF'S
TFIIRDAI/nENDED
PETITION- Page 32
nor did they disclosewhat the
actionsfinactions
they were conternplating,
risks and options were for the client in connection with their
actions/!nactions;
e.
Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerfailed to disclosethe conflictsof
interest presented,includingbut not limited to the actual conflict of
pursuingan appealcausedby Greenberg'sand Motsenbocker's
failureto
procure
tinnely
citationsand serveTurleyand LOWT,and by employing
Turley'slawyer,Lynn,to serve Baron'sinterestsin the litigationarising
fromthe B&tsMemoScandal;and
f.
Greenhergand Motsenbockencontinuedto bill Plaintiff and accept
paymentsfrom Plaintiffafter not timely servingthe Turley and LOWT in
the Turleylitigation.
As a resultof such breachof fiduciaryduty, Plaintiffhas been harmed. Also,just as
significantly,Greenbergand Motsenbockerare not entitled to any compensation
previouslypaid becausethey breachedthe fiduciaryduty owedto Plaintiffand they did
not properlyperformthe legalservicescontemplated.
6.06 Plaintiffwill dennonstrate
that 1) there was a fiduciaryrelationshipwith
Defendants,2) the conductcomplainedof was a clearand seriousbreachof fiduciary
duty, 3) that the breachresultedin injuryto the Plaintiffand benefitto the Defendants
(whichconstitutesconstructive
wl'richare considerations
fnaud)to be weighedin viewing
the remedies,inclurding
disgorgernent
that shouldbe appliedin this case.
VII.UNJUSTENRICHME]TT
7.01 Al[ previousparagraphshereinare herebyre-allegedfor all purposesand
incorporatedby referenceas if set out in full.
7.02 Inconporating
the above paragraphs,Plaintiffwould show that funds,
assetsand/orclaimswhichwere rightfullydue him were wrongfullylost becauseof tl"re
breachof a specialtnust,fiduciaryrelationship,
and/oractuailfraudby Baron,Greenberg
and Motsenbocker,
one or more. Retentionof Plaintiffsfunds,assetsand/orclaims
PLAINTIFF'S
THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 33
would be unconscionable,
thus Plaintiffassertsthat DuPontand Conoco,and Turley
were unjustlyenrichedthroughthe breach of a specialtrust, fiduciaryrelationship,
and/oractual fraud of Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker,
and Plaintiffseeks the
equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon those entitiesthat have benefitedfrom
the breachesof a specialtrust, fiduciaryrelationship,and/oractualfraud by Baron,
Greenbergand Motsenbocker.
7.03 A constructive
trust on the funds,assetsand/orclaimsin questionis the
only remedy that will adequatelycompensatethe Plaintiffand preventthe unjust
enrichmentof DuPontand Conoco,and Turley,one or more,at the Plaintiffsexpense.
7.04 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the
funds,assetsand/orclaimswithinany Defendant's
care,custodyand control,as well as
the care, custodyand controlof otherentitiesand/orperson(s)that have benefitedfrom
the breachesof a specialtrust, fiduciaryrelationship,and/oractualfrauds by Baron,
Greenbergand Motsenbocker.
These funds, assetsand/orclaimsshouldhave been
rightfullypaid to Plaintiffto the extent of Plaintiffsdamages.To avoid furthenunjust
enrichmentof the DuPontand Conoco,and Turley,or suchotherentityor person(s)that
Plaintiffmay demonstrateat trial, a constructivetnustshouldbe imposedupon those
defendantsor such other entity or person(s)that Plaintiffmay demonstratethat
benefitedfronr threbreachesof a specialtrust, fiduciaryrelationship,and/or actual
fraudsof Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker.A constructivetrust on these funds,
assetsand/orclaimsis the only remedythat will adequatelycompensatePlaintiffand
preventany furtherunjustenrichmentof Defendantsat Plaintiffsexpense.
PLAINNTIFF'S
ThIilRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 34
7.O5 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the
funds, assetsand/orclaimswithin DuPont'scare, custodyand controlin an amount
DuPontwas unjustlyenrichedby avoidingpaymenton the judgmentdebt that would
havebeenaccessedin the anticipatedfrauduponthe courtactionagainstDuPont,but
for the breachesof a specialtrust,fiduciaryrelationship,
and/oractualfraudsof Baron,
Greenbergand Motsenbocker.
7.06 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the
funds, assetsand/orclaimswithin Conoco'scare, custodyand controlin an amount
DuPontwas unjustlyenrichedby avoidingpaymenton the judgmentdebt that would
havebeenaccessedin the anticipatedfrauduponthe courtactionagainstConoco,but
for the breachesof a specialtrust,fiduciaryrelationship,
and/oractualfraudsof Baron,
Greenbergand Motsenbocker.
7.07 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the
funds, assets and/or claimswithin Turley'scare, custodyand control in an amount
DuPontwas unjustlyenrichedby avoidingpaymenton the judgmentdebt that would
have been accessedin Parsonsy. TufleyagainstTurley,but for the breachesof a
special trust, fiduciaryrelationship,and/or actual frauds of Baron, Greenbergand
Motsenbocker.
7.08 Plaintiffseeks the equitableimpositionof constructivetrusts upon the
funds, assets and/or claimswithin LOWT'scare, custodyand controlin an arnount
LOWTwas unjustlyenrichedby avoidingpaymenton the judgmentdebt that woulld
have been accessedin Parsons v. Tufley against LOWT, but for the breachesof a
PLAINTIFF'S
THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 35
special trust, fiduciary relationship,and/or actual frauds of Baron, Greenbergand
Motsenbocker.
VIII.NEGLIGENCE
8.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporatesthe allegations made in the above
paragraphs,
as if fullyset out at lengthherein.
8.02 The individualBaron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerwere attorneys
practicinglaw within the State of Texas at all relevanttimes herein. Each was an
attorneyfor Plaintiff. At all times relevanthereto,Plaintiffand Baron,Greenbergand
Motsenbockermaintainedan attorney-clientrelationship.Baron, Greenberg and
Motsenbocker
were negligentin the courseof the performance
of their legalservicesto
their client,Roger K. Parsons,individually,and as IndependentAdministratorof the
Estateof EstherAnn KartsotisParsons.
8.03 Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbockersolelycontrolledthe timing of the
citationand petitionuponTurleyand failedto exercisediligencewhendelayingsame.
8.04 Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
owed Plaintiffthe duty to exercise
the level of care that other aftorneyspracticingin the same localityand in the same or
similar circumstanceswould have exercised. However, Baron, Greenbergand
of Plaintiffdid not
Motsenbocker
actions/inactions
in the courseof their representation
meet the standard of care as required by their profession,and thereby Baron,
Greenbergand Motsenbocker
breachedthelr duty of careto Plaintiff.Evenin the post
remandbriefingGreenbergand Motsenbocker
failedto brief availableargumentsthat
the statuteof limitationswas not a defenseto the Turley lawsuit. These actionsor
inactionsamountto legalnegligence.
PLAIhITIFF'S
Thl[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 36
8.05 Due to Greenbergand Motsenbocker'slack of diligenceand neglect,
Parsonslosthis claimsagainstTurleywhichinclude,but are not limitedto:
a.
Turley's failure to use reasonableeffort to obtain an award of
adequatecompensatory
damages;
b.
Turley'sfailureto developand/oruse sufficientevidenceof gross
negligencein orderto havesecuredan exemplarydamagesaward;
c.
breach of contractclaim relatedto the attorney/clientagreement;
and
d.
breachof the fiduciarydutiesowedto Parsons.
Turley'sactions/inactions
werebelowthe standardof care,causingPlaintiffdamages.
8.OO As direct and proximateresultof these acts of negligence,Plaintiffhas
sufferedactualdamages,in an amountof the compensatory
damagesPlaintiffwould
have recovered in excess of the jury verdict if Turley had properly prepared and
presented the trial evidence against DuPont, in an amount of the additional
cornpensatory
damagesand the exennplary
damagesPlaintiffwould have receivedin
the DuPontlitigation,in an amountof compensatory
and exemplarydamagesPlaintiff
wouldhave receivedagainstConoco,in an amountto compensatePlaintifffor Turley's
breach of the employmentcontractbetween P|aintiffand Turley, the forfeitureof the
approximate$1,500,000.00fee paid by Parsonsto Turley,the amountof any prejudgmentand post-judgment
interestas a resultof those lost exemplarydamages,in
duringthe
additionto the aftorney'sfees Plaintiffpaid Greenbergand Motsenbocker
courseof their representation,
all of which Plaintiffnow seeksjudgmentas against
jointlyand severally.
Defendants,
8.07 There is a standardof care requiredfor lawyerspracticinglaw withinthe
Stateof Texas. Thereis a stanrdard
of care that requiresa lawyerto be reasonableand
PLAINXTIFF'S
T[-I[RDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 37
prudent,i.e., not negligent,with the respectto the handlingof affairsto which he is
entrusted. There is also a standard of care that requires an attorneyto act as a
fiduciaryand complywith his fiduciarydutyto the clientat alltimes. In this case,Baron,
Greenbergand Motsenbocker
breachedthe standardof care applicableto aftorneys.
The acts and omissionsof Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
were negligentand in
violationof fiduciarydutiesowedto Plaintiff. In particular,Plaintiffwouldsay that the
followingnon-exclusiveconductfell below the standardof care requiredfor Baron,
Greenbergand Motsenbocker,
separatelyor as a groupbecauseBaron,Greenbergand
Motsenbockerneglecteda legalmatterthat was entrustedto them, becausein doingall
of the actionsthat are complainedof herein,withoutnoticeto the clientor withoutan
adequateexplanationto the client,and withoutthe informedconsentof the client,they
showeda consciousdisregardfor the responsibilities
thattheyowedto the client.
8.08 In the underlingcases againstConocoand DuPont,Turley and LOWT
breachedthe standard of care applicableto attorneys. The acts and omissionsof
Turleyand LOWTwerein violationof fiduciarydutiesowedto Plaintiffandfraud.
8.09 All of this conductwas a breachof the dutiesthat were owedto Plaintiff.
This conductconstitutedunreasonableconduct,which was negligentas that term is
definedin law andwhichis a proximatecauseof damageto the Plaintiff.
IX. GROSSNEGLIGENCE
9.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporatesthe allegations nrade in the above
paragraphs,
as if fullyset at lengthherein.
9.02 The acts of Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
constitutea departure
from that which a personof ordinaryprudencewould do underthe same or similar
"[-hN[RD
PLAIhXTIFF'S
AMENDEDPETITION- Page38
circumstances. As such, Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbockerare liable for
negllgence,negligenceper se, gross negligenceand gross negligenceper se. In
particular,Plaintiffwouldshowthat Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
were negligent
and/orbreachedtheirfiduciarydutyin connectionwith one otrrnoreof the followingnonexclusiveparticulars:
a.
Failingto properlyhandleFlaintiffslegalmattensregardingthe Turleyand
!-OWTlitigation,and the DuPontand Conocolit[gation;
b.
Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerin general have been trying to
promotetheirown economicself-interest
ratherthantheirclient;
c.
Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockeractuallyabandonedthe client by
failingto timelyserve\MndleTunleyand his lawfirm,and therefore,should
forfeit all of the fees and/or economicbenefitsand/or items of economic
substancethatthey received;
d.
Earon,Greenbergand Motsenbocker
failedto adviseand counselPlaintiff,
point
in time, of the legal risks and consequencesinvolvingtheir
any
actionsand/orinactions.
9.03 Al[ of these items are negligent,grosslynegligentand violationof the
fiduciarydutythat Baron,Greenhergand Motsenbocker
owe to its client. Theseactions
either have been taken hy Defendantsand/ortaken by its partners,agents,employees
or other entitiesover whom it has control. Further,when these actionshave been
brought to the attention of Baron, Greenbergand Motsenhocker,they were totaily
callousand in a blatantdisregardof any rightsor considerations
the clientrnighthave.
All of thls is negligent,grosslynegtrigenrt,
a breachof fiduciarydutyand is fraudor, rnore
specifically,a constructivefraud. A breach of fiduciaryduty is a form of constnuctive
fraud. All of thesetontsare a proximatecauseof darnagesto the Plaintiff.
9.04 Each of the above and fonegoingacts of Baron, Greenberg and
causeof
Motsenbocker
constitutednegligence,negligenceper se and werea pnoximate
- Page39
PLAINITIFF'S
lfH[RDAMENDEDPETITION
damageto Plaintiff. Therefore,for all of such actions,Plaintiffherebyrequestsactual
damagesas appropriateunderlaw. Nothingthe Plaintiffdid or failedto do in any way
causedor contributed
to the injuriescomplainedof herein.
9.05 Further, the conduct of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbockerwas
intentional,
willful,grosslynegligentand in totaldisregardfor the rightsof Plaintiff.More
specifically,the conduct of Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerwas consciously
indifferentand/orgrosslynegligent,towardsPlaintiff,in that they knewthe importance,
and the monetaryvalueof providingcompetentlegalserviceson behalfof the Plaintiff,
as well as Plaintiffs immediatedesire and need to have competentlegal seruices
regardingthe Turley litigation. Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbocker,with such
knowledge,failed to protectthe interestsof Plaintiffand, in fact, put their interests
before the interestsof the Plaintiff. The conductwas of the kind and characterthat
warrantsthe impositionof punitivedamagesin orderto compelrespectfor the law and
the rights of others,and to deter Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerand others
similarlysituatedfrom similar conduct in the future. Plaintiffis entitledto recover
punitivedamagesin an amountin excessof the minimumjurisdictionallimits of the
Court.
9.06 Plaintiffwould show that there are no applicablebars to his case based
uponany statuteof limitations.Flrst,Plaintiffwouldshowthat the statuteof limitations
has not run on the causesof actionassertedherein. Plaintiffwouldshowthat eitherthe
causesof actionhave not accrued,or have accruedwithinthe last tro years. Plaintiff
also allegesthat Plaintiffhas two (2) yeansfrom the date that the acts complainedof
were knownto Plaintiff. Plaintiffwould also pleadthe benefitof any tollingstatuteof
PLAIhJTIFF'S
ThflIRD
AMENDEDPETITION- Page40
limitations,includingany tollingof statuteof limitationsregardingthe time periodduring
whichany Defendants
wereout of the Stateof Texas.
9.07 ln addition,Plaintiffwould showthat any statuteof limitationswould be
that
relationship
tolledduringthe peniodof time that defendantshad an attorney/client
was ongoingwith Plaintiffbecausethe discoveryrule appliesto toll the statute of
llmitations
for claimsof breachesof fiduciaryduty.
9.08 Plaintiffwouldshowthat manyof the allegationsreferredto hereinas acts
of malpracticeon the part of Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbocker,occurredwithintwo
(2) years of the date the conduct of Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerbecame
knownto Plaintiffand, therefore,are not barred by the statuteof limitations. Further,
Plaintiffwould also plead the effect of any tolling statute regardingamendedor
pleadingsarisingout of the transactionor occurrenceas relatingbackto
supplemental
the dateof the originalfiling.
9.09 Plaintiffwouldask the Courtto takejudicialnoticeof the datethe original
to
filingin this casetook placeand alsojudicialnoticeof the datethat any amendments
the petitionare filed.
9.10 Plaintiffwould ask the court to applythe discoveryrule to all applicable
claims. Additionally,Plaintiffherebypleadsthe Hughesrule, as cited by the Texas
SupremeCourtin Hughesv. Mahaney& Higgins,821 S.W.2d154(Tex.1991)and the
Apex rule,as cited by TexasSupremeGourt,is Apex TowingCo. v. Tolin,41 S.W.3D
118 (Tex. 2001). Underthe Hughesand Apex doctrines,the statuteof limitationsis
tolled until Plaintiffhas exhaustedall litigationand appeals. Until then, the causeof
actlondoesnot accrue. Plaintiffthereforeassertseachof theseexceptionsto the tolling
PLAIhITIFF'S
THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page41
of the statuteof limitationsto supportthe timelyfilingof the Plaintiffsoriginalpetitionin
this matter.
X. DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT
10.01 Plaintiffincorporates
the provisionsof the aboveparagraphs.Pursuantto
judgment
Tex. Civ. Prac.& Rem.CodeSS37.001,et seq.,Plaintiffseeksa declaratory
that:
a.
Evidencethat the pilot suffered from alcoholismshould have been
discoveredand utilizedby Turley;
b.
and
Plaintiffwouldhavesatisfiedthe Texasstandardfor grossnegligence,
thus would have been granted an exemplarydamagesaward, if the
evidencethat the pilot sufferedfrom alcoholismhad been discovered,
and not utilized
alongwith the otherevidencediscoveredby Defendants,
by Turley;
c.
Turley's failure to use the Cardamoneletters and the testimonyof.
Cardamoneat the DuPont trial would have satisfiedthe subjective
awarenessprongof a grossnegligence
finding;
d.
Flaintiffwas damagedby virtueof the breachof suchduties;
e.
Flaintiffsdamageswere proximatelycausedby the breachof suchduties
by Defendants;
The discoveryrule appliesto toll the statuteof limitationsfor the claimsof
breachof fiduciarydutiesmadeherein;and
g.
DefendantsConocoand DuPontare vicariouslyliablefor the fraudulent
SDO&S;Baron;B&B;
acts of Greenberg;LegalServices;Motsenbocker;
Turley;and LOWT;
h.
Defendants
Conocoand DuPont,andTurleywereunjustlyenrichedby the
actionsof Greenberg;LegalServices;Motsenbocker;
SDO&S;Baronand
B&B;and
Flalntiffis entitledto a returnof all fees and expensespaidto Greenberg,
Legal Services, Motsenbocker, SDO&S and these defendants'
recommended
consultantsand experts.
PLAIhITIFF'S
THIRDAIVIENDED
PETITION- Page42
XI. VrcI.ATIONSOF TEXASDECEPTIVETRADEPRACTICESACT
11.01 Flaintiff hereby incorporatesthe allegations made in the above
paragraphs,
as if fullyset out at lengthherein.
11.02Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerwere and are in violationof the
TexasDeceptiveTradePracticesAct. Defendantsengagedin false,mislead[ng,
and/or
deceptiveacts or practicesthat Plaintiffreliedon his detriment.Baron,Greenbergand
Motsenbockerhave violatedthe provisionsof the Texas DeceptiveTrade PracticesConsumerProtectionAct (the "DTPA') by failing to disclosecertain informationto
Plaintiff.Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerand/or its agents, employees,and
servantsactingwithin the courseand scope of their employmentengagedin false,
misleading,deceptive and unconscionableconduct. Specifically,the wrongful,
unconscionable,and culpable conduct of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker
includes,but is not necessarily
limitedto, the following:
a.
representingthat goods or services have sponsorship,approval,
characteristics,
ingredients,uses,benefitsor quantitleswhichthey do not
have,Tex.Bus.& Com.CodeAnn.$17.46(bX5);
b.
repnesenting
that goodsor servicesare of a particularstandardonquality,
whenthey are or another,Tex. Bus.& Gorn.GodeAnn.$17.46(bX7);
G.
representingthat an agreementconfersor involvesrights,rernedies,or
obligationswhich it does not have or involveor which are prohihitedby
law,Tex.tsus.& Com.CodeAnn.$17.46(b)(12);
d.
whichwas
the failureto discloseinformationconcerninggoodsor senvices
known at the tirne of the transactionif such failure to disclosesuch
infonrnation
was intendedto indurcethe consumerinto a transactioninto
which the consumerwould not have enteredhad the informationbeen
and
disclosed,Tex.Bus.& Com.CodeAnn.$17.46(bX24):
e.
engagingin unconscionable
conduct,actionsand coursesof action,Tex.
tsus.& Conn.CodeAnn.$17.50(aX3).
PI-AIIUTIFF'S
THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 43
11.03 Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockerengaged in deceptiveconduct
intentionallyand knowingly. Defendantshave actual awarenessof the falsity,
deception,or unfaimessof the act or practice and acted with a specific intent that
Plaintiffact in detrimentalrelianceon the falsityor deceptionor in detrimentalignorance
of the unfairness.
11.04 Because Baron, Greenbergand Motsenbockeracted knowinglyand
intentionally,Plaintiffis entitledto recoveractual damages,damagesfor emotional
distress,aftorney'sfees and additionalstatutorydamages. Furthermore,Plaintiffis
entitled to such damages because Plaintiff has complied with the statutory notice
requirementof the DTPA by issuing a timely demand on Baron, Greenbergand
Motsenbocker.
XII.ATTORNEYS'FEES
12.01 Plaintiffincorporatesthe provisionsof the above paragraphsand would
showthe Courtthat pursuantto the termsof the contract,the DTPAand Section38.001
et seq., of the Civil Practices& RemediesCode,Plaintiffis entitledto recoverof and
from Baron,Greenbergand Motsenbockera sum representingPlaintiffsreasonable
and necessaryattorneys'fees, which sum is a reasonablechargefor the services
renderedin bringingthis suit. In the eventof Baron's,Greenberg'sor Motsenbocker's,
one or more, unsuccessfulappealto the court of appeals,Plaintiffwould be further
entitledto a reasonableattorney'sfee; and in the event of Baron's,Greenberg'sor
Motsenbocker's
unsuccessfulappealto the Texas SupremeCourt,Plaintiffwould be
entitledto an additionalreasonableattorneys'fee.
PLAINTIFF'S
THflRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 44
XIII.RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR
13.01 Motsenbockerwas in the course and scope of his employmentwith
SDO&Sduringthe time periodthattheywere representing
the Plaintiff.Further,he was
in the courseand scopeof his law practiceat all timesthereafterwhen he madelegal
decisionsregardingthe representation
of Plaintiff.Accordingly,SDO&Sis responsible
for the actions of Motsenbocker. Motsenbockerwas an agent of the firm of Shafer
Davis, either as vice-principal,principal,partner,employee,or as express,implied,
ostensibleor apparentagent. SDO&Sis both directlyresponsiblefor beingnegligent,
and for its agent'snegligence,and for a breachof fiduciaryduty. In addition,SDO&Sis
vicariouslyresponsible
for the actionsof Motsenbocker.
13.02 ln addition, SDO&S should have had policies, procedures,rules,
regulationsand codes of conductthat would have preventedthis sort of outcome. To
the extentthat SDO&Sdid not have such policies,procedures,rules, regulationsor
codes of conduct in place, then SDO&S is negligentin not operatingits firm ,in
accordancewith standardsthat wouldcomportwith the minimumstandardsrequiredof
attorneyswho are practicinglaw in the State of Texas and dischargingrights and
obligationto theirclients.
13.03 Greenbergwas in the course and scope of his employmentwith B&B
and/orBaronduringthe time periodthat they were representing
the Plaintiff. Further,
he was in the courseand scopeof his law practiceat alltimesthereafterwhenhe made
legaldecisionsregardingthe representation
of Plaintiff.Accordingly,B&Band/orBaron
is responsiblefor the actionsof Greenberg. Greenbergwas an agentof B&B and/or
Baron,either as vice-principal,principal,partner,employee,or as express,implied,
PTAINTIFF'S
THIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page ,45
ostensibleor apparentagent.B&B and/orBaronis both directlyresponsiblefor being
negligent,and for its agent'snegligence,and for a breachof fiduciaryduty. In addition,
B&Band/orBaronis vicariouslyresponsible
for the actionsof Greenberg.
13.04 In addition,B&B and/or Baron should have had policies,procedures,
rules,regulationsand codesof conductthat wouldhavepreventedthis sort of outcome.
To the extentthat B&B and/or Baron did not have such policies,procedures,rules,
regulationsor codes of conductin place,then B&B and/or Baronis negligentin not
operatingits firm in accordancewith standardsthat would comportwith the minimum
standards required of aftorneyswho are practicinglaw in the State of Texas and
dischargingrightsand obligationto theirclients.
XIV. DISCIPLINARY
RULES
14.01The DisciplinaryRulesof the State Bar of Texas (sometimescalledthe
DR's)provideguidanceto courtsin evaluatingthe conductof attorneys.The rulescan
be consideredby the court, or by the trier of fact, as evidenceof a violationof existing
duty of care when consideringclaimsfor legal malpracticeor breachof fiduciaryduty.
Giventhis, it is appropriateto pointout to the courtthat Plaintiffis allegingviolationsof
the followingTexasRulesof Disciplinary
Conduct:
a.
to a legalmatter
1.01(a lawyershall not neglector show inattentiveness
that is entrustedto him);
b.
1.03 (a lawyershouldmake full disclosureto a clientand keep a client
reasonablyinformed);
c.
2.O1(a lawyershouldhaveundividedloyaltyto his clients);
d.
5.01 (a lawyer is responsibleif he orders, encouragesor knowingly
permitsconductthat is improper).
PI-AINTIF'F'S
THflRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 4.6
whetheror not the
14.02All of suchdisciplinaryrulesare relevantin determining
Baron,Greenbergor Motsenbocker
havebreachedthe standardof carethat is required.
CONCEALMENT
RULE
)$/. DISCOVERY
RULE'FRAUDULENT
15.01 Plaintiff incorporatesthe provisions of the above paragraphsand
affirmativelypleadsthe discoveryrule and/orthe fraudulentconcealmentrule where
applicable.
PRAYER
and
WHEREFORE,
PREMISESCONSIDERED,
RogerK. Parsons,individually,
as IndependentAdministratorof the Estateof EstherAnn KartsotisPersonsrespectfully
praysthat on finaltrial,Defendantsbe heldliableas follows:
1.
Judgmentagainst Defendants,jointly and severally,for the actual and
special damagessuffered by Plaintiffas a result of the Defendants'
limitsof the court;
conductin an amountwithinthe jurisdictional
Forfeitureof all attorneys'fees or interestsreceivedby or conveyedto the
plusinterest;
Defendants,
judgmentas requestedherein;
For declaratory
Reasonableand necessaryattorneys'fees;
Exemplarydamages;
Statutorypenalties;
Costsof suit;
by law;and
Pre-judgment
interestas pnovided
and post-judgment
Suchotherand furtherreliefat law or in equity,to whichPlaintiffmay be
justlyentitled.
PLAINNTIFF'S
ThIIRDAMENDEDPETITION- Page 47
Respectfullysubrnltted,
Roger KP.M.B.188
6850 NorthShilohRd
Garlatrd,Texas75044
(214) 649-8059
(972')295-2776(FAX)
PROSE FORPIAINTIFF
ROGERK. PARSONS,
ANDAS INDEPENDENT
INDIVIDUALLY,
OF THE ESTATEOF
ADMINISTRATOR
ESTHERANN KARTSOTISPARSONS
PLffNJIFF'STN-NIRD
AMENDEDPFT|TI9N- Fage48
CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
I hereby@rtfy that I havefonrvarded
a true and conectcopyof the aboveand
for_qgoing
instrumentvia telecopyand by certifiedmail,retumreceiptrequested,on this
22Ndayof Deember,2008to:
GharlaAfdous,Esg.
zsos
ceo#f,nblHSlt
zoo
suire
Dallas,Texas75201
Attorneyfor DefendantLegafServices,P.C.,and
RobertM. Greenberg,Attorney
R. H. Wallace,Esq.
MonikaCooper,Esg.
Shannon,Gracey,Ratliff& Miller,L.L,P.
777 MainStreet,Suite3800
FortWorth,Texas76102
Attomeyfor DefendantRobertE. Motsenbocker,
and
Shafer,Davis,O'Leary& Stoker,Inc,
Lisa Blue,Esq.
Baronand Blue
5956Sherryl-ane,Suite1616
Dallas,Texas75225
RogerK. Pansons
PlSlNTlFF'sTHIRDAMFNDEDpETfrfohl - page49