The Fractured Self in “Le Bateau Ivre” by Arthur Rimbaud and
Transcrição
The Fractured Self in “Le Bateau Ivre” by Arthur Rimbaud and
1 Nout Van Den Neste Maestrado Estudos Comparatistas Comparar Pessoa Prof. H. Buescu THE FRACTURED SELF IN LE BATEAU IVRE BY ARTHUR RIMBAUD AND ODE MARÍTIMA BY ÁLVARO DE CAMPOS 2 INTRODUCTION In this essay, I will discuss and compare two important poems, Ode Marítima by Fernando Pessoa, under the moniker of de Campos and Le Bateau Ivre by Arthur Rimbaud. In the short space of a 15 page essay it is of course impossible to discuss both long and winding poems in their entirety so therefore I have decided to just focus on the theme of the unknown and more specifically, Liberty and how both narrators end up disappointed. Before I can discuss Liberty, I need to establish a hefty theoretical base of both the theoretical thinking behind Je est un Autre of Rimbaud and the Sensationism of de Campos. In the first chapter I will just focus on the theoretical thinking and how it in both cases defines their metaphysical search for the unknown. In the next chapter, I will discuss the poems themselves more deeply, close-reading both texts in the context of their respective ecstatic experience of Liberty whilst already hinting at a possibility of failure and disappointment. The third and final chapter is mostly preoccupied with how both narrators come to disappoint themselves and I will argue how this is closely linked with a rupture between body and the self (typically for Modernism) and how this is also closely linked to cristalization (which carries its autonomous destruction within) and the simulacrum. 1. ʻJE EST UN AUTREʼ: VOYANT AND SENSATIONIST Rimbaud wrote his letters du voyant from Charlesville, one a critique on the subjective, hyperpersonal poetry of Georges Izambard on the 13th of May, and a second one directed to Paul Demeny, oblique and elleptical but gentler in tone on the 15 th of May, both in 1871 (Œuvres Complètes, 248-254). These letters have been studied and analysed, adequately, by the likes of Bonnefoy and Munier and in this first section, I will give an overview of the different interpretations of this complex theory and compare it to the sensacionismo prevalent in Alvaro de Campos. I want to make the point that Rimbaud and Pessoa, under the moniker of Campos, are what I would call voyants: both Le Bateau Ivre and Ode Mariima explore new ways of seeing the reality which both narrators of the poems have a complex relationship with. The letter du voyant revolves around two crucial phrases: “JE est un autre”, the JE as capitalized by him in the letter to Izambard (248) and “Le Poète se fait voyant par un long, 3 immense, et raisonné dérèglement de tous les sens.” from the letter to Demeny two days later. What connects both these phrases is their common purpose: “Puisquʼil a cultivé son âme, déjà riche, plus quʼaucun! Il arrive à lʼinconnu, et quand, affolé, il finirait par perdre lʼintelligence de ses visions, il les a vues!” (251). I will come back to this specific sentence in my discussion of Le Bateau Ivre, but for now I quoted this phrase in order to point out Rimbaudʼs quest and neverending search for the unknown, lʼinconnu. The famous phrase, “Je est un autre”, mentioned in his two letters, according to Gusmão, “mostra ainda uma crise do cogito cartesiano e uma crise dos modos de representação do sujeito, mas ao mesmo tempo, tal como por exemplo em Pessoa, diz um modo de fazer e pensar a poesia, um metódo outro.” (156). This cartesian crisis of knowledge is not the exclusive prerogative of Rimbaud because it is prevalent throughout the Romantic period. Pina Coelho indicates this as well when discussing Pessoaʼs sensationism: “Com o Romantismo há um progresso da centralização da atenção na alma. A sensação passa a ser a realidade primordial. O objecto exterior cessa como independente da sensação, mas é enquanto sentido.” (260), or in other words: there is a significant disbelief in the objective representation of reality since reality now takes its shape and representation from the way it is experienced by the subject. As Buescu points out in the introduction to Cristalizações: Fronteiras da Modernidade, it is an epistemological problem according to Gumbrecht, a problem concerned with the production of knowledge caused by a lack of trust in the knowledge which is produced by the subject perceiving reality, leading irrevocably to a crisis of representation, analyzed by Foucault. (25) I mention this brief historical and philosophical contextualization only to situate Rimbaudʼs poetic objectives and to point out that he was reacting to a general tendency of thought very much prevalent in his lifetime. By depersonalizing his own poetry and writing it as if also he himself is unknown, he blatantly attacks and critiques this Romantic model of thinking which spills out into the often very self-indulgent poetry of the time as well. This explains why he lashes out to Izambard in his letter of the 13 th of May: “Sans compter que votre poésie subjective sera toujours horriblement fadasse. Un jour, jʼespère, - bien dʼautres espèrent la même chose, - je verrai dans votre principe la poésie objective” (248). Poet-academic Bonnefoy analyses the phrase “Je est un autre” as a refusal of formulations which otherwise lose themselves in everyday language use: “Et ce quʼil sait aussi, et affirme avec la plus grande force, cʼ est que sous le moi est un ʻjeʼ qui, à lʼamont du 4 recours aux mots, garde le sujet parlant au contact de façons dʼêtre au monde perdues de vue par la pensée ordinaire” (28), or in other words: underneath the me, moi, there is an I, je, which experiences the world instinctively and directly and it is exactly this moi who tries to derange the perceptions of the deeper, more fundamental je, who perceives the world in a way which is defined by (social) conventions and habits. Or to put it in the words of Munier in LʼArdente Patience dʼArthur Rimbaud, “le réalité est dʼabord, est avant. La réalité du réel est toujours ʻavantʼ.” (11) and it is exactly this perception or experience of reality, which is instinctive, effective and immediate, that Rimbaud tries to escape and disrupt through a deregulation of the senses. Inevitably, this results in a paradox: the means through which to achieve the objective and impersonal, is to penetrate through to the level of the most subjective, personal and therefore instinctive experience. Rimbaud is looking for an objective way to see reality, leading him to experiencing it in a new, innocent way unrestricted by social conventions or society and its ordinary, conventionalized language use, what Bonnefoy in his book Notre Besoin de Rimbaud has coined as a “mise en question des habitudes de la parole.” (27). It is also in this context in which the dérèglement of all of the senses should be situated. Bonnefoy directs the readerʼs attention to the ambiguity of this specific statement, giving two definitions for these senses. On the most direct level they are “façons dont le corps se met en rapport avec la réalité empirique en ce quʼa celle-ci de plus immédiat,”, but tous les sens can also refer to “les significations, multiples elles aussi, qui sʼinscrivent et ce superposent dans la parole, dans les textes, dans les poèmes.” (29). If the poet also deranges the significations of his words (by putting them in unexpected contexts for example), then the logical consequence of this writing process is that one single poem bears a multitude of references and interpretations which can be paradoxical or mutually exclusive (just like Pessoa). It is through this deranging of the senses, both sensations and significations that the poet-voyant arrives at the inconnu (including the deeper layers of the self, differing between the moi and the je). The disrupt manifests itself on the sensuous level of the touch, the sensation and on the level of the gaze. This necessarily means that the disordering of the senses results in a different way of seeing reality, escaping “ces stéréotypes du quotidien.” (Bonnefoy, 27), “Désorganiser le regard, lʼouïe, le toucher.” (30). Hence the term voyant, derived from the verb voir, meaning to see: “Car changer la vision, cʼest dʼabord changer celui qui voit: le sujet comme il voit. Plus radicalement, cʼest faire quʼil voie, en faire un ʻvoyantʼ.” 5 (Munier, 50). A perfect example of this, which comes back time and again in most works written about Rimbaud, is the poem Voyelles, in which Rimbaud describes the vowels of the alphabet in terms of colors. This poem hints at a synaesthetic experience which later on would turn out to be crucial in the Symbolist movement of which Rimbaud was definitely a forerunner. To call him a Symbolist would be anachronistic as Entiemble indicates in Le Mythe de Rimbaud: “Non seulement on peut, mais on ʻdoitʼ regarder Rimbaud comme lʼun des fondateurs, lʼun des pères fondateurs de lʼÉglise symboliste, avec Verlaine et Mallarmé”, but it would be wrong according to Entiemble to really classify him as a symbolist since the author in his research only saw the symbolist procédé fully developed “douze ou quinze ans plus tard les premiers symptômes.” (66). But it is exactly the Symbolist perspective which to a great extent will influence Pessoaʼs poetry and his conception of Sensationism. Its direct theoretical precursor, Intersecconism, a term and theory conceived by Pessoa, deals with the crossing, the intersecting of two dimensions of reality: “celui des ʻsensations apparemment venues de lʼextérieurʼ avec celui des ʻsensations apparemment venue de lʻintérieur” (Lopes, 150). To paraphrase: it was a theory (and a literary practice prominent in O Livro do Dessassossego or Chuva Obliqua) preoccupied with two different kinds of perceptions of reality. There is the effectiveness, immediacy of reality (which might be called the exterior landscape), that is to say, the way it manifests itself in a direct sense to the subject, exterior sensations on the one hand. At nearly the same time of this experience of reality, within the subject, there are the direct, internalized reactions to these perceptions (the interior landscape). The problem however with this line of thinking, as Lopes indicates, is its two-dimensionality: “Plus quʼun visionnaire, le poète aspire à être un créateur et cʼest pourquoi le poète ʻinterseccionistaʼ ne pourra pas coexister longtemps avec le créateur des hétéronymes.” (152). Interseccionism has a descriptive quality since it just tries to describe how the internal and external landscape intersect, is therefore nearly static and lacks the aspiration of the dynamic, all-encompassing gaze of Sensationism. Before I discuss the different characteristics of Sensationism, I want to spend a short amount of time on Pessoaʼs theory of sensation, giving a brief summary based on the explanations given by Dutch Pessoa-academic Michaël Stoker. Stoker considers sensation as the whole of perceptions and awareness and paraphrases Pessoaʼs six elements of sensation: the sensation of an exterior universe; the sensation of the object which is perceived and noticed at this time; the association of objective ideas (such as physical characteristics or 6 knowledge about the history of this object); association of subjective ideas (the state of mind); the general character of the observer or subject (his more permanent state); the awareness of the perception and critical reflection about it. Crucial to this is that “een sensatie zich nooit in zijn geheel openbaart; het gaat altijd om één of enkele elementen daarvan.” (“a sensation never reveals itself completely: it always revolves around one or a couple of its elements”) 1 (49). The central purpose of Sensationism has of course been quoted many times, but the phrase, written by the heteronym Álvaro de Campos, bears repeating: “sentir tudo de todas as maneiras” (qtd. in Stoker, 38). The implications of this particular statement mean several things: if art and literature as conceived by Pessoa are supposed to describe every possible feeling, then that entails a what I would call paradoxical, inward regression. I use the word ʻparadoxicalʼ because if in one poem every possible sensation (as a reaction to the external reality) can be included, then logically, as with Rimbaudʼs multi-interpretable poetry, certain sensations will be paradoxical and mutually exclusive. It is also an ʻinward regressionʼ. If the purpose of Sensationism is to feel everything in every possible way, then that means that there is also a critical reflection about those sensations, which, according to José Gil, “fazendo nascer outros espaços, que acompanham as sensações minúsculas; trata-se por fim de testar os processos de abstracção das emoções, procurando criar sensações jà analisadas.” (Gil, 20). This means inevitably that also critical analyzes about those critical analyzes are possible and this kind of procédé seems to me to be infinitely regressive into the experiencing self. Pessoa “escreve sobre a possibilidade infinita de escrever, sobre a incessante proliferação das palavras e das sensações” (10). José Gil also distinguishes between two different poetical principles of Sensationism. The first principle is that writers become organs of feelings and sensations but experience these sensations as intellectual phenomena (hence the self-critical analysis I mentioned before) which provokes poetical emotion. The whole purpose of this particular principle bears some resemblence to Décadence: “no limite, sentir come se escreve um poema, viver como se compõe uma obra de arte: ʻQuero ser uma obra de arteʼ, exclama Bernardo Soares.” (21). Just like with Rimbaud, in this sense, the gaze of the poet (since he is critically overlooking both an external and his own internal landscape) plays a crucial role. The second principle according to Gil lies in the capacity of the poet to become others, which is inevitable if the poet or artist wants to experience everything in every possible way, 1 Note of the author: my translation. 7 therefore explaining the necessity of the existence of heteronyms. “Vivo-me estheticamente em outro. Esculpi a minha vida como a uma estatua de materia alheia a meu ser.” (Soares qtd. in Gil, 21). According to Gil, this does not necessarily mean that ʻthe otherʼ should be the only subject of the work of art: “Não há um sujeito artistico, mas uma multiplicidade; não há apenas um devir-outro, mas uma pluralidade indefinida.” (21). The means through which Pessoa can experience everything in every possible way is depersonalization, not in the sense of an absence of subjects, au contraire, but in the sense of the absence of the personal characteristics of the author, who specifically goes looking for otherness outside of himself (which comically paradoxical is so all-defining that Pessoa, in his obsessive search for other perspectives and sensations, actually lets his work bear a heavy mark of the author himself). Sensationism resembles “des Symbolistes et des Décadents français, mais ils le font en tant que personnages. Ils sont le fruit dʼune création, dʼune ʻobjectivationʼ. Dʼaprès Pessoa, ce qui compte pour lʼart ce ne sont pas les sensations mais la conscience que lʼartiste a de ses sensations.” (Lopes, 156). It is also in this respect that Pessoa and all of his heteronyms are as much voyants as Rimbaud: they all are trying to critically see what it is that they experience. The crucial difference between Rimbaud and Pessoa is actually indicated by this quote from Monteiro, in the context of the difference between Symbolism and Modernism: “Mas o simbolismo acha-se, em relação ao ʻmodernismoʼ, num plano muito mais limitado. O simbolismo é um aspecto da evolução das formas de expressão, e não um movimento que implique uma transformação profunda da literatura – ele é, exactemente como na pintura o impressionismo, um ʻfimʼ, e não um ʻprincipioʼ” (Monteiro, 33). To summarize, if we apply this quotation to Rimbaud and Pessoa, then I would say that Rimbaud is purposefully looking for a depersonalization, considering the self also as other, as strange, as much of an object to be analyzed and described in poetry as any other. The means through which to achieve this depersonalization is through a deregulation of the senses, both in terms of sensations and the significations of the words in the poem. Pessoa however uses depersonalization as his guiding principle (and not as a purpose) and is therefore able to take it further than Rimbaud ever could, multiplying himself through various heteronyms (the most important ones are Ricardo Reis, Bernando Soares, Alberto Caeiro and Álvaro de Campos). The purpose of this depersonalization (the absence of the characteristics 8 of the author in his work but still focusing on the experiences of a multitude of subjects) is to ʻsentir tudo de todas as maneirasʼ. The deregulation with Pessoa happens both on the level of the self and on the level of the sensations and significations of words (which are a means to portray a multitude of sensations). Their poetry does however have one destination in common, which is the arrival at the unknown. This unknown manifests itself in both Le Bateau Ivre and Ode Marítima in different ways and it is on this unknown and its consequential freeing effects that I will focus in the next chapter. 2. EXALTED LIBERTY When Rimbaud seeks to arrive at the inconnu, he is actually looking to free and emancipate himself from socio-cultural conventions and institutions as Yuat already indicates: “Cʼest peut-être dans et par la poésie que lʼhomme retrouve son lien primordial avec la nature.” (228): the goal is to make a tabula rasa with everything that is part of the sociocultural structure, symbolised by the “porteur de blés flamands ou de cotons anglais” (122) as argued by Haugen (149). What is important in this particular quote is the word primordial, since it indicates something crucial about Rimbaudʼs poetic project: he wants to experience reality in an immediate way, in an original way as if it was new and for the first time, an experience unrestricted by society. According to Bonnefoy, the phrase “Acteurs de drames très antiques” should be regarded in this context: “ils semblent remémorer des scènes des premiers temps de la vie, avec entre leurs protagonisteds des heurts qui furent cause dʼeffroi si ce nʼest de marques durables sur lʼavenir dʼun petit témoin.” (40). Logically, in the associated imagery of the first scenes of life, there seems to be a search for the Romantic motif of childhood and innocence, which is imagery which crops up time and again throughout Le Bateau Ivre: “plus sourd que les cerveaux dʼenfants”, “plus douce quʼaux enfants la chair des pommes sures” (123) and also in the second to last stanza: “Un enfant accroupi plein de tristesses” (125). Also in his exaltation, the poet-voyant (symbolized by the boat, drunk on the poem of the sea, delirious because of his many experiences and sensations) he resembles the almost naïve enthusiasm of a child, depicting the hope for everlasting happiness and Liberty: “tohu-bohus plus triomphants”, “Plus léger quʼun bouchon jʼai dansé sur les flots” (“il dance son abandon” (Munier, 63)) and most importantly: “Les Fleuves mʼont laissé descendre où je voulais.” (122), finding a contrast in 9 their own impassibility just one stanza before, pointing to a journey into the unknown. The narrator is blissfully unaware of the loss of a specific place which these Fleuves will cause (something I will come back to in the next chapter). This is what Haugen calls “le moment de la liberté”: “Dans les premières strophes du poème sʼexprime le rêve de lʼinstant enivrant, où la répression perd son pouvoir, où les murs tombent”, “cʼest lʼabandonnement: le bateau cède, avec une jouissance passive, aux forces de la nature.” (152). So in this sense, the poet-voyant not only returns to a childlike innocence in order to experience new sensations, even more he looks to surrender himself, passively, to the forces of nature, another way of rebelling against the conventions of society, Haugen continues: “impliquerait une nouvelle soumission aux contraintes aveugles de la nature. La liberté nʼest réalisable que par le chemin dur de la répression civilisatrice.” (154). Crucial to realise is that poet-voyant finds joy and exaltation in being another (in this case, imagining himself to be a drunken boat, therefore forcing himself to rediscover and to see himself as anew and other), reflected also in the constant redefinitions of the self-narrator: “Jʼétais insoucieux” (122), “Je courus!”, “Jʼai dansé”, “Moi, lʼautre hiver, plus sourd que les cerveaux dʼenfants,” (123). In the next chapter I will explain how this ecstatic state turns to selfdeprecation. What the poet-voyant seems to be expressing is the gaze of the child, which could be regarded as the most plausible, the most possible access to the sensation unregulated by social conventions. But it is exactly the rupture between the desire to have a childlike gaze (and innocence) and the impossibility to go back to that which is crucial to the failure of the poetvoyant: “Cʼest ici quʼintervient dès lʼabord la logique de Rimbaud: il nʼy a évolution quʼen apparence; entre la vie de lʼenfant et celle qui la prolonge cʼest une rupture.” (Dhôtel, 22). It is something which in the next chapter I will label as the transient nature of the cristilization of his visions: “Puisque la vie la plus enviable est profondément altérée par lʼidée dʼune fin nécessaire” (25). However, he does not want to evade or distract himself from this pending, unavoidable destruction: “Ce principe lui permettra de mieux comprendre ce quʼil a perdu et de se situer sans erreur par rapport à la vie parfaite de lʼenfance qui est la vraie vie, la seule vie.” (26). Important to notice is also how the narrator looks to free himself from concrete reality and the Fleuves which the boat sails upon, into abstraction (therefore a deregulation of signification): “Fleuves, avec une majuscule: tous les fleuves que peut descendre un bateau 10 comme celui-ci. Ils sont ʻimpassiblesʼ, comme le réel ordinaire, effectif et interte.” (62). Ode Marítima mentions something similar: “O Cais Absoluto por cujo modelo inconscientemente imitado” (81), therefore, the opening lines, “Sozinho, no cais deserto, a esta manhã de Verão” (80) signify de Campos standing there at every possible-to-imagine wharf: “olho prò Indefinido” (80). Güntert explains it thus: “O consciente de Pessoa desperta por conseguinte como um pensar que olha e ao mesmo tempo deseja, que espera o prolongamento deste olhar e anseia por resisistir.” (29). In this sense, he is no different from the poet-voyant Rimbaud: “O seu pensamento e sobretudo visual: tal como a vista, ele cria distância” (39). Now that I have briefly pointed out, also in the previous chapter, how feeling everything in every possible way is strongly connected to seeing (the critical gaze of observing both the external and internal landscape giving sensationism its dynamic), I want to ask the question of how for de Campos, the unknown, the implied Liberty of every possible sensation is depicted in the poem. I would say that, unlike Rimbaud, Campos, with the same passionate, almost desperate abandon, does not try to go back, but instead finds himself looking forward to the glory of Futurism, filling him with awe and childlike wonder: “as maquinas que duplicam a nossa força, os navios que nos trazem as mensagens através dos mares. O homem, este novo Ulisses, subjuga o mundo com o auxílio da civilização moderna.” (174). The recurring symbol throughout the poem is the inner flywheel: “E dentro de mim um volante começa a girar” (80). It is a flywheel that, according to Stoker, “Campos in de Ode van de zee nog met almaar toenemende snelheid voortstuwde, verder en verder zijn kop in alvorens vaart te minderen en hem achter te laten op de kade, alleen met zijn ziel” (“propelled Campos forward with a constantly increasing speed, further and further into his head before slowing down and leaving him behind on the wharf, alone with his soul” 2) (Stoker, 39). This flywheel represents the glory of Futurism and progress which Campos so almost naively hopeful believes in: “A minha imaginação higiénica, forte, pratica,/Preocupase agora apenas com as coisas modernas e úteis,/Com os navios de carga, com os paquetes e os passageiros,/Com as fortes coisas imediatas, modernas, comerciais, verdadeiras./Abranda o seu giro dentro de mim o volante.” (103), he goes on to describe machines in poetic terms, praising commercial trade and the shortening of distances but does end up lamenting the poor steamer, out of fashion: “Enternece-me o pobre vapor, tão humilde vai ele e tão natural.” (106) and laments also throughout the poem the disappearing of discoveries and the loss of 2 Note of the author: my translation. 11 imagining worlds unknown, “Esses mares, maiores, porque se navegava mais devagar./Esses mares, misteriosos, porque se sabia menos deles.” (86), hinting at the mythical nature of the sea (also present in his self-identification with Ulysses). Just like the Fleuves of Rimbaud, also the Sea of de Campos is an abstract one: “Aqui a universalidade abstracta e simbólica do mar, cede o lugar a uma visão metafisica e onírica da vida como mar e do mar como metáfora da vida, chamamento intemporal e terrível das águas eternas. Nesse mar se recortam todos os mares.” (Lourenço, 167). In other words: de Camposʼ experience is a universal one, incorporating every possibly imaginable sea and every life associated with it in his mind. But the sea itself is, as Lourenço argues, a symbol: “Em boa verdade, a Ode Marítima não é evocação do mar ou dos mares que há no mar, mas da viagem, do nosso destino como viagem a partir de um cais anterior” (170), resulting in a metaphyisical search for what I would call the unknown. “Com tal velocidade desmedida, pavorosa/A máquina de febre das minhas viões transbordantes/Gira agora que a minha consciência, volante/E apenas um nevoento círculo assobiando no ar.” (95), expressing how the flywheel represents the dizzying multitude of sensations which he encounters and how he seems to be unable to stop them. In this particular stanza, the flywheel is his consciousness, indicating a (temporary) convergence between the things he dreams of and sees (the ships, the ocean, progress and discoveries) with himself. It is exactly this convergence which is the second major characteristic of the Liberty expressed in Ode Marítima: the Liberty to become all possible to imagine being others, which, as I have pointed out in the previous chapter is a logical consequence of feeling everything in every possible way. He imagines himself a pirate expressed by a childlike shouting out of pirate songs, making this particular poem one of the noisiest of Pessoaʼs body of work (“Fifteen men on a dead manʼs chest,/Yo-ho-ho and a bottle of rum” (95)), he imagines himself a barbarian (96) even the woman who was either raped or who eagerly waits for her man to come home (94). In other words, we can draw a conclusion from this work similar to that which Yuat has drawn from the work of Rimbaud: “ʻJeʼ nʼest plus fermé comme lʼunité du moi personnel, mais un opéra fabuleuxʼ où se mèlent et se parlent plusieurs voix, les voix des autres. Le poète est donc conduit à affirmer: à chacue être, plusieurs autre vies me semblaient duesʼ.” (Yuat, 241). In conclusion, even though Rimbaud and de Campos share the metaphyisical search for the unknown, sailing seas of endless possibilities and Liberty, they do experience this 12 Liberty in different ways. For Rimbaud, it consists of a return to childhood and to surrendering to the powers of nature in order to escape the limiting structure of social conventions and experience the world as if for the first time, with a childlike innocence and abandon, finding himself again in the otherness of the narrator of the drunken boat. De Campos however experiences his Liberty as a propulsion into Futurism which opens up the seas in order to explore them, in order to meet other people and travel the world (which he seems to experience as a double-edged sword) combined with the Sensationist possiblity to become others and he does this in a more explicit way than Rimbaud (who uses the symbol of the drunken boat in order to present the poet-voyant anew), because he literally imagines himself to live every kind of life he could possibly think of. In the next chapter I will explain how both these forms of Liberty ultimately cause disappointment and disillusion. 3. THE EDGES OF THE UNKNOWN In the previous section, I established that both poems conceptualize the unknown as a form of Liberty: for Rimbaud it is a childlike Liberty unrestricted by social conventions whereas for de Campos, textual Liberty and Futurism become intertwined with the potential of a similar childlike imagination which lead him to reconsider himself in other lives. So if these poems both celebrate their own Liberty and their own purpose (the search for the unknown), why then do they both express such disappointment in their search, to such an extent that the reader can only conclude that they have failed? By the end of the poem, de Campos is left alone on the wharf in the utter silence of his soul: “Traça um semicírculo de não sei que emoção/No silêncio comovido da minhʼalma...” (107). I would argue that de Camposʼ most prominent disappointment is his inability to return, or rather to recapture the experience of his childhood, through his imagined being of a pirate: “Todo este tempo não tirei os olhos do meu sonho longínquo./Da minha casa ao pé do rio,/Da minha infância ao pé do rio,” (100).Coto Fagundes argues that remembering is not enough: “The flow of time would have to be reversible, hence its new inverted course would erase the present (that is, the adult) consciousness of fugit irreparable tempus and transport the poet to the paradisaical past where time and its ravages are of no concern.” (110). In other words, his quest in this sense is quite similar to Rimbaud but, unlike Rimbaud (who uses symbols), the disappointment is more immediate and direct as soon as he mentions his 13 childhood home. The logical consequence for Campos is of course propelling himself with great abandon into the progress of the future, something which, as I have alluded to in the previous chapter, he also finds disappointing because of the disuse of the old steamer, the stories of worlds unknown and imagination in general. Therefore, when the Ode Marítima finally ends, de Campos finds himself alone and in the silence of the present, disappointed because of “the poetʼs inability to recapture the self associated with lost childhood” failing to reconcile “the imaginative past with the state of mind of the child who first experienced it.” (126). It is of course logical that his own disappointment, disillusionment and nostalgia become equally as prominent as their ecstatic counterparts described in the previous section since the goal of his poetic project is to ʻsentir tudo de todas as maneirasʼ, including also the opposite side of the same experience, countering it and therefore creating within the poem two completely irreconcilable experiences, only textually not mutually exclusive since they all share the same poem. I do however want to look a bit further than just de Camposʼ poetic goals. For me, part of the answer to his disappointment, lies in the experience of Modern times, so obviously expressed by his Futurist ode to the ship and discoveries. When Buescu researches the frontiers of Modernity, she writes about the two novels she is discussing: Neste sentido, os corpos invisíveis, divididos e expostos que aqui lemos são tanto uma forma de questionar a demasiadamente directa relação entre corpo e identidade pessoal como um modo de, por metonímia, evocar os tempos e os espaços que formulam uma certa identidade comunitária. (193) Described here is the Modern experience of the body with relation to ones own identity: the disturbance of this relationship appears to be crucial to Modernism. As Tucherman, quoted by Buescu, indicates, the penultimate experience of Modernity is the crisis of the body, caused by both desire of an intense nature and “linguagem (capacidade de representar o mundo). Apesar de poder pensar o intemporal e de perceber em si a acção da temporalidade, o corpo existe no presente e é o suporte da sua experiência de sujeito, assim como de objecto.” (Tucherman qtd. in Buescu, 194). In this sense, it is a continuation of Rimbaud: the experience of the body in the presence and the awareness of subjectivity of his experience, therefore causing a disrupt between the body and the experience since the very nature of reality and experience is questioned and deemed too personal to be universal or 14 completely trustworthy. In other words, in the quote from Rimbaud “ʻOn me penseʼ, lʼunité du moi, lʼidentité subjective, nʼest plus certaine.” (Yuasa, 230). In de Camposʼ constant obsession with imagining himself in another life, he places himself at the forefront of Modernism and showcases exactly the problematic relationship of the body with the self which is no longer singular but forever fractured, due to an increasing self-reflection and the awareness of the subjectivity of our experiences. Pessoa does not seek to resolve an epistemological problem, rather, he expands upon it and creates them himself through imagining himself in other lives who in turn imagine themselves in other lives. According to Brooks, also mentioned in Cristalizaçoes: Fronteiras da Modernidade, “we live after a Fall from a time of greater unity of consciousness, language and being.” leaving us only able to “think back to, or invent such unity only through our present consciousness of division” (qtd. in Buescu, 208). The consequence is that we now live in a world surrounded by the Baudrillard-coined term of simulacrum: “a produção de uma imagem cujo carácter virtual, mais do que representar, substitui a própria realidade” (198). In other words, since the Modernist subject now is aware of his own subjectivity, his authority to represent reality becomes a personal one, only there in terms of how the subject experiences the reality he is surrounded by, and how much he is aware of the particularity of his experience. Closely linked to the simulacrum is the concept of cristalization: “Cristalizações: momentos precários de passagem do estado líquido ao sólido, que instavelmente fixam uma imagem-num-momento.” (Buescu, 27, my italics). Fixation is crucial to the idea of cristalization since the whole concept is unstable since the solid state can once again go back to the liquid state of time passing, dissolving in its final illusion. In other words, cristalization tries to capture the momentariness, the temporariness of the experienced present therefore already entailing its very own destruction, highlighting the precariousness of the experience. This idea of cristalization also connects itself to the epistemological problem of its time, since it is only an impossible poetic impetus for those who have an indestructible belief in the truthfulness of their own point of view since cristalization tries to capture the moment of time passing in the present as it is utmost subjectively, personally experienced. What Rimbaud tries to capture however, I would say, is not so much the momentariness of a precarious present but rather the momentariness of the experiences of his visions, the childlike gaze, the abandon within ecstatic experiences. 15 To me, the failure inherent to the concept of cristalization and the simulacrum prove to be crucial in Le Bateau Ivre as Munier indirectly points out: “Comme les fleurs qui accompagnaient sa dérive alors apaisée nʼétaient pas des fleurs, mais des ʻécumes de fleursʼ, des fleurs qui étaient le feston dʼécume ʻberçantʼ sa coque ou de lʼécume qui était fleurs... Le voyant ne saurait dire.” (69). It is in the verse which Munier quotes that for me, the poetvoyant for the first time expresses disappointment in his own abilities and vision: “Jʼaurais voulu montrer aux enfants ces dorades/Du flot bleu, ces poissons dʼor, ces poissons chantants. - Des écumes de fleurs ont bercé mes dérades/Et dʼineffables vents mʼont ailé par instants.” (Rimbaud, 124). In other words, the poet-voyant (symbolized by the boat), finds himself unable to actually capture that which he sees. It is the logical consequence of all the stanzas that came before, which consisted mostly of a summation of “Je sais”, “Jʼai vu” and “Jʼai rêvé” (123-124) but never does he say: I captured or I kept: “cʼest moins une énumération, un catalogue de merveilles, quʼune capacité de voir, de savoir, de rêver quʼil va célébrer dans les dix strophes à venir.” (Munier, 65). Essential to the understanding of Le Bateau Ivre, is the link between the simulacrum and the impossibility of the eternal cristalization. From this point onwards, the poet-voyant himself is aware of the finiteness of his visions and experiences since he is not able to show to children those singing fishes of which he writes. He finds himself unable to catch them and take them with him: his visions pass him by transiently. Therefore, his inability to capture his visions makes his very poem riddled with inadequacy, since the words he uses to describe his visions and experiences fall short in actually capturing the experience itself, rather just register the nature of his subjective experiences (I know, I have seen, I have dreamed...). Therefore, the simulacrum, the absence of reality in the text penetrates the whole poem: the boat is not bathed in the sea but in the “Poème de la Mer”, drawing attention to the solely textual existence of the sea; the flowers do not appear to be present, they are in there in memory, represented by the foam. It is also from this stanza onwards that the boat starts to describe and redefine himself (described as a form of Liberty in the previous chapter) in pejorative terms: “Preque île” (124), “Or moi, bateau perdu sous les cheveux des anses/Jeté par lʼouragan dans lʼéther sans oiseau”, “Libre, fumant”, “Planche folle, escorté des hippocampes noirs”, “Moi qui tremblais”, exclaiming finally: “Je regrette lʼEurope aux anciens parapets!” (125), in other words: “il se perd dans lʼespace inconnu. Mer et ciel à présent se confondent. Le réel est 16 percé, ʻtrouéʼ dans un bond délirant.” (Munier, 71). That he regrets or longs for Europe is significant: “Les perspectives étant cosmiques, cʼest à lʼEurope quʼil pense (…) celui des ʻparapetsʼ justements, cʼest-à-dire dʼun réel balisé, bien défendu, sans dangers.” (Munier, 72). In other words, the Liberty searched for by the voyant, appears to be disappointing and too all-encompassing and transient to ever capture the experience of the vision, therefore leaving him in a no-place, or as Bonnefoy says: “Là même où Rimbaud grandi semblait avoir transgressé toute localisation de ses expériences” (41). This lack of a specific place causes him to long for the old continent of Europe. In the second to last stanza, Europe returns again: “Si je désire une eau dʼEurope, cʼest la flache/Noire et froide où vers le crépuscule embaumé/Un enfant accroupi plein de tristesses, lâche/Un bateau frêle comme un papillon de mai.” (Rimbaud, 125). According to Bonnefoy, the place described here, is a poor place, “noire et froide”: “Le seul bateau qui ait sens, ici, cʼest ce simularcre, ʻfrêle comme un papillon de maiʼ, simple bout de papier peut-être, et de durée brève.” (41). In other words: his textual incapability to fixate his visions – the “fleuves impassibles” could have just as easily been “fleuves impossibles” – spills over into his selfdeprecating descriptions and the imagery of the poem which is very much influenced by the Baudrillard-like idea of the simulacrum, the culmination of the textual failure to represent his experiences. I would also define the many pirate-like cries of de Campos as simulacra: they no longer, for him refer to any kind of reality, but rather refer to his inability to represent the childlike reality which he has forever lost and can only vaguely, textually recreate. In the process, according to Cota Fagundes, he constructs two pasts: the involuntary memory (represented by the pirate-like cries, showcasing the gap between his actual child-self making the cries and his adult-self) and the factual memory which just reminds him of what he no longer is and no longer can regain, being his house and childhood by the river. (116-117) CONCLUSION Whereas both poets invest in a metaphysical search for the unknown and Liberty, they do deal with it in different ways, as I have established in the first chapter: for Rimbaud, depersonalization is the purpose whereas it is a guiding principle for Pessoa. They both experience their respective Liberty in ecstatic ways throughout the poem, Rimbaud reimagines himself in the body of a drunken boat sailing the poem of the sea having visions of 17 great beauty and mystery whilst simultaneously looking for a way to re-imagine and redefine the self through a childlike gaze and a passive surrender to nature. De Campos finds his liberty however in progress of Futurism and the constant, more explicit re-imagination of himself in other lives. The obvious conclusion in both poems is disappointment which has to do with the increasing prominence of the Modern awareness that there is a rupture between the body and the self and the consequential epistemological doubt. Both poems deal with the consequences and find themselves, in completely different ways unable to cristalize their childhood gaze (the innocent, unstained way of seeing and experiencing the world) resulting in two poems riddled with simulacra. Both poems deal with an abstract Sea, therefore showcasing how time, symbolized by the sea, and the Liberty which it is supposed to yield in Modern life no longer has the same capacity as it used to have since the simulacra seems to be the all-pervasive and we can no longer return to a previous, more singular state of things, only reflect on the loss from this permanent fractured state between the body and the self. 18 BIBLIOGRAPHY BERARDINELLI, CLEONICE. Fernando Pessoa: Outra vez te revejo... Rio de Janeiro: Lacerda, 2004. BONNEFOY, Yves. Notre Besoin de Rimbaud. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2009. BUESCU, Helena Carvalhão. Cristalizações: Fronteiras da Modernidade. Lisboa: Relógio DʼAgua, 2005. COELHO, António Pina. 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