Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!

Transcrição

WISSENSCHAFT & SICHERHEIT
WiSi-Papers
Texte des Bundesverbandes für Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact
of the Lisbon Treaty
von Karsten Pötschke
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 05. 2010
The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
development to resolve tensions between the
organizations.4
A. Introduction
After1 the Cold War the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)
shaped Europe‟s strategic landscape. During the
last 20 years both organizations have changed their
character tremendously. Having lost its main raison
d´être since the Soviet threat had vanished, NATO
is still in the process of defining its new mission.
Besides maintaining collective defense as its core
function, it is trying to find new uses for its
capabilities.
Simultaneously,
the
European
Communities (EC) have been transformed with the
Treaty of Maastricht (1992) into the European
Union. In order to promote political integration the
EU is successively equipped with powers and
instruments to deal with foreign policy matters. As
part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy
The objective of the paper is twofold. It strives to
analyze the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the
NATO-EU Strategic Partnership. Therefore, it will
need to review the current state of the partnership
beforehand to identify existing deficits of and risks to
(CFSP) the European Union has only recently
begun starting with the EU Summit of Cologne
B. NATO – EU Strategic Partnership before
Lisbon
(1999) to develop an European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP) as integral part.2 The
European Union strives for the capability to conduct
a broad range of military and civilian operations.
Unfortunately, the parallel development of NATO
and EU has created some friction since
responsibility is not clearly divided among the
organizations.3 In response the EU and NATO
announced a formal “Strategic Partnership” in 2002
almost 10 years after the start of the parallel
the relationship. By focusing afterwards on selected
revised European Union treaty provisions, the article
will be able to analyze whether existing problems
are mended, ignored, or aggravated. Thereafter, it
will briefly discuss the possible impact of the
development trend of the EU-NATO partnership on
international law. The final conclusion will contain an
outlook of the future development of NATO-EU
relations and, building upon prior findings, some
policy advice.
The following chapter will focus on the description of
the strategic partnership between EU and NATO
before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.
Before looking at the links which have been
established between the organizations and how
these organizations cooperated in the field, the
chapter will first briefly address the question why
NATO and EU are doomed to cooperate. Finally, the
persistent problems in the relationship between
NATO and EU will be reviewed.
1. Reasons for a Strategic Partnership
1
The author holds a bachelor degree in
International Relations from Dresden University of
Technology. He is currently a LLM (Adv.) candidate in
Public International Law at Leiden University. The
author wishes to thank Professor Frans A.M. Alting von
Geusau and Nicholas Procopenko for their
encouragement and perceptive comments. All errors are
the author’s own.
2
For a good overview of the development of
ESDP see Keukeleire, From Taboo to Spearhead
3
Twenty-one countries belong to NATO and the
EU. The six non-NATO members of the European Union
are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and
Sweden; the seven non-EU members of NATO are
Albania, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and
the USA.
There are several reasons why NATO and EU need
to cooperate thoroughly. The most important ones
are: First, as can be seen comparing the current
NATO
strategy
as
5
Washington Summit
developed
at
the
1999
and the EU strategy with
6
respect to CFSP and ESDP , it is apparent that both
4
EU-NATO, EU-NATO declaration on ESDP
NATO, Washington Strategic Concept 1999
6
EU, Report on the Implementation of the
European Security Strategy, 1-9
5
organizations have partially overlapping missions
crises call for a comprehensive approach combining
and geographical foci. Both organizations aim to
military and civilian efforts.9 Undoubtedly, the EU is
bolster European defense and crisis management
more proficient than NATO in topics like civilian
capacities. In addition, besides having a clear focus
reconstruction or the promotion of the rule of law,
on Europe, both organizations conduct crisis
but it is still lacking necessary assets to conduct
management operations worldwide. It is important
high intensity combat operation.
to note that the EU as an actor who is perceived as
“EU capabilities have become the necessary
more independent than NATO can be active in
complement to NATO‟s military forces in nearly all of
regions where NATO engagement is politically
the Alliance‟s current operations.”
10
The reality is that
11
impossible. The EU missions to Georgia after the
Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, in the Middle
East and in the Ukraine can stand as an example.
Hence, one organization can stabilize regions which
Fourth, both organizations suffer from similar
capacity shortfalls. Joint capacity building is likely to
benefit both organizations and moderate costs for
the member states. The importance of cooperation
are also of strategic interest to the other.7
to address joint capability shortfalls is highlighted by
Second, the organizations need to coordinate since
the fact that the 2009 EU Report on ESDP
they partially build upon the same resource pool. As
dedicates one third of its section on NATO-EU
some countries‟ militaries have to fulfill roles within
relations to the work of the joint EU-NATO
NATO and the ESDP, they have earmarked their
Capability Group.12
resources for use within both frameworks. Hence,
two problems arise: Availability and interoperability.
Availability is not only an issue when resources are
double hatted and are already used within an EU or
NATO operation yet are needed by the other
organization for its own mission, but also when they
are single hatted since then the other organization
has
no
access
to
these
resources
at
all.
Interoperability is important to ensure that national
resources can be used in both NATO and EU roles
and that resources of countries, not being a joint
Fifth, the number of operations where NATO and
EU Assets are deployed jointly is rising; recent
examples are Afghanistan and the fight against
piracy (Operation Ocean Shield (NATO) and
Atalanta (EU)).13
Sixth, as Shea points out, in an ever more multipolar world, where power shifts towards Asia, the
pressure of North America and Europe increases
since both have a common value base resulting in
14
similar policies.
member of NATO and EU, can be applied
effectively in operations where NATO and EU are
jointly engaged.8
9
Third, both organizations lack certain capacities that
the other organization can offer. Many of today‟s
7
Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 (highlighting
added)
8
Here different training standards and equipment
have proved to be a problem, since NATO rules of
engagement differ from EU rules. See CRS, NATO and
EU, 7 and 20
The Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategy in
Afghanistan is a perfect example of this complex
interplay. See PA Consulting Group, Dynamic Planning
for COIN in Afghanistan; NATO, Afghanistan Report
2009; and US Army, COIN Field Manual
10
Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 99; Duke, Future
of EU-NATO Relations, 32
11
Shea quote a high ranking NATO official, see
Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44
12
EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34; EU, Development
of European Military Capabilities, 6
13
14
Ibid., 45
To sum up, NATO and the ESDP of the European
development commenced with informal “breakfast
Union are realities which cannot be denied by the
meetings”19 between the NATO Secretary-General
other organization. For practical reasons they are
de Hoop Scheffer and the High Representative for
required to cooperate as long as both of them exist.
CFSP Solana, a former NATO Secretary-General
The next part will explain how the organizations
himself. As the ESDP developed more permanent
have structured their cooperation.
structures
in
2001,
expanded
institutionalized
cooperation became viable. Currently, meetings
2. Conceptual and Institutional Links
between the Foreign Ministers of NATO and EU or
various
the EU‟s Political and Security Committee (PSC)
instruments and forums with NATO. The foundation
and NATO‟s North Atlantic Council are common
for formal cooperation was created with the
practice20. Furthermore, EU and NATO have
announcement of a “Strategic Partnership” in 2002
established ad hoc working groups addressing
The
European
Union
is
linked
via
15
in the joint “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP” . The
issues such as managing capability goals, the
cornerstone of this partnership is the Berlin Plus
implementation of the Berlin Plus Agreement, the
Agreement of 2003 which gives the European Union
exchange of classified information, or the facilitation
“assured access” to NATO planning abilities and
of
“presumed
access”
16
to
NATO
operational
capabilities for EU-led missions. Furthermore, both
organization
confirmed
and
have
constantly
geographical
dialog.21
In addition, mission
working groups have been established to coordinate
efforts where NATO
personnel
alongside EU personnel.
22
are deployed
Moreover, the EU has
reassured each other that their relationship ought to
established a small planning cell at the Supreme
be mutually reinforcing and that they respect their
Headquarter Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in
decision making autonomy. Additionally, it was
2006 which is reciprocal to the NATO permanent
underlined that the development of ESDP takes
liaison team to EU Military Staff (EUMS) (since
place within the framework of NATO and that NATO
2005).23 However, it appears that the informal staff
should remain the main organization for the
to staff contacts are most important to smooth the
Before
day to day cooperation.24 Moreover, the simple fact
NATO
that the majority of member states belongs to both
distinguished itself from the EU via its mandate of
organizations or is associated at least via programs
collective self defense which contrasts the EU‟s
like the NATO‟s Partnership for Peace (PfP)
provision of collective security in Europe.
the
Lisbon
Treaty,
it
seemed
more general humanitarian tasks.
17
that
18
guarantees an exchange of information.25
NATO and the EU slowly established institutional
Looking at the development of the institutionalized
links parallel to the conceptual links. The formal
cooperation between the NATO and EU, one is
15
19
16
20
EU-NATO, Declaration on ESDP
The agreement reads that NATO will with
“strong likelihood” decide that some listed assets and
capabilities will be made available to the EU. See EUNATO, Berlin Plus Agreement; see also CRS, FAQ EU,
6; CRS, NATO and EU, 16
17
See for example EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34
and NATO, Straßbourg/Kehl; Duke, Future of EUNATO Relations, 28
18
Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30
Ibid., 33
See NATO, List of Ministerial Dinners.
21
See for example Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96
for the cooperation for the Berlin Plus mission Althea to
Bosnia-Herzegovina
22
CRS, NATO and EU, 16
23
24
25
See EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34-35 for current
cooperation
likely to conclude that a healthy relationship
military activities in Afghanistan even within the
between both of them exists. However, as will be
framework of NATO‟s Provision Reconstruction
shown below, this perception is misguiding.
Teams (PRT). Shea, the Director of Policy at NATO,
concludes that “it is difficult to envisage a major
3. Relationship of Field Operations
NATO operation these days in which the EU would
NATO and EU have conducted a broad range of
not also be present in a significant complementary
missions after the end of the Cold War. The
role.”29 However, it seems that some operations are
relationship pattern between them is and ever was
rather competitive than complementary, which is
diverse. Both organizations conducted missions
especially problematic if shared resources are used.
which were totally independent from the other
For instance, NATO and EU were competing to
organization.26 Many of the EU‟s independent
provide air lift capacities for the African Union‟s
missions, however, made use of the Berlin Plus
mission in Darfur.30 Also, at the Horn of Africa the
Agreement since critical assets such as air transport
EU mission ATALANTA operates parallel to the
capacity were and are missing in the Union‟s
NATO‟s Ocean shield with essentially the same
arsenal. The first such independent mission was
mandate – prevent piracy.
CONCORDIA in Macedonia. It seems that the Berlin
Plus Agreement is working quite effectively when
4. Deficits and Risks
applied.27 The European Union‟s first autonomous
Whereas part 1 identified the opportunities created
military mission outside the Berlin Plus agreement
by cooperation, this part turns to the other side of
was ARTEMIS to the DRC contributing to the
the coin looking at the deficits of and the risks for
stabilization of the security conditions and the
the strategic partnership.
improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia
in 2003.28 Some of the independent missions
conducted by the EU have in fact been taken over
from NATO; an example is the EU mission
(EUFOR) Althea which replaced NATO‟s in Bosnia-
The relationship between NATO and EU might look
healthy, but it is in fact crippled for various reasons.
At core of the “stalemate”31 is the fluidity in which
both organizations operate and their overlapping
membership. On the one hand, fluidity refers to the
Herzegovina.
ever changing operating environment of ESDP and
In some instances EU and NATO missions run
NATO. They need to deal with issues ranging from
parallel. Ideally they are complementary like in
classical
Afghanistan.
the
humanitarian aid and out of area crisis management
development of the Afghan National Army, EUPOL
to “new” threats like terrorism and organized crime.
provides assistance to the Afghan National Police.
On
Furthermore,
provides
organizations themselves. NATO and the EU are
significant funding, personal and material for non-
involved in a transformation process developing
While
the
ISAF
European
focuses
Union
on
their
the
national
other
structures
defense,
hand,
and
over
fluidity
strategies.
delivery
refers
to
Having
of
the
three
26
For NATO see Frantzen, NATO and peace
support operations 1991-1999
27
Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44; EU, ESDP
Report 2009, 34
28
EU, Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP; for
NATO missions see: NATO, NATO operations and
missions
29
CRS, NATO and EU, 20; Duke, Future of EUNATO Relations, 32
31
This is the term used by former NATO
Secretary-General Japp de Hoop Scheffer, see de Hoop
Scheffer, Transatlantic Leadership for a New Era
30
variables (environment, NATO, ESDP), which are
institutions.”33 Furthermore, the absence of
highly volatile and whose future value is hard to
common strategy and henceforth priority setting
predict, it seems to be almost impossible to define a
hampers the effective development of capabilities
stable and efficient relationship among the EU and
and creates the controversy about deployment of
NATO.
commonly used resources.
On a less abstract level the threats facing the
Thirdly, there is a constant fear of competition for
relationship are: Firstly, the purpose and mission of
especially more mobile, high readiness resources
NATO are not clearly defined. The strategic
and the fear of independent, uncoordinated action
concepts of Rome (1991) and Washington (1999)
by one organization.
are merely interim measures. Since the end of the
unfounded. The examples of the USA‟s coalition of
Cold War, which rendered collective security less
the willing or the competition in support of the AU‟s
important, it is constantly looking for a new raison
Darfur mission are telling. Another stunning example
d´être. While it is looking for a purpose, NATO does
of lacking coordination is the fight against piracy. At
not want the EU to occupy any possible roles it
the Horn of Africa are currently ships from multiple
might want to fulfill itself. This leads to rivalry. The
NATO/EU countries deployed in various missions.
internal deadlock about strategic future, due to
These ships are active under national command, as
deadlocked negotiations between the USA and
part of the NATO Operation Ocean Shield, the EU
Europe as well as the Europeans response to fulfill
Operation ATALANTA, or the US led CTF 151.35
34
a
This fear is not quite
their vision via ESDP, hinders effective cooperation
Fourthly, one major reason for the deadlock of EU-
between NATO and EU.
NATO cooperation relates to Turkey. Not only has
Secondly, impacted by either the lack of their own
the Turkish blockade “reduced to a farce the regular
strategic concepts or their ambiguity, NATO and EU
official meetings between the PSC and the NAC[,]”
have not gone past their mutual recognition as
which makes strategic cooperation impossible, but
strategic actors in the European security structure.
also everyday cooperation between established
a
liaison cells is hampered.37 To justify this blockade,
common comprehensive strategy is missing. Thus,
Turkey claims that it cannot pass NATO intelligence
no clear cut burden sharing exists (e.g. NATO
to EU, since non-PfP countries Malta and Cyprus
focuses on collective security and robust peace
could benefit.
enforcement, while the EU focuses on policing and
Turkeys obstruction of coordination of EU-NATO
peace keeping and building). The manner in which
relations, it needs to be pointed out that Turkey
NATO and EU cooperate led some to conclude that
exerts quite some influence over NATO and EU.
the “strategic benefits to Europe‟s security have
Besides the fact that Turkey can effectively veto any
Despite the limited substantial cooperation
32
36
38
Before looking into the reasons for
resulted more from a happy convergence of the
independent actions of both NATO and the EU than
from a deliberately coordinated policy of these two
32
On issues like: defense policy, crisis
management, capability building for expeditionary
missions, stabilization and reconstruction operations and
security sector reform.
33
CRS, NATO and EU, 7; McNamara, CFSP
threatens transatlantic security, 2
35
Wiegold, Wie ernüchternd ist die Piratenbilianz
& Order of Battle (Revised)
36
Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96
37
38
Ibid., 29; Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96-97
34
NATO decision due to the consensus requirement39,
not a viable alternative to formal debates and
Turkey‟s geographic location as bridge between
decisions. Moreover, Turkey also weakened the EU
Europe, the Middle East and Asia is of strategic
Battlegroup concept by withdrawing its promised
importance. Furthermore,
it
contribution. Furthermore, the future application of
40
the Berlin Plus Agreement is also unclear due to
hence it has a great potential to support peace
possible Turkish delays. ALTHEA might be its last
keeping operations. Turkey has already done so in
mission.44
excluding Russia,
commands by far the biggest European military,
support of several ESDP mission.
41
Fifthly, the current institutional links are weak and
Turkey‟s behavior derives from various reasons.
deficient, especially for cooperation on strategic
Turkey is not interested in seeing a separate
matters. The Berlin Plus Agreement might have
European Security Identity evolve at the decline of
worked well in the two instances where it was
NATO. Additionally, it has virtually no weight in
applied; however, it is too cumbersome and
ESDP as compared to its active role in the Western
politically complex to be suitable for some of the
European Union before. Ankara is also upset with
EU‟s envisioned fast crisis response scenarios.
the EU because of the slow progress in its
Additionally, it does not explicitly allow strategic
accession negotiations. Furthermore, the historical
debate. Furthermore, it forces the EU to adapt to
conflict between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey over
NATO structures.45 Therefore, some like Howorth
Northern Cyprus has recently reached new heights.
conclude that “an entirely new set of arrangements
Additionally, Cyprus is reciprocally blocking Turkish
therefore needs negotiating.”
participation in EU security activities like the EDA. It
that this is going to happen any time soon especially
is mainly the political disagreement between Turkey
because of the Turkish blockade.47 Moreover,
and Cyprus that has “essentially held the entire
outside Berlin Plus, the capacity to conclude
ESDP-NATO relationship hostage for years.”
42
46
It is highly unlikely
agreements quickly between NATO and EU to
arrange for joint deployment was hampered48 by the
The
deadlock
is
hampering
everything
from
strategic debate, over every day exchange of
lack of
international
European Union.
legal
personality of
the
49
sensitive information up to the set up of new
missions or the management of existing missions.
Sixthly, recently the base for the development ESDP
For instance, Turkey‟s refusal to let Cyprus
within the framework of NATO known as the three
participate in a police training mission in Southern
Ds
Kosovo
complicates
this
mission.
43
(no
decoupling,
no
discrimination,
no
Strategic
duplication), a term coined by Madeleine Albright in
cooperation on questions like Afghanistan or Darfur
1998, is being questioned.50 ESDP challenges all
is impossible. The existing informal channels are
44
39
NATO, Consensus-Decision Making
In fact, it has with 514.000 troops twice as
much as Germany (215.000). Russia excluded. For
military comparison see Globalfirepower, Turkey
Military Strength and Globalfirepower, Germany
Military Strength
41
42
Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96-97
43
40
Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 97; see also Duke,
Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33; CRS, FAQ EU, 6;
45
46
47
In fact, Ankara already delayed the conclusion
of the Berlin Plus Agreement by two years, see Howorth,
NATO and ESDP, 97
48
49
50
three D‟s by its very design. Duplication is
dictates is the terms of the development of ESDP
inevitable.
and the strategic partnership, is under siege.54
For
example,
after
in
2002
the
compromise to add a small operational planning cell
to EUMS could prevent the establishment of a
51
separate EU Military Headquarter,
5. Interim Conclusion
the 2008 EU
As has been shown, it is in the interest of North
strategic review based on operational experience
America and Europe that the EU and NATO
concluded that the EU still needed its own military
cooperate thoroughly and avoid competition and
52
planning capacity.
The fear of decoupling is
rivalry. Crises like in Somalia or Afghanistan call for
55
evident, considering the negative reactions of some
long term engagement of NATO and EU.
NATO countries because the EU did not consult
potential for synergies and greater coherence
NATO before starting its latest autonomous mission
exists.56 Yet, the formal relationship between them
to Congo, even though EU did not request the use
is still unsatisfactory or even dysfunctional. Their
53
of NATO.
Yet, on the other hand not only the
The
relationship is dominated by “political and functional
57
Europeans are striving for more independence
confusion.”
Lately, it seems that “neither entity is
through ESDP, but also the USA has recently
at all interested in a formal division of labour.”58
detached itself from the NATO framework when it
Cooperation under the Berlin Plus Agreement,
engaged in “coalitions of the willing”. The reason for
except for existing missions, is steadily declining.59
the decoupling process is the growing division
This is even more surprising as the agreement
between European and Americans about the
offers a partial raison d’être for NATO after the Cold
strategic security interest of each region. This
War, which, henceforth, should be interested in its
transatlantic divide is best seen in the struggle to
implementation. The various deficits identified are
find a new security strategy for NATO.
the cause and catalyst for the diminishing scope of
cooperation between NATO and the EU. The Lisbon
In
conclusion,
the
problems
the
NATO-EU
Treaty impacts on both will be discussed next.
partnership is facing are intrinsically linked to the
problems NATO and the EU face by themselves:
The divide between the their member states about
the proposed role for the organization in the future,
the fear of each organization and member states to
C. Possible Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on
the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership
Subsequently, selected provisions of the Treaty on
be sidelined in important decisions as well as very
the European Union (TEU) and of the Treaty on the
tight military budgets and limited military capabilities
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as
threaten security cooperation among the two
organizations. Furthermore, the assumption that
NATO is the senior partner in the relationship, who
revised by the Lisbon Treaty, which are relevant for
the
NATO-EU
Strategic
Partnership,
will
be
examined. The focus will be on those prominent
provisions which either differ from the Nice Treaty or
54
51
Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33-34;
52
European Security Strategy, 9
53
Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 98; CRS, NATO
and EU, 23
55
56
57
Ibid., 96
58
Ibid., 99
59
will likely have an impact on the Strategic
however, keeping that the organic development of
Partnership.
ESDP occurred mainly outside the treaty structure,
the Lisbon Treaty merely “brings the ESDP and all
1. General
its development since the Cologne European
65
Prior to any in depth analysis of the Lisbon Treaty, it
Council in 1999 within the Treaty framework.”
is important to note that the Lisbon Treaty
Secondly, despite the formal abolition of the EU‟s
resembles most of the provisions which already
pillar structure, it seems to continue to exist at least
were contained in the European Constitution; in
implicitly.
For
instance,
all
major
substantial
66
total over 90 percent of the structure of the
decisions require unanimity , only implementation
constitutional treaty have been preserved, and even
decisions in non CFSP matters are subject to
more in case of CFSP.60 However, despite that the
qualified majority voting. Yet, in case of vital interest
provisions on CFSP and ESDP proved to be the
even implementation decisions can be referred to
“most uncontroversial” in the negotiation and
the European Council for a decision by unanimity.67
62
academic debate
61
significant
Additionally, Article 31 TEU prohibits any kind of
about their quality and the
legislative act. Moreover, Article 24 TEU stresses
ratification process of the treaty,
For
that the procedures of CFSP must be strictly
instance, Sally McNamara perceives the Lisbon
observed, and Article 352 TFEU underlines the
Treaty as the “most significant boost to date” of
prohibition of the use of implied powers. Therefore,
CSFP that effectively “remov[es] foreign policy form
it can be concluded CFSP and CSDP essentially
the intergovernmental sphere and mak[es] it a
remain an intergovernmental matter.68 If it however
supranational EU competence” and that “the Lisbon
represents a threat to NATO and the partnership is
treaty represents a major threat to the NATO
a different matter, which will be discussed below.
impact
on
63
alliance.
transatlantic
Contrary,
relations
exists:
the International
Security
Information Service concludes that many provisions
of the treaty “do not challenge the essential intergovernmental nature of foreign and security policy
decision
making.”64
Undoubtedly,
this
second
interpretation appears after all more convincing.
First, it might be true that in direct comparison with
the Nice Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty represents a
significant restructuring of
CFSP and ESDP;
60
With respect to CFSP only three relevant
changes occurred: First, the ECJs jurisdiction is more
limited with respect to CFSP (Art. 24 TEU); a separate
data protection clause has been introduced, and the
principle of implied powers does explicitly not apply to
CFSP (Art. 352 TFEU); Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional
Architecture after Lisbon, 2-5; CRS, FAQ EU, 3
61
62
A very good summary can be found at Wessels/
Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 3-5
63
McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic
security, 1, 10
64
ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 1
65
DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP,
3
66
Constructive abstention is allowed (Art. 31 (1)
3rd sentence TEU); see also Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional
Architecture after Lisbon, 23
67
Art. 31 TEU in the Nice Treaty the threshold for
referral was lower: Only “important” interests must have
been in stake for a referral. See also Wessels/ Bopp,
Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 24-25
68
So concludes also Wessels/ Bopp, Intuitional
Architecture after Lisbon, 10-11
Furthermore, it is remarkable that new list contains
2. EU Objectives and Missions
a) Objective of CFSP and Extended Petersberg
explicitly the task of conflict prevention and postconflict stabilization, besides the old tasks of
peacekeeping and peace-making, but also the task
Tasks
of combating terrorism. In addition, Article 42
As ESDP, now formally CSDP, is an “integral part”
69
of the Unions CFSP,
it ought to contribute to the
stresses the coherent civilian-military approach of
ESD.
Union objectives as set out in the Preamble, Article
In conclusion, the new aims and objective provisions
3 (5) and Article 21 TEU.
reflect the EU‟s desire to become a global actor and
In comparison to Nice several differences can be
crisis manager. On the one hand, the extension of
identified in the Union‟s objectives which can have
the Petersberg Tasks can lead to increased
an impact on the conceptual relationship between
tensions and pressure to coordinate with NATO as it
NATO and EU. Article 3 contains an expanded list
aims to be active in the same area (e.g. terrorism).
of common values which characterize the EU
On the other hand provides the EU‟s explicit focus
internally and that it seeks to promote externally. It
on prevention and post-conflict stabilization and
is important to note that the EU has added the
civilian-military cooperation potential for a burden
“protection of its citizens” as a new aim. Article 3
sharing.76 The preamble and Article 3, in particular,
and 21, which combines several Nice Treaty
contribute to widening the transatlantic conceptual
articles, underlines the Union‟s character as a
divide as they reaffirm the European position on
“civilian power”70 willing to export its values and
issues like the respect for the United Nations system
promote worldwide development.71
and the preferred mode of conflict resolution.
The Lisbon Treaty also updates the ESDP mission
b) Towards a Truly Common Defense Policy
task list.72 Compared to the old TEU this Petersberg
The Lisbon Treaty maintains the goal of a common
Task73 list seems quite extensive.74 However, if
defense policy. However, the language in some
compared to the latest mission list as set out in the
parts of new Treaty is more compelling than in
Head Line Goal 2010 (2004) the task extension
previous treaties. For instance, the ESDP was
seems less dramatic.75 Yet, it can be seen as
renamed to CSDP. Article 42 (2) TEU now states
reaffirming of the EU‟s strategic development.
that CSDP “shall include the progressive framing of
a common Union defence policy” and “this will lead
69
Art. 42 (1) TEU
Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after
Lisbon, 7-8
71
Articles 11(1), 131, 177, 181a TEU (Nice
version)
72
Article 43 TEU
73
The mission list was only included with the
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 to the EU. Originally it was a
task list compiled by the Western European Union in
1992. See WEU, Petersberg Declaration
74
Article 17 TEU (Nice version) only included
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks of
combat forces crisis management.
75
DGExPo, Lisbon and implications for CFSP, 56
70
to a common defense”. The provisions promote the
doubling of capacities and open the opportunity for
decoupling from NATO strategy. The changed
provisions can especially harm the partnership if
read in conjunction with the new aim of “citizen
protection” as they encroach on NATO‟s core
function.
76
The Operation Active Endeavour in the
Mediterranean is one example, which could lead to
coordination difficulties.
c) Formal Relationship to NATO
Furthermore, besides leading the Foreign Affairs
Like previous treaties the revised TEU stresses in
Article 42 (2), directly after it confirmed the
perspective of the developing a truly common
defense policy, that the Union shall respect the
obligations of member states under the North
Atlantic Treaty and that CSDP shall be compatible
with NATO defense policy. Yet, paragraph 2 does
not state that CSDP will be developed within the
NATO policy framework. However, the newly
established
provision
on
mutual
assistance
77
Council he or she will be the Vice President of the
Commission. The tasks of the HR, inter alia, are to
representing the Union‟s position in International
Organization, to harmonize Member States views
and to preside over the CFSP bodies.
The wish to create greater policy coherence through
new institutional structures is supplemented by
expanding the obligation of member states to
confirm with Union policy.
Article 24 (3) TEU adds
to the existing commitment to refrain from any action
reaffirms that NATO will “remain[] the foundation of
[…] collective defence and the forum for its
implementation [for NATO members].” The future
which is contrary to the interest of the Union or likely
to impair its effectiveness the obligation to “comply
with the Union‟s action in [CFSP]”. Hence, the
will show how much these provisions are a mere lip
member states‟ obligation to coordinate themselves
service to calm some NATO member states and
is enhanced. 82 The impact on the behavioral pattern
improve the relations to NATO. However, the
of member states remains to be seen.83
absence of such provisions would have been
certainly destructive for NATO-EU relations.
The major changes in institutional architecture
certainly do have an impact on NATO-EU relations.
3. Institutions and Procedure
First, they are likely to create greater policy
a) Longer Presidency, High Representative and
coherence among the European states, which
eventually will tilt the balance of power in NATO and
European External Action Service
in the strategic partnership towards Europe as the
The Lisbon Treaty aims to provide greater visibility,
USA will have more difficulties countering pre-
stability and coherence in the Union‟s CFSP by
negotiated European consensus. Secondly, as the
prolonging the presidency of the European Council
HR will make a difference in framing EU policy
to two and a half years78 and the creation of the
towards NATO, its election mechanisms require
“High Representative of the Union for Foreign
some attention. The required qualified majority could
is
either be achieved through a “pro integration” or “pro
supported by the newly created European External
NATO” coalition or from 2017 onward by all 23
Affairs
and
Security
Policy”
79
(HR),
who
The HR will wield
smaller member states plus two big states.84 Lastly,
substantial power as he will link the Council to the
the new architecture has the potential to address the
80
Action Service (EEAS).
Commission by combining the roles of the former
High Representative for CFSP in the Council and
the
77
78
79
80
81
Commissioner
for
External
Art. 42 (7) TEU
Article 15 (5) TEU
Article 18 TEU
Art. 27 (3) TEU
Relations.
81
82
For a detailed description of member states
obligations see Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture
after Lisbon, 12
83
For a detailed explanation of institutional
changes see Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture
after Lisbon, 14-23 especially 16
84
„Big states“ are Germany, France, United
Kingdom and Italy. Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional
Architecture after Lisbon, 20
Turkey-problem as it allows member states to adopt
more decoupling and duplication. In order to benefit
decisions with qualified majority if they act upon a
the partnership the USA and Europe will have to
85
proposal from the HR.
Hence, the Union could
agree on common priorities and threats that need to
approve actions that improve the relationship with
be countered. Such agreement will depend on the
Turkey even against the opposition of Cyprus.
outcome of NATO‟s strategic debate. Furthermore,
However, due to the provisions limitation in case of
NATO‟s capabilities development mechanism and
“vital interests” and the exclusion of matters with
EDA need to establish a formal relationship, which
security and defense implications, it remains to be
is also less likely today.
seen to what extend the provisions can be applied.
4. Other Instruments
b) EDA
a) Mutual Assistance and Mutual Solidarity
The European Defense Agency (EDA) is not an
Clause
invention of Lisbon. It was established by the
Council of Ministers in 2004 “to improve the EU‟s
defense capabilities.”
86
It came into being despite
The mutual assistance clause
93
clause
92
and the solidarity
are important innovations. The solidarity
the failed ratification of the Constitutional treaty. It is
clause will not directly impact the NATO-EU
the perfect example that “institutional changes
relationship as its application is limited to terrorist
within the CFSP are also pursued without the official
attacks and man-made or natural disasters. It has,
87
however, the potential to supplement NATO efforts
However, the Lisbon Treaty did not only bring EDA
in preventing and reacting towards terrorist attacks
within the treaty structure, but also highlighted
since it includes also non-military actions.
procedure of treaty revisions and ratification”.
EDA‟s importance of the improvement of European
military capacities by the frequency and compelling
The mutual assistance/defense clause can however
manner it referred to EDA.88 It underlines the wish
be perceived as a threat to NATO. The including
of European states to make the EU also a military
saving clause, which prohibits the treaty from
actor on the international scene.89
prejudging NATO‟s collective defense system, is
merely cosmetic. If the mutual assistance/defense
The EDA is critical in the attempt to encourage
clause is seen in conjunction with the provisions on
more
amongst
establishing a common defense policy and the goal
European allies. Indisputably, the choices EDA will
of protection of European citizen, it is apparent that
make are going to be important for NATO-EU
the clause encroaches on NATO‟s core function –
joint
relations.
90
R&D
and
procurement
The European capability building can
collective self-defense. However, Duke concludes
have “beneficial effects on allied contributions to
that despite the provision the EU will not assume a
91
NATO,”
as Duke predicts, but it could also lead to
classical collective defense function.94 Currently, the
EU lacks the military capacity to displace NATO as
85
Art. 31 (2) TEU
EU, Joint Action, 2004/551/CFSP
87
Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after
Lisbon, 28
88
Mainly Art. 42 (3) and 45 TEU, see also Duke,
Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32
89
90
91
Ibid., 28
86
92
Article 42 (7) TEU; detailed analysis of the
article can be found at DGExPo, Lisbon and its
implications on CFSP, 8
93
Art. 222 TFEU
94
Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 31; also
Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 11
foundation for Europe‟s defense. Yet, the pure
member
existence of the clause will put strain on the NATO-
intergovernmental cooperation.100
states
to
create
more
than
EU relations.
The introduction of these mechanisms allows for a
Europe of two speeds; A hard core101 of particular
capable states could now go ahead with further
b)
Permanent
Structured
and
Enhanced
Cooperation Procedure
Strategic Partnership is ambiguous. PSCo is likely
In reaction to the existing ESDP rhetoric-resource
gap95 and the Union‟s desire to handle the extended
Petersberg Tasks, the Lisbon Treaty expands the
96
existing mechanism “Enhanced Cooperation”
to
ESDP and introduces the new mechanism of
97
“Permanent Structured Cooperation”
(PSCo). The
later is especially interesting for the EU-NATO
relationship.
Member
States
“whose
military
capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have
made more binding commitment to one another […]
with a view to the most demanding missions shall
establish permanent structure cooperation”. The
PSCo is established by QMV in the Council after
consultation with the HR. The details of PSCo are
laid out in detail in a specific protocol. It defines the
“higher criteria” threshold and calls upon the
participants “to take concrete measures to enhance
the
availability,
defense integration. The impact on NATO and the
interoperability,
flexibility
and
deployability of their forces.”98 They shall cooperate
to strengthen European military capacities through
encouraged
improved
joint
procurement
interoperability.
projects
Furthermore,
and
PSCo
provides a strong incentive for non participants to
improve their own military capacities in order to join
the PSCo. On the other hand, the risk exist that a
small group of EU nations pool their military
resources “to form an army of 60.000 to undertake
EU missions.” McNamara concludes that since no
additional troops would be enlisted, “either [forces]
who are already committed to NATO [would] be
counted twice, or, in the worst case scenario, troops
[would]
be
withdrawn
from
existing
NATO
Missions.”102 Additionally, better coordinated and
capable Europeans could also aggravate the
deadlock
within
NATO
and
the
NATO-EU
relationship since they are more likely to challenge
the USA‟s and NATO‟s leadership.
c) International Legal Personality
in joint procurement and development programs
and regularly review their commitments with respect
The explicit recognition of
to the changing security environment and the EU‟s
personality is likely to strengthen the Union‟s
missions. Furthermore, they are called upon to
perception as a global actor.
develop their defense capacities in multinational
facilitate and accelerate the formal conclusion of
99
the Union‟s legal
103
Additionally, it will
forces . In fact, PSCo is one of the few CFSP
agreements with other international actors, including
provisions that clearly show the motivation of
NATO,
improving
the
100
95
96
97
98
Art. 326-334 TFEU
Art. 42 (6) icw 46 TEU
DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP,
7
99
Protocol.
The Battelgroup concept is also included in the
Union‟s
reaction
time.
At the beginning these are most likely the
Defense G6: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain
and Poland.
102
security, 11
103
Art. 37 TEU icw Art. 47 TEU; Wessels/ Bopp,
Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 3
101
However, it is unlikely to resolve the political
an attempt to dismantle the pillars”108 and that “the
deadlock preventing the conclusion of any kind of
treaty underscores the EU‟s long held ambition to
agreements between NATO and EU.
become a global power.109
d) Other
Keeping in mind the deficits and risks identified in
Two other innovations need mentioning. First,
Article 41 (3) provides a procedure “guaranteeing
rapid access to the Unions budget for urgent
financing of initiatives in the framework of” CFSP.
This includes the set up of a rapid start-up fund to
finance ESDP mission.104 Such a measure is likely
to increase the Unions crisis reaction time.
However, it might harm the NATO-EU relations, as
it strengthens the EU‟s crisis first responder
capacities, which impacts the debate on appropriate
chapter B, the question whether the Lisbon Treaty
harms or helps NATO and the Strategic Partnership
cannot be answered easily. On the one hand, for
example, the recognition of NATO as prime
collective defense mechanism is positive. On the
other hand, the affirmation of the creation of a
common
defense
policy
combined
with
the
introduction of a mutual assistance clause are very
likely to harm the relationship as they fuel the
traditional 3-D fears.110 The impact of
other
provisions like the ones aiming at joint defense
roles of NATO and EU.
procurement needs to be assessed in the light of
Second, the Lisbon treaty also institutionalizes the
105
future events. Currently, it is not possible to
to “entrust the implementation of an EU
conclude whether they will help the Alliance, i.e. by
mission” to a group of member states who are
creating a bigger and better resource pool available
practice
106
“willing and have the necessary capacities.”
This
to the Alliance, or harm it, i.e. by substituting
procedure is similar to the delegation of UN mission
armament cooperation in NATO for EU cooperation
or even NATO non-Article 5 missions to certain
and withdrawing resources from the Alliance.
member
effective
Additionally, the new Treaty stresses the European
implementation of ESDP.107 This provision could
perception on foreign and security policy, which is
benefit NATO because it encourages capacity
likely to reinforce the transatlantic divide. The further
development to fulfill delegated tasks. However, it
development
could also limit the availability of high quality
capacities will also impact the debate on the division
resources for NATO, as they may be already used
of labor between NATO and the EU. More
in EU missions.
importantly, some core problems of the NATO-EU
states.
It
allows
the
of
European
crisis
management
relationship, like the Cyprus-Turkey deadlock, are
5. Interim Conclusion
not or only insufficiently addressed.
The Lisbon Treaty is not a revolutionary jump in the
Therefore, de Hoop Scheffers conclusion that
development of ESDP, but it cements its progress
Lisbon will not unlock the institutional stalemate in
and hints the direction of its further development.
the EU Relationship is probably correct.
111
The
One can agree with the conclusions that “it is clearly
104
The provision emulates the current informal
funding practice for missions like Athena. DGExPo,
Lisbon and its implications, 3
105
E.g. Artemis 2003 with France as lead-nation.
106
Art. 44 TEU
107
ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4-5
108
Ibid., 6
security, 9
110
Ibid., 10
111
de Hoop Scheffer, Transatlantic Leadership For
A New Era
109
treaty, by setting a clear course towards integration,
help to develop legal rules and regulation governing
is more likely to aggravate the existing deadlock in
a more supranational cooperation. Furthermore, as
NATO and the Strategic Partnership. Following the
EU member states limit their sovereignty by
ratchet integration model the treaty will put more
participating in the ESDP, it seems possible that the
pressure on the USA and NATO to adapt to Europe
legal concept of sovereignty is impacted, for
as Europe‟s position is becoming more rigid.
example, further limiting the scope of the domain
reserve.
D. Impact on the Development of
International Law
The
current
development
of
the
EU-NATO
Relationship, impacted by the Lisbon Treaty, could
have in the long run a profound impact on the
development of international law. Three distinct
E. Conclusion and Advice
Unfortunately it is true that “despite overlapping
membership and interests, NATO and the European
Union have struggled to establish a cooperative and
modes can be identified.
complementary relationship.”112 The main problems
The first mode is the impact via the “European
bothering
approach to security”. Firstly, by acting coherently
conceptual transatlantic divide, which hampers the
(e.g. actions, declarations, voting behavior in UN
ongoing transformation process of NATO as well as
General Assembly) the European states could
Turkey‟s blockade of NATO-EU cooperation. The
contribute to the formation of soft law or even
deadlock in NATO‟s new strategy development and
custom. The further development can impact the
the hampered EU-NATO strategic partnership are in
legal concept of security (human security, link
harsh contrast to the progressive development of
between security and development), the concept of
the ESDP, which can partially be understood as a
humanitarian intervention and the use of force. The
reflex to the standstill in NATO and the partnership.
strict adherence to UN rules is likely to strengthen
Whereas the EU seems to have found its future role
the UN system. Secondly, a proactive EU could
in nation building and crisis management and is
promote European values like the rule of law as well
rapidly developing structures and instruments to
as human rights worldwide.
match its vision, NATO is still puzzling where it
NATO-EU
relation
stem
from
the
belongs to the 21st century.
The second mode results from the cooperation
between NATO and EU. The cooperation could
The Lisbon Treaty, even though not revolutionary,
further develop the law of cooperation among
underlines the EU‟s drive for more independence
international organizations, by helping to resolve
and points towards the creation of an “ever closer
such questions as whether an organization can be
union” also in security and defense issues. It is
held legally responsible for the acts of another when
unlikely to solve the existing deadlocks, but is more
it shared its assets (logistics, intelligence).
likely to contribute to the transatlantic strategic
divide.
The final mode results from further EU integration.
Because the Union is striving towards future
integration
in
areas
previously
reserved
for
international-governmental cooperation, it could
112
CRS, FAQ EU, 6
The
more
the
pattern
of
EU

progressive‟s
Keeping the history of European integration
development and its establishment as a global crisis
in mind, NATO, but in particular the USA,
manager with a comprehensive civilian-military
should accept that CSDP will boost the
strategy in contrast to the deadlock in NATO
EU’s civilian and military capacities to
transformation and EU-NATO relations persists, the
operate independently from NATO. NATO
more pressure will come upon NATO to define its
should not perceive this as threat to its
strategy in response to the EU‟s concept.
113
It
existence, but rather accept it as reality and
seems we are at a turning point of the relations
seize the opportunity to build its new
between NATO and ESDP. Until recently, NATO
strategic concept in response to the path
limited the scope in which ESDP could develop;
chosen
henceforth, it might be the ESDP defining what
Remembering its origins and capacities
NATO‟s role in the world should be.
NATO should retain its character as a
by
the
European
Union.
military and (collective self-) defense
However, this is far from concluding that NATO will
organization
disappear. In the foreseeable future NATO will
and
be
a
forum
of
transatlantic exchange.
remain an important organization114 for the following
reasons: First, NATO‟s, but especially the USA‟s

The EU has proven itself as a valuable
and Canada‟s military capacities and knowledge is
crisis manager. It should continue to boost
still indispensable for the EU and the UN to resolve
its own civilian and military capacities to
high intensity conflicts. Furthermore, although the
match its ambitious vision. To preserve the
transatlantic
the
transatlantic relationship it should refrain
relationship between North America and Europe is
from becoming the second collective self-
and will remain special. The European continent is
defense organization on the continent.
link
has
lost
importance,
well aware that several conflicts (e.g. Palestine,

Iran) can only be solved with the help of the United
Since both organizations are still evolving,
States.115 The complete decoupling of Europe of
NATO and the EU should abandon their
North America is therefore very unlikely. With this
attempts to define a common strategic
perspective NATO will remain the forum for
relationship.116 Rather they should in the
transatlantic security and defense cooperation.
short and medium term improve their adhoc
Based on the analysis of the relationship of EU and
coordination
and
consultation
mechanism.
NATO and the trend shown by the Lisbon Treaty the

following advice may be derived:
The
transatlantic
divide
needs
to
be
addressed urgently. It can only be closed by
balancing the leadership ambitions of the
EU and the US and mutual understanding of
each other‟s world perception. Bilateral
113
So concludes also Duke, Future of EU-NATO
Relations, 30
114
Howorth explicitly concludes that NATO will
stay the “primary body for coordinating military, security
and defense policy among its 28 member states.”
115
European Security Strategy, 11
dialogue between the US and European
116
So concludes also Howorth, NATO and ESDP,
106
states as well as between the USA and
the
European
Union
should
be
improved.

The Lisbon Treaty could not remove the
Turkish
blockade
of
the
Strategic
Partnership. It can only be solved if USTurkish and EU-Turkish relations are
improved in a comprehensive manner also
117
outside defense the security realm.
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International Security Information Service (2008):
The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and
ESDP, in: European Security Review No. 37,
available
at:
http://www.isiseurope.org/pdf/2008_artrel_150_esr37tolmar08.pdf (01.02.2010) (cited as: ISIS, Impact
of Lisbon)
Keukeleire, Stephan (2006): European Security
and Defence Policy - From Taboo to a
Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy?, in: Bindi,
Federiga: The Foreign Policy of the European
Union - Assessing Europe's Role in the World,
Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p.
51-72
McNamara, Sally (2009): The EU‟s Common
Foreign and Security Policy – How it
Threatens
Transatlantic
Security,
in:
Backgrounder No. 2250, p. 1-12 (cited as:
CFSP threatens transatlantic security)
PA Consulting Group (2009): Dynamic Planning
for COIN in Afghanistan; available at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Compo
nents/Photo/_new/Afghanistan_Dynamic_Plan
ning.pdf (11.02.2010)
Shea, Jamie (2009): Ten Years of the ESDP – A
NATO perspective, in: European Security and
Defence Policy, Issue 9, 10 year anniversary
issue 1999/2009, p. 44-45
Wessels, Wolfgang/ Bopp, Franziska (2008): The
Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the
Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or
challenges ahead?, Research Paper 6 June
2008,
available
at:
http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_The_In
stitutional_Architecture_of_CFSP_after_the_Li
sbon_Treaty.pdf (17.02.2010) (citied as:
Institutional Architecture after Lisbon)
Wiegold, Thomas (2009): Wie ernüchternd ist
die Piratenbilianz & Order of Battle
(Revised), blog entry of 28.12.2009;
available
at:
http://wiegold.focus.de/augen_geradeaus/2
009/12/wie-ern%C3%BCchtern-ist-diepiratenbilanz-order-of-battle-revised.html
(11.02.2010)
G. Appendix
Extracts from the revised Treaty on European
Union118
Article 3 (5) TEU
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall
uphold and promote its values and interests and
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall
contribute to peace, security, the sustainable
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual
respect among peoples, free and fair trade,
eradication of poverty and the protection of human
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as
to the strict observance and the development of
international law, including respect for the principles
of the United Nations Charter.
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into
the world economy, including through the
progressive abolition of restrictions on international
trade;
(f) help develop international measures to
preserve and improve the quality of the environment
and the sustainable management of global natural
resources, in order to ensure sustainable
development;
(g) assist populations, countries and regions
confronting natural or man-made disasters; and
(h) promote an international system based on
stronger multilateral cooperation and good global
governance.
Article 21 TEU
1. The Union's action on the international scene
shall be guided by the principles which have
inspired its own creation, development and
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the
wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the
universality and indivisibility of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity,
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect
for the principles of the United Nations Charter and
international law. The Union shall seek to develop
relations and build partnerships with third countries,
and international, regional or global organisations
which share the principles referred to in the first
subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions
to common problems, in particular in the framework
of the United Nations.
2. The Union shall define and pursue common
policies and actions, and shall work for a high
degree of cooperation in all fields of international
relations, in order to:
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests,
security, independence and integrity;
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule
of law, human rights and the principles of
international law;
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and
strengthen international security, in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act
and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including
those relating to external borders;
118
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and
environmental development of developing countries,
with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
3. The Union shall respect the principles and
pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2
in the development and implementation of the
different areas of the Union's external action […].
Article 24
1. The Union's competence in matters of
common foreign and security policy shall cover all
areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to
the Union's security, including the progressive
framing of a common defence policy that might lead
to a common defence.
The common foreign and security policy is
subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be
defined and implemented by the European Council
and the Council acting unanimously, except where
the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of
legislative acts shall be excluded.
The common foreign and security policy shall
be put into effect by the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by
Member States, in accordance with the Treaties.
The specific role of the European Parliament and of
the Commission in this area is defined by the
Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European
Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to
these provisions, with the exception […].
2. […], the Union shall conduct, define and
implement a common foreign and security policy,
based on the development […] the achievement of
an ever-increasing degree of convergence of
Member States' actions.
Emphasis added.
3. The Member States shall support the
Union's external and security policy actively and
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual
solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action
in this area.
The Member States shall work together to
enhance and develop their mutual political
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which
is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to
impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in
international relations.
The Council and the High Representative shall
ensure compliance with these principles.
Article 37
The Union may conclude agreements with one
or more States or international organisations in
areas covered by this Chapter.
Article 42 TEU
1. The common security and defence policy
shall be an integral part of the common foreign and
security policy. It shall provide the Union with an
operational capacity drawing on civilian and military
assets. The Union may use them on missions
outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict
prevention and strengthening international security
in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks
shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by
the Member States.
2. The common security and defence policy
shall include the progressive framing of a common
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common
defence, when the European Council, acting
unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case
recommend to the Member States the adoption of
such a decision in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union
in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice
the specific character of the security and defence
policy of certain Member States and shall respect
the obligations of certain Member States, which see
their common defence realised in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North
Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common
security and defence policy established within that
framework.
3. Member States shall make civilian and
military capabilities available to the Union for the
implementation of the common security and
defence policy, to contribute to the objectives
defined by the Council. Those Member States which
together establish multinational forces may also
make them available to the common security and
defence policy. Member States shall undertake
progressively to improve their military capabilities.
The Agency in the field of defence capabilities
development, research, acquisition and armaments
(hereinafter referred to as „the European Defence
Agency’) shall identify operational requirements,
shall promote measures to satisfy those
requirements, shall contribute to identifying and,
where appropriate, implementing any measure
needed to strengthen the industrial and
technological base of the defence sector, shall
participate in defining a European capabilities and
armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in
evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
4. Decisions relating to the common security
and defence policy, including those initiating a
mission as referred to in this Article, shall be
adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a
proposal from the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative
from a Member State. The High Representative may
propose the use of both national resources and
Union instruments, together with the Commission
where appropriate.
5. The Council may entrust the execution of a
task, within the Union framework, to a group of
Member States in order to protect the Union's
values and serve its interests. The execution of such
a task shall be governed by Article 44.
6. Those Member States whose military
capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have
made more binding commitments to one another in
this area with a view to the most demanding
missions shall establish permanent structured
cooperation within the Union framework. Such
cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall
not affect the provisions of Article 43.
7. If a Member State is the victim of armed
aggression on its territory, the other Member
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid
and assistance by all the means in their power,
in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific
character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States. Commitments and
cooperation in this area shall be consistent with
commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, which, for those States which are
members of it, remains the foundation of their
collective defence and the forum for its
implementation.
Article 43 (1) TEU
The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the
course of which the Union may use civilian and
military means, shall include joint disarmament
operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention
and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peace-making and
post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may
contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by
supporting third countries in combating terrorism
in their territories.
(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary,
implementing any useful measure for strengthening
the industrial and technological base of the defence
sector […].
Article 46 (1) TEU
1. Those Member States which wish to
participate in the permanent structured cooperation
[…], which fulfil the criteria and have made the
commitments on military capabilities set out in the
Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall
notify their intention to the Council and to the High
Representative […].
Article 44 (1) TEU
Article 47 TEU
Within the framework of the decisions adopted
in accordance with Article 43, the Council may
entrust the implementation of a task to a group of
Member States which are willing and have the
necessary capability for such a task. […]
Article 45 (1) TEU
1. The European Defence Agency referred to in
Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council,
shall have as its task to:
(a) contribute to identifying the Member States'
military capability objectives and evaluating
observance of the capability commitments […];
(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs
and adoption of effective, compatible procurement
methods;
(c) propose multilateral projects […], ensure
coordination of the programmes implemented by the
Member States and management of specific
cooperation programmes;
(d) support defence technology research, […];
The Union shall have legal personality.
Article 222 (1) TEFU
1. The Union and its Member States shall act
jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is
the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a
natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including
the military resources made available by the
Member States, to:
(a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of
the Member States;
- protect democratic institutions and the
civilian population from any terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory, at the
request of its political authorities, in the event of a
terrorist attack;
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the
request of its political authorities, in the event of a
natural or man-made disaster.
Der Bundesverband Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen (BSH)
ist der Dachverband sicherheitspolitischer Hochschulgruppen
an deutschen Universitäten. Der BSH setzt sich aus
sicherheitspolitisch interessierten Studierenden, Doktoranden
und Lehrkräften aller Fachrichtungen zusammen. Die
Mitgliedschaft im BSH steht allen sicherheitspolitisch
interessierten Personen mit akademischem oder praktischem
Hintergrund offen, welche die Grundsätze und Ziele des BSR
teilen.
Grundsätze des BSH
Der BSH steht ein für die Verteidigung der Werteordnung des
Grundgesetzes. In unserer sicherheitspolitischen Arbeit bildet
die Auseinandersetzung mit Bedrohungen dieser
Werteordnung einen Schwerpunkt. Zudem ist uns die
Aufrechterhaltung der akademischen Freiheit ein besonderes
Anliegen. Die Schaffung von Erkenntnis im Wettbewerb der
Ideen setzt voraus, daß alle Stimmen gehört werden.
Die Arbeit des BSH
Die Arbeit des BSH richtet sich an alle Studierenden und
erfolgt überparteilich und überkonfessionell.
Die Aktivitäten des BSH umfassen:

Sicherheitspolitische Bildungsarbeit an Hochschulen

Akademische Nachwuchsförderung im
sicherheitspolitischen Bereich

Wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit sicherheitspolitischen Fragestellungen

Weiterbildung- und Qualifikation der Mitglieder im
Bereich politische Bildung und Sicherheitspolitik
Impressum
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit wird herausgegeben durch die AG
Wissenschaft & Sicherheit des BSH und erscheint in
unregelmäßigen Abständen. Kontakt und kostenloses
elektronisches Abonnement unter [email protected]
sowie [email protected]
Kontakt:
Verband der Reservisten der Deutschen Bundeswehr e.V.
- Geschäftsstelle Zeppelinstraße 7A
53177 Bonn
Tel.: 0228/2590 914
Fax: 0228/2590 919
Im Internet www.sicherheitspolitik.de
ISSN: 1869-5256 (elektronische Ausgabe „WiSi Papers“)
Verantwortlich für diese Ausgabe:
Karsten Pötschke
Redaktion:
Stella Adorf, Johanna Lange, Steve Schlegel

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