The Brazilian energy and infrastructure projects presented as

Transcrição

DOSSIER
The Brazilian energy and infrastructure projects
presented as business opportunities to international
investors and the socio-environmental risks
involved in these mega-projects
Developed by
Rios Vivos Network Energy Program
Partners
Fundação Heinrich Böll
Coordination
- Lúcia Schild Ortiz – Friends of the Earth Brazil
Rios Vivos Coalition
Presentation
Alcides Faria - Rio Vivos Coalition Executive Secretary
Authors
Maurício Galinkin – Fundação CEBRAC
Lúcia Schild Ortiz –
Friends of the Earth Brazil
José Rafael Ribeiro –– SAPE - Angraense Ecological Protection Society
Glenn Switkes – International Rivers Network
Bárbara Happe – URGEWALD, Germany
Summary
Presentation _________________________________________________________ 03
Introduction _________________________________________________________ 04
Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex , Xingu River, Altamira, Pará___________ 06
Teles Hydroway – Pires – Tapajós _________________________________ 11
Hydroway, railway and hydroelectric systems in the Araguaia-Tocantins River
Basin, Tocantins ________________________________________________ 19
Seival Thermoelectric Power Plant powered by mineral coal, Candiota, Rio Grande
do Sul ________________________________________________________ 41
Lúcia Schild Ortiz – Friends of the Earth Brazil
Angra 3 Nuclear Power Plant, Angra dos Reis Nuclear
Complex, Rio de Janeiro _________________________________________ 44
Lúcia Schild Ortiz - Friends of the Earth Brazil
José Rafel Ribeiro - SAPÊ –Angraense Ecological Protection Society
Sustainable Alternatives to Brazil __________________________________ 50
Bibliographical references, publications and documents
available at request ____________________________________________ 53
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Presentation
This dossier presents a series of information gathered from data and knowledge acquired by
Brazilian and German Civil organizations about the socio-environmental risks related to
mega energy and infrastructure projects to Brazil.
Our aim is to be an independent source of information able to influence the decision making
process of investors and international financial agents in relation to the accomplishment of
such projects, by pointing sustainable alternatives that can also represent opportunities in
relation to investment and economic earnings, as well as socio and environmental benefits
to the Brazilian society.
This is document is meant to approach the press, politicians, businessmen, opinion makers,
financial institutions, national and international influent sectors in relation to public and
private investments in order to bring them together to promote social, environmental and
economic sustainability.
Rio Vivos, a coalition of more than four hundred non-governmental agencies, social
movements and traditional as well as indigenous communities, has been working on megainfrastructure projects and their impact on the territory and the populations in Latin America
since 1994. Rio Vivos’ experience in this process has showed that it is possible to promote
alliances and coordinated actions locally, regionally and internationally by uniting and
transforming several characters into sustainable development partners.
Rio Vivos has elected the energy theme as one of its priorities, since it considers that the
decisions regarding policies in this field play direct influence on the Nature and the life
quality of people, favoring or creating obstacles to the sustainability we aim at acquiring for
our societies.
Its greatest objective is to contribute that the unavoidable transition to the energetic
development sustainability be accelerated. In addition, we believe that it is necessary the
union of different segments of society such as parliaments, governments, enterprises, civil
society, international finance organisms, etc in order to help abandon the old destructive
project implementation practice and implement cooperation processes that favor the
generation of sustainable energy forms and its use.
Alcides Faria
Rio Vivos Coalition Executive Secretary
Energy Program
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Introduction
In the beginning of 2002, an agreement was set between the President of Brazil, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, and the German Prime Minister, Schröder, as for the launching of a
common action towards infrastructure and energy investment opportunities in Brazil.
It was highlighted that Germany had missed business opportunities, which had arisen in
Brazil during the privatization process, due to internal affairs. However, it considers it is
about time to move forward and announce that “companies and financial agents could offer
their expertise and availability in relation to new financing models in Brazil that happens to
be the greatest export credit and international investment receiver in Latin America”.
In July 2002, the meeting Brazil – Germany, in Hamburg, was the official opportunity to the
establishment
of
the
so-called
“
Brazil
–
Germany
Cooperation
Initiative
to the
Infrastructure and Energy Sectors”. A list of 60 great potential investment projects,
representing US$28 billion, was presented by the agency Investe Brasil in cooperation with
the BDI (German Industries Federation).
Brazil, that moment on, became part of the business and service agenda of Germany that
seeks both business opportunities and external market expansion. In Brazil, decisions about
the infrastructure and energy projects are based on economical and external interests,
without any discussions being carried out with society about the need of a socioenvironmental planning linked to the goals established for the development of such sector.
Moreover, the people responsible for the selection of such projects, or “international
liquidation” as we prefer to call it, do not seem to acknowledge, or intend to omit, the
controversies and the legal problems that are faced by such proposals since they hold great
environmental, social and cultural impact, as well as the economical and political risks
reflected by the popular resistance to their implementation. In addition, other projects have
not been successful yet due to the same reasons or due to the technology they wish to
apply that are considered obsolete in their homeland; for instance, the nuclear reactor
negotiated between Brazil and Germany during the military dictatorship, in the 70’s, and
thermoelectric power plants powered by mineral coal.
As the negotiation process - also called cooperation process - went on, in November 2002, a
delegation made up of about 60 businessmen and representatives of the Brazilian
government visited Germany aiming at bringing investments of about 10 billion dollars in
energy and infrastructure projects by 2007. Among these projects, were those regarding
the Amazonian region such as the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex of Belo Monte in the
Rio Xingu, the Hydroway Teles Pires Tapajós and several other projects involving the
Araguaia-Tocantins basin. All of them have been criticized since they represent enormous
social and environmental impacts. Other energy generation projects in Brazil may receive
the financial support of German investors, for example, the Seival Thermoelectric Power
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Plant powered by mineral coal, which belongs to the German company STEAG, and the
Angra 3 Nuclear Power Plant, which belongs to Eletronuclear do Brasil and ANP Framatone.
This last one depends on international financial institutions willing to assume its commercial
risk. So far, only French and German financial institutions have showed interest in taking
part of this nuclear project. If any of the projects mentioned above becomes reality, should
Germany be criticized for the incoherence between its internal and external policies since it
shows interest in the development of new renewable sources of energy and has been
contributing to a more sustainable world society. It has also been progressively abandoning
the use of mineral coal in its energetic matrix, substituting it for renewable ones in order to
reach and outdo the goals set for the reduction of green house gas emission effect
established by the Kioto Protocol. In 2001, it announced it was abandoning nuclear energy
projects and setting a moratoria to new domestic or international investments in this field.
Due to the reasons mentioned above, and the cooperation Germany has been offering in
regard to the preservation of the Brazilian biodiversity and natural resources, is that we find
it unacceptable the involvement of this country in both official or private investments to
promote human and environmental degradation, consequences of mega-projects related to
infrastructure and traditional energy generation that promote great impact or make use of
obsolete sources. In addition, such investments may suppress effective international
cooperation processes regarding sustainable development, risking great opportunities of
economic, social and environmental return by means of technological, financial and
educational cooperation to overcome the global challenges related to the economy and the
sustainability of the planet.
Discussions involving the participation of Germany in such projects are just beginning,
reason why we understand it is important to inform them now about the economic, social
and environmental risks presented by some of those projects, and suggest alternative
sustainable ones.
The dossier about the socio-environmental risks of energy and infrastructure projects in
Brazil, presented as business opportunity to international investors, contains crucial
information acquired by Brazilian and German organizations about some of these projects
and aims at being a source of independent information able to influence the decisions of
investors and financial agents, as well as act as a guide to help direct the flux of capital to
the initiatives that contribute to the sustainable development of Brazil.
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Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex, Xingu River , Altamira, Pará
1
Project name: Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex
Location: Vitória do Xingu, Xingu River, state of Pará
Capacity installed: 11,182 MW (stable energy offer: 4,796 average MW)
Investors: ELETROBRÁS/ELETRONORTE
Financed by: private investors (46%), BNDES (41%), ELETROBRÁS (6%); debentures
(7%)
Project official cost: US$ 5,252 million (power plant US$3,157 million; transmission line
US$2,095 million)
Summary
This project involves the construction of a hydroelectric complex in the Xingu River,
comprising a 440 km2 dam, a hydroelectric power plant with 20 (twenty) units of 550 MW in
the main load center and 07 (seven) units of 26MW in the complementary load center, and
830 km of transmission lines reaching the SE Colinas, which will conduct the generated
energy to the load centers located in the Northeast and Southeast regions of Brazil, (states
of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais) mainly.
Due to a reduced capacity factor, about 40%, ELETROBRÁS is discussing project variations
that include the construction of thermoelectric power plant powered by gas in Belém, state
of Pará, which would generate 1,500 MW to complement the energy necessary to supply
Belo Monte during drought, with an estimated cost of US$750 million.
The dam will operate on short water during the dry months and, consequently, will have to
make use of the entire river flow drying up the “Volata Grande do Xingú”, where indigenous
and river bank populations live. Other dams, located upstream, will be necessary to
guarantee the adequate flow of water in the turbines of Belo Monte all year long, which
would jeopardize other indigenous territories located upstream. The complex involves four
more power plants: Altamira (6,588 MW), Ipixuna (1,900 MW), Kakramoiro (1,490 MW) and
Jarina (620 MW). More than 20 indigenous reserves are located in the Xingu River area.
1
Glenn Switkes is graduated in History from the University of Columbia, holds a Master’s degree in Journalism and
Documentary Cinema by the University of Berkeley, and is the director for International Rivers Network for Latin
America.
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Historic
Originally, a series of 5 dams were planned to be built in the Xingu River which would flood
thousands of km of indigenous reserves, the majority of them belonging to the Kaiapó
Indians. Babaquara, the biggest power plant of the project, would flood 5,200 km2 of
tropical forests with the greatest reservoir in the world.
In 1989, the Kaiapós, and their allies, organized the Altamira Reunion where the indigenous
communities rejected the project. In 1999, ELETRONORTE proposed the Belo Monte power
plant, with reservoir downsized from 1,200 km2 to 440 km2. Doubts concerning the viability
of the construction, in relation to its new engineering project, remained.
According to the Brazilian environmental legislation, ELETRONORTE, licensed by the state of
Pará, ordered the Environmental Impact Assessment to FADESP, an institute of the Federal
University of Pará. In May 2001, the Federal Justice Department of Pará requested the
suspension of such assessment and, in January 2002, a legal ruling declared it invalid.
Among the reasons presented to the suspension of the assessment are the facts that the
project should be under federal jurisdiction, being necessary prior authorization from the
Brazilian National Congress, and also because FADESP had already been involved in a fraud
scandal concerning another Environmental Impact Assessment about the Araguaia –
Tocantins Hydroway. Moreover, the suspended assessments involve only the Hydroelectric
power plant. On the other hand, the environmental license for the transmission system is to
be requested to IBAMA separately.
Investors/Financers
In the end of the year 2001, the Executing Unit of the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex
Project, along with companies which are part of the holding: ELETRONORTE, FURNAS,
CHESF, ELETROSUL and CEPEL. The funding suggested is made up of the following sources,
taking into consideration their respective participations and tax return demanded:
Table 1 – Investment sources and their participation
Sources
Participation
Investor
(ordinary 46
Return Tax
15
shareholder)
Eletrobrás
(preferential 6
12
shareholder)
BNDES
(direct
and
indirect 41
10
participations)
Debentures
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13
7
The official construction costs presented to Belo Monte Power Plant are fake and do not
comply with the financial reality. The cost announced of US$12/MWh will be reached with a
capital of US$400/KW only, with a discount tax of 10% a year for a 35 year return period.
Social Impact
About 20 indigenous ethnics, including those who live along the Xingu River, will be affected
by the Belo Monte power plant. Despite the fact the original project was reviewed and the
reservoir area reduced from 1,200 km² to 440 km²; without changes in the energy
generation capacity, the hydroelectric complex construction would affect more than 3000
families, mainly the Paçamqui reserve, where the Juruna indigenous live. The construction
of dams upstream, would flood part of the Kaiapó reserve and the territories of the Araweté,
Assuriní and Arara indigenous. The I Volta Grande do Rio Xingu Conference, which took
place in June 2002, gathered about 250 people from the community who reassured their
position against the dam construction.
Environmental Impacts
The Belo Monte construction would flood 400 km² of productive land and forests, and it
would demand the displacement and relocation of thousands of families. We fear that the
socio-environmental impact caused by the Tucuruí dam be repeated. The lack of public
hearings threatens the discussions and searches for alternatives. According to the MDTX
(Movement for the Development of Transamazon and Xingu), the Environmental Impact
Assessment-RIMA developed is limited to 6 municipalities only, not reflecting all of the
probable effects involving the construction. Besides that, it also points that the assessment
will not have the necessary efficacy to guide decisions about population displacement and
pressures set over the region’s natural resources such as the forest remainings, tributary
rivers, hunted target species and other biological reproduction interactions that are spread
out in an area that is larger to the one studied.
According to an environmental viewpoint of responsibility, the fact that practically 2/3 of the
Brazilian hydroelectric potential is located in the Amazon region makes even more urgent
the need of establishing effective measures for the management of reservoirs formed by
hydroelectric power plants, leaving the administration of hydroelectric basins to the electric
companies, which is something that has not been seen up to now. In the three reservoirs
formed by hydroelectric power plants built in the region – Tucurui (PA) in Tocantins River ,
with 2,875 km2; Balbina (AM) in the Uatuma River, with 2,360 km2, and Samuel (RO) in
Jamari River, with 560 km2- the vegetal coverage was not removed before the floodgates
were closed, leading them to decompose and, consequently, emit gases. Besides, the
quality of the water is also affected, resulting in a considerable decrease of the fishing
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activities. The reservoirs from those three hydroelectric power plants emit considerable
amounts of CO2 and CH4 both greenhouse gases, contributing to the aggravation of the
environmental impact on these reservoirs. Taking into account what has already happened
to these hydroelectric power plants, if all of the mega-projects that are planned for Amazon
are accomplished, the emission of about 2,308.5 millions of tons of CO2 is estimated to
happen in the first ten years, in other words, 231 millions of tons of CO2 a year. This
volume corresponds to 75% or 3/4 of the total amount of net emission for the year 2000
from the burning of fossil fuel, wood and coal from the native forest, that, itself, represents
an undesirable contribution.
Concerning the Belo Monte project, the Viability Assessment, conducted by ELETRONORTE,
admits only going through the floodgates what the company calls “ecological flow” that,
during the dry period would be half the minimum flow of the Xingu River (200 m3/s in
October), drying up its streams and tributaries, harming the fishing and farm landing of the
communities, besides affecting the availability of water for domestic use.
Economic impacts
Belo Monte Hydroelectric complex has roused interest mainly of the electro-intensive
industries in the Amazon region (production of primary aluminum and exploration of mineral
resources as iron stone). Big constructions already built in the north region have not
provided economical development, and Belo Monte certainly would create serious social and
environmental problems for the Xingu region. The priorities of the regional communities are
the feasibility of familiar agriculture and small industries, and not the construction of megaconstruction to generate energy to the industrial and populational centers of the country.
Brazil has a great potential to encourage alternative energy sources like wind and biomass,
and promote higher energetic efficiency to avoid the impact of those large scale projects in
the Amazon region.
Alternatives
It is possible to drive away the perspectives of the lack of energy for the following years
adopting four solutions to raise the offer; first, reduce the losses in the Brazilian electrical
system; second, modernize the power plants which are more than twenty years old; third,
generate energy in decentralized systems through the PCHs – Small Hydroelectric power
plants and aeolian power plants; fourth, make use of biomass and other agricultural
residues in cogeneration regimen.
All of them, would require small linvestments comparing to the large scale power plants,
without causing the undesirable social and environmental impacts, making about 24.000
MW available for the Brazilian society, an equivalent of more than 33% of the generation
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capacity currently installed (see item Sustainable Alternatives to Brazil, at the end of this
paper).
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Hydroway Teles Pires – Tapajós River
Maurício Galinkin – Foundation CEBRAC
2
Project name: Teles Pires Hydroway Project – Tapajós
Location: Tapajos and Teles Pires Rivers, from Rasteira waterfall until its mouth, in the city
of Santarem, right bank of the Amazon River, in a distance of 1,043 km, in the states of
Mato Grosso and Pará.
Companies: Hidrovias da Amazonia Oriental Administration – Ahimor/Cia Docas do Pará.
Financers: No definition.
Project total cost: US$ 393.9 millions.
Summary
The Teles Pires Hydroway Project – Tapajos has as an objective to ship grains from the
north of Mato Grosso state, today the biggest producer of soy bean in the country, to the
Santarem harbour, in Pará. From Santarem, these good would be shipped to the
international market.
Tapajos River is 851 km long from the confluence of its two rivers, Teles Pires and Juruena,
until the city of Santarem, on the right bank of the Amazon River. This city is 950 km far
from Belém and 750 km from Manaus.
The estimated cost for the implementation of the necessary initiatives to the transformation
of river bed, so that Teles Pires and Tapajos would become navigable, from the Rasteira
waterfall region to its mouth, totalizing 1,043 km, is of US$ 393.9 millions.
This proposal foresees impacts on Indigenous territories, a large amount of demolitions and
the construction of a floodgate to surpass one of the waterfall passages; the constructions
are to be carried out in 36 months.
2
Maurício Galinkin is Journalist and Mechanical Engineer, holding a Master’s degree on Regional Studies (Latin
America) from the University of London, and he is also the Technical Director for CEBRAC Foundation, Brasília,
Brazil
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Map situations (1) and detail (2) of Teles Pires Hidroway-Tapajos.
Source: Ministry of Transport, Brazilian Government, site, 2003.
source: Ahimor, site, 2003
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History
The first Assessment on the Environmental Impact was presented by the entrepreneur to
the environmental licensing organization of Pará state, as if the licensing was only local. The
existence of groups of indigenous, whose tribes are located near the Tapajós River, Teles
Pires River (Manduruku and Kaibi) and in the urban area of Itaituba (Praia Índio and Praia
Mangue) would be cut by the cargo transportation road foreseen in the project and,
therefore, the need for Federal licensing and authorization of the National Congress to
implement this kind of construction on indigenous territories was completely ignored .
The Justice Department asked for the construction suspension in 1998, obtaining a
favorable decision. The entrepreneur, Administração de Hidrovias da Amazônia OrientalAhimor/Cia Docas do Pará, was able to revoke this judicial decision.
Investors / Financers
The estimate cost to implement the necessary changes in the beds of rivers, in order to turn
the Tapajós and Teles Pires rivers navigable, from the cachoeira Rasteira region to its
mouth, totalizing 1,043 kilometres, was R$ 154.7 million (Ahimor, Ppa 2000 - 2003, U$
1=R$ 1.70) according to the dollar exchange rate in 1999. The updated quotation of the
American currency (US$ 1=R$ 3), would be approximately R$ 273 million. According to
Brasil Investe, which presented the project to German Investors, in November 2002, the
total estimated cost of it was US$ 393.9 million.
The investors interested in this project, which has not been granted an environmental
license yet, have not been defined so far.
Social Impact
The area for gain transportation, according to the data provided by Ahimor (Ahimor, site,
2003) is of 800,000 km2, reaching the population of the following towns:
In the state of Mato Grosso: Alta Floresta, Apiacás, Aripuanã, Cana Brava do Norte,
Carlinda, Castanheira, Cláudia, Colíder, Cotiguaçu, Feliz Natal, Guarantã do Norte, Itaúba,
Juara, Juína, Lucas do Rio Verde, Marcelândia, Matupá, Nova Bandeirantes, Nova Canaã do
Norte, Nova Guarita, Nova Monte Verde, Nova Mutum, Nova Ubiratan, Novo Horizonte do
Norte, Novo mundo, Paranaíta, Paranatinga, Peixoto de Azevedo, Porto dos Gaúchos, Santa
Carmem, Sinop, Sorriso, Tabaporã, Terra Nova do Norte, Tapurá, União do Sul and Vera.
In the state of Pará: Itaituba, Santarém, Juruti, Aveiro, Rurópolis, Uruará, Medicilândia and
Altamira.
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Indigenous Populations
This project is meant to build a cargo transportation route, basically to transport grains (soy
bean) to reach the international market. This route would cross indigenous territories
located near the Tapajós River, the Teles Pires River (Munduruku and Kaiabi) and the urban
area of the city of Itaituba (Praia do Índio and Praia Mangue). Besides this serious problem,
this construction goes against the possibility of giving effective survival conditions to this
populations. In
1999, for example, the Rotary International Pro-hydroway Teles Pires-
Commission, from Alta Floresta (MT), sent a protesting letter to the president of Brazil,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, asking the Government not to sanction the enlargement of the
indigenous Cayabi territory, which lies in the town region of Jacareacanga and Apiacas (in
the south of PA and north of MT), according to the notes of the Socio-environmental
Institute in its bulletin- Parabolicas (ISA, site, 1999).
The redefinition of the limits of the indigenous Cayabi territory has been an old claim of the
Kayabi and Munduruku who are settled there, as stated by the sources mentioned above.
Decades of gold searching made the rivers, which flow through the indigenous territory,
very degraded, so it became impossible for the indigenous families to make use of the water
as they used to do. According to members of this commission, who are soy producers, the
enlargement of the territory would make it impossible to implement the hydroway since it
would reach the point considered to be ideal to connect the highway to its fluvial harbor, in
Apiacás (idem, ibidem).
Besides the relevant matters regarding the indigenous people, there are also considerable
environmental issues on this hydroway route. Impacts that will be caused by the activities
necessary to turn the river navigable: 22 km of waterfalls in the Tapajós River, between São
Luis and Buburé, in Pará, and 50 km of “hard navegable conditions” with due to the existing
waterfalls all the way to Mangabalzinho and Chacorão, on the border between the states of
Pará and Amazonas, in the Mundurucânia Forest Reserve. There are also the Capoeiras
Waterfall in Tapajós River and, in the Teles River, in the state of Mato Grosso, lies the
Aquibi Waterfall, close to the city of Colider.
To overcome these obstacles, Ahimor proposes the construction of a channel parallel to
Tapajós River, reaching 28 km, with a floodgate to bear the existing unlevellings. The
hydroway would operate between the region of Cachoeira Rasteira and Santarém, having
approximately 1,043 km of extension.
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Characteristics of the convoy and the road
According to the data published by the entrepreneur (Ahimor, site, 2003) the typical convoy
indicated to this hydroway is made up of “empurradores” and four barges, 2 by 2
formation), maximum of two hundred meters of width (24 meters of mouth and maximum
vessel draught of 2,5 meters, with a medium vessel draught of 1,50 meters) in 75% of
average year (retracing every two years), in a 30 meter wide channel. It is expected to
transport 7.500 tons.
The navigation channel would be 30 meters wide, for the passages without intersections
and 70 meters for the passages with intersections. The minimum depths would be of 1,8
meters on the sand banks and 2.0 meters on the rocky beds. The minimum curve radius
would be from 700 to 1,400 meters. The minimum depths of the navigation channels will be
equals to the vessel’s draught more 0.5 meters for safety. This minimum safety measure is
assumed to be kept in any situation, that is, the minimum depth is the vessel draught, 2.5
meters, plus a 0.5 meter room.
A study performed by Internave Engenharia Ltd. (apud Ahimor, site, 2003) indicates that
the grain load to be transported through the Tapajos hydroway would reach around 2.5
million of tons in 2005, an equivalent to 333 convoy journeys. Since each journey should
take at least 8 days (considering 24 hour daily navigation, at 12 km per hour), it will be
necessary to count on 10 convoys (a total of 75,000 t for each convoy) to discharge the
harvest in approximately 3 months.
Navigability
The lower Tapajós has free navigation in an extension of 345 km, that is, the route between
Santarém-PA and São Luis do Tapajós-PA, convoys with great loading capacity navigate on
this route, without difficulties at any time of the year, making the traffic of vessels with 2.5
meters of draught possible at any time of the year. Between São Luis do Tapajós, PA and
Buburé, PA, lies Corredeiras de São Luis, a region comprising 28 km of waterfalls in the
Tapajós River.
At the upstream of Buburé River, next to the mouth of Jamanxim River, main affluent on
the right bank of Tapajós River, there is a 170 kilometer navigable route. On the following
route, which is about 50 km long, there are many rapids until Cachoeira de Mangabalzinho.
The next 147 km, passing by the city of Jacareacanga, have reasonable navigation
conditions up to Cachoeira do Chacorão, a waterfall considered an obstacle to be overcome
by means of constructions. From the upstream of these rapids, in Chacorão, to the mouth of
Teles Pires River, there is a route where small rocks, that will need demolition, appear on
the surface along its 111 km. By the end of this route, which is about 192 long, from this
point up to Cachoeira Rasteira, dredgings will be necessary to make it navigable.
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The only access to Tapajós River is through Transamazon highway (BR 230) that crosses
this river in Itaituba. Besides Transamazon, the region has only BR 163 highway (CuiabáSantarém), usually poorly asphalted in the state of Pará, and the highways of Mato Grosso
that cross the upstream of the tributary basin of Tapajós River, located upstream of the
confluence of its rivers. These routes represent a crucial access to the hydroway, because it
is only through them that the agricultural production north of Mato Grosso can be shipped.
Interventions on the river banks
On the route, which is about 28 km long and where the São Luis do Tapajós rapids are
located, is being proposed the construction of a lateral channel to Tapajós River, using part
of the river bank along Cruzes channel. Demolition and construction of a floodgate will be
necessary to the transposition of the existing unleveling conditions at this part of the river.
Between Buburé, PA, and the confluence with the rivers Teles Pires and Juruena, in the
upstream of Tapajós River, which is 462 km long, demolition and dredging are proposed.
Downstream Teles Pires River, at the confluence with the rivers Teles Pires, Juruena and
Rasteira waterfall, an extension which is 185 km long, only dredging is necessary.
Table 1. Forecasted river interventions for the implementation of the Teles Pires Tapajós Hydroway
Project
Routes
Volume m3
Baburé – Jacareacanga
Dredging
138,800
Demolition
484,009
Jacareacanga-Confluence
Dredging
85,900
Demolition
245,362
Confluence – Cahoeira Rasteira
Dredging
1,034,036
Total dredging
1,258,736
Total demolition
729,371
Source: Ahimor, site, 2003.
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Table 02. Forecasted intervention cost for the implementation of the Teles Pires –Tapajós Hydroway,
values good for September 1997.
Routes
Value
R$1,000
Baixo Tapajós (Down stream Tapajos River) (345 km)
São Luis do Tapajós Rapids (28 km) (channel digging, protection dike and 91,000
dam)
Médio Tapajós Buburé – Jacareacanga (Mid-stream Tapajós Buburé – 31,870
Jacareacanga) (268 km) (dredging and derrocamentos)
Alto Tapajós Jacareacanga (upper stream Tapajós – Jacareacanga) – 16,419.7
confluence (196 km) (dredging and demolitions)
Baixo Teles Pires (down stream Teles Pires) (185 km) dredging
4,261.1
Total construction total cost
143,550.7
Total construction inspection
4,991.1
Total cost
148,541.8
Source: Ahimor, site, 2003.
Obs.: The Plano Plurianual de Investimento PPA -2000-2003 (Pluriannual Investment Plan) of the former
government diverges slightly from this information, estimating the hydroway cost to be about R$ 154,700 million
(Ahimor, PPA 2000-2003, U$ 1= R$1.70 in 18.05.99).
Economic Impact
The transportation corridor which is going to be created by the Tapajós-Teles Pires
Hidroway has, according to the proponents of this project, a fundamental importance for the
shipping of the grains produced in the Brazilian Middle-East region, especially the one
located in the North of the State of Mato Grosso, bordering the States of Para and
Amazonas. It is important to call attention to the fact that the use of this region for planting
grains must be preceded by the deforestation of the Amazon Forest. According to this
perspective, the difference among the transportation costs through the hydroway and other
alternative ways for the shipping of the grains, produced under the area of influence, would
amount to R$ 5.00 – ton until R$ 37.00 – ton, depending on the city and distance navigated
till the ports (idem, ibidem).
Alternatives
Cargo transporting alternatives , if they existed, are not the aim of this project. Our aim is
to speculate about new ways to generate income in order to benefit and improve the living
conditions not only of the local population, but also of the natives.
One should be aware that the social group that would benefit from this enterprise – big
farmers, capitalists and the sectors involved in the agribusiness – will influence the
construction of this hydroway as long as the production of soy bean is an attractive
Energy Program
17
business. In order to avoid socio-cultural and environmental harm with the implementation
of this hydroway, a strong articulation between the natives and the local society is
necessary to convince the federal government not to give this project priority.
Energy Program
18
Transport and Energy infra-structure in central Brazil:
Hydroway, railway and hydroelectric systems of the Araguaia-Tocantins
Basin
Maurício Galinkin 3, Foundation CEBRAC
4
Glenn Switkes – International Rivers Network 5
Introduction
The view that the Brazilian dominant classes have on how to manage the country’s
development becomes clear indeed when we analyze the current proposal for infra-structure
projects in the Tocantins hydrographic basin, which is formed by the rivers Araguaia,
Tocantins and its tributaries. What prevails is the transport (hydro and railway)
“structuring” projects, and a large number of hydroelectric power plants, as well as
transmission lines, basically to supply the demand for energy in the economic region of
southeastern Brazil (made up by São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo,
but especially for the first two states) and to exportation, in the case of shipping the grains
whose production is yet to come. There may be, too, a reduction on the cost of
transportation of goods within the Southeast and North/Northeast, with the use of the
North-South railway.
It is about an “attachment” proposal of a territory that will supply raw material (energy,
minerals, grains) or resources to keep allowing importation and the payment of foreign
debts, essential for the continuation of the current economic exploration model. The
necessities of local populations are totally ignored, if not their own existence, as well as the
feasibilities of an effective development based on their way of living. Few crumbs of
resources trickle down to “mitigating” programs, which are not implemented or occur in
unsuitable, authoritative and discriminatory ways. These populations will always end up
seeing their lives worsen, in terms of self- support, food and health, and they are generally
snatched from their roots, family and social links.
It is shown, as follows, a breakdown of the main projects by the federal government in
relation to the Tocantins Hydrographic Basin, among with the projects presented to German
investors as business opportunities in Brazil, grouped under the titles:
1) Transport infra-structure, and Energy generation and transmission.
3
Maurício Galinkin is a journalist and mechanical engineer, holding a Master’s degree on Regional Studies (Latin America) from the
University of London, and he is also the Technical Director for CEBRAC Foundation, Brasília, Brazil.
4
This work has counted on the research performed by the agronomist D’alembert de Barros Jaccoud, NSc, CEBRAC associate
researcher.
5
Glenn Switkes is graduated in History from the University of Columbia, he holds a Master’s degree in journalism and documentary
cinema from the University of Berkeley; he is also the current Director of non-governmental organization International Rivers
Network, for Latin America.
Energy Program
19
Each summary brings an analysis of the social, economic and environmental impacts of the
project, as well as a quick reference to their cumulative impacts at the end of the section.
At the last section, an existing variant is approached, in terms of another trajectory for the
use of the resources, in search for an effective improvement on the standard of living of the
local populations.
Map 1- Araguaia-Tocantins Hydroway and North-South Railway
Source: Valetec (1999)
I - ARAGUAIA-TOCANTINS HYDROWAY
Project name: Araguaia-Tocantins Hydroway
Location: Rivers Tocantins (420 km), Araguaia (1,230 km) and das Mortes (580 km),
states of Mato Grosso, Goiás, Tocantins and Pará
Project total cost: approximately US$300 million
Energy Program
20
Summary
This project aims at implementing an industrial hydroway in the rivers Tocantins, Araguaia
and its main tributary on the left bank, the Rio das Mortes. The main cargo to be shipped is
grains for exportation, specially soybeans, South-Northwards. The soybean production in
the region in question is still incipient, but its supporters believe that its implementation will
be greatly motivated due to transportation facilities.
The proposed routes for the traffic of vessels have the following extensions: Tocantins
River, 420 km, Araguaia River, 1,230 km, and River das Mortes, 580 km. The investment
initially forecasted (MPO, 1996, apud Galinkin, 2000) was of about R$765 million, at values
of 1996, including investments on ports, highways and railway tracks necessary to the
functioning of the hydroway.
Environmental and socio-cultural impacts
The main environmental, social and cultural impacts of this project were studied and
presented at the Independent Specialists Panel Report managed by CEBRAC foundation
(Galinkin, 2000) which analyzed the Environmental Impact Assessment handed in by the
companies to Ibama in 1999. In sum, an extensive and serious modification of the
ecosystems can be predicted along the rivers Araguaia and Das Mortes which would be
provoked by removing, even if partially, the heap of rocks that come to the surface in the
north of Bananal island. There would be an intense drainage upstream these areas, with
reduction or extinction of the side lakes formed by the flood during the rain season. These
lakes work as "nurseries" to the ictiofauna and shelter to young fish, and its disappearance
will reflect directly on fish supply, with possible extinction of species, and indirectly on the
rich avifauna dependent of it. The reflex upon the food and health of indigenous and
riparian populations may also be considerable, taking into account the negative impact upon
the culture of these groups who live in close spiritual and practical link with the river,
besides the food dependence.
The cumulative and indirect impacts of this project will contribute to aggravate even more
the situation described previously, in terms of environment as well as the situation of local
populations: a mere announcement of the implementation of this project will attract batches
of migrants to the region in search of job opportunities and life improvement. This will
pressure the social infrastructure of the cities, making the quality of education and health
services fall even more, among others.
The small number of low paid jobs, which will probably be generated by the construction,
will be disputed among the locals and the migrant workers, having the second more
chances to succeed for being probably more qualified. In addition, towns will get bigger
spreading to the city outskirts generating a poorer life quality. These people will search for
Energy Program
21
survival alternatives, invading and deforesting areas to grow crops. Since the private
properties are carefully watched, this populational pressure will probably lead to the
indigenous reserves and/or national and/or state parks generating social conflicts, which do
not take place nowadays, and will probably be settled in favor of the migrants due to the
social aspect of the matter. However, not only the indigenous populations will be affected,
since they will lose essential space necessary to their way of living and survival, but also
environmental conservation and biodiversity. In addition, the expansion of the agricultural
border to the hydroway influence area will provoke a radical change in relation to the
vegetal coverage in a region that holds the best natural remanent in the Cerrado, since it
has barely been antropized so far. The grain production proposed by the hydroway project
will probably affect large extensions of land and, consequently, the flora, fauna and hydro
resources due to the fact that neither the river nascent nor the legislation are respected.
The rural jobs generated are small; for instance, one permanent job in relation to each 250
soybean planted hectare, or a permanent or temporary job to each 100 hectares. (Galinkin,
2000). Moreover, being this a highly capitalized and technological business that demands
large scale production, about 500 hectares in the Cerrado, the chances that a small farmer
succeeds are far too small. Chances are that they get expelled from their land either by
selling them, the ones that hold a deed, or by the pressure played by the land grabbers and
land speculators; as a consequence, they would probably move to the cities without any
chances of surviving.
About 13,300 people, representing 11 indigenous reserves, live in the region under direct
and indirect influence of the Araguai-Tocantins – hydroway. There are 30 indigenous
reserves distributed along the project extension belonging to the Apinayé, Avá-Canoeiro,
Bororo, Javaé, Karajá, Karajá do Norte, Krahô, Krikati, Tapirapé, Xavante and Xerente
populations (Ramos, 2000). According to the anthropological reports, the implementation of
such project will, in a general manner, provoke a huge impact on the lives of these people,
changing the biodiversity and the quality of water, aspects which are crucial to their
survival. In addition, the changes, which will affect the ecosystem, will probably turn their
knowledge on nature obsolete. Let alone the fact that their contact with the so called
“modern society” will jeopardize their cultures.
Economic Impact
The impact of such hydroway will be harmful to the goianos municipalities, where
ecotourism is becoming an increasing business which counts with hotels (about 1,000
beds). This region, mainly the municipalities of Aruanã, Bandeirantes, Cocalinho and São
Energy Program
22
Miguel do Araguaia (Luiz Alves district), hosst about 150,000 tourists annually, generating
an income of about R$187 million - 1999 prices (Borges, 2000 in Galinkin, 2000).
The data presented by the project Environmental Impact Assessment show that the
hydroway will not be ale to compete with the railway in terms of fares unless it receives
governmental subsidies like in the Mississipi River, in the USA. It is important to mention
that the transport scale in the Mississipi River is ten times bigger than that of the Araguaia,
das Mortes and Tocantins fact which demands a higher governmental subside in order to
make it come true. The transport via North-South railway, that follows along the AraguaiaTocantins Hydroway, as will be showed on the map, will be faster, cheaper, and will make
use of modern technology developed by the Cia Vale do Rio Doce.
Energy Program
23
II- NORTH-SOUTH RAILWAY
Map2 – North-South Railway, Main Urbanized Areas in the Area of Influence
Source: Valec (1999)
Project name: Ferrovia Norte-Sul (North-South Railway)
Location: 1,442 km from Goiânia, state of Goiás to Estreito, state of Maranhão
Project total cost: US$1.3 billion (final phase: US$456 million)
Summary
The North-South Railway will connect Goiânia, the capital city of the state of Goiás to
Estreito, in the state of Maranhão, where lies the intersection with the Carajás Railway that
heads to the port city of São Luís, capital city of the State of Maranhão. The distance
between Goiânia and Estreito is of 1,442 km. The final construction phase foresees the
implementation of the Aicilãndia-Belém* route. This route will be 600 km long and it will
also make the connection with the Transnordestina (Estreito Balsas-Salgueiro). The
estimated implementation cost for the 1,442 km mounts to US$1.3 billion, and the final
stage holds a budget of US$456 million (Valec, 1999).
*capital city of the state of Pará.
The construction of the “north front”, from Estreito to Porto Nacional (Tocantins) has
already began and has reached the state of Tocantins. The financial engineering of the
project has not been totally accomplished yet, as far as we know.
Energy Program
24
Social Impact
Similarly to what has happened in places where this kind of project has taken place,
migrants will show up looking for urban and rural jobs or for an opportunity to make easy
money; consequently, arising the demand for social services, housing and so on, being
necessary to perform evaluations, propositions and implementation of public policies able to
face and solve these matters.
The study regarding the environmental impact of the North South Railway lists seven
indigenous reserves which will be directly affected for being in the area under influence of
the project (other areas, which are part of the document are about the Araguaia-Tocantins
hydroway that, like the railway, is part of the “Corredor de Transporte Multimodal/CenterNorth Transportation Corridor).
The implementation of roads generates an environmental impact, affects the lives of these
populational groups and tends to promote a severe negative cultural impact with
consequent decharacterization and loss of values as a result of the contact with the the so
called “modern society”.
Environmental Impact
The environmental impact of the North-South Railway is similar to the ones inflicted to other
terrestrial transport roads in the Midwest region of Brazil during the implementation
process, for instance, stretches of vegetation are removed; ground filling and levelling
performed; bridges are built, with consequent habitat elimination; wild animal transit is
made more difficult; during the operational process, animals are exposed to accidents and
hunting; extractivism and agricultural activities increase, with consequent changes in the
fauna natural habits, reducing its area and flora diversification. These alterations result from
transport availability from which is inferred that more areas will probably be incorporated to
production, leading to the substitution of the natural vegetal coverage for exotic commercial
species, in continuous mono cultive in larger areas. A study and, consequently, a
subsequent application of an economic-ecological mapping of the area under the influence
of the North-South Railway project, which stands for a direct and indirect influence over an
important part of the state territory, is crucial.
GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION OF ENERGY
I – Energy Generation
Energy Program
25
Brazilian panorama
Brazil has, nowadays, 1,242 electric power plants representing an operational capacity of
83,422.5 MW; about 79% of this total comes from hydraulic sources, 18.5% from thermal
sources, 2.4% from nuclear power plants and only 0,03% from aeolian source. There are 86
construction sites that will generate more than 10,784 MW, and from this additional
potency, 55% will come from thermal power plants and the remaining from hydraulic
sources. Concessions have been passed, although the constructions have not begun yet, will
add 27.142 MW more to the electric energy capacity of the country and, from this total,
about 23% comes from aeolian sources, 31% from hydraulic and 46% from thermal sources
(ANEEL, site, 2003).
The increment of aeolian energy represents a good perspective to the country in terms of
environment, but this source represents only 5% of the total, in case all of these enterprises
succeed. The thermal sources will represent 27.5% of the total, against the actual 18.5%,
counterbalancing the environmental improvement obtained from the Energetic Matrix in
relation to the aeolian energy source launching (idem, ibidem). In geographical terms,
63.5% of the annual energy production is located in the states of São Paulo (24.5% of the
total), Paraná (19.6%) and Minas Gerais (19.4%), being the most significant results
presented in the Paraná River basin.
Information regarding the projects and Energy Production in the Hydrographic Region of the
Tocantins will be provided, as follows:
Table 1 –Central Hydroelectric Projects in relation to the Araguaia River basin – Tocantins, presented
as business opportunities to German investors
Project
name
Location
Installed
Capacity
Total
cost
Torixoréu
Araguaia River, Close to Torixoréu, states of Goiânia 408MW
and Mato Grosso
105
Marabá
Tocantins River, close to Marabá and São João do 2,160MW
Araguaia, states of Pará and Maranhão
2,900
Ipueiras
Tocantins River, close to Ipueiras and Brejinho de 600MW
Nazará, state of Tocantins
610
Novo
Acordo
Rio do Sono, Novo Acordo, state of Tocantins
160MW
170
Bocaina
Parnaíba River, between Divinópolis and Abadia dos 150MW
Dourados, state of Goiás and Minas Gerais
285
Serra
Quebrada
Tocantins River, Itaguatins and Imperatriz, states od 1,328MW
Tocantins and Maranhão
135
Tupiratins
Tocantins River,Tupiratins, state of Tocantins
1,164
Itaguaçu
Claro River, Cachoeira Alta and São Simão, sate fo 151MW
Goiás
Energy Program
1,000
129.43
26
Summary
The Tocantins Geographical Region is made up of the rivers Araguaia, Tocantins and their
affluents, totalizing an area of 757,000 km2, at a flow of 11,800 m3/ second and a hydric
availability of 372.12 km3/year (ANA, s.d). The hydroelectric potential of this region reaches
27,540 MW, 10.6% of the total value for Brazil, being surpassed only by the Amazon region
that holds 40.5% of the total country capacity (ANEEL, 2002).
The power plants installed generate 7,039.5 MW , according to the data presented below,
that is, 25.6% of its potential (ANEEL, 2002) and 8.4% of the total energy generation
capacity generated in the country (idem, site, 2003). This geographic region will promote,
considering only the licensed plants and the ones under construction, an increase of 96% in
the energy generation capacity in the years to come (see Table 2). The hydroelectric power
plants installed will be presented in Table 3, and the ones under construction will be
presented in Tables 4 and 5.
2- Energy Generation Transmission
Tocantins River Basin
Hydroelectric
Thermal Power Plant
Power Center
Name
Potenc Name
Potenc
y MW)
y MW)
Diacal II
*5.0
Cana Brava
*468.0
Dianópolis
Lageado
*5.5
*1.8
Lajes
Sobnrado
Taguatinga
*2,.1
*4.8
*81.8
Estreito
Luís
Eduardo
Magalhaes
Peixe Angical
Sao Salvador
Serra da Mesa
Agrotrafo
*14.0
Tucuruí I
Isumi Ikeda
Sao
Domingos I
Sao
Domingos
II
Total
*29.0
*14.3
Tucuruí II
General
total
13,808.
1
Araguaia River Basin
Hydroelectrical
Power Plant
Name
Potency
(MW)
Primave
*2.3
Ra
1,087.0
*902.5
Thermal Power
Plant
Name
Potenc
y(MW)
Couto
150
Magalhae
s
Santa
Isabel
1,087
452.0
241.0
*1,293.
0
*4,376.
0
4,125.0
28.0
92.3
12,476. 2.3
5
1,237
Source: ANEEL, site: www.aneel.gov.br, information obtained from 03.17.03 to 05.13.03
(*) 7,039.5 MW operating, that is, 51% of the total licensed for construction
Energy Program
27
Table 3. Situation of the Hydrolelectric Power Plants in operation in the Tocantins Hydrographic
Region, May 2003
Tocantins
River
Basin
Riv
er
Cana Brava Toc
anti
ns
Luis
Eduardo
Magalhaes
Toc
anti
ns
Serra
Mesa
da Toc
anti
ns
TUCURUI I Toc
anti
ns
Total
4
river
s
Town
State
Licensing
Situation
Cavalca Operating
nte,
Minaçu,
GO
Miracem Operating
a
do
Tocantin
s
e
Palmas,
TO
Potency(
MW)
468.0
902.5
Partic Desti
ipatio natio
n
n%
(1)
Companhia Energética 100
SP
Meridional
Enterprises
CEB Lajeado S/A
EDP Brasil S/A
Investco S/A
Paulista Lajeado
Energia S/A
Rede Lajeado Energia
S/A
Furnas
Centrais
Elétricas S/A
20
27
1
Res
erv
oir
km2
-
PIE
20.6
SP
2,87
5.0
7
45
100
Cavalca Operating
nte,Mina
çu, GO
Tucurui, Operating
PA
1,293.0
4,376.0
Centrais Elétricas do 100
Norte do Brasil S/A
SP
9 towns 7 operating
in
3
states
7,039.5
10 enterprises
67,9% to SP
-
Source: www.aneel.gov.br
Notes: (1) SP= Public Service; PIE= Energy Independent Production; APE= Energy Auto-Production
Energy Program
28
Table 4. Licensed Hydroelectric Power Plants under construction in the Tocantins River Basin, May/2003
Legal Situation Potency
(MW)
Enterprises
Partici
pation
%
Dest Reser
inati voir
km2
on
Number of
people
affected
Estreito, Carolina, MA, Licensed
Aguiarnópolis,
Babaçulândia, Barra do
Ouro, Bom Jesus do
Tocantins,
Darcinópolis, Filadélfia,
Goiatins,Guaraí,
Itapiratins,
Palmeirante, Palmeiras
de Santa Maria de
Tocantins,
Tocantins,
Tupirama,
Tupiratins,
Pedro Afonso, TO.
OK
(no 1,087
environmental
licensing)
Alcoa Alumínio
S/A
BHP metais S/A
Camargo Correa
Energia S/A
Companhia Vale
do Rio Doce
Tracbel E. S.A
Ltda
19
PIE
710.0
13,775
(8,849
in
the
rural
áreas, according
to
the
1999
inventory.
Filadélfia
and
Babaçulândia
are
100%
affected
and
Carolina
10%
(MA)
Barra do Ouro,
Cana Brava and
Palmatiba 100%
affected
(Tocantins).
Peixe
Angical Tocantins
(under
construction)
Peixe, São Salvador, Constructio
Palmeiral e Paraná, TO n
Enerpeixe S/A
100
PIE
194.1
1,081.6
São Salvador Tocantins
(withstanding
construction)
Tucuruí
II Tocantins
(under
construction,
but delayed)
São Salvador, Paraná, Licensed
TO
104.0
479.6
Under
constructio
n
100
Companhia
Energética São
Salvador
100
Centrais
Elétricas
do
Norte do Brasil
S/A
ELETRONORTE
PIE
Tucuruí, PA
452
Impeded
(environmental
licensing
only
for caissons)
Impeded
(no 241
environmental
licensing)
OK
4,125
SP
Totals
6 towns, 4 states
3 licensed, 2 impeded
2
under
constructio
ns
9 companies
69.5
%
SP
2,875.
0
(alread
y
existen
t)
1,008.
1
Tocantins
River Basin
River
Towns
Estreito
(withstanding
construction)
Tocantins
2 rivers
Licensing
Situation
5,933
(5,240)
17
4
30
30
Cost at
the
auction
date
Source: Aneel: www.aneel.gov.br
Note: SP (Public Service)/PIE (Independent Energy Production)
Energy Program
29
Table 5. Situation of the Hydroelectric Power Plants Under Construction in the Araguaia River, May2003
Araguaia River
Basin
River
Municipality/St
ate
Licensing
Situation
Couto Magalhães
(withstanding
construction)
Aragua Santa Rita do
ia
Araguaia/GO
Alto Araguaia/MT
Licensed
Santa Isabel
(withstanding
construction)
Aragua Palestina do Pará,
ia
Ananás/TO
Licensed
Totals
1 river
4 states
4 municipalities
Legal
Situation
Potency
(MW)
150
OK
impeded (no
environmental
licensing)
1,087
Impeded(no
environmental
licensing) (2)
2 Licensed 1 impeded
1,237
Enterprises
Enercouto S/A
Rede Couto
Magalhães S/A
Alcoa Alumínio S/A
BHP P. Metais S/A
Camargo Correa
S/A
Companhia Vale
do Rio Doce
Votorantim Ltda
7 companies
Particip
ation
%
Destinati
on (1)
Reserv
oir km2
PIE
7.25
Cost at
auction
date (R$)
245.2
PIE
240.0
1,865.6
100%
meant to
PIE
247.25
2,110.8
49
51
20
20
6
44
10
Source: site, Aneel www.aneel.gov.br
Notes: (1) SP: Public Service, PIE = Energy Independent Production, APE = Energy Autoproduction. (2) licensing denied by IBAMA
Energy Program
31
The environmental impacts caused by such large scale dams tend to outdo their
dimensions, that is, we can say that big dams create mega impacts. In order to avoid
the same mistakes, the impacts foreseen in the Reference Terms as to the elaboration
of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in the Hydroelectric Power Plant of
Estreito (IBAMA, 2001), will be presented as an example, as follows:
Loss of 260 km of fluvial environment in the Tocantins River, with the flooding of
457.80 km2 of river shore forest (“mata de galeria”) and 158.80 km2 of marginal lakes
– being
20% and 8% of such environments located in the meddle of the Tocantis
River.
These marginal lakes act as ‘nursery’ in the reproduction of fish, as well as shelter to
the young ones against the adult predators; consequently, their disappearance would
provoke an impact on fish stocks or even the disappearance of species.
Significant impacts on the maintenance of aquatic biodiversity ecosystems affect the
migration routes and escape areas, as well as the entrance of alocton material in the
river and their natural deposition in the river bed directly affecting the feeding
capacity of the fish stock all river long, since this material brought from the flooded
regions is the main food source of the ictiofauna (comments added by the author).
Floading of the following phytophyisiocharacteristics of the Cerrado bioma, totalizing
710 km2:
Cerrado “strictu senso”: 166.9 km2;
Secondary and pioneer vegetation: 170.3 km2;
River shore forest: 117.5 km2;
Cerradão: 88.5 km2;
Campo cerrado limpo: 81.4 km2;
Agropecuary: 64.8 km2;
Open Stational Forest: 22.6 km2.
Energy Program
32
Loss of the babaçu which are located in the stational forests and in areas covered with
secondary vegetation in advanced stage of regeneration, specie important to the
extractivism developed in the region.
Social and Economic Impacts
The proportion o f the negative impacts on the local population are similar to the ones
concerning
the
environmental
area.
The
document
issued
by
IBAMA,
the
environmental office in charge (IBAMA, 2001), shows the following:
Urban nucleous affected: Babaçulândia (100%), Filadélfia (100%), Carolina(10%),
Barra do Ouro (100%), Cana Brava (100%) and Palmatuba (100%);
Population affected: 13,775 people, being 8,849 in the rural area and 4,926 in urban
áreas;
Agricultural areas affected: 6,480 out of 125,527 hectares, representing about 5.2 %
of the towns affected;
Disarticulation of part of the rural population, interfering in the activities conducted by
the river shore farmers and extractivists;
Interference in the local associativism relations;
Interference in the seasonal zonal use of the Tocantins River beaches, affecting the
socio-cultural relations and the local tourism, which stands as a source of income to a
group of people (comments added by the author);
Flooding suitable farming areas;
Indirect interference in the Aldeia Indígena Kraolândia (Kraolândia Indigenous
Reserve) due to the populational afflux to the area caused by the construction sites;
loss of the babaçuais that are relevant to the local population who live from
extractivism.
It is important to consider that these impacts on the local population and economy are
certainly underestimated since they are based on studies carried out between 1986
and 1999. The license to build the Estreito Hydroelectric Power Plant happened in
December 12, 2002. The construction is due to start in June 2005.
From that
moment up to now there has been a populational growth that should continue to grow
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33
till the implementation of compulsory measures such as land expropriation and
relocation of the target population.
Transmission Islands
The Brazilian transmissions have become extense due to the fact that the big
hydrolectric power plants are located far from the major consumption centers. Almost
all of the country is interlinked through hydroelectric transmission lines, having an
integrated electrification system been developed. This system leaves only part of the
states of Pará, Mato Grosso, Amazonas, Acre, Amapá, Rondônia and Roraima out of it.
Having these states only production units in their capitals and major cities (ANEEL,
site, 2003).
This interlinked system makes the exchange of electricity among the different regions
possible, and it also meets the seasonal needs that provoke reduction on the water
levels of the resevoirs. Having the South, Southeast, North and Northeast regions
different rain fall regimem makes that the high tension transmission lines (500 KV or
750 KV) bring the energy supply balance necessary to the system as a whole.
The Electric Energy National Agency, has been granting the transmission system
expansion to private sectors. These sectors build the lines with their own resources.
The Hydrographic Region of Tocantins has two transmission lines under construction
and one more will be bidded within this year. This new bid is meant to attend the
“Tucuruí – Vila do Conde” 500KV, which is 329 km long. The “Vila do Conde - Santa
Maria”, 230 KV, 179 km long, is being built and it is conclusion is due to July 2004.
The “Tucuruí – Marabá and Marabá – Açailândia”, 500KV and 468 km long is also
being built and its conclusion is due to November 2004 (opus cit.).
The Cuiabá – Barra do Peixe Project, 500KV , 840 km long, is within the transmission
line investment opportunities presented to the German investors.
Project name: Transmission Line Cuiabá – Barra do Peixe
Location: 840 transmission line km, 500KV, in the States of Mato Grosso do Sul,
Goiás and Minas Gerais
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Total project cost: US$270 million
Impacts
The environmental and social impacts caused by transmission line constructions are
less harmful than the ones related to energy generation; although, they may be
significant in the areas they will pass by. The construction of roads and transmission
lines may play similar impacts as the ones mentioned in relation to the South-North
Railway, however, its operation seems to cause less impact since the traffic of vehicles
and people is not as heavy.
3- CUMULATIVE IMPACT
The federal government transport and infrastructure projects as well as the energy
transmission and generation projects proposed to the Hydrographic Tocantins Region
may play significant direct negative impact on environmental, socio-cultural and
economic areas, probably outdoing the benefits they might bring to the local
population. According to what has been expressed in tables 4 and 5, there are three
energy generation business whose environmental licenses are pending approval due
to the enormous environmental, socio-cultural and archeological impact they will
create (Angical and São Salvador fish in the Tocantins River, and Santa Isabel fish in
the Araguaia River).
The outcome presented by an assessment performed on indirect and cumulative
impacts shows the
they may enhance the
destruction of the biodiversity and the
hydric resources of the Cerrado with the substitution of the native vegetal coverage
for mono cultures where the grains for exportation would prevail. It is a priority that
we avoid that such business take place by assessing the bioma capacity in bearing the
proposed interventions by defining priorities and minimizing their effects and,
simultaneously, searching for resources and investments that would allow the local
population to choose economic activities they would benefit from and would be
compatible with the preservation of the biodiversity.
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4- ALTERNATIVES
Another way is possible to the development of the Araguaia-Tocantins River
basin
As one can see, all the transport infrastructure, production and energy transmission
mentioned so far aims at meeting the need for raw materials and primary products
the major urban centers of the country have.
The local populations, their actual and future conditions, were not relevant to the ones
who performed the planning except for the stereotype of being poor and having to be
“developed”.
We strongly believe that it is possible to choose another path for the future of the
country and of these populations
who are excluded from
the economic, social,
technological and scientific progress benefits by focusing the investments in economic
activities that allow them to extract from the natural resources their living and,
therefore, achieve a sustainable human development. Such attitude should start in
the region itself in order to integrated it with the rest of the Brazilian economic system
since the opposite would aggravate the exclusion process and implement concepts
and values that have little to do with the local population.
Investments in energy, for instance, can be directed to aeolian sources instead of the
hydraulic or thermal ones. In the region, according to the Brazilian Aeolian Atlas
(CNEE, 2002), there are stretches of land along the east part of the states of Goiás
and Tocantins with winds superior to 5m/second. The Brazilian government has placed
incentives to the fomenting of aeolian energy, according to the Bill 10.438, dated April
26,2002. This legislation creates the Aeolian Energy Source Incentive Program –
PROINFA , and the Energetic Development Account - CDE – and it changes the legal
remedies that interfere in the alternative source and energy cogeneration use,
highlighting the establishment of mechanisms that induce to the economical and
energetic efficiency, environmental appraisal,
and the application of local energetic
resources, new proceedings and mechanisms as to allocate them to
generate
business that make use of alternative sources, mainly small ones (up to 5 MW), in
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36
order to meet the needs of communities which count with isolated electric systems
(ANEEL, site, 2003).
Acitivities that can become an agribusiness
Some proposals will be presented to the development of economic activities in the
rural area under study (Galinkin, 1999). Such proposals, which can be applied
specially with the purpose of showing the existence of possible actions to compete
against the social and economic exclusion that accompanies the monotony of large
grain mono cultured areas and help avoid biodiversity loss. Activities related to the
transformation, distribution and commercialization of rural production can be
developed in urban areas, by developing an “agribusiness chain”.
“The natural resource use along with the rural vocation of the Araguai-Tocantins River
basin, allows that the rural sector benefits from Nature, commercializing several
regional products attending different potential markets; for example, fruits, processed
fruit woods and wooden products, chemical and technological industries insume;
meat, leather and wild animal sub-products; domestic plants; honey, propolis and
other apicultural products; pequi butter, pear flavor energetic drinks, araticum sweet,
cagaita liquour, wild mallow ointment. A regional tourism office to integrate amateur
fishing, agritourism and ecotourism, as well as other possibilities that, by promoting
the regional development and the uprising of the
social and economic level of the
producers, can reduce the environmental, social and economic impact caused by the
occupation the mono culture of grains, sugar cane, eucalyptus and cattle raising,
brings.
The strengthening of the economic use of the Cerrado with its native species and
sustainable handling can create new food and industrial products to meet different
consumption demands. The commercialization of different foods should focus, initially,
the local and regional markets considered more suitable to absorb the products they
are familiar with and innovative ones (for instance, the newly developed “powdered
pequi” obtained from the dehydrated and sprayed pulp, water soluble) then
consolidate their position in the Mid-West market, before searching for new ones.
Such strategy would allow the producers to obtain the experience, quality, quantity
Energy Program
37
and consistency conditions demanded by the agroindustry. For instance, supplying
with pequi is not a problem in certain regions, but harvest conditions, classification
transport and storaging are precarious among the producers and intermediaries yet.
(idem, ibidem).
* Investing in the use of native species to the region, by implementing adapted
production systems and extractivism regulamentation control to avoid the dilapidation
of the natural resources. Create a “Cerrado Stock Exchange” that allows collecting up
the production developed by different regions to gather a volume of goods enough to
develop commercialization and distribution process (CEBRAC, 2001).
About 80 native species from the Cerrado are used as food such as fruits, seeds and
palm trees. The fruit trees native to the region, for instance, araticum, jatobá, pequi,
mangaba, cagaita and buriti present the following advantages:
-
constitute important sources of fiber, protein, vitamins, minerals, saturated and
unsaturated fat acids present in the pulps and seeds;
-
have deep roots that allow a more efficient extraction of the water and minerals
from the soil;
-
do not depend on supported handling systems as to the intensive revolving of the
soil;
-
offer protection to the soil against the impact of rain and accelerated hydric and
aeolian erosion;
-
allow a consortium with other cultures favoring a better performance of the soil
and can also be explored without strong alteration of the biodiversity, among
others.
Several plants can be used as condiments, for example, pimenta de macaco and
canela-batalha; others, are used for flavoring such as vanilla, most of it imported;
arcassu, whose roots give milk the smell and flavor of chocolate; coloring for example,
açafrão-do-cerrado. Seeds, leaves and husk of plants of the specie Chorisia,
Eriotheca, Pseudobombax, Mauritia, Attalea, Xylopia, Luehea and Guazuma provide
fibers to the production of fabric, cords, hats, hammock, cushions, and etc.
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38
More than one hundred species of the plants here have medicinal properties. About
twenty species of plants, such as pau-santo, mama-da-porca, cervejinha, tamboril-docerrado and fruta-de-papagaio provide cork in economically suitable quantities. Other
plants such as babaçu, macaúba and pequi provide oil and fat. Jatobá, breu and
laramjinha-do-campo provide resins extracted from the trunk. The Vochysia sp, the
angico-vermelho, and aroeira offer gums. Balsam can be extracted from plants like
the balsam, cabreúva, copaiba and pau-d`oleo. Plants such as leiteiro, mangabeira
and some Ficus species produce latex.
* Investing in the rational use of the fauna resources
Several species native of the cerrado such as alligators, teiú, capivaras, emas, tatus,
tamanduás, have economic potential due to their skin, feathers and meat. It is
necessary to define them handling strategies and fight predatory hunting. Some well
succeeded experiences have been done in relation to the exportation of meat and
skins.
* Investing in the research and production of biological plague control by applying
their natural enemies and fellow plants
* Implementing business alternatives to the production of regional fish adapted to the
environmental potentialities and regulating fishing activity in the region
* Investing in the production of fertilizers and low solubility soil correctives, and in
cultures that have a longer or perene cycle, more compatible with the limitations of
the region
* Investing in ecotourism, as means of highlighting the existing natural resources,
contributing to their preservation and job openings
* Supporting the implementation of agritourism as means of promoting the cultural
traditions of the region.
Due to the fact that such investments are innovative in the area, they tend to be more
profitable. Moreover, opportunities will be given to the local population to generate an
income compatible with their knowledge, that is, a project with local roots and less
aggressive in relation to the environment and cultural values since it aims at
Energy Program
39
highlighting the importance of popular wisdom. Having a better income will play an
important impact on these families, for instance, it will improve their food and health,
and it will also enable their children to attend school till they become teenagers, at
least. Education and information will enable these youngsters to search for new paths
that will lead them to the living conditions of the contemporaneous world.
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40
Thermoelectric Power Plant powered by coal, Candiota, Rio Grande do Sul
Lúcia Schild Ortiz – Friends of the Earth Brazil
6
7
Project name: Thermoelectric Power Plant
Local: Municipality of Candiota, Rio Grande do Sul
Installed capacity: 550MW
Investors: COPELMI, STEAG (Germany)
Financial agency: BNDES (Brazilian National Bank for the Economical Development), others
Project total cost: US$800 million
Summary
The project consists of the istallation of a Thermoelectric Cola Powered Plant to generate 550
MW of potency as an energetic supply alternative to the state of Rio Grande do Sul, that will
have as sub-product the production of fertilizers. 3 million tons of coal yearly will be added to
the actual regional production which stands for 1.5 ton nowadays. The well known atmospheric
and hydric pollution in the region, which causes impacts in Uruguay, can be regionally
aggravated with the implementation of this and other coal power plants planned to the region,
like Candiota III (350 MW), owned by the CGTEE state company.
Social Impacts
The population of the Candióta Region, which is comprised of the neighboring towns of Bagé,
Aceguá, Hulha Negra, Pedras Aatts, Pinheiro Machado and the bordering region between Brazil
and Uruguay, is affected by the problems generated by the atmospheric and hydric pollution in
the hydrographic basin upstream the Jaguarão River, the main affluent of the Mirim lake, that
delineates the border between Brazil and Uruguay.
The Environmental Impact Assessment -RIMA for the Seival Power Plant mentions the
possibility of displacement of the rural communities settled in areas which are requested for
6
Lúcia Schild Ortiz is a geologist, holds a Master’s in Geosciences from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, and Coordenates
the Projects involving Friends of the Earth/Brazil and also coordinates the Rio Vivos Network Program.
7
Barbara Happe is a political scientist, holds a PhD in Political Sciences from the Marburg University in Germany, and
coordinates the South American activities involving the German non-governmental organization URGEWALD.
Energy Program
41
mining. The region is one of the densest in the state in terms of settlements of families and
rural workers who belong to the Landless Movement MST, process which begun in the region in
the 80´s.
For several decades has Uruguay been complaining about acid rain and has accused the
Brazilian government of transfrontier pollution related to the installation of the thermolectric
power plant of Candiota. This region holds about 80% of the coal reserves in Brazil, and its
coal presents low quality in regard to calorific power, ash content (higher than 50%) and sulfur
concentration (higher than 1.5%), consequently, the emission of atmospheric polluents are
higher than the ones compared to similar plants in the world. STEAG, the company which
obtained from IBAMA, in the end of 2002, the primary license to operate, is now trying to
negotiate a new one due to the fact it will not able to meet the atmospheric polluent emission
pattern presented in its original assessment to the institute (IBAMA).
The contamination of the subterraneous and superficial hydric resources, as pointed by the
rural workers who make use of it to supply their homes and irrigations, should be deeper
affected with the enlargement of Seival Mine, located in the upsteram of the Candiota stream.
The area, which is now leased by COPELMI, was abandoned in 1996 without any environmental
recovery or social measures being taken. Ever since, the Vila do Seival and Vila João Emílio
face serious unemployment rates with suicide cases registered. The social and environmental
problems, which derive from the exploration and use of coal in the region, are enormous and
its solution has not been pointed in the environmental impact studies carried out by the
company.
Seival Thermoelectric Power Plant installation, foresees the capturing of water from the CGTEE
dam, in the Candiota stream; however, the dam, itself, is not enough to supply the actual
industrial and domestic needs of the region since it already suffers from the lack of water
during draughts.
Economical Impact
The low quality of the Brazilian mineral coal determines its low competitiveness in the
international market. Its low calorific power, its mining and transportation needs, its great
residues volumes, since 50% of the mined coal volume stands for fly ashes, turns its
application in thermoelectric energy the only option available. Even though, this operation
needs subsidies of about R$300 million a year: Imported coal could turn thermolelectric
generation into a more economic and environmentally attractive source of energy, if we are to
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42
consider it the only energetic source. Such subsidies, on the other hand, if added to the
advantages suggested by Law 10,438 of 2002 – Energetic Development Bill - CDE, would harm
the Brazilian economy as they represent resources which could be applied in the technological
development and implementation of new renewable energy sources to meet the goals
proposed by Brazil at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg
2002.
Alternatives
The potential of both aeolian and biomass energy from agricultural residues are great in the
state and there are assessments proving their effectiveness; however, few investment
alternatives have been presented. In the Candiota region, 5% of the demand for energy could
be met by generating 200MW from rice peel. Moreover, the Aeolian Atlas of Rio Grande do Sul
points a 15,000 MW (in soil at 50 m) to the generation of such energy and there are more than
100 MW projects under planning and /or licensing.
The environmental impact from the use of coal can deeply affect the outstading work which
has been developed by the Landless Movement Workers (MST), settled in the region in the end
of the 80´s, in regard to the production of seeds and agro-ecological (carrots, onions and
others) products.
The Environmental Impact Assessment RIMA, on the Seival Thermoelectric Power Plant, has
not supplied us with data about the emission of CO2. It is known that more updated
technologies reduce the emission of polluent gases, mainly when the coal used is of a better
quality (not the case in Brazil), but they do not foresee CO2 emission reduction since it
is
related to the quantity and calorific power of the coal used.
Energy Program
43
Angra III Nuclear
Power Plant, Angra dos Reis Nuclear Complex, Rio de
Janeiro
Lúcia Schild Ortiz, Friends of the Earth Brazil
8
José Rafel Ribeiro, SAPÊ – Angraense Society for Ecological Protection
Bárbar a Happe, URGEWALD, Germany
9
10
Project name: Nuclear Power Plant III
Place: Angra dos Reis, Rio de Janeiro state, Brazil
Installed capacity: 1,350 MW
Investors: Eletronuclear, Framatome ANP, Siemens, Camargo Correa, Andrade Gutierrez
Financers: Public, with probable involvement of the agencies related to credit for exportation
from Germany (Hermes) and France (COFACE, Société Genérale)
Total project estimated conclusion cost: US$1.8 billion
Summary
The Brazilin Nuclear Program dates back to the military regimem in the 60´s. Angra 1, the first
power plant, a PWR-Westinghouse reactor – 650MW, was bought from the USA in 1971 and
started operating in 1985.
The Nuclear Brazil-Germany Treaty was signed in 1975 and it forecasted the construction of
08 nuclear power plants, besides the construction of a series of industrial installations aiming
at the whole development of uranian cycle in Brazil. Angra II Nuclear Power Plant
(PWR,
1,350 MW), the only construction that resulted from this treaty, was concluded in 2000 at a
cost three times higher than expected.
The plans towards the construction of Angra III Nuclear Power Plant are also part of the treaty
between Brazil and Germany. In the end of the 70´s, diggings were started in the place where
the power plant is to be built and part of the equipment was bought. Due to our country´s
8
Lúcia Schild Ortiz is a geologist, holds a Master’s in Geosciences from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul,
and Coordenates the Projects involving Friends of the Earth/Brazil and also coordinates the Rio Vivos Network
Program.
9
José Rafael Ribeiro is graduate in Agronomy from the Rural Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, RJ, he is a member
of the Deliberative Council of the Agraense Ecological Protection Society and its energy program coordinat.
10
Barbara Happe is a political scientist, holds a PhD in Political Sciences from the Marburg University in Germany, and
coordinates the South American actities involving the German non-governmental organization URGEWALD.
Energy Program
44
economic difficulties and the problems with Angra I and Angra II nuclear power plants, the
plans were interrupted in 1983.
Eletronuclear, a public Brazilian company, identified an opportunity to retake
Angra III
Nuclear Project due to the Brazilian energetic crisis in 2001, that resulted from lack of
planning, investments and the lack of water in the reservatoir of the hydroelectric plants. In
case such project is retaken, it would be due to start operating in the end of 2008, adding
1,350 MW to attend the Brazilian electric system.
More than US$750 million has been invested in this project so far and nothing else, but a
huge well has been left.
The components acquired to Angra III
Nuclear Power Plant are
storaged there and the maintanance cost sums up to US$20 million a year.
Investors/Financers
Eletronuclear is involved in this project along with Framatome ANP, a fusion between the
French Framatome and the German Siemens. Siemens and Eletronucler have sold part of the
equipment to Angra II. Considerind the unstable economic situation of Brazil, and the fact that
Framtome ANP is not willing to take high economil risks, Angra III Nuclear Power Plant will
probably come true with the support of Hermes, a public German credit exportation agency.
Such credits and warranties are a typical and necessary mechanism to allow the exporting of
goods manufactured in industrialized countries to the underdeveloped ones where the
economic and politics scenarios are usually unstable. The German government established in
2001 –after having decided the year before it will close the nuclear power plants in the country
in a 20 year period – that Hermes agency would not finance “nucler technology to new
constructions or to the conversion of nuclear enterprises”; however, there exist an attempt to
classify Angra III as a “pre-exisitng nuclear project”, not taking into account that the
construction of a new nuclear central would be necessary. Considering that Framatome ANP is
involved in the operation, it is possible that the French credit exportation agency (COFACE)
decides to put up with the risks involved in the project, specially after the cooperation
agreement signed in 2002 between Brazil and France as for the “pacific usage of nucler
energy”.
Social Impact
Angra dos Reis and the surrounding communities count with about 130,000 inhabitants who
are under the impact of the nuclear power plant. The environmental risks of radioactivity would
hit populations that count on tourism, fishing and commercial activities as their income source.
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45
In case of a radioactivity accident, its impact would be aggravated for the fact that the health
system in the area has a precarious emergency plan, let alone one to handle emergencies of
this importance and nature.
Angra Nuclear Power Plants present problems in relation to their location, as follows:
1 – Angra is on top of a sismic zone;
2 – corrosive salt water has already caused great problems in previous construction phases;
3 – the geological substract of the region is unstable, reason why the local indigenous call it
“Itaorna”, that is, “rotten rock” in Tupi – Guarani.
The area to be considered in case of an emergency was restricted to as far as 5 km around the
plant, that means that the neighboring communities have been excluded from this so called
emergency measures. The unstable soils of the region put at stake the existing evacuation
measures, specially during the torrential rain season since the roads are, at times, logged.
In regard to the radioactive materials, all the nuclear fuel applied is storaged in Angra. The
storaging installations are considered temporary ones and will have its capacity surpassed in
2004. Even tough, Brazil does not have any mid or long-term plan as for definitely storaging
these nuclear residues generated by the acitivities performed in Angra. Storaging and
discharging
problems happen all over the world, this is one of the reasons why Germany
decided to progressively give up the generation of nuclear energy. Last but not least, the
technology applied in Angra II and III is obsolete, even tough some technical
adjustments
have been made in in the 80´s. In terms of maintenance, this 20 year period will certainly
create problems related to the spare parts for Angra II and to any nuclear plant built with the
same characteristics.
The problems mentioned above, plus the ones concerning the environmental issues of Angra I
and II, as well as their poor performance record, can not be put aside neither disconnected
from Angra III. The same problems concerning residues storage, emergency plans,
environment and so on will always be linked to this kind of business.
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46
Economic Impacts
The numbers and physical chronograms presented by Eletronuclear, in relation to Angra II, do
not seem to be reliable since it took 25 years to be built at the extraordinary cost of
something about US$7 and US$10 billion -
three times more than expected . Calculations
comparing the cost of a KW/hour generated in Angra II to similar nuclear power plants located
in England and the USA, shows that the energy generated in Angra II is more expensive than
any other available options.
Even tough, Eletronuclear
had
a deficit of about US$800
thousand in 2002.
We understand that Angra II, even if there were no environmental impacts, would not be
advisable for it would be a very expensive option that would depend on public money and it is
well known the country faces economic problems.
The generation of nuclear energy in Brazil is one of the most expensive in the world,
presenting tremendous economic disadvantages, specially when compared to the potentialities
related to the return of investments on renewable alternative energy sources abundant in
Brazil.
Alternatives
In several industrialized countries, nuclear energy is about to disappear due to its countless
risks (serious accidents, radioactive waste storing…). For all that has been written so far, is
that the non-governmental Brazilian organizations demand that the government declare a
moratoria to the investments in this kind of energy which is considered unsafe and old
fashioned. There are several other abundant energetic resources in Brazil (solar energy,
aeolian, biomass, Small Hydroelectric Centers, natural gas, and etc.) which are more
reasonable in terms of costs and offer solutions that present lower social and environmental
risks. Germany, for instance, holds excellence in relation to solar and aeolian technology and
could benefit from the Brazilian partnership and know-how in the use of biomass as for
energetic means. Our intention is suggest that the public funds meant to nuclear energy, which
is expensive and presents high social, environmental, political and economic risks, be used to
new renewable sources. While such decision has not been taken by the Brazilian and German
governments, Eletronuclear and CNEN, as well as the local authorities, should give more clear
and precise information on their actions. In regard to the construction license for Angra III, a
national, or at least, a regional plebiscite should be conducted regarding the continuation or
not of the Brazilian Nuclear Project. We also demand that the Ministery for Environmental
Affairs, along with IBAMA, within its legal competence, contact Rio de Janeiro state
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47
government in order that the impacts caused by the existing nuclear power plants be solved
and that any further discussion regarding the third plant only will be conducted when the
solutions to meet the existing problems have been implemented.
History
The history of nuclear energy in Brazil is troublesome. The first power plant, Angra I, is
considered one of the worst reactors in activity in the world, functioning with only 29% of its
capacity. Due to its constant paralyzation, Angra I has been called “firefly”.
The nuclear agreement between Brazil and Germany was supposed to result in the
construction of eight power plants, however, so far only one has been built: Angra II. This
power plant started operating 25 years after being contracted at cost between US$ 7 to US$10
billion, three times more than what had been expected (a new nuclear reactor of the same
kind costs US$ 2.5 billion).
Nevertheless, there are many problems relatetd to power plants; for example, not a strategy
for storaging
the remains of the high radioactivity residues, there is not a policy for the
desmantlement of mines and reactors, there are not effecient and reliable emergency plans for
Angra dos Reis and the neighboring communities, as well as disagreements with environmental
laws and the impact of uranium mining in Poços de Caldas and Lagoa Real.
Even with so many problems, and the energy crisis in the Brazilian electric sector, in 2001,
pressure to built Angra III Nuclear Power Plant has started. In the same year, the request to
continue the assessments to the construction of the power plant, plus the renewal of the
contracts set for both buying and giving the the equipment maintenance were evaluated at the
National Energy Policy Council (CNPE). The Brazilian environmental organizations started a
campaign, internationally supported, by sending letters to the ministers of CNPE demanding
the abandonment of the project. As a result, the minister Jose Sarney Filho, looking for a
better way to substantiate the position of the Ministery for Environmental Issues requested
that the document was analyzed by the Department of Justice. Next, he asked the Department
for Environmental Quality to promote meetings with
qualified segments of the Brazilian
society so that the Ministery for Environmental Issues could have a solid opinion on the subject
and could be sychronized with the Brazilian public opinion. Separate meetings with
entrepreneurs, scientists and environmentalists were held, holding the last two groups a
position against the continuation of the construction.
On the 28th of August, 2002, the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo informed that the federal
government had decided that the power plant was due to restart in 2003, depending only that
Energy Program
48
problems be settled with the Federal Administrative Court in order to have the R$ 123 million
necessary available as soon as possible.
Until 2002, US$750 million had already been invested and it will be necessary US$1,835 billion
to have the construction finished.
In September of 2002, The National Energy Policy Council (CNPE) subjected the decisions
about Angra III to new assessments on technical and economic feasibility of the power plant ,
which have not come out yet. Such decision is due to May, 2003, after the government
change.
Only on the 4th of May, 2003, 100 days after Lula was in office, the Minister of Science and
Technology, Roberto Amaral gives an interview to Folha de Sao Paulo presenting his position
on the subject. What came as a surprise for the voters was the announcement that the restart
of Angra III had been already discreetly set during the government of Fernando Henrique
Cardoso between the Science and Technology Department staff and its interlocutors in the
Labor Party. The result was the resolution of The National Energy Policy Council (CNPE),
approved in September of 2002, leaving the decision for May ,2003, in other words, for the
new government. According to this resolution, Eletronuclear should present to the National
Energy Policy Council (CNPE) a report on the negotiations held with banks and credit agencies
for the financing of the rest of the construction, measures for environmental and nuclear
licensing and proposals for the radioctive waste storage.
The final decision about Angra III has not been taken yet. Brazilian and other international
non-governmental organizations, supported by members of the parliament and business
sectors in the area of renewable energy source will go on fighting against the continuation of
the nuclear program and the construction of Angra III, cancellation of the nuclear agreements
and for new investments in the area of alternative renewable sources of energy appropriate to
the sustainable development of Brazil. The mobilization of the Brazilian civil society has been
growing stronger since it has been fighting against the anti-democratic decisions on this
subject . It seems these decisions continue to be made in the same anti-democratic way,
despite the fact that dictatorship is over and that the new government is showing to the world
there is hope for a social and popular democracy.
The reviewing of the nuclear agreement between Brazil and Germany is supposed to happen in
2005 and it is likely to be cancelled.
Energy Program
49
Energy alternatives for Brazil
11
It is possible to avoid the perspectives of lack of energy for the next years by adopting four
solutions, for instance, the first solution would be reducing the losses in the Brazilian electric
system; second, modernize the stations which are more than 20 years old; third, generate
energy in decentralized systems through the Small Hydrelecric Centrals (PSH´s) and aeolian
plants that use wind energy; fourth, use biomass (sugar cane bagasse or remains of paper
and cellulose) in cogeneration regimen.
All of them would require little investment in comparison to the big plants, without causing the
undesirable social and environmental impacts, and making available to the Brazilian society
about 24,000 MW, which is equivalent to more than 33% of the generation capacity installed
nowadays.
The first solution is based on the current situation of the Brazilian Electric System, which
presents technical losses in a total of 15%. These losses, estimated in 54 million MWh (or 54
billion Kv per hour), start in the process of energy generation by the plants and continue
during the processes involving transmission lines and distribution nets up to end user.
If Brazil adopts a loss rate of 6%, considered an international pattern, the electric system
would increase its availability of electric energy in 33 million MWh, and this increase is equal to
what a hydroelectic power plant, with 6,500 MW of installed potency (or more than half of
Itaipu Power Plant potency which is 12,600MW), produces during a year.
The necessary costs to promote this loss reduction consist basically of a better isolation in the
lines and replacement of old and defective equipment, like the transformers. Such steps are
not being followed with the frequency and extent required by the current situation. Besides,
the same costs would be lower than the investments in the construction of new power plants
and the availability increase could be obtained without flooding lands and without expelling the
population that lives by the bed of rivers dammed to build hydroelectric power plants.
The second solution takes into account the fact that the electric energy generation park in
Brazil has many hydroelectric power stations that have been working for more than 20 years.
These stations can have their capacity of producing electric energy increased through
investments in equipment replacement (e.g. replacement of the generator rotor, or in the
modernization of components and systems).
11
This text is based on the alternatives presented in details in the studies of Professor Dr. Celio Bermann, published
BERMANN,C – Energy in Brazil: what for? To whom? – Crisis and alternatives to a sustainable country. São Paulo, Ed
FASE-Physics Bookstore-USP, 2002, 139 pg.
Energy Program
50
It is estimated that the Brazilian Electric System can reach a potency increase of 7,600 MW, as
a result of the rehabilitation, reconstruction and repairs conducted on the hydroelectric power
plants that have been working for more than 20 years.
This gain in potency can be obtained with reduced costs in comparison to the costs of new
power plants (around 1/3, or possibly reaching 1/5 of the costs of a new KW installed). If the
repotenciation does not interfere in the level of the reservoirs, therefore, not raising the
operational quota, there will be a 7,600 MW energy rgeneration without social and
environmental impacts, as it is happening in relation to the construction of new power plants.
The third solution considers the official data of SIPOT- Information System of Hydroelectric
Potential- Eletrobras, indicating that there is a potential of 9,800 MW to be obtained with the
construction of 942 small hydroelectric centrals in Brazil. For the next three years, at least 1/3
of these power plants could be built, adding about 3,200 MW to the current Brazilian generator
park.
The Small Hydroelectric Centers (PCHs) are defined by ANEEL- Electric Energy National Agency
as power plants with installed potency of 30,000 Kw (30 MW) and maximum flooded area of 3
km2 reservoir. The hydroelectric usage involved can raise the electric energy supply conditions
in Brazil in a decentralized way. In order to assess the impact of having many Small
Hydroelectric Centers (PCHs) located in the same river, basin should be evaluated as a whole,
not individually. This procedure should also be followed during the environmental feasibility
evaluation of the big dams located in the same hydrographic unit, which is something that has
not been considered so far. This is exactly the case of the five hydroelectric power plants
planned in the Xingu River that must be analyzed as a group and not individually (Monte Belo,
for example).
In relation to wind energy generation, it is estimated a aeolian potential of 143,000 MW,
mainly in the northeast region of Brazil (Ceara and Rio Grande do Norte). In a three
period,
year
it would be possible to install 3,000 MW through aeolian power plants. Taiba and
Prainha, the two power plants recently built on the coastline of the state of Ceará and that
supply Coelce with electricity, demonstrate the economic feasibility of this alternative.
Finally, the fourth solution identifies the cogeneration of electricity from sugar cane bagasse as
the source with greatest short-term application possibility. There is a 750 MW estimated
potency currently installed in the southeast region, mainly in the sate of Sao Paulo, where
there are 131 power plants with an exceeding capacity of more than 150 MW. On the other
hand, the potency installed in the northeast regions, specially in the states of Pernambuco and
Alagoas is of 358 MW. Nowadays the commercialization of such energy is much reduced.
Energy Program
51
From the technological development, which results in the efficiency of the process, it is
estimated that 3,000 MW could be obtained in the country from the bagasse of sugar cane.
Another sector
which
presents a high potential in terms of conegeration of energy is the
paper and cellulose industry, through the reutilization of residues in combined systems of
electric energy production and heat process. For Brazil, a potential of 650 MW is estimated
by
applying the residues from this type of industry as fuel.
Four solutions are shown here, not taking into consideration the immense possibilities of solar
energy provided from photovoltaic
panels. Each of the energy alternatives indicated in this
paper cannot be considered as an isolated solution since they are complement alternatives and
should be taken into consideration as a whole. By doing so, it is possible to consider hybrid
systems, composed by, e.g. aeolian plants operating with Small Hydroelectric Centers
(PCH`s), in order to guarantee energy supply all year long, taking advantage of the fact that
the periods of draught
coincide with the periods of stronger winds, and vice-versa. In the
same way, the hybrid systems applying Small Hydroelectrical Centers (PCH`s) and
cogeneration of energy from the bagasse of sugar cane
that the period of draught coincides with the
may also take advantage of the fact
period of
harvest, and the period of inter-
harvest corresponds to the period in which there is a higher volume of rain.
As a
whole, these alternatives make it possible to add to the Brazilian Electric System an
installed capacity of 24,000 MW, which represents 33% of the present generation capacity of
the country, not taking into account the benefits from energy efficiency and maintenance.
When one considers the demand, the shifting of the Brazilian industrial profile, counting
nowadays with industries whose production processes consume far much energy, as the
aluminum industries, the metallurgy, the industries which produce iron alloy, the chemical
industries which produce chloride and sodium hydroxide, and the paper and cellulose
industries.
Energy Program
52
Bibliographical references, publications and documents available at request
Ahimor - Administração das Hidrovias da Amazônia Oriental, www.ahimor.gov.br;
ANA - Agência Nacional de Águas. s.d. Gestão de Recursos Hídricos, folder;
ANEEL - Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica 2001. AHE Santa Isabel: Estudos de Impacto
Ambiental e de Viabilidade, 3 CD-Rom;
ANEEL - Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica 2003, site na Internet: www.aneel.gov.br,
acessos de 17 de março a 15 de maio de 2003;
ANEEL - Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica, 2002. Atlas de energia elétrica do Brasil. ANEEL:
Brasília;
BERMANN, C. - Energia no Brasil: para quê? para quem? - Crise e Alternativas para um país
sustentável. São Paulo, Ed. FASE/Livraria da Física-USP, 2002, 139 p.
BORGES, M.M., 2000. Turismo e hidrovia não cabem no mesmo barco. in Galinkin,
M.
(coord.), 2000. Relatório do Painel de Especialistas Independentes. Análise do EIA/RIMA do
Projeto da hidrovia Araguaia-Tocantins. CEBRAC: Brasília;
CBEE
-Centro
Brasileiro
de
Energia
Eólica/UFPE,
1999.
Atlas
eólico
do
Brasil.
CBEE/UFPE:Recife;
CEBRAC - Fundação Centro Brasileiro de Referência e Apoio Cultural, 2001 - Projeto de Criação
da Bolsa de Mercadorias do Cerrado, n.p.;
COPELIMI / HAR Engenharia. EIA RIMA da Usina Termelétrica Seival, 5 volumes. Porto Alegre,
RS, junhode 2000.
DILGER, G. A Aventura Nuclear Brasileira : 25 anos do Acordo Brasil – Alemanha, Angra dos
Reis, RJ, SAPÊ / Fundação Heinrich Böll, 36p.
FRIEDLANDER D & TRAUMANN T. Um lobby de US$ 1,8 bi: Como empresários, políticos e até o
governo da França pressionam pela construção da usina nuclear de Angra-3. Revista Época,
12 de maio de 2003, p. 40
GALINKIN, M. (coord.), 2000. Relatório do Painel de Especialistas Independentes. Análise do
EIA/RIMA do Projeto da hidrovia Araguaia-Tocantins. CEBRAC: Brasília;
GALINKIN, M. (coord.), 1999. Oportunidades de Geração de Renda no Cerrado. CEBRAC/PPPGEF: Brasília;
GALINKIN, M. A Mesma Estória, a Mesma Carga. in Parabólicas, publicação mensal do Instituto
Socioambiental, São Paulo, ano 4, nº 31, julho/agosto 1997, pág. 8-9;
Energy Program
53
IBAMA, 2001. Termo de referência para elaboracão do estudo de impacto ambiental e o
respectivo relatório de impacto ambiental da UHE Estreito. IBAMA:Brasília;
INVESTE BRASIL. The German-Brazilian Infrastructure Initiative: Investment opportunities in
Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, Investe Brasil / Federation of German Industries (BDI), 2002, 15p.
ISA - Instituto Socioambiental, 2003.
http://www.socioambiental.org/website/especiais/bm/index2.asp
ISA - Instituto Socioambiental, Parabólicas, 1999, www.socioambiental.org.
ISER. Como fica a energia nuclear no contexto da crise energética Brasileira? Uma discussão
sobre o Complexo Nuclear de Angra dos reis/RJ. 24/09/01, Brasília, DF, ISER – COPPE –
(SQA) MMA, 2001.
MPO - Ministério do Planejamento e Orçamento, Brasil, 1996, apud Galinkin,
M. (coord.),
2000. Relatório do Painel de Especialistas Independentes. Análise do EIA/RIMA do Projeto
da hidrovia Araguaia-Tocantins. CEBRAC: Brasília;
ORTIZ, L.S. (org.) - Fontes Alternativas de Energia e Eficiência Energética: Opção para uma
política energética sustentável no Brasil. Campo Grande, Coalizão Rios Vivos/Fundação
Heinrich Böll, 2002.
RAMOS, A., 2000. Análise dos Estudos do Meio Antrópico, in Galinkin,
M. (coord.), 2000.
Relatório do Painel de Especialistas Independentes. Análise do EIA/RIMA do Projeto da
hidrovia Araguaia-Tocantins. CEBRAC: Brasília;
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Viabilidade do Complexo Hidroelétrico de Belo Monte. São Paulo, 2003. (em elaboração)
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2003, p.6
Energy Program
54

The Brazilian energy and infrastructure projects presented as

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