BRASIL REPORT No. H.10-0810-36 BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENTS
Transcrição
BRASIL REPORT No. H.10-0810-36 BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENTS
AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL - BRASIL REPORT No. H.10-0810-36 BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY B737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700 & -800 SERIES AIRCRAFT MODELS NELSON EISAKU NAGAMINE Manager, Programs Management Aeronautical Product Certification Date: 12 April 2011 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOEING 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700 & -800 SERIES AIRCRAFT MODELS 01 - INTRODUCTION This document has the objective to establish the basis for the issuance of the Brazilian Import Type Certificate (Certificado de Homologação de Tipo para Importação) and Brazilian Standard Airworthiness Certificate (Certificado de Aeronavegabilidade) for the above aircraft. 02 - CERTIFICATION BASIS The Certification basis for the aircraft are those indicated in the FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet n A16WE, revision 38 dated 31 May 2006 or later revisions, plus any addition or deletion established in paragraphs 05, 06, 08 and 09 of this report. 03 – DEFINITION OF THE AIRCRAFT The type design which was submitted for ANAC evaluation and which is considered for ANAC approval is defined by the following: a. For models 737-300, -400 and –500 series: General assembly DWG. N 65-73701 plus: - MODEL B737-317 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C30192, dated 18 April 1985. - MODEL B737-341 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C33721, dated 30 September 1990. - MODEL B737-3Y FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C31972, dated 16 January 1986. - MODEL B737-36Q FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C45304, dated 22 September 1997. - MODEL B737-36N FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35326, dated 18 August 1997. - MODEL B737-3Q4 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C33715, dated 18 November 1987. - MODEL B737-33A FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C32733, dated 08 November 1994. - MODEL B737-3K9 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C33459, dated 22 June 1987. - MODEL B737-3S1 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35895, dated 09 April 1993. - MODEL B737-3L9 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C30971, dated 21 May 1991. - MODEL B737-3Q8 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C34085, dated 30 August 1991. - MODEL B737-3U3 Boeing letter CP-L4L-09-00468, dated 13 October 2009; Detail Specification no D6-38604-29, rev. A, dated 22 October 1997; and Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2924, rev. H, for S/N 28742. - MODEL B737-33R FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35904, dated 09 June 1997. H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 - MODEL B737-3S3 Boeing letter B-T113-98-3719, dated 03 June 1998. - MODEL B737-3M8 Boeing letter B-T113-98-3719, dated 03 June 1998. - MODEL B737-330 Boeing letter C1-L4-04-0593, dated 10 June 2004; FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C31978; Detail Specification no D6-76300-29, rev. H, dated 25 August 1989; and Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-1887, rev. D. - MODEL B737-322 Boeing letter C1-L4-04-0637 dated 21 June 2004; Boeing letter C1-L4L-04-1028 dated 9 September 2004; Boeing letter C1-L4L-05-0618 dated 27 May 2005; Boeing letter C1-L4L-06-00096 dated 31 January 2006; Boeing letter C1-L4L-07-01250 dated 31 October 2007; FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C32735; Detail Specification no D6-76300-25, rev. S, dated 30 April 1990; Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2230, rev. F for S/N 24379, 24452, 24453, 24455 and 24532; Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-1872, rev. M for S/N 23952, 23955, 23956, 24247, 24248 and 24249; Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2339, rev. A for S/N 24666, 24668 and 24670; and Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2339, rev A for S/N24663. - MODEL B737-382 Boeing letter C1-L4L-05-0921 dated 09 August 2005; General Assembly drawing no 65-73701-5007; Detail Specification no D6-76300-73, rev F, dated 15 February 2005; and Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2173, rev D, for S/N 24366. - MODEL B737-4Y0 FAA Interior Certification Diagram No 65C34083, dated 05 July 1988. - MODEL B737-46B Boeing letter M-ABOH-02-0723, dated 24 September 2002; and FAA Interior Schematic LOPA 374-678. - MODEL B737-4S3 Boeing Letter C1-L4L-04-0531, dated 21 May 2004; FAA Interior Schematic LOPA-374-526; and Detail Specification D6-38900-9-1, rev. A, dated 31 March 1992. Boeing Letter CP-L4L-10-00395, dated 30 September 2010; Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-374-526, rev E for S/N25595. - MODEL B737-48E Boeing Letter C1-L4L-04-0531, dated 21 May 2004; FAA Interior Schematic LOPA 374-585; and Detail Specification D6-38900-28, rev. H, dated 29 July 1994. - MODEL B737-5Y0 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C36152, dated 16 October 1990. - MODEL B737-548 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35897, dated 19 September 1990. - MODEL B737-5Q8 FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C36440, dated 09 December 1996. Page 3 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 - MODEL B737-53A FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35894, dated 26 September 1990. - MODEL B737-56N FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 401N5002, dated 17 September 1997. - MODEL B737-58E Boeing letter B-T113-98-3585, dated 29 May 1998. b. For models 737-600, -700 and -800: Final Assembly DWG. nº PL 001A0001, rev. BP, dated 16 September 1998 plus: - MODEL B737-73S Detail Specification D6-38808-66, rev. D, dated 20 December 2000. - MODEL B737-7L9 Boeing letter M-ABOH-BAS-01-0147, dated 19 March 2001; Boeing letter L4L-06-00153, dated 13 February 2006; Detail Specification D6-38808-2; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0961, revision “-”for S/N 28012 and 28015; and Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0788, revision G for S/N 28011. - MODEL B737-75B Boeing letter M-ABOH-BAS-01-0147, dated 19 March 2001. - MODEL B737-76N Detail Specification D6-38808-34 Detail Specification D019A001GEF37P-1, rev A, dated 15 February 2006 applicable to S/N 32743; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0201, rev. U for S/N 28577, 28580, 28582, 28583, 28584, 28585, 29904, and 29905; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0736, rev. G for S/N 28640, 28641 and 30830; and Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-1185, rev. A for S/N 32743. (Boeing letter C1-L4L-05-1183 dated 18 October 2005). Boeing letter C1-L4L-08-00352 dated 03 July 2008 applicable to aircraft S/N 33417 and 33380; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0851, rev E; Detail Specification D6-38808-34 rev AA. - MODEL B737-76Q Boeing letter B-H340-01-2502, dated 11 April 2001. - MODEL B737-7Q8 Interior arrangement LOPA-377-0600, dated 30 September 1998. - MODEL B737-700 IGW (-7BC) Boeing Letter M-AB0H-03-0614, dated 25 November 2003 for aircraft S/N 32575 (YG040); Configuration Specification Document nº D019A002, rev.G, dated 11 May 2000; and Boeing letter B-H340-00-0768, dated 11 February 2000. - MODEL B737-7K9 Boeing Letter C1-L4L-04-1499 dated 23 December 2004; FAA Interior Schematic LOPS 377-066 Revision J; and Detail Specification D6-38808-8 rev. B, dated 17 September 2001. - MODEL B737-73V Boeing Letter C1-L4L-06-00866 dated 01 September 2006 applicable to S/N 30238 and 30242; Boeing Letter C1-L4L-08-00548 dated 31 October 2008 applicable to S/N 30239; Boeing Letter C1-L4L-08-00593 dated 05 December 2008 applicable to S/N 30246 and 30247; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0906, rev. G for S/N 30238, 30239, 30246 Page 4 of 45 H.10-0810-36 - - - - - - - - 12 April 2011 and 30247; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0902, rev. `-` for S/N 30242; and Detail Specification D019A00EZY37P-01, rev G, dated 19 December 2003 applicable to S/Ns 30238, 30242, 30246 and 30247. MODEL B737-7EA Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-01442 dated 11 December 2007 applicable to S/N 32406; Boeing Letter C1-L4L-08-00132 dated 06 March 2008 applicable to S/N 32407; Interior arrangement LOPA-377-0839 rev A, for aircraft S/N 32406 and 32407; and Detailed Specification D019001A2ZX37P-1 rev A, applicable to S/N 32406 and 32407. MODEL B737-7EH Boeing Letter B-H340-09-01157 dated 25 June 2009 applicable to S/N 37595; Interior arrangement LOPA-377-1468 rev H, for aircraft S/N 37595; and Detailed Specification D019A001GOT37P-1 rev A, applicable to S/N 37595. Boeing Letter RA-11-01192, dated 25 March 2011, applicable to S/N 37608 and 37609. Interior arrangement LOPA-377-1631; and Detail Specification D019A001GOT37P-2 rev “New”. MODEL B737-73A Boeing letter C1-L4L-08-00342 dated 27 June 2008 applicable to aircraft S/N 28499 and 28500; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0203, rev G; Detail Specification D6-38808-34 rev AA. MODEL B737-7BX Boeing Letter C1-L4L-08-00434, dated 31 July 2008; Interior arrangement LOPA-377-0654, rev N for aircraft S/N 30738 and 30739; and Detailed Specification D019A001MID37P-1, rev B, dated 03 July 2002. MODEL B737-8S3 Boeing letter B-H340-01-4509, dated 02 July 2002. MODEL B737-8BK Boeing Letter B-H340-06-1204, dated 24 March 2006; Interior arrangement LOPA-378-1197, dated 01 Mar. 2002 for aircraft S/N 30620 and 30625. Interior arrangement LOPA-378-1681 for aircraft S/N 33027. MODEL B737-8CX Boeing letter B-H340-01-8986, dated 18 December 2001. FAA Interior Schematic LOPA 378-1184, rev `-`, and Detail Specification D019A001GAT38P-01, rev G dated 06 March 2003. MODEL B737-85F Interior arrangement LOPS-377-0278, rev. C, dated 30 January 2002 (0 “zero” PAX). MODEL B737-83N Boeing Letter C1-L4L-05-0178 dated 15 February 2005; Interior arrangements LOPA-378-0946 Revision N and LOPA-378-1109, Revision E; Detail Specification D019A001AAT38P-1 rev. F dated 25 October 2004. MODEL B737-8EH Boeing Letter B-H340-06-1434 dated 14 April 2006; Interior arrangements LOPA-378-1585 Revision H, LOPA-378-1776 Revision E and LOPA-378-1859 Revision B; Detail Specification D019A001GOT38 original issuance; and Boeing letter B-H-340-07-01042 dated 15 June 2007 includes B737-8EH models which incorporates the major change Technology Insertion CFM International engines – CFM56-7B27/3 series on aircrafts S/Ns 34267-34272, 34964-34966, 36146. The model B737-8EH is a Short-Field Performance (SFP) aircraft with the following modifications: two position tailskid, winglet lift credit, increased flight spoiler Page 5 of 45 H.10-0810-36 - - - - - 12 April 2011 deflection on ground, reduce idle thrust delay after touchdown, revised FMC for improved performance, sealed slats for all takeoff flap position and recambered main landing gear. Boeing Letters B-H340-07-01822 dated 19 November 2007 and B-H340-07-01995 dated 14 December 2007; Detailed Specification D019A001GOT38P-1 Rev A dated 28 February 2007, applicable to S/Ns 34273 and 34274 CSOS Log Report number GOT38W0000 defined to S/Ns 34273-34276, 3506335066, 35824; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-2116 Rev A. Boeing letter B-H340-09-00545 dated 19 March 2009; Detailed Specification D019A001GOT38P-1 Rev C dated 29 August 2008 applicable to S/N 35825, 35827-35830, 36566, 36147-36150, 37596-37598. The LOPA applicable to each one airplane is defined in the above Detailed Specification. Boeing letter B-H340-09-02055 dated 01 December 2009; Detailed Specification D019A001GOT38P-1 Rev E dated 01 December 2009 is applicable to S/N 35831, 35832, 35835, 36596, 37599-37601. The LOPA 378-2372 is applicable to S/N 35831, 35832, 36596, 37599-37601, and LOPA 378-2369 is applicable for S/N 35835. Boeing letter B-H340-10-01150 dated 10 August 2010 extended the applicability of LOPA 378-2369 for S/N 35836 to 35838. Boeing Letter RA-11-01192, dated 25 March 2011, applicable to S/N 35842 to 35846, 35851 and 35852. Interior arrangement LOPA-378-2680 applicable to S/N 35842 to 35844, 35851 and 35852. Interior arrangement LOPA-378-2906 applicable to S/N 35845 and 35846. Detail Specification D019A001GOT38P-2 rev “New” MODEL B737-8Q8 Boeing Letter C1-L4L-06-01133 dated 14 November 2006; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0510, rev. E; and Detail Specification D6-38808-18, rev AC, dated 31 August 2005. MODEL B737-86N Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-00003 dated 04 January 2007; General Assembly Drawing 001A0101-3556 Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0749, rev. G for S/N 28616; and Detail Specification D6-38808-35, rev V. Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-01043 dated 01 October 2007; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0286, rev AB for S/N 28575 and 28578 and Detail Specification D6-38808-35, rev Y. MODEL B737-8AS Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-00636 dated 23 May 2007; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0584, rev. G; and Detail Specification D6-38808-110, rev K dated 27 October 2004. MODEL B737-809 Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-01043 dated 01 October 2007; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0498, rev M for S/N 29103 and 28403 and Detail Specification D6-38808-23, rev F. Boeing Letter CP-L4L-09-00160 dated 10 April 2009; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0913, rev “new” for S/N 30636. Detail Specification D019A001MDN38P-1, rev A. MODEL B737-8HX Boeing Letter B-H340-08-00982 dated 30 June 2008; Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-2087, rev D for S/N 36434 and Detail Specification D019A001CGP38P-1, rev C. Page 6 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 04 - CHANGES TO THE APPROVED TYPE DESIGN a. Any design change, to be incorporated in Brazilian aircraft, must be FAA approved. b. In addition to the provision of item (a), all major changes to the approved type design which affect the aircraft limitations, structural strength, performance, flight characteristics and the approved main equipment list, must be submitted for ANAC review, before Export Certificate of Airworthiness issuance. c. Different interior arrangements (cabin configuration) must be submitted for ANAC review and approval before incorporation in Brazilian aircraft. d. For each aircraft finished or modified by a Completion Center/Repair Station the following procedure apply: - All the new installations must be submitted to the local airworthiness authority approval. - The TC/STC holder must follow the procedures established in the ANAC Informative Circular CI No. 21-010 - “Procedures for Approval of Imported Civil Aeronautical Products”, paragraph 6, “Procedures for Issuance of Import Supplemental Type Certificate for Aircraft”. - The annex IV of this report presents the list of CHST’s (STC’s) and AFM’s supplements approved by FAA or LBA and validated by ANAC. 05 - COMPLIANCE WITH THE BRAZILIAN OPERATING REGULATIONS a. Compliance with the operating regulations appropriate to the kinds of operations to be conducted, are incumbent upon the Brazilian operator. However, the application of such regulations may require the installation of equipment and/or application of standards in addition to those required for Airworthiness Certification. Boeing Commercial Airplane Company is reminded that it is responsible to furnish to the ANAC the existing technical data or information which might be deemed necessary to the ANAC to approve locally such installations or operations. b. The modification below must be installed in the Aircraft to comply with the applicable RBHA operational requirement: - Emergency locator transmitter (ELT), portable or fixed, in order to comply with RBHA 121.339 and 353. 06 - FLIGHT MANUAL A Brazilian Flight Manual Supplement incorporating the changes listed below in respect to the FAA approved document, shall be furnished to each aircraft exported to Brazil: 6.1 The Supplement shall be organized in Sections and Paragraphs entitled and numbered in direct correspondence to the FAA approved AFM to permit an easy cross-reference of the Supplement information with that of the basic AFM. The Supplement Approval Page (see a suggested model in Annex II) shall: - Indicate its mandatory nature for Brazilian operators; - Stating “the AFM is in accordance with RBHA 21.29; and - Be signed by ANAC or by FAA, on behalf of ANAC. Items 6.2 through 6.13 are applicable only to Models 737-300, -400 and –500: 6.2 The following additional information shall be included in the Supplement to complete the basic AFM information regarding malfunctions and failures in the control systems: a) On Section 3.2 - page 2 –” Hydraulic System”- remove: “if desired”; b) On Section 3.2, page 7, include: “Loss of both hydraulic systems” and corresponding procedures (see Ops. Manual for reference); Page 7 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 c) On Section 3.2, include: “leading edge flaps transit light” procedures as per Ops Man. Pg. 03.10.07; d) On section 3.2 – page 6, “Jammed Controls”, * include instructions for jamming in each control axis; e) Inclusion of auto-slat failure procedures on section 3.2; f) Inclusion of “feel differential pressure” failure procedures in section 3.2 advising the flight crew to avoid excessive elevator inputs; g) Inclusion of “Mach trim failure” speed limitation in section 3.2, according to Ops. Manual; h) Inclusion of ‘Speed brake do not arm” procedures in Section 3.2 (see Ops Manual); i) Inclusion of “Stabilizer-out-of-trim” procedures in Section 3.2 according to Ops Manual pg. 03-10.09; and j) On Section 3.2 – page 5 0 Alternate flap operation - Include note advising crew that asymmetry protection is not available (as per Ops Manual pg. 03-10.03). 6.3 Deleted per CTA fax 188/93 dated 19 February 1993. 6.4 Substitute the words “Do not engage autopilot for single channel approach” by “Do not engage autopilot for approach” on page 2, section 3.2, IRS fault paragraph. Note: Item deleted from Supplement 1CTA and included in the basic FAA AFM (CTA fax 1757/97 dated 26 September 1997 refers). 6.5 The AFM Supplement shall include information to correct and adjust the required normal landing field length for the non-normal landing configurations such as: - all flaps up; - unsymmetrical or no leading edge devices; - unsymmetrical trailing edge devices; and - trailing edge flaps up. 6.6 Deleted - Justification provided by Boeing letter B-225R-88-1135 dated 14 June 1988. 6.7 The chart on page 11, section 4.13 (stopping distance with automatic wheel brakes) should use “landing speed” instead of “approach speed” as defined on page 5, section 4.1 (Definitions). 6.8 The maximum crosswind definition on page 8 of Section 4.1 should be revised by deleting the sentence: “This component is not considered to be limiting on a dry runway with all engines operating”. 6.9 The AFM Supplement shall establish a procedure to use the alternate static source switch in case of failure of the normal static pressure system. 6.10 Deleted-Justification provided by Boeing letter B-225R-RD-87-1392 dated 03 September 1997. 6.11 A procedure for “disagreement between the gear lever position and red lights” must be established in the AFM Supplement. 6.12 The go-around procedure as shown on page 14, section 3.1, does not establish the attitude or the minimum airspeed for go-around and therefore, should be revised. 6.13 The basic AFM shall present weight and temperature units in Kg and C Conclusion: The CTA approved AFM Supplement 1CTA - revision 03 - dated 14 November 1997 complies with the requirements above. For the B737.322 model the approved AFM is the document D6-8730.322, revision 27 (Reference Number 056046) approved by FAA on 25 May 2005. Item closed. Page 8 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Note: For the B737-300 Series only, CTA has approved on 21 October 1991 the Supplement 2CTA “Grooved or Porous Friction Course Overlayed Runway Landing Performance, Wet or Dry”. Items 6.14 through 6.16 are applicable only to Models 737-600, -700 and –800: 6.14 The AFM presented to the CTA for review was D631A001, dated 07 Nov. 1997, including the following appendices and supplement: - Appendix 20 - Engine Derate Operation at 20K Thrust; - Appendix 22 - Engine Derate Operation at 22K Thrust; - Appendix CDL - Configuration Deviation List 737-100/-200/-300/-400/-500/-700/-800; - Supplement 1CTA. 6.15 The Brazilian AFM shall be based in the FAA AFM but including the following modifications in the affected pages of the Supplement 1CTA to complete the basic AFM information: 6.15.1 FMS a) “Pilot manually inserted approach procedures, even with waypoints retrieved from the FMS database, are prohibited”; b) “Before performing a FMS approach the crew must verify the correspondence between FMS waypoints / altitudes and the published chart data"; 6.15.2 Engine failure during takeoff A procedure for engine failure during takeoff after V1 was not found either in the AFM, Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) or OPS Manual. Although a pictorial trajectory with some details can be found in the QRH, CTA does not consider this as a procedure. Therefore, CTA requests an “Engine failure during takeoff after V1” procedure to be inserted in the Brazilian AFM Supplement. 6.16 The Brazilian AFM for the B-737-700 IGW, applicable to the specific model 737-7BC is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.7BC2, Revision 4 dated 25 February 2004, including the supplement CTA1. (Log of Pages 044869). Conclusion: The FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.7BC2, Revision 4 dated 25 February 2004, including the supplement CTA1, complies with the items above. Item closed. 6.17 Boeing will provide a Brazilian AFM Supplement 1CTA for the models 737-4S3 and 737-48E. The corresponding FAA approved AFM document number for the 737-4S3 model is D6-8734.4S31 and for the model 737-48E is D6-8734.48E. Conclusion: Boeing Letter C1-L4L-04-0531 dated 21 May 2004. Item closed. 6.18 Boeing will provide a Brazilian AFM Supplement 1CTA for the models 737-330 and 737-322. The corresponding FAA approved AFM document number for the 737-330 model is D6-8730.330 and for the model 737-322 is D6-8730.322. Conclusion: Boeing Letters C1-L4L-04-0593 dated 10 June 2004 and C1-L4L-04-0637 dated 21 June 2004. Item closed. 6.19 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-7K9 is the FAA approved Page 9 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 AFM document no. D631A001.7K9, Revision 6 dated 14 December 2004, including the supplement CTA1. (Log of Pages 045648). Conclusion: The FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.7K9, Revision 6 dated 14 December 2004, including the supplement CTA1, complies with the items above. Item closed. 6.20 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-83N is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.83N2, including the supplement 1CTA rev. 2. (Log of Pages 044870). Conclusion: The FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.83N2, including the supplement 1CTA rev 2, complies with the item above. Item closed. 6.21 Boeing will provide a Brazilian AFM Supplements 1CTA and 2CTA for the model 737-382. The corresponding FAA approved AFM document number for the 737-382 model is D6-8730.3Q83. Conclusion: Boeing Letter C1-L4L-05-0921 dated 09 August 2005. AFM D6-87303Q83 dated 15 August 2005. Item closed. 6.22 Boeing will provide a Brazilian AFM Supplements 1CTA and 2CTA for the model 737-322 S/N 24666. The corresponding FAA approved AFM document number for the 737-322 model is D6-8730.3222. Conclusion: Boeing Letter C1-L4L-05-0963 dated 15 August 2005. Item closed. 6.23 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-76N is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.76N, including the supplement 1CTA. (Log of Pages 056326). Conclusion: The FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.76N, Revision 27 dated 30 September 2005, including the supplement 1CTA, complies with the item above, Boeing Letter C1-L4L-05-1183 dated 18 October 2005. Item closed. 6.24 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-7L9 is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.7L92, including the supplement 1 CTA. Conclusion: Boeing Letter C1-L4L-06-00153 dated 13 February 2006. Item closed. 6.25 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-8EH “Short Field Performance” is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.8EH, including the supplement 1 CTA (Log of Pages 066836). Revision 13 of the document no. D631A001.8EH dated 18 June 2007 (Reference Number 077617) includes the B737-8EH models which incorporates the major change Technology Insertion CFM International engines – CFM56-7B27/3 series. Conclusion: Item closed. 6.26 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-73V is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.73V2, revision 0 dated 21 September 2006, including the supplement 1 CTA. Conclusion: Item closed. 6.27 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-8Q8 is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.8Q82, Revision 33 dated 21 November 2006, including the supplement 1 CTA. Conclusion: Item closed. Page 10 of 45 H.10-0810-36 6.28 12 April 2011 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-86N is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.86N2, Revision 39 dated 18 December 2006, including the supplement 1 CTA. Conclusion: Item closed. 6.29 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-8AS is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.8AS2. Conclusion: Item closed. Page 11 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 07 - OPTIONAL INSTALLATIONS. All optional installations required by the Brazilian operators and incorporated by The Boeing Co., in addition to the Type Design defined in section 03, must be approved by the FAA. 08 - MARKINGS AND PLACARDS. All markings and placards for passenger information under normal or emergency conditions must be in Portuguese (or English and Portuguese). External markings for emergency operation of doors, normal ground operation of cargo doors and for certain servicing operations must be in Portuguese (or bilingual). Markings and placards indicating maximum loads in cargo and baggage compartments must also be presented in Portuguese (or bilingual). All others markings and placards not included in the proposals defined by the items a. and b. above shall be maintained in English Language. Some usual acceptable translations to Portuguese of these required markings and placards are presented in Annex III, but they are not intended to be unique and neither complete. 09 - FINDINGS, PENDING ITEMS AND COMMENTS The items included in this paragraph represent ANAC concerns in respect to the type design or the substantiation presented for ANAC review. These items are classified as findings, pending items and comments, according with the following criterion: Findings are those points of concern which must be solved before the issuance of the Brazilian TC. Findings 01 through 29 are applicable only to Models 737-300, -400 and -500: 01 - Stall Warning System It was noted that the stall warning system is not considered essential by Boeing and even the MMEL permits aircraft dispatch with one system inoperative. A review of flight tests reports indicates that the natural stall margins and the stall characteristics in some configurations do not show compliance with the applicable requirements. Pending the results of the ANAC flight testing the system may be considered essential and therefore its failure probability must fall in the improbable range. It was noted that an advanced system has been designed, including dedicated vanes, separated sensors and fed by the stand-by electric power. (Production effectively LN 1225). After having reviewed additional reliability data concerning both systems the ANAC reached the conclusion that dispatch with one system inoperative would be acceptable for a period not to exceed 18 flight hours, provided the operative system is verified to operate normally before each departure. Conclusion: The CTA AD 88-11-02 has been issued in November 1988 imposing this MEL limitation for the 737-300series (the AD has been revised in August 1989 to include the 737-400 series and further revised, in November 1997, to include the 737-500 series). Item closed. Page 12 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 02 - Flaps Asymmetry Detection and Protection Systems The non-existence of a warning to advise the pilots of an asymmetric flaps condition associated with the fact that under alternate electric operation, the trailing edge flaps are not protected against asymmetry, is criticized. The CTA believes that, at least, the AFM should contain such information for pilots awareness. Conclusion: The AFM Supplement 1CTA has included this information on Section 3.2. Item closed. 03 - Rotor Non-Containment The rotor non-containment report D6-37781, although covering all critical systems for the aircraft safety, does not contain basic information to permit an assessment of the information supplied. Additional details are required, regarding: dimensions of rotor debris; distances from targets; dimensional definitions of vulnerable zones (both 5 & 15 degrees); angular impact zones in the vertical planes; etc. Conclusion: The Engine Rotor Non-Containment Report n 37860 (CAA) has been submitted for compliance with this requirement. This additional information has been reviewed and accepted. Item closed. 04 - Illuminated Passenger Information Placards Illuminated “Exit” placards over exits, aisles and dividers, to facilitate emergency egress of passengers, shall be supplied in Portuguese (or bi-lingual). The minimum letters dimensions and height/width ratio required by the regulations shall be respected for the Portuguese translation “SAÍDA”. Equivalent safety for 25.812(b) (i) in respect to the height/width ratio is acceptable. Illuminated “NO SMOKING/FASTEN SEAT BELTS” and “NO SMOKING IN LAVATORY” placards shall also be supplied in Portuguese (or bilingual). Conclusion: See applicable translations on Annex III.a. Item closed. 05 - Slide Operation Due to the fact that slide may not inflate automatically under certain emergency conditions, an additional door placard in Portuguese (or bilingual) instructing the crew to inflate slide manually, is required. Conclusion: See applicable translations on Annex III.a. Item closed. 06 - Flight Crew Emergency Exits Converted into comment 09.c.01. 07 - Aircraft Static Tests It was found that static tests data, obtained on former 737 models, were used to some extent to substantiate stress analysis results, weight increases, stress levels on critical components, etc. The structural certification substantiation of the –300 model was made only by analysis, not including the fitting factor of at least 1.15 in the attachments of main structural components such as: wing-fuselage, wing engine strut, empennage – fuselage, etc. The section 25.625 (b) (1) only allows the nonutilization of fitting factors if comprehensive test data are available. A summary of the tests results and a comparison with analytical results for critical load conditions is required for justification of that approach. Page 13 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Conclusion: A summary correlation analysis between the static tests results and the stress analysis reports has been submitted by Boeing letter B-225R-88-1330 dated 13 July 1988 and accepted by the CTA. Item closed. 08 - Consistency of Elevator Flutter Analysis The figure 4.2-4 of report D6-37386 shows no flutter instabilities for unbalanced elevator with power off. Such results were discussed to some extent and additional data has been requested. New flutter limits were presented in a draft figure and considered acceptable. A copy of the report above including the revised figures, when available, is requested. Conclusion: The complementary information for the elevator flutter analysis has been supplied through revision C to report D6-37386 forwarded by letter B-225R87-1107 dated 15 July 1987. Item closed. 09 - Deleted. 10 - Temperature Criteria Substantiation for Allowables Data in Composite Materials The temperature used to determine the environmental factor on the allowable strain levels was 130 F (54 C). The CTA is concerned that the temperature developed inside the control surface exceeds such value in a hot day. The criterion used to guarantee that such temperature limit is not exceeded in service is required. Conclusion: The temperature criteria adopted by Boeing for determination of the allowable data for composite materials has been supplied by letter B-225R-RD-871089 dated 15 July 1987 and was accepted by the CTA. Item closed. 11 - Scatter Factor for Landing Gear Fatigue Life Conclusion: deleted per CTA letter 1233/86 dated 14 November 1986. Item closed. 12 - Bird Impact on the Aircraft Structure and Empennage Converted into comment 09.c.02. 13 - Blow-Out Panel on Aft Cargo/Rear Under Floor Compartments Bulkhead A blowout panel will be incorporated on production line aircraft in the bulkhead dividing aft cargo/rear compartments to reduce high stresses on floor beams just above the small/rear “K” compartment in case of a sudden loss of pressure. It’s recommended that a Service Bulletin incorporating this feature as a retrofit in Brazilian aircraft be released as soon as possible. Conclusion: The SB 737-25-1198 covers this subject and is applicable to the 737-300 aircraft up to LN 1527 (correspondence to SN is found on SB Index Part 3), which is therefore mandatory to affected Brazilian aircraft. All other 737-300, 737-400 and 737500 have an equivalent modification incorporated in production. Item closed. 14 - Ditching Investigation Converted into comment 09.c.03. 15 - Design Trailing Edge Flap Speed for 40 The flap system has a load limit device, which retracts the flap from 40 to 30 when the speed exceeds 160 kt. The design flap speed is 158 kt, therefore no tolerance was given to this speed in the placard as it was for the other positions. Additionally, in case of a single failure on the limit load device system, for which no warning is provided, the speed may be exceeded and consequently the design loads for the flap. Page 14 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Conclusion: This item was closed in the basis of the justification presented by Boeing letter B225R-88-1135 dated 14 June 1988 and on results of the CTA flight testing (see finding 09.a.20). Item closed. 16 – Incorporation of existing optional systems on Brazilian approved type design The following optional systems shall be installed on Brazilian aircraft: a) b) c) d) e) f) Warning light indicating that primary instruments are being fed only by one source of IRS or EFIS symbol generator (switches of the forward overhead panel out of “NORMAL” position). Conclusion: Aircraft exported in non-compliance shall accomplish Boeing SB 737-341222 before starting commercial operations. Item closed. Comparator/Disagree Warning for pilot/copilot attitude information (EFIS and non EFIS configurations) Conclusion: This feature became basic on EFIS aircraft at line number 2768, and was optional for EFIS aircraft prior to that line number and for all nonEFIS aircraft (which is the reason for the CTA requirement). Boeing letter BT113-97-4958, dated 08 October 1997, pertains to this subject. Item closed. One HF communication system Conclusion: Brazilian operational requirement. Item closed. Deleted. Emergency evacuation floor path system Conclusion: Deleted - The system is part of the basic type design. Item closed. Radome with diverter strips and conductive paint (BMS 100-21 Type 1) for lightning protection. Conclusion: Deleted - The system is part of the basic type design. Item closed. 17 - Electric Load Analysis As no limitation of maximum allowable electrical load for each generator is included in the flight manual for pilots monitoring, the CTA requires that the load analysis report for each Brazilian aircraft must take in consideration that the sum of each generator loads plus the 115 VAC transfer bus loads of the other generator, shall not be greater than 43.1 KVA (For 45 KVA rated generator). Conclusion: Accepted by the CTA in the basis of the FAA approval. Item closed. 18 - Pressure refueling system The design of the pressure refueling system is not in compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.979 (b) (1) and (2). Item (1) cannot be complied with because it is not possible to perform a fueling precheck on the float valve. Item (2) is not complied with because the indicating light will not inform about a failed solenoid valve stuck in the open position. No justification for such non-compliance has been provided. Page 15 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Conclusion: The FAA letter dated 27 October 1986 to CTA explains that the pressure refueling system is unchanged in respect to the B737 - 100 and -200 models and was accepted by the FAA for the 737-300 and later series in the basis of satisfactory service experience. According to FAA compliance with the subject requirement is demonstrated by means of the refueling procedure itself accomplished successfully. Accepted by the CTA in the basis of the FAA approval. Item closed. 19 - Fire extinguishing concentration tests for the APU installation. Compliance with the fire extinguishing concentration tests required by RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.1195(b) was not shown. No justification for such non-compliance has been provided. Conclusion: The APU fire extinguishing system has been certified by similarity with the -200 installation which was approved by analysis as permitted by the subject requirement prior to amendment 25-46 (Boeing letter 1205/87 dated 4 August 1987 refers) - Accepted by the CTA in the basis of the FAA approval. Item closed. 20 - Flight Test a) A flight test program must be accomplished in a Boeing 737-300 representative aircraft to complete the CTA evaluation. Conclusion: The CTA flight test program has been conducted on 30 Junee 1988 using a B737-3Y0 aircraft tab number PP843. No additional findings have resulted from those tests. Item closed. b) For certification of the B737-400 and -500 models the CTA has not performed a direct flight test evaluation but, instead, has reviewed the flight test program carried out for FAA certification. In general, the results of such program have been accepted by the CTA, but one concern has been raised in respect to the stall warning margin obtained for the 737-500 with maximum weight of 134 000 pounds in the 1/UP and 5/UP configurations, which were substantially lesser than the 5% required by the FAA Issue Paper F1. Therefore, acceptance of any 737-500 model with maximum operational takeoff weight in excess of 134 000 pounds, shall require CTA flight testing approval. Conclusion: This subject has been raised by the CTA fax msg. 213/93 dated 25 February 1993 and noticed by BOEING through letter 613/93 dated 22 March 1993. Item closed. 21 - EFIS System Any first of a model EFIS system installed on Brazilian aircraft shall be flight tested. Conclusion: The CTA flight test program above referred was performed on an EFIS equipped aircraft. No concerns have been raised by the CTA pilots. Item closed. Page 16 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 22 - Simulator Flights An evaluation of the EFIS, auto-pilot, auto-throttle and control system malfunctions could not be carried out in a complete simulator (with vision and movement aids). Those simulator flights shall be performed before certification. Conclusion: The CTA simulator flight test program has been completed on 28 June 1987. No concerns were raised by the CTA pilots. Item closed. 23 – Deleted. 24 – Deleted. 25 - Cabin evaluation A cabin evaluation was only accomplished in daylight conditions, either for the standard and EFIS configuration. A night light evaluation still needs to be accomplished. Conclusion: Completed at the time of CTA flight testing. No additional comments were raised. Item closed. 26 - Engine vibration indicators Converted into comment 09.c.04. 27 - Equipment cooling switch On the forward overhead panel all switches but the equipment cooling switch are forward for normal position. (Criticism only). Converted into comment 09.c.05. 28 - Instruments in metric units The fuel instruments units for quantity, flow and used fuel shall indicate in kg, kg/h, kg respectively. Conclusion: Boeing presents the system with both metric and English unit. For the Brazilian Type Design metric units is required. Item closed. 29 - Single reverse controllability during landing in wet runways No evidence was found that during landing in wet runways either the engines will not stop or that the aircraft is controllable in the ground up minimum reverser application speed under single reverse conditions. Compliance with this requirement is usually shown during the water ingestion tests performed in accordance with 25.1091(d) (2), which were not conducted for the –300 certification. A justification for this condition is required. Conclusion: justification presented by Boeing letters B-225R-RD-87-1273 dated 08/10/87 and B-225R-87-1572 dated 30 September 1987, which were accepted by the CTA. Item closed. Page 17 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Findings 30 through 51 are applicable only to Models 737-600, -700 and -800: 30 - Stall Warning System It was noted that the stall warning system is not considered essential by Boeing and even the MMEL permits aircraft dispatch with one system inoperative. CTA has found that the stall margins do not show compliance with the applicable requirements. Since BOEING has some restrictions to perform, with a non-instrumented aircraft, full stalls and after having reviewed additional reliability data (loss of a single stall warning channel) the CTA reached the conclusion that dispatch with one system inoperative would be acceptable for a period not to exceed 18 flight hours (the same period for 737-300/-400/-500 Brazilian models), provided the operative system is verified to operate normally before each departure. Note: See also finding 09.a.01 of this report. Conclusion: The CTA AD 88-11-02 has been issued in November 1988 imposing this MEL limitation for the 737-300series (the AD has been revised in August 1989 to include the 737-400 series and further revised, in November 1997, to include the 737-500 series). The CTA AD 88-11-02 will be revised to include the 737-700 series. Item closed. 31 - Absence of Flap 2 Position Warning According to RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.703 (a), a takeoff warning system must be installed and provide to the pilots an aural warning that is automatically activated during the initial portion of the takeoff roll if the aircraft is in a configuration that would not allow a safe takeoff. As long as flaps 2 is not an approved configuration for takeoff, Boeing is requested to provide a rationale, which could include flight test data and/or analysis, to demonstrate that flaps 2 performance and flight characteristics do allow a safe takeoff. Conclusion: Closed based in the Document AERO-B-B114-C98-1187, forwarded by Fax message dated 11 November 1998. Item closed. 32 - LNAV mode coupling during the takeoff It was not clearly understood if this mode is already approved, since the report C5.04.0232, page 4, states that the approval of this mode will be deferred to 737800 program, although the QRH seems to permit to use this mode. Boeing position is requested to present the substantiation of this mode utilization, in order to show compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.1301. Conclusion: The CTA agrees that this information can be kept in the QRH, based in the substantiation presented in Enclosure E of letter B-T113-98-8056, received 16 November 1998. Item closed. 33 - Flight Test A flight test program must be accomplished in a Boeing 737 Next Generation (-600/ -700 /-800) representative aircraft to complete the CTA evaluation. Conclusion: The CTA flight test program has been conducted on 10 November 1998 using a B737-76N aircraft, serial number 28580. No additional findings have resulted from those tests. Item closed. Page 18 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 34 - Abused Takeoff (Applicable only to Models 737-600 and 737-800) Boeing is required to demonstrate compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.107 (e) (4), which requires that the “all engines takeoff case” with out-of-trim condition may not result in marked increases in the scheduled takeoff distances. Conclusion: Closed by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 June 2001. Item closed. 35 - Use of the ground spoilers for accelerate-stop and landing distances determination Converted into comment 09.c.11. 36 - Illuminated Passenger Information Placards Illuminated “Exit” placards over exits, aisles and dividers, to facilitate emergency egress of passengers, shall be supplied in Portuguese (or bi-lingual). The minimum letters dimensions and height/width ratio required by the regulations shall be respected for the Portuguese translation "SAÍDA". Illuminated “NO SMOKING/FASTEN SEAT BELTS” and “NO SMOKING IN LAVATORY” placards shall also be supplied in Portuguese (or bilingual). Note: See applicable translations on Annex III.a. Conclusion: Closed by FAX message dated 13 November 1998, where BOEING states that the illuminated placards above mentioned will be provided in pictorial format, except by the "EXIT" placard. CTA agrees with this position. Item closed. 37 - Slide Operation In order to emphasize the comments already presented in finding 09.a.05, for the B737-300, -400 and -500, the CTA requires that the BOEING guarantees the installation of that required placard instructing the crew to inflate slide manually. Note: See the applicable translation on Annex III.a. Conclusion: Closed by FAX message dated 17 November 1998. Item closed. 38 - Flight Crew Emergency Exits The dimensions of the flight crew emergency exits do not comply with the minimum established by the regulations RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.807 (f). BOEING is required to show compliance with this requirement. Note: See also finding 09.a.06 of this report Conclusion: Closed by FAX message B-PFFG-PS98-C094, dated 17 November 1998, which presented the BOEING report D410N414, Rev. B. Therefore the 737-600/-700/-800 models compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.807(f) is accepted by the CTA based on similarity to the 757-200 with presents a smaller window opening area. Item closed. 39 - Bird Impact on the Aircraft Structure and Empennage Comparing to the comments already presented in finding 09.a.12, for the B737-300, -400 and -500, the CTA has reviewed and accepted the 4 lb. bird impact substantiation for the entire aircraft. However, the CTA requires BOEING to present a rationale for not choosing the latest amendments associated to 8 lb bird impact in the aircraft empennage. Conclusion: CTA exemption to section RBHA/14 CFR Part25.631 will be based in the rationale presented by Enclosure F of letter B-T113-98-8056, received 16 November 1998, which refers to the FAA Certification Basis and Issue Paper G-1. Item closed. Page 19 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 40 - Cargo Compartment / Retention of Cargo No substantiation was found regarding to the cargo net capability to prevent the contents in the cargo compartments from becoming hazard by shifting under the applicable flight and ground loads conditions. BOEING is required to provide this substantiation, in order to show compliance with the section RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.787(b). Conclusion: Closed based in the commitment established by BOEING in FAX message dated 17 November 1998. BOEING is requested to sent copies of reports D101A801-58 and D453A018, when revised, in order to demonstrate that the fuselage is capable to withstand the above mentioned loads, resulting from the cargo shifting due to the absence of the cargo net. The CTA agrees with the considerations submitted by Fax message dated 12 November 1998, where the cargo net installation can be considered not necessary based in the weight and balance changes consequences. Item closed. 41 - Aileron Mass Balance Weight Attachments The structural substantiation for the aileron mass balance weight attachments was not presented during the B737-600/-700/-800 process of the validation. BOEING is required to show compliance with the section RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.629(c), regarding to this attachment. Conclusion: Closed based in FAX message dated 13 November 1998. Item closed. 42 - Vibration and Buffeting (Applicable only to Models 737-600 and 737-800) Considering the substantiation presented to show compliance with the section RBHA/14 CFR Part 25. 305(e) is applicable only to B737-700 model, the substantiation reports applicable to B737-600 and -800 models are required to be presented to CTA for evaluation. Conclusion: Closed by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 June 2001. Item closed. 43 - Single reverse controllability during landing in wet runways No evidence has been shown that during landing in wet runways either the engines will not stop or that the aircraft is controllable in the ground under single or dual reverser application. Compliance with this requirement is usually shown during the water ingestion tests performed in accordance with section RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.1091(d) (2), however, this has not been the case. Therefore BOEING is required to address the aircraft controllability, with asymmetric thrust during landing in a wet runaway. Note: See also finding 09.a 29 of this report Conclusion: (Only for models 737-600 and -700) by Report D541A002 Sections C1.26.0039 and C1.26.0051, forwarded by FAX message dated 13 November 1998. Item closed. 44 - Fire detectors in the Tail Pipe Converted into comment 09.c.12. 45 - Fire extinguishing agent concentration Converted into comment 09.c.13. 46 - Deleted. Page 20 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 47 - Markings and Placards All the Markings and Placards categories indicated in section 8, as necessary to be translated to the Portuguese, must be provided by Boeing, in order to permit the CTA to determine the final wordings to be used and included in annex 3 of this report. A complete drawings set for all these placards, including their location at the aircraft, in order to define the placards intention must be submitted to the CTA. Conclusion: Closed By CTA Fax message 1823/HES/98 dated 17 December 1998. Item closed. 48 - Seat Cushions/seat back flammability tests Boeing is requested to present for CTA review, the “as delivered seat cushion/seat back configuration” as well the test specimen configurations used for vertical flammability tests. Refers to RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.853(a) and Appendix F, Part I, item (b)(2). Conclusion: Closed based in the commitment established by BOEING in FAX message dated 19 November 1998. BOEING is requested to send copies of "seat flammability test results" reports from Weber Aircraft, in order to show the compliance with the above-mentioned requirements. (BOEING commits to finalize this task before beginning of revenue flights). Item closed. 49 - 737-700 IGW Series- Engine Type Certificate Boeing has applied the model 737-7BC (IGW) for Brazilian validation through the letter M-AB0H-03-0614 dated 25 Nov. 2003. This model has the engines CFM567B27/B3 installed. In order to comply with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.903(a), this CFM engine model is required to be certified in Brazil Status: CTA has received the application for Brazilian validation through the CFM letter 56/DJB/00604 dated 04 February 2004 and CTA have provided the guidelines to CFM through the CTA letter 193/FDH/2004 dated 16 Feb. 2004. CFM has responded by e-mail message dated 09 March 2004 and CTA has included this engine type in the Brazilian TC no. 1999T09 on 10 March 2004. Item Closed. 50 - The items below represents CTA concerns in respect to Supplemental Type Certificate (STC# ST00936NY) installed in the B737-700 IGW model which must be solved prior the aircraft S/N 32575 (YG040) delivery to Brazil. a) SFAR 88 Compliance: Pats Inc. indicated that changes to the Type design along with Periodic Inspections on system components will be required to comply with the intent of SFAR 88 Requirement. Although during the technical discussions, the philosophy adopted by Pats Inc. to develop the SFAR 88 analysis had been discussed, it was identified that the required changes and inspections, are not still cleared documented. In order to allow CTA be acquainted with the these changes and inspections, PATS Inc. is required to prepare and make available to the CTA, a list with all needed actions indicated by SFAR 88 analysis. Pats Inc. is required, as well, to present for each change and inspection, a description and the reasoning behind each one. Page 21 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Conclusion: PATS Inc. to submit to the CTA a list with the SFAR 88 changes and inspections along with the description and rationale for each one. This list has been sent on e-mail message dated 17 March 2004 from Mr. William Ertle PATS Inc. and is part of the CHST 2004S03-06, CTA process H.02-2259-0. Item Closed. b) FCAR HPR 01 – Management of Fuel Usage and Loading During the discussions with Pats representatives it was identified that, although the aircraft CG may change in flight, and in some failure conditions to outside the approved CG travel envelope, the fuel management system was not designed to control aircraft CG. The concept adopted, is that will be pilot’s responsibility keeps the CG travel within approved envelope. The pilot will rely on the system to keep the CG enveloped. CTA released the FCAR HPR 01 to indicate to PATS Inc. the concerns raised and the substantiation required to accept the fuel management system. The FCAR was issued by the CTA on its stage 1 on 05 March 2004. Conclusion: PATS Inc. to respond to the CTA. FAA to provide a position. PATS Inc. position has been provide on 17 March 2004 and FAA NYACO position has been provided on 18 March 2004. These positions were included in the respective sections of the FCAR. The FCAR was closed in the stage 4 on 19 March 2004. Item closed. c) Markings and Placards PATS Inc. is required to submit for CTA review a Report or Service Bulletin with all the Markings and Placards related to the auxiliary fuel pressure fuelling system in Portuguese along with the applicable installation drawings. Conclusion: Pats Inc. to provide the document number by 09 March 2004 and the document itself by 12 March 2004. Pats Inc. has presented the Service Bulletin SB_BBJ-28-109_A, Revision A dated 16 March 2004, including the revised placards. Item Closed. 51 - The items below represents CTA concerns in respect to Supplemental Type Certificate (STC# LBA.21E2.TA0307 and # ST01381NY) installed in the B737700 IGW model which must be solved prior the aircraft S/N 32575 (YG040) delivery to Brazil. a) FCAR HES 01 – Emergency Exit Locator Signs The VIP executive interior configuration for the B737-700 IGW aircraft approved by LBA STC includes the emergency exit locator signs in English language. According to the RBHA 21.29 (a)(3) all the marking and placard addressed to the passengers should be presented in the Portuguese language. This FCAR is issued as an acceptable means of compliance for the acceptance of emergency exit locator sign in English language. Conclusion: The STC Holder, Lufthansa Technik, position is established on the letter HAM TO/L Li, dated 18 February 2004. As the primary certification authority, the LBA position is established on the reference letter V-M111/M11502/04 dated 18 February 2004. The FAA concur with assessment and rationale contained within this FCAR. FAA letter 100S-04-44 dated 5 March 2004. The FCAR was closed in the stage 4 on 18 March 2004. Item closed. Page 22 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 b) Internal Markings and Placards Considering that for the Brazilian aircraft the Markings and Placards related to the passengers information need to be presented in Portuguese Language, the STC Holder, Lufthansa Technik, Engenieering Bulletin no. 737-EB11-0024 Revision 1 dated 21 January 2004, which presents the Portuguese Placards translations will be referred in the Brazilian CHST (STC). In order to reflect the correct Portuguese Placards translations the below referred placards are required to be revised as following: PLACARD P/N FFKPL113000214 ENGLISH GUARDE OS ITENS SOLTOS E MANTENHA TODAS AS PORTAS E GAVETAS FECHADAS DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO FFKPL113000302 O BOX DEVE ESTAR DESOCUPADO E A PORTA FECHADA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO BOTE SALVA-VIDAS COM TRANSMISSOR NO INTERIOR BOTE SALVA-VIDAS COM TRANSMISSOR NO INTERIOR MANTENHA A PORTA ABERTA E TRAVADA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO PROIBIDO FUMAR NO TOALETE MANTENHA A PORTA FECHADA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO FFKPL113000306 FFKPL113000307 FFKPL113000002 FFKPL113000005 FFKPL113000006 FECHE E TRAVE TODAS AS PORTAS, PRATELEIRAS E GAVETAS DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO A MESA DEVE ESTAR FECHADA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO O SOFÁ-CAMA DEVE SER CONVERTIDO EM DIVÃ DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO COLETE SALVA-VIDAS EMBAIXO DO ASSENTO ESTE ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR DESOCUPADO DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO FFKPL113000012 FFKPL113000014 FFKPL113000020 FFKPL113000022 FFKPL113000023 PORTUGUESE FOR TAXI TAKEOFF AND LANDING Page 23 of 45 DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO, O ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR VOLTADO PARA FRENTE NA POSIÇÃO MAIS ATRÁS COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NO DESCANSO DAS PERNAS DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO, O ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 PLACARD P/N ENGLISH PORTUGUESE SEAT MUST BE AFT FACING IN FWD POSITION WITH HEADREST FULLY EXTENDED LIVE VEST IN SEAT BASE VOLTADO PARA TRÁS NA POSIÇÃO MAIS A FRENTE COM O APOIO DE CABEÇA ESTENDIDO COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NA BASE DO ASSENTO DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO, O ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR VOLTADO PARA FRENTE NA POSIÇÃO MAIS ATRÁS COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NA BASE DO ASSENTO FECHAR E AMARRAR DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO FFKPL113000024 FFKPL113000025 FFKPL113000026 FFKPL113000027 A JANELA DEVE ESTAR ABERTA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO FIRST AID KIT EMERGENCY MEDICAL KIT DEFIBRILLATOR KIT OXYGEN BOTTLE INSIDE FFKPL113000033 NÃO OCUPAR A CAMA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO COLOQUE O CINTO DE SEGURANÇA AO DEITAR A FAIXA DEVE ESTAR CRUZADA NA JANELA QUANDO A ESCORREGADEIRA ESTIVER ARMADA FFKPL113000034 FFKPL113000037 GUARDE OS ITENS SOLTOS E MANTENHA TODAS AS PORTAS E GAVETAS FECHADAS DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO FFKPL113000037 GUARDE OS ITENS SOLTOS E MANTENHA TODAS AS PORTAS E GAVETAS FECHADAS DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO FFKPL113000039 DESLOQUE A MESA PARA O CORREDOR, DOBRE E AMARRE A PONTA DA MESA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NA BASE DO ASSENTO DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM, E POUSO: CONVERTER SOFÁ-CAMA EM DIVÃ EMBUTIR COMPLETAMENTE A MESA COLETE SALVA-VIDAS EMBAIXO DO ASSENTO PUXAR EM EMERGÊNCIA FFKPL113000040 FFKPL113000043 Page 24 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 PLACARD P/N FFKPL113000044 ENGLISH GUARDE A MESA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO PESO MÁXIMO 22,7 KG (50 LB) DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO: A PORTA DEVE ESTAR ABERTA E TRAVADA, QUANDO OCUPADO FECHADA QUANDO DESOCUPADO PROIBIDO FUMAR NO TOALETE MANTENHA A PORTA ABERTA E TRAVADA DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO MESA DE SERVIÇO NO INTERIOR FFKPL113000047 FFKPL113000048 FFKPL113000049 FFKPL113000051 FFKPL113000052 FFKPL113000056 FFKPL113000TBD PORTUGUESE FOR TAXI TAKEOFF AND LANDING SEAT MUST BE AFT FACING IN AFT POSITION WITH HEADREST FULLY EXTENDED LIVE VEST IN SEAT BASE CAUTION REMOVABLE TRASH CONTAINER MUST BE IN PLACE PRIOR TO TAXI TAKEOFF AND LANDING GUARDE O TELEFONE QUANDO NÃO EM USO APERTE AQUI PARA ABRIR “THIS PLARCARD TRANSLATION MUST BE REMOVED” DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO O ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR VOLTADO PARA TRÁS NA POSIÇÃO MAIS ATRÁS COM O APOIO DE CABEÇA ESTENDIDO COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NA BASE DO ASSENTO ATENÇÃO LIXEIRA REMOVÍVEL DEVE ESTAR NO LUGAR ANTES DO TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO Conclusion: Lufthansa Technik to revise the referred Engineering Bulletin and Boeing to revise the installed Placards in the aircraft S/N 32575. Lufthansa Technik has presented the revision 3 of the Engineering Bulletin dated 15 March 2004, including the revised placards. Item Closed. Pending items are those points of concern which will be discussed locally with the authority and which may be converted into a finding, a comment or deleted. 01 - Ditching Investigation Converted into comment 09.c.14. 02 - Deleted. Page 25 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Comments are those points of concern which do not need to be solved before the issuance of the Brazilian TC, but they are listed to indicate to the manufacturer that eventual future design or substantiation development, which may solve the particular issue, shall be included in the Brazilian approved type design or substantiation, after CTA review; also may indicate policies to be followed by the CTA in future certification processes. No retrofit action for aircraft already delivered is envisaged in respect to those improvements unless the need is dictated by safety problems found in service. Comments 01 through 05 are applicable only to Models 737-300, -400 and -500: 01 - Flight Crew Emergency Exits The dimensions of the flight crew emergency exits, which do not comply with the minimum established by the regulations (25.805), are criticized. 02 - Bird Impact on the Aircraft Structure and Empennage The CTA realizes that the aircraft certification basis do not include requirements on this subject, however, as many amendments were applied to the design changes incorporated into the –300 model, it would be desirable that the aircraft behavior regarding bird impact, mainly in the nose, leading edges and empennage, were investigated. 03 - Ditching Investigation A limited ditching investigation was conducted for the –300 model, which included floatation analysis and pressure loads calculations developed from NASA papers and 14 CFR Part 25 seaplane requirements. The section 25.801 asks for model tests or comparison with similar aircrafts configurations with known ditching characteristics. In actual model tests is possible to determine the stability and floatation characteristics, failure modes of aircraft components (nacelles, flaps, etc), as well as, the pressure distribution on lower fuselage and wings, which may be significantly different from those for hulls, for instance. The CTA criticizes the ditching investigation analysis. 04 - Engine vibration indicators The fact that the engine vibration indicators do not have a maximum limit is criticized. 05 - Equipment cooling switch On the forward overhead panel all switches but the equipment cooling switch are forward for normal position. (Criticism only). Comments 06 through 15 are applicable only to Models 737-600, -700 and -800: 06 - Deleted. 07 - Fuselage and Empennage Damage Tolerance Assessment The CTA does not totally agree with the categorization of the fuselage and empennages as “unmodified” structure. A serial of non-significant changes in Principal Structure Elements (PSE’s) of the fuselage, as well as the increasing in the empennages spans in more than 10%, combined with the increasing in maximum operating altitudes and some fatigue loads 20% greater in magnitude can have cumulative effect in the structure damage tolerance characteristics. Page 26 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Since this issue was extensively discussed, according to Issue Paper A-7, and a structural inspection program is already scheduled to be completed by October 1999, based on a damage tolerance assessment, the CTA will accept this agreement in the basis of the FAA approval, but will reserve the right to review and approve the substantiation data to support this inspection program determination, when it is completed. BOEING is requested to establish a commitment to submit to CTA the Damage Tolerance Analysis for both the Fuselage and Empennages. Boeing has provided comments by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 June 2001. 08 - Aeroelasticity failure cases During the CTA evaluation visit, many failure conditions have been discussed to some extent and additional new data has been requested, because the reports D101A801-50, D101A80250 and D101A803-50 do not present all the analyzed conditions. The flutter analyses with the failure conditions listed below are being required in order to show compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.629(f). The preliminary results of such analyses were presented in a draft figure and considered acceptable. These revised reports (for all the Next Generation models), including these aeroelastic analyses, are requested: - Most critical failure in the nacelle strut combined with a POWER OFF condition; - A single structural failure in the jackscrew (horizontal stabilizer) supporting structure; - One elevator Tab Rod Failure combined with a POWER OFF condition; and - A reduction in stiffness due to a bird impact in the horizontal stabilizer. Boeing has provided comments by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 June 2001. 09 - Cargo Compartment Placard CTA criticizes the reduced size of cargo compartment placards (installed to establish the distribution of cargo limits), since this information is not clearly visible either from the ground or even from some positions inside the cargo compartment. Boeing has provided comments by Enclosure A of letter B-T113-98-8056, received 16 November 1998. 10 - Certification Reports Status Several certification reports, scheduled to demonstrate the compliance with the Certification Basis, were presented to the CTA before final approval, and, in some cases, even not released as a final version. CTA requests that BOEING identifies if any significant design changes that should be raised in the future, due to the completion of this formal approval process. 11 - Use of the ground spoilers for accelerate-stop and landing distances determination According to RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.109 (b) (1) and 25.125 (b) (3) (i), additional means other than wheel brakes may be used to determine the accelerate-stop and landing distance respectively, if that means is safe and reliable. The CTA policy considers that “safe and reliable” corresponds to an improbable failure condition (10E-05 or less). Boeing is requested to show that the failure of this system during these two flight phases complies with the CTA policy. The rationale has been presented by Mr. David Weller to CTA during the final meeting, at BOEING facilities, in 02 October 1998. Page 27 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 12 - Fire detectors in the Tail Pipe The RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.1203 requires fire detection to be installed in the tail pipe sections of turbine installations. Since no fire detectors are installed in engine tail pipe sections of models B737-600, -700, -800, CTA requires BOEING to show compliance with the above section, or justify the absence of the referred detectors. The rationale has been presented by Mr. Justin Shnili to CTA during the final meeting, at BOEING facilities, in 02 October 1998. 13 - Fire extinguishing agent concentration It has been noticed that ground test have been performed by BOEING, simulating flight air flow conditions within the engine nacelle, to demonstrate compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.1195(b). Boeing is being requested to demonstrate the validity of the adopted airflow modeling. The rationale has been presented by Mr. Justin Shnili to CTA during the final meeting, at BOEING facilities, in 02 October 1998. 14 - Ditching Investigation In order to complement the comments already presented in finding 09.a.14, for the B737-300, -400 and -500, the CTA requires that the Boeing submits the Ditching Investigation Report No. D043A018-3 for the B737-800 model, in order to provide a better clarification regarding to the model tests or comparison with similar aircraft configurations with known ditching characteristics. Boeing has provided comments by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 Junee 2001. 15 - Hollingsead International STC #ST00405LA-D (LBA.21NE1.TA0682) - Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Systems Reports installed in the B-737-700 IGW model. During the discussions it was identified that some certification reports which were developed by Hollingsead International address both class “C” and “D” cargo compartments. As the class “D” is not anymore a certified configuration. Hollingsead International is suggested to revise the reports below to reflect the class “C” as the only one approved cargo compartment: - #R-6206, Rev. G, Plumbing Integrity Check Procedure #TP-1001, Rev. C, Ground/Flight Test Plan #R-6073, Rev. E, BBJ System Definition Document #R-6202, Rev. A, System Safety Report 10 - CERTIFICATION DOCUMENTS REQUIRED (New or used aircraft) Several engineering reports containing certification substantiation data, related to the Models 737-300, -400 and -500 were supplied by Boeing, reviewed by the CTA and are maintained in the CTA confidential documentation files. The following additional documents listed below are related to Models 737-600, -700 and 800, and are being required to permit the conclusion of some engineering analyses and to substantiate the CTA type design approval. Additional requests may arise from the analysis of those documents even after type certification which are assumed to be responded by BOEING: Page 28 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 a. Engineering Certification Reports and other documents: D101A801-50 - “Summary of Analytical Flutter Investigations for the 737-700 Airplane”, original issue, dated 12 November 1996; D101A802-50 - “Summary of Analytical Flutter Investigations for the 737-800 Airplane”, Rev. A, dated 04 September 1998; D101A803-50 - “Summary of Analytical Flutter Investigations for the 737-600 Airplane”, original issue, dated 18 November 1997; D101A801-51 - “Summary of Experimental Flutter Investigations for the 737-700 Airplane”, original issue, dated 30 May 1997; D101A801-9 - “Wing Damage Tolerance Analysis”, Rev. D, dated 13 August 1998; D101A801-61 - “Fail Safe Stress Analysis - Fuselage and empennage”, Rev. B, dated 10 Aug. 1998; D101A801-47 - “Structural Inspection Planning Data”, Rev. B, May 1998; D041A018-2 - “Aerodynamic Flight Test Results 737-700 with CFM International CFM56-7B Engines”, Rev. C, 21 August 1998; D101A801-24 - “Summary Data for Loads Analysis”, Rev. C, dated 29 July 1998; D6-36238 - “Passenger Seat Structural Design and Interface Criteria”, Rev. B; D6-55698 - “Design and Certification Requirements for Galleys, Closets, Stowage's, Partitions and Crew Rests”; D453A018-1 - “737-600/-700/-800 Cargo Compartment Certification Compliance Document”; D6-55441 - “Galley / Interior Furnishing Structural Requirements”, Rev. C, dated 15 April 1997; D218A018-6 - “Cargo Compartment Fire Protection System Certification Data for 727 and 737 Aircraft”, Rev A; D101A801-38 - “New material and New applications of existing materials”, Original issue, 02 February 1997; C1.33.0016 - “Control systems malfunction”; C1.35.0011 -“Effect of simulated ice shapes on handling qualities”; C2.04.0221 - “Lapse rate takeoffs for ratings and limits”; C2.04.0277 - “Engine go-around acceleration”; C5.04.0232 - “Flight management computer system”; C5.06.0308 - “Allied Signal weather radar system”; C5.06.0309 - “Collins weather radar system”; C5.09.0203 - “Black label common display system (CDS)”; C5.09.0218 - “Red label common display system (CDS)”; D361A282 - “Propulsion control system safety analysis 737-600/-700/-800”; and D361A283 - “Propulsion control system failure analysis 737-600/-700/-800”. The following Certification Flight Test Reports have already been provided for CTA review by BOEING Flight Test Group: C1.00.0026 - proof of compliance -- 14 CFR Part 25.21; C1.01.0032 - air data system certification; C1.04.0010 - minimum unstick speeds, 737-700; C1.05.0006 - rapid rotation speed determination; C1.06.0054 - takeoff performance; C1.07.0012 - abuse takeoff; Cl.09.0040 - RTO performance, BF Goodrich brakes; C1.09.0043 - RTO performance, antiskid off, BF Goodrich brakes; C1.09.0047 - RTO performance, Bendix brakes; C1.09.0048 - RTO performance, antiskid off, Bendix brakes; Page 29 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 C1.09.0049 - RTO performance, 44.5 inch tires; C1.11.0020 - ground minimum control speed; C1.11.0030 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k ground minimum control speed; C1.12.0029 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k air minimum control speed; C1.13.0043 - stall speed performance; C1.14.0038 - stall characteristics; C1.15.0039 - low speed drag performance; C1.15.0052 - low speed drag performance with revised simulated ice shapes; C1.17.0043 - check climb performance; C1.20.0060 - landing performance, BF Goodrich brakes; Cl.20.0063 - auto brake performance, BF Goodrich brakes; C1.20.0066 - landing performance, Bendix brakes; C1.20.0067 - auto brake performance, Bendix brakes; C1.20.0071 - thrust reverser effectiveness; C1.21.0050 - longitudinal control; C1.21.0051 - maneuvering capability, including out of trim; C1.22.0029 - static longitudinal stability; C1.22.0034 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k static longitudinal stability; C1.23.0007 - dynamic longitudinal stability; C1.24.0018 - lateral control; C1.25.0016 - static lateral directional stability; C1.26.0038 - directional control; C1.26.0039 - reverse thrust controllability; C1.28.0015 - dynamic lateral/directional stability; C1.29.0029 - trim characteristics; C1.29.0038 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k trim characteristics; C1.31.0031 - high speed buffet boundary demonstration; C1.32.0012 - high speed characteristics; C1.34.0038 - ground handling characteristic; C1.34.0039 - crosswind takeoff and landing; C1.35.0013 - effect of natural ice on handling qualities; C1.35.0014 - performance with natural ice; C1.35.0017 - effect of simulated ice shapes (config 1) on flaps DN handling qualities; C1.35.0018 - effect of simulated ice shapes (config 2) on flaps DN handling qualities; C1.35.0019 - effect of simulated ice shapes (config 3) on flaps UP handling qualities; C1.35.0020 - effect of simulated ice shapes (config 4) on flaps UP handling qualities; C1.38.0040 - mach trim system demonstration; C1.38.0041 - speed trim system demonstration; C1.38.0052 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k mach/speed trim system demonstration; C1.39.0080 - high lift system demonstration; C1.39.0088 - ground spoiler system demonstration; Cl.39.0093 - red label stall management/yaw damper (SMYD) demonstration; C1.39.0094 - black label stall management/yaw damper (SMYD) demonstration; C1.39.0116 - rudder system PCU evaluation (phase 2) ground test; C1.40.0019 - 737-700/800 certification demonstration flight for configuration deviation list; C2.01.0144 - in-flight starting demonstration; C2.02.0133 - engine operating characteristics; C2.02.0162 - engine operating characteristics; Page 30 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 C2.03.0123 - EEC demonstration ground test; C2.03.0124 - EEC demonstration flight test; C2.08.0117 - thrust reverser operating procedure demonstration; C4.02.0015 - flight flutter of 737-700 equipped with CFM56-7 engines; C5.01.0114 - DFCS takeoff and cruise demonstration; C5.01.0115 - single channel autopilot roll hardover demonstration; C5.01.0117 - DFCS black label demonstration; C5.01.0133 - single channel autopilot pitch hardover demonstration; C5.02.0069 - DCFS approach and autoland red label demonstration; C5.03.0128 - red label autothrottle; C5.03.0144 - black label autothrottle; C5.04.0236 - black label single U10 series FMC; C5.05.0049 - air data module/air data sensor; C5.07.0217 - ground proximity warning system (GPWS); C5.10.0085 - air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU); D019A001 - “Configuration Specification”, Rev. A, 17 April 1998; D6-38808-34 - “GECAS Detail Specification”, Rev. A, 16 July 1998; D6-24958 - “Damage Tolerance Methods and Allowables - BOOK 3”, dated May 1998; M-7360-D541 - “Maintenance Program Development Policy and Procedures Handbook”, Aug. 1995; D6-56900-1 - “AFM DPI User’s Guide”, Rev. B; D6-36230 - “Passenger Seat Design and Installation Criteria”, Rev. H, dated 20 February 1998; and D415A001 - “Galley Standard Interface Document”, Rev. C, dated 13 March 1998. a. The documents listed below are required to permit the conclusion of the analysis and to substantiate the CTA CHST’s (STC’s) approval. Additional items may arise from the analysis of those documents even after Supplemental Type Certification, which are assumed to be responded by Boeing and/or CHST’s (STC’s) holders: Documentation related with STC #ST00405LA-D (LBA.21NE1.TA0682) - Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Systems to be supplied by Hollingsead International Certification Plan – Report #2637-03 STC # LBA.21NE1.TA0682 Type Inspection Authorization – Report #16NM0067 JAA, CRI #PTC/FOX-19, issue 3, dated 20 September 1999 Hollingsead Designated Alterations Station (DAS) Procedures Manual Documentation related with STC #ST00647SE – HGS 2350 supplied by Rockwell Collins. HGS 2350 Qualification Test Pocedure – doc #9851-1304, Rev.A, dated 19 December 1997.Qualification Test Pocedure – doc #9851-1304, Rev.B, dated 19 December 1997. HGS 2350 Boeing New Generation 737-700 Cat IIIa Certification Simulation Test Plan – doc #9701-1012, Rev.A, dated 04 September 1998. HGS 2350 Certification Simulation Test Report – doc #9701-1013, Rev. A, dated 09 November 1998. HGS 2350 Cat IIIa Flight Test Certification Plan – doc #9885-0057, dated 15 September 1998. HGS 2350 Certification Flight Test Report – doc #9885-0558, Rev. A, dated 10 November1998. HGS 2350 Cat IIIa System Performance Evaluation – doc #9851-1343, Rev. A, dated 04 November 1998. Page 31 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 Documentation related with STC #ST00830SE – Winglets supplied by Aviation Partnes Boeing. List of Eligeble Aircraft Serial Number – Doc.#737-0107, Rev. L, dated 26 November2002, and Master Drawing List ( MDL)- Doc. #AP37.7-011, Rev. B1, dated 08 October 2003. Airplane Flight Manual Suplement (AFMS) -Doc.# AP37.1-0616, FAA approved 4 October 2001 (two 3 ½ floppy disks included), for –3kit blended winglets installation. Weight & Balance Control and Loading Manual Supplement, doc #AP37.7-6019, Rev. A, dated 20 August 2003. Supplement to the 737-700 IGW Structural Repair Manual, doc. #AP37.7-0615, dated 14 September 2001. Maintenance Planning Data – doc. #AP37.1-0604, Rev. D, dated December, 2003. Aircraft Maintenance Manual Part I and Part II – doc.#AP37.7-0618 Rev. B, dated July 2003. Supplemental Inspection Planning Data – doc. #AP37.1-0305, Rev. E, dated 26 February 2002. Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) – Boeing Manual #D6-32545, dated 17 November 2003. Copy of JAA STC # LBA.21NE1.TA0472, issue 1, dated 19 July 2002. Documentation related with STC #ST0936NY – Auxiliary Fuel System to be supplied by PATS INC. TO 671 – System description for BBJ auxiliary fuel TO 902 – BBJ Auxiliary Fuel System Safety assessment TO 1706 – PATS/Decrane Auxiliary Fuel System summary – SFAR 88 Compliance report TO 1519 – 737-700IGW/-800 Auxiliary Fuel System SFAR 88 Compliance report TO 1453 – Auxiliary Fuel System SFAR 88 Functional Hazard Assessment TO 662 – Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Report TO 680 – System Intrinsic Safety Report TO 800 – Plan for Software Aspects of Certification ( PSAC) TO 683 – EMI & RFI test Program TO 867 – Flight Test Results Documentation related with STC #LBA.21E2.TA0307 (FAA ST01381) – VIP Interior to be supplied by Lufthansa Technik. CR 23-00/16 – Report and Engineering Bulletins related CR 23-00/17 – Report and Engineering Bulletins related Maintenance Planning Data Supplement, doc. #A-00-01/311-MPD, Rev 00 dated 30 May 2001. Aircraft Maintenance Manual Supplement – doc # A-00-01/311-AMM, Rev 00 dated 30 May 2001. Documentation related with STC #LBA.21E2.TA0311 (FAA ST01340NY) – Tip Radome to be supplied by Lufthansa Technik. Aircraft Maintenance Manual Supplement – doc # A-34-01/349, Rev 00 dated 03 April 2001. Aircraft Maintenance Manual Supplement – doc # A-55-01/350, Rev 00 dated 03 April 2001. c. The documents listed in Annex (1) to this report. Note: This list does not refer to the documentation which must be furnished to the aircraft Operator, such as: Airframe/engine logbooks; Flight Manual; Maintenance Manuals; Parts Catalog, Wiring Diagram manual; Overhaul and Maintenance Manuals for the repairable equipment, etc. Page 32 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 d. Addresses for sending publications to ANAC: 01. Certification National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC-Brazil) Aeronautical Products Certification Branch (GGCP) Av. Cassiano Ricardo, 521 - Bloco B - 2° andar 12246-870 – São José dos Campos – SP BRAZIL Facsimile: 55 (12) 3797-2330 E-mail: [email protected] 02. Operations/Maintenance National Agency of Civil Aviation (ANAC) Operational Safety Branch (SSO) Av. Presidente Vargas, 850 – 13º andar - Centro 20.071-001 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ – BRAZIL Facsimile: 55 (21) 3501-5467 E-mail: [email protected] 11 - EXPORT ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS (New aircraft) For exporting an aircraft to Brazil, the following is required: a. For each aircraft, a FAA Export Certificate of Airworthiness, indicating that the aircraft is in compliance with the ANAC approved type design, defined by the Brazilian Type Certificate No. 8807, and stating compliance with the Brazilian Import Requirements of this report. The original Export Certificate of Airworthiness remains with the aircraft operator and a copy should be sent to the ANAC by mail. b. For each aircraft, a list of exceptions (if any) in respect to the ANAC approved type design, listed in the Export Certificate of Airworthiness above mentioned. c. For each aircraft, a list of the optional equipment installed (standard and non-standard options). 12 - EXPORT ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS (Used aircraft) The following is required, for each aircraft: a. An Export Certificate of Airworthiness from the exporting country indicating that the aircraft is in compliance with the ANAC approved type design, defined by the Brazilian Type Certificate No 8807, and stating compliance with the Brazilian Import Requirements of this report. The original Export Certificate of Airworthiness remains with the aircraft operator and a copy should be sent to the ANAC by mail. Note: For these aircraft, the ANAC approved type design corresponds to the FAA approved type design plus the special requirements listed in section 13 of this report. b. A list of exceptions (if any) in respect to the ANAC approved type design, listed in the Export Certificate of Airworthiness above mentioned. Page 33 of 45 H.10-0810-36 c. 12 April 2011 A list of the optional equipment installed (standard and non-standard options). d. A summary of the modifications and major repairs, which have been incorporated, indicating the mandatory and recommended ones due to Bombardier instructions and other incorporated by the former owners. e. Summary of the past maintenance inspections and operating hours and/or cycles since the last inspection or overhaul for the aircraft and all controlled parts. Note: For aircraft exported from third countries, the requirements of paragraphs (11) (a) and (b) above may be accomplished by the third country Export Airworthiness Certificate. 13 - BRAZILIAN IMPORT REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY Aircraft to be exported to Brazil must show compliance with the following requirements: a. The airplane must be in conformity with the approved Type Design as established in section 03 of this report or any modification must be approved in accordance with section 04. b. The Brazilian AFM, as established in section 06, must be included for delivery. c. All placards in Portuguese (or English and Portuguese), required by Annex III, must be installed in the airplane. d. An Export Certificate of Airworthiness must be issued indicating compliance with sections 11 or 12 of this report, as applicable. Page 34 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 ANNEX I a. With the first-of-a-model exported aircraft: 1. Type Certification Documents (for each approved model, e.g.: 3YO, 5Q8, etc): Revised FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet A16WE (indicating approval of subject model). 2. Following Manuals and Publications (for the first approved model) and its updatings: Airplane Flight Manual (including the applicable DPI floppy disks); Airplane Operating Manual; Quick Reference Handbook; Weight and Balance Manual; Aircraft Maintenance Manual; Corrosion Prevention Manual; Service Bulletin and Airworthiness Directives Collection; Master Minimum Equipment List; Dispatch Procedures Deviation Guide; Maintenance Review Board Report; Maintenance Planning Document; Structural Repair Manual; Parts Catalog Handbook; Maintenance Training Manuals; System Schematic Manual D6-80804. Note 1: Two copies are required, one for the ANAC/GGCP and another for the ANAC, including amendment services. Note 2: ANAC are able to receive all publications not only in paper form, but also in PC compatible CD-ROM (preferred) or floppy disk, microfiche and microfilm. So far, only the Airplane Flight Manual must be provided in paper form. Note 3: Aircraft Components Maintenance Manuals, prepared by the vendors, may be required as needed. b. Individual Aircraft documents: (to be supplied to the ANAC for each aircraft exported to Brazil) 1. List of modifications incorporated in respect to the originally approved type design. 2. Statement of Compliance with FAA Airworthiness Directives Page 35 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 ANNEX II (Brazilian Airplane Flight Manual Supplement- front-page model) THE BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP B737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700 AND -800 AIRCRAFT MODELS BRAZILIAN AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT This Supplement is hereby approved by the FAA on behalf of the “Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil” for Brazilian registered aircraft, in accordance with the “Regulamentos Brasileiros de Homologação Aeronáutica” (RBHA) 21, Section 21.29. Doc no__________________ Approved by: ______________________________________________ (FAA representative) Date: ____________________________________________________ Aircraft Registration: ________________________________________ Aircraft Serial Number: ______________________________________ This Aircraft shall be operated in accordance with the limitation and instructions herein established. Page 36 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 ANNEX III MARKINGS AND PLACARDS TRANSLATION The following Markings and Placards Translation must be installed in the aircraft model, as applicable: a. Internal Markings ENGLISH PORTUGUESE NO SMOKING LIFE VEST UNDER FRONT OF YOUR SEAT FASTEN SEAT BELT EXIT RETURN TO SEAT EMERGENCY FOR CREW USE ONLY SOFT ARTICLES ONLY OPEN (INDICATING FINAL POSITION) FASTEN SEAT BELT WHILE SEATED DOOR MUST BE CLOSED AND LATCHED DURING TAKEOFF AND LANDING FASTEN CURTAIN OPEN DURING TAKEOFF AND LANDING NO SMOKING IN LAVATORY LIFE VEST INSIDE LIFE VEST BEHIND YOUR SEAT BACK PULL PUSH NO CIGARRETE DISPOSAL INFANT LIFE VEST INSIDE ESCAPE STRAP RED STRAP MUST BE ACROSS WINDOW WHEN SLIDE IS ENGAGED SLIDE INSIDE SLIDE INFLATES AUTOMATICALLY WHEN DOOR IS ENGAGED CLOSET LOAD LIMIT LATCH CLOSED LOAD LIMIT LOAD LIMIT LOAD LIMIT FOR LOOSE ARTICLES NÃO FUME COLETE SALVA-VIDAS SOB O ASSENTO DE SUA POLTRONA USE CINTOS SAÍDA RETORNE À SUA POLTRONA EMERGÊNCIA APENAS PARA USO DA TRIPULAÇÃO APENAS OBJETOS MACIOS ABERTA USE CINTOS DURANTE O VÔO A PORTA DEVE SER MANTIDA FECHADA E TRAVADA DURANTE O POUSO E DECOLAGEM MANTENHA A CORTINA ABERTA DURANTE O POUSO E DECOLAGEM NÃO FUME NO LAVATÓRIO COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NO INTERIOR COLETE SALVA-VIDAS ATRÁS DO ENCOSTO DA POLTRONA PUXE EMPURRE NÃO JOGUE CIGARROS COLETE SALVA-VIDAS PARA CRIANÇAS NO INTERIOR CORDA PARA EVACUAÇÃO COLOCAR A FITA VERMELHA CRUZANDO A JANELA QUANDO A ESCORREGADEIRA ESTIVER ARMADA ESCORREGADEIRA NO INTERIOR A ESCORREGADEIRA INFLARÁ AUTOMATICAMENTE QUANDO CONECTADA À AERONAVE COM A PORTA ABERTA CARGA LIMITE NO COMPARTIMENTO LIMITE DE CARGA COM PORTA FECHADA LIMITE DE CARGA LIMITE DE CARGA PARA OBJETOS SOLTOS Page 37 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 ENGLISH PORTUGUESE USE SEAT BOTTOM CUSHION FOR FLOATATION PULL TO INFLATE (ON SLIDE) (no English placard equivalent) IN EMERGENCY, USE MANUAL INFLATION IF SLIDE DOES NOT INFLATE AUTOMATICALLY (on all type I doors) USE O ASSENTO DA POLTRONA PARA FLUTUAÇÃO PUXE PARA INFLAR EM EMERGÊNCIA, USE INFLAÇÃO MANUAL SE A ESCORREGADEIRA NÃO INFLAR AUTOMATICAMENTE External placards on doors ENGLISH PORTUGUESE EMERGENCY EXIT SAÍDA DE EMERGÊNCIA (To be installed near the emergency exit, only for models 737-300, -400 and -500): EMERGENCY EXIT PRESS TO SAÍDA DE EMERGÊNCIA EMPURRE PARA DESTRAVAR EMPURRE A JANELA PARA DENTRO E LEVANTE-A UNLATCH PUSH HATCH INWARD AND LIFT UP (To be installed near the emergency exit, only for models 737-600, -700 and -800): WARNING HOLD DOOR WITH YOUR BODY PUSH VENT DOOR MAKE DOOR OPEN UP SLOWLY OR SERIOUS INJURY CAN OCCUR ATENÇÃO SEGURE A JANELA COM SEU CORPO, EMPURRE O FLAPETE E DEIXE-A ABRIR LENTAMENTE POIS HÁ O RISCO DE FERIMENTOS (To be installed near the emergency exit, only for models 737-600, -700 and -800): EMERGENCY EXIT ONLY PUSH TO OPEN DOORS OPENS OUT AND UP AUTOMATICALLY EMERGENCY EXIT PUSH WINDOW AND PULL RELEASE PULL OUT TO ENGAGE HANDLE ROTATE AS SHOWN ABOVE, PULL DOOR OUTWARD PULL PUSH EXIT CAUTION WHEN RED FLAG SHOWS IN WINDOW AUTOMATIC ESCAPE SLIDE IS ARMED STAND CLEAR WHEN OPENING DOOR OPEN (INDICATING MOVEMENT) SAÍDA DE EMERGÊNCIA EMPURRE PARA ABRIR A JANELA ABRE AUTOMATICAMENTE PARA FORA E PARA CIMA SAÍDA DE EMERGÊNCIA PARA ABRIR, PUXE A MANOPLA E EMPURRE A JANELA PUXE PARA ENGATAR A ALAVANCA GIRE COMO INDICADO ACIMA PUXE A PORTA PARA FORA PUXE EMPURRE SAÍDA CUIDADO QUANDO A FAIXA VERMELHA APARECER O ESCORREGADOR ESTÁ ARMADO MANTENHA A ÁREA LIVRE QUANDO ABRIR A PORTA ABRIR Page 38 of 45 H.10-0810-36 c. 12 April 2011 External Placards on Cargo and Service Doors ENGLISH PORTUGUESE CAUTION HANDLE MUST BE IN UNLOCKED POSITION TO CLOSE DOOR UNLOCKED LOCKED PULL & ROTATE TO UNLOCK OPEN RETURN HANDLE TO OPEN POSITION BEFORE CLOSING DOOR DWG BAC27DPA506 (English) CUIDADO A ALAVANCA DEVE ESTAR NA POSIÇÃO DESTRAVADA PARA FECHAR A PORTA DESTRAVADO TRAVADO PUXE E GIRE PARA DESTRAVAR ABRIR RECOLOQUE A ALAVANCA NA POSIÇÃO ABERTA ANTES DE FECHAR A PORTA DWG BAC27DPA5107 (Portuguese) EMPURRE AQUI PARA ABRIR: 1. SOLTE A ALAVANCA E GIRE ATÉ A POSIÇÃO ABERTA 2. EMPURRE PARA CIMA A LATERAL DA PORTA ATÉ QUE ESTA TRAVE NO MECANISMO DESLIZANTE 3. EMPURRE A PORTA E O MECANISMO, PARA CIMA E PARA O LADO ATÉ O ENGAJAMENTO DA TRAVA DE FINAL DE CURSO PARA FECHAR: 1. SOLTE A TRAVA DE FINAL DE CURSO E DEIXE A PORTA E O MECANISMO DESLIZANTE MOVEREM-SE PARA BAIXO ATÉ QUE A HASTE DE LIBERAÇÃO DA TRAVA DA PORTA CONTACTE A ESTRUTURA E A PORTA SE SEPARE DO MECANISMO 2. PUXE PARA BAIXO PELA ALAVANCA PARA COMPRIMIR O SELO E ENTÃO GIRE-A 180 PARA TRAVAR A PORTA EMPURRE A ALAVANCA ATÉ QUE ELA FIQUE FACEANDO O REVESTIMENTO DA PORTA NA POSIÇÃO TRAVADA ABRIR Page 39 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 d. Cargo Compartment placards ENGLISH DWG BAC27DPA4997 PORTUGUESE CARREGAMENTO O CARREGAMENTO NESTE COMPARTIMENTO NÃO DEVE EXCEDER QUALQUER DOS SEGUINTES VALORES: 1) 3 469 kgf (7 648 1bf) CARGA TOTAL 2) 733 kgf/m2 (150 1bf/ft2) NA ÁREA HORIZONTAL 3) 2337 kgf (5152 1bf) DA BHD (727 + 4) ATÉ A ESTAÇÃO 792. 414 kgf (912 1bf) DA ESTAÇÃO 792 ATÉ A ESTAÇÃO 849. 718 kgf (1584 1bf) DA ESTAÇÃO 849 ATÉ BHD 948. CUIDADO: PARA DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE CARGA VEJA MANUAL DE PESO E BALANCEAMENTO. DWG BAC27DPA4996 NOTA: VEJA O “MAINTENANCE HANDBOOK” PARA DETERMINAR A CAPACIDADE DE CARGA DOS “TRACKS”. CARREGAMENTO O CARREGAMENTO NESTE COMPARTIMENTO NÃO DEVE EXCEDER QUALQUER DOS SEGUINTES VALORES: 1) 2 269 kgf (5 002 1bf) CARGA TOTAL 2) 733 kgf/m2 (150 1bf/ft2) NA ÁREA HORIZONTAL. 3) 763 kgf (1 682 1bf) DA BDH 380 ATÉ A ESTAÇÃO 438. 388 kgf (855 1bf) DA ESTAÇÃO 438 ATÉ A ESTAÇÃO 495. 1 118 kgf (2 465 1bf) DA ESTAÇÃO 495 ATÉ BHD 500D CUIDADO: PARA DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE CARGA VEJA MANUAL DE PESO E BALANCEAMENTO. NOTA: VEJA O “MAINTENANCE HANDBOOK” PARA DETERMINAR A CAPACIDADE DE CARGA DOS “TRACKS”. Page 40 of 45 H.10-0810-36 e. 12 April 2011 Miscellaneous External Placards ENGLISH DWG BAC27DPA4996 PORTUGUESE ATENÇÃO MANTENHA-SE AFASTADO DAS ÁREAS PERIGOSAS ENQUANTO O MOTOR ESTIVER FUNCIONANDO (Only for models 737-300, -400 and -500): DWG BAC27DPA504 CUIDADO SENSOR DELICADO. MANUSEIE COM CUIDADO WARNING ATENÇÃO HOT AIR EXHAUST EXAUSTÃO DE AR QUENTE WARNING ATENÇÃO STAY CLEAR OF DOOR FIQUE AFASTADO DA PORTA WHEN QUANDO A LUZ VERMELHA RED LIGHT IS ON ESTIVER ACESA NO STEP DWG BAC27XSTN192 DWG 141A6401 (AIRSTAIR DOOR) WATER SERVICE PANEL DRAIN VALVE P/N OGCL4-97108859-023 FILL VALVE P/N BAC27NPA1391 WATER FILL CONECTION FUELING STATION P/N 0GCL4-95148505-027 CLOSED P/N 0GCL4-99108859-025 PULL HANDLE TO OPEN PUSH HANDLE TO CLOSE (VALVE MUST BE CLOSED IN FLIGHT) P/N BAC27DPA5129 MAXIMUM FILLING PRESSURE SHALL BE 55 PSI 3.8 KG/CM2 NÃO PISE PERIGO CUIDADO: OPERAÇÃO EXTERNA DA ESCADA ESCAMOTEÁVEL RECOLHA O CORRIMÃO DE EXTENSÃO ANTES DE RECOLHER A ESCADA. A ESCADA DEVERÁ SER TRAVADA NA POSIÇÃO DOBRADA DURANTE O RECOLHIMENTO. PAINEL DE SERVIÇO DE ÁGUA DRENO VÁLVULA DE ABASTECIMENTO CONEXÃO PARA ABASTECIMENTO DE ÁGUA ESTAÇÃO DE ABASTECIMENTO FECHADO PUXE A ALAVANCA PARA ABRIR EMPURRE A ALAVANCA PARA FECHAR (AS VÁLVULAS DEVEM ESTAR FECHADAS EM VÔO) PRESSÃO MÁXIMA DE ABASTECIMENTO 55 PSI 3.8 KG/CM2 Page 41 of 45 H.10-0810-36 f. 12 April 2011 Fuel System External Placards (only for Models 737-300, -400 and -500): PORTUGUESE INSTRUÇÕES PARA ABASTECIMENTO 1) INSTALE O FIO TERRA. A SEGUIR REMOVA A TAMPA E ACOPLE OS BOCAIS DE ABASTECIMENTO. 2) TESTE OS INSTRUMENTOS E AS LUZES DE POSIÇÃO DAS VÁLVULAS. 3) POSICIONE OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTROLE DAS VÁLVULAS DE ABASTECIMENTO DOS TANQUES EM “OPEN”. VERIFIQUE A ABERTURA DAS VÁLVULAS ATRAVÉS DO ACENDIMENTO DAS LUZES AZUIS 4) POSICIONE OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTROLE DAS VÁLVULAS DE ABASTECIMENTO DOS TANQUES EM “CLOSED” QUANDO ATINGIR A QUANTIDADE DESEJADA DE COMBUSTÍVEL. MANTENHA A PRESSÃO DA FONTE DE ABASTECIMENTO E VERIFIQUE QUE TODO O FLUXO DE COMBUSTÍVEL PARA A AERONAVE TENHA CESSADO. DESLIGUE A FONTE DE ABASTECIMENTO, DESACOPLE O BOCAL DE TANQUEIO, RECOLOQUE A TAMPA E DESLIGUE O FIO TERRA. 5) TODOS OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTROLE DAS VÁLVULAS DE ABASTECIMENTO DOS TANQUES DEVEM ESTAR NA POSIÇÃO “CLOSED” ANTES DO VÔO E TODAS AS LUZES AZUIS DEVERÃO ESTAR APAGADAS. CERTIFIQUESE QUE OS BULBOS DESTAS LUZES ESTEJAM FUNCIONANDO. Page 42 of 45 H.10-0810-36 g. 12 April 2011 Fuel System External Placards (only for Models 737-600, -700 and -800): ENGLISH BAC27DFS251 PORTUGUESE CUIDADO BAC27DFS252 BAC27DFS266 NÃO EXCEDA 55 PSI/379 Kpa DE PRESSÃO DE COMBUSTÍVEL ABASTEÇA A AERONAVE COM JET FUEL SPEC. GED50TF2 SENSOR DE TEMPERATURA DE COMBUSTÍVEL TANQUE 1 ATERRE AQUI CUIDADO BAC27DFS250 NÃO EXCEDA 55 PSID/379 Kpa DE PRESSÃO DE COMBUSTÍVEL ABASTEÇA ESSA AERONAVE COM JET FUEL SPEC. GED50TF2 NÃO USE COMBUSTÍVEIS CLASSE B/GED50TF2, JET B OU JP-4. CAPACIDADE UTILIZÁVEL DE COMBUSTÍVEL BAC27DFS253 TANQUE N 1 BAC27DFS249 TANQUE CENTRAL TANQUE N 2 1 288 GALOES U.S. 4 299 GALOES U.S. 1 288 GALOES U.S. 4 875 LITROS 16 272 LITROS 4 875 LITROS INSTRUCÕES PARA ABASTECIMENTO INSTALE O FIO TERRA. REMOVA A TAMPA E ACOPLE O BOCAL DE ABASTECIMENTO. MOVA O INTERRUPTOR PARA A POSICÃO “TEST GAGES” – CONFIRME QUE OS MOSTRADORES SUPERIOR E INFERIOR INDICAM 88888888. PRESSIONE AS LUZES AZUIS “VALVE POSITION LIGHTS" - CONFIRME QUE AS LUZES ACENDEM. MOVA OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTRÔLE DAS VÁLVULAS DE ABASTECIMENTO DOS TANQUES PARA A POSICÃO “OPEN”. INICIE O ABASTECIMENTO. CUIDADO: SE OS INDICADORES SUPERIORES COMEÇAREM A PISCAR ISSO INDICA QUE A CAPACIDADE MAXIMA DO TANQUE FOI EXCEDIDA. INTERROMPA O ABASTECIMENTO. MOVA OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTRÔLE DAS VÁLVULAS DE ABASTECIMENTO PARA A POSIÇÃO “CLOSED” QUANDO O ABASTECIMENTO ATINGIR O NÍVEL MÁXIMO OU A QUANTIDADE DESEJADA. REMOVA A MANGUEIRA E O ATERRAMENTO. VERIFIQUE SE TODOS OS INTERRUPTORES ESTÃO EM “OFF” E QUE AS LUZES AZUIS SE APAGARAM. NOTA: LUZ AZUL INDICA VALVULA ENERGIZADA ABERTA PARA ABASTECIMENTO. Page 43 of 45 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 ANNEX IV THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATES – CHST’s (STC’s) LISTED BELOW, ISSUED AND APPROVED BY FAA (USA) OR LBA (GERMANY), APPLICABLE TO THE B-737-700 IGW MODEL AND ISTALLED BY BOEING OR STC’S HOLDERS, ARE VALIDATED BY ANAC. CTA PROJECT NUMBER H.02-2246-0 H.02-2257-0 H.02-2263-0 STC NUMBER DESCRIPTION OF TYPE DESIGN CHANGE ST00405LA-D AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT (AFMS) Installation of Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression AFMS No. 20629 REV. A, dated System Lower Cargo Compartments in accordance 12 November 1999 (FAA) with Hollingsead International Master Data List No. LBA.21NE1.TA06 12106, Rev. R dated 03 November 2003 82 (LBA) LBA.21E2.TA031 Structural Provisions for installation of Vertical AFMS No. A-55-01/331, REV. 1 (LBA) Stabilizer Tip Radome in accordance with Lufthansa B, dated 04 June 2002 Technik Supplemental Type Definition document No. ST01340NY STDD55-00/01M, Issue 2, dated 22 March 2001 (FAA) ST00647SE Installation of the Head-up Guidance System (HGS) AFMS No. 9701-1044, REV. C model 2350 in accordance with installation Rockwell dated 12 March 1999 Collins Aerospace – Flight Dynamics Division Drawing List 9701-1001, Rev AE dated 27 August 2003. Page 44 of 45 CHST No. 2004S03-01 2004S03-02 2004S03-03 H.10-0810-36 12 April 2011 THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATES – CHST’s (STC’s) LISTED BELOW, ISSUED AND APPROVED BY FAA (USA) OR LBA (GERMANY), APPLICABLE TO THE B-737-700 IGW MODEL AND ISTALLED BY BOEING OR STC’S HOLDERS, ARE VALIDATED BY ANAC (cont.) CTA PROJECT NUMBER H.02-2256-0 STC NUMBER DESCRIPTION OF TYPE DESIGN CHANGE LBA.21E2.TA030 Installation of a VIP Executive Interior in accordance 7 (LBA) with Lufthansa Technik Supplement Type Definition documents No. STDD00-00/02M, Issue 04, dated 24 ST01381NY August 2001. (FAA) H.02-2258-0 ST00830SE H.02-2259-0 ST00936NY Installation of Winglets, wing structural reinforcement and related system changes in accordance with Aviation Partners Boeing Master Drawing List No. AP37.7-0611, Rev A, dated 24 September 2001. Installation of Configuration 3E for Seven Cell Auxiliary Fuel System in the forward and aft cargo compartments in accordance with PATS, Inc. Master Drawing List no. BBJ007, REV N, dated 03 June 2002 Page 45 of 45 AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT (AFMS) CHST No. AFMS No. A-52-01/424-AFM, REV. 01, dated 03 July 2001 AFMS No. A-00-01/311-AFM, REV. 02, dated 13 July 2001 AFMS No. A-26-01/423, REV. 01, dated July 2001 AFMS No. A-23-01-01/422, REV. 01, dated 03 June 2001 AFMS No. AP37.1-0616, dated 04 October 2001 2004S03-04 AFMS No. 6 For Seven-Cell Auxiliary Fuel System configuration, REV. B dated 07 June 2001 2004S03-06 2004S03-05