BRASIL REPORT No. H.10-0810-36 BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENTS

Transcrição

BRASIL REPORT No. H.10-0810-36 BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENTS
AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL - BRASIL
REPORT No. H.10-0810-36
BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY
B737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700 & -800 SERIES AIRCRAFT MODELS
NELSON EISAKU NAGAMINE
Manager, Programs Management
Aeronautical Product Certification
Date: 12 April 2011
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
BRAZILIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
BOEING 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700 & -800 SERIES AIRCRAFT MODELS
01 - INTRODUCTION
This document has the objective to establish the basis for the issuance of the Brazilian
Import Type Certificate (Certificado de Homologação de Tipo para Importação) and
Brazilian Standard Airworthiness Certificate (Certificado de Aeronavegabilidade) for the
above aircraft.
02 - CERTIFICATION BASIS
The Certification basis for the aircraft are those indicated in the FAA Type Certificate Data
Sheet n A16WE, revision 38 dated 31 May 2006 or later revisions, plus any addition or
deletion established in paragraphs 05, 06, 08 and 09 of this report.
03 – DEFINITION OF THE AIRCRAFT
The type design which was submitted for ANAC evaluation and which is considered for
ANAC approval is defined by the following:
a.
For models 737-300, -400 and –500 series: General assembly DWG. N 65-73701 plus:
- MODEL B737-317
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C30192, dated 18 April 1985.
- MODEL B737-341
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C33721, dated 30 September 1990.
- MODEL B737-3Y
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C31972, dated 16 January 1986.
- MODEL B737-36Q
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C45304, dated 22 September 1997.
- MODEL B737-36N
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35326, dated 18 August 1997.
- MODEL B737-3Q4
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C33715, dated 18 November 1987.
- MODEL B737-33A
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C32733, dated 08 November 1994.
- MODEL B737-3K9
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C33459, dated 22 June 1987.
- MODEL B737-3S1
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35895, dated 09 April 1993.
- MODEL B737-3L9
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C30971, dated 21 May 1991.
- MODEL B737-3Q8
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C34085, dated 30 August 1991.
- MODEL B737-3U3
Boeing letter CP-L4L-09-00468, dated 13 October 2009;
Detail Specification no D6-38604-29, rev. A, dated 22 October 1997; and
Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2924, rev. H, for S/N 28742.
- MODEL B737-33R
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35904, dated 09 June 1997.
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- MODEL B737-3S3
Boeing letter B-T113-98-3719, dated 03 June 1998.
- MODEL B737-3M8
Boeing letter B-T113-98-3719, dated 03 June 1998.
- MODEL B737-330
Boeing letter C1-L4-04-0593, dated 10 June 2004;
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C31978;
Detail Specification no D6-76300-29, rev. H, dated 25 August 1989; and
Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-1887, rev. D.
- MODEL B737-322
Boeing letter C1-L4-04-0637 dated 21 June 2004;
Boeing letter C1-L4L-04-1028 dated 9 September 2004;
Boeing letter C1-L4L-05-0618 dated 27 May 2005;
Boeing letter C1-L4L-06-00096 dated 31 January 2006;
Boeing letter C1-L4L-07-01250 dated 31 October 2007;
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C32735;
Detail Specification no D6-76300-25, rev. S, dated 30 April 1990;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2230, rev. F for S/N 24379, 24452, 24453,
24455 and 24532;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-1872, rev. M for S/N 23952, 23955, 23956,
24247, 24248 and 24249;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2339, rev. A for S/N 24666, 24668 and 24670; and
Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2339, rev A for S/N24663.
- MODEL B737-382
Boeing letter C1-L4L-05-0921 dated 09 August 2005;
General Assembly drawing no 65-73701-5007;
Detail Specification no D6-76300-73, rev F, dated 15 February 2005; and
Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-373-2173, rev D, for S/N 24366.
- MODEL B737-4Y0
FAA Interior Certification Diagram No 65C34083, dated 05 July 1988.
- MODEL B737-46B
Boeing letter M-ABOH-02-0723, dated 24 September 2002; and
FAA Interior Schematic LOPA 374-678.
- MODEL B737-4S3
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-04-0531, dated 21 May 2004;
FAA Interior Schematic LOPA-374-526; and
Detail Specification D6-38900-9-1, rev. A, dated 31 March 1992.
Boeing Letter CP-L4L-10-00395, dated 30 September 2010;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPS-374-526, rev E for S/N25595.
- MODEL B737-48E
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-04-0531, dated 21 May 2004;
FAA Interior Schematic LOPA 374-585; and
Detail Specification D6-38900-28, rev. H, dated 29 July 1994.
- MODEL B737-5Y0
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C36152, dated 16 October 1990.
- MODEL B737-548
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35897, dated 19 September 1990.
- MODEL B737-5Q8
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C36440, dated 09 December 1996.
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- MODEL B737-53A
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 65C35894, dated 26 September 1990.
- MODEL B737-56N
FAA Interior Certification Diagram nº 401N5002, dated 17 September 1997.
- MODEL B737-58E
Boeing letter B-T113-98-3585, dated 29 May 1998.
b. For models 737-600, -700 and -800: Final Assembly DWG. nº PL 001A0001,
rev. BP, dated 16 September 1998 plus:
- MODEL B737-73S
Detail Specification D6-38808-66, rev. D, dated 20 December 2000.
- MODEL B737-7L9
Boeing letter M-ABOH-BAS-01-0147, dated 19 March 2001;
Boeing letter L4L-06-00153, dated 13 February 2006;
Detail Specification D6-38808-2;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0961, revision “-”for S/N 28012 and 28015;
and
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0788, revision G for S/N 28011.
- MODEL B737-75B
Boeing letter M-ABOH-BAS-01-0147, dated 19 March 2001.
- MODEL B737-76N
Detail Specification D6-38808-34
Detail Specification D019A001GEF37P-1, rev A, dated 15 February 2006 applicable
to S/N 32743;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0201, rev. U for S/N 28577, 28580, 28582,
28583, 28584, 28585, 29904, and 29905;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0736, rev. G for S/N 28640, 28641 and 30830; and
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-1185, rev. A for S/N 32743. (Boeing letter
C1-L4L-05-1183 dated 18 October 2005).
Boeing letter C1-L4L-08-00352 dated 03 July 2008 applicable to aircraft S/N 33417
and 33380;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0851, rev E;
Detail Specification D6-38808-34 rev AA.
- MODEL B737-76Q
Boeing letter B-H340-01-2502, dated 11 April 2001.
- MODEL B737-7Q8
Interior arrangement LOPA-377-0600, dated 30 September 1998.
- MODEL B737-700 IGW (-7BC)
Boeing Letter M-AB0H-03-0614, dated 25 November 2003 for aircraft S/N 32575 (YG040);
Configuration Specification Document nº D019A002, rev.G, dated 11 May 2000; and
Boeing letter B-H340-00-0768, dated 11 February 2000.
- MODEL B737-7K9
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-04-1499 dated 23 December 2004;
FAA Interior Schematic LOPS 377-066 Revision J; and
Detail Specification D6-38808-8 rev. B, dated 17 September 2001.
- MODEL B737-73V
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-06-00866 dated 01 September 2006 applicable to S/N 30238
and 30242;
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-08-00548 dated 31 October 2008 applicable to S/N 30239;
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-08-00593 dated 05 December 2008 applicable to S/N 30246
and 30247;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0906, rev. G for S/N 30238, 30239, 30246
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and 30247;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0902, rev. `-` for S/N 30242; and
Detail Specification D019A00EZY37P-01, rev G, dated 19 December 2003
applicable to S/Ns 30238, 30242, 30246 and 30247.
MODEL B737-7EA
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-01442 dated 11 December 2007 applicable to S/N 32406;
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-08-00132 dated 06 March 2008 applicable to S/N 32407;
Interior arrangement LOPA-377-0839 rev A, for aircraft S/N 32406 and 32407; and
Detailed Specification D019001A2ZX37P-1 rev A, applicable to S/N 32406 and
32407.
MODEL B737-7EH
Boeing Letter B-H340-09-01157 dated 25 June 2009 applicable to S/N 37595;
Interior arrangement LOPA-377-1468 rev H, for aircraft S/N 37595; and
Detailed Specification D019A001GOT37P-1 rev A, applicable to S/N 37595.
Boeing Letter RA-11-01192, dated 25 March 2011, applicable to S/N 37608 and
37609.
Interior arrangement LOPA-377-1631; and
Detail Specification D019A001GOT37P-2 rev “New”.
MODEL B737-73A
Boeing letter C1-L4L-08-00342 dated 27 June 2008 applicable to aircraft S/N 28499
and 28500;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-377-0203, rev G;
Detail Specification D6-38808-34 rev AA.
MODEL B737-7BX
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-08-00434, dated 31 July 2008;
Interior arrangement LOPA-377-0654, rev N for aircraft S/N 30738 and 30739; and
Detailed Specification D019A001MID37P-1, rev B, dated 03 July 2002.
MODEL B737-8S3
Boeing letter B-H340-01-4509, dated 02 July 2002.
MODEL B737-8BK
Boeing Letter B-H340-06-1204, dated 24 March 2006;
Interior arrangement LOPA-378-1197, dated 01 Mar. 2002 for aircraft S/N 30620 and 30625.
Interior arrangement LOPA-378-1681 for aircraft S/N 33027.
MODEL B737-8CX
Boeing letter B-H340-01-8986, dated 18 December 2001.
FAA Interior Schematic LOPA 378-1184, rev `-`, and
Detail Specification D019A001GAT38P-01, rev G dated 06 March 2003.
MODEL B737-85F
Interior arrangement LOPS-377-0278, rev. C, dated 30 January 2002 (0 “zero” PAX).
MODEL B737-83N
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-05-0178 dated 15 February 2005;
Interior arrangements LOPA-378-0946 Revision N and LOPA-378-1109, Revision E;
Detail Specification D019A001AAT38P-1 rev. F dated 25 October 2004.
MODEL B737-8EH
Boeing Letter B-H340-06-1434 dated 14 April 2006;
Interior arrangements LOPA-378-1585 Revision H, LOPA-378-1776 Revision E and
LOPA-378-1859 Revision B;
Detail Specification D019A001GOT38 original issuance; and
Boeing letter B-H-340-07-01042 dated 15 June 2007 includes B737-8EH models which
incorporates the major change Technology Insertion CFM International engines –
CFM56-7B27/3 series on aircrafts S/Ns 34267-34272, 34964-34966, 36146.
The model B737-8EH is a Short-Field Performance (SFP) aircraft with the following
modifications: two position tailskid, winglet lift credit, increased flight spoiler
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deflection on ground, reduce idle thrust delay after touchdown, revised FMC for
improved performance, sealed slats for all takeoff flap position and recambered main
landing gear.
Boeing Letters B-H340-07-01822 dated 19 November 2007 and B-H340-07-01995
dated 14 December 2007;
Detailed Specification D019A001GOT38P-1 Rev A dated 28 February 2007,
applicable to S/Ns 34273 and 34274
CSOS Log Report number GOT38W0000 defined to S/Ns 34273-34276, 3506335066, 35824;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-2116 Rev A.
Boeing letter B-H340-09-00545 dated 19 March 2009;
Detailed Specification D019A001GOT38P-1 Rev C dated 29 August 2008 applicable
to S/N 35825, 35827-35830, 36566, 36147-36150, 37596-37598. The LOPA
applicable to each one airplane is defined in the above Detailed Specification.
Boeing letter B-H340-09-02055 dated 01 December 2009;
Detailed Specification D019A001GOT38P-1 Rev E dated 01 December 2009 is
applicable to S/N 35831, 35832, 35835, 36596, 37599-37601. The LOPA 378-2372
is applicable to S/N 35831, 35832, 36596, 37599-37601, and LOPA 378-2369 is
applicable for S/N 35835.
Boeing letter B-H340-10-01150 dated 10 August 2010 extended the applicability of
LOPA 378-2369 for S/N 35836 to 35838.
Boeing Letter RA-11-01192, dated 25 March 2011, applicable to S/N 35842 to
35846, 35851 and 35852.
Interior arrangement LOPA-378-2680 applicable to S/N 35842 to 35844, 35851 and
35852.
Interior arrangement LOPA-378-2906 applicable to S/N 35845 and 35846.
Detail Specification D019A001GOT38P-2 rev “New”
MODEL B737-8Q8
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-06-01133 dated 14 November 2006;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0510, rev. E; and
Detail Specification D6-38808-18, rev AC, dated 31 August 2005.
MODEL B737-86N
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-00003 dated 04 January 2007;
General Assembly Drawing 001A0101-3556
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0749, rev. G for S/N 28616; and
Detail Specification D6-38808-35, rev V.
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-01043 dated 01 October 2007;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0286, rev AB for S/N 28575 and 28578 and
Detail Specification D6-38808-35, rev Y.
MODEL B737-8AS
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-00636 dated 23 May 2007;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0584, rev. G; and
Detail Specification D6-38808-110, rev K dated 27 October 2004.
MODEL B737-809
Boeing Letter C1-L4L-07-01043 dated 01 October 2007;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0498, rev M for S/N 29103 and 28403 and
Detail Specification D6-38808-23, rev F.
Boeing Letter CP-L4L-09-00160 dated 10 April 2009;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-0913, rev “new” for S/N 30636.
Detail Specification D019A001MDN38P-1, rev A.
MODEL B737-8HX
Boeing Letter B-H340-08-00982 dated 30 June 2008;
Interior arrangement diagram LOPA-378-2087, rev D for S/N 36434 and
Detail Specification D019A001CGP38P-1, rev C.
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04 - CHANGES TO THE APPROVED TYPE DESIGN
a. Any design change, to be incorporated in Brazilian aircraft, must be FAA approved.
b. In addition to the provision of item (a), all major changes to the approved type design
which affect the aircraft limitations, structural strength, performance, flight
characteristics and the approved main equipment list, must be submitted for ANAC
review, before Export Certificate of Airworthiness issuance.
c. Different interior arrangements (cabin configuration) must be submitted for ANAC
review and approval before incorporation in Brazilian aircraft.
d. For each aircraft finished or modified by a Completion Center/Repair Station the
following procedure apply:
- All the new installations must be submitted to the local airworthiness authority approval.
- The TC/STC holder must follow the procedures established in the ANAC Informative
Circular CI No. 21-010 - “Procedures for Approval of Imported Civil Aeronautical
Products”, paragraph 6, “Procedures for Issuance of Import Supplemental Type Certificate
for Aircraft”.
- The annex IV of this report presents the list of CHST’s (STC’s) and AFM’s supplements
approved by FAA or LBA and validated by ANAC.
05 - COMPLIANCE WITH THE BRAZILIAN OPERATING REGULATIONS
a. Compliance with the operating regulations appropriate to the kinds of operations to be
conducted, are incumbent upon the Brazilian operator. However, the application of such
regulations may require the installation of equipment and/or application of standards in
addition to those required for Airworthiness Certification. Boeing Commercial Airplane
Company is reminded that it is responsible to furnish to the ANAC the existing technical
data or information which might be deemed necessary to the ANAC to approve locally
such installations or operations.
b. The modification below must be installed in the Aircraft to comply with the applicable
RBHA operational requirement:
- Emergency locator transmitter (ELT), portable or fixed, in order to comply with RBHA
121.339 and 353.
06 - FLIGHT MANUAL
A Brazilian Flight Manual Supplement incorporating the changes listed below in respect to
the FAA approved document, shall be furnished to each aircraft exported to Brazil:
6.1
The Supplement shall be organized in Sections and Paragraphs entitled and numbered
in direct correspondence to the FAA approved AFM to permit an easy cross-reference of the
Supplement information with that of the basic AFM.
The Supplement Approval Page (see a suggested model in Annex II) shall:
- Indicate its mandatory nature for Brazilian operators;
- Stating “the AFM is in accordance with RBHA 21.29; and
- Be signed by ANAC or by FAA, on behalf of ANAC.
Items 6.2 through 6.13 are applicable only to Models 737-300, -400 and –500:
6.2
The following additional information shall be included in the Supplement to complete
the basic AFM information regarding malfunctions and failures in the control systems:
a) On Section 3.2 - page 2 –” Hydraulic System”- remove: “if desired”;
b) On Section 3.2, page 7, include: “Loss of both hydraulic systems” and
corresponding procedures (see Ops. Manual for reference);
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c) On Section 3.2, include: “leading edge flaps transit light” procedures as per Ops
Man. Pg. 03.10.07;
d) On section 3.2 – page 6, “Jammed Controls”, * include instructions for jamming in
each control axis;
e) Inclusion of auto-slat failure procedures on section 3.2;
f) Inclusion of “feel differential pressure” failure procedures in section 3.2 advising
the flight crew to avoid excessive elevator inputs;
g) Inclusion of “Mach trim failure” speed limitation in section 3.2, according to Ops.
Manual;
h) Inclusion of ‘Speed brake do not arm” procedures in Section 3.2 (see Ops Manual);
i) Inclusion of “Stabilizer-out-of-trim” procedures in Section 3.2 according to Ops
Manual pg. 03-10.09; and
j) On Section 3.2 – page 5 0 Alternate flap operation - Include note advising crew that
asymmetry protection is not available (as per Ops Manual pg. 03-10.03).
6.3
Deleted per CTA fax 188/93 dated 19 February 1993.
6.4
Substitute the words “Do not engage autopilot for single channel approach” by
“Do not engage autopilot for approach” on page 2, section 3.2, IRS fault paragraph.
Note: Item deleted from Supplement 1CTA and included in the basic FAA AFM (CTA
fax 1757/97 dated 26 September 1997 refers).
6.5
The AFM Supplement shall include information to correct and adjust the required
normal landing field length for the non-normal landing configurations such as:
- all flaps up;
- unsymmetrical or no leading edge devices;
- unsymmetrical trailing edge devices; and
- trailing edge flaps up.
6.6
Deleted - Justification provided by Boeing letter B-225R-88-1135 dated 14 June 1988.
6.7
The chart on page 11, section 4.13 (stopping distance with automatic wheel brakes)
should use “landing speed” instead of “approach speed” as defined on page 5, section
4.1 (Definitions).
6.8
The maximum crosswind definition on page 8 of Section 4.1 should be revised by
deleting the sentence: “This component is not considered to be limiting on a dry
runway with all engines operating”.
6.9
The AFM Supplement shall establish a procedure to use the alternate static source
switch in case of failure of the normal static pressure system.
6.10 Deleted-Justification provided by Boeing letter B-225R-RD-87-1392 dated 03
September 1997.
6.11 A procedure for “disagreement between the gear lever position and red lights” must be
established in the AFM Supplement.
6.12 The go-around procedure as shown on page 14, section 3.1, does not establish the
attitude or the minimum airspeed for go-around and therefore, should be revised.
6.13 The basic AFM shall present weight and temperature units in Kg and C
Conclusion: The CTA approved AFM Supplement 1CTA - revision 03 - dated 14
November 1997 complies with the requirements above. For the B737.322 model
the approved AFM is the document D6-8730.322, revision 27 (Reference Number
056046) approved by FAA on 25 May 2005. Item closed.
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Note: For the B737-300 Series only, CTA has approved on 21 October 1991 the
Supplement 2CTA “Grooved or Porous Friction Course Overlayed Runway
Landing Performance, Wet or Dry”.
Items 6.14 through 6.16 are applicable only to Models 737-600, -700 and –800:
6.14 The AFM presented to the CTA for review was D631A001, dated 07 Nov. 1997,
including the following appendices and supplement:
- Appendix 20 - Engine Derate Operation at 20K Thrust;
- Appendix 22 - Engine Derate Operation at 22K Thrust;
- Appendix CDL - Configuration Deviation List 737-100/-200/-300/-400/-500/-700/-800;
- Supplement 1CTA.
6.15 The Brazilian AFM shall be based in the FAA AFM but including the following
modifications in the affected pages of the Supplement 1CTA to complete the basic
AFM information:
6.15.1
FMS
a) “Pilot manually inserted approach procedures, even with waypoints
retrieved from the FMS database, are prohibited”;
b) “Before performing a FMS approach the crew must verify the
correspondence between FMS waypoints / altitudes and the published
chart data";
6.15.2
Engine failure during takeoff
A procedure for engine failure during takeoff after V1 was not found either in
the AFM, Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) or OPS Manual. Although a
pictorial trajectory with some details can be found in the QRH, CTA does not
consider this as a procedure. Therefore, CTA requests an “Engine failure
during takeoff after V1” procedure to be inserted in the Brazilian
AFM Supplement.
6.16 The Brazilian AFM for the B-737-700 IGW, applicable to the specific model 737-7BC
is the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.7BC2, Revision 4 dated 25
February 2004, including the supplement CTA1. (Log of Pages 044869).
Conclusion: The FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.7BC2, Revision 4
dated 25 February 2004, including the supplement CTA1, complies with the items
above. Item closed.
6.17 Boeing will provide a Brazilian AFM Supplement 1CTA for the models 737-4S3 and
737-48E. The corresponding FAA approved AFM document number for the 737-4S3
model is D6-8734.4S31 and for the model 737-48E is D6-8734.48E.
Conclusion: Boeing Letter C1-L4L-04-0531 dated 21 May 2004. Item closed.
6.18 Boeing will provide a Brazilian AFM Supplement 1CTA for the models 737-330 and
737-322. The corresponding FAA approved AFM document number for the 737-330
model is D6-8730.330 and for the model 737-322 is D6-8730.322.
Conclusion: Boeing Letters C1-L4L-04-0593 dated 10 June 2004 and C1-L4L-04-0637
dated 21 June 2004. Item closed.
6.19 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-7K9 is the FAA approved
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AFM document no. D631A001.7K9, Revision 6 dated 14 December 2004, including
the supplement CTA1. (Log of Pages 045648).
Conclusion: The FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.7K9, Revision 6 dated
14 December 2004, including the supplement CTA1, complies with the items
above. Item closed.
6.20 The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-83N is the FAA approved AFM
document no. D631A001.83N2, including the supplement 1CTA rev. 2. (Log of Pages 044870).
Conclusion: The FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.83N2, including the
supplement 1CTA rev 2, complies with the item above. Item closed.
6.21 Boeing will provide a Brazilian AFM Supplements 1CTA and 2CTA for the model
737-382. The corresponding FAA approved AFM document number for the 737-382
model is D6-8730.3Q83.
Conclusion: Boeing Letter C1-L4L-05-0921 dated 09 August 2005. AFM D6-87303Q83 dated 15 August 2005. Item closed.
6.22
Boeing will provide a Brazilian AFM Supplements 1CTA and 2CTA for the model
737-322 S/N 24666. The corresponding FAA approved AFM document number for
the 737-322 model is D6-8730.3222.
Conclusion: Boeing Letter C1-L4L-05-0963 dated 15 August 2005. Item closed.
6.23
The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-76N is the FAA approved AFM
document no. D631A001.76N, including the supplement 1CTA. (Log of Pages 056326).
Conclusion: The FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.76N, Revision 27
dated 30 September 2005, including the supplement 1CTA, complies with the
item above, Boeing Letter C1-L4L-05-1183 dated 18 October 2005. Item closed.
6.24
The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-7L9 is the FAA approved AFM
document no. D631A001.7L92, including the supplement 1 CTA.
Conclusion: Boeing Letter C1-L4L-06-00153 dated 13 February 2006. Item closed.
6.25
The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-8EH “Short Field Performance” is
the FAA approved AFM document no. D631A001.8EH, including the supplement 1 CTA
(Log of Pages 066836).
Revision 13 of the document no. D631A001.8EH dated 18 June 2007 (Reference Number
077617) includes the B737-8EH models which incorporates the major change
Technology Insertion CFM International engines – CFM56-7B27/3 series.
Conclusion: Item closed.
6.26
The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-73V is the FAA approved AFM
document no. D631A001.73V2, revision 0 dated 21 September 2006, including the
supplement 1 CTA.
Conclusion: Item closed.
6.27
The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-8Q8 is the FAA approved AFM
document no. D631A001.8Q82, Revision 33 dated 21 November 2006, including the
supplement 1 CTA.
Conclusion: Item closed.
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6.28
12 April 2011
The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-86N is the FAA approved AFM
document no. D631A001.86N2, Revision 39 dated 18 December 2006, including the
supplement 1 CTA.
Conclusion: Item closed.
6.29
The Brazilian AFM applicable to the specific model 737-8AS is the FAA approved AFM
document no. D631A001.8AS2.
Conclusion: Item closed.
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07 - OPTIONAL INSTALLATIONS.
All optional installations required by the Brazilian operators and incorporated by The Boeing
Co., in addition to the Type Design defined in section 03, must be approved by the FAA.
08 - MARKINGS AND PLACARDS.
All markings and placards for passenger information under normal or emergency conditions must be in
Portuguese (or English and Portuguese).
External markings for emergency operation of doors, normal ground operation of cargo doors and for
certain servicing operations must be in Portuguese (or bilingual). Markings and placards indicating
maximum loads in cargo and baggage compartments must also be presented in Portuguese (or
bilingual).
All others markings and placards not included in the proposals defined by the items a. and b. above
shall be maintained in English Language.
Some usual acceptable translations to Portuguese of these required markings and placards are presented
in Annex III, but they are not intended to be unique and neither complete.
09 - FINDINGS, PENDING ITEMS AND COMMENTS
The items included in this paragraph represent ANAC concerns in respect to the type design
or the substantiation presented for ANAC review. These items are classified as findings,
pending items and comments, according with the following criterion:
Findings are those points of concern which must be solved before the issuance of the Brazilian TC.
Findings 01 through 29 are applicable only to Models 737-300, -400 and -500:
01 - Stall Warning System
It was noted that the stall warning system is not considered essential by Boeing and
even the MMEL permits aircraft dispatch with one system inoperative. A review of
flight tests reports indicates that the natural stall margins and the stall characteristics
in some configurations do not show compliance with the applicable requirements.
Pending the results of the ANAC flight testing the system may be considered
essential and therefore its failure probability must fall in the improbable range.
It was noted that an advanced system has been designed, including dedicated vanes,
separated sensors and fed by the stand-by electric power. (Production effectively
LN 1225).
After having reviewed additional reliability data concerning both systems the
ANAC reached the conclusion that dispatch with one system inoperative would be
acceptable for a period not to exceed 18 flight hours, provided the operative system
is verified to operate normally before each departure.
Conclusion: The CTA AD 88-11-02 has been issued in November 1988 imposing
this MEL limitation for the 737-300series (the AD has been revised in August 1989
to include the 737-400 series and further revised, in November 1997, to include the
737-500 series). Item closed.
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02 - Flaps Asymmetry Detection and Protection Systems
The non-existence of a warning to advise the pilots of an asymmetric flaps condition
associated with the fact that under alternate electric operation, the trailing edge flaps
are not protected against asymmetry, is criticized.
The CTA believes that, at least, the AFM should contain such information for pilots
awareness.
Conclusion: The AFM Supplement 1CTA has included this information on Section
3.2. Item closed.
03 - Rotor Non-Containment
The rotor non-containment report D6-37781, although covering all critical systems
for the aircraft safety, does not contain basic information to permit an assessment of
the information supplied.
Additional details are required, regarding: dimensions of rotor debris; distances
from targets; dimensional definitions of vulnerable zones (both 5 & 15 degrees);
angular impact zones in the vertical planes; etc.
Conclusion: The Engine Rotor Non-Containment Report n 37860 (CAA) has been
submitted for compliance with this requirement. This additional information has
been reviewed and accepted. Item closed.
04 - Illuminated Passenger Information Placards
Illuminated “Exit” placards over exits, aisles and dividers, to facilitate emergency
egress of passengers, shall be supplied in Portuguese (or bi-lingual). The minimum
letters dimensions and height/width ratio required by the regulations shall be
respected for the Portuguese translation “SAÍDA”. Equivalent safety for 25.812(b)
(i) in respect to the height/width ratio is acceptable. Illuminated “NO
SMOKING/FASTEN SEAT BELTS” and “NO SMOKING IN LAVATORY”
placards shall also be supplied in Portuguese (or bilingual).
Conclusion: See applicable translations on Annex III.a. Item closed.
05 - Slide Operation
Due to the fact that slide may not inflate automatically under certain emergency
conditions, an additional door placard in Portuguese (or bilingual) instructing the
crew to inflate slide manually, is required.
Conclusion: See applicable translations on Annex III.a. Item closed.
06 - Flight Crew Emergency Exits
Converted into comment 09.c.01.
07 - Aircraft Static Tests
It was found that static tests data, obtained on former 737 models, were used to
some extent to substantiate stress analysis results, weight increases, stress levels on
critical components, etc. The structural certification substantiation of the –300
model was made only by analysis, not including the fitting factor of at least 1.15 in
the attachments of main structural components such as: wing-fuselage, wing engine
strut, empennage – fuselage, etc. The section 25.625 (b) (1) only allows the nonutilization of fitting factors if comprehensive test data are available. A summary of
the tests results and a comparison with analytical results for critical load conditions
is required for justification of that approach.
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Conclusion: A summary correlation analysis between the static tests results and the
stress analysis reports has been submitted by Boeing letter B-225R-88-1330 dated
13 July 1988 and accepted by the CTA. Item closed.
08 - Consistency of Elevator Flutter Analysis
The figure 4.2-4 of report D6-37386 shows no flutter instabilities for unbalanced
elevator with power off. Such results were discussed to some extent and additional
data has been requested. New flutter limits were presented in a draft figure and
considered acceptable. A copy of the report above including the revised figures,
when available, is requested.
Conclusion: The complementary information for the elevator flutter analysis has
been supplied through revision C to report D6-37386 forwarded by letter B-225R87-1107 dated 15 July 1987. Item closed.
09 - Deleted.
10 - Temperature Criteria Substantiation for Allowables Data in Composite Materials
The temperature used to determine the environmental factor on the allowable strain
levels was 130 F (54 C). The CTA is concerned that the temperature developed
inside the control surface exceeds such value in a hot day. The criterion used to
guarantee that such temperature limit is not exceeded in service is required.
Conclusion: The temperature criteria adopted by Boeing for determination of the
allowable data for composite materials has been supplied by letter B-225R-RD-871089 dated 15 July 1987 and was accepted by the CTA. Item closed.
11 - Scatter Factor for Landing Gear Fatigue Life
Conclusion: deleted per CTA letter 1233/86 dated 14 November 1986. Item closed.
12 - Bird Impact on the Aircraft Structure and Empennage
Converted into comment 09.c.02.
13 - Blow-Out Panel on Aft Cargo/Rear Under Floor Compartments Bulkhead
A blowout panel will be incorporated on production line aircraft in the bulkhead dividing
aft cargo/rear compartments to reduce high stresses on floor beams just above the
small/rear “K” compartment in case of a sudden loss of pressure. It’s recommended that
a Service Bulletin incorporating this feature as a retrofit in Brazilian aircraft be released as
soon as possible.
Conclusion: The SB 737-25-1198 covers this subject and is applicable to the 737-300
aircraft up to LN 1527 (correspondence to SN is found on SB Index Part 3), which is
therefore mandatory to affected Brazilian aircraft. All other 737-300, 737-400 and 737500 have an equivalent modification incorporated in production. Item closed.
14 - Ditching Investigation
Converted into comment 09.c.03.
15 - Design Trailing Edge Flap Speed for 40
The flap system has a load limit device, which retracts the flap from 40 to 30 when the
speed exceeds 160 kt. The design flap speed is 158 kt, therefore no tolerance was given
to this speed in the placard as it was for the other positions.
Additionally, in case of a single failure on the limit load device system, for which no
warning is provided, the speed may be exceeded and consequently the design loads for
the flap.
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Conclusion: This item was closed in the basis of the justification presented by
Boeing letter B225R-88-1135 dated 14 June 1988 and on results of the CTA flight
testing (see finding 09.a.20). Item closed.
16 – Incorporation of existing optional systems on Brazilian approved type design
The following optional systems shall be installed on Brazilian aircraft:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
Warning light indicating that primary instruments are being fed only by one source of
IRS or EFIS symbol generator (switches of the forward overhead panel out of
“NORMAL” position).
Conclusion: Aircraft exported in non-compliance shall accomplish Boeing SB 737-341222 before starting commercial operations. Item closed.
Comparator/Disagree Warning for pilot/copilot attitude information (EFIS and
non EFIS configurations)
Conclusion: This feature became basic on EFIS aircraft at line number 2768,
and was optional for EFIS aircraft prior to that line number and for all nonEFIS aircraft (which is the reason for the CTA requirement). Boeing letter BT113-97-4958, dated 08 October 1997, pertains to this subject. Item closed.
One HF communication system
Conclusion: Brazilian operational requirement. Item closed.
Deleted.
Emergency evacuation floor path system
Conclusion: Deleted - The system is part of the basic type design. Item closed.
Radome with diverter strips and conductive paint (BMS 100-21 Type 1) for
lightning protection.
Conclusion: Deleted - The system is part of the basic type design. Item closed.
17 - Electric Load Analysis
As no limitation of maximum allowable electrical load for each generator is
included in the flight manual for pilots monitoring, the CTA requires that the load
analysis report for each Brazilian aircraft must take in consideration that the sum of
each generator loads plus the 115 VAC transfer bus loads of the other generator,
shall not be greater than 43.1 KVA (For 45 KVA rated generator).
Conclusion: Accepted by the CTA in the basis of the FAA approval. Item closed.
18 - Pressure refueling system
The design of the pressure refueling system is not in compliance with RBHA/14
CFR Part 25.979 (b) (1) and (2).
Item (1) cannot be complied with because it is not possible to perform a fueling precheck on the float valve.
Item (2) is not complied with because the indicating light will not inform about a
failed solenoid valve stuck in the open position.
No justification for such non-compliance has been provided.
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Conclusion: The FAA letter dated 27 October 1986 to CTA explains that the
pressure refueling system is unchanged in respect to the B737 - 100 and -200
models and was accepted by the FAA for the 737-300 and later series in the basis of
satisfactory service experience. According to FAA compliance with the subject
requirement is demonstrated by means of the refueling procedure itself
accomplished successfully. Accepted by the CTA in the basis of the FAA approval.
Item closed.
19 - Fire extinguishing concentration tests for the APU installation.
Compliance with the fire extinguishing concentration tests required by RBHA/14
CFR Part 25.1195(b) was not shown. No justification for such non-compliance has
been provided.
Conclusion: The APU fire extinguishing system has been certified by similarity
with the -200 installation which was approved by analysis as permitted by the
subject requirement prior to amendment 25-46 (Boeing letter 1205/87 dated 4
August 1987 refers) - Accepted by the CTA in the basis of the FAA approval. Item
closed.
20 - Flight Test
a) A flight test program must be accomplished in a Boeing 737-300 representative
aircraft to complete the CTA evaluation.
Conclusion: The CTA flight test program has been conducted on 30 Junee 1988
using a B737-3Y0 aircraft tab number PP843. No additional findings have
resulted from those tests. Item closed.
b) For certification of the B737-400 and -500 models the CTA has not performed a
direct flight test evaluation but, instead, has reviewed the flight test program
carried out for FAA certification. In general, the results of such program have
been accepted by the CTA, but one concern has been raised in respect to the
stall warning margin obtained for the 737-500 with maximum weight of
134 000 pounds in the 1/UP and 5/UP configurations, which were substantially
lesser than the 5% required by the FAA Issue Paper F1. Therefore, acceptance
of any 737-500 model with maximum operational takeoff weight in excess of
134 000 pounds, shall require CTA flight testing approval.
Conclusion: This subject has been raised by the CTA fax msg. 213/93 dated
25 February 1993 and noticed by BOEING through letter 613/93 dated
22 March 1993. Item closed.
21 - EFIS System
Any first of a model EFIS system installed on Brazilian aircraft shall be flight
tested.
Conclusion: The CTA flight test program above referred was performed on an EFIS
equipped aircraft. No concerns have been raised by the CTA pilots. Item closed.
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22 - Simulator Flights
An evaluation of the EFIS, auto-pilot, auto-throttle and control system malfunctions
could not be carried out in a complete simulator (with vision and movement aids).
Those simulator flights shall be performed before certification.
Conclusion: The CTA simulator flight test program has been completed on
28 June 1987. No concerns were raised by the CTA pilots. Item closed.
23 – Deleted.
24 – Deleted.
25 - Cabin evaluation
A cabin evaluation was only accomplished in daylight conditions, either for the
standard and EFIS configuration. A night light evaluation still needs to be
accomplished.
Conclusion: Completed at the time of CTA flight testing. No additional comments
were raised. Item closed.
26 - Engine vibration indicators
Converted into comment 09.c.04.
27 - Equipment cooling switch
On the forward overhead panel all switches but the equipment cooling switch are
forward for normal position. (Criticism only).
Converted into comment 09.c.05.
28 - Instruments in metric units
The fuel instruments units for quantity, flow and used fuel shall indicate in kg, kg/h,
kg respectively.
Conclusion: Boeing presents the system with both metric and English unit. For the
Brazilian Type Design metric units is required. Item closed.
29 - Single reverse controllability during landing in wet runways
No evidence was found that during landing in wet runways either the engines will
not stop or that the aircraft is controllable in the ground up minimum reverser
application speed under single reverse conditions.
Compliance with this
requirement is usually shown during the water ingestion tests performed in
accordance with 25.1091(d) (2), which were not conducted for the –300
certification. A justification for this condition is required.
Conclusion: justification presented by Boeing letters B-225R-RD-87-1273 dated
08/10/87 and B-225R-87-1572 dated 30 September 1987, which were accepted by
the CTA. Item closed.
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Findings 30 through 51 are applicable only to Models 737-600, -700 and -800:
30 - Stall Warning System
It was noted that the stall warning system is not considered essential by Boeing and
even the MMEL permits aircraft dispatch with one system inoperative. CTA has
found that the stall margins do not show compliance with the applicable
requirements.
Since BOEING has some restrictions to perform, with a non-instrumented aircraft,
full stalls and after having reviewed additional reliability data (loss of a single stall
warning channel) the CTA reached the conclusion that dispatch with one system
inoperative would be acceptable for a period not to exceed 18 flight hours (the same
period for 737-300/-400/-500 Brazilian models), provided the operative system is
verified to operate normally before each departure.
Note: See also finding 09.a.01 of this report.
Conclusion: The CTA AD 88-11-02 has been issued in November 1988 imposing
this MEL limitation for the 737-300series (the AD has been revised in
August 1989 to include the 737-400 series and further revised, in November 1997,
to include the 737-500 series). The CTA AD 88-11-02 will be revised to include
the 737-700 series. Item closed.
31 - Absence of Flap 2 Position Warning
According to RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.703 (a), a takeoff warning system must be
installed and provide to the pilots an aural warning that is automatically activated
during the initial portion of the takeoff roll if the aircraft is in a configuration that
would not allow a safe takeoff. As long as flaps 2 is not an approved configuration
for takeoff, Boeing is requested to provide a rationale, which could include flight
test data and/or analysis, to demonstrate that flaps 2 performance and flight
characteristics do allow a safe takeoff.
Conclusion: Closed based in the Document AERO-B-B114-C98-1187, forwarded
by Fax message dated 11 November 1998. Item closed.
32 - LNAV mode coupling during the takeoff
It was not clearly understood if this mode is already approved, since the report
C5.04.0232, page 4, states that the approval of this mode will be deferred to 737800 program, although the QRH seems to permit to use this mode.
Boeing position is requested to present the substantiation of this mode utilization, in
order to show compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.1301.
Conclusion: The CTA agrees that this information can be kept in the QRH, based in
the substantiation presented in Enclosure E of letter B-T113-98-8056, received
16 November 1998. Item closed.
33 - Flight Test
A flight test program must be accomplished in a Boeing 737 Next Generation
(-600/ -700 /-800) representative aircraft to complete the CTA evaluation.
Conclusion: The CTA flight test program has been conducted on 10 November
1998 using a B737-76N aircraft, serial number 28580. No additional findings have
resulted from those tests. Item closed.
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34 - Abused Takeoff (Applicable only to Models 737-600 and 737-800)
Boeing is required to demonstrate compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.107 (e)
(4), which requires that the “all engines takeoff case” with out-of-trim condition
may not result in marked increases in the scheduled takeoff distances.
Conclusion: Closed by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 June 2001.
Item closed.
35 - Use of the ground spoilers for accelerate-stop and landing distances determination
Converted into comment 09.c.11.
36 - Illuminated Passenger Information Placards
Illuminated “Exit” placards over exits, aisles and dividers, to facilitate emergency
egress of passengers, shall be supplied in Portuguese (or bi-lingual). The minimum
letters dimensions and height/width ratio required by the regulations shall be
respected for the Portuguese translation
"SAÍDA".
Illuminated
“NO
SMOKING/FASTEN SEAT BELTS” and “NO SMOKING IN LAVATORY”
placards shall also be supplied in Portuguese (or bilingual).
Note: See applicable translations on Annex III.a.
Conclusion: Closed by FAX message dated 13 November 1998, where BOEING
states that the illuminated placards above mentioned will be provided in pictorial
format, except by the "EXIT" placard. CTA agrees with this position. Item closed.
37 - Slide Operation
In order to emphasize the comments already presented in finding 09.a.05, for the
B737-300, -400 and -500, the CTA requires that the BOEING guarantees the
installation of that required placard instructing the crew to inflate slide manually.
Note: See the applicable translation on Annex III.a.
Conclusion: Closed by FAX message dated 17 November 1998. Item closed.
38 - Flight Crew Emergency Exits
The dimensions of the flight crew emergency exits do not comply with the
minimum established by the regulations RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.807 (f). BOEING is
required to show compliance with this requirement.
Note: See also finding 09.a.06 of this report
Conclusion:
Closed
by
FAX
message
B-PFFG-PS98-C094,
dated
17 November 1998, which presented the BOEING report D410N414, Rev. B.
Therefore the 737-600/-700/-800 models compliance with RBHA/14 CFR Part
25.807(f) is accepted by the CTA based on similarity to the 757-200 with presents a
smaller window opening area. Item closed.
39 - Bird Impact on the Aircraft Structure and Empennage
Comparing to the comments already presented in finding 09.a.12, for the B737-300,
-400 and -500, the CTA has reviewed and accepted the 4 lb. bird impact
substantiation for the entire aircraft. However, the CTA requires BOEING to
present a rationale for not choosing the latest amendments associated to 8 lb bird
impact in the aircraft empennage.
Conclusion: CTA exemption to section RBHA/14 CFR Part25.631 will be based in
the rationale presented by Enclosure F of letter B-T113-98-8056, received
16 November 1998, which refers to the FAA Certification Basis and Issue
Paper G-1. Item closed.
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40 - Cargo Compartment / Retention of Cargo
No substantiation was found regarding to the cargo net capability to prevent the
contents in the cargo compartments from becoming hazard by shifting under the
applicable flight and ground loads conditions. BOEING is required to provide this
substantiation, in order to show compliance with the section RBHA/14 CFR Part
25.787(b).
Conclusion: Closed based in the commitment established by BOEING in FAX
message dated 17 November 1998. BOEING is requested to sent copies of reports
D101A801-58 and D453A018, when revised, in order to demonstrate that the
fuselage is capable to withstand the above mentioned loads, resulting from the cargo
shifting due to the absence of the cargo net. The CTA agrees with the considerations
submitted by Fax message dated 12 November 1998, where the cargo net
installation can be considered not necessary based in the weight and balance
changes consequences. Item closed.
41 - Aileron Mass Balance Weight Attachments
The structural substantiation for the aileron mass balance weight attachments was not
presented during the B737-600/-700/-800 process of the validation. BOEING is required to
show compliance with the section RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.629(c), regarding to this
attachment.
Conclusion: Closed based in FAX message dated 13 November 1998. Item closed.
42 - Vibration and Buffeting (Applicable only to Models 737-600 and 737-800)
Considering the substantiation presented to show compliance with the section RBHA/14 CFR
Part 25. 305(e) is applicable only to B737-700 model, the substantiation reports applicable to
B737-600 and -800 models are required to be presented to CTA for evaluation.
Conclusion: Closed by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 June 2001.
Item closed.
43 - Single reverse controllability during landing in wet runways
No evidence has been shown that during landing in wet runways either the engines
will not stop or that the aircraft is controllable in the ground under single or dual
reverser application. Compliance with this requirement is usually shown during the
water ingestion tests performed in accordance with section RBHA/14 CFR Part
25.1091(d) (2), however, this has not been the case. Therefore BOEING is required
to address the aircraft controllability, with asymmetric thrust during landing in a wet
runaway.
Note: See also finding 09.a 29 of this report
Conclusion: (Only for models 737-600 and -700) by Report D541A002 Sections
C1.26.0039 and C1.26.0051, forwarded by FAX message dated 13 November 1998.
Item closed.
44 - Fire detectors in the Tail Pipe
Converted into comment 09.c.12.
45 - Fire extinguishing agent concentration
Converted into comment 09.c.13.
46 - Deleted.
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47 - Markings and Placards
All the Markings and Placards categories indicated in section 8, as necessary to be
translated to the Portuguese, must be provided by Boeing, in order to permit the
CTA to determine the final wordings to be used and included in annex 3 of this
report.
A complete drawings set for all these placards, including their location at the
aircraft, in order to define the placards intention must be submitted to the CTA.
Conclusion: Closed By CTA Fax message 1823/HES/98 dated 17 December 1998.
Item closed.
48 - Seat Cushions/seat back flammability tests
Boeing is requested to present for CTA review, the “as delivered seat cushion/seat
back configuration” as well the test specimen configurations used for vertical
flammability tests. Refers to RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.853(a) and Appendix F, Part I,
item (b)(2).
Conclusion: Closed based in the commitment established by BOEING in FAX
message dated 19 November 1998. BOEING is requested to send copies of "seat
flammability test results" reports from Weber Aircraft, in order to show the
compliance with the above-mentioned requirements. (BOEING commits to finalize
this task before beginning of revenue flights). Item closed.
49 - 737-700 IGW Series- Engine Type Certificate
Boeing has applied the model 737-7BC (IGW) for Brazilian validation through the
letter M-AB0H-03-0614 dated 25 Nov. 2003. This model has the engines CFM567B27/B3 installed. In order to comply with RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.903(a), this
CFM engine model is required to be certified in Brazil
Status: CTA has received the application for Brazilian validation through the CFM
letter 56/DJB/00604 dated 04 February 2004 and CTA have provided the guidelines
to CFM through the CTA letter 193/FDH/2004 dated 16 Feb. 2004. CFM has
responded by e-mail message dated 09 March 2004 and CTA has included this
engine type in the Brazilian TC no. 1999T09 on 10 March 2004. Item Closed.
50 - The items below represents CTA concerns in respect to Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC# ST00936NY) installed in the B737-700 IGW model which must be
solved prior the aircraft S/N 32575 (YG040) delivery to Brazil.
a) SFAR 88 Compliance:
Pats Inc. indicated that changes to the Type design along with Periodic
Inspections on system components will be required to comply with the intent of
SFAR 88 Requirement. Although during the technical discussions, the
philosophy adopted by Pats Inc. to develop the SFAR 88 analysis had been
discussed, it was identified that the required changes and inspections, are not still
cleared documented.
In order to allow CTA be acquainted with the these changes and inspections,
PATS Inc. is required to prepare and make available to the CTA, a list with all
needed actions indicated by SFAR 88 analysis. Pats Inc. is required, as well, to
present for each change and inspection, a description and the reasoning behind
each one.
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Conclusion: PATS Inc. to submit to the CTA a list with the SFAR 88 changes
and inspections along with the description and rationale for each one. This list
has been sent on e-mail message dated 17 March 2004 from Mr. William Ertle PATS Inc. and is part of the CHST 2004S03-06, CTA process H.02-2259-0. Item
Closed.
b) FCAR HPR 01 – Management of Fuel Usage and Loading
During the discussions with Pats representatives it was identified that, although
the aircraft CG may change in flight, and in some failure conditions to outside
the approved CG travel envelope, the fuel management system was not designed
to control aircraft CG. The concept adopted, is that will be pilot’s responsibility
keeps the CG travel within approved envelope. The pilot will rely on the system
to keep the CG enveloped.
CTA released the FCAR HPR 01 to indicate to PATS Inc. the concerns raised
and the substantiation required to accept the fuel management system. The
FCAR was issued by the CTA on its stage 1 on 05 March 2004.
Conclusion: PATS Inc. to respond to the CTA. FAA to provide a position. PATS
Inc. position has been provide on 17 March 2004 and FAA NYACO position has
been provided on 18 March 2004. These positions were included in the
respective sections of the FCAR. The FCAR was closed in the stage 4 on 19
March 2004. Item closed.
c) Markings and Placards
PATS Inc. is required to submit for CTA review a Report or Service Bulletin
with all the Markings and Placards related to the auxiliary fuel pressure fuelling
system in Portuguese along with the applicable installation drawings.
Conclusion: Pats Inc. to provide the document number by 09 March 2004 and the
document itself by 12 March 2004. Pats Inc. has presented the Service Bulletin
SB_BBJ-28-109_A, Revision A dated 16 March 2004, including the revised
placards. Item Closed.
51 -
The items below represents CTA concerns in respect to Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC# LBA.21E2.TA0307 and # ST01381NY) installed in the B737700 IGW model which must be solved prior the aircraft S/N 32575 (YG040)
delivery to Brazil.
a) FCAR HES 01 – Emergency Exit Locator Signs
The VIP executive interior configuration for the B737-700 IGW aircraft
approved by LBA STC includes the emergency exit locator signs in English
language. According to the RBHA 21.29 (a)(3) all the marking and placard
addressed to the passengers should be presented in the Portuguese language. This
FCAR is issued as an acceptable means of compliance for the acceptance of
emergency exit locator sign in English language.
Conclusion: The STC Holder, Lufthansa Technik, position is established on the
letter HAM TO/L Li, dated 18 February 2004. As the primary certification
authority, the LBA position is established on the reference letter V-M111/M11502/04 dated 18 February 2004. The FAA concur with assessment and rationale
contained within this FCAR. FAA letter 100S-04-44 dated 5 March 2004. The
FCAR was closed in the stage 4 on 18 March 2004. Item closed.
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b) Internal Markings and Placards
Considering that for the Brazilian aircraft the Markings and Placards related to
the passengers information need to be presented in Portuguese Language, the
STC Holder, Lufthansa Technik, Engenieering Bulletin no. 737-EB11-0024
Revision 1 dated 21 January 2004, which presents the Portuguese Placards
translations will be referred in the Brazilian CHST (STC). In order to reflect the
correct Portuguese Placards translations the below referred placards are required
to be revised as following:
PLACARD
P/N
FFKPL113000214
ENGLISH
GUARDE OS ITENS SOLTOS E
MANTENHA TODAS AS PORTAS E
GAVETAS FECHADAS DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO
FFKPL113000302
O BOX DEVE ESTAR DESOCUPADO E A
PORTA FECHADA DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO
BOTE SALVA-VIDAS COM
TRANSMISSOR NO INTERIOR
BOTE SALVA-VIDAS COM
TRANSMISSOR NO INTERIOR
MANTENHA A PORTA ABERTA E
TRAVADA DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM E POUSO
PROIBIDO FUMAR
NO TOALETE
MANTENHA A PORTA FECHADA
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO
FFKPL113000306
FFKPL113000307
FFKPL113000002
FFKPL113000005
FFKPL113000006
FECHE E TRAVE TODAS AS PORTAS,
PRATELEIRAS E GAVETAS DURANTE
TAXI, DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E
POUSO
A MESA DEVE ESTAR FECHADA
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E
POUSO
O SOFÁ-CAMA DEVE SER
CONVERTIDO EM DIVÃ DURANTE
TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS EMBAIXO DO
ASSENTO
ESTE ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR
DESOCUPADO DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM E POUSO
FFKPL113000012
FFKPL113000014
FFKPL113000020
FFKPL113000022
FFKPL113000023
PORTUGUESE
FOR TAXI TAKEOFF AND
LANDING
Page 23 of 45
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E
POUSO, O ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR
VOLTADO PARA FRENTE NA POSIÇÃO
MAIS ATRÁS
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NO DESCANSO
DAS PERNAS
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E
POUSO, O ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
PLACARD
P/N
ENGLISH
PORTUGUESE
SEAT MUST BE AFT
FACING IN FWD POSITION
WITH HEADREST FULLY
EXTENDED
LIVE VEST IN SEAT BASE
VOLTADO PARA TRÁS NA POSIÇÃO
MAIS A FRENTE COM O APOIO DE
CABEÇA ESTENDIDO
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NA BASE DO
ASSENTO
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E
POUSO, O ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR
VOLTADO PARA FRENTE NA POSIÇÃO
MAIS ATRÁS
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NA BASE DO
ASSENTO
FECHAR E AMARRAR DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM E POUSO
FFKPL113000024
FFKPL113000025
FFKPL113000026
FFKPL113000027
A JANELA DEVE ESTAR ABERTA
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E
POUSO
FIRST AID KIT
EMERGENCY MEDICAL
KIT
DEFIBRILLATOR KIT
OXYGEN BOTTLE
INSIDE
FFKPL113000033
NÃO OCUPAR A CAMA DURANTE
TAXI, DECOLAGEM E POUSO
COLOQUE O CINTO DE SEGURANÇA
AO DEITAR
A FAIXA DEVE ESTAR CRUZADA NA
JANELA QUANDO A
ESCORREGADEIRA ESTIVER ARMADA
FFKPL113000034
FFKPL113000037
GUARDE OS ITENS SOLTOS E
MANTENHA TODAS AS PORTAS E
GAVETAS FECHADAS DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO
FFKPL113000037
GUARDE OS ITENS SOLTOS E
MANTENHA TODAS AS PORTAS E
GAVETAS FECHADAS DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM, TURBULÊNCIA E POUSO
FFKPL113000039
DESLOQUE A MESA PARA O
CORREDOR, DOBRE E AMARRE A
PONTA DA MESA DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM E POUSO
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NA BASE DO
ASSENTO
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM, E
POUSO:
CONVERTER SOFÁ-CAMA EM DIVÃ
EMBUTIR COMPLETAMENTE A MESA
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS EMBAIXO DO
ASSENTO
PUXAR EM EMERGÊNCIA
FFKPL113000040
FFKPL113000043
Page 24 of 45
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
PLACARD
P/N
FFKPL113000044
ENGLISH
GUARDE A MESA DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM E POUSO
PESO MÁXIMO 22,7 KG (50 LB)
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E
POUSO:
A PORTA DEVE ESTAR ABERTA E
TRAVADA, QUANDO OCUPADO
FECHADA QUANDO DESOCUPADO
PROIBIDO FUMAR NO TOALETE
MANTENHA A PORTA ABERTA E
TRAVADA DURANTE TAXI,
DECOLAGEM E POUSO
MESA DE SERVIÇO NO INTERIOR
FFKPL113000047
FFKPL113000048
FFKPL113000049
FFKPL113000051
FFKPL113000052
FFKPL113000056
FFKPL113000TBD
PORTUGUESE
FOR TAXI TAKEOFF AND
LANDING SEAT MUST BE
AFT FACING IN AFT
POSITION WITH
HEADREST FULLY
EXTENDED
LIVE VEST IN SEAT BASE
CAUTION
REMOVABLE TRASH
CONTAINER MUST BE IN
PLACE PRIOR TO TAXI
TAKEOFF AND LANDING
GUARDE O TELEFONE QUANDO NÃO
EM USO
APERTE AQUI PARA ABRIR
“THIS PLARCARD TRANSLATION
MUST BE REMOVED”
DURANTE TAXI, DECOLAGEM E
POUSO O ASSENTO DEVE ESTAR
VOLTADO PARA TRÁS NA POSIÇÃO
MAIS ATRÁS COM O APOIO DE
CABEÇA ESTENDIDO
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NA BASE DO
ASSENTO
ATENÇÃO
LIXEIRA REMOVÍVEL DEVE ESTAR NO
LUGAR ANTES DO TAXI, DECOLAGEM
E POUSO
Conclusion: Lufthansa Technik to revise the referred Engineering Bulletin and
Boeing to revise the installed Placards in the aircraft S/N 32575. Lufthansa
Technik has presented the revision 3 of the Engineering Bulletin dated 15 March
2004, including the revised placards. Item Closed.
Pending items are those points of concern which will be discussed locally with the authority
and which may be converted into a finding, a comment or deleted.
01 - Ditching Investigation
Converted into comment 09.c.14.
02 - Deleted.
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H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
Comments are those points of concern which do not need to be solved before the issuance of
the Brazilian TC, but they are listed to indicate to the manufacturer that eventual future
design or substantiation development, which may solve the particular issue, shall be included
in the Brazilian approved type design or substantiation, after CTA review; also may indicate
policies to be followed by the CTA in future certification processes. No retrofit action for
aircraft already delivered is envisaged in respect to those improvements unless the need is
dictated by safety problems found in service.
Comments 01 through 05 are applicable only to Models 737-300, -400 and -500:
01 - Flight Crew Emergency Exits
The dimensions of the flight crew emergency exits, which do not comply with the
minimum established by the regulations (25.805), are criticized.
02 - Bird Impact on the Aircraft Structure and Empennage
The CTA realizes that the aircraft certification basis do not include requirements on
this subject, however, as many amendments were applied to the design changes
incorporated into the –300 model, it would be desirable that the aircraft behavior
regarding bird impact, mainly in the nose, leading edges and empennage, were
investigated.
03 - Ditching Investigation
A limited ditching investigation was conducted for the –300 model, which included
floatation analysis and pressure loads calculations developed from NASA papers
and 14 CFR Part 25 seaplane requirements. The section 25.801 asks for model tests
or comparison with similar aircrafts configurations with known ditching
characteristics. In actual model tests is possible to determine the stability and
floatation characteristics, failure modes of aircraft components (nacelles, flaps, etc),
as well as, the pressure distribution on lower fuselage and wings, which may be
significantly different from those for hulls, for instance. The CTA criticizes the
ditching investigation analysis.
04 - Engine vibration indicators
The fact that the engine vibration indicators do not have a maximum limit is
criticized.
05 - Equipment cooling switch
On the forward overhead panel all switches but the equipment cooling switch are
forward for normal position. (Criticism only).
Comments 06 through 15 are applicable only to Models 737-600, -700 and -800:
06 - Deleted.
07 - Fuselage and Empennage Damage Tolerance Assessment
The CTA does not totally agree with the categorization of the fuselage and empennages as
“unmodified” structure. A serial of non-significant changes in Principal Structure Elements
(PSE’s) of the fuselage, as well as the increasing in the empennages spans in more than 10%,
combined with the increasing in maximum operating altitudes and some fatigue loads 20%
greater in magnitude can have cumulative effect in the structure damage tolerance
characteristics.
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H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
Since this issue was extensively discussed, according to Issue Paper A-7, and a structural
inspection program is already scheduled to be completed by October 1999, based on a
damage tolerance assessment, the CTA will accept this agreement in the basis of the FAA
approval, but will reserve the right to review and approve the substantiation data to support
this inspection program determination, when it is completed.
BOEING is requested to establish a commitment to submit to CTA the Damage Tolerance
Analysis for both the Fuselage and Empennages.
Boeing has provided comments by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 June 2001.
08 - Aeroelasticity failure cases
During the CTA evaluation visit, many failure conditions have been discussed to some extent
and additional new data has been requested, because the reports D101A801-50, D101A80250 and D101A803-50 do not present all the analyzed conditions. The flutter analyses with the
failure conditions listed below are being required in order to show compliance with RBHA/14
CFR Part 25.629(f). The preliminary results of such analyses were presented in a draft figure
and considered acceptable. These revised reports (for all the Next Generation models),
including these aeroelastic analyses, are requested:
- Most critical failure in the nacelle strut combined with a POWER OFF condition;
- A single structural failure in the jackscrew (horizontal stabilizer) supporting structure;
- One elevator Tab Rod Failure combined with a POWER OFF condition; and
- A reduction in stiffness due to a bird impact in the horizontal stabilizer.
Boeing has provided comments by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 June 2001.
09 - Cargo Compartment Placard
CTA criticizes the reduced size of cargo compartment placards (installed to establish the
distribution of cargo limits), since this information is not clearly visible either from the ground
or even from some positions inside the cargo compartment.
Boeing has provided comments by Enclosure A of letter B-T113-98-8056, received
16 November 1998.
10 - Certification Reports Status
Several certification reports, scheduled to demonstrate the compliance with the Certification
Basis, were presented to the CTA before final approval, and, in some cases, even not released
as a final version. CTA requests that BOEING identifies if any significant design changes that
should be raised in the future, due to the completion of this formal approval process.
11 - Use of the ground spoilers for accelerate-stop and landing distances determination
According to RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.109 (b) (1) and 25.125 (b) (3) (i), additional
means other than wheel brakes may be used to determine the accelerate-stop and
landing distance respectively, if that means is safe and reliable. The CTA policy
considers that “safe and reliable” corresponds to an improbable failure condition
(10E-05 or less). Boeing is requested to show that the failure of this system during
these two flight phases complies with the CTA policy.
The rationale has been presented by Mr. David Weller to CTA during the final
meeting, at BOEING facilities, in 02 October 1998.
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12 April 2011
12 - Fire detectors in the Tail Pipe
The RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.1203 requires fire detection to be installed in the tail
pipe sections of turbine installations. Since no fire detectors are installed in engine
tail pipe sections of models B737-600, -700, -800, CTA requires BOEING to show
compliance with the above section, or justify the absence of the referred detectors.
The rationale has been presented by Mr. Justin Shnili to CTA during the final
meeting, at BOEING facilities, in 02 October 1998.
13 - Fire extinguishing agent concentration
It has been noticed that ground test have been performed by BOEING, simulating
flight air flow conditions within the engine nacelle, to demonstrate compliance with
RBHA/14 CFR Part 25.1195(b). Boeing is being requested to demonstrate the
validity of the adopted airflow modeling.
The rationale has been presented by Mr. Justin Shnili to CTA during the final
meeting, at BOEING facilities, in 02 October 1998.
14 - Ditching Investigation
In order to complement the comments already presented in finding 09.a.14, for the
B737-300, -400 and -500, the CTA requires that the Boeing submits the Ditching
Investigation Report No. D043A018-3 for the B737-800 model, in order to provide
a better clarification regarding to the model tests or comparison with similar aircraft
configurations with known ditching characteristics.
Boeing has provided comments by Boeing letter B-H340-01-4157 dated 15 Junee
2001.
15 - Hollingsead International STC #ST00405LA-D (LBA.21NE1.TA0682) - Smoke
Detection and Fire Suppression Systems Reports installed in the B-737-700 IGW
model.
During the discussions it was identified that some certification reports which were
developed by Hollingsead International address both class “C” and “D” cargo
compartments. As the class “D” is not anymore a certified configuration.
Hollingsead International is suggested to revise the reports below to reflect the class
“C” as the only one approved cargo compartment:
-
#R-6206, Rev. G, Plumbing Integrity Check Procedure
#TP-1001, Rev. C, Ground/Flight Test Plan
#R-6073, Rev. E, BBJ System Definition Document
#R-6202, Rev. A, System Safety Report
10 - CERTIFICATION DOCUMENTS REQUIRED (New or used aircraft)
Several engineering reports containing certification substantiation data, related to the Models
737-300, -400 and -500 were supplied by Boeing, reviewed by the CTA and are maintained in
the CTA confidential documentation files.
The following additional documents listed below are related to Models 737-600, -700 and 800, and are being required to permit the conclusion of some engineering analyses and to
substantiate the CTA type design approval. Additional requests may arise from the analysis of
those documents even after type certification which are assumed to be responded by BOEING:
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H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
a. Engineering Certification Reports and other documents:
D101A801-50 - “Summary of Analytical Flutter Investigations for the 737-700 Airplane”, original
issue, dated 12 November 1996;
D101A802-50 - “Summary of Analytical Flutter Investigations for the 737-800 Airplane”, Rev. A,
dated 04 September 1998;
D101A803-50 - “Summary of Analytical Flutter Investigations for the 737-600 Airplane”, original
issue, dated 18 November 1997;
D101A801-51 - “Summary of Experimental Flutter Investigations for the 737-700 Airplane”,
original issue, dated 30 May 1997;
D101A801-9 - “Wing Damage Tolerance Analysis”, Rev. D, dated 13 August 1998;
D101A801-61 - “Fail Safe Stress Analysis - Fuselage and empennage”, Rev. B, dated 10 Aug. 1998;
D101A801-47 - “Structural Inspection Planning Data”, Rev. B, May 1998;
D041A018-2 - “Aerodynamic Flight Test Results 737-700 with CFM International CFM56-7B
Engines”, Rev. C, 21 August 1998;
D101A801-24 - “Summary Data for Loads Analysis”, Rev. C, dated 29 July 1998;
D6-36238 - “Passenger Seat Structural Design and Interface Criteria”, Rev. B;
D6-55698 - “Design and Certification Requirements for Galleys, Closets, Stowage's, Partitions and
Crew Rests”;
D453A018-1 - “737-600/-700/-800 Cargo Compartment Certification Compliance Document”;
D6-55441 - “Galley / Interior Furnishing Structural Requirements”, Rev. C, dated 15 April 1997;
D218A018-6 - “Cargo Compartment Fire Protection System Certification Data for 727 and 737
Aircraft”, Rev A;
D101A801-38 - “New material and New applications of existing materials”, Original issue, 02
February 1997;
C1.33.0016 - “Control systems malfunction”;
C1.35.0011 -“Effect of simulated ice shapes on handling qualities”;
C2.04.0221 - “Lapse rate takeoffs for ratings and limits”;
C2.04.0277 - “Engine go-around acceleration”;
C5.04.0232 - “Flight management computer system”;
C5.06.0308 - “Allied Signal weather radar system”;
C5.06.0309 - “Collins weather radar system”;
C5.09.0203 - “Black label common display system (CDS)”;
C5.09.0218 - “Red label common display system (CDS)”;
D361A282 - “Propulsion control system safety analysis 737-600/-700/-800”; and
D361A283 - “Propulsion control system failure analysis 737-600/-700/-800”.
The following Certification Flight Test Reports have already been provided for CTA
review by BOEING Flight Test Group:
C1.00.0026 - proof of compliance -- 14 CFR Part 25.21;
C1.01.0032 - air data system certification;
C1.04.0010 - minimum unstick speeds, 737-700;
C1.05.0006 - rapid rotation speed determination;
C1.06.0054 - takeoff performance;
C1.07.0012 - abuse takeoff;
Cl.09.0040 - RTO performance, BF Goodrich brakes;
C1.09.0043 - RTO performance, antiskid off, BF Goodrich brakes;
C1.09.0047 - RTO performance, Bendix brakes;
C1.09.0048 - RTO performance, antiskid off, Bendix brakes;
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H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
C1.09.0049 - RTO performance, 44.5 inch tires;
C1.11.0020 - ground minimum control speed;
C1.11.0030 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k ground minimum control speed;
C1.12.0029 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k air minimum control speed;
C1.13.0043 - stall speed performance;
C1.14.0038 - stall characteristics;
C1.15.0039 - low speed drag performance;
C1.15.0052 - low speed drag performance with revised simulated ice shapes;
C1.17.0043 - check climb performance;
C1.20.0060 - landing performance, BF Goodrich brakes;
Cl.20.0063 - auto brake performance, BF Goodrich brakes;
C1.20.0066 - landing performance, Bendix brakes;
C1.20.0067 - auto brake performance, Bendix brakes;
C1.20.0071 - thrust reverser effectiveness;
C1.21.0050 - longitudinal control;
C1.21.0051 - maneuvering capability, including out of trim;
C1.22.0029 - static longitudinal stability;
C1.22.0034 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k static longitudinal stability;
C1.23.0007 - dynamic longitudinal stability;
C1.24.0018 - lateral control;
C1.25.0016 - static lateral directional stability;
C1.26.0038 - directional control;
C1.26.0039 - reverse thrust controllability;
C1.28.0015 - dynamic lateral/directional stability;
C1.29.0029 - trim characteristics;
C1.29.0038 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k trim characteristics;
C1.31.0031 - high speed buffet boundary demonstration;
C1.32.0012 - high speed characteristics;
C1.34.0038 - ground handling characteristic;
C1.34.0039 - crosswind takeoff and landing;
C1.35.0013 - effect of natural ice on handling qualities;
C1.35.0014 - performance with natural ice;
C1.35.0017 - effect of simulated ice shapes (config 1) on flaps DN handling qualities;
C1.35.0018 - effect of simulated ice shapes (config 2) on flaps DN handling qualities;
C1.35.0019 - effect of simulated ice shapes (config 3) on flaps UP handling qualities;
C1.35.0020 - effect of simulated ice shapes (config 4) on flaps UP handling qualities;
C1.38.0040 - mach trim system demonstration;
C1.38.0041 - speed trim system demonstration;
C1.38.0052 - increased gross weight (IGW)/27k mach/speed trim system demonstration;
C1.39.0080 - high lift system demonstration;
C1.39.0088 - ground spoiler system demonstration;
Cl.39.0093 - red label stall management/yaw damper (SMYD) demonstration;
C1.39.0094 - black label stall management/yaw damper (SMYD) demonstration;
C1.39.0116 - rudder system PCU evaluation (phase 2) ground test;
C1.40.0019 - 737-700/800 certification demonstration flight for configuration deviation list;
C2.01.0144 - in-flight starting demonstration;
C2.02.0133 - engine operating characteristics;
C2.02.0162 - engine operating characteristics;
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C2.03.0123 - EEC demonstration ground test;
C2.03.0124 - EEC demonstration flight test;
C2.08.0117 - thrust reverser operating procedure demonstration;
C4.02.0015 - flight flutter of 737-700 equipped with CFM56-7 engines;
C5.01.0114 - DFCS takeoff and cruise demonstration;
C5.01.0115 - single channel autopilot roll hardover demonstration;
C5.01.0117 - DFCS black label demonstration;
C5.01.0133 - single channel autopilot pitch hardover demonstration;
C5.02.0069 - DCFS approach and autoland red label demonstration;
C5.03.0128 - red label autothrottle;
C5.03.0144 - black label autothrottle;
C5.04.0236 - black label single U10 series FMC;
C5.05.0049 - air data module/air data sensor;
C5.07.0217 - ground proximity warning system (GPWS);
C5.10.0085 - air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU);
D019A001 - “Configuration Specification”, Rev. A, 17 April 1998;
D6-38808-34 - “GECAS Detail Specification”, Rev. A, 16 July 1998;
D6-24958 - “Damage Tolerance Methods and Allowables - BOOK 3”, dated May 1998;
M-7360-D541 - “Maintenance Program Development Policy and Procedures Handbook”,
Aug. 1995;
D6-56900-1 - “AFM DPI User’s Guide”, Rev. B;
D6-36230 - “Passenger Seat Design and Installation Criteria”, Rev. H, dated 20 February 1998;
and
D415A001 - “Galley Standard Interface Document”, Rev. C, dated 13 March 1998.
a. The documents listed below are required to permit the conclusion of the analysis and to substantiate
the CTA CHST’s (STC’s) approval. Additional items may arise from the analysis of those
documents even after Supplemental Type Certification, which are assumed to be responded by
Boeing and/or CHST’s (STC’s) holders:
Documentation related with STC #ST00405LA-D (LBA.21NE1.TA0682) - Smoke Detection and
Fire Suppression Systems to be supplied by Hollingsead International
Certification Plan – Report #2637-03
STC # LBA.21NE1.TA0682
Type Inspection Authorization – Report #16NM0067
JAA, CRI #PTC/FOX-19, issue 3, dated 20 September 1999
Hollingsead Designated Alterations Station (DAS) Procedures Manual
Documentation related with STC #ST00647SE – HGS 2350 supplied by Rockwell Collins.
HGS 2350 Qualification Test Pocedure – doc #9851-1304, Rev.A, dated 19 December
1997.Qualification Test Pocedure – doc #9851-1304, Rev.B, dated 19 December 1997.
HGS 2350 Boeing New Generation 737-700 Cat IIIa Certification Simulation Test Plan – doc
#9701-1012, Rev.A, dated 04 September 1998.
HGS 2350 Certification Simulation Test Report – doc #9701-1013, Rev. A, dated 09 November 1998.
HGS 2350 Cat IIIa Flight Test Certification Plan – doc #9885-0057, dated 15 September 1998.
HGS 2350 Certification Flight Test Report – doc #9885-0558, Rev. A, dated 10 November1998.
HGS 2350 Cat IIIa System Performance Evaluation – doc #9851-1343, Rev. A, dated
04 November 1998.
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Documentation related with STC #ST00830SE – Winglets supplied by Aviation Partnes Boeing.
List of Eligeble Aircraft Serial Number – Doc.#737-0107, Rev. L, dated 26 November2002, and
Master Drawing List ( MDL)- Doc. #AP37.7-011, Rev. B1, dated 08 October 2003.
Airplane Flight Manual Suplement (AFMS) -Doc.# AP37.1-0616, FAA approved 4 October 2001
(two 3 ½ floppy disks included), for –3kit blended winglets installation.
Weight & Balance Control and Loading Manual Supplement, doc #AP37.7-6019, Rev. A, dated
20 August 2003.
Supplement to the 737-700 IGW Structural Repair Manual, doc. #AP37.7-0615, dated
14 September 2001.
Maintenance Planning Data – doc. #AP37.1-0604, Rev. D, dated December, 2003.
Aircraft Maintenance Manual Part I and Part II – doc.#AP37.7-0618 Rev. B, dated July 2003.
Supplemental Inspection Planning Data – doc. #AP37.1-0305, Rev. E, dated 26 February 2002.
Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) – Boeing Manual #D6-32545, dated
17 November 2003.
Copy of JAA STC # LBA.21NE1.TA0472, issue 1, dated 19 July 2002.
Documentation related with STC #ST0936NY – Auxiliary Fuel System to be supplied by PATS INC.
TO 671 – System description for BBJ auxiliary fuel
TO 902 – BBJ Auxiliary Fuel System Safety assessment
TO 1706 – PATS/Decrane Auxiliary Fuel System summary – SFAR 88 Compliance report
TO 1519 – 737-700IGW/-800 Auxiliary Fuel System SFAR 88 Compliance report
TO 1453 – Auxiliary Fuel System SFAR 88 Functional Hazard Assessment
TO 662 – Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Report
TO 680 – System Intrinsic Safety Report
TO 800 – Plan for Software Aspects of Certification ( PSAC)
TO 683 – EMI & RFI test Program
TO 867 – Flight Test Results
Documentation related with STC #LBA.21E2.TA0307 (FAA ST01381) – VIP Interior to be
supplied by Lufthansa Technik.
CR 23-00/16 – Report and Engineering Bulletins related
CR 23-00/17 – Report and Engineering Bulletins related
Maintenance Planning Data Supplement, doc. #A-00-01/311-MPD, Rev 00 dated 30 May 2001.
Aircraft Maintenance Manual Supplement – doc # A-00-01/311-AMM, Rev 00 dated 30 May 2001.
Documentation related with STC #LBA.21E2.TA0311 (FAA ST01340NY) – Tip Radome to be
supplied by Lufthansa Technik.
Aircraft Maintenance Manual Supplement – doc # A-34-01/349, Rev 00 dated 03 April 2001.
Aircraft Maintenance Manual Supplement – doc # A-55-01/350, Rev 00 dated 03 April 2001.
c.
The documents listed in Annex (1) to this report.
Note: This list does not refer to the documentation which must be furnished to the
aircraft Operator, such as: Airframe/engine logbooks; Flight Manual;
Maintenance Manuals; Parts Catalog, Wiring Diagram manual; Overhaul and
Maintenance Manuals for the repairable equipment, etc.
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d. Addresses for sending publications to ANAC:
01.
Certification
National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC-Brazil)
Aeronautical Products Certification Branch (GGCP)
Av. Cassiano Ricardo, 521 - Bloco B - 2° andar
12246-870 – São José dos Campos – SP
BRAZIL
Facsimile: 55 (12) 3797-2330
E-mail: [email protected]
02.
Operations/Maintenance
National Agency of Civil Aviation (ANAC)
Operational Safety Branch (SSO)
Av. Presidente Vargas, 850 – 13º andar - Centro
20.071-001 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ – BRAZIL
Facsimile: 55 (21) 3501-5467
E-mail: [email protected]
11 - EXPORT ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS (New aircraft)
For exporting an aircraft to Brazil, the following is required:
a. For each aircraft, a FAA Export Certificate of Airworthiness, indicating that the aircraft
is in compliance with the ANAC approved type design, defined by the Brazilian Type
Certificate No. 8807, and stating compliance with the Brazilian Import Requirements of
this report. The original Export Certificate of Airworthiness remains with the aircraft
operator and a copy should be sent to the ANAC by mail.
b. For each aircraft, a list of exceptions (if any) in respect to the ANAC approved type
design, listed in the Export Certificate of Airworthiness above mentioned.
c.
For each aircraft, a list of the optional equipment installed (standard and non-standard
options).
12 - EXPORT ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS (Used aircraft)
The following is required, for each aircraft:
a. An Export Certificate of Airworthiness from the exporting country indicating that the
aircraft is in compliance with the ANAC approved type design, defined by the Brazilian
Type Certificate No 8807, and stating compliance with the Brazilian Import
Requirements of this report. The original Export Certificate of Airworthiness remains
with the aircraft operator and a copy should be sent to the ANAC by mail.
Note: For these aircraft, the ANAC approved type design corresponds to the FAA
approved type design plus the special requirements listed in section 13 of this
report.
b. A list of exceptions (if any) in respect to the ANAC approved type design, listed in the
Export Certificate of Airworthiness above mentioned.
Page 33 of 45
H.10-0810-36
c.
12 April 2011
A list of the optional equipment installed (standard and non-standard options).
d. A summary of the modifications and major repairs, which have been incorporated,
indicating the mandatory and recommended ones due to Bombardier instructions and
other incorporated by the former owners.
e.
Summary of the past maintenance inspections and operating hours and/or cycles since
the last inspection or overhaul for the aircraft and all controlled parts.
Note: For aircraft exported from third countries, the requirements of paragraphs (11) (a)
and (b) above may be accomplished by the third country Export Airworthiness Certificate.
13 - BRAZILIAN IMPORT REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
Aircraft to be exported to Brazil must show compliance with the following requirements:
a.
The airplane must be in conformity with the approved Type Design as established in
section 03 of this report or any modification must be approved in accordance with
section 04.
b. The Brazilian AFM, as established in section 06, must be included for delivery.
c.
All placards in Portuguese (or English and Portuguese), required by Annex III, must be
installed in the airplane.
d. An Export Certificate of Airworthiness must be issued indicating compliance with
sections 11 or 12 of this report, as applicable.
Page 34 of 45
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
ANNEX I
a. With the first-of-a-model exported aircraft:
1. Type Certification Documents (for each approved model, e.g.: 3YO, 5Q8, etc):
Revised FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet A16WE (indicating approval of subject model).
2. Following Manuals and Publications (for the first approved model) and its updatings:
Airplane Flight Manual (including the applicable DPI floppy disks);
Airplane Operating Manual;
Quick Reference Handbook;
Weight and Balance Manual;
Aircraft Maintenance Manual;
Corrosion Prevention Manual;
Service Bulletin and Airworthiness Directives Collection;
Master Minimum Equipment List;
Dispatch Procedures Deviation Guide;
Maintenance Review Board Report;
Maintenance Planning Document;
Structural Repair Manual;
Parts Catalog Handbook;
Maintenance Training Manuals;
System Schematic Manual D6-80804.
Note 1: Two copies are required, one for the ANAC/GGCP and another for the ANAC,
including amendment services.
Note 2: ANAC are able to receive all publications not only in paper form, but also in PC
compatible CD-ROM (preferred) or floppy disk, microfiche and microfilm. So far,
only the Airplane Flight Manual must be provided in paper form.
Note 3: Aircraft Components Maintenance Manuals, prepared by the vendors, may be
required as needed.
b. Individual Aircraft documents: (to be supplied to the ANAC for each aircraft exported to Brazil)
1. List of modifications incorporated in respect to the originally approved type design.
2. Statement of Compliance with FAA Airworthiness Directives
Page 35 of 45
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
ANNEX II
(Brazilian Airplane Flight Manual Supplement- front-page model)
THE BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP
B737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700 AND -800 AIRCRAFT MODELS
BRAZILIAN AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT
This Supplement is hereby approved by the FAA on behalf of the “Agência Nacional de
Aviação Civil” for Brazilian registered aircraft, in accordance with the “Regulamentos
Brasileiros de Homologação Aeronáutica” (RBHA) 21, Section 21.29.
Doc no__________________
Approved by: ______________________________________________
(FAA representative)
Date: ____________________________________________________
Aircraft Registration: ________________________________________
Aircraft Serial Number: ______________________________________
This Aircraft shall be operated in accordance with the limitation and instructions herein
established.
Page 36 of 45
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
ANNEX III
MARKINGS AND PLACARDS TRANSLATION
The following Markings and Placards Translation must be installed in the aircraft model, as
applicable:
a.
Internal Markings
ENGLISH
PORTUGUESE
NO SMOKING
LIFE VEST UNDER
FRONT OF YOUR SEAT
FASTEN SEAT BELT
EXIT
RETURN TO SEAT
EMERGENCY
FOR CREW USE ONLY
SOFT ARTICLES ONLY
OPEN
(INDICATING FINAL POSITION)
FASTEN SEAT BELT WHILE SEATED
DOOR MUST BE CLOSED AND
LATCHED DURING TAKEOFF
AND LANDING
FASTEN CURTAIN OPEN
DURING TAKEOFF AND
LANDING
NO SMOKING IN LAVATORY
LIFE VEST INSIDE
LIFE VEST BEHIND YOUR
SEAT BACK
PULL
PUSH
NO CIGARRETE DISPOSAL
INFANT LIFE VEST INSIDE
ESCAPE STRAP
RED STRAP MUST BE ACROSS
WINDOW WHEN SLIDE IS
ENGAGED
SLIDE INSIDE
SLIDE INFLATES AUTOMATICALLY
WHEN DOOR IS ENGAGED
CLOSET LOAD LIMIT
LATCH CLOSED LOAD LIMIT
LOAD LIMIT
LOAD LIMIT FOR LOOSE
ARTICLES
NÃO FUME
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS
SOB O ASSENTO DE SUA POLTRONA
USE CINTOS
SAÍDA
RETORNE À SUA POLTRONA
EMERGÊNCIA
APENAS PARA USO DA TRIPULAÇÃO
APENAS OBJETOS MACIOS
ABERTA
USE CINTOS DURANTE O VÔO
A PORTA DEVE SER MANTIDA FECHADA
E TRAVADA DURANTE O
POUSO E DECOLAGEM
MANTENHA A CORTINA ABERTA
DURANTE O POUSO E DECOLAGEM
NÃO FUME NO LAVATÓRIO
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS NO INTERIOR
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS ATRÁS DO
ENCOSTO DA POLTRONA
PUXE
EMPURRE
NÃO JOGUE CIGARROS
COLETE SALVA-VIDAS PARA
CRIANÇAS NO INTERIOR
CORDA PARA EVACUAÇÃO
COLOCAR A FITA VERMELHA
CRUZANDO A JANELA QUANDO A
ESCORREGADEIRA ESTIVER ARMADA
ESCORREGADEIRA NO INTERIOR
A ESCORREGADEIRA INFLARÁ
AUTOMATICAMENTE QUANDO
CONECTADA À AERONAVE COM A
PORTA ABERTA
CARGA LIMITE NO COMPARTIMENTO
LIMITE DE CARGA COM PORTA FECHADA
LIMITE DE CARGA
LIMITE DE CARGA PARA OBJETOS
SOLTOS
Page 37 of 45
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
ENGLISH
PORTUGUESE
USE SEAT BOTTOM CUSHION
FOR FLOATATION
PULL TO INFLATE (ON SLIDE)
(no English placard equivalent)
IN EMERGENCY, USE
MANUAL INFLATION IF
SLIDE DOES NOT INFLATE
AUTOMATICALLY (on all type I doors)
USE O ASSENTO DA POLTRONA
PARA FLUTUAÇÃO
PUXE PARA INFLAR
EM EMERGÊNCIA, USE INFLAÇÃO
MANUAL SE A
ESCORREGADEIRA
NÃO INFLAR AUTOMATICAMENTE
External placards on doors
ENGLISH
PORTUGUESE
EMERGENCY EXIT
SAÍDA DE EMERGÊNCIA
(To be installed near the emergency exit, only for models 737-300, -400 and -500):
EMERGENCY EXIT PRESS TO
SAÍDA DE EMERGÊNCIA
EMPURRE PARA DESTRAVAR
EMPURRE A JANELA PARA
DENTRO E LEVANTE-A
UNLATCH PUSH HATCH INWARD
AND LIFT UP
(To be installed near the emergency exit, only for models 737-600, -700 and -800):
WARNING
HOLD DOOR WITH YOUR BODY
PUSH VENT DOOR
MAKE DOOR OPEN UP SLOWLY
OR SERIOUS INJURY CAN OCCUR
ATENÇÃO
SEGURE A JANELA COM SEU CORPO,
EMPURRE O FLAPETE E
DEIXE-A ABRIR LENTAMENTE
POIS HÁ O RISCO DE FERIMENTOS
(To be installed near the emergency exit, only for models 737-600, -700 and -800):
EMERGENCY EXIT ONLY
PUSH TO OPEN
DOORS OPENS OUT AND
UP AUTOMATICALLY
EMERGENCY EXIT PUSH WINDOW
AND PULL RELEASE
PULL OUT TO ENGAGE HANDLE
ROTATE AS SHOWN ABOVE, PULL
DOOR OUTWARD
PULL
PUSH
EXIT
CAUTION
WHEN RED FLAG SHOWS IN
WINDOW
AUTOMATIC ESCAPE SLIDE IS
ARMED
STAND CLEAR
WHEN OPENING DOOR
OPEN (INDICATING MOVEMENT)
SAÍDA DE EMERGÊNCIA
EMPURRE PARA ABRIR
A JANELA ABRE AUTOMATICAMENTE
PARA FORA E PARA CIMA
SAÍDA DE EMERGÊNCIA
PARA ABRIR, PUXE A MANOPLA
E EMPURRE A JANELA
PUXE PARA ENGATAR A ALAVANCA
GIRE COMO INDICADO ACIMA
PUXE A PORTA PARA FORA
PUXE
EMPURRE
SAÍDA
CUIDADO
QUANDO A FAIXA VERMELHA
APARECER
O ESCORREGADOR ESTÁ ARMADO
MANTENHA A ÁREA LIVRE
QUANDO ABRIR A PORTA
ABRIR
Page 38 of 45
H.10-0810-36
c.
12 April 2011
External Placards on Cargo and Service Doors
ENGLISH
PORTUGUESE
CAUTION
HANDLE MUST BE IN UNLOCKED
POSITION TO CLOSE DOOR
UNLOCKED
LOCKED
PULL & ROTATE TO UNLOCK
OPEN
RETURN HANDLE TO OPEN
POSITION BEFORE CLOSING DOOR
DWG BAC27DPA506 (English)
CUIDADO
A ALAVANCA DEVE ESTAR NA POSIÇÃO
DESTRAVADA PARA FECHAR A PORTA
DESTRAVADO
TRAVADO
PUXE E GIRE PARA DESTRAVAR
ABRIR
RECOLOQUE A ALAVANCA NA POSIÇÃO
ABERTA ANTES DE FECHAR A PORTA
DWG BAC27DPA5107 (Portuguese)
EMPURRE AQUI
PARA ABRIR:
1. SOLTE A ALAVANCA E GIRE ATÉ A POSIÇÃO
ABERTA
2. EMPURRE PARA CIMA A LATERAL DA PORTA
ATÉ QUE ESTA TRAVE NO MECANISMO
DESLIZANTE
3. EMPURRE A PORTA E O MECANISMO, PARA
CIMA E PARA O LADO ATÉ O ENGAJAMENTO
DA TRAVA DE FINAL DE CURSO
PARA FECHAR:
1. SOLTE A TRAVA DE FINAL DE CURSO E DEIXE
A PORTA E O MECANISMO DESLIZANTE
MOVEREM-SE PARA BAIXO ATÉ QUE A HASTE
DE LIBERAÇÃO DA TRAVA DA PORTA
CONTACTE A ESTRUTURA E A PORTA SE
SEPARE DO MECANISMO
2. PUXE PARA BAIXO PELA ALAVANCA PARA
COMPRIMIR O SELO E ENTÃO GIRE-A 180 PARA
TRAVAR A PORTA
EMPURRE A ALAVANCA ATÉ QUE ELA FIQUE
FACEANDO O REVESTIMENTO DA PORTA NA
POSIÇÃO TRAVADA
ABRIR
Page 39 of 45
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
d. Cargo Compartment placards
ENGLISH
DWG BAC27DPA4997
PORTUGUESE
CARREGAMENTO
O CARREGAMENTO NESTE
COMPARTIMENTO NÃO DEVE
EXCEDER QUALQUER DOS
SEGUINTES VALORES:
1) 3 469 kgf (7 648 1bf) CARGA TOTAL
2) 733 kgf/m2 (150 1bf/ft2) NA ÁREA HORIZONTAL
3) 2337 kgf (5152 1bf) DA BHD
(727 + 4) ATÉ A ESTAÇÃO 792.
414 kgf (912 1bf) DA ESTAÇÃO 792 ATÉ A ESTAÇÃO 849.
718 kgf (1584 1bf) DA ESTAÇÃO 849 ATÉ BHD 948.
CUIDADO: PARA DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE
CARGA VEJA MANUAL DE PESO E
BALANCEAMENTO.
DWG BAC27DPA4996
NOTA: VEJA O “MAINTENANCE
HANDBOOK” PARA DETERMINAR
A CAPACIDADE DE CARGA DOS “TRACKS”.
CARREGAMENTO
O CARREGAMENTO NESTE
COMPARTIMENTO NÃO DEVE
EXCEDER QUALQUER DOS
SEGUINTES VALORES:
1) 2 269 kgf (5 002 1bf) CARGA TOTAL
2) 733 kgf/m2 (150 1bf/ft2) NA ÁREA HORIZONTAL.
3) 763 kgf (1 682 1bf) DA BDH 380 ATÉ A ESTAÇÃO 438.
388 kgf (855 1bf) DA ESTAÇÃO 438 ATÉ A ESTAÇÃO 495.
1 118 kgf (2 465 1bf) DA ESTAÇÃO 495 ATÉ BHD 500D
CUIDADO: PARA DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE
CARGA VEJA MANUAL DE PESO E
BALANCEAMENTO.
NOTA: VEJA O “MAINTENANCE
HANDBOOK” PARA DETERMINAR
A CAPACIDADE DE CARGA DOS “TRACKS”.
Page 40 of 45
H.10-0810-36
e.
12 April 2011
Miscellaneous External Placards
ENGLISH
DWG BAC27DPA4996
PORTUGUESE
ATENÇÃO
MANTENHA-SE AFASTADO DAS
ÁREAS PERIGOSAS ENQUANTO O
MOTOR ESTIVER FUNCIONANDO
(Only for models 737-300, -400 and -500):
DWG BAC27DPA504
CUIDADO
SENSOR DELICADO.
MANUSEIE COM CUIDADO
WARNING
ATENÇÃO
HOT AIR EXHAUST
EXAUSTÃO DE AR QUENTE
WARNING
ATENÇÃO
STAY CLEAR OF DOOR FIQUE AFASTADO DA PORTA
WHEN
QUANDO A LUZ VERMELHA
RED LIGHT IS ON
ESTIVER ACESA
NO STEP
DWG BAC27XSTN192
DWG 141A6401
(AIRSTAIR DOOR)
WATER SERVICE PANEL
DRAIN VALVE
P/N OGCL4-97108859-023
FILL VALVE
P/N BAC27NPA1391
WATER FILL CONECTION
FUELING STATION
P/N 0GCL4-95148505-027
CLOSED
P/N 0GCL4-99108859-025
PULL HANDLE TO OPEN
PUSH HANDLE TO CLOSE
(VALVE
MUST
BE
CLOSED IN FLIGHT)
P/N BAC27DPA5129
MAXIMUM
FILLING
PRESSURE SHALL BE
55 PSI
3.8 KG/CM2
NÃO PISE
PERIGO
CUIDADO: OPERAÇÃO EXTERNA DA ESCADA
ESCAMOTEÁVEL
RECOLHA O CORRIMÃO DE EXTENSÃO ANTES DE
RECOLHER A ESCADA.
A ESCADA DEVERÁ SER TRAVADA NA POSIÇÃO
DOBRADA DURANTE O RECOLHIMENTO.
PAINEL DE SERVIÇO DE ÁGUA
DRENO
VÁLVULA DE ABASTECIMENTO
CONEXÃO PARA ABASTECIMENTO DE ÁGUA
ESTAÇÃO DE ABASTECIMENTO
FECHADO
PUXE A ALAVANCA PARA ABRIR
EMPURRE A ALAVANCA PARA FECHAR
(AS VÁLVULAS DEVEM ESTAR FECHADAS EM VÔO)
PRESSÃO MÁXIMA DE ABASTECIMENTO
55 PSI
3.8 KG/CM2
Page 41 of 45
H.10-0810-36
f.
12 April 2011
Fuel System External Placards (only for Models 737-300, -400 and -500):
PORTUGUESE
INSTRUÇÕES PARA ABASTECIMENTO
1) INSTALE O FIO TERRA. A SEGUIR REMOVA A TAMPA E ACOPLE OS BOCAIS DE
ABASTECIMENTO.
2) TESTE OS INSTRUMENTOS E AS LUZES DE POSIÇÃO DAS VÁLVULAS.
3) POSICIONE OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTROLE DAS VÁLVULAS DE
ABASTECIMENTO DOS TANQUES EM “OPEN”. VERIFIQUE A ABERTURA DAS
VÁLVULAS ATRAVÉS DO ACENDIMENTO DAS LUZES AZUIS
4) POSICIONE OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTROLE DAS VÁLVULAS DE
ABASTECIMENTO DOS TANQUES EM “CLOSED” QUANDO ATINGIR A
QUANTIDADE DESEJADA DE COMBUSTÍVEL. MANTENHA A PRESSÃO DA
FONTE DE ABASTECIMENTO E VERIFIQUE QUE TODO O FLUXO DE
COMBUSTÍVEL PARA A AERONAVE TENHA CESSADO. DESLIGUE A FONTE DE
ABASTECIMENTO, DESACOPLE O BOCAL DE TANQUEIO, RECOLOQUE A TAMPA
E DESLIGUE O FIO TERRA.
5) TODOS OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTROLE DAS VÁLVULAS DE
ABASTECIMENTO DOS TANQUES DEVEM ESTAR NA POSIÇÃO “CLOSED” ANTES
DO VÔO E TODAS AS LUZES AZUIS DEVERÃO ESTAR APAGADAS. CERTIFIQUESE QUE OS BULBOS DESTAS LUZES ESTEJAM FUNCIONANDO.
Page 42 of 45
H.10-0810-36
g.
12 April 2011
Fuel System External Placards (only for Models 737-600, -700 and -800):
ENGLISH
BAC27DFS251
PORTUGUESE
CUIDADO
BAC27DFS252
BAC27DFS266
NÃO EXCEDA 55 PSI/379 Kpa
DE PRESSÃO DE COMBUSTÍVEL
ABASTEÇA A AERONAVE COM
JET FUEL SPEC. GED50TF2
SENSOR DE TEMPERATURA DE
COMBUSTÍVEL TANQUE 1
ATERRE AQUI
CUIDADO
BAC27DFS250
NÃO EXCEDA 55 PSID/379 Kpa
DE PRESSÃO DE COMBUSTÍVEL
ABASTEÇA ESSA AERONAVE
COM JET FUEL SPEC. GED50TF2
NÃO USE COMBUSTÍVEIS CLASSE B/GED50TF2,
JET B OU JP-4.
CAPACIDADE UTILIZÁVEL DE COMBUSTÍVEL
BAC27DFS253
TANQUE N 1
BAC27DFS249
TANQUE CENTRAL
TANQUE N 2
1 288 GALOES U.S. 4 299 GALOES U.S. 1 288 GALOES U.S.
4 875 LITROS
16 272 LITROS
4 875 LITROS
INSTRUCÕES PARA ABASTECIMENTO
INSTALE O FIO TERRA. REMOVA A TAMPA E ACOPLE O
BOCAL DE ABASTECIMENTO.
MOVA O INTERRUPTOR PARA A POSICÃO “TEST GAGES”
– CONFIRME QUE OS MOSTRADORES SUPERIOR E
INFERIOR INDICAM 88888888.
PRESSIONE AS LUZES AZUIS “VALVE POSITION LIGHTS"
- CONFIRME QUE AS LUZES ACENDEM.
MOVA OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTRÔLE DAS
VÁLVULAS DE ABASTECIMENTO DOS TANQUES
PARA A POSICÃO “OPEN”. INICIE O ABASTECIMENTO.
CUIDADO: SE OS INDICADORES SUPERIORES
COMEÇAREM A PISCAR ISSO INDICA QUE A
CAPACIDADE MAXIMA DO TANQUE FOI EXCEDIDA.
INTERROMPA O ABASTECIMENTO.
MOVA OS INTERRUPTORES DE CONTRÔLE DAS
VÁLVULAS DE ABASTECIMENTO PARA A POSIÇÃO
“CLOSED” QUANDO O ABASTECIMENTO ATINGIR O
NÍVEL MÁXIMO OU A QUANTIDADE DESEJADA.
REMOVA A MANGUEIRA E O ATERRAMENTO.
VERIFIQUE SE TODOS OS INTERRUPTORES ESTÃO EM
“OFF” E QUE AS LUZES AZUIS SE APAGARAM.
NOTA: LUZ AZUL INDICA VALVULA ENERGIZADA
ABERTA PARA ABASTECIMENTO.
Page 43 of 45
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
ANNEX IV
THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATES – CHST’s (STC’s) LISTED BELOW, ISSUED AND APPROVED BY
FAA (USA) OR LBA (GERMANY), APPLICABLE TO THE B-737-700 IGW MODEL AND ISTALLED BY BOEING OR STC’S
HOLDERS, ARE VALIDATED BY ANAC.
CTA
PROJECT
NUMBER
H.02-2246-0
H.02-2257-0
H.02-2263-0
STC NUMBER
DESCRIPTION OF TYPE DESIGN CHANGE
ST00405LA-D
AIRPLANE FLIGHT
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT
(AFMS)
Installation of Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression AFMS No. 20629 REV. A, dated
System Lower Cargo Compartments in accordance
12 November 1999
(FAA)
with Hollingsead International Master Data List No.
LBA.21NE1.TA06 12106, Rev. R dated 03 November 2003
82 (LBA)
LBA.21E2.TA031 Structural Provisions for installation of Vertical AFMS No. A-55-01/331, REV.
1 (LBA)
Stabilizer Tip Radome in accordance with Lufthansa
B, dated 04 June 2002
Technik Supplemental Type Definition document No.
ST01340NY
STDD55-00/01M, Issue 2, dated 22 March 2001
(FAA)
ST00647SE
Installation of the Head-up Guidance System (HGS) AFMS No. 9701-1044, REV. C
model 2350 in accordance with installation Rockwell
dated 12 March 1999
Collins Aerospace – Flight Dynamics Division
Drawing List 9701-1001, Rev AE dated 27 August
2003.
Page 44 of 45
CHST No.
2004S03-01
2004S03-02
2004S03-03
H.10-0810-36
12 April 2011
THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATES – CHST’s (STC’s) LISTED BELOW, ISSUED AND APPROVED BY
FAA (USA) OR LBA (GERMANY), APPLICABLE TO THE B-737-700 IGW MODEL AND ISTALLED BY BOEING OR STC’S
HOLDERS, ARE VALIDATED BY ANAC (cont.)
CTA
PROJECT
NUMBER
H.02-2256-0
STC NUMBER
DESCRIPTION OF TYPE DESIGN CHANGE
LBA.21E2.TA030 Installation of a VIP Executive Interior in accordance
7 (LBA)
with Lufthansa Technik Supplement Type Definition
documents No. STDD00-00/02M, Issue 04, dated 24
ST01381NY
August 2001.
(FAA)
H.02-2258-0
ST00830SE
H.02-2259-0
ST00936NY
Installation of Winglets, wing structural reinforcement
and related system changes in accordance with
Aviation Partners Boeing Master Drawing List No.
AP37.7-0611, Rev A, dated 24 September 2001.
Installation of Configuration 3E for Seven Cell
Auxiliary Fuel System in the forward and aft cargo
compartments in accordance with PATS, Inc. Master
Drawing List no. BBJ007, REV N, dated 03 June 2002
Page 45 of 45
AIRPLANE FLIGHT
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT
(AFMS)
CHST No.
AFMS No. A-52-01/424-AFM,
REV. 01, dated 03 July 2001
AFMS No. A-00-01/311-AFM,
REV. 02, dated 13 July 2001
AFMS No. A-26-01/423, REV.
01, dated July 2001
AFMS No. A-23-01-01/422,
REV. 01, dated 03 June 2001
AFMS No. AP37.1-0616, dated
04 October 2001
2004S03-04
AFMS No. 6 For Seven-Cell
Auxiliary Fuel System
configuration, REV. B dated 07
June 2001
2004S03-06
2004S03-05

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