the full article as PDF

[Second Draft]
Regional Security and Integration in South America:
What UNASUR could learn from the OSCE and the Shanghai
Organization experiences?
Marco Cepik 1
The Brazilian proposal to create a regional Security and Defense Council in South
America was the most controversial issue related with the Constitutive Treaty of the Union
of South American Nations (UNASUR), which was signed by the twelve South American
Heads of State and Government attending the summit held in Brasilia in May 2008.
The main concern and initial refusal to participate came from Colombia, worried
about the how its neighboring countries would treat the illegal armed group FARC
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). Colombia also had expressed concerns
about the exact procedures to reach decisions in such a council. During the visit of the
Brazilian President Lula da Silva to Colombia in July 2008, both concerns were addressed
and the Colombian President Alvaro Uribe declared that Colombia would be a partner in
the security institutional building of the UNASUR. With the main political obstacles solved,
the real conceptual work shall begin.
In order to contribute to this debate regarding the institutional design, operations
and strategic rationale of the UNASUR Security and Defense Council, this text will start the
examination of two different contemporary experiences of institutionalized security
cooperation, namely those of OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in order to evaluate how
useful and applicable those experiences would be for South America.
Since the UNASUR was conceived to absorb and transcend previous regional
organizations such as the MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (CAN), it has
potential security roles in addressing common regional ills like drug trafficking, organized
crime, militarized interstate disputes and high rates of interpersonal violence. A more
institutionalized regional order is also supposed to provide more room of maneuver for the
2
South Americans facing the current U.S. primacy push and neoliberal globalization.
1
Dr. Cepik is an Adjunct Professor of International Security and Comparative Politics at the Federal
University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil (http://lattes.cnpq.br/3923697331385475). Paper presented at
the Second Global International Studies Conference, Ljubljiana, Slovenia, 23-26 July. This research
was supported by the National Scientific Research Council of Brazil (CNPq). The author wishes to
express his appreciation for the research contributions made to this work by Helena Jornada, Luiza
Schneider, Paula Lazzari, Christiano Ambros, Thabita Abrahim, Lucas Sangalli and Felipe Machado,
research assistants at the Strategic and International Relations Center (NERINT –
www.ufrgs.br/nerint).
2
As one can read in the Preamble of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR: “CERTAIN that integration is a
decisive step towards the strengthening of multilateralism and the rule of law in international relations
1
As pointed by Kelly (2007:212-215), a normative desire for regional integration still
drives most of the academic and political debate concerned with security in the so called
“non-critical regions” like Africa or South America. Assuming explicitly a normative desire
for a robust UNASUR to be built in South America, in this paper I have tried to examine the
usefulness of two alternative models of security cooperation and integration in rather
realist terms (Mares, 2001; Buzan & Weaver, 2003).
The general line of reasoning is organized as follows: The first section contains a
very brief account of what are the main security threats in South America nowadays. Then,
in section II the recently constituted South America´s Union is presented, including the
somewhat controversial proposal of a South America´s Security and Defense Council. In
the following two sections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are discussed in order to
evaluate – in the concluding section - how useful and applicable those experiences would
be for South America.
I – South America: unanswered threats and security concerns
South America is a violent region in the contemporary world, although it is also
recognized by the low incidence of interstate warfare or even overt civil war. It has
experienced just one conventional war since the end of Cold War (between Peru and
Equator in 1995) and a total of three wars since the II World War. Colombia´s complex
internal armed conflict is a big one for all accounts, but is rarely described as a civil war in
the same way many contemporary African and Asian violent conflicts are. However, by no
means South America can be considered a peaceful zone or a sort of ‘security community’
3
(Adler & Barnett, 1998).
At least four types of threats and risks to the security of the region can be identified
by any bird´s eye view of the region.
As David Mares (2001:29-51) has pointed out, the apparent paradox requires a
proper conceptual toolkit to explain this region. He uses the term "violent peace", i.e.,
"officially sanctioned use of military violence across national boundaries when war is not
the intended result" (Mares, 2001:07). The war might happen, as the result of a dynamic
often unwanted by actors, originated from a miscalculation that escapes their control. The
decision to use military force must be understood more as a bargaining tool for the states
constituencies than just as the desire to resolve a dispute through interstate war. Violent
peace among countries remains a pervasive feature of South America´s security equation
as far as territorial disputes and other structural induced concerns about relative gains are
present in the recent history of the region.
The South American countries also faces important internal threats as well, related
to narcotics’ trafficking, transnational crime, localized urban and rural violence, The region
in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and just world, in which the sovereign equality of States
and a culture of peace prevail and in a world free of nuclear weapons and of weapons of mass
destruction“, the Union is not designed as a tool for balancing, but has balance and justice as core
values.
3
For further elaboration, see Herz (2008).
2
was ranked as the second most violent in the world due to the increase of crime rates in
the mid 1990´s. Countries like Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela have crime rates three
times higher than the world average, and high levels of violence related to street crime, car
accidents, drug trafficking, social clashes and organized crime. 4
The incapacity to deal with real and present internal security and safety threats,
increased by the persistence of developing problems, which can be exasperated by
increasing levels of inequality of income distribution in many countries, may lead to further
erosion of the state legitimacy among citizens with raising expectations regarding their
social and economic welfare. All of this amounts for a third type of risk to the security of
the whole region (Rojas, 2008:36).
A fourth type of risk is related with the regional role of United States after 2001 and
the commercial and diplomatic presence of other great powers in South America. There is
no serious competition for military presence or security leverage in the region between
Russia, China and United States, but the growing assertiveness of these three countries
as they defend their respective interests across the world cannot be dismissed as totally
unrelated to the security status of South America. Therefore, great power politics is part of
the equation, whether we like it or not.
Taking the four types of risks and threats as context, the recent crisis started by the
Colombian attack to a FARC camp inside Ecuador´s territory brought additional turbulence
for the South American integration project. As the militarized dispute between Colombia
and Ecuador-Venezuela passes its peak (reached in March 2008), and the possibility of an
armed conflict in Bolivia being less severe than it seems to be just a few months ago, a
moderate optimism arises in the region. However, the two potential conflicts are still
serious enough to be dismissed by any actor or observer.
The tensions between Venezuela and Colombia go all way back to the Chavez
opposition to the Colombian counterinsurgency strategies supported by the U.S. The
Colombian government led by President Uribe and the average Colombian public opinion
have been very critical towards Venezuela´s government led by President Hugo Chavez.
The anti-imperialist discourse from Chavez also reaches fiercely the Colombia´s alliance
with President Bush in Washington. The Colombian offensive against the FARC in
Ecuador’s territory resulting in the killing of Raul Reyes (FARCs’ spokesman and secondin-command) prompted President Hugo Chavez to mobilize troops to the Colombian
frontier. The March crisis has been diplomatically solved, but the Colombian internal
security problem, mainly related to the FARC and the Paramilitaries, still poses significant
problems to the whole region (Villa, 2005 and 2007).
By its turn, Bolivia is currently the crisis core and the place where the future of
South America integration process is being decided (Cepik, 2008:10). The eastern
departments (where are located the main resources, as mineral and energy reserves) are
struggling for greater autonomy, what could generate an escalation of the tension and
even turn out in a civil conflict (Malamud, 2008). Even if that extreme outcome is avoided,
the tensions posed by the popular referendum in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the other
departments clearly expose social antagonisms and institutional dilemmas of fundamental
importance not only to Bolivia, but also to South American integration future. In the end of
the day, if an armed civil conflict unleashes in Bolivia, it would be hardly carried out without
4
According to the Health Ministry of Brazil, for instance, out of 125,816 deaths by external causes in 2005,
37.1% were caused by homicides, 28.4% by car accidents, and 6.8% by suicides. Cf.
www.saude.gov.br.
3
the covert or otherwise overt involvement of opposing South American governments and
social groups (Sebben, 2007). In this sense, a strong institutional and socio-economic
alternative has to be developed inside Bolivia, with strong support from countries like
Brazil and Argentina.
Considering the four structural risks and these two big recent crises, the South
American governments seem in need not only of an integrated strategy, but also of the
basic institutional and operational means to face those problems effectively and with
legitimacy (Estevez, 2001:08).
Therefore, the necessity of a greater coordination and cooperation in the security
and defense issues is not only associated with the new transnational threats posed by
non-state actors, but also may be related to the possibility of interstate conflicts. In this
way, the UNASUR, as the newest integration program in South America, has to develop
mechanisms of peaceful resolution of conflicts and much greater and stronger security
coordination.
II – South America´s Union and the Security and Defense Sectors
The creation of a South American Defense Council, proposed by the Brazilian
president, even though rejected in a moment by Colombia, turns out to be a real attempt to
fulfill the institutional emptiness. Nevertheless, it is necessary to go even further than the
Security and Defense Council itself, deepening the coordination mechanisms,
implementing public policies in a huge variety of areas, applying distributive justice and
building effective democratic controls.
Paradoxically in light of what was mentioned in the previous section, just a few lines
have been devoted to address the security challenges of the region in all institutional
arrangements so far designed to advance the integration process, from Mercosur and
CAN to the OTCA and UNASUR. The Union of South American Nations is characterized
by a strong intergovernmental process, as UNASUR tries to converge and transcend the
two main blocks of the South American subcontinent (the CAN and MERCOSUR) as well
as the singular experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, in a much more robust
solution without necessarily repeat all the steps and features of the European Union..
The origins of UNASUR go back to the South American Presidential Summits, in
progress since 2000 in Brazil, where the Presidents reaffirmed their commitment whit the
integration of South America. The South American Community of Nations (CASA) was
born in the third Presidential Summit, held in Peru in 2004, through the Declarations of
Ayacucho and Cusco, its fundamental documents. CASA aimed at the convergence of
South America in a single block, strengthening the regional countries and increasing the
bargaining power and international capacity to resist foreign pressures. CASA’s intentions
were wide, from political and diplomatic coordination to physical integration through new
transport routes, energy exchange energy and communications improvement. Above all, it
aimed at the creation of a free trade area, with a common currency and a regional
parliament (Taunay Filho, 2008:11-32).
The name of this new institutional framework changed from CASA to UNASUR with
the agreement of all member states during the first day of meeting at the South American
Energy Summit held at Isla Margarita, Venezuela, in 2007. That meeting was important as
it hosted significant additional agreements, including the creation of the Energy Council of
4
South America (based on the principle that energy integration is an essential tool for the
region’s economic and social development).
On 23 May 2008, it was formalized as the Union of South American Nations,
UNASUR, by a Constitutive Treaty signed in Brasilia. The treaty resulted in the creation of
an entity with international juridical character, based on the statements of Cusco (2004),
Brasilia (2005) and Cochabamba (2006). The countries stated that South American
integration should be achieved through an innovative process, which would include the
progress achieved so far by the MERCOSUR and CAN processes, as well as the
experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, going beyond the convergence among them.
Topics as energy integration and development of an interconnection infrastructure of the
region are highlighted in UNASUR’s goals, using the economic and commercial
motivations as a reason for regional integration.
The security aspects of the integration are dealt with in the treaty’s three final
objectives establishing measures for coordination among the member states’ specialized
agencies in order to strengthen the fight against narcotics, corruption, human trafficking,
small and light weapons trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime and other
threats. It aims at, for this matter, the promotion of cooperation among the judicial
authorities of the Member States, the exchange of information and experiences in matters
of defense and the cooperation for the strengthening of civilian security.
The highest organ of UNASUR is the Council of Heads of State and Government
that meets annually. The Pro Tempore Presidency of UNASUR will be held successively
by each of the Member States, in alphabetical order, for one year periods. UNASUR has
two other mechanisms of regular meetings: the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
which meets every six months, and the Council of Delegates, with bimonthly meetings.
The Working Groups are set up by the Council of Ministers and coordinated by the Council
of Delegates. The General Secretariat is currently the only permanent organ of the
organization, with headquarters in Quito, Equator. The Secretary General shall be
appointed by the Council of Heads of State and Government, following a proposal by the
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for a term of two years, renewable only once. The
Institutional Development is characterized by the Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, and
meetings of the Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups and other institutional levels
may be convened as required on a permanent or temporary basis, in order to fulfill the
mandates and recommendations of the competent bodies. These bodies will report on
their activities through the Council of Delegates, which will present its findings to the
Council of Heads of State and Government or to the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, as appropriate.
All the norms of UNASUR will be adopted by consensus. However, any Member
State may completely or partially refrain from implementing an approved policy, be it for a
period defined beforehand, or for an indefinite period, without preventing it from later
joining the total or partial implementation of that policy. In the case of institutions,
organizations or programs which are created, any Member State may participate as an
observer, or refrain from participating fully or partially for a definite or indefinite period.
There is no specialized body for border dispute settlements, so any dispute that
may emerge between the Member States will be settled through direct negotiations – in
case of no solution, the dispute will be submitted to the consideration of the Council of
Delegates and, in the case of no settlement; the dispute will be taken by the Council of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
5
The treaty underlines that one of the main objectives of UNASUR is the
development of political, social and economical coordination among the region’s different
countries. Notwithstanding the deepening levels of interaction between those countries
over the last few years, a significant number of challenges remain even in the economic
and social fields.
The economic asymmetry is a real problem. Brazil alone has a GDP of nearly half of
the entire UNASUR, but hardly could afford to finance all of the investments required to
elevate the per capita income in South America and drastically reduce poverty and
inequality. 5 Besides, the infrastructural integration, the strengthening of productive chains
and the establishment of trade regulations are issues that must be solved. All three have
important security implications.
As a matter of fact, Brazil and Venezuela are both trying to convert the defense
policies and the defense industrial basis in a more propellant engine for the entire regional
integration process (Malamud, 2008:04).
The proposed Security and Defense Council would promote joint military training,
improved defense bases, and military industrial cooperation in order to ensure the supply
of the necessary elements for defense. Dissuasive defense would be the aim, mainly
through the exchange of information, joint training for peace-keeping, the holding of joint
military exercises and the participation in peace operations of the United Nations. 6
There were already some attempts to develop effective mechanisms for security
coordination in South America, although not fully institutionalized. The peace mission in
Haiti, for example, shows that interoperability and joint action are possible. Despite the fact
that it has encountered some difficulties, the mission helped in advancing policy
coordination and cooperation through a 2x9 scheme, i.e., through the conduction of the
Ministers of Defense and of Foreign Affairs of the countries involved (Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala and Uruguay).
Other important steps were taken in the Southern Cone, between Argentina and
Brazil and mainly between Argentina and Chile. The work of the Standing Committee of
Argentine-Chilean Security (Comperseg) is an example of measures that build confidence
in the region, as the creation of a combined peace force (Rojas, 2008:41).
Important as those experiences are, government officials, researchers and citizens
should discuss more explicitly in both normative and analytical ways the role of security
and defense in the current and future South America integration process. To address
these questions thinking outside the EU model box, in the next two sections one shall find
some preliminary work on two specialized regional arrangements (OSCE and SCO)
designed to address contemporary security issues.
5
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reported that the GDP of the twelve South
American countries $2.5 trillion in 2006. Brazil alone had a GDP of $1.06 trillion in 2006 and $1.3
trillion in 2007.
6
Cf. www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/04/080415_jobimvenezuela_cj_ac.shtml
6
III – The OSCE comprehensive approach towards security
The Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has its roots on
the Helsinki Process of the 1970’s, which gave birth to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe created
a new dynamic to the security cooperation in the European continent, and the basic
agreements made on the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 were improved on the Charter of Paris
for a New Europe, signed in 1990. Only in 1995, though, the CSCE would be renamed as
OSCE and gain a new institutional framework. Today, it counts 56 members from Europe,
North-America and Asia. 7
The highest-level bodies of the Organization are the Ministerial Council, which
meets every year, and the Permanent Council, meeting weekly at the Secretariat in
Vienna, and the Forum for Security Co-operation. Summits with the presence of heads of
State may also be scheduled, but do not happen regularly. In addition to that the OSCE
has a Secretariat and a Parliamentary Assembly, with the intention of facilitating interparliamentary dialogue. This Assembly should further discuss the subjects dealt during the
Ministerial meetings and assess the functioning of the Organization by issuing resolutions
and recommendations.
The OSCE has a comprehensive approach on security, dealing with it in three
dimensions: the politico-military, the economic and environmental and the human. Within
the politico-military dimension, the OSCE deals with classic security issues, such as arms
and border controls, but also with conflict prevention, terrorism, combat of illicit narcotics
and arms trafficking and all other kinds of transnational criminal activities. The economic
and environmental dimension, in which the OSCE works in close cooperation with other
international organizations, includes combating corruption and money laundering, as well
as the management of natural resources. The human dimension of the OSCE works on
fields as democratization, education, electoral activities, minority rights and even free
media, tolerance and non-discrimination, elections, environmental activities, gender
equality.
In order to successfully deal with all those issues, aside of the organs referred
before, the Organization counts with a High-Commissioner on National Minorities, a
Representative on Freedom of the Media and an Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights. Also, it counts with several missions and field activities throughout Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, to monitor stressful situations, facilitating early
warning and conflict managing.
The OSCE is a landmark regional security organization, as it was the first one to
deal with security problems in a multidimensional approach, as afore-mentioned, and as it
is the most comprehensive regional security organization, both in scope and membership
from different continents. This Organization has achieved, through its predecessor
institution – the CSCE – an alternative way of treating security problems by not staying
restricted only to politico-military questions, so present during the Cold War, and being
able to see through the problems that reached the European continent during the 1990s in
a more global way.
7
For a list of member states, cf. Table 1.
7
In the context of the end of the Cold War, the CSCE was the first Organization to
understand the necessity of systemic and institutional cooperation for the combat and the
prevention of threats and to develop mechanisms to deal with it more adequately, going
from informal mechanisms to treaties and other institutionalized ways of doing so. A good
example of these mechanisms is the creation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).
CBMs are aimed at assuring a more transparent relation between countries – especially
when concerning military activities, and although they are not a formal treaty and do not
imply judicial constrains, they have a relevant pedagogical effect, being an important tool
to enhance cooperation among countries and to establish the fundamental stones for
further security cooperation (Haas, 2007b).
The CBMs are designed to help controlling military activity and to provide early
warnings when any country starts to develop different military activities. Some simple
examples of CBMs that proved to be effective would be: annual defense ministers
meetings; exchange of defense information; publication of Defense White Papers; prior
notification of major military maneuvers; exchange of observers; exchange, by invitation, of
military personnel – including visits by foreign delegations; information on existing forces –
including structure, deployment, peacetime authorized strength and major weapons and
equipment systems down to brigade/regiment level; information about the planned
deployment of major weapons and equipment systems and publication of annual military
budgets, among others.
Although the later development of the OSCE and the European context in general
led to the establishment of the concept of comprehensive security, which states that the
management of security issues should not be restricted to the politico-military dimension but also include the economic, environmental and human dimension, the basis for the
OSCE is the establishment of better military and political relations, as it regularly is for
every existent security organization. Due to that, the OSCE is a pioneer organization and a
model to be followed by other countries wishing to have the same reach and breath.
However, exactly because of the wide range of aspects and activities proposed by
the OSCE, and mainly because of the vast number of countries that participate on the
Organization, it has seeing its scope of action and the very effectiveness of its actions
diminished. First of all, there are other organizations that deal with the same sort of
subjects addressed by the OSCE in Europe competing with the OSCE. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most important of them, even if does not work the same
way or follows the same principles that OSCE. For Human Rights and the Rule of Law, the
European Union has the Council of Europe with its charter.
The first signs of failure and weakness of the OSCE can be traced back to the late
nineties, during Yugoslavian wars, where the Organization was overshadowed by those
structures aforementioned. Besides, as the OSCE is formed by 56 countries, with the rise
of new security problems, it is getting harder to reach a common ground between
countries that participate in specific regional structures such as those from Central Asia
(Hopmann, 2008).
Although the OSCE is an important model for other regions wishing to establish
similar structures, the European experience has to be adapted to suit other continents.
Although it is important to expand the dimensions of security as made by the OSCE, for
the South American continent this could be a very delicate matter, especially when related
to democratic control, because imposing a political agenda to South American political
leaders could lead to the disintegration of this initiative. The complexity of the OSCE
structure is another point that has to be viewed with some criticism, although some
8
important aspects, such as the creation of different branches of activities, could be
adapted to South America. The same caveat is obviously valid to the next organization to
be considered here.
IV - The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its security focus
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a permanent intergovernmental
organism established in 2001 by Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. Its current institutional design evolved from the “Shanghai Five” established in
1996, an initiative comprised by five of the aforementioned countries, except Uzbekistan.
According to Marcel de Haas (2007a:07-10), the institutional development of the
SCO could be divided in three phases:
1o) Confidence and security building measures (1996-2001), when the basic
objectives were related to increase trust in the border regions and reduce military forces in
border regions of countries that were used to be hostile to each other (China versus former
Soviet Union) throughout most of the Cold War.
2o) Regional security against terrorism, separatism and extremism (2001-2004),
when the Shanghai convention was signed, the first cross-border anti-terrorist exercises
were conducted, and the two permanent organs of the OCS were established, a
Secretariat (in Shanghai) and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan.
3o) Comprehensive international organization (2004-present). During the third
phase, SCO transformed itself into an organization pursuing international recognition and
cooperation with similar organizations (Memoranda of Understanding with UN, ASEAN,
OCSE, CIS etc). Likewise, its observers were raised from one admitted during the
previous phase (Mongolia) to four (India, Pakistan and Iran) and the organization
developed military exercises almost yearly since then, including the 2005 Russian-Chinese
Peace Mission, the 2006 ´East Antiterror’, and the 2007 ´Issik-Kul Antiterror´ conducted in
the northern Kyrgyzstan.
In general terms, SCO’s institutional design is organized in the form of two basic
mechanisms of interactions: one of periodic meetings, and a permanent structure. The first
mechanism comprises the meetings of the Council of Heads of States, and the Council of
Heads of Governments (Prime-Ministers), as well as meetings carried on by the official
representatives of other sectors – Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Culture, Economy, Defense,
Transportation, and the Council of National Coordinators. 8
8
There are some areas of cooperation and disagreement between SCO and OSCE, as well as between
SCO and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), or even between SCO and NATO, but
this is not the focus here. For a preliminary assessment, see: HAAS (2007a).
9
Figure 1 – The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Main Structures
Source: http://www.sectsco.org/html/00027.html
As for more descriptive information on this system of periodic meetings, SCO’s
Council of Heads of States is the higher decision-making body in the Organization,
followed by the Council of the Heads of Government, which annually discusses multilateral
cooperation in Central Asia. The latter is responsible as well for approving the
Organization´s annual budget. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs also
holds regular meetings as to discuss the present international situation and the
interactions between SCO and other international organizations. Finally, the Council of
National Coordinators co-ordinates the multilateral cooperation of the member states
under the scope of SCO’s chart.
The second mechanism of interaction, namely the permanent structure, is
composed by the two permanent bodies of the Organization – the Secretariat, established
in 2004 and located in Shanghai (China), and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS),
created in 2002 and located in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). SCO´s Secretariat is the main
executive body of the Organization. It implements organizational decisions, projects and
10
documents (such as statements and agenda), functioning as the documental depositary of
the Organization and managing all the activities addressed by SCO.
Through the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) the SCO member countries
also take part in the Shanghai Convention on terrorism, separatism and extremism.
Bearing in mind the objectives and principles of the United Nations related to peace and
international security, good relations with neighbor countries and cooperation among
states, as well as perceiving that terrorism, separatism and extremism are a threat to
peace and security of nations, Kazakhstan, China, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan decided to create a mechanism of joint control. Therefore, convinced of the
necessity of coordinating actions of common interest as to provide territorial integrity,
security and stability, and to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism, RATS was
established. This structure has been successful in acquiring the capacity to deal with
groups that oppose to the governments of the member states.
Moreover, SCO contributes to stability in the vast Central Asian region, which
comprises not only natural resources reserves, but also areas of conflict. A common
strategy among great powers is to carefully include new actors as minor partners, either
for the purpose of tactical convenience or due to the necessity of reflecting new power
realities, decurrently from the international dynamics. As a part of the Chinese-Russian
strategy of co-opting the neighbor countries to their sphere of influence, China and Russia
intend to bring economic growth and cooperation to their regional partners – in that sense,
a Chinese credit fund was established to facilitate the SCO members’ access to financing.
Furthermore, one could also mention the cooperation between China, Russia and
Kazakhstan in the energy field, as well as the economic and commercial cooperation
9
among SCO’s members.
On the subject of the security field, SCO promotes stability to the governments of
the member state, combating domestic and foreign insurgent groups that contest the
central government´s authority. Security is the key issue in SCO, since the main problem
faced in the region is the low level of control in border relations, as well as the presence of
alleged terrorist or extremist groups in their territories. For that reason, SCO has adopted
very precise and rigid definitions for terrorism, separatism and extremism – which are
somewhat rare among international organizations. In practical terms, SCO nations seek to
contend terrorism by combating separatism and religious (Islamic) extremism. The
region´s emphasis in security matters is, therefore, the search for guaranteeing the
territorial integrity of each country, as well as the maintenance of secular regimes in
Central Asia.
Another growing security concern for SCO is the rising in the production of poppy in
Afghanistan and the illegal commerce of heroin which originates there. On that matter,
SCO’s members signed in 2004 an Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illegal
Turnover of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and the Precursors Thereof.
Despite SCO´s tradition in addressing matters of security, it has been pointed out
that the future of the organization depends on its members’ ability to cooperate in the
economic field as well. Since the region is extremely rich in resources that are increasingly
9
The only Central Asian country that is not a SCO member is Turkmenistan, although its president
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov did attend the SCO Bishkek Summit (August 2007) and might be
interested in joining the so called SCO ´Energy Club´. Cf. HAAS (2007a:10)
11
necessary, but tend to scarceness, the absence of cooperation in economic affairs could
induce a level of competition that would obliterate any integration initiative. Formally, the
organization already works toward that type of cooperation, although the approved
projects have yet to come to full implementation.
In short, the “Shanghai Spirit” symbolizes a new type of international security
cooperation model, less bureaucratic, less comprehensive and much more practical for
countries that are not among the richest ones. On the less brilliant side, the authoritarian
nature of the political regimes involved in the SCO process hardly could inspire blind
confidence in this model in South America, where one of the biggest challenges in the
security field reform is exactly try hard to find balance between state effectiveness in
providing safety and security to all citizens and strong legitimacy achieved by
accountability and democratic control of institutions.
V – Conclusion
As one compares even briefly the institutional design, types of operations and the
strategic rationales of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a couple of recommendations can be
made for South America.
From the OSCE experience, it should be avoided the too broad defined mission
based upon a comprehensive concept of human security. It was important for OSCE at
some point in order to focus on citizens instead of states as well as to provide a common
agenda for very different types of states and regional security contexts. This type of
missions, “with a relatively low profile, have played a central role in managing all of the
conflicts that have emerged in the broad European regions following the end of the Cold
War and the breakup of the large multinational states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia”
(Hopmann, 2008:03). With the renewed conflicts between secessionists and central
governments, civil wars and militarized interstate disputes in different parts “east of
Vienna” over the last fifteen years, the very same comprehensiveness that was so useful
in the beginning became dysfunctional and the OSCE lost appeal for most stakeholders,
including Russia, United States, and European Union.
In contrast, the areas where OSCE is still making a difference with its current
agenda (namely border control cooperation, education programs, and law enforcement
assistance) are largely complementary or compatible with the less “soft” security agenda
of SCO. Created to lesser the tensions between China and former soviet republics
bordering it, the SCO structures and raison d’être changed dramatically after 2001.
Building upon a strong base of confidence measures in border issues and counterterrorism, the SCO is slowly expanding its cooperation agenda towards more conventional
defense and military themes as well as economic ones, energy, and general state capacity
building.
12
Although UNASUR is still a fledgling organization, there are theoretical and political
10
reasons to avoid modeling it exclusively after the European Union security institutions.
Theoretically, most of the critics of the SCO model wrongly assume that from “state
weakness flows the internal security dilemma and from that, in turn, the sovereigntyreinforcing international organizations” (Kelly, 2007:218). The link between weakness or
strength of a state apparatus and its alliance pattern seems to be just the opposite, not to
mention the inherent problems with the concept of weak state. Politically, the same sort of
criticism just assumes naively that the European Union ought to be superior for some
hidden moral reason. The thinking goes like this: “Regional security organizations do not
pool sovereignty so much as amass it for joint, coordinated repression. Weak-state
regional international organizations are mutual sovereignty reinforcement coalitions, not
integrationist regional bodies like the European Union. The joint strategy regionalizes not
sovereignty but domestic conflict and elite pushback” (Kelly, 2007:219). It just doesn´t
seem necessary that regional security organizations in the Third World will inevitably work
that way.
Even taking these somehow displaced caveats in full consideration, it does not
exempt us of at least think about alternatives to the European Union model, which are
costly, heavily bureaucratic and regulated. As for the Defense or Security Council now in
study in South America, a sort of combination between a ´thin´ and broad normative basis
similar to the “spirit of the OSCE” pre-2001 (focusing on the civil rights of the citizens and
confidence building measures) and the effectiveness and priority (SCO style) rendered to
the actual security threats of the region (in opposition to a generic ´Global War on
Terrorism´ type of agenda) might prove worth of trying. Hopefully this text will help to foster
the debate about the options and timing.
10
The under balancing behavior here can and should be explained in realist terms as well. For a first
attempt, see: SCHWELLER (2006).
13
Table 1 – Comparing UNASUR, OSCE, and SCO
UNASUR
SCO
OSCE
Year of
Formation
2008
2001
1995
Year of
Previous
Initiative
2004
1996
1973
Region
South America
Asia
Europe-Asia-North America
Number of
Member States
12
06
56
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Chile, Ecuador,
State Members Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay,
Venezuela
Observers/Part
ners
Panama and Mexico
attended the
NONE
Nuclear Powers
as State
Tlatelolco Treaty for the
Members or
Prohibition of Nuclear
observers/partn Weapons in Latin America
ers
and the Caribbean
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, FYR Macedonia,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Vatican
China, Kazakhstan, City, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Tajikistan and
Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Uzbekistan
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova,
Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, San Marino, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine United
Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan
Iran, Pakistan, India
and Mongolia
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan,
Japan,
South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand.
Russia and China;
Pakistan and India
USA, Russia, France, United
Kingdom
Related
Organizations
UN, OAS, CAN,
MERCOSUR, OTCA
UN, CIS, CSTO
UN, EU, NATO, CIS
Primary Focus
Economic Integration
State Security
Cooperation
Comprehensive Security Dialogue
14
Equitable social and human
development, the
eradication of illiteracy, the Strengthening mutual
universal access to quality trust, friendship and
education and the regional good neighborliness;
recognition of courses and
enhancement of
titles; energy integration;
military security by
infrastructure for the
promoting dialogue,
interconnection of the
transparency, coregion; financial integration;
operation and
protection of biodiversity,
commitments on
water resources and
military conduct;
ecosystems; cooperation in disarmament and arms
the prevention of
control; border security
catastrophes; consolidation
and management;
Anti-trafficking, arms control, border
of a South American
police and other law
management, combat terrorism,
identity; universal access to enforcement assistance
democratization, economic growth,
social security and health
programs; conflict
education programs, election
services; migratory
prevention; combating assistance projects, environmental
regularization and
terrorism; combating activities, gender equality, human
Objectives and harmonization of policies; transnational organized
rights, media freedom, military
reduction of poverty;
Activities
crime such as drugs, reform, conflict prevention, minority
industrial and productive
human beings
rights, policing and police reform, as
integration; cooperative
and arms trafficking; well as promotion of the rule of law,
research and technological
supporting economic
tolerance and non-discrimination
development; promotion of
growth and
based upon racism, xenophobia,
cultural diversity; fight
cooperation; education
anti-Semitism and so on.
against corruption, the
interchanges;
global drug problem,
counteracting
trafficking in persons,
separatism and
trafficking in small and light
extremism;
weapons, terrorism,
counteracting illegal
transnational organized
immigration; regional
crime and other threats;
cooperation
in culture,
non-proliferation of weapons
sports, tourism, science
of mass destruction;
and technology, trade,
cooperation among the
energy, transport,
judicial authorities of the
Member States of UNASUR, credit, finance and
health care.
and the exchange of
information and experiences
in matters of defense.
Source: Adapted from Haas (2007:259) and complemented with
http://www.sectsco.org; http://www.osce.org and http://www.mre.gov.br.
information
obtained
at
15
Table 2 – Armed Forces in South America
Country
Total
Army
Air Force
Navy
Argentina
72,700
42,500
13,200
17,000
Bolivia
33,500
25,000
4,000
4,500
Brazil
293,500
195,000
50,000
48,500
Chile
81,000
45,000
13,000
23,000
Colombia
210,300
180,000
7,300
23,000
Ecuador
457,000
47,000
4,000
6,500
Guyana
1,630
1,500
100
30
Paraguay
18,600
14,900
1,700
2,000
Peru
110,000
70,000
14,500
25,500
Suriname
3,140
2,800
100
240
Uruguay
23,500
14,500
3,000
6,000
Venezuela
79,000
34,000
7,000
15,000
Notes:
1. Reserves not included.
2. Including National Guard.
Table 3 - Defence Expenditure in South America
Country
Defence expenditure (USD Per cent of
billions)
GDP
Per head of
population (USD)
Per member of armed
forces (USD)
Argentina
1.53
1.04
40.2
21,309
Bolivia
0.12
1.6
15
3,700
Brazil
16.43
1.7
87.4
56,000
Chile
1.44
1.75
92
17,777
Colombia
4.0
3.9
95.23
10,816
Ecuador
0. 7
1.7
51
12,174
Guyana
0.017
2.2
23.1
5,766
Paraguay
0.52
1.2
15
4,166
Peru
0.9
1.35
33.6
8,181
Suriname
0.03
2.0
15.0
9,790
Uruguay
0.17
1.5
50.45
6,824
Venezuela
1.2
1
1.8
1
1
50
15,227
1
Note:
1 - Latest available figure.
16
Table 4 - Economic Indicators
Country
GDP (USD billions)
GDP Growth (annual per cent)
GDP per capita (ppp USD)
Argentina
153
8. 9
7,482
Bolivia
8.7
3.6
1,036
Brazil
794
2.3
3,596
Chile
115.3
6.3 0
5,747
Colombia
122.3
5
7,304
Ecuador
30.3
6.9
1,459
Guyana
0.79
-0.65
951
Paraguay
7. 3
3.0
1,361
Peru
79.4
6.4
2,650
Suriname
1.1
4.6
2,369
Uruguay
16.7
6.6
4, 653
Venezuela
138.8
9. 33
4,939
Note: All figures from World Development Indicators.
17
Table 5 - Social Indicators
Country
Population(millions)
Population growth (average
annual)
2005 UN Human Development
Index ranking
Argentina
38.7
1. 1
34
Bolivia
9. 0
2.1
113
Brazil
183.9
1. 5
63
Chile
16. 1
1. 3
37
Colombia
44.9
1. 7
69
Ecuador
13. 0
1. 5
82
Guyana
0.75
0. 3
107
Paraguay
6. 0
2.5
88
Peru
27. 6
1. 6
79
Suriname
0.4
0. 8
86
Uruguay
3.4
0.7
46
Venezuela
26. 3
2. 0
75
Notes: World Health Organisation figures. Ranked out of 177 countries (1-575: high human development; 58145: medium human development; 146-177: low human development).
Source: 2007 Jane's Information Group
18
Abbreviations:
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAN – Comunidad Andina de Naciones / Andean Nations Community
CASA – Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones / South American Community of Nations
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization of the CIS
EU – European Uniion
MERCOSUR – Common Market of South / Mercado Comum Del Sur
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS – Organization of American States
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OTCA – Organización del Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica / Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization
RATS – Regional Antiterrorist Structure of SCO
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UN – United Nations
UNASUR – Unión de Naciones Suramericanas / Union of South American Nations
19
References
ADLER, Emanuel & BARNET, Michael [editors]. (1998). Security Communities. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
ARTEAGA, Rosalía (2006). “A Organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica (OTCA): um desafio
permanente”. Revista DEP - Diplomacia, Estratégia e Política. No. 4. Abril/junio, 2006. pp. 86-100.
Brasilia.
ATTINA, Fulvio. (2005). Regional Security Partnership: the concept, model, practice and a preliminary
comparative scheme. Jean Monet Working Papers, no 58.
BAILEY, John [editor]. (2001). Public Security in the Americas: New Challenges in the South-North Dialog.
Working Paper. Georgetown University.
BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. (2003). Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: Conflito e Integração na
América do Sul (da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul) 1870-2001. Rio de Janeiro: Revan.
BOUZAS, Roberto & SOLTZ, Hernán. (2002). Instituciones y mecanismos de decisión en procesos de
integración asimétricos: el caso MERCOSUR. Hamburgo, Institut Für Iberoamerika-Kunde,
Arbeitspapier nr. 1, august 2002.
BUZAN, Barry & WÆVER, Ole. (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CEPIK, Marco & CARRA, Marcos. (2006). Nacionalização boliviana e desafios da América do Sul. Análise
de Conjuntura, OPSA, n:4, abr. 2006. IUPERJ/UCAM.
CEPIK, Marco & FARIA, Carlos. (2003). Brasil y América Latina: bolivarismos antiguos y modernos. Análisis
Político, Bogota, v. 49, n. 1, p. 63-82.
CEPIK, Marco & RAMIREZ, Socorro [Orgs.]. (2005). Agenda de Seguridad Andino-Brasileña: primeras
aproximaciones. Bogota: IEPRI-FESCOL. 517 p.
CEPIK, Marco. (2008) A Crise Andina e o Futuro da Unasul. OPSA. Análise de Conjuntura n°4, abril 2008.
Disponível em: http://observatorio.iuperj.br/pdfs/45_analises_AC_n_4_abr_2008.pdf.
Acesso a
04/07/08.
COSTA, Darc. (2004). Estratégia Nacional: a cooperação Sul-Americana como caminho para a inserção
internacional do Brasil. Porto Alegre: L&PM.
CHINA. (2004). MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Available
at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm.> Last accessed: 14 july 2008.
ESTÉVEZ, Eduardo E. (2001). “Public and Citizen Security in South America: Trends, Controversies and
Proposals”. In: BAILEY, John (Ed.) Public Security in the Americas: New Challenges in the SouthNorth Dialog: Working Paper. Georgetown University.
ESTEVES, Paulo Luiz [organizador]. (2003). Instituições internacionais: comércio, segurança e integração.
Belo Horizonte: Ed. PUCMinas.
GOODIN, Robert E. [editor]. (1999). The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge-UK, Cambridge
University Press.
HAAS, Marcel de [editor]. (2007a). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: towards a full-grown security
alliance. The Hague, Netherthelands Institute of International Relations Clingdael.
HAAS, Marcel de. (2007b). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the OSCE: Two of a kind? Helsinki
Monitor: Security and Human Rights no. 3.
HERZ, Monica & HOFFMAN, Andrea Ribeiro. (2004). Organizações Internacionais: história e práticas. Rio
de Janeiro: Elsevier.
HERZ, Monica. (2008). Latin America Security Perspectives. Paper presented at the at the Second Global
International Studies Conference, Ljubljiana, Slovenia, 23-26 July.
HIRST, Monica. (2003). Seguridad regional en las Américas. In: GRABENDORFF, Wolf. La seguridad
regional en las Américas. Bogotá: Cerec, p. 25-80.
20
HOPMANN, P. Terrence. (2008). Can the OSCE Be Saved? Paper presented at the Second Global
International Studies Conference, Ljubljiana, Slovenia, 23-26 July.
HURRELL, Andrew. (1998). Latin America’s New Security Agenda. International Affairs, v. 74, n 3, p. 529 546, July.
KELLY, Robert E. (2007). Security Theory in the “New Regionalism”. International Studies Review, 9, pp.
197-229.
LOVEMAN, Brian. (2006). Addicted to Failure: U.S. Security Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region.
Washington-DC, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
MALAMUD, Carlos. (2008). Potenciales focos de conflicto bélico en America Del Sur (introducción). ARI N°
27/2008. Disponível em: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/!ut/. Acesso a 15/07/08.
MARES, David. (2001). Violent peace: militarized interstate bargaining in Latin America. New York:
Columbia University Press.
MEARSHEIMER, John. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.
OLIVEIRA, Amancio Jorge & ONUKI, Janina. (2000). Brasil, Mercosul e a segurança regional. Revista
Brasileira de Política Internacional, ano 43, n 2, p.108-129.
OLIVEIRA, Eliezer Rizzo de. (2004). O Brasil diante dos desafios internacionais em matéria de segurança e
defesa: um enfoque hemisférico. In: PINTO, J. R. de Almeida & ROCHA, Antônio Jorge Ramalho da &
SILVA, R. Doring Pinho da [organizadores]. O Brasil no Cenário Internacional de Defesa e Segurança.
Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, Secretaria de Estudos e de Cooperação, p. 89-101.
PARADISO, Jose [et allii]. (2000). Política Externa na América do Sul. São Paulo, Fundação Konrad
Adenauer, Cadernos No. 07.
PEÑA, Felix. (2007). As qualidades de um Mercosul Possível. Política Externa, Vol. 15 (03).
RITTBERGER, Volker & ZANGL, Bernhard. (2006). Internacional Organization: polity, politics and policies.
Palagrave Mcmillan.
ROJAS, Francisco A. (2008). El riesgo de La superposición entre las políticas de defensa y seguridad.
Nueva Sociedad, N° 213, enebro-febrero.
SCO. (2004). The Regional Anti-Terrorist Regional Structure of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization:
history and development. Available at: http://www.ecrats.com/en/history/. Last accessed: 14 july 2008.
SCHMIED, Julie. (2007). “Cenários da integração regional: os desafios da União de Nações Sul Americanas
e o novo caminho da integração na América do Sul”. Cadernos Adenauer VIII, nº 1, pp. 105-126.
SEBBEN, Fernando Dall’Onder. (2007). Separatismo e Hipótese de Guerra Local na Bolívia: Possíveis
Implicações para o Brasil. Porto Alegre, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas, Universidade Federal do
Rio Grande do Sul. Monografia de Conclusão do Curso de Relações Internacionais,,.
SENNES, Ricardo & ONUKI, Janina & OLIVEIRA, Amâncio Jorge de. (2004). La política exterior brasileña y
la seguridad hemisférica. Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad, volume 18 (3-4), pp. 03-26.
SCHWELLER, Randall. (2006). Unanswered Threats: political constraints on the Balance of Power.
Princeton-NJ, Princeton University Press.
TAUNAY FILHO, Jorge d´Escragnolle. (2008). “Comunidade Sul Americana de Nações - CASA”. In: América
do Sul: Anais da II Conferência Nacional de Política Externa e Política
Internacional. Brasília,
FUNAG, páginas 11-32.
VIGEVANI, Tullo [et allii]. (2007). O papel da integração regional para o Brasil: universalismo, soberania e a
percepção das elites. Brasília, I Encontro da Associação Brasileira de Relações Internacionais (ABRI).
VILLA, Rafael Duarte & OSTOS, Maria del Pilar. (2005). As relações entre Colômbia, países vizinhos e
Estados Unidos: visões em torno da agenda de segurança. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional
(RBPI), vol 48 (2), pp. 86-110.
VILLA, Rafael Duarte. (2007). Quatro teses sobre a política de segurança dos Estados Unidos para a
América do Sul. Tese preparada para o concurso público de títulos e provas visando à obtenção do
título de livre-docente no Departamento de Ciência Política da Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e
Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo.
21
VIZENTINI, Paulo. (2007). “Brasil: a dialética segurança/integração sul-americana”. In: KORNEGAY, Francis
& DADA, Jabulani [organizadores]. A África do Sul e o IBAS: desafios da segurança humana. Porto
Alegre, Ed. UFRGS/FUNAG. Série Sul-Africana. Páginas 65-81.
VIZENTINI, Paulo. (2008). “O Brasil, o Mercosul e a Integração da América do Sul”. In: WIESEBRON,
Marianne & GRIFFITHS, Richard T. [organizadores]. Processos de Integração Regional e
Cooperação Intercontinental desde 1989. Porto Alegre, UFRGS editora, 93-108.
22
SOUTH AMERICAN UNION OF NATIONS CONSTITUTIVE TREATY
The Republic of Argentina, the Republic of Bolivia, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Chile,
the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Ecuador, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the Republic of
Paraguay, the Republic of Peru, the Republic of Suriname, the Oriental Republic of Uruguay and the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
PREAMBLE
BASED on the shared history and solidarity of our multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural nations, which
have fought for the emancipation and unity of South America, honouring the vision of those who forged
our independence and freedom in favour of that union and the building of a common future;
INSPIRED by the Cusco Declaration (December 8th, 2004), the Brasilia Declaration (September 30th, 2005)
and the Cochabamba Declaration (December 9th, 2006);
AFFIRMING their determination to build a South American identity and citizenship and to develop an
integrated regional space in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy and
infrastructure dimensions, for the strengthening of Latin America and Caribbean unity;
CONVINCED that the South American integration and South American unity are necessary to promote the
sustainable development and wellbeing of our peoples, and to contribute to the solution of the problems
which still affect our region, such as persistent poverty, social exclusion and inequality;
CERTAIN that integration is a decisive step towards the strengthening of multilateralism and the rule of law
in international relations in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and just world, in which the sovereign
equality of States and a culture of peace prevail and in a world free of nuclear weapons and of weapons
of mass destruction;
CONFIRMING that both South American integration and the South American union are based on the guiding
principles of: unlimited respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability of States; selfdetermination of the peoples; solidarity; cooperation; peace; democracy, citizen participation and
pluralism; universal, interdependent and indivisible human rights; reduction of asymmetries and harmony
with nature for a sustainable development;
UNDERSTANDING that South American integration should be achieved through an innovative process,
which would include the progress achieved so far by the MERCOSUR and CAN processes, as well as the
experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname, and which goes beyond the convergence among them;
CONSCIOUS that the process of building a South American integration and union is ambitious in its strategic
objectives and will be flexible and gradual in its implementation, ensuring that each State honour its
commitments according to its own reality;
RATIFYING that fully functioning democratic institutions and the unrestricted respect for human rights are
essential conditions for building a common future of peace, economic and social prosperity and for the
development of integration processes among the Member States;
AGREE:
Article 1 - Constitution of UNASUR
The States Party to this Treaty decide to constitute the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) as an
entity with international juridical character.
Article 2 - Objective
The objective of the South American Union of Nations is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner,
an integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizing
political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among
others, with a view to eliminating socioeconomic inequality, in order to achieve social inclusion and
participation of civil society, to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework of
strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States.
Article 3 - Specific Objectives
The South American Union of Nations has the following objectives:
23
a) The strengthening of the political dialogue among Member States to guarantee a space for consultation in
order to reinforce South American integration and the participation of UNASUR in the international arena;
b) The inclusive and equitable social and human development in order to eradicate poverty and overcome
inequalities in the region;
c) The eradication of illiteracy, the universal access to quality education and the regional recognition of
courses and titles;
d) Energy integration for the integral and sustainable use of the resources of the region, in a spirit of
solidarity;
e) The development of an infrastructure for the interconnection of the region and among our peoples, based
on sustainable social and economic development criteria;
f) Financial integration through the adoption of mechanisms compatible with the economic and fiscal
policies of Member States;
g) The protection of biodiversity, water resources and ecosystems, as well as cooperation in the prevention
of catastrophes and in combating the causes and effects of climate change;
h) The development of concrete and effective mechanisms to overcome asymmetries, thus achieving an
equitable integration;
i) The consolidation of a South American identity through the progressive recognition of the rights of
nationals of a Member State resident in any of the other Member States, with the aim of attaining a South
American citizenship;
j) Universal access to social security and health services;
k) Cooperation on issues of migration with a holistic approach, based on an unrestricted respect for human
and labour rights, for migratory regularisation and harmonisation of policies;
l) Economic and commercial cooperation to achieve progress and consolidation of an innovative, dynamic,
transparent, equitable and balanced process focused on an effective access, promoting economic growth
and development to overcome asymmetries by means of the complementarities of the economies of the
countries of South America, as well as the promotion of the wellbeing of all sectors of the population and
the reduction of poverty;
m) Industrial and productive integration, focusing especially on the important role that small and medium size
enterprises, cooperatives, networks and other forms of productive organisation may play;
n) The definition and implementation of common or complementary policies and projects of research,
innovation, technological transfer and technological production, aimed at enhancing the region’s own
capacity, sustainability and technological development;
o) The promotion of cultural diversity and the expression of the traditions and knowledge of the peoples of
the region, in order to strengthen their sense of identity;
p) Citizen participation through mechanisms for interaction and dialogue between UNASUR and the various
social actors in the formulation of South American integration policies;
q) Coordination among specialised bodies of the Member States, taking into account international norms, in
order to strengthen the fight against corruption, the global drug problem, trafficking in persons, trafficking
in small and light weapons, terrorism, transnational organised crime and other threats as well as for
disarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and elimination
of landmines;
r) The promotion of cooperation among the judicial authorities of the Member States of UNASUR.
s) The exchange of information and experiences in matters of defence;
t) Cooperation for the strengthening of citizen security;
u) Sectoral cooperation as a mechanism to deepen South American integration, through the exchange of
information, experiences and capacity building.
Article 4 - Bodies
The Bodies of UNASUR are:
1. The Council of Heads of State and Government
2. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
3. The Council of Delegates
4. The General Secretariat
Article 5 - Institutional Development
Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, and meetings of the Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups and other
institutional levels may be convened as required on a permanent or temporary basis, in order to fulfil the
mandates and recommendations of the competent bodies. These bodies will report on their activities
24
through the Council of Delegates, which will present its findings to the Council of Heads of State and
Government or to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as appropriate.
The agreements adopted by the Sectoral Ministerial Meetings, Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups
and other institutional levels will be submitted for consideration by the competent body which has
summoned or created them.
The Energy Council of South America, created by the Declaration of Margarita (April 17th, 2007), is part of
UNASUR.
Article 6 - The Council of Heads of State and Government
The Council of Heads of State and Government is the highest organ of UNASUR.
Its responsibilities are:
a) To establish policy guidelines, plans of action, programmes and projects of the South American integration
process and to decide on the priorities to be implemented;
b) To summon Sectoral Ministerial Meetings and to create Councils at Ministerial level;
c) To decide on the proposals presented by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
d) To adopt the political guidelines for relation with third parties;
The ordinary meetings of the Council of Heads of State and Government will be held annually. Upon the
request of a Member State, extraordinary meetings may be summoned through the Pro Tempore
Presidency, subject to the consensus of all Member States of UNASUR.
Article 7 - The Pro Tempore Presidency
The Pro Tempore Presidency of UNASUR will be held successively by each of the Member States, in
alphabetical order, for periods of one year.
Its responsibilities are:
a) To prepare, summon and preside over the meetings of the bodies of UNASUR;
b) To present to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and to the Council of Delegates the annual
program of activities of UNASUR, with dates, venues and agenda of the meetings of its bodies in
coordination with the General Secretariat;
c) To represent UNASUR in international events, with the prior authorization of the Member States;
d) To undertake commitments and to sign Declarations with third parties, with prior consent of the
appropriate bodies of UNASUR.
Article 8 - The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has the following functions:
a) To adopt Resolutions in order to implement the Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and
Government;
b) To propose draft Decisions and prepare the meetings of the Council of Heads of State and Government;
c) To coordinate positions on central themes of South American integration;
d) To develop and promote political dialogue and coordination on themes of regional and international
interest;
e) To oversee and evaluate the integration process as a whole;
f) To approve the annual Programme of activities and the annual working budget of UNASUR;
g) To approve the financing of the common initiatives of UNASUR;
h) To implement the policy guidelines for relations with third parties;
i) To approve resolutions and regulations of an institutional nature or on other themes falling within its
jurisdiction;
j) To create Working Groups based on the priorities established by the Council of Heads of State and
Government.
25
The ordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs will be held every semester and may be
convened by the Pro Tempore Presidency on an extraordinary basis at the request of half of the Member
States.
Article 9 - The Council of Delegates
The Council of Delegates has the following functions:
a) To implement, through the adoption of the appropriate Provisions, the Decisions of the Council of Heads
of State and Government, and the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with the
support of the Pro Tempore Presidency and the General Secretariat;
b) To prepare the meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
c) To prepare draft Decisions, Resolutions and Regulations for the consideration of the Council of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs;
d) To ensure the compatibility and to coordinate the initiatives of UNASUR with other existing regional and
subregional integration processes in order to promote the complementarity of efforts;
e) To establish, coordinate and oversee the Working Groups;
f) To oversee the political dialogue and consultation and coordination on issues of regional and international
interest;
g) To encourage the opportunities for dialogue so as to facilitate citizen participation in the South American
integration process;
h) To propose to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for its consideration and approval, the draft
ordinary annual working budget.
The Council of Delegates is composed of one accredited representative of each Member State. It will meet
preferably every two months, in the territory of the State which occupies the Pro Tempore Presidency or
another agreed venue.
Article 10 - The General Secretariat
The General Secretariat is the body that, under the leadership of the Secretary General, executes the
mandates conferred upon it by the organs of UNASUR and represents them accordingly. Its headquarters
shall be the city of Quito, Ecuador.
Its responsibilities shall be:
a) To support the Council of Heads of States and Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
the Council of Delegates and the Pro Tempore Presidency in the fulfilment of their duties;
b) To propose initiatives and to oversee the implementation of the directives of the organs of UNASUR;
c) To participate with the right to speak and to perform the role of secretary in the meetings of the organs of
UNASUR;
d) To prepare and submit the Annual Report and the respective reports to the corresponding organs of
UNASUR;
e) To serve as depository of the Agreements in the framework of UNASUR and to arrange for their
respective publication;
f) To prepare the draft Annual Budget for the consideration of the Council of Delegates and to adopt the
necessary measures for its proper management and execution;
g) To prepare the draft Regulations for the functioning of the General Secretariat and to submit them for the
consideration and approval of the corresponding organs;
h) To coordinate with other integration and cooperation entities of Latin America and the Caribbean with a
view to developing those activities requested by the bodies of UNASUR;
i) To execute, according to the regulations, all the legal acts necessary for the proper administration and
management of the General Secretariat;
The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council of Heads of State and Government, following a
proposal by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for a term of two years, renewable only once. The
Secretary General shall not be succeeded by a person of the same nationality.
26
During the exercise of his or her functions, the Secretary General and the staff of the General Secretariat
shall be exclusively dedicated to UNASUR and will not request, neither accept, instructions from any
Government nor any authority other than UNASUR, and will refrain from acting in a manner inconsistent
with their status as international civil servants with sole responsibility to this international organisation.
The Secretary General shall be the legal representative of the General Secretariat.
In the selection of the employees of the General Secretariat, an equitable representation for each Member
State will be guaranteed, taking into account, as far as possible, criteria of gender, language, ethnicity
and others.
Article 11 - Juridical Sources
The juridical sources of UNASUR are the following:
1. The Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR and other additional instruments;
2. The Agreements concluded by the Member States of UNASUR as a consequence of the instruments
mentioned in the item above;
3. The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government;
4. The Resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;
5. The Provisions of the Council of Delegates.
Article 12 - Approval of the Legislative Measures
All the norms of UNASUR will be adopted by consensus.
The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and the Provisions of the Council of Delegates may be adopted with the presence of at
least three quarters (3/4) of the Member States.
The Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs adopted without the presence of all Member States, shall be forwarded by the Secretary
General to the absent States, which shall make known their position within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the document in the appropriate language. In the case of the Council of Delegates, that deadline shall be
fifteen (15) days.
The Working Groups shall hold sessions and make proposals as long as they have a quorum of half plus one
of the Member States.
The legislative measures emanating from the organs of UNASUR will be binding on the Member States once
they have been incorporated into each Member State’s domestic law, according to its respective internal
procedures.
Article 13 - Adoption of Policies and Creation of Institutions,
Organizations and Programmes
One or more Member States may submit for the consideration of the Council of Delegates a proposal for
adoption of policies, creation of common institutions, organisations and programmes which will be
adopted in a consensual manner, on the basis of a flexible and gradual criteria of implementation
according to the objectives of UNASUR and the provisions of Articles 5 and 12 of this Treaty.
Programmes, institutions and organisations in which Member States participate prior to the entry into force of
this Treaty may be considered as UNASUR programmes, institutions or organisations, in accordance with
the procedures outlined in this article and in accordance with the objectives of this Treaty.
The proposals will be submitted to the Council of Delegates. Once approved by consensus, they will be
forwarded to the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and, subsequently, to the Council of Heads of
State and Government, for approval by consensus. When a proposal has not obtained consensus, it may
only be submitted to the Council of Delegates six months after its last inclusion in the agenda.
Once a proposal is approved by the highest body of UNASUR, three or more Member States may begin to
implement it, provided that the possibility of inclusion of other Member States in such a common initiative
is guaranteed and periodical reports of its implementation are presented to the Council of Delegates.
Any Member State may completely or partially refrain from implementing an approved policy, be it for a
period defined beforehand, or for an indefinite period, without preventing it from later joining the total or
27
partial implementation of that policy. In the case of institutions, organisations or programmes which are
created, any Member State may participate as an observer, or refrain from participating fully or partially
for a definite or indefinite period.
The adoption of policies and the creation of institutions, organisations and programmes will be regulated by
the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, following a proposal by the Council of Delegates.
Article 14 - Political Dialogue
The political consultation and coordination among the Member States of UNASUR will be based on harmony
and mutual respect, strengthening regional stability and supporting the preservation of democratic values
and the promotion of human rights.
Member States will reinforce the practice of consensus-building on the central themes on the international
agenda and will promote initiatives that affirm the identity of the region as a dynamic factor in international
relations.
Article 15 - Relationship with Third Parties
UNASUR will promote initiatives for dialogue on themes of regional or international interest and will seek to
strengthen cooperation mechanisms with other regional groups, States and other entities with
international legal character, focusing on projects in the areas of energy, financing, infrastructure, social
policies, education and others to be identified.
The Council of Delegates with the support of the Pro Tempore Presidency and the General Secretariat is
responsible for overseeing the implementation of activities. For the purpose of achieving proper
coordination, the Council of Delegates shall be informed of and consider the positions that UNASUR will
adopt in its relationship with third parties.
Article 16 - Financing
The Council of Delegates will propose to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for consideration and
approval, the draft Annual Ordinary Budget for the functioning of the General Secretariat.
The financing of the ordinary budget for the functioning of the General Secretariat will be based on
differentiated contribution quotas of the Member States to be determined by a Resolution of the Council
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, following a proposal by the Council of Delegates, taking into account the
economic capacity of the Member States, shared responsibility and the principle of equity.
Article 17 - Parliament
The creation of a South American Parliament, whose seat shall be the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia, will be
the subject of an Additional Protocol to the present Treaty.
Article 18 - Citizen Participation
Full citizen participation in the process of South American integration and union will be promoted by means
of dialogue and interaction in a broad, democratic, transparent, pluralistic, diverse and independent
manner with the various social actors, establishing effective channels of information, consultation and
supervision in the different bodies of UNASUR.
The Member States and organs of UNASUR will promote innovative mechanisms and spaces to encourage
discussion of various issues ensuring that the proposals submitted by civil society receive adequate
consideration and response.
Article 19 - Associate States
Other Latin American and Caribbean States that request participation as Associate States of UNASUR may
be admitted with the approval of the Council of Heads of State and Government.
The rights and obligations of the Associate States will be regulated by the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs.
Article 20 - Accession of New Members
After the fifth year of the entry into force of the present Treaty and taking into account the aim of
strengthening Latin American and Caribbean unity, the Council of Heads of State and Government may
consider requests for accession as Members States by Associate States, that have held such a status for
four years, by means of a consensual recommendation by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The
28
respective Protocols of Accession will enter into force 30 days after the completion of the ratification
process by all Members States and the acceding State.
Article 21 - Dispute Settlement
Any dispute that may emerge between States Parties regarding the interpretation or implementation of the
provisions of this Constitutive Treaty will be settled through direct negotiations.
In the case where a solution is not reached through direct negotiation, the Member States involved will
submit the dispute for the consideration of the Council of Delegates, which will formulate within 60 days,
the appropriate recommendations for the settlement of the dispute.
If a solution is not reached by the Council of Delegates, the dispute will be taken to the Council of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, which will consider it at its next meeting.
Article 22 - Privileges and Immunities
UNASUR shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Member States, the privileges and immunities necessary
for the fulfilment of its functions.
The representatives of the Member States of UNASUR and the international employees of UNASUR will
therefore benefit from the privileges and immunities necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions with relation to this Treaty.
UNASUR shall establish with the Republic of Ecuador the corresponding Headquarters Agreement which will
establish the specific privileges and immunities.
Article 23 - Languages
The official languages of the Union of South American Nations will be English, Spanish, Portuguese and
Dutch.
Article 24 - Validity and Denunciation
This treaty will have an indefinite validity. It may be denounced by any of the Member States by means of a
written notification to the Depositary, which shall communicate such notification to the other Member
States.
The denunciation will have effect six (6) months after the date in which the notification is received by the
Depositary.
The notification of the denunciation shall not exempt the Member State of the obligation to pay outstanding
ordinary contributions.
Article 25 - Amendments
Any Member State may propose amendments to this Constitutive Treaty. The proposed amendments will be
communicated to the General Secretariat which shall notify the other Member States for its consideration
by the bodies of UNASUR.
The amendments approved by the Council of Heads of State and Government will follow the procedure
established in article 26 for entry into force.
Article 26 - Entry Into Force
The present Constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American Nations will enter into force thirty days after
the date of receipt of the 9th instrument of ratification.
The instruments of ratification will be deposited before the Government of the Republic of Ecuador, which will
communicate the date of deposit to the other States, as well as the date of entry into force of this
Constitutive Treaty.
For the Member State which ratifies the Constitutive Treaty after the deposit of the 9th instrument of
ratification, the Treaty will enter into force 30 days after the date in which that State deposits its
instrument of ratification.
Article 27 - Registration
This Constitutive Treaty and its amendments will be registered at the United Nations Secretariat.
Transitory Article
29
The Parties agree to appoint a Special Commission, coordinated by the Council of Delegates and composed
of representatives of the National, Regional and Subregional Parliaments, with the objective of preparing
a draft of an Additional Protocol which will be considered in the IV Summit of Heads of State and
Government. This Commission will meet in the city of Cochabamba. Such an Additional Protocol will
determine the composition, attributions and functioning of the South American Parliament.
Done in the city of Brasilia, Brazil, on the 23rd day of the month of May of the year 2008, in original copies in
the English, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch languages, the four texts being equally authentic.
30
Abstract
As pointed by Kelly (2007:212-215), a normative desire for regional integration still drives
most of the academic and political debate concerned with the newly created Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR). The main goal of this paper is to compare the
institutional design, operations and strategic rationales of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in
order to evaluate how useful and applicable those experiences would be for South
America. Since the UNASUR was conceived to absorb and transcend previous regional
organizations such as the Mercosur and the Andean Community, it has potential security
roles in addressing common regional ills like organized crime and high rates of
interpersonal violence. A more institutionalized regional order is also supposed to provide
more room of maneuver for the South Americans facing global centripetal forces such as
the current U.S. primacy push and neoliberal globalization. Although UNASUR is still a
fledgling supranational / intergovernmental union, there are theoretical and political
reasons to avoid modeling it exclusively after the European Union security institutions.
Assuming a normative desire for a robust UNASUR to be built in South America, this
paper examines in rather realist terms the usefulness of two other models of security
cooperation and integration (Mares, 2001; Buzan & Weaver, 2003).
Key words: Europe-South America-Integration-Cooperation-Security-Regional-RegionOrganization
31