Framing Islam and Constructing Cultural Identities in the Debate on

Framing Islam and Constructing Cultural Identities
in the Debate on
Thilo Sarrazin’s Deutschland schafft sich ab
by Meike Osterchrist
2
Table of Contents
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………3
1.1 Immigration and Integration in Germany ……………………….4
1.2 Thilo Sarrazin’s Deutschland schafft sich ab…………………...6
1.3 The Research Topic……………………………………………….9
2. Methodology……………………………………………………………….11
2.1 Cultural Identities…………………………………………………12
2.3 Agenda-Setting Theory…………………………………………..16
3. Analysis…………………………………………………………………….18
3.1 Setting the Agenda: How the Media Shaped the Debate…….19
3.2 Framing Islam……………………………………………………..31
3.3 Constructing Cultural Identities………………………………....44
4. Conclusion: The Results and their Effects…………………………...60
Appendix
I. Works Cited…………………………………………………………65
3
1. Introduction
“Long Dormant, German Pride Blinks and Stirs” proclaimed The New York
Times in their eponymous September 2010 article (Kulish 1). The reason for the
German nation “flexing its muscles and reasserting a long-repressed national pride”
(1) was a heated debate on integration that emerged in late summer 2010. At the
center of the public discourse stood the publication of a book called Deutschland
schafft sich ab by Thilo Sarrazin, a social democrat and at that time member of the
executive board of Germany’s Central Bank. The public debate following the
publication soon centered on one main concern: the assumed problems of Muslim
immigrants integrating into German society. The discourse surrounding the book’s
arguments was initiated and carried out by the German mass media. As the
international New York Times observed the debate, it seemed to concern not only
issues of integration but also addressed feelings of national pride and identity. In short:
Sarrazin’s ideas about Muslim immigrants revealed a great deal about what it means
to be German in today’s world. The correlation between Muslim immigration and
German national identity is subject of this thesis. This concerns in particular the
question how cultural identities are being constructed in relation to each other. As the
news media played a crucial role in the debate a qualitative analysis of a media
sample is the ideal way to approach the research question. In order to introduce the
research topic beforehand the debate’s context will be elaborated in further detail.
4
1.1 Immigration and Integration in Germany
The European nation states share a long history of emigration. Between 1821
and 1924 approximately 55 million Europeans emigrated, the vast majority of them to
the United States (Ryskamp 68). Following this, emigration to Ireland, Italy, England,
and Germany was on the top of the list of departing citizens. This tendency underwent
a significant shift after World War II when immigration to the European countries
started to gain importance. Since 1945 Germany experienced immigration of large
numbers and from various groups (Green 333). Following the End of World War II
about 12 million refugees arrived from the country’s former eastern territories. In the
1950s an additional 4 million ethnic Germans of the former Soviet Union immigrated to
Germany. From 1955 on labor immigration started. Due to the flourishing German
economy guest workers were recruited until in 1973, when the government under Willy
Brandt announced the Anwerbestop. From 1987 on asylum appeared on the agenda
as a new significant source of immigration (334). Almost as old as Germany’s history
of immigration is the debate on whether the country should be considered a country of
immigration. Until the late 1990s the German government held the position that
Germany was not a country of immigration. Even in the 1960s when large amounts of
guest workers came to Germany, this immigration was primarily considered as
temporary. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt announced in 1981 the infamous sentence “the
Federal Republic should not and will not be a country of immigration” (qdt. in Williams
57) that afterwards has been adapted by many other politicians. For instance by
Helmut Kohl who referred to Schmidt’s expression ten years later in stating that “the
Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration” (qtd. in Williams 57). As
5
Helen Williams points out the exact phrase “Germany is not a country of immigration”1
appears in more than 6.400 books and various parliamentary debates (57).
Certainly the political elite’s refusal to regard Germany as a country of
immigration strongly influenced public discourses on immigration until the late 1990s.
It was finally in 1998 the SPD–Green coalition under Gerhard Schröder that broke with
the policy and established immigration on the political agenda (Green 334). Among
European countries Germany today has the largest foreign population in absolute
terms. In 2010 6.7 million immigrants have been registered in the country whereby the
two largest foreign nationalities are Turkish and Italian. From 1990 to 2010 an average
number of 900,000 immigrants per year arrived in Germany from various countries of
origin (336). Most of these immigrants reside in the country for a long time: The
average period of residence is 18.9 years. Simon Green describes the German nonnational population as “large, well-settled and diverse” (338). Considering the statistics
it cannot be doubted that Germany has in fact become a country of immigration.
Howsoever recent debates prove that society and politics still struggle with this reality.
Integration is a topic of various political discussions and almost continually present in
the news media. Angela Merkel’s famous statement that “multiculturalism has
absolutely failed” from 16 October 2010 is exemplary for a general sense of
dissatisfaction concerning integration (qtd. in Williams 65). Just recently in 2007 the
German government announced the first official definition of integration describing the
goal as “integration into the social, economic, intellectual, cultural and legal fabric of
the host country without giving up one’s own cultural identity” (68).
1
“Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland”
6
1.2 Thilo Sarrazin’s Deutschland schafft sich ab
In 2010, Thilo Sarrazin, a Social Democratic politician and at that time member
of the Executive Board of Germany’s Central Bank published a book entitled
Deutschland schafft sich ab. In his work Sarrazin warned that ethnic Germans were
soon going to be outnumbered by immigrants because of their low birth rates. He
furthermore accused Muslim immigrants of refusing assimilation and undermining
German society. Sarrazin’s argumentation centers on the idea of the society’s decline
through a combination of falling birth rates, immigration and a growing lower class.
According to the author this “decomposition inside society” 2 (Sarrazin 7) will rapidly
ruin the nation economically and culturally. Sarrazin believes that intelligence,
mentality and tradition are genetically determined (32). He supports a eugenic model
that suggests that a certain genetic composition of a population is less favorable than
another. The idea of eugenics reaches back to the 1880s and had its peak of
popularity in the 1920s (Levine 1). It is rooted essentially in Darwinian Theory that
emerged shortly before in the 1850s. The aim of most eugenic movements is to affect
reproductive practice through the application of theories of heredity. According to the
eugenic logic some human life is of more value to the state, the nation, the race and
future generations than other human life. The inventor of eugenic theory, Francis
Galton, saw eugenic selection as a preferable alternative to natural selection among
humans (1).
Sarrazin does not mention the term eugenic in his book but he explicitly refers
to Charles Darwin and Francis Galton. According to Sarrazin the fertility of the less
intelligent influences the average level of intelligence within the population. He
concludes that “the inborn intellectual potential of the population continuously dilutes” 3
2
“Fäulnisprozesse im Inneren der Gesellschaft”
„Deshalb bedeutet ein schichtabhängig unterschiedliches generatives Verhalten leider auch, dass
sich das vererbte intellektuelle Potential der Bevölkerung kontinuierlich verdünnt“
3
7
(Sarrazin 92). According to Sarrazin different cultures and ethnicities have different
genetic abilities and levels of intelligence. He states that for instance Jews developed
an above average intelligence because they had to face high selection pressure
caused by persecution4 (95). Sarrazin goes on by stating that certain nation states
and cultures are limited in their possibilities for development through their genetic
dispositions5 (34). Departing from this idea Sarrazin identifies certain groups of
immigrants as potentially problematic for the composition of the German society
because of their genetic difference. Those are in particular migrants from Turkey, the
Middle East and Africa (261). According to Sarrazin they share one important trait:
they are all Muslims. The way in which the Germans differ from the Italians, writes
Sarrazin, seems minimalistic compared to the way they differ from Muslims6 (290).
Problems of integration – and here the author leaves no doubts – are closely
connected to the immigrant’s religious beliefs. Sarrazin defines the specific problems
with Muslim immigrants as lower success on the labor market and in the education
system, a general high dependence on governmental support and above-average
potential for violent crime (262). He sums up “prejudices against Muslims exist
throughout Europe out of good reasons” (292). In addition he puts them in charge of
having absolutely no interest in German society and culture. In his opinion Muslim
migrants come to Germany for mainly one reason: to receive social security benefits7
(150). The journalist Patrick Bahners sees Sarrazin in the tradition of eugenic
pessimists that fear the moral and intellectual collapse and decline of the Occident
4
„Erklärt wird die durchschnittlich höhere Intelligenz der Juden mit dem außerordentlichen
Selektionsdruck“
5
„Es zeigt sich aber, dass Staaten und Gesellschaften nur sehr unterschiedlich in der Lage sind,
die von der Industrialisierung und Technisierung ausgehenden Entwicklungschancen zu nutzen“
6
„Die Deutschen […] haben bis heute kaum erkannt, wie sehr sie sich selbst etwa von den
Italienern unterscheiden und wie nachhaltig selbst diese, im Vergleich zu den Muslimen minimalen
Unterschiede fortwirken.“
7
“Insbesondere unter den Arabern in Deutschland ist die Neigung weit verbreitet, Kinder zu
zeugen, um mehr Sozialtransfers zu bekommen, und die in der Familie oft eingesperrten Frauen
haben im Grunde ja kaum etwas anderes zu tun”
8
(Bahners 25). Ethnic purity in Sarrazin’s sense can only be achieved through
bureaucratic politics. Accordingly the author demonstrates on 408 pages a catalogue
of measures. The most important are the restriction of immigration, the short cutting of
social benefits and increased governmental control for those who refuse to work or to
contribute to society.
On August 23 - one week before the official publishing of Deutschland schafft
sich ab – the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel and the daily tabloid Bild printed
selected parts of the book and thereby managed to start one of the most heated
debates in post-war Germany. The public discussion that seemed to divide the nation
into proponents and opponents of Sarrazin’s arguments lasted for months. Even
before the book’s actual publication in August 2010 the first printing of 25.000 copies
was entirely sold out (Krieger 2012). To date more than 1.5 million hardcopies of
Deutschland schafft sich ab have been sold. Thilo Sarrazin has earned millions with
his controversial thesis but it has also led to severe consequences in his professional
life. Facing the possibility of an official exclusion Sarrazin decided to resign from his
position at the Central Bank in October 2010. Furthermore the SPD discussed his
suspension from the party but closed the proceeding in April 2011.
9
1.3 Research Topic
In 2012, 20% of the German population had an immigrant background - around
4% of them are Muslims (Statistisches Bundesamt). In August 2010 Thilo Sarrazin
declared these minorities as essentially threatening to the German society. The public
debate following the book’s publication has been one of the most controversial ones in
post-war Germany. Although the core discussion took place from August 2010 until
October 2010, the effects last until today. The role of the mass media in the debate is
significant. The news media did not only kick off the debate, they furthermore heated it
up to an extent that critics have described as public hysteria. Immigration is a socially
relevant topic. It touches on the way native and non-native citizens live together and it
leads to the question of minorities’ places in the wider construct of the nation. The
debate on Deutschland schafft sich ab did not only show how the German public
perceives immigrants it moreover revealed how Germans perceived themselves. The
very idea that immigration might work to transform German society implies that
something as a German core identity existed beforehand. But how can one define this
national identity? The following analysis should lead closer to an understanding of
cultural identities in modern Germany. The debate on Sarrazin’s book will be the
object of examination because it revealed ongoing public discourses on national
identity, immigration and not at least uncovered deep public anxieties. The focus in
this work will be set on the particular role of the mass media in the debate on
Sarrazin’s book.
Media discourses reflect social, cultural and political interests. Therefore they
allow us to draw conclusions on wider public concerns. The media does not only
mirror certain ideas and ideologies but additionally actively produces, structures and
shapes knowledge and thus holds a powerful position in democracy. The question to
be examined in this discursive analysis is how the German news media produced
10
representations of Muslim immigrants in the debate on Deutschland schafft sich ab
and how these representations interact with discourses of German national identity.
The outcome of this investigation will ideally provide new information about media
produced processes of cultural identity formation. Finally, it will also after all pose
questions of the media’s responsibility in the public realm. The dataset used for this
study includes news magazines, cover stories and articles on Thilo Sarrazin’s book
Deutschland schafft sich ab in German print media. The sample is gathered in an
exploratory, qualitative and open fashion dating from August 2010 to October 2010. In
order to develop a representative sample, the selected papers cover a large portion of
the political spectrum from right and left wings to more centrist sources.
11
2. Methodology
The opening chapter heretofore placed the debate on Deutschland schafft sich
ab in the context of Germany’s struggle with its status as a country of immigration. It
indicated the far-reaching consequences and social relevance of the debate on
Sarrazin’s book and the media’s role in the discussion. The succeeding chapter serves
to define the terminology and to provide a framework for the discursive analysis. The
methodological frame for the following analysis covers two main subjects: cultural
identities and the news media. The analysis will essentially rely on the notion of
discursive practices as articulated by Michel Foucault. According to Foucault
discursive formations consist of groups of statements that distribute knowledge
concerning a certain object (Foucault 22). In analyzing objects it has to be kept in mind
that those objects are constructed “only on the basis of a complex field of discourse”
(23). It is hence the aim of the analysis to identify the underlying discourses that the
examined articles and texts participate in and to “search for unities that form within”
(27). The question is how groups of statements establish correlations with each other
and what other groups of statements are excluded. (28). This work’s aim is to examine
constructions of cultural identities. Accordingly the focus will be set on concepts and
discourses concerning two main topics: German national identity and the Muslim
immigrant’s identity.
12
2.1 Cultural Identities
Stuart Hall understands identity in the tradition of Foucault’s discourse theory
as embedded in discursive practices. He thereby rejects naturalistic concepts of
identity as a unified subjective thing but rather suggests that it is constructed within
discursive practices, a process that he describes as identification (Hall 2).
“Identification is constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or
shared characteristics with another person or group” writes Hall. It is a “construction, a
process never completed” (2). In the case of cultural or national identities the shared
characteristic belongs to a cultural or ethnic category. The term ‘national identity’ is
being often used in political debates but rarely defined. This inaccuracy in language is
partly due to a general uneasiness in dealing with national feelings and partly to
uncertainty what the concept includes at all. A solid starting point when talking about
nationhood is Benedict Anderson’s definition of a nation as a “imagined political
community” (Anderson 6). Anderson writes that this community is “imagined because
the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellowmembers, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image
of their communion” (6). Although Anderson’s definition of a nation might be rather
broad it nevertheless directs the attention towards one important aspect: The general
constructiveness of what is considered a nation. Anderson sharps this point by quoting
Ernest Geller that nationalism “is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness”
but that it “invents nations where they do not exist” (qtd. in Anderson 6).
Adopting the idea of a nation as a construct of imaginary force it becomes
possible to examine national identity as a “cultural artefact” (4). It has to be considered
as Anderson writes how the concept has come “into historical being”, in what ways its
“meanings has changed over time” and why it commands “such profound emotional
legacy” (4). The issue of German national identity – often also referred to as the
13
‘German question’ – has widely been addressed by intellectuals but rarely formulated
as the German author Hans Magnus Enzensberger criticizes (qtd. in Langguth 9).
Germany’s recent history of National Socialism and its post-war division into two
states have certainly strained the discussion on a national identity. The horrors of the
authoritarian state and the misuse of national attributes turned the formulation of a
coherent national identity into a hard undertaking. But in fact German national identity
has been an ambiguous issue long before the Third Reich. In comparison to other
nations the Germans always struggled with the idea and reality of the national
construct (Alter 33). The popular expression of Germany as a “late nation” calls
attention to the delayed foundation of the German state in 1871 (33). Nevertheless an
awakening German national consciousness can be traced back to around 1800.
Facing the danger of Napoleonic France and the inner particularism of single states as
Preußen, Bayern and Sachsen, a new desire for unity emerged among the German
population (39).
In order to understand what distinguishes this German national consciousness
from other nation states it is helpful to consider Friedrich Meinecke’s theory of
Staatsnation and Kulturnation. Meinecke, a German historian provided in 1907 a
widely used distinction into Staatsnation and Kulturnation. The Staatsnation is founded
on the idea of voluntary individual and collective self-determination as a member of the
nation state (35). In this sense the Staatsnation is a mutually supportive group whose
members define themselves through their nationality. France and Great Britain but
also the United States are classic Staatsnationen. In those countries the nation was
founded as a political community of willed citizens (36). “Late nations” such as
Germany, Italy and Poland are considered to be Kulturnationen. The Kulturnation is in
contrast to the Staatsnation not founded on the idea of a state but rather more on
assumed objective parameters. Those parameters are for instance ethnicity,
14
language, religion, tradition, territory and shared history (36). Thus the Kulturnation
relies on an ethnic definition of belonging that existed already before the foundation of
a state. The perception of Germany as a Kulturnation helps us to understand that
national affiliation existed already before the actual foundation of a German nation
state. And this affiliation was built – different than for instance in France or Great
Britain – on an ethnic understanding of belonging. While members of a Staatsnation
actively choose to be citizens, members of a Kulturnation are born into a certain
nationality. Consequently the concept Kulturnation carries a racist component: who is
not born as a German cannot become one.
Of course Meinecke’s distinction is rather schematic, but it nevertheless mirrors
a German tradition of understanding national identity as a form of ethnic belonging.
Concepts of belonging always imply exclusion. As Peter Alter suggests Germany has
a long practice of thinking of national identity in terms of the exclusion of others (50).
To further investigate these processes it is helpful to return to Stuart Hall’s idea of
identity. Hall’s understanding of identity is deeply rooted in the discourse process. He
suggests that identities arise from “narrativization” within the discourse, that they are
“constituted within representation” (Hall 4). Processes of identity formation are
essentially processes of articulation as Hall points out. This articulation “entails
discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries”. Those boundaries
produce what Hall describes as “frontier-effects” (3). In order to construct identity,
according to Hall, it “requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate
the process” (3). His understanding of identity is radical in the sense that he is
convinced that it is “the making of difference and exclusion” that constitutes it rather
than a feeling of unity (4). The concept of constituting identity against the backdrop of
an “Other” in combination with the traditional perception of Germany as a Kulturnation
15
provides us with a framework to examine German national identity in relation to the
Muslim immigrant’s identity.
Initially it has to be said that the term “Muslim identity” is primarily a
generalization. Muslims are of various nationalities with numerous ways of cultural and
religious practices. Nevertheless immigrants of Muslim religion are often reduced to
their status as religious subjects and treated as one collective subject one can refer to.
Participants of public discourses frequently miss the fact that the category of the
Muslim immigrant includes people with complex economic, social and political
backgrounds and opinions. They fail to recognize Islam as a “heterogeneous set of
cultural systems” as Peter Morey writes (Morey 2). The one-dimensional and dogmatic
view of Islam has a long tradition in Western cultures. Edward Said’s book Orientalism
is probably the most important work on the Western perception of Islam. Said
describes Orientalism as a “style of thought based upon an ontological and
epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’” (Said,
Orientalism 2). He refers to Michel Foucault by understanding Orientalism as a
discourse. European culture manages and produces representations of the Orient
within this discourse (3). Said draws the attention towards the fact that what the
discourse treats as Islam is in fact “part fiction, part ideological label, part minimal
designation of a religion called Islam” (Said, Covering Islam Preface x). The tendency
is to “reduce Islam to a handful of rules, stereotypes, and generalizations” as Said
writes and to usually associate it with “violence, primitiveness, atavism, threatening
qualities” (xvi). In the aftermath of 9/11 the association of Islam with fundamentalism
and terrorism became even more powerful. These pictures of Islam that circulate
among Western discourses go along with sets of feelings, values and attitudes (47).
Orientalism is closely connected to two other concepts that should be
introduced briefly: colonialism and racism. As Jamal Malik suggests contemporary
16
Islam cannot be understood “without the colonial experience in mind” (Malik 496). The
fact that after the end of the First World War “approximately half of the mainland of the
earth consisted of colonies” and “about two-fifths of the world’s population lived as
‘subjects’ under colonial rule” structures and influences Islamic cultures until today
(496). The concept of European hegemony continues to define the relationship
between Orient and Occident. Racism is hard to define as such because the term
includes a “multitude of concepts” as Ghassan Hage points out (Hage 29). Hage offers
a practical definition for the purpose of this analysis as he focuses on the racism’s
aspects of identity and its connection to nationalism. He regards racism as a “system
of beliefs, a mode of classification, a way of thinking about the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’”
that maintains the superiority of certain groups or ethnics (29). The “privileged
relationship” of one race or ethnicity and a territory binds nationalist practices and
racist practices together (32). According to Hage, thus one cannot think racism without
considering nationalism as well.
2.3 Agenda-Setting Theory
In Covering Islam Edward Said particularly discusses the role of the mass
media in discourses on Islam. He suggests that the media occupies an essential role
in constituting public views on Muslims. For most Americans and Europeans pictures
of Islam are solely delivered through the mass media. This position gives the media a
key role in shaping public attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. To elaborate this
relationship further theory on mass media shall be consulted. Theory on mass media
is available on a large scale and with diverse orientations. One of the widely adapted
approaches is Maxwell McComb’s theory of agenda-setting. In the case of this
research McCombs concept is a promising tool, because it focuses on the media’s
powerful position in the formation of public opinion. Agenda-setting theory is based on
the idea that our perception of the world is structured by the media. As individuals our
17
direct personal experience is limited – most of the issues that catch our attention are
beyond our personal reach. The mass media provides us with information that is
outside the limits of our personal knowledge. McCombs calls the picture that the
media provides “second-hand reality” (McCombs 1).
Journalists structure, organize and provide information for the public. But the
daily capacity available for news is limited. Consequently they focus on a handful of
issues. They choose what is most noticeable and thereby set the media’s agenda.
Empirical investigations on agenda-setting have clearly shown that news provided by
the media comes to be regarded over time as important by the public (5). The media’s
agenda hence at least partly sets the public’s agenda. The news media provides
people with pictures and information that they “incorporate into their images and
attitudes about a variety of objects” (45). Moreover these surveys revealed that
educated individuals are more likely to attend to the mass media’s agenda because
they have a greater need for information and orientation as McCombs suggests (57).
One other practice is essential in the context of agenda-setting: the concept of
framing. Framing describes the media’s “central organizing idea for news content that
supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection,
emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (87). The concept of framing is especially
important when it comes to the representation of certain groups or minorities in the
media. Later on in this analysis the term will be used to describe how the media
portrays Islam and Muslim immigrants and which perspectives are dominant in these
frames.
18
3. Analysis
For the media discourse analysis a sample of six articles has been created.
These should serve to cover the whole political spectrum from left to right winged. The
focus is set on the mainstream media; extremist sources are not going to be
considered. All articles have been published between August and October 2010 and
therefore during the core phase of the debate. The following articles will be considered
in the analysis:
 Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung: Frank Schirrmacher „Ein fataler
Irrweg“, 29 August 2010
 Bild: Nikolaus Blome, „Warum fallen alle über Sarrazin her?“ 31 August 2010
 die tageszeitung: Ulrike Herrmann / Alke Wierth, „Die Gene sind schuld“, 30
August 2010
 Hamburger Abendblatt: Armgard Seegers „Was darf man heute sagen und was
lieber nicht? , 1 September 2010
 Frankfurter Rundschau: Stephan Hebel „Der Ruf des Rattenfängers“ , 02
September 2010
 Die Welt: Ralph Giordano „Wider die Kreidefresser“, 4. September 2010
 Der Spiegel: Henryk M. Broder „Thilo und die Gene“, 06 September 2010
 Süddeutsche Zeitung: Heribert Prantl „Ende gut, gar nichts gut“, 11 September
2010
Bild (2.4 million sold copies)8 and Die Welt (220,000 sold copies)9 cover the
right-wing conservative part of the spectrum. The Frankfurter Allgemeine
Sonntagszeitung (316,000 sold copies)2 and Hamburger Abendblatt (190,000 sold
8
9
(ma 2013)
(IVW, I/2014)
19
copies)2 can be described as conservative, center-right. Der Spiegel (900,000 sold
copies)2 - the only news magazine in the sample – is centrist. The Süddeutsche
Zeitung (418,000 sold copies)10 is considered liberal and center-left. The Frankfurter
Rundschau (87,000 sold copies)11 and die tageszeitung (56,000 sold copies)4 cover
the left-wing part of German news media, while the former is less radical but rather
social-liberal. The chosen articles on Deutschland schafft sich ab will be examined in a
qualitative analysis. Simultaneously underlying discourses shall be revealed and
analyzed. As Thilo Sarrazin’s book is the debate’s central issue the book itself will be
included in the sample. The question to be solved in the media analysis is the
interconnection of discourses on Muslim immigration and German national identity. In
order to solve this question it is necessary to narrow the scope of the media analysis.
Consequently the focus will be set on three main issues that penetrate the research
topic. The first is the setting of the media’s agenda and the shaping of the debate.
Secondly it shall be examined which frames of Islam the media produced. Thirdly
representations of cultural identities will be analyzed in order to reveal how Muslim
and German identity constructions inform each other.
3.1 Setting the Agenda: How the Media Shaped the Debate
“Finally someone dares to speak the truth”12 announces Nikolaus Blome in Bild
on 31 August 2010. Germany’s biggest daily news paper, with more than 2.4 Million
sold copies and a range of 12.5 Million readers (ma 2013), established a special
relationship with Thilo Sarrazin from the very beginning of the debate. Along with Der
Spiegel the tabloid published selected parts of Deutschland schafft sich ab in an
exclusive advance publication. In the months following the book’s publication Bild
covered the issue extensively. In doing so the paper focused mainly on the book’s
10
(IVW II/2013)
(IVW I/2013)
12
„Endlich spricht mal einer die Wahrheit aus!“
11
20
parts on immigration and in particular discussed the “problem” of Muslim immigrants.
The idea of being “the people’s voice”13 is an essential part of Bild’s self-image.
Blome’s article associated Sarrazin with that perception and established him as a
mirror of German public feelings and opinions. According to Blome a huge majority of
Germans share Sarrazin’s anger about immigration (Blome 1). Blome moreover
sharply contrasts Sarrazin against the political elite. He states that politicians of all
political parties attack him and suggests “it is very rare that politicians are so oneminded and at the same time so far away from the opinion and mood of a huge
majority of Germans who say: Sarrazin is right!”14 (1). Blome constructs Sarrazin as a
rebel against the political class. If he should really loose his position and membership
in the SPD then he will finally be a “martyr” according to the Bild author (1). At the
same time he reports that Sarrazin’s ideas are rarely new - that Sarrazin is mainly
being celebrated for announcing that “the emperor is naked”15 (2). He thereby evokes
the notion that Sarrazin simply articulates what is visible to everyone but has been
ignored by the political class.
Along with Bild the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel participated in the
advance publication of selected sections from the book. Similarly to the tabloid the
selection focused on the topic immigration and the assumed failure of integration.
According to chief editor Mathias Müller von Blumencron the magazine thereby
intended to open the floor for a debate on integration (Grimberg 16). With nearly
900,000 weekly sold copies (IVW I/2014) Der Spiegel is the biggest and most
influential German news magazine. The advance publication in combination with the
nation’s biggest newspaper Bild thereby placed Deutschland schafft sich ab on the top
of the agenda and established the idea that the book would be of huge social
13
”Die Stimme des Volkes”
„Ganz selten nur ist die Politk so einmündig – und zugleich so weit entfernt von Meinung und
Stimmung einer ganz großen Mehrheit der Deutschen. Sie sagt: Sarrazin hat recht!“
15
„Und wer wie Sarrazin ruft: Der Kaiser ist nackt! – wird bejubelt“
14
21
significance. “This text is sadly a reflection of the way large parts on this country
discuss integration” claimed van Blumencron in an interview (Grimberg 18). By that he
portrays the advance publication as a way to transport an already existing discourse to
the society’s surface. Likewiese Henryk Broder writes in his article in Der Spiegel that
Sarrazin obviously “hit a nerve“ with his statements (Broder 119). Comparable to
Blome (Bild) Broder sees Sarrazin in the position of a rebel. He uses similar imagery
as Blome’s martyr figure when he states that the political elite is “calling for Sarrazin’s
head”16 and just like the Bild author he assumes that Sarrazin is “probably right in
most points” (117). Both articles ascribe to Sarrazin what McCombs has described as
the “status conferral”. A person of status conferral is someone who “receives intensive
media attention” (McCombs 86). Additionally Bild and Der Spiegel strongly shaped the
debate’s opening phase through their focus on certain parts of Deutschland schafft
sich ab. In the process of agenda-setting journalists choose from the “entire range of
properties and traits that characterize an object” in order to picture it (70). Bild and Der
Spiegel selected those parts of the book that focused on integration and immigration
but excluded for instance the highly controversial eugenic theory Sarrazin’s argument
is built on. However the eugenic model became part of the agenda shortly later on
after Frank Schirrmacher (FAS) mentioned it in an article.
In his agenda-setting theory Maxwell McCombs points out the relevance of
interactions between different media sources. McCombs writes “in the process of
intermedia agenda-setting, high status news organizations […] set the agendas of
other news organizations (McCombs 117). Consequently the book’s importance,
suggested through the advance publication in two influential papers, led to an
increased interest in the issue among the rest of the German media landscape. Frank
Schirrmacher, co-publisher of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung devoted himself to
16
„Heute steht die politische Elite auf und schreit nach dem Kopf von Thilo Sarrazin“
22
the topic and published a variety of articles on it. With around 316,000 daily sold
copies (IVW I/ 2014) the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and its Sunday edition
Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung are both well established conservative
newspapers. Schirrmacher’s position in the debate was of outstanding importance as
he brought the eugenic aspects of Sarrazin’s book to the table. In an article in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung Schirrmacher describes the eugenic model
as a “fatal error” (Schirrmacher 22). Despite this criticism he nonetheless mainly
supports Sarrazin’s ideas on integration. For Schirrmacher Sarrazin is mainly stating
facts that are “absolutely correct” (23). He furthermore agrees with Blome (Bild) and
Broder (Der Spiegel) that “the number of people agreeing openly or secretly with
Sarrazin is considerable”17 (22). Schirrmacher shares Blome’s (Bild) vocabulary of
Sarrazin as a man of plain language and blunt announcer of truth. The expression that
some people only agree secretly even suggests that a hidden approval exists within
German society. Schirrmacher obviously assumes to be in knowledge of public
opinions that have not even been articulated. He declares that Sarrazin is “merely a
ghostwriter” of an anxious public18 (22). By picturing Sarrazin as a “ghostwriter”
Schirrmacher discharges him of personal responsibility and reinforces the idea that the
book is first and foremost a mirror of public concerns.
As a conservative intellectual authority Schirrmacher placed his seal of quality
on the book. Other conservative papers shared his approval. Ralph Giordano praises
in Die Welt that Sarrazin depicts “reality the way it is” (Giordano 95). “Thilo Sarrazin
does not only ask the right questions, he also offers the right answers” writes Giordano
(93). Similar to the other journalists he suggests that the public opinion and the
17
„Die Zahl der Menschen, die ihm hinter vorgehaltener oder nicht vorgehaltener Hand recht
geben, ist beträchtlich“
18
„Thilo Sarrazin ist der Ghostwriter einer verängstigten Gesellschaft“
23
political class’ opinion have “rarely been so diametrically separated”19 (93). According
to the journalist it is Sarrazin’s achievement that the issue has been “catapulted to a
new level of national consciousness”20 (94). Giordano hereby proposes that the
“problem” of Muslim immigration is a subject of national significance. The expression
“new level” raises the debate above all previous discussions on integration and
creates the notion of a historic climax. Giordano clearly positions Sarrazin’s book as a
benefit for German society. Sarrazin himself is in Giordano’s eyes an “expert on
immigration and integration” (93) and he describes Deutschland schafft sich ab as the
“encyclopedia of migration and integration” (95). An encyclopedia is commonly
providing information and knowledge on a strictly factual basis. Giordano’s comparison
underlines the assumed objectivity of the book and refines its qualities. It moreover
suggests that Sarrazin’s book is the one and only reading one needs to consult on the
issue of immigration and integration.
Armgard Seegers’ article in the Hamburger Abendblatt differs from the rest of
the sample as she approaches the topic on the micro rather than on the macro level of
society. Seegers regards Sarrazin’s convictions in accordance with the “people’s
everyday experiences” (Seegers 59). Thereby she does not only assume that he
mirrors public opinions but furthermore that these opinions are congruent with the
average German’s experiences. Seegers adopts the viewpoint of the simple citizen
and claims to know the people’s very personal affairs. As much as Schirrmacher
(FAS) assumes that he knows what is going on in the people’s minds, Seegers claims
to know what goes on in the their everyday life. She implies that the “problem” of
Muslim immigrants as described by Sarrazin is something the average German is
confronted with personally. Perceived through agenda setting theory her proceeding
19
„Wobei die öffentliche Meinung und die der politischen Klasse selten so diamentral auseinander
gelegen haben“
20
„Das Thema […] das Sarrazins Buch auf eine neue Ebene des nationalen Bewusstseins
katapultiert hat“
24
argument reveals a paradox: Most of the issues covered in the media are not available
to readers as personal experiences. Large parts of the German population have none
or only very little personal experiences with Muslim immigrants. The ideas they have in
mind of their Muslim co-citizens are strongly based on what journalist create and
provide in their agenda. When Seegers reports people’s everyday experiences she
blurs the dualism of reality and “second-hand reality” created by media.
Also Seegers shares the view of Sarrazin as the people’s voice and the
announcer of “uncomfortable truths” (57). According to Seegers, Sarrazin is breaking
taboos by speaking openly about “facts that have been well-known for a long time”
(58). Just as Broder (Der Spiegel) she suggests that the discourse already existed
before the book’s publication. But she emphasizes even stronger the idea that it has
been kept silenced by authorities. Germany is “firmly in the hand of the discourse
guards”21 announces Seegers (59). The discourse guards are in Seeger’s eyes
idealists and overambitious democrats22. As an example she names Stephan Kramer
a member of the German Jewish Central Committee who in the course of the debate
advised Sarrazin to join the extremist NPD. Seegers regards the attempt to place
Sarrazin in the right-wing corner as a complete knockout argument23. Thereby she
evokes the notion that the clear statement that Sarrazin’s arguments are racist and
extremist is simply putting an end to the dialogue. This in fact brands a critical
approach towards Deutschland schafft sich ab as useless for the debate and blackens
those who would call Sarrazin a racist as inadequate participants. As the journalist
Patrick Bahners points out Sarrazin’s arguments were validated through establishing
the “legend of him being a victim of critique” (Bahners 14). This legend is directly
linked to another legend: the idea that problems of integration have been kept secret
21
Denn das, was man sagen und nicht sagen darf, ist fest in der Hand der Diskurswächter“
„Gutmenschen oder ‚Erregunsdemokraten‘“
23
„Totschlagargument“
22
25
by the political elite. According to Bahners critics of Islam unite against the political
elite under the term “political incorrect”. He suggest that the “so-called enemies of
political correctness regard the political system and its institutions as a conspiracy of
the elite” (35).
The tendency to establish Sarrazin as a rebel against “political correctness” and
the assumed “cartel of silence”24 can be evidently traced in large parts of the sample.
For Giordano (Die Welt) his book is a “thrust into the heart of German political
correctness”25 (Giordano 93). According to Giordano the image of integration has been
forged for years by “professional chalk eaters”26 as he calls them (95). Anybody who
does not share the pessimistic view on integration is disqualified by Giordano as
idealistic, romantic, weak and unrealistic 27. Anybody who calls Sarrazin a racist has
either not read the book properly (93) or uses the most contemptible argument
available (95). This practice does not only prevent a discussion about racists and
nationalists tendencies in the book but furthermore raises a fundamental mistrust in
the political system and its information policy. If the German public cannot trust in the
information given by politicians then they have to rely even heavier on the information
provided by the media. Large parts of the conservative media aligned themselves with
Sarrazin against the political elite. Blome (Bild) for instance even uses revolutionary
vocabulary when he suggests that Sarrazin’s arguments might “set the trench between
voters and politicians on fire”28 (Blome 1). But these journalists do not only form an
alliance with Sarrazin, they moreover include the German public in it. They set up the
debate as an essentially unfair conflict between a majority with little influence
(Sarrazin, media, German public) and an influential minority (the political elite).
24
Schweigekartell
„Ein Stoß mitten ins Herz der bundesdeutschen Politcal Correctness“
26
„Professionelle Kreidefresser“
27
„Vereinte Riege der Berufsempörer, Sozialromantiker und Beschwichtigungsapostel“
28
„Sarrazins Thesen und die Reaktionen darauf sind wie ein Brennglas: Gut möglich, dass der
Graben zwischen Wählern und Gewählten bald in Flammen steht“
25
26
The tendency to describe Sarrazin as the messenger of public opinions is
present among all right winged, conservative or centrist media of the sample. At the
time the articles were published the debate was still young therefore no statistical
material was available to prove that large parts of the public agreed with Sarrazin. The
high sales of the book might have given a hint to the public’s interest in the topic but
could not confirm their approval. The case is rather that journalists assumed these
public opinions and contributed them to the discourse. “Media discourse is shaped
both by itself and by what becomes a norm of practice in a given social contest” writes
Anne O’Keeffe in Investigating Media Discourse (O’Keeffe 28). Obviously the idea of a
wide public approval of Sarrazin’s arguments became a norm in the context of the
debate. Still the articles differ in the way they define the public. While for instance
Blome (Bild) sees Sarrazin rather broadly the voice of the whole German public,
Schirrmacher (FAS) characterizes him as a classical educated middle class citizen 29
(Schirrmacher 24). Schirrmacher furthermore proclaimed that his belonging to the
educated middle class explains Sarrazin’s particular concern with the decline of
culture (24). This view is certainly concurrent with Sarrazin’s self-perception who
himself claims that his convictions correspond with the values of a middle class30
(Sarrazin 391). The author misses no opportunity to express his level of education and
cultivation. This includes frequent quotations of Goethe as well as a whole chapter
dedicated to his close relationship to literature31 (192). Besides Sarrazin’s pejorative
convictions about the lower class and his concern about the level of intelligence within
German society are clearly addressed to middle class readers. Also Heribert Prantl
from the Süddeutsche Zeitung sees the middle class as particularly concerned with
29
“Bildungsbürger”
„Die […] zum Ausdruck kommende Werthaltung einer bürgerlichen Mitte“
31
„Der Bildungskanon als hierarchische Struktur oder Wie ich lesen lernte“
30
27
the book’s issue. He suggests that Sarrazin activates “fears of losing social status”32
specifically among the bourgeoisie (Prantl165).
Indeed a poll from January 2011 proved that Deutschland schafft sich ab
particularly interested the German middle class. According to the survey the book’s
typical reader is male (62%), either between 20 and 29 or over 60 years old with an
above average income and educational qualifications. Furthermore the average reader
is a frequent user of news media. The most popular news papers consulted by
Sarrazin’s readership are Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung followed by Welt
am Sonntag, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit and Welt (Kniebe 2011). All of
these papers belong to the high quality conservative media section. The survey’s
results indeed suggest that the people who decided to buy Sarrazin’s book belong to
the readership of precisely those papers that were suggesting that it mirrored their
concerns. Consequently it has to be questioned what existed first: The middle class’s
interest in the issue or the media’s creation of the interest. “The greater an individual’s
need for orientation in the realm of public affairs is the more likely they are to attend to
the agenda of the mass media” writes Maxwell McCombs in Setting the Agenda
(McCombs 57). McCombs refers to a connection between education and media use.
An increased education is according to numerous surveys correlated to a higher need
for orientation (57). The better educated parts of society are “frequent users of
newspapers, television and news magazines for political information” so McCombs
(57). Considering this relationship it seems likely that the media’s placement of the
Sarrazin’s issues in a middle class context empowered if not created the middle
class’s interest in the topic.
As it has turned out so far the conservative media did not only place Sarrazin’s
book on the top of the agenda but furthermore aligned themselves with the author’s
32
„Sarrazin hat soziale Abstiegsängste aktiviert“
28
convictions. Moreover all papers examined announced public opinions and anxieties
at a very early stage of the debate and established the idea of a wide public approval
for Sarrazin’s ideas. Meanwhile the progressive media remained rather reserved and
less homogeneous. The left-wing and liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung initially struggled
with a clear position towards Sarrazin. Early articles from August 2010 called his ideas
“absurd” but also suggested that he expressed what many people were thinking 33 (Van
Bullion 14). It was not until beginning of September 2010 that the newspaper attended
the topic in a firm manner. At this time the debate was already beyond its peak.
Heribert Prantl’s article is largely a review of the debate itself that he regards as a
spectacle of huge public attention (Prantl 160). Prantl points out the interdependent
relationship between Sarrazin and the media by suggesting that Sarrazin has “used
the media and the media has used him” (161). According to Prantl both did so in order
to increase their sales (161). By revealing the economic aspects of the debate he
promotes a critical view of the process of agenda-setting. He deconstructs the
impression of reliability as conveyed by the other articles in the sample and draws the
attention towards the fact that scandals and catastrophes are especially rentable
under economic aspects (165). Moreover he dismantles the image of Sarrazin as
victim of critique. “Sarrazin is no martyr of freedom of speech” writes Prantl “he is
primarily its profiteer”34 (161). Prantl’s conclusion is pessimistic: German journalism
has promoted Sarrazin’s provocative arguments but has extinguished a reasonable
discussion of integration (162).
The left wing and social Frankfurter Rundschau fought Sarrazin’s ideas very
explicitly from the very beginning. Still the paper joined the general media consent of
wide public approval for the book. Stephan Hebel claims in his article that Sarrazin’s
arguments “fall on fertile ground” (Hebel 69) and thereby supports the idea that the
33
34
„Sarrazin mag vielen aus der Seele sprechen“
„Sarrazin ist kein Märtyrer der Meinungsfreiheit; er war und ist fürs Erste ihr Profiteur“
29
discourse already existed within society. Hebel portraits Sarrazin as a “rat-catcher”35
who activated deeply rooted public anxieties (70). This imagery places Sarrazin in a
powerful position of the evil seducer. It additionally conveys an impression of a
dependent readership that is unable to resist his argumentation. Just like Prantl
(Süddeutsche Zeitung), Hebel refuses the legend of Sarrazin as a victim of critique.
The often conjured “cartel of silence”36 fails as an explanation for the book’s huge
success according to Hebel (70). On the contrary, he believes that “rat-catchers” as
Sarrazin activate social anxieties that established politics and media have been not
able to ease37 (70). Even though Hebel does mark the idea of a conspiracy of the
“political correct” elite as the conservative’s favorite argument he does not deconstruct
it explicitly. His remark that politicians have failed to ease the German’s anxieties also
emphasizes the idea of a general misunderstanding between political elite and public.
Additionally Hebel’s perception of the media is rather uncritical. In contrast to the
conservative sources he aligns the media with the politics instead of Sarrazin or the
common people. He suggests that the people do not want to listen to “politicians and
the media” because Sarrazin and the other “rat-catchers” offer easier solutions to the
“Muslim problem” (70). For Hebel politicians and the media obviously embody the
rational side of the debate while Sarrazin stands for the irrational but seductive side.
Hebel though fails to recognize the close relationship between Sarrazin and large
parts of the German media. By caricaturing Sarrazin as the evil force and
underestimating the German public’s critical capacity he gives a rather onedimensional image of the debate.
The very left wing of the sample, die tageszeitung stands out from all the other
articles in their treatment of the issue. Ulrike Herrmann and Alke Wierth tear the work
35
„Rattenfänger“
„Schweigekartell“
37
„Und doch entdecken die Rattenfänger einen Resonanzraum in Teilen der Bevölkerung, den
etablierte Politik und Medien bisher nicht zu füllen vermögen“
36
30
into pieces on a textual level but completely spare out the social context and mention
no assumptions about public opinions. Out of all texts their short article is the one that
most closely resembles a traditional book review. What might seem unusual for the
otherwise pugnacious paper could indeed be connected to the taz’s policy not to allow
polemics like Sarrazin too much space for their argumentation (Grimberg 17). Already
in earlier articles die tageszeitung discribed Deutschland schafft sich ab as “radical
racist populism” and criticized the Spiegel for providing Sarrazin a “prominent stage”
for his racist arguments38 (Grimberg 16). Thereupon die tageszeitung refused to allow
the issue as much attention. The consequence out of this policy was however that the
taz’s voice within the debate remained of rather minor significance and allowed the
conservative media even more space to establish their perception of the topic.
Considering this imbalance it has to be questioned whether the policy of ignorance
does indeed function as a clear statement or is rather equal to a declaration of
surrender.
To sum up, the first part of the analysis clearly revealed certain trends. Firstly
the discourse on Deutschland schafft sich ab was introduced and placed on top of the
agenda through an advance publication by two leading sources – Bild and Der
Spiegel. Secondly the rest of the media adapted the topic whereby the sovereignty of
interpretation was clearly taken over by the conservative media. The conservative
media established an image of Sarrazin as a rebel against an assumed political
conspiracy and formed an alliance with the author. Thirdly not only the conservative
media but also the progressive sources in the sample portrayed Thilo Sarrazin as the
voice of an anxious and concerned public and gave the impression that his thesis
found wide approval of the German public. Nearly all articles in the sample suggested
that the author referred to already existing discourses within society. Fourthly the
38
„Der Spiegel hat Sarrazins rassistischen Thesen zum Thema Integration eine promintente
Auftrittsfläche verschafft“
31
“problematic” topic of integration was marked as an important and social relevant
issue by nearly all papers. How exactly the media took up the “problem” of Muslim
immigrants suggested by Sarrazin will be the topic of the following chapter.
3.2 Framing Islam
A frame is according to agenda-setting theory a “central organizing idea for
news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use
of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (McCombs 87). The expression
“framing Islam” thus refers to the media’s practice of constructing an image of Islam.
To examine frames it is necessary to consider their construction. This includes the
“choice and ordering of material, the privileging of one voice or account rather than
another, the tone of a story, and the juxtaposition of aural and visual elements” (Morey
63). In the following chapter it will be analyzed how the sources in the sample frame
Islam. Sarrazin’s own perception of the religion will serve as a starting point. The
following quote is exemplary: “Muslim immigration and the growing influence of Islam
confront the Western Occident with authoritarian, pre-modern, and also antidemocratic
tendencies that do not only challenge our self-image but also directly threaten our
lifestyle“39 (Sarrazin 266). In just a few sentences Sarrazin conveys his readers an
impression of his view of Islam. For him Islam is an authoritarian, backward and
antidemocratic system. He solely defines it through negative terms and in contrast to
the assumed democratic and modern Western culture.
For Sarrazin Islam and fundamentalism cannot be separated. He writes that
Islam’s moderate, radical or even violent tendencies are side by side 40. He does not
39
„Das westliche Abendland sieht sich durch die muslimische Immigration und den wachsenden
Einfluss islamistischer Glaubensrichtungen mit autoritären, vormodernen, auch antidemokratischen
Tendenzen konfrontiert , die nicht nur das eigene Selbstverständnis herausfordern, sondern auch
eine direkte Bedrohung unseres Lebensstils darstellen“
40
„Dabei stehen gemäßigte und radikale, ja gewalttätige Auffassungen immer wieder unvermittelt
nebeneinander“
32
rule out that secular forms of Islam exist but “the western gaze cannot distinguish
between what kind of Islam the 15 to 17 Million Muslims in Europe belong to”41 (270).
Sarrazin worries that “hardly anybody knows what they preach in their mosques”42
(270). He colors a picture of Islam as a mystic and alien force. Westerns are unable to
understand and control it43. This practice raises a fundamental mistrust in Muslim
citizens by suggesting that any of them could be a potential threat. This threat is
strongly associated with terrorism. Islam cannot be thought without Islamism and
Terrorism claims the author. He goes on “Even though 95 percent of the Muslims are
peaceful the outlines are too blurred, the ideologies too strong and the density of
violent and terroristic events too big”44 (277). Apparently Sarrazin believes that the five
percent non peaceful Muslims are reason enough to suspect all of them.
According to Sarrazin Islam is a secluded religion and culture. Even though
they live in Germany, Muslims are suspected to disconnect from German society by
forming so-called parallel societies45. The term parallel societies presupposes that
migrant communities “establish their own societies and lead their lives without ever
interacting with the host culture” (Özcan 431). As Esra Özcan points out it suggests a
problematic “division of society among ethnic lines” (431). Likewise Sarrazin declares
that Muslim immigrants remain “subjects of foreign cultural and religious external
influences that we can neither overview nor control”46 (277). Islam is in his eyes an
almost anarchistic force that threatens the stability of German society. The word
control implies a need to restrict and supervise Islam while the assumed inability to
41
„Der westliche Blick kann nicht unterscheiden, welchem Islam welcher Teil der 15 bis 17
Millionen Muslime in Europa anhängt“
42
„Kaum jemand weiß, was in den Moscheen gepredigt wird“
43
„Die Muslime in Deutschland und im übrigen Europa unterliegen einem fremden kulturellen und
religiösen Einfluss, den wir nicht überblicken und schon gar nicht steuern können“
44
„Die Übergänge sind zu verschwommen, die Ideologien zu stark und die Dichte gewalttätiger und
terroristischer Ereignisse ist zu groß“
45
Parallelgesellschaften
46
„Die Muslime in Deutschland und im übrigen Europa unterliegen einem fremden kulturellen und
religiösen Einfluss, den wir nicht überblicken und schon gar nicht steuern können“
33
understand works to estrange the native and foreign populations. If ethnic Germans
are unable to understand Muslims, than any kind of dialogue is determined to fail. The
Muslim, this is Sarrazin’s message, is nothing less than the enemy from within. He
threatens German society on a demographic level as well as under cultural, social and
security aspects.
Edward Said whose work on Orientalism has been already mentioned before is
one of the first theorists who revealed the conceptual framework surrounding Islam in
public discourses (Morey 2). The perception of Islam as a threat has in fact a long
history as Edward Said points out. “After Mohammed’s death in 632, the military and
later the cultural and religious hegemony of Islam grew enormously” writes Said. He
follows “yet where Islam was concerned, European fear, if not always respect, was in
order” and Islam “came to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated
barbarians”. According to Said for Europe Islam “was a lasting trauma” (Said,
Orientalism 59). Sarrazin explicitly refers to historic references but he offers his own
interpretation. He suggests that Islam has a tradition of waging a “holy war” against
the West (Sarrazin 271) and states “the link between violence and Islam has been
obvious since its birth”47 (280). His continues “up to today the Islam has a strained
relationship to occidental modernity” 48 (280). Interestingly Sarrazin clearly locates hard
feelings on the Muslim’s side - “they” have problems with “us” not the other way round.
According to Sarrazin the reason lies in Islam’s “narcissistic insult” of falling back
behind the West’s economic and cultural development49 (280). Sarrazin’s message to
his readers is: Islam as an ideology has a deep resentment towards Western culture
and hence will likely continue its “holy war” against European civilization.
47
„Dabei ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Gewalt und Islam seit dessen Geburtsstunde völlig
offenkundig“
48
„Im Grunde hat der Islam bis heute ein belastetes Verhältnis zur abendländischen Moderne“
49
“Das wirtschaftliche und zivilisatorische Zurückfallen der islamischen Welt […] hat zu einer
narzisstischen Kränkung geführt“
34
Sarrazin’s argumentation originates from a point of deep fear and despair. His
fear is that the “occidental Europe will not survive in its cultural essence”50 (258) if
Muslim migrants “take over state and society” (259). The scenario he imagines is
dramatic, the language used apocalyptic. Islam critique as articulated by Sarrazin and
others always shows a high level of aggression as Patrick Bahners points out in his
publication Die Panik-Macher (Bahners 25). The conflict between Islam and the West
is seen as one between good and evil. At stake is nothing less than the whole Western
culture’s survival. This essential fear legitimizes “escalation out of self-defense” writes
Bahners (26). Islam critics use radical, urgent, and apocalyptic vocabulary because
their ultimate goal is to mobilize the population against the threat. “The style of thought
is paranoid” according to Bahners and resembles to that of American right wing
politics such as the Tea Party (83). The conflict with Islam is imagined as a concern of
the immediate future. Sarrazin for instance raises the fear that Germans might be
outnumbered by Muslim immigrants within only 100 years. He describes this scenario
in a fictional chapter of his book called “a nightmare”. The growing number of
immigrants will lead to the nation’s “death” according to the author (Sarrazin 393). In
order to underline the urgency of the conflict he draws a comparison to climate
change. He wonders why Germans should be interested in the climate in 500 years if
the nation will have abolished itself by then51. While climate change is a very abstract
threat in Sarrazin’s opinion Islam is an immediate one.
Nikolaus Blome (Bild) clearly adopts Sarrazin’s image of the Islam as socially
destabilizing. He quotes different statistics mentioned in Deutschland schafft sich ab
and states that “Muslim immigrants show an above average participation in crime,
50
„Das abendländische Europa würde, alternd und schrumpfend, wie es ist, in seiner kulturellen
Substanz auch gar nicht überleben“
51
„Warum sollte uns das Klima in 500 Jahren interessieren, wenn das deutsche
Gesellschaftsprogramm auf die Abschaffung der Deutschen hinausläuft?“
35
school dropouts, unemployment”52 (Blome 2). Blome suggests that the German
citizens are furious because for them everything is at stake 53 (2). He thereby supports
the perception of Islam as essentially antagonistic towards German society. The
expression that everything is at stake gives the conflict an existential dimension.
Additionally his expression that this raises anger in the citizens marks the issue as
highly emotional and reinforces the perception of Muslims as enemies. Also Frank
Schirrmacher (FAS) joins this canon. He suggests that Deutschland schafft sich ab is
helpful to understand what is “really at stake“54. Schirrmacher goes on “a failed
immigration policy has imported a Middle Age to Germany that might question the
society’s stability” 55 (Schirrmacher 26).The expression that immigrants have been
imported to Germany associates them along with goods and does not picture them as
human individuals. It shows an economic understanding of migration that qualifies
migrants solely according to their economic value.
Schirrmacher’s argument can be seen as part of the “economic-utility
perspective” that has been present in German immigration discourse since World-War
II as Harald Bauder suggests (Bauder, “Neoliberalism” 56). Bauder distinguishes
between two extreme economic representations of immigrants: the positive one
depicts immigrants as a source of “fresh labor, innovation and creativity”, the negative
one as “irritants or threats” (57). In the later case the immigrant is either perceived as
an unwelcome competitor for workplaces or as a burden for the social security system.
Sarrazin as well as Schirrmacher obviously share the later perception. The recruitment
of guest workers is from today’s perspective a “giant mistake”56 declares Sarrazin
(259). In his opinion this especially applies for Muslim immigrants. He claims that
52
Zuwanderer mit muslimischem Hintergrund sind überproportional in der Kriminal-Statistik
vertreten, bei den Schulabbrechern, bei den Hartz-IV-Empfängern“
53
„Für die Bürger geht es ums Ganze – nämlich um sie selbst“
54
„Es ist hilfreich, um wirklich zu verstehen, was auf dem Spiel steht“
55
„Und er hat recht damit, dass eine verfehlte Einwanderungspolitik Deutschland gleichsam ein
Mittelalter importierte, das die Stabilität des Gemeinwesens infrage stellen kann“
56
„ Aus heutiger Sicht war die Gastarbeitereinwanderung […] ein gigantischer Irrtum“
36
Muslim immigrants have neither contributed anything to German affluence in the past
nor will be expected to do so in the future (260). He concludes “there is no economic
need for Muslim migration in Europe”57 (267). On the contrary Sarrazin is convinced
that Muslim immigrants rather slow down the country’s development through their
small workforce and high dependence on social security benefits 58 (267). Likewise in
Schirrmacher’s article Muslim immigrants are portrayed as unproductive. He
articulates the hope for “impulses that might wake up Muslim milieus” (Schirrmacher
28). The image that Muslim citizens are asleep suggests passivism, unproductiveness
and denies their social value. Additionally the term milieu segregates them from the
German society and reinscribes their status as a minority.
Schirrmacher’s language is that of exclusion and discrimination. It relies on
concepts of Orientalism and cultural stereotyping. This is particular evident in his
comparison of Islam and the European Middle Age (“imported a Middle Age to
Germany” (26)). The Middle Age comparison is a popular one among Islam critics
because it serves two purposes: It marks Islamic cultures as backward and
underdeveloped and demonstrates European superiority while it simultaneously
incorporates Islam as a part of Western history. “The Western style of dominating,
restructuring and having authority over the Orient” is a clear demonstration of power
as Edward Said points out (Said, Orientalism 2). Western culture is thereby imagined
as the hegemonic culture that structures and shapes discourses on Islamic cultures.
According to the Middle Age comparison modern Islam is centuries behind Europe’s
development. The Middle Age is commonly imagined as a dark period with stagnating
cultural development and brutal religious violence as the crusades or burnings of
witches. Sarrazin writes “also Christianity had its fundamental phase of religious wars
57
„Wirtschaftlich brauchen wir die muslimische Migration in Europa nicht“
„In jedem Land kosten die muslimischen Migranten aufgrund ihrer niedrigen Erwerbsbeteiligung
und hohen Inanspruchnahme von Sozialleistungen die Staatskasse mehr, als sie an
wirtschaftlichem Mehrwert einbringen“
58
37
and stakes”59 (Sarrazin 268). But while this phase ended in the case of Christianity
with the upcoming of Enlightenment theory Islam never left it according to Sarrazin
(268). He goes on and states that most Islamic cultures still have to go through the
process of social development that Christianity left behind in the past 500 years60
(269). Sarrazin imagines development as a linear historic process predetermined by
the European proceeding. His attempt to narrate Islam as part of this process shows a
fundamental inability to think Islam outside of the European frame.
The European view of Islam continues to be the view of the colonizer as Jamal
Malik points out. Malik sees a historical tendency to perceive the “Islamic world
diachronically against the background of its historically formative phase instead of
being sensitive to the fact that the Islamic world needed to be viewed synchronously
as a part of the common world with similar contemporary discourses on nation, state
and modernity” (Malik 496). Until today Islam is commonly portrayed as an archaic
system that is unable to meet the requirements of modernity. Islam is solely thought of
in terms of its correspondence to European development and the possibility of an
independent process is denied. Ralph Giordano’s article (Welt) resembles
Schirrmacher’s and Sarrazin’s arguments in describing Islamic cultures as backwards.
But Giordano contrasts Orient and Occident even more explicitly. He writes that the
Judeo-Christian and the Muslim culture clash because they are at different stages of
development. Giordano reports the Judeo-Christian culture as progressive and
mentions fundamental keywords as the Renaissance, Enlightenment and the French
Revolution to back up this claim. The Muslims culture in contrast simply “stagnates in
a frightening way” so Giordano (96). Giordano’s claim that Islam stagnates once more
frames it in comparison to European historic development. Likewise Sarrazin fears
59
„Auch das Christentum hatte eine fundamentalistische Phase, es gab Religionskriege und
Scheiterhaufen“
60
„Die meisten islamischen Glaubensrichtungen haben den gesellschaftlichen
Entwicklungsprozess noch vor sich, den die Richtungen des Christentums in den letzten 500
Jahren mehrheitlich hinter sich gebracht haben“
38
that Islam might lead German culture and civilization to a step backwards61 (Sarrazin
267). Integration into the German culture is in Giordano’s eyes not only a civil duty but
furthermore a way for Muslims to become modernists. He concludes “it serves the
immigrants’ interests as well” (Giordano 96). From his viewpoint of cultural hegemony
Giordano assumes that European modernity is the crown of civilization. Along with
Schirrmacher and Sarrazin he estimates that Islam has to go through the same stages
of development in order to reach a comparable level. In order to do so Islam needs to
be reformed. To reform hereby means the integration of “Islamic religion with
European ideas by referring to the central concept of reason” as Malik points out
(Malik 497).
According to Malik the idea that Islam performs “strategic mimesis” of European
culture “standardizes the cultures of Islam until today” (497). The result is a dogmatic
view of Islam that relies on orientalist projections and denies its diversity. Ralph
Giordano’s call for integration follows the colonizing mission by asking Muslims to
internalize the orientalist concept. Muslims are expected to adopt Western concepts.
But even in doing so Islam hardly is regarded as equal. Henryk M. Broder for instance
writes in Der Spiegel “the Islam is an authoritarian, archaic system that adopts devices
of modernity without taking over their spirit” 62 (Broder 118). He thereby supports the
perception of Islam as an ideology rather than a religion. Broder goes on claiming that
Islam “is not compatible with democratic values and structures” (118). Just like the
previous authors he describes Islam in opposition to assumed Western values.
According to Broder many Muslims have made “the step into modernity” while “Islam
as a whole has not”63 (119). In contrast to the other authors Broder evidently
61
„Kulturell und zivilisatorisch bedeuten die Gesellschaftsbilder und Wertvorstellungen, die sie
vertreten, einen Rückschritt“
62
„Der Islam ist ein autoritäres, archaisches System, das sich der Mittel der Moderne bedient, ohne
deren Geist zu übernehmen“
63
„Viele Muslime haben den Sprung in die Moderne geschafft […] der Islam als Ganzes hat es
nicht“
39
distinguishes between Islam as a system and Muslims as its subjects. He portrays the
“step into modernity” as an individual decision. “Being modern” is for Broder a choice
of lifestyle. It contains a whole set of values: separation of powers and of church and
state, self-determination of the individual, freedom of belief and speech, equal rights
and choice of partner (119). For Broder, the German society embodies these values
just as much as Islam opposes them. This line of thought reveals a paradox: if Islam
as an ideology contradicts German values than being modern and being Muslim is in
fact an impossible state. If Muslims choose to be modern, if they choose assimilate to
the Western spirit (not just adopt it) then they have to give up their religion.
Cultural stereotyping of Islam is apparently a wide practice in German news
media. Authors as Broder try to give the practice a tolerant appearance by suggesting
that “many Muslims” are behaving differently thus that exceptions do exist. Towards
the end of his article Ralph Giordano criticizes Sarrazin for showing too little empathy
with exactly those exceptions, with people of the Muslim minority that are “most
loveable but nevertheless have their problems with the majority society” 64 (Giordano
96). The sentence neither expresses any esteem nor does it meet Muslims on equal
terms. On the contrary, Giordano speaks again from the colonizer’s perspective who
kindly regards the subjects of his care. He writes “when I see children from the Muslim
milieu then my first thought is: they should have a good life” (96). He obviously not
only assumes that children of Muslim immigrants generally live a “bad life” but
additionally claims for himself the role of their imagined benefactor. Racism is a
dogma that maintains the “congenital inferiority or superiority of certain groups” as
Ghassan Hage writes in White Nation, his work on nationalism in Australia (Hage 28).
From the racist’s point of view the native subject occupies a privileged position while
64
“Ich hätte mir Sarrazin gerne öffentlich emotionaler gewünscht […] mit mehr persönlicher
Empathie für die unzähligen Menschen aus der türkisch dominierten muslimischen Minderheit, die
höchst liebenswert sind, aber aufgrund kultureller Verschiedenheit dennoch ihre Probleme mit der
Mehrheitsgesellschaft haben“
40
the “Other” is “an object to be managed” (42). The racist “has a sense of his size and
power” (45) according to Hage. He pictures himself as the manager of the imagined
national space. The way in which Giordano looks down on his Muslim fellow citizens
and how his language portrays them as inferior can therefore be described as racist.
What he pictures as empathy is in fact pejorative and shows a lack of understanding
and sympathy.
Of the sample, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Hamburger
Abendblatt and Der Spiegel supported Sarrazin’s description of Islam as an essential
threat. The framing of Islam relies heavily on orientalist concepts such as the clear
opposition between Occident and Orient. Islam is framed in negative terms against the
backdrop of Western culture. It is reported as antidemocratic, archaic and
fundamentalist while Western culture is described as modern, reasonable and
democratic. Furthermore Islam is perceived as an aggressive ideology that fights a
“holy war against the West” rather than a religion. The development of Islamic cultures
is narrated solely within the framework of European development. While Europe has
allegedly reached modernity, Islam is viewed as left behind, stagnating on the level of
the Middle Age. The framing of Islam refuses to regard the development of Islamic
cultures as a synchronal and autonomous process. The colonial perspective is evident
in this perception. Mimeses of European culture and lifestyle is presented as the only
way for Islam to “reach modernity”. Muslim immigrants are framed as a source of
instability for the nation state, as the mystic and alien enemies from within. They are
being perceived as a threat on cultural, economic and social level while their value for
the nation state is denied. The framing of Muslims carries racist connotations in the
way they are seen as subordinate and as objects to be managed. The frame
constructed by the media sample is congruent with the frame given by Sarrazin in
41
Deutschland schafft sich ab. The analyzed articles use similar vocabulary as Sarrazin
and share his main ideas.
But this only applies for one half of the sample – what can be said about the
other? Heribert Prantl (Süddeutsche Zeitung) does not share Sarrazin’s pessimistic
view of integration. He consults the Jahresgutachten Einwanderungsgesellschaft 2010
as an alternative source in order to evaluate Sarrazin’s arguments. Prantl’s conclusion
is: There is no reason to assume that Germany abolishes itself (Prantl 164). He refers
to reported success stories of integration in the past years and thereby manages to
establish a counter narrative to Sarrazin’s paranoid apocalyptic version. Compared to
the other sources in the sample Prantl uses a less emotional language and reflects
rather fact based. He criticizes the practice of establishing Islam as an enemy65, the
debate’s polemic language and generalizations. But while Prantl is quiet explicit in
criticizing the framing of Islam provided by Sarrazin and the conservative media he
does however not offer an alternative view. In contrast parts of his article reveal a
critical perception of Islam as well. For instance when he writes “tolerance does not
mean that one has to have sympathy for everything”66 and later on claims that it can
only exist “within clearly defined borders”67 (169). He expresses the thought that
intolerable things exist within the Muslim community that challenge the German’s
tolerance. According to Prantl the belief in democracy and the constitution are the
fundament of integration – he writes “the Koran does not stand over the basic law” 68
(170). Just as much as the previous authors, Prantl sees Islam in conflict with
“German values” like democracy and the constitution.
Moreover the need for “clearly defined borders” conveys the idea of the Muslim
immigrant as an object that needs to be managed. The Süddeutsche Zeitung author
65
„Für soziale Abstiegsängste muss ein Feindbild gestiftet werden; der Islam bietet sich dafür an“
„Toleranz heißt nicht, dass man für alles Verständnis haben muss“
67
„Sie kann nur innerhalb klar definierter Grenzen existieren“
68
„Auch der Koran steht nicht über dem Grundgesetz“
66
42
refers to security discourses that are concerned with protecting the society by
managing the potentially dangerous foreigners. Prantl speaks of integration and
tolerance but his language is that of securitization and restriction. He goes on “if those
borders are not set and guarded then a good deed turns into a plague”69 (169). It is
again the fear of the Islamic threat that resonates in his words. The expression of
“setting and guarding borders” frames the Muslim immigrant as a concern of national
security. Additionally Prantl refers to the economic discourse by implying that the
migrant can either be a benefit or a “plague”. The word plague belongs to
dehumanizing vocabulary that is often used within racist discourses. Terminology such
as “influx, invasion, flood and intrusion” expresses the idea of large numbers of
migrants entering the country (Kaya 403). The expression plague suggests a
destructive force that threatens the nation. Prantl’s declared wish that the society’s
future is something that has to be created together along with minorities is
contradicted by the desire to control immigrants expressed in his language. He fails to
meet his own expectations addressed towards Sarrazin and his supporters. Despite
his explicit critic of Sarrazin the closer examination of his article reveals a reliance on
similar discourses and related ideas.
Also Ulrike Herrmann and Alke Wierth criticize Sarrazin’s picture of Muslim
immigrants in die tageszeitung. They refuse the image of Muslim immigrants as
“welfare bums” and write “Sarrazin fails to recognize how many migrants work hard to
free themselves from social security benefits by founding their own small
businesses”70 (Herrmann 43). This statement is actually depending on stereotypes as
well. The authors firstly adopt Sarrazin’s view that migrants are initially depending on
social security benefits, secondly they refer to the stereotype of the Turkish fruit and
69
„Wenn diese Grenzen nicht gesetzt und nicht bewacht werden, wird aus Wohltat Plage“
“Dabei entgeht Sarrazin, wie viele Migranten sich bemühen, sich aus der Abhängigkeit von
Sozialleistungen zu befreien, indem sie eigene kleine Betriebe gründen“
70
43
vegetable retailer or kebab stall owner. The possibility that Muslim migrants occupy
different positions within society and labor market is simply ousted. Again the Muslim
subject is captured in a limiting frame. This time is not seen as threatening but rather
as powerless and depending on others (in this case the journalist) to defend its
position. Islam critics and supporters of multiculturalism in fact share a point of view as
Ghassan Hage points out. They both share a position of power in defining the “Other”
in persona of the Muslim immigrant. Hage concludes that in this sense the “practice of
integration is structurally similar to the nationalist practice of exclusion” (Hage 79). The
voice of the “ethnic other is made passive, silenced, constructed as an object to be
governed by those who have given themselves the right to worry about the nation”
(17). Progressive intellectuals as Herrman and Wierth see themselves as liberal and
tolerant nevertheless they participate in the same processes of domination as their
conservative opponents.
Stephan Hebel’s article in the Frankfurter Rundschau is indeed the only one
that offers a different viewpoint. “The image of the poor migrant as a victim has a long
history of cultivation” recognizes Hebel (Hebel 69). He goes on “seeing him as an
active member of society – whether a good or bad one – has not even been
considered” 71 (69). By revealing the mechanisms of domination Hebel points out the
limiting frame in which Muslim immigrants are being perceived. Thereby he manages
to open up the possibility to think of Islam and Muslims outside of the given frames.
However his perspective remains a minority within the sample. The framework
surrounding Islam created by the rest of the sample dominates the debate. Sarrazin,
as well as the conservative and progressive press, in fact turned out to rely on the
same discourses in constructing the frame. The representation of Islam is one-sided
and heavily build on stereotypes and clichés. A powerful counter narrative is missing.
71
„Ein Bild des armen Migranten als Opfer wurde gepflegt, das ihn als aktives Mitglied der
Gesellschaft – gutes oder auch böses – gar nicht erst zur Kenntnis nahm“
44
This is also partly owed to a lack of authentic voices. In none of the articles voices of
Muslims are considered. A lot is said about them and for them but no author
considered it worth asking the affected persons for their opinion. Throughout the
debate the Muslim immigrant himself remained silenced. The “intellectual authority”
(Said, Orientalism 19) over Islam as Said calls it remains at hand of the German
journalists, intellectuals and polemicists as Sarrazin.
3.3 Constructing Cultural Identities
In the previous chapter the media sample has been analyzed considering the
conceptual frame the articles construct around Islam. So far the Muslim identity as
composed in the sample has turned out to be defined in almost exclusively negative
terms. In this chapter the processes of constructing cultural identities shall be
examined in further detail. Thilo Sarrazin is very precise in his formulation of cultural
identities. His perception of culture is a biological one. He writes that processes of
“cultural evolution” have led to different stages of development among different
cultures. Some regions and nations used their chances and developed themselves
quickly as Sarrazin claims, others needed longer, while some simply remain
underdeveloped or end up as “failed states” (Sarrazin 33). The author remarks that
there is no scientific method to rank cultures nevertheless he presents it as common
sense that the conditions in Germany are preferable to those in Romania, life in
Romania is preferable to life in Sudan and living in Sudan is still better than living in
Somalia (24). For Sarrazin a country is defined through “its inhabitants and their living
spiritual and cultural tradition”72 (7). His perception of a nation is that of a cultural
community. Man is according to Sarrazin both a “group-oriented”73 and “territorial
72
„Ein Land aber ist das, was es ist, durch seine Bewohner und deren lebendige geistige sowie
kulturelle Tradition“
73
„Der Mensch ist ein gruppenorientiertes Wesen“
45
oriented”74 being (255). He states that building a community and securing a terrain are
basic human instincts75. Sarrazin further exemplifies his understanding of community
by claiming that “belonging to one group implicates logically dissociation from others”76
(255). Whether it is the local football club, a company or an ethnic group, a religious
community or a nation – everywhere “the opposition of ‘them’ and ‘we’ creates bonds
and solidarity”77 writes the author (255). Sarrazin obviously believes in the community
building force of exclusion. Following the logic of humans as territorial- and grouporiented beings immigration as well as emigration become “absolutely inconceivable”
options for Sarrazin. Leaving one’s country of origin is just as destabilizing to the
national construct as entering into a foreign country. Sarrazin is convinced that
“factories and services have to migrate not humans”78 (258).
Sarrazin is without a doubt proud to be German. This applies especially for the
German economic power and high living standard (7). He glorifies German history by
writing for instance that “unbroken by the catastrophe” of World War II and driven by
their “traditional diligence” Germans have rebuilt their nation (13). He describes the
German culture as “democratic, cultural and free to practice religion, individualistic and
longing for affluence and self-fulfillment”79 (264). Moreover he frequently quotes
famous German cultural idols to associate being German along with education and
intelligence. Each chapter of Deutschland schafft sich ab starts with a quote by
famous intellectuals as Goethe and Schiller or a bible verse. Thereby the author not
only highlights the German history as the nation of Dichter and Denker but furthermore
attempts to underline his belonging to the educated, intellectual elite and his Christian
74
„Der Mensch ist ein territorial orientiertes Wesen“
„Diesbezügliche Instinkte sind tief in ihm angelegt“
76
„Die Zugehörigkeit zur einen Gruppe impliziert folgerichtig die Abgrenzung zur anderen“
77
„Überall wirkt der Gegensatz von ‚Die‘ und ‚Wir‘ und schafft Bindung und Solidarität“
78
„Heute wissen wir, dass Fabriken und Dienstleistungen wandern müssen und nicht die
Menschen“
79
„Demokratie, kulturelle und religiöse Freiheit, individuelles Streben nach Wohlstand und
Selbstverwirklichung“
75
46
belief. Despite his overall positive image of the Germans Sarrazin articulates critique.
According to the author their affluence and years of “unclouded success” have made
the Germans unaware of destructive processes within their society80 (7). The Germans
are lacking a “healthy will for self-assertion as a nation”81 writes Sarrazin and states
when it comes to Germany many Germans have “a pair of scissors in their mind” 82
(18). The expression “Germany abolishes itself” from the book’s title refers to this lack
of will for the nation’s survival. The demographic change and German low birth rates
are in Sarrazin’s eyes not structural developments but rather personal decisions. He
states that Germans are “refusing their reproduction”83 (344). Reasons for this refusal
are in Sarrazin’s opinion a stronger desire for individual fulfillment, emancipation of
women, the disintegration of the traditional family model and declining religiosity (345).
These trends lead Sarrazin to the fatal prediction that the Germans eventually might
disappear from Middle Europe. They do not even have to be driven out by force he
writes but rather “withdraw themselves quietly from history” 84 (394).
The German lack of national collectivity seems even more dangerous as the
society’s assumed enemies - the Muslim immigrants - appear exclusively as a
collective force. Through processes of “homogenization and disciplination” as Jamal
Malik writes, the Muslim identity is constructed as that of “collective subjects” with “one
single, culturally tied” identity (Malik 499). Sarrazin dedicates large parts of his book to
the assumed special traits of Muslim immigrants. According to the author Muslim
immigrants lack ambitions, they are mostly depending on social security benefits, they
tend to isolate themselves, suppress women, have high birth rates and they show an
above average affection for religious fundamentalism and crime (violence as well as
80
„Jahrzehnte fast ungetrübten Erfolgs haben aber die Sehschärfe der Deutschen getrübt für die
Gefährdungen und Fäulnisprozesse im Inneren der Gesellschaft“
81
„gesunder Selbstbehauptungswille als Nation“
82
„Nur wenn es um Deutschland geht, haben viele eine Schere im Kopf“
83
„die Fortpflanzung verweigern“
84
„Wir Deutschen müssen nicht vertrieben werden, wir ziehen uns still aus der Geschichte zurück“
47
terrorism) (Sarrazin 264). Armgard Seegers (Hamburger Abendblatt) summarizes
Sarrazin’s description of Muslims as “casually expressed, fidgety, lazy and religious”85
(Seegers 58). The author of Deutschland schafft sich ab furthermore claims that
Muslim immigrants are neither of benefit for the German society nor do they show any
interest in it. The Koran pupil in the mosque next door will probably not know
Wanderers Nachtlied according to Sarrazin (393). In contrast he is convinced that
most Muslims even disapprove the German culture and develop a “dislike for their
benefactor”86 (321). The reason for the Muslim’s assumed “inability to integrate” is
according to Sarrazin a fatal mixture of failure in education system and labor market
and a strong fixation on their culture of origin (262). He depicts the Muslim immigrant
as a loser who blames his own inabilities on the host-country – thus who is not only
incapable but also ungrateful. Sarrazin suspects Muslims to form their own cultural
cells within German society. These “parallel cultures” are characterized by him as
underdeveloped, authoritarian and misogynist (264). Whereas long-established family
models have lost importance among ethnic Germans the Muslim culture is holding on
to “traditional authoritarian family structures” (265). According to Sarrazin the
suppression of women in combination with a high religiosity marks their cultures as
archaic but nevertheless very stable entities. When it comes to collective force
Sarrazin sees the Muslim communities at an advantage over German culture. The
emphasis on the “spiritual strength and the social cohesion” of the Muslim community
has to be seen in correspondence with a Western fear for loosing this traits in their
own cultures as Doug Saunders suggests (Saunders 37). This potential spiritual
advantage makes the Muslim threat even more frightful to the “host society”.
85
“salopp ausgedrückt, fickrig, faul und fromm”
„Der Beschenkte fühlt sich nicht respektiert und nicht ausreichend ernst genommen. Um sein
Ego zu schützen, entwickelt er eine Abneigung gegen den Wohltäter“
86
48
“The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing
ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong” wrote Edward Said in the
1970s (Said, Orientalism 27). Said’s examination of classical colonial authors as
Balfour and Cromer revealed an image of the Muslim as “irrational, depraved (fallen),
childlike, different”. Hence he appears as the exact opposite of the European who is
“rational, virtuous, mature, normal” (40). He suggests “the Orient is Europe’s deepest
and most recurring image of the ‘Other’” (1). Said’s discovery is trail-blazing. The
fundamental distinction made between the Orient and the Occident allows the
orientalist to construct the Muslim identity against the backdrop of its own identity. As
much as the Islam is portrayed as incompatible with European culture the Muslim is
constructed as incompatible with the European. He is “culturally and religiously
dissimilar with the ‘civilized’ western subject” (Kaya 405). Is it possible that until today
the Muslim works as “the negation of the national subject” (Bauder 265)? That the
culturally alien foreigner is a constitutive element of German national identity?
Sarrazin’s statement that “the opposition of ‘them’ and ‘us’ creates bonds and
solidarity” does indeed suggest so (Sarrazin 255). The author of Deutschland schafft
sich ab constructs the Muslim immigrant in clear opposition to the native Germans. But
does the media sample support this practice?
Out of all articles Armgard Seegers’s text in the Hamburger Abendblatt deals
with questions of cultural identity most explicitly. Seegers uses the first person plural
pronoun “we” to align herself with her readership and to establish the image of
speaking for a collective. She starts her article with a reference to freedom of speech.
According to Seegers “we can be proud that in our democracy anything can be said
and written”87 (Seegers 57). Her phrase “our democracy” presents the political system
as something that is owned by the Germans while being proud implies that some kind
87
„Zu Recht halten wir uns viel darauf zugute, dass in unserer Demokratie alles gesagt und
geschrieben werden darf“
49
of personal achievement is involved. Seegers’ perspective is that “we” as Germans
created this democracy and therefore have it at “our” disposal. Considering that just a
couple of centuries ago most Germans were enthusiastic supporters of a brutal
dictatorship Seegers’ picture of democracy as a German achievement could be
questioned in its historical truth. According to Seegers the German democracy is even
more valuable because its ideals are “valid in very few of the countries worldwide”88
(57). Despite the fact that this is actually not accurate – half of the world’s countries
are considered democracies (Democracy Index 2006) – she ascribes a minority status
to the German political system and marks it thereby as especially in need of
protection. But in Seegers’ opinion the Germans refuse to declare their support in this
case. She critics that “many people in our country share the silent consent” that one
has to “deny positive national feelings”89 (57). Obviously Seegers equals national pride
with democratic pride. She suggests that Germans struggle with their national identity
and claims that national feelings are suppressed in German society. The tendency to
deny national pride is in Seegers’ view connected to a historic guilt complex. She
writes that because “Hitler cried ‘Doitschland’ and 60 Million people had to die” until
today Germans are ashamed of their nationality90. Her euphemistic reference to the
Third Reich shows a remarkable lack of reflection concerning the negative aspects of
nationalism.
The idea of a low German self-esteem as a consequence of a guilt complex is a
widely used one. Also Sarrazin refers to it in his book. He states that being worried
about Germany “as a country of Germans” is considered “political incorrect” (Sarrazin
18). Feelings of national pride are only allowed in context of football championships
everything else would be considered inappropriate. Sarrazin even suspects certain
88
„Denn in den wenigsten Ländern der Welt gelten diese Werte“
„Viele Menschen in unserem Land teilen still die Übereinkunft, dass man […] positive
Heimatgefühle zu verleugnen hat“
90
„Weil Hitler ‚Doitschland‘ schrie und 60 Million Menschen dafür sterben mussten, tun wir heute
bei jeder Auslandsreise so, als kämen wir aus Schweden, Irland oder Holland“
89
50
German intellectuals to be in favor of the nation’s decline as the final punishment for
the cruelties of World War II91 (8). He is convinced without a “healthy will for selfassertion” the nation will not be able to face its difficulties (18). Also Seegers’ makes
an argument for a more expressive handling of national feelings in Germany. She asks
“Is the living in this country so bad? Do we not have to defeat our values?” (Seegers
57). In this logic national pride is presented as the precondition for preserving the
German lifestyle and culture. Simultaneously the expression “to defeat” implies that
there is an enemy who threatens “our way of life”. Seegers does not explicitly define
this enemy but her statement that “our laws and rights do not apply for people in Syria,
Iran or Somalia” names three countries with Muslim majorities (57). Just as much as
Sarrazin she clearly regards Muslim cultures as opposed to German culture. Seegers
decribes a Pakistani woman who has “lost everything in a flood” with the words “she
has her baby on the arm and a burka over her head” (58). She uses an image of
religious difference to associate Islam and devastation alongside. By using the picture
of the helpless Muslim woman Seegers moreover supports the idea that Muslims need
to be colonized in order to improve their lives. She asks “would it not be nice if our
laws of human rights and state authority would also be applied in Syria, Iran or
Somalia?92” (57).
Seegers is clearly convinced of the superiority of Western culture. Likewise she
bemoans that the wider German public does not share this conviction. She claims that
Germans do not fight for their values and refuse the idea that their culture might be a
leading culture93 (57). The concept of the “leading culture”94 that Seegers refers to has
been an essential part of German discourses on immigration in last decades. The
91
„Manche mögen dieses Schicksal als gerechte Strafe empfinden für ein Volk, in dem einst SSMänner gezeugt wurden“
92
“Wäre es nicht wünschenswert, Gesetzte wie wir sie über Menschenrechte und Staatsgewalt
kennen, würden auch in Syrien, Iran oder Somalia gelten?”
93
„Wir verteidigen unsere Werte nicht gerne. Und dass unsere Kultur eine Leitkultur sein könnte,
das weisen wir lauf entrüstet weit von uns“
94
Leitkultur
51
word Leitkultur originally has been created 1998 by the Arab-German sociologist
Bassam Tibi to describe a common set of European values (Williams 64). In the same
year Theo Sommer the publisher of Die Zeit used the term to support his also widely
used argument that integration is not “a one-way street” (qtd. in Williams 64). Sommer
smoothed the term’s way into discourse – up to today it appears in nearly every
political debate on immigration. The word Leitkultur describes German culture as a
leading culture. Immigrants are expected to integrate themselves into the hegemonic
culture. As Simon Green points out historically the German “conceptualization of
integration has focused much more on an active choice my non-nationals to embrace
the German culture than elsewhere” (Green 345). Connected to this perception is the
claim that Germany should demand more of its immigrants. Thilo Sarrazin titles his
chapter on immigration and integration with the philosophy “expect more, offer less”
(Sarrazin 255). Also the expression of the “immigrant’s debt”95 is frequently used in
this context. For instance Ralph Giordano (Die Welt) declares that “the fight for
integration” will fail if Muslims do not start understanding integration as their own debt
(Giordano 94). Immigration is understood as a conditional offer of hospitality, as a debt
that the immigrant has to pay back through integration. The native population claims
the role of the host, while the migrant is the guest. This idea is also expressed in the
term “guest workers”. Part of paying back the debt includes for Giodano to show
loyalty for the nation (94). He does not only ask Muslim immigrants to adapt the
German culture but additionally to subscribe to it emotionally.
This task turns out to be a hard one as it remains an object of discussion what
exactly signifies the German Leitkultur. Is it eating roulade, complaining about the
weather and stopping at red lights even if no car is at sight as Seegers ironically asks?
She refers to the debate on Sarrazin “why do we even have this awful debate that is
95
Bringschuld
52
so full of clichés and prejudices? Maybe because we, in contrast to the French or
Americans cannot even define how someone has to be who belongs to us?”96
(Seegers 61). She follows “the German society debates its identity on the migrant’s
back”97 (61). Seegers observation points out the existence of a link between German
national identity and immigration. By recalling the principle of cultural identity formation
as formulated by Stuart Hall this link becomes clearer. According to Hall the
construction of identity requires discursive work and the production of what he calls
frontier-effects. Identity “requires what is left outside, it’s constitutive outside, to
consolidate the process (Hall 3). In the case of German identity formation it is
obviously the Muslim immigrant who works as this “constitutive outside”. By
constructing the Muslim immigrant as the “Other” the national “Self” establishes a
backdrop for its own identity. In other words: German National Identity is constructed
in negation of the Muslim’s identity. It is their exclusion that strengthens the national
collective. If Muslim immigrants are undemocratic, underdeveloped and lazy then
being German must mean to be democratic, modern and hard working. If Muslims
threaten our society, if they are fearsome, then Germans must be the ones who fear
and worry about that society. The stereotypical negative framing of Islam allows
Germans to describe themselves in positive terms – “enlightened, tolerant and
emancipated this is how we like to see ourselves”98 as Seegers writes (Seegers 62).
The ethnic “Other” provides a rich variety of characteristics against which national
identity can be “reinvented, reconstructed, reimagined” (Bauder, Humanitarian
immigration 265).
The consequence of this sort of identity formation for the declared goal of
integration is fatal. If being German involves the idea of exclusion than those who
96
Warum haben wir diese unsägliche Debatte, in der Klischees und Vorurteile ausgebreitet
werden, überhaupt? Vielleicht, weil wir, anders als Franzosen und Amerikaner gar nicht genau
definieren können, wie einer zu sein hat, der zu uns gehören will“
97
„An Minderheiten trägt die deutsche Gesellschaft ihre Identitätsdebatte aus“
98
„So fühlen wir uns am besten. Aufgeklärt, tolerant und emanzipiert“
53
have been “othered” can never be included in the national construct. Hermann and
Wierth (die tageszeitung) point out this aspect in their article. They emphasize
Sarrazin’s close relationship to Necla Kelek a famous and very active German Islam
critic with Turkish roots. Sarrazin frequently quotes Kelek and other Islam critics of
Muslim religion in his book. He does so in order to avoid being called a racist and to
provide knowledge from within the Muslim community. He particularly refers to Muslim
feminists as Necla Kelek, Ayaan Hirsi Ali or Sayran Ates because he assumes that
Muslim feminists cannot be branded as nationalist or racist99 (Sarrazin 279). In
Sarrazin’s logic there exists no reason to consider Muslims as German nationalists.
Even if they support his claims, as Kelek does, they remain excluded from the national
collective. Hermann and Wierth remark that “Sarrazin obviously does not see Necla
Kelek as a German” (Hermann 45).
Sarrazin’s definition of being German is that of an ethnic belonging as
described in Friedrich Meinecke’s Kulturnation. If one is not ethnic German, than one
cannot simply become German. Correspondingly Sarrazin does clearly view the
immigrants that arrived after World War II from former German territories100 as
Germans. He describes them as especially hard working and easy to integrate and he
refers to them as “fellow countrymen”101 to emphasize the blood bond (Sarrazin 258).
The Turkish guest workers and their children in contrast cannot become Germans in
Sarrazin’s eyes. Even if they have been born and raised in Germany they have a
different “genetic code”102 (32). Here Sarrazin’s whole ethnic argumentation unfolds in
its consequences. “Germany is the country of the Germans” claims the author of
Deutschland schafft sich ab (18). “Specific German qualities” such as a high standard
99
„…manche, denen der Durchblick fehlt, stellen jetzt auch schon muslimische Feministinnen in die
rechte und rassistische Ecke“
100
„Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene aus den deutschen Siedlungsgebieten im Osten und dem
ehemaligen Reichsgebiet östlich von Oder und Neiße“
101
„Landsleute“
102
„genetische Ausstattung“
54
of science, education and training, an efficient economy and bureaucracy are rooted in
the German character that is genetically hard working and ambitious.
The construction of cultural identities in the sample heavily relies on cultural
stereotypes. Spiegel author Broder regards this practice as unproblematic. He
remarks that discrimination originally means distinguishing and that clichés can also
be “charming and provide orientation” (Broder 118). The Germans still enjoy being
called the “nation of poets and thinkers” writes Broder and states “no one has got a
problem with being positively discriminated” (118). To illustrate this he gives some
examples: Blues musicians are black, Kenyans win marathons and Asians are smart
(118). Broder is surprisingly inconsiderate in his treatment of stereotypes. He plays
down Sarrazins eugenic model by equating ideas of cultural selection with popular
clichés as for instance the Spanish temperament and the English humor and thereby
describes certain forms of discrimination and racism as socially acceptable. The
double standard of his argumentation is obvious: when it comes to Muslim immigrants.
Broder’s image of Islam as an “authoritarian, archaic system” that is “incompatible with
democratic values and structures”103 (118) is not a “charming clichés” at all. Broder
initially makes the claim that discrimination should not lead to exclusion 104 (118) but he
apparently does not consider this maxim himself. The very idea of Islam as
incompatible with German culture must lead to exclusion eventually. Referring to the
English humor is not equal to labeling a diverse cultural group as dissimilar.
In contrast to Broder Schirrmacher (FAS) clearly points out that he believes
Sarrazin’s eugenic approach to be wrong. Education and believe in culture have
proved to be able to integrate immigrants much faster than any kind of eugenic policy
according to the journalist. Schirrmacher states that education and the ability to use
103
„Er ist mit demokratischen Werten und Strukturen nicht kompatibel“
„…wenn die Feststellung von Unterschieden zu sozialen Sanktionen wie Ausgrenzung führt,
wird es hässlich und gefährlich“
104
55
one’s mind can take people out of “social meaninglessness and turn them into
important citizens” no matter who their parents are105 (Schirrmacher 28). Schirrmacher
hereby refers not only to Enlightenment theory but also to economic models of selfimprovement. He sees the process of social advancement as an individual
performance. His claim that immigrants start from a position of “social
meaninglessness”106 denies their social, cultural and economic value. Schirrmacher
disregards the influence of circumstances on people’s lives and pictures social mobility
simply as question of personal will. He reinforces the perception that immigrants have
to prove themselves to be worth of living in “our country”. His reference to
Enlightenment theory moreover reinforces the idea that Muslims are suffering from low
education and have to run through transformation processes in order to become
“modern” citizens.
Schirrmacher is relying on the same discourses of otherness as Sarrazin: that
Islam is fundamentally dissimilar from German identity and German values. Although
he does not support the idea that this difference is genetically based he still believes
that Muslims have to let go of their original culture in order to become equal German
citizens. Schirrmacher sees the need for assimilation not only as a personal need but
emphasizes its wider social relevance. He claims “the demographic changes
overshadow everything else our ancestors had to deal with” 107 (23). By referring to the
ancestors Schirrmacher conjures the national collective and supports the idea of
ethnic belonging. Furthermore his suggestion that the Germans have “to deal” with
those problems evokes notions of them as the managers of the imagined national
space. Finally Schirrmacher’s idea of dealing with demographic changes arrives at the
same point as Sarrazin’s: in order to “save the nation” culturally dissimilar minorities
105
“Bildung und das Vermögen, sich des eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen, hat Menschen aus dem
gesellschaftlichen Nichts zu großen Bewergern gemacht, ganz gleich, wer ihre Eltern waren”
106
“gesellschaftliches Nichts”
107
„…die demografischen Veränderungen stellen in den Schatten, was unsere Vorfahren zu
bewältigen hatten“
56
need to be assimilated. “National identity and social stability need a certain amount of
homogeneity concerning values and cultural practices”108 writes Sarrazin (Sarrazin
369) otherwise Germany might change “culturally beyond recognition” 109 (368).
It has already been shown how German national identity is discursively
constructed in opposition to Muslim identity. The figure of the Muslim immigrant serves
as the “Other” that provides a border against which the national “Self” can set itself up.
But the constructions of Muslim identity are not only involved in the formation of
German national identity but additionally obviously have a community building force.
The perception of Muslim immigrants as agents of a threatening cultural force called
Islam works to mobilize the national collective. The formation of an alliance of ethnic
subjects is presented as the only way to face the crisis. The Germans are asked to
stand together out of what Sarrazin describes as a “healthy will for self-assertion as a
nation”110 (Sarrazin 18) or Ralph Giordano (Die Welt) as “legitimate self-interest”111
(Giordano 95). The nation as such is imagined in association with home writes
Ghassan Hage. This mode of belonging is dual – the native subject belongs to the
nation and the nation belongs to the native subject (Hage 45). By entering “our”
country the “Other” enters “our” home. The Muslim “problem” is turned into a personal
problem. We have to understand, writes for instance Schirrmacher (FAS) what is really
at stake (Schirrmacher 28). The average German fears that Muslims will move to his
neighborhood, bring crime to his streets, force his wife to wear a headscarf. Sarrazin
writes “I do not want my grandchildren and great-grandchildren to live in a country that
is in large parts Muslim, where people speak Turkish and Arabic, where women wear
108
„Nationale Identität und gesellschaftliche Stabilität bedürfen aber einer gewissen Homogenität in
Werthaltung und akzeptierten kulturellen Überlieferungen“
109
„Deutschland wird sich kulturell bis zur Unkenntlichkeit verändern“
110
„gesunder Selbstbehauptungswille als Nation“
111
„berechtigte Eigennutzinteressen“
57
headscarf and the daily rhythm is structured by the Muezzin’s call 112 (Sarrazin 308). It
is the very fear of “losing the control over one’s home” (Hage 189), of becoming a
stranger in one’s home that is expressed in those apocalyptic thoughts.
Realistically regarded the possibility of Muslims becoming a majority in
Germany is unlikely – according to Saunders their number will raise to 7.1% of the
total population by 2030 (Saunders 68). Saunders sees no signifiers to believe that
Muslims will even become a large minority in Europe (69). But moderate voices as
Saunders’ drown in the hysteric noise created by Sarrazin and other Islam critics.
Sarrazin’s ideas activate deep public anxieties writes Stephan Hebel in the Frankfurter
Rundschau (Hebel 70). Immigration has changed the nation whereby Symbols of
foreign cultural practices such as the headscarf make this change visible. Germans
witness how their environment transforms and this change causes fear and anger.
Polemists as Sarrazin use these strong emotions to support their agenda. In her work
on the social dimension of emotions Sara Ahmed points out that “the role of emotions,
in particular of hate and love, is crucial to the delineation of the bodies of individual
subjects and the body of the nation” (Ahmed 117). The subject, in this case the ethnic
German, is imagined as endangered by others “whose proximity threatens not only to
take something away from the subject (jobs, security, wealth), but to take the place of
the subject” (117). This development is perceived as unfair because the native
Germans perceive themselves as the ones who own legacy over the country. They
“claim the place of hosts at the same time as they claim the position of the victim”
(118). Ahmed follows that this narrative “suggests that it is love for the nation that
makes the white Aryans hate those whom they recognize as strangers” (118).
112
„Ich möchte nicht, dass das Land meiner Engel und Urenkel zu großen Teilen muslimisch ist,
dass dort über weite Strecken türkisch und arabisch gesprochen wird, die Frauen ein Kopftuch
tragen und der Tagesrhythmus vom Ruf der Muezzine bestimmt wird“
58
Sarrazin and others Islam critics form an alliance with the people’s fear writes
Hebel and they offer simple solutions (Hebel 70). But they only indicate those
solutions according to Hebel and leave the realization to the ultra-rights or the “good
citizen’s secret fantasies”113 (70). Sarrazin for example suggests that the “rapid
growth” of Muslim immigrants needs to be limited (Sarrazin 369) but he is “afraid to
draw the consequences” as Schirrmacher remarks because they would “take his
followers’ breath away” 114 (Schirrmacher 24). It is the fear of losing one’s home that
binds the national collective together. Sarrazin and his supporter’s rhetorically call the
German people to arms. If the Germans do not act now their national culture 115 might
change forever writes Sarrazin (Sarrazin 330). Likewise Giordano (Die Welt) regards it
as a “civil duty” to resist the Muslim tendencies that are unwilling to integrate
(Giordano 95). The term “to resist” pictures Muslim immigration as an invasion. Military
language empowers the idea of a conflict. Schirrmacher compares the recent situation
to past wars and concludes that the demographic crisis scores out everything “our
ancestors had to deal with” (Schirrmacher 23). Blome’s (Bild) addresses a final call to
politicians “to solve the problem completely”. His choice of words leaves a bitter taste
as his rhetoric evokes notions of the Nazis’ Final Solution, the extermination of
European Jews (Blome 2). The military language works to legitimize restrictions and
actions against Muslim immigrants as acts of self-defense.
Identities are never unified according to Hall and “in late modern times
increasingly fragmented and fractured” (Hall 4). German national identity has been
historically subject of ambiguities and contradictions. Disruptive changes in the
political history of the German nation state have “added to the inconsistent and
ruptured historical development of notions of German national identity” as Sinclair
113
„Die ‚Lösungen‘ deuten sie nur an, überlassen sie den Ultrarechten und den geheimen
Phantasien manches braven Bürgers“
114
„Aber es führt zu Konsequenzen, die er sich selbst nicht zu ziehen traut […] und die in ihrem
Ergebnis manchem seiner Anhänger den Atem rauben würden.“
115
“Volkscharakter”
59
points out (Sinclair 28). Ethnic concepts of citizenship are a sensitive issue as they
evoke notions of racist ideologies as promoted by the Nazis. The analysis of the
sample has shown that the idea of an Islamic threat obviously led to a revival of such
concepts. In the discourse on Deutschland schafft sich ab large parts of the German
news media participated in the cultural stereotyping and exclusion of Muslims. The
aggressive tone and exaggerated rhetoric is remarkable. When it comes to Islam it
appears that practices of discrimination are not only common but also socially
acceptable. Muslims are not regarded as equal citizens but they become objects of
threat that need to be controlled and restricted. The German nation as a “’natural’
category with an ‘authentic’ ethnic core as well as a shared language and cultural
history” has to be “preserved and protected against ‘other’ ‘foreign’ cultural influences”
as Stefanie Sinclair writes (28). Muslim immigrants give the native Germans an enemy
against whom they can unite. Authors as Sarrazin and Schirrmacher conjure national
feelings and explicitly call for restrictive actions against immigrants. Their call is not
only directed towards politicians - that are expected to “solve the problem” as Nikolaus
Blome (Bild) puts it (Blome 1) – but additionally towards every single German. In this
line of thought the question of national identity becomes a matter of personal survival.
60
4. Conclusion: The Results and their Effects
The discourse analysis has clearly revealed a tendency to frame Islam in
negative terms and Muslim immigrants as the culturally dissimilar “Other” of the
German national “Self”. The trend to construct Islam in stereotypical terms is evident in
large parts of the sample from right wing to more progressive sources. Muslims
themselves are silenced and excluded from the debate as their voices are not
considered. The authors in the sample show a lack of awareness in their use of racist,
colonialist and orientalist terminology. Especially the conservative media largely
adopts Sarrazin’s discriminating language and partly even his eugenic theory. Apart
from a few exceptions the progressive media fails to correct the one-sided image of
Islam. This failure is also due to the fact that liberal journalists mostly rely on the same
discourses as their conservative counterparts. The analysis revealed a clear lack of
will to construct Muslim identities outside the frame provided by polemics as Thilo
Sarrazin.
Large parts of the media sample raised Sarrazin as an authority on integration.
Ralph Giordano (Die Welt) for instance regards him as an “expert for the migration and
integration scene”116(Giordano 93). The ascribed status as an expert validated
Sarrazin’s controversial arguments and provided him a forum to promote his ideas.
Patrick Bahners therefore sees the mainstream media as a big supporter of Sarrazin
and other Islam critics. The so-called experts are used to spice up debates because
their arguments activate public resentments and mock the political class as incapable
(Bahners 83). Paradoxically the Islam critics on their turn regard the media not as an
ally but as aliened with the political class and hence part of the often conjured “cartel
of silence”. Sarrazin for example claims that “voices from the media largely dictate the
116
„Kenner der Migrations- und Integrationsszene“
61
political class’ position in questions of migration”117 (Sarrazin 257). Simultaneously
large parts of the news media do not declare their support for Sarrazin openly. They
rather hide their approval behind what they claim to be the public opinion.
The ambivalent relationship between Sarrazin and the German mass media
may be a profitable one under economic terms but otherwise has to be regarded
highly critical. Agenda-setting theory has proved that the media’s agenda sets the
public agenda. People learn from the mass media’s reports facts that “they incorporate
into their images and attitudes” (McCombs 45). The framing of Islam in the German
news hence influences the way Germans perceive their Muslim co-citizens. It is
particularly within the well-read middle class that this tendency is strong. Researcher
Carolin Dorothée Lange speaks in the context of the Sarrazin debate of a “radicalized
middle class” (Lange 15), the sociologist Michael Hartmann even of a “class struggle
from above” that is directed against the political class as well as against socially
weaker ones (Hartmann qtd. in Lange 15). The mass media’s influence on people’s
ideas and perceptions asks in return for a responsible behavior of journalists.
Journalists should choose their sources carefully and they should not promote racist or
discriminating content. This especially concerns the treatment of minorities such as
Muslim immigrants because those groups have less means of representation available
and are more likely to be excluded from public discourses.
In the debate on Deutschland schafft sich ab the media clearly neglected their
social responsibilities. Heribert Prantl (Süddeutsche Zeitung) sees the case of
Sarrazin as an “intense political-media symbioses”118 that has been of questionable
good for journalism’s reputation (Prantl 161). The debate marks a changing point in
German debate culture in so far as it widened the frame of which theories are
117
„Umso bedauerlicher ist es, dass sich die deutsche politische Klasse ihre Haltung zu
Migrationsfragen weitgehend von Stimmen aus den Medien diktierten lässt“
118
“Der Fall Sarrazin wird daher noch lange als Beispiel für eine intensive politisch-mediale
Symbiose gelten”
62
discussable in public. Dubious eugenic models became subjects of serious
consideration in established German newspapers. Sarrazin, “a lifelong Social
Democrat, and not some fringe far right extremist” has made it “acceptable for the
German everyman to criticize a specific minority group, and to make sweeping
statements about that group's intellectual capacity” as the American New York Times
recognized (Slackman 2).
The results do not only point out the media’s lack of responsible behavior in the
debate it moreover gives a rather dark perspective for the declared goal of integration.
Ethnic concepts of belonging and citizenship are obviously still deeply rooted in the
minds of German intellectuals. These concepts are destructive, based on exclusion
and do not match the reality of Germany as a country of immigration. The idea of
Germany as a Kulturnation renders the concept of integration absurd: even if
immigrants assimilate, if they adopt the German culture and renounce the culture of
their origin someone like Sarrazin still will not regard them as equal citizens. Sarrazin’s
reliance on genetic components is a barrier no individual could ever possibly cross. If it
is assumed that the difference between “Self” and “Other” is genetically determined
than the later can never be absorbed into the national collective. Such ideas open
doors to “either an aggressive fatalism or a program of segregation”119 as the
Süddeutsche Zeitung author Prantl points out (Prantl 168). Out of the sample Nikolaus
Blome (Bild) exemplifies this fatalism in an extreme way. He writes “if the conditions
are indeed genetic destiny then any kind of policy can pack up and go home”120
(Blome 2). Blome states “stupid stays stupid, no pills will help” 121 (1), whereby pill
evidently has to be read as a metaphor for political actions. Blome hence uses
Sarrazin’s eugenic model to declare not only the impossibility of integration but also
119
„Diese Lehre führt entweder zu einem aggressiven Fatalismus oder zu einem
Segregationsprogramm“
120
„Wenn die Verhältnisse tatsächlich genetisches Schicksal sind, kann jede Politik einpacken“
121
„Blöd bleibt blöd, da helfen keine Pillen“
63
the failure of politics. In his opinion the eugenic model withdraws the “basis and right
of existence from politicians” (1). The antidemocratic tendency in these words is
alarming and goes even far beyond Sarrazin’s own convictions as the author
Deutschland schafft sich ab after all believes in the function and efficiency of politics.
The clearly eugenic argumentation and the dubious practice of ranking cultures
are the main reason to mark Sarrazin as racist. The fact that the German media
established someone with his convictions as an expert of integration is a scandal.
Some authors as for instance Herrmann and Wierth (die tageszeitung) stated bluntly
that his arguments are intolerable and wrong (Herrmann 41) but the clear term racism
is not mentioned in any of the analyzed articles. For some authors as for example
Frank Schirrmacher (FAS) on the contrary Sarrazin is “certainly not” a racist but simply
someone who rightfully worries about the nation (Schirrmacher 27). Schirrmacher
sees Sarrazin in the tradition of discourses on immigration and intelligence that
circulated in the United States at the beginning of the 20s century. Also the BritishCanadian journalist Doug Saunders points out that connection is his book The Myth of
the Muslim Tide. After World War I streams of immigrants arrived at the United States.
Those immigrants were of mostly catholic religion and they originated from less
democratic and developed nations. Just as the Muslims nowadays back then the
“catholic flood” was feared for their high birthrates, low educations and religious
fundamentalism (Saunders 168). Back then Paul Blanshards claimed in his bestselling
book American Freedom and the Catholic Power that the Catholics would take over
American society through their high birth rates. He additionally announced they would
bring crime, fascism and terrorism to the nation and therefore strict regulation by the
government was urgent (Sauders 168). The arguments used show remarkable
parallels to Sarrazin’s language. Schirrmacher sugggets that by reading those
64
American debates that lasted until the 1960s one finds himself in the middle of the
recent Sarrazin discussion.
Just as today back then the future of the country was considered at stake,
intelligence was feared to decline and different ethnics were analyzed and selected
(Schirrmacher 27). It seems that whenever new groups of immigrants enter a nation
the same kind of public anxieties come up. The foreign influence with its different
cultural and religious habits is feared because the native population is afraid of losing
their home. In these debates it is often neglected that culture is indeed never
something static but rather fluent and constantly in transformation anyway. It is time to
rethink cultural politics as Hage writes in order to be able to recognize and deal
“realistically with the sense of cultural loss” (Hage 26). It is finally the “deeper
commitment to a more far-reaching multiculturalism” (26) that enables integration and
renders strictly bond constructions of cultural identities obsolete.
65
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