Personal agency in feminism theory

GRUPO DE ESTUDOS E DIFUSÃO DA ANÁLISE DO COMPORTAMENTO (GEDAC)
MATERIAL DE ESTUDOS PARA O 5º ENCONTRO
DATA: 27/09/2014
LEITURA BÁSICA
Texto 01: “Personal agency in feminism theory: evicting the illusive dweller”
RUIZ, MARIA R. Personal agency in feminism theory: evicting the illusive
dweller. The Behavior Analyst, n. 21, 1998.
LEITURA COMPLEMENTAR
Texto 02: “Introdução: o que é feminismo?”
GARCIA, CARLA C. Introdução: o que é feminismo? IN: GARCIA, CARLA C.
Breve História do Feminismo. São Paulo: Claridade, 2011.
The Behavior Analyst
1998, 21, 179-192
No. 2 (Fall)
Personal Agency in Feminist Theory:
Evicting the Illusive Dweller
Maria R. Ruiz
Rollins College
The growing impact of feminist scholarship, activism, and politics would benefit substantially from
input by radical behaviorists. The feminist community, broadly defined, and radical behaviorists
share interesting commonalities that suggest a potentially fruitful alliance. There are, however, points
of divergence that must be addressed; most prominently, the construct of personal agency. A behavioral reconstruction of personal agency is offered to deal with the invisible contingencies leading
to gender-asymmetric interpretive repertoires. The benefits of a mutually informing fusion are discussed.
Key words: feminist theory, gender, person-situation dualism, agency, invisible contingencies,
interpretive repertoires, verbal communities
In her book Mismeasure of Woman,
Carol Tavris (1992) documents the often-cited work of Samuel Cartwright, a
noted American physician who in the
early 1 800s studied and described a
mental illness that was prevalent
among slaves. He named this condition
Drapetomania. The interesting thing
about this condition was that it was diagnosed by a single symptom, namely,
the uncontrollable tendency to run
away from slavery (pp. 176-177).
Could we write fiction to be this interesting? Alas, Cartwright pathologized
the reasonable response of the slave,
and in so doing, left the institution of
slavery unexamined. Tavris goes on to
show, as others have, how psychological science has historically followed a
similar approach in its construction of
woman and gender.
The feminist critique of science
came to my attention several years ago
as I began to explore disciplinary frontiers in order to develop a new elective
This article is a revised version of an invited
address presented at the 23rd annual meeting of
the Association for Behavior Analysis, Chicago,
May 1997.
I thank Guillermo V. Ruiz for inspiration and
Judi Addelston for her insightful suggestions on
an earlier version of this manuscript.
Please address correspondence and reprint requests to Maria R. Ruiz, Department of Psychology, Rollins College, 1000 Holt Ave - 2760,
Winter Park, Florida 32789-4499 (E-mail:
[email protected]).
course for our undergraduate psychology curriculum. As a behavior analyst
teaching undergraduates in a liberal
arts institution, I realized that some of
my most engaging intellectual conversations were with feminist colleagues
from disciplines other than psychology. I decided to focus on the existing
feminist psychological literature and
eventually developed a course I entitled "Women: Psychology's Challenge."
As I explored the feminist psychological literature, particularly its critique of traditional psychological science, I realized two things. First, and I
felt very enthusiastic about this point,
the feminist critique of traditional psychological science was, in some ways,
remarkably consistent with the radical
behaviorist critique.
The second point was distressing yet
ironically familiar. Radical behaviorism,
the philosophy of science articulated by
Skinner and the conceptual framework
for behavior analysis, was among the
"traditional" psychological models most
poignantly criticized by feminists. I say
that this last point was ironically familiar
because as Todd and Morris (1983,
1992) have documented, Skinner's radical behaviorism has been consistently
misrepresented as Watsonian methodological behaviorism throughout the
psychological literature. It was therefore
not surprising, and perhaps to be ex-
179
180
MARIA R. RUIZ
pected, that this culturally received view
of radical behaviorism be the one incorporated in feminist critiques as well.
Rhoda Unger (1988), whose work has
been inspirational to my own even
though we have divergent points of
view, perhaps better than anyone articulates this culturally received view. Although not as widely quoted by feminists as reflections on her years at Harvard as a graduate student in Skinner's
laboratory where "even the rats were
male" (Unger, 1989, p. 15), Unger's observation that "the juxtaposition of the
words 'behaviorism' and 'the study of
women' seems to some of us to be a
contradiction in terms" (p. 125) succinctly captures the spirit of the feminist
reaction to behaviorism.
My first reaction to Unger and other
feminists was to shut my eyes and plug
my ears as children sometimes do in
the hopes that something annoying will
go away, but when I released my senses the received view was still there. So
it seemed not only reasonable, but the
indicated course in terms of my teaching, to begin by addressing the unfortunate problem of mistaken identities.
Therefore, part of my work in this area
has been aimed at clarifying the distinctions between the two strains of behaviorism. But what is more interesting
is to move beyond clarification to elaborate on substantive issues on which
radical behaviorism and feminist thinking are congenially aligned.
In this paper I will illustrate how a
feminist critique combined with a radical behavioral analysis can yield productive results. Specifically, the differential effects of discriminative contingencies invisibly embedded in some
cultural practices often result in gender-asymmetric interpretations of those
practices. An example that most of us
are familiar with is the notion of politically correct talk. The insistence by
feminists that we change our verbal
practices to become more inclusive has
been trivialized and satirized, as typified by Rush Limbaugh's description
of "femi-nazis." Have feminists gone
too far, or do the gender-specific exclu-
sionary effects of our verbal practices
require change? A behavioral analysis
of invisible contingencies and interpretive repertoires can lead to a cohesive
understanding of the dynamics of this
problem that can help us begin to answer the question. There are numerous
points of convergence between radical
behaviorism and the feminist perspective, broadly defined, that suggest a potentially productive merger. I will begin by discussing these. At the same
time there are fundamental tensions
that must be addressed as a precondition to a successful synthesis, and a
discussion of these follows. I then examine the merits of a merger and present the case of invisible contingencies
and interpretive repertoires. I conclude
with a preliminary construction of a
feminist radical behaviorist perspective.
CONVERGENCE OF
FEMINIST THEORY AND
RADICAL BEHAVIORISM
I begin by highlighting what I understand to be the most important
points of convergence between radical
behaviorism and feminist theory (Ruiz,
1995). This will give us a context from
which to address specific details on the
ways, means, and benefits of working
towards a mutually informing alliance.
First, radical behaviorists and feminists agree on the importance of context in understanding human action.
Thus, both reject psychological approaches that decontextualize individuals and fail to take into account the
conditions of people's lives. A second
and related point is their rejection of
the notion that the scientist, or knower,
is separate from the subject of inquiry,
or that which is known. Both radical
behaviorists and feminists emphasize
the relational character of the process
of knowing, and recognize that the scientist and the perspectives that he or
she brings to bear on the subject are
important considerations.
Consequently, and as a final point to
highlight, radical behaviorists and fem-
PERSONAL AGENCY
inists recognize the social nature of scientific knowledge, the status of which
is inextricably connected to and not
separate from the activity of scientists.
Therefore, the work of science is not
about establishing ultimate and transcendental truths, but is rather a practical matter and is about determining
what works given the problem and the
questions that it raises.
Besides these conceptual junctures,
there are other common grounds
shared by these two scholarly communities that I have discussed in detail
(Ruiz, 1992, 1995, 1996; Ruiz & Tallen, 1993) and are worth mentioning
here. Originating from common intellectual roots, both communities share
the assumption that experience plays a
central role in human development. As
such, both share a belief in the transformative possibilities of human life
and an optimistic philosophy of social
change. Both feminism and radical behaviorism advocate a view of human
behavior and development that emphasizes the contextual interconnectedness
of individuals with their social and
physical realities. Both groups would
agree on the value of an educated understanding of our mutual interconnectedness in promoting humanistic
practices and values. Accordingly, both
communities have challenged the dominant worldview that deemphasizes or
ignores altogether the powerful influences of external forces, and both have
consequently faced similar problems of
acceptance. In fact, both communities
have been and continue to be marginalized by gatekeepers of mainstream
psychology, but both have defied marginalization. In so doing, both communities have endeavored to create social changes and advocated the restructuring of environments across the
whole spectrum of social institutions,
from the classroom to the work place
to the family unit, to create better
learning opportunities for all participants.
Indeed, a mutually informing fusion
between feminist psychology and radical behaviorism has much promise. I
181
will elaborate on what I see as key aspects of this fusion, and why it would
be in our mutual interests to look to
one another as allies, both intellectually and pragmatically. But before doing so let us to pause to examine major
points of divergence between our verbal communities.
MAJOR POINTS OF
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN
FEMINIST THEORY AND
RADICAL BEHAVIORISM
Before elaborating on key distinctions, it is prudent to remind the reader
that the feminist community is highly
diverse (cf. Herrmann & Stewart,
1994; Kirk & Okazawa-Rey, 1998;
Reinharz, 1992). Any attempt to speak
of this group as a monolithic entity
would be misguided. Nevertheless,
there are themes that predominate in
feminist discourse, one of which is the
construct of personal agency. The pervasive influence of this illusive dweller
in feminist theory is related to the emphasis on individualism, at the expense
of context, within traditional psychological models. Within the psychology
of women and feminist theory, this
prejudice manifests itself as a "pervasive but implicit emphasis" on liberal
feminism (Crowley-Long, 1998, p.
113). Disparate views on personal
agency represent a fundamental tension
between radical behaviorism and feminist theory. Ironically, although the
resolution of this conceptual tension
presents a formidable challenge, it is a
necessary step if we are to achieve a
successful merger and a widely accepted working alliance. Despite the
conceptual problems that our standard
western understanding of personal
agency poses for feminists, many feminists nevertheless retain this conceptualization as a working assumption.
Let us examine the problems more
closely.
Person-Situation Dualism and
Personal Agency
Similar to its function in mainstream
psychology, the self-actional agent as
182
MARIA R. RUIZ
locus of awareness and action has
played the role of guardian of personal
choice in feminist theory. Feminists
look to the agent as the ultimate source
of feminist resistance, a crucial process
in feminist activism. At the same time
feminists believe in the power of social
controls and are committed to exposing
the external sources of power and control that limit opportunities for individuals in society. Feminists want to
change our society's institutions in order to create better opportunities for all
who live in it. As such, feminists are
committed to the transformative possibilities of human life and an optimistic philosophy of social change.
Feminists then find themselves in a
unique position to be arguing for the existence of what appears to be conceptually conflicting sources of behavioral
control, namely, the power of social
forces to oppress the individual and the
power of the individual or agent to resist
such oppression. The conceptual tensions created by these coexisting beliefs
have served as a great challenge to feminist scholars, some of whom have attempted to reconcile the two within conceptual paradigms that simply cannot
provide adequate grounds for reconciliation. Specifically, feminist scholars
have struggled to find solutions within a
conceptual framework that assumes person-situation dualism as the mechanism
for preserving the Cartesian agent while
arguing for social control. But in the
struggle to retain that Cartesian agent,
these feminists run into serious conceptual conflicts. Let me briefly mention
four.
Conceptual conflicts in feminist theory. First, a hallmark of feminist scholarship has been its challenge of Cartesian dualities and the false dichotomies and myths that are based on these
dualities. The feminist critique of science, for example, has exposed the
pervasive impact of gender ideology
on our scientific knowledge base. Science's masculinist perspective includes
value-laden Cartesian splits between
who can know (the scientist vs. the
subject), what can be known and the
relative status of such knowledge (objective vs. subjective reality), and how
we can come to know it (intuition vs.
reason as tools for acquiring knowledge). The generic feminist critique of
dualism on epistemological grounds
notwithstanding, person-situation dualism is well embedded in much feminist writing.
Second, person-situation dualism is
kindred with another form of dualism
that is of special interest and poses specific concerns to feminists and behaviorists alike, namely the nature-nurture
dichotomy. In psychological science,
essentialist ideologies such as biological determinism have historically masqueraded as the self-actional agent in
the person-situation duality. This camouflage, as I will illustrate, has escaped
even some feminists who reject essentialism in favor of social constructionism, making claims that are conceptually indefensible and unsustainable.
Third, the self-actional agent has
been a convenient locus of proximal
causation in psychological theory. Invoking it as such feeds into and promotes the "billiard ball" mechanistic
model of causation, which has been the
prevalent explanatory model in psychology and which feminist critics
have widely and ardently attacked.
Finally, the self-actional agent creates some serious conceptual traps for
the feminist critique of traditional psychological models that focus on the individual and exclude or ignore social
and political influences on development. Specifically, many feminists
maintain that the individual as agent
constructs reality and creates personal
change in spite of social controls. Let
me elaborate on the conceptual traps
with an illustration.
Unger (1988), for example, casts
the problems in terms of personal epistemologies. The conceptual dilemma
she elaborates goes something like
this: If we extend the argument that the
individual as agent constructs his or
her own reality, it is possible to conclude that "reality is all in one's head."
Unger herself notes the problem that if
PERSONAL AGENCY
reality is all in one's head, how do we
explore a shared reality, including social controls that affect members of
some social groups uniformly and selectively (e.g., how sexist practices affect women's behavior)? In reconciling
agency and social control, Unger
writes that it is noteworthy that feminists who are social activists and
agents of social change appear to be
able to maintain a contradictory cognitive schema, which may be particularly adaptive to a contradictory reality.
From a behavioral perspective I
would argue that the agent-based cognitive solution spoken in terms of contradictory cognitive schemas and realities is itself problematic. For one, it
leaves open the question "under what
conditions or situations is a particular
cognitive schema activated?"
Feminist praxis. But even if we
could determine the conditions that
"call forth" or set the occasion for a
particular cognitive schema, we would
still have some practical questions to
answer. That is, the cognitive solution
is at worst problematic and at best incomplete from the perspective of feminist praxis. Consider, for example, two
practical goals of feminist practice.
One is to empower individuals and increase individual resistance to oppressive cultural practices. A second goal
is to create a feminist epistemology or
way of knowing that gives voice to
how women experience the world and
with which to analyze how gender as
an epistemological system works to
frame our experiences as women (Kaschak, 1992; Unger, 1990).
Returning to Unger's solutions,
knowing the conditions that set the occasion for a particular cognitive schema to come into play still leaves unanswered the questions of just how
contradictory cognitive schemas and
realities develop. It also leaves unanswered the question of how these actually operate to facilitate or mediate
feminist resistance or what we might
call agentic action.
183
WHAT DOES FEMINISM
HAVE TO OFFER
RADICAL BEHAVIORISTS
AND BEHAVIOR ANALYSTS?
Let us consider how a feminist perspective might contribute to work conducted in the behavior-analytic tradition. This is an important area of
discussion to me because behaviorist
colleagues often reply to feminist analysis by asking "Well, do we really
need feminism? What can it add? After
all, when properly understood behavior
analysis is gender neutral and does not
presuppose any particular set of values." So let me share why I believe
that we would benefit from a feminist
perspective, in spite of the fact that
these claims may be true in principle if
not in practice.
In addressing how a feminist perspective might contribute to work conducted in the behavior-analytic tradition, I will not focus on the specific
types of research questions that a feminist researcher might address using
behavior analysis as the methodological tool. Although in all honesty this
might be the easier task, what I actually want to focus on is how the orienting assumptions that guide feminist
work might affect how a behavior analyst looks at and approaches potential
questions to research in virtually any
area. With that in mind, let me spell
out two such assumptions that I will
work from in addressing the pertinence
of a feminist perspective. First is the
notion that scientific activity is not value free or gender neutral, and that scientific inquiry must include examination of both values and gender. The
second assumption is that scientific activity is a means to achieving solutions
to practical problems and as such it is
also political activity.
Although these orienting assumptions do not themselves define or delineate research areas, they certainly
influence the researcher's point of
view. As such, they can encourage us
to ask certain questions about the research setting or context of discovery,
184
MARIA R. RUIZ
for example "is our environmental
configuration gendered, and if so, how
might this influence our outcomes?"
We might also ask questions about the
research process itself. For instance, in
relation to the context of justification
and in keeping with our "truth criterion" of effective action, we might ask,
"What are the cultural values reflected
in our definitions of effective action
with respect to discriminatory cultural
practices?" Here feminists would
agree with Rogers (1966) that "the value or purpose that gives meaning to a
particular endeavor must always lie
outside that endeavor" (p. 310). We
might also ask "On whose behalf are
we functioning effectively, and who
benefits directly? Who benefits indirectly?" Along the same lines we
might continue, "Are there any hidden
costs to particular individuals or
groups resulting from this effective action?" As I will illustrate later, "invisible" contingencies are most problematic to identify and deal with in this
area. Finally, "What classes of cultural
practices are we selecting and what, if
any, gender-related metacontingencies
are we affecting?" Certainly behavior
analysts concerned with social validity
ask these general types of questions
(Kazdin, 1977; Wolf, 1978). But I believe, and will try to show, that a feminist perspective brings a special prism
to bear and leads to specific types of
questions that might not otherwise suggest themselves as obvious pauses for
further inquiry.
I will be more specific later when I
discuss a concrete illustration, but first
let me say a couple of words about the
assumptions themselves. One of the
things I have found most enlightening
in reading the feminist critique of science is its sophisticated unveiling of
well-hidden assumptions that demand
new interpretations of old "facts." Feminists have analyzed and disentangled
controlling relations in scientific work
to expose how gender and gendered arrangements affect our scientific knowing. Moreover, they have shown how
gender can influence our research find-
ings while remaining invisible as a
source of control (e.g., Broverman,
Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz, &
Vogel, 1970; Collins, 1998; Eagly &
Mladinic, 1989). If a feminist perspective were to do no more than set the
occasion for identifying such sources
of invisible control, then this would be
sufficient grounds for encouraging the
feminist perspective among behavior
analysts. But there is more to offer.
Of even more immediate practical
importance is feminists' focus on how
discriminatory cultural practices work
to disempower certain groups. Of particular interest to feminists is how discriminatory practices are invisibly and
seamlessly woven into well-established
cultural practices that are widely accepted and, it would seem, acceptable
to the mainstream in our culture. Feminist analyses are designed to dissect
such practices and expose the problems.
But doing so is often easier said than
done, because the literal invisibility of
discriminatory practices makes the exposing a difficult challenge. Specifically, discriminatory practices may be
visible to or discriminated by some,
though not all, members of a social
group who by virtue of their membership in that group are adversely affected by the practice. Members of the
dominant group, on the other hand, for
whom the practice is established and
who are favored or accommodated by
the practice are less likely to see the
practice as discriminatory in the sociopolitical sense. This social blindness by
members of the dominant group who
are accommodated by the practice is
likely related to the absence of discriminative contingencies that might make
the differentially oppressive effects of
the practice visible.
But the problem grows even further
in complexity as individuals who are
differentially affected engage in verbal
exchanges about such practices. Specifically, the highly selective effects of
subtle discriminatory practices may
make it difficult, if not impossible, for
a member of a group adversely affect-
PERSONAL AGENCY
ed by the practice to actually communicate effectively about it with a member of the dominant group not adversely affected. The notion of the so-called
"chilly climate" in the classroom for
female students is a good illustration of
this because of the subtlety of the practices that create such a climate. The
courts have now come to appreciate
this very point. Whereas in the past
such perceptions might have been put
to the "reasonable person test," the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the need for a "reasonable woman standard" in Ellison v. Brady
(1991). In this decision the court recognized that the perception of a subtle
discriminatory practice as such might
be different for men and women. That
is, what a reasonable woman may
"see" and interpret as sexist and oppressive, a reasonable man might not.
Writing for the majority, Circuit Judge
Beezer explains that
A complete understanding of the victim's view
requires, among other things, an analysis of the
different perspectives of men and women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable
may offend many women.... We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends
to systematically ignore the experiences of
women. (p. 7)
Justice Beezer clearly recognized that
the nuances of interpretation are related to a person's experiences. His articulation of this important point is compatible with a behavior-analytic interpretation of interpretive repertoires.
Specifically, whether an individual interprets a cultural practice as offensive,
oppressive, or objectionable has everything to do with the effects of those
practices on the person's behavior. Although direct experience may be sufficient, it is not necessary, because
rules concerning those relations may
also reveal the practice to be objectionable. To better understand how members of different social groups may
come to see and label cultural practices
differently, it is helpful to examine the
185
interactive dynamics of interpretive
repertoires with concrete examples.
ON THE INVISIBILITY OF
DISCRIMINATORY
PRACTICES AS
STIMULUS CLASSES
Hineline's (1992) analysis of interpretive repertoires as they relate to different situations is extremely helpful in
understanding how environmental arrangements might render discriminatory practices "invisible" to some interpreters but not others. Hineline asks
us to consider the case of a color-blind
experimenter who attempts to assess
and interpret the wavelength sensitivities of a participant with trichromatic
vision without the benefit or aid of specialized instruments. Imagine further
that you are an observer who, like the
participant of the experiment, has trichromatic vision, and who is unaware
that our experimenter is color-blind. As
you try to make sense of the experimenter's interpretations of the participant's discriminations, you may conclude that our experimenter is dense or
foolish in denying the validity of the
discriminations the participant is obviously making. And you might ask
yourself, in a figurative sense, "Is she
blind?"
On the other hand, imagine if our
experimenter was the only individual
with trichromatic vision. Imagine further that everyone else was color-blind,
including the participant and you, the
observer who is trying to make sense
of the experimenter's interpretations. In
this case you would be justifiably likely to conclude that there must be something wrong with the experimenter
who is after all insisting on distinctions
that do not make sense to anyone else.
In this case you might ask yourself, "Is
she crazy?"
Hineline's illustrations provide helpful examples of complexities that can
emerge when stimulus control relations
that influence repertoires of discrimination and generalization of the interpreter and the participant whose dis-
186
MARIA R. RUIZ
covered that, culturally speaking, he
was entering the wrong bathroom.
Applying the term trichromatic vision in a loose metaphor, if my father
were the subject of observation in an
investigation, and the experimenter or
interpreter were a North American scientist with trichromatic vision, culturally speaking, the experimenter might
well wonder whether my father was
"colored blind." This question would
be most likely if the interpreter had no
information about my father's cultural
history. The resulting disequilibrium in
stimulus control relations governing
their respective repertoires in this case
involves a class of environmental
events that are culturally peculiar to
and characteristic of the interpreter's
behavior (i.e., the experimenter observing and describing my father) but
not of the interpretee's (i.e., my father's) behavior.
Now imagine the reverse, that is, my
father observing a colleague, also of
Euro-American descent but with culturally sensitive lenses. This colleague
walks three times as far as he to go to
the bathroom for no apparent reason.
My father might interpret his behavior
as strange, and wonder why this colleague is "going out of his way" to use
The Bathroom
the bathroom. It is unlikely that my father would interpret his colleague's beThis scenario comes from a story havior as "sensitive" to subtle cultural
that my father tells about a personal expectations.
experience. Our family emigrated from
Cuba to the United States in the 1960s, INTERPRETIVE REPERTOIRES
and once in the U.S. my father entered
APPLIED TO INVISIBILITY
a residency program in pathology in a
central Florida hospital in order to valDiscriminatory cultural practices are
idate his medical degree. At the time, seldom as conspicuously labeled as
the men's bathrooms in the hospital were the segregated bathrooms in the
were labeled in one of two ways: either 1960s. As sources of behavioral con"men", or "colored men."' The bath- trol, these practices tend instead to be
room closest to the laboratory where inconspicuously embedded in standard
my father worked and the one he used cultural practices. Feminist psycholoconsistently was designated "colored gists' primary research interest has
men." The racial designation and the been the analysis of gender, as well as
cultural practices signified by the la- other socially constructed categories
bels were not familiar to my father at such as race and class. They have arfirst; that is, he could not tact these. gued that gender and other culturally
Our family is of Euro-American de- constructed categories are transmitted
scent, and it wasn't long before he dis- through cultural practices. Moreover,
criminative responding he or she is interpreting (i.e., the interpretee) are different. In Hineline's examples certain
wavelength values will remain invisible to the individual who is color-blind.
And the participant with trichromatic
vision may not be able to appropriately
affect her listener as she tries to communicate to the color-blind interpreter
the stimulus classes that are operative
for her. Conversely, a color-blind interpreter may simply not see, and therefore, not get the stimulus control relations that are operative for the participant with trichromatic vision whose
repertoire he or she is interpreting.
Now I want to borrow Hineline's illustration and apply the terms trichromatic vision and color blindness in a
rather loose metaphor to illustrate how
the same types of complexities, or disequilibria, may emerge with stimulus
control relations that involve cultural
practices, rather than wavelength, as
the stimulus class. This scenario illustrates how cultural practices may come
to be labeled discriminatory, or interpreted as different, by individuals from
one group while remaining invisible as
such to members of another.
PERSONAL AGENCY
one's gender or race strongly influences the conceptual classes that come to
control one's behavior in keeping with
such practices. In fact, researchers
have shown that these conceptual
classes are, in many instances, different for men and women (Bosmajian,
1995; Richardson, 1997) and for
blacks and whites (Moore, 1995;
Scheurich, 1993).
The Classroom
Consider a more typical example of
the subtlety and invisibility of discriminatory cultural practices. This scenario comes from a story that a colleague
of mine tells about a graduate student
at her university. My colleague and another department member, both of
whom teach in their university's women's studies program, held an informal
discussion group for graduate students
interested in feminist issues. The group
met weekly, and Sandy, a doctoral student in psychology, came to the group
on a regular basis. One afternoon
Sandy came into the meeting a few
minutes late. She was upset and having
a difficult time connecting with the discussion, rare in her case because she
was typically an energetic and assertive leader in discussions.
The group asked Sandy what was
the matter and she gasped for words.
She was upset about some things that
had happened in her Individual Psychotherapy class, but she was not clear
about what specifically had upset her.
She talked with some friends after
class to see if they had had similar reactions. They too were feeling strange,
but were not sure why. This lack of
clarity in the students' understanding
turns out to be a very important point
that I'll return to.
The group continued to listen and to
ask questions. "What happened in
class today?" The professor had shown
an old but classic film on the topic of
psychotherapy that was upsetting to
Sandy. The film was made in the early
1960s (same period as the bathroom
signs) and displayed outdated fashions
187
and outdated cultural stereotypes that
have changed over the past 30 some
years. Nevertheless, the film is a classic and contains three segments with
Fritz Perls, Carl Rogers, and Albert Ellis working with the same female patient whose name is Gloria, and illustrating how their particular brand of
therapy-gestalt, client-centered, and
rational emotive therapy, respectively-is done. The group tried to help
Sandy decipher her feelings and relate
them to what had gone on in the class.
It was not simple for her to make connections. She knew "how" she felt,
but she was having a very difficult
time specifying why and putting words
to it. This is, once again, an important
point for our analysis.
Eventually the group discovered that
there were two aspects of the classroom situation that had set the occasion for her reaction. First was the content of the film. The film depicted a
young female patient who came to
therapy because she felt depressed.
Gloria was a divorced mother with two
children to care for. The divorce had
created financial circumstances that
forced her to work outside the home.
She felt guilty about having to leave
the children to go to work. She also felt
guilty because she had begun to date
for the first time since her divorce, and
was concerned that working and dating
made her a "bad mother."
All three therapists responded to the
patient by directing their attention at
strategies for coping with the guilt and
depression. Sandy pointed out that this
poor woman had a right to be depressed given the situation she was in,
and it added insult to injury that she
should feel guilty that the situation rendered her a "bad mother." Yet none of
the therapists focused on or even
picked up on the patient's problematic
situation or context. None challenged
the notion that a working mother is a
"bad mother" or that a single mother
who dates is irresponsible. The cultural
stereotypes that help to create and exacerbate this woman's stress remained
invisible to the therapists, and her pa-
188
MARIA R. RUIZ
thology was the exclusive focus of
their respective therapeutic interventions.
The group suggested to Sandy that
the film was outdated, it was filmed in
the 1960s, after all, and things had
changed. My colleague then asked her
if she had shared her misgivings with
the professor and the rest of the class.
The group then discovered the second
aspect of the situation that had upset
Sandy. After the film ended, the professor asked the class to determine
which of the three therapists each student would pick to go to for therapy,
and why. Sandy was sure that she
would not pick any of them. She made
an attempt to communicate this to the
professor and the class, but she was unclear when she tried to explain why she
was having negative reactions. In fact
she realized that she did not have a
clear understanding herself of the reasons for her reactions. The professor
gently steered Sandy and the class to
focus on the question he had posed,
"Of the three alternatives, which
would you pick, and why?" Sandy felt
silenced, disempowered, and confused.
"Not only had the therapists in the film
missed the point," said Sandy to the
group, "but so did our professor."
The scenario is a powerful illustration of how hidden assumptions leading to subtle discriminatory practices
can remain invisible as such. These
may be particularly likely to remain invisible to members of a group not directly affected by them. In this scenario Gloria's "problems" were understood by all authority figures, the therapists and professor alike, in much the
same way that Cartwright had understood the problems of runaway slaves
nearly 200 years ago. That is, they
were legitimate problems that the individual should address and solve for
herself in this case, with the help of a
therapist. Sandy's view that the woman's troubles are related to the problematic nature of women's roles in our
society and the social construction of
the "good mother" remained unarticulated. The locus of the problem, as
defined by the authority figures in the
film and the classroom, was the patient
herself. A focus on the patient as the
source of the problem is tacit if not explicit acceptance of the assumptions
that a working divorced mother who
dates is a bad mother in our culture.
Moreover, it is also implicitly assumed
that she does well to seek individual
psychotherapy to deal with the anxieties and depression that such behaviors
not surprisingly occasion.
Note the complementary treatments
of this situation by feminist theory and
radical behaviorism. A feminist analysis of the scenario exposes the assumptions embedded in these cultural practices, whereas a behavioral analysis of
the interpretative repertoires of the objecting student and the affirming professor helps us to understand the
sources of the disequilibrium in the
two repertoires. Specifically, and to put
it in terms of the metaphor we used
before, the disequilibrium involves the
repertoire of a student with culturally
speaking trichromatic vision who
"sees," subtle discriminatory practices
and tacts them as such. It also involves
the repertoire of a professor who is in
turn "color blind" and for whom these
practices, as such, remain invisible.
AGENCY: A RADICAL
BEHAVIORIST
RECONSTRUCTION
Sandy's dilemma brings into focus a
class of educational practices feminists
refer to as the hidden curriculum. The
term is somewhat misleading in that it
may suggest gratuitous intentionality
on the part of the educational establishment. In fact, the hidden curriculum can be described as a class of educational practices that have differential effects on the behavior of male and
female students (Association of American University Women, 1995). However, the overwhelming majority of
teachers are unable to tact the differential reinforcement contingencies they
administer (e.g. Eccles, 1992; Spender,
1982). Therefore, differential selection
PERSONAL AGENCY
as a practice transmitted through the
hidden curriculum remains largely invisible to students and teachers of both
sexes. Feminist praxis encourages us to
ask questions such as "How do we
teach students and teachers to become
aware of these effects? How do we
promote resistance to these practices
by students and teachers alike?"
It is my contention that a behavioranalytic perspective is the appropriate
tool with which to address these feminist concerns. Moreover, this presents
an opportune juncture for radical behaviorists to engage the feminist verbal
community in a conversation. However, for the conversation to proceed productively, a complete reworking of the
view of the individual as self-actional
agent is necessary. The view of the individual as locus of agency and awareness must be transformed so that we
can begin to speak about tacting repertoires as potentially agentic action
and the role of the verbal community
in their emergence. Let us be more specific.
When we speak of agency from a
radical behaviorist perspective, we
speak of acts in context. Agency is not
seen as a characteristic of the individual, but rather as a characteristic of
acts. Agency, therefore, is action, and
agent acts can be distinguished from
nonagent acts in that agent acts include
awareness or "knowing that" one's actions are related to key aspects of the
current circumstance, and the individual can give an explanation relating the
act in context. In other words, agent
acts incorporate a verbal repertoire for
naming or, as Skinner referred to it,
tacting stimulus conditions that set the
occasion for the act as well as its functions.
Feminist Praxis
Given this reworking of agency, let
us return briefly to issues of feminist
praxis, which I raised earlier in this paper. The development of feminist voice
or resistance, or to use Skinner's term
countercontrol, is critical in the femi-
189
nist agenda. Therefore, a key question
to ask is "can the behavioral reconceptualization of agency help us understand how to facilitate the development
of these agentic acts?" I believe it can
in the following way. Feminist resistance requires the convergence of two
distinct but related repertoires which
together function as the locus of agency. First, the repertoire "knowing
how" is acquired through direct experience. Second, the repertoire "knowing that" enables us to explain an act
of resistance and its functional relation
to external, contextual circumstances.
Beyond direct experience, verbal
explanations require socially mediated
learning and a verbal community that
can mediate such learning.
I now return to the case of Sandy to
illustrate. First, Sandy experienced
feelings of discomfort in the classroom
but she could not explain them; that is,
she knew "how" she felt, but she could
not articulate why. So when she tried
to speak in the classroom, she was unclear to the professor. The professor, in
turn "not seeing" her point, steered the
class back to what he wished them to
focus on, that is "which therapist
would you choose and why?" There
was no opportunity in this situation for
Sandy to come to "know that" her
feelings were specifically related to the
disequilibrium between her own interpretation of Gloria's problems and the
therapists'.
The second important point is that
following the classroom discussion
Sandy felt even worse, because now
her interpretative repertoire was out of
sync with that of yet another authority
figure, the professor. Far from facilitating the emergence of agentic voice, in
the behavioral sense, the classroom experience inadvertently silenced Sandy's
voice and blocked the emergence of
what feminists call resistance.
This takes us back to the issues
raised earlier. We know that an overarching goal of feminist research is to
develop a feminist epistemology that
can address how gender operates as an
epistemological system to frame wom-
190
MARIA R. RUIZ
en's experiences and their interpretations of those experiences (Kaschak,
1992; Unger, 1990). The behaviorist
conceptual framework and behavioranalytic tools can be brought to bear
on this problem in a number of ways.
To illustrate, radical behaviorists understand subjective knowledge or selfknowledge to be socially constructed
and originating within the verbal community. Skinner's (1974) treatment of
self-knowledge is particularly useful
here as he described that
Self knowledge is of social origin. It is only
when a person's private world becomes important to others that it is made important to him
(sic). [Nonetheless] self-knowledge has a special
value to the individual himself. A person who
has been made "aware of himself" by the questions he has been asked is in a better position to
predict and control his own behavior. (p. 31)
The focus of analysis, in turn, is on the
contingencies set up by the verbal
community in the development of such
knowledge. The tools of behavior analysis may prove to be valuable in unveiling relations that work to establish
and transmit gender as an epistemological system influencing how women
and men live, become aware of their
experiences, and interpret them.
Sandy's small but critical feminist
verbal community kept probing and
asking her the kinds of questions that
led her to become aware of the relations between her private responses
and the events in the classroom. These
questions set the occasion for her
"knowing that" she was responding to
relationships the professor did not see.
Not only did her feminist verbal community help Sandy tact important stimulus control relations, but members
also validated these through shared experiences of disequilibrium and silencing.
Mediating Tacting Repertoires or
Helping the Blind to "See"
Because feminists and behaviorists
are interested in effective action, we
must reflect on what sorts of effective
action this conceptual analysis might
recommend. Specifically, what kinds
of experiences might be sufficient to
facilitate the acquisition of tacting repertoires or the double vision that we
have discussed? For example, what
minimal experiences might we expose
our professor to in order to bring his
interpretive repertoire and Sandy's into
equilibrium? This is the type of question that feminists involved with consciousness raising have asked for over
30 years.
Having defined the task as involving
the emergence of tacting repertoires,
we might proceed to recommend the
use of training films with scenarios
similar to Sandy's that set the occasion
for gender-related asymmetrical interpretations. Viewing the film would
then be followed by verbal interactions
designed to bring into focus and tact
gender-related stimulus classes embedded in the actors' repertoires. Ultimately, the emergence and maintenance of
such repertoires, or double visions, will
relate back to the metacontingencies
that are operative within organizations
that select for them. Behavior analysts
who work within organizations including education, industry, and the military are in a unique position to affect
relevant cultural practices beyond earlier efforts at simple consciousness
raising with the tools of cultural analysis (Biglan, 1988; Glenn, 1985, 1988;
Glenn & Malagodi, 1991; Malagodi &
Jackson, 1989; Mattaini, 1996).
CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for radical behaviorists to join the conversation on feminist issues that is entering its fifth decade of development. The growing impact of feminist scholarship, activism,
and politics will continue without our
input, but for behaviorists to remain silent would mean a loss for all. Our
commonalities include historical roots,
visions of the transformative possibilities of human behavior, and the commitment to create optimal environments for behavioral development. A
merger is indeed in the interest of both
communities. Feminists can use our
191
PERSONAL AGENCY
tools to good effect, and we can integrate the feminist orientation in important areas in which effective action is
sorely needed. This is a fine opportunity to forge a potentially valuable alliance, as many of our colleagues have
urged us to do (Allen, Barone, &
Kuhn, 1993; Foxx, 1996; Neuringer,
1991).
Forging this alliance will be a challenging task, but the products of our
efforts are highly promising. The most
difficult impasse will be the reconceptualization of personal agency called
for by a behavioral analysis. Yet this
transformative act can have liberating
effects on feminist theory and practice.
Specifically, the behavioral perspective
shifts the focus from agency as a quality of the person to agency as a characteristic of acts. This perspective dismisses the distinction between person
and situation and the conceptual traps
embedded in this false dichotomy. That
is, the person and the situation are no
longer understood as separate or even
distinct from one another, but rather as
relational coparticipants in a behavioral
process.
This behavioral process entails the
development of what we might call
agentic voice, or said in other terms,
interpretive repertoires. From a feminist radical behaviorist perspective,
agency is said to emerge not in opposition to cultural practices or in spite of
these. Rather, agency emerges as the
understanding of the very behavioral
dynamics of such controlling practices.
So, to speak of agency is to speak of
emergent verbal process. The verbal
community creates the conditions under which we learn to name and interpret our experiences, viewing and describing ourselves not as isolated and
insulated loci of information choice
and power but as relational and dynamic selves in process. Finally, the
development and maintenance of agentic action can then be understood as a
collective process that properly resides
within the verbal community.
REFERENCES
Allen, K. D., Barone, V. J., & Kuhn, B. R.
(1993). A behavioral prescription for promoting applied behavior analysis within pediatrics. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis,
26, 493-502.
Association of American University Women.
(1995). How schools short change girls. New
York: Marlowe.
Biglan, A. (1988). Behavior analysis and the
larger context. Behavior Analysis, 23, 25-32.
Bosmajian, H. (1995). The language of sexism.
In P S. Rothenberg (Ed.), Race, class, and
gender in the United States: An integrated
study (pp. 386-392). New York: St. Martin.
Broverman, I. K., Broverman, D. M., Clarkson,
F E., Rosenkrantz, P. S., & Vogel, S. R.
(1970). Sex-role stereotypes and clinical
judgements of mental health. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 34, 1-7.
Collins, L. H. (1998). Illustrating feminist theory: Power and psychopathology. Psychology
of Women Quarterly, 22, 97-112.
Crowley-Long, K. (1998). Making room for
many feminisms: The dominance of the liberal political perspective in the psychology of
women course. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 22, 113-130.
Eagly, A. H., & Mladinic, A. (1989). Gender
stereotypes and attitudes towards women and
men. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15, 543-558.
Eccles, J. (1992). Bringing young women to
math and science. In M. Crawford & M. Gentry (Eds.), Gender and thought (pp. 36-59).
New York: Springer-Verlag.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F2d 872, C.A.9 (Cal.)
1991.
Foxx, R. (1996). Translating the covenant: The
behavior analyst as ambassador and translator.
The Behavior Analyst, 19, 147-162.
Glenn, S. S. (1985). Some reciprocal roles between behavior analysis and institutional economics in post-Darwinian science. The Behavior Analyst, 8, 15-27.
Glenn, S. S. (1988). Contingencies and metacontingencies: Toward a behavior analysis and
cultural materialism. The Behavior Analyst,
11, 161-179.
Glenn, S. S., & Malagodi, E. F. (1991). Process
and content in behavioral and cultural phenomena. Behavior and Social Issues, 1, 1-14.
Hermnann, A. C., & Stewart, A. J. (1994). Theorizing feminism: Parallel trends in the humanities and social sciences. Boulder, CO:
Westview.
Hineline, P. (1992). A self-interpretive behavior
analysis. American Psychologist, 47, 12741286.
Kaschak, E. (1992). Engendered lives: A new
psychology of women's experience. New
York: Harper Collins.
Kazdin, A. E. (1977). Assessing the clinical or
applied importance of behavior change
192
MARIA R. RUIZ
through social validation. Behavior Modification, 1, 427-451.
Kirk, G., & Okazawa-Rey, M. (1998). Women's
lives: Multicultural perspectives. Mountain
View, CA: Mayfield.
Malagodi, E. F, & Jackson, K. (1989). Behavior analysis and cultural analysis: Troubles
and issues. The Behavior Analyst, 12, 17-34.
Mattaini, M.A. (1996). Envisioning cultural
practices. The Behavior Analyst, 19, 257-272.
Moore, R. B. (1995). Racism in the English language. In P. S. Rothenberg (Ed.), Race, class,
and gender in the United States: An integrated
study (pp. 376-386). New York: St. Martin.
Neuringer, A. (1991). Humble behaviorism. The
Behavior Analyst, 14, 1-13.
Reinharz, S. (1992). Feminist methods in social
research. New York: Oxford.
Richardson, L. (1997). Gender stereotyping in
the English language. In L. Richardson, V.
Taylor, & N. Whittier (Eds.), Feminist frontiers (Vol. 4, pp. 115-122). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Rogers, C. (1966). Some issues concerning the
control of human behavior: A symposium. In
R. Ulrich, T. Stachnik, & J. Mabry (Eds.),
Control of human behavior (pp. 301-316).
Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
Ruiz, M. R. (1992, March). Feminism and behaviorism in historical perspective: Kindreds
in the challenge of a worldview. Paper presented at the 16th annual meeting of the
Southeastern Women's Studies Association,
Tampa, FL.
Ruiz, M. R. (1995). B. F Skinner's radical behaviorism: Historical misconstructions and
grounds for feminist reconstructions. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 19, 161-179.
Ruiz, M. R. (1996, June). Re-conceptualizing
agency in feminist theory: A radical behaviorist perspective. Paper presented at the 17th
annual meeting of the National Women's
Studies Association, Saratoga Springs, NY
Ruiz, M. R., & Tallen, B. S. (1993, March).
Modem feminist theory and psychology: Rebellious twins from a dysfunctionalfamily. Paper presented at the 18th annual meeting of
the Association for Women in Psychology,
Atlanta, GA.
Scheurich, J. J. (1993). Toward a white discourse on white racism. Educational Researcher, 22, 5-10.
Skinner, B. F (1974). About behaviorism. New
York: Knopf.
Spender, D. (1982). Invisible women: The
schooling scandal. London: Writers and Readers Publishing.
Tavris, C. (1992). Mismeasure of woman. New
York: Simon & Shuster.
Todd, J. T., & Morris, E. K. (1983). Misconceptions and miseducation: Presentations of
radical behaviorism in psychology textbooks.
The Behavior Analyst, 6, 153-160.
Todd, J. T., & Morris, E. K. (1992). Case histories in the great power of misrepresentation.
American Psychologist, 47, 1441-1453.
Unger, R. K. (1988). Psychological, feminist,
and personal epistemology: Transcending contradiction. In M. M. Gergen (Ed.), Feminist
thought and the structure of knowledge (pp.
124-141). New York: University Press.
Unger, R. K. (1989). Sex in psychological paradigms-from behavior to cognition. In R. K.
Unger (Ed.), Representations: Social constructions of gender (pp. 15-28). New York:
Baywood.
Unger, R. K. (1990). Imperfect reflections of
reality: Psychology constructs gender. In R.
Hare Mustin & J. Marecek (Eds.), Making a
difference: Psychology and the construction of
gender (pp. 102-149). New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Wolf, M. M. (1978). Social validity: The case
for subjective measurement, or how applied
behavior analysis is finding its heart. Journal
of Applied Behavior Analysis, 11, 203-214.
Introdução:
O que é o feminismo?
Nós, que nos dedicamos a estudara vida das mulheres, necessi­
tamos e queremos basear nossa autoridade em uma linha de pen­
samento feminina. Reivindicamos uma genealogia de mulheres
pensadoras que nunca se interrompeu, mas quefoi escamoteada sis­
tematicamentepelopatriarcado e que a universidade com seu androcentrismo continua escondendo ou condenando à excepcionalidade
ou à marginalidade, o que vem a ser mais ou menos a mesma coisa.
Fina Birulés
Estamos vivendo um fato muito curioso na sociedade contem­
porânea: políticos, pesquisadores, organizações públicas e privadas
afirmam que estào introduzindo a perspectiva de “gênero” em
seus trabalhos, pesquisas e nas relações de trabalho. Praticamente
ninguém nega que é necessário o enfoque de “gênero” no desen­
volvimento de políticas públicas. Entretanto muitas dessas mesmas
pessoas torcem o nariz quando a palavra feminismo é mencionada.
Por que isso acontece? Por que a palavra “gênero” parece menos
perigosa do que feminismo?
A resposta mais óbvia é porque desconhecem o que é o femi­
nismo e todas as suas realizações, mas talvez a mais realista seja
a de que essas pessoas foram “desinformadas”, pois o feminismo
ao longo de sua história foi alvo de campanhas que fizeram com
Carla Cristina Garcia
que a população de modo geral acreditasse que o feminismo era
um inimigo a combater e não que segundo a época e a realidade
de cada país existiram e coexistiram muitos tipos de feminismo
com um nexo comum: lutar pelo reconhecimento de direitos e
oportunidades para as mulheres e, com isso, pela igualdade de
todos os seres humanos.
É preciso ressaltar que, ao longo da história da sociedade
ocidental, muitos discursos de legitimação da desigualdade entre
homens e mulheres foram produzidos. A mitologia e as religiões
são bons exemplos. Na Grécia Clássica e na tradição judaico-cristã,
Pandora e Eva respectivamente desempenham o mesmo papel: o
de demonstrar que a curiosidade feminina é a causa das desgraças
humanas e da expulsão dos homens do Paraíso.
A ciência e a filosofia ocidentais também têm funcionado com o
legitimadores da desigualdade e continuam, em maior ou menor
medida, cumprindo essa tarefa.
O ocultamento do trabalho feminista foi tão intenso e eficaz que
temos consciência de que este livro logo precisará ser atualizado
e isso não apenas porque novas tendências irão aparecer, mas
porque o trabalho das feministas dos últimos anos tem produzido
material suficiente para rastrearmos a história escondida e silen­
ciada e recuperarmos os textos e as contribuições das feministas
que acrescentarão nomes, ações e textos até hoje desconhecidos.
Por esta razão, é preciso mostrar que feminismo tem uma longa
história como movimento social emancipatório. Este é um discurso
capaz de impugnar, criticar, desestabilizar e mudar essa relação
injusta por conta de sua força crítica.
O termo feminismo foi primeiro empregado nos Estados Unidos
por volta de 1911, quando escritores, homens e mulheres, come­
çaram a usá-lo no lugar das expressões utilizadas no século XIX
tais como movimento das mulheres e problemas das mulheres, para
descrever um novo movimento na longa história das lutas pelos
direitos e liberdades das mulheres. Esse novo feminismo visava ir
Breve História do Feminismo
além do sufrágio e de campanhas pela moral e pureza social bus­
cando uma determinação intelectual, política e sexual. O objetivo
das feministas americanas era um equilíbrio entre as necessidades
de amor e de realização, individual e política, o que parecia algo
muito difícil de conseguir.
Em um sentido amplo, pode-se afirmar que sempre que as
mulheres - individual ou coletivamente - criticaram o destino
injusto e muitas vezes amargo que o patriarcado lhes impôs e rei­
vindicaram seus direitos por uma vida mais justa estamos diante
de uma ação feminista. Porém, neste livro, aborda-se o feminismo de
maneira mais específica: trataremos os diferentes momentos his­
tóricos em que as mulheres articularam, tanto na teoria quanto na
prática, um conjunto coerente de reivindicações e se organizaram
para consegui-las.
Desse modo, o feminismo pode ser definido como a tomada
de consciência das mulheres como coletivo humano, da opressão,
dominação e exploração de que foram e são objeto por parte do
coletivo de homens no seio do patriarcado sob suas diferentes fases
históricas, que as move em busca da liberdade de seu sexo e de
todas as transformações da sociedade que sejam necessárias para
este fim. Partindo desse princípio, o feminismo se articula como
filosofia política e, ao mesmo tempo, como movimento social.
Como veremos, não existe apenas um tipo de feminismo, mas
vários, pois são muitas as correntes de pensamento que o compõem,
isto porque uma das características que diferencia o feminismo de
outras correntes de pensamento político é que está constituído pelo
fazer e pensar de milhares de mulheres pelo mundo todo.
Além de ser uma teoria política e uma prática social o femi­
nismo é muito mais. O discurso, a reflexão e a prática feminista
carregam também uma ética e uma forma de estar no mundo.
A tomada de consciência feminista transforma - inevitavelmente a vida de cada uma das mulheres que dela se aproximam, pois a
consciência da discriminação supõe uma postura diferente diante
Carla Cristina Garcia
dos fatos. Supõe dar-se conta das mentiras - pequenas ou grandes em que a história, a cultura, a economia, os grandes projetos, os
pequenos detalhes do cotidiano estão alicerçados. Supõe enxergar
os micromachismos, as pequenas manobras realizadas por muitos
homens todos os dias para manter sob seu poder as mulheres e a
estafa que supõe manter duplas ou mais jornadas de tarefas. Ser
consciente de que estamos infrarrepresentadas na política e ver como
a mulher é coisificada dia a dia na publicidade. Supõe saber que
segundo a ONU uma em cada três mulheres no mundo já sofreu
algum tipo de maus-tratos ou abuso.
Nisso consiste a capacidade emancipadora do feminismo. Ele é
como um motor que vai transformando as relações entre homens
e mulheres e seu impacto é sentido em todas as áreas do conhe­
cimento. O feminismo é uma consciência crítica que ressalta as
tensões e contradições que encerram todos esses discursos que
intencionalmente confundem o masculino com o universal.
O feminismo engloba muitas expectativas e muitas vontades
operantes. Incide em todas as instâncias e temas relevantes desde
as questões sobre os novos processos produtivos até os desafios
impostos pelo meio ambiente. Sua importância é de tal calibre
que não podemos conhecer todas as suas consequências, cada
um de seus efeitos pontuais seja a diminuição na taxa de nata­
lidade, a transformação industrial, a organização do trabalho. O
feminismo é uma lanterna que mostra as sombras de todas as
grandes ideias gestadas e desenvolvidas sem a participação das
mulheres e muitas vezes à custa das mesmas: democracia, desen­
volvimento econômico, Estado de Bem-Estar Social, justiça, família,
religião. As feministas empunham esta lanterna com orgulho por
ser a herança de milhões de mulheres que partindo da submissão
forçada - enquanto eram atacadas, ridicularizadas, vilipendiadas souberam construir uma cultura, uma ética e uma ideologia nova
e revolucionária para enriquecer e democratizar o mundo. Esta é
a luz que ilumina os quartos escuros da intolerância dos precon­
ceitos e dos abusos.
Breve História do Feminismo
Por fim, o feminismo é uma lanterna cuja luz é lilás. Ninguém
sabe ao certo por que o lilás é a cor do feminismo. Diz-se que
esta foi adotada em honra às 129 mulheres que morreram em uma
tecelagem norte-americana no dia 8 de março de 1857 quando o
dono da fábrica, diante da greve realizada pelas operárias, ateou
fogo ao galpào com todas as mulheres presas dentro do prédio. Esta
é a versão mais aceita sobre a origem das comemorações do Dia
Internacional das Mulheres. Esta história conta que os tecidos em
que estavam trabalhando eram dessa cor. Outra, que esta era a cor
da fumaça que saía da chaminé que se podia ver a quilômetros de
distância. Existem outras versões sobre esta história, mas tanto a cor
quanto a data são compartilhados por feministas do mundo todo.1
Para analisar, explicar e modificar essas realidades, a teoria
feminista desenvolveu quatro conceitos-chave: androcentrismo,
patriarcado, sexismo e gênero, intimamente relacionados e que
servem como instrumentos de análise para examinar as sociedades
atuais, detectar os mecanismos de exclusão, conhecer suas causas
e propor soluções para modificar essa realidade.
Androcentrismo
O mundo se define em masculino e ao homem é atribuída a
representação da humanidade. Isto é o androcentrismo: considerar o
homem como medida de todas as coisas. O androcentrismo distorceu
a realidade, deformou a ciência e tem graves consequências na
1 A data foi proposta pela alemã Clara Zetkin, uma das organizadoras da
II Conferência Internacional das Mulheres Socialistas, em Copenhague/
Dinamarca, em 1910. Nessa reunião ficou estabelecido que o dia 8 de março
seria uma data marcada para as grandes manifestações em toda a Europa,
em homenagem às operárias da fábrica de Nova York. Mas foi apenas em
1977, quando mais de 1 milhào de mulheres se reuniram nas ruas, que a
data passou a ser reconhecida pela ONU como o dia internacional de luta
pelos direitos de igualdade das mulheres.
Carla Cristina Garcia
vida cotidiana. Enfocar um estudo, uma análise ou pesquisa a
partir unicamente da perspectiva masculina, e utilizar os resultados
como válidos para todo o resto do mundo, faz com que todo o
conhecimento produzido nào seja confiável ou, no mínimo, tenha
enormes lacunas e confusões. Um bom exemplo de androcentrismo
sào os meios de comunicação. A visão androcêntrica do mundo
decide e seleciona quais fatos, acontecimentos ou personalidades
sào noticias, quais serão primeira página e a quem ou ao que
dedicar tempo e espaço. Essa mesma visão também decide quem o
explicará diante dos microfones, quem dará a chave dos aconteci­
mentos. Como os meios de comunicação configuram a visão que a
sociedade tem do mundo, perpetuam, em pleno século XXI, a visão
androcêntrica. A distorção do androcentrismo e suas consequên­
cias também são sentidas em outras áreas como a medicina. Outro
exemplo: popularmente sabe-se que os sintomas do infarto sào dor
e pressào no peito e dor intensa no braço esquerdo. Mas poucas
pessoas sabem que esses sào os sintomas masculinos. Nas mulheres
os sintomas sào dor abdominal, náuseas e pressão no pescoço.
Patriarcado
Até que a teoria feminista o redefiniu, se considerava o patriar­
cado como o governo dos patriarcas, cuja autoridade provinha de
sua sabedoria. A partir do século XIX, quando começaram a ser
desenvolvidas teorias que explicam a hegemonia masculina, passou-se a utilizar o termo em seu sentido crítico. É o feminismo radical,
a partir dos anos 70 do século XX que o utiliza como peça-chave
de suas análises. Para este o patriarcado pode ser definido como.Forma de organização política, econômica, religiosa, social
baseada na ideia de autoridade e liderança do homem, no qual se
dá opredomínio dos homens sobre as mulheres; do marido sobre as
Breve História do Feminismo
esposas, dopai sobre a mãe, dos velhos sobre osjovens, e da linhagem
paterna sobre a materna. Opatriarcado surgiu da tomada depoder
histórico por parte dos homens que se apropriaram da sexualidade
e reprodução das mulheres e seus produtos: os filhos, criando ao
mesmo tempo uma ordem simbólicapor meio dos mitos e da religião
que o perpetuam como única estrutura possível.2
Analisar o patriarcado como um sistema político significou
enxergar até onde se estendiam o controle e o domínio sobre as
mulheres. Boa parte da riqueza teórica do feminismo procede daí.
Ao se dar conta de que o controle patriarcal se estendia também às
famílias, às relações sexuais, trabalhistas e outras esferas, as feminis­
tas popularizaram a ideia de que opessoal épolítico. As mulheres se
deram conta de que aquilo que pensavam ser problemas individuais
eram experiências comuns a todas, fruto de um sistema opressor.
Essa consciência foi determinante, por exemplo, para a análise
da violência de gênero. Durante séculos as mulheres acreditaram
que a culpa pela violência que sofriam era delas. No Brasil, esse
sentimento ainda é comum e até que os movimentos feministas
conseguissem que esse tema aparecesse nos meios de comunicação,
milhares de mulheres pensavam que sofrer maus-tratos era normal.
É importante ressaltar que a existência do patriarcado não quer
dizer que as mulheres não tenham nenhum tipo de poder ou direito.
Mas as feministas chamam as conquistas políticas das mulheres
neste sistema de vitórias paradoxais. Um exemplo: nas sociedades
ocidentais contemporâneas, as mulheres conseguiram o direito à
educação e ao trabalho remunerado, mas a maioria daquelas que
trabalham fora de casa, tanto as assalariadas quanto as autônomas,
continua encarregada do trabalho doméstico e do cuidado com os
2 REGUANT, Dolores. La mujer no existe. Bilbao: Maite Canal, 1996, p. 20.
In: Victoria Sau. Diccionario ideologicofeminista, vol. III. Barcelona: Içaria,
2001 .
p
Carla Cristina Garcia
filhos. É a dupla jornada ou a dupla presença. Mesmo aquelas que
conseguem delegar essa tarefa também o fazem sobre outras mulhe­
res mais pobres ou mais velhas: as empregadas domésticas e as avós.
As formas do patriarcado variam. Em um país como a Arábia
Saudita, por exemplo, onde as mulheres não possuem nenhum
direito fundamental, sua realidade não se parece com a das euro­
peias que, ao menos formalmente, conseguiram seus direitos. Na
Europa, o patriarcado utiliza outros instrumentos para manter os
estereótipos e os papéis sexuais, a discriminação no mundo do
trabalho e a violência de gênero que continuam a existir em núme­
ros assustadores. Por isso, é habitual encontrar ideias opostas em
relação à atual situação das mulheres no mundo. Aqueles que não
levam em conta o patriarcado asseguram que as coisas mudaram
tremendamente, mas quem o percebe com nitidez afirma que as
coisas não mudaram tanto assim: são osproblemas que mudam sem
desaparecer O objetivo fundamental do feminismo é acabar com
o patriarcado como forma de organização política.
Sexismo
O machismo é um discurso da desigualdade. Consiste na dis­
criminação baseada na crença de que os homens são superiores às
mulheres. Na prática utiliza-se esse conceito para qualificar atos ou
palavras com as quais normalmente de forma ofensiva ou vulgar se
demonstra o sexismo subjacente à estrutura social. Desse modo, há
situações em que uma expressão, uma piada, uma desqualificação,
uma observação são machistas sem que a pessoa que o disse seja
sexista. Por isso, um machista não é forçosamente um sexista e
vice-versa. Então o que é o sexismo?
O sexismo se define como o conjunto de todos e cada um dos
métodos empregados no seio do patriarcado para manter em situa­
ção de inferioridade, subordinação e exploração o sexo dominado:
Breve História do Feminismo
o feminino. O sexismo abarca todos os âmbitos da vida e das
relações humanas. Ou seja, nào se trata de costumes, piadas ou
manifestações do poderio masculino em um momento determinado,
mas de uma ideologia que defende a subordinação das mulheres
e todos os métodos utilizados para que essa desigualdade se per­
petue. Um exemplo é a divisão da educação por sexos, constante
na nossa sociedade e que tem oscilado entre ensinar as meninas
unicamente a costurar e a rezar até a proibição de ingressarem
na universidade ou exercerem certas profissões.
Gênero
Quando falamos de gênero, fazemos referência a um conceito
construído pelas ciências sociais nas últimas décadas para analisar
a construção sócio-histórica das identidades masculina e feminina.
A teoria afirma que entre todos os elementos que constituem o
sistema de gênero - também denominado “patriarcado” por algumas
correntes de pesquisa - existem discursos de legitimação sexual
ou ideologia sexual. Esses discursos legitimam a ordem estabe­
lecida, justificam a hierarquização dos homens e do masculino e
das mulheres e do feminino em cada sociedade determinada. São
sistemas de crenças que especificam o que é característico de um
e outro sexo e, a partir daí, determinam os direitos, os espaços, as
atividades e as condutas próprias de cada sexo.
O conceito de gênero é a categoria central da teoria feminista.
Parte da ideia de que o feminino e o masculino nào são fatos
naturais ou biológicos, mas sim construções culturais. Por gênero
entendem-se todas as normas, obrigações, comportamentos, pen­
samentos, capacidades e até mesmo o caráter que se exigiu que
as mulheres tivessem por serem biologicamente mulheres. Gênero
nào é sinônimo de sexo. Quando falamos de sexo estamos nos
referindo à biologia - as diferenças físicas entre os corpos - e ao
Carla Cristina Garcia
falar de gênero, as normas e condutas determinadas para homens
e mulheres em funçào do sexo.
Deve-se acrescentar a essa descrição que as diferenças bioló­
gicas homem-mulher são deterministas, são dadas pela natureza,
mas como seres culturais, a biologia não determina nossos com­
portamentos. O propósito principal dos estudos de gênero ou da
teoria feminista é o de desmontar o preconceito de que a biologia
determina o feminino enquanto o cultural ou humano é uma cria­
ção masculina. Foi Robert J. Stoller quem, em 1968, utilizou pela
primeira vez o conceito de gênero:
Os dicionários assinalam principalmente a conotação biológica
da palavra sexo, manifestada por expressões tais como relações
sexuais ou o sexo masculino. Segundo este sentido, o vocábulo
sexo se referirá nesta obra ao sexo masculino ou feminino e aos
componentes biológicos que os distinguem; o adjetivo sexual se
relacionará, pois, com a anatomia e a fisiologia. Agora bem, esta
definição não abarca certos aspectos essenciais da conduta a saber, os afetos, os pensamentos e as fantasias - que, mesmo
estando ligados aos sexos, não dependem de fatores biológicos.
Utilizaremos o termo gênero para designar alguns destesfenômenos
psicológicos: assim como cabefalar de sexofeminino e masculino,
também se pode aludir á masculinidade e à feminilidade sem
fazer referência alguma a anatomia ou a fisiologia. Desse modo,
mesmo que o sexo e o gênero se encontrem vinculados entre si de
modo inexpugnável na mente popular, este estudo propõe, entre
outrosfins, confirmar que não existe uma dependência biunívoca
e inelutável entre ambas as dimensões (o sexo e o gênero) e que,
ao contrário, seu desenvolvimento pode tomar vias independentes.3
3 STOLLER, Robert. Sex and gender: On the development o f masculinity and
feminity. New York: Vintage Books, 1968, p. VIII e IX.
Breve História do Feminismo
Depois deste trabalho, as feministas passaram a utilizar o con­
ceito no desenvolvimento de suas teorias:
Em inrtude das condições sociais em que nos vemos submetidos,
o masculino e o feminino constituem, com certeza, duas culturas
e dois tipos de vivências radicalmente distintos. desenvolvimento
da identidade genérica depende, no decorrer da infância, da
soma de tudo aquilo que os pais, os companheiros e a cultura
em geral consideram próprio de cada gênero no que concerne ao
temperamento, ao caráter, aos interesses, à posição, aos méritos,
aos gestos e às expressões. Cada momento da vida de uma criança
implica uma série de pautas sobre como deve pensar ou comportarse para satisfazer as exigências inerentes ao gênero. Durante a ado­
lescência, se recrudescem os requerimentos de conformismo, desen­
cadeando uma crise que costuma acalmar-se na idade adulta
O
.4
Os estudos de gênero começaram nas universidades norte-americanas na década de 1970 e se espalharam por universidades
de todo o mundo incorporados às ciências humanas.
Para as estudiosas do gênero, nenhuma das correntes teóricas
(marxismo, funcionalismo, estruturalismo) tinha conseguido dar conta
de explicar a opressão das mulheres. Nesse sentido, uma das conse­
quências mais significativas que esses estudos provocaram foi uma
crise de paradigmas: quando as mulheres apareceram nas ciências
sociais, sejam como objeto de investigação ou como pesquisadoras,
colocaram em xeque todas as teorias estabelecidas. Questionavam
a validade das pesquisas, a suposta neutralidade dos termos,
das teorias e as pretensões de universalidade de seus modelos.
A introdução dos estudos de gênero supôs uma redefinição de
todos os grandes temas das ciências sociais.
4 MILLETT, Kate. Política sexual. Madrid: Cátedra, 1995, p. 80.
Carla Cristina Garcia
Mas a construção de tal conceito também gerou discussões e
conflitos entre as teóricas feministas. Começando pelo problema
central. O conceito de gênero se constituiu como via de acesso
dos estudos sobre mulheres na universidade. Desse modo o termo
parece indicar seriedade e rigor, e como críticas francesas afirmaram
se tornou uma espécie de folha de parreira, que oculta muito mais
do que mostra, como uma caixa de costureira onde cabe quase tudo.
De qualquer modo, como afirma Scott o termo gênero passou a
indicar a qualidade fundamentalmente social das distinções basea­
das no sexo e a ressaltar todos os aspectos relacionais das definições
normativas da feminilidade. Assim, o uso do termo parecia situar
quem o utilizava em um dos lados do debate que com frequência
se travava nas diversas controvérsias dos discursos feministas dos
últimos anos e que se pode sintetizar de forma esquemática com
a pergunta: Deve-se entender o feminino em termos de constru­
ção social ou há que se falar de uma essência feminina definida
biológica ou filosoficamente?
Laurents propõe interrogar-se acerca das relações mantidas
por mulheres reais enquanto agentes históricos com o conceito
normativo de mulher, produto do discurso hegemônico. Ou seja,
antes de tentar dar a resposta à pergunta “O que é uma mulher?”,
deve-se deixá-las falar para que nos digam quem são ou quem
eram. E isso não só porque às mulheres foram impostos o silêncio
e a exclusão, mas também porque a construção do gênero é ao
mesmo tempo resultado de um processo de representação e de
autorrepresentaçào.
Teóricas do conceito de gênero foram as encarregadas de
descrever um território novo que alterou radicalmente as teorias
antropológicas androcêntricas da discussão sobre a realidade e a
experiência; essas teóricas forçaram o reconhecimento da diferença
que marcam o gênero e o reconhecimento da política sexual como
princípio fundamental do patriarcado.
Breve História do Feminismo
Sem dúvida, desde meados dos anos 1980, o novo sujeito
“generado” (ou seja, permeado pelo conceito de gênero) também
se manifestou muitas vezes como uma ficção unitária, que encobria,
ao não considerar, outras dimensões da construção da identidade
individual e social.
Se nos anos 1970 as feministas haviam reagido contra a razão
patriarcal, agora as primeiras a denunciar que o gênero havia se
convertido em uma nova totalizaçào excludente foram as margina­
lizadas dos relatos feministas: as mulheres negras e as lésbicas que
encontravam sua história e sua cultura ignorada. O termo “mulher”
usado no discurso feminista dos anos 70 com frequência se referia a
experiência das mulheres ocidentais, brancas, burguesas e heteros­
sexuais como se fosse uma totalidade, ao que Spillers denominou
uma “metonímia mortal” que relegava ao silêncio a experiência
individual e coletiva de muitas mulheres.
O feminismo dos anos 70 acreditava que se podia definir uma
categoria chamada “mulher” e que as elas compartilhavam certas
experiências e perspectivas trans-históricas e transculturais e as
práticas discursivas nos textos literários ou nas análises críticas
procediam diretamente dessas experiências.
Se por um lado a crítica feminista dessa época foi determinante
na hora de desmascarar a razão patriarcal ao denunciar que as
pretensões de neutralidade e objetividade se faziam à custa das
mulheres e contra elas mantendo como pilar do sistema patriarcal a
sua exclusão da esfera da razão transcendente, por outro manteve
alguns supostos essencialistas sobre a natureza dos seres humanos
e as condições da vida social utilizando conceitos e teorias como
se fossem ferramentas permanentes e invariáveis, que as condu­
ziram a compartilhar algumas noções essencialistas e a-históricas
das metanarrativas.
A investigação feminista recente parte da noção de que a sexua­
lidade humana é uma construção social em que se entrecruzam
Carla Cristina Garcia
estruturas econômicas, sociais e políticas do mundo material. A
sexualidade nào é um fato natural como sugerem as teorias essencialistas; ainda que esteja materialmente no corpo, o funcionamento
fisiológico do mesmo não determina a configuração ou o significado
da sexualidade de uma forma direta e simples.
A ciência e o senso comum que pretendem dar a entender que
os usos culturais e sexuais dominantes são resultado da biologia
e que portanto são intrínsecos, eternos e imutáveis nào são senão
expressões ideológicas que assinalam as relações de poder domi­
nantes. Identidades profundamente sentidas, tais como feminina/
masculina ou hetero/homossexual, nào sào privadas nem produto
exclusivo da biologia, mas se criam no espaço de encontro e tensão
de forças políticas, sociais e econômicas e variam com o tempo.
A partir do entendimento desses conceitos, dividiremos esta
breve história do feminismo em quatro grandes blocos: o feminismo
pré-moderno: em que podemos encontrar as primeiras manifesta­
ções da polêmica feminista; o feminismo moderno ou a primeira
onda: que começa com a obra de Poulain de la Barre e o movi­
mento de mulheres da Revolução Francesa que ressurge com toda
a força nos grandes movimentos sociais do século XIX chamado
também de segunda onda e o feminismo contemporâneo - ou a
terceira onda - que abarca o movimento dos anos 60 e 70 e as
novas tendências que nasceram no final dos anos 80.5
5 Pela riqueza de sua história, o desenvolvimento do movimento feminista no
Brasil nào caberia em apenas um capítulo e por essa razão ele nào é aqui
mencionado.