Instituições Políticas em Perspectiva Comparada - IESP-UERJ

Instituições Políticas em Perspectiva Comparada (3 créditos)
Prof.ª: Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo
Horário: Terça-feira, das 13 às 16 horas
Consultas: A combinar com o professor
____________________________________________________________
Objetivos:
Este curso visa introduzir os alunos no estudo das instituições políticas listadas
abaixo e discutir o efeito de cada uma delas no funcionamento e desempenho dos
sistemas políticos. Sendo assim, foram selecionados textos que permitam
caracterizar as instituições, identificar os formatos que assumem em diferentes
países, inclusive o Brasil, e analisar de forma comparada as instituições
selecionadas.
As seções combinarão aulas expositivas e seminários, requerendo a leitura prévia
dos textos obrigatórios indicados seguindo um cronograma a ser distribuído na
primeira aula. A avaliação será feita de duas formas: 1) cada aluno ficará
responsável pela apresentação de uma revisão crítica (2-3 páginas) de pelo menos
dois textos ao longo do semestre, que deverá circular entre os colegas previamente
à sua discussão em aula; 2) cada aluno deverá fazer um trabalho final a ser definido
no decorrer do curso.
Programa:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Sistemas de Governo
Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidários
Organização do Estado: Federalismo
Organização do Legislativo
Poderes de Agenda
Tipos de Governos e Coalizões Políticas
Bibliografia
1. Sistemas de Governo
Cheibub, José Antonio & Jennifer Gandhi. 2004. “Classifying Political Regimes: A SixFold Classification of Democracies and Dictatorships.” Presented at the 2004
Annual APSA Meeting.
Cheibub, José Antonio. 2007. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy.
Cambridge, Cambridge Univeersity Press.
Eaton, Kent. 2000. “Parliamentarism and Presidentialism in the Policy Arena,”
Comparative Politics, October.
Elgie, Robert. 1999. “The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism” and “Semi-Presidentialism
and Comparative Institutional Engineering.” In Robert Elgie (org.). SemiPresidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Moe, Terry M. e Michael Caldwell. 1994. “The Institutional Foundations of Democratic
Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems.”
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150/1: 171-95.
Samuels, David e Shugart, Matthew. 2010. Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers:
How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior.
Cambridge University Press.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: NYU
Press, pp.83-140.
Shugart, M. (2005). “Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority
Patterns”. French Politics, vol. 3, nº 3, pp. 323-351.
Shugart, Matthew Soberg & John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies:
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
2. Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidários
Carey, John & Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1994. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal
Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14(4):417439.
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s
Electoral Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Cox, Gary W. 1987. The Efficient Secret. The Cabinet and the Development of
Politica
Parties in Victorian England; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Crisp, Brian F., Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones and
Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2004. “Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative
Representation in Six Presidential Democracies.” Journal of Politics 66(3):823848.
Foweraker, Joe. 1998. “Review Article: Institutional Design, Party Systems and
Governability – Differentiating the Presidential Regimes in Latin América”.
British Journal of Political Science, 28, no. 4, pp. 651-676.
Gallagher, M. e Mitchell. Paul. 2006. The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
Fiorina, Morris. Cain, Bruce & Ferejohn, John. 1987. The Personal Vote: Constituency
Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
2
Golden, Miriam A. 2003. “Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on
Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy”. British
Journal of Political Science 33:189-212.
Haggard, Stephan & Mathew D. McCubbins. 2001. “Introduction: Political Institutions
and
the Determinants of Public Policy” in Stephan Haggard and Mathew
McCubbins, eds, Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Jones, Mark. 1995. Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Cap.
5. Legislative Multipartism and Presidential Legislative Support. Notre Dame,
University of Notre Dame Press.
Mainwaring, Scott. 1993.”Presidentialism, multipartism and Democracy: the Difficult
Combination”. Comparative Political Studies 26, 2 (July), 198-228.
Mainwaring, Scott & Matthew Shugart. 1997. Presidentialism and democracy in Latin
America. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott. Sistemas Partidários em Novas Democracias – O Caso do Brasil.
Rio de Janeiro, FGV/Mercado Aberto.
Nicolau, Jairo. 2006. “O Sistema Eleitoral de Lista Aberta no Brasil” DADOS – Revista
de Ciências Sociais, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 49, no 4, pp. 689 a 720.
Pradeep K. Chibber & Ken Kollman. 2004. The Formation of National Party Systems:
Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the
United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework For Analysis. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Shugart , Matthew Soberg & Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001. “Mixed-Member Electoral
Systems: A Definition and Typology” in Shugart and Wattenberg, eds. MixedMember Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001. pp.9-24.
3. Organização do Estado: Federalismo
Bednar, Jenna. 2009. The Robust Federation: Principles of Design. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C. & Shvetsova, O. 2004. Designing Federalism: A Theory
of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Gibson, Edward L., Ernesto Calvo & Tulia G. Falleti. 2004. “Reallocative Federalism:
Legislative Overrepresentation and Public Spending in the Western
Hemisphere”
3
in Edward L. Gibson, ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 173-196
Jones, Mark P., Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano. 2000. “Politics, Institutions,
and Fiscal Performance in a Federal System: An Analysis of the Argentine
Provinces.” Journal of Development Economics 61:305-333.
Kincaid, J.&e Tarr, A. (eds.) 2005. Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in
Federal Countries. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
Melo, Marcus A. 2005. “O Sucesso Inesperado das Reformas de Segunda Geração:
Federalismo, Reformas Constitucionais e Política Social, Dados vol. 48, no. 4,
pp. 845-889.
Obinger, H. Leibfried, S. & Castels, F. (eds.). 2005. Federalism and the Welfare
State: New World and European Experiences.
Pierson, Paul, 1995. “Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the
Development of Social Policy,” Governance 8, 4 (1995): 449-78.
Rodden, Jonathan. 2004. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning
and Measurement”. Comparative Politics, July.
Samuels, David & Scott Mainwaring. 2004. “Strong Federalism, Constritis on the
Central
Government, and Economic Reform in Brazil in Edward L. Gibson, ed.
Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, pp. 85-130.
Samuels, David & Snyder, Richard. 2001. “The Value of Vote: Malapportionment in
Comparative Perspective.” British Journal of Political Science 31 (4):651-671,
October.
Stepan, Alfred. 2004. “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism,
Multinationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism” in Edward L.
Gibson, ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, pp.29-84.
Souza, Celina. 2007, “Coalizões eleitorais e ajuste fiscal nos estados brasileiros”.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais. , v.22, p.31 - 54, 2007.
Yusako
Horiuchi & Jun Saito. 2003. “Reapportionment and Redistribution:
Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan.” American Journal of Political
Science 47(4):669-682, October.
4. Organização do Legislativo e Processo Decisório
Arnold, Douglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. new Haven, Yale
University
Press.
4
Clinton, Joshua D. 2007, “Lawmaking and Roll Calls”. Journal of Politics, vol. 69, nº
2,
pp. 455- 467
Cox, Gary. 2002. “On the Effects of Legislative Rules”. Legislative Studies Quarterly.
Vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 455-467.
Cox, Gary & Scott Morgenstern. 2002. “Epilogue: Latin America’s Reactive
Assemblies
and Proactive Presidents” in Scott Morgenstern e Benito Nacif (orgs.),
Legislative Politics in Latin America. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
pp. 446-468.
Cox, Gary & Mathew McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in
the
House. Berkley, University of California Press.
Fiorina, Morris. 1977. Congress: the Keystone of the Washington Establisment. New
Haven, Yale University Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. Information and Legislative Organization. Michigan, Michigan
University Press. pp. 1-21; 247-266.
Mayhew, David. 1974. The Electoral Connection. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Santos, Fabiano e Almeida, Acir . 2005. “Teoria informacional e a seleção de
relatores na Câmara dos Deputados”. Dados, Dez 2005, vol.48, no.4, p.693735.
Shepsle, Kenneth & Weingast, Barry. 1994. “Positive Theories of Congressional
Institutions”. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 149-179.
5. Poderes de Agenda e Delegação
Alemán, Eduardo & Tsebelis, George. 2002. “Agenda Control in Latin American
Presidential Democracies.” Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, August 29 to September 1.
Carey, John M, & Matthew Shugart (orgs.) 1998. Executive Decree Authority.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, Phillip. 2002. By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive
Direct Action. Lawrence, Kansas University Press.
Cox, Gary W. & McCubbins, Mathew D. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party
Government in the House of Representatives. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Döring, Herbert. 2001. “Parliamentary Agenda Control and Legislative Outcomes in
Western Europe”. Legislative Studies Quarterly, XXVI, 1, February.
5
Döring, Herbert. 1995. “Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the
Agenda.” In Herbert Döring (org.). Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western
Europe. Frankfurt/New York: Campus/St. Martin’s.
Epstein, David, & Sharyn O’Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Costs
Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. New
York:Cambridge.
Hallerberg, Mark & Marier, Patrick. 2004. “Executive Authority, the Personal Vote,
and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries.” American
Journal of Political Science 48(3)571-587, July.
Huber, John D. 1996. Rationalizing Parliament. Cambridge. Cambridge University
Press.
Huber, John D. 1998. “Executive decree authority in France” in Carey, John M, and
Matthew Shugart (orgs.). Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 233-253.
Kleinerman, Benjamin A. 2006.The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of
Executive Power. Lawrence, Kansas University Press.
Metcalf, Lee Kendall . 2000. “Measuring Presidential Power.” Comparative Political
Studies 33(5):600-685, June.
Moe, Terry M. & William Howell. 1999. "The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action."
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 No.1(April): 132-179.
2. Tipos de Governos e Coalizões Políticas
Cheibub, José Antonio, Adam Przeworski, Sebastian Saiegh. 2004. “Government
Coalitions
and
Legislative
Success
Under
Parliamentarism
and
Presidentialism.” British Journal of Political Science 34:565-87, October.
Chasquetti, Daniel. 2001. “Democracia, Multipartidarismo y Coaliciones en América
Latina: Evaluando la difícil Combinación” in Jorge Lanzaro (org.) Tipos d
e Presicencialismo y Coaliciones Políticas en América Latina. Buenos Aires,
CLACSO, pp.319-359.
Deheza, Ivana G. 1997. “Gobiernos de Coalición en el Sistema Presidencial: América
del Sur”
in Dieter Nohlen e Mario Fer nández (orgs) El Presidencialismo Renovado:
Institucionalismo Y Cambio Político en America Latina. Caracas, Nueva
Sociedad, pp. 151-169.
Figueiredo, Argelina & Canello, Júlio & Martins, Marcelo. 2012. “Governos
minoritários no presidencialismo latino-americano: determinantes políticos e
institucionais”.
Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais, Vol. 55, no. 4.
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King, Anthony. 1976. “Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain,
France,
and West Germany.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 1:11-34.
Laver, Michael & Norman Schofield. 1990. Multiparty Government: The Politics of
Coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Laver, Michael & Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Laver, Michael. 1998. “Models of Government Formation.” Annual Review of Political
Science
1:1-25.
Müeller, Wofgang & Kaare Strom (orgs.). 2000. Coalition Governments in Western
Europe. London. Oxford University Press, pp. 1-31.
Martin, Lanny W. 2004. “The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies”.
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, no. 3, July.
Schofield, Norman. 1993. “Political competition and multiparty coalition
government”. European Journal of Political Reaserch, Vol. 23, pp. 1-33.
Strom, Kaare 1990, Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Strom, Kaare, Muller, W. e Bergman, T. (eds) 2008. Cabinets and Coalition
Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
Volden, Craig & Clifford J. Carrubba. 2004. “The formation of oversized coalitions in
parliamentary democracies”. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48,
no. 3, July.
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